FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXIV, AFRICA Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XXIV Africa United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Africa (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV) Contents Preface Sources Abbreviations Persons U.S. Covert Actions and Counter-Insurgency Programs Africa North Africa Region (Documents 1-5) Algeria (Documents 6-39) Libya (Documents 40-98) Morocco (Documents 99-144) Tunisia (Documents 145-180) Africa Region (Documents 181-234) Ghana (Documents 235-274) Horn of Africa (Documents 275-356) Nigeria (Documents 357-402) Southern Africa Region (Documents 403-412) Portuguese Africa (Documents 413-456) Rhodesia (Documents 457-573) South Africa (Documents 574-659) Index Sources Sources The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. When this volume was being compiled, the Department of State records consulted were still under the custody of the Department, and the footnotes citing Department of State files suggest that the Department is the repository. By the time of publication, however, all the Department’s indexed central files for these years had been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Many of the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In preparing this volume, the editor made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Numerous White House memoranda, including memoranda to the President, testify to President Johnson’s concern with issues relating to Africa, especially the maintenance of personal ties with various African leaders. The bulk of the foreign policy records at the Johnson Library are in the country files and other component parts of the National Security File. The Department of State has arranged for access to the many audiotapes of President Johnson’s telephone conversations that are held at the Johnson Library. The original manuscript for this volume had been completed when most of these audiotapes became available in 1995 and 1996. Two transcripts of the President’s conversations related to Africa were subsequently added to the volume. With the exception of the Congo, which is covered in a separate volume, very few of these taped conversations deal with Africa. Second in importance only to the White House records at the Johnson Library were the records of the Department of State. The Department’s central files contain the cable traffic recording U.S. diplomatic relations with Africa, memoranda of diplomatic conversations, and memoranda proposing action or providing information. Some important documents are found only in the Department’s lot files. The Conference Files maintained by the Executive Secretariat contain briefing materials as well as records of conversations. Documentation on initiatives that were not approved is often found only in desk or bureau files. The Rusk Files contain records of Secretary Rusk’s telephone conversations. The Central Intelligence Agency provides access to Department of State historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records in the custody of that Agency and at the Presidential libraries. This access is arranged and facilitated by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of identifying the key portions of the intelligence record. This volume includes a limited number of intelligence records. Among the intelligence records reviewed for the volume were files of the Directors of Central Intelligence, especially John McCone, 303 Committee records, the CIA Registry of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, and the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research Historical Files. Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of these records is in process, and many of them are already available for public review at the National Archives. The declassification review of other records is going forward in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12958, under which all records over 25 years old, except file series exemptions requested by agencies and approved by the President, should be reviewed for declassification by 2000. Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files . See National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files . See also National Archives and Records Administration below. INR/IL Historical Files Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1970s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. S/S Files: Lot 68 D 451 Minutes of meetings and memoranda of the Special Group, Counterinsurgency, for July-December 1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318 National Security Council files for 1966–1968, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files AID PORT, Aid, general policy, plans, and coordination, Portugal AID (US) BIAFRA, general policy, U.S. aid to Biafra AID (US) LIBYA, general policy, U.S. aid to Libya AID (US) MOR, general policy, U.S. aid to Morocco AID (US) TUN, general policy, U.S. aid to Tunisia AID (US) 8 MOR, grants and technical assistance, U.S.-Morocco AID (US) 9 TUN, U.S. loans to Tunisia AID (US) 15 MOR, PL 480, Food for Peace Program, Morocco AID (US) 15–4 ALG, PL 480 agreements, U.S.-Algeria DEF 1–1 LIBYA, contingency planning, The Congo DEF 1–1 ZAMBIA, contingency planning, Zambia DEF 7 GHANA–US, visits and missions, Ghana-U.S. DEF 7 S AFR–US, visits and missions, South Africa-U.S. DEF 12 AFR, armaments, Africa DEF 12 TUN, armaments, Tunisia DEF 12–5 ETH, procurement and sale of armaments, Ethiopia DEF 12–5 GHANA, procurement and sale of armaments, Ghana DEF 12–5 NIGERIA, procurement and sale of armaments, Nigeria DEF 12–5 RHOD, procurement and sale of armaments, Rhodesia DEF 12–5 S AFR, procurement and sale of armaments, South Africa DEF 15 ETH–US, bases and installations, Ethiopia-U.S. DEF 15 LIBYA–UK, bases and installations, Libya-U.K. DEF 15 LIBYA–US, bases and installations, Libya-U.S. DEF 15 S AFR–US, bases and installations, South Africa-U.S. DEF 15–10 MOR–US, establishment, construction, and termination of bases DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US, agreements and leases, Libya-U.S. DEF 18–9 MEDIT, demilitarized and nuclear-free zones, Mediterranean DEF 19 US–ETH, military assistance, U.S.-Ethiopia DEF 19 US–MOR, military assistance, U.S.-Morocco DEF 19 US–TUN, military assistance, U.S.-Tunisia DEF 19–3 US–ETH, defense organizations and conferences, U.S.-Ethiopia DEF 19–6 USSR-SOMALI, Communist bloc assistance, U.S.S.R.-Somalia DEF 19–8 US–ETH, defense equipment and supplies, U.S.-Ethiopia DEF 19–8 US–MOR, military equipment and supplies, U.S.- Morocco DEF 19–8 US–PORT, defense equipment and supplies, U.S.-Portugal DEF 19–8 US–TUN, military equipment and supplies, U.S.-Tunisia FSE 12 GHANA, fuels and energy, electric power, Ghana FT 11–2 RHOD, foreign trade, boycotts, Rhodesia FT 18 S AFR, foreign trade, munitions control, South Africa FT 18 S AFR–US, foreign trade, munitions control, South Africa-U.S. installations IT 7–16 TANZAN–ZAMBIA, inland transport, highways, transportation network, Tanzania-Zambia ORG 7 S, organization and administration, visits OS 12–12 TANZAN, ocean shipping, movement of vessels, Tanzania PET 17–2 RHOD, petroleum imports, Rhodesia POL AFR, political affairs and relations, Africa POL AFR, political affairs and relations, Africa POL AFR–PORT, political affairs and relations, Africa-Portugal POL AFR–US, political affairs and relations, Africa-U.S. POL ALG–US, political affairs and relations, Algeria-U.S. POL ARAB–ISR, political affairs and relations, Arab-Israeli dispute POL BIAFRA–NIGERIA, political affairs and relations, Biafra-Nigeria POL ETH–SOMALI, political affairs and relations, Ethiopia-Somalia POL ETH–US, political affairs and relations, Ethiopia-U.S. POL GHANA–US, political affairs and relations, Ghana-U.S. POL LIBYA–US, political affairs and relations, Libya-U.S. POL MOR–US, political affairs and relations, Morocco-U.S. POL MOZ–TANZAN, political affairs and relations, Mozambique-Tanzania POL NIGERIA–US, political affairs and relations, Nigeria-U.S. POL PORT–US, political affairs and relations, Portugal-U.S. POL RHOD–UK, political affairs and relations, Rhodesia-U.K. POL RHOD–US, political affairs and relations, Rhodesia-U.S. POL RHOD–ZAMBIA, political affairs and relations, Rhodesia-Zambia POL SOMALI–US, political affairs and relations, Somalia-U.S. POL TUN–US, political affairs and relations, Tunisia-U.S. POL TUN–US, political affairs and relations, Tunisia-U.S. POL UK-US, political affairs and relations, U.K.-U.S. POL 1 AFR–US, general policy and background, Africa-U.S. POL 1 ALG, general policy and background, Algeria POL 1 ANG–US, general policy and background, Angola-U.S. POL 1 ETH–US, general policy and background, Ethiopia-U.S. POL 1 GHANA, general policy and background, Ghana POL 1 GHANA–US, general policy and background, Ghana-U.S. POL 1 MOR–US, general policy and background, Morocco-U.S. POL 1 NIGERIA–US, general policy and background, Nigeria-U.S. POL 1 PORT–US, general policy and background, Portugal U.S POL 1 S AFR–US, general policy and background, South Africa-U.S. POL 1 US–VIET S, general policy and background, U.S.-South Vietnam POL 2 ETH, general reports and statistics, Ethiopia POL 3 OAU, regional alignments and groupings, Organization of African Unity POL 7 ALG, visits and meetings with Algerian officials POL 7 ETH, visits and meetings with Ethiopian officials POL 7 GHANA, visits and meetings with Ghanaian officials POL 7 LIB, visits and meetings with Liberian officials POL 7 LIBYA, visits and meetings with Libyan officials POL 7 MOR, visits and meetings with Moroccan officials POL 7 NIGERIA–US, visits and meetings, Nigerian-U.S. officials POL 7 RWANDA, visits and meetings with Rwandan officials POL 7 S AFR, visits and meetings with South African officials POL 7 SOMALI, visits and meetings with Somali officials POL 7 TUN, visits and meetings with Tunisian officials POL 7 US/BALL, visits and meetings of George W. Ball POL 7 US/HARRIMAN, visits and meetings of W. Averell Harriman POL 7 US/HUMPHREY, visits and meetings of Vice President Humphrey POL 7, NIGERIA, visits and meetings with Nigerian officials POL 9 ALG–US, intervention, Algeria-U.S. POL 9 EUR W–TANZAN, intervention, Western Europe-Tanzania POL 10 PORT, colonialism and imperialism, Portugal POL 10 PORT/UN, colonialism and imperialism, Portugal-U.N. POL 12 ANG, political parties, Angola POL 12 GHANA, political parties, Ghana POL 12 THE CONGO, political parties, The Congo POL 13 AFR, political organizations in Africa POL 13 ETH, non-party blocs, Ethiopia POL 15 NIGERIA, Government, Nigeria POL 15 PORT, Government, Portugal POL 15 SOMALI, Government, Somalia POL 15–1 GHANA, Ghanaian Head of State, Executive Branch POL 15–1 LIBYA, head of state and executive branch, Libya POL 15–1 MOR, Head of State and Executive Branch, Morocco POL 15–1 NIGERIA, Head of State and Executive Branch, Nigeria POL 15–1 SOMALI, Head of State and Executive Branch, Somalia POL 15–1 TUN, Head of State and Executive Branch, Tunisia POL 15–1 US/Johnson, visits and meetings of President Johnson POL 16 ALG, independence and recognition, Algeria POL 16 CHICOM, recognition, People’s Republic of China POL 16 GHANA, independence and recognition, Ghana POL 16 RHOD, independence and recognition, Rhodesia POL 16 RHOD/UN, independence and recognition, Rhodesia-UN POL 17 ETH–US, diplomatic and consular representation, Ethiopia-U.S. POL 17 LIBYA–US, diplomatic and consular representation, Libya-U.S. POL 17 MOR–US, diplomatic and consular representation, Morocco-U.S POL 17 US–AFR, diplomatic and consular representation, U.S.-Africa POL 17 US–ALG, U.S. diplomatic representation in Algeria POL 17 US–S AFR, diplomatic and consular representation, U.S.-South Africa POL 19 ANG, government of dependencies, Angola POL 19 PORT, government of dependencies, Portugal POL 19 PORT/UN, government of dependencies, Portugal/U.N. POL 19 RHOD, government of dependencies, Rhodesia POL 19 SW AFR, government of dependencies, South West Africa POL 19 SW AFR/UN, government of dependencies, South West Africa/UN POL 23 ALG, internal security and counter-insurgency, Algeria POL 23 TUN, internal security and counter-insurgency, Tunisia POL 23–8 ALG, demonstrations, riots, and protests, Algeria POL 23–9 ALG, rebellions and coups, Algeria POL 23–9 GHANA, rebellions and coups, Ghana POL 23–9 MOZ, rebellions and coups, Mozambique POL 23–9 NIGERIA, rebellions and coups, Nigeria POL 24 S AFR, sanctions, South Africa POL 25 ALG, demonstrations and protests, Algeria POL 27 ARAB–ISR, Arab-Israeli military operations POL 27 BIAFRA–NIGERIA, military operations, Biafra-Nigeria POL 27 VIET S, military operations, South Vietnam POL 29 S AFR, political prisoners, South Africa POL 29 SW AFR, political prisoners, South West Africa POL 29 SW AFR/UN, political prisoners, South West Africa/U.N. POL 30 MOR, defectors and expellees, Morocco POL 30–2 ANG, exile political activities, Angola POL 30–2 ETH, exile political activities, Ethiopia POL 30–2 MOZ, exile political activities, Mozambique POL 31–1 ETH–SOMALI, air disputes and violations, Ethiopia-Somalia POL 32–1 ALG–MOR, Algerian-Moroccan boundary disputes POL 32–1 ANG–ZAMBIA, Angola-Zambia boundary disputes POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI, Ethiopia-Somalia boundary disputes POL 32–1 KENYA–SOMALI, Kenya-Somalia boundary disputes SOC 14 S AFR/UN, human rights, race relations, South Africa-U.S. SOC 14–1 S AFR, South Africa general policy in human rights SOC 14–1 S AFR/UN, general policy, human rights and race relations, South Africa/UN SP 15 S AFR–US, space vehicle tracking, South Africa-U.S. STR 6–3 MOR, Presidential determinations, Morocco Lot Files Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192 Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961–1969, including texts of speeches, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files and memoranda of telephone conversations. S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139 S/P and S/PC Country Files; W. Rostow and H. Owen memoranda. S/S Files: Lot 65 D 330 Memoranda of the Secretary’s and Under Secretary’s conversations for 1961–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217 White House and executive departments’ memoranda and letters to the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State for the years 1963–1966. S/S Files: Lot 67 D 262 Correspondence of the President and the Secretary of State with various foreign statesmen for 1966, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S Files: Lot 70 D 263 Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) Memos, Agendas, Record Agreements and Policy Documents, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110 Records of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and international conferences attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials for 1961–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347 Records of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States, and international conferences attended by the President, Vice President, or Secretary of State for 1965, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586 Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials and on major conferences attended by the Secretary of State, October 1966–May 10, 1967, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453 Official International Conference chronologies of visits of U.S. officials abroad, foreign heads of state and government, and ranking foreign officials, May 10, 1967–January 11, 1968, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents, 1961–1966, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master file of National Security Action Memoranda for 1961–1968, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Williams Records Records of the Bureau of African Affairs: Files of G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1961–1966. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. DCI/McCone Files: Job 80–B01285A ODDI Registry of NIEs and SNIEs: Job 79–R01012A Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. Harriman Papers Special files of W. Averell Harriman, Public Service, Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 842/534 (12 Sep 68) TR 5077, Sec. 1 9118.3 (25 Jan 65) 9118.4 (16 Feb 66) IR 5630, Sec. 1A Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306 Secret and lower-classified general files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1964. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023 Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1964. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717 Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1965. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546 Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1967. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499 Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1967–1968. OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425 Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1964. OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1965. OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1966. OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662 Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1966. OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489 Miscellaneous files and records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their assistants, 1951–1966. OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467 Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1967. OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1967. OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1968. Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson National Security File Country File Files of Edward Hamilton Files of Harold H. Saunders Files of McGeorge Bundy Files of Robert W. Komer Files of Walt W. Rostow Haynes Files International Meetings and Travel File Special Head of State Correspondence File Memos to the President Name File National Security Action Memorandums National Security Council Histories NSC Meetings File Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings Special Files Meeting Notes File President’s Daily Diary White House Central Files Confidential File Other Personal Papers George Ball Papers Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings Franklin H. Williams Papers Abbreviations Abbreviations ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ADB, African Development Bank AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AEDS, Atomic Energy Detection System AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AF/AFI, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AF/AFN, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AF/CM, Country Director for Central Africa, Malagasy and Mauritius, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFB, Air Force Base AFC, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFCM, Office of Central African, Malagasy and Mauritius Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFCW, Country Director for West Central Africa, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFE, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFL–CIO, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations AFN, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFNE, Office of Northeastern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFP, Agence France Presse AFSE, Country Director for Southeastern Africa, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AID, Agency for International Development ALN, Armee de Liberation Nationale (Algerian National Army of Liberation) Amb, Ambassador Amcits, American citizens ammo, ammunition ANC, African National Congress ANC, Congolese National Army AP, Associated Press APC, armored personnel carrier ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ARMA, Army Attache ARMISH/MAAG, U.S. Army Mission in Iran/Military Assistance Advisory Group ASAF(s), Asian/African(s) ASAP, as soon as possible ASW, anti-submarine warfare BAC, British Aircraft Corporation BAFM, Belgian Air Force Mission BF, Belgian francs BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State BP, British Petroleum CA, circular airgram CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board CAF, Congolese Air Force CAR, Central African Republic CARE–MEDICO, Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere-Medical International Cooperation CAS, Controlled American Source CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation CHMAAG, Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group ChiCom, Chinese Communist(s) ChiRep, Chinese representation question CHMUSLO, Chairman, U.S. Liaison Office CI, Counterinsurgency CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CIA/DDP, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency CIB, Combined Intelligence Board CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, European Command CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Atlantic CINCMEAFSA, Commander in Chief, Middle East/South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Commander in Chief, Strike Command; Commander in Chief, Middle East, South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, United States Air Force, Europe CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff CO, Commanding Officer; Commonwealth Office (Nigeria) COCOM, Coordinating Committee on Export Controls COMUSJTF, Commander, U.S. Joint Task Force CORE, Common Register on Development Activities COREMO, Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique) CPP, Convention’s People’s Party (Ghana) CPR, Chinese People’s Republic CRO, Commonwealth Relations Office CS, Chief of Staff CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State DAO, Defense Attache’s Office DATT, Defense Attache DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DDP/AF, Deputy Director of Plans for Africa, Central Intelligence Agency DefMin, Defense Minister Del, Delegation Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram Deptel, Department of State telegram Deptoff, Department Officer DFA, Department of Foreign Affairs DHC, District High Commissioner (Nigeria) DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DOD, Department of Defense DOD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs DRC, Democratic Republic of the Congo E, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ECA, Economic Commission for Africa (ECOSOC) EEC, European Economic Community (Common Market) ELF, Eritrean Liberation Front Emb, Embassy Emboff, Embassy officer Embtel, Embassy telegra EST, Eastern Standard Time ETA, estimated time of arrival EUCOM, European Command EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/FBX, Country Director for France, Benelux, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/SPP, Country Director for Spain and Portugal, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EXIMBANK, Export-Import Bank FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service FCIA, Foreign Credit Insurance Association FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State FLN, Front de Liberation Nationale (Algerian National Liberation Front) FMG, Federal Military Government (Nigeria) FNLA, Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) FonMin, Foreign Minister FonOff, Foreign Office FonSec, Foreign Secretary FRC, Federal Records Center FRELIMO, Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Mozambique Liberation Front) FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs GA, United Nations General Assembly GDRC, Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo GNP, Gross National Product GOA, Government of Algeria GOB, Government of Belgium GOC, Government of the Congo GOEN, Government of Eastern Nigeria GOF, Government of France GOG, Government of Ghana GOI, Government of Italy GOK, Government of Kenya GOL, Government of Libya GOM, Government of Morocco GON, Government of Nigeria GOP, Government of Portugal GOR, Government of Rwanda GOT, Government of Tunisia GOU, Government of Uganda GOZ, Government of Zambia G/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs GRAE, Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile GRC, Government of the Republic of China GRZ, Government of the Republic of Zambia GSR, Government of the Somali Republic GUAR, Government of the United Arab Republic GURTZ, Government of the United Republic of Tanzania HICOM, High Commissioner HIM, His Imperial Majesty HM, His Majesty HMG, Her Majesty’s Government HQ, Headquarters IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) ICEM, Inter-Governmental Committee on European Migration ICFTU, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ICJ, International Court of Justice ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross IDA, International Development Association IDI, Illegal Declaration of Independence IEG, Imperial Ethiopian Government IEGF, Imperial Ethiopian Government Forces ILN, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations IMF, International Monetary Fund INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State INR/DDC, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State INR/RAF, Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group IRG/AF, Interdepartmental Regional Group, Africa ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs ITM, Italian Training Mission JANAF, Joint Army, Navy, Air Force JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum JCS/SAMAA, Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff JTF, Joint Task Force KANU, Kenya African National Union L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State LA, Latin America L/AF, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs, Department of State LDC, Less Developed Country Leo, Leopoldville LGTA, General League of Angolan Workers L/UNA, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group MANU, Mozambique African National Union MAP, Military Assistance Program MATS, Military Air Transport Service MDRA, Democratic Movement of Algerian Renovation MIG, A.I. Mikoyan i M.I. Gurevich (Soviet fighter aircraft named for designers Mikoyan and Gurevich) MilGovs, Military Governments MinDef, Minister of Defense MinExtAff, Minister of External Affairs MinInfo, Minister of Information (Ethiopia) MOD, Minister of Defense MPLA, Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) MSTS, Military Sea Transportation Service MTT, mobile training teams MUSLO, Moroccan-U.S. Liaison Office NAACP, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEA/NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEP, North Eastern Province (Somalia) NER, North East Region (Kenya) NESA, Regional Director for Near East and South Asia, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense NFD, Northern Frontier District (Kenya) NFTU, Libyan National Federation of Trade Unions NFZ, nuclear free zone NIE, National Intelligence Estimate NLC, National Liberation Council (Ghana) NMG, National Military Government (Nigeria) Noforn, No Foreign Dissemination NOTAL, not received by all addressees NPP, National Policy Paper NPT, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSA, National Security Agency NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council OAS, Organization of American States OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs OAU, Organization of African Unity OCAM, Organization Commune Africaine et Malagache (African-Malagasy Common Organization) OCI, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency ODMA, Office of the Director of Military Assistance, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OEP, Office of Emergency Planning ONE, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense P, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs PAC, Pan African Congress PC, Peace Corps PCC/ZAPU, Peoples’ Caretaker Council/Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union PIDE, Policia Internacional de Defensa de Estado (International Police for the Defense of the State, the Portuguese secret police) P.L., Public Law PM, Prime Minister PNG, persona non grata POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants POLAD, political adviser PriMin, Prime Minister RAF, Royal Air Force reftel, reference telegram reps, representatives RF, Rhodesian Front RG, Record Group RLAF, Royal Libyan Air Force RMAF, Royal Moroccan Air Force RSA, Republic of South Africa RTV, Radio and Television International, Inc. S, Office of the Secretary of State SA, South Africa SAC, Strategic Air Command SAG, South African Government S/AH, Office of the Ambassador at Large SAM, surface-to-air missiles SC, United Nations Security Council SC Res, Security Council resolutions SCI, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State SEA, Southeast Asia SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) to the Department of State septel, separate telegram SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group SITREP, situation report SMC, Supreme Military Council (Nigeria) SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate SOFA, Status of Forces Agreement SONJ, Standard Oil of New Jersey Sov, Soviet S/P, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State SR, Southern Rhodesia SRG, Southern Rhodesia Government S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State STRATCOM, Strategic Command STRIKECOM, Strike Command STRIKEOPS, Strike Operations SWA, South West Africa SWAPO, South West Africa People’s Organization SYG, Secretary-General SYL, Somali Youth League Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) TWA, Trans-World Airlines U, Office of the Under Secretary of State UAMCE, Union for African and Malagasy Economic Cooperation UAR, United Arab Republic UDENAMO, Uniao Democratica Nacional de Mocambique (Democratic National Union of Mozambique UDI, Unilateral Declaration of Independence UK, United Kingdom UKG, United Kingdom Government ULC, United Labour Congress (Nigeria) UN, United Nations UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP, United Nations Development Program UNECA, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNITA, Uniao Nacional para e Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State UNRep, United Nations Representative UNSC, United Nations Security Council UNSYG, United Nations Secretary-General UPA, Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (Union of Angolan Peoples) UPC, Ugandan Peoples’ Congress UPGA, United Progressive Grand Alliance (Nigeria) URTZ, United Republic of Tanzania USAF, United States Air Force USDA, United States Department of Agriculture USIA, United States Information Agency USIS, United States Information Service USN, United States Navy USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic UST, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations VALCO, Volta Aluminum Company (Ghana) VOA, Voice of America VOLAGs, volunteer agencies VP, Vice President WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State WH, White House WHO, World Health Organization ZANU, Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union ZAPU, Zimbabwe African People’s Union Persons Persons Abdirascid, Ali Scermarke, Prime Minister of Somalia until June 1964; President from June 1967 Abdirazak, Hagi Hussein, Prime Minister of Somalia until July 1964; again, September 1964–June 1967 Abidia, Fathi, Libyan Ambassador to the United States Adams, General Paul D., Commander in Chief, Strike Command, until November 1966; concurrently Commander in Chief, Middle East/South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara, November 1963–November 1966 Aden, Abdullah Osman, President of Somalia until June 1967 Adoula, Cyrille, Prime Minister of the Congo until July 1964; Ambassador to the United States from January 1967 Aklilu, Abte-Wold Tsahafi, Prime Minister of Ethiopia Anderson, George W., Jr., Ambassador to Portugal until June 1966 Ankrah, Lieutenant General Joseph A., Chairman, National Liberation Council of Ghana, from February 1966 Attwood, William, Ambassador to Kenya, March 1964–May 1966 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, President of Nigeria from 1963 al-Badri, Abd-al-Qadir, Prime Minister of Libya, July-October 1967 Bakkush, Abd al-Hamid, Prime Minister of Libya and Minister of Justice, October 1967–September 1968 Balafrej, Haj Ahmed, Personal Representative of the King of Morocco with rank of Minister Balewa, Sir Abubakar, Prime Minister of Nigeria and Minister of External Affairs, from 1965 until assassinated in January 1966 Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State until September 1966; Representative to the United Nations, June-September 1968 Banda, Hastings K., President of Malawi from July 1966 Barr, Joseph W., Under Secretary of the Treasury until December 1968; thereafter Secretary Belk, Samuel E., member, National Security Council Staff, until 1965 Bell, David E., Administrator of the Agency for International Development until June 1966 Ben Barka, Mehdi, Moroccan leader of the leftist opposition party abducted in Paris in October 1965 while living in exile Ben Bella, Ahmed, President and Prime Minister of Algeria until June 1965; concurrently Minister of the Interior, December 1964–June 1965; overthrown by a military coup and imprisoned in June 1965 Ben Salah, Ahmed, Tunisian Secretary of State for the Plan and National Economy from 1964 Bengelloun, Ali, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States until November 1965 Benhima, Ahmed Taibi, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1964–1966; Director, Cabinet of the King, 1966–1967 Benhima, Mohammed, Prime Minister of Morocco from July 1967 Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., Ambassador to Portugal from July 1966 Bishti, Ahmad, Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1965–1968 Blake, James J., Deputy Director, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until August 1965; thereafter Director Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France until February 1968; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Boumediene, Col. Houari, Algerian Vice Premier of the Ministerial Council and Minister of Defense until June 1965; Head of the Revolutionary Council, June-July 1965; thereafter Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Bourguiba, Habib, President of Tunisi Bourguiba, Habib, Jr., Tunisian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from November 1964 Bouteflicka, Abdelaziz, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs from July 1965 Brown, George, British Foreign Secretary, March 1967–April 1968 Brown, L. Dean, Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, September 1965–July 1966; Country Director for Central Africa, July 1966–November 1967; thereafter Ambassador to Senegal and The Gambia Brubeck, William H., member, National Security Council Staff, until November 1964 Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to Great Britain Buffum, William B., Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until August 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, September 1965–December 1966; thereafter Deputy Representative to the United Nations Bunche, Ralph J., UN Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs until 1967; thereafter Under Secretary-General Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until February 1966; Executive Secretary of the Special Committee of the National Security Council, June-August 1967 Chase, Gordon, member, National Security Council Staff, until January 1966 Cherkaoui, Mohammed, Moroccan Minister of National Economy and Finance, 1964–1965; Minister of Development, 1965–February 1966; Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 1966–1967; Minister of National Defense from 1967 Clark, G. Edward, Director, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, October 1965–July 1966; Country Director for South Africa, July 1966–September 1968; thereafter Ambassador to Mali Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until September 1965 Conway, General Theodore J., Commander in Chief, Strike Command, from November 1966 Davignon, Viscount Etienne, Chef de Cabinet, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States from June 1965 Dodd, Thomas J., Democratic Senator from Connecticut Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, British Prime Minister until October 1964 Driss, Rachid, Tunisian Ambassador to the United States from May 1964 Egal, Mohammed Ibrahim, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somalia from June 1967 Fekini, Mohieddine, Prime Minister of Libya until January 1964 Feld, Nicholas, Deputy Director, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, March-October 1965; Director, Office of East African Affairs, from June 1967 Ferguson, John H., Ambassador to Morocco until November 1964 Forrestal, Michael V., member, National Security Council Staff, until April 1964 Fowler, Henry H., Secretary of the Treasury, April 1965–December 1968 Fredericks, J. Wayne, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until September 1967 Galanto, Fred J., Officer in Charge of Somali Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until July 1964; Officer in Charge of Ethiopian Affairs, July 1964–May 1966 Garin, Vasco Vieira, Portuguese Ambassador to the United States Gaud, William S., Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development, February 1964–August 1966; thereafter Administrator Goldberg, Arthur J., Representative to the United Nations, July 1965–June 1968 Gowan, Major General Yakubu, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria from July 1966 Guedira, Ahmed Reda, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs until August 1964 Guellal, Cherif, Algerian Ambassador to the United States until February 1967 Gullion, Edmund A., Ambassador to Zaire until February 1964 Hadsel, Fred L., Director, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from March 1964 Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia Hall, William O., Ambassador to Ethiopia from October 1967 Hamilton, Edward, member, National Security Council Staff, October 1965–December 1968 Harmel, Pierre, Belgian Prime Minister, July 1965–1966; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1966–December 1968 Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large Hassan II, King of Morocco Haynes, Ulric, member, National Security Council Staff, 1965–1966 Helms, Richard, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, 1964–1966; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, April 1965–June 1966; thereafter Director Hooper, Peter, Jr., Deputy Director, Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, May 1964–September 1965; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in South Africa Hoopes, Townsend W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1965–1968 Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States Idris Al-Sanusi, Muhammad, King of Libya Ironsi, Major General Johnson Aguiyi, Head of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, January 1966–July 1966 Jernegan, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until July 1965; Ambassador to Algeria, October 1965–June 1967, when Algeria severed diplomatic relations with the United States Jessup, Peter, member, National Security Council Staff Johnson, Charles E., member, National Security Council Staff Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until July 1964; Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam, July 1964–September 1965; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1965–October 1966 Jonathan, Chief Leabua, Prime Minister of Lesotho Jones, G. Lewis, Special Ambassador for Libyan base discussions, June 1964 Judd, Thomas M., Officer in Charge of United Kingdom Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1967 Kaiser, Philip M., Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in the United Kingdom from July 1964 Kapwepwe, Simon Mwansa, Zambian Foreign Minister, January 1965–December 1967; thereafter Vice President Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Deputy Attorney General until February 1965; Attorney General, February 1965–October 1966; thereafter Under Secretary of State Kaunda, Kenneth D., President of Zambia Kayibanda, Gregoire, President and Prime Minister of Rwanda Keita, Modibo, President of Mali Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States until 1964; Democratic Senator from New York from 1965 until his assassination in June 1968 Kenyatta, Jomo, President of Kenya; Chairman of the Organization of African Unity Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs until February 1967 Knight, Ridgway B., Ambassador to Belgium from June 1965 Kohler, Foy D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1966–December 1967 Komer, Robert W., member, National Security Council Staff, until September 1965; Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, September 1965–March 1966; Special Assistant to the President, March 1966–May 1967 Korry, Edward M., Ambassador to Ethiopia until September 1967 Lang, William E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Laraki, Ahmed, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States, January 1966–March 1967; thereafter Minister of Foreign Affairs Leddy, John M., Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development until June 1965; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Lefevre, Theodore, Belgian Prime Minister until June 1965 LeMay, General Curtis E., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, until January 1965 Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., Commander in Chief, European Command Leonhart, William, Ambassador to Tanzania until December 1965 Lightner, E. Allen, Jr., Ambassador to Libya until June 1965 Looram, Matthew J., Deputy Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, April 1964–September 1965; Deputy Director, Office of Northern African Affairs, October 1965–May 1966; thereafter Country Director, Office of Northeast African Affairs MacArthur, Douglas II, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, March 1965–March 1967; thereafter Special Adviser to the Secretary of State MacKnight, Jesse M., Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until November 1965 Mahoney, William P., Jr., Ambassador to Ghana until May 1965 Mann, Thomas C., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, March 1965–May 1966 Marks, Leonard H., Director, United States Information Agency, September 1965–December 1968 Martins, N. Ade, Nigerian Ambassador to the United States, September 1965–December 1967 Mathews, Elbert G., Ambassador to Nigeria from April 1964 Maziq, Husayn Yusuf, Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 1964–March 1965; Prime Minister, March 1965–June 1967 McBride, Robert H., Ambassador to Zaire from June 1967 McClelland, Roswell D., Consul General in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, September 1964–February 1966 McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence until April 1965 McElhiney, Thomas W., Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, October 1965–July 1966; Country Director for Southeast Africa, July 1966–August 1968; thereafter Ambassador to Ghana McIlvaine, Robinson, Country Director for Northwestern Africa, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, July-September 1966; thereafter Ambassador to Guinea McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense until February 1968 McNaughton, John T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 1964–July 1967 Melbourne, Roy M., Country Director for West Africa, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from June 1966 Mobutu, Lieutenant General Joseph D., President of the Republic of the Congo and Minister of Defense from November 1965 Mondlane, Eduardo, President of FRELIMO, the Mozambican nationalist movement Morris, Roger P., member, National Security Council Staff, from October 1967 Moyers, Bill, Special Assistant to the President, 1964–1967; Chief of Staff in the White House, October 1964–January 1967; White House Press Secretary, July 1965–January 1967 Muller, Hilgard, South African Foreign Minister Muntasir, Mahmud, Prime Minister of Libya, 1964–1965; thereafter Chief of the Royal Household Naude, Willem C., South African Ambassador to the United States until January 1965 Newsom, David D., Deputy Director, Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until June 1965; thereafter Ambassador to Libya Nitze, Paul R., Secretary of the Navy until June 1967; Deputy Secretary of Defense, July 1967–January 1969 Nkrumah, Kwame, President of Ghana until February 1966 Nogueira, Franco, Foreign Minister of Portugal Nujoma, Sam, President of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) Nyerere, Julius, President of Tanganyika until country renamed in October 1964; thereafter President of Tanzania Obote, A. Milton, Prime Minister of Uganda Ojukwu, Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria from January 1966 Osman, Ahmed, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States from April 1967 O’Sullivan, James L., Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, April 1964–August 1965 Oufkir, General Mohammed, Moroccan Minister of the Interior from 1964 until August 1965; sentenced to life in prison in absentia over the Ben Barka affair in Paris in 1967 Palmer, Joseph II, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from August 1964 Popper, David H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from September 1965 Porter, William J., Ambassador to Algeria until July 1965 al-Qadhafi, Wanis, Prime Minister of Libya from September 1968 Quimby, Thomas H.E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from January 1968 Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department until February 1969 Roberto, Holden, Angolan nationalist leader, President of GRAE, and leader of FNLA and UPA Root, John F., Director, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, December 1965–June 1967; thereafter Country Director for Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Spanish Sahara, and Tunisia Rostow, Eugene V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 1966 Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council until March 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the President Rountree, William M., Ambassador to South Africa from January 1966 Rowan, Carl T., Director, United States Information Agency, February 1964–July 1965 Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Russell, Francis H., Ambassador to Tunisia Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, Prime Minister of Portugal Satterthwaite, Joseph C., Ambassador to South Africa until November 1965 Saunders, Harold H., member, National Security Council Staff Savimbi, Jonas, leader of the Angolan national liberation movement UNITA Schaufele, William E., Jr., Officer in Charge of Congo Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, June 1964–September 1965; Deputy Director, Office of Central African Affairs, October 1965–May 1966; thereafter Country Director for West Central Africa Scheyven, Louis, Belgian Ambassador to the United States Schultze, Charles L., Director, Bureau of the Budget Senghor, Leopold Sedar, President of Senegal Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from September 1965 Slim, Mongi, Tunisian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until 1964; thereafter, personal representative of President Bourguiba Slim, Taieb, Tunisian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Sloan, Frank K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until 1965 Smith, Bromley K., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Smith, Ian Douglas, Prime Minister of Rhodesia from April 1964 Smith, Robert P., Officer in Charge of Ghanaian Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, August 1965–July 1966; thereafter Officer in Charge of Nigerian Affairs Spaak, Paul-Henri, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1965; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Coordination of External Policy, 1965–1966 Stevenson, Adlai E., Representative to the United Nations until his death in July 1965 Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, September 1965–July 1968 Stoltzfus, William A., Jr., Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until July 1965 Strong, Curtis C., United Nations Adviser, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until October 1964; Deputy Director, Office of Central African Affairs, November 1964–October 1965; Deputy Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, October 1965–July 1966; Country Director for East African Affairs, July 1966–June 1967 Tasca, Henry J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until May 1965; thereafter Ambassador to Morocco Taswell, Harold L.T., South African Ambassador to the United States from February 1965 Taylor, General Maxwell D., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 1964; Ambassador to Vietnam, July 1964–July 1965 Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large until December 1966 Thurston, Raymond L., Ambassador to Somalia, November 1965–December 1968 Torbert, Horace G., Ambassador to Somalia until August 1965 Toure, Sekou, President of Guinea Trimble, William C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, July 1965–December 1967 Tron, Rene A., Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, July 1965–1967 Trueheart, William C., Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from July 1967 Tshombe, Moise, Prime Minister of the Congo, July 1964–October 1965 Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 1965 Vance, Cyrus R., Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 1964–June 1967 Verwoerd, Henrik F., Prime Minister of South Africa until his assassination in September 1966 Vorster, B.J., Prime Minister of South Africa from September 1966 Webb, James E., Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Westerfield, Samuel Z., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from June 1967 Wheeler, General Earle G., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, until July 1964; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Williams, Franklin H., Ambassador to Ghana from January 1966 until May 1968 Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until March 1966 Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister from October 1964 Woods, George D., President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) until April 1968 Yifru, Ketema, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs U.S. Covert Actions and Counter-Insurgency Programs U.S. Covert Actions and Counter-Insurgency Programs In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United States statute to include in the Foreign Relations series comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have sought to present essential documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. In order to provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government, the following note is offered. It describes, on the basis of previously-declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Presidencies. Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological warfare” prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4–A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington. 1 CIA’s early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4–A. NSC 10/2 directed CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations. 2 The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. 3 In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to OPC through the DCI. During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare. 4 The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency. As the Truman administration ended, CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations. NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee The Eisenhower administration began narrowing CIA’s latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. 5 A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special Group,” emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA. 6 The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects. 7 After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request and submitted a report in June which recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group. 8 From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs. 9 NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee. 10 The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected. 11 Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) In March 1961 early in the administration of President Kennedy, a Counter-Guerrilla Task Force under CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell was set up. In December the Bissell Task Force completed its report “Elements of US Strategy To Deal With Wars of National Liberation.” NSC Staff member Robert Komer proposed to Bundy that “high-level responsibility” for coordinating counter-insurgency activities should be assigned to ”Taylor and the Special Group,” separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2. 12 On January 18, 1962, President Kennedy signed NSAM No. 124, which established the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) to be composed of the Military Representative of the President (Taylor) as Chairman, the Attorney General, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the President’s Special Assist-ant for National Security Affairs, and the Administrator of AID. The task of Special Group (CI) would be “to assure unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries.” The Special Group (CI) was to confine itself to establishing broad policies and give oversight to country or regional interagency task forces. An annex to NSAM No. 124 assigned Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos to the initial cognizance of the Special Group (CI). 13 The Special Group (CI) held its first meeting on January 18, 1962, and subsequently held weekly 2-hour meetings with no substitute members allowed. Although members may have preferred that the Special Group (CI) act as a separate executive body to carry out its decisions, the decisions were coordinated with the various executive departments and agencies within the existing chain of command. General Taylor served as Chairman until he became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1962 when Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson succeeded him. 14 Throughout much of 1962, Special Group (CI) received extensive briefings on the situations in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Iran, Indonesia, and other countries faced with what the Group regarded as “internal defense problems.” After much debate and interagency drafting, an agreed Special Group (CI) policy statement on counter-insurgency was set forth in a State Department report of September 1962, entitled “United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy.” The policy expressed in the report, which was approved by President Kennedy in NSAM No. 182, included the presumption that counter-insurgency programs (referred to as “internal defense programs” in the report) should not be limited to military measures but should also involve as necessary such additional dimensions as economic development, police control, and effective local government. 15 In the course of its existence until 1966, Special Group (CI) spurred the establishment of extensive training courses on counter-insurgency throughout the government; promoted the responsibility of inter-agency “country teams” in the countries concerned to develop “Internal Defense Plans;” examined and reshaped programs for advising, supplying, and training paramilitary and military forces in developing countries; encouraged the redirection and expansion of government programs to equip police forces in developing countries; agreed on programs to encourage the local military in these countries to undertake their own “civic action” programs; asked for additional government weapons research for counter-insurgency operations; urged the Agency for International Development to coordinate economic assistance programs with military civic action programs; and urged the CIA to increase its intelligence and counter intelligence activity in target countries. 16 On October 15, 1963, General Taylor, signing as Chairman of the JCS, addressed a memorandum to members of the Special Group (CI) entitled “U.S. Support of Foreign Paramilitary Forces,” which concluded that U.S. policy to support the Honduran Civil Guard had resulted in the overthrow of the constitutional government. Taylor observed that the Honduras experience suggested that U.S. programs in other countries should be reviewed to determine whether similar potentially dangerous situations were being fostered, and he recommended that “interagency working groups which monitor internal defense plans” review these programs and report to the Special Group (CI). 17 On January 17, 1966, General Taylor wrote to President Johnson recommending that the Special Group (CI) “be converted into an agency for supporting the Secretary of State in discharging his broadened responsibilities for the direction, coordination, and supervision of overseas affairs.” In NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, President Johnson assigned to the Secretary of State the “authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental [counter subversion] activities of the United States government overseas.” A Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), chaired by the Under Secretary of State, was established to assist the Secretary of State in discharging his responsibilities. Assistant Secretaries of State would chair interdepartmental regional groups (IRGs) within the SIG structure to coordinate regional planning and actions. 18 W. Averell Harriman, chairman of the former Special Group (CI), wrote on March 7, 1966, to Under Secretary George Ball that “real progress has been made in that field. We have learned from mistakes and know considerably more about the matters on which to concentrate.” 19 Counter-insurgency doctrine in the areas supervised by the Secretary of State was re-defined in a SIG-approved paper of May 23, 1968. 20 1 NSC 4–A, December 17, 1947, printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257 . 2 NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, printed ibid., Document 292 . 3 Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, printed ibid., Document 298 . 4 NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, in Michael Warner, editor, The CIA Under Harry Truman (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 437–439. 5 William M. Leary, editor, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; the text of NSC 5412 will be printed in Foreign Relations, 1950–1960, Development of the Intelligence Establishment, scheduled for publication in 2000. 6 Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, pp. 63, 147–148; Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp. 50–51. The texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2 will be printed in Foreign Relations, 1950–1960, Development of the Intelligence Community, scheduled for publication in 2000. 7 Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, p. 63. 8 Ibid., p. 82. 9 See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. X, Documents 270 and 278 . 10 Text of NSAM No. 303 will be printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. X , scheduled for publication in 2000. 11 Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 56–57. 12 Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vols. VII , VIII , IX , Microfiche Supplement, Document 249 , and Richard M. Bissell, Reflections of a Cold Warrior (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 149. 13 For text of NSAM No. 124, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, Document 68 . 14 Memorandum by McCone, August 17, 1962, published ibid., 1961–1963, vols. VII, VIII, IX, Microfiche Supplement, Document 277 , and U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984), p. 330. 15 “United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy,” September 1962, and NSAM No. 182 are printed, respectively, in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vols. VII, VIII, IX, Microfiche Supplement, Document 279 , and ibid., vol. VIII, Document 105 . 16 See Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, pp. 330–339. 17 Memorandum from Taylor to Special Group (CI), October 15, 1963, published in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vols. VII , VIII , IX , Microfiche Supplement, Document 300 . 18 Memorandum from Taylor to President Johnson, January 17, 1966, NSAM No. 341, and other documentation on the origins of the SIG will be printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII , scheduled for publication in 2000. 19 Scheduled for publication ibid. 20 Editorial note to be printed ibid., vol. X, scheduled for publication in 2000. North Africa Region North Africa Region 1. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 5, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and the NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on May 5, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A table of contents is not printed. 2. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, February 8. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The source text is attached as Tab C to a transmittal memorandum from Department of State Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to Rusk, undated but drafted on February 7. The memorandum notes that Tab C is the discussion paper, which Rusk had already seen, prepared for the NSC meeting on North Africa scheduled for February 8. 3. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, February 8. Secret. Attached to a February 6 memorandum from Palmer to Rusk, and both are Tab B to Read’s February 7 memorandum (see footnote 1, Document 2). No drafting information appears on the source text, but Read’s memorandum indicates that the paper was drafted by Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs Rene Tron and cleared by Palmer, J. Stapleton Roy in EUR/SOV, Francis R. Campbell in EUR/SPP, and Richard W. Aherne in EUR/FBX. 4. Notes on the Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, February 8, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, Tab 50, 2/8/67, North Africa. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the notes were drafted by Harold H. Saunders of the NSC Staff. 5. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, August 3, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted in a memorandum from Hughes to Rusk. 1. National Intelligence Estimate 1. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, May 5, 1966. NIE 60–66 THE MAGHREB (MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA) The Problem To examine and assess trends and problems of the individual Maghrebian states and of the area as a whole over the next two or three years. Conclusions A. The three Maghreb states share a certain sense of identity, but this tends to be overshadowed by the differences between them. Some modest forms of economic cooperation are developing, but over the next few years nothing approaching economic integration or political unity is in sight. (Paras. 1–6, 43–46) B. Tunisia is likely to enjoy continued political stability under President Bourguiba and his entrenched Destourian Socialist Party. Bourguiba’s departure would probably not bring on a serious succession crisis or major policy changes, at least in the short term. Long range economic prospects are fairly good, but Tunisia will suffer from some painful economic problems, particularly a balance of payments deficit, over the next few years. (Paras. 17–25) C. Morocco is also likely to enjoy relative political stability for the next few years. King Hassan II, facing minimal domestic opposition and supported by the security forces, will probably continue to dominate the political scene. In time, however, the combination of rapid population growth and continued economic stagnation is likely to pose a major threat to the nation’s social and political order. (Paras. 7–16) D. In Algeria, Boumediene will probably continue to seek a broad consensus in support of his government, but the army will remain the dominant political force. Considerable political infighting within the regime is likely, probably involving occasional charges within the leadership. There is considerable potential for economic growth, but political confusion and the leaders’ demonstrated difficulty in reaching policy decisions will hamper the task of dealing with Algeria’s monumental economic problems. However, high levels of petroleum revenues and French economic assistance will keep the economy going, though at a slow pace. (Paras. 26–32) E. France will continue to be the single most important foreign influence in the Maghreb. The cultural link is likely to persist for some time, and France is the principal trading partner of each of the three countries. Algeria will continue to be the most favored by French subsidies and other economic aid, though throughout the area these will decrease over the longer term. (Paras. 38–42) F. Algeria’s relations with the US will be less suspicious, and with the USSR more reserved, than in Ben Bella’s day. Algerian dependence on the Soviets as a source of arms aid, and Algerian distrust of US policy—notably in Vietnam but also in the Maghreb itself—will be limiting factors on any basic change. Tunisian and Moroccan relations with the West, particularly the US and West Germany, are likely to remain close. None of the Maghreb countries is likely to become closely involved in the affairs of the Eastern Arab or sub-Saharan African states. (Paras. 47–51) G. Both Morocco and Tunisia have border disputes with Algeria, and both fear that Algeria may try to dominate North Africa. Algeria, on the other hand, fears that Morocco and Tunisia, backed by Western powers, might attempt to encircle it. These attitudes have contributed to a North African arms race, with Algeria receiving large amounts of Soviet arms, and Morocco and Tunisia pressing for extensive military aid from Western powers, particularly the US. Algeria’s military capabilities are now greater than those of Morocco and Tunisia combined, and we believe Algeria would seek additional Soviet arms if a major build-up of Moroccan or Tunisian forces occurred. (Paras. 33–36; Annex, Paras. 1–10) H. Despite the tensions among the Maghreb states, none is likely to mount a deliberate major armed attack against a neighbor during the period of this estimate. Limited border conflicts may occur, but they would probably be localized and of short duration. (Paras. 36–38) [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and the NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on May 5, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A table of contents is not printed. 2. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 2. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. NORTH AFRICA The Strategic Importance of North Africa 1. Increasing Soviet naval activity in the Western Mediterranean and substantial arms shipments to Algeria raise new questions for us and for NATO about the significance of the Soviet thrust into the area. North Africa has a southern Mediterranean coastline extending from Portugal to Turkey. With Spain, it commands the Atlantic approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar. The United States enjoys military facilities at Wheelus Air Base in Libya and the Kenitra Naval Communications Center in Morocco. The immense oil and gas reserves of Libya and Algeria constitute a strategic as well as an economic asset of considerable importance. 2. Intrusion of the USSR into an area of such vital strategic and economic importance to the United States adds a new dimension to an already difficult set of North African problems. France has so far appeared indifferent to Soviet activities, and the helpfulness of other North Atlantic nations is questionable. It falls largely to the United States to examine the military and political implications of the increased Soviet presence. The Arms and the Anxieties of King Hassan and President Bourguiba 3. One of our major difficulties involves the Moroccan and Tunisian reaction to the intensive Algerian military buildup with Soviet assistance. Algeria over-reacted to its pummeling by Moroccan forces in 1963 and has acquired the third largest military establishment in Africa. Soviet military assistance, half in grants and half in loans, now totals over $180 million. Greatly concerned by the growing Algerian potential, Hassan and Bourguiba have sought from us additional military assistance, as well as a United States guarantee of their national security. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Both appear to be upset that we have not been more responsive to their requests for arms and protection. King Hassan, who arrives in Washington tomorrow on an official visit, intends to raise the security problem as a prime order of business. 4. Security commitments pose obvious difficulties for us. While in one sense a convenient solution, perhaps, to the pressures from Hassan and Bourguiba, they do not seem to be a practical possibility at the present time. On the other hand, while we are considering limited amounts of arms for Morocco and Tunisia, we are determined to avoid being caught up in a North African arms race. The problem of reassuring such friends as Hassan and Bourguiba is thus a very difficult one. Polarization 5. Morocco and Tunisia, as their own relations with France have become strained, have turned increasingly to the United States for military and economic assistance, while France and the Soviet Union have clearly opted for Algeria. Strictly regional issues therefore tend to take on overtones of wider international significance, and could, if present trends continue, lead to East-West confrontation. The Border Problems 6. This polarization is further aggravated by Moroccan territorial claims against a large part of western Algeria and to the whole of Spanish Sahara and Mauritania. There are minor Tunisian claims against Algeria, which would be manageable were it not for the precedent a settlement here would establish for the Moroccan case. Even so, periodic border incidents mar otherwise good relations with Tunisia and have explosive potential with Morocco. Algeria 7. In an effort to de-fuse the arms race and avoid polarization, we have believed it necessary to find a basis for improved relations with Algeria, without prejudice to the friendly relations we enjoy with Morocco and Tunisia. The course of our relations with Algeria, however, has been far from smooth. The Algerian Government appears sincerely to want good bilateral relations and has accorded warm welcomes to a series of American officials, including Governor Harriman and Senator Edward Kennedy. A hostile press dominated by French-trained left-wing intellectuals and strong GOA criticism of our Viet-Nam policies have marred the relationship which we hoped would improve after the elimination of Ben Bella by Colonel Boumediene. 8. Algeria nevertheless has need of Western assistance, including that of the United States, in developing its tremendous gas, oil and steel potential, and it is reasonable to hope that economic realities will eventually take precedence over the more extreme political inclinations of some of its leadership. We therefore consider it desirable to maintain at least a modicum of U.S. presence in the form of food and other assistance, in the hope of gradually improving relations. Spanish Sahara 9. Generalissimo Franco’s letter to the President expressing concern that we may be too generous in response to King Hassan’s arms request underlines Spanish concern over Moroccan ambitions to acquire control of Spanish Sahara by force. Spain has committed itself to a solution based on self-determination and has refused to enter into bilateral talks with Morocco on this issue. Morocco has also accepted the principle of self-determination for Spanish Sahara but wants international control of a plebiscite in the belief that a fair vote would be favorable to Morocco. King Hassan’s visit on February 9–10 will provide the occasion to emphasize our interest in the elimination of tensions and the peaceful resolution of the Spanish Sahara and Algerian border problems. Food Problems 10. North Africa is rapidly becoming one of the major food deficit areas of the world, and the problem will become more acute as population continues to increase at an alarming rate. With a present population of about 30 million, the North African countries have been receiving from us nearly three quarters of a million tons of PL 480 grain annually. Last year, because of a serious drought, the food deficit in the area amounted to over two million tons. Nevertheless, the prospect of increased food production through use of fertilizers and other improved agricultural methods is encouraging, provided these countries devote sufficient resources to the task. Tentative steps toward planned parenthood with the assistance of American private organizations have already been taken and will doubtless increase as education and women’s rights develop. Economic Development 11. The general prospects for economic development in the area, given in particular the petroleum and gas resources of Libya and Algeria and the phosphates of Morocco, Spanish Sahara and Tunisia, are good. We already have a major assistance program in Morocco and Tunisia, and the latter is an outstanding example of what can be accomplished in the less developed world through a combination of self-help and foreign aid. Libya has passed from the category of aid recipient to aid donor, though on a minor scale, and the IBRD forecasts a potential growth in GNP for Algeria of 7–1/2 percent a year, though the bank considers this growth rate contingent on major U.S. and other foreign assistance. North Africa could become, in the not too distant future, a significant trading partner for the United States. 12. In view of North Africa’s petroleum, phosphates, iron ore and other mineral resources, it is possible to conceive, at least, of a vast regional effort for the integrated development of the area’s impressive industrial, agricultural and commercial (including touristic) potential. Such an effort would require a much greater degree of regional cooperation than presently exists, and major financial and technical assistance from the IBRD, U.S. and other Western sources, public and private, would be indispensable. The Bank would probably have to play a catalytic role. Regional Cooperation 13. Coexisting uneasily with the arms race is a strong but sluggish current pushing the Maghreb countries towards increased regional cooperation. There are now annual meetings of the Economic Ministers and a Permanent Consultative Committee in Tunis. Seven permanent commissions for specific problems or commodities have been established and are working on such possibilities as a common Maghreb airlines and the elimination of impediments to regional trade. While these constitute small steps toward a big goal, they compare favorably with efforts of other regional groups at similar stages of development. 14. Sheer economic necessity might, in time, dampen down the arms race and spur regional economic cooperation. If national markets for local industries are small, elimination of tariff barriers would open up a market almost the size of Spain’s. Technical Assistance for Libya 15. Libya typifies that category of country where normal aid activities are no longer justified for economic reasons, but where there is still a requirement for foreign technical help. The Libyans hire foreign technicians but cannot employ Americans because of their higher salary range. In order to maintain our important position in the Libyan economy and to give American firms the opportunity to bid on Libyan development projects, we are trying to devise a formula that would enable the Libyans to acquire the American technical advice they require. We are accordingly attempting to establish some mechanism, preferably within the U.S. Government, but perhaps from private sources, to furnish technical assistance to Libya at a subsidized price. U.S. Interests and Objectives 16. Our primary interest is in the stability and progress of the area as a whole. As in other parts of the developing world, we support the national integrity and independence of the countries of the region, attempt to help them promote social and economic development in the interests of stability and seek to promote regional cohesion. We seek friendly relations with all four countries of the Maghreb and to deny any part of this strategically important and potentially prosperous region to Soviet domination. We do not ourselves need to dominate any part of it. 17. The United States, in addition to these general interests, does enjoy some useful special facilities. These include Kenitra Naval Communications Center and the VOA relay station in Morocco, substantial private investment in Algerian gas and oil, a close political relationship with Tunisia, and Wheelus Air Force Base and major investments in Libya. U.S. Strategy and Past Actions 18. We have operated on the assumption that our interests in North Africa could be safeguarded by a relatively modest effort, complementary to that if the French and responsive to the needs of all the countries of the region. We have been aware of the dangers of excessive polarization and possible East-West confrontation and have therefore tried to include Algeria in our assistance programs and to convince its leadership of our good will. 19. In the field of military assistance, we have taken the position that arms expenditures are wasteful and should be subordinated to economic and social development and regional cooperation. Since Algeria’s independence, we have provided only about $65 million in military aid to Morocco, Tunisia and Libya. New programs for these countries involve relatively modest amounts and are presently under discussion. Future Actions 20. The question to be asked is whether this policy is succeeding. It is a rational policy, provided events beyond our control do not dictate more radical measures. Improvement of our bilateral relations with Algeria appears vital to a solution of the arms race, polarization and regional cooperation. At the same time, it appears necessary to move ahead with modest military assistance programs for Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, keeping the Soviet thrust into the Western Mediterranean under the closest scrutiny. Where opportunities present themselves, we should of course opt for regionally oriented assistance projects. 21. In view, however, of the explosive tensions within the area, our difficulties in finding a basis for cooperation with Algeria, the limited resources available to us for economic and military assistance, uncertainty about French attitudes, and the potential threat to Western interests posed by the Soviet challenge, it is advisable to keep the problems of the Maghreb under continuous review and to re-examine our policies again in another six months. Background In assessing the problems outlined in this paper, the following background elements are worth keeping in mind: a. The four countries of the Maghreb occupy an area one-half the size of the United States on the northwest African littoral. They have considerable religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic cohesion side by side with the greatest political diversity. Islam is the cement and a western dialect of Arabic the common language. Relations among peoples are as close and uncomplicated as those between governments are difficult. b. We are dealing in the Maghreb with old cultures but new and untried countries and governments. Algeria is five years old and never existed as a country before 1962; it has had to develop institutions and political practices from scratch. Libya is in comparable straits, and Morocco and Tunisia only are somewhat more fortunate. c. All have emerged from a common colonial past, but only in Algeria was a major and prolonged war required to achieve independence. The war and its aftermath caused half a million Algerian casualties, the relocation of nearly three million people, and the precipitate departure of one million Europeans who had formed the country’s administrative and technical elite. Only in the case of Algeria, furthermore, did the United States side with the colonial power. d. If the countries are new, so are the people. Fifty percent of the population of the Maghreb is under twenty-one. There is a long-term risk that this generation coming of age in new countries without strong institutions or economies will demand more of their governments than they can possibly provide. In the short run, all the countries of the area must spend inordinate amounts on education and social services. e. The discovery and development of oil and gas have rapidly made North Africa one of the most significant producing areas in the world. Investments by Western oil companies in Algeria and Libya are in the multi-billion dollar range. Algeria has 10 percent of the world’s gas reserves and some of the largest fields in the world. Libya is producing oil at the rate of 1.5 billion barrels per day and will reach 2–2.5 billion bpd in a few years, putting it in a class with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Over 90 percent of the investment and production in Libya is by American companies. The French are of course the predominant investors in Algeria, but American companies come second with about $100 million invested. The IBRD estimates that there is an additional potential for investment in Algerian oil and gas of over $1 billion, much of which would presumably have to come from the United States. North African hydrocarbons enjoy a price advantage over those from the Middle East because of the proximity of the European market. The strategic advantage of lying west of Suez could one day make this source of energy even more important to the NATO area. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, February 8. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The source text is attached as Tab C to a transmittal memorandum from Department of State Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to Rusk, undated but drafted on February 7. The memorandum notes that Tab C is the discussion paper, which Rusk had already seen, prepared for the NSC meeting on North Africa scheduled for February 8. 3. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 3. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. TALKING POINTS FOR THE SECRETARYNSC MEETING ON NORTH AFRICA February 8, 1967 1. Number of upcoming Presidential decisions make discussion timely. These include: PL 480 for Morocco and Algeria, both of which require waivers under Findley Amendment because of trade with Cuba, Morocco’s being of major proportions; MAP for Tunisia, and military sales packages for Morocco and Libya; Tunisian and Moroccan requests for security guarantees; possible US participation in regional economic projects; and reply to Franco’s letter on Spanish Sahara. There are visits by Chiefs of State of Morocco and Tunisia, Hassan tomorrow and Bourguiba in June. 2. All these decisions are inter-related and may well shape political context in the Maghreb for years to come. 3. Underlying problems we face are: growing polarization, with Morocco and Tunisia supported by US, and Algeria underwritten by France and Soviet Union; unresolved claims on Algerian territory by Morocco and to much smaller degree, Tunisia, and claims by Morocco to Spanish Sahara; and economic development. 4. Although problems not as immediate as in some other parts of the world, we could have our strategic interests threatened, either by implantation of Soviet military power or by loss of our own military facilities. 5. We have substantial elements of strength, including a sound relationship with three of the four countries. Libya, where we feared fragmentation and Egyptian influence several years ago, now appears firmly cemented together by economic prosperity. Tunisia is making sound economic progress, and Bourguiba’s control is firm, although succession problem is causing some concern. In Algeria, alongside major problems, we possess potentially important assets. The Moroccan internal political situation has disturbing elements of weakness, but Hassan’s popularity in the countryside and proven political shrewdness provide assurances for the stability of his regime. 6. Arms problem is difficult. French refused to take problem seriously until recently, but are now trying to expand their influence in the Algerian military field. We have discussed situation in NATO. Would it be useful to discuss problem directly with Soviets? Would it be possible to enlist the help of the UN in devising a solution to the arms race and other problems of the area? Assuming that a US bilateral guarantee is out of the question, is there any other form of reassurance that could be given Morocco and Tunisia with respect to our interest in their security and well-being? 7. Underlying cause of arms race is suspicion between Morocco and Algeria based on major border difficulties. We subscribe to OAU principles on need to solve African border problems by peaceful means. 8. A long-term solution to the arms race and mutual suspicion is the creation of close economic ties between the four Maghreb countries in general and Morocco and Algeria in particular. Morocco and Tunisia are countries of aid concentration, however, and we have no aid programs of any consequence in Algeria and none in Libya. Does this harden economic nationalism rather than sponsor regional cooperation? Could we sponsor a program of increased food production based on advanced agricultural techniques and fertilizer production, on a regional basis? Morocco is particularly rich in phosphates and Algeria has ten percent of the world’s natural gas. 9. To what extent should we be prepared to “co-exist” with the Soviets in the area? Should we be prepared to make parallel investments, as in the Algerian steel complex, or in meeting food needs of the area. 10. Essentially, we see no alternative to pursuing the broad general policy outlined in our paper. The assistance that we feel would keep the door open to passably friendly relations with Algeria is modest, while to withhold all assistance from Algeria and to concentrate our efforts exclusively on Morocco and Tunisia would be costly in terms of increased political tensions in the area. Moreover, such an extreme position is not yet warranted by the degree of deterioration of our relations with Algeria or by our understanding of Soviet intentions. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, February 8. Secret. Attached to a February 6 memorandum from Palmer to Rusk, and both are Tab B to Read’s February 7 memorandum (see footnote 1, Document 2 ). No drafting information appears on the source text, but Read’s memorandum indicates that the paper was drafted by Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs Rene Tron and cleared by Palmer, J. Stapleton Roy in EUR/SOV, Francis R. Campbell in EUR/SPP, and Richard W. Aherne in EUR/FBX. 4. Notes on the Meeting of the National Security Council 4. Notes on the Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, February 8, 1967. Discussion of North Africa At the President’s request, Secretary Rusk sketched the policy framework within which we operate in North Africa as follows: We have an interest in the success and stability of all four North African countries. We have been concerned over polarization in the Arab world which has seen some countries (e.g. Egypt, Algeria, Syria) drawn to Arab socialism. These nations have put pressure on the more conservative regimes. The Soviet Union has sent substantial quantities of arms to two of these more radical regimes—Egypt and Syria. Neither we nor the French know why they have poured so much materiel into Algeria, but it has stirred up instability in Morocco and Tunisia. We have been in touch with the Soviet Union in the Middle East about possible limitation on arms. The Soviets are willing to see the area denuclearized but have no interest in the control of conventional arms. Our immediate problem is to give King Hassan a sense of stability. Therefore, we have recommended a $14 million arms sale and a new food agreement. In this process, however, we do not believe we should abandon Algeria. There are other cases around the world—the passing of Ben Bella, Nkrumah, Sukarno—where our maintaining a presence through a difficult period has paid off. Algeria faces a food problem like the other North African nations. It has bought 405,000 tons of wheat in the United States in FY 1967. We would like to keep a presence there to give us some influence while our private sector moves ahead. At this point the President asked what the Algerians might be willing to buy in the future. For instance, we furnish India 8–10 million tons of grain and India buys commercially elsewhere. Although Algeria has bought grain here, would it buy more? Assistant Secretary Palmer felt Algeria, if it needed more wheat, would probably buy elsewhere. When asked, he could not argue that this was because prices were better elsewhere. Whether or not we could make our Algerian sale conditional on further purchases is another matter, he felt. Secretary Rusk concluded, in essence, that Algeria has all but met its requirements for this year, but in FY 68 probably could buy more grain in the US. The President concluded by asking him to pursue that point. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, Tab 50, 2/8/67, North Africa. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the notes were drafted by Harold H. Saunders of the NSC Staff. 5. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 5. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1 Washington, August 3, 1967. No. 643 SUBJECT North Africa Eight Weeks After the Arab-Israel Conflict The spirit of unity that pervaded North Africa during and immediately after the Arab-Israel war has evaporated. Algeria has rejected any compromise with Israel and the West and has called for a resumption of the war. Armed with this militancy, its reputation as the strongest Arab state undefeated in the recent conflict, and a 60,000-man army equipped with the most modern Soviet weapons, it has made a powerful bid to replace the UAR as the leader of the Arab world. Algeria’s moderate neighbors, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya, realizing the futility of further conflict and anxious to preserve political and economic ties with the West, have moved in the opposite direction to temper opinion at home and restrain opposition elements seeking to undercut a more realistic policy. So far, the two camps have avoided a direct confrontation. Both appear to have made gains in their respective strategies. Yet the long-term success of either depends as much on how domestic affairs are handled as on the future course of the Arab-Israel struggle in the Middle East. Algeria’s Inadequacies . Boumediene’s motives in pushing for an uncompromising policy on the Middle East appear to derive heavily from domestic political considerations. Over the past year Algerian politics has reverted increasingly to the Ben Bellist pattern. The regime has subordinated earlier post-coup plans for domestic reconstruction to the imperatives of “revolutionary” politicking, as demagogic politicians vie with each other in pressing for more stridently anti-Western policies abroad and more rapid socialization at home. Boumediene, lacking a secure political base, has come to depend increasingly on short-term political tactics designed to keep his adversaries off balance and prevent them from outflanking him on the left. Seizing on war hysteria, he has turned away from decision-making to an increasingly personal form of leadership. The economy continues to deteriorate as the government’s socialist-oriented policies and anti-US and UK measures discourage new investment and dry up even existing markets for Algerian goods. In the process of turning from domestic reconstruction to “revolutionary” politics, Algeria has become increasingly dependent on the USSR. Even normally excellent French-Algerian relations have been damaged during the recent crisis by the prevalence in France of pro-Israel sentiment and the anti-European backlash in Algeria. Signs are growing that these developments have resulted in considerable dissatisfaction both among elite groups and in the population as a whole. Hobbled by its domestic inadequacies, the Boumediene regime is nonetheless buoyed up by its new-found prestige in the Arab world. Yet this prestige stems more from the stridency of Algerian pronouncements on renewing hostilities with Israel, Algeria’s entente with Syria, and the diminished stature of UAR President Nasser than from the exercise of any real leadership by Algeria in the present crisis. The Arab moderates in both halves of the Arab world have rejected Algeria’s bellicose anti-Western panaceas. Even the UAR appears reluctant to be pushed into a new conflict before it recovers from the wounds of the last one. Still more significant is the apparent reluctance of the Soviets to endorse the Algerian hard line for fear of being drawn into an eventual confrontation with the US and out of concern for what would happen to their Arab proteges should full-scale hostilities break out again in the near future. Given the natural reluctance of the eastern Arabs to submit to the leadership of a geographical remote Maghrebian state, secure from attack by Israel, there is little likelihood that Algeria over the long run can make good its present claims to Arab leadership. 2 If it does not succeed in doing so, however, this, together with its domestic failures, will inevitably threaten Boumediene’s position at home. Moderates Batten Down the Hatches: Morocco Seeking Arms . For the moderates the essential problem has been to gain control of public opinion, disarm unruly opposition elements, and improve the effectiveness of security forces. To keep his domestic opposition in line, King Hassan of Morocco has strengthened the authority of his tough Interior Minister Mohammed Oufkir, thereby guaranteeing—because of French President De Gaulle’s opposition to Oufkir as the result of the Ben Barka affair—a continued freeze in relations with France. He has also cracked down on the country’s two strongest political groups, labor and the Istiqlal Party, thus reducing the prospects for ending emergency rule and for broadening the political base of his regime. With the help of efficient security forces and traditional rivalries among opposition groups, he has had reasonable success in these efforts. But while he has made some headway towards popular acceptance of a more realistic accommodation to power realities in the Middle East, Moroccan opinion remains volatile and unpredictable. As in the case of Algeria, Hassan’s main headaches are economic ones growing out of stagnation in the industrial sector and the continuing inadequacy of Moroccan agriculture; these, in turn, contribute to rising social tensions. Hassan cannot afford to turn his full attention to domestic concerns, however, because of Algeria’s growing military might and increasing radicalism. Because of the prominent role the Moroccan army plays in his regime, Hassan must respond to military demands for heavy armaments to match those of Algeria, even at the expense of high-priority economic projects. Hassan’s principal concern, therefore, has been to obtain more arms quickly. Despairing of obtaining quick delivery from the US of the types of military equipment he is seeking under our $14 million commitment of last February, he has turned to Czechoslovakia for T–54 tanks and other heavy equipment. The burden of any attempt to match the Soviet arms build-up in Algeria on the already stagnant Moroccan economy would be crushing, making unrealistic any major expansion of programs to reduce unemployment and relieve social tensions. The extent of the additional strain will depend on the size of foreign aid inputs: Hassan is clearly looking to the US for additional economic and military assistance. Tunisia Reorganizing Security Forces . Domestically, Bourguiba’s regime in Tunisia is stronger than the monarchies in either Libya or Morocco. Bourguiba’s skill as an effective modernizer and the success of his development efforts have won him the loyalty of much of the population, particularly the older generation. Nonetheless, the restlessness of Tunisian youth, the strong pro-Arab sentiments aroused during the recent crisis, and the economic strains of an ambitious development program have had an unsettling effect on the regime. Tunisian leaders have been unable to control public opinion, inflamed by Algiers and Cairo radios. While the government has made progress in restoring its authority by dealing severely with rioters and in moderating opinion by using government media to instill greater realism, it is aware that a new outbreak of hostilities could produce a fresh wave of hysteria and new threats to public order. Bourguiba’s principal concerns spring from the inadequacies, both quantitative and qualitative, of his army and security services. The June 5 riots demonstrated that Tunisia’s security services were neither alert to the dangers of rioting nor able to control the rioting once it began. To remedy its defects the security apparatus is being reorganized under a new chief. The army is also undergoing a reorganization to improve its efficiency and morale. There’s no real prospect, however, that Tunisia’s forces could be adequate to withstand a direct military challenge from Algeria. Moreover, Tunisia’s ability to withstand a determined effort to subvert it by Algeria and the UAR is unknown—particularly in the event that the present Libyan regime should be replaced by one favorable to the UAR. Even more than Morocco, Tunisia looks to the US for its ultimate security. Libya—Putting The Lid Back On . New Premier Abd-al-Qadir al-Badri, pressed into service and prodded into action by King Idris, seems to have mastered a previously chaotic internal situation. Badri broke the crippling oil and dock strikes, jailed free-wheeling political and labor agitators, muzzled a rampaging press, and has Libyan oil flowing again. But Libya may never be the same as it was before the Arab-Israel war. The deep humiliation of the Arabs—which the Libyan people share—will keep the Palestine issue alive. The identification of the US as the principal enemy will die hard—if it dies at all. The internal opposition forces unleashed in June 1967 will prepare to try again, convinced—correctly, we believe—that only the timely intercession of a 78-year old monarch prevented the foundering of the regime. Their opportunity may come as the result of the reopening of negotiations, scheduled to begin in August, for the withdrawal of US and UK bases—if the Libyan Government cannot demonstrate concrete results within a reasonable period of time. Barring a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East, Idris and Badri (or a successor) may be able to clamp the lid on once more. But the long-term prospects for Libyan stability, and for the resumption of Libya’s special ties with the US and UK, are as cloudy as ever. Radicals vs. Moderates: Which Side Will Crack First? The prospects for the survival of the moderate regimes have thus considerably improved over the past eight weeks. Their internal security is stronger, and anti-Western sentiments destructive of public order have cooled. The very fact that Libya has survived strong radical pressures has improved the moderate position throughout the area. The moderates have also profited indirectly from the failings of radical leaders: their infighting, their inability to settle on a viable diplomatic or military strategy to compel the withdrawal of Israel from Arab territory, and Soviet reluctance to endorse any early resumption of hostilities. Nonetheless the prospects over the longer term are less clear. Should the impasse between Israel and the Arab states be prolonged indefinitely and the UAR, Algeria, and other radicals build up sufficient military strength, the logic of a military solution could once again become compelling, and pressure could once more build up on the moderates. In such an atmosphere the radicals might be able to work off Arab frustrations by fastening the onus of stalemate on the moderates for maintaining ties with the West. In the meantime, domestic considerations will probably largely determine the relative advantages of radicals and moderates. Both camps have significant internal weakness. Libya will remain vulnerable to nationalist agitation as long as foreign bases remain. The competitive efforts of both Morocco and Algeria to build up military and security forces will aggravate their internal economic strains—perhaps leading, ironically enough, to a net decline in real security. In this game the side with the most generous foreign donors will hold an important advantage. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted in a memorandum from Hughes to Rusk. 2 See Intelligence Note RAF-481, “Prospects for Algeria as a Replacement for the UAR as Leader of the Arab World,” June 15, 1967 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem). [Footnote in the source text.] Algeria Algeria 6. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 10, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, 12/63–7/65. Secret. Prepared by Robert W. Komer on January 15. Copies were sent to Ralph Dungan, McGeorge Bundy, G. Mennen Williams, and David Newsom. 7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, January 13, 1964, 8:52 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 ALG. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Valdes of SOV, Dean of FE, Follestad of ARA, and McCloskey of P; and approved and initialed by Tasca. Repeated to Paris and pouched to Rabat and Tunis. 8. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, May 14, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and cleared by Jones in NE, Kleine in AID, Imhof in EUR, and Fine in AFP. 9. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State Algiers, May 28, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, 12/63–7/65. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris and Moscow. 10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, June 17, 1964, 5:36 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Stoltzfus in AFN, cleared by Blake, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris. 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, June 23, 1964, 5:04 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Blake on June 22; cleared by Tasca, Harriman, and Hughes; and approved and initialed by Secretary Rusk. 12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea Washington, October 23, 1964, 6:57 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Stoltzfus, cleared by Newsom and Pelletreau, and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Algiers. 13. Memorandum for the Record Washington, November 19, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I (2). Secret. Prepared by Robert W. Komer. Copies were sent to Williams and Newsom. 14. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, December 5, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. 15. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. 16. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, December 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 1962, Algeria. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on December 23, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 17. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 5, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Secret. 18. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, January 8, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966. Confidential. 19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, May 15, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I (2). Secret. 20. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, June 14, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966, Economic. Secret. 21. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, June 19, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/65. Secret. 22. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 23, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I (2). Secret. 23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, June 23, 1965, 9:43 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 ALG. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Stoltzfus and Blake; cleared by White of S/AH, Fine of AFP, Phillips of P, Manhard of FE, Nelson of AID, Kearney of L, and Williams; and approved and initialed by both Rusk and Ball. Also sent to Rabat, Tunis, Addis Ababa, Tripoli, Paris, and London, and repeated to Cairo, Saigon, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Manila, Bangkok, and Djakarta. 24. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, July 26, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/65. Secret. 25. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 27, 1965. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation, 1965, July-December. Confidential. Drafted by Williams and approved by Komer in the White House on July 30. 26. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, September 13, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II (2). Confidential. 27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, December 23, 1965, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Root and Tron of AFN, cleared by Nelson of AID, and approved by Williams. 28. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, January 17, 1966, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–11/68. Secret. 29. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 26, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966. Confidential. Prepared by Komer. 30. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 17, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. Secret. 31. Memorandum by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman Washington, December 12, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–11/68. Secret. Attached to a December 20 memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President. 32. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 22, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–11/68. Secret. 33. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 7, 1967, 10:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/67. Secret. 34. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 13, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21. Confidential. 35. Editorial Note 36. Memorandum From John Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 15, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–11/68. Secret. 37. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 12, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 ALG. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 38. Memorandum of Conversation Algiers, July 15, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Root and Galanto on July 31. The meeting was held at the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 39. Information Memorandum From the Country Director of the Office of Northern Africa Affairs (Root) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) Washington, October 3, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 ALG. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Hume A. Horan in AF/N. 6. Memorandum for the Record 6. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, January 10, 1964. Algerian Ambassador Guellal came in on 10 January before returning to Algeria for consultation (ostensibly on the formation of an Algerian national oil company). My theme was that I was a little discouraged when I took an overall look at US-Algerian relations. We had made every effort to achieve a good working relationship with the new GOA, but there didn’t seem to be much reciprocation. Moreover 1964 was likely to be a hard year for the US in the Arab world. For example, the Jordan Waters problem would put us in the middle between the Arabs and Israelis, and the Arabs would undoubtedly say some nasty things about us. Guellal interrupted to assure me that Ben Bella is quite reasonable on this issue and has no strong personal feelings. So he didn’t think this would cause trouble between us; Arab action would probably be confined to shouting. He confided that Ben Bella had taken a “very cautious” line with Nasser. To bring us back to US-Algerian relations, I said I’d cited the Jordan Waters problem simply as one factor promising to create a generally difficult atmosphere this year. Closer to home were Ben Bella’s continued pro-Cuba comments and new cozying up to Communist China and North Vietnam. Though President Johnson is just as determined as President Kennedy to develop good relations with key nations like Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, etc., he naturally doesn’t have the same long-standing personal feeling for Algeria. So bad atmospherics could hurt. Guellal explained that Ben Bella gets emotional, and sometimes in public goes embarrassingly beyond his real position. He had been sending back material on Cuba and explaining our sensitivities; he thought a time of greater moderation was coming. I said I understood but others didn’t, and this makes life difficult for Algeria’s friends here. In showing him several ticker reports of Ben Bella’s recent blasts, I quoted his comment about Algeria following the example of the Yugoslav, Cuban and Chicom revolutions. My jocular comment was, “If you must follow the Yugoslav model so be it, but for pete’s sake, not the Cubans or Chicoms. Their economic performance is pitiful.” Guellal volunteered that life was difficult for Algerian political leaders too. Preparations for the party congress had caused Ben Bella’s opponents to look for every opening to attack him. When I said we didn’t see much of a threat from Abbas, Ben Khedda, etc. but what about Boumedienne? Guellal said he thought Boumedienne was quite content with his present position and had no further political ambitions. Boumedienne’s political activity is simply a response to Khider’s maneuvering against him. I returned to my theme of general concern over the way things are going, citing my earlier hope that Algerians would be farther along administratively and economically by now. Guellal agreed that Algeria faces difficult problems—a unique heritage from seven years of revolution and the loss of a million trained people—but countered, “Who could have done better?” He cited domestic stability and continuing relations with France despite the acrimony of revolution as major achievements. I conceded that perhaps we were hoping for too much too soon, but said I still wondered whether the Algerians are really making the most of present assets. When he asked what I would do, I said I’d take a more reasonable line on oil, for instance, deriving needed revenue from present arrangements while building goodwill. When Algeria was on surer footing and farther down the development track, it could then seek more advantageous arrangements. I cited the great success of Malaysian cooperation with the UK, as contrasted to the mess Sukarno has made of his economy by following a policy of belligerent nationalism. Guellal said he thought the Algerians were being pretty reasonable (though he thought the Algerian share of oil revenues was disgracefully small). He said the Investment Guaranty would soon be signed and he hoped that four American companies would participate in the new national petroleum company along with a couple of German firms and a French one. But he got my point. On economic development, I also emphasized how sorry I’d be to see Algeria waste its money on building a large military establishment. India was a case in point. Here was the same sharp swing from almost complete disregard for defense needs before the Chinese attack to current over-emphasis which might critically reduce India’s development effort. He agreed with the general point but mentioned that Algeria would soon be getting some Soviet equipment needed for defense against the Moroccans. He made a crack about our arming Morocco. My reply was (a) the Soviets had probably given them more than we had; and (b) most of our aid went to them long before Morocco and Algeria became enemies. Despite his crack, he agreed that we had been quite fair during the Moroccan-Algerian clash. He said the Algerians are concerned not only about border “aggression” but also about treatment of Algerians in Morocco, who have been “arrested and tortured, one even killed.” Then he asked what our attitude would be toward supplying Algeria with some military equipment. I was sure we wouldn’t reject this idea out of hand provided (a) Algeria and Morocco composed their differences first so we wouldn’t be arming one friend against another and (b) we wouldn’t end up side by side with Cuba in the same aid effort. When he spoke of the problems of the Algerian bureaucracy—its tremendous task and lack of trained people—I told him I hoped he would jog his government on the Four Areas Project. This was ready to go and could employ 60,000 people before summer, but administrative roadblocks on their side appeared to be holding it up. He promised to look into this in Algiers. He went on to say how important he thought it was for Ambassador Porter to have a direct line to Ben Bella because things often got distorted or bogged down in the bureaucracy. He promised to set something up while he was in Algeria. I put in a plug for Porter; Guellal agreed that he knows the Arab world well and is a good source of advice. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, 12/63–7/65. Secret. Prepared by Robert W. Komer on January 15. Copies were sent to Ralph Dungan, McGeorge Bundy, G. Mennen Williams, and David Newsom. 7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 1 Washington, January 13, 1964, 8:52 p.m. 1455. Dept concurs your proposal see Ben Bella following return from summit. While appreciating tense atmosphere resulting Oran problem, we hope such meeting might offer opportunity express growing concern here over espousal anti-American causes by Algerian press, radio, FLN and other semi-governmental political groups and some evidence Algerians may be encouraging closer relations other African states with Bloc and Bloc-oriented nations. (Report Algerians sought encourage Moroccan restoration relations with Cuba [Rabat’s 947]; 2 Tunisian relations with China [Tunis 434]). 3 While GOA continues stress interest in close ties with U.S., espousal, often in anti-American context, of Viet Cong, Cuba, Korea, and other causes sheds doubt on real interest Algerian leadership in close relations with us. Department realizes there is genuine strength in Algerian public attitudes related to Bloc and Arab support for social change; opposition to colonialism; support for militant nationalism. We realize GOA attitudes affected by need for external economic assistance and consequent pragmatic desire receive aid all quarters, by internal pressures, by difficulties with Morocco, and by ambitions for African leadership. Nevertheless, Algerian quasi-official support continues for issues far removed from North Africa and of apparent significance only in general support reflected for anti-Western causes. FLN entertainment Italian Communist Party one example. Dept welcomed Ambassador’s initiative in protesting to GOA on pro-Viet Cong demonstration (Embtel 1309). 4 Dept raised this and more general question with Ambassador Guellal January 10 and suggests these points be made in call on Ben Bella: 1. USG seriously concerned by increasing reports of events in Algeria which suggest accelerated effort by quasi-official organs and groups espouse Communist side East-West issues such as Viet Cong, Cuba, and Korea. 2. We would regard most seriously any endorsement by GOA such activities or any indication GOA was seeking further these causes among other African nations. 3. We do not have in mind so much spotlight on Soviets and Communist Chinese which came as result recent visits; we do have in mind demonstrations, press accounts, radio broadcasts, and FLN party actions which support causes friendly to East. 4. We cannot, in one party state in which press and radio controlled by government and party, consider what these organs say as something independent of government policy. 5. Policy of Algerian press, radio, and party organs these issues seems to U.S. markedly inconsistent with normal non-alignment. 6. U.S. has brought specific incidents to attention Embassy Washington and Foreign Office from time to time. In spirit desire for promoting close relations, USG desires President be aware our concern these matters and inevitable effect on relations of continuing exploitation by institutions considered quasi-official of anti-American causes, essentially taking aligned position in Cold War on these issues. 5 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 ALG. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Valdes of SOV, Dean of FE, Follestad of ARA, and McCloskey of P; and approved and initialed by Tasca. Repeated to Paris and pouched to Rabat and Tunis. 2 Not found. All brackets are in the source text. 3 Dated January 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM) 4 Dated December 24, 1963. (Ibid., POL 25 ALG) 5 In telegram 1516 from Algiers, January 24, Ambassador Porter reported that he had not taken up the matter of Algeria’s pro-Communist propaganda activities directly with Ben Bella, but had asked Algerian Ambassador Cherif Guellal to convey to Ben Bella the message that the United States was watching this carefully. (Ibid., POL ALG–US) 8. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 8. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 1 Washington, May 14, 1964. SUBJECT Action Plan for Algeria Current Basis of Action: U.S. policies toward Algeria were set for FY 1963 and FY 1964 by the response to NSAM 211 forwarded to the White House on January 31, 1963. A copy is attached (Tab A). 2 Purpose of Current Plan: The purpose of the current plan is to bring home to President Ben Bella personally and to officials of the Algerian Government the risks of departure from non-alignment and the importance of the support the United States is giving to Algeria without directly challenging the present regime in a manner which Ben Bella is likely to exploit. (An inventory of statements and actions by Ben Bella and the Algerian Government inimical to the U.S. is attached at Tab B.) Premises of Action Plan: 1. Algeria, by size, potential, and location is of sufficient importance to the United States to justify efforts to retain a position of influence in the country, even in the face of current Algerian attitudes. We cannot abandon Algeria. 2. Ben Bella’s endorsement of Communist-line positions on world affairs, with the notable exception of Germany, during his recent trip to the Soviet Union results both from an emotional attachment to situations he considers revolutionary and anti-imperialist and from the desire to find aid in sufficient quantities from other sources to reduce his dependence on France. While the United States can, perhaps, moderate his expression of these views and persuade him to avoid further attacks on U.S. programs, there is little likelihood of a basic change in his militantly revolutionary outlook. 3. Soviet interest in Algeria is primarily in terms of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the lavish treatment given Ben Bella in the USSR was primarily a response to the Chou En-lai trip to Algeria. It was a response to the new challenge to the Soviets from the Chinese for influence in the third world. There are certain limitations on Soviet intentions towards Algeria, in that they are probably hopeful of obtaining Algerian support for their world positions, rather than acquiring a new satellite, which, like Cuba, would be an expensive drain on their resources and which, like Cuba, would not be under their control. 4. Ben Bella, after the successful FLN conference in April, appears to be in firm control in Algeria, although he may face some opposition from Army and Muslim elements to his closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Other opposition to him is weak and divided. 5. The French are probably at least as concerned as we are about the prospect of increased Soviet influence in Algeria. They also have been the primary targets of Ben Bella’s revolutionary activities with the result that except for military bases and the petroleum industries, little remains of the Evian Accords under which Algeria obtained independence. Despite this situation the French have continued their assistance to Algeria at the rate of over 200 million dollars per annum, and they have neither found it possible, nor advisable, to put heavy pressure on the regime. Once the need for nuclear testing in the Sahara disappears (presumably in 1966) and if Ben Bella eliminates French petroleum interests, the French will undoubtedly take a harder look at Algeria and cut their aid, although for reasons of proximity they will remain concerned with developments in Algeria. Meanwhile Algerian dependence on French aid and technicians may have exerted some restraint on Ben Bella, although not on matters of less interest to France such as Cuba or Vietnam. French development aid, in any case, is likely to decline from its present $200,000,000 annual figure but would still be significant even if reduced by half. Conceivably, upon sufficient provocation, direct French aid might be canceled abruptly as was the case in Tunisia this month. An even more serious consequence of clean break in the French-Algerian relationship would be the disruption of the total trade pattern including the sudden loss of vital French markets for Algerian exports staples, petroleum, wines, citrus, vegetables, etc. 6. The U.S. policy has been to maintain some influence through substantial food distribution activities, work relief and demonstration programs in the rural areas, and a small medical presence, while leaving to France the primary role. The United States is not in a position to match either the French ($200,000,000 annually) or Soviet ($228,000,000 in credits plus substantial military assistance) aid. We can find ways to bring home to Ben Bella more forcefully the importance of our food program and of his relationship to the United States; we would find great difficulty in supplanting either of the present major donors. 7. Directly and indirectly, we can bring home to Ben Bella the risk to his non-aligned role in Africa and Asia and to his other relationships of his growing political support of the Soviet Union and its world-wide policies. Other Arabs and Africans do not favor so close an alignment nor so close an involvement in the Cold War. To be effective, this must be done without any direct public challenge of a type he can exploit to strengthen his own position. 8. Through widening our contacts in Algeria, we can seek to influence Ben Bella through his associates and can possibly identify and become acquainted with potential future Algerian leadership more friendly to the West. At the moment, with the opposition in disarray, there is little likelihood of our being able to effect any immediate change and few possibilities for other U.S. political action. Proposed Courses of Action: 1. Explore fully with the French the current situation in Algeria and the possibilities of influencing the course of events. France remains the key to the Western position in Algeria and her actions will have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of our approach. 2. Strong demarche to Ben Bella on his recent statements in the Soviet Union (telegram already sent). Prior to such demarche recall Ambassador Porter to Washington for consultations, thereby lending the full weight of the U.S. to this demarche. Make similar demarche to the Algerian Ambassador here. 3. Make known to selected African governments our concern over Ben Bella’s increasing alignment with Communist cause, having in mind the attitude these governments may take at OAU meeting in July and toward proposed and planned non-alignment conferences. We have in mind particularly: a. United Arab Republic. Nasser cannot be too pleased at this development. b. Tunisia. c. Morocco. d. Guinea. e. Nigeria. f. Senegal. 4. Encourage those African and Latin American states friendly to the West which do not have diplomatic missions in Algeria to establish them. 5. Pay occasional conspicuous attention to Tunisia and Morocco, avoiding actions which would suggest we are favoring Morocco in the Moroccan-Algerian dispute. Consider the possibility of visits to both countries by a high-ranking U.S. official in the near future, bearing in mind that timing should take into account, in addition to the reaction of Algeria to our demarche, both Tunisian and Moroccan difficulties with France over land. 6. Maintain our aid programs, but leave to the Algerians the initiative on particular actions required to continue the individual projects. Because of Algerian administrative shortcomings, we have generally pressed them to sign the necessary documents. Letting them come to us when the programs appear to be faltering might be one way of demonstrating to them more dramatically the value of the programs while, at the same time, demonstrating our lessened interest. 7. Discourage Algerian delegations to the United States of high-level officials or ranking political figures. We wish to avoid giving Ben Bella opportunities to point to his balanced attitude as demonstrated by good will delegations. At the same time, increase visits of lower level technical and administrative personnel and non-governmental Algerians to the United States and contacts with such persons in Algeria. 8. Offer limited opportunities to Algerian Army officers for special training in the United States. 9. Examine the U.S.I.S. program in Algeria (already assigned a high priority) to determine where it might be strengthened. We are forwarding the foregoing courses of action for consideration. We are not making specific recommendations on other than steps 1 and 2 at this time, pending the results of our conversations with the French. Recommendation: That you approve steps 1 and 2 above as immediate courses of action. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and cleared by Jones in NE, Kleine in AID, Imhof in EUR, and Fine in AFP. 2 None of the tabs is attached. For NSAM No. 211, December 14, 1962, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXI, p. 113 . The January 31, 1963, response to NSAM No. 211 is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 211. 3 The source text is a copy bearing no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. 9. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State 9. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State 1 Algiers, May 28, 1964, 7 p.m. 2374. Reference: Embassy telegrams 2356, 2358, 2360, 2364. 2 Following are general reactions to conversation with Ben Bella reported reference telegrams. Department aware I have been observing Ben Bella for ten years and have been in close contact with him since his arrival in Algiers during summer of 1962. I doubt there is much he has said or done publicly in that period which has not been given my careful attention, as has considerable additional information about his private utterances and actions. Access to him has been easy and conversation with him frank and at times sharp. This has not affected our personal relationship which remains good. It was with particular interest that I looked forward to seeing him after his return from the Soviet Union. While there he has created [omission] of type to evoke from him through word or manner enough signs to permit judgment as to degree Communist adulation and contact may have affected his outlook. Like most observers, I originally looked on him as a nationalist with a messianic complex who was determined to lead Algeria and Africa upward and onward toward an ill-defined but nevertheless anxiously desired socialism which would secure his own stature as a great African revolutionary. But developments in recent months, and now the trip to Moscow, raise doubts that this analysis goes far enough. Our latest conversation permitted me put him under some pressure, and I was not reassured by what I observed. At present, I suspect that his relationship to Soviet Union probably goes beyond what he has admitted, or what was revealed by Moscow communique. His demeanor and statements since his return indicate that he may feel he has some kind of blank check or other assurance of support from Soviet Union in event of difficulty with France or US. Utterances such as “Soviet Union is our shield” and “French aid is important but not indispensable” and the surly confidence that he displayed to me that “now” nobody can prevent Algeria from pursuing its socialist experience, all contribute to my impression. His evasiveness in most matters discussed was in sharp contrast to his earlier frankness, and while he has always been most difficult to budge from political concepts once adopted, he at least discussed his positions frankly. On this occasion he clearly refused to consider any evidence which might lead to refute ideas he expressed. Thus, when he complained that the American press constantly attacks him and I at once showed him several recent articles of entirely different tenor, he looked away and would not examine them. When I remarked, in connection with our aid, that I assumed I could appeal to his sense of justice, he said nothing. His was a closed mind, a rigid determination to look nowhere and consider nothing which might contradict his existing impressions. Of interest in this connection was brush-off he gave to my comments, with examples in hand, about anti-American tone of press just after he had informed the French Ambassador, who also complained about anti-French campaign, that latter had no cause for complaint on this score as French are not “the Americans” (see Embassy telegram 2346). 3 His accusation that French are stirring up Touaregs had its counterpart in alleged American activities in Kabylie and there was clear allusion also to alleged American involvement in Algerian-Moroccan frontier dispute last autumn. Ben Bella has always been inclined to seek scapegoats as his problems become acute, and I consider these accusations along with his refusal or inability to produce evidence an ominous sign of line he may take publicly if and when pressures on him increase. Contrary to his practice with some other Ambassadors, he usually receives me without anyone else present, as was case this time. Whether this due to frank nature of our conversations, I cannot say, but I would have been pleased had someone else, the Foreign Minister for example, been present to hear recent discussion. If Department is so inclined, I see no objection to telling Guellal exactly what occurred, adding that all this raises doubts in our minds which cannot be resolved by continuing innuendo without supporting evidence. I took care before leaving him to talk for few minutes about other less controversial matters as it unwise to depart immediately after sharp discussion. He inquired about our rural program, offered to assist me in several minor matters locally, and escorted me with usual courtesy to door of his residence. We will of course report any signs of his reaction to our representations. Only one so far was complete lack of mention of interview in French language press, contrary to usual practice, though Arabic newspaper carried photo of two of us without comment. 4 Porter 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, 12/63–7/65. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris and Moscow. 2 These telegrams report on Ambassador Porter’s May 26 conversation with Ben Bella. Telegram 2356, May 26, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG–US; telegram 2358, May 27, is ibid.; telegram 2360, May 27, is ibid., DEF 18–9 MEDIT; and telegram 2364, May 27, is ibid., POL ALG–US. 3 Not found. 4 On June 2, Komer sent a copy of this telegram to McGeorge Bundy attached to a transmittal memorandum noting that the telegram underlined the desirability of a review of U.S. policy toward Algeria, and stating that the first step had to be to consult with the French, who were the only ones with enough assets in Algeria to force a change in policy or personalities. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. 1, 12/63–7/65) 10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 1 Washington, June 17, 1964, 5:36 p.m. 2461. Following is based on uncleared memcon of Secretary’s talk with Ambassador Guellal June 16, 2 subject to revision on review, and not to be discussed with foreign nationals: In answer Secretary’s request, Amb Guellal outlined present GOA viewpoint on Algeria and US-Algerian relations. He maintained Algerian problems and attitudes had to be viewed in light history of struggle since 1954 and political leadership crisis of 1962. Algeria still suffering from political vacuum caused by refusal opposition leaders join GOA despite fact Ben Bella not “rigid” toward them. Internally, Ben Bella had taken necessary steps such as expropriation of foreign-held land and movement toward greater state control industrial sector but admittedly had not been entirely successful to date. Economic situation remained serious, unemployment high, Algerian emigration to France had assumed alarming proportions, and country hampered by lack of trained personnel. Problem now uppermost in minds of regime was trouble in Kabylia fomented and nurtured by opposition. Turning to external relations, Guellal said Algeria’s policy was one of non-alignment. Difficulties with Morocco appeared on way to resolution, Algerian-Tunisian relations quite good, relations proceeding well with France which understood Algeria’s problems including need for greater oil revenues. Re other Arab states, Algerian policy was try to be helpful in narrowing differences among them. Guellal said GOA aware of US concern re Ben Bella’s visit to USSR. Visit was, however, normal outgrowth of long-standing Russian invitation. Algerians had prepared thoroughly for it including consultations with other visitors to USSR and recipients of Russian aid. Algeria made clear its intention remain aloof from Soviet-Chicom dispute and its identification with neutral outlook of OAU. Guellal added unfortunately US-Algerian relations were not what GOA had hoped for. GOA felt US had not taken sufficient account of Algeria’s social, economic and political problems resulting from revolution. Wheat program useful but did not contribute to Algeria’s great need for development projects without which country could not progress. Soviets on other hand promptly selected and studied projects they were interested in and six months later had agreed to begin program. Guellal said “on top of everything else” there had emerged, rightly or wrongly, suspicion in minds Algerians that CIA engaged in anti-regime activities in Kabylia and had contacted opposition in Zurich last August. As result Ben Bella had developed feeling US was hostile to Algeria as well as unsympathetic with its problems. This feeling given further substance by Fascell report. Guellal said Algiers had become scene of free-for-all among pro-Soviets, pro-Chinese, pro-Westerners, etc. In these circumstances, those like himself attempting “balance” political climate in Algiers by representing US point of view having very difficult time of it. Secretary observed US found Algerian accusations against CIA frustrating. There was no truth whatever to them 3 and no evidence forthcoming from GOA despite our declared willingness look into matter. Secretary said he would soon be going before Senate Foreign Relations Committee re foreign aid bill and might well be asked two questions. First was, what does Algeria mean by non-alignment? Algerian official press had only that morning spoken of US “policy of aggression” in SE Asia, and Ben Bella still seemed curiously fascinated by Castro. US had much experience with and was sympathetic to non-alignment and knew what it meant. Did Algeria? Guellal replied that to Algeria non-alignment did not mean remaining exactly equidistant between two points. It had to be admitted differences of viewpoints between US and Algeria substantial on many issues. Current Algerian views on Korea and Vietnam (where, incidentally, many Algerians still residing following their service with French army in Indo-China) were same as those Algerian leaders had defended since 1954. It was unrealistic expect that two years after independence Algeria would alter its views these matters and recast its position on non-alignment. Algeria still in state of flux, and process of maturing could be expected last many years. Guellal said he felt it was not constructive make issues of such questions although he could understand US sensitivities regarding them. Secretary said he readily understood nation could in principle oppose stationing of troops in foreign countries. However, he could not subscribe to view that in Vietnam, for example, presence of foreign Communist troops acceptable but presence American troops was not. Secretary said problems such as Vietnam were issues of war and peace and thus obviously not only sensitive but of great importance to US. Secretary said second question Senators could ask him related to Ben Bella’s reference to American wheat aid as “poisoned bread”. Secretary asked Guellal how he thought average American paying taxes, part of which supported this program, would react to such as insulting description of our aid. Guellal said he agreed words were unjustified and that he had reported US reaction this matter to Ben Bella. Secretary observed US-Algerian relations now in descending spiral. Question was could both sides cooperate to reverse trend or not? Most he would be able to say in answer to Senators, in absence any explanation from GOA, was that in his opinion it did not make any real difference what Algeria thought. Of course such remark would not be appreciated by Ben Bella but there appeared to be little else that could be said. Guellal said he could assure Secretary that Ben Bella harbored good intentions toward US and France. It would have been easy cut Algeria off from both countries at time of independence when feeling against them running high. Ben Bella had, however, wanted start new page in these relations. Secretary said US had entertained high hopes for understanding relations with Algeria during time of President Kennedy, but unfortunately it had not proved possible build on these hopes. Although US wheat program was one of largest in world, it apparently not helpful in our relations. Guellal asserted food program had helped Algerian people. Nevertheless it was not of economic reconstruction type that would help put Algeria on its feet. Guellal said Ben Bella, he and others had been obliged intervene with certain GOA ministries which opposed US work projects. Ben Bella had finally agreed intervene in favor of projects in interest maintaining good relations with US. Guellal said he agreed US-Algerian relations heading downhill and there was no doubt GOA had developed suspicions re US intentions toward Algeria. Secretary said he believed it was important in interest better US-Algerian relations to clear up matter of allegations against CIA. He wondered whether US and Algerian Governments might each select person in whom it had utmost confidence to conduct quietly and discreetly joint investigation of true origin and facts concerning these reports. Guellal promised convey this thought to Ben Bella. Mr. Tasca emphasized US concern over denuclearization conference and especially indications conference had official GOA support. Guellal said he would again report US concern to Algiers. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Stoltzfus in AFN, cleared by Blake, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris. 2 The memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL ALG–US. 3 Telegram 21 to Algiers, July 2, stated that Secretary Rusk had instructed that, in view of the assurances he had given to Ambassador Guellal that U.S. officials were not in contact with Algerian opposition elements, there be no contact by State, CIA, Service attaches, or other members of the U.S. establishment with Colonel Chabaani. (Ibid., POL 9 ALG–US) 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 1 Washington, June 23, 1964, 5:04 p.m. 2512. For Ambassador. Deptel 2461. 2 Aberkane of Algerian Embassy today informed Department Ben Bella had responded favorably to Secretary’s suggestion re possible desirability quiet and discreet joint inquiry into source allegations CIA activities Kabylie. Unless you perceive objection, request you contact appropriate level Algerian Government and say DCM prepared to discuss matter of meeting of representatives suggested during Washington conversation Secretary-Guellal. DCM should take line (1) US desires any new information Algeria has; (2) repeat in detail previous position; and, (3) unless Algerians indicate they can provide new data, endeavor to close matter by reiterating fact US not supporting opposition to Ben Bella. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Blake on June 22; cleared by Tasca, Harriman, and Hughes; and approved and initialed by Secretary Rusk. 2 Document 10 . 3 Telegram 47 to Algiers, July 7, reported that the Department of State informed Ambassador Guellal on July 6 that Norris Haselton had been appointed to meet with a designated Algerian representative in Washington for a joint examination of these allegations. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 9 ALG–US) On July 13, Assistant Secretary Williams sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk reporting that Guellal had referred the matter to his government, which had hoped the examination could take place in Algeria. (Ibid.) 12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea 12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea 1 Washington, October 23, 1964, 6:57 p.m. 398. Embtel 274. 2 In response repeated expressions of concern by Ben Bella during past eight months that US in contact with Algerian opposition elements to detriment his regime, Dept has assured Ben Bella at highest level Department that US in no way involved with opposition. We have stated our willingness to look into matter if GOA will submit specific evidence that can properly be investigated. In late August Algerian Ambassador brought back to Washington impression that Ben Bella finally satisfied with USG assurances and considered matter closed, at least for time being. As reftel makes clear, Ben Bella does not in fact consider matter closed. You might therefore take appropriate opportunity to give substance of foregoing to Toure to emphasize US concern and our efforts to allay Ben Bella’s suspicions, which are totally without foundation. You may also suggest US would welcome his help or advice on what else we might do to achieve this end. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Stoltzfus, cleared by Newsom and Pelletreau, and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Algiers. 2 Dated October 22. (Ibid., POL 1 THE CONGO–US) 13. Memorandum for the Record 13. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, November 19, 1964. Algerian Ambassador Guellal came in today for a rambling discussion, but I believe mainly to sound me out on a Ben Bella visit here. Midway in our chat he said he presumed I’d seen the Algerian press reports that Ben Bella might be coming to the UNGA. He had no information himself but what did I think about a visit “to New York and Washington?” I told him this was a matter on which I didn’t feel able to offer much advice; it was after all a matter for Ben Bella to decide. However, I gathered that relatively few chiefs of state would be coming to the GA this year. This might change of course, but none of the key world leaders now seemed to be planning to attend. It was also possible that the Article 19 issue might lead to further delay in the UN session after 1 December. I then asked if Ben Bella would plan to go on directly from the US to Peking, reminding Guellal of the unfortunate impression made here on his first visit here by his trip to Cuba right after. What issues might Ben Bella want to raise while here? When Guellal mentioned Palestine, the Congo, and perhaps Cuba and Vietnam, I doubted that it would be possible to have much in the way of productive talk on these issues. These were all sensitive issues in US public opinion, and our different viewpoints on them were well-known. For Ben Bella to come and bell the cat on such matters might be a cause of embarrassment to him and to us. Finally, I pointed out that the President probably would be away in Texas for a considerable part of the time between now and the end of the year; he wanted to do some thinking about major new programs without being subjected to constant Washington pressure. I granted that all of these points seemed to add up to throwing a bit of cold water on a Ben Bella visit at this time. I did not wish to give the impression that anyone here would be opposed to such a visit. We had simply not focused on the problem, and I was merely giving him my own horseback thinking that perhaps the timing was not optimum. Guellal took all of this in very good part, and I had the impression that it coincided with his own feelings. Earlier Guellal had asked me about the current state of US-Algerian relations. I opined that there did not seem to be many bilateral problems between us, but it was discouraging to see that we and Algeria seemed to be on different sides of the fence on so many external issues. While we fully respected Algeria’s independence and non-aligned policy, it did seem to us that Algeria almost invariably tended to lean toward the opposite side of the fence on most problems. The friends of Algeria in the US had a tough time explaining that this was mostly growing pains. Guellal bridled a bit at this. He argued that Algerian policy wasn’t as one-sided as I suggested. The only concrete case he brought out, though, was relations with West instead of East Germany. We read the Algerian press too closely, and niggled at every little thing. We should take a longer view. Above all, we should understand why Algeria felt so strongly on anti-colonial issues, and particularly those in Africa. So I asked him about what I described as strictly a non-colonial issue but one involving the very right of majority rule in the UNGA—Article 19. Guellal insisted that Algeria took a firm position in principle in favor of Article 19. Being unfamiliar on where Algeria stood, I simply complimented him on his courage. We hoped the majority of UN members would feel the same way. I slipped in the Nuncie case; here was one peanut bilateral issue which we both ought to clear out of the way lest it eventually cause problems because of the Congressional bar in the Foreign Assistance Act. He got my point in a hurry, but said he’d done all he could. He’d gotten his Finance Ministry to write a letter along the lines State wanted but this was held up in the Foreign Ministry. He’d give them another nudge to break it loose. Guellal asked me about our China policy, which I explained as not being as rigid as some people seemed to think. All we asked was a halt to China’s aggressive behavior, which even the Soviets seemed to find rather a problem. We ended up talking a bit about the Sudan. He had known in Delhi two of the ministers in the new government. They were fine people and certainly not communist. Guellal commented that he commiserated with the Sudanese Ambassador who was going to Cairo. Guellal also argued that the Ben Bella regime was doing a pretty effective job in Algeria. It now had a secure hold on power. He deplored Moroccan fears of Algeria and said that the Algerians hoped for nothing more than good relations with both their neighbors in the Maghreb. He thought the Moroccan-Algerian problem was well on the way to being worked out. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I (2). Secret. Prepared by Robert W. Komer. Copies were sent to Williams and Newsom. 14. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 14. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 1 Washington, December 5, 1964. I can well understand our mounting disillusionment over Algeria. Ben Bella has been hard to swallow in the past, but his antics in the Congo will be the last straw for a lot of people. The Nuncie expropriation case may force us to suspend aid anyway. But if we get over that hurdle, we’ll still have a choice. The real issue is not so much whether we can get more for our money in terms of political leverage (I’m pessimistic here though we ought to try); it is essentially whether things wouldn’t get a lot worse if we cut Algeria off. I’d hate to see us abandon the field to the French, Soviets, and Chicoms. We wouldn’t save much since most of our aid is PL 480 (around $25 million per annum); dollar aid has run only $1–2 million annually. More important, cutting off aid punitively would only magnify the damage BB could do us in spite. He could send more aid to the Congo, Cuba, Guiana; he could start trouble with Morocco again. He could nationalize our oil. Even the oil companies are now worrying about getting caught in the fall-out. So to keep our hand in at modest cost still makes sense, even though public and congressional criticism will be painful. What we ought to do is figure out how to get some leverage from what we give. We don’t have much now (even though we feed 1/3 of BB’s people), because BB has never faced up to what loss of our food would cost him. He doesn’t rate it highly because he thinks we’re happy to dump our surplus, and he doesn’t grasp the real economic (and indirect political) contribution it makes. I’d argue we should try to realize the potential leverage our present program gives us by two possible approaches: 1. Try to make BB face up to what losing our food would mean to him by (a) cutting back slightly (without fanfare which would give BB a moral issue) until the shoe pinches; (b) letting him come to us for renewal of the program in 1965. Then bargain hard for restoring cuts. If we’re right in assuming our food staves off starvation for 3 million Algerians, a food scarcity should drive them to the streets. If we’re wrong, we’ve already started phasing out anyway. 2. A longer range corollary might be to insinuate ourselves further into school milk and other feeding programs, increase the numbers employed in our food-for-work projects and move into training in important areas to increase BB’s dependence. We can’t stop BB from bucking us in the Congo, though we might be able to calm him down a bit. But rather than throwing up our hands and making matters worse, the long view would be to keep trying to build some Algerian stake in rational relations with us. R.W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 15. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 15. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 23, 1964. Mac— I think we now have the question of cutting off aid to the UAR and Algeria on the right track. 2 Harriman, Bell, and I agreed yesterday (with pale acquiescence of Talbot and Soapy) that we’d stop for now any new aid projects or programs to UAR or Algeria, except for one $3000 eye clinic to Algiers. This means UAR can cool its heels waiting for $35 million PL 480 amendment (which we’d cut to $14 million anyway), and will find a blank wall when it wants to talk about other aid projects. In Algeria we will go for an administrative slow-down of wheat shipments to draw down their existing 4–6 month stock so that if we do more later, the pipeline will be less full. Harriman and co. will try this out on Rusk this afternoon, and it should satisfy him. This is the smart way to do it, avoiding a flat confrontation which would lead to a repetition of Aswan but at the same time getting the word across. [Here follows discussion of another subject.] RWK 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. 2 On December 18, Komer sent a memorandum to Bundy opposing CIA Director John McCone’s argument that the United States should cut off aid to countries supporting the rebels in the Congo. Komer pointed out that cutting off aid to any radical African country and using it as a political weapon would lead to a violent reaction in Asia and Africa, and probably increased aid to the rebels. Instead, he argued for “a skillful effort to shake our radical friends by quietly getting across that if they raise the ante in the Congo they’ll jeopardize US aid.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administration, Subject Files, Komer, Robert W.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 16. National Intelligence Estimate 16. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, December 23, 1964. NIE 62–64 ALGERIA The Problem To assess the situation in Algeria, and to estimate its prospects over the next two years or so. Conclusions A. We think that Ben Bella’s chances of remaining in power for the next two years or so are good. He will probably continue to keep a narrow but fairly solid power base, especially in the military establishment, where Vice President and Minister of Defense Boumedienne appears loyal. We do not believe that Boumedienne would use the army to oust Ben Bella, except under extraordinary conditions. (Paras. 13, 24–25) B. The economy will probably continue to decline for a time, and will probably stabilize at a lower level than at present. We do not believe that the economic situation will deteriorate so far as to generate extreme political discontent. The majority of the people will follow the traditional subsistence agricultural pattern, while the new society of politically important elements, including the army, bureaucracy, and workers on nationalized farms, is likely to continue to fare better than under the French. (Paras. 16, 24, 28) C. The 60,000 man Algerian military establishment has been largely re-equipped with Soviet weapons in the past year or so. It can maintain internal security and is improving vis-a-vis its most likely external rival, Morocco. In about a year it will probably be superior to the Moroccans. However, while Algerian-Moroccan relations are likely to remain uneasy, a recurrence of major hostilities is unlikely. (Paras. 11, 14–15, 41) D. Algeria will probably move away, albeit slowly and haphazardly, from its close linkage with France, and the latter’s aid will almost certainly decline after 1965, when the nuclear test sites will no longer be needed. French interests, especially oil, as well as Algeria’s need for financial aid, will militate against a complete break. The coming years are likely to be marked by continued frictions, however, as Algeria strives to reduce its dependence without losing the benefits of the association, but a major breach will probably be avoided at least as long as de Gaulle lives. (Paras. 31–32) E. Algeria’s revolutionary convictions lead it to support virtually any movement bearing the anti-colonialist label. In Africa particularly, Ben Bella will provide moral support, as well as arms and training, to revolutionary movements, often in concert with Soviet and Chinese actions. This already conflicts with US policies in sub-Saharan Africa and would be especially serious if a rebel movement were to develop the staying power to wage a drawn-out guerrilla conflict. In any event, US-Algerian relations are likely to be marked by growing frictions. (Paras. 29, 36–39) F. Both Soviets and Chinese appear to regard the Ben Bella regime as promoting their respective interests by its predilection for supporting revolutionary movements. While this condition obtains and at least as long as French assistance and presence remain strong, the USSR and China will be content to play a background role, although continuing to provide economic aid. A major breach between France and Algeria could open the way for greatly increased Soviet influence. However, the Soviets would be faced with problems, as well as opportunities, especially since providing budget support would break a precedent and also be very costly. (Paras. 34–35) [Here follows the “Discussion” section of the Estimate.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 1962, Algeria. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on December 23, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 17. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 17. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 5, 1965. The attached is one of the most interesting dispatches I have seen in recent months. 2 It shows our Ambassador, William Porter, in a straight out talk with Ben Bella. Bearing in mind that one man is a head of government and the other is a diplomat, I think you will agree that Porter did an astonishing job of stating his case while maintaining communication with his target. He also surprised Ben Bella into unusual frankness about his attitudes. Finally, in his concluding section, Porter shows that he is not a bit taken in by Ben Bella and understands precisely how B.B. is playing into the hands of the Soviets—not because he is a Communist, but because of his own fanatical emotions. The policy question we face, of course, is whether it helps to cut off PL–480 to a man like this. My own estimate, which the intelligence community shares, is that as a matter of cold national interest it would do us no good—in the sense that it would not bring Ben Bella “to his senses” and would only confirm him in his fundamental emotional convictions. Cutting off Algeria would also play right into Soviet hands. It’s precisely what Moscow would like us to do. On the other hand, food does not buy his friendship, and if it is politically very unpopular here, it should be cut back gradually in ways that are not visibly connected to his foreign policy. Ben Bella, unlike Nasser, has done us no injury within his own territories—at least so far. What we currently have is a freeze on discussion of new projects with Ben Bella, and I think this is right for the present. One more point about this message is that it does show Porter’s own quality. He has been under something of a cloud at the State Department for reasons which I do not understand, and unless you disagree I plan to put in a plug for him over there. McG. B. 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Secret. 2 Not attached. 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 18. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 18. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, January 8, 1965. RWK: It turns out that Porter and Lennon on their own hook are doing what we’ve been recommending right along but what AID has been saying is too hard. Part of the stimulus was need to prepare phase-down in case we invoked 620(e), but part is Porter’s political sense. They’ve knocked off further January-February food shipments to Algeria (fortuitously but secretly we’re diverting them to Morocco to tide us over a crisis there). This will reduce stocks so we’ll be in a realistic position in April to manipulate the program instead of continuing to pile up a backlog. Just another example of the problems of getting things done in USG. You thought Bell was all for slowing shipments and cutting stocks. I found AID/State working levels not even thinking about it. Today I asked them about attached cables, 2 and they sheepishly admitted the embassy started this all by itself. 3 H. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966. Confidential. 2 Telegram Toaid 177 from Algiers, December 31, 1964, and telegram Toaid 180 from Algiers, January 4, 1965, are attached but not printed. 3 Komer’s handwritten note in the margin reads: “Good—keep an eye on it.” 19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 15, 1965. I hear that Secretary Rusk plans to call you next week about our aid program in Algeria. The State and AID people have been thoroughly shaken up by your tough attitude on aid (which has both advantages and disadvantages). As to the facts, our Algerian aid has been almost all surplus food. From $53 million in PL 480 for FY 64 we went down this year to $24 million, though unemployment is still high. We’ve also provided tools and supplies (we pay wages in food) for three small model land rehabilitation projects and a CARE-MEDICO effort to keep one of the big Algiers hospitals going. We have to decide now whether to continue these programs or let them lapse by default over the next six months. We don’t kid ourselves that we’re buying much short-term political cooperation with our help. Ben Bella is a radical who’s taken outspoken left-neutralist stands on Cuba, Vietnam, Congo, Dominican Republic. He’s also hosting both the Commie-line World Youth Festival and the Afro-Asian Conference this summer. As with the UAR, however, we want to keep giving Ben Bella an alternative to Moscow (and Paris) because Algeria is one of the half-dozen key African powers. We also want to keep a foot in the door with friendlier second-echelon figures who might run the show if anything happens to the current regime. Finally, we have about $100 million invested in the booming Algerian oil industry. For these reasons, Rusk and AID favor cutting back to about $20 million (again mostly food) in FY 66, but continuing a reduced needy feeding program and our CARE-MEDICO project. Ambassador Porter also wants to go in and force Ben Bella to say yes or no on all our programs. He knows he couldn’t extract much in return for continuing, but feels that a clear affirmative from Ben Bella would be a useful reminder of our help. Also, a negative would put the blame squarely on Ben Bella so he couldn’t charge us with playing politics with food for hungry people. Here’s another case where the lack of short-term return argues with longer range potential. My own instinct would be to side State in cutting back gradually but staying in the ballgame, unless the Congressional heat mounts. Algeria hasn’t been a big Hill issue so far and it seems unwise to make BB sore at us just before he hosts the big Afro-Asian Conference. The other side of the coin is that letting aid lapse might demonstrate to a lot of other people like Nasser and even Ayub that we do expect something in return for our help. All in all, however, I’d argue for postponing another minor flap here at a time when we’re under the gun in many other places. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I (2). Secret. 20. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 20. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, June 14, 1965. RWK: State and AID have begun clearing a cable to plot the phase-out of our Algerian aid. Rusk told Guellal several weeks ago that much of our aid would lapse if we receive no GOA request, and Root has made the same comment to one of Ben Bella’s assistants, so although the Algerians could still present us with a request, there seems no alternative now to this kind of planning. This action would leave two activities in operation—the Care-Medico project which the Algerians have asked for and continuing participant training for six people. Other programs would stop when the food stocks supporting them run out. The Four-Areas Project would probably run into the early fall while the mass feeding program would run out some time in the summer. We would tell the voluntary agencies and the Soil Conservation Service not to recruit replacements for their people and we would plan to have most of the AID staff out by the end of the calendar year. The one procedural aspect still open for discussion is whether we should give the Algerians a note on this just to keep the record clear. We want to be sure they realize we are quitting because they haven’t asked us to stay on, not for some political reason. State will ask the Embassy what it thinks of a note to the technical level of the Algerian Government requesting cooperation in smoothing out an alternative termination. I hate to see this happen but I can’t see where we have any alternative. I am pushing State to be sure everyone has a good story on our rationale against the time when news of this move breaks. HHS 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966, Economic. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 21. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 21. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, June 19, 1965. OCI No. 1781/65 SUBJECT Consequences of Algerian Coup 1. The apparently bloodless coup which early on the morning of 19 June brought the Algerian military, and more particularly Vice Premier and Defense Minister Houari Boumedienne, to power will probably not produce any abrupt changes in either Algeria’s domestic or foreign policy. So far there appears to have been no general shakeup of the ministers, and Foreign Minister Bouteflika has stressed that Algeria will continue to recognize all international commitments. He has indicated that the Afro-Asian Conference will open in Algiers on 29 June as scheduled. 2. Boumedienne’s government is likely to pay more attention to the badly faltering Algerian economy than to foreign ventures and entanglements—especially in Black Africa. He is likely to orient Algeria more toward the Arab East, and may well ultimately establish a regime similar to Nasir’s Egypt. He is an avid nationalist and socialist, and has long felt that the army had a political mission to lead the people of Algeria. In fact, in many areas of Algeria the army has probably already provided sounder leadership and administration than Ben Bella’s government or the FLN party. 3. Boumedienne will probably lead Algeria on a more genuinely non-aligned course than did Ben Bella. He is realistic enough to appreciate that French assistance—some $200 million a year in direct financial aid, plus many hundreds of millions more in indirect benefits and the salaries of nearly 20,000 French technicians and school teachers—is not likely to be forthcoming from any other source. He is also aware that US surplus food feeds nearly one-third of Algeria’s 11.5 million people, although he still probably thinks of the Western world in imperialistic terms. He has been warm, open, and attentive with US officials. At the same time, he knows that the Soviet Union’s some $85 million in military aid has transformed his once ragtag forces into a well equipped army, with a respectable air arm of modern jet fighters and bombers. The Soviet Union has also extended some $250 million in economic credits, for long-range projects. Only a small portion of this has been utilized, and Boumedienne probably does not intend to sacrifice this. Algeria also has a $50 million credit from Communist China. Boumedienne will probably attempt, however, to deal warily with the Communists, and to preserve Algeria’s independent status. He is said to have become disillusioned with Castro’s Cuba, following a visit there in 1963, largely because it was so patently a Soviet satellite. 4. Algeria’s neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia, will not be pleased by Boumedienne’s coming to power. During the border fighting with Morocco in the fall of 1963, the Algerian army fared badly. It was largely as a consequence of this humiliating treatment that the Soviet-backed build-up of the Algerian forces was begun. King Hassan has watched this build-up with deep misgiving, and recently went out of his way to effect a reconciliation with Ben Bella. Hassan will regard a military regime in Algeria as a dagger pointing straight at Morocco. Tunisian President Bourguiba, always distrustful of Ben Bella, will be even more so of Boumedienne toward whom he was at best coolly polite during the years Boumedienne spent in Tunisia during the Algerian revolution. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/65. Secret. 22. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 22. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 23, 1965. McGB: It’s still early to tell how the new Algerian government will pan out. It doesn’t look like there’ll be a sharp lurch to the left. In fact, there’s a good chance it will try to be more businesslike in attacking its chronic economic troubles, less concerned with foreign adventures. However, Boumedienne is not popular, and he hasn’t seen the last of the pro-Ben Bella demonstrations. So his first job will be to put together a leadership that will command some popular support. State may skirt the whole recognition problem by saying there’s no need for a formal act since most members of the previous government are still at their posts. The one thing we’re sure about is that the coup has put both Moroccans and Tunisians on edge. Both have border troubles with Algeria and view Boumedienne as the architect of the 1963 Moroccan-Algerian border spat. Although the well-connected Tunisian ambassador in Algiers thinks the coup could well net out as a gain, Bourguiba, Jr. has already said the US military aid he asked the President for is now “emergency rather than precautionary.” Tactically, we’re in an excellent position to move either way. After a winter of cutting food stocks to the bare minimum needed to keep food-for-work and feeding programs going, we had just decided to let stocks run out and programs expire over the summer. Rusk and Porter have both told Algerian officials this would happen since current agreements are running out and they haven’t asked us to continue. So we can easily coast for a month or two and still pick up momentum if the situation warrants. If the new government asks for help, I’d argue for making self-help the chief criterion for whatever we do. The small model rural rehabilitation projects we’re running there now are technically impressive. But because we’ve never fully engaged the political level of the government, our aid hasn’t had the catalytic effect we’d hoped for. What we want this time—if we start up again—is something they’ll put their own resources behind. Our line ought to be that we’re ready to help with their nation-building but we’re not going to waste our time if they’re not interested in their own problems. I wouldn’t argue for a big dollar program (though the new French oil-aid agreement will cut French aid and maybe trigger requests to us) because we can do a lot to tackle unemployment and some reconstruction through food-for-work. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I (2). Secret. 23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 1 Washington, June 23, 1965, 9:43 p.m. 3147. For Algiers. Embtel 3294. 2 1) Dept concurs your recommendation that you inform Bouteflika USG prepared examine possibilities for “fruitful cooperation” referred to by Fonmin at mutually convenient time. If asked, Dept will take line here that question of need for recognition of new regime is under study and in meantime USG is continuing normal contacts with Algerian officials. 2) From all indications we have from Embassy Algiers and other sources, Boumedienne Government making as good progress as can be expected under circumstances toward consolidation its control. While there is some evidence internal discontent exists and may continue, regime has shown signs of determination and ability to deal with it, at least on its current scale. We therefore proceeding on assumption new regime is achieving reasonable measure of stability and that it would be politically disadvantageous for us to postpone indefinitely our giving assurance to GOA of USG desire for maintenance of relations between two governments. 3 3) Re Bandung II, you should take opportunity during call on Bouteflika to state that, contrary some reports, USG has made no effort discourage Afro-Asian states from attending Algiers conference. Moreover, USG naturally interested in conference and in this connection wishes GOA to know we believe all Afro-Asian states having right to participate, such as South Korea, South Viet Nam and Malaysia, should be permitted to attend. US hopes that GOA assurances of non-alignment in foreign affairs will be reflected in support for attendance at conference of these states and support for constructive resolutions in Afro-Asian interest rather than anti-US and anti-Western polemics. In discussing foregoing with Bouteflika you should avoid any implication US endorsement of Conference or that US position is contrary to that of Afro-Asian Commonwealth countries or strong moderates. For Other Action Addressees . Please convey to host government our views regarding recognition, (numbered para.2), indicating we would welcome any comments. In this connection we note GOT view (Tunis’s 683) 4 that for Tunisia question of recognizing new regime does not arise. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 ALG. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Stoltzfus and Blake ; cleared by White of S/AH, Fine of AFP, Phillips of P, Manhard of FE, Nelson of AID, Kearney of L, and Williams; and approved and initialed by both Rusk and Ball. Also sent to Rabat, Tunis, Addis Ababa, Tripoli, Paris, and London, and repeated to Cairo, Saigon, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Manila, Bangkok, and Djakarta. 2 Dated June 23. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 3216 to Algiers, June 28, instructed Porter to see Bouteflika as soon as possible to affirm that the U.S. Government looked forward to continuing friendly relations with the Algerian Government and to confirm its desire to explore fruitful avenues of cooperation at a mutually convenient time. Porter was informed that the Department intended to say, if asked, that the U.S. Government recognized the Government of Algeria and considered that there had been no interruption in diplomatic relations. (Ibid.) 4 Dated June 23. (Ibid.) 24. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 24. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 26, 1965, 6 p.m. Meeting with Algerian Ambassador, 11:30 July 27. He carries an “oral message” from Boumedienne, but we suspect it merely says Algeria wants good relations with us. State’s brief is attached 2 and the following talking points might be of use: 1. Your regards to Boumedienne, and Ambassador should assure him we too hope for better relations. 2. We’ve long felt that first priority of any new government is to provide better life for its own people. We’ve tried to be helpful to Algeria in this respect. 3. US is fully aware of differences between itself and Algeria on issues like Vietnam. But we hope that Algerians will at least be truly non-aligned on such issues. Vietnam is not a matter of US preventing independence of small nations; on the contrary, we see ourselves as fighting for South Vietnam’s independence from Chicom domination. 4. All we ask is mutual respect, which has not always been forthcoming in the past. R.W. Komer McG B 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/65. Secret. 2 Not printed. 3 The source text bears Komer’s typed signature but was initialed by Bundy. 25. Memorandum of Conversation 25. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 27, 1965. SUBJECT Algeria PARTICIPANTS The President” Ambassador Guellal, Algeria” Mr. Komer” G. Mennen Williams The President asked Guellal how he liked 4040 referring to the number of his old house. They exchanged a few pleasantries. Guellal then responded to the President’s question as to the effect of the change in government in Algeria. Guellal said it was for the good, and in the national interest, of Algeria. He said it was not a result of a military coup for power alone. Rather it was the product of political and economic forces, particularly the concentration of power in the administration. Guellal said there was speculation as to the origins of the coup. Some said it was China because of the earlier messages sent. Some said it was the Soviet Union seeking postponement of the Bandung II Conference. Notably the CIA was never mentioned. At this point, the President interjected that the role of the CIA was tremendously overstated. If it did even half the things it was credited with doing, it would be quite an outfit. Guellal continued that the fact of the matter was that the coup was internal against the concentration of power. Ben Bella, he said, had sought all offices: Secretary-General of the party, Minister of Planning, Interior, etc., etc. He indicated that the second problem was the systematic elimination of political opposition. The President then asked what was the effect of this on the United States. Guellal said it was for the better. The President then turned to me and asked if it had been better. I replied that there were some improvements, and we were hoping for more but that just recently, as the Ambassador knew, the press had brutally attacked the United States on Vietnam. The President then spoke with great vigor on Vietnam. He asked rhetorically why people who didn’t understand the situation talked so much about it. He said it is a pure question of defending the South Vietnamese. He said that he wants actually to help the North Vietnamese and has provided for a regional over-all AID program. But he was not going to let North Vietnam gobble up South Vietnam. He wasn’t going to let them do it even if China and Russia intervened. Then the President said if they quit attacking us, we’ll quit tomorrow. On the other hand, the President said if they bomb us we have to continue. What’s more, as far as foreign public opinion goes it seems that if the opposition bomb us as they are doing all around in Saigon, that’s all right, but if we bomb them, we are criticized. The President then said that we are all for peace, that we would go to Cambodia, to Geneva, to the United Nations; we would talk to anybody anywhere; that we are ready for unconditional talks. The President then referred to the fact that this had been the policy of President Eisenhower, of Kennedy, and of himself. The President then changed his tone and manner completely and said in an earnest and kindly voice: we do hope for better understanding. If we have better understanding, there is much that we could do. Guellal then took up the conversation by saying that Algeria wished for an improvement in relations with the United States. Guellal, before continuing with what Boumedienne had authorized, said that in the past our relations had never been very very good but neither had they been very very bad. He said that he had met with Boumedienne and that Boumedienne had authorized him to convey the message to the President that he wanted to see relations between the two countries improve. Guellal then said that, as a matter of fact, certain measures had already been taken to clear up misunderstandings of US policy where there were differences. However, he said, one must realize that Algeria can’t do it completely all at once. But the indications were there that they were going to do something. Actually, actions had been taken to put relationships that had been extreme before into regular form, namely measures had been taken to normalize relationships with the UAR, Cuba, the USSR, and even small Bulgaria. Guellal said that there were important developments which would effect a reorientation of policy. Guellal then expressed the appreciation of Boumedienne for the July 5 message from the President. 2 He also thanked us for the continuation of assistance and said that they would like to see assistance increased even as it had been increased by France. Guellal then said that Boumedienne wanted the President to know that if there were any problems, he would be happy to have an exchange of direct messages between heads of state, and that President Johnson’s views would always be carefully taken into consideration. Guellal continued that Algeria had good relations with most of the Afro-Asian countries. If we felt that there was anything that we wished to convey to them, Algeria would be ready to develop a procedure to do so. At this point, the President broke in to say that if people can’t get along with Komer and Williams they can’t get along with anybody. But if the Ambassador had problems he couldn’t work out with us, he would be happy to see the Ambassador. The President then said that he would follow up on Boumedienne’s invitation to communicate. He realized that everyone couldn’t agree on everything but that we weren’t going around trying to sell everybody on our idea of things. He then made reference to the fact that Chou En-lai had been three times in Africa to exercise his influence. The President then said that it was his ambition to work with the countries of the world to raise their standards of living, to provide more education, and to fight against the ancient enemies of mankind, poverty, ignorance and disease. The President said international relations should not be conducted by international name-calling. If Algeria has any problems with us, don’t talk to others about it but come directly to us. He hoped that Algeria would not from time to time say ugly things about the United States. He had never said a critical thing about any country since he had been President—not even about Russia or China. He said the place to handle diplomatic matters was in the office. The President terminated the meeting by saying he was happy to see Ambassador Guellal but that he was already fifteen minutes overdue for a Cabinet meeting. Note: After leaving the President, I pointed out to Ambassador Guellal that he had asked the President for aid but that we had never received an official request from his Government and that we wouldn’t respond until they had done so. He said never worry they were working on it. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation, 1965, July-December. Confidential. Drafted by Williams and approved by Komer in the White House on July 30. 2 President Johnson’s message of congratulations on the anniversary of Algerian independence was transmitted in telegram 47 to Algiers, July 5. (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, CO 13 Algeria) 26. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 26. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 13, 1965, 6 p.m. Title III programs for the UAR and Algeria. These can be separated from India and Pakistan, and reduce the risk of voluntary agency and other plaints that we’re holding up “humanitarian” programs for political reasons. The best case for going ahead is Algeria. Here CARE (doing 65%), Catholic Relief Services, and Church World Service cooperating with Lutheran World Relief have been operating since 1962. Their proposed FY’66 program is $14 million to reach 2.5 million recipients—mostly through family feeding centers geared to people displaced by the rebellion and unable to provide for themselves. This amounts to 328 million pounds of powdered milk, wheat, flour, corn meal, and vegetable oil. Supplies are almost exhausted, and we’d have to divert a ship to Algiers in the next few days to keep programs going. CARE lacks the customary 2–3 months stock to work from, because we purposely put Algeria on a hand-to-mouth basis last winter when we thought Ben Bella might well not ask us to continue. But now the new Boumedienne government has formally asked us to continue Title III and for an overall review of our aid program. The case for going ahead is that Boumedienne seems at least marginally better than Ben Bella, so it would be better not to lump him with our more irksome clients until he proves himself one. Moreover, we don’t want to get him sore at us just before the potentially quite important Afro-Asian summit conference on 5 November in Algiers. One report says that he’ll try to keep the conference from becoming an anti-US platform, if he thinks there’s a chance of improving relations with us. We can’t turn off all the invective, but it may make a difference to have the guy in charge interested in keeping the lid on. 2 [Here follows discussion of the United Arab Republic.] R.W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II (2). Confidential. 2 There is no indication of President Johnson’s approval or disapproval. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 1 Washington, December 23, 1965, 7 p.m. 1806. Ref: (A) Algiers 1336; 2 (B) Algiers 1337. 3 For Ambassador from Governor Williams. 1. Department appreciates line you took with Yaker as described Ref A. I intend call in Guellal to express our equally strong reaction to Moscow communique and to request explanation of how Algerian positions therein can be reconciled with earlier Algerian assurances to us of desire improved relations on basis mutual respect. 2. We do not wish at this time link aid negotiations with recent Algerian performance on Vietnam. However, we hope soon be able assess meaning of Moscow visit and acquire further information on any aid or other arrangements that might have been concluded in Moscow. We also wish gauge Algerian reaction to concern we expect to take with Guellal. Embassy need not break off discussions pending this review but they should be kept in low key. 3. We would appreciate as much light as you can shed on Algerian intentions on future relations with the U.S. following Moscow trip. You authorized in your discretion see Boumedienne, or anyone else in government, for this purpose. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG–US. Secret. Drafted by Root and Tron of AFN, cleared by Nelson of AID, and approved by Williams. 2 In telegram 1336 from Algiers, December 20, Ambassador John D. Jernegan reported that he had met with Layachi Yaker, Director of the Economic, Social, and Cultural Affairs Division of the Algerian Foreign Office, to discuss the state of the U.S.-Algerian aid negotiations, and had told him “bluntly” that the joint communique issued at the end of Boumedienne’s trip to Moscow with its long list of grievances against the United States did not make his efforts to improve relations between the two countries easier. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–4 ALG) 3 Dated December 20. (Ibid., POL 7 ALG) 4 In telegram 1368 from Algiers, December 24, Jernegan reported that he did not think he should seek a special appointment with Boumedienne or Bouteflika to discuss this, since the essential point had already been made to Yaker who had promised to convey it to Bouteflika. He noted that there was nothing to indicate that any significant new arrangements for aid had been concluded in Moscow, and argued that it would be a mistake for the United States to break off its own aid negotiations unless there was some evidence that the communique would be followed by unacceptable Algerian actions. (Ibid., POL ALG–US) 28. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 28. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 17, 1966, noon. A few weeks ago we asked your OK of our proposed new food deal with Algeria—a relatively tight one for $12.6 million in Title IV dollar sales with provision for phasing out Title II and III. 2 I haven’t pressed further because of Boumedienne’s bad public performance on Vietnam (indeed I purposely delayed this agreement a little myself). But I want to keep you abreast of the play, since Tom Mann may call you. We’re about two weeks beyond when negotiations would normally have led to signing, and the Algerians need food in February. So we’re at the point where they’ll begin reading further delay as our backing out. The issue is whether we want to bid for a working relationship with the Boumedienne regime as it sorts itself out. Mann, Soapy, our Ambassador, and I feel it’s worth this small food sale (mostly dollars anyway). I doubt that we’ll ever see eye-to-eye with Algeria on Vietnam, but it has little influence on this issue, Boumedienne still looks more hopeful than Ben Bella, and we have a stake in Algerian oil. 3 R.W. Komer McG. B. 4 Go ahead Hold a while longer Break off negotiations 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–11/68. Secret. 2 On January 4, Komer sent a memorandum to the President asking for approval of a modest new P.L. 480 program on the grounds of Algeria’s strategic importance. (Ibid.) 3 On January 20, Komer sent a third memorandum to the President, again asking for approval of the Title IV food sale to Algeria and again receiving no response. On January 22, Saunders notified McGeorge Bundy that a definite answer had to be given to the Algerians, since they needed the food in February and would have to buy it elsewhere. Later that day, Saunders sent Bundy another note, saying that the President had seen the “third Algerian memo” and laid it aside. (Ibid.) 4 Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 5 None of these options is checked. 29. Memorandum for the Record 29. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, January 26, 1966. Algerian Ambassador Guellal came in this afternoon to make a discreet inquiry about the pending PL 480 deal. State was telling him the matter was already over in the White House. I said we just hadn’t gotten to this matter yet, and explained the heavy pressures of White House business in January—all the usual presidential messages at the beginning of the congressional session with momentous Vietnam decisions on top of them. He accepted that in good grace and didn’t press further, though he had apparently been instructed to find out the score. 2 When I added that after all we had no special cause to give priority to Algeria these days, that led him into a discussion of Vietnam which I quickly dropped. I explained our current sensitivities and preoccupations, leaving the implication that Algerian public statements have left us without any inclination to take time out from more important matters for “secondary problems.” Guellal turned that into a discussion of how others could help on Vietnam concluding that there was nothing others could do as long as our position and (as a polite afterthought) the other side’s remain the same. I chided him about our still-delayed Investment Guaranty Agreement. He said it was very complex and the Finance Ministry was studying its implications for relations with French and other foreign companies but expected it to be ready soon. When I jokingly reminded him that he’d been telling me that ever since he arrived, he replied that now at least he gets reports of action. That concluded the day’s business. To get onto less touchy ground, I asked his view of the Ben Barka case. He felt Hassan had clearly started the whole thing in an effort to broaden his own political base to the left. This worried Oufkir who was far right. Oufkir, as Guellal pictured it, had intended only to bring Ben Barka back to Morocco but had gotten into a fight with him and killed him. (Guellal painted a very black picture of Oufkir.) On the French side, De Gaulle was furious because close advisers hadn’t been candid with him, and Hassan (his fair-haired boy) had bucked him. Guellal hoped Hassan would sack Oufkir. If Hassan chose Oufkir over De Gaulle, Guellal saw the French cutting off aid a la Guinea and Tunisia and tough times ahead for Morocco. Guellal asked about developments in the Middle East. I told him things were generally quiet, with the exception of two bothersome problems—the Iran-Iraq border squabble and the dragging Yemen settlement. I told him nothing he couldn’t have figured out from the newspapers (though he took it in as if for the first time) and steered clear of the issues we worry about most. I promised to let him know if I learned anything about P.L. 480. I reminded him with a smile that last July the President had told him to “talk to Komer and Williams” if he had any problems and said I might just tell the President that Guellal had a problem and had talked to me. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963–March 1966. Confidential. Prepared by Komer. 2 The P.L. 480 agreement with Algeria was signed on February 23. 30. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 30. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 17, 1966. SUBJECT Algerian PL 480 Agreement [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] Helms mentioned Monday mainly wanted to pass on the substance of a long talk with two of Boumedienne ’s top advisors. Jernegan considers it significant. The main points: — Boumedienne is concerned about US-Algerian relations and feels US failure to help with wheat will set relations back years. —Both French and Soviets hope we won’t come through so they can prove the US is Algeria’s enemy. DeGaulle fears that American business will loosen France’s economic hold. —Algeria can’t change its Vietnam position but departure of Information Minister Boumaza will change “the form and expression.” Besides that, he added little to the Embassy’s argument: —Algeria is potentially a major African power, and our policy should be constructive, not punitive. —Algeria is not hurting us in Vietnam. Besides, we must demonstrate that we don’t see the world only through Vietnamese lenses. Our Algerian policy has been on dead center since last February . The day after the President reluctantly approved a new PL 480 agreement, the Algerians released a letter to Ho Chi Minh. The President reacted sharply: “Don’t send another thing to Algeria without checking with me.” State’s seventh floor (especially Mann) was so stunned that they’ve suggested nothing new for Algeria since. Now Algeria, suffering from drought, has asked for help. State is about to recommend a new Title IV deal. There’s nothing for you to do until we get State’s memo. But it would help greatly if we could settle our thoughts on whether or not we’re going to conduct policy with a Vietnamese touchstone, or whether we’re going to pursue local interests and put Vietnam “in the icebox.” Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. Secret. 31. Memorandum by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman 31. Memorandum by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman 1 Washington, December 12, 1966. MEMORANDUM ON ALGERIA My impressions gained in Algiers, even in a brief three-day period, are perhaps worth recording as the situation is so complex. My most extensive talks were with Foreign Minister Bouteflika, a three-hour discussion, and then lunch. I was more impressed with him than I expected to be. He looked me straight in the eye, made his statements quietly but definitely, and has an occasional smile. Ambassador Jernegan told me that he was more direct in his conversation with me than on previous occasions. Usually, Bouteflika appears to be devious. He has a forceful personality, young, confident, and with a good opinion of himself, but he showed willingness to listen attentively. He was critical of US policies on Vietnam, but accepted in return my criticisms of the Algerian Government’s positions. He emphasized their policy of non-alignment, and claimed to oppose communism, but he considers Algeria has every right to express its opinions on international questions which concern them. We must recognize that he is part of a revolutionary group that has fought hard to win its battle. While he will not give in to pressure, he appeared to be open to reason on some questions. His experience has been largely with revolutionists. He sympathizes with revolutionary movements, although opposing communism. In Algeria, they put their communists in jail, and, in fact, any one else who threatens their one-party regime. I was unimpressed by Boumediene. He has not a forceful personality. In fact, he gives the impression of a man who has been picked as a figurehead, and used by activists in the background. However, he firmly states the Algerian Government position, but without fervor. I pressed him hard on Soviet arms shipments, to which he replied in a matter of fact manner. I finally got a reaction, however, when I compared Algerian shipments to the large Soviet shipments to Nasser, Iraq, and Syria. He responded vigorously, and took issue with my putting Algeria in the same category as those other Arab countries. Ambassador Jernegan said this was the first time he had seen such an emphatic reaction. He spoke frankly about Algerian policies, maintained throughout their independence of outside influences, and showed determination to get on with the development of their country, which he believes has vast potentialities. All in all, although the leaders of the Algerian Government are antagonistic to our policy on Vietnam as they see the conflict as a struggle similar to their own for the independence and unity of the country, I gained the impression that we might be able to work with them in some other fields. Although they consider themselves revolutionaries, they do not appear to have the Ben Bella aggressive designs, nor are they as yet committed to such extreme policies as Nasser. They obviously believe they must hold to their revolutionary posture to maintain control of the party and the country. They are ambitious for the development of their country, but their enthusiasms and confidence are not matched by adequate knowledge or experience. I feel the Algerian Government is worth while cultivating. Nothing is to be gained by accentuating our differences. They may be helpful in finding a peaceful solution to Vietnam. Considering our past policies of supplying food for relief under Ben Bella, I would recommend that we continue a moderate Title III program and watch developments with the view of increasing our aid if favorable developments occur. In addition, considering the unusually bad crop this year, I concur in AF’s recommendation for an additional 275,000 ton sale of wheat under Title IV concessional terms. I am not familiar with the amount of grain we now have available, but I would give the Algerian request very much higher priority than UAR. If we refuse any requests, we should make it plain that our reasons for doing so were not political. W. Averell Harriman 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–11/68. Secret. Attached to a December 20 memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President. 32. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 32. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 22, 1966. SUBJECT Food for Algeria After much soul-searching, Secretary Rusk recommends a PL 480 Title IV dollar sale of 200,000 tons of wheat to Algeria (attached). 2 Last February you approved a similar sale. But except for that and a little continuing technical assistance ($125,000), our program in Algeria has been on dead center ever since because of Algeria’s vociferous opposition to our position in Viet Nam. These political problems remain because the Algerians can’t dissociate their own revolutionary experience from what is going on in Viet Nam today, no matter how often we point out the differences. The large buildup of Soviet weapons there also upsets our friends in Morocco and Tunisia. But if it were not for Viet Nam, we’d be on relatively good terms with this government. It has not caused trouble elsewhere in Africa, and its interests do not cross ours anywhere. Despite these political differences, we still face the fact that Algeria is potentially one of the half-dozen African powers of tomorrow. When its government becomes more effective, its oil revenues could underwrite substantial development from the already good French base. Its successful revolution gives it the credentials of leadership among the Afro-Asian nations. Its population and army will be among Africa’s largest and strongest. The main question is whether we want to play for a continuing role there despite its unfriendly public attitude on Viet Nam. The Soviets and French are making a major play for Algeria and would be glad to see us drop out. So far our food has been our blue chip in this game. Now, we must decide whether we will ante up for another round. Secretary Rusk on balance thinks we should go ahead. Averell Harriman—just back from Algeria—says: “I feel the Algerian government is worth cultivating. Nothing is to be gained by accentuating our differences. They may be helpful in finding a peaceful solution to Vietnam.” (His fuller report on his talks in Algeria is attached to Secretary Rusk’s memo.) 3 Apart from the politics, the North Africans suffered a severe drought this year, and Algeria estimated its need at slightly over 900,000 tons of grain. They’ve bought 500,000 tons (400,000 in the US) for cash, and the Soviet Union has offered 200,000. This leaves a gap of slightly over 200,000 which Secretary Rusk recommends we fill. He would like to go ahead in the next few days so we can negotiate a new agreement before 31 December. First, while Algerian supplies probably would carry the government into the early spring, we have CIA reports indicating that it feels it must make its own arrangements to cover the rest of the gap in the next few weeks for political reasons. Second, he would like to avoid your having to make a determination—which you’ve objected to but which will be required under the new legislation beginning 1 January—that it’s in the national interest to aid Algeria despite its trade in non-strategic goods with Cuba. It will also be easier to negotiate an agreement with the Algerians under the present legislation than under the new because we are not in any position to discuss changes in its own agricultural practices unless we can expand our technical help. I have to admit I’m torn. I recognize the pain Algeria causes us on Viet Nam, but it’s not in a position to do us much positive harm or good. I also know that rushing to beat the 31 December deadline may not square with your own strenuous effort to shift the food program to harder terms. However, the Algerians have suffered drought and have already bought almost half their requirements here for hard cash, and this concessional sale is repayable in dollars. Therefore, I recommend looking at this primarily in Algerian terms and lean toward keeping a foot in the door as long as we can do it with mostly dollar sales and a little technical aid. 4 Walt Approve Title IV sale and current technical assistance level Disapprove Let’s talk 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–11/68. Secret. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 See Document 31 and footnote 1 thereto. 4 On February 4, 1967, Rusk sent a follow-up memorandum to the President, urging him to approve the recommendations in his December 20 memorandum. The Secretary said that U.S. lack of response to the Algerian request for P.L. 480 assistance in a year of serious drought was being interpreted by Algeria as an indication of systematic political hostility and might lead it to pursue more radical foreign policies. He argued that it was important that the United States maintain enough of a stake in Algeria to forestall complete Soviet domination. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 20) 5 None of these opinions is checked. 33. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 33. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 7, 1967, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Three North African Decisions Secretary Rusk wants to discuss with you at lunch the three attached North African decisions. 2 The two Moroccan decisions—one food and a $14 million military credit sale—are relatively easy and should be made before King Hassan arrives Thursday. The third is an Algerian PL 480 deal which the Secretary has added to the package because he would like to see us keep a foot in all North African doors. We have also scheduled an NSC discussion on North Africa tomorrow to give you a picture of all our interests there and the whole complex of problems we face. You may want to give us a preliminary OK on the Moroccan programs and then hold the Algerian decision until after the NSC meeting if you still have reservations after the lunch today. The attached bulky package boils down to this: [Here follow summaries of Tabs A and B concerning Morocco; for text, see Document 130 .] Tab C : The Secretary recommends a dollar credit sale of 200,000 tons of wheat to Algeria. Politically, this is the toughest of the three because of Algeria’s posture on Viet Nam. However, on balance, Secretary Rusk feels that our North African policy requires keeping a position in Algeria. The alternative is to let all food aid drift to a halt and maintain only minimal diplomatic representation. Our long-run goal is to knit North Africa into one of Africa’s most prosperous regional units. To do so, we need some influence in Algeria, and it’s hard to expect our oil companies to shoulder the whole load. We will discuss this policy more fully at the NSC tomorrow. A dollar credit sale of 200,000 tons does not seem out of line on pure self-help grounds. Algeria has already bought for cash in the U.S. more than 350,000 tons this year, and the U.S.S.R. has offered 200,000 tons from its own Canadian purchases. 3 If you approve, you would have to sign the finding at the second signature tab . Algeria’s trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic commodities for which you can make an exception. We have touched base with Budget Bureau. They feel these requests are reasonable, and they confirm that all are within approved budgets and plans. 4 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/67. Secret. 2 Not attached. 3 A handwritten note in the margin by Rostow reads: “President asked for proposal in which Algerians bought some as well.” 4 Later that day, in response to a question raised by the President during his lunch with Rusk, Rostow sent him a note stating that Algeria had bought 405,000 tons of U.S. wheat for cash so far that fiscal year and that, if the Secretary’s recommendation for selling 200,000 tons was approved, Algeria would have bought about 40 percent of its requirements in the United States during the fiscal year. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21) 34. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 34. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 13, 1967. SUBJECT Algerian Food Deal Following our NSC meeting Wednesday, Joe Palmer called in the Algerian Ambassador to discuss future Algerian purchases here. Ambassador Guellal said he is “confident that Algeria would continue to have every reason to look to the American commercial market for its future requirements.” He felt that approval of the PL 480 request would make it easier for Algeria to continue buying here commercially. It’s difficult to spell out a precise condition for making them continue their purchases here next year. Our 200,000 tons would complete their requirements for this year (500,000 tons or 50% already bought here for about $31 million cash), and next year’s needs aren’t clear yet. We feel sure Algeria will be in the market again, but Algiers may have to put up a more optimistic front. Katzenbach and Palmer believe circumstances will drive the Algerians to buy here again. Harriman has also talked with Guellal and feels going ahead with this deal is the best basis for keeping the door open for future purchases when they know what they need. I see the deal shaping up like this: We tell the Algerians we’ll go ahead with this deal. At the same time, we’d explain the importance of their purchases here this year in enabling us to make this decision. If they come back into the market again, they’ll be clear on what we have in mind. If you agree to go ahead on this basis with the 200,000 ton dollar credit sale Secretary Rusk recommends, we’ll need your signature on the attached Findley amendment waiver. 2 Algeria’s trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic commodities for which you can make an exception. Algeria does not have any current trade with North VietNam. I recommend we go ahead. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21. Confidential. 2 Not attached. President Johnson signed the waiver on March 2. (Ibid.) 35. Editorial Note 35. Editorial Note As a result of the Six-Day War which broke out on June 5, 1967, between Israel on one side and the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria on the other, Algeria announced on June 6 that it was breaking diplomatic relations with the United States, which it accused of aiding Israel. That same day, Assistant Secretary Palmer called in Ambassador Guellal and told him that the United States intended to deal with the break on a strictly reciprocal basis and expected full protection of U.S. nationals and property in Algeria. Palmer also categorically denied that the United States had committed any acts of aggression and declared that it had made every effort to deal with the Near Eastern question with the “greatest impartiality.” (Telegram 208730 to Algiers, June 6; Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 US–ALG) Ambassador Jernegan left Algiers on June 10. A U.S. Interests Section, staffed by U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel, was subsequently established in the Swiss Embassy. Consular relations between the two countries continued, and the U.S. Interests Section retained the right to direct telegraphic communications with Washington. Telegrams continued to be tagged “AmEmbassy Algiers.” 36. Memorandum From John Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 36. Memorandum From John Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 15, 1967. SUBJECT Situation in Algeria You may have seen a number of reports that a military rebellion is underway in Algeria. The most recent government announcements claim that Boumedienne has completely crushed the attempted coup, but we’re not sure yet that we’ve heard the last of it. The best information we have comes from the French Embassy in Algiers (attached). 2 Just before Boumedienne’s victory announcements, they thought the situation was still serious, but even they weren’t sure what was going on. Perhaps the most relevant indicator is that Boumedienne himself acted as if he took the threat seriously. It will make little difference to us in the short run whether Boumedienne stays in power, or whether Col. Z’Biri—the coup leader—has more strength than it now appears he has. The rivalry grows out of an internal power struggle, basically without ideological connotations. In the longer run Z’Biri might be worse than Boumedienne since he’s even more vociferous about Israel and resents the technocrats who are trying to put Algeria on its feet. Today’s events will increase uncertainty around the country and could, over time, lead to a breakup of the army and a situation where groups now quiet—both pro-Soviet and pro-West—could emerge. But it’s much too soon even to speculate seriously, although one expert says it “looks more and more like Syria every week.” We have no evidence of which way Soviet preferences lie. We assume they’d like the army to stay intact under leadership they can influence (unlike Syria’s), but beyond that we don’t have any indication that today’s events can be linked to other Soviet activities in the area. John Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–11/68. Secret. 2 Not attached. 37. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 37. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 12, 1968. Intelligence Note 456 SUBJECT Algeria Facing Critical Internal and External Problems: Implications for the US In the course of the last several weeks the statements and acts of Algerian officials have shown an aggressiveness that borders at times on paranoia. After attempting to bring about a rapprochement with the US during March and April, 2 they have over the past two weeks adopted a stance of increasing aloofness. In the meantime their relations with France have gone from bad to worse as they have adopted a bull-in-the-China-shop approach to the solution of very delicate problems. They have been both arrogant and pugnacious in their recent tiff with the Tunisians. 3 Underlying much of their behavior is undoubtedly the fear that their internal security problems may be getting out of hand and the suspicion that internal and external enemies may be conspiring to overthrow Boumediene. For the US the effect has been to put our relations once again into the familiar framework of suspicion and hostility. Even more disturbing is the possibility the Soviets may be able to move into a position to establish themselves as the dominant foreign power in Algeria. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 ALG. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 2 Beginning in late February, the Italian Ambassador in Algiers reported several conversations with Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika indicating that Algeria was interested in restoring diplomatic relations with the United States as soon as an appropriate atmosphere could be created for such an action. Bouteflika also indicated that he needed to be able to present tangible evidence of U.S. goodwill, such as resumption of U.S. aid, before he approached higher levels for a favorable decision on resumption of relations. (Telegram 119688 to Algiers, February 23; telegram 1367 from Algiers, March 11; telegram 1376 from Algiers, March 13; telegram 1496 from Algiers, April 15; telegram 1521 from Algiers, April 21; all ibid., POL 17 US–ALG) The general U.S. response to such unofficial feelers was that the United States was prepared to give prompt and sympathetic consideration to an authoritative Algerian Government invitation to resume relations. (Telegram 1336 from Algiers, March 2; telegram 158286 to Algiers, May 3; telegram 1642 from Algiers, May 16; all ibid.) 3 See Intelligence Note 437, “Algerian-Tunisian Relations Deteriorating: A Return to Maghrebian Cold War?,” June 7, 1968 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem) [Footnote in the source text.] 38. Memorandum of Conversation 38. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Algiers, July 15, 1968. SUBJECT I. U.S.-Algerian Relations II. Vietnam III. Middle East PARTICIPANTS Layachi Yaker—Director of Economic, Social and Cultural Affairs, Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mohammed Aberkhan—Office of Economic, Social and Cultural Affairs, Ministry Foreign Affairs John F. Root—Director, Office of Northern African Affairs, Department of State Laurent E. Morin—Charge d’Affaires, a.i., American Embassy, Algiers Fred J. Galanto—First Secretary, American Embassy, Algiers I. U.S.-Algerian Relations Mr. Yaker welcomed Mr. Root to Algiers, noting that they had known each other for some time, which enabled both sides to talk on a personal as well as on an official basis. Yaker said there were two main sets of problems having a bearing on U.S.-Algerian relations: international—Vietnam and the Middle East—and bilateral. He would be willing to inform the Foreign Minister of the talks, particularly any comments Mr. Root might care to make on new U.S. approaches to these problems. Mr. Root expressed his pleasure that the GOA had agreed to receive him. He said the U.S. was ready to respect whatever procedure Algeria wished in carrying out talks. We appreciated the initiative which Foreign Minister Bouteflika had undertaken in March 1968 with Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani and had respected the Algerian wish to keep subsequent talks in the Italian channel. Sooner or later, perhaps the intermediary could be dispensed with. Mr. Root emphasized that the fundamental desire of the U.S. remained the same—for a restoration of normal relations. The break had come on Algerian initiative, not ours. The premise on which the break had been made had been proven false, but this was all behind us now. Any decision would be up to the GOA. The U.S. would wait for a signal. Resumption itself could be a relatively simple process—just agree to resume. As for new U.S. approaches on Vietnam and the Middle East, our attitude towards these problems would be determined by our overall interests, commitments, and considerations. Our views and policies on these questions were not a function of U.S.-Algerian relations. Mr. Root said he liked to think, however, that on both questions the U.S. was following policies which were farsighted and aimed at the achievement of lasting, peaceful solutions. On the immediate question of bilateral relations, Mr. Root said he did not feel a new approach was needed. The U.S. approach to Algeria had always been one of friendship and cooperation. Mr. Aberkhan could give witness to the friendliness which the Algerian Embassy found in Washington and its great success on the Washington scene. In North Africa the U.S. looked for good relations with all countries. We felt pained that the U.S. had good relations with three countries but not with the fourth—Algeria. We were not pursuing selfish interests in Algeria, but were interested in stability and progress. We hoped, for example, that the presence of U.S. business interests in Algeria would provide a basis for strengthened cooperation. We appreciated the fact that Algeria had not allowed the break to affect American business and that Algeria had been generous and hospitable to the small U.S. staff in Algiers. We had also noted the improvement in direct contacts with Algerian officials. We did not ignore these various signs of good will, including the Algerian willingness to receive Mr. Root. If the GOA was interested in improving relations, and we thought it was, the U.S. would certainly reciprocate. Replying, Mr. Yaker noted, somewhat icily, that there seemed to be no new important elements in the American attitude towards Vietnam and the Middle East. At independence, America enjoyed a large capital of good will in Algeria. This had been dissipated, mostly because of Algerian feeling on Vietnam, the reasons for which were well known to Mr. Root. The GOA was unhappy with the situation, and disconsolate that external matters have hindered the development of harmonious relations with the U.S. Algeria had been made to pay a heavy price in the rupture of food aid for work programs, needy feeding and other activities. The GOA had been penalized by the stopping of shipments to the benevolent agencies (VOLAGs), an action which had a strongly negative influence on Algerian leadership and public opinion. The GOA had no new elements to report. Perhaps it should just close the “dossiers” and wait for better days. But, on the other hand, it was encouraging that an old friend and acquaintance of Algeria like Mr. Root should be making this visit to Algiers now. Perhaps this was a good sign. Mr. Root said he liked Mr. Yaker’s conclusion about personal friendship. As a former member of the American Embassy in Algiers, and considering all the years he had been associated with Algerian affairs, it was difficult for him to keep a detached attitude. Relations with Algeria were like an investment. He had become attached to it and wanted to see it pay off. It was a real challenge to seek the improvement of relations. It was not a source of great satisfaction to the U.S. to know that of all the influences—Arab, African, European-French, and Soviet—acting on Algeria, that of the U.S. was the smallest. Addressing himself to bilateral relations, Mr. Root noted that the break in food aid through the voluntary agencies did not occur as a result of the break in relations. The PL 480 assistance was yet another matter—an impasse had been reached in May 1967 for reasons familiar to Mr. Yaker. It was decided in Washington after June 1967 that VOLAG aid should not be affected but that its fulfillment should be based on factors such as: —the country should be willing to receive and distribute it; —it could be carried on U.S. ships which could call freely; —and the freight would be paid by the recipient or the VOLAGs. As a result of the failure to meet these technical qualifications, VOLAG shipments had stopped. Hence, it was not a political consequence. In the follow-on to the Bouteflika-Fanfani talks, the Algerian Foreign Minister had said that gestures from the U.S. on Vietnam, the Middle East, and food aid would help. Washington replied it could not make gestures for restoration because Algeria was the one which broke. The U.S. could not pay a price for resumption. Without calling these things gestures, however, the U.S. had tried to signal Algeria that it had an open disposition. Governor Harriman in particular, who retained an excellent souvenir of his December 1966 stay in Algeria and his talks with President Boumediene and Minister Bouteflika, had been struck by Algeria’s very recent willingness to help find a suitable site for the Vietnam talks. As for the VOLAGs, the U.S. was prepared in principle to respond to a request from the agencies themselves for a continuation of activities at the level of the past year. Mr. Root was chagrined that there had been a communications breakdown. The decision was made some weeks ago, and he thought the VOLAGs would have responded immediately with proposals, but they had not. Perhaps Mr. Yaker could look into the matter and facilitate the VOLAG dealings with the GOA organizations. In all events, Mr. Root expressed the hope that this act, more than words, would show the U.S. interest in the welfare of the Algerian people. Mr. Yaker appeared genuinely and visibly pleased at this news. He said this was the first clear indication he had heard. Mr. Root explained it had been our intention in making this manifestation of good will that the GOA be informed through the agencies which were carrying on the humanitarian program. He was sorry the message had not come through clearly. Mr. Root asked Mr. Yaker to convey to Minister Bouteflika our feeling that broken relations was not a normal situation. The break, and the lack of an ambassador always implied that things were not going well. Mr. Root reiterated that restoration could be a simple procedure. In this connection (in an allusion to the UAR) he supposed that Algerian policy on resumption would be decided by Algeria. Yaker bristled briefly but then stated with a smile that Mr. Root knew the Algerians well. They were known for their independence and would make up their own minds. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam and the Middle East.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Root and Galanto on July 31. The meeting was held at the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 39. Information Memorandum From the Country Director of the Office of Northern Africa Affairs (Root) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) 39. Information Memorandum From the Country Director of the Office of Northern Africa Affairs (Root) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) 1 Washington, October 3, 1968. SUBJECT Belkacem Krim’s Emissary Asks for U.S. Support Mr. Michel Leroy, the representative of Algerian exile leader Belkacem Krim, called on me at 10:00 this morning. 2 We had previously heard from our Embassy in Paris that Leroy was coming to the United States and might approach us on Krim’s behalf. Leroy explained that Belkacem Krim was presently disturbed by Algeria’s leftist policies and the extent of Russian influence in the country. To combat this he had founded the MDRA (Democratic Movement of Algerian Renovation) which was well entrenched throughout the country and even represented in Boumediene’s immediate entourage. Leroy saw Krim’s return to power as inevitable but stated that some slight U.S. financial assistance over the next few months would enable Krim to perfect his organization and return to Algeria that much sooner. In exchange for this help, Krim would be prepared to conclude political and economic accords of various sorts whenever he should assume power. Leroy denied that Krim’s organization had been weakened by last summer’s arrests of MDRA militants and gave me a list of names that purportedly represented the hard core of Krim’s organization. If the State Department could not help him, Leroy wondered if it could put him in touch with some American service that could be of assistance. “Such as,” he said, “the CIA.” I replied that the United States was not in a position to be helpful in this matter. We did not see the Algerian situation in as gloomy colors as Mr. Leroy did and felt we had to stand by our guiding principle of non-interference in another country’s affairs. I told Leroy, furthermore, that many specious charges had been leveled against CIA but that he should remember that Algeria was not an area of major American concern. Finally, I conveyed to Leroy the substance of our reply to Krim’s request for a visit (Department’s 248231, attached) 3 and added that I doubted if the results of any trip Krim might make to the United States would be worth his while. As I excused myself for another appointment, Leroy said he would remain in town for several more days in case I had further word for him. I replied that he was, of course, free to do so but should not expect to hear again from us. I did not object, however, when Leroy asked if he might call me on Monday morning. He assured me on leaving that he was fully aware of the delicacy of his mission and that even within the Krim entourage only one other person knew of this approach to the United States. Comments: (1) I feel we should avoid giving Leroy any encouragement, especially since we consider Krim’s political prospects to be unfavorable. (2) CIA showed no interest in the matter one way or the other when the prospect of Krim’s visit first came up. I am informing CIA of my morning conversation and will let you know what position they take. 4 (3) We can expect Leroy to try to interest private American firms in his principal’s future. The security arrangements surrounding this visit will, hence, be more porous than ever—which is another reason why we should keep our distance. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 ALG. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Hume A. Horan in AF/N. 2 The memorandum of conversation is ibid. 3 Not attached. 4 A handwritten note initialed by Moore in the margin reads: “JR—should CIA be tempted, please let me know.” On October 7, Root wrote a memorandum to the files stating that he had spoken that morning with [ name not declassified ] of the CIA, who had said that not only was there no disposition to provide such assistance to Krim, the CIA thought it was unwise to give him any encouragement. When Leroy subsequently telephoned, Root told him that there was no change in the U.S. position. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 ALG) Libya Libya 40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, February 4, 1964, 7:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 LIBYA–US. Secret. Drafted by McClanahan; cleared by Newsom, Ellis in AID, and Colonel Heffner in DOD; and approved by Williams. Repeated to CINCEUR and pouched to London. 41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya Washington, March 8, 1964, 5:34 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Bronez in DOD, Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Tripoli. Due to the distribution of Libyan Ministries between Baida and Tripoli, the Ambassador maintained residences at both locations. 42. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, March 10, 1964. 43. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, March 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I, 11/63–6/64. Secret. 44. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, March 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I, 11/63–6/64. Secret. 45. National Security Action Memorandum No. 291 Washington, March 20, 1964. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 291. Secret. Copies were sent to AID Administrator David E. Bell and Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone. 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, March 20, 1964, 7:33 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Hinman of AID, George L. Warren of G/PM, NE Deputy Director Harrison M. Symmes, and Bronez; and approved by Fredericks. Also sent to the Embassy Office in Baida and repeated to Cairo, London, and USCINCEUR. 47. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, March 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Confidential. 48. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, March 25, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1964. Secret. 49. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 1, 1964. 50. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 3, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Memoranda of Meetings with the President, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by William H. Brubeck of the NSC Staff. The meeting was held at the White House. 51. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, April 11, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I. Secret. 52. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, undated [ca. April 20, 1964]. 53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, April 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 291, Libya Base Rights. Secret. 54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, April 24, 1964, 5:38 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Bronez, Tasca, Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Charles Runyon III, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration Thomas Stern, and Warren; and approved by Harriman. Also sent to Baida and repeated to London, CINCUSAFE, and CINCEUR. 55. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 1, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I, 11/63–6/64. Secret. 56. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, May 15, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1964. Secret. 57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya Washington, May 21, 1964, 7:55 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LIBYA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by McClanahan; cleared by Bronez, Hancock of USAF, Sol Polansky of SOV, and Tasca; and approved by Harriman. Repeated to London, Tripoli, Benghazi, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 58. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, May 27, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret. 59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, June 11, 1964, 7:26 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Blake; cleared by Bronez, Howard Myers in G/PM, Jones in NE, Tasca, Judd in BNA, Newsom, Hinman and Hirschburg in AID, and Runyon; and approved by Harriman. Also sent to Baida and repeated to London, Cairo, Addis Ababa, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, July 2, 1964, 7:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and Blake; cleared by Warren, Runyon, Frazier Meade of BNA, Hilbert of AIR, Eric E. Oulashin, and Bronez and Heffner of DOD/ISA; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Baida and repeated to London for Lewis Jones, to Benghazi, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya Washington, July 20, 1964, 9 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Blake; cleared by Warren, Runyon, Harriman, Judd, Tasca, Bronez, Lang in DOD, and Jones in NE; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Tripoli and Cairo, and repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 62. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 30, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Secret. 63. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, August 8, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Secret. 64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya Washington, August 8, 1964, 11:25 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Bronez, Strong in NEA, and with BNA and CIA; and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Tripoli, Cairo, and London, and repeated to Benghazi, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 65. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 12, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Secret. 66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, October 15, 1964, 5:35 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Lee of USIA, Hilbert of Air Force, Chapin in M, Warren, and Bronez; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, CINCUSAFE for General Disoway, and to CINCEUR. 67. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, November 10, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Secret. Copies were sent to Harriman, Rostow, Bundy, Hutchinson, and Polk. 68. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, December 9, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1964. Secret. 69. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, March 19, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965–March 1966. Secret. 70. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State Tripoli, March 30, 1965, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, USAFE, USCINCEUR, Baida, and Benghazi. 71. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 22, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and the NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except for the AEC representative and the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction. 72. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) Washington, June 25, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) LIBYA. Confidential. Drafted by McClanahan. 73. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, August 31, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965–March 1966. Secret. 74. Letter From President Johnson to King Idris Washington, September 1, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LIBYA. Secret. Circular airgram CA–2580, September 2, transmitted the text of the letter to the Embassy in Tripoli with instructions that it be delivered at an appropriate moment as soon as possible after the presentation of Ambassador Newsom’s credentials. (Ibid., POL 15–1 US/Johnson) David D. Newsom, who replaced Ambassador Lightner, presented his credentials on October 16. He presented the letter to King Idris on November 8. 75. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, November 19, 1965, 7:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Secret. 76. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 27, 1966, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965–March 1966. Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary for European Affairs John M. Leddy and approved in S on February 18. The source text is labeled “Part II of IV.” The conversation was held during a luncheon in the Madison Room at the Department of State. 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, February 25, 1966, 6:18 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 LIBYA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Campbell in AF/AFN; cleared by Root, Lang, Meyers, and Judd; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Tripoli and Monrovia for Kitchen. 78. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, March 9, 1966, 1835Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 LIBYA. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to DOD, Tripoli, CINCSTRIKE, and EUCOM. 79. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) Washington, March 15, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965–March 1966. Secret. 80. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) Washington, April 25, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 LIBYA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell. 81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, August 26, 1966, 6:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–UK. Secret. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Looram in AF and Shullaw in EUR/PMI, and approved by Kitchen. Also sent to Tripoli and repeated to Baida. 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, January 11, 1967, 3:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–UK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Judd and Major Pinckney in G/PM, and approved by Root. Repeated to London, Baida, and Benghazi. 83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, June 2, 1967, 5:54 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Hilbert of USAF, Wolf in G/PM, Root, Bergus in NEA/UAR, Colonel Kennedy in DOD/ISA, Neuman in L/AF, and the NE Task Force; and approved by Trimble. Also sent to Baida and repeated to Benghazi, Cairo, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, June 7, 1967, 6:19 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Tron and Root, cleared by Cooper in S/AH and Bader in DOD/ISA, and approved by Trimble. 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, June 13, 1967, 4:44 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Root and Campbell of AFN; cleared by Kitchen, Lang of DOD/ISA, General Sibley of the Joint Staff, General Martin of USAF, Neuman, Judd, and NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE. 86. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State Tripoli, June 15, 1967, 1500Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Flash. Repeated to London, CINCUSAFE, and CINCEUR and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 87. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State Tripoli, June 16, 1967, 0905Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Flash. Repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE and passed to the White House, CIA, USIA, DOD, NSA, COMAC for POLAD, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State Tripoli, June 22, 1967, 0945Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, and London and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, June 30, 1967, 3:58 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Campbell on June 29; cleared by Eugene V. Rostow, Jones in AF, Root, Neuman, Wolf, Judd, Kohler, General Sibley of JCS, Bronez and Bader in DOD/ISA, and Hilbert; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, July 16, 1967, 3:02 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Root, cleared by Colonel Kennedy in DOD/ISA, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 91. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Special Committee of the National Security Council (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, July 28, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL LIBYA–US. Secret. 92. Memorandum of Conversation Tobruk, Libya, August 30, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL LIBYA–US. Secret. Drafted by Suddarth on September 6. The conversation was held at the Royal Palace (Bab Zaytun). The source text is enclosure 1 of airgram A–61 from Tripoli, September 7. (Ibid.) 93. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 17, 1967, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LIBYA. Confidential. Drafted by Sacksteder and approved in S on October 18. The conversation was held in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State. 94. Memorandum From the Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff (Johnson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hoopes) Washington, November 14, 1967. Source: Department of Defense, JCS Files, 842/365 (28 Aug. 67) IR 2543 Sec. 1. Secret. 95. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 28, 1968, 10:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Confidential. 96. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 11, 1968, 4:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Proposed Visit of PM Bakkush, 9/25–26/68. Confidential. 97. Editorial Note 98. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, September 4, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Proposed Visit of PM Bakkush, 9/25–26/68. Confidential. 40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, February 4, 1964, 7:37 p.m. 264. Libyan Appointed Ambassador Abidia during initial call on Governor Williams February 4 raised question future US assistance. Emphasizing Libya had been loyal friend of US and was grateful for assistance since 1951, Abidia said currents of change in Libya’s region were running against military bases, and Libya therefore could be increasingly subject to criticism by other governments in area. Certain African and Arab states might say they were receiving greater quantities of aid than Libya while not granting US Government comparable favors in return. Libya needed continued US assistance to counteract the effect of such troublesome allegations. Abidia acknowledged US might say Libya no longer needed assistance from US. This was not case, and as indicated in remarks prepared for presentation to President with letter of credence, Libya while pleased pay tribute to technical, economic and military assistance which US had made available also wished to express hope at same time for continuation of assistance particularly at present time. Abidia said oil revenues were not yet sufficient to support intended development projects. Abidia noted British, less wealthy than US, in 1963 agreed to continue commitment level of assistance for two more years. Abidia said US aid need not necessarily be in dollars but might be in form of technical assistance, machinery and military equipment. Later Abidia asked whether US Government in deciding close down military bases had any intention close Wheelus. In response Governor Williams while thanking Abidia for frankness of his statement said that in similar spirit of candor he must refer to position which had been taken by President Kennedy in conversation with Prime Minister Fekini last September. Both President Kennedy and President Johnson had taken a firm, public stand in favor of a level of foreign aid which was in keeping with necessity to maintain US responsibilities abroad. Congress had greatly reduced total amounts and some in Congress were particularly opposed to providing assistance to countries financially able to help themselves. Although in case of Libya and of other countries US willing take further look if requested, US had little room for maneuver. Governor said Ambassador should be aware we could not make a completely fresh study of a matter already weighed at considerable length. Matter, however, was not non-negotiable. As President Kennedy had clearly indicated we believe Libya has now reached point where it can pay for its own economic development and may in future be able to think of giving aid to less fortunate areas. 2 As for Wheelus Base, agreement with Libya for use of facilities runs through 1971 and we are hopeful that we may continue cooperate in accordance this agreement. Base in Libya is not, we understand, among those which US Government plans close in near future. Governor Williams emphasized that we believe that our relations with Libya rest on a firm foundation of mutual interest, sharing of common values and respect for each other’s way of life. While we might argue with Libya on some points such as assistance or the presence of an air base, such a dialogue need not effect our more basic relationship. Libya could be assured our moral support and, if necessary, material support. He recalled frankness with which President Kennedy had explored these matters with Prime Minister Fekini and referred to eloquent manner in which President Kennedy had indicated that presence of Wheelus Air Base was in mutual interest of Libya and US. Abidia was apparently echoing familiar line taken repeatedly by Fekini. He said he hoped Department would take further look at aid problem. Dept Officer asked him whether views were shared by present government, and he affirmed they were. Embassy’s comments requested. Has Muntasir government raised question of US assistance or Wheelus since January 22? Can we assume Abidia approach represents views new Government? Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 LIBYA–US. Secret. Drafted by McClanahan; cleared by Newsom, Ellis in AID, and Colonel Heffner in DOD; and approved by Williams. Repeated to CINCEUR and pouched to London. 2 On January 28, Assistant Secretary Williams sent a memorandum to Acting Secretary Ball noting that AID had proposed that no further economic aid funds be requested for Libya, which would mean closing out the AID mission in Libya and withdrawing 12 direct hire technicians by the end of FY 1964. Williams noted that the Bureau of African Affairs had reservations concerning the effects of the proposed termination, especially its effect on the future of the Wheelus Air Base in Tripoli, the only U.S. air base in Africa. (Ibid., AID (US) LIBYA) 41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya 41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya 1 Washington, March 8, 1964, 5:34 p.m. 18. Please convey following oral, personal message from President Johnson to King Idris: Your Majesty: The United States, since the days it fought beside the United Kingdom in furtherance of Libya’s independence has been keenly interested in the future and welfare of Your Majesty’s country. Your Majesty will, I know, agree that in the years since independence, our cooperation at the Wheelus Air Base has been beneficial to us both. I am now deeply concerned that this important element in our cooperation may be threatened. We believe the presence of this valuable installation helps to symbolize and demonstrate the substantial nature of our common efforts. We believe, in the years ahead, it will be of genuine benefit to the development of Libya’s own air force. We would deeply regret moves which might unnecessarily disturb this cooperation and require negotiation under undue pressures or in the face of foregone conclusions. 2 We are, of course, prepared fully to discuss this question at the request of your Government. I hope that a high level U.S. official who will be in the area within the next few weeks may have an opportunity quietly and in confidence and frankness review with Your Majesty and the Prime Minister this general question. Until then, we would strongly hope that such public statements as the Libyan Government may be obliged to make would not prejudice either the pace or the outcome of any discussions of this matter. I make this approach, Your Majesty, with full appreciation of the problems of the Libyan Government. As a good friend to Libya, however, I would urge that your Government not move too precipitously on a matter of great importance to us both. Lyndon B. Johnson. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Bronez in DOD, Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Tripoli. Due to the distribution of Libyan Ministries between Baida and Tripoli, the Ambassador maintained residences at both locations. 2 On February 22, UAR President Nasser made a speech declaring that no country could claim independence unless the military bases on its territory were liquidated. The Libyan Government subsequently announced that it did not intend to renew the treaties whereby the United States and the United Kingdom maintained bases in Libya. 42. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 42. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, March 10, 1964. [Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Subject Files, Komer, Robert W. Secret. Extract—1 page of source text not declassified.] 43. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 43. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 17, 1964. There seems little alternative but to agree now to renegotiate our Libyan base agreement, in hopes this will defuse the issue. Our best friends in the Libyan Government (the King and PM) plead that we do so. They’ve panicked in the face of an outburst of Libyan nationalism, and face an aroused Parliament demanding prompt abrogation of the US/UK treaties. Nasser started off the parade by criticizing the bases, but clearly both his action and Libyan popular hysteria were stimulated by the Arab-Israeli issue. Our ability to resist is undermined by UK agreement to renegotiate its base rights. Actually, the UK treaty had a renegotiation clause, while ours is legally good till 1971. Yet if we stall now, we’ll almost certainly face a Libyan parliamentary motion for abrogation which the regime will be unwilling to block. We want to save this regime (the best we could have), and also protect our oil investment, now $670 million. So State, our Embassy, and our Libyan friends recommend we be forthcoming now to sidetrack demands for abrogation. We would then hope to spin out negotiations, and finally agree to a reduced tenure which will buy us three-five more years. Much will depend on whether external factors affecting US-Arab relations set the Libyans off again. But it’s worth the try. McG. Bundy R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I, 11/63–6/64. Secret. 44. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 44. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 17, 1964. SUBJECT Discussions with the Libyan Government Regarding the future of Wheelus Air Force Base, Tripoli Recommendation: If you concur, we plan to inform the Libyans that we are prepared fully to discuss the 1954 US-Libya agreement relating to the Wheelus Air Force Base 2 without any limitation on the scope of the discussions, including the matter of tenure. Orally we will inform the Libyans that, if they wish, they may understand this as a willingness to negotiate in the sense of a review seeking a mutually agreed solution. 3 Discussion: 1. In a note of March 8, the Libyan Government of Prime Minister Muntassir requested that the United States enter into negotiations regarding the 1954 US-Libya agreement , now valid until 1971. 4 The Muntassir Government has been under significant pressure, both internally and externally, to seek the early abrogation of this agreement, as well as a base agreement with the United Kingdom. 2. Hopefully, the proposed discussions might extend over a prolonged period of time resulting in a formula satisfactory to both parties, but the pace of internal Libyan political events might make this impossible. The alternative of rejecting the Libyan request would be to risk possible unilateral Libyan abrogation of the agreement and demands for an early evacuation. 3. The United Kingdom has already informed the Libyans of its willingness to discuss its base agreement. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I, 11/63–6/64. Secret. 2 For text of the U.S.-Libyan agreement relating to military bases in Libya signed at Benghazi on September 9, 1954, and entered into force on October 30, 1954, see 5 UST 2449. 3 McGeorge Bundy initialed approval of the recommendation. Below his initials he wrote: “per LBJ telecon.” 4 Ambassador Lightner reported in telegram 71 from Baida, March 9, that the Acting Foreign Minister had handed him the note. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US) 45. National Security Action Memorandum No. 291 45. National Security Action Memorandum No. 291 1 Washington, March 20, 1964. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The President is quite concerned over the prospect that we may very quickly lose our base rights in Libya. While fully recognizing that events may be moving so fast that we will be unable to hold on for much longer, he desires that we make every reasonable effort to prolong our stay, consistent with our longer-term objective of preserving the independence and stability of Libya. He asks that the Department of State, in conjunction with other interested agencies, prepare an action program to this end, which he would like to review by 10 April. McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 291. Secret. Copies were sent to AID Administrator David E. Bell and Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone. 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, March 20, 1964, 7:33 p.m. 358. While events have moved most rapidly in Libya and Libyan opinion obviously aroused on base question, Department nevertheless desires do all possible, consistent with friendly Libyan-US relations, to create atmosphere and understanding among key elements in Libya which will permit useful discussion this question. In addition desiring continuing estimate of Libyan scene by Country Team based on widest possible contacts, we desire all elements take suitable occasion if and when you deliver note and GOL announces receipt stress following points as appropriate with GOL officials and key political figures. 1. US in agreeing discuss base question without conditions has made major concession to Libyan government and opinion. 2. US respects agreements and expects other nations to do same. We have never given up a base in Africa or Asia through renegotiation of agreement prior agreed expiration. Departures both Morocco and Saudi Arabia were at conclusion agreements with these countries. Thus agreement even discuss tenure represents major departure in desire friendly relations with Libya. 3. Wheelus has provided benefits to Libya in employment, income, and security. It represents extensive complex which cannot be quickly abandoned without great loss both Libya and to US. Our desire make maximum use these facilities for benefit Libya would justify serious and possibly prolonged discussion. 4. Wheelus has never been used in any manner against Libya or any other country. US has been careful insure its uses are not embarrassing to Libya. Its use on contrary in such cases as Congo has been valuable to Africa. Its use as relief base has been valuable to Libya as well as to Africa generally on many occasions. 5. US very much concerned with future of US-Libyan relations after Wheelus matter settled. Therefore believe most important that GOL despite desire satisfy Parliamentary and public sentiment still bear in mind value which US friendship and support may have for Libya in future, particularly as growing Libyan oil revenues make country increasingly attractive target for subversion or aggression. While US desires continue closest friendship Libya as indicated by our willingness discuss Wheelus question including tenure of agreement, it is inevitable that relationship will change once this symbol our close cooperation goes. Re proposed US statement (Tripoli’s 395) 2 we do not intend initiate statement on note here, but intend reply questions along following lines: “US has informed Libyan Government in response to its request that we are prepared to discuss the 1954 agreement in the same spirit of friendship, cooperation and mutual interest which has traditionally characterized relations between the two governments. We have indicated to the Libyans that we are prepared to receive any suggestions they might have on when the discussions might start.” Department has no objection if Embassy wishes emphasize in talking with press benefits US-Libyan relations, but on balance not inclined believe statement likely be useful in present situation. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Hinman of AID, George L. Warren of G/PM, NE Deputy Director Harrison M. Symmes, and Bronez; and approved by Fredericks. Also sent to the Embassy Office in Baida and repeated to Cairo, London, and USCINCEUR. 2 Dated March 18. (Ibid., DEF 15 LIBYA–US) 47. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 47. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, March 23, 1964. McGB: We may have had a modest break in Libya. King Idris strengthened his hand by threatening abdication and allowing himself to be persuaded to stay on. However, it’s not clear to what extent Idris balked on abrogating base rights. So we’re far from out of the woods. We’ve sent a strong team out from State and Defense to take a reading before we try drawing up our negotiating position. UK will begin negotiating 20 April and is willing to pull out troops by September 1965 if it can save transit-staging rights through El Adem to East Africa. Our best tactic may be to let UK run in front so Libyans can show some progress in getting US/UK out. Meanwhile, we can try to spin out our tenure by gradually phasing Libyans into nominal control over Wheelus. We’ll be lucky if we can get three years. Am following Wheelus closely, and am satisfied we’re playing it smart. 2 Naturally DOD people talk of State softness (a la Moroccan bases) and act as if all we need do is beat up Nasser, but this sort of backflap is normal just now. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Confidential. 2 A handwritten note in the margin by Bundy reads: “Keep it up—it matters—McGB (and do P a sitrep when you think it ripe).” 48. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 48. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, March 25, 1964. JCSM–261–64 SUBJECT Status of Wheelus Air Base (U) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted Ambassador Badeau’s recent message (Cairo message 2136 to the Secretary of State, dated 18 March 1964) in which he requests further guidance prior to carrying out Department of State instructions (State message 4292 to Cairo, dated 17 March 1964) 2 to conduct conversations with President Nasser relative to Wheelus Air Base. The Ambassador posed eight questions in his message, four of which concern the importance of Wheelus Air Base and properly require a judgment of military considerations. Specifically, the following are provided as suggested answers to the Ambassador’s four questions: a. “What is US firm estimate of strategic value of Wheelus?” (1) Training . Wheelus Air Base is critical to the requirements of the Air Force for the maintenance of combat ready crew status for all fighter and fighter interceptor crews assigned in the European area. The base is the only facility in the area that provides important all year good weather, gunnery and bombing ranges, and other facilities capable of accommodating the large numbers of personnel to be trained. At any one time, there are approximately 100 fighters and fighter interceptors scheduled for training operations at the Weapons Training Center, Wheelus Air Base. Crews are rotated every thirty days. This schedule permits each crew member an opportunity to maintain his proficiency and to requalify himself every six months. These are minimum air training requirements for combat crews. The weather factor is important in that it permits dependable scheduling not only at the Weapons Training Center, but also for the return of these crews to their duty stations to assume their combat alert status. As long as combat ready air forces remain on the European continent, a training facility such as Wheelus will remain an essential requirement. (2) Contingencies . Beyond its significance as a training site, the strategic location of the base has even greater importance. It enhances the US capability to support over 50 contingency plans relating to the Middle East, North and South Africa, and the Indian Ocean area. The loss of Wheelus Air Base would undoubtedly require revision of these plans with the attendant likelihood of degradation of effective response. During our increase of readiness for operations in the Lebanon crisis in 1958, Greece denied the United States certain landing and overflight privileges. In these circumstances, the availability of Wheelus was—and could again be—of major importance. (3) Cold War . As the location of the base is significant to the support of US contingency plans, its location is equally important in support of cold war activities. The air support furnished the United Nations during the Congo emergency could not have been as effective and timely had Wheelus Air Base not been available. US efforts would certainly have been more costly. Were we called upon to provide support for the UN Peacekeeping Force now active in Cyprus, Wheelus would be an important facility in assuring such support. The emerging, volatile nations of Africa South of the Sahara are potential trouble areas in which US interests may require involvement. Wheelus Air Base remains the last US foothold of significance on the Continent of Africa. The combination of US withdrawals elsewhere, the high likelihood of continuing disturbances throughout the area, the strategic interests of the United States, and the role we assume in UN operations increase its strategic importance. (4) Other Significant Uses . Other activities are conducted at Wheelus Air Base. The storage of War Reserve matériel is directly related to the ability of US forces to respond to contingencies since they make possible support of continued operations in remote areas. In addition, the base, again because of its location, serves effectively for strategic aircraft recovery. Military Air Transport Service aircraft operate through Wheelus Air Base and service areas in the Middle East and Africa. The base also includes an important communications station of the Defense Communications System. In addition, a number of important electronic detection devices to monitor nuclear activities of the USSR and France are located and operated on the base. b. “Is US now convinced that retention of Wheelus rights is a top defense priority?” Yes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff attach high importance to the retention of the base. In addition to its importance to US security interests, the base has helped to forestall covetous external interests and has provided the Libyan Government security during its national emergence and development. This has unquestionably contributed to the maintenance of the stability of the Mediterranean area. Just as our departure could very well encourage United Arab Republic subversion or aggression, our removal would make more difficult effective response to preserve Libyan independence. c. “Is retention of Wheelus Air Base such a vital US interest that we prepared to go all the way in its protection?” The United States should be prepared to take all necessary actions consistent with our longer-term objectives of preserving the independence and stability of Libya. A Wheelus Working Group has been organized by the Department of State to assist all action agencies to achieve maximum effectiveness in dealing with the problem. The United States should be prepared to take such necessary steps as would serve to eliminate or reduce the pressures being brought to bear on the Libyan Government. Pressures emanating externally should be dealt with at the source. d. “Does the US in fact see no alternative between complete possession and complete relinquishment of Wheelus rights?” The United States does not now enjoy complete possession of the base. The Royal Libyan Air Force is in possession of a portion of the base and has the utilization of many other areas and facilities. As the space requirements for the Libyan Air Force increase, additional space will be provided. The United States would be willing to discuss additional sharing of base space should the Government of Libya raise the issue. Libyan flags are prominently displayed in designated areas and there exists no dispute over the arrangement under which the Libyan Air Force and the US Air Force work and live side by side. The United States is not rigid in the question of extremes in the exercise of base rights, and the existing agreement does not preclude conversations toward the alteration or adjustment of base space, usage, possession, or command relationships. 2. Beyond the factors outlined above, it should be recognized that Wheelus Air Base has become a symbol of world-wide deployments, the loss of which could serve to reinforce pressures on the United States to evacuate bases and installations in such additional places as Ethiopia, Morocco, the Azores, Spain, Cuba, Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Panama. In this context, the loss of Wheelus could only be viewed as an extremely serious setback to the overseas posture of the United States. Whereas a single base may be of signal importance, the world-wide US system of bases is of vital importance to national security. 3. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the retention of Wheelus Air Base is of primary importance to the security interests of the United States. They recommend that steps be taken to relieve pressures on the Libyan Government and that their views be forwarded to the Secretary of State for use in the formulation of positions regarding Wheelus Air Base. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J.W. Davis 3 Rear Admiral, USN Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1964. Secret. 2 Telegram 2136 from Cairo, March 18, and telegram 4292 to Cairo, March 17, are in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature. 49. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 49. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 1, 1964. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 50. Memorandum of Conversation 50. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 3, 1964. MEETING WITH PRESIDENT RE GOVERNOR HARRIMAN’S REPORT ON TRIP TO GHANA, NIGERIA AND CONGO—APRIL 3, 1964 PRESENT Under Secretary Harriman, Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams, William Brubeck, White House 1. Libya Harriman reviewed his trip 2 saying that Libya seemed to be most difficult and urgent immediate problem of the countries he had visited—both in terms of the Wheelus base and the future for US oil investment. He thinks both covert and open action programs are needed. The President said that he is very much concerned about Libya and asked how soon Harriman estimates the Libyans will seriously demand we evacuate the base. He also asked for specifics on US oil investment in Libya. Harriman indicated we ought to be able to protract our tenancy and our negotiation on the base for several years if it is well handled and that the British will be trying to do the same. Beyond the short-range base problem, however, he is concerned with the security of the very large oil investment and plans to talk to Jersey Standard and the other major companies involved. On the base issue Harriman said the situation is now out of hand and the Ambassador and his staff show little ability to deal with the problem. He thinks it essential that a competent negotiator be appointed to handle the negotiations rather than leave them in the hands of the Embassy. He emphasized also the need to counter the heavy influence of the Cairo “Voice of the Arabs” radio. This is a particularly difficult problem because of the “super Arabism” and anti-Israeli sentiment in Libya. Harriman thinks a propaganda effort is required to create distrust of and opposition to Nasser in Libya. Governor Williams said he had warned Nasser on his visit to Cairo a year ago of the serious view the United States would take of UAR interference to jeopardize US oil investment in Libya. The President requested Governor Harriman to get Carl Rowan’s personal attention to the propaganda problem. 3 [Here follows discussion of the Congo, Zanzibar, and Ghana.] William H. Brubeck 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Memoranda of Meetings with the President, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by William H. Brubeck of the NSC Staff. The meeting was held at the White House. 2 On a fact-finding trip to Africa, Harriman met for 3 hours on April 1 with the Ambassador and the Country Team in Libya to discuss the forthcoming Wheelus negotiations. A summary of this meeting was transmitted in airgram A–331, April 9. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US) 3 That afternoon, Harriman gave a brief report on his trip to Libya at an NSC meeting with Congressional leaders. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. I, Tab 7, April 3, 1964, Various topics (Panama, etc.)) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 51. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 51. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 11, 1964. We’ve bought some time in Libya by agreeing to begin base talks 29 April. Our strategy is to be forthcoming at the outset but then bargain hard. Meanwhile, Parliament has been in recess and press attacks have quieted down. Most important, the King is now making an effort to hold the line, and we’re thinking of a message from you to stiffen his spine as negotiations begin. He tightened his grip on the government last month by threatening to abdicate and then giving in to pressure to stay on. He also told us Thursday that he expected elections early in the fall to produce a “more reasonable” Chamber—with the clear inference that he’d see to it (but we’re not succumbing to overoptimism). Badeau on 5 April got Nasser to agree to lay off US bases. However, his attacks on the British for bombing the Yemeni fort at Harib can’t help but spill over on us in Arab minds. And any signs of a major pro-Israeli move by us might call all bets off. We’ll have a negotiating strategy to show you next weekend, and are developing an action program to get key Libyans to back whatever agreement we can get. With luck, we should be able to hold on to our most important Wheelus assets for 3–5 years (and some even longer), though much will depend on what happens elsewhere in the Arab world. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I. Secret. 52. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 52. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, undated [ca. April 20, 1964]. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 291, Libya Base Rights. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 23, 1964. SUBJECT Reply to NSAM 291 on Wheelus Air Base 2 I enclose a proposed action program prepared in response to NSAM 291, dated March 19. The paper has the concurrence of the Department of Defense and AID. 3 There follows a summary of the important points covered in the action program. The United States has agreed to a Libyan request to discuss in Libya on or about April 29 the agreement of 1954 on Wheelus Air Base, an installation considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be of primary importance to the security interests of the United States. The United States objective in the discussion is to preserve facilities at Wheelus for as long as possible, consistent with the preservation of the independence, stability, and friendship of Libya. The British are opening similar discussions to preserve the future of their Libyan base arrangements and treaty on April 20. We are coordinating closely with them. Pressures for the withdrawal of the United States from the Wheelus Air Base result from a feeling of greater nationalism in Libya, crystallized by a February 22 speech of President Nasser of the UAR. Since then the Government of Libya and the King have assumed greater control of the situation and have helped create a better climate for reasonable discussions with both the United States and Britain. Current United States actions described in the enclosed paper are designed to: (1) create a suitable climate in Libya for reasonable discussions; (2) win support in Libya for a continued United States presence; (3) enlist the interest of friendly governments; (4) prepare in detail for actual discussions with the Libyans; and (5) insure that the United States and the United Kingdom are in harmony. Despite the current pressures in Libya, it is considered possible to work out arrangements in the discussions which will enable the United States to continue using facilities in Libya for a considerable period, perhaps until, and on a limited basis even beyond 1971. This prognosis could be upset, however, by renewed attacks from Nasser, further unrest in Libya, British policies against Yemen, or Arab reactions to United States policy toward Israel. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 291, Libya Base Rights. Secret. 2 Document 45 . 3 Attached but not printed. 54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, April 24, 1964, 5:38 p.m. 448. Wheelus. Embassy may inform GOL Ambassador Lightner accompanied by a Special Representative, Ambassador G. Lewis Jones, who has been designated to represent the U.S. in base discussions, prepared meet with Foreign Minister Mazziq in Baida April 29 to open discussions on base question. Following are instructions for Ambassadors Lightner and Jones for April 29 meeting: Initial UK-GOL meeting on bases indicates opening session will be limited to formalities. U.S. objectives April 29 should be: (1) to make clear U.S. not prepared to agree to an abrogation of agreement or immediate liquidation of Wheelus Base and related areas; (2) assure GOL we are, nevertheless, prepared understand problems of GOL, changes which have taken place in Libya, and, in light these, examine all aspects of the problem on the basis of the existing agreement of 1954, believing that this framework will permit a thorough examination of the problem. Accordingly, on assumption Libyan side will again present request for abrogation and liquidation based on parliamentary resolution of March 16, Ambassador Lightner should reply: 1. U.S. believes Wheelus Base relationship is significant for Libya’s own security as well as being of importance to the United States and other nations friendly to both. 2. U.S. has agreed to discuss this relationship on the basis of the existing agreement of 1954 and believes that this framework will permit a thorough examination of the problem. 3. Should the examination of the problem disclose areas where changes appear to be necessary, the United States is prepared to negotiate on these points to bring about a solution satisfactory to both parties. 4. As an indication of the desire of the United States to provide full opportunity for a thorough examination of the problem, the United States has, following the pattern of other recent negotiations, appointed the Honorable G. Lewis Jones as a Special Representative with the rank of Ambassador, to meet with the Libyan Government representatives on this question as desired. 5. The United States is ready to proceed with the discussions at such time as the Libyan Government may desire. While U.S. does not wish encourage Libyans believe current pressures on them necessitate changes in Wheelus relationship, we do not believe changed atmosphere and pressures on bases can be denied. If, therefore, question pressures and changes raised, Ambassador may state U.S. has followed recent events but believes base relationship remains matter to be resolved by countries directly involved. Additional detailed instructions are being prepared for use in later substantive discussions. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Bronez, Tasca, Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Charles Runyon III, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration Thomas Stern, and Warren; and approved by Harriman. Also sent to Baida and repeated to London, CINCUSAFE, and CINCEUR. 55. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 55. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 1, 1964. McGB: We hit a stone wall in Libyan Foreign Minister Maaziq when Wheelus talks opened Wednesday. 2 In addition to ranting about ineffectiveness of US aid, he demanded we terminate the base agreement, negotiate terms of withdrawal and cancel MAP (about which he turned out to be totally uninformed). Maaziq’s approach contrasted sharply with King’s and PM Muntassir’s. Just before talks started, Muntassir told Jones and Lightner he was sure we could find solution “even if by camouflage.” Jones is having lunch tomorrow with Muntassir to express amazement and unhappiness at Maaziq’s tack and to try to figure out what Muntassir-Maaziq are up to. State is cabling its support for his approach. If Muntassir can’t or won’t soften Maaziq’s line, our getting to the King will be all the more important. Their tough opening may just be Arab bargaining, but Maaziq’s tirade makes it sound more like Arab nationalism. Jones will be back here next week to report so we can get our next steps lined up. My sense is that Maaziq must go (and we could get rid of him by carrying tales to the King), but State will take its usual two weeks to come around to same conclusion. Lightner probably also needs to be replaced but the Old Crocodile can be depended on here. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I, 11/63–6/64. Secret. 2 A detailed account of the April 29 negotiations between the U.S. and Libyan delegations at Baida was transmitted in airgram A–47 from Baida, May 2. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US) 56. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 56. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 15, 1964. Talks with the Libyans on Wheelus base started 29 April and recessed. Lewis Jones, our Minister in London, launched them as our special negotiator and ran into a stone wall. The Libyans insisted on talking only about ending our tenure, so he never got a chance to do more than hint at our plan for gradually transferring nominal control of Wheelus to them, while we stay on as a tenant. Now State and Defense are hammering out our position for the second round, probably in early June. Jones’ formula is to agree in principle to talk about leaving Wheelus but to ask the Libyans for 6 months to study timing, alternatives and other complicated aspects of closing down. This would get us past the touchy period of the Eshkol visit’s aftermath; the Arab summit (August), Organization for African Unity (July), and non-aligned (October) conferences; the current UK-Arab flare-up over South Arabia; and our own elections. However, Defense is still studying this idea, and State will probably end up treating it as a fallback position. Events have overtaken Rusk’s action plan (Tab B), 2 but it would be helpful for you to note it to show your continued concern. We also want to be sure the agencies don’t lose sight of our long-run interests in Libya while concentrating on the base negotiations. NSAM at Tab A for your signature will keep the heat on. 3 R.W. Komer 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1964. Secret. 2 See Document 53 . 3 Attached but not printed. The NSAM was never issued. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya 57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya 1 Washington, May 21, 1964, 7:55 p.m. 79. Baida’s 141. 2 During private conversation with King on May 23 you should convey to His Majesty following points: 1. We are studying results of opening session US-Libyan talks. 2. Insistence by Libyan side at that time on abrogation as basis for discussions naturally creates great difficulties for us because of the great importance of our Wheelus Base facilities to us and prevents useful discussion of other mutually advantageous possibilities. 3. We are sure that this matter can be worked out by means which will be satisfactory to both Libyans and ourselves although inevitably matters of this kind require time. We are certain that a full examination of the possibilities of cooperation at the base will reveal areas of activity which can be developed to the mutual advantage of both nations. 4. We have been approached by Libyan military concerning military assistance and possible purchases and are responding sympathetically in this field. FYI. We are not suggesting by foregoing initiation of substantive discussion or negotiation with King on base issue but propose language as talking points through which you and Col. Dregne may be able evoke some indication King’s current thinking this problem. End FYI. We believe would also be useful to underline to King frequent Khrushchev references bases during Egyptian visit as indicative of common UAR and Soviet interest this matter and Khrushchev remarks concerning Arab unity which cannot but run counter general Arab sentiment. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LIBYA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by McClanahan; cleared by Bronez, Hancock of USAF, Sol Polansky of SOV, and Tasca; and approved by Harriman. Repeated to London, Tripoli, Benghazi, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 2 Dated May 21. (Ibid., DEF 15 LIBYA–US) 3 After having lunch with the King and Queen on May 23, Lightner reported that he was barely able to get in the main points in the Department’s telegram and that the King obviously did not wish to discuss the negotiations. The main subject had been the many services provided by Wheelus to Libya, and the King had remarked that the public and government officials ought to know more about this. He also hinted strongly that the United States might be dealing with another more tractable government before long. (Telegram 570 from Tripoli, May 25; ibid.) 58. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 58. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 1 Washington, May 27, 1964. Dear Averell: Thank you for your letter of May 13th 2 in which you asked for our views concerning the position we should adopt at the next meeting with the Libyans on the problem of Wheelus Air Base. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this matter. We attach great importance to retaining effective use of Wheelus for as long as possible. We also want to avoid prejudicing our base rights in such other countries as Ethiopia by the premature loss of our facilities in Libya. As we see it, the negotiating situation at this time presents a choice between two broad courses of action. One course is to accept the principle of abrogation now. Presumably this would mean, at least, agreeing now to settle for a shorter tenure at Wheelus than the 1954 Agreement provides. The other course is to attempt to deflect the Libyans from this issue of principle. We might, for example, propose that the tenure question be reserved for later discussion. Meanwhile, we would try to focus the talks on ways in which U.S. operation of Wheelus might assist Libya in some of its military activities, and on formal changes at Wheelus which might make our activities there politically more presentable for Libya. Between these two alternatives, we recommend using the second at this time. Following our recent discussion with you, we have well under way the study of progressive reductions in the scale of operations at Wheelus for possible use at an appropriate time in the negotiations. The hard core requirement for a fair-weather training base is not easily separable into two or more operations, each with its own facilities. However, we hope to have the broadest possible range of options available for consideration in the near future. 3 Sincerely, Cy 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 On June 4, Harriman replied to Vance saying that although the Department fully endorsed the negotiating tactic Vance had suggested, he thought that U.S. negotiators ought to be aware of the possibility that in order to meet the U.S. objective of retaining Wheelus for as long as possible, they might be required to agree to discuss tenure in some form. On June 10, Harriman sent Vance a follow-up letter noting that in considering the tenure question, U.S. negotiators needed to take into account the certainty that the Libyans would not under any circumstances consent to an extension of U.S. base rights beyond their scheduled expiration date of December 24, 1971. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 680.1 Libya) 59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, June 11, 1964, 7:26 p.m. 530. For Ambassador Jones. Following constitute instructions for second round Wheelus discussions: A. Objectives 1. Primary purpose US continues to be that of retaining for as long as possible US access to Wheelus facilities under 1954 Agreement. 2. Additional objective is to maintain contact with Libyans on Wheelus problem; avoid deadlock which would jeopardize US retention Wheelus or security other US interests in Wheelus; and preserve for the longer term cordial relations between the two Governments. B. Position concerning 1954 Base Agreement 1. You should indicate USG has given most careful attention GOL proposal abrogation 1954 Agreement. In our view, such action would not merely affect the important activities at Wheelus which we have been conducting on the expectation agreement would continue indefinitely but also be serious precedent endangering other essential base arrangements. US has never been confronted with or agreed to abrogation similar agreements with other countries. We therefore urge that abrogation issue be set aside. 2. You authorized, however, make following statement: a. By terminal date 1954 agreement (December 24, 1971) the US military presence will have been withdrawn from Wheelus, except for such personnel as GOL may agree should remain. b. There are presently no alternative facilities for training activities we conduct at Wheelus. Selection alternative location, planning and development new facilities, relocation equipment would require very considerable study and time. FYI—If pressed by Libyans as to how much study and time are required, you should point out that these are immensely complicated problems for us, and that we trust the GOL will not press us for response now to question whose answer US cannot have before completion of planning well into 1965. End FYI. c. Study has already begun regarding equipment and personnel that can be moved out of Wheelus. This study shows initial reductions could begin this year. First reductions would be items least needed. Libyan side will appreciate US will wish retain until last moment before departure full use training facilities now possessed under 1954 Agreement. FYI—Article X of Agreement covers removal of property. End FYI. d. We hope that even before our withdrawal is completed Wheelus will be in full operation as the center of a well-equipped RLAF which we endeavoring assist GOL bring into existence as effective force. e. To this end we wish propose program for increased participation Libyan military personnel in use of base. We have in mind a broad range of items. Perhaps most important is appointment Libyan officer to act first as a co-commander and eventually as full commander of the base. Other items include enlarged program for training Libyans in base operations, greater Libyan participation in base security. Orderly and effective development of this program will require time. We like to suggest joint Libyan-US subcommittee be established in coming weeks to examine all details of Libyanization. f. Wheelus has already begun serve Libyan Air Force and is capable making significant contribution that would relieve your defense budget of substantial expenditures. We visualize broad expansion this support for your forces at Wheelus. Current talks on military sales and assistance will disclose specific needs of the Libyan Air Force that we can meet at Wheelus. 3. You authorized at your discretion to provide any or all of the foregoing in writing to Maaziq. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Blake; cleared by Bronez, Howard Myers in G/PM, Jones in NE, Tasca, Judd in BNA, Newsom, Hinman and Hirschburg in AID, and Runyon; and approved by Harriman. Also sent to Baida and repeated to London, Cairo, Addis Ababa, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 2 A detailed account of the second round of U.S.-Libyan negotiations on Wheelus on June 15 was transmitted in airgram A–63 from Baida, June 20. (Ibid.) 60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, July 2, 1964, 7:13 p.m. 4. Joint State Defense message. Ref: Deptel 106 to Baida, 2 Baida’s 189, 3 London’s 6485 to State. 4 Request Ambassador convey to Mazziq that: 1. US desires to proceed in accordance GOL acceptance US proposal with establishment US-Libyan subcommittee on Libyanization of base. 2. As Ambassador Jones indicated the US side will consist of both diplomatic and military personnel who will be named at a later date. 3. US suggests early meeting of subcommittee for which space and staff facilities at Wheelus would be made available. US would appreciate receiving indication from GOL of earliest date on which subcommittee might meet. 4. US views purpose subcommittee as development and implementation (after obtaining approval if necessary from their respective higher authorities) of measures agreed to by subcommittee affecting existing arrangements and operations at Wheelus which will more clearly identify its character, administration, and facilities with Libyan interests. The only dates subcommittee should be concerned with are dates of implementation of phased measures of Libyanization program being developed by subcommittee through joint action. FYI: Vital this point be made to distinguish between functions Libyan-US and Libyan-UK subcommittees in order preclude misunderstanding and confusion. End FYI. FYI: At an appropriate time after Libyanization effort has progressed we would propose that GOL representatives on subcommittee, and few key personnel of MOD and Foreign Office, accept US invitation which Ambassador would be authorized extend for visit by them along with US members subcommittee to other facilities outside Libya where arrangements satisfactory to host governments are in effect. Consider this trip should not be mentioned at outset because the obvious advantages are considered to be outweighed by the disadvantage of possibly confirming any suspicion in the Libyan mind that US objective with respect to Libyanization is continued use of Wheelus by US forces. End FYI. In drafting final instructions for US side subcommittee, State/Defense considering Lightner’s and Jones’ comments. In this connection also request Embassy forward recommended agenda, including description and problems if any raised for US by each item, for early sessions subcommittee in accordance Hancock conversation with Paolozzi and Moody at Wheelus. Embassy and Jones authorized to freely exchange info with British on role composition and activities of subcommittee. Ambassador should not raise other aspects Wheelus problem. If Mazziq tries to raise such matters as abrogation principle, dates, etc., he should be informed Ambassador under precise instructions to follow up on only one aspect 15 June discussion, namely Libyanization subcommittee, and has no instructions other subjects as yet. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and Blake; cleared by Warren, Runyon, Frazier Meade of BNA, Hilbert of AIR, Eric E. Oulashin, and Bronez and Heffner of DOD/ISA; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Baida and repeated to London for Lewis Jones, to Benghazi, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 2 Dated June 25. (Ibid.) 3 Dated June 27. (Ibid.) 4 Not found. 61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya 61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya 1 Washington, July 20, 1964, 9 p.m. 22. Following constitutes line you should take with King during expected audience with him this week. In advancing these points you should do so in context your desire acquaint King with current status Wheelus negotiations as we see them. You should not associate your approach with Maaziq’s remarks Cairo and should carefully avoid any appearance either of rebuttal Foreign Minister or criticism of him. Suggest you preface remarks by stating you desire bring HM up to date on base matters as US see them, stressing that high level elements USG have been continuously and deeply concerned with exploration ways of meeting major policy problem posed for US by wholly unexpected March 16 demand by Libyan Parliament for abrogation 1954 agreement and evacuation Wheelus base. Preoccupation USG with this problem result not only of suddenness of Libyan demand but also prompted by grave concern over impact any hasty US decisions this matter, particularly with respect abrogation agreement, would have on US base rights arrangements world-wide as well as local arrangements Libya. Important training function of Wheelus in relation to US regional responsibilities also factor US cannot afford lightly to dismiss. Successful maintenance political stability and peace in critical areas of world directly depend on awareness would-be aggressors of US presence and extent of US commitment to peace. Consequently, US has necessarily had to view Wheelus question in this wider context. At same time, US has endeavored see Wheelus situation in Libyan terms as well. This evidenced by fact US has: 1. Accepted Libyan statement of February 23 that Wheelus agreement will not be renewed on expiration 1971; 2. Declared that by terminal date 1954 agreement US presence will have been withdrawn except for such Americans as GOL may agree should remain; 3. Agreed examine possible alternatives to Wheelus and has already begun to do so with promise to make available results of study in 1965; 4. Undertaken study to determine equipment and personnel that can be moved out of Wheelus, preliminary results of which indicate initial reductions can be made this year; 5. Sponsored proposal for closer identification Wheelus with Libyan national interests and for training of Libyans to operate base when US withdraws through Libyanization program and has recommended to GOL that measures to that end be developed soonest. US attaches substantial importance to cooperative efforts both governments this regard which it hopes will begin soon after GOL names its members Libyanization subcommittee; 6. Negotiated and is willing continue negotiate in good faith with GOL through intermediary of Special Representative designated by President for that purpose as evidence of importance US attaches to development mutually satisfactory solution to problem and longer term relations between both governments; 7. Agreed to military sales agreement to GOL on concessional basis with view strengthening Libyan defense establishment. In concluding your remarks, you should recall the even and friendly course of US-Libyan relations since independence Libya and US desire preserve those relations in interest both countries over longer term. Essential element any such preservation must be determination not exaggerate differences which from time to time will inevitably arise between US and GOL. US has had major differences with other friendly governments in past. In all cases their resolution has depended upon recognition both sides that much more to be gained by mutual comprehension and acceptance each other’s basic good faith than by indifference to each other’s sensitivities and interest. For Cairo: View our continued desire keep Wheelus discussions in low key, and particularly avoid involvement UAR, suggest Embassy generally avoid any comments on Maaziq remarks if queried by local sources. However, no objection if Embassy wishes to draw on foregoing information in providing background to any sources friendly to US which might be interested US side of question. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Blake; cleared by Warren, Runyon, Harriman, Judd, Tasca, Bronez, Lang in DOD, and Jones in NE; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Tripoli and Cairo, and repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 62. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 62. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 30, 1964. McGB: Time may be running out on our effort to stall for time in negotiations over Wheelus . The King told Lightner Tuesday 2 the Libyan parliament will be reconvened in August just to hear a report on the base negotiations. The Libyans want a definite agreement that we’ll get out before 1971. They’ll wait till early next year to talk dates. RWK and I have argued for this right along because it makes more sense to bargain for as much as we can get than to be thrown out standing on our treaty right to stay till 1971. So far we’ve only said we can’t talk about abrogating the agreement but we’ll talk about a departure date next year after we’ve studied alternatives. So the Libyans think we’re sticking to 1971. We’ve tried to hint that the date will be sooner, but Air Force hasn’t let us come out and say so because it still hasn’t faced the fact that we’ll have to get out early. State sees the realities as we do, but is doing its best to buy as much time as possible for the Air Force. Part of our problem is that bases have become a football in Libyan infighting. The PM never explained our position to the King, so we’ve lacked the help of a traditional ally. The King needs British troops more than American planes, so now he’s inclined to split the difference with the anti-base group—be tough on us and soft on the UK. The King recently got wind of Defense Ministry plotting and put the kibosh on an arms deal we’d negotiated to get the military on our side. (Fortunately, he’s relented on the jets we’ll sell to keep working with the new Libyan Air Force at Wheelus, though he sacked the Defense Minister.) We’re considering sending Lewis Jones back next month to reassure the Libyans we’re not trying to stall indefinitely, though a note from him may be enough. The big question Air Force faces now is whether to risk further stalling or to make the best of an early out. If we keep stalling, parliament may abrogate the treaty unilaterally. When we move, we face the political and other problems of relocating the huge Wheelus operation (probably in Spain). 3 Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Secret. 2 July 26. 3 A handwritten note by Bundy in the margin reads: “Thanks for memo. Keep me informed. DOD can help with AF if need be.” 63. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 63. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 8, 1964. Libyan base issue . Under pressure from the Libyans we’ve agreed to let Libya announce that the US accepts the “principle of withdrawal” from Wheelus air base (with no dates mentioned) when Libyan parliament meets, probably in late August. We’ve done pretty well stalling the Libyans since the crisis over Wheelus base broke last February. We’ve asked them to set aside the question of abrogation (this would set a bad precedent for base agreements around the world) and to concentrate on gradual Libyanization of the base. We’ve promised we’d talk date of withdrawal early next year, after we’ve had time to figure out where to relocate Wheelus operations. But Libyans have been insisting we give them something more to say to their parliament indicating we’re responsive to their desire to end the base agreement. Now the Prime Minister (under some prodding from the King) has backed off a bit. He thinks he can satisfy his parliament for the moment if we simply agree to “withdrawal” in principle. Libyans will read this as US agreement to get out well before 1971, but we think it’s the minimum concession we can make to avoid risk that we’ll be told to get out now. It buys us time to bargain hard next year on the actual date for withdrawal. In turn for our accepting this compromise, we hope to get Libyans to keep their press and parliament from heating up the base issue again. While this deal may not stick, it’s worth the try. If we give a little we may be able to hold on to Wheelus for 3–4 years. The Air Force and some in DOD favored a stiffer line, but this was asking for trouble. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Secret. 64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya 64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya 1 Washington, August 8, 1964, 11:25 a.m. 39. Refs: Deptels 37 and 38 to Baida. 2 Acceptance principle withdrawal from Wheelus and agreement report on timing in 1965 represents U.S. decision designed maintain satisfactory relations with Libya and create best possible atmosphere for reasonable discussions on modalities of withdrawal. Department does not exclude possibility, however, that, despite previous assurances, Prime Minister Muntassir or Foreign Minister Maaziq may now find U.S. position has not gone far enough and that, either independently or under GOL stimulation, parliament may still order abrogation of 1954 agreement and establishment early date for evacuation Wheelus. We believe, therefore, it most important make greatest possible effort, as appropriate, assure key figures that: (1) this had been difficult decision for U.S. but we intend carry out our part in good faith and in manner designed maintain best possible relations with Libya; (2) given this step on part U.S., we would regard any unilateral action by Libyans as most serious matter, reflecting not only on good faith Libyan Government, but casting doubt, as well, on Libyan good faith in other matters involving international agreements; (3) additional pressure on U.S. at this time will not make early resolution this matter any more likely and could seriously complicate it. For Baida : Accordingly, we suggest, after presentation note to Muntassir: 1. Informing King in most suitable manner, transmitting, if possible, copy of letter to Prime Minister to King through Khoja. 2. To extent we can do so without antagonizing GOL, informing friends of U.S. who may have influence on government or in parliament. 3. Coordinating closely with CAS which being separately alerted this problem. For Cairo : (Reftels being repeated separately) Once you receive word GOL has been informed of substance Reftels, desire you inform GUAR in manner best designed reach Nasser of U.S. decision accept principle withdrawal and discuss details in good faith in 1965, expressing at same time hope nothing will be done by GUAR disturb atmosphere for reasonable resolution this matter. For London : Desire you inform HMG of U.S. decision this matter and request such assistance as UK feels it may appropriately give through its influence in Libya to insure smooth acceptance U.S. step. We know UK appreciates this step on our part more difficult in many ways than their own recent decision. When GOL has been informed Baida, we intend call in Libyan Ambassador Washington and stress our desire this decision be accepted in manner consistent with friendship two countries. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–4 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Bronez, Strong in NEA, and with BNA and CIA; and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Tripoli, Cairo, and London, and repeated to Benghazi, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 2 Telegram 37 to Baida, August 7, transmitted the text of a letter from Lightner to Prime Minister Muntasir stating that the United States accepted the principle of withdrawal from Wheelus. (Ibid.) Telegram 38 to Baida, August 7, instructed the Ambassador to tell Muntasir that the United States was reiterating in writing its acceptance of the principle of withdrawal, provided that he would confirm that the Libyan Government would not press for further discussion of this matter until 1965 when the U.S. study of the problem was completed, that it would make every effort to maintain a satisfactory climate for discussions, and that it would be reasonable in discussing terms for withdrawal. (Ibid.) 65. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 65. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, August 12, 1964. McGB: Libyan PM Muntassir has bought the deal we offered on Wheelus (Baida 55). 2 In return for our accepting the “principle of withdrawal” he’s agreed to wait till next year to talk dates and to set aside the question of terminating the base agreement. He also said he’ll try to calm public opinion and be reasonable in talks on Libyanizing the base (and later on withdrawal date). Muntassir has proved more reasonable than Foreign Minister Maaziq, so we’re not entirely out of the woods. There will probably be a press flurry when Muntassir reports our acceptance (possibly later this week), and Maaziq could stir up trouble at the Arab Summit conference beginning the end of the month. However, we’ve come off about as well as we could hope so far. We’ll start talking Libyanization as soon as the Libyans name some people to talk with us, and we’re ready to talk dates early next year. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Secret. 2 Attached but not printed. In telegram 55 from Baida, August 10, Lightner reported that he had called on the Prime Minister, who had readily given reassurances on the three points the Ambassador had been instructed to raise. Muntasir had said, however, that he hoped the United States was also agreeing to take steps before the end of the year to lay the groundwork for future talks concerning dates of withdrawal. 66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, October 15, 1964, 5:35 p.m. 236. Ref: Tripoli’s 253. 2 Audience with King October 6 most helpful in providing further elaboration King’s view on base issue. We naturally take most seriously what King has said as indication his probable feelings this matter and will take views into account in our planning. Against background King’s statement and with objective of retaining Wheelus for longest time possible consistent with US objectives we believe following should be broad strategy: 1. Complete study and obtain early approval of CINCUSAFE Action Plan. Implement those portions which are acceptable and can be implemented within current resources and capabilities, all in coordination with general strategy. 2. Seek through sub-committee to impress Libyans with complexity costs and technical requirements to maintain and operate base and offer closer association on base with Libyans. 3. Be prepared for Libyan pressures to make statement to new Parliament; hopefully, only new element any such statement if required would be based on subcommittee progress. 4. Plan for opening negotiations during first half 1965 which will offer increasing Libyan involvement at base and to extent possible and necessary reduce less important US activities while preserving basic US training activities against possible ultimate reversal pressures for complete withdrawal. These negotiations should seek basis for phased arrangements acceptable to King and GOL while preserving US presence and avoiding specific commitment on withdrawal dates. 5. Keep King informed directly of approaches and results of meetings. 6. Avoid mention in any manner to Libyan officials King’s intentions as expressed to us. Such strategy takes note of fact King does not intend reveal his thoughts to GOL. As Ambassador has noted, matter remains in hands Libyan Government and pressures continue for early agreement on withdrawal, as evidenced by statement Libyan Crown Prince October 8 at Non-Aligned Conference that negotiations are now in progress in order to fix a final date for withdrawal. Comments thus do not alter significantly practical negotiating problem US will have to face in sub-committee meetings and in 1965 negotiations based on acceptance of principle of withdrawal. Although King does not intend disclose his views, we can expect enlist his support at critical moments to moderate Libyan position even though we find little basis for expectation he will take any action now reverse present pressures. Re King’s suggestion of Mutual Defense Pact: We have serious doubts any GOL government in present situation would be prepared seek parliamentary approval and sign such pact in face recent demands for abrogation existing agreements. From US viewpoint, while we are prepared reiterate our interest in independence Libya, formal pact raises numerous problems regarding post requests for similar guarantees from other Mediterranean powers as well as Congressional considerations. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Lee of USIA, Hilbert of Air Force, Chapin in M, Warren, and Bronez; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, CINCUSAFE for General Disoway, and to CINCEUR. 2 In telegram 253 from Tripoli, October 7, Ambassador Lightner described a meeting with King Idris on October 6, during which the King said that the United States should not take the Libyan Government’s demands for evacuation of Wheelus or early agreement on dates of withdrawal seriously. Such demands were necessary because of pressure from the Arab League states. The King noted that the negotiations in 1965 could lead to agreement to defer discussions for 2 years. If there were no agreement in 1971, he might ask for an extension, especially if there were a mutual defense pact between the two countries. (Ibid.) 67. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 67. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, November 10, 1964. May I urge that the time has come to gin up an action program on Libya. In four years I haven’t met a single optimist on this non-country; there are only varying degrees of pessimism. True, Libya is no more fragile than many other African or Arab states, but we have a very special interest in it—not only because of Wheelus Base but oil investments approaching $1 billion. We’ve spent a lot of time and energy devising a good strategy to prolong our hold on Wheelus. But we’ve been rather passive about the larger problem—preserving Libya’s independence by helping it toward a higher degree of internal stability and growth. From where I sit, we don’t seem to be worrying enough about Libya—not State, AID, DOD, CIA, or above all the British, who seem either unduly complacent or increasingly prepared to write Libya off. A more active policy wouldn’t necessarily cost us much, because Libya’s own oil revenue (if halfway efficiently used) would more than suffice. What we mostly need are some ideas, energy and preventive diplomacy. With luck, we may have a few years yet before a succession crisis calls Libya’s future into doubt, but it could happen any time. So I see merit in mounting a preventive effort right now. Inter-agency task forces seem a bit passe these days, but why couldn’t an informal action program be drawn up under State’s leadership? An NPP might be in order, but this would take too long. As an initial stop, Dave Newsom when in London Thursday could be instructed to probe hard for both the UK’s own sense of the situation and what concrete measures they might propose. Given our still substantial joint interest in Libya, there might be merit in developing a joint program. Second, why not tell Dave that, when he gets to Libya, he should ask the Embassy on your behalf to come up pronto with its own version of an action program, aimed at complementing our Wheelus negotiating strategy by focussing on a broader target. Third, why not ask the Agency to come up with some political action suggestions aimed at strengthening Libya’s independence and fortifying the position of friendly elements. None of us have any brilliant ideas as yet, but we’re never going to get any unless we start worrying the problem. Fourth, we might think again about discreet ways of warning off Nasser, for whatever these are worth. Fifth, are we or the British doing enough to encourage the Libyans to spend their own money wisely? I fear we have concluded that our aid phase-out deprives us of much leverage. I’m not sure this is valid, given Libya’s continuing dependence on US/UK support for its very security. But at any rate, I’d rather make an effort and fail than not make one. The above ideas by no means exhaust the possibilities; others may have wiser thoughts. But the real need is to anticipate the problem while there’s yet time. I’m sure you agree with me—the important thing now is to bell the cat. R.W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Secret. Copies were sent to Harriman, Rostow, Bundy, Hutchinson, and Polk. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 68. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 68. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, December 9, 1964. RWK: Pending any new ideas Dave Newsom may have brought back, here’s where we stand on Wheelus . State is waiting for Defense’s response to draft negotiating instructions for the next round of talks (possibly February-March). Defense hasn’t formulated a position yet, although it has launched OP Plan 2, a program to make Wheelus more palatable to the Libyans. However, Defense admits we have to start thinking seriously about the next round. Newsom plans to get things going this week. Defense has not made any massive study of alternatives such as we told the Libyans we’d have to make before we could talk about a departure date. The only other possible locations Defense sees are: (1) relocation of training activities at Moron AFB, Spain, at a construction cost of about $40 million plus whatever we have to pay Franco in MAP or political concessions (present agreement ends 1968) or fragmentation of training activities among several bases, including rotation to US (no price tag for this). Defense figures it could move in 2–3 years if necessary. These are DOD conclusions, but there isn’t any big “study.” However, Defense doesn’t see this “study” as the real prerequisite for the next round of talks. They see the “study” as a fiction Lewis Jones invented to stall the Libyans. DOD doesn’t want to set a date for getting out if they can avoid it, though obviously they could pick one out of the air as easily as they could set one through any massive study. They want to try stalling for another round. Defense would go back at the Libyans—not with a date but with a new package for joint use of Wheelus. The big new enticement would be moving the Libyan civil international airport to Wheelus . The Libyans want this, and USAFE has now reversed field and decided it could tolerate this. DOD hopes the base could then be designated as a Libyan airport and joint USAF-Libyan air force training center with our training activity as tenant. I’d recommend asking DOD (perhaps Bill Lang) to do a short memo listing the possible bases where Wheelus activities could be moved and explaining what’s good or bad about each. At least this would clear the air between State and DOD. As long as Defense won’t document its reasons for wanting to stay at Wheelus, State will suspect that the “reasons” are typical Pentagon overstatement. A concrete list could at least get us talking about the real issues—Defense wants to stall and stay as long as possible while State doubts we can put GOL off much longer. HHS 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1964. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 69. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 69. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, March 19, 1965. RWK: Wheelus roundup for London . We’ve just been through another three weeks of Muntasir’s maneuvering to get some political mileage from Wheelus. On 25 February Idris told Lightner he wanted Wheelus to stay. He suggested we just let “negotiations” drift while he’d contain opposition. He even said the government might support our staying through 1971. Then Muntasir got to him and persuaded him that such blunt tactics wouldn’t work. Presumably with the King’s OK, Muntasir has now proposed we convene one showcase negotiating session in May and then step up the work of the committee on Libyanizing Wheelus. He wants a note from Lightner to this effect. State has agreed generally with this scenario provided Lightner reaffirms our understanding of Libyan interest (as stated by Idris) in our staying on. Everybody realizes Muntasir may further undercut the King’s position. However, we’ve gained a year by our stalling and May would be 3 months after we thought we’d have to talk again anyway, so we’re not doing badly. Idris accepted the British plan for pulling their garrison out of Tripolitania by March 1966 while staying on in Cyrenaica for another 3–4 years. Muntasir has asked for a UK note too. The attached paper 2 (which Newsom gave the British several weeks ago) will be the framework for London discussion of broader Libyan problems. It’s the best description of the problem I’ve seen, but it’s still far from an action program. It still banks (probably rightly) on trying to put the CP on the throne. But I think you ought to come down hard on plans for a military government or republic if the CP flops. That’s where we ought to be putting our effort. We ought to press for a concrete plan within 3 months. HHS 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965–March 1966. Secret. 2 Not attached. 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 70. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 70. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 1 Tripoli, March 30, 1965, 11 a.m. 859. 1. During nearly two hour talk with King in Tobruq March 29 I had occasion ask for clarification certain questions relating to base negotiations. I reviewed (a) our last conversation this subject, in which he had stated objective was for US to maintain base through lifetime of agreement, (b) Muntasir’s subsequent request for early announcement of date we prepared resume negotiations (within framework of objective as stated by King) and (c) Maaziq’s indication no statement needed until Parliament meets and his desire review Muntasir’s tactic with King before committing himself on specific request to US. I mentioned we of course welcomed Libyan objective have US remain at Wheelus long as possible and wished cooperate in whatever way best suited to obtain that objective. My govt had been studying Muntasir request in that light and in context of our mutual desire to maintain the independence and integrity of Libya and to preserve and strengthen its institutions including Senoussi Monarchy. 2. King said he very much appreciated last statement and he then reiterated that he and govt wanted US to stay at Wheelus during life of agreement and, if situation permitted, even after that date. He said he had informed Muntasir of our conversation (February 25) and Muntasir had reported to him conversation with me (March 4), including Muntasir’s view that it would be necessary to do something to placate those who demanded our withdrawal from the base. King said he did not believe anything should be volunteered and that no public statement before Parliament convened should be contemplated. Even after Parliament met there would be no need to say anything about resuming negotiations unless question were asked. 3. I asked if he no longer believed in possibility taking public position explaining in full frankness his true position: that it was in Libyan national interest to keep the base at least through 1971. King said this was still possibility that would be considered at the time and he agreed that attitude and strength of public opinion must at all times be gauged with greatest care. 4. Upshot of this discussion was agreement along following lines: (a) that our objective was the same: for US to keep the base going at least through 1971; (b) that tactics he pursued following the convocation of the new Parliament May 22 might involve a forthright expression of the true intentions of the King and his govt or announcement of a date for resuming Libyan-American discussions, for example next Sept; (c) in light of (a), if discussions actually took place they would not deal with date of our withdrawal; (d) there was no present need for USG authorization for the GOL to announce a time for resumption of talks; (e) it was hoped any such statement, if required, could be deferred as long as possible, but it was recognized, that the GOL should be prepared to handle questions about Wheelus when Parliament met; and (f) further details as to what exactly the GOL wanted from US for this purpose should await discussions between King, the Prime Minister and new Foreign Minister. 5. The King said he understood Maaziq had been briefed on all aspects of situation as FonMin. He would now inform Maaziq as PriMin of our talk. King said that if I saw PriMin first I should feel free to tell him of this conversation. I thanked him for clarifying situation and we went on to discuss other subjects. 6. I asked about Mahmud Muntasir’s new position, where he would be living and what his true role would be. I referred to increasingly heavy burdens King had assumed in recent months and wondered if Muntasir would not now be able lighten this load. King said that was exactly why he had appointed him as Diwan Chief. I asked if it was fair to compare Muntasir’s position with that of King Hassan’s Bellafrej. King Idris agreed this was correct. He went on to say that “Muntasir had agreed come and live with us here,” where climate was good for his health especially his high blood pressure. Other subjects discussed reported separate messages. 7. Comment A. I consider Muntasir’s recent proposal as definitely shelved for time being. Next move clearly up to GOL. B. This is no current plan for any GOL statement on base question but GOL must be ready to answer questions when Parliament convenes March 22. C. Neither Muntasir nor Buuri expected back in Libya until next week and no decision likely until they and Maaziq and King get together. Lightner 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, USAFE, USCINCEUR, Baida, and Benghazi. 71. National Intelligence Estimate 71. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 22, 1965. NIE 36.5–65 LIBYA The Problem To assess the situation and probable trends in Libya over the next several years. Conclusions A. As long as King Idris remains active, his conservative regime will probably continue to be relatively stable and pro-Western in orientation. However, Idris will almost certainly make some concessions to the growing educated, reformist elements in Libyan society. In particular, if he came to feel that his throne was threatened by domestic pressures, perhaps stimulated by the UAR, he would be likely to demand fairly rapid withdrawal by the US from Wheelus Air Base. The chances are fairly good that the US can retain Wheelus for two or three years, but the likelihood will decrease over a longer period, and will be particularly dependent on the King’s health and effective control. (Paras. 1–10) B. The chances are better than even that Crown Prince Hasan will succeed to the throne, though only as a constitutional figurehead. Indeed, the monarchy itself may not long survive, as nationalist army officers and civilians might seek to establish a republic in the post-Idris era. Such an Arab nationalist regime would be less friendly to the West. Even conservative leaders may see their interests served by setting up a republic. A growing sense of Libyan nationalism and a desire to keep control of the country’s oil wealth will make appeals for UAR intervention progressively less likely. (Paras. 11–13, 21–26) C. Libya is now a major oil producer, and the massive inflow of oil revenues is creating serious domestic problems. Living standards are rising, but the gap between the rich and the poor will remain despite the government’s efforts at economic development. The government’s present oil policies are likely to continue for at least a few years, and nationalization of the oil industry is unlikely under any regime. (Paras. 14–20) [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and the NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except for the AEC representative and the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction. 72. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 72. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 1 Washington, June 25, 1965. SUBJECT Possible Oil Company Supported Foundation to Assist Libya’s Economic Development You will recall that the Department and AID gave considerable attention last year to the possible establishment of an oil company foundation which would take over, at least to some degree, the activities of the AID Mission in Libya following the termination of the AID program in that country on June 30, 1965. Your personal interest in this matter did much to stimulate the oil company representatives to explore the subject and to send a survey team consisting of Dr. Alvin Eurich and Dr. Jesse Hobson to Libya in February. There is attached a Memorandum of Conversation 2 describing the team’s talk with representatives of AID and of State last April, following their return from Libya. You will note in the last paragraph of the Memorandum of Conversation, Dr. Eurich’s statement that the survey team’s report would be ready in a few weeks for submission to the oil industry committee in New York. So far as we know, the report has not yet been submitted to the industry representatives and no decision has therefore been made with respect to the foundation. The slowness with which the industry representatives have moved on this matter is a source of very real concern to us inasmuch as AID plans to close out in Libya on June 30, except for some twenty advisors on contract to the Libyan Government, who were AID-recruited and are partly AID supported out of previous fiscal year funds. Henry Heuser, the AID representative, may remain in Libya until July or August and will then depart. Thus we seem to be coming to a period soon when we will have neither the AID Mission nor the oil company foundation, and the latter is not even a certainty for some time in the future. Recommendation: That you telephone Mr. M.A. Wright of SONJ and express your concern that there has apparently not yet been a definite decision to follow up concretely on this excellent initiative of last year to establish a foundation to help maintain a U.S. advisory presence in Libya. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) LIBYA. Confidential. Drafted by McClanahan. 2 Not attached. 3 Harriman initialed his approval on June 29. 73. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 73. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 31, 1965, 6 p.m. Letter to King of Libya . Our Libyan affairs have taken a turn for the better and the pressure is off Wheelus Base for the moment, because King Idris fears Nasser so much he wants to keep the US and UK around. He’s also worried by the talk that Britain may pull back various places for payments reasons, so has asked for reassurances we’d help defend him if attacked. The chances of such an open aggression are quite remote; far more likely that Nasser would try to trigger an internal upset, perhaps when King Idris (now 74) died. We also want to avoid any firm commitments and to keep the UK, which has a defense treaty with Libya, out in front. But with over a billion oil investment plus Wheelus in Libya, it pays to buck up the King’s morale by some response to his request. Hence the attached letter, 2 which is very carefully drafted. It says in effect only that we’d “consult immediately” if there were an unprovoked attack on Libya, but surrounds this with a lot of mood music. R.W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965–March 1966. Secret. 2 A handwritten note in the margin reads: “Att Signed 9/1/65.” For the letter, see Document 74 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 74. Letter From President Johnson to King Idris 74. Letter From President Johnson to King Idris 1 Washington, September 1, 1965. Your Majesty: The United States is deeply conscious of the pressures on those who seek to maintain significant traditional relationships between Arab nations and their friends in the West. I am well aware of the steadfastness of the position of Your Majesty and of Libya in this situation. We in turn are determined to assist in the preservation of the sovereignty and dignity of the nations of the area and of the peace which, through so many critical years, has been generally maintained. We particularly value our long relationship with Libya and its friendship and cooperation during the years since independence. We hope with you for sustained freedom and progress in accordance with Libya’s rich endowment, its traditions, and its constitution. Mindful of this valued association and common hope, the United States regards as highly important the political independence and territorial integrity of Libya under Your Majesty. Libya’s first line of defense is, of course, its own forces, and we have informed Your Majesty’s Government of our willingness to cooperate with Libya and other friends of Libya in the continued strengthening and modernization of these forces. Libya’s own expanding resources will provide a base for the strengthening of these defenses. But a nation’s strength lies also in its friends. I can assure you that the United States could not remain indifferent to an unprovoked and aggressive attack on Libya. We would in such an event consult immediately with the Government of Libya and other interested governments on the necessary and appropriate steps to meet the situation within the framework of the international obligations and constitutional procedures of all concerned. Of course, the presence of friendly military facilities within Libya provides a further deterrent to such aggression and would be a significant factor in our ability to lend assistance in such circumstances. I look forward, Your Majesty, to continued close and friendly relations between the United States and Libya over the years to come. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LIBYA. Secret. Circular airgram CA–2580, September 2, transmitted the text of the letter to the Embassy in Tripoli with instructions that it be delivered at an appropriate moment as soon as possible after the presentation of Ambassador Newsom’s credentials. (Ibid., POL 15–1 US/Johnson) David D. Newsom, who replaced Ambassador Lightner, presented his credentials on October 16. He presented the letter to King Idris on November 8. 75. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 75. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 19, 1965, 7:45 p.m. You scored with your letter to Libya’s King Idris. He was quite pleased and assured Ambassador Newsom we could stay at Wheelus Airbase through our present agreement (1971) and maybe even beyond. So without promising to do any more than “consult” if Libya is attacked, we’ve successfully parried the King’s request for a security guarantee yet still kept his backing. This is the capstone of our effort to end the threat to our tenure triggered by Nasser’s February 1964 anti-base speech (a good example of how he can hurt us without spending a cent). However, this is just a battle won. While the politicians have knuckled under to the King for the moment, we can never tell when they’ll stir up the base issue again. We’re also vulnerable when occasional plane crashes draw attention to the base, especially if they harm Libyan lives or property. The other crucial variable is whether Nasser continues to lay off. We’ve come back better than we thought possible, but we’re still holding our breath. Harold H. Saunders 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 76. Memorandum of Conversation 76. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 27, 1966, 1 p.m. SUBJECT UK Defense Review: Reduction of British Forces in Libya and US Commitments there PARTICIPANTS US Secretary Rusk Under Secretary Ball Ambassador Bruce Asst. Secretary Leddy UK Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart Sir Bernard Burrows, Dep. Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office Ambassador Dean Mr. Maclehose, Priv. Secy. to Mr. Stewart The Secretary asked whether the British had in mind that the US should assume a commitment in Libya going beyond the President’s letter of September 1, 1965. The Foreign Secretary explained that British adjustments resulting from the UK defense review would eliminate the British stockpile in Cyprus, which meant that they could no longer draw reinforcements from this source for Libya. (The UK would stay in Cyrenaica.) They could if necessary transfer men from the UK, but not equipment. He asked whether the UK might understand the US letter to mean that the US would be prepared to provide reinforcements for Libya with equipment in the first instance and also with some men. He felt it was important to have a US card to play if the whole arrangement were to be considered credible. The Secretary stated that the US could not undertake any commitment going beyond the President’s letter and he was reluctant to interpret the application of the letter to future circumstances. He pointed out that the letter had been written at a time when the UK position was entirely different from that now envisaged in the UK defense review. In any event, the US commitment must be regarded as junior to that of the UK. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965–March 1966. Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary for European Affairs John M. Leddy and approved in S on February 18. The source text is labeled “Part II of IV.” The conversation was held during a luncheon in the Madison Room at the Department of State. 2 Telegram 3888 to London, January 7, noted that the U.S. Government had reservations about assuming primary responsibility for the defense of Libya as the British had recently requested, and asked the Embassy to express these reservations to the British Foreign Office. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 LIBYA) Telegram 3261 from London, January 13, reported that Embassy officials had made U.S. reservations clear to the British Foreign Office, but noted that the British had indicated they felt that the United Kingdom lacked adequate forces in the area for a meaningful intervention and that the United States was better equipped. (Ibid.) 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, February 25, 1966, 6:18 p.m. 4968. Ref: Deptel 4836. 2 Subj: US–UK Talks. 1. Please inform Fonoff verbally of following. Dept will do same with British Embassy here: A. US is willing to have talks on Libya as soon as this can be arranged. US participants would be Kitchen, Asst Secy for Politico-Military Affairs, and Root, Director Office of Northern African Affairs. US members of the Joint UK/US Planning Group in London could be on call for military advice if required. FYI—Consideration being given to participation from DOD/ISA—End FYI. B. We propose following agenda: 1. Consider arrangements for continuing diplomatic and intelligence exchanges concerning the circumstances in which aggression against Libya might occur and a range of political and political/military courses of action to deter or counter aggression. 2. To undertake preliminary exploration of these subjects, including identification in light of UK Defense Review, of UK capabilities to support the Libyan commitment. C. Referring to discussions of the British Defense Review, the US recalls the understanding reached between principals that objective of discussions now being proposed would be to study the problem and narrow it down, with understanding that US is unable to consider further commitments. In the circumstances, we would wish to limit the forthcoming discussions to an exchange of views under the above agenda. 3. FYI—Recent discussions with UK suggest British are now seeking a firm US commitment on the forces the US would be willing to make available to assist UK forces in carrying out UK’s treaty commitments. British seemed to be working on assumption that there would be little or no backup forces available from UK resources outside of Libya. We are not willing to concede this point. Only as actions under UK defense review begin to take shape will they (and we) be in position to consider various sources (BAOR or forces in UK) from which British could draw backup forces and necessary airlift. It may eventually turn out that under circumstances British will need our help, but burden would be on UK to prove necessary forces are not available from her resources. In meantime, we are prepared to continue exchanging information through political and intelligence channels on situation in Libya, and through UK/US Study Group on the size and type of forces likely to be required to meet various contingencies. Study Group would not identify, however, which country would provide specific forces—End FYI. 4. For Kitchen: Please inform London and Dept if you will be available March 7. S/S amending orders to London. We have informally told British March 7 looks suitable, subject to your schedule. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 LIBYA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Campbell in AF/AFN; cleared by Root, Lang, Meyers, and Judd; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Tripoli and Monrovia for Kitchen. 2 Dated February 18. (Ibid.) 78. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 78. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, March 9, 1966, 1835Z. 2 4252. Subj: US/UK talks on Libya. A. Opening Session, March 7 1. Leading for Brit side, Geoffrey Arthur of FonOff stated he believed there might be some misunderstanding of effect of defense review on British intentions and military capability to honor UK treaty commitment to Libya. UK intended to honor its commitment, but, as information British intended to provide during course of talks would indicate, implementation of defense review decisions would make this task more difficult. After mentioning that withdrawal of all British ships from Mediterranean would markedly reduce deterrent insofar as treaty was concerned, he stressed that Canberra strike force at Akrotiri was retained as a deterrent for contingencies involving Libya as well as CENTO and Kuwait. He hoped this US/UK group could identify problems and (a) agree on nature threat and circumstances in which Libyan Govt might need help from outside and (b) consider current military plans and effect of defense review thereon. 2. Kitchen for US side accepted British approach to problem and ascertained that UK would not use force on purely internal threat, although British observed it was hard to separate internal from external. Kitchen stressed that US letter to King Idris 3 commits US only to consult Libya and other interested govts in case of threat to Libya. 3. Speares circulated draft paper entitled “Libya: The Threat,” conclusions of which were (A) internal situation is likely to remain stable so long as King reigns; (B) prospects of internal stability are improving; (C) threat we are concerned with is an external attack by UAR rather than by internal subversion alone; (D) UAR military intervention is likely only in circumstances in which Libyan revolution already underway and British willingness to assist legitimate govt was in doubt; (E) Egyptians would be anxious to avoid direct confrontation with British troops and any Egyptian decision to intervene would be greatly influenced by presence or otherwise of British troops in Libya and their assessment of reenforcement capability. 4. Root observed that US estimate of threat to Libya was very close to that of British and while UAR threat now seems more hypothetical than real we should remember UAR involvement in Yemen, Congo, and Algerian-Moroccan conflict. Root emphasized that US considers UK treaty with Libya very important as a deterrent because it provides framework within which military action can be taken. 5. Both sides agreed it was difficult to assess internal threat to regime but that continued, full exchanges of information were essential. 6. Speares for UK reviewed capabilities Cyrenaica defense force as being sufficient to deal with internal problems in their area of operations. Less is known about loyalty of army which British do not consider capable of opposing UAR invasion. 7. Arthur said he suspected Nasser was waiting for King’s death before making moves, sequence of which might be attempt to bring off coup and establish new govt which would denounce UK treaty and permit UAR military to move in. He added that we must watch Libyan army and police like a hawk. 8. Root agreed that Nasser might proceed as Arthur had indicated. He added that UAR had been reminded of our interest in Libyan integrity. It was agreed that US would take British paper back to Washington for further comment. B. Second Session, March 7 9. UK element of US/UK planning group outlined Brit unilateral contingency plan in detail, covering three phases of steps to meet possible UAR threat in Cyrenaica. Notable that post-UK defense review revision of this plan calls for full augmentation previously contemplated, although degraded in time, and with unresolved problems of airlift and naval support. Arthur emphasized all permanent UK naval deployments in Mediterranean will be removed by mid-1968. 10. Subsequent discussion indicated Benghazi area reductions from two armored reconnaissance squadrons and two companies to one of each had been initiated by previous conservative govt by agreement with Libyan Govt, well before defense review, but would not be complete until end 1967. UK plan not operative in absence some element of external aggression, since this rather than internal coup is contingency UK committed to deal with. Moreover, it could only be implemented in response to request by GOL. 11. Kitchen and US element of planning group summarized US deployments in Tripolitania, training and staging roles of Wheelus AFB and arrangements for its protection. Stated no special planning had been undertaken as result of President’s letter to King. However, also noted USG had no formal commitment to Korea or, except under protocol to SEATO, to Vietnam. 12. Arthur observed that apart from defense treaty US and UK interests in Libya essentially similar, politically and militarily, without any strong emotional involvement by either. Said consideration had been given during defense review to Brit withdrawal from treaty. Kitchen pointed out US would view such step with utmost gravity, since treaty of major importance, most fortuitous to defense of West and accepted by other Arab states. Finkelstein noted value of close and continuous US/UK consultation. 13. Arthur said HMG had admitted to Brit press that Dhekelia stockpile being cut, and Egyptians bound realize this to some extent. However, he hoped UAR would notice that a British Canberra bomber force was remaining in Cyprus, since it provided “real deterrent” to any UAR aggression against Libya. C. Final Session, March 8 14. Arthur reemphasized degradation of UK deterrent in Libya that would result from reduced UK presence in Mediterranean area, particularly removal of Brit Fleet. Since this situation only tolerable because of US Sixth Fleet, he asked whether there were any actions, political or military, which US could take to fill in gaps in UK planning, recognizing they must be without commitment to US side. 15. Kitchen expressed appreciation for continued undertaking by UK to dispose its forces in support of Libyan treaty. Noted US response necessarily limited by heavy Far East operational requirements, demands on our European airlift and other resources which might be further strained by De Gaulle’s initiative against NATO, as well as US unwillingness to commit itself to a joint plan. Nevertheless, the US team was willing look into possibilities for complementary US planning which would enable fulfillment of British plan, such as airlift augmentation or more definitive utilization of presence of Sixth Fleet. Arthur observed that without some US assistance the Brit units in Libya would be very much out on limb, with sea reinforcements from UK five or more sailing days away. 16. In response Root’s question, Arthur stated for record that HMG has no intention try get out of treaty obligations. Although UK plan as such not known to Libyans, may be necessary discuss matters with King if his confidence appears shaken when Brit ships removed from Mediterranean. Agreed to consult with US in normal course, and particularly in that event. 17. Discussions of possible courses of action to enhance deterrent vis-a-vis UAR included US ship visits, training exercises, firepower demonstration off Egypt to which Nasser’s senior officers might be invited, and training of additional US security force personnel in Libya. Kitchen noted need not to overload Wheelus and requirement to work contemplated measures in with other Sixth Fleet requirements. 18. Root noted US less optimistic than UK over lack of trouble during King’s lifetime. Again observed UK threat assessment pointed exclusively eastward, and desirability of consulting on other contingencies, such as those arising from Algeria or even Tunisia. Arthur accepted theses, and also need to consult on Libyan internal situation. Was agreed one method for refining joint threat assessment would be to exchange views on current UK paper (JIC 6615) after it had been circulated through intelligence channels. 19. In light foregoing discussion, US side undertook to raise matter in Washington with view to seeking modification of instructions to US element of US/UK planning group so that coordinated military planning could take into account problems which will arise in Brit plans as result of decisions taken during defense review and which were explained at meeting on March 7. 20. Possibility of contributions by other NATO nations to Libya also considered; although no specifics emerged, was agreed to keep matter under review. Timing of future meetings will be left to pace of developments. Bruce 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 LIBYA. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to DOD, Tripoli, CINCSTRIKE, and EUCOM. 2 Beginning in Spring 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in 6-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 Document 74 . 79. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 79. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 1 Washington, March 15, 1966. RWK: Kitchen at lunch may talk Libya. Report on his London talks attached. 2 My reading is that, while the Brits may not be trying to ditch their formal treaty commitment to Libya, they’re clearly drawing a narrow circle around it. It’s OK to plan how we’d deal with Nasser’s army coming across the border. But we can’t stop at “external aggression” as the Brits seem to. So I’d say the London talks were OK as far as they went. The Brits are worried about two things: (a) They fear Nasser will see the real weakness of their new position, thus degrading the deterrent value of their force. (b) If they actually have to put their force in the field, they’ll need help lifting reinforcements. They’d like us to increase 6th Fleet visits and training exercises geared to Libya and also at least to promise we’d help them bring up their reinforcements if Nasser attacked. Washington’s next bureaucratic step is to decide (a) how much we’ll do to bolster the deterrent’s tarnished image and (b) whether this is enough. I don’t mind moving a few ships around, but I think we ought to let the Brits know the planning doesn’t stop there. (I realize the Four Square planning goes on in other channels, but I think we ought to keep the focus straight.) H. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965–March 1966. Secret. 2 Not attached. 80. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) 80. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) 1 Washington, April 25, 1966. SUBJECT Libya: Reply to Letter from Ambassador Newsom on Assistance Ambassador Newsom has written you inviting your attention to the problem of providing technical and advisory assistance to Libya in the absence of an AID program. (Tab B) 2 This is a longstanding question, with which Ambassador Newsom dealt during his assignment as Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs, which preceded his appointment as Ambassador to Libya. He continues to believe, after seven months at the post, that we should reverse the decline in American advisory and technical assistance to Libya (although not necessarily by reestablishing an AID program) on grounds of U.S. political, economic, commercial and strategic interests. We are planning to take up this question in the IRG and are preparing our case. Accordingly, we recommend an interim reply to the Ambassador, expressing your continuing personal interest. We will provide you with copies of relevant documents as this proceeds toward resolution in the IRG or otherwise, as well as a follow-up letter for your signature if this is indicated. Recommendation That you sign the attached interim reply. (Tab A) 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 LIBYA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Attached but not printed. Mann signed the letter on April 28 and it was pouched to the Embassy in Tripoli on May 3. 81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, August 26, 1966, 6:13 p.m. 36265. Subj: British withdrawal of troops from Libya. 1. During recent Washington visit, Prime Minister Wilson alluded to possibility sustaining treaty commitment to Libya without necessity for British presence. In subsequent conversations in Dept., British Emboff asked whether follow-up of Primin’s brief mention this subject would be sympathetically received. Following negative reaction from Dept., British stated to Dept. they recommended to London no follow-up. 2. Nevertheless, Dept. uneasy that British attempting pave way for virtually complete withdrawal from Libya (presumably excluding El Adem), perhaps based on low-key approaches mentioned above and such discussions as that of Sarell with Newsom (Tripoli A–47). 2 Moreover, British may believe we would not object, view our lack of reaction to reductions in Malta and Gibraltar and our knowledge their serious economic problem. 3. We suppose that British would justify further withdrawal from Libya on financial grounds (although insignificant foreign exchange savings result since Libya in sterling area), and minimal interpretation of British obligations under Libyan treaty (which in any event they believe they can sustain without presence in Libya). British may also believe that their substantial oil interests in Cyrenaica would receive same kind of protection they judge would be extended to American interests in Libya. It may well be that only factor still keeping British in Libya is personal attitude of King, who presumably regards British as his chief protector, and need for El Adem, which, however, evidently diminishing. 4. We consider that psychological aspects of British presence are of particular importance. Departure of additional British troops might reawaken latent pressure for corresponding U.S. moves, despite personal views of King, and other important Libyans might lose significant respect for value of British (therefore U.S.) military presence. We inclined believe that if British left Benghazi, their presence only in remote eastern reaches of Libya would be tantamount no presence at all on Libyan scene, but only satisfying personal wishes of King. We believe also that once departed, British could not easily move back into Libya. We hope we have made it sufficiently clear to British that U.S. could not fill the void their departure would leave, physically or psychologically. 5. In circumstances, and especially considering pattern discerned in British withdrawals elsewhere, Dept. considers it desirable go on record in London re Libya. Therefore suggest demarche limited to discussion of Libya, based on our common interests in stability and integrity of Libya and history of close consultations over past years. In expressing appreciation for frankness with which British have discussed their defense plans for Libya, and recognition of exigencies of British situation, we might say that we would wish be equally candid in stating that we continue to consider Libya as special case, that we would be alarmed at further indications British wish minimize or eliminate their presence (although we recognize that they have plainly said they will honor defense commitment), that our recognition of British difficulties and consequent reductions elsewhere in Mediterranean should not be misread as indicating we would be indifferent to further UK withdrawal from Libya. 6. Welcome comments of addressees, but believe approach in London should be made at early date. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–UK. Secret. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Looram in AF and Shullaw in EUR/PMI, and approved by Kitchen. Also sent to Tripoli and repeated to Baida. 2 Dated July 27. (Ibid.) 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, January 11, 1967, 3:40 p.m. 116386. Ref: Tripoli’s 2228. 2 1. DeptOff reiterated to British EmbOff on January 10 our concern that Benghazi withdrawal might cause Libyans question British commitment and might expose Wheelus to additional pressure. Said we wished reinforce points made by Newsom in London and hope way can be paved to assure no adverse Libyan reaction. 2. Brit EmbOff, speaking personally, said he understands matter being presented as no weakening British commitment, in fact redispositions British forces make entry points more secure. Said no doubt British intention informing King and PriMin well in advance. Execution withdrawal needs to be “faultless” so as to cast no doubt on British intentions. Matter of Libyan offset had been considered but rejected. British PriMin message considered sufficient, since higher-level effort might result in alarming Libyans. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–UK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Judd and Major Pinckney in G/PM, and approved by Root. Repeated to London, Baida, and Benghazi. 2 In telegram 2228 from Tripoli, January 6, Ambassador Newsom commented on his report earlier that day that the British Ambassador had informed him that the British Cabinet had taken an “irrevocable” decision to withdraw British troops from Benghazi by December 1967. (Ibid.) 83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, June 2, 1967, 5:54 p.m. 207217. Ref: Tripoli 4108; 2 Cairo 8365; 3 Baida 567; 4 Tripoli 4105. 5 In further conversations with Ghannai and senior GOL officials, you may draw on following with respect current concern over Wheelus: 1. USG appreciates cooperation GOL officials in present tense circumstances and desires to cooperate to fullest in reassuring Libyans that US facility in no way being utilized against Arab interest. 2. Ambassador Newsom has brought to attention senior Air Force officials in Washington Ghannai’s concern over night transit and exercises. Air Force has assured Ambassador that in accordance our normal practice GOL will be advised of any unusual activities and night activity will be reduced to minimum. Some night activity necessary in view regular schedules of military transport planes in accordance normal procedures and necessary exercises and night flying training. 3. Embassy has in past indicated willingness arrange visits Ghannai or others to Wheelus at any time. This invitation remains open. 4. US continues stand by Article XII of Base Agreement. 5. USAF sending separate messages USAFE re above. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Hilbert of USAF, Wolf in G/PM, Root, Bergus in NEA/UAR, Colonel Kennedy in DOD/ISA, Neuman in L/AF, and the NE Task Force; and approved by Trimble. Also sent to Baida and repeated to Benghazi, Cairo, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 2 Telegram 4108 from Tripoli, June 1, reported that Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Al-Ghannai had told the Embassy that he had received information that Hercules 130 planes had been observed departing from Wheelus, and had pointed out that such movements were subject to misinterpretation by the Libyan public and “other non-Libyans who are watching Wheelus movements very closely.” (Ibid.)” 3 Dated June 2. (Ibid., POL ARAB–ISR) 4 Dated June 1. (Ibid., DEF 15 LIBYA–US) 5 Telegram 4105 from Tripoli, June 1, commented that Ghannai’s request that officials at Wheelus exercise discretion and avoid activities that might be used as proof that the base was being used to supply Israel reinforced the need for an increase in the effort that Embassy and base authorities had been making to decrease the visibility of the base and its operations. (Ibid.) 84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, June 7, 1967, 6:19 p.m. 209026. Ref Tripoli 4204, 4216; Baida 579. 2 1. Appreciate your efforts persuade GOL place RLAF officers at Wheelus Base Ops Center. You should continue to urge GOL to accept this offer, emphasizing we anxious Libyan representatives maintain 24-hour observation Wheelus activities in order satisfy themselves Cairo allegations totally false. 2. We consider Cairo charges about 6th Fleet and Wheelus complicity on side of Israel highly dangerous and as having directly served stir up mob action against Americans in various parts Arab world. 3. We would like be informed soon as GOL assigns any observation and liaison personnel to Wheelus so we may include this information in our publicity refuting Cairo allegations. 4. Per your suggestion we are taking steps include denial Wheelus being used in support of Israel in general denials relating to 6th Fleet activity. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Tron and Root, cleared by Cooper in S/AH and Bader in DOD/ISA, and approved by Trimble. 2 Telegram 4204 from Tripoli, June 6; telegram 4216 from Tripoli, June 6; telegram 579 from Baida, June 4. (All ibid.) 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, June 13, 1967, 4:44 p.m. 210639. State/Defense message. 1. This message requests your views on immediate future Wheelus. 2. Part I—Main elements of situation as of June 11: (a) 38 F–100, plus a few air-sea rescue and transport aircraft still on base. Flying operations limited to supply and evacuation. (b) 6300 Americans evacuated from Libya, 3305 civilians remain in country, of which 530 employees and dependents still at Wheelus. 3346 US military still on base. Unknown number third-country nationals may use base for evacuation. 2 (c) Stages for defense of base, if necessary, outlined Tripoli’s unnumbered telegram June 9. 3 (d) Security situation Tripoli area seems to be improving but presumably still subject sudden change for worse. (e) Attitude and intentions of King and GOL in aftermath of Sinai debacle still unclear. 3. Part II—Fundamental assumptions or issues: (a) Context of our base rights at Wheelus may have changed radically with events of past week. Even if lie about use of Wheelus is not perpetuated, we may find it difficult resume useful operations for some time. Question to be reviewed in both field and Washington is extent to which continued importance Wheelus function to US strategy would justify determined effort remain there in face of hostile mob actions. (b) Immediate future of country depends heavily on extent to which King and GOA reassert authority, particularly if Cairo propaganda blasts continue and local mood remains inflammatory. Presumably in own self-interest, regime will want to recover control and provide adequate protection for Wheelus, but ability to do so uncertain. (c) There is at least possibility breakdown in order leading to threat of mob action against Wheelus. Alternatively, GOL to placate local or general Arab sentiment, may demand control or even evacuation of Wheelus. (d) If King should abdicate responsibility or prove ineffectual in present circumstances, present government might be overthrown or Prime Minister Maziq simply concentrate on preserving his position in Cyrenaica. If government overthrown or effective authority reverts to provinces, successor leadership we would have to deal with in Tripolitania likely be more radical and Cairo-oriented. (e) On other hand, suggestion that US giving in to Cairo propaganda in preparing to give up Wheelus could pull rug from under King and present govt. (f) Mob action against Wheelus which Libyan security forces unable to contain would present us with serious dilemma. Use of US force justified in last analysis in protecting American lives, but physical injury or deaths among Libyans would again inflame emotions against US throughout Arab world. Resulting loss effective use of Wheelus might be only one of adverse consequences for US policy. (g) This in turn leads to two further questions: (1) whether non-lethal crowd control equipment at Wheelus (fire hoses, etc.) should be augmented, and (2) whether remaining military complement at Wheelus should be reduced to essential minimum. (h) If Wheelus becomes political and physical target, this may seriously prejudice any prospects early resumption oil flow by companies Libya. We may then have to weigh our interest in Wheelus against interest in Libyan oil. Conversely, continued US presence Wheelus may support our interest in Libyan oil. (i) If internal security breaks down or country threatened from without (e.g., by Algerians), King and GOL may appeal to us for protection. We would then have to decide whether to intervene with force in their behalf. British would presumably be faced with such request before US, given their defense treaty with Libya and presence of UK troops in Cyrenaica. (j) Assumption underlying Wheelus/Embassy defense plan (reftel) seems to be that all Americans would be evacuated and base abandoned if mob action could not be controlled. We recognize that total withdrawal from Wheelus will make it extremely difficult if not impossible ever to return to Wheelus. (k) We would contemplate intervening unilaterally with additional force only to protect American lives, and contemplate intervening with force to protect American interests (base and oil installations, or stake in survival of friendly government) only at express request recognized Libyan governmental authorities. Political implications could be far-reaching. (l) Because of British interests in Libya (including El Adem airbase) and responsibilities under UK-Libyan treaty, closest possible consultation with UK desirable but not until US has carefully considered situation and you are then so instructed. Embassy London’s 10292 does not provide much reassurance that UKG has thought out its own reactions to various contingencies. 4. Part III—US interests: (a) We are in Wheelus under valid base agreement. We would want to hold on to base and retain at least essential American military complement, preserving our base rights and resuming normal operations when possible, because (1) military importance Wheelus; (2) abandonment of Wheelus might bring new risks to other Americans and other American interests in Libya and elsewhere in Arab world; (3) we do not wish to appear to be responding to and confirming false Cairo propaganda; (4) our withdrawal would probably weaken Libyan Government and Libyan security; and (5) US withdrawal except under clear and present danger could have unfavorable implications affecting US base rights in other countries. (b) We want to cooperate closely with present GOL in reducing vulnerability of Wheelus to minimum. For this we need fullest possible cooperation GOL, first, in reestablishing public order, and second, by encouraging GOL to take most effective stand to limit damages Cairo propaganda. (c) We think it tactically unwise to take any initiative to change status of base. If GOL considers some alterations, at least in appearance, are necessary, we would give any appropriate suggestions to this end our urgent consideration. (d) We think F–100’s should remain on ground for time being but prepared to leave on short notice. (e) We want to avoid all actions that would further arouse Libyan and Arab passions against US or would further prejudice US stake in Libyan oil. (f) For present, therefore, we intend stand fast at Wheelus with minimum activity and hope to rely on GOL to protect base from mobs. Request Embassy Tripoli views on need and desirability reducing size Wheelus complement. (g) Meanwhile future prospects with regard to Wheelus, in light of all current factors, will be undergoing urgent review. 5. We urgently need your comments and recommendations addressees in light foregoing considerations. We especially need continuing assessment of capability GOL to maintain law and order and survive politically, and of what is likely to happen within country if GOL fails in this mission. We also anxious to have your recommendation of actions that could be taken to preserve acceptability of Wheelus to GOL and also Libyan populace in general. 4 Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Root and Campbell of AFN; cleared by Kitchen, Lang of DOD/ISA, General Sibley of the Joint Staff, General Martin of USAF, Neuman, Judd, and NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE. 2 Angry demonstrations and attacks against U.S. offices in Libya occurred immediately following the outbreak of the Six-Day War on June 5. 3 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US) 4 In telegram 114 from Tripoli, June 15, Newsom reported that the Embassy agreed generally with the Department’s assessment. The U.S. approach should be to assume that the Libyan Government would be able to restore order and follow through on its expressed desire to resume normal relations with the United States and normal base activity at Wheelus. Newsom noted that the Libyan officials with whom he had been in contact had given no indication that they expected U.S. withdrawal from Wheelus. He believed that Libyan security officials had the situation under control and the Embassy was working with the government to keep base activities subdued. (Ibid.) 86. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 86. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 1 Tripoli, June 15, 1967, 1500Z. 136. Ref: Tripoli’s 135. 2 1. Foreign Minister Bishti, with tone of deep regret, told me today of King’s decision request implementation withdrawal from Wheelus. He had made similar request re British bases earlier to Amb. Sarrell. 2. In acknowledging demarche, I made these points: (A) I would report approach immediately to Washington. (B) I regretted I had not had opportunity discuss matter with King prior his decision. King had frequently shown great concern over Libyan security and dependence on U.S. role that security. He knew degree to which our military facilities represented symbol our interest in Libya. (C) While base was only one facet of U.S.-Libyan relations, Libyan request for implementation of withdrawal at this time will be interpreted by Cairo as victory for its tactics of untruth. This was time for Libya to demonstrate its independence. One cannot avoid interpreting recent events primarily as effort by Cairo with Soviet support liquidate U.S.-U.K. presence and gain domination in Middle East and North Africa. While it might be Libyan hope base withdrawal would remove irritant in relations with Cairo, Cairo almost certain to find other means attacking present regime and Libya’s wealth. (D) Request coming at this time cannot but further shake confidence of Americans to Libya and in possibilities investing Libya. It would seem confirm malicious charges of U.S.-U.K. involvement. (E) In 1964, Libya had requested U.S. liquidate base and had immediately begun public and Parliamentary pressure apparently on assumption U.S. not prepared discuss issue. This did not help its resolution. I strongly hoped that Libya would give U.S. adequate time for reply and that whatever results could be handled in manner which has as its objective preservation close U.S.-Libyan ties. 3. Bishti, who obviously not happy with decision, acknowledged truth these statements, but said government under intense pressures and believed those essential steps in its program of restoring order. In response my question regarding public announcement, he said one might come today or, at latest, during Kuwait meeting Foreign Ministers on 16th. He said he hoped accompany any statement in Kuwait repeating Libyan denial of any use Wheelus for aggression against Arabs. 4. Comment and recommendation : This not unexpected, although GOL had given impression it was seeking preserve bases. Pressures for satisfactory posture at Kuwait and possible summit meeting undoubtedly weighed in balance. We should also keep in mind that U.K., given pressures for withdrawals, may well welcome opportunity to reduce presence here. In such situation we have at least these alternatives: (A) Reply that we have an agreement until 1970 and state that we believe this agreement should be respected. We should, if take this approach, be prepared for harassment and, perhaps, violence. This would require a determination of the cost we wish to pay. (B) Make further argumentation with GOL and King against decision. I attempted, before this demarche, see King on general situation, was told he was indisposed and audience could not be at least for week. I believe we should assume GOL will make statement and commit itself this policy before we can make further arguments. (C) Delay reply until situation cools. Despite my statement to Bishti. I am almost certain GOL will commence public pressure against base in belief we are stalling. This, in my view, not desirable. (D) Inform the GOL that the USG as a result of its regular review of overseas base requirements had already reached the decision to liquidate the base and would therefore be prepared to begin discussion to that end. (E) Make immediate reply that, in accordance request GOL and our position in 1964 we are prepared resume discussions leading to withdrawal and will make best effort present time table within one month. GOL will in meantime wish organize committee meet with us. I favor this approach since it will serve hopefully delay further discussion until heat of present crisis subsides, we can take further soundings locally and with UK and can then judge whether time table we present will propose long or short period withdrawal. 5. While appreciating how short time is, I believe there is value in my replying to GOL along foregoing lines prior Kuwait meeting Saturday. Newsom 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Flash. Repeated to London, CINCUSAFE, and CINCEUR and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 2 Dated June 15. (Ibid.) 87. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 87. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 1 Tripoli, June 16, 1967, 0905Z. 165. Ref: Flash State 211609. 2 1. Informed Foreign Minister Bishti June 16 that in accordance request GOL and our position 1964, we are prepared resume discussions leading to withdrawal. I told him that, given brief time available for reply we were not able say when we would be ready for discussions, but that GOL might wish organize committee its side. Suggested that Department might wish me return for consultation prior discussions. 2. I stressed to Bishti our hope matter could be viewed in context continuation 1964 discussions rather than in context present crisis. I read him proposed Departmental contingency statement. 3. Bishti expressed appreciation for prompt reply. He said Departmental approach thoroughly acceptable to GOL which did not plan further statements. His own statement at Foreign Ministers’ meeting would mention favorable response both US and UK Governments. Newsom 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Flash. Repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE and passed to the White House, CIA, USIA, DOD, NSA, COMAC for POLAD, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 2 Dated June 15. (Ibid.) 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 1 Tripoli, June 22, 1967, 0945Z. 297. Reference: Tripoli 175. 2 Wheelus. 1. During audience with King June 21, I said I wished be certain he was aware our reply to government on base issue. He asked what “agreement” we had with government. I explained we had discussed approach with PM and planned have preliminary talk with GOL soon after which I might return for consultation. He commented, “The more delay the better”. 2. In this context, I stressed need get base operating again. I stressed also my disappointment at lack confidence in US on part RLAF. He said he was shocked by conduct RLAF, including informing Egyptians regarding movements at Wheelus. He had not told government yet, but he intended move RLAF away from Wheelus to base which would be near neither Tripoli nor Benghazi. When I asked about further development RLAF, he said it would be slow. We will give them a few advisors, he added. 3. My efforts suggest to him we might find common basis for cooperation with RLAF if they remained at Wheelus were unavailing, at least for moment. 4. Comment : Throughout audience, of which foregoing was part, King displayed relaxed relief that tough problems currently facing country were, under constitution, government’s responsibility, not his. Newsom 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, and London and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 2 Dated June 16. (Ibid.) 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, June 30, 1967, 3:58 p.m. 219716. Ref: Tripoli 332. 2 Joint State/Defense. 1. Concur generally with your ideas for initial session re Wheelus with FonMin Bishti (reftel) and offer following comments and guidance. 2. We understand Bishti likely remain in New York at least through June 30, when Libya inscribed to speak at special UNGA. 3. We do not want to leave Wheelus at this stage and therefore should play it cool. FYI: Recent Soviet activities in Eastern Mediterranean and rumors USSR may be seeking bases in Arab countries are disquieting and further developments along this line might have effect on both US and Libyan negotiating attitude. End FYI. 4. We do not know for sure what Libyan Government actually wants us to do, and first session should probe to ascertain this. Therefore we should not be so forthcoming as to invite Libyan demands (in GOL effort to get itself off Cairo hook) that we take early action toward reducing US presence. Possible that internal situation will improve or Arabs will split, reducing pressure on Wheelus. Moreover, King has expressed desire we spin out negotiations. 5. Nevertheless, odds are that discussions will be held with GOL which is running scared. Atmosphere will be affected by (a) UNGA outcome and (b) degree of GOL success in restoring oil production, latter being test of Libyan determination and ability to lead public and control adherence to GOL policy. While USAF is under substantial handicap due to suspension of training, and there is some danger that long hiatus in training operations may make it harder for GOL to authorize resumption, the controlling aspect should be to retain US rights and presence and resume training, over longer time frame if need be, when political climate permits rather than press for immediate answer which might well invite a “no”. Unstable and delicate internal situation in Libya, even under new government, may well be an additional limiting factor. We therefore leave your discretion how you play this softly and let training aspect arise without unnecessary pressure for quick decision. 6. In negotiating session you should if possible touch on content of public statements GOL may wish to issue. We assume that anything you say during negotiations will be grist for Libyan publicity mill. We hope avoid kind of publicity which might serve interests inimical to both GOL and USG. Of course we recognize desirability show forward progress. If helpful to GOL, we willing issue agreed statement (ad referendum to Dept) from Washington. 8. Re para 7 reftel, we see advantages to future negotiating sessions taking place in less formal atmosphere than 1964 meetings. USG has accepted “principle of withdrawal” at end of Wheelus agreement; discussions re means or timing, and provision for orderly return to normal operations at Wheelus, will take place in established diplomatic framework. 9. Hope that dimensions of any necessary RIF of local staff at Wheelus will not give unhelpful impression Wheelus closedown imminent. There should be no repeat no withdrawals even of surplus supplies from Wheelus that could give rise to public impression we were withdrawing now. 10. Following first session and provided local situation quiet, you will be expected proceed Washington via Germany and UK. London inform FonOff of foregoing, except FYI portion. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Campbell on June 29; cleared by Eugene V. Rostow, Jones in AF, Root, Neuman, Wolf, Judd, Kohler, General Sibley of JCS, Bronez and Bader in DOD/ISA, and Hilbert; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 2 In telegram 332 from Tripoli, June 26, Newsom said that he thought the primary U.S. purpose during the first meeting on Wheelus should be to request Libyan advice and assistance on early restoration of normal base operations without prejudice to the final outcome of the discussions. (Ibid.) 90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, July 16, 1967, 3:02 p.m. 7607. Tripoli 185. 2 Agree you are proceeding along right lines in conversation with Bishti. You may tell him we deeply gratified it is GOL’s policy retain ties with traditional friends, understand GOL’s present political problem and through discussion are anxious to help GOL surmount problem. We will welcome Bishti’s suggestions for how best to do so. On availability info on 1964 negotiations we concur in reply you gave Bishti. FYI. Bishti seems bothered mainly by problems resulting from proximity Wheelus to Tripoli. Our impression is he does not yet have clear idea of what he or GOL will want us to do and that he probably welcomes suggestions you make to him. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Root, cleared by Colonel Kennedy in DOD/ISA, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 2 In telegram 185 from Tripoli, July 15, Newsom reported that following the swearing in of a new Prime Minister and Cabinet, Bishti had told him that the Libyan Government’s policy was to retain ties with its traditional allies as possible, and that he wished Wheelus were farther away from Tripoli and less conspicuous. Newsom replied that Wheelus was an important installation and the United States hoped to retain it for as long as possible. However, the United States recognized the Libyan Government’s special problems and was prepared to discuss how it could help meet these. Newsom also told the Foreign Minister that he thought it preferable that the two of them discuss the various possibilities before any committees were formed. (Ibid.) 91. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Special Committee of the National Security Council (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 91. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Special Committee of the National Security Council (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, July 28, 1967. SUBJECT Rebuilding our Position in Libya As I think about unexpected willingness of the new Libyan government to rebuild some kind of relationship with us, it occurs to me that we face an opportunity here that reaches beyond Libya itself and even beyond the current Middle East crisis. My life at the Ford Foundation 2 has taught me a little about the difficulty of maintaining our position in countries where AID has legitimately phased out. Now I understand that after a decade and some $200 million worth of aid, the last American technicians are about to pull out of Libya (a) because they are more expensive and the USG has no way of topping off salaries the Libyan Government will pay to cheaper European advisers and (b) because the USG has no really responsive mechanism for pulling together the kind of technical assistance the Libyans need now. Having invested so much, we will look ridiculous if our technicians must give way to Europeans in the Libyan ministries just at a time when they would be in a position to direct commercial purchases toward US suppliers, and at a time when the Libyan ministries are still so much in formative stage. Libya’s income has matured far beyond the government’s ability to use it. Consequently, AID has phased out too soon, in terms of overall US interests, even though on economic and Congressional grounds, it has done the logical thing. I am wondering therefore whether in the context of the Middle East crisis we could not find quickly some way to put together a small fund of up to $300,000 to underwrite the gradual return of a few technicians during the critical period ahead. I realize this is being considered in our contingency planning for Libya and that it gives AID problems. However, this seems important enough to be worth an experimental shot. (The idea also has implications elsewhere—as in Iran.) As I understand it, there is no way AID can do this with existing funds. I suppose the only quick way to manage this, therefore, is a quick trip to Congress to try to write it into the new aid bill. I know Bill Gaud would worry that Congress would simply earmark some of his current depleted funds for this purpose. This is a real danger which we should consider, but I don’t think it is sufficient to dismiss the idea. Could you give me a ring if you feel we ought to do something about this. McGB 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL LIBYA–US. Secret. 2 McGeorge Bundy was the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs until February 28, 1966, after which he became President of the Ford Foundation. From June until August 1967, he served as Executive Secretary of the Special Committee of the National Security Council. 92. Memorandum of Conversation 92. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Tobruk, Libya, August 30, 1967. PARTICIPANTS His Majesty King Idris al-Senussi, King of Libya The Honorable David D. Newsom, American Ambassador Roscoe S. Suddarth (Interpreter), Political Officer SUBJECTS 1. Royal Trip to Turkey 2. The Khartoum Conference and Middle East Situation 3. King Husayn’s Visit 4. Wheelus Base Negotiations 5. U.S. and U.K. Commitments to Libyan Defense 6. Strengthening Libyan Internal Security 1. Royal Trip to Turkey . The King and Queen received the Ambassador and Mrs. Newsom and family in the living room of the Royal Palace of Bab Zaytun at Tobruk. After several minutes of pleasantries the King revealed that he and the Queen would be leaving by ship from Tobruk Saturday, September 2 on a five-week trip to Turkey. He said he was tired, partly from work, and wished to take the mineral baths at Bursa, Turkey. He would have to wait until the Crown Prince returned from the Arab Heads of State Conference in Khartoum on Friday, September 1, since both the King and the Crown Prince were not, under the constitution, to be out of the country at the same time. The King would be accompanied by the Queen, Fathi Khoja, Master of Royal Ceremonies, and Miss Hind Ayoubi. The King said he had visited Turkey on an official visit in 1957 but that this visit would be strictly personal. The Ambassador mentioned that the American Ambassador to Turkey, Ambassador Hart, was formerly Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and spoke Arabic. The King said he would welcome meeting Ambassador Hart and expected to be seeing a lot of the Libyan Ambassador to Turkey during his vacation. (At this point the Queen and Mrs. Newsom left the room.) 2. The Khartoum Conference and the Middle East Situation . The Ambassador asked the King his forecast of the outcome of the Khartoum Conference. The King explained that he expected the conference to proceed in an orderly fashion, with the opening session, three days of secret meetings and a close. He did not expect it to produce any agreement among the Arab states. Algeria and Syria were radical states opposed to recognizing the realities of the Israeli situation, the UAR had lost a great deal of leadership due to its military collapse, and the rest of the Arab states would be generally following along behind, anxious not to get too far out of step with the UAR. The Ambassador offered that the USG hoped the radical view of the existence of Israel would not prevail, as it was harmful to the Arabs’ basic interests. King Idris said he thought that Bourguiba had the most realistic view of the situation, by recognizing that Israel, even though its formation as a state was an injustice, could not be ignored. This the Israelis had proven during the June war. And indeed, continuing refusal to admit these realities was hurting the Arab states. In for instance the Arab boycott of America and Britain, Britain was in fact buying oil from Russia, and West Germany was getting oil from Venezuela. The Ambassador interjected that the boycott was however hurting Britain, even though it was hurting the Arab states most of all. The King said that Libya had originally been against instituting the boycott and asserted apologetically that “a lot of untruths have been written about that affair”—which were largely the work of UAR press media and Embassies, which, he mentioned, were regularly distributing money. The King said the Egyptians only had themselves to blame if they lost the war. His Majesty understood that three or four Egyptian military defectors had pin-pointed Egyptian airfields for the Israelis who surprised the Egyptians and bombed their airfields while the Egyptians were “eating beans” (fuul) at nine a.m. on June 5. King Idris said Israel spends its resources on unifying its efforts while Egypt spends its money on sowing dissension (fitan) in other countries. The Ambassador interjected that the influence of the United States was quite limited with regard to Israel, partly because Israel had defended itself so successfully. King Idris said he realized that “Israelis” around the world were supporting Israel financially as a part of their religious identification with Israel. King Idris went into a discussion of the Alexandria Summit of 1964 and observed that it had been divided from the start: Faysal was mainly interested in Yemen, Kuwait was paying money to the UAR to keep Nasser quiet, Husayn was interested mainly in money question and the Palestine organization, etc. King Idris spoke disparagingly of Prime Minister Husayn Maaziq’s handling of the riots in June, saying that he should have thrown a few people into jail immediately and that would have stopped the disturbances. 3. King Husayn’s Visit . The Ambassador asked about the results of King Husayn’s visit with His Majesty. King Idris concentrated his answer on the problem of Jerusalem, which he said was uppermost in King Husayn’s mind. King Idris said that Muslem holy places such as the Aqsa Mosque were in Israeli-held territory, as well as Christian holy places. He mentioned the possibility of arranging international control of Jerusalem in which Israel would be allowed a voice. King Idris praised King Husayn and said he was providing himself a good diplomat. People who said that Husayn was a coward were unjust to him since he is only looking to further the interests of his country in very difficult circumstances. 4. Wheelus Base Negotiations . The Ambassador then explained that he had requested the audience with His Majesty in order to review the status of the negotiations on Wheelus Air Force Base. King Idris replied that he too was concerned with that subject. In a few words, the Ambassador said that he was satisfied with the negotiations and with the friendly atmosphere in which they were held. He felt that the observer mechanism, as agreed to in the joint communique, 2 would provide a means of stretching out the negotiations over a long period of time, in accordance with the desires of both His Majesty and the United States Government. (King Idris nodded assent to this statement.) The USG felt that greater contact was needed between the Base and the GOL and was glad to see the appointment of a high-ranking Libyan officer, Brigadier Zantuti, to that position. King Idris asked if the USG had agreed to the terms of the communique “in all liberty” or whether it had acquiesced under pressure from the Libyan Government. The Ambassador replied that his Government had agreed without coercion, but that it required five hours to come to the agreement on one point and, as a result, Foreign Minister Bishti said he no longer felt it was easy to deal with Californians. King Idris said he was concerned about the reference to the closing of Wheelus in the event of the recurrence of an emergency in the Middle East and wondered if the USG agreed with that proposition. The Ambassador replied that in the communique the two sides agreed only to consult together regarding the possibility of closing the Base in such an emergency. This bone of contention was the subject of five hours of the negotiations. King Idris insisted: “Then your Government was not in agreement with the Libyan Government.” Ambassador Newsom replied that both sides recognized the necessity of taking measures to avoid exposing the Base to charges and rumors that it would be used against the interests of the Arabs in such an emergency. They hoped to dispel mistaken notions like that one held by His Majesty’s friend, Khalid al Gargoni, from Tripoli, who apparently believed that 2,000 American and British planes had landed in Israel. King Idris then recalled a story of the American pilot who claimed the U.S. had no need of aircraft from Wheelus to help Israel since it had sufficient aircraft for that purpose on carriers in the Mediterranean. The Ambassador then explained that after discussion the Libyan delegation had changed some of its language at the Ambassador’s insistence and had agreed to the principle of consultation. King Idris showed great interest in how this procedure would work in practice and appeared satisfied and relieved when the Ambassador said that in such an event the USG would expect that His Majesty’s opinion would be included in any such consultation. King Idris then said assertively, “Let them come to me.” The Ambassador said there was one further worrisome point: the Libyan delegation had insisted on referring to the “evacuation and liquidation” of Wheelus in the communique. The USG recognized that political conditions had not returned to normal and that the Libyan Government felt obliged to take account of political considerations in the communique. The USG hoped that the GOL would let the matter rest there, for the Ambassador feared that further statements along those lines might lead the Libyan public to expectations which were not in accordance with the desire of either government. The Ambassador was hopeful that this type of statement would not be repeated; and if the negotiating position of the GOL should in the future change from the desired course the Ambassador would like to consult with His Majesty. King Idris agreed that he should do so. The Ambassador inquired if the King had any thoughts with regard to the return of the Royal Libyan Air Force to Wheelus. King Idris replied that the RLAF had demonstrated its need for a purge (tathiir) during the events of June, which was currently being undertaken. (As an example of Air Force disloyalty, he referred to an incident involving collusion between a Libyan Air Force officer and the Egyptian Embassy.) In that connection, the Ambassador mentioned that Wheelus would be gradually resuming its pre-June level of operations during the next three months. This was very important to the USG in order to justify the Base’s utility to the American Government from a military point of view. King Idris nodded in agreement. With regard to the GOL request for modern aircraft, the Ambassador said this had been in abeyance since the events of June because of the situation in Libya and of U.S. Congressional review of the worldwide military assistance program. But, the USG is continuing to give the Libyan request sympathetic consideration. King Idris replied that he appreciated USG efforts in that direction. The GOL, he said, is making every effort to purge the Air Force and to insure that only “sincere” persons would be flying such aircraft. He had no objection to continuing to pursue the aircraft sales program, but wanted to “go slowly”. 5. U.S. and U.K. Commitments to Libyan Defense . King Idris turned the discussion to the problem of Libyan defense and asked point blank, “What is America prepared to do to defend in case Libya is attacked?” He said that America had important interests in Libya, including substantial petroleum investments and military installations. It knew that Libya was threatened by Egypt on the East and Algeria on the West. Algeria under Ben Bella and Nasser had agreed to divide Libya and then respectively turn towards Morocco and Sudan for further aggrandizement. Nasser had failed in Syria and Yemen but who knew when he would turn on Libya. King Idris noted that the Soviet Union was behind the UAR and Algeria (particularly Boumedienne). He also alluded to the fact that Russia during the post World War II U.N. debate on Libya had insisted that Libya be rid of foreign bases within four months after Independence. The Ambassador then reviewed the contents of the letter sent by the President of the United States to King Idris, 3 which indicated continuing U.S. friendships for Libya and interests in its security. It stated that the USG would consult with the GOL and other friendly governments in the event Libya security was threatened. This referred particularly to Great Britain which was tied to Libya through its Treaty of Friendship, committing Britain to defend Libya in case of external aggression. The letter also mentioned that the continuing existence of military facilities in Libya would help the USG to fulfill any such commitments to defend Libyan security. As His Majesty knew, the USG letter was not more explicit because, for constitutional reasons, the President could not go further in his commitment without consulting Congress. (The King replied in that connection that “the first Ambassador” had explained that the USG was prepared to go even further than the letter had stated in defending Libya.) King Idris then asked “What joint plans do the British and Americans have for defending Libya against external aggression?” The Ambassador replied that the U.S. and Britain have been allies for a long time and often consulted each other over global problems. Far from being in competition in the Middle East, as many Arabs assert, the U.S. and Britain keep in close touch. As an example, in 1958 when the U.S. went into Lebanon and Britain into Jordan, the operation was highly coordinated. In the case of Libya the two powers keep each other aware of their military capabilities and general military political considerations. Planning was not more specific as both countries recognized that measures would have to be tailored to fit particular circumstances that might vary from time to time. The Ambassador asked if His Majesty had revealed the contents of the Presidential letter to any of his Prime Ministers. King Idris replied that he had not done so because “ministers come and ministers go”, implying that they probably would not keep the secret. The Ambassador asked if the Prime Ministers might not treat the Base questions somewhat differently if they realized the contents of the letter, which links the U.S. ability to help to the presence of the Base. 6. Strengthening Libya Internal Security . In the U.S. view, an outright military attack on Libya was less likely than difficulties arising from internal subversion. In this connection the Libyan Government particularly needed to strengthen its ability to collect and evaluate information related to internal security. As an example, the Ambassador heard a story that the police in Tripoli had recently followed the movements of a subversive Algerian until he left Tripoli. When asked where he had gone, a police officer said he had gone to Benghazi and admitted that the Tripoli police had not notified the Benghazi authorities of this fact. This illustrated that Tripoli and Benghazi security forces acted almost as though they were in separate countries. The Ambassador understood that an office of security had existed on the national level in the government of Mahmud Muntassir but that Husayn Maaziq had disbanded it. He felt that the GOL needed such an office to collect and coordinate information on subversive activities in Libya. And the USG for its part would be willing to provide information on, for instance, Soviet and UAR diplomats if the GOL so requested. The King noted those remarks and said that by coincidence he had been discussing the same subject that morning and the GOL is planning to reconstitute that office in the near future. The Ambassador said he hoped the King would not consider his remarks an intrusion into Libyan internal affairs on his part, and King Idris replied that he considered it rather to be “advice from a friend”. Earlier in the conversation the Ambassador mentioned the GOL request for a variety of security equipment and said that the USG felt the GOL could use technical help in placing such orders. For example, the GOL had recently ordered five helicopters which had proved to be of insufficient range for effectiveness in Libya and which were provided with neither pilots nor mechanics. Accordingly, if the GOL so requested, the USG was ready to provide experts who could advise the GOL on the technical aspects of their security equipment. The USG felt it important that some experts (Americans or British) should be present to give such advice. The King noted these remarks and said that he recognized that Libyans still needed foreign help in the technical field until they could fully train their own people. And it was foolish to allow expensive equipment to be ruined because of mishandling. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL LIBYA–US. Secret. Drafted by Suddarth on September 6. The conversation was held at the Royal Palace (Bab Zaytun). The source text is enclosure 1 of airgram A–61 from Tripoli, September 7. (Ibid.) 2 Telegram 695 from Tripoli, August 17, transmitted the text of the joint communique agreed upon during the second session of the U.S.-Libyan talks on Wheelus on August 17. The communique announced that in preparation for establishing a program for U.S. withdrawal from the base, a Libyan committee would be formed and headquartered at Wheelus in order to undertake an inventory, to observe the activity at the base, and to act as liaison between Libyan and U.S. authorities. (Ibid., DEF 15 LIBYA–US) 3 September 1, 1965. [Footnote in the source text. For the letter, see Document 74 .] 93. Memorandum of Conversation 93. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 17, 1967, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Resumption of Arms Deliveries PARTICIPANTS Foreign Minister Ahmad al-Bishti of Libya Ambassador Fathi Abidia, Libyan Ambassador The Secretary Ambassador Trimble, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Mr. Sacksteder, AFN The Secretary told Foreign Minister Bishti that he hoped we could soon clear up the question of arms for our friends. 2 Unfortunately, the Senate-House Conference Committee on the Foreign Aid Bill had been quarreling for a month over this question. This is a reflection of the serious concern of certain members of Congress with our military assistance policy which goes back to the India-Pakistan conflict of two years ago when both parties used U.S.-supplied arms against each other. The Secretary said that we hope we shall soon be able to go ahead with our agreement with Libya. Foreign Minister Bishti replied that he appreciated the Secretary’s observations and was confident that we would do what we could to help our friends. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LIBYA. Confidential. Drafted by Sacksteder and approved in S on October 18. The conversation was held in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State. 2 As part of the U.S. decision to resume limited and selective arms shipments to Israel and moderate Arab states, telegram 58945 to Rabat, Tunis, and Tripoli, October 24, authorized the Embassy in Tripoli to inform the Libyan Government of U.S. willingness to proceed with the cash sale agreed to in May 1967 of 10 F–5s, half to be delivered in July 1968 and the remainder by December 1968. The United States was also prepared to resume shipments under existing grant and sales programs of equipment scheduled for delivery within the following 60 days, but the Embassy was reminded that the U.S. ability to go beyond this would depend not only on the FY 1968 African ceiling, but also on further Arab-Israeli developments. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 US–MOR) 94. Memorandum From the Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff (Johnson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hoopes) 94. Memorandum From the Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff (Johnson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hoopes) 1 Washington, November 14, 1967. J–5M 1335 1967 SUBJECT Contingency Planning for Relocation of Military Functions from Wheelus Air Base (U) 1. (U) Reference is made to your memorandum, 2 dated 28 August 1967, which requested that a study be conducted of alternative relocation possibilities, and associated costs, for the functions now being performed at Wheelus. 2. (S) The requested study 3 has been completed by the Air Force and is forwarded as requested. The study recommends that: a. Wheelus Air Base be retained. b. In the event the Air Force is forced to withdraw from Wheelus Air Base, the Weapons Training Center be relocated at Zaragoza Air Base, Spain, and the other functions being performed at Wheelus Air Base be relocated as outlined in individual sections of the study. c. Preliminary negotiations with the Government of Spain not be undertaken at this time. However, in renegotiation base rights with Spain (scheduled for late 1968/early 1969), care should be exercised that the agreement does not foreclose the option of future relocation at Zaragoza Air Base. 3. (C) This study has not been addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; therefore, it is recommended that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be requested prior to any action being taken in regard to relocation of Wheelus Air Base activities. Nels C. Johnson Vice Admiral, USN 1 Source: Department of Defense, JCS Files, 842/365 (28 Aug. 67) IR 2543 Sec. 1. Secret. 2 Attachment to JCS 2264/41. [Footnote in the source text. The memorandum is attached but not printed.] 3 Distributed separately; on file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text. The study is attached but not printed.] 95. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 95. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 28, 1968, 10:45 a.m. SUBJECT Don Hornig’s Report on Libya Don’s three recommendations in the attached warrant serious consideration. 2 I. The most important and far-reaching is his proposal for tackling the problem of how we operate in countries where AID can’t work. Right now this applies to most of the countries of the Middle East—either because they are AID graduates or too oil-rich to qualify for aid. What they need is not capital but American experts. Yet there is now, believe it or not, no systematic way for the USG to get one American consultant to any of these countries. Every time we send one, we have to spend endless hours jerry-building a special program and finding odd little pockets from which to pay for it. Meanwhile, Eastern and Western Europeans are flooding these countries and collaring contracts and political influence for their own capitals. After we’ve invested millions of dollars in aid, we now bar ourselves from being present at the pay-off. This has the makings of an important new 1969 program. What this amounts to is developing a way to manage our post-AID relationships. In Iran, for instance, AID has pulled out and it’s time to lay the foundation for a mature economic relationship between our two countries. Now that Iran is doing well, we want to cement our relationship in solid ways that can survive political storms. At this stage, I recommend you just instruct Don and me to give you a more precise recommendation on how to proceed. State endorses the general idea, but we’re not ready to be specific yet. 3 II. The Libyan Government would like a little boost in developing a small nuclear research program related to petroleum technology. State favors the idea and I see no reason why Don shouldn’t go ahead and work this out with Glenn Seaborg. Libya will pay most of the freight. 4 III. Don recommends a visit for the young new Libyan Prime Minister. I will have Secretary Rusk’s recommendation for you shortly. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64–12/68. Confidential. 2 Attached but not printed is a report dated March 26 from Donald F. Hornig, who visited Libya March 8–10 as the President’s representative to the International Trade Fair. 3 The source text indicates Rostow approved this recommendation. 4 The source text indicates Rostow approved this recommendation. 96. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 96. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 11, 1968, 4:35 p.m. SUBJECT Visit for the Libyan Prime Minister We have had in mind for several months your inviting the new Libyan Prime Minister. He has indicated his intention to visit the US soon but has not decided between late May or September–October. Don Hornig, after his return from Libya, strongly recommended that you invite Bakkush, and Nick Katzenbach formally seconds that recommendation. State could work out an impressive program for him with our oil companies working in Libya and universities doing archeological work there. You would need only the minimum for him in Washington—a short office chat and a small working lunch for about 10 people. He speaks English well and has an interesting story to tell about Libya’s rapid modernization. Bakkush is important because he is the first Libyan Prime Minister from the younger generation. His appointment could begin to divert into constructive enterprise the growing dissatisfaction of Libya’s younger, technically competent men. You’ll remember the Shah’s story about how the young hotheads of the early 1960’s are now in the government working for the Shah’s various programs. If the same could happen in Libya, it might be the step that saves Libya from radical takeover when the old king dies. You will recall also Bakkush’s highly constructive statement, which I sent you yesterday, on your address to the nation a week ago Sunday. Nick Katzenbach suggests (attached) 2 that you invite him for a small working lunch on May 29, but any other date about that time would be equally good. Jim Jones is holding open the entire week May 27–31 for a possible long Memorial Day weekend. Your schedule, however, would permit an office visit and working lunch on Wednesday, May 22. If you would prefer not to add anything to your spring schedule, we could schedule him in the early fall now that you have given us a go-ahead to develop a fall visit schedule. Even if you approved a spring date, we aren’t entirely sure he could come on the exact date proposed, so we would wish to offer a fall date as an alternative anyway. May we have your preference among these choices: 1. Invite him to short office talk and small working lunch on May 22. If he can’t come then, invite him for September or October, exact date to be set later 3 2. Disapprove May visit, but invite him for September or October, exact date to be set later 4 3. Disapprove visit for time being Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Proposed Visit of PM Bakkush, 9/25–26/68. Confidential. 2 Not attached. 3 A handwritten note on the source text reads: “No in May. Yes in Sept or Oct” 4 President Johnson checked this option. 97. Editorial Note 97. Editorial Note The Report of the USAFE Survey Team on Expansion of the Royal Libyan Air Force, August 15, 1968, noted that the recent purchase of 10 F–5 aircraft from the United States would provide the RLAF with only a nucleus of a modern tactical air force. The Report recommended a 15-year time-phased development program, which would provide Libya with a small but balanced tactical air force capable of performing air defense and ground support roles. The Survey Team proposed the early development of a second RLAF base, in addition to Wheelus, at Benina Airfield, Benghazi. On November 20, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Report be furnished to the Ambassador in Libya and the Chief of MAAG, Libya, for their use as planning guidance during follow-up discussions with Libyan officials. (Department of Defense, JCS Files, 842/534 (12 Sep 68) IR 5077, Sec. 1) 98. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 98. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, September 4, 1968. SUBJECT Bakkush Visit—5 p.m. Meeting Today In introducing the substantive aspects of the Libyan visit, you might make the following points: 1. Bakkush represents the younger generation of western-educated, technically-competent Libyans who, a few years ago, were the main critics of the traditional Libyan regime but who, now, have found an outlet in the government itself and some hope of a voice in shaping Libya’s future. One of the main themes we will be stressing is Libya’s rapid economic progress and our desire to continue a close technical relationship with this new generation of Libyans. 2. As a practical move in this direction, during the visit we will be signing a series of technical cooperation agreements. These are important milestones. AID has phased out in Libya because of rapidly growing Libyan oil revenues. These agreements are designed to provide a framework for continued technical cooperation despite the fact that we are no longer in an aid donor-recipient relationship. 3. We will have to talk about the Arab-Israeli problem, but the Libyans would probably prefer to play it down and concentrate on their own development. We have an interest in that development too since American companies have the majority of concessions for developing Libya’s oil revenues. We also have an important air training base there, which we hoped to continue using at least though 1971. In short, this is not a major visit but it is one with some interesting angles to exploit in our public statements. After this introduction, I would be inclined to ask Bess Abell whether there are any questions she would like to ask of the State people present. Bess has a guest list and gift suggestions. She will not have seen State’s suggestion for entertainment. As far as I can see, there are no outstanding issues except that Bess may wish our help in paring down the State Department’s guest list suggestions. 2 Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Proposed Visit of PM Bakkush, 9/25–26/68. Confidential. 2 On September 4, Prime Minister Abd al-Hamid Bakkush resigned and King Idris named former Foreign Minister Wanis al-Qadhaafi to replace him. On September 9, the White House announced that since Bakkush had resigned, the official visit scheduled for September 25 and 26 would not take place. (Telegram 235498 to Tripoli, September 10; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LIBYA) Morocco Morocco 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, January 4, 1964, 4:49 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom in AF/AFN; cleared by Colonel Heffner in OSD/ISA, Hinman in AID, Beigel in EUR/WE, Valdes in EUR/SOV, and Kitchen; and approved by Williams. Repeated to London, Madrid, Paris, Algiers, and by pouch to Moscow. 100. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, January 24, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–10 MOR–US. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs Stephen H. McClintic. The source text was transmitted to McGeorge Bundy on February 4 under cover of a memorandum from Benjamin Read which reads: “Transmitted herewith is a final report under NSAM 232 of the action taken with respect to U.S. bases in Morocco agreed upon between King Hassan II and President Kennedy last March.” For text of NSAM No. 232, April 5, 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXI, pp. 231–232. 101. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 12, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Morocco, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. 102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, March 27, 1964, 6:35 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 15 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic in AF/AFN; cleared by Blake in AFN, Burati in AID, and Reed in E/ISM; and approved by Tasca. 103. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, May 19, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Heads of State Correspondence File, Morocco—King Hassan Correspondence. Secret. 104. Letter From President Johnson to King Hassan Washington, May 20, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Heads of State Correspondence File, Morocco—King Hassan Correspondence. Secret. 105. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, September 4, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Morocco, December 1963–March 1966. Confidential. 106. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 6, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Secret. Prepared by Komer. 107. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, October 8, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Morocco, December 1964–March 1966. Confidential. Copies were sent to Harriman and Hutchinson. 108. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 16, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 330, October 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Toumayan and Chase. The conversation was held in Under Secretary Ball’s office. 109. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, November 6, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR. Secret. Drafted by Blake. 110. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 15, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and sent through Bell and Harriman. Concurred in by Lang (DOD), Kleine (AID), Barbour (WE), and Moses (G/PM). 111. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 18, 1965, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR–US. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs Robert W. Chase on January 28 and approved in S on February 12. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office at the Department of State. 112. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 21, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Secret; No Distribution. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Assistant Secretary Williams. 113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, January 26, 1965, 7:16 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Chase in AF/AFN and Kling in AF/AFI, cleared by Hinman and Nelson in AID/AFR, and approved by Blake in AF/AFN. 114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, January 28, 1965, 12:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Chase and Blake; cleared by Williams, Barbour in EUR/WE, Sisco, Lang in DOD/ISA, Hutchinson in AID, Moses in G/PM, and Komer; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Rabat, Paris, Algiers, and Madrid. 115. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 29, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Morocco, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. 116. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Acting Secretary of State Ball Washington, February 13, 1965. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Subject Files, Ball, George W. Secret. Drafted by Komer and Assistant Secretary Williams. 117. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Lang) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, April 16, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret. 118. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Washington, May 10, 1965. Source: Department of Defense, JCS Files, 9118.3 (25 Jan. 65). Secret. 119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, June 12, 1965, 3:50 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 MOR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Chase, cleared by Barbour and Williams in EUR/WE and Sterner in NEA/NE, and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Algiers, Bonn, and Paris and pouched to Cairo and Tunis. 120. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 18, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 8 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Trimble, Chase, and Toumayan and approved in S on January 10, 1966. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VIII.” The conversation was held in the Secretary’s Dining Room. 121. Editorial Note 122. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, February 12, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Chase on February 11 and cleared by Barbour. 123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, February 16, 1966, 4:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Chase; cleared by Root in AF/AFN, Beigel, Roberts in FE/VN, Burati in AID/AFR/NS, Symmes in NEA/NE, and Komer; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Madrid, Paris, Algiers, Nouakchott, Tripoli, Tunis, Cairo, and by pouch to Saigon. 124. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 19, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Secret. 125. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 30, 1966, 11 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Confidential. 126. Letter From President Johnson to King Hassan Washington, August 12, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 MOR. Limited Official Use. Telegram 28094 to Rabat, August 15, transmitted the text of the President’s letter to the Embassy with instructions that it be delivered to King Hassan. (Ibid.) 127. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret. This paper is part of a larger “Report of Post-Manila Trip,” dated November 22, transmitted by Harriman to the President and Rusk on November 28, following his trip to 10 countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa after the Manila Conference. It included a general report and separate reports on each country he visited. Harriman’s conversation with the King on November 9 was recorded in a memorandum of conversation which is ibid. 128. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 25, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs R. Peter Spicer and Porson and approved in S on February 9. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” 129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, January 30, 1967, 6:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Spicer and Deputy Executive Secretary John P. Walsh, cleared by Katzenbach and Saunders, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Monrovia for Palmer. 130. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 7, 1967, 10:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 20. Secret. 131. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 8, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Visit of King Hassan, 2/9–10/67. Secret. 132. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 9, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Secret. The source text is labeled “Part II of V.” The conversation was held at the White House. Memoranda of conversation of President Johnson’s discussion of other topics with King Hassan on February 9 are ibid. 133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, February 13, 1967, 5:23 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Root on February 11, cleared by Landau in EUR/SPP and Saunders, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to Algiers, Madrid, Paris, and Tunis and repeated by pouch to Cairo, London, and Tripoli. 134. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 27, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21. Confidential. 135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, May 30, 1967, 12:32 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Secret. Drafted by Bader in DOD/ISA and Spicer; cleared by Commander Peters in JS/SAMAA, Legner in DA/DCSLOG, McCall in AFR/NA, Shaw in PC/MAD, Colonel Hazam in OSD/I and L, Gardner of Treasury, Forman in OSD/GC, Rabida in G/PM, Allen in INR/RAF, Feigl in ISA/ILN, Goldstein in ODMA, Malmborg in L/E, Runyon in L/AF, and Nilsen in L/T; and approved by Root. Also sent to CHMUSLO Rabat and repeated to USCINCEUR. 136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, June 17, 1967, 3:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Root and Palmer on June 16; cleared by Kitchen, Hoopes, Saunders, and Bundy; and approved by Eugene V. Rostow. 137. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, June 21, 1967. Source: Department of Defense, JCS Files, 9118.3 (17 Nov. 1966). Secret. The source text is attached as an Appendix to a “Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Arms Policy for Morocco” (JCS 2409/6). 138. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 29, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Toumayan and Spicer on July 10. 139. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State Rabat, August 5, 1967, 0859Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 MOR–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to DOD, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSNAVEUR. 140. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 26, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Lloyd in AF/AFN on October 31. 141. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 22, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Visit of King Hassan, 2/9–10/67. Confidential. 142. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State Rabat, February 3, 1968, 1258Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Secret; Priority. 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, March 1, 1968, 2359Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McCall in AID/AFR/NA and Root, cleared by Claus W. Ruser in U/SIG and Straus in AID/AA/AFR, and approved by Palmer. 144. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 5, 1968, 4:50 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 80. Secret. 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 1 Washington, January 4, 1964, 4:49 p.m. 1260. Embtel 947—King’s request for arms. 2 FYI. Most careful consideration has been given to King’s demarche to you of December 21 re possibility increased military assistance. Request has been viewed against following background: (a) Continuing importance U.S. relations both countries and Africa generally. (b) Continuing OAU efforts to establish demilitarized zone to which GOM has not yet given its support. (c) Possible further Algerian buildup in materiel which would tip present military advantage in favor Algeria once GOA overcame present training and organizational problems. (d) U.S. desire avoid arms race in Africa and restrictions on U.S. ability provide significant military assistance GOM view foreign aid limitations. (e) Desire avoid, if possible, creation new area cold war confrontation. (f) U.S. interest Kenitra. (g) Recent French military assistance to Morocco which presumably will be added to as necessary. End FYI. Following U.S. response should be conveyed Foreign Offices U.K., France, and Spain. Ambassador Ferguson should inform respective Ambassadors Rabat. In absence of significant objection Ambassador Ferguson should seek audience with King January 7 or as soon thereafter as his presence in Morocco permits: 1. U.S. is following and fully supports King’s efforts to maintain and strengthen independence of Morocco and feels it has continually demonstrated its interest in Moroccan independence, unity, and progress. 2. U.S. recognizes legitimate GOM concern over shipments of military equipment to Algeria. On basis our intelligence, however, GOA still faces formidable task in attempts overcome training and organizational difficulties. In our judgment Moroccan equipment and its recent mobilization of 30,000 troops seems an adequate response. We would not wish dissuade GOM from improving its own security situation, but we believe substantial arms acquisition from whatever source requires close evaluation political and economic consequences. In our view, such acquisition, beyond that normally being supplied from French and U.S. sources not justified by assessment of Algerian forces nor by present possibilities for political settlement. 3. U.S. has noted with satisfaction considerable success King has had in recent weeks in redressing admittedly dangerous situation of last October. Constructive attitude Morocco demonstrated at Bamako, Addis, and Abidjan have reflected favorably on King’s statesmanship and sense of African responsibility. Restraint practiced by GOM since cease-fire and GOM willingness resume diplomatic representation with GOA have considerably strengthened Moroccan position vis-a-vis GOA not only with Bamako conferees whose prestige involved in successful outcome their efforts but with other African states as well. 4. U.S. recognizes that problem of this kind poses difficulties in terms of compromises that may be necessary in any final solution. However, we believe progress already made by King on African scene justifies his continuing support OAU effort both by reaching such agreement as is possible on withdrawal and by considering sympathetically ultimate proposals of OAU. 5. U.S. is not aware that Algeria has placed restrictions on exchange diplomatic relations to extent indicated by King and is seeking clarification in matter. We would hope problem could be worked out in coming meeting at Cairo. We would not consider Algerian conditions unreasonable if it relates solely implementation work OAU commission. 6. In pursuing political solution, we believe keen interest both Haile Selassie and Mobito Keita is important element. We would propose King might wish make known to them his concern over arms acquisition in Algeria and Algerian response his overtures on diplomatic relations. U.S. prepared lend support their consideration of problem if King desires. 7. One important factor in establishing African sympathy for Morocco has been adverse African reaction to Algerian acceptance of UAR, Cuban, and Soviet arms in initial period of conflict. We understand arms flow to Algeria has diminished. GOM acceptance now of substantial quantities of arms from Soviets would completely undercut one aspect of support from African and, in frankness it must be added, Western sources. 8. U.S. has situation under continuing review and should it change materially we would be prepared to reexamine our position in consultation with other interested governments. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom in AF/AFN; cleared by Colonel Heffner in OSD/ISA, Hinman in AID, Beigel in EUR/WE, Valdes in EUR/SOV, and Kitchen; and approved by Williams. Repeated to London, Madrid, Paris, Algiers, and by pouch to Moscow. 2 Telegram 947 from Rabat, December 21, 1963, reported on King Hassan’s December 20 meeting with the U.S., British, French, and Spanish Chiefs of Mission in Rabat, during which he expressed his concern over the growing strength of Algerian forces and noted that the Soviet Union had indicated its willingness to provide Morocco with arms. The King emphasized that he had to protect his national territory and said that he would deal with the devil himself if necessary for the defense of his country. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ALG–MOR) 3 In telegram 1019, January 11, Ambassador Ferguson reported that he had communicated the substance of telegram 1260 to Acting Foreign Minister Driss Slaoui. (Ibid., DEF 19 US–MOR) 100. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 100. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, January 24, 1964. SUBJECT Withdrawal from Moroccan Bases Summary This represents a final report under NSAM 232 of the virtual completion of actions with respect to U.S. bases in Morocco agreed upon between King Hassan II and President Kennedy in March 1963. The three SAC bases were evacuated in December. U.S. naval personnel continue to operate the Naval Communications Facility in Kenitra, but as of December 16, 1963, under the Moroccan flag with their function ostensibly as a training mission to enable Moroccans to operate the base. The withdrawals were carried out smoothly and on schedule. The U.S. Air Force was able to remove that equipment not excess to its needs. The Moroccan Government, despite repeated urgings, did not come forward with projects which could justify the retention of non-excess material in Morocco, except in one instance—the decision to convert Nouasseur into an international airport. Arrangements have been made to consider a Moroccan loan application for this purpose. [Here follow Sections 1–7 of the paper.] 8. Conclusions: Despite some unresolved details and possible problems ahead we believe that the situation surrounding our withdrawal and our chances of attaining the objectives we seek are generally favorable. Transfers of authority were smooth; there was minimal attendant publicity. The fact that our departure was on schedule is in itself likely to stifle criticism of those aspects of our withdrawal which may run counter to some Moroccan expectations. Morocco’s own troubles with Algeria make it unlikely it would stir up additional problems which would undermine sympathy for their cause. Our principal objective, retention of the U.S. Naval forces in Kenitra to operate the communications facilities beyond the end of 1963, has been so far agreed to without challenge. Several recent and significant expressions of interest in continued cooperation with us have also come forward. Foreign Minister Guedira declared at Kenitra, “We are making by this ceremony the beginning of an era of cooperation, active friendship and dynamic work for the cause of peace and security.” Earlier in the day the King told our Ambassador the turnover ceremony would not mark the end of our relationship but a new phase and said he was sure we could work together in friendship. Thus, on balance we are inclined to believe that the U.S. withdrawal from these installations in Morocco and the transfer of command at Kenitra were effected in good order. On a broader plane, base conversion to civilian use in an underdeveloped country proved extremely difficult. Both our own procedures as well as Moroccan created problems. No commitments of like character should be made in the future without clear plans and agreed to sources of funding for property involved. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–10 MOR–US. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs Stephen H. McClintic. The source text was transmitted to McGeorge Bundy on February 4 under cover of a memorandum from Benjamin Read which reads: “Transmitted herewith is a final report under NSAM 232 of the action taken with respect to U.S. bases in Morocco agreed upon between King Hassan II and President Kennedy last March.” For text of NSAM No. 232, April 5, 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963 , vol. XXI, pp. 231–232. 101. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 101. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 12, 1964. Mac— Under the pertinent section of the new aid law the lawyers say we must cut off any new aid to Morocco on 14 February because two Moroccan ships are still in Cuba trade. We’ve raised this with the Moroccans innumerable times, they’ve promised they’d do something, but they never have. State concurs and reportedly DOD. Chief worry is whether this might cloud our title to Kenitra, which as you know rests wholly on private oral agreement. I see no valid reason to hold off. But I told State this should be strictly without publicity for as long as possible, in hopes that it might shock our lethargic Moroccan friends into doing something. 2 RWK 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Morocco, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. 2 Telegram 1338 to Rabat, February 14, instructed the Embassy to inform the Moroccan Government that in the absence of a reply to previous U.S. communications stating that Section 620 (a) (3) of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 107 (b) of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act prohibited continued U.S. aid to countries trading with Cuba, the United States had no choice but to end economic and military assistance to Morocco effective February 14. (Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR) In telegram 1123 from Rabat, February 21, Ferguson reported that Foreign Minister Ahmed Reda Guedira had said that Morocco did not want to violate U.S. laws but that its sovereignty and traditional policy of non-alignment were in question. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 1 Washington, March 27, 1964, 6:35 p.m. 1420. Ambassador Bengelloun returning Morocco for approximately two weeks consultation on March 30. Called at Dept to convey message thanks (copy pouched) 2 from Guedira in response Gov. Williams’ message (Deptel 1361). 3 Also sought info on removal AID suspension and was told by Dept (Tasca) that problem, which complicated administratively by question cobalt, is receiving our urgent attention but would take time. Ambassador also pressed strongly for acceptance by Dept proposal he claims being advanced by Phillips Bros. to import for US stockpile Moroccan manganese, in return for US agricultural commodities to Brazil which would provide sugar to Morocco. Such stockpiling he stated now permitted for other countries, is of vital importance to Morocco, of humanitarian advantage to both Brazil and Morocco and would lessen latter’s dependence on Cuba for sugar. Was told question had long been under consideration, manganese excess to our needs and of insufficient value to cover significant amounts sugar, but a further examination matter would be made on basis of which more definitive reply would be furnished. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 15 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic in AF/AFN; cleared by Blake in AFN, Burati in AID, and Reed in E/ISM; and approved by Tasca. 2 A memorandum of conversation, March 26, is ibid., POL 32–1 ALG–MOR. 3 Telegram 1361 to Rabat, February 25, transmitted a message of congratulations from Assistant Secretary Williams on the preliminary peace accord between Morocco and Algeria. (Ibid., POL 15–1 MOR) 4 Telegram 1440 to Rabat, April 16, informed the Embassy that the President had determined that it was in the national interest to continue aid to Morocco despite the Battle Act finding occasioned by Morocco’s shipment of cobalt ore to Communist China. (Ibid., STR 6–3 MOR) 103. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 103. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 19, 1964. We suggest the attached brief note to Moroccan King Hassan to reassure him of our support. 2 He went home from his March 1963 visit here thinking he had found a real friend in JFK. Then we had to turn down his request for military help during the Moroccan-Algerian border war last fall. We’ve since heard from several sources that he thinks we’ve lost interest in Morocco and in him. Ambassador Ferguson will take this letter back, which will incidentally establish the fact that he’s your man. We’ve also drafted the letter to impress on Hassan, as we have with the Shah, the importance of internal reform. He faces a full-blown financial crisis (chiefly due to rotten fiscal planning but also nudged along by declining US aid and the cutback in US base expenditures). He may come to us again for loans which we can’t give (we’re already committed to $20 million to keep access to our commo facility at Kenitra). So we want to urge him to take the necessary domestic measures before stormy weather sets in. 3 Bob Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Heads of State Correspondence File, Morocco—King Hassan Correspondence. Secret. 2 An attached note from McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson reads: “Secretary of State and I strongly concur.” For text of the President’s letter to King Hassan, see Document 104 . 3 Bundy wrote a note on the source text that reads: “This also saves a request from Ferguson for a call on you. McGB” 104. Letter From President Johnson to King Hassan 104. Letter From President Johnson to King Hassan 1 Washington, May 20, 1964. Your Majesty, Let me take advantage of Ambassador Ferguson’s presence in Washington to send my personal greetings and best wishes. We recall with pleasure your visit last year, and I want to assure you that I have the same friendly interest in Morocco’s progress under your leadership that you found in President Kennedy during your talks with him. In fact, we Americans have closely followed your personal role in creating institutions designed to modernize Morocco. It is gratifying to see that Morocco has chosen a moderate course—that it is a country where political parties can operate and where massive efforts are being made to educate the people to play an ever more productive role in the development of their country. Your steps to improve the management of your government’s resources and to strengthen the economy are of special interest to me. I realize that neither the political nor the economic path before you is an easy one. As you know, I too am engaged in a major effort here to stimulate adequate economic growth and meet growing popular needs while pursuing sound fiscal policies. We both realize what a difficult task this is, but I think we both share the conviction that the internal strength we are trying to build is the very foundation of freedom and political stability. I will count on Ambassador Ferguson to keep me informed of your continued progress, and trust that you will not hesitate to convey to me through him or directly your thoughts on ways in which we can strengthen the close and historic ties between our two countries. 2 With all good wishes, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Heads of State Correspondence File, Morocco—King Hassan Correspondence. Secret. 2 In telegram 1495 from Rabat, June 29, Charge L. Dean Brown reported that, at the King’s request, he delivered the President’s message that morning to Driss M’Hammedi, Director of the Royal Cabinet. (Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR–US) 105. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 105. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, September 4, 1964. RWK: Ferguson’s MAP proposals for Morocco have run into heavy sledding. The big problem is that OSD has to absorb a $170 million shortage in MAP funds. (Initially counted on $1.215 billion, but recoupments are lower than expected, Congress will cut some, requirements are going up in Vietnam, Laos, Congo, Ethiopia, etc. Congress imposed a $25 million ceiling on Africa; Ethiopia takes $10 m., Congo already claims $8 m. and may go another $10 m.) So DOD hasn’t yet found the money for the $2 million program Ferguson initially proposed (half training, half equipment), not to mention jets. They figure the best they can say to Hassan’s request for planes and tanks is to promise a survey. DOD is also thinking of some sort of guarantee that we’d rush in MAP jets if Algeria attacks, but that doesn’t look very good to me since the need would pass before Moroccans could learn to use them. The objections are strictly financial. Everyone agrees the military balance is tipping toward Algeria. Everyone agrees it would be good to help Hassan. But we just don’t have the money. I think our position ought to be that it’s ridiculous to say we aren’t going to have any MAP at all if the Navy is still interested in Kenitra and if we’re interested in a Moroccan counter to Algeria. It may be we’ll have to stall on jets this year. (Nobody is even willing to think about that right now.) But we should keep the bureaucracy thinking in terms of continuing MAP for Morocco. (I’ve talked to AFN, ISA, Bronez, and will drop a hint to the Navy next week.) This is just a preliminary note on where we stand. State (To Rabat 95 attached) 2 has asked Rabat, Algiers, Paris, and Madrid for some more dope on how serious the Algerian threat and Moroccan vulnerability are. When replies are in, we can push our line further. H. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Morocco, December 1963–March 1966. Confidential. 2 Not attached. 106. Memorandum for the Record 106. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, October 6, 1964. Amb. Bengelloun, just back from Rabat, came in this morning to make a pitch for help in the current Moroccan financial crisis. His line is that a new situation now exists, different from that envisioned when the Kennedy-Hassan aide-memoire for 1964–5 was formulated. Morocco faces a serious financial crisis brought about by problems common to less developed countries trying to invest heavily enough to launch a serious development program while coping with poverty, unemployment, vast educational needs and the other serious problems of underdevelopment. Hassan has instructed him personally to talk with Morocco’s friends here, including President Johnson, and to seek aid. I dissuaded him from trying to see the President now. I told him that the President has had Moroccan problems much in mind recently, was pleased the exchange of intelligence views had gone so well, and was relieved that the immediate threat from Algeria seemed less serious than GOM had originally feared. I went on with a little speech on our interest in Morocco. There was no question about our support for Morocco’s independence and progress. In fact, we had already given more aid to Morocco than to any other country in Africa except the UAR (where actual dollar aid has been relatively small). However, even that sizeable contribution was secondary to what the Moroccans could do for themselves and to assistance from France. These facts don’t rule out further US help, but put our help in proper perspective. Regretting frankly that past aid has not been as effectively used as it might have been, I stressed that the biggest pre-requisite to Moroccan progress was for the GOM to put its own financial house in order. Morocco could learn a bit from Tunisia in this respect. I underscored that to do so would be the best possible insurance for Moroccan security, too. The real threat from Algeria was not the threat of an overt attack across the border; in that event, the UN, the OAU, and the Western powers would all intervene to halt the fighting as they had last year. What really made Morocco vulnerable to the Algerian brand of radicalism was internal economic weakness. Subversion, not attack, was the greatest threat. The best way to cope with this, I said, was financial reform and a serious development effort. Citing the Shah’s “white revolution,” I suggested, for instance, that the King himself might launch an austerity program—perhaps announcing a cut in palace expenditures as an example. Then he might get 100% behind the new development plan and make this his own political instrument, much as the Shah had done in attempting to ride the crest of change. Bengelloun probably missed the point and got bogged down defending palace expenditures and explaining the differences between the Shah (who held vast lands to give away) and King Hassan (who doesn’t). Bengelloun got down to arguing that the decrease in US dollar aid is partly responsible for the current crisis. When I commented that this was the natural result of the agreed evacuation of our bases, he expressed regret that Morocco had moved in this direction. But he had to find out whether Morocco could count on US help. I replied that the important thing was to work out a solid stabilization plan with the IMF. He said the GOM would meet IMF conditions (though he probably overestimates the value of measures GOM is taking and may be seeking US aid so GOM won’t have to swallow the IMF prescription). He asked specifically that we turn the $10 million we’ve set aside for projects under the aide-memoire into a general program loan. I promised to ask Mr. Hutchinson about the problem. (B. is seeing him 8 October), but could offer no encouragement just now. The PL 480 outlook might be more hopeful. Mr. Saunders reiterated that AID’s response would depend heavily on what measures the GOM takes to remedy permanently the situation which has led to the current deficit and financial crisis. So the Ambassador should be prepared to state what his government will do to shore up its own structure. Before leaving Bengelloun mentioned that he had an Arabic letter from King Hassan thanking the President for sending the intelligence team. He would have given it to me, but was having it translated. Could he get just a minute’s interview to deliver it? I talked him out of this. But I agreed to ask his friend, Mr. Bundy; he assured me he’d only take five minutes. 2 R.W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Secret. Prepared by Komer. 2 Attached to the source text is an October 7 transmittal memorandum from Komer to McGeorge Bundy that reads: “Mac—Your Moroccan friend Bengelloun promises he’ll only take ’five minutes’ Friday at 4 pm simply to deliver King Hassan’s letter of thanks for our intelligence team (this gambit worked). Even so, I’d see merit in your reinforcing my pitch to him about importance of Morocco putting its own financial house in order. We want to be helpful but our aid is marginal at best, compared to what Moroccans can do themselves. They should follow Tunisian model, and meet IMF terms for austerity program. US is not drawing away from Morocco—US is merely anxious that Moroccans use their own resources wisely, plus the really massive aid they get from French.” 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 107. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 107. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, October 8, 1964. The Moroccan picture seems worrisome and might be worth a look. While we seem to have turned aside for the moment Moroccan fears of an Algerian attack, their Ambassador is just back from Rabat with instructions from King Hassan to persuade us to help bail him out of his financial crisis. Moroccan exchange reserves have fallen off sharply, and the government budget is running a $70 million deficit. Though Morocco’s long-range economic prospects are reasonably bright, the short-run picture is a mess. Bengelloun will undoubtedly be making a strong pitch to State and AID. Specifically, he’s suggesting that we unblock the $10 million set aside for project loans in the 1963 Kennedy-Hassan aide-memoire in favor of a program loan. I’m flatly against the Moroccans using us to escape the stabilization medicine the IMF is trying to get them to swallow. However, given Ben Bella’s tendencies next door, we should make some effort to keep Hassan afloat. AID will naturally be reluctant to come up with anything that looks like weakening of our resolve to get out of the budget support business, but there may still be ways to help. Perhaps if we required the Moroccans first to work out a sound program with the IMF, it might then be worth considering another program loan. But the big thing is to get these impecunious Moroccans to start helping themselves. We must be able to sell Hassan on amassing political capital by assuming personal leadership in carrying out a stabilization program and then by making the new development program (to be announced next month based on an IBRD study) his own political instrument. Only by getting him really committed can we hope to avoid future cries for bail-outs and get Morocco headed the right way. After all, it’s economic not military weakness that makes Morocco most vulnerable to the Algerian brand of radicalism. A confluence of events—request for our military help against the Algerian threat, plea for a loan, new development plan, IMF negotiations—makes the time ripe for such advice. Shouldn’t we gin up something here? R.W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Morocco, December 1964–March 1966. Confidential. Copies were sent to Harriman and Hutchinson. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 108. Memorandum of Conversation 108. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 16, 1964, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Morocco’s Request for Increased Financial and Economic Assistance PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Ali Bengelloun, Moroccan Ambassador Mr. Tedlaoui, First Secretary, Moroccan Embassy Under Secretary George W. Ball Mr. Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary, African Affairs Mr. Robert W. Chase, OIC, Moroccan Affairs Mr. Alec C. Toumayan, Interpreter The Ambassador informed the Under Secretary of the present financial difficulties of his country, and outlined a number of measures of fiscal reform which had been taken or would be taken. He said that the King had asked him to seek increased assistance from the United States. Mr. Ball said that he had reviewed the situation, and was aware of the difficulties presently besetting Morocco. However, there seem to be substantial amounts of US aid which remained available. These unused resources might go a long way toward solving Morocco’s problems. Mr. Ball stressed also the importance of a Moroccan/IMF agreement to permit a drawdown of funds to help in the foreign exchange problem. Mr. Tasca also noted the aid available which had not yet been used, and suggested a Moroccan/US review of these figures in Rabat. Mr. Ball said that this would be arranged. The Ambassador commented on the growing threat posed by Algeria’s military program. Mr. Ball referred to the intelligence estimate recently concluded, and suggested that the estimate shows no imminent threat. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 330, October 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Toumayan and Chase. The conversation was held in Under Secretary Ball’s office. 109. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 109. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, November 6, 1964. SUBJECT Morocco: Measures to Improve Moroccan Economic and Financial Position Background: On October 16 you suggested to Ambassador Bengelloun that we send representatives of the Department and of AID to Rabat to discuss with the GOM the financial and economic problems that had prompted the GOM’s request for increased US financial aid. You noted to the Ambassador our understanding that the GOM already had substantial credits which were available for utilization, including $68 million of credits from the US. The Ambassador and subsequently the GOM indicated that the latter would be pleased to discuss the problem with two representatives from the Department and AID. The talks were held in Rabat during October 23–28. As a result, the GOM is apparently convinced that it does not need increased financial help but must, instead, practice greater austerity, improve its operating procedures, and explore ways in which it may expedite utilization of the credits already available to it. For our part, we have promised to take certain steps to facilitate expenditure of over $30 million of Supporting Assistance funds in the US. The attached telegram informs the Embassy and the AID Mission of our understanding of the steps which the GOM will now take and of these which we have told the GOM we will take. We are forwarding the attached telegram for your signature to indicate the success of your suggestion and to obtain your endorsement of the need for prompt and effective follow-up. Recommendation: That you sign the attached cable. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR. Secret. Drafted by Blake. 2 Attached but not printed. Telegram 231 to Rabat, November 8, stated that in view of the political importance the United States attached to Morocco, it was highly desirable that the momentum generated by the Rabat discussions be strengthened by joint U.S.-Moroccan efforts. (Ibid.) 110. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 110. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 15, 1965. SUBJECT Military Assistance for Morocco Discussion: The rapid build-up in military materiel in Algeria as the result of Soviet aid will, according to US intelligence estimates, place Morocco at a clear military disadvantage in terms of hardware, organization and training in both air and ground within six months to a year. Morocco is understandably apprehensive regarding its ability in the future to deter aggression and defend its territory. The Moroccans have presented the French and ourselves with requests for military assistance and Foreign Minister Benhima will understandably pursue the matter when he sees you January 18. The French have responded with a five-year program involving ground force equipment and propeller-driven support aircraft (Tab A). 2 Although severely hampered in our response by the shortage of MAP funds, we are considering a program to supplement the French program through providing surplus equipment either by gift or by sale for local currency. We are now determining whether our program will in any way conflict with that of the French (Tab B). The principal problem lies in meeting Morocco’s concern over the Algerian air force which now includes MIG-21’s and IL–18 bombers. The French have said they are not interested in helping Morocco in this field, a position that we are attempting to verify (Tab B). A ground to air missile defense would be both expensive and elaborate in terms of installations and training. (Nike installation, for example, would cost $13–15 million per battalion of 36.) The least expensive approach lies in providing more advanced aircraft equipped for air defense. Depending on the aircraft chosen, this could mean an outlay of between $5 and $15 million over a period of years. A list of the possible aircraft now under consideration, their cost, and their characteristics is attached at Tab C. 3 In view of the growing disadvantage vis-a-vis Algeria, Morocco will undoubtedly press for an early delivery. To provide such an early adequate response to the Moroccans would require additional MAP funds beginning in FY-1965 or FY-1966 and probably over the next two or three subsequent years. The Moroccan MAP program which has totalled $24.9 million over the past five years is now phasing out; the current FY 1965 figure is $800,000, largely for training and spare parts. Additional funds for aircraft are not now available and are not included in the transfer of surplus AID funds to DOD now planned for this fiscal year. A possible resolution would be for DOD to use the authority in the Foreign Assistance Act to provide aircraft from its inventories in this fiscal year; this would require reimbursement from MAP in subsequent fiscal years. Helping Morocco under present circumstances poses other problems as well. Morocco is currently experiencing serious financial difficulties and the addition of sophisticated military aircraft will place greater burdens on its budget. A decision on the type and phasing of an air defense program must take into account the financial implications for Morocco as well as the direct effect upon its economic development efforts. Morocco, over the longer term, suffers from problems of administrative disorganization and growing political restiveness. A military deterrent will be of little value without improvement in its internal political and economic health. Conspicuous Western assistance to Morocco runs a risk of additional polarization in North Africa. Nevertheless, it is important to the United States that Morocco maintain its basically pro-Western orientation. Morocco has been particularly helpful to the US in recent UN and African issues, regarding the Congo. How Morocco obtains a military deterrent to Algerian strength will be a major factor in determining how Morocco goes politically. The United States is today faced with three alternatives: 1. It can provide an assurance to Morocco that, if Morocco is clearly threatened with aggression by air from Algeria, the United States will send forces to defend the Kingdom. This would have the advantage (if accepted) of not involving us in a further MAP program; it would have the disadvantages of directly involving US forces, possibly before actual fighting had begun, in North Africa. 2. The United States can indicate it is not in a position to provide more advanced aircraft and encourage Morocco to look elsewhere. King Hassan, who already has MIG 17 aircraft and is scheduled to visit Moscow in May, would almost certainly seek additional parts for his present MIG’s and additional aircraft from the Soviet Union and would undoubtedly be required to make political concessions to the USSR. Such action on his part, however, would avoid a military polarization in North Africa. 3. The United States could provide a minimum program of additional jet aircraft phased over three to four years and on condition that, because of shortage of support resources, Morocco retire its MIG squadron. To do this would require extraordinary Executive Branch measures to obtain additional funds. Recommendation: On balance we favor the third alternative. We recommend that you: 1. Authorize AF to examine with AID and DOD (a) the most appropriate type and number of aircraft to provide Morocco, taking into account Morocco’s ability to operate and maintain, together with the impact of the program on the GOM’s budgetary situation in relation to overall US objectives in Morocco and (b) the possible source and timing of funding for the program determined to be most appropriate in the light of US world wide priorities and requirements. 4 2. Inform Benhima although the U.S. has still under consideration the possibility of ground force equipment from surplus and may be able to help on some items, the most appropriate area for a U.S. contribution to Moroccan military needs appears to be that of air defense. Morocco has, of course, other sources of ground force equipment. Our response on air defense must necessarily be limited by stringent fund restrictions, worldwide U.S. military requirements, the impact of alternative air defense possibilities on Morocco’s budgetary situation, and the GOM’s capability to operate and maintain such alternative programs. We would hope to be in further touch with the Government of Morocco as soon as our analysis of the problem is completed. 5 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and sent through Bell and Harriman. Concurred in by Lang (DOD), Kleine (AID), Barbour (WE), and Moses (G/PM). 2 Tabs A and B were not attached. Tab A was telegram 3774 from Paris; Tab B was telegram 3691 to Paris. 3 Tab C was attached but is not printed. 4 Secretary Rusk initialed his approval of this recommendation on January 19. On January 26, Secretary of Defense McNamara approved an $11 million grant-credit arrangement ($5 million grant and $6 million credit) recommended by the Department of State to help Morocco develop a deterrent to the Algerian air threat by acquiring a squadron of 12 F–5s. (Memorandum from McNaughton to McNamara; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 091.3 Morocco) 5 Secretary Rusk initialed his approval of this recommendation on January 19. 111. Memorandum of Conversation 111. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 18, 1965, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Call on the Secretary by the Moroccan Foreign Minister PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Ahmed Taibi Benhima, Moroccan Foreign Minister His Excellency Ali Bengelloun, Moroccan Ambassador The Secretary Mr. Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs Mr. Robert W. Chase, OIC, Moroccan Affairs The Secretary met privately with the Foreign Minister for over half an hour after which they were joined by Ambassador Bengelloun and Departmental officers. Mr. Benhima then outlined the Moroccan view of African affairs, particularly the Congo. He noted that the substance of this appreciation had been given to Mr. Sisco of IO earlier in the day. Returning to purely Moroccan problems, the Foreign Minister emphasized that in considering defense needs, “Morocco does not wish a Maginot line.” Benhima said he knew Morocco’s future depended on a sound economy, strong labor movement, and political freedom. He hoped to build new industry and prosperous communities along the Algerian border to act as a showcase to the Algerians as West Berlin does to East Germany. In response to a question by the Secretary regarding nonalignment, Mr. Benhima replied that the King believes nonalignment “of the Belgrade Conference type” is a dead issue. Africa is being split into two blocs, radical and moderate, with the former equating nonalignment with socialism. The Secretary asked Mr. Benhima which countries of Africa Morocco considered its best friends. The Foreign Minister mentioned Senegal and Nigeria. In discussing economic aid and the current Moroccan austerity campaign, the Secretary emphasized the importance of Morocco having IBRD support for its three-year plan and for its fiscal policies. He noted that such support does much to encourage world confidence in Morocco’s economic activities. Mr. Benhima said his government works in close cooperation with the World Bank. The Foreign Minister spoke of Moroccan relations with West Germany, which he feared were often the victim of ups and downs of West German-French relations. He mentioned that most of Morocco’s links with the West were “via Paris.” He hoped to forge more direct and closer contacts and asked the Department’s aid in persuading the Bonn Government to extend an invitation for a state visit by King Hassan. Mr. Benhima noted that the King had twice accepted, but subsequently had to cancel, earlier invitations. Now the Germans seemed reluctant to reply to Moroccan requests made two months ago suggesting an April visit. This would be just prior to the King’s scheduled Moscow visit. Speaking again of Moroccan economic development, the Foreign Minister stressed the need for comprehension of Morocco’s problems and the need for urgent action. He saw the next two years as crucial. The Secretary suggested that Europe, too, has a stake in Moroccan stability and urged Mr. Benhima to look toward Paris, Bonn, Rome, and The Hague. As the Foreign Minister prepared to leave, the Secretary assured him the Department would continue to remain in close contact with him on the several matters discussed during his visit. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR–US. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs Robert W. Chase on January 28 and approved in S on February 12. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office at the Department of State. 112. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk 112. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 21, 1965. After luncheon on January 19th for the Moroccan Foreign Minister Benhima, he asked to have a private word with me. He explained that the Moroccan Government was coming more and more to realize the impracticability of nonalignment as it was being interpreted by the radical Africans. He said these countries were clearly following Communist policies. Under these circumstances Morocco, he said, was in the process of making a fundamental decision to align itself more closely with the West, that his government has confidence in the United States and its Western friends, but the King wanted to have a somewhat clearer understanding of the United States attitude. The King hoped to have an early opportunity to talk to the President. He realized that with all the claims on the President this could only be done in connection with some other visit. The King thought that the President might be going to Rome, in which event the King could come to Rome to meet the President, with the excuse of making a trip for his health. I asked whether Paris would be as convenient to the King. The Minister replied that he felt Rome would be more appropriate. Mr. Benhima concluded that if a meeting was to be arranged it would be well for someone to come to Morocco in advance to talk over the subjects for the meeting between the King and the President. He expressed the hope that as the King knew me of old, I might be selected. I made no comment except to say that I would undertake to explore the subject he had raised and would advise him through his Ambassador in Washington. Averell 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Secret; No Distribution. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Assistant Secretary Williams. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Harriman signed the original. 113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 1 Washington, January 26, 1965, 7:16 p.m. 386. Joint State/AID message. Department and AID have conducted review current African AID programs for purpose determining those projects for which US approval could be conveyed to governments concerned immediately or favorable approval probable within next 60 days. Purpose of so informing governments would be to achieve political impact by accelerating timing of notification. Review identified those projects which were sufficiently far along in AID processing to accelerate notification. The projects for Morocco follow: A. Immediate Announcement 1. Nouasseur Air Base Conversion.—Advise GOM that AID is willing to increase the $2.3 million loan authorization for Nouasseur Air Base conversion (amount to be determined) as soon as cost estimates, plans and specifications for an expanded project have been submitted by the GOM and expeditiously reviewed by AID. 2. Port of Casablanca.—Advise the GOM that we are prepared to finance a feasibility study to determine the requirements for expansion of the facilities of Casablanca Port. B. Announcement within 60 Days 1. Phosphate Mining Equipment (provided, question of competition with domestic producers is resolved favorably) 2. Action on P.L. 480, Title I sale request (wheat and oil) 3. Approval of Title II Food for Work and Livestock Grain grants. Intention of this review is that government concerned be informed at a time considered politically desirable by our Missions and Department (presumably soon in most cases). As appropriate, announcement of US approval of these projects could be timed, or used indirectly to gain support (or to show appreciation for past support) for the US position re current political problems. Your views requested on how and when this information could be transmitted to GOM with maximum advantage to US. Department/AID is also continuing to examine new projects or projects that can be accelerated in order to gain political benefits in future. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Chase in AF/AFN and Kling in AF/AFI, cleared by Hinman and Nelson in AID/AFR, and approved by Blake in AF/AFN. 114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, January 28, 1965, 12:40 p.m. 1894. Depcirtel 1309 and USUN 2899. 2 In response Benhima request for definitive answer on US intentions with respect military assistance to Morocco prior his departure from New York January 29, you may convey following (Dept. also informing Moroccan Amb.): 1. US agreeable provide Morocco with squadron (12) F–5 aircraft on combined grant-credit basis dollar repayable designed minimize burden on Moroccan economy. Dollar repayable portion essential if Morocco to obtain latest high performance aircraft. 2. Aircraft deliveries will be worked out on basis factory production schedule and RMAF ability absorb. Hopefully delivery this advanced aircraft could begin within 12–18 months. In addition to air package, Benhima may be informed US agreeable make available for sale for local currency or, possibly in part, as outright gift, certain surplus stocks for ground forces, including Scorpions, trucks, and ammunition. However, Benhima should not be left with impression US will be able to provide all items on Moroccan surplus list. Embassy Paris should await further instructions prior informing GOF. 3 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Chase and Blake; cleared by Williams, Barbour in EUR/WE, Sisco, Lang in DOD/ISA, Hutchinson in AID, Moses in G/PM, and Komer; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Rabat, Paris, Algiers, and Madrid. 2 Circular telegram 1309, January 22, and telegram 2899 from USUN, January 26. (Ibid., POL AFR and DEF 19 US–MOR, respectively) 3 Telegram 396 to Rabat, January 29, informed the Embassy that Fredericks had conveyed the substance of telegram 1894 to Bengelloun that morning, but that the Ambassador had showed no enthusiasm or appreciation. (Ibid.) In telegram 705 from Rabat, February 2, Brown reported that he discussed its contents with M’Hammedi, who was immediately enthusiastic. (Ibid.) 115. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 115. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 29, 1965. JCSM–67–65 SUBJECT Military Assistance for Morocco (U) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed recent developments in North Africa and consider that the military imbalance being created in Algeria, vis-a-vis Morocco, can become a positive threat to the peace of the area. If current trends continue, it is estimated that the Algerian military establishment will probably be superior to that of Morocco in about a year. The Algerian military buildup has reached the point that the Government of Morocco feels it is again seriously threatened and, accordingly, has requested the United States to provide additional military assistance, including fighter aircraft. The US Ambassador to Morocco has recommended that the United States plan a five-year military assistance program for the Moroccan armed forces, coordinated with, but separate from, French and Spanish aid programs. 2. The Moroccans are justifiably concerned with events taking place in Algeria, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the situation which is developing could have important implications for US security interests, not only in the Mediterranean area, but in all of Africa. Soviet and Chinese communist influence throughout Africa is increasing, and Algerian policies, such as the aid she is providing the Congolese rebels, parallel communist interests. It is important that the United States remain responsive to the legitimate security requirements of friendly African states, particularly those, such as Morocco, which occupy strategic locations on the continent. 3. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff must reserve their position on Ambassador Ferguson’s estimate of Moroccan military requirements pending further study, they concur with his recommendation that the United States should undertake an increased military assistance program to Morocco in order to counter the growing Algerian threat. Such a program should take into consideration Morocco’s economic limitations and must be closely coordinated with the Spanish and French, on whom the Moroccans must remain primarily dependent for military aid. This action could be significant, not only in thwarting communist infiltration and in retaining US influence in a strategic area of the world, but also as a means of obtaining overflight privileges and perhaps eventually regaining the use of one of the US-constructed air bases in Morocco. The availability of an alternate air base in Morocco which could provide landing, refueling, minor maintenance, and limited war readiness materiel (WRM) storage facilities in support of USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA contingency requirements would be most desirable. Such a base would provide direct access to the West Coast of Africa from the Azores and Europe and would provide additional and/or back-up facilities to those available in Spain, the Canary Islands, and Libya. 4. It is recognized that, despite possible Moroccan receptivity to such a proposal, anticipation of political and propaganda pressures, such as those brought to bear on the Government of Libya relative to Wheelus, will probably militate against Morocco openly granting unrestricted base rights to the United States. It may be feasible, however, to obtain more limited use of a base in Morocco as a storage/staging facility, possibly under the cover of a US military mission, similar to the recent CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA proposal regarding the use of Dhahran Airfield. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States must, in its own security interests, become more responsive and more committed to selected nations on the African continent. Toward this end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. Early favorable consideration be given to an increased military assistance program for Morocco, consistent with her requirements and resources, and the transfer of additional AID funds to MAP. b. As recommended by Ambassador Ferguson, joint discussions be undertaken with the Moroccans, and with the French and Spanish as appropriate, to determine specific Moroccan military requirements and ways and means of satisfying those requirements. c. During such discussions, the Department of State attempt to ascertain Moroccan receptivity to a proposal for the reactivation of one of the relinquished air bases as a US base or, at a minimum, as a storage/staging facility in support of USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA contingency requirements. However, these discussions should not prejudice the establishment of the program as recommended in subparagraph 5 a, above. d. A memorandum substantially as contained in the Appendix hereto, 2 be forwarded to the Secretary of State. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: L.J. Kirn 3 Rear Admiral, USN Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Morocco, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature. 116. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 116. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 1 Washington, February 13, 1965. I have seen a certain amount of traffic about the advisability and inadvisability of the possible meeting of the President with the King of Morocco. I want to underline my personal reaction that it would be important to arrange such a meeting, if at all possible, either most informally in Rome (where the King would coincidentally be on a health check-up) or during a “refueling stop” in Morocco on the way home. Foreign Minister Benhima made it plain to me that the King was considering very seriously the future posture of his country. He was becoming more and more disillusioned with so-called African nonalignment as practiced by the radical group, Ben Bella, Nkrumah et al and wanted to disassociate himself with that group; but before taking a definite position, he was anxious to talk to the President to see whether the President understood his position and whether he could feel confidence in United States continued friendship and support. I do not believe it is the King’s intention to ask for any specific military or economic assistance as some suggest. In any event, we could see to it in advance that no such request was made. I believe that it would be worthwhile for the President to have a brief talk with the King, as the meeting might well affect the future position of his country with its influence in Africa and the Arab world. He places an unusual reliance on personal contact. If the meeting becomes impractical, I think it would be a good idea for me to stop by to see him with an appropriate message from the President. W.A.H. 2 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Subject Files, Ball, George W. Secret. Drafted by Komer and Assistant Secretary Williams. 2 Printed from a copy with Harriman’s initials in an unidentified hand, indicating Harriman signed the original. 117. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Lang) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 117. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Lang) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, April 16, 1965. I–22,538/65 Dear Governor: I am writing about a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have raised concerning the use of an airfield in Morocco as a standby facility that could be available, if needed, to support contingency operations in Africa and the Middle East. The Chiefs do not envisage establishing a US base per se in Morocco. Rather, they propose to prestock relatively small amounts of ammunition and equipment on an existing Moroccan facility. This prestockage would provide a basis for supporting US units on short notice and thus provide us with an alternative to the facilities in Spain, in the event the latter are denied to us in time of need because of political or other factors. The Chiefs’ first choice as a contingency facility would be Nouasseur since, if the Moroccans go through with their plans for Nouasseur’s development, it would have ample parking space, POL storage and other physical attributes that would be important to the support of a contingency operation. If Nouasseur were not available, the Chiefs consider Rabat-Sale, Kenitra and Meknes as alternatives worth exploring further. Whatever field is chosen by the Moroccans to support their F–5 squadron would probably do the trick, and the US training team accompanying the F–5s would provide a good cover for the storage and maintenance of the US stocks. I would very much like your views on whether our improved relations with Morocco offer the opportunity to work out the type of arrangement that the Chiefs have in mind. In this regard, the thought occurs that the Moroccans may find in such an arrangement a certain degree of assurance that the United States would come to their aid in the event of an Algerian attack, even in the absence of a formal defense commitment on our part. What may be a more difficult question to assess is the type of contingency, other than an attack against Morocco, where we could be fairly well assured that the Moroccans would permit us to use the prestocked facility. Sincerely, Bill 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret. 118. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 118. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Washington, May 10, 1965. I–22, 888/65 SUBJECT Military Assistance for Morocco I am enclosing a letter from Assistant Secretary Williams regarding the proposal to approach the Moroccan Government on the establishment of contingency facilities in Morocco (JCSM–255–65). 2 In his judgment, the Moroccan Government either would not respond favorably because of domestic and external political considerations or, in the unlikely event of a favorable response, would demand a sizeable quid pro quo. In the circumstances, I propose that we defer action until the F–5 training program for the Moroccan Air Force is well underway. At that time, we could assess whether this program, which could provide a cover for the contingency stocks, and the then existing political factors would favor our chances of moving forward successfully with the proposed contingency arrangements. Peter Solbert 1 Source: Department of Defense, JCS Files, 9118.3 (25 Jan. 65). Secret. 2 Enclosure A to JCS 2409/4–1. [Footnote in the source text. The enclosure was attached but is not printed.] 119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 1 Washington, June 12, 1965, 3:50 p.m. 745. Deptel 735. 2 Following is FYI and Noforn, based on uncleared memo of conversation and subject to possible later revision. Ambassador Bengelloun told Secretary morning June 12 King had asked him explain recent political decisions Morocco 3 in view close and friendly relations our two countries. Outlined genesis crisis and impossibility find solution in face unreasonable demands of political parities and lack of clear parliamentary majority. Emphasized King’s decision suspend parliament and assume control was entirely within constitutional framework and in no way resembled coup d’etat some French papers pictured. In response Secretary’s question, Ambassador said initial reaction masses was favorable, because parliament “had not projected good image.” It argued endlessly over petty matters and failed act on country’s crucial problems. When Secretary queried regarding internal or externally-inspired resistance, Ambassador said UNFP, in person Bouabid, accepts decision, though without much enthusiasm. Istiqlal is “resolutely opposed” and challenges right of King to invoke Article 35 in situation. Mass of people want strong and stable government, however. Abroad, Bengelloun said no real reaction yet. Algeria quiet but UAR might “tend not facilitate.” Secretary in reply noted USG much interested in security and prosperity of Morocco. He hoped King’s pledge protect freedom of individual and rights of political parties and unions would prevent atmosphere from becoming strained, tense, or explosive. In search for economic progress, he hoped King would consult often with leaders of various sectors of community in order mobilize them and enlist their aid. Secretary offered best wishes to King during this trying time as he worked to bring Morocco back to kind of system of government he had envisaged for his people in promulgating constitution. Ambassador emphasized again this is provisional situation as King sought “return of calm.” Said “King’s authority is at stake.” Upon preparing to leave, Bengelloun said Foreign Minister Benhima had telephoned to say King suggests Benhima visit Washington again soon to review general situation with Secretary and exchange views on current problems. In noting identity of views on many subjects, he mentioned specifically Moroccan stance on FRG relations and plans for moderating role at Bandung II. Said Benhima planning visit Bonn June 17, “which amounts to direct challenge to Arab opinion.” Called Moroccan policy on FRG issue “courageous.” On Bandung II, said King felt it unwise not have Afn Chief of State there so plans attend at least on day, probably June 29. Bengelloun was told Dept would establish when Secretary might be able see Benhima, possibly early July. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 MOR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Chase, cleared by Barbour and Williams in EUR/WE and Sterner in NEA/NE, and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Algiers, Bonn, and Paris and pouched to Cairo and Tunis. 2 Dated June 9. (Ibid.) 3 On June 7, King Hassan declared a state of emergency under Article 35 of the Moroccan Constitution of 1962, suspended the Parliament, and assumed direct control of all legislative and executive functions. On June 8, he announced the appointment of a 20-man Cabinet (including 13 members of the previous Cabinet), with himself as Prime Minister. 120. Memorandum of Conversation 120. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 18, 1965. SUBJECT Economic Aid PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Mr. J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary Ambassador William C. Trimble, Deputy Assistant Secretary Mr. Alec Toumayan, Interpreter His Royal Highness Prince Moulay Abdullah His Excellency Ahmed Laraki, Moroccan Ambassador His Excellency Driss M’Hammedi, Director General, Royal Cabinet His Excellency Ali Bengelloun, Director General, Moroccan Phosphate Office The Secretary asked the Prince whether he thought his mission to interest American business in Morocco had been successful. 2 The Prince said he thought some useful contacts had been established. An agreement between Occidental Petroleum and the Phosphate Office had been worked out, and they had talked with International General Electric about an electric iron smelter for a proposed steel mill near Nador. The Prince pointed out that Morocco and Tunisia had hoped to get agreement from Algeria for an integrated steel mill within the concept of Maghrebian economic cooperation. However, the Algerians were going ahead with plans for a Soviet-financed mill of 800,000 tons annual capacity. Morocco feels if there is not to be a Maghreb mill, Morocco should have one of its own. The Secretary stated that private investment has an important role in economic development. It was his observation, during his years with the Rockefeller Foundation, that one of the most important factors in getting US businessmen interested was in the word of mouth exchange of information which went on informally at clubs and at luncheons, where business leaders might be discussing the investment climate and possibilities. It would be to Morocco’s advantage to build personal contacts with these leaders, even as Ambassador Bengelloun and Ambassador Laraki have been able to on a limited scale here in Washington. The Secretary further noted that the great international bankers play a vital part in this process and asked what banks the GOM used. Mr. M’Hammedi named the Bank of America, National City, and Bankers’ Trust. Also, he added, the ExIm Bank. The Secretary said the latter was, of course, of a different type. The private banks were the important ones, because what they had to say regarding a country, businessmen would listen to. They would not be as impressed by a government bank. He asked how the domestic situation looked in Morocco. Mr. M’Hammedi said that the Moroccan leaders saw the role of the state as a coordinator of the various cadres in the country. Unfortunately, Moroccans are poor businessmen and have few cadres. They do have a liberal investment code, however, which should encourage foreign businessmen to play a role. The GOM has close contact with the IBRD, and is following their advice. But Morocco needs US aid and private investment. It needs guidance and orientation from the US and similar countries, and advice on which companies to deal with and which schemes contribute most to the country’s development. The Secretary agreed that some development projects contributed more than others, so priorities should be established. He suggested that it would be useful to have some talks together to establish priorities for investment and development. He asked whether some system of priorities was now in effect. Mr. M’Hammedi noted that the King and Parliament had set agriculture as a first priority, both in the modern and traditional sectors, since almost 80 per cent of the country lived off agriculture. He cited the example of the King’s recent talk to the nation in which he asked the people to express their opinion as to whether reduced sugar prices on the current world market should be passed on to the consumer (Morocco has a very high per capita sugar consumption) or whether the savings Morocco expected to realize in the next year should be put into a special fund to build a flood control and irrigation dam benefitting the people and economy of the Tafilalet region where a disastrous flood had recently occurred. The King had just telephoned the Prince to tell him that the people had indicated by an overwhelming majority their wish to invest the savings in the dam project. The second priority is the formation of cadres; teachers, technicians, administrators, engineers. The third priority is tourism, which not only brings in foreign exchange but permits foreign people and the Moroccans to get to know each other. In establishing these priorities, the King had not overlooked education, industry, and public health. It is his belief, shared by his government, that the best defense against foreign subversion is prosperity. Better jobs, wages, education, and health form the basis. Mr. M’Hammedi welcomed the idea of bilateral discussions on priorities. He was sure the Prince would pass the suggestion on to his brother, the King, and he, M’Hammedi, would do the same. The King will undoubtedly instruct the Ambassador to pursue this matter. The Secretary said this would be fine, but pointed out that priorities should be established in the use of private investment, because there, too, some projects help a great deal more than others. He mentioned tourism which earns foreign exchange. He asked what numbers of tour-ists Morocco was getting. M’Hammedi said that last year there were 500,000 and that they expected the number to reach 800,000 in a few years. The main limitation at this time was insufficient hotels. The Secretary observed the trend is to visit countries and areas never seen before. Statistics show that the average visitor to France now spends only three days there. Spain, however, is up to 15,000,000 visitors a year. One third of those might go on to Morocco if the facilities were there. It would be a great boon to Morocco. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 8 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Trimble, Chase, and Toumayan and approved in S on January 10, 1966. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VIII.” The conversation was held in the Secretary’s Dining Room. 2 King Hassan’s brother, Prince Moulay Abdullah, and the Director General of the Royal Cabinet, Driss M’Hammedi, were on a private visit to New York and Washington December 10–18 with the stated purpose of making contact with U.S. business leaders and encouraging them to invest in Morocco. 121. Editorial Note 121. Editorial Note On January 25, 1966, Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News at the Department of State, telephoned Under Secretary Ball to inform him that news stories were alleging CIA involvement in the October 1965 kidnapping of Moroccan opposition leader Ahmed Ben Barka in Paris. Noting that he had checked with the CIA and was satisfied, McCloskey said that he planned to deny U.S. Government involvement. The Under Secretary suggested that McCloskey telephone Bundy at the White House and tell him that Ball was “reasonably satisfied” that there was nothing to this. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Algeria [6/18/65–1/25/66]) On January 28, Ambassador Bohlen reported from Paris that during an off-the-record meeting with journalists, French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou had stated categorically that there was not the slightest indication of involvement of any U.S. intelligence service in the Ben Barka affair. When asked why he did not say this publicly, Pompidou said that it would be inappropriate for him to raise the subject without any official reason. (Telegram 4435 from Paris; Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 MOR) 122. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 122. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 12, 1966. SUBJECT Visit by Special Emissary of Moroccan King You have agreed to meet briefly with His Excellency Driss M’Hammedi, Director General of the Royal Cabinet of the King of Morocco. He will be accompanied by Governor Williams, Ambassador of Morocco Laraki, and an interpreter. Mr. M’Hammedi will probably carry a personal message from the King to you. His visit is to explain the Moroccan side of the “Ben Barka Affair”. We have asked that he not go into detail with you but reserve his exposition for a meeting with me. The issue arose from the kidnapping in Paris last October of Mehdi Ben Barka, self-exiled leader of the leftist opposition in Morocco. He is feared dead. French police and secret agents are reportedly involved, but the French Government claims that the kidnapping was organized by the Moroccans, and have issued international warrants for the arrest of the Moroccan Minister of the Interior, General Oufkir. King Hassan claims the General is innocent and that the French are blaming Morocco in an attempt to whitewash their own Government’s guilt. Both governments have withdrawn their respective ambassadors. However, while French-Moroccan relations are at their lowest ebb since pre-independence Resistance days, French technical and economic assistance continues. It is still not known just what the true story is, and we do not wish to get involved, much less take sides. Talking points are enclosed. 2 Dean Rusk 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Chase on February 11 and cleared by Barbour. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 1 Washington, February 16, 1966, 4:37 p.m. 438. Following based on uncleared memcons and is FYI, Noforn, and subject to change upon review: 1. Driss M’Hammedi met with President for thirty minutes and with Secretary for ninety minutes on February 14. Atmosphere both talks most cordial and M’Hammedi seemed very pleased with reception. 2. He reviewed Ben Barka case but added nothing to what already known. He did say GOM sure allegations of any US involvement are completely untrue. Said GOM seeks only that justice pursue its course and full truth be made known. Morocco had every desire to limit damage to French-Moroccan relations. It was GOF diversion of matter from legal to political context and inadmissible demand that King dismiss his Minister that had forced GOM break silence and defend its good name. If France refrained from repetition unwise pronouncements, Morocco would certainly do nothing to aggravate situation. 3. Viet Nam situation discussed at length, with both President and Secretary expressing USG appreciation for GOM stand. Secretary expressed hope GOM and other moderates would take stronger lead in AF where he feared voice of moderation had been diminished by recent coups. 4. When M’Hammedi asked what pertinence Southeast Asia situation has for AF countries, Secretary replied Communist world sees AF as major target. AF countries can meet threat through forceful political action, in OAU and other meetings, by making it clear all rpt all outsiders must not interfere in Africa. 5. M’Hammedi then mentioned Moroccan fears in Libyan situation where aging king and oil revenues might prove temptation for UAR. He said GOM also much concerned at potential for trouble in Spanish Sahara. Concerned lest Spanish for sake of own prestige and pride might move to give territory autonomy. This would be grave mistake, since region lacks sufficient population, trained personnel, and infrastructure to handle own affairs. Might easily fall prey, through Mauritania and UAR, to forces of agitation, giving Communists chance to realize old dream of “window on Atlantic.” 6. Secretary hoped Morocco and Spain would not let matter become agitated but would somehow work out on bilateral basis, keeping in mind fundamental importance of good Spanish-Moroccan relations. Said he sure Spain attaches great importance to maintenance of such good relations. M’Hammedi replied this certainly King’s intention, to settle bilaterally, and he hoped US might put in good word. 7. M’Hammedi then recalled Secretary’s comments to Prince Moulay Abdullah last December suggesting US-Moroccan consultations on priorities for investment and development in Morocco. King had been most interested this proposal and would now like formally suggest both US and Morocco designate delegations to undertake talks in Washington or Rabat relative to improvement economic relations and formal structuring of continuing consultations in this field. He suggested such bilateral discussions might also embrace political subjects. 8. M’Hammedi extended formal invitation for US to send “high-ranking personage” to celebration of tenth anniversary Moroccan independence at Fez March 2 and 3. In leaving he mentioned GOM concern on manganese and phosphates, but noted Ambassador Laraki would take up with Department. He asked that Secretary receive Laraki to discuss if any major problems arose. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Chase; cleared by Root in AF/AFN, Beigel, Roberts in FE/VN, Burati in AID/AFR/NS, Symmes in NEA/NE, and Komer; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Madrid, Paris, Algiers, Nouakchott, Tripoli, Tunis, Cairo, and by pouch to Saigon. 124. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 124. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 19, 1966. Moroccan King Hassan plans to come to the UN General Assembly in late November or early December and has asked whether he could drop down to see you. The normal procedure if you see a head of state visiting the UN is just to have him for lunch and an hour’s talk. We have told our ambassadors to discourage these visitors from expecting to see you, and we do not have any reason to expect any heavy influx this fall. I think this would be a good way to handle Hassan since we are not ready to invite him for another official visit. He has angled for a meeting ever since you took office, and we have stalled him off each time. During his 1963 state visit, President Kennedy made a special effort to get close to him because we wanted him to let us stay on in our communications [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] base after closing our SAC bases. Hassan wants to feel equally close to you. My first inclination was to discourage this because you tentatively have two visitors each in November and December. He might not even come to the UN if he were not sure of seeing you at the same time. However, an hour’s talk and a lunch might save you a more formal visit next year. He is one of the moderate Arab-Africans we want to support. He has been good on Vietnam and moderate on Israel. He has kept his word on our communications base. He has closed out Soviet military aid (though he probably will make a long-deferred Moscow visit early this fall). A larger reason for seeing him is that this, coupled with Bourguiba’s visit early next year, will give you a good crack at troublesome North Africa. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya are a natural grouping for economic cooperation. Oil, natural gas and minerals in the Sahara are ripe for common exploitation. One thing holds them back—Algeria. While Boumedienne is less menacing than Ben Bella was, neither Bourguiba nor Hassan trust him with his Soviet-equipped army, and we are fighting to keep out of an arms race there. We want to encourage these countries to work together, and Ambassador Korry will be giving you some suggestions in a couple of days in reporting on your African program. This would give you a chance to weigh in. I recommend you authorize Ambassador Tasca to tell the King you would hope to see him if he comes to the UN. But we would tell Tasca to explain your especially heavy schedule this fall and ask to defer making definite plans until later. 2 W.W. Rostow 3 Approve having Hassan, schedule permitting 4 Too busy See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Secret. 2 Telegram 14058 to Rabat, July 23, instructed Tasca to tell King Hassan that if he came to the United States to attend the U.N. General Assembly in late November or early December, the President would be happy to entertain him at luncheon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR) Following the President’s operation in early November, King Hassan canceled his trip to the United Nations, and his visit to the United States was tentatively postponed until January or February 1967. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 4 This option is checked. 125. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 125. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 30, 1966, 11 a.m. Attached is a subtle letter from Moroccan King Hassan, 2 which his Finance Minister delivered to me yesterday. The FM is here to discuss his economic program and to talk to potential private investors. Hassan is reinforcing his request for help against his drought—Morocco has lost about 50% of its cereals production this year. However, he does not come right out and ask. He relates his own agricultural program to your Food for Freedom message and your efforts to focus world-wide attention on the food problem. Only at the end of his letter does he describe briefly his own shortages. We have already responded in several ways. On the emergency front, we sent Dick Reuter to Morocco (he was in Europe anyway) as your personal representative to look at the problem, both long and short range. We agreed to send 200,000 tons of wheat and to review the situation again in the fall when requirements are clearer. Our own tight supply will keep us from coming close to the 1.2 million tons the Moroccans think they need. But the Canadians and French are also helping, and we may be able to get close to 500,000 tons as the year goes on. On the development front, we have two research teams there now—one from TVA—to lay out longer term projects to improve Morocco’s land and fertilizer use. The IBRD and the Germans are helping too. The Moroccan program is not quite so well-defined as Hassan suggests, but there’s a good chance to do a sound job there. These efforts are in line with Korry’s recommendations. The Moroccans are reasonably satisfied with our response. I think Hassan just wanted to break the ice with you by highlighting a mutual interest in the food problem and showing he is a serious-minded fellow ready to help himself. He is looking forward to seeing you when he comes to the UN late this fall. We will use your reply to let you weigh in on the substance of our program. I have asked State for a draft and for suggestions on timing. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Confidential. 2 Attached but not printed. 126. Letter From President Johnson to King Hassan 126. Letter From President Johnson to King Hassan 1 Washington, August 12, 1966. Your Majesty: I was heartened to receive your letter describing views so similar to my own on the importance of increasing world food production, and I especially appreciated your kind words about our Food for Freedom Program. Mr. Rostow had a good talk with Finance Minister Tahiri, and Mr. Reuter returned from his visit to Morocco optimistic about your country’s potential in agriculture. It is particularly encouraging to learn of the high priority which you are giving to agriculture in Morocco’s economic development plans. I am convinced that by intensive efforts in this direction Your Majesty’s Government can bring to the rural population of Morocco a higher income and to the consumers in the cities the necessities of life at prices they can afford. A sustained effort to make Morocco more self-sufficient would be the most important contribution you could make in attacking the world food problem. We are especially gratified to see countries like your own striving to meet their own food requirements at a time when our exportable surpluses are diminishing. One of the most striking revelations to me in my study of the food problem is the prospect that even my country, with its rich blessing of agricultural abundance, will not be able to meet much longer the shortages that could develop around the world in the short space of a decade. In the end, your nation’s own agricultural programs and policies will determine the degree of its success. We intend to help wherever we appropriately can, and I have asked my own experts to press ahead in determining how the United States can work with Your Majesty’s Government to improve Morocco’s productivity in food grains. I am pleased that we are currently financing two studies in Morocco which we expect will help Your Majesty’s Government reach important decisions on the degree of food self-sufficiency that is most economic for Morocco. These studies should also clarify alternative paths to accelerated agricultural development over the long term. I hope you will find them useful. The World Bank, I understand, has offered to make available to you its professional advice and services, and I hope you can make full use of its great resources. I have been impressed with the Bank’s acute analysis in other situations and know its guidance will become increasingly important to us all. Regarding the grain shortage that last season’s bad weather has inflicted on you, I can assure you that the United States will help as much as possible, taking into account heavy demands on our limited supplies. As Ambassador Tasca has told you, we have already allotted to Morocco 100,000 metric tons of wheat under the sales provisions of our Public Law 480 to meet the present emergency. Shipments will begin in the near future. In addition, our officials are examining possibilities for further assistance. Ambassador Tasca has kept us carefully informed of your needs, and Ambassador Laraki is in close touch with our officials here. I assume that other friendly countries are also cooperating in meeting Morocco’s needs. Your letter has given me a useful opportunity to exchange views on a subject which is of special concern to me. I shall follow Morocco’s program with great interest. Should you come to the United Nations later this fall, I hope we can discuss these and other issues of common interest in greater detail. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 MOR. Limited Official Use. Telegram 28094 to Rabat, August 15, transmitted the text of the President’s letter to the Embassy with instructions that it be delivered to King Hassan. (Ibid.) 127. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 127. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 1 Washington, undated. MOROCCO At Ambassador Tasca’s urging and to fulfill an old promise to the King, I stopped off at Rabat on my way home. The King is understanding of and has sympathy with our policies in Vietnam. There is not much he can do. He has sent one cargo of phosphate fertilizer and I encouraged him to do more. He was just back from a visit to the Soviet Union and had obtained agreements for economic assistance. Whether these will materialize in actual deliveries is still to be seen. They do involve, however, sending a number of Russian technicians promptly and his Ministers were anxious to get from us our experience with subversive action in other parts of the world. I think it is much to our interest to encourage this. In spite of his hospitable reception, the King is under no illusions that the Soviets would like to unseat him and supplant him with a leftist government. In fact, he told me they had been frank in telling him that although they wanted to be friendly, he must understand that if he got into difficulties with any of the countries that were in the “socialist family,” the Soviet Union would be on their side. He told me they mentioned the following countries: UAR, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania, Somalia, Syria and Iraq. The King is concerned over the extremely heavy shipments of arms to Algeria. They are so large that our own military officers in Rabat are at a loss to understand just what the Russians have in mind. The King shares the Shah’s and the Ethiopian Emperor’s concern over Nasser’s aggressive intentions. They are all worried over what will happen when the British leave Aden. They look upon Nasser as a Soviet tool and watch with concern the military build-up with Russian weapons in UAR, Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, and now Syria. The King is unhappy that we have refused to sell him ten to fifteen million dollars in tank and anti-tank weapons which he feels is necessary to enable Morocco to hold out against Algerian attack for the few days necessary to take the issue to the Security Council. Without more modern weapons, he feels an Algerian attack might penetrate so deeply in Moroccan territory that he would be unseated. The King expressed concern about the defense of Saudi Arabia against possible Nasser attack and hopes we will give King Faysal full support. For my part I have been and am now increasingly concerned about what the Soviets are up to in the Middle East and feel there should be a strategic study of the military, political, and economic implications of the entire area from Morocco to Iran. The threat to the oil resources is as much in Libya as in the Arabian Peninsula. Morocco is on the right flank of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The use of facilities in Morocco are vital to its operation. I hope by the time the King arrives in February, there can be at least a preliminary estimate which will make possible some decision on his problems. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret. This paper is part of a larger “Report of Post-Manila Trip,” dated November 22, transmitted by Harriman to the President and Rusk on November 28, following his trip to 10 countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa after the Manila Conference. It included a general report and separate reports on each country he visited. Harriman’s conversation with the King on November 9 was recorded in a memorandum of conversation which is ibid. 128. Memorandum of Conversation 128. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 25, 1967. SUBJECT Morocco’s Security and King Hassan’s Visit to the United States PARTICIPANTS Dr. Ahmed Laraki, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States The Secretary Ambassador William C. Trimble, AF Mr. R. Peter Spicer, AF/AFN Mrs. S. Porson, Interpreter Ambassador Laraki said that the King had talked with Mr. Palmer about the organization of Africa. 2 On the continent there are the so-called “moderate” states and those termed “revolutionary” or “progressive.” Morocco, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Tunisia have been moderate, but have not received assistance in their endeavors. On the other hand, there are massive arms buildups in Algeria, Tanzania, Guinea, the UAR and Somalia. This concerns the King and all the moderate heads of state who are counting on Morocco to deal with the problem, because if it cannot be solved, then there will be a split in Africa along horizontal or vertical poles, i.e., Algeria-Congo (Brazzaville) or Guinea, UAR, and Algeria. Three weeks ago, the King received personally a MUSLO (MAAG) mission. The conversation lasted for four hours and revealed that U.S. and Moroccan data on weapons agree. When the King talked with Mr. Palmer, the latter stated that it is the policy of the United States to avoid an arms race. The King replied that Morocco too wishes to avoid an arms race, preferring a race for prosperity. But how is this possible when Morocco’s neighbor has 450 tanks and Morocco only 100; when Morocco’s neighbor has 800 heavy artillery pieces and Morocco only 80; when Morocco’s neighbor has 120 bombers and fighters and Morocco only 10? According to Ambassador Laraki, the King asked Mr. Palmer whether the United States would agree to try and work out a “table of organization” to deal with the situation, and Mr. Palmer said no. [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ] 3 Ambassador Laraki continued by saying that the King wants to talk to the President and Secretary Rusk but believes that if this is the thinking of the Department of State and the Executive Branch of the United States Government, it would be better to avoid a reception here which would offer only platonic discussions, no concrete results. In the light of the frankness in U.S.-Moroccan relations, the King wished that Secretary Rusk be asked if this is the thinking of the United States Government. If it is, it would be better, in the King’s estimation, for a mutually acceptable formula to be found to cancel the King’s trip. Ambassador Laraki stated that this does not mean that Morocco is changing its orientation. After all, Morocco is an established monarchy, the King being the seventeenth in his line, and the country is stable and will never turn socialist. In his conversation with Ambassador Laraki, the King said that during his trip to the USSR seven weeks ago, the Russians had made a number of offers which the King turned down because of the former’s ulterior motives and because he did not wish to receive instructions from them in his own country. But on the other hand, the King does not want to come to the United States and go home empty-handed. It would be difficult for him to have refused the Russian offers and then not achieve anything in the United States. Ambassador Laraki again assured the Secretary that this did not represent a change in the centuries-old friendship which links our two countries. The Ambassador added that the King had asked him to remind Secretary Rusk of his statement made at the train station here in 1963 during the King’s visit, in which the Secretary spoke of the King’s role in Africa. But, asks the King, how can he play that role without the understanding of his friends? Ambassador Laraki concluded with the statement that he had simply summarized the issues, knowing that Mr. Palmer had no doubt sent detailed reports to the State Department. In reply the Secretary stated that he could not reply immediately, because the question is too serious. We have not yet received full reports from Mr. Palmer, and the Secretary would have to contact Mr. Palmer and obtain a detailed report of the conversation. The Secretary then said that there are some matters that cannot be dealt with by means of a short question and a short response. The Secretary did not think that he had enough information to judge. He added that he would never comment, even informally, on the relations between the King and President Johnson without consulting the President. Therefore, he needed to have more information because the question raised is very serious. The Secretary then asked the Ambassador to convey his personal greetings to the King and to assure him of the friendship and interest of the United States in Morocco’s safety and prosperity. He added that one would have to look very hard to find a better friend of Morocco, since independence, than the United States. In conclusion, the Secretary said that he wished to examine the questions presented and, in view of their nature, could not reply at this time. Ambassador Laraki said he would transmit the Secretary’s comments to the King and would keep the Secretary informed of all developments. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs R. Peter Spicer and Porson and approved in S on February 9. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” 2 Telegram 3394 from Rabat, January 23, reported Palmer’s conversation with the King. (Ibid., ORG 7 AF) 3 In telegram 3504 from Rabat, January 27, Palmer commented that Laraki’s demarche had embroidered some aspects of his conversation with the King beyond recognition. [ text not declassified ] (Ibid., POL MOR–US) 129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 1 Washington, January 30, 1967, 6:30 p.m. 127945. For Ambassador. 1. IRG agreed January 28 King should be told soonest and you should so inform him: (a) apparently some misunderstanding in conversation with Asst. Secretary Palmer, if King interpreted Palmer’s response to be lack of sympathy with or understanding of Moroccan problems. Palmer’s negative response confined to possibility obtaining security guarantee. We have military sales question under urgent consideration with decision expected shortly; (b) President expects hear first hand King’s opinions Morocco’s security situation. 2. FYI: While IRG reached agreement in principle on credit sales arms within range $5 million to $14 million, 2 this is subject to independent review by SIG with meeting scheduled tomorrow afternoon. If decision made to proceed with sales program, details re equipment and terms to be worked out after visit probably with country team in Morocco. We expect include in any agreement limitation to defensive uses equipment and Moroccan concurrence that sales will not detract from economic development of Morocco or Morocco’s advancement Maghreb economic cooperation. 3. FYI: If the decision is made to proceed with the sales program, we would take Spanish concerns into account at appropriate time by emphasizing the defensive character of the assistance and its relatively modest dimension. We would also reaffirm US commitment to peaceful solution Sahara question based on self-determination, acceptable all interested parties. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Spicer and Deputy Executive Secretary John P. Walsh, cleared by Katzenbach and Saunders, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Monrovia for Palmer. 2 On January 28, the African Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) met to consider the Moroccan request for additional military assistance, and decided there should be a favorable U.S. response. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Morocco 1967) 130. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 130. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 7, 1967, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Three North African Decisions Secretary Rusk wants to discuss with you at lunch the three attached North African decisions. 2 The two Moroccan decisions—one food and a $14 million military credit sale—are relatively easy and should be made before King Hassan arrives Thursday. The third is an Algerian PL 480 deal which the Secretary has added to the package because he would like to see us keep a foot in all North African doors. We have also scheduled an NSC discussion on North Africa tomorrow to give you a picture of all our interests there and the whole complex of problems we face. You may want to give us a preliminary OK on the Moroccan programs and then hold the Algerian decision until after the NSC meeting if you still have reservations after the lunch today. The attached bulky package boils down to this: Tab A : The Secretary recommends you approve the $14 million credit sale of arms King Hassan has asked for. Bill Gaud would prefer no sale on the grounds that these countries can’t afford drain from economic development and that we should be trying to build regional cooperation in North Africa—not get into an arms race. We all sympathize with his view but, with $180 million in Soviet arms next door in Algeria, it’s hard to refuse Hassan permission to buy this small amount over 2–3 years. The Senior Interdepartmental Group, in endorsing this recommendation, recommended that we attach appropriate conditions to avoid disruption to economic development and to make sure the arms are primarily defensive. Go ahead See me 3 Tab B : The Secretary recommends that you make a finding that it is in the national interest to make grain sales to Morocco under PL 480. If you approve, he would go ahead with negotiation of 167,000 tons of wheat ($11.3 million, 50–50 between local currency and dollar credit financing). The determination is necessary because Morocco still trades its phosphates for Cuban sugar. King Hassan will give you his personal assurance that Morocco will continue to phase down its Cuba trade to meet the requirements of the Findley amendment. 4 Morocco has suffered from drought this year, and you approved sale last fall of a similar amount for the first half of the year. Morocco is overhauling its agriculture, and the King is behind a pretty decent program to increase cereal yields. Besides, Morocco is a good friend. If you approve, we ask you to sign the determination at the signature tab. [Here follows discussion of a dollar credit sale of wheat to Algeria; for text, see Document 33 .] W.W. Rostow 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 20. Secret. 2 None of the tabs was attached. 3 Neither of the options is checked, but a handwritten note in the margin next to the paragraph reads: “President OK’d.” 4 A handwritten note in the margin next to this paragraph reads: “President OK’d.” 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 131. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 131. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 8, 1967. SUBJECT Your Talk with King Hassan King Hassan sets especially great store by his meeting with you. When he saw President Kennedy in 1963, they negotiated the terms under which we stayed on [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] at our naval [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] commo base at Kenitra after closing down our big SAC bases. He has more reason than many of our smaller-country visitors for figuring that the way to do business with the U.S. is to sit down with the President. From our point of view, there is no such burning issue as the base question this time. The visit is mostly his initiative. From his point of view, however, the visit will be crucial in determining where his big-power support will come from. He is at odds with De Gaulle, his former mentor. German economic and military help has been disappointing. He disputes Spain’s claim to the phosphate-rich Spanish Sahara. He doesn’t trust the USSR, which has sent $180 million in military equipment to Algeria. A closer relationship with the U.S. seems his best remaining bet. [1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified] He probably won’t expect you to take him up on this, but the offer is a measure of his worry. His main interest in talking with you is to discuss the Algerian threat. He’ll probably settle for an OK on his request for $14 million in military sales, but he may probe pretty hard to see how far we’d go in coming to his aid. In answering this pitch, you can explain your political problems with such commitments. You can tell him of our willingness to sell military equipment to the amount of $14 million, which he requested. You can say we’d be deeply concerned by any attack on him. However, it would also help if you could outline our hope for North African regional cooperation. You might describe the spirit of regionalism you found in Manila and elsewhere on your Asian trip. With all of their resources and advanced economic base, it would be tragic if the North African nations let suspicion undercut what they could accomplish together. This is why we are reluctant to see Morocco spend too much on arms. You’ll have to concede that Algeria is a problem, but you may find a way to point out gently that both Algeria and Spain are seriously worried about Morocco’s own territorial claims against them. Hassan will also want to discuss food, and you can tell him you’ve approved his wheat sale for the second half of the year (167,000 tons). In doing so, you might want to give him your picture of the world food problem and your own political difficulties in continuing food aid. Morocco suffered drought last summer and has launched a crash fertilizer project (which we’re helping with). But population growth is still ahead of food production, and encouragement from you would help. The King wrote you a good letter last fall on what Morocco is doing in agriculture, but he’s still in the stage of talking a better game than he plays. The same is generally true of his whole developmental effort. He’s done a lot of basic work in the foothills but hasn’t begun to climb yet (see attached charts). 2 However, AID has picked Morocco as one of its concentration countries. That doesn’t mean we’ll be spending a lot of money there. It does mean that our aid has dropped sharply from the artificially high level (over $70 million at the peak) [1 line of source text not declassified] and is now seeking a more appropriate level (around $10 million). In connection with our food aid, you’ll want to note the restrictions Congress has put on the program. The Findley amendment causes us special trouble with Morocco, which barters phosphates for badly needed Cuban sugar. We’ve tried—so far without success—to help the Moroccans find a better deal elsewhere. Nevertheless, Hassan is ready to give you his personal assurance that he will phase this trade down. It’s on the basis of his assurance that you will be signing the Findley waiver. Leonard Marks would like you to ask for a firmer tenure (now year-to-year) for his Voice of America relay transmitter. If he could nail that down, he might delay building a new $25 million facility in Spain. However, State feels we ought to let sleeping dogs lie. In negotiating our stay at the naval commo station, President Kennedy mentioned five years, which would expire in 1968. Nevertheless, we’re in a better position not raising the subject and making the Moroccans ask us to leave. If the King raises the subject, you could express our appreciation and confirm our desire to stay. I ought to warn you that these talks are more likely than most to take an unexpected turn. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] He may, for instance, press hard for an answer on the security guarantee and, when you don’t give him one, ask to come back and see you again Friday. (He got an extra meeting with President Kennedy.) You will sense how to handle him, but forewarned is forearmed. The King may also press for a communique, which we don’t normally include in this simpler visit format. My solution to this would be to ask George Christian at his Thursday afternoon briefing to make a fairly formal statement of subjects discussed which we might check with the King’s party. He could announce the PL 480 deal then and perhaps a couple of smaller loans that are ready to go. He could even invite one of the King’s party to be present. State’s briefing memo is attached. 3 Secretary Rusk’s involvement with Brandt has so far kept him from signing the original. However, this does represent the Department’s recommendation. I believe our discussion at lunch Tuesday gives you most of the background you need so doubt you will need to look at background papers. I’ll have a last-minute talking paper for you in the morning. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Visit of King Hassan, 2/9–10/67. Secret. 2 Not printed. 3 Attached but not printed. 132. Memorandum of Conversation 132. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 9, 1967. SUBJECT Morocco’s Security Problem PARTICIPANTS Morocco: King Hassan II Mr. Balafrej, the King’s Personal Representative Mr. Cherkaoui, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Laraki United States: The President The Secretary Ambassador Tasca Ambassador Symington Mr. Rostow, The White House Assistant Secretary Palmer Mr. Root, AFN Mr. Saunders, The White House Mr. Glenn, Language Services Mr. Nowfel, Language Services The King stressed that while he would prefer to be concerned only with problems of economic development, he must worry about the security of his nation. One reason for concern, for example, is the effect which will be produced by the return to Algeria of 2,000 young officers who are being trained in the Soviet Union. It has been shown that sometimes two hundred well organized officers can carry out a political takeover. This is a disquieting factor, whatever may be the relative moderation of the Algerian leaders. Another point of concern is the progressive erosion of Algerian independence. The enormous armaments which Algeria has received have decreased Algerian freedom of action in the diplomatic field. They have tied the Algerian economy to Soviet production plans. The King said that he had to worry about the security of his nation. In addition to a military danger, Algeria is a source of subversion. If the armaments being brought into Algeria were of a type which would be used purely for internal purposes he would not worry, but Algeria’s tanks and missiles are not appropriate for a mountainous country and can be used only for aggression. Algeria has assembled armaments beyond the Moroccan border which include a number of supersonic jet bombers, 40 MIG 21s, 800 artillery pieces (against the 80 in the hands of Moroccans), 450 tanks (against the less than 120 in Morocco) and an army of 60,000 men (against 35,000 in Morocco). Algeria can be encouraged to use its armaments for aggressive purposes if it knows there is no counterforce capable of opposing it beyond the Tunisian and Moroccan borders. Morocco does not wish to enter into an arms race with Algeria; all it needs is enough weapons to hold for three days, enough time for the Security Council to gather and demand cessation of military action. During its long history Morocco has always been able to defend its borders and its honor. It has never sought to conquer alien territory. Morocco would fight with empty bottles if necessary but empty bottles would be useless against the Algerian arsenal. The King said he was told by Mr. Brezhnev in Moscow that the latter would not like Morocco to become entangled with such friends of the USSR as the UAR, Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, Somalia, Tanzania, Syria and Yemen. Under the circumstances, Morocco must turn towards friendly, like-minded, richer countries to ask for help. The President said that the United States recognizes Morocco’s concern for its security, and for this reason the President has approved the sale of $14 million of military equipment, subject to the usual proviso in American policy that the materiel in question be used exclusively for defensive purposes. A further proviso is that the purchase of this equipment would not hurt the Moroccan economy. It would also be wise to play down the already over-publicized question of military aid. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. Secret. The source text is labeled “Part II of V.” The conversation was held at the White House. Memoranda of conversation of President Johnson’s discussion of other topics with King Hassan on February 9 are ibid. 133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 1 Washington, February 13, 1967, 5:23 p.m. 136042. 1. King Hassan of Morocco departed for New York this morning after two-day informal visit Washington Feb 9–10 as guest President Johnson. King and party will be private visitors New York until departure for Morocco by plane late evening Feb 17. 2. King Hassan had about hour’s conversation with President on Feb 9 and made brief farewell call on President Feb 10. 2 King continued substantive discussions with Secretary morning Feb 10. Fuller details of discussions will be provided you in due course, but following are highlights (based uncleared memcon and for your background only) of meeting Feb 9 with President: a) President told King US attached great importance Moroccan self-help efforts in field of agriculture (King affirmed economic development, particularly in agriculture, his most important concern). Meanwhile, to help Morocco over effects serious drought US prepared to provide Morocco further PL–480 sales of 167,000 tons wheat. 3 b) President informed King that in view Morocco’s concern for its security US prepared make $14 million credit sales military equipment for defensive purposes, details to be worked out subsequently. (Deliveries will be spread out over several years.) President said this assistance predicated on use for defense only and on Moroccan dedication to peaceful policies. c) King emphasized what Morocco hoped to achieve next four years in agricultural development, through extensive irrigation and other improvements. He said he could nevertheless not neglect Morocco’s security and had responsibility as Moroccan monarch take into account disturbing developments in Algeria next door. He dwelt at considerable length on future dangers implicit in Algerian arms buildup and return 2,000 Soviet-trained Algerian military personnel. Morocco had to be able defend itself against attack for at least few days (until Security Council could act). d) King said of course he had no choice but to turn to friends who thought as Morocco, had necessary resources and could help. (He obviously appreciative offers arms sales and wheat and did not seek further specific commitments.) e) On Kenitra naval communications center and VOA Tangier, he assured President our use these facilities could continue. 4 f) President and King of course referred to problems of peace in world generally, with President stressing particularly our efforts achieve peace Vietnam but finding so far no serious response from other side. President expressed appreciation Morocco’s understanding and support this matter. 3. In addition foregoing, U.S.-Moroccan cultural agreement was signed Feb 10 at Moroccan Embassy by Secretary and Moroccan Foreign Minister in King’s presence. (Agreement is standard form for its kind and carries no immediate or explicit obligations.) 4. Comment : Moroccans seemed highly pleased with visit and it went off well from US viewpoint. We are anxious of course to downplay arms question and in answer to press inquiries are giving following background guidance: “There will be limited expansion of our present program of modest arms sales to Morocco for purely defensive purposes. Categories of defensive armaments remain to be worked out. None of this should be construed as sudden infusion of military support for Morocco, but is merely part of our ongoing program”. 5. If you are questioned by officials your capital, you should stick to this formulation regarding arms sales (but mention no figures) and emphasize that President and King talked about security in area solely in terms of Moroccan defense. Any assistance we furnish will be solely for defense, condition which King accepted without question. 6. Two leaders agreed moreover on overriding importance devoting resources in North African area to peaceful pursuits. King said his main interest was in economic development his country and in this connection two leaders agreed on importance regional cooperation. 7. For Embassy Algiers : We appreciate difficulties which newspaper focus on question military assistance may cause you, but trust you will exert best efforts with GOA place matters in true perspective. Any additional military sales to Morocco will be within very low figure (negligible fraction of what Algeria has already received from USSR), remain to be negotiated, will be related strictly to Morocco’s minimum defensive needs and will take several years to deliver. There can thus be no question of contributing to “arms race”. We strongly hope therefore that GOA can be convinced that such a marginal contribution to Morocco’s defensive capabilities would in no way require or justify further Algerian acquisitions. King did not raise border problems with President ( El Fassi and Minister Saharan Affairs never appeared in conversations) and there was no sign of bellicose, irredentist attitude. On contrary, Hassan seemed genuinely anxious live on good terms with his North African neighbors. In fact, discussions dealt largely with problems of food, agricultural development and regional economic cooperation. 8. FYI: Prospects for early decision on Title IV sale of 200,000 tons wheat to Algeria seem very good and it would be unfortunate if Algerian press complicates matters in any way at this point. End FYI. 9. For Madrid : Much foregoing guidance applies to your concerns. While King never raised Morocco’s territorial claims with President, he subsequently referred to Spanish Sahara problem with Secretary. His comments were, however, within context peaceful resolution of problem in accordance principle self-determination. Further details on this discussion will follow. 10. For Paris : In addition to foregoing, you may find it useful reassure French officials that, whatever may be exaggerations of press, there was in fact nothing in visit that changed in any way past US policies limited assistance to Morocco and that King has been given no reason to think we have any desire, capability or intent of trying “replace French.” On contrary, Moroccans have every reason to appreciate importance we continue to attach to Franco-Moroccan cooperation, and therefore to avoidance further difficulties in this relationship. Cultural agreement was added fillip during visit but in fact is standard text of its kind and signifies no more than expression of principle which appears on its face. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Root on February 11, cleared by Landau in EUR/SPP and Saunders, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to Algiers, Madrid, Paris, and Tunis and repeated by pouch to Cairo, London, and Tripoli. 2 President Johnson’s conversation with King Hassan on February 10 was recorded in three memoranda of conversation; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–7/67. 3 A memorandum of conversation of President Johnson’s discussion of P.L. 480 wheat sales to Morocco with King Hassan on February 9 is ibid. 4 A memorandum of conversation of President Johnson’s discussion of the U.S. facilities at Tangier and Kenitra with King Hassan on February 9 is ibid. 134. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 134. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 27, 1967. SUBJECT Findley Waiver for Morocco When King Hassan was here, you agreed to a PL 480 credit sale of 167,000 tons of wheat worth $11.3 million, repayment to be half in dollars and half in local currency. Before negotiation can start, we need your signature on the attached waiver to the Findley Amendment. The main reason for a waiver in Morocco’s case is its barter of phosphates for Cuban sugar. The King has agreed to end trade in all items that PL 480 prohibits waiving. When he was here, he also assured Secretary Rusk that he would phase down his phosphate exports but he asked help in finding new markets. We believe his assurance is a fair basis for your waiver. Morocco’s barter with Cuba has been a persistent problem—largely because it’s clearly the best deal Morocco can make to buy badly needed sugar. We’ve tried for a couple of years to help them work out a good arrangement elsewhere. We’ve even tried three-way barters involving our own commodities. But so far we haven’t hit on a good solution. Hassan understands the politics of our problem and obviously has no heart in helping Cuba. It’s been pure economics, but even at that he’s trying to work with us. Attached is a report from State indicating they have consulted with the Leadership of both Houses and of the appropriate committees on the above deal, and there are no objections. 2 If you want to go ahead on this for Morocco as agreed with Hassan, the next step is to sign the attached so negotiations can legally begin. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21. Confidential. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 President Johnson signed the waiver on February 27. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21) 135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 1 Washington, May 30, 1967, 12:32 p.m. 204894. Joint State/Defense message. Subject: $14 million credit sales package. Ref (A) Rabat’s 5204, (B) State 150173. 2 1. As Embassy aware decision approve $14 million credit sale was based on (a) King’s specific request for “tank and anti-tank equipment,” and (b) JCS concept of balanced improvement of GOM defensive forces. Point is that an increment of tanks was requested and was a basis for approving the $14 million level. We could not now agree to GOM proposal use all of the available $14 million for other items without having provided for its tank requirement. This would either leave the requirement neglected or lead to a request for a second sales package which we are not prepared to consider. 2. Guidance for conducting discussions with GOM provided in reference B still valid: (a) that the objective of the sales discussion is to provide, within $14 million available, greatest relative defensive capability compatible with existing Moroccan logistical/maintenance systems, (b) that we are not prepared provide equipment beyond Moroccan capacity to use and maintain for defense purposes, (c) that we are not prepared to approve Moroccan requests for equipment items and quantities substantially different or larger than JCS package, and (d) that follow-on support requirements for items in the credit package (as well as current inventory) should not be included in $14 million package. 3. The quantities of items proposed reference A are in excess GOM needs (particularly number C–119G aircraft) and would not provide greatest relative defensive capability. 4. At your discretion you may wish call upon above in explaining to GOM we cannot agree its proposal per reference A. While we believe M–48A1 tank would meet GOM requirement, we do not wish force it upon them and would, therefore, be willing set aside $5 million of $14 million total to accommodate tank and logistical support requirement at later time. Only feasible alternative we see on horizon is M–48A3 (diesel version M–48A1) which, depending SEA developments, could possibly be made available in 25 months (without radios and ancillary armament) at about $150,000 each basic cost vs $43,742 for M–48A1 (as indicated letter offer). None could be made available in less time. (We intend convey same General Driss during visit.) 5. In view of the difficulties experienced thus far in obtaining agreement on itemization and in view of fast approaching end fiscal year, every effort should be exerted obtain GOM agreement on basic memorandum of understanding regarding credit. Following (para 6) is text unclassified Memorandum of Understanding that should be signed by appropriate representatives Ministry of Defense and MUSLO. Terms offered are same as 1965 F–5 sale. Detailed credit arrangements and implementing sales orders will be entered into later pursuant to the classified military assistance agreement of June 29, 1960, which includes certain necessary undertakings and carries Circular 175 authority. End Secret Begin Unclassified. 6. “ Memorandum of Understanding —In order to assist the Government of Morocco in financing the purchase from the Government of the United States during the United States fiscal years 1967 and 1968 of such defense articles and defense services as may during that period be mutually agreed, the total estimated cost of which will not exceed $14,000,000, the Government of the United States agrees, subject to the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and acts amendatory or supplementary thereto, to extend credit to the Government of Morocco of not to exceed $14,000,000 on terms of repayment over 10 years and interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum on the unpaid principal balance of each order. Detailed credit arrangements and implementing sales orders will be entered into from time to time during the aforesaid period by duly authorized representatives of the two Governments. (signed) (Ministry of Defense) (signed) (MUSLO)” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Secret. Drafted by Bader in DOD/ISA and Spicer; cleared by Commander Peters in JS/SAMAA, Legner in DA/DCSLOG, McCall in AFR/NA, Shaw in PC/MAD, Colonel Hazam in OSD/I and L, Gardner of Treasury, Forman in OSD/GC, Rabida in G/PM, Allen in INR/RAF, Feigl in ISA/ILN, Goldstein in ODMA, Malmborg in L/E, Runyon in L/AF, and Nilsen in L/T; and approved by Root. Also sent to CHMUSLO Rabat and repeated to USCINCEUR. 2 Telegram 5204 from Rabat, May 23, reported that the King wished to present a revised list of military material that the Moroccan Government wished to purchase under the $14 million credit sale. (Ibid.) Telegram 150173 to Rabat, March 7, which provided guidance for discussions with the Moroccan military in developing a mutually acceptable credit sale, emphasized that the objective of the sale should be to provide the greatest relative defensive capability compatible with existing Moroccan logistical/maintenance systems. (Ibid.) 136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 1 Washington, June 17, 1967, 3:30 p.m. 212261. Ref Rabat’s 5531 and 5532. 2 1. You should assure Laraki and Oufkir of our continuing deep concern for Moroccan security. We are giving urgent attention to specific problem raised reftel and, while you are not in position give specific response at this time, GOM can be sure that we are carefully examining situation in light of all prevailing circumstances in Maghreb and Near East. We will remain in closest contact at both military and governmental levels on this matter. 2. You should add that while we do not have any independent evidence suggesting that Algerians readying attack against Morocco, we are taking all steps available to us ascertain further information about Algerian intentions. We obviously do not know Boumediene’s thoughts at this time, but seems most illogical to us that he would contemplate attack against Arab country at same moment he is trying to exert some leadership in reuniting Arabs against Israel. 3. We naturally hope to avoid new arms race throughout North Africa and Middle East. We are closely following Soviet actions and intend to probe their intentions in this respect. We consider it highly important in interest of countries of the area and of the world to bring arms deliveries to area under some kind of control. 4. However, we certainly recognize Morocco’s right and desire to be in position to defend itself. This is why, in light this latest request, we are now urgently reexamining availability of resources, as well as how our resources and influence can be brought to bear to insure that eventuality GOM fears does not materialize. Timing of our response will have to take into consideration general situation in Middle East as well as Maghreb. 5. FYI. Apart from probable practical impossibility of providing any substantial amount of equipment that Moroccans could use effectively within time indicated, we are reluctant take risk of action which might excuse Soviet increases arms supply at this delicate juncture of Near East crisis. Moreover, we do not exclude possibility that Moroccan request is essentially ploy by Oufkir to get US to react in a hurry. In this connection we would be disturbed by possibility suggested in some [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] reports that Oufkir might even be considering preemptive strike against Algeria. We would hope of course you could find means discourage any such possibility. 6. While unable for present to give Moroccan request clear answer in affirmative, we are also anxious that King does not take our reply as flat turndown. We want to retain GOM’s confidence, especially in view of its potentially constructive role in Arab-Israeli settlement, and to reassure King that we continue to follow with close interest Morocco’s relations with its Algerian neighbor and would be far from indifferent if there were serious danger of Algerian attack. Your response to Laraki and Oufkir should therefore be governed by various and to some degree conflicting considerations set out above. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Root and Palmer on June 16; cleared by Kitchen, Hoopes, Saunders, and Bundy; and approved by Eugene V. Rostow. 2 Telegrams 5531 and 5532 from Rabat, June 15, reported that Foreign Minister Laraki and General Oufkir informed the Embassy that recent intelligence reports indicated that Algeria planned to attack Morocco July 8. Laraki said that Morocco would have to obtain more arms very quickly, since its 3–4-day holding strategy was invalid after the Arab-Israeli war when Israel won in 3 hours. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ALG–MOR) 3 In telegram 5605 from Rabat, June 20, the Embassy responded that the Department’s telegram did not answer the question posed by the Moroccan Government, which was primarily interested in how it could meet the serious security problem it faced on its eastern border. Morocco wanted to know if the United States was prepared to supply the arms it needed, so that, if necessary, it could make other provisions over the next few months. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 US–MOR) 137. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 137. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, June 21, 1967. JCSM–361–67 SUBJECT Arms Policy for Morocco (U) 1. (S) The Government of Morocco has requested that the US Government affirm that it is prepared to supply arms which Morocco wants to purchase. In answer to this request, Morocco was informed that the US Government could not give a specific response but that the situation was being examined in light of all prevailing circumstances in North Africa and the Middle East. 2. (S) In view of the importance of maintaining US influence in the moderate Arab nation of Morocco and in the interests of avoiding a polarization which would align all Arab States with the USSR, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the US Government should be responsive to Morocco’s request. Failure to be responsive at this time may reinforce the deep Arab suspicion about US exclusive support for Israel. Refusal of the Moroccan request may seriously jeopardize the continued use of the US Naval Communications Station and Voice of America facilities in Morocco. Loss of the cooperation of Morocco will have an adverse effect on the US strategic position on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean. 3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their recommendation in JCSM–780–66, dated 19 December 1966, subject: “Sales Package for Morocco (U),” 2 that a sales package to the Government of Morocco be approved and recommend that an early decision be made to inform the Government of Morocco that: a. The outstanding grant Military Assistance Program and foreign military sales items will be delivered expeditiously. b. The US Government is prepared to deliver specific items as soon as possible and to discuss the specific composition of the remainder of the arms sale package with Morocco. 3 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Department of Defense, JCS Files, 9118.3 (17 Nov. 1966). Secret. The source text is attached as an Appendix to a “Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Arms Policy for Morocco” (JCS 2409/6). 2 Not printed. printed 3 On July 20, 1967, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William E. Lang sent a memorandum to the Director of the Joint Staff that reads: “The President has approved proceeding with the negotiation and programming of the $14 million credit agreement for Morocco. Delivery of items in the grant and sales program remains suspended.” (Ibid.) 138. Memorandum of Conversation 138. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 29, 1967. SUBJECT Morocco, the Middle East Situation and Security Concerns PARTICIPANTS Morocco: Ahmed Laraki, Moroccan Foreign Minister Ahmed Osman, Ambassador to the United States United States: Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary Peter Spicer, Country Officer for Morocco Alec Toumayan, Language Services After exchanging greetings with Mr. Palmer, Foreign Minister Laraki remarked that he had been distressed at the divergence between our appraisal of the ME situation and his own. He repeated that, as he had told the President yesterday, 2 Morocco feels that an unconditional withdrawal is the indispensable preliminary step that can then be followed by other steps. He saw a dangerous parallel between the recent Israeli-Arab conflict whereby Israeli attitudes seem to imply that Israel can hold on to its conquests, that “might makes right”, and the situation between Morocco and Algeria. Algeria would need only to attack Morocco, occupy one-third of Morocco’s national territory, as far as the natural obstacles, and then negotiate from a position of strength. Morocco found itself therefore forced to revise its policies and to formulate a new appraisal regarding its security. Morocco was aware that the struggle was on two levels, the struggle between the Arabs and Israel which had been lost and the internal struggle between the so-called “progressive states” and the so-called “reactionaries”. One already hears that the Arab lack of victory is due to the fact that the moderates failed the cause. This new appeal for what Morocco needs for its security leads to an appeal for U.S. aid, which the Minister called “completely inadequate”. If Morocco translates $14 million into F–5 aircraft for example, Morocco has one squadron. In a time of lightning air strikes and essential air cover this is totally inadequate. The Minister stated that Morocco had applied to the Czechs for T–54 tanks and the Italians for G-91 jet aircraft for which NATO concurrence is required. Laraki had asked Ambassador Tasca to act on their behalf to obtain that concurrence. In short, and speaking with great frankness as he had done in the past, the Minister said, everything centered on whether or not Morocco could count on our aid. Mr. Palmer remarked that perhaps it would not serve any useful purpose to go over the points which had been discussed yesterday; in particular our divergence on the prior and unconditional withdrawal. The President and Mr. Rostow both had stressed that, whatever our wishes are, in effect we have very little influence to exert on Israel. The problem is that Israel has been living for 20 years with a situation in which belligerence is exerted against it, its security is comprised and its existence is not recognized. Mr. Rostow said yesterday that the Israelis would insist on having prior assurances and prior arrangements regarding security and the exercise of the right of free international navigation before they would agree to any withdrawal. Mr. Palmer stated that he did not agree with the parallel the Minister had drawn between the present Middle East situation and the situation existing between Morocco and Algeria. Mr. Palmer said he did not deny the dangers of the situation confronting Morocco, for he was fully aware of the situation. There were differences in the two situations, however, in that Algeria recognized Morocco and Algeria had no territorial claims against Morocco, at least not officially. Mr. Palmer said that there was a split within the Arab world which was providing a false issue to the so-called “progressive” states in their efforts to undermine the activity of the moderate states; which he liked to call the “constructive” states. He was not, therefore, minimizing the problem. We have great concern for the security and independence of Morocco. The USG wanted Morocco, Tunisia, Libya to be able to maintain their political independence and their security. It was in this framework that we had agreed to the Moroccan request for $14 million worth of arms. As the President had said yesterday, we are going ahead with this and we are ready to implement this agreement. We had, however, not heard finally from Morocco about the types of equipment Morocco wished to procure. As to any additional procurement arrangements they wished to enter into, the GOM could be assured that we would give them our most earnest consideration, but Mr. Palmer said he, of course, could not prejudge the decision. Mr. Palmer reiterated, citing the President’s statement of the day before, the sincerity of our commitment to the political independence of Morocco and our continuing concern for it. Mr. Palmer then said that it would be helpful for us to have some clarification as to the exact nature of the threat that Morocco feels to be directed against it by Algeria. Yesterday, he said, the Minister had outlined the “three-point strategy” of Nasser. Did the Minister still feel that an immediate threat exists, with a planned attack by Algeria in July, or has that been amended? In replying to Mr. Palmer’s statement that Algeria has no claims against Morocco, Laraki pointed out that Algeria has no border with Israel. Algeria has absolutely no need for the intensive program of armament now being conducted there. This can be directed against no one but Morocco. Before the crisis the ratio of forces was 10–1 in favor of Algeria. Algeria has continued to import military equipment. True, although part of it goes to the UAR, this equipment is not intended for use against Israel, but for use against Morocco. Another sign is that 14 airports have been built in Algeria along the Moroccan border. The Minister said that long “lead-times” cause great problems for Morocco. He cited a delay of two years for communications equipment. Morocco is concerned about what could happen in those years. The F–5 program has also been going ahead so slowly. It was started under Ambassador Benjelloun and should have been completed by the end of 1966. In mid-1967 only four had been delivered and without ordnance. Morocco could not defend itself with that, and Morocco knew that the U.S. would not act directly in Morocco’s behalf because that act might bring in the Soviet Union on the other side. It was not a question of Morocco exerting pressure on us or trying to blackmail us. Morocco’s choice and attitude were well known. Mr. Palmer said that we had absolutely no doubt as to Morocco’s stand. We wanted to assure the Minister in the strongest terms possible of the importance we attach to the independence and security of Morocco. The Minister was aware of our difficulties. We are faced with demands on our resources which cause us many problems. We will have further talks with DOD in order to determine what needs to be done to speed up deliveries, and we shall also review the availabilities of equipment. We will give this matter the highest priority and we will report to the Minister as soon as possible. Within the framework of our general cooperation, Mr. Palmer said, a review was in order to determine what could be done to restore peace and stability to that region. We appreciated the efforts made by His Majesty to secure an agreement on the reduction of armaments in the Maghreb. Nothing had come of it, for reasons which were well known. We hoped that it would be possible, within the framework of the Middle East situation, to exert influence to stop the escalation. Mr. Palmer cautioned the Minister not to believe that the USG lacked realism or that we advised disarmament in circumstances of remote possibilities. However, one should not lose sight of the opportunities that are available in the world in which we live. The Minister replied that His Majesty intended to make a new approach to U Thant on disarmament. Once again, it was not expected that Algeria would even acknowledge the proposal. Morocco deplored the fact that it had to arm itself at the expense of economic development. What good was it to expend $60 million for the Lower Moulouya Dam and to develop 100 million hectares at a cost of $10–15 million if these works are on the border of Algeria? Mr. Palmer asked the Minister if the recent events in the Middle East had caused France to review some of its attitudes toward the Maghreb. It should be a cause for concern for France to see Soviet penetration into Algeria. The Minister said that he wished this were true. France’s attention has been drawn to that situation. Unfortunately, De Gaulle’s attitude was very clearly to oppose anything that Washington did. De Gaulle’s attitude here is to attempt to “pull chestnuts out of the fire”. De Gaulle had gone even beyond his Foreign Minister’s speech at the UN. Mr. Palmer said that, in view of France’s interest and concern in the Maghreb, and even more in view of the historic relations that France has had with the Maghreb, Soviet influence must be an object of French preoccupation. Should Algeria attack Morocco, this would surely place France in an impossible situation. The Minister said that, in his view, France would sacrifice its interests in Morocco. Morocco, on its side, had done everything to forestall a deterioration of relations. Witness, he said, Morocco’s satisfaction at the outcome of the Ben Barka trial. Mr. Palmer said that if Algeria attacked Morocco, and occupied one-third of its territory, it would be very difficult for the French. World opinion would be against Algeria, and French support of Algeria would place France in an untenable position. The Minister replied that recent events had shown the ineffectiveness of world public opinion and its lack of importance. Mr. Palmer then asked the Minister if the information Morocco had on Algerian intentions was of a nature to be made public. The Minister replied publicity was unnecessary since every intelligence service in the world knew that an attack was planned. Mr. Palmer concluded by reiterating that we would give high priority to consideration of the Moroccan arms request. We would immediately look into what needed to be done to speed up deliveries and look into the availabilities. On future requests he could not now be more specific than he had been. He hoped the Minister would reassure His Majesty of our continued concern for the independence and political security of his country, as the President had stated the day before. Mr. Palmer informed the Minister of the resumption of economic aid programs to Morocco, saying that these programs had been affected by the general suspension at the outbreak of the crisis. He cited the recent signing of a loan agreement on Nouasseur. These acts, he said, were evidence of our continued desire to help. The Minister, referring to economic assistance, indicated that Morocco would suffer a shortfall of 800,000 tons of wheat. He hoped that our contribution would be at least equal to what it had been the year before. Mr. Palmer stated that we would do our best. He mentioned, in this connection, the continued difficulties, that Morocco’s trade with Cuba would pose for us. The Minister stated that Morocco had already curtailed its sugar purchases at some cost. Morocco had purchased 160,000 tons of sugar from an American supplier at a higher price. His Majesty had pointed out that such a curtailment of activities could only be done in stages. It was in this constructive spirit that Morocco was acting. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Toumayan and Spicer on July 10. 2 No memorandum of conversation recording the President’s meeting with Foreign Minister Laraki on June 28 has been found. 139. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State 139. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State 1 Rabat, August 5, 1967, 0859Z. 2 453. Ref. Rabat 435. 3 1. Further pursuant to my tel 435, during my breakfast with King he also mentioned in passing the fact that he had offered Asst Secy Palmer to enter into an alliance with the US in order to provide for reciprocity of interest between the two countries. As Dept will recall, Asst Secy Palmer pointed out difficulties involved with such a proposal. King mentioned this within the framework of endeavoring to demonstrate his continuing sincere interest in closer relations with the US in spite of his recent recourse to acquisition of limited quantities of Czech and Soviet arms and transport planes. PriMin Benhima during my conversation with him two days earlier also noted in reply to the various points I made regarding the danger of Soviet arms supply that Morocco had offered us an alliance which we had not seen fit to accept. I explained to him at the time the problems this kind of an approach to closer relations raised and the greater desirability of achieving his objective by building up our relations brick by brick based on concrete facts and achievements. 2. As indicated in Rabat 435, King’s thinking is now apparently turned in direction of some security understanding, on a regional basis, among moderates in Mediterranean. 3. I hope the Dept will examine suggestions made in my comments reftel in the foregoing context. As I indicated, it is clear the King does wish closer relations with US and it would be a pity if we were not to make every effort possible within the framework of our world-wide responsibilities to strengthen our relations further along the lines indicated. Tasca 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 MOR–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to DOD, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSNAVEUR. 2 Beginning in Spring 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in 6-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 Telegram 435 from Rabat, August 4, reported Tasca’s breakfast conversation with the King on August 3. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR) 140. Memorandum of Conversation 140. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 26, 1967. SUBJECT Military Assistance to Morocco PARTICIPANTS Ahmed Osman, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Mr. John F. Root, Country Director for Northern African Affairs Mr. Wingate Lloyd, Country Officer for Morocco Mr. Alec G. Toumayan, Interpreter Ambassador Osman stated he had been instructed by his Government to ask for clarification of the October 24 announcement of the resumption of arms shipments to Israel and certain other Arab countries. 2 The Ambassador said the announcement covering deliveries of 6 F–5 aircraft on which agreement had been reached three (sic) years ago had caused some surprise in Rabat. Mr. Palmer reviewed the imposition of the arms embargo in June, and explained that after considerable review the decision had been made to resume deliveries of previously planned items to certain countries. Mr. Palmer noted that in addition to the F–5s Morocco would be authorized to purchase $1.3 million worth of F–5 ammunition, and MAP shipments including spare parts and other items valued at $3 million would be resumed. Ambassador Osman said Morocco understands the necessity of maintaining balanced treatment for Israel and the Arab countries. Morocco was concerned, however, by the unexpected manner in which the announcement was made, linking the resumption of arms deliveries to Morocco to the Arab-Israel hostilities. Mr. Palmer expressed regret that time had not permitted prior consultation with Morocco. He added that the decision to resume shipments to both Israel and the Arab states was taken in the same context as the original imposition of the arms embargo. Mr. Root observed in this connection that Morocco clearly sought in June to associate itself with the Arab cause in the Middle East hostilities. Referring to King Hassan’s October 25 conversation with Ambassador Tasca on the Middle East situation, Mr. Palmer expressed appreciation for the insights which the King’s presentation provided, and reiterated our desire to discuss the subject with Morocco and other countries which approach the question from the same constructive standpoint. Referring to the Ambassador’s conversation with the King, Mr. Palmer emphasized that the U.S. has in no way delayed or hesitated in the expectation of a change of leadership in Cairo. He made it clear that Nasser’s departure was in no way a precondition to any U.S. action. Mr. Palmer noted welcome signs of re-thinking in Cairo, thanks in large measure to the efforts of Morocco and like-minded Arab governments. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Lloyd in AF/AFN on October 31. 2 Telegram 58945 to Rabat, Tunis, and Tripoli, October 24, announced the U.S. decision to resume limited and selective arms shipments to Israel and moderate Arab states. The Embassy in Rabat was informed that the United States would move forward with delivery of six F–5 aircraft with ammunition in completion of the May 1965 grant/credit sales agreement and the resumption of existing military assistance and grant and sales programs. The telegram noted that implementation of the $14 million credit sales program agreed to with King Hassan awaited Congressional action on the Foreign Assistance legislation. (Ibid.) 141. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 141. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 22, 1967. SUBJECT Moroccan Military Aid 1. On 9 February the President told King Hassan we’d go ahead with a $14 million military credit. The Moroccans leaked this and the President was mad, but he later signed the required determination anyway. 2. In early June we clamped a freeze on all military aid arrangements, including this. 3. On 30 June, the President approved resuming negotiations in order to allow last-minute FY 67 funding. 4. Immediately thereafter, however, State clamped its own freeze on because it ran into the prospect of a drastically reduced Congressional ceiling on military aid to Africa. State couldn’t see committing ourselves further when existing commitments wouldn’t even fit under the ceiling. 5. In a nutshell : The King is disturbed. State wants to go ahead just as soon as the aid appropriation settles how much it has to divide up around Africa. We haven’t reneged. We just don’t want to move until we see where Congress comes out. 2 Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Visit of King Hassan, 2/9–10/67. Confidential. 2 Telegram 78656 to Rabat, December 2, instructed the Embassy to inform the Moroccan Government “at the highest appropriate level” that the United States was prepared to move forward on the arms credit sale, and that details would be forwarded in a week, based on U.S. understanding of Moroccan desires as of June 1967. The Embassy was asked, if possible, to avoid mention of the specific $14 million figure, since the $40 million ceiling on grants and sales to Africa would place heavy limitations on U.S. ability to meet all African requirements. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR) 142. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State 142. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State 1 Rabat, February 3, 1968, 1258Z. 2723. For Katzenbach and Palmer. 1. I am deeply concerned at King’s reaction to continued delay in US military assistance to Morocco. When I saw Prime Minister Benhima January 23 for first time since return from home leave, he asked me about delays in implementing 4 million dollar Presidential arms commitment. I explained limitations placed by Congress on military assistance and provided him with English texts of Conte-Long and Symington amendments. 2. Two days later after I had supplied Prime Minister with unofficial French translations of texts of amendments he called me back and expressed deep concern, asking whether US was turning its back on its friends. I sought to reassure him by stressing that priority of Morocco based on strategic location and traditional close ties of friendship made US confident of being able to come through on 4 million dollar commitment. Officials of Executive Branch USG now engaged in devising procedures for administering military assistance under new Congressional guidelines. I urged that Morocco think in terms of strategy rather than tactics, of long term relationships rather than temporary short term expedients. Benhima understood allusion to recent GOM purchases of Czech ground equipment. 3. When I saw Prime Minister again February 1 he told me King concerned that personal Presidential commitment might be negated by Conte-Long and Symington amendments. King had asked specifically what these limitations meant in terms of 14 million dollar arms package. Benhima left me in no doubt that King deeply disturbed and that only prompt implementation of Presidential arms commitment will allay his concern. 4. Foregoing illustrates deep concern of King which I described to you when I was in Washington. 5. My recommendation on 14 million dollar arms package which cites pertinent political, economic and military considerations follows by separate telegram. Urge prompt Presidential determination required to permit sale of arms to Morocco. Tasca 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR. Secret; Priority. 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 1 Washington, March 1, 1968, 2359Z. 2 123593. Joint State/AID. Refs: Tasca/Palmer Telcon Feb. 26, Tasca/Straus Telcon Feb. 29, Rabat 3030. 3 1. Total aid levels for Morocco have been arrived at after most thorough consideration, in light Country Team recommendations and given reduced prospects for FY 1969. These levels reflect sustained and in some respects upward trend in US aid to Morocco; they also compare most favorably with programs elsewhere in Africa and clearly establish Morocco as one of primary countries of concentration. 2. Among nine development emphasis countries in Africa Morocco only emphasis country with 1968 aid increase over 1967, one of two emphasis countries with ’69 increase over ’67. DLs in ’68 more than four times ’67 level, ’69 proposal nearly three times ’67 level. TC/DG in 1968 nearly twice 1967, ’69 more than twice ’67. 3. There will naturally be fluctuation from year to year in level components, e.g. development loans, of over-all program any country, and we agree it is unfortunate if these appear out of context to give false impression magnitude of US effort. Nevertheless, what remains important is total contribution and trend, and in this sense Morocco need envy no other country in Africa or in Arab world. At time when we are having great difficulty making equitable aid cuts elsewhere because of reduced Congressional appropriations, this is notable evidence of importance US attaches to Morocco’s development efforts. 4. We have given fullest consideration to Rabat’s 3030. You will in due course be receiving report of SIG policy discussion February 15 on Morocco and other North African countries. You will see among other things that SIG carefully noted unusual significance of major 5-year development program on which Morocco about to embark, approving for this reason continued high level of US support. Agricultural sector loan, increased emphasis food program, contemplated regional wheat productivity scheme are particular manifestations of US forward-looking interest in Moroccan economic development. 5. PL 480 authorization documents are in the process of clearance by BOB. 4 We have reached finding under Symington Amendment that Morocco not unduly diverting resources from economic development to military procurement. This finding will enable early clearance cereals project. 6. We can understand your concern about declassification AID figures, but pros and cons declassification issue for all countries led to agency-wide decision that declassification necessary for purposes Congressional presentation. No exception can be made. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McCall in AID/AFR/NA and Root, cleared by Claus W. Ruser in U/SIG and Straus in AID/AA/AFR, and approved by Palmer. 2 Beginning in late 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in 6-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 No record of these telcons has been found. In telegram 3030, February 26, Tasca reported that he was disappointed to learn the levels of FY 1969 aid for Morocco, and that he hoped the Department would reconsider them. (Ibid.) 4 On March 26, the President approved a $16.2 million P.L. 480 agreement for Morocco. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Visit of King Hassan, 2/9–10/67) 144. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 144. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 5, 1968, 4:50 p.m. SUBJECT Conte-Long Determinations for Morocco Nick Katzenbach recommends you sign the two attached determinations on military assistance to Morocco. The purpose is to enable us to sell jet fighters without cutting economic aid. In February 1967, you promised King Hassan $14 million in arms and approved a credit sale. Unfortunately, the Conte-Long amendments apply. In signing the waiver at Tab A, 2 you will essentially be saying that it is in our interest to preserve a firm relationship with Morocco and helping Hassan meet his legitimate defense needs is an important part of that relationship. Even if we didn’t have a promise to keep, we would have to recognize that Morocco faces a military threat from Algeria which is well supplied by the USSR, and King Hassan will have to get arms somewhere. We know the Russians are ready to step in with MIG-21s if we don’t sell the F–5s, and we have persistently tried to help Hassan maintain his Western ties. His is a friendly and moderate voice in a part of the world where we must take special care to keep our friends. As you know, we still have our communications intelligence station there. The second determination (Tab B) 3 is a purely technical matter, similar to ones you have signed for Morocco for the last three years. It permits the use of $1.5 million in grant assistance under a 1960 agreement rather than negotiating a new one that would authorize us to review their use of the equipment and require them to return it to us when they no longer need it. In practice, our people in Morocco have full access to the equipment. It would also waive the requirement that this money be used exclusively for internal security and civic action rather than self-defense. We want to use the grant for such things as F–5 pilot training. Attached two determinations for your signature if you approve. Nick Katzenbach, on the basis of consultations, foresees no adverse Congressional reaction. Signing these determinations will pave the way for your approving an agricultural loan which is at the bottom of this package. 4 W. W. Rostow 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 80. Secret. 2 Attached but not printed. President Johnson signed the determination on June 6. Telegram 177949 to Rabat, June 6, instructed the Embassy to negotiate the $14 million credit package. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–MOR) 3 Attached but not printed. President Johnson signed the determination on June 6. 4 Attached but not printed. President Johnson approved an $8 million agricultural loan for Morocco on June 6. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Tunisia Tunisia 145. Memorandum for the Record Washington, November 25, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. Prepared by Robert W. Komer. Copies were sent to Assistant Secretary Williams, Tasca, and Hutchinson. 146. Memorandum for the Record Washington, December 21, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscelleanous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. Prepared by Komer. Copies were sent to Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, Williams, and Newsom. 147. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) Washington, March 25, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. Also sent to Hutchinson and Williams. 148. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 14, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963–March 1966. Confidential. Prepared by Komer. Copies were sent to Williams and Hutchinson. 149. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, April 27, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Secret. Drafted by Charles J. Nelson, Director of the Office of Mediterranean Affairs in AID’s Bureau for Africa, on April 24. The source text was attached to an April 27 briefing memorandum Williams sent to Rusk prior to Rusk’s meeting with Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr. on April 28. The memorandum of conversation of their meeting is ibid., POL TUN–US. 150. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, April 29, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, December 1963–September 1968. Confidential. 151. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 29, 1965, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, December 1963–September 1968. Confidential. Drafted by Ambassador Russell on April 30. The meeting was held at the White House. 152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) Washington, May 10, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) TUN. No classification marking. Drafted by Nelson in AFN. 153. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Trimble) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 21, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL TUN–US. Confidential. Drafted by Chase. A note on the source text indicates Secretary Rusk saw the memorandum. 154. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, June 3, 1965. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 091.3 Tunisia. Secret. 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, June 20, 1965, 12:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–TUN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Blake and McClanahan on May 27; cleared by Black in AID/PC, Colonel Dregne in DOD/ISA, Trimble, Warren in G/PM, and Rusk; and approved by Carol C. Moor in S/S. 156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, July 28, 1965, 5:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 TUN. Secret. Drafted by McClanahan and Blake on July 27; cleared by Lang in DOD and by Warren; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Tripoli, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 157. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, September 17, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. 158. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 18, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–TUN. Secret. Drafted by Blake on September 22 and approved in S on September 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.” 159. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 27, 1965, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. Drafted by O’Neill and approved in S on October 25. The meeting was held at USUN. The source text is labeled “Part 1 of 4.” 160. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 4, 1966, 2:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:15 p.m. 161. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 12, 1966, 11:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Confidential. 162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, May 20, 1966, 8:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Polk in AFN and approved by Root. 163. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, July 23, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. 164. Memorandum for the Record Washington, August 12, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. Prepared by Saunders. Copies were sent to Bromley Smith and James Clark. 165. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 25, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL TUN–US. Confidential. Drafted by Spicer and approved in S on September 1. The source text is labeled “Part I of IV.” 166. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 4, 1966, 9 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. 167. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, October 13, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. 168. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 17. Secret. 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, January 23, 1967, 4:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–TUN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sacksteder in AFN and Colonel Kissinger in OSD/ISA; cleared by Colonel Alba in JCS/J–5, Commander Peters in JCS/SAMAA, Litmans in DOD/GC, Dunlap in DOD/ODMA, Malmborg in L/E, Post in AFN, Colonel Megna in AFI, and Meinecke in AID/AFR/NA; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Paris, Rabat for Root and Lang, and USCINCEUR for ECMAP–IA. 170. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 4, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Confidential. Drafted by Sacksteder and approved in S on March 13. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office. 171. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 21, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Visit of President Bourguiba, Cables & Memos, 5/15–16/68. Confidential. 172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, June 8, 1967, 12:39 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Secret; Priority; Noforn/Limidis. Drafted by Root on June 7 and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Rabat. 173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, June 15, 1967, 2:57 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Sacksteder and Palmer (text revised in the White House); cleared by Battle, Harold Saunders, and Eugene V. Rostow; and approved by Herbert B. Thompson of S/S. 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, March 1, 1968, 0021Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 9 TUN. Confidential. Drafted by Baron in AFR/NA and by Root, McClanahan, and Post; cleared by Straus in AA/AFR, Meinecke in AFR/NA, and SIG Staff Director Arthur A. Hartman; and approved by Palmer. 175. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 14, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Visit of President Bourguiba, Cables & Memos, 5/15–16/68. Secret. 176. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 15, 1968, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63–9/68. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Edmund S. Glenn. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part I of III”; memoranda of conversation of other portions of the discussion of the Middle East and Bourguiba’s visit to Canada are ibid. 177. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 16, 1968, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63–9/68. Secret. Drafted by Root. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part I of II”; the memorandum of conversation covering the remainder of the discussion, which concerned Vietnam, is ibid. 178. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 24, 1968, 7:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63–9/68. Confidential. 179. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 27, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 84. Secret. 180. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 19, 1968, 11:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 TUN. Secret. Drafted by McClanahan on September 20 and approved in M on October 2. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 2.” The meeting was held in Rostow’s office. 145. Memorandum for the Record 145. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, November 25, 1964. I spent a pleasant 40 minutes with Ambassador Cecil Hourani, 2 Bourguiba, Jr.’s advance man. He had no major items to plug. His pitch was that President Bourguiba thought it useful right after our elections to send a few savvy fellows to Washington to get the feel of the new Administration’s thinking about Tunisia and US/Tunisian relations. He and I agreed that the relationship was an unusually comfortable one—we had no major bilateral problems. He then got on to what I suspect was his chief message. Tunisia was getting a little nervous about becoming too committed to African causes and the OAU. Hourani thought personally (and implied that Bourguiba felt the same way) that Tunisia had to look out more for its own interests, and not pursue too far whatever the African radicals dreamed up. Indeed, perhaps Tunisia could be more useful to the US in African councils, by discreetly acting as a voice of moderation; of course, this would be a most delicate operation. To appear to be a US stooge would be self-defeating. Bourguiba, Jr. would want to discuss when he came here in December ways and means by which Tunisia might thus serve US interests and its own. I assured him that we’d be most responsive to such suggestions (my hunch is that the Tunisians are looking around for ways of making themselves a bit more valuable to us, so as to insure the continuation of substantial US aid). Though I probed politely about Tunisia’s economic problems, Hourani didn’t even rise to the bait. He didn’t see any major economic issues between us, and failed even to mention either a program loan or Tunisia’s balance of payments difficulties. So I volunteered a few comments about the importance of putting Tunisia’s economic house in order and showing us that it could meet its current balance of payments problem. I also urged coming up with decent projects for the money we had earmarked. As to relations with France, Hourani doubted they would improve much until DeGaulle died. The great man had a deplorable habit of remembering old grudges. I suggested that perhaps Tunisia could get back into the French market most successfully via the EEC. He agreed. Hourani expressed some dubiousness about our Nasser policy, to which I gave the standard replies. I pointed out to boot that Tunisia too seemed to feel the necessity of playing ball with Nasser to an extent these days. Indeed we hoped that Tunisia would be more of a voice of moderation in Arab as well as African councils. As he left, Hourani mentioned that he had delivered to the Vice President’s office a letter from Bourguiba, Jr. The latter also was interested in inviting Humphrey to Tunisia as soon as he could come. I suggested that the best thing to do would be for Jr. to raise this matter with the Vice President-elect when they got together. Naturally, the new VP had received a large number of feelers and would hardly be able to respond usefully for a while yet. Therefore, the more low-key the approach the less potential embarrassment to Tunisia and the US. He got the point. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. Prepared by Robert W. Komer. Copies were sent to Assistant Secretary Williams, Tasca, and Hutchinson. 2 Ambassador Cecil Hourani served as Special Adviser to Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba. 146. Memorandum for the Record 146. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, December 21, 1964. I had a good hour-and-a-half with Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr . (along with Ambassador Driss) on 19 Dec. When I commented on our plethora of problems, including our troubles in Pakistan, Bourguiba asked jocularly, “Which would you rather have—friends or allies?” (I said, “Friends”.) In brief, he made a strong pitch for aid, while I urged Tunisia to speak with an even stronger voice for moderation in Africa. Bourguiba began jokingly by saying he thought stability was becoming a liability and perhaps he should generate a little turmoil to get Tunisia on the “emergency list.” What he really wanted was a “green light” from top US echelons to treat the successful building of the “Tunisian showcase” as an urgent matter. He cited the recent 3-day bridge-building operation by US and Tunisian military engineers as an example of how quickly things can happen when the top level gives a push. He wished the whole Tunisian aid and development program could get that kind of steam behind it. In the discussion which followed, these specifics emerged: 1. He’d be happy to receive more US military engineers any time it would help get a job done. I pointed out the limited scope of their activities but agreed we would look into whether military engineers, either US or Tunisian, could reasonably help further with Tunisian development. 2. Bourguiba said his government is now willing to receive US experts to help plan and document projects to speed up loans. At first, GOT had wanted to do this for itself to learn how but now felt confident enough to seek help. I suggested that private firms like Checci and Nathan have been good at this elsewhere. 3. He asked whether there was any chance of our loosening up on tied US procurement. I saw little until our payments gap disappeared. He reiterated the usual arguments about US equipment often being high-priced and the difficulty of integrating it into systems standardized on European equipment. 4. He commented that oil and gas exploration in southern Tunisia had turned up hopeful signs. One Italian firm is already talking to GOT about a pipeline. The biggest boon of real discovery would be the reduction in power costs, which would release money for further development 5. When I underscored the importance of re-establishing decent economic relations with France, he animatedly described how far GOT had gone to meet French desires in every respect. But De Gaulle feels personally insulted and little can be done until the air clears. After a point, “Tunisia is too weak to bend,” he said. He made clear he’d welcome help, but I pointed out that our currency is none too good in Paris these days either. 6. Taking up my comparison of Tunisian project preparation with Moroccan ineptitude, Bourguiba outlined his impressions of the Moroccan situation. He said (interestingly, since I’d pressed the idea with Amb. Bengelloun in October) that King Hassan during his recent visit to Tunis had pressed his ministers to learn all they could about Tunisian development techniques and even left several of them behind to continue their study. He also invited Tunisian specialists to Morocco to study Moroccan problems, and to bring back to Tunisia selected Moroccans for further training. From a private visit to Morocco last summer, he deduced that the big Moroccan political problem is the court coterie which isolates Hassan as a sort of cult of adulation; men like Oufkir poison the King’s views. He also said Hassan “is a man 35 with the body of a man 50” and has serious stomach trouble. When Bourguiba asked what I wanted to say to him, I hit two points: 1. More and more, US policy is turning on the Congo, and—for better or worse—causing the USG to re-examine our relations with African radicals like Nasser and Ben Bella. (He smiled, and I acknowledged he’d been warning us for years about Nasser.) I said we really couldn’t think too harshly of the new East African governments because they are so inexperienced, but Nasser and the old-timers know better. We also are coming around to feel that we’re entitled to more backing from our friends; we want the moderate Africans to stand up and be counted. 2. We hope for Tunisian moderation on the Israeli question, which I felt could heat up over the next 3–4 years. We couldn’t expect GOT to change its position—we understand its views. But we have been encouraged by the willingness of the Lebanese, for instance, in keeping UAC forces out of its territory. All we ask is for reasonable Arabs to realize everyone will get hurt if there’s a showdown. It used to be that the Western Arabs ignored Palestine, but Ben Bella has now attracted to them the wrath of anti-Arab lobbies and other critics in the US—all of which makes it increasingly difficult for us to carry on a reasonable Maghreb policy. Responding to my first point, he described at length his efforts the day before in New York and his disgust that most of the OAU foreign ministers won’t stand up for what is obviously right, even in their own longer term interests. Nigeria was the only other member not ready to follow the crowd. Bourguiba claimed credit for stiffening the spines of the Moroccans and Malagasy. He pointed out the delicacy of the Tunisians’ effort as white Africans to stay moderate without discrediting themselves. He said he had argued at some length with one Sudanese delegate at least to admit facts (e.g. radical arms shipments through Khartoum), but he threw up his hands at trying to force reason on Maghoub. A discussion of Ben Bella developed out of my comments on BB’s role in getting the Western Arabs into the Israeli issue. He felt that BB is not the most radical Algerian; BB has trouble with extremists in his own government, notably Bouteflika and Boumedienne. He cited specifically how Bouteflika had tried to undermine a Bourguiba, Sr.-BB agreement in Cairo to solemnize an Algerian-Tunisian border settlement (milestone 233) during Bourguiba’s visit to Algiers in May. He also commented on BB’s penchant—like Sukarno’s—for “externalizing his problems.” I said BB is fooling around in the Congo because he’s revolutionary at heart. All he knows is how to promote revolutions. Before leaving, Bourguiba stressed another major fear: What will happen to Tunisia if Libya collapses? He said—as I mentioned one possible Libyan leader after another—that there’s no one in Libya after the King dies whom we can deal with. He even said the Tunisians had to consider moving into Libya when the King dies to pre-empt Nasser (though I suspect this comment was more to dramatize his point than a serious thought). I told him we’re very much concerned—he quipped, “You’re concerned; we’re scared”—and said we’d continue to think hard about staving off the problem of a Nasser push into a Libyan vacuum. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscelleanous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. Prepared by Komer. Copies were sent to Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, Williams, and Newsom. 147. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) 147. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) 1 Washington, March 25, 1965. My initial concern over how we handle our next aid round with the Tunisians (my London 4561) 2 was to avoid slapping Bourguiba just after he’s stuck to a responsible line on Palestine. 3 However, entirely apart from this we face the problem of how to capitalize on gains from past aid as we begin talking about their next plan. There’s a special obligation to use tact because we made such a big thing of our multi-year commitment three years ago. I realize multi-year deals aren’t as appealing to us as they were in 1961–62. But if we’re going to shift back to annual programming, it would be inexcusable not to do it gently. After all, we’re the ones who sold the Tunisians on long-term aid planning and multi-year commitments. I’m not judging the merits of a multi-year pledge. What I’m worried about is how to present whatever decision we make to the Tunisians without jeopardizing the confidence we’ve built there. So I think we ought to be looking for a formula for telling the Tunisians how far we’ll go in supporting their next plan. Just to get us started, what about saying something like this to Bourguiba and Ben Salah: “We’ll continue aiding Tunisian development at substantial levels. Our interest is as great as ever. To improve the effectiveness of our aid, we would like to suggest some new techniques developed from our experience since 1961. For instance, one device we think offers promise is the annual development budget, which provides the most accurate guide to amounts and types of aid required. So we’d like to begin working with Ben Salah on such a budget and will gear our aid to that as soon as precise needs become clear.” This is much better than telling them right off we’re not going to make a quantitative commitment to the new plan. The point is that this is both a political and an aid problem and we need a formula that serves both needs. Above all, we can’t afford another fiasco like the Title I blowup in December, especially on something as important as this. R.W. Komer 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. Also sent to Hutchinson and Williams. 2 In telegram 4561 from London, March 22, Komer warned that AID’s plan to advise Tunisia that the U.S. Government was not prepared to make a quantitative commitment to a new Tunisian long-term plan would be “political folly” at a time when the United States wanted all the moderate Arab support it could get. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 524 from Amman, March 9, reported that President Bourguiba, who was on a visit to Jordan, had declared at a March 6 press conference in Jerusalem that Arabs could cooperate with Jews. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 148. Memorandum for the Record 148. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 14, 1965. Amb. Driss and his new press attache (Ferid El Mouldi) came in this morning to lay the groundwork for the coming visits of Bourguiba, Jr. and Ben Salah. After an exchange of comments on President Bourguiba’s performance during his recent trip, Driss made four points: 1. Bourguiba, Jr. has asked to see the President; he will have a letter to deliver from his father. I said I’d do my best, though I did leave us an out by mentioning the President’s busy schedule. 2. After a few generalities about the new Four-Year Plan which Bourguiba, Jr. and Ben Salah will be discussing, Driss made a pitch for a non-project loan this year. He made it clear that the Tunisians will view this as a purely political decision on the part of the US. He intimated politely that he didn’t feel our decision in this case should be governed by the economists and aid technicians. 3. He said GOT is very anxious to have a four-year commitment to support its new plan. I assured him there is no question of our continued aid for Tunisian development and warned that, if we would prefer not to quantify this commitment in principle, the GOT should not read our act as a loss of interest. I pointed out that our massive programs in India, Pakistan and Turkey run on the basis of yearly pledges. He suggested that the consortium framework gives those programs a continuity that Tunisia must seek bilaterally. We didn’t get into detailed discussion of the merits of multi-year commitments because Driss seemed more intent on what he was going to say next than on taking in my points. 4. He asked us to help GOT turn the Consultative Group into an effective organ. Saunders suggested it would be important for Ben Salah to give members of the Group as soon as possible the substance of the presentation he’ll make in Washington so they can do their homework. I underscored this by pointing to the trouble we’d had getting the Turks to become their own chief advocates in their consortium. Driss got the point but reiterated that everyone looks to the US for leadership. In this connection, he said that relations with France are improving. I said we had pondered trying to persuade the French to let bygones be bygones but had decided our words wouldn’t help much. We agreed that the Germans could be helpful, especially right now in the afterglow of gratitude for President Bourguiba’s Middle East stance. I jokingly suggested the way to get De Gaulle back into Tunisia would be for us to cut off aid and he, only half jokingly, agreed. I confined myself to reassuring him of our receptivity and interest, with the thought that we’d want to save any answers for Bourguiba, Jr. and Ben Salah. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963–March 1966. Confidential. Prepared by Komer. Copies were sent to Williams and Hutchinson. 149. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 149. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, April 27, 1965. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO TUNISIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT It is suggested that in your meeting with the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Habib Bourguiba, Jr., you include the following points on U.S. assistance to Tunisian economic development. Talking Points: 1. Tunisia is one of the seven countries in the world to which the United States Government will continue to provide major support under its economic assistance program. Further, the United States Government affirms its support of Tunisia’s economic development within the context of the new Four Year Plan. The unutilized portion (roughly $80 million) of the past U.S. commitment of $180 million will continue to be available in connection with Tunisia’s development efforts. 2. In addition to major support from the United States, the successful execution of Tunisia’s development program and the realization of an adequate long-run rate of growth, will involve (1) Tunisia’s association with the EEC; (2) increased self-help measures; and (3) greater participation by other aid donors. 3. We are encouraged by the recent report that the EEC Council has indicated its willingness to open formal negotiations with Tunisia and that a negotiating mandate is to be prepared by June. Early association with the EEC should enable Tunisia to develop a more viable economy and an expanded volume of trade with Western Europe. 4. The United States will support the World Bank in its efforts to take a more active role in strengthening the Consultative Group and will encourage the individual member nations to enlarge their participation in Tunisia’s development efforts. This we believe to be in conformance with the desires and interest of your Government and we hope that you would pursue a similar course. 5. The review of the Four Year Plan and the strengthening of the Consultative Group will take time. We recognize that the Tunisian balance of payments situation may require the provision of interim assistance. The United States Government is prepared to provide such assistance as a supplement to the foreign exchange resources that Tunisia can obtain through additional drawings from the IMF. After a review of the Four Year Plan, including the current state of the Tunisian economy, with Minister Ben Salah next month, the requirements for interim assistance can be determined. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Secret. Drafted by Charles J. Nelson, Director of the Office of Mediterranean Affairs in AID’s Bureau for Africa, on April 24. The source text was attached to an April 27 briefing memorandum Williams sent to Rusk prior to Rusk’s meeting with Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr. on April 28. The memorandum of conversation of their meeting is ibid., POL TUN–US. 150. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 150. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 29, 1965. Habib Bourguiba, Jr., now Tunisia’s foreign minister, is coming in briefly to deliver a letter from his father. Simply knowing that you appreciate Tunisia’s stance will give Bourguiba, Sr. a big boost. He has gone way out on a limb in recommending that Arabs and Israelis negotiate a Palestine settlement. Even though this is unworkable now, it took courage to be the only Arab leader to recognize that Israel is here to stay. Other Arabs have criticized him bitterly. Bourguiba has also publicly supported our position on negotiation without preconditions in Vietnam. To be honest, Tunisia’s forthright stand is partly designed to generate maximum US backing for its next development plan. It wants (1) a pledge of specific support—we’re giving a general assurance but don’t want to make another multi-year commitment; (2) a $30–40 million foreign exchange cushion to start the next plan. We’ll help meet the need but, again, don’t want to talk amounts until we figure out how much is required. In sum, we want to be as re-assuring as possible, both to show it pays to be friendly and because Tunisia is using our aid well (Tunisia is one of the seven countries AID is concentrating on). Possible Talking Points are: (1) You hope his father’s courageous stand on the Palestine issue will win followers among the sensible Arab leaders when the initial shock wears off; (2) you’re aware of Tunisia’s effective development effort and can assure him that, even though we don’t want to commit ourselves to a specific amount of aid now, we will support Tunisia’s development during its next 4-year plan; (3) it’s important to get the Western Europeans more heavily involved in Tunisian development, not to get ourselves off the hook but because Tunisia’s most profitable natural economic relationship is with Europe; (4) your best wishes to his father. 2 McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, December 1963–September 1968. Confidential. 2 Attached to the source text is a typed note that reads: “Mr. Bundy: I saw him and it went fine. LBJ/mf, 4–29–65, 2:45p”; see Document 151 . 151. Memorandum of Conversation 151. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 29, 1965, noon. SUBJECT Tunisia PARTICIPANTS The President Foreign Minister Bourguiba of Tunisia Ambassador Rachid Driss of Tunisia Ambassador Francis H. Russell, Ambassador to Tunisia Mr. Bourguiba expressed his appreciation to the President for receiving him at a time when the President is greatly concerned with difficult and fast-moving world problems. He said he had been asked by his father, President Bourguiba, to express his warm greetings. President Bourguiba has had the privilege of knowing personally President Eisenhower and President Kennedy and he looks forward at some time to becoming personally acquainted with President Johnson. In the meantime, he was asking his son, the Foreign Minister, to say how close the Government of Tunisia feels itself to the principles and objectives of American foreign policy. Both countries have their special problems and preoccupations which may make for minor differences in policy from time to time but as a general matter and especially when the chips are down, the United States will find Tunisia at its side. Tunisia may not be a large or important country but it places great importance upon democratic beliefs, integrity, and courage in pursuing its ideals. The President said that Tunisia is important. What it stands for and what it has done, both internally and in its foreign policies, has been observed and appreciated by Americans. We want to do all we can to help it. There is a question as to what Congress will do with the foreign aid bill that has been sent up. There may be some cuts but the President thinks that the bill will come through successfully. Mr. Bourguiba said that his government would like to make Tunisia a model of a democratic, progressive country working closely with the West and especially with the United States. It has just worked out its Four Year Program following the initial Three Year Program. The new program calls for a contribution by the Tunisian people of 60% of the development budget as compared with only 50% in the Three Year Program. However, there is a limit beyond which the people will not go in making sacrifices. If you try to push them too far you have to resort to totalitarian measures and you defeat your democratic goals. The Minister said that national security has become increasingly a problem for Tunisia as the result of developments of the past month and the misunderstanding, very largely an inspired misunderstanding, of what President Bourguiba was suggesting for a rational and pragmatic solution of the Arab-Israeli question. He expressed the hope that the United States could help the Government of Tunisia to make its Army more efficient. They do not wish to increase its size and they hope that some arrangements can be made with the United States for improving the equipment of the present army without cutting into the Tunisian economy and setting back the development effort. The President said that he would ask his people to look into that question. Congress has practically cut out the military assistance portion of the Aid Program and it has become very difficult to give assistance of this kind. He said, however, that he was sympathetic to Tunisia’s problem and he would see what we could do. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, December 1963–September 1968. Confidential. Drafted by Ambassador Russell on April 30. The meeting was held at the White House. 152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) 152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) 1 Washington, May 10, 1965. SUBJECT Economic Aid to Tunisia During my recent talks with Tunisian Foreign Secretary Bourguiba, Jr., 2 he raised the question of a cash loan to build up Tunisian resources. I told him that a cash loan would be difficult under present circumstances. However, I assured him that we would view sympathetically Tunisia’s short-term economic needs and how we could most effectively assist his country within the limits of our aid procedures and balance of payments problems. In this context I welcomed AID’s agreement to assist the next Tunisian Four Year Plan. Tunisian Secretary of State for Plan and National Economy Ahmed Ben Salah will arrive this week to discuss details of Tunisia’s economic assistance needs. I am profoundly interested in continuing our support of Tunisia. To this end, I hope you will assure that to the extent possible our responses to Ben Salah’s requests are in consonance with our close relations with Tunisia, especially in the light of its recent helpful policies on a number of international issues. Dean Rusk 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) TUN. No classification marking. Drafted by Nelson in AFN. 2 The memorandum of the Secretary’s conversation with Foreign Minister Bourguiba is ibid., POL TUN–US. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 153. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Trimble) to Secretary of State Rusk 153. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Trimble) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 21, 1965. SUBJECT President Bourguiba Defies Nasser and Vows to Continue Support of the US In a speech on May 21 before the National Council of the Destourian Socialist Party, President Habib Bourguiba expressed defiance of the efforts of Nasser to impose his doctrines on Israel and the Cold War on Tunisia. Bourguiba said that “if the countries of the Arab League wish to join the Soviet camp, that is their business. But we cannot accept their efforts to force us to work against the Americans in the name of solidarity with Nasser.” With reference to Israel, Bourguiba said he doubted that, as Nasser has suggested, the Arabs could mobilize two or three million soldiers and push Israel into the sea. He said that campaigns of denigration will never solve the problem and can only strengthen Israel. Comment: President Bourguiba seems now to have made a complete break with his fellow Arab Leaders on two most sensitive issues: Palestine and Arab solidarity, and nonalignment. It is extremely unlikely that even moderate Arab states can follow him on the Palestine issue. There will be few of the moderate Arab or African states which will follow him away from nonalignment. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL TUN–US. Confidential. Drafted by Chase. A note on the source text indicates Secretary Rusk saw the memorandum. 154. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara 154. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, June 3, 1965. Dear Bob: On April 28 during his visit to Washington, Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., raised privately with me the possibility of some additional assistance to Tunisia’s armed forces. Having informed the Foreign Minister that his request would be given early consideration, I asked members of my staff to explore the possibility of an initial equipment sales program for Tunisia of about $2 million in FY 1966 with repayment in local currency. I understand that our respective staffs have since been in touch on this matter and that it has been brought to your attention. In mid-May, the Foreign Minister again raised the question of U.S. military assistance with Ambassador Russell in Tunis and referred to his discussions in Washington on this subject. On May 18, the Tunisian Minister-Counselor called on the Department to inquire when our decision on this problem might be expected and to express the hope that we would be responsive to the Foreign Minister’s request. I am aware of the major current pressures and limitations on our military assistance funds and the need for their careful utilization in terms of our worldwide requirements. I would hope, however, that the Department of Defense, in its approach to this problem, will give full weight to the constructive position that Tunisia has been taking on a significant number of international issues of direct concern to the United States and that we will be able, in the very near future, to give a positive response to Foreign Minister Bourguiba. We have been very strongly impressed by Tunisia’s willingness to withstand the heavy criticism and pressures on it to modify the positions it has assumed. We believe that an early and favorable response to its request for military aid will fortify its resolve to maintain those positions. 2 Sincerely yours, Dean 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 091.3 Tunisia. Secret. 2 On June 11, Secretary McNamara responded to Rusk’s request in a letter stating that he had approved the addition of $2 million in grant aid funds for the FY 1966 Tunisian Military Assistance Program. (Ibid.) 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 1 Washington, June 20, 1965, 12:40 p.m. 443. From Secretary to Ambassador. Request you convey following to Foreign Minister Bourguiba as my response his approach re security equipment during recent Washington visit: 1. We continue our close interest in independence and territorial integrity of Tunisia. While as you recognize Tunisia must, in time of grave threat, look to United Nations and to friends, we understand desire for adequate defense force. 2. In assessing what we can do in present circumstances, we are mindful of our common desire to avoid increased burden on Tunisian economy and diversion funds from commendable development plans, as well as major current pressures on US military assistance funds. 3. Nevertheless, we are prepared consider limited immediate assistance, preferably in anti-aircraft or anti-tank fields, dependent on consultations our military experts. We are prepared send officer immediately to confer on this basis. 4. As suggested to you when you were in Washington, German equipment compatible with US and we would suggest approach to Germany which we would be prepared endorse if this would be helpful, although appreciate current problems. 5. In meantime in response to your request, we will explore possibility for minimizing the burden of old programs. FYI: Though not stated in Secretary’s response, program we envisage would not exceed $2 million actual MAP expenditures, would be funded from FY 1966 MAP and would be on nominal sales basis, with repayment in local currency (in recognition of Tunisian budgetary situation and fact US is large holder of Tunisian dinars). We would seek, during discussions leading to agreement on such program, to secure GOT assurances that GOT will permit adequate US end-use checking and information on past and future equipment deliveries to insure satisfactory maintenance and use of material in which US dollars are invested. End FYI. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–TUN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Blake and McClanahan on May 27; cleared by Black in AID/PC, Colonel Dregne in DOD/ISA, Trimble, Warren in G/PM, and Rusk; and approved by Carol C. Moor in S/S. 2 In telegram 671 from Tunis, June 21, Russell reported that he had conveyed the substance of telegram 443 to Foreign Minister Bourguiba, who expressed appreciation but asked the Ambassador to convey his plea to Washington that U.S. aid not be too little and too late. Mentioning events in Algeria, the Foreign Minister said such assistance should be considered in a political rather than a “limited technical” framework. The United States would suffer the same loss if Tunisia were overrun as it would if Vietnam or the Dominican Republic were lost. (Ibid.) 156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 1 Washington, July 28, 1965, 5:15 p.m. 38. Ref: Your 34. 2 Embassy should convey to President Bourguiba or other high-level Tunisian leaders following points concerning US position on Libyan situation as raised by President Bourguiba in his conversation reported in reftel: 1. US welcomes opportunities afforded by excellent US–GOT relations for frank exchanges re political and security situation in area. President’s wide experience and forthright appraisal of regional problems, both current and future, are particularly valuable to USG in developing its own policies and programs for areas. 2. As Tunisians no doubt are aware US has expressed interest in Libya’s security and territorial integrity, which are matters of importance to USG. This continuing interest stems from our long-standing friendship with Libya and the extensive US relations with Libya which have grown up over past years. We believe Tunisians, with whom US has similar ties based on mutual confidence and interests, will appreciate soundness this US approach to Libya. 3. We believe that assistance to Libya from friendly countries should, of course, be with the consent of GOL in order avoid unfortunate and unintended misunderstanding among friends and to insure maximum effectiveness such assistance as may be requested. 4. US is not in a position to provide such assistance to Tunisia with any understanding or implication that the assistance was to be used in circumstances such as those alluded to by FonMin. FYI—Use of US-supplied equipment in third countries would of course require consultation with USG and latter’s prior consent. End FYI. 5. Our own impression of situation in Libya is that political atmosphere is possibly receptive to closer cooperation with Tunisia. Re para 5 above, we would appreciate Embassy assessment as to probable GOT reaction to suggestion that Tunisians consider direct approach to GOL on such contingency subjects as GOT has raised with US. FYI—With respect to current GOT arms request Embtel 39, 3 at this juncture we believe it preferable as next step that ARMA merely listen to forthcoming Tunisian explanation of plans and requirements. Following this presentation, which was promised for May, we will know better scope of Tunisian needs and areas where we could best assist. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 TUN. Secret. Drafted by McClanahan and Blake on July 27; cleared by Lang in DOD and by Warren; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Tripoli, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 2 In telegram 34 from Tunis, July 16, Russell reported a conversation with President Bourguiba, who declared that he was convinced that Nasser was contemplating moving into Libya on the pretext of assuring stability, most likely after King Idris’ death. Noting that Nasser’s enmity toward a Tunisian regime friendly toward the West was implacable, Bourguiba said that having Nasser on the Tunisian-Libyan border would be intolerable. Tunisia wanted to be in a position to protect itself by drawing a line somewhere in west Libya if Nasser were to cross its eastern border, and he hoped for U.S. understanding of this position and material support so Tunisia’s security could be assured if this occurred. (Ibid.) 3 Dated July 19. (Ibid., DEF 19 US–TUN) 157. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 157. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, September 17, 1965. RWK— Tunisian shopping list is the big document on the bottom (summarized at the clip). 2 DOD hasn’t fully analyzed it yet and won’t definitively until they have a team take a look at present forces. (McNamara promised to consider sending the team when he saw Bourguiba, Jr. at 4:00 p.m.) Key features are: a new tank squadron, a group of anti-tank guided missile squadrons, amphibious landing capability, 12 jet interceptors and radar, doubled ground transport, doubled ground force strength. Bourguiba saw Rusk this morning for 45 minutes 3 until interrupted by Nehru; Rusk agreed to continue discussion tomorrow. Most of today’s talk ran to Vietnam, Pak-India, etc. Bourguiba only repeated his father’s request for a team and said he’d even go as far as an alliance if necessary (Tunis 157 attached). 4 He did acknowledge importance of economic program and it sounds as if he’ll be happy if we send a team . Rusk will reply tomorrow. You’ve written the general pitch, but here are some specifics to bolster it: 1. $100 million program over 5 years would absorb 80% of Congressional MAP ceiling for all of Africa ($20–25 million a year). So we can’t afford anything that big. 2. A $20 million annual MAP would be larger than in any other country away from the Communist perimeter (except Spain where base rights are all-important and anti-Bloc). 3. Such a large MAP would wreck economic program. We couldn’t afford it, and Tunisian budget costs (doubled) would wipe out budgetary surpluses which finance local costs of development plan. 4. You may want to say a private general word about our concern for Libyan independence. You remember, he told you Tunisians were even thinking of need for a pre-emptive strike if Libya crumbled after Idris’ death. H. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. 2 Not attached. 3 A memorandum of conversation of Secretary Rusk’s discussion of the Tunisian arms request with Foreign Minister Bourguiba on September 17 is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 TUN. 4 Not attached. 158. Memorandum of Conversation 158. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 18, 1965. SUBJECT Military Assistance to Tunisia PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., of Tunisia His Excellency Rachid Driss, Ambassador of Tunisia Ambassador Trimble, Deputy Assistant Secretary of African Affairs James J. Blake, Director, Office of Northern African Affairs The Foreign Minister referred to his meeting the previous day with Secretary of Defense McNamara 2 and to his conversation earlier that same day with the Secretary. From these talks he had drawn the conclusion that the essential question was whether the US agreed with his analysis of Tunisia’s security. The Secretary stated that there were some elements in the Foreign Minister’s presentation on which he would appreciate clarification. An attack on Tunisia by the UAR or Algeria would clearly require “big battalions” which Tunisia with a population of four million could not meet with “big battalions” of its own. On the other hand, the assumption that such an attack could be made from the UAR side overlooked the existence of Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya. Wheelus would not be overrun or bypassed by the “big battalions”. The nature of the threat, how it could materialize, and how it could be met, were not clear. The Secretary further noted the Foreign Minister’s reference to Tunisia’s interest in establishing a “special relationship” to the US. It was not clear to him what kind of relationship the Foreign Minister had in mind. The US had entered various military alliances but only to prevent Communist aggression. The type of threat described by the Foreign Minister did not appear to be a Communist threat. Parenthetically, he noted that US alliance relationships were now being subjected to substantial criticism because of some of the basic misunderstandings that had arisen among the partners, virtually from the outset, regarding their purposes. For example, the US and Pakistan were partners in SEATO. We regarded SEATO as a bulwark against Communism in Southeast Asia, but Pakistan from the beginning saw it as an instrument of its own policy against India. The Secretary wondered whether some kind of a regional defensive arrangement might not be the answer to Tunisia’s problems, but one which would leave the US in the background. The Foreign Minister stated that a regional grouping was not possible because of the political and economic weakness of Morocco and the political and military weakness of Libya. Moreover, the Libyans were so frightened of the Egyptians that they would hesitate to engage in any kind of an arrangement that would become known to Cairo. Besides, he asked, to whom could one speak in Libya with confidence on such a sensitive subject? The Foreign Minister stated that a further complicating problem was posed by France whose ambitions, he believes, extend to Libya as well as to the three Maghreb states. He expressed the opinion that any security arrangement in the region would be weakened by the willingness of France to play up to Nasser for its own purpose in North Africa and elsewhere. The Secretary said that the problem described by the Foreign Minister had to be examined in terms of the risks that must be catered to or put aside. He could not say whether Tunisia’s assessment of the threat to its security was accurate but it was clear that the military solution envis-aged by the Foreign Minister to contain that threat would create very grave problems for Tunisia by diverting resources which would otherwise go to economic development. In his judgment Tunisia would have to face the fact that Tunisia could not compete militarily either with Algeria or the UAR. Moreover, the threat described by the Foreign Minister was not one that would develop overnight; as change in the political atmosphere would precede it. The Foreign Minister agreed that Tunisia could not afford an expensive military establishment and that it would have to give priority to the allocation of its resources to economic development. This was precisely why Tunisia had included the cost of maintenance in the military assistance request it had submitted to the US. Moreover, all it hoped to do was to establish a force sufficiently strong enough to withstand the first shock of an attack and to hold off the aggressor until Tunisia’s friends came to its assistance. In this connection, he discounted any possibility of help from the UN. The Secretary described the mounting criticism the Kashmir problem had provoked of military assistance programs, even among people who had been supporters of those programs. He noted that it would be dangerous for Tunisia to rely exclusively on one country for its military security. The Secretary then referred to the Foreign Minister’s indication early in the year that a certain amount of discretion would be desirable in connection with any military assistance by the US. He asked whether this was still the Foreign Minister’s view inasmuch as it would be difficult to be discreet about a military assistance program of the size suggested by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister replied that his earlier interest in discreet US military assistance had been overtaken by events; the important thing was that Tunisia needed military assistance because of the threat it faced. He declared it would be a mistake to regard Nasser as less dangerous because of his recent political and military reverses. He remains dangerous in the same way that a wounded boar remains dangerous. The UAR is basically expansionist. Population pressures require it to expand. Nasser himself is a crude, unsophisticated, immature colonel who still does not reflect fully before he acts and does not assess in advance the possible consequences of his actions. The Secretary asked whether the evidences of continued French interest in Algeria might help to stabilize the Algerian situation and make the GOA more responsible and moderate in its external policies. The Foreign Minister replied that it was difficult to make any judgment on these points. The one thing that was clear was that France was pursuing its own nationalist ambitions in Algeria and was concerned primarily with the preservation of its economic interest in that country, and the exploitation of its petroleum resources. Algeria’s foreign policy would be no concern of France if it did not place those interests in jeopardy. The Foreign Minister reverted to what he regarded as the central issue: whether the US agreed that the threat to Tunisia was real. He had posed the same question to Secretary McNamara and he would like to have the Secretary’s views. The Secretary stated that he recognized that Tunisia’s anxieties were proper and understandable. This did not mean that every risk the Foreign Minister envisaged could be catered to; certain risks would have to be put to one side. The problem then became one of the degree of any US assistance. He reminded the Foreign Minister that we had already agreed in principle to be of some assistance, but stated that he would have to review this matter more fully before providing an answer regarding the extent to which we might be of help. He would discuss the problem with Secretary McNamara in terms of priorities as well as requirements and would provide the Foreign Minister with an answer before the latter’s return to Tunis. The Secretary expressed the opinion that any such assistance should in some way support the Tunisian economic development effort. Perhaps this could be done by including a civic action component in US military aid. The Foreign Minister noted that Tunisia was already using its armed forces for economic purposes, such as road construction and in the technical training of youth; Tunisia would welcome military assistance that included civic action elements. The Secretary asked whether some of Tunisia’s anxieties would be eased by other things we might do, for example, by scheduling regular visits by the Sixth Fleet. The Foreign Minister replied that such visits would be very helpful. The Foreign Minister concluded by telling the Secretary that Tunisia felt that it could trust the US. It has no fears of an American presence in Tunisia, and it would welcome a closer association with this country. The Secretary assured the Foreign Minister of the substantial US interest in Tunisia and of US good will toward Tunisia. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–TUN. Secret. Drafted by Blake on September 22 and approved in S on September 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.” 2 The memorandum of conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 331 Tunisia. 159. Memorandum of Conversation 159. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 27, 1965, noon. SecDel/MC/46 SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1965 SUBJECT Military Assistance to Tunisia PARTICIPANTS U.S.: The Secretary William Witman, Ambassador to Togo W. Paul O’Neill, Jr., AFE Tunisia: Habib Bourguiba, Jr.—Foreign Minister Taieb Slim—Permanent Representative to the U.N. Rachid Driss—Ambassador to the U.S. The Secretary said he had three or four things to say on military assistance to Tunisia, but he must warn the Foreign Minister in advance that they did not represent a complete answer. They were, however, a beginning. 1. Secretary of Defense McNamara was prepared to send a survey team to Tunisia to assess Tunisia’s military needs. 2 2. The U.S. is interested in the area of civic action, which is a constructive one. The Foreign Minister said Tunisia has seen civic action on a small scale and that the people were now accustomed to the idea. The Secretary further noted the contributions of U.S. military forces to the development of the United States, of which there had been a surprising amount west of the Mississippi in earlier days, and not just by the Army Corps of Engineers. He promised to send some material on this subject to the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister observed that the Tunisian army had been trained in a different way, largely as a technical corps. The Secretary observed that the military traditionally look on themselves as warriors and often do not like to perform civilian projects. 3. The U.S. would be glad to arrange with the Tunisian Government fairly regular visits of units of the 6th Fleet. These would be noted where they should be and, in addition, would bring some tangible economic benefits. 4. The U.S. Government is looking into the possibility of increasing the number of training slots in the U.S. for members of the Tunisian military forces. In general, the Secretary added, the two countries should arrange to keep in close touch with developments which could affect Tunisian security. For example, problems might arise when UAR troops returned home from the Yemen. The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary for the USG response and agreed on the utility of maintaining close cooperation. He said the survey team was probably the best way to reach agreement on the amounts Tunisia needed in the military field. The Secretary said the problem of figures was probably a bit tricky and that the U.S. would have to have freedom to arrange this. We needed to consider what were the highest priorities. In view of what might develop in North Africa, the Secretary thought that communications’ equipment, including radar, seemed very important. The Foreign Minister agreed on the need for communications’ equipment and mentioned the problem created for Tunisia when it sees its neighbors getting jets, tanks and training from eastern countries. The Secretary referred to the experience of the recent Indo-Pakistani conflict and the fact that new anti-tank weapons might be better for some countries than supplying tanks to oppose enemy tanks. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. Drafted by O’Neill and approved in S on October 25. The meeting was held at USUN. The source text is labeled “Part 1 of 4.” 2 Telegram 146 to Tunis, November 12, informed the Embassy that the U.S. Military Survey Team formed to study Tunisia’s security requirements would arrive in Tunis on November 29 to begin the survey, which would take about 3 weeks. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–TUN) The Report of the U.S. Military Survey Team (Tunisia) dated February 16, 1966, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, 9118.4 (16 Feb 66) IR 5630 Sec. 1A. 160. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 160. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 4, 1966, 2:45 p.m. Dave Bell asks your approval of a $15 million non-project loan for Tunisia—all tied to US procurement. Fowler and Schultze are on board. This is the bulk of our economic aid program this year, except for a little food and technical assistance. We will release it in two stages to maintain pressure for continued progress on self-help measures. At Bourguiba’s urgent request, we are also considering additional military aid, but we will give you a crack at that later since it would be virtually a new commitment. This is an outstanding example of using our aid to bargain for better self-help. Talks leading to this loan began almost a year ago. Rusk promised continued support for Tunisian development, provided the Tunisians made some economic policy changes. Out of those talks came a major new Tunisian procedure for budgeting development resources. Now we and other donors ($30 million) working through a World Bank consultative group are ready to underwrite this year’s program. It has been a long pull, but the Tunisians have done a good job. The World Bank has just voted its confidence by setting aside $100 million for the next three years. While this is a sound development loan, there is also strong political justification. As you recall from your last talk with Bourguiba Jr., President Bourguiba has put himself far out on a limb in the Arab world by standing up to Nasser and preaching a peaceful solution for the Palestine problem. He fears Nasser’s retaliation by subversion and is desperately looking for somebody to tie to. He’s even offered us both naval and air bases (which we don’t need) as an inducement for closer ties. We do not want Tunisia to depend too heavily on us; it should look to its natural markets in Europe. But until Bourguiba can smooth DeGaulle’s ruffled feathers, we have an interest in keeping this effective little enterprise going. 2 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:15 p.m. 2 A handwritten note in the margin of the source text reads: “When does he come to see us. Check with Rusk & see if we can’t coordinate the two—L.” 161. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 161. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 12, 1966, 11:45 a.m. In answer to your question (attached), 2 Rusk does not think Bourguiba can visit Washington until later in the year, since he has a string of tenth anniversary celebrations this spring. So Rusk recommends going ahead with the $15 million Tunisian program loan now and asks your approval for inviting Bourguiba for the second half of 1966. The main reason for not delaying the loan any longer is that the Tunisians have geared their self-help measures for this calendar year to our aid and to the $30 million which other donors pledged at a World Bank meeting in December. We originally promised a decision by the end of December but delayed during our aid review to give it an especially careful going over. The Tunisians have done a good job on their side of the bargain and need to push ahead with their development imports for this year. We’re afraid holding off any longer would make us look horribly inefficient and undercut our leverage in bargaining for a new round of reforms. Walt Go ahead with loan 3 See me Invite Bourguiba for last half of 1966 4 See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Confidential. 2 See footnote 2, Document 160 . 3 This option is checked on the source text. 4 This option is checked on the source text. On April 18, Assistant Secretary Palmer informed Foreign Minister Bourguiba that the $15 million program loan had been authorized, and confirmed the invitation for President Bourguiba to visit the United States in the latter part of the year. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, POL TUN–US) 162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 1 Washington, May 20, 1966, 8:37 p.m. 417. Deptel 407. 2 1. Following are principal points made during May 20 call on Secretary by Tunisian Ambassador Driss. 3 They are FYI, Noforn, and subject revision upon review: 2. Bourguiba Visit US. Referring recent consultations Tunis, Driss expressed President’s appreciation for invitation; indicated that if it envisaged as “working visit” and there something to discuss, it possible Bourguiba arrange to come this year. If question protocol or courtesy visit, then next year might be better. However, did not wish leave impression Bourguiba unwilling to come. Secretary assured Ambassador invitation not protocol one, and visit conceived as opportunity for two Presidents discuss informally not just bilateral matters but also wide range international problems—e.g., Africa and Arab world, UN. We do not view visit as connected with any particular problems between our two govts. We working on these separately in hope of early progress. We do not suggest President alter planned European visits, nor on other hand to postpone US visit indefinitely. Perhaps we can find mutually agreeable time this year; however, if not, then early next year. 3. US-Tunisian Relations Amb said Tunisians hopeful proposed visit might be new take-off point in US–GOT relations to even higher plane than presently exists. Expressed GOT concern over Soviet arms to Egypt and Algeria, and Tunisia’s obligation to protect economy and political system. While grateful for US aid, GOT unhappy with delays in implementation and with quantities. Driss concurred in Secretary’s comment that Tunisia’s per capita aid one of highest, but on other grounds he felt it deserves more. Secretary said we would look into ways of reducing administrative delays, but of course procedures and questions involved of necessity take time. 4. Military Assistance Secretary questioned whether Tunisia’s security could ever be answered primarily by military means, and whether internal security and support by friends outside not more important. Said Survey Team Report under consideration in high levels USG and hoped transmit results soon to GOT. Driss insisted Tunisia had to be able defend itself during initial attack, friends notwithstanding. 5. Tunisian-French Relations Driss said relations seem to be improving; however, Tunisian cooperation with France would not be allowed to occur at expense of cooperation with US. Secretary said we favored improvement, and do not consider ourselves as rivals of France or Europe in Tunisia’s foreign relations. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Polk in AFN and approved by Root. 2 Dated May 14. (Ibid., POL TUN–US) 3 Memoranda of conversation of Rusk’s meeting with Driss are ibid., POL 7 TUN and ibid., DEF 19–8 US–TUN. 163. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 163. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 23, 1966. SUBJECT Military Assistance for Tunisia Recommendation: Military assistance for Tunisia has been under close study, and debate, for many weeks. Decisions in favor of a $26 million military assistance program spread over five years have been made, and appealed, through the African Regional Group and the Senior Interdepartmental Group to me. Subject to your concurrence, I have decided to recommend the $26 million five-year arms program subject to the following provisions: a) That we take soundings on the problem from the British, French, Germans and Italians to see how they might be prepared to help; b) That we inform the Tunisians of our intention to take such soundings before deciding on our own contribution; c) That the Department of Defense be asked to undertake maximum training of Tunisians in this country and to keep the number of military assistance personnel in Tunisia down to the absolute minimum; d) That we avoid if at all possible a public announcement of the magnitude of our help and that we phase our assistance gradually over the five years so that for the most part the “non-lethal” hardware is sent first and the more sophisticated arms arrive later. Background: Following an urgent Tunisian request and discussions which you, Secretary McNamara and I had with Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., we agreed about a year ago to provide some limited military assistance to Tunisia. The amount was left to be determined after we had sent a military survey team to study how to meet that country’s minimum requirements for security with the least adverse effect on Tunisia’s economic development, which we are helping. The survey team visited Tunisia last November and completed its report in February of this year. The team recommended a $26 million military assistance program spread over five years which would provide a minimum deterrent to external attack. The program was approved first by the African Regional Group with A.I.D. dissenting and then by the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). Because A.I.D. dissented in SIG, the matter was referred to me for decision. There are serious arguments pro and con. The Arguments in Favor 1. President Bourguiba is of course an outstanding and courageous leader among statesman in the lesser developed countries and a friend of the U.S. He has given us, for example, strong support on Viet-Nam. 2. While we tend to discount any present threat to Tunisia from its neighbors, Bourguiba is understandably concerned about the danger over the longer run from the massive input of Soviet arms into a still basically unstable Algeria and a unfriendly Egypt on the other side of a weak Libya. 3. We are in any event obligated to provide him at least that portion of the survey team’s Report which gives the technical assessment of our military experts on what he requires to meet the threat of attack. 4. Moreover, even with the added local costs of this proposed program, Tunisia’s defense expenditures would still be less than 10% of its annual budget. The Arguments Against 1. What we do in Tunisia will effect to some extent the Moroccan demand for increased assistance and the attitude in Algeria towards the U.S. role in North Africa. 2. It is not, of course, feasible to arm Tunisia to the point where it could actually hold off the Algerians for more than a very short time. 3. While we have made sales of military equipment in the past, the new program would put military aid on a different and more important basis, involving some military training. 4. Tunisia’s economic resources are already strained and we are not eager to see funds diverted into military expenditures. 5. It would obviously be preferable if we were able to disassociate ourselves from any kind of arms race in the Maghreb. After balancing the above considerations, I have decided to go ahead with a military assistance program for Tunisia, subject to your approval. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. 164. Memorandum for the Record 164. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, August 12, 1966. I received word this morning from the Secretariat of the SIG that Rusk, McNamara and Gaud met several days ago on the Tunisia Military Assistance Program and decided to scrap the July 23rd memo for the President which Secretary Rusk had sent to us. 2 We had been holding that memo since its arrival to let the Presidential Determination papers catch up with it so we would only have to take this issue to the President once. The Secretaries decided that it would be too damaging to the AID program in Congress to try for a five-year commitment to Tunisia. They agreed to go ahead as planned for FY 67 but feel we can make no commitment thereafter. Ambassador Palmer’s Bureau is now drafting a paper reflecting this new position. The main problem is that the Tunisians are already aware of the existence of the military survey team’s report. The debate now will be over how to tell them that we are only willing to sign up for one year. One solution is to tell them forthrightly about our problems, tell them that we are willing to start on a program but admit that unfortunately we can not be sure what the future will bring. I have told State and AID to be sure that the Presidential Determination papers this time come over with the Secretary’s memo. I am returning Secretary Rusk’s original memo to Bromley Smith, presumably for the dead letter file. H. H. Saunders 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. Prepared by Saunders. Copies were sent to Bromley Smith and James Clark. 2 Document 163 . 165. Memorandum of Conversation 165. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 25, 1966. SUBJECT U. S. Attitude Toward Tunisia PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Rachid Driss, Ambassador of Tunisia Mr. Ferid El Mouldi, Third Secretary, Embassy of Tunisia The Secretary Mr. Peter Spicer, Acting OIC, Tunisia Ambassador Driss referred to his recent vacation in Tunisia and to the conversations he had had there with President Bourguiba and with Foreign Minister Bourguiba, Jr. The Ambassador said that he had already reported his impressions to Mr. Palmer. 2 President Bourguiba was disheartened and had asked many questions; the first of which was, “What was the strategy of the United States toward Tunisia?” “If Tunisia is worthy of being helped, why are there so may difficulties?” The President had noted that he had been waiting since 1964 for an indication of U.S. intent on the military question and that he was still awaiting the results of the Clowes mission. President Bourguiba must consider the total situation and draw his conclusions. The Ambassador said that he had tried again to explain the problems of the American Government to the President, but that, in reply, the President had displayed a press clipping in which members of the Congress were praising Tunisia. In addition, even should the Government of Tunisia understand the problem, it is difficult to placate young people and Party militants. The Secretary said that Mr. Palmer had informed him of the Ambassador’s reflections and that we well understood the restlessness about the delay in decisions. There had been no change in our attitude toward President Bourguiba and toward Tunisia. We are still hoping that President Bourguiba’s visit can be worked out. The question of military assistance to Tunisia was now under study at the highest, Cabinet, level. All preliminary study had been completed. There is a great problem with Congress; a problem now being discussed in joint committee, and we are hopeful of a compromise. This is a very bitter question, an amendment to the AID bill has been written on behalf of many leading Senators that would limit the number of countries receiving aid. We can make no decisions until we know the results of the compromise, how much money we will have and where it can be spent. The Secretary expressed his belief that some of the problems had been resolved, for example, the delayed ammunition had arrived. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL TUN–US. Confidential. Drafted by Spicer and approved in S on September 1. The source text is labeled “Part I of IV.” 2 A memorandum of conversation of Ambassador Driss’ meeting with Assistant Secretary Palmer on August 15 is ibid. 166. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 166. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 4, 1966, 9 a.m. SUBJECT Military Aid for Tunisia Secretary Rusk may raise at lunch one of the trickiest small problems we face—how to answer a year-old Tunisian request for military aid. Our government has divided sharply. Bourguiba wants a closer relationship with us to offset his deteriorating relations with De Gaulle and Nasser and the Soviet-backed arms-buildup next door in Algeria. Last fall, his government gave us a $100 million shopping list. To bring it back to reason we sent a survey team which recommended a $25 million program over five years to develop a Tunisian force that could hold off the Algerians just long enough for outside help to arrive. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have vetoed the five-year commitment and are recommending a one-year slice of the $25 million program. The deciding factor in their minds is that they don’t think the Congress will stand for any new long-term commitment right now. However, they feel there are strong reasons for doing something: —Tunisia is a small country next to a big neighbor with a lot of Soviet equipment. —Bourguiba has been remarkably good on Vietnam, and we can’t expect our friends to stick up for us if we don’t take their legitimate defense concerns seriously. —He has isolated himself in the Arab world by standing up to Nasser, and he is a moderate voice on Israel and African issues. —It doesn’t make sense to force Bourguiba to buy arms in the open market while we’re helping with his successful development program. He has nowhere else to turn. —We have gone far enough by offering a survey team to lead Bourguiba to expect a positive response. Dave Bell felt strongly that we should not go ahead with this program and appealed right up through the Senior Interdepartmental Group to the Secretary. He argued that: —Tunisia’s natural relationship lies with Europe, not with the US. Moving into any long-term program now would reverse our policy of gradually disengaging from Tunisia and nudging it toward its natural partners. —By balancing the Tunisian side of the North African arms imbalance, we would appear to be fueling a Tunisian-Algerian arms race. The examples of India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, Jordan-Israel teach that we should be drawing back from this kind of program wherever possible. —Ambassador Korry’s recommendation for your African program capitalize on natural sub-regional groupings like Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. With both neighbors suspicious of Algeria, economic cooperation may be a pipe dream. However, we ought to be urging cooperation—maybe even arms limitation—not undermining it by helping widen the Tunisian-Algerian gap. —Tunisia needs to concentrate every last ounce of talent and money on economic development. The Secretaries’ proposal contains one big hooker. There’s no sensible military rationale for a one-year $5 million program. We must either go on with the next four years, year by year, or stop before we’ve finished the job. Cutting off the program a year from now would be harder than not starting at all. So we re talking about a one-year program only for the sake of Congressional appearances. We are all uncomfortable about this program especially if there’s any thought of stopping after one year. At best, it’s a 51–49 decision. However, on balance I think we ought to go ahead. If we had something promising to offer Bourguiba in the way of arms limitation, I’d give it a try, but there’s little chance of that now. In the final analysis, it’s tough to tell a friend like Bourguiba that we won’t help him defend himself when he has so willingly backed our cause in Vietnam. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. 167. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 167. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, October 13, 1966. SUBJECT Tunisian Military Assistance It would help greatly if you could clear up the misunderstanding with Secretary Rusk over what the President has approved. AF is putting together the paperwork, and neither we nor the Budget Bureau know whether we should be fighting to keep the President’s options open or whether everything from here out is pro forma. The Secretary told Bourguiba, Jr., that (a) we’d transmit our survey team’s report; (b) we’re ready to go ahead with a “rather significant one-year program”; and (c) we’ll put the “most urgent items” (i.e. F–86’s and AA guns) into the first year. 2 Implicitly, the Secretary is talking about a $5.2 million program—a one-year slice of the 5-year program recommended by the survey report. Whether the President approved or not, the Secretary has committed us. So maybe all we can do is lie down and roll over. However, if there is still room for choice, the alternatives are these: 1. Go all-out with this year’s program. The argument is that Tunisians will be disappointed that we’re not promising the whole 5 years the survey team recommended and putting the fancy hardware into the first year of the program does our best to make it as politically palatable as possible. This is the Secretary’s current approach. 2. Go slow. Don’t jump into a splashy program that will look like our share in an arms race with Algeria and will move us into rather than out of Tunisia. Concentrate on training this year and move only simple pieces of equipment. This was the Secretary’s line before he reversed himself. We don’t want to fight a useless battle to keep option #2 open for the President if you decide, after talking to the Secretary, that the decision is made. But if you feel there’s room for maneuver, we’d like to see what option #2 might look like. Hal Give up Push for option #2 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. 2 A memorandum of Secretary Rusk’s conversation with Foreign Minister Bourguiba at the United Nations on October 5 is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–TUN. 3 Neither of these options is checked. 168. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 168. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 14, 1966. SUBJECT Presidential Determination—Military Aid for Tunisia After discussing this with you at lunch on 4 October, Secretary Rusk told Bourguiba, Jr. we’d go ahead with a grant program but couldn’t commit ourselves beyond FY 1967. However, since this is the first time you’ve seen a formal recommendation, I want to give you the background. Bourguiba has long wanted a closer relationship with us to offset the Soviet-backed arms buildup in Algeria and his deteriorating relations with DeGaulle and Nasser. Last fall, he asked us for $100 million in military equipment. To bring him back to reason, we sent a survey team. It recommended a $25 million program over five years to develop a Tunisian force that could hold off the Algerians just long enough for outside help to arrive. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara vetoed a five-year commitment. In the attached, 2 they recommend a one-year $5.2 million program because they don’t think the Congress will stand for any new long-term commitment right now. But they recognize that going ahead is in effect starting a five-year program since it is the only militarily sensible approach. Cutting off the program a year from now would probably be harder than not starting at all. Secretary Rusk explained to Bourguiba, Jr. our problems with long-term commitments and suggested we get started this year and deal with the future as it comes. They feel there are strong reasons for helping Tunisia: —The USSR has shipped large amounts of Soviet equipment to Algeria, and Tunisia justifiably feels defenseless. Both the Moroccans and Tunisians have tried unsuccessfully to persuade Moscow to lay off. —Bourguiba has been remarkably good on Vietnam, and we can’t expect our friends to stick up for us if we don’t take their legitimate defense concerns seriously. —He has isolated himself in the Arab world by standing up to Nasser, and he is a moderate voice on Israel and African issues. —It doesn’t make sense to force Bourguiba to buy arms in the open market while we’re helping with his successful development program. He has nowhere else to turn. —Dave Bell strongly opposed this program. He argued that: —Tunisia’s natural relationship lies with Europe. Moving into a long-term program now would reverse our policy of gradually disengaging and nudging Tunisia toward its natural partners. —We might appear to be fueling a Tunisian-Algerian arms race. The examples of India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, Jordan-Israel teach that we should be drawing back from this kind of program wherever possible. —Your African program tries to build on natural sub-regional groupings like Algeria-Morocco-Tunisia. With both neighbors suspicious of Algeria, economic cooperation may be a pipe dream. Nevertheless, we ought to be urging cooperation—maybe even arms limitation—not undermining it by helping widen the Tunisian-Algerian gap. —Tunisia needs to concentrate every last ounce of talent and money on economic development. We have all been uncomfortable about this program for the reasons Dave Bell cited (especially if there’s any thought of stopping after one year). At best, it’s a 60–40 decision. However, I’ve explored all the alternatives and on balance think we ought to go ahead. If we had something promising to offer Bourguiba in the way of arms limitation, I’d give that a try, but neither the Moroccans nor the Tunisians feel they can do that kind of business with either Algeria or Moscow. In the final analysis, it’s tough to tell a friend like Bourguiba that we won’t help him defend himself when he has so willingly backed our cause in Vietnam. He told Ambassador Harriman last week that he urgently needs an answer. Therefore, since you have already given Secretary Rusk verbal approval, I recommend you sign the attached determination. 3 Charlie Schultze’s memo (attached) 4 explains the legalities. For signature if you approve. 5 W. W. Rostow 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 17. Secret. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Secretary Rusk’s memorandum to President Johnson, December 1, recommending that the President sign the determination authorizing a 1-year $5.2 million military assistance program is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 17. 4 Attached but not printed. 5 Telegram 106134 to Tunis, December 21, informed the Embassy that the President had signed the MAP Determination, and that the Ambassador could notify the Foreign Minister of the U.S. decision to extend military assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–TUN) 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 1 Washington, January 23, 1967, 4:22 p.m. 123472. State/Defense message. Subject: Tunisian MAP. Ref: Tunis 2653 NOTAL. 2 Tunis 2728 NOTAL. 3 1. Conversation with Ladgham reported reftel reveals wide difference between GOT and ourselves in interpretations of President Bourguiba’s past allusions to a security guarantee. We had believed that Bourguiba viewed such a guarantee as a desirable long-term objective, but would look upon a joint US-Tunisian cooperative endeavor to modernize and strengthen Tunisian armed forces as a manifestation of our interest. It would now appear that Bourguiba regards security guarantee as a prerequisite, or at minimum as an integral part, of US agreement to help improve Tunisia’s defense posture. In this respect it is important to point out that our support of Tunisia prior to and since independence (i.e. our willingness to provide carefully designed, well-balanced, economically feasible military assistance program, and preferential economic treatment accorded Tunisia) is clear and convincing evidence of US interest in and support of Tunisia. However, we are prepared to continue full and frank discussion of all aspects of Tunisian security problem during coming months prior to Bourguiba’s Washington visit in June, but we must discourage repeat discourage any thought that we are prepared to provide a security guarantee. 2. We recognize language of proposed notes transmitted in State 110563 and 112264 4 is restrictive and formalistic. This is necessitated by narrow and specific purpose of notes, which intended to constitute military assistance agreement only, and designed to meet certain statutory requirements of US law. Language can be toned down to give better visibility impression. It never intended, however, that these Notes assume character of a security treaty, alliance or guarantee. 3. The proposed FY 1967 Military Assistance Program constitutes significant US assistance towards modernizing Tunisian armed forces. Furthermore it emphasizes the need for greatly increased training of military in order to permit efficient and effective absorption of proposed equipment, as prerequisite to deliver. FYI. FY 1967 funds must be committed prior to end of the FY or be lost. Therefore, the current USCINC–EUR “abbreviated plan” for Tunisia will have to be definitized as completely as possible to enable implementation. Balance of funds will be preserved as an “abbreviated plan” on MAP orders. Equipment availability will pose even greater difficulties in the future if identification of items is delayed. For these reasons we believe it is in Tunisian Government’s interest to consider proceeding with proposed MAP. End FYI. 4. We are prepared to implement the FY 1967 Tunisia MAP on basis of assurances in 1957 confidential agreement as suggested by Ladgham and Bourguiba, Jr. Would appreciate, however, your specific comments immediately to clarify following; —Is Tunisian concern primarily receiving an assurance from the US and less interest in actual military assistance? —What is the extent of the dissatisfaction with the size and content of the program? —Reasons for one-year limitation clearly stated to GOT. Was limitation a serious factor in Tunisian reaction and would it have been overcome by a multi-year commitment? —Is their principal concern that of being faced with hard decisions on whether to follow through on developing a professional military force and accepting the new position of the military? 5. Review of memcons and Tunis 2653 indicates Tunisians may be under impression that complete fulfillment of all survey team findings necessary adjunct to our providing military assistance. If this true, suggest you reiterate purpose of team report to provide Tunisians balanced evaluation of security situation and requirements for improving military forces and not as a precondition to provision of MAP. 6. Assuming Tunisians desire go-ahead, following conditions would apply: (A) Begin programming training and defense articles for Tunisia against FY 1967 funds on basis of the assurances given by the GOT in the 1957 confidential agreement (FYI and in accordance with the terms of Presidential Determination of 16 December 1966 End FYI). Consideration will be given to capability to absorb equipment effectively prior to delivery. (B) Implement our plan to send a USAF team to Tunisia in February in order to study the Tunisian Air Force’s immediate requirements to enable it to utilize jet fighter aircraft. Require immediate response to preclude cancelling plans for assembling USAF team. (C) Select and assign initially to the Amembassy Tunis, Office of the Defense Attache, personnel that will form nucleus of US military training mission. (D) Acceptance by the GOT of above-mentioned proposals shall be evidenced by letter of agreement from the GOT stipulating that GOT reiterates the assurances it gave the US Government in the 1957 confidential agreement, and that it will receive a military training mission to be assigned to the Amembassy Tunis. The US Defense Attache may continue initially to assume responsibility for Military Assistance Program. The Chief of the military training mission shall be accredited to the Secretary of State for National Defense, and he and members of his staff shall be authorized direct access to the component units of the Tunisian defense establishment as may be required for the proper fulfillment of their mission. FYI. Embassy should note that “token payment” provisions of 1957 agreement are not applicable to delivery of grant aid funded from FY 1967 funds. End FYI. (E) Acceptance by the GOT of training and defense articles under the assurances given by the GOT of the 1957 confidential agreement shall not be considered by the US as a commitment to accept the terms and conditions of the military assistance agreement proposed in State 110563 and 112264. 5 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–TUN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sacksteder in AFN and Colonel Kissinger in OSD/ISA; cleared by Colonel Alba in JCS/J–5, Commander Peters in JCS/SAMAA, Litmans in DOD/GC, Dunlap in DOD/ODMA, Malmborg in L/E, Post in AFN, Colonel Megna in AFI, and Meinecke in AID/AFR/NA; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Paris, Rabat for Root and Lang, and USCINCEUR for ECMAP–IA. 2 In telegram 2653 from Tunis, January 12, Russell reported a conversation with Bahi Ladgham, Minister for the Presidency, who had stated that Tunisia would like to have the same kind of relationship with and type of assistance from the United States that Turkey did, and the kind of “assurance guarantee” from the United States that it would have if it were a member of NATO. (Ibid.) 3 Dated January 18. (Ibid.) 4 Neither found. 5 On February 9, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow told Driss that although the United States had mutual security commitments with a number of countries, such as those in NATO, U.S. public opinion was hostile to other such commitments. Driss said that President Bourguiba thought it necessary for Tunisia’s security that some form of alliance with the United States be arrived at, and Rostow said that the U.S. Government was willing to study this. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–TUN) 170. Memorandum of Conversation 170. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 4, 1967. SUBJECT Plans for President Bourguiba’s Visit to Washington in June PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador Rachid Driss, Tunisian Embassy Mr. Slaheddine Abdellah, Minister, Tunisian Embassy Mr. Frederick Sacksteder, Tunisian Desk Officer Ambassador Driss said he had received telegraphic instructions to accept the date of June 6 for the beginning of President Bourguiba’s visit to Washington. He had originally requested a meeting with the Secretary to review a series of questions in U.S.-Tunisian relations prior to returning to Tunis, but would only discuss one question: the character and content of President Bourguiba’s visit to Washington next June. The Ambassador said Tunis was very interested in the program we were proposing for the President’s visit and in this connection wanted to know if the visit would be a State visit or an official visit. The Secretary assured the Ambassador that the President was looking forward to seeing President Bourguiba and that he would extend to his guest every appropriate courtesy. The Ambassador asked if a joint communique announcing the visit could be issued making the character of the visit clear. The Secretary said that the Department would work with the Ambassador and the White House to draft a suitable announcement for simultaneous release in Washington and Tunis. The Ambassador then said that President Bourguiba was most anxious to have an opportunity to speak to the Congress. The Secretary replied that he hoped the Tunisian Government would not attach too much importance to an address to the Congress. The Congressional leadership has told us that we should not consider joint sessions to hear foreign Chiefs of State a part of visits to Washington. The Ambassador insisted that President Bourguiba had important things to tell the Congress—for example, how a small poor country like Tunisia was making excellent use of American economic aid. The Ambassador hoped the Secretary would try to convince Congress to receive Bourguiba. The Secretary replied that he was not saying no, and that he would look into it but that he did not want to be encouraging because he felt he knew what the reply would be. The Secretary also reminded the Ambassador that there were other more effective ways to reach the American people, such as a television interview on a program like “Meet the Press”. Ambassador Driss said that they had contacted “Meet the Press” about the possibility of an interview but that he hoped President Bourguiba could speak to our lawmakers as well as to the people. The Ambassador referred to the fact that the Congress had recently invited President Marcos of the Philippines and President De Valera of Ireland to speak before it. The Secretary agreed but he reminded the Ambassador that the Philippines had been under U.S. rule for many years and that in inviting Ireland’s “grand old man”, the Congress was paying tribute to the millions of Americans of Irish ancestry. The Secretary assured the Ambassador that he would nevertheless look into the possibilities with the Congress and that the Department would find out if a suitable reception by the Congressional leadership could be arranged. Ambassador Driss then referred again to the character of the visit, saying that what he meant was whether the visit was official or not. The Secretary said that he believed all of the visits scheduled for June—and there were many because numerous Chiefs of State were going to Canada for the Exposition—were being considered informal working visits. The Secretary said this permitted us to cut down a little bit on unnecessary and purely formalistic protocol in order to enable the President and his visitors to devote maximum time to substantive discussions. Ambassador Driss said that President Bourguiba attached importance to formalities. He said the rest of the world, Tunisia included, would judge the status of Tunisia in American eyes by the manner in which its Chief of State was received. The Ambassador said Bourguiba had come to the U.S. several times before, first as a leader of an independence struggle and, last, as Chief of State. He had always been warmly received, the last time with all of the honors of a state visitor. The Ambassador thinks that public opinion in North Africa and elsewhere would interpret any significant change in the manner of Bourguiba’s reception as evidence of a change in U.S.-Tunisian relations. This was why he was so insistent about the character of the visit which he thought had to be at least the official visit specified in President Johnson’s invitation. The Secretary asked Mr. Sacksteder if he recalled what exact invitation had been. Mr. Sacksteder said that the Secretary, at the request of the President, had issued an invitation on April 19, 1966 to President Bourguiba to make an official visit to the United States during the second half of 1966 for two days in Washington and several additional days in other parts of the U.S. The meeting concluded with the Secretary reassuring the Ambassador that President Bourguiba would be satisfied with the visit to Washington and that we would inform him of the possibilities of arranging something suitable on the Hill. The Secretary then gave the Ambassador a personal letter to Foreign Minister Bourguiba Jr. and requested that the Ambassador give this to the Foreign Minister when he returned to Tunis. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Confidential. Drafted by Sacksteder and approved in S on March 13. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office. 171. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 171. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 21, 1967. SUBJECT Letter to President Bourguiba President Bourguiba suffered a heart attack on 15 March. Shortly after, we arranged for General Mattingly, formerly of Walter Reed Hospital, to fly to Tunis for consultation with Bourguiba’s doctors. This gesture was extremely well received in Tunisia. Doctors tell us President Bourguiba stands an excellent chance of making a complete recovery but he must have absolute rest for some time. His doctors feel that he should not come to Washington for his planned visit in June. However, they have not yet told him he must postpone his visit. He is anxious to see you and may want to try to come anyway. Therefore, his doctors and the top officials of the Tunisian government hope you might suggest postponing. Since this visit has already been put off for nine months, another few won’t make any difference. From your point of view receiving him in the fall when there are not so many visitors lined up as we have for June would be better anyway. We can give him better attention then. State is tentatively considering a State visit the last half of September for planning purposes, but we will be back to you later on that. There is no need to be that specific in this letter. If you approve this tack, we would send the attached message telegraphically. 2 It would be nice to get it off before you see Bourguiba, Jr. at the funeral next week since he has asked us informally for this help in slowing his father down. 3 W. W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Visit of President Bourguiba, Cables & Memos, 5/15–16/68. Confidential. 2 Attached but not printed. Telegram 180670 to Tunis, April 22, transmitted President Johnson’s message to President Bourguiba. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 TUN) 3 The source text indicates the recommendation was approved. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 1 Washington, June 8, 1967, 12:39 a.m. 209164. 1. Following FYI uncleared summary of Tunisian FonMin Bourguiba’s meeting with Secretary afternoon June 7: 2. FonMin expressed regret for “shame” mob action Tunis including destruction at American Embassy. Emphasized steps GOT undertaking make amends and reestablish control. 3. Explained background Tunisian attitude toward Palestine problem, going back to 1946. GOT considered birth of Zionist state colonial solution imposed by force. Injustice then committed will remain as focus of unrest until rectified. In 1965 Tunisia proposed new approach based on UN legality but this rejected by both sides. Since then Tunisia has in effect been saying to Nasser your policy not serious—you are promising but not producing. 4. When showdown actually came, Tunisia had no choice. It had to express support for the general Arab cause for two reasons: (1) to maintain its reputation and credibility with the Arab states; and (2) by continuing to demonstrate that it remained a member of the Arab community to be in a position to help pick up the pieces when the present trauma is over. Tunisia was appearing to offer help, but we would notice that its “troops were hastening slowly.” 5. Tunisian position is not comfortable. Only yesterday there were comments from Algiers suggesting that Bourguiba Jr in Washington plotting with his friends in USG to break the back of Arab unity. Tunisia remains very worried about its neighbor to the west. Algeria now completely in tow of UAR. After Arab defeat disgruntled Arab government might begin to look for a diversion. 6. Reminded Secretary Tunisian pleas for military assistance—more wanted then ever now. For present Tunisia had to be cautious about relying too openly on U.S. support. Effects of present events will certainly last for months if not longer. Tunisians look to Turks as perhaps closest friends in Mediterranean area. Understood from President Sunay during recent visit that perhaps possible GOT obtain surplus US military equipment which Turkey now releasing, if US agreed. Bourguiba said Tunisian need is more for feeling of security than security itself. (Secretary promised look into question.) 7. Neither Bourguiba Jr nor father, with whom he spoke yesterday on telephone, believes Egyptian charges US and UK aircraft involved in Near East crisis. This clearly smoke screen by Nasser to cover up his setback. Tunisia not going to break relations with US. However, will not take public position on Cairo charges and will pretend go along with Arabs in order “keep our credit for future.” 8. Secretary said there were certain things he wanted both FonMin and his father to know. USG used every argument at its command with all parties, particularly Israel, to dissuade them from initiating hostilities. What we had done in this sense with Israel, USSR agreed do with “other side.” We were aware situation extremely tense, particularly after closing Strait of Tiran, and that Israelis concerned about passing of time. (FonMin interjected that “objectively” Israel had to fight—time moving against them.) Egyptian troop movements into Sinai and repeated Cairo announcements time had come for destruction of Israel added to tension. Nevertheless, we were relying on commitments from both sides they would not initiate hostilities. We had absolutely no advance information hostilities would begin. 9. There was absolutely no truth to charges by Cairo about US military involvement. No one knows this better than USSR. Their destroyers 500 yards from our carriers. (Bourguiba emphatically agreed.) 10. Difficult understand what Nasser thought he was up to. By closing Strait of Tiran and moving troops he was handing Israel casus belli. Difficult to understand why he went on forcing Israel toward life and death decision when he so poorly prepared for consequences. (FonMin’s comment: “Bluffer is bluffer.” Like Hitler, Nasser did not know when to stop.) Nasser did not expect U Thant remove UN troops from Sharm-el-Sheikh. When this happened he felt obliged move in and then impose blockade. 11. As result 1957 settlement obtaining removal Israeli troops from Egyptian territory, US committed insist on right of free passage US ships through Strait of Tiran and we recognized similar right for Israeli vessels. We thus bound not only by our general commitment to principle free passage in international waters but by this specific commitment. 12. Difficult also understand Soviets. They had been equipping and training UAR army. They presumably were in position analyze Egyptian military capabilities. Moreover there were differences in what they had been saying to us privately and what they appeared to be saying to Arabs. (FonMin said he was sure Soviets would not press for showdown in this instance. It was not in nature of Soviet regime to come to “rescue of defeat.”) 13. Secretary wondered where we go from here. There increasing evidence revulsion to Nasser tactics setting in in Arab world, even in Egypt. There were some very difficult problems ahead and within USG we were already beginning study of what might be done after immediate problems are over on such basic issues as economic and social development in area, development of water resources, some form of arms limitation, and problem of Arab refugees. 14. In shorter term, opening of Strait again will be very difficult problem. Moreover, difficult to imagine situation in which Israel would agree neighbors could exercise rights of belligerent. Something must be done stabilize frontier situation. On these vital points it will be difficult for anyone outside have much influence on Israel. 15. FonMin pessimistic about early change in attitude of present Arab governments despite resounding military setback. Too much of Arab world still thought emotionally, not rationally. Practically all Arab governments except Tunisia (which announced support to Arab League) had lined up with Nasser and would now have to go along with his policies whatever the consequences. Nasser would continue refuse to admit his defeat, would struggle to retain his power, and other Arab governments would be bound to him. Feelings in Arab world on what had happened should not be underestimated. Even in Tunisia patient work of President Bourguiba over past twelve years had not proved enough to prevent emotional outbreak. Frustration over Palestine would be widespread and remain so. As result present trauma months to come would be very difficult. Tunisia’s aim was to remain part of Arab community so that its influence could be used constructively when the day for this arrived. 16. Secretary emphasized that Arab leader like President Bourguiba had responsibility and would have opportunities do just this. We appreciated FonMin’s exposition Tunisian actions at this time and he could be sure of our understanding. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Secret; Priority; Noforn/Limidis. Drafted by Root on June 7 and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Rabat. 173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 1 Washington, June 15, 1967, 2:57 p.m. 211328. Ref: Tunis 4774, State 209980. 2 1. Please deliver the following message, dated June 15, 1967 from the President to President Bourguiba: “Dear Mr. President: I fully understand the deep concern expressed in your urgent message of June 9. As you know, we had tried hard to prevent war. Once it started, we energetically supported the efforts of the United Nations Security Council to achieve an effective cease-fire as a prelude to a lasting peace. As we attempt to mend the torn fabric of relations in the Middle East, your prestige as an advocate of moderation and your consistent support of peaceful solutions to international problems give you an important voice which must be heard. I am pleased to hear from your son that you continue to regain your strength. I deeply appreciate the message of friendship and understanding which he brought to Secretary Rusk and to my Special Assistant, Mr. Rostow. With my warmest personal sentiments, Lyndon B. Johnson” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Sacksteder and Palmer (text revised in the White House); cleared by Battle, Harold Saunders, and Eugene V. Rostow; and approved by Herbert B. Thompson of S/S. 2 Both dated June 9. (Ibid.) Telegram 4774 transmitted a letter from President Bourguiba to President Johnson. 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 1 Washington, March 1, 1968, 0021Z. 2 122856. Joint State/AID message. Refs: Tunis 3202, 3223; Aidto 740; Toaid A–549. 3 Subj: FY 68 Program Loan Level. 1. We recognize problem, which arises solely from reduced Congressional aid appropriations. Tunisia remains major country of concentration and total assistance level for FY 68 of $42 million compares favorably with levels of previous years. Tunisians were alerted at time of FY 67 loan to expect reduction in FY 68 and with lag in drawing down previous loans real need for high level new Program Loan at this time is difficult to justify. 2. Because of psychological effect sharp loan reduction on GOT and possible repercussions on contributions other consultative group donors, extent of reduction was discussed February 15 by Under Secretary, AID Administrator and Assistant Secretary AF who agreed to consider possibility of raising loan level to $10 million if adequate funds became available, primarily through prospect deobligations from other African programs. This was basis for Administrator’s statement to Ambassador Driss February 19 (State 118410). 4 3. While we think there is good chance eventually of raising loan level above $5 million presently earmarked, we do not at this time want to raise Tunisian expectations unduly. You should therefore limit yourself to telling Tunisians that some deobligations elsewhere seem probable and you are confident that if additional funds do become available Tunisia will certainly be among favored candidates for receiving benefits. 4. Our impression is that Tunisian Embassy Washington understands and accepts this position in belief that if USG finds any practical way of increasing the Program Loan it will do so. Would appreciate learning whether you find this impression borne out in Tunis. You should in any event report telegraphically any significant GOT reactions to Program Loan question to assist Department in preparing position papers for Bourguiba State visit. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 9 TUN. Confidential. Drafted by Baron in AFR/NA and by Root, McClanahan, and Post; cleared by Straus in AA/AFR, Meinecke in AFR/NA, and SIG Staff Director Arthur A. Hartman; and approved by Palmer. 2 Beginning in 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in 6-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 Telegram 3202 from Tunis, February 21, reported that the Embassy was deeply concerned over reports that serious consideration was being given in discussions of FY 1968 aid to cutting the level of the program loan for Tunisia from $15 million to $5 million, and noted that this would be a particularly bad time to announce such a sharp cutback. (Ibid., POL 7 TUN) Telegram 3223 from Tunis, February 23, is ibid. Aidto 740 and Toaid A–549 have not been found. 4 Not found. 175. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 175. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 14, 1968. SUBJECT Your Meetings with President Bourguiba You will recall that you yourself proposed inviting Bourguiba in 1966 at a time when you were particularly impressed by one of his statements supporting our policy in Vietnam. His heart attack and the Arab-Israeli war delayed his visit. However, our purpose is still as it was then—to show our approval of this rational and like-minded statesman. Although there are some questions about the level of our economic and military assistance we do not expect Bourguiba to dwell on these bilateral programs. He will probably talk on a high plane about his need to assure Tunisians progress and security and his view of our role in securing world peace. The main points we expect to come up are: 1. Tunisian security . The buildup of Soviet weapons in Algeria on one side and Nasser’s power across Libya to the other have made the Tunisians feel highly vulnerable. Bourguiba and his son, now the Foreign Minister, have for several years been talking with us about the possibility of a US security guarantee. We are providing limited military aid. But the plain fact is that, without a military establishment it couldn’t possibly afford, Tunisia will have to rely on outside help if it is attacked. To gain some assurance of such help, Bourguiba has gone so far as to offer us secretly the use of his naval base at Bizerte in return for such an assurance. We believe the Bourguibas are too well informed not to realize that a formal US guarantee is impossible in today’s Washington. However, he may discuss with you this problem at some length. Your best response is that we have given Tunisia as much military aid as Congress has made possible. We regret it can’t be more, but we just don’t have the appropriations. We are doing what we can with advisors to help Tunisia adopt the most modern techniques to get the maximum defense capability out of its limited expenditures. If he presses hard for a security commitment, you will have to explain honestly the limits imposed by Congress on your ability to make any such commitment. 2. Arab-Israel . Although Bourguiba has always taken a moderate position on Israel’s right to exist, he feels very deeply about the injustice the Palestinians have suffered. He has even recently made veiled statements favoring Arab terrorism as the only way to force Israel to withdraw. Some of this stems from his own revolutionary experience against France. In general, he has no time for radical Arab solutions, and he has said publicly he thought Nasser ought to resign. Because of his moderation and his antipathy for Nasser, Bourguiba carries little weight with the more powerful Arabs. However, it would be well for you to make unmistakably clear to him that our position has not changed since your speech last June 19. The problem is that we can not make peace for Jordan and the UAR if they—especially Nasser—can’t find a way to engage in peace talks of some sort. 3. Economic development . Since Tunisian independence, we have provided over $500 million in aid. Our three year development aid commitment in the early 1960’s gave Tunisia a needed boost at a time when its serious economic planning was just getting under way. Recently, we have provided loans at the level of $15 million a year along with other economic aid. This year we will have to reduce this to $10 million (a formal recommendation will be on your desk later this week). We would like to stay at $15 million, but Congressional cuts make this impossible. Bourguiba doesn’t know exactly what the level will be, but he must realize that the cut does not indicate any dissatisfaction with the way Tunisia uses our aid. We only wish more aid recipients would do as well. (Vice President Humphrey was extremely impressed by what he saw in Tunisia.) You will be interested to know that one of our major aid efforts in Tunisia now is to help adapt the miracle wheat strains to North Africa by developing them in experimental areas in Tunisia. This could become the basis of a sub-regional program involving Morocco and Algeria if it goes well. We have also furnished PL–480 aid. Last September you approved a $21.7 million program for Tunisia and in March an additional $1.3 million. 4. Vietnam . If you have time, it would be worthwhile for you to look over again the letter (attached) 2 Bourguiba sent to Ho Chi Minh urging him to negotiate and pointing out the importance of a settlement with the United States. Bourguiba all along has recognized the importance of our commitment to stop Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. You will find him receptive to your point of view, but he will be deeply interested in your reflections on where you hope to go from here. 5. Soviet influence. Bourguiba is especially sensitive because his two main threats—Algeria and the UAR—stem partially from the Soviet-backed military in these two countries. He may be particularly interested in the buildup of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and may gear his pitch to you for possible security guarantees to the Soviet buildup and offer of the Bizerte Naval Base for our use. Our only answer is that we are, as usual, watching the Soviet Fleet carefully. In sum, Bourguiba will want to discuss his security and development problems with you. He will be equally interested in your view of the world. He will be pleased to share his views of major problems with you. I will give you a check list of talking points in the morning. 3 I recommend you read Nick Katzenbach’s memo and attached talking points in the attached book (red Tab A under “General”). 4 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Visit of President Bourguiba, Cables & Memos, 5/15–16/68. Secret. 2 Not attached. Telegram 4104 from Tunis, April 24, transmitted an English translation of President Bourguiba’s March 20 message to Ho Chi Minh. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3 Attached but not printed. 4 Not attached. Briefing material is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Visit of President Bourguiba, Briefing Book Folder. 176. Memorandum of Conversation 176. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 15, 1968, noon. SUBJECT Bilateral Relations and Turkish Aid to Tunisia PARTICIPANTS United States President Johnson Ambassador Duke, Chief of Protocol E.S. Glenn, Interpreter Tunisia President Habib Bourguiba President Johnson invited President Bourguiba to select the topic of conversation which would be of the greatest interest to Tunisia. President Bourguiba said that the Tunisian positions on world affairs are well-known. In regard to Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa, the two countries are in complete agreement. A few points might be made in regard to bilateral relations. These relations are excellent. Tunisia understands full well American preoccupations with a number of trouble spots and, in particular, with the war in Viet Nam. Nevertheless, President Bourguiba expressed the wish that the United States not forget Tunisia, a country whose geographical position is dangerous as it is surrounded by countries who have opted out of the free world. In consequence, Tunisia needs to be reassured as to her security and the security of her economic development. In this respect Tunisia has made a request to Turkey, a country with which it shares the bonds of the common history in the past and common friendships in the present. The Turks have indicated that they would be glad to help with some materiel, provided the authorization of the United States could be obtained. President Johnson asked President Bourguiba for information as to the kind of materiel needed. President Bourguiba said that the Foreign Minister of Tunisia, his son, had the detailed list of materiel and would place it before any person designated by President Johnson. President Johnson suggested that the Foreign Minister communicate the list to Assistant Secretary Palmer. President Bourguiba said that the question was primarily psychological and not one of engaging in an arms race. There is no question for Tunisia of asking armaments comparable to those supplied by the Soviet Union to Egypt and Algeria, but simply obtaining a minimum, without which Tunisia cannot face the harassment of which it is the object. The President said that the United States does not intend to lose interest in Africa, the Middle East and, in particular, Tunisia, and intends to do whatever can be done. Unfortunately, we have serious difficulties at home and it is even conceivable that there might be no aid bill at all. Nevertheless, the President was hopeful and it is clear the United States intends to pursue the same policies it has been carrying out so far. President Bourguiba said that he fully understood the situation. Tunisia counts mainly on her own efforts and understands the difficulties of her friends. It is asking only what is in the realm of the possible, but understands fully that some things may become impossible. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63–9/68. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Edmund S. Glenn. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part I of III”; memoranda of conversation of other portions of the discussion of the Middle East and Bourguiba’s visit to Canada are ibid. 177. Memorandum of Conversation 177. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 16, 1968, 5 p.m. SUBJECT United States-Tunisian Relations PARTICIPANTS Tunisians President Habib Bourguiba Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Ben Salah, Secretary of State for the Plan and National Economy Chedli Klibi, Secretary of State for Information and Cultural Affairs Mohamed Amamou, Director of the American Department Rachid Driss, Tunisian Ambassador in Washington Hamed Ammar, Minister, Embassy of Tunisia Americans President Johnson Mr. Harold Saunders, White House Ambassador Duke, Chief of Protocol Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Joseph Palmer 2nd Ambassador to Tunisia Francis H. Russell Mr. Samuel King, Assistant Chief of Protocol Mr. John F. Root, Country Director for North Africa Mr. Jose DeSeabra, Interpreter President Johnson asked whether President Bourguiba was satisfied with the Joint Communique which had been submitted for their approval. 2 President Bourguiba said he was. President Johnson said he had been informed of President Bourguiba’s discussion with Secretary of State Rusk earlier in the day 3 and was in agreement with their exchange of views regarding Tunisia’s security and development. As regards the Tunisian desire to obtain U.S. arms from Turkey, he saw no objection in principle, but there were certain legal problems. We would be in touch with the Tunisians on this matter in due course. President Johnson said President Bourguiba’s statements had been warmly welcomed and the warmth of his message was greatly appreciated. President Johnson said he had heard a number of favorable comments about President Bourguiba’s toast at the White House dinner. He wanted to thank President Bourguiba sincerely for his public and private statements. President Johnson said he had much respect for President Bourguiba’s opinions. President Johnson said he did not know what the future would hold, particularly as regarded action by Congress. We were having difficulties with the Tax Bill and having to deal with a record-breaking deficit of $31 billion. There were problems with Congress over our foreign aid programs, which he himself considered to be in the best interest of the U.S. He could assure President Bourguiba that the United States would always consider what served the best interests of Tunisia and the U.S., as the U.S. is aware of Tunisia’s problems and has full confidence in President Bourguiba’s leadership. President Bourguiba assured President Johnson that, in stating Tunisia’s concerns, he always takes into full account the difficulties experienced by the U.S. Tunisia is aware of our difficulties with Congress, such as those of taxes, which are quite normal in a democratic country, particularly in an election year. He felt sure that eventually good sense and the general interest would prevail in Congress as elsewhere. The U.S. could be proud that it has always done what is right, even though at times there may be some delay in our action. It is to be hoped and expected that a majority in Congress and among the American people would support constructive action. He looked to the future with optimism, as Tunisian security and development really coincided with the interest of the U.S. The U.S. can always count on Tunisia as a true friend. Tunisia knows that the U.S. gives fair consideration to Tunisia’s needs and does what is possible and is right. The relations between the two countries are good, very good, and will remain so, whatever may come. President Bourguiba said that the ideas he had expressed yesterday are those he has previously expressed in Tunisia—before students, responsible political leaders and the people in general. In speaking to his countrymen, he was never engaged in demagoguery. He can speak honestly to his people because his popularity has been solidly established by 35 years of struggle. All he wants for his country is peace, security and development. President Johnson said he agreed with the thoughts expressed by President Bourguiba. He had personally felt strengthened by President Bourguiba’s visit. He was happy with the present state of U.S.-Tunisian relations and looked forward to their continued consolidation. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63–9/68. Secret. Drafted by Root. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part I of II”; the memorandum of conversation covering the remainder of the discussion, which concerned Vietnam, is ibid. 2 For text, see Department of State Bulletin , June 10, 1968, pp. 753–754. 3 No record of this conversation has been found. 178. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 178. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 24, 1968, 7:15 p.m. SUBJECT $10 Million Tunisian Program Loan Attached is Bill Gaud’s recommendation for this year’s program loan ($10 million) for Tunisia. 2 As you know from your talks with Bourguiba, this is justifiable on economic grounds alone, but it will also be another demonstration to Bourguiba that your expressions of friendship during his visit here are backed by action. Our past program loans have run about $15 million a year, but we don’t have that much money this year. The Tunisians, as Bourguiba told you, understand our problem so there shouldn’t be any serious reaction to the cut. In fact, we told them at one time we might have to cut all the way down to $5 million. The loan will be used to finance imports essential to Tunisia’s development program. Judging by their past performance and what the Tunisians told us last week, they will use the loan well. There are no difficulties for this loan with the Conte-Long amendments. Charlie Zwick is aboard, and Secretary Fowler is satisfied that there will be no major adverse effects on our balance of payments. I recommend you approve. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63–9/68. Confidential. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 The approval line is checked on the source text. 179. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 179. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 27, 1968. SUBJECT Military Aid Determination for Tunisia The attached determination 2 would permit us to go ahead in FY 1968 with the second slice ($2.7 million) of our 5-year program for Tunisia. It’s a routine determination such as those you’ve signed in past years for Tunisia—not one of the new Conte-Long determinations. Charlie Zwick’s memo (attached) 3 outlines its contents. You will recall President Bourguiba’s understanding of our shortage of funds but his hope that we would help as much as possible. Three years ago, we laid out a $25 million program over five years designed to do no more than enable the Tunisians to hold off the Algerians for 2–3 days until help could arrive. We had to tell them frankly that they couldn’t handle more than that now. After Congressional cuts, we’ve had to cut even that minimum program in half. The equipment involved is mainly defensive—anti-aircraft, vehicles, ammo, spares. We would like to get this out today if you approve in order to get these items on Defense’s year-end procurement list. Attached determination for your signature if you approve. This program has been approved in the Senior Interdepartmental Group and is recommended by Nick Katzenbach with Defense and Budget Bureau concurrence. W.W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 84. Secret. 2 Attached but not printed. President Johnson signed the determination on June 28. 3 Attached but not printed. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 180. Memorandum of Conversation 180. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 19, 1968, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT Tunisian Security PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Rachid Driss, Tunisian Ambassador to U.S. Mr. Hamed Ammar, Minister, Tunisian Embassy Mr. Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Mr. John F. Root, Country Director for North African Affairs Mr. Grant McClanahan, Country Officer for Tunisian Affairs Mr. R.T. Grey, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary Ambassador Driss said that Tunisia, having withdrawn for good from the Arab League, now feels isolated like a star in the sky. They hope their friends understand them. What was the best thing for Tunisia to do about its security in the present situation, when they have no treaty with anyone? Mr. Rostow observed that U.S. policy since the 1950’s has been to support the independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East. The Congress even declared it to be our policy in 1957. That policy had been the basis of our support for Israel, of the UAR in 1957, and it was our general line of policy. President Eisenhower even landed troops in Lebanon in 1958. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 TUN. Secret. Drafted by McClanahan on September 20 and approved in M on October 2. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 2.” The meeting was held in Rostow’s office. Africa Region Africa Region 181. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, January 29, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, East, Vol. I, 1/64–4/64. No classification marking. 182. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, February 7, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, PM Home Visit Briefing Book, 2/12–13/64. Secret. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote. 183. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) Washington, March 2, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 373.5 Africa. Secret. 184. Draft National Security Action Memorandum Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. I 2/64–6/64. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A May 12 covering memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that on April 9, the Special Group (CI) considered a reassessment of internal security in Africa, approved certain courses of action, and suggested preparation of an NSAM incorporating these courses of action. Williams and Harriman had subsequently recommended preparation of an NSAM and a draft was enclosed for Bundy’s approval. The Special Group (CI) was a high-level interdepartmental group created to deal with counterinsurgency issues. The April 9 meeting was attended by Under Secretary Averell Harriman, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance, CIA Director John A. McCone, NSC Staff member Michael Forrestal, AID Deputy Administrator William S. Gaud, and General Anthis representing JCS Chairman General Maxwell Taylor. 185. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 10, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 388.3 Africa. Top Secret. 186. Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 14, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, 7/64–6/65. Secret. 187. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson Washington, July 21, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. No classification marking. Drafted by Lester E. Edmond, Executive Assistant to the Director. 188. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to President Johnson Washington, October 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. No classification marking. 189. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, December 24, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 352 Africa. Secret. 190. Memorandum From Lee C. White of the White House Staff to President Johnson Washington, December 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. No classification marking. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Hold for staff mtg Mon/McGB.” 191. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the source text. The source text contains minor handwritten revisions and corrections, but there is no indication who made them. The most important of them is the title, to which was added: “IN THE AF AREA.” All the changes have been incorporated into the text printed here. 192. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 6, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. Secret. 193. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, March 4, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. Confidential. 194. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, March 30, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. Secret. A copy was sent to Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Associate Special Counsel to the President. 195. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 22, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 22. 196. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, May 18, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Secret. 197. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 5, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. Confidential. Copies were sent to Komer and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff. 198. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 15, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Secret. Copies were sent to Komer and Saunders. 199. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, June 19, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11. Secret. A June 21 covering memorandum from Bundy to the President states that this summary of the African problem was worth reading. Bundy added that his only reservation concerned the memorandum’s endorsement of “Presidential noisemaking” about the Portuguese and the South Africans, commenting, “I think we have to be very careful with this and speak much more in sorrow than in anger.” (Ibid.) 200. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 17, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. Drafted by Williams’ Special Assist-ant, Thomas W. McElhiney, on September 15. Cleared by Bell, USIA Deputy Director of Policy and Plans Burnett Anderson, Trowbridge of Commerce, Frankel, Solomon, Leddy, Walt Rostow, Greenfield, and Lang. 201. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, October 14, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. 202. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, November 23, 1965, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Secret. 203. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 28, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. 204. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control (Barber) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Yarmolinsky) Washington, November 29, 1965. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 388.3 Africa. Secret. A typed notation on the source text reads: “Mr. McNaughton has seen.” 205. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, December 1, 1965. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 388.3 Africa. Secret. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “Mr. McNaughton has seen.” 206. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, December 23, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. Drafted on December 10 by Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs Curtis C. Strong. 207. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 5, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFR. Secret. Drafted by Director of the Office of Inter-African Affairs Fred L. Hadsel and cleared by Rostow. Copies were sent to U, G, and M. The source text bears Rusk’s initials, indicating that he read it. 208. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, March 10, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Confidential. 209. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 20, 1966, 3:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3, 4/2/66–5/26/66. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Mr. President—State Dept draft of address seems long to me and needs editing by Moyers. K—5/20. 210. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All African Posts Except Pretoria Washington, May 25, 1966–6:48 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 US/Johnson. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Hadsel; cleared by NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies, AID/AFR Assistant Administrator Edmond C. Hutchinson, and Bromley Smith. Approved and initialed by Palmer. Repeated to Pretoria, USUN, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. 211. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Moyers) to President Johnson Washington, May 26, 1966, 3:10 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. 4, 3/6–5/66. No classification marking. 212. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, June 8, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Haynes Memos. Confidential. 213. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, July 7, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on July 7. 214. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, July 13, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. No classification marking. 215. Report of the Task Force on the Review of African Development Policies and Programs Washington, July 22, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Review of African Development Polices and Programs as Directed by the President, Edward M. Korry. Confidential. 216. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson Washington, August 8, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. Confidential. 217. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 9, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. Confidential. 218. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, September 12, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Arms Control for Africa. Secret. 219. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 24, 1966, 1:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Alec G. Toumayan and Harry R. Melone, and approved in S on October 4. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York. 220. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 3, 1966, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. No classification marking. 221. National Security Action Memorandum No. 356 Washington, October 5, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 356. Confidential. 222. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson Washington, December 17, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Korry Report on African Development Policy & Programs. Confidential. 223. Memorandum From Halvor O. Ekern of the Operations Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Director of the Operations Staff (McAfee) Washington, March 8, 1967. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Top Secret. 224. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson Washington, April 18, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. Confidential. 225. Summary Notes of the 572d Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, July 13, 1967, 12:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, 7/13/67, African Problems. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Another record of this meeting is ibid., Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, July 13, 1967–12:08 p.m., NSC Meeting # 572. 226. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, 7/13/67, African Problems. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The paper was discussed at the July 13 NSC meeting; see Document 225. 227. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Barr), the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach), and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) to President Johnson Washington, August 14, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. Limited Official Use. 228. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, August 22, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Africa, General. No classification marking. An attached transmittal note from Hamilton to the President reads: “Mr. President: Attached is the memo you wanted concerning Senator McCarthy’s speech on Africa. You should know that the final version of the speech is (1) much more complimentary to us than the AP report suggests, and (2) vastly improved—due to hard lobbying from AID—compared with the original draft which would have called upon you to scrap the current program and start over. I will send a copy of the speech as soon as I can get my hands on it.” 229. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, September 8, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 41. No classification marking. 230. Intelligence Memorandum Washington, October 19, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. III, 10/66–9/68. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. According to a note on the source text, “This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services.” 231. Report From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson Washington, January 12, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Secret. 232. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, March 13, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFR–US. Secret. Drafted by Hadsel in AF/AFI. A March 16 covering memorandum from Read to Rostow reads: “The enclosed paper on African foreign policy issues which may arise during 1968 is submitted as a possible topic for a future NSC meeting. The paper was prepared by the Bureau of African Affairs and has been cleared by the Under Secretary.” 233. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 22, 1968, 4:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Non-Vietnam, March-June ’68. Confidential. Drafted by Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff. 234. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 5, 1968, 3:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, President’s Proposed Trip to Africa, August 1968. Secret. 181. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 181. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 29, 1964. Chicom Activity in Africa We are concerned by evidence of growing Chinese Communist effort and influence in Africa, involving possible threat to US interests there, shift of African votes on Chinese representation in the UN, and subversion of moderate regimes in Africa. Items of interest include—Chou En-lai’s current tour of Africa; the effects in Africa of French recognition of the Chicoms; and possible Chicom involvement in the Zanzibar and East Africa disturbances. There is a variety of evidence that the Chinese are making a major long-term effort in Africa. Even Haile Selassie has now invited Chou En-lai to visit Ethiopia this week, and we may have an issue of Ethiopian recognition of the Chicoms on our hands soon. Averell Harriman is working on these problems—what the Chicoms are up to in East Africa, the Ethiopian issue, how to block the Chinese drive for a “Bandung”-type Afro-Asian conference (we would rather see a neutralist Afro-Asian meeting, excluding the Chicoms), etc. I am following this and will keep you informed; if you agree I might tell Harriman you are interested in a comprehensive State review of the Chicom offensive in Africa and what we can do about it. William H. Brubeck 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, East, Vol. I, 1/64–4/64. No classification marking. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 182. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 182. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, February 7, 1964. ADH/B–26 VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER DOUGLAS-HOME FEBRUARY 12–13, 1964 Background Paper East Africa and Zanzibar 1. Recent Developments in East Africa Despite speculation there is no hard evidence at this time that the trouble in East Africa was part of an interrelated Communist plot to take over the area. There was obvious Communist involvement in Zanzibar. The successful Zanzibar revolution undoubtedly provided inspiration to frustrated dissidents in neighboring East African countries. 2 The situation in Zanzibar was basically unstable. African antagonism towards the entrenched Arab minority was deep-rooted. While the coup was essentially an African drive to seize control from the Arabs, the African nationalists were assisted in the planning and execution of the coup by pro-Communist forces. A chain of mutinies then swept through the armed forces in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya. The revolt in Tanganyika was an alarming eye-opener to the other East African governments. When Ugandan troops threatened to rebel, Obote requested the British for help. After obtaining signed requests for help from the African governments, the British promptly brought the situation under control. Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya also sought and received British assistance. Julius Nyerere, when convinced that he could no longer cope with his army, fearing trouble in the labor field, and impressed with British action in Uganda and Kenya, readily accepted similar British assistance. 2. Zanzibar Problem . The crux of the Zanzibar matter is to prevent its takeover by the Communists. The new regime is an uneasy coalition of African nationalist and pro-Communist elements, each struggling for power. We are gravely concerned that the role of the nationalists may be deteriorating. The elements of preventing a Communist takeover include: 1. Elimination or control of “Field Marshal” Okello and armed thugs, who represent a continuing threat to order and stability. 2. Development of an independent nationalist government probably built around President Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazis. 3. Political containment of any pro-Communist force, including Babu and Hanga, if they are unwilling to work with Karume. Babu and Hanga have had strong ties with Peiping and Moscow. Nevertheless Nyerere believes in the showdown they are African nationalists who can be and must be worked with. This is questionable. 4. Support and strengthening of Nyerere in Tanganyika and Kenyatta in Kenya. Time Factor . The time factor in any Zanzibar action program is highly important since the vacuum now existing favors Communism. Discussion . The U.K. has a military capability in the area to disarm Okello and his followers and to maintain order. It would do this on its own initiative if British nationals were endangered. Otherwise, understandably, it would desire a written GOZ request from Karume. Only the British can act militarily with adequate effectiveness. Alternatively, the U.K. has non-military capabilities which it might use to get rid of Okello or at least to bolster the chances of a successful conclusion of intervention by covert operations, economic aid, educational help, police training, etc. The U.S. could provide non-military support for either of the above U.K. approaches, through educational and economic assistance, diplomatic support and support at the UN. There are roughly 300 Tanganyikan police already in Zanzibar. Initially these policemen disarmed a number of the local population, but they have not been able to control Okello and his hard-core gunmen. Recent reports indicate that the Tanganyikan police are not now an effective factor. Nyerere indicated to our Ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam that these police might be helpful if the British also were on the ground. Duncan Sandys told Ambassador Bruce on February 4 that the British had as yet no grounds for intervention and no action program had been formulated for Zanzibar. In a follow-up to this conversation Ambassador Bruce on February 6 delivered a Presidential message to Prime Minister Home asking what action the British proposed to take to frustrate a Communist takeover in Zanzibar and to strengthen African nationalists. 3 The Prime Minister expressed his great concern about Zanzibar and said he had established a study group to deal with the question. Unfortunately he had no faith in the character or motives of any of the Zanzibar leaders. He would discuss the matter further in his talks with the President. Every effort must be made to induce the British to take effective action. Since any definitive U.S. action would be based on the extent and type of action by the British, alternative measures the U.S. might take diplomatically, covertly or through economic or technical assistance would best be considered in light of the British program. However, certain minimal actions to prevent the further deterioration of the U.S. position, such as to increase our intelligence capability in the area and to maintain contact with the Zanzibar government must be and are being taken. Neither the U.K. nor the U.S. has recognized Zanzibar yet. Both countries are under increasing pressure from Zanzibar officials to take such action. 3. Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda U.K. intercession has served to check the immediate threat of chaos in East Africa. Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote all seem to be aware that they must be more alert against subversive elements of various origins. The Chicoms have been particularly active of late. President Nyerere plans to explain the seriousness of the situation in East Africa at an emergency meeting of the Organization of African Unity to be held in Dar-es-Salaam on February 12. Despite the short-term stability which the U.K. military presence probably will insure, basic problems will remain, making British disengagement extremely difficult. Dependable African security forces cannot quickly be developed. At the same time, East Africa’s leaders will be under mounting domestic pressure to seek early U.K. withdrawal. Domestic and general African pressures could lead to a British withdrawal before internal security forces have been adequately strengthened. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, PM Home Visit Briefing Book, 2/12–13/64. Secret. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote. 2 On January 12, African rebels on the island of Zanzibar overthrew the predominantly Arab government and established a republic. 3 A copy of the President’s February 5 message to Prime Minister Home is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Zanzibar, Vol. 2, 2/64–4/64. 183. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) 183. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) 1 Washington, March 2, 1964. Dear Frank: I am writing in response to your letter of November 1, 1963 regarding the proposed MATS Survey Flight to Africa. 2 Replies are now in from the twenty posts queried on this subject. They are almost uniformly opposed to instituting regular MATS flights or even making a preliminary route survey at this time. Our missions generally believed that little need currently exists for such a service, and that present transportation services are adequate. Thus, the introduction of military flights and attendant support personnel would strain local facilities and be viewed with suspicion by many countries as conflicting with their policies of non-alignment. Radical elements would point to this as a form of Western “NATO and neocolonialist penetration.” Most replies indicated that the introduction of regular MATS flights would increase Soviet Bloc pressure for landing rights and would prejudice the case for U.S. commercial airlines attempting to secure landing rights. It was also believed that there would be resentment among local airlines, which would consider MATS to be unfair competition. In addition, some posts indicated that the French would be annoyed at any increase in U.S. military operations in areas in which they have traditionally played the major military role. In light of recent developments in East Africa, I am quite willing to review this matter, should that be indicated. However, a check with the African Bureau has confirmed that in view of the overwhelmingly strong opposition from the field, we believe that the proposal for the survey should be dropped, at least for the foreseeable future. Sincerely, Jeff Kitchen 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 373.5 Africa. Secret. 2 Not printed. 184. Draft National Security Action Memorandum 184. Draft National Security Action Memorandum 1 Washington, undated. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, Central Intelligence Agency The Director, United States Information Agency The Administrator, Agency for International Development SUBJECT Internal Security in Africa The Special Group (CI) has considered the reassessment of internal security in Africa and has approved the following courses of action: 1) Continued improvement of US intelligence capability in Africa; 2) Taking into consideration varying African political sensitivities, urge African states in general to rely upon their former metropoles for internal security assistance to the greatest practicable extent and urge metropoles to be responsive to the requirements of African states for internal security; 3) Direct US assistance to African internal security forces (police and military) and economic assistance programs in appropriate proportions to deal with the specific nature of the threat, taking into consideration other foreign assistance and degree of US economic, political, and military interest; 4) Encourage Western European and Commonwealth countries to provide aid to Africa—on a coordinated basis when appropriate and feasible—and pursue coordination of US programs with such countries generally on a bilateral basis. 5) Be prepared, in certain circumstances, to give sympathetic consideration to requests which might entail assistance to an African country that would not be merely supplementary to that provided by the former metropole. 6) Continue to evaluate US-supported education programs for Africans and devise means to enhance their efficacy and general impact. 7) Develop programs to counteract Communist penetration into the African labor field. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs is hereby designated to coordinate the execution of the above recommendations in consultation with the Africa Policy Committee. 2 McGeorge Bundy 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. I 2/64–6/64. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A May 12 covering memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that on April 9, the Special Group (CI) considered a reassessment of internal security in Africa, approved certain courses of action, and suggested preparation of an NSAM incorporating these courses of action. Williams and Harriman had subsequently recommended preparation of an NSAM and a draft was enclosed for Bundy’s approval. The Special Group (CI) was a high-level interdepartmental group created to deal with counterinsurgency issues. The April 9 meeting was attended by Under Secretary Averell Harriman, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance, CIA Director John A. McCone, NSC Staff member Michael Forrestal, AID Deputy Administrator William S. Gaud, and General Anthis representing JCS Chairman General Maxwell Taylor. 2 This NSAM was never issued. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 185. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 185. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, July 10, 1964. I–36326/64 SUBJECT African Nuclear Free Zone 1. The following is for your information. 2. The Organization of African Unity will consider at its Cairo conference on 17 July a resolution declaring Africa a nuclear free zone (Tab A). 2 Our main concern is with that section of Article I which would prevent transport of nuclear weapons in African territory, territorial waters and air space. 3. Approval of the resolution could adversely affect our transit rights since our policy is neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard our ships or aircraft. We would have to answer, or fail to transit. This could result in a situation similar to that now existing in Ceylon where we have not conducted a naval visit since that country instituted a requirement last January requiring a declaration that no nuclear weapons were aboard visiting ships or aircraft. 4. The JCS have indicated they do not favor a NFZ in Africa and that such would have important security implications (Tab B). 3 Based on that I have answered Alex Johnson’s inquiry on this subject (Tab C) 4 by forwarding the JCS comments (Tab B) and certain other information the JCS made available to me. My reply is at Tab D. 5 5. State has instructed its embassies in key African countries to approach local leaders and attempt to remove or change objectionable transit clause from the proposed resolution. 6. Recommendation: That we take no action on this problem until we can study the African resolution in its approved form. 6 T. McNaughton 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 388.3 Africa. Top Secret. 2 Tab A is a copy of the “Draft Convention for the Denuclearization of the African Continent”; not printed. 3 Tab B is JCSM–577–64, July 2, 1964; not printed. 4 Tab C is a June 19, 1964, letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson; not printed. 5 Not printed. 6 Secretary McNamara initialed his approval on July 11. 186. Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 186. Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 14, 1964. SUBJECT Status of Efforts to Influence Action on Draft Convention for African Nuclear Free Zone The Department’s July 6 circular telegram on the draft Convention for an African nuclear free zone 2 instructed our Ambassadors in selected African countries to approach Heads of Government or Foreign Ministers. The Ambassadors were asked to persuade them to advocate either (a) modification of language which would meet our concern regarding both possible prohibition of transit by US naval vessels or military aircraft and lack of provision in the draft Convention for verification and inspection against production or acquisition of nuclear weapons or their deployment in Africa by others, or (b) postponement of definite action on the draft in order to permit “further study.” Responses to date have ranged from definitely sympathetic to non-committal, so that as of this writing the Department is not in a position to make a prediction as to the final outcome. It should be borne in mind that we have initially assumed that although the Africans may of their own volition proceed as we would wish, there is little likelihood that our own effort alone will influence a sufficient number of African governments to take one of the courses that we have proposed. There is enclosed, as a separate but related item, a brief resume of the proceedings of the Algiers Conference on Denuclearization of the Mediterranean Area. 3 Marion A. Baldwin 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, 7/64–6/65. Secret. 2 Circular telegram 28, July 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 OAU) 3 Attached but not printed. On July 21, the OAU Heads of State Conference at Cairo passed a resolution reaffirming the November 1961 U.N. resolution calling on states to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone and asking for an international treaty to achieve this. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , p. 1096. 4 Baldwin signed for Read above Read’s typed signature. A covering note from NSC Staff member Samuel Belk to Bundy reads: “Mac: The attached memorandum deals with the current situation on a problem Governor Harriman is following closely. He spoke to me at great length about it and probably will do the same with you. Perhaps the attachment will be of interest. Sam.” 187. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson 187. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 21, 1964. SUBJECT African Reaction to Recent U.S. Civil Rights Developments African reaction to the passage of the civil rights bill has been highly favorable, although some evidence exists of an increasing impatience with what is regarded as the lagging eradication of racial discrimination in the United States. The significance of the bill’s passage has been a major theme at the Cairo meeting of the Organization of African Unity. 2 Guinea’s President Sekou Toure, speaking of the civil rights bill’s passage, told the African summit conference that “in America, the colored people engaged in the struggle for social progress and racial equality have just won a great victory . …” In his conference address, Sudan’s President Abboud expressed the hope that the “American civil rights bill be speedily put into execution lest the reactionaries should gain with their right hand what their left has lost.” Kenya’s Prime Minister Kenyatta, on the other hand, attacked the continued existence of racial discrimination and stated that this was an area in which the United States could learn from independent Africa. Also speaking at the OAU meeting, President Nasser said: “We can complete the siege around South Africa and Rhodesia where hateful discrimination is practised,” adding that “one of the promising signs in this connection is the adoption of the civil rights bill in the U.S.” President Nasser’s comments linking the civil rights bill with the advance of African liberation is a new theme so far receiving only sparse play in African media reaction. Sudan’s Al-Telegraph said that the bill indicated U.S. “support for the world struggle against racial discrimination in South Africa” and “the nearing victory of the national forces against the attempts of the white man in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.” President Abboud’s reaction expressing concern about U.S. reactionaries was also carried by Ghanaian Radio on July 16, which said that Senator Goldwater’s nomination reflected the fact among other things that the “civil rights issue has frightened many Americans who feel that things are slipping beyond their control.” The commentator described Goldwater’s views as “coinciding with those of the John Birch society—a racist, rightist, America-first political movement whose support Goldwater has never repudiated.” The Nigerian Radio, which is ordinarily quite friendly to the United States, expressed the belief on July 9 that previous Presidents could have stamped out discrimination if they had used the full powers of their office. The radio also commented that “President Johnson is the only person who can arrest the present violence in the southern states and effectively enforce the new bill,” and that “if he fails to show the necessary courage, the new law can from the beginning be dismissed as a dead letter.” In other reaction, African press and radio comment continues to be highly favorable. Africans view the bill as a great tribute to President Kennedy and commend you for securing its passage. They see the bill as giving the Federal Government power to enforce the Constitution and as guaranteeing to Negroes the legal rights hitherto guaranteed only to whites. Some comment has viewed the bill as a challenge to Americans to act in accordance with professed beliefs, while other comment has expressed the opinion that the majority of Americans will obey the law. Comment indicates that Africans are keeping a watchful eye on the bill’s implementation. Nigerians, for example, are dismayed by the recent outbreak of violence in the U.S. and what they see as Federal inaction and are alarmed by Senator Goldwater’s nomination, which they fear represents white backlash and the increased strength of reactionaries. We can expect the Harlem riots to be given massive coverage and to set in motion a severe adverse reaction that will erode much of the benefit that we had hoped we would achieve with the civil rights legislation. Carl T. Rowan 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. No classification marking. Drafted by Lester E. Edmond, Executive Assistant to the Director. 2 For text of a resolution adopted at the Cairo OAU Conference, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , p. 739. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 188. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to President Johnson 188. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 28, 1964. SUBJECT Report on Africa Zambia’s attainment of independence last weekend highlights the fact that Africa’s march toward freedom continues to be a dynamic political factor in the world scene. Thirty-two new African nations have been established in less than 13 years in a remarkably smooth transfer of power. The wide publicity given to the few cases of violence in independent Africa has overshadowed much of the solid political and economic progress the continent is making. This imbalance makes it imperative that the United States Government base its understanding of the true situation in Africa on a firm foundation of fact. Not a single new African nation has succumbed to Communist domination, although incentives have been provided readily by Sino-Soviet nations. The Soviets and Chinese have been trying to cultivate several African nations as satellites, but African determination to preserve hard-won freedom and our policy and diplomacy—and those of our friends—have strengthened Africa’s awareness of the dangers to its independence of external subversion. We understand and support Africa’s desire to remain truly non-aligned and independent. Africa’s nations have been anxious to cooperate in Africa-wide efforts to solve the continent’s problems through African initiatives. They have made important progress toward that goal through the 35-member Organization of African Unity. The OAU played a major role in halting Algerian-Moroccan hostilities, and it is working toward a resolution of the Ethiopian-Somali border dispute. In addition, African states cooperated to provide police assistance in Tanganyika when that country asked for help following the troop mutiny earlier this year. The OAU is now undertaking to assist the government and people of the Congo in its present internal difficulties and to improve the relations between the Congo and its neighbors. The Economic Commission for Africa is becoming a prime factor in African economic growth. That body has created an African Development Bank, an Institute for Economic Development and Planning, and is developing proposals for regional economic growth. We support those efforts wholeheartedly. Many significant economic gains are being recorded by individual countries. Heartening growth of gross national products can be found in Liberia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Nigeria, to name only a few. Agricultural production—Africa’s chief economic pursuit—in the last 10 years has been doubled in Ivory Coast, has increased 50 percent in Kenya and has risen 29 percent in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Libya, Algeria and Nigeria are rapidly becoming important centers of oil production. American private interests have been instrumental in developing vital minerals, such as iron in Liberia and Mauritania, manganese in Gabon, copper in Zambia and bauxite in Guinea. Another measure of progress—electric power production—is rising in many countries. In this growth also, American loans and technical skills have been important elements, supplementing substantial assistance from European countries. Emphasis has been placed on the need for education and technical training in every country and notable progress is being made in this formidable task. An impressive share of Africa’s advancement is due to the dedication of many African leaders to the welfare of their people. There is no doubt that Africa needs external help during this period of development just as we did in our early days, but determined African leadership is making good use of such aid to hasten the political and economic transformation of the continent. Averell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. No classification marking. 189. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 189. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, December 24, 1964. JCSM–1068–64 SUBJECT Pan-African Military School (U) 1. There is ample evidence of a critical need in Africa for professional military training. Developing African states are confronted with internal security problems in a climate conducive to insurgency. In most areas, military elements are emerging as the principal guardians of national sovereignty. To cope with this situation and to counter Soviet and Communist Chinese exploitation, it is desirable for the United States to contribute to the strength and authority of all pro-Western elements within state power structures, particularly the military elements. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that while there are military programs designed to support US interests in Africa (e.g., Military Assistance Programs, an Officer Leadership Training course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and a five-year university program) a Pan-African Military School, supported as appropriate by the United States and possibly other pro-Western nations, would be a new initiative in Africa that is worthy of further consideration. Such a school, in Ethiopia or Nigeria for example, may have the advantage of obtaining participation from countries that for political or other reasons shy away from offers of training in the United States or other pro-Western countries. Establishment of this school could serve to enhance the concept of creating US positions of influence in Africa. The attendance of students from other African nations hopefully would spread Western philosophy and ideals, and would contribute to offsetting the training and political orientation offered by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The initial motivation for this school could come from the United States; however, the prime impetus should be developed among pro-Western African sources. 3. It is envisioned that students in a Pan-African Military School would consist of junior military leaders. Though possibly more basic, the training offered at this school could be similar to that of the Officer Leadership Training Course, Fort Knox, Kentucky, i.e., military concepts, fundamental tactics, weapons instruction, counterinsurgency, civic action, discipline, and morale responsibility. 4. A report on this subject submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA is attached as Appendix B 2 hereto. This report includes comments on the concept, control, sponsorship, host and third country participation, type of training, and possible school sites. Further elaboration of these and other major considerations is contained in the Annex to Appendix A. In general, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with this report but recommend against the sponsorship of this school by the Organization for African Unity. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that the establishment of a Pan-African Military School merits further consideration. They recommend that: a. In the context of the over-all African problem the views of the Department of State on such a school be requested, including views on the appointment of a joint State/Defense team to conduct a comprehensive study to aid in making a final determination on the feasibility and desirability of establishing the school. b. The memorandum in Appendix A hereto, together with its Annex, which reflects these ideas, be forwarded to the Secretary of State. 3 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 4 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 352 Africa. Secret. 2 The appendices are not printed. 3 The CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA report was sent to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William E. Lang on January 15, 1965. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 352 Africa) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. 190. Memorandum From Lee C. White of the White House Staff to President Johnson 190. Memorandum From Lee C. White of the White House Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 28, 1964. SUBJECT US African Policy While talking to Roy Wilkins the other day on a completely unrelated matter, he took the occasion to indicate that the Negro leadership group has taken a great interest in our African policy. The formal committee, which Roy chairs, met with President Kennedy and Ambassador Stevenson in the fall of 1963 to set forth the views of the members on African policy. During the past election campaign they wrote seeking a meeting with you, but we arranged instead for a meeting with State Department people. I am not certain whether Secretary Rusk was able to meet with them, but my recollection is that he did not. In any event, Roy says that the group is of the opinion that those who are shaping our African policy have missed a few opportunities and perhaps mishandled others, and he wondered whether there was any possibility of the group meeting with you. I told him that, quite candidly, I personally saw some problem in the President meeting with a group of American Negroes to secure from them their recommendations on what our African policy should be. He had no trouble understanding and maybe even agreeing with the point, and we then discussed the possibility of 2 or 3 of the group meeting with Mac Bundy and some of his people on a completely informal and unscheduled basis. He said he would explore the matter quietly and discreetly, and I assured him that I was in no position to commit Bundy or anyone else, but while he was thinking about that approach, I would at least check to see whether there was any thought here that such a meeting might be useful. Although this is obviously way out of my field, it seems to me that there might be some advantage in such a session. I am confident that the organization is not going to evaporate; it would therefore make sense to do what we can to make it an asset rather than an extra burden in this already difficult area. Lee C. White 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. No classification marking. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Hold for staff mtg Mon/McGB.” 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 191. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of State 191. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. REVIEW OF 1964 OPERATIONS IN THE AF AREA Description of Operations Generally speaking, Africa has been a relatively new area for CIA covert action operations. Although the Agency has been in some African countries for quite some time, the expansion of CAS capabilities corresponds roughly with State expansion on the continent—the buildup has occurred largely since 1960. Moreover the Agency started from scratch in most countries, laboring under the handicap of the visibility of the white man, few natural cover opportunities [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], and language and cultural differences. [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ] The Agency’s AF Division has operated under a philosophy of building carefully and solidly. It has been conservative rather than aggressive as regards political action. Its development of assets has been hampered by the relatively unsophisticated character of many of the African bureaucracies and political leaders with whom it has had to deal. The maintenance of security in particular has posed a considerable problem. However, it is to be noted that the Agency’s experience with a number of Africans with whom it has maintained a clandestine relationship appears to be excellent. [ 1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified ] Developments in Africa have forced the pace of covert operations. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] The instability of other African states, notably in East Africa, and the evidence of Soviet bloc and Chinese Communist inroads also argued for covert measures on our part. The Agency has been responsive to these requirements. However, there have been indications from time to time that it has done so under forced draft. This is to say that the Agency is not, as some might believe, overflowing with resources and raring to go. On several occasions Agency representatives have alluded to the difficulty of finding the right man for the job. Priorities and limitation of resources have been cited as precluding the opening of new stations. In general the maintenance of security is closely related to the type and size of the operation. [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] This was recognized but nevertheless agreed to because of the needs of the situation. So long as the Agency must engage in paramilitary operations there is a significant element of visibility. The Agency is also wary of crash operations because of the high security risk. Principal Operations in 1964 [ Heading and 5 paragraphs (18 lines of source text) not declassified ] Angola Covert support for non violent activities of the Angolan Nationalist Movement. [ 1 paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified ] Purpose: To provide covert support to selected individuals and activities of the Angolan nationalist movement in order to develop checks to extremist/communist elements within the movement and to exercise some control over the movement’s programs and planning. [ 1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified ] Problems: The program of support to the Angolan Nationalist was a controversial one within the Department, AF strongly supporting the proposal and EUR opposing it. Other considerations bearing on the proposal was the factionalism and in fighting within the Provisional Angolan Government (GRAE). Accomplishments: [ 1-½ lines of source text not declassified ] The proposed $20,000 of covert support to moderate leaders was deferred for further justification. In fact it was never approved. In August 1964 another proposal for covert support to Angolan nationalist leaders, [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] came before the 303 Committee after having been the subject of protracted discussion on the “Seventh Floor.” At the request of Mr. McCone consideration of the proposal was deferred pending clarification of the Congo situation. It was never revived. The sums provided to LGTA and UNEA probably served to reassure Holden Roberto of the U.S. favorable attitude. However, his ebbing fortunes since that time and his pressing problems as a result of Tshombe’s attitude toward him have tended to put GRAE in the shadows. Congo 2 Support of Congolese Government [ 1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified ] Purpose: To support the legitimate Congolese Government in the hopes of bringing stability to the Congo and frustrating Communist efforts. [ 8 paragraphs (11 lines of source text) not declassified ] Accomplishments: Covert assistance enabled Adoula [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] to buy the support of political and military leaders. Efforts to develop a national party never got very far. Tshombe has also used covert funds to buy the support of political leaders and tribal chiefs. He has not drawn down funds to pay mercenaries, however. Problems: From the outset the Congo operation has had to cope with successive crises on a crash basis. The very nature of the problem has meant that great reliance had to be placed on close coordination between the Ambassador and the Station Chief in the expenditure of funds. Both Ambassadors Gullion and Godley appear to have had confidence in the CIA Station Chief and in his conduct of operations. Although courses of action have frequently been discussed between representatives of the Department and CIA, the bulk of the day to day operational decisions were taken in the field without reference to the Department. A legitimate question is whether the wholesale buying of political [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] leaders is a sound basis for establishing a stable government. In the Congo there appears to have been no feasible alternative. [ 9 headings and 49 paragraphs (8 pages of source text) not declassified ] Bureaucratic Process of Formulating and Approving Operations Proposals for covert operations arise from consultations in the field between CAS and the Ambassador, CIA and the Department, generally in the context of discussions between representatives of CIA and representatives of AF and INR/DDC, or from an initiative of CIA. The larger number of proposals are spawned in the field. The fewest from CIA initiative. In the latter category are proposals for an airline, for instance, or other operations which derive from a requirement more particular to the Agency. Consonant with the responsibility placed by NSC 5412 on the Director of Central Intelligence to carry out covert operations and the operational know how which reposes in CIA/DDP it is the Agency which formulates and drafts the proposal for consideration by the 303 Committee. It is the responsibility of the Agency to get political guidance from the Department. As a practical matter informal guidance is obtained by the Agency during the consultations with the geographic bureaus and INR/DDC and, in the field, with the Chief of Mission. In the case of major projects a formal proposal is submitted to the 303 Committee, with INR/DDC staffing out the proposal with the bureaus concerned before presentation to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, the Department’s representative on the 303 Committee. Following the approval of a proposal by the 303 Committee there is frequent supplementary guidance provided by the Department or the chief of mission in regard to policy questions which may arise during the course of implementation of the operation. In Washington, guidance requests are addressed to INR/DDC or come up during the course of meetings between representatives of CIA and of the geographic bureau. The guidance is generally formalized by a memorandum to the Agency prepared by INR/DDC. In fast moving situations, however, as in the acute states of successive crises in the Congo, guidance may flow from meetings chaired by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs or from the head of a task force or working group organized to handle the crisis. These are exceptions to the general rule, however, resulting from the need for rapid action. The Defense Department is represented on the 303 Committee and, therefore, votes on proposals submitted to that group. Should proposals involve a Defense interest, Defense would be consulted in the formulation stage. In the African area Defense considerations have generally involved technical and operational matters. Therefore the coordination has been done by the Agency directly with Defense. It has occurred, however, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] that Defense has sat in on meetings where the use of military force was discussed. One final word might be said regarding the discussions carried on by AF and INR/DDC with representatives of CIA/DDP. Although the regular weekly meetings at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level are held primarily to consider covert action, they frequently turn to discussions of other matters, for example, estimates of situations, exchange of information on developments, expressions of interest by the bureau in obtaining more intelligence about a particular problem, and CAS personnel and administration. These contacts provide an excellent forum for CIA to get the feel of the Bureau’s thinking on policy matters and for the Department’s representatives to get CIA appreciation of developments. 1 Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the source text. The source text contains minor handwritten revisions and corrections, but there is no indication who made them. The most important of them is the title, to which was added: “IN THE AF AREA.” All the changes have been incorporated into the text printed here. 2 Documentation on Congo is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XXIII . 192. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 192. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 6, 1965. Mac— The President’s reaction to Lee White’s memo 2 was that you (not Busby) should talk to Rusk about it. Rusk should take the main laboring oar since he’s particularly good with the American Negro leadership. 3 On substance, Buz says the President feels he’s working to make the American Negro fully a part of American society and overcome his segregation from the white community. He doesn’t think it at all a good idea to encourage a separate Negro view of foreign policy. We don’t want an integrated domestic policy and a segregated foreign policy. The President recognizes the American Negro community’s natural interest in African affairs but doesn’t think they should make it their special province. They shouldn’t become a special interest group but should be interested in the totality of US policy as Americans. In short, I get loud and clear that the President wants to discourage emergence of any special Negro pressure group (a la the Zionists) which might limit his freedom of maneuver. 4 RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. Secret. 2 Document 190 . 3 On January 7, Bundy sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk saying that President Johnson hoped that the Secretary would talk with the American Negro leadership because he had a particularly high standing with them. The President wanted Rusk to make the point that the administration did not think it was a good thing to encourage a separate Negro view of foreign policy. He recognized the natural interest of the Negro leaders in African affairs, but hoped they would also be interested in the totality of U.S. foreign policy as Americans. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65) 4 A notation on the source text in Komer’s handwriting reads: “Amen.” 193. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 193. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, March 4, 1965. Note for Mr. Bundy Secretary Rusk’s meeting with representatives of the Negro Leadership Conference on Africa was quiet and friendly. 2 Concerning the Congo, the Secretary and the Negro Leadership group agreed on the necessity for an O.A.U. solution and for Tshombe to get rid of the white mercenaries. The Secretary indicated that the problems of Portuguese Africa were thorny because of the importance of the Azores to NATO. He suggested that the coming International Court of Justice decision in the South West Africa case might provide the U.S. Government a better “handle” with which to influence the South African Government to moderate its racist and totalitarian policies. He agreed with the Negro leaders that it would be most desirable to see an increase in U.S. aid to Africa. The Secretary himself initiated the discussion of the desirability of having more Negroes in the Foreign Service and invited suggestions from the Negro Leadership as to people who might qualify. Concerning their suggestion that he visit Africa, the Secretary said that it would be difficult to find an occasion around which to plan such a visit and that he wished to avoid offending those countries on the African Continent which he might not have time to visit. It was mentioned in the course of the discussions that Dr. Martin Luther King may go to Africa this spring on his own. None of the leaders expressed a desire to see the President or any one else in the White House about African affairs. All three spoke to the press afterwards for about an hour as “friendly critics” and were interviewed by CBS Television. The meeting was given minimal press coverage and is not likely to give rise to any undesirable repercussions. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. Confidential. 2 Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP; Dr. John Davis, President of the American Society of African Culture; and Theodore Brown, Director of the American Negro Leadership Conference, met with Secretary Rusk on March 3. 194. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 194. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, March 30, 1965. McGB: We’re quite concerned over the prospect of an imminent Negro leadership conference to set up an organization to influence US policy on Africa . 2 As I recall the President’s view, this is just what he doesn’t want. As I get it, the President’s view is since he’s working to make the American Negro fully a part of American society, he doesn’t think it at all a good idea to encourage a separate Negro view of foreign policy. We don’t want an integrated domestic policy and a segregated foreign policy. While the President recognizes the American Negro Community’s natural interest in African affairs, he doesn’t think they should make it their special province. Rather than becoming a special interest group, they should be interested in the totality of US policy as Americans. Fortunately the conference has been postponed briefly. This gives us a little turnaround time. Only the White House could turn this aside, so we ought to consider putting out discreet high level word to the most responsive of the key people involved, along the lines of LBJ’s comment. Who’s the best man to do this—Moyers? Hobart Taylor? Yourself? We believe the recipients of our counsel should be: (a) Roy Wilkins and Martin Luther King—the key figures; (b) Phil Randolph; and (c) Dorothy Height. If there is an inevitable trend toward the emergence of a major private organization interested in US policy toward Africa (which may be the case), we should guide this toward a non-racial outcome, i.e. it should include whites as well as Negroes. If we’re going to move on this we ought to do so fast. At any rate, the President ought to be informed, given his previous strong views. RWK Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. Secret. A copy was sent to Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Associate Special Counsel to the President. 2 A March 25 memorandum from Haynes to Komer stated that a meeting of the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa would be held in New York on April 1 to create a permanent organization concerned with American Negro influence on U.S. foreign policy in Africa. Haynes recommended doing something to eliminate the raison d’etre of such a group, such as a high-level U.S. friendship tour of Africa. (Ibid., Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66) 195. National Intelligence Estimate 195. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 22, 1965. NIE 60/70–65 PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 2 The Problem To examine those situations and trends in Sub-Saharan Africa likely to affect the stability of the area and Western security interests over the next three to five years. Conclusions A. Political and social turmoil is virtually certain during the period of this estimate in most of the states of Sub-Saharan Africa. The general trend in the area—to which there are some exceptions—is probably toward more radical policies, and certainly toward more vigorous manifestations of African nationalism, in a variety of forms. (Paras. 1–12, 28–29) B. The various “liberation” movements in white-dominated southern Africa have made little headway despite considerable emotional support elsewhere in Africa. Meanwhile, white resistance has stiffened. Although most independent African states, as well as the USSR and China, probably will step up assistance to the nationalists, it is almost certain that white governments will command sufficient power and determination to contain “liberation” movements at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 36–42) C. Economic growth in most areas will be very slow; indeed, setbacks are probable in a number of countries. There is a desperate shortage of virtually all kinds of technical and managerial skills; indeed, the basic institutions and staff for economic development are often inadequate or absent. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that most African countries will obtain external assistance or investment on anything approaching the scale required for sustained economic development. (Paras. 47–50) D. The Communists have made substantial progress in expanding their presence in Africa, and the situation will provide them with new opportunities. Western influence in Africa will remain important during the period of this estimate, but it will decline, in part because both the UK and France will gradually shed presently expensive commitments. There is a good chance that a few African states will collaborate closely with either Moscow or Peiping, and become, at least temporarily, highly unfriendly to the West. The foreign policies of many, perhaps most, African states on many major international issues during the period of this estimate. However, even the militant radicals prize their freedom of movement, and we consider it unlikely that any African country will become a full-fledged Communist state, or will reject all ties with the West. (Paras. 30–35, 54–57) E. African relations with the US will remain ambivalent and difficult. Nevertheless, we do not believe that in most instances difficulties will decisively affect such material interests as the US has in Africa. No African raw materials or other resources are essential to US security. The US is likely to be able to retain the Kagnew facility at least during Haile Selassie’s lifetime. Other less important installations and privileges seem safe during the period of this estimate. (Paras. 58–60) [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 22. 2 For purposes of this estimate, we have defined this area to include all the countries of Africa except the following: UAR, Sudan, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Spanish Sahara. [Footnote in the source text.] 196. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 196. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, May 18, 1965. RWK SUBJECT Replies to “Soapy’s” Depcirtel on “New Policy for Africa” 2 Here’s the weighty thinking of our Ambassadors in Africa on what a “New Policy for Africa” should constitute. With a few exceptions (i.e., Attwood in Nairobi, Korry in Addis), the replies to “Soapy’s” telegram did not provoke any new ideas or provide any new insights. The more interesting telegrams are at the top of the pile, marked with a red “X” in the upper lefthand corner. A breakdown follows of recurrent themes and significant points raised in the replies: Political (1) US policy should be “more positive” in its approach to the problems of Southern Africa. (2) Best evidence of LBJ’s personal interest in Africa would be a tour of Africa by the Vice President, Mrs. Johnson and daughters or Secretary Rusk. (3) A major shortcoming of US policy in Africa is its “proclivity toward over-close association and identification with traditional conservative leaders” to the exclusion of the Young Turks. AID (1) AID should be used as a political weapon with the major assist-ance going to African friends of the US. (2) AID procedures should be simplified and sped up to meet requirements peculiar to Africa. (3) Future AID programs for Africa should be regional or multinational in orientation. Special consideration should be given to developing a continent-wide telecommunications and transportation network. (4) US should make a sizeable grant to the African Development Bank as soon as it is established. (5) US foreign assistance should be re-channelled into an international consortium approach in which the UK, Western Europe, the Commonwealth Nations and others are represented. In any case, there should be greater coordination between Free World foreign assistance programs. (6) AID should explore the use of counterpart funds for development purposes in Africa. Education (1) The US should support more local vocational training in Africa. (2) US should establish a scholarship program for secondary school education in African countries (as distinguished from abroad). Psychological (1) US public concern for the Cold War (“Chicom threat”, etc.) should be downplayed in Africa. “Wild!” (1) US should distribute the National Geographic magazine throughout Africa as it does an excellent job of presenting “the US image.” (Ambassador Dumont, Burundi). Rick Haynes 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Secret. 2 Circular telegram 2156, May 6, to African posts noted that the President wanted the Department to undertake a new and critical look at overall African policy, including a country-by-country review, and to evaluate existing programs with a view to reforming and improving them and eliminating unnecessary operations. The telegram requested that chiefs of mission respond by May 10 if possible. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFR–US) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 197. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 197. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 5, 1965. McGB SUBJECT AF Chiefs of Mission Conferences—“New Policy for Africa” Summary The AF Chiefs of Mission Conferences in Addis Ababa and Lagos were a “qualified” success. Insofar as they provided a feel for the political and economic climate in the various African countries, the conferences were a success. They were also successful in breaking down the parochialism of most of the AF Ambassadors who tend to see US foreign policy interests in terms of US relations with their countries of assignment only. However, both conferences failed to generate significant, new or imaginative ideas around which a “New Policy for Africa” could be built. Recognizing their own shortcomings, the AF Ambassadors urged that “Soapy” substitute the term “strengthened” for “new” as the appellation for their policy recommendations. I came away from both conferences convinced that the US should not announce a “New” or “Strengthened” Policy for Africa unless it has the substance of a Marshall Plan or of an Alliance for Progress. This is not possible under the President’s mandate to “Soapy” which calls for the reform, improvement or elimination of existing programs to better achieve our foreign policy objectives and which cautions that substantial increases in US foreign assistance expenditures are not envisaged. With such limitations, the announcement of a strengthened policy for Africa would only encourage African aspirations which the US could not possibly meet. The resultant disillusionment would be a major setback to US-African relations. The consensus at both conferences was that US relations with Africa today are generally good. Therefore, I feel strongly that the US should take advantage of this favorable climate to build a reserve of credit to see us through some of the predictable crises we will have to face on the African continent in the future; e.g., the growing crisis in Southern Africa. The best way to build this credit is by responding to key African needs and problems on an ad hoc basis with specific American solutions, all bearing the “LBJ” label. Significant Policy Observations Made by Conferees 1. AID— a) should be used as a political weapon with more aid going to our friends than to our critics and a minimal aid presence in all African political units; b) while aid for long-term economic development is sound, an increase in “impact” aid pays higher political dividends; c) procedures should be simplified and speeded up and criteria tailored to African capacity to develop projects. 2. USIA— a) the Voice of America devotes too much of its African-oriented broadcasting time to race relations in the US; b) USIA’s output is generally too “ethnocentric” and is based on American, rather than African, tastes; c) the Voice of America signal is weak or spotty in many parts of Africa: d) with these reservations, both conferences had the highest praise for USIS performance in the field. 3. Cultural Affairs— a) US scholarship programs for undergraduate study in America create dissatisfied, misfit elites in many African countries. 4. Political— a) the toughest potential problem involving US-African relations centers around self-determination for the black populations of Southern Rhodesia, South and South West Africa, and the Portuguese territories; b) until his voting rights speech, LBJ did not have what was described as a “positive image” in Africa; c) crises involving the US in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic are not big issues in Africa where preoccupation with African problems takes precedence over all else; d) the US should be more subtle and circumspect in pointing out the dangers of Communism to Africans as the latter are anxious to keep the Cold War out of Africa at all costs; several Ambassadors complained of instructions requiring them to belabor African Chiefs of State and Foreign Ministers on every little Communist issue; e) Ethiopia was acknowledged to pose problems calling for special attention because of the serious threat to US strategic interests caused by the large and unpopular US military presence and increasing anti-Americanism in that country. Policy Recommendations Although many complaints were heard and problems raised by the AF Ambassadors, few policy recommendations were proposed—certainly not enough for the US to present as a new or strengthened policy for Africa. The following is a selective summary of the better policy recommendations. 1. The US should make every effort to achieve greater coordination of policy and action and to eliminate competition by the nations of the Free World in Africa on both political and foreign assistance matters. Annual meetings on African affairs should be held with those friendly Free World nations with African involvements: e.g., France, Nationalist China, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Canada, Spain, India, Pakistan and the Scandinavian countries. Similar efforts already undertaken to coordinate US policy with the British, Germans and Belgians have proven successful. 2. Personal relationships between Chiefs of State are important in Africa. For US policy objectives to be advanced, it is desirable that African leaders be made aware of the US President’s personal interest in African affairs. All of the Ambassadors urged a high-level tour of Africa by a personal representative of the President whose sole purpose would be to generate good will for the US. (Bob Komer has informed me that the time is not yet ripe for such a trip to be undertaken.) Barring such a trip, the continued exchange of letters between the President and African leaders was considered most helpful. 3. Occasions should be exploited for the President to pronounce himself on matters of interest to Africans. Too many US public statements on African affairs refer to positions taken and comments made by President Kennedy. Few identify President Johnson with African interests in his own right. (How about Bundy-Williams and Bundy-Rowan memos on this subject?) 4. The use of the $25,000 Self-Help Fund made available to AF Ambassadors by AID should be completely discretionary with the Ambassador in consultation with his Country Team. Its use should be based on the sole criterion of whether it produces a desirable “impact” (i.e., conspicuous, readily identifiable as coming from US, meets an immediate local need of the people rather than a privileged few). The amount available for the Self-Help Fund should be raised to the $50,000 level as in Latin America. All of the Ambassadors endorsed the fund with enthusiasm. 5. AID should be instructed to make a study and come up with recommendations as to the use of counterpart or surplus currency funds in a coordinated US foreign assistance program. For example, such funds might be used to pay (or top off) the salaries of friendly third-country technicians and advisors, for procurement in friendly third-countries or for scholarships for Africans to study in friendly third-countries. 6. The US should phase-out its scholarship programs of undergraduate studies for Africans in American colleges and universities. Concentration should be on US assistance to secondary school education and vocational training within African countries. Scholarships for study in the US should be limited to the graduate level. This would broaden the educational base, provide required skills and eliminate competition with emerging African institutions of higher learning for the best students. Attachments Attached are copies of some of the working papers from the two Chiefs of Mission Conferences. 2 Of special interest are attachments numbered 1 and 2. Attachment number 1 contains “Soapy’s” proposed (still subject to change) action recommendations to the President and Secretary of State for a “Strengthened African Program.” I would appreciate it if no reference were made to this document in discussions with AF. Attachment number 2 contains the “basic elements of US policy in Africa” which the Lagos conferees evolved. Attachment 3 is a summary of the Addis Conference; attachment 4 is a summary of the Lagos Conference. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64–6/65. Confidential. Copies were sent to Komer and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff. 2 Not printed. 198. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 198. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 15, 1965. SUBJECT President’s Interest in African Affairs At his request, I met with Bill Moyers this morning to get from him the President’s thinking on African affairs. Bill explained that he was discussing this with me because both you and Bob Komer were swamped with more pressing matters. In the course of a dinner conversation with Bill last night, the President expressed his concern that the US lay a solid foundation for good relations with a continent which will become increasingly important. The President’s night-reading on African affairs had aroused this concern. The subjects of his special interest are summarized below: 1. African Telecommunications System —A proposal made by Ambassador Korry (Ethiopia) struck the President as worthy of consideration. The Ambassador recommended that the US establish a continent-wide telecommunications system for Africa utilizing a telecommunications satellite. Korry’s proposal came to the President’s attention by way of a letter from the Ambassador to the President and an Embassy telegram (attached). 2 If, in fact, the cost of such a telecommunications set-up would only be in the area of $10 million, the President considers this “nominal” in view of the potential advantageous continent-wide impact. I informed Bill that AID is currently doing a study on this subject. Bill asked me to inform AID that the President wanted to see the results of the AID study and recommendations as soon as possible. 2. Tanzania-Zambia Railroad Study —The President has come around to the point of view that the US should cooperate with the British in doing a survey of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad. However, this involves no commitment on the part of the US to construct a railroad. 3. African “Problems on the Horizon ”—The President is aware that we are in no real trouble in Africa at present. However, he is anxious to be kept informed of the “problems on the horizon.” Bill asked for a one-page memo for the President on this subject. (Komer-Haynes will prepare and submit for your approval.) 3 4. Presidential Trip to Africa —the President feels that of all the places he would like to visit abroad, perhaps an African visit would pose the least problems and get the greatest return. Bill and I discussed the possible timing of such a trip for the late fall just prior to the convening of the UN General Assembly. Bill stressed that such a trip was still very much in the “thinking stage.” 5. “Soapy’s” Africa Policy Memo —The President has read “Soapy’s” African policy memorandum 4 and his comment was “carry through quickly.” Moyers shares our concern that the memo lacks specifics although no one can argue with the platitudes it contains. Bill urged that we light the fires under AF to get them to move forward with more preventive diplomacy to avert crises. He advised that where State seems to be falling short in protecting and advancing the President’s interests in Africa, the NSC staff should not be reluctant to take the initiative. Bill was also as worried as we that “Soapy’s” recent extended absences (speech-making, etc.) are causing a slow-down of AF momentum. 6. Presidential Pronouncements on African Affairs —Bill agreed that the President was anxious to make his own mark in Africa. Therefore, we should (even on our own initiative) find more opportunities for the President to pronounce himself on matters of interest to Africans. Bob Komer and I will contact the appropriate agencies to get cracking on the President’s request and/or to inform them of his specific interests. Rick Haynes 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Secret. Copies were sent to Komer and Saunders. 2 Not attached. 3 Document 199 . 4 Not found; for the final version, see Document 200 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 199. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 199. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 19, 1965. Our African Affairs . This responds to your request via Bill Moyers. 2 First off, we’ve recovered a good deal from the low point of the Congo paradrop last fall. The back of the Congo rebellion has been broken, though cleaning up may go on for months. More and more African states are beginning to do business with Tshombe. Meanwhile, a surprising number of countries are adopting a more pro-Western stance—Kenya, Guinea, Mali, Uganda, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and now perhaps Algeria. Our biggest problem at the moment is the backlash from Vietnam and Santo Domingo, although our parochial African friends are not too responsive to Communist propaganda on these affairs. Problems on the Horizon. Looking ahead, what will mostly agitate Africans over the next few years will be the “liberation” of the southern third of Africa, which the new African countries regard as their chief unfinished business. In Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, Southwest Africa, and South Africa itself white minority governments are sitting repressively on volcanoes. These issues will provide the chief test of outside sympathy for African aspirations in 1965–70. So I’m convinced that the stance we take toward them will have greater weight in determining our African image and influence than any “Marshall Plan for Africa” or similar grandiose schemes. The Soviets and Chicoms have a big advantage in this competition; they preach violent revolution while trying hard to pin on us guilt by association. This is true in a way. The Azores base makes us chary of seeming too anti-Portuguese, and we and the UK have major investments and trade ties with Rhodesia and South Africa. So we do have assets we could lose. Proposed US Stance . The more we can stay ahead of the game on southern African issues, instead of being dragged reluctantly toward the inevitable, the better we will get along with Africa. In any case we want to press the intransigeant white regimes to modify their repressive policies before there are explosions which the Communists will exploit. Ideally, we want evolution not revolution, which will minimize the likelihood of violence and of risk to our assets in the area. The way to start is by a more forthright declaration of US policy, initially in general terms. This can come best from the White House itself. US Aid Policy. Soapy Williams and our country teams all tend to see the African problem too much in terms of US aid. We are already investing about $145 million in economic aid and MAP, and $150 million in food. I don’t see us going up very fast. Nor do I think we’d buy much. The new African countries are mostly in such a primitive state of development, and are so hipped on internecine quarrels that I doubt whether even a massive US investment now would show a commensurate result. In any event, there are more profitable ways to spend our aid money. So I’d argue for only a gradual increase in US aid, with concentration on such dramatic impact projects as the communications satellite idea (if it proves feasible). Tactical Disengagement from the Bad Guys . Our Africanists tend to run too fast after the radical Africans. They overstate the risks to us from a degree of Chicom or Soviet influence in certain countries. Our experience to date has been that most African states which have tasted the fruits ’of Communist support in the first flush of independence have tended to get a stomach ache (Morocco, Guinea, Mali and Kenya are cases in point). So I’m against rushing in too fast to bail out radical regimes in trouble. Let’s keep a foot in the door everywhere, and let’s be decently responsive where opportunity offers, but let these wayward countries come to us rather than courting them too eagerly. The above is the bare bones outline of what I see as a sensible new policy toward Africa. I’d lay heaviest stress on deliberately showing greater sympathy for the remaining independence movements, even if it breaks some crockery. A few rousing speeches will buy us more than $200 million in aid. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11. Secret. A June 21 covering memorandum from Bundy to the President states that this summary of the African problem was worth reading. Bundy added that his only reservation concerned the memorandum’s endorsement of “Presidential noisemaking” about the Portuguese and the South Africans, commenting, “I think we have to be very careful with this and speak much more in sorrow than in anger.” (Ibid.) 2 See Document 198 . 200. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 200. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 17, 1965. SUBJECT Strengthened African Program Background During a conversation in May, the President asked me to review U.S. policy and implementing actions in Africa and to develop a program with which he could be associated personally. As a first step in meeting this request, the idea of a new African program was discussed in some detail at the Chiefs of Mission conferences held in Addis Ababa and Lagos in late May and early June. At those conferences, there was a consensus that U.S. African policy is sound but that some of the programs which implement it should be strengthened. Specifics for inclusion in a new program were discussed, with particular emphasis on the desirability of (1) personal association with Africa on the part of the President, (2) personal association of the President with the principle of self-determination, (3) the use of economic aid to serve political as well as developmental objectives, and (4) the strengthening of our programs in the fields of information and cultural and educational exchange to promote the U.S. and combat Communism. After my return to Washington, a tentative program proposed by AF was reviewed by representatives of interested bureaus of the Department and other agencies. The attached papers are derived from the basic memorandum prepared in the group these representatives formed. Discussion It is fair to say, therefore, that most careful consideration has been given to the specifics of the Strengthened African Program and that not only our ambassadors in the field but also the interested agencies in Washington agree on the need for the new emphases and directions proposed. Strong positions in the areas of African self-determination and economic development are in any event important to support general U.S. policy objectives in Africa. But they are valuable for two other pertinent reasons, first to secure African support or understanding of general U.S. policy objectives such as Chinese representation, Vietnam, etc., and second, to enable the President to create his own African image. These positions will not buy African votes but they will help create the climate of concern in their problems that will permit us to get a hearing and argue our points. Action in these areas, with manifestation of the President’s personal interest through his or the Vice President’s visit and a Presidential speech as recommended, will go far to imprint African policy with the LBJ brand. We would have preferred to avoid recommending increases in the funds devoted to the programs in question. However, after consideration of all of the possibilities offered by resource reallocation and reorganization of effort, it was decided that budget increases would be required in certain critical areas if the proposed strengthening is to take place. Against the background of the great disparity between program budgets for Africa versus those for other underdeveloped areas and the decline in program budgets per country in Africa over the past five years, I feel that these modest increases are fully justified. I would also like to emphasize the fact that military expenditures in Africa are very low, as we would like them to continue to be, and that, as the attached descriptive memorandum on the Strengthened African Program points out: “Relatively modest expenditures now for non-military programs in Africa may well provide an extra dividend in reducing or eliminating the seeds of dissension which otherwise, give rise to the need for large security programs.” In any case, I am convinced that certain of the more significant new directions and emphases which we propose cannot be introduced unless we have additional resources. And, unless we introduce these new directions and emphases into our programs, we cannot strengthen the climate of trust and respect we need in Africa to gain African support for our positions on specific issues in international affairs and to maintain friendly and effective bilateral relations. I think it is clear, therefore, that at least some additional resources are required to permit us to achieve our objectives in Africa. Recommendation That you sign the attached memorandum to the President (Tab 1) and forward it and its enclosures to him. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. Drafted by Williams’ Special Assist-ant, Thomas W. McElhiney, on September 15. Cleared by Bell, USIA Deputy Director of Policy and Plans Burnett Anderson, Trowbridge of Commerce, Frankel, Solomon, Leddy, Walt Rostow, Greenfield, and Lang. 2 See Document 221 . 201. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 201. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 14, 1965. SUBJECT Strengthened African Program Recommendation 2 At your request, Assistant Secretary Williams has undertaken a survey of United States programs in Africa to determine whether they adequately support our policy objectives. Governor Williams’ recommendations in this regard, which I support, are: 1. That high officials of the Administration visit Africa, both on a planned basis to the continent and in connection with visits to other parts of the world. 2. That you make a major speech or speeches associating yourself personally with United States policy and programs in Africa along the lines of the attached draft. 3 3. That you approve in principle the strengthening of our African programs in the fields of: (a) information (pages 10 to 11 of the attached memorandum); 4 (b) educational and cultural exchange (pages 11 to 12 of the attached memorandum); (c) economic aid (pages 13 to 16 of the attached memorandum). AID, USIA and the Department of Commerce concur. The Defense Department concurs in the parts of the memorandum and speech dealing with military assistance and related Defense matters. 5 Discussion The attached memorandum, prepared under Governor Williams’ direction, describes the areas of activity examined, largely on the recommendation of our ambassadors in Africa, but in cooperation with the agencies concerned. There is general agreement that the basic elements of United States African policy are sound. However, it does seem desirable to introduce certain new directions and emphases into the programs which implement policy, particularly if we are to develop in Africa a climate of trust and respect which both produces African support for over-all United States positions on specific issues in international affairs and also serves to maintain effective bilateral relations. In broad perspective, a political and social evolution is envisaged in Africa which would in time significantly extend the area of freedom in the world, thus making our own democratic freedoms more secure. This evolution begins with self-determination—largely achieved, proceeds through the establishment of economic and social conditions which give meaning to nationhood, and ultimately arrives at societies based on genuinely free institutions. If we are to influence this evolution in our own interest, we must first establish a stronger position in Africa by identifying the United States and its leaders, particularly the President, with legitimate African aspirations, and by contributing to the process of development in ways which more effectively convince the Africans of our interest in them. The situation in Africa provides us with a unique opportunity to project American ideas and use American resources in Africa by means which attract attention to and are consistent with our democratic principles, our commitment to an interracial society, and our concern with human welfare. An important aspect of the proposed strengthening of our programs in Africa is that it emphasizes evolutionary, peaceful progress and mutual understanding. In a very real sense, the greater the effectiveness of our non-military programs in contributing to African economic and social development and to developing African attitudes favorable to the West, the less need there will be for large military outlays to resist Communist encroachments (perhaps “Wars of Liberation”) in Africa. This liberal, responsive concept of our relations with Africa would be a particularly appropriate foreign policy counterpart of the Great Society. Our efforts to project this concept abroad would be much more effective and our position in Africa would be considerably strengthened if you would associate yourself publicly with Africa and its aspirations. In Africa, perhaps more than in any other part of the world, relations between governments are viewed as personal relations between leaders. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China recognize this, and top leaders from both have visited Africa. Both also build on this personal high-level attention through programs in the same general categories as ours. Both the Chinese and Russian Communists have over the past year or so stepped up their activities. The action required in this area is a visit to Africa by yourself or the Vice President and a speech or speeches, a suggested draft of which is attached. Other new directions and emphases affect our programs in the fields of information, cultural and educational exchange, and economic aid. While the content of these programs will in general remain the same, they will be used more extensively and effectively. This will require additional funds, but the amounts involved have been kept to the absolute minimum. Even with the relatively modest increases recommended, expenditures for programs in Africa will still be considerably less than for any one of the other four geographic areas. We are convinced, in any case, that in Africa small increases would bring substantial returns. I agree with Governor Williams that the general strengthening of our programs in the fields of information, cultural and educational exchange, and economic aid is needed and should be undertaken particularly to reinforce the benefits we would derive from your association with Africa. The budget increases to permit this strengthening are now estimated at $1.5 million for USIA in Fiscal Year 1966, and $1.7 million for the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in Fiscal Year 1967. In the economic aid program, there would be no increase stemming directly from the Strengthened African Program as such. What would be involved is primarily a shifting of priorities and a reallocation of funds within the limits of the total of $263 million in Fiscal Year 1967, which AID has already been considering for its request to the Congress without reference to the Program. This would be $40 million higher than the amount requested of the Congress for Fiscal Year 1966. The planned United States financing of $20 million in loan projects through the African Development Bank and such humanitarian projects as the measles inoculation program, both mentioned in the attached draft speech, would be covered by Fiscal Year 1966, tentatively planned Fiscal Year 1967, or subsequent year funds If the $40 million increase already being considered is not provided, however, the shifting of priorities envisaged under the Program could not take place without serious damage to on-going projects I would not interpret your approval in principle of the strengthening of our African programs as committing the Executive Branch to these figures. However, I would assume that your approval carried with it agreement to proceed with requests for budget increases of this general order of magnitude for these three programs. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. 2 There is no indication on the source text whether the President approved or disapproved these recommendations. 3 Not printed. 4 Not printed. 5 On September 17, Deputy Assistant Secretary Lang sent Williams the Defense Department comments which read: “The Defense Department has reservations about whether the speech will further the principal objective of achieving a peaceful, evolutionary solution to the southern African problem, or have the opposite effect of widening the breach.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 092 Africa) 202. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 202. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 23, 1965, 6:30 p.m. Attached are Soapy Williams’ package proposals for a Strengthened African Program , endorsed by Secretary Rusk. 2 You will recall that this is what you “asked” Soapy for last spring. We have held it up briefly, so as not to burden you with what is regrettably rather a mouse. The chief trouble with his package is that it doesn’t have much focus or go far enough. It would simply beef up slightly our existing aid and info programs, and call for high level visits and a speech by you. But we doubt that such measures, necessarily spread over 36 countries, add up to a bold new program Neither a little more aid nor more high level massage—desirable as these are—go to the heart of the problem. In our judgment the success of US policy and the extent of US influence will depend primarily on the position we take on those political issues of overriding interest to the Africans themselves . Over the coming years these issues will inevitably be those of clearing the remaining vestiges of colonialism from the southern third of Africa—Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, and South Africa itself. As is already clear from the ruckus over Rhodesia, these are the issues which Africans themselves will regard as the prime test of who’s with them and who isn’t. Vietnam, South Asia, or Berlin are far away, but these African issues are seen by Africans as an intimate part of their own struggle for independence of colonialism. Moreover, each of them has racial overtones of black vs. white, so arouse great African suspicions. Without debating all the pros and cons of a positive US policy on these issues (it has many real costs), we can’t escape one basic point—African majority rule is sooner or later inevitable and we ought to be on the winning side. The battle was really lost when two-thirds of Africa became independent; the completion of the process is historically inevitable. It will be painful, but there’s no stopping it (except perhaps in South Africa for a time). There are other reasons too. As Arthur Goldberg keeps pointing out, we need the 36 African UN votes, and these 36 countries will be looking more at where we stand than at what we give them. They won’t be responsive to the case for gradualism, but will be quick to ask whether US opposition to racism at home is also our policy abroad. Such questions are also likely to be asked increasingly by civil rights groups here at home. Finally, we are in competition with the Soviets and Chinese, who will jump to exploit too much US waffling on these issues. Thus, we’d argue that the best and cheapest way to advance US interests in Africa would be a clear US stance on the southern third of Africa. Even so, we see merit in the three recommendations outlined in Rusk’s memo (which summarizes Soapy’s longer memorandum—also attached but not necessary to read). These are (1) more high level visits; (2) an African speech by you; and (3) somewhat increased info, exchange, and aid programs. The added cost would be only $1.5 million for USIA in FY 1966; $1. 7 million for State (CU) in FY 1967 and $263 million for AID in FY 1967 (some $40 million more than this year). If you agree in principle with both Rusk and us, but don’t wish to sign on to specific dollar levels, we suggest the device of the memo to Rusk at Tab 1. 3 Charlie Schultze is satisfied with the phrase “subject to usual budget review.” Or if you prefer, we can just give this package the silent treatment. R.W. Komer 4 Memorandum approved Do a more positive approval 5 Hold up on this 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Secret. 2 See Document 201 . 3 See Document 203 . 4 Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 5 President Johnson checked the first two options. 203. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk 203. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 28, 1965. SUBJECT Strengthened African Program I have read with interest the Strengthened African Program which you sent to me on 14 October, 2 and am generally in accord with your three specific recommendations, subject to the usual budget review. However, I feel that the prime determinant of US influence in Africa will be the stance the US takes on those political issues of primary concern to the Africans themselves. US concern for African problems must be demonstrated by actions, and in terms, which will have an immediate appeal to the people of Africa. Therefore, I request the State Department, in cooperation with other appropriate agencies, to submit recommendations by 15 December 1965 on: (a) Strengthening the proposed speech to restate more forcefully US support of independence and majority rule in Africa, perhaps using Rhodesia as a case in point; (b) A proposal for an occasion when such a speech should be made; and (c) Other actions which can be taken to help toward peaceful solution to the problems of self-determination in Southern Africa. 3 Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. 2 Document 201 . 3 A handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text indicates that the memorandum was sent on November 29. 204. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control (Barber) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Yarmolinsky) 204. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control (Barber) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Yarmolinsky) 1 Washington, November 29, 1965. SUBJECT African Nuclear Free Zone Resolution in United Nations Tomorrow, the United States must vote on a resolution calling for the denuclearization of Africa, which has been drafted primarily by African states. Ambassador Yost, calling for Ambassador Goldberg, has said that he believes he can get the first operative paragraph dropped if the US will vote for the resolution. (While the language does not appear troublesome, the resolution, which is reaffirmed, forbids transport of nuclear weapons in the air and seas about the territory of Africa.) Recommendation I recommend that we concur in Ambassador Yost’s proposal. I have referred this to the JCS, who have suggested two changes: 1. Striking the first paragraph. This is the condition for US acceptance. 2. Delete the words “or deploying” in paragraph 5. Reason: To avoid implication of interference with transit rights. Discussion I believe this point can be made quite clear in the US policy statement; to wit: we interpret the word “deploy” to mean the permanent stationing of nuclear weapons in the area. As Mr. Vance has indicated that he wished to reserve judgment on this matter until the issue became clearer, you may wish to call him on it. I would appreciate an answer before we close tonight. 2 Arthur Barber 3 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 388.3 Africa. Secret. A typed notation on the source text reads: “Mr. McNaughton has seen.” 2 A handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text reads: “Mr. Vance approved (29 Nov. 65).” 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Barber signed the original. 205. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 205. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, December 1, 1965. JCSM–849–65 SUBJECT Denuclearization of Africa (U) 1. (U) Reference is made to an oral request by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff related to a proposed UN resolution calling for the denuclearization of Africa. 2. (U) An analysis of the operative paragraphs of the resolution shows generally four proposed actions: a. Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 call upon all UN members to refrain from testing, storing, using, or deploying nuclear weapons in Africa. b. Paragraphs 2 and 3 endorse a treaty under UN auspices whereby African states will undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. c. Paragraph 6 urges UN members possessing nuclear weapons and capabilities not to transfer nuclear weapons or technology to any state which may be used to assist that state in manufacturing or using nuclear weapons in Africa. d. Paragraph 7 expresses the hope that African states will initiate studies to implement denuclearization of Africa and to take the necessary measures through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to achieve this end. 3. (S) [ 7-½ lines of source text not declassified ] [ 2 paragraphs (32 lines of source text) not declassified ] 4. (U) It is not clear to the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether all aspects of an NFZ in Africa are covered by the UN declaration. However, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the reasons set forth above, that the denuclearization of Africa as contained in the proposed resolution would not be in the security interest of the United States and should be opposed. It is recognized that political considerations may not warrant active US opposition to the UN resolution. In such an eventuality, it is recommended that the United States abstain from voting on this resolution. 2 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 3 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 388.3 Africa. Secret. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “Mr. McNaughton has seen.” 2 On December 1, the U.N. First Committee approved the proposed draft resolution without change by a roll-call vote of 105 (including the United States) to 0 with 3 abstentions. On December 3, by a vote of 105 (including the United States) to 0 with 2 abstentions (France and Portugal), the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 2033 (XX) endorsing the July 21, 1964, OAU declaration on the denuclearization of Africa. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 369–370. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. 206. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 206. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, December 23, 1965. SUBJECT Strengthened African Program Background On October 14 you sent to the President a memorandum, 2 prepared in AF, making three recommendations for strengthening our programs in Africa. These recommendations were: (1) that high officials of the Administration visit Africa, (2) that he make a speech associating himself personally with U.S. policy and programs along the lines of an attached draft, and (3) that our information, educational and cultural exchange, and economic aid programs be strengthened along specified lines. In a memorandum dated November 28 3 the President expressed general accord with these recommendations but requested recommendations for: (a) strengthening the proposed speech, (b) an occasion for making it, and (c) other actions which can be taken to help towards peaceful solution to the problems of self-determination in southern Africa. Discussion AF has consulted other interested bureaus and Departments and arrived at agreed recommendations. These are submitted in the form of a memorandum from you to the President with three attachments: (a) a revised draft of the proposed speech, (b) a memorandum on an occasion for its delivery, and (c) a memorandum on other actions that can be taken vis-a-vis the southern African problem. Clearances are shown on each attachment. During the course of our consultations a number of suggestions were made, particularly with regard to other possible actions, on which considerably more discussion would have been required to reach agreed positions. They were therefore not included in our recommendations. I propose, however, to submit further recommendations on southern Africa at a later date. In this connection, much will, of course, depend on developments in the Southern Rhodesia problem. Recommendation That you sign the attached memorandum to the President. Attachment Washington, undated. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson SUBJECT Strengthened African Program Recommendations In response to the requests contained in your memorandum of November 28, Assistant Secretary Williams has submitted the following recommendations, with which I concur, for strengthening our programs in Africa: 1. The proposed speech has been revised to restate more forcefully US support of independence and majority rule in Africa. A copy of the revised speech is enclosed. 4 2. It is recommended that, circumstances permitting, you consider making the speech on the occasion of Lincoln’s birthday, February 12, 1966. A memorandum on this subject is enclosed. 3. Recommendations for other actions to help towards peaceful solutions to the problems of self-determination in southern Africa are contained in the enclosed memorandum. They call for actions in the fields of education for southern Africans, assistance to the former High Commission Territories, assistance to the victims of apartheid, and contingency planning for South West Africa. AID and USIA concur in these recommendations. Dean Rusk 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. Drafted on December 10 by Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs Curtis C. Strong. 2 Document 201 . 3 Document 203 . 4 None of the attachments is printed. President Johnson made his first speech on Africa on May 26, 1966; see Document 211 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 207. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to Secretary of State Rusk 207. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 5, 1966. SUBJECT Opportunities in the New African Situation Facts Within the past nine months there have been seven military take-overs of political power in Africa (Algeria, June 19, 1965; Congo, November 25; Dahomey, December 28; CAR, January 1, 1966; Upper Volta, January 3; Nigeria, January 15; and Ghana, February 24). In almost every case the younger officers have joined with experienced officials to eliminate a layer of politicians who were either corrupt or ineffective. This new generation of leadership displays more idealism, while also being more pragmatic. It is strongly nationalist without greater xenophobia. It is seeking greater efficiency without necessarily being more dictatorial. Ghana, the scene of the most recent take-over, illustrates this change most clearly. Results The inevitable confusion of this transformation has obscured the significant results. They include: (1) Greater concentration on internal economic and political development. (2) Lesser interest in foreign adventures, especially extra-African issues. (3) Stronger endorsement of honesty in government, and a corresponding lower tolerance of corruption. (4) Greater emphasis on competence, especially in the field of governmental activities. (5) Stronger emphasis on national integrity, with growing antipathy toward Soviet and Chinese subversive activities. (6) Less emotional atmosphere in some cases, permitting more practical cooperation with the former metropoles and the United States. These immediate results all favor our own interests in Africa. We should not, however, be misled into thinking that this new atmosphere will necessarily produce long-term improvement. (1) The new leadership in itself cannot solve the problems facing these new nations. They will remain. Budgets cannot be balanced overnight; economic development is not the automatic consequence of good intentions; external subversion will not cease because communist missions leave a few countries. (2) Although the pendulum of this change has swung in our direction, there is no assurance that the motion will not be reversed if the basic problems remain untouched. Politics, as Walt Rostow observed in his paper of January 26 on The Politics of Development, will continue to assume the form of contention among competing pressure groups, and it is only a matter of time before this occurs in these African states. Economic, educational and social well-being will continue to be the goal of the African people, and frustration of these aspirations could cause another shift in political power. In such instance, the pendulum can only swing away from us. The long-range threat of Communist China, which you often stress, will again be an immediate problem in Africa. (3) The irreducible fact remains that African nations will continue to need significant external assistance. The additive of recent events is a new coalition of forces which displays greater realism in facing up to economic difficulties. These leaders are instinctively more open to sound advice from Western governments or international organizations, such as the IBRD and the Fund. Although continuing to be thoroughly African in their world outlook, they are more prepared to minimize or cut ties with Communist countries. Conclusions While the military take-overs may change the power structure of these nations, they do not invalidate either the need for rapid economic and social development or the general goals of our assistance programs. Thus the Strengthened African Program, which in accordance with the President’s suggestion is being revised and is coming to you soon, remains valid. These African nations illustrate in a very particular form the general fear expressed by George Woods in the January issue of Foreign Affairs that the industrialized world might fumble its chance to respond effectively to the underdeveloped world. From every country where a military take-over has occurred, we have received urgent pleas for assistance, which in the aggregate may not be very large but which if deployed rapidly could have significant effect. If we miss the opportunity which recent developments present to capitalize on this new wave of nationalism, idealism and efficiency, we face the real danger of seeing the present atmosphere go sour and of having gained little or nothing from the opportunity presented to us. By contrast, it seems to us that our task is to create an atmosphere in the US Government and elsewhere which by matching the atmosphere in Africa will serve our interests both immediately and in the long-run. An effective initiative on our part will, of course, cost us some money. We urge that this fact be recognized at the highest levels of our government and by the heads of agencies directly concerned. We do not, however, urge a go-it-alone attitude by the United States, or by any one of its agencies. We would recommend, instead, a major attempt to diversify the effort. For example: (1) A.I.D. should be prepared to expand its efforts in these countries. Public safety, transportation, education and selected capital developments appear possibilities. (2) Food for Peace could be more widely used in cases of need and more broadly used as an instrument of economic development. (3) International organizations, especially the Bank and the Fund, should be urged to expand their advice and loans. (4) The European powers should be hit hard to seize the present opportunities to invest in loan and grant assistance to these African nations. (5) The Peace Corps should expand its efforts, especially in Francophone states. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFR. Secret. Drafted by Director of the Office of Inter-African Affairs Fred L. Hadsel and cleared by Rostow. Copies were sent to U, G, and M. The source text bears Rusk’s initials, indicating that he read it. 208. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 208. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 10, 1966. Outlook in Africa . Aside from the looming black-white issue already on us in the southern third of Africa, our African affairs are moving along quite well. Military coups like those in Ghana and Nigeria are not really a matter of civilians vs. military, but of a dynamic educated element of the new African societies getting fed up with the ineptitude or posturing (or both) of the original leaders of these young countries. Telescoping the historical experience of the older nations of the world, the new nations of Africa are ending the first phase of their modern history. It was one of great popular euphoria—sparked by the end of colonialism and the beginning of independence. Hopes and aspirations were high. The military coups of 1965–66 in Algeria, Dahomey, Upper Volta, the Central African Republic, Nigeria and Ghana signal the beginning of the second phase of modern African history. This latest phase is born of frustrated hopes and aspirations, and disappointment with the performance of the independence leaders. While most of the coups, especially that in Ghana, are a distinct plus for us, there are dangers too because the military coup has left something of a political vacuum in each of the affected countries. The officer corps may in many cases be unable to meet a payroll any better than their predecessors. So it is premature for the US to clap its hands in glee. Nor is it safe to assume that opposition to pro-Communist leanings on the part of leaders like Ben Bella or Nkrumah played a central role in their overthrow. In every case it was primarily internal conditions that caused the coups. In a real sense, this new phase in Africa is a healthy one, because the dreams and myths which accompanied independence are being replaced by the realization that austerity and hard work are required for survival. The problem is to get this notion across to the masses of African people without dashing their faith in their new leadership. Our interest is to encourage internal political stability and enough forward movement in Africa to keep it from becoming a Moscow or Peiping playground, while limiting our own investment in favor of other more critical areas. This seems to me quite feasible, provided we don’t get caught on the wrong side of the Rhodesia, Portuguese, and South Africa issues which will essentially determine African attitudes toward the great powers over the next 2–5 years. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Confidential. 209. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 209. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 20, 1966, 3:30 p.m. Attached is a draft of remarks 2 which State suggests you make at your Thursday, May 26, reception for the Ambassadors of the 36-member Organization of African Unity (OAU). (May 25 is the OAU’s third anniversary.) We have revised the remarks for style and agree with the substance. Your remarks at the reception would (a) get across to Africans, who tend to feel ignored, your personal interest in their welfare, (b) kick off a new US policy initiative in accord with your instruction to us. The proposed approach is as follows: Part I states those principles of the OAU Charter which we share in common with the Africans; Part II cites the developmental progress in Africa to which the US has made a substantial contribution; Part III , holds out the promise of expanded U. S. assistance in the areas of regional economic development, education, health, and satellite communications; Part IV announces that the US has begun studies of a new multi-national approach to aid for Africa and will shortly be consulting with African and other governments, as well as with international agencies. 3 I have the agreement of the Bureau of the Budget to this initiative. If you approve USIA will make a color film of the entire reception (most of the African Ambassadors will be in colorful national dress) for African consumption. Approve 4 Disapprove See me— Following your launching of this revitalized US initiative in Africa, State will be systematically enlisting the ideas and support of the various African governments as well as the governments of the UK, France, Belgium, Italy, West Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Japan and Israel, among others, in this new multi-national cooperative aid effort. In addition, similar contacts will be made with the World Bank, African Development Bank, the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic Community of Eastern Africa and other African regional groupings. We established that serious staff work on this project could only be effectively done—here in the government, with consultants, and abroad—after a kick-off of this kind. It gives you a powerful political initiative, with time in hand to figure out what it will cost and who will pay. Walt Remarks approved 5 Remarks disapproved See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3, 4/2/66–5/26/66. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Mr. President—State Dept draft of address seems long to me and needs editing by Moyers. K—5/20. 2 Not printed. 3 On April 23, Rostow sent Secretary Rusk a memorandum reporting on a review of various foreign policy problems with President Johnson. In this, he noted: “The President wants as soon as possible a design for an African alliance for progress, perhaps involving the expenditure of several hundred million dollars over some years.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Vietnam, April-July 1966) 4 This option is checked. 5 This option is checked with a question mark, and a handwritten notation reads: “Must be cut.” 210. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All African Posts Except Pretoria 210. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All African Posts Except Pretoria 1 Washington, May 25, 1966–6:48 p.m. 2325. 1. At reception for OAU, Ambassadors Washington, May 26, President expected to make statement concerning Africa (text in wireless file) which designed achieve five principal purposes: a. Identification of US with basic African aspirations. b. Encouragement of African efforts meet African problems, especially economic and social development. c. Special note of African regional and subregional efforts. d. Outline of fields where US already prepared take initiative if Africans so desire: regional organizations, trained manpower and education, health and telecommunications. e. Invitation in general sense to Africans and other friendly governments examine anew their present and future efforts and announcement of US plan reappraise and strengthen its own efforts in Africa. 2. Begin FYI: Statement is calculated balance among several important considerations. a. Need for identification with Africans in areas of constructive economic and social development. b. Desire to identify certain initiatives that US can take if Africans so desire without arousing expectations that cannot be met. c. Importance of encouraging further efforts by other friendly nations and international organizations. d. Intention to initiate inquiry within US, both on implementation of immediate initiatives and redirection of policy and programs. Without anticipating outcome this inquiry, President’s remarks regarded as first step, and he or other high-level spokesman may make follow-up statement later in year. 3. Inquiry which is beginning immediately will be directed by Ambassador Edward Korry. His staff will be made up of both government officers and outside consultants. We cannot yet foresee exact timing or nature of report to President. End FYI. 4. Department desires President’s statement be brought to attention of highest levels you deem appropriate of government to which you accredited in manner best calculated to elicit interest and response within framework of considerations mentioned paragraph 2 above. If feasible, make approach on May 27. 5. Report reactions. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 US/Johnson. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Hadsel; cleared by NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies, AID/AFR Assistant Administrator Edmond C. Hutchinson, and Bromley Smith. Approved and initialed by Palmer. Repeated to Pretoria, USUN, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. 211. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Moyers) to President Johnson 211. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Moyers) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 26, 1966, 3:10 a.m. Mr. President: This is your first speech on Africa. 2 It is an effort to lay the foundation for a Johnson Doctrine for Africa. Even so, it is only 2003 words. I have sought help in ideas and language from such eminent authorities as Walt Rostow, Lady Jackson (who is in Cambridge, Mass. this week), Waldemar Neilson of the African-American Institute in New York, and others. I am not sure what domestic play it will get, but I can assure you—it will be big news throughout the world if Section One is permitted to stand. This is the Section that deals with self-determination, Rhodesia, racial inequality in Africa, etc. There is no new policy in it, but this will be the first time the President will have spoken out on the issue. As such, that makes it good news. Except in South Africa and Rhodesia and other outposts of injustice, it will splash big headlines. As you know, I think it is important to speak out this once on the subject for foreign policy reasons as well as for its impact on the civil rights people at home; it is a cheap way to keep them quiet on at least one issue. There is also another reason. Bobby Kennedy goes to South Africa next week. He will try to get ahead of you on the question of political liberty for Negro Africans. Your speech preempts the stage. I think it would be wrong for us simply to offer economic assistance and material aid while Kennedy trots off making hay on the intangible issue of the rights of man. The attached speech is reasonable and restrained, but it will nonetheless make it difficult for Bobby to get far ahead of you on this issue. I am giving copies to Rostow for clearance with State. Frankly, I wish we could come out harder and more concretely on the Rhodesian thing. Bill Moyers 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. 4, 3/6–5/66. No classification marking. 2 For text of Johnson’s speech on May 26, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 556–560. The President delivered the address at a White House reception observing the third anniversary of the formation of the Organization of African Unity. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 212. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 212. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, June 8, 1966. SUBJECT Check List of African Problems 1. President Senghor of Senegal’s State Visit in early July. a) US Ambassador to Senegal, Mercer Cook, has resigned in disgust over US aid policies toward Senegal; he may pose a problem during the State Visit; b) Senegal’s use of US aid has not been very effective; c) Senghor (who has a French wife and a chateau in Normandy) is much more of a Frenchman than an African; he is very sophisticated and also sensitive to slights of protocol. 2. The unresolved Rhodesian independence crisis could provoke all sorts of unreasonable responses in Black Africa (e.g., withdrawals from the Commonwealth, breaking of diplomatic relations with HMG) if it is not resolved soon to the satisfaction of Africans. Meanwhile, the critical position of Zambia in this political drama is important to watch. 3. Continuing Problems : a) Nigeria —The US has its largest AID investment in this country which is plagued by a combination of problems such as an inefficient and unpopular military government, tribalism, unemployment, inflation, etc. b) Uganda —Prime Minister Obote is ruthlessly consolidating his totalitarian administration. Internal dissension is probable for some time to come. c) Congo (L) —The Congo’s problems have never been licked because of the pitiful lack of human resources. 2 General Mobutu is the latest in a series of disastrous Congolese leaders. His heavy-handed rule has made him very unpopular with both Congolese and Belgians (especially Belgian commercial interests); his days are numbered. d) Ghana —The post-coup economic rehabilitation of Ghana is a major preoccupation. The prospects for success are very good thanks to the high calibre of those who succeeded N’Krumah, backed up by a first-rate civil service to provide continuity and expertise. 4. The Steady Nuisances : a) Guinea —Haven for N’Krumah and persistent exponent of radicalism in Africa, Guinea is threatened from within by a serious lack of economic development and from without by coup plots supported by her more moderate neighbors. US aid to Guinea is under constant attack by the moderates of francophone Africa. b) Mali —For more than a year Mali has been wavering between the Free World and Communist Bloc camps. The Chicoms are present in great numbers and the Soviets are running a close second. Mali’s economy is a mess and may provide the necessary push to re-enter the moderate francophone African world which is shored up by France. c) Tanzania —Under the mercurial and fiercely independent leadership of Nyerere, Tanzania is the bastion of radicalism in East Africa. Soviet and Chicom influence is considerable, especially in Zanzibar. d) Congo (B) —Soviets, Chicoms and Cubans are the major foreign influence in Congo (B). 3 The US has withdrawn its Embassy staff after constant harassment of US officials and nationals. There are some signs of an internal power struggle. However, none of the elements in this struggle is likely to produce anything to please us. e) Burundi —This “perpetual itch” is important as it offers one of the surest jumping off points for Chicom penetration of Africa. The US Ambassador has been recalled and an Embassy official PNG-ed. Our relations are poor. 5. On the Horizon : a) South West Africa —This sleeper has been with us for so long that there is a tendency to ignore it. However, the decision of the International Court of Justice in the case involving South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa is due at any moment. It will be a very big issue at the UN and one in which it will be to the US advantage to assume a role of leadership. b) Apartheid in South Africa —Progress in Civil Rights in the US contrasted with retrenchment in race relations in South Africa imposes a heavy burden on the USG when apartheid is discussed at the UN. Senator Kennedy’s current visit to South Africa offers a unique, if difficult, opportunity for the USG to encourage the development of liberal sentiment in South Africa. c) The Last Wave of Independence in Africa will occur with independence in late 1966 and early 1967 for each of the High Commission Territories (Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland) and the Indian Ocean Island of Mauritius. All come into the family of nations with problems of viability. However, Basutoland’s problems are the greatest as the territory is an enclave completely surrounded by South Africa. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Haynes Memos. Confidential. 2 Congo (L) refers to the Republic of the Congo (formerly the Belgian Congo) with its capital at Leopoldville. 3 Congo (B) refers to the People’s Republic of the Congo (formerly the French Congo) with its capital at Brazzaville. 213. National Intelligence Estimate 213. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, July 7, 1966. NIE 60–1–66 THE RADICAL WEST AFRICAN STATES The Problem To assess the nature of West African radicalism as exemplified in Guinea, Mali, and Congo (Brazzaville) and the prospects over the next few years. Conclusions A. The radical or moderate character of a West African state depends essentially on the inclinations of the man or group of men at the top. West African radicalism, though influenced by Communist policies and practices, is vague in doctrine. It is characterized by strong distrust of the West, and a tendency to follow extreme means to reduce dependence on former metropoles. (Paras. 1–5, 10) B. The radical cause in West Africa is now at a low ebb. Ghana’s virtual bankruptcy has been revealed after Nkrumah’s overthrow. Sekou Toure of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali in particular have severely strained their economies by mismanagement, are unable to sustain revolutionary zeal among the populace, and do not fully trust their armies. Nevertheless, though they require Western aid, their devotion to militant radicalism and their affinity for the Communists remain unshaken. (Paras. 6–9, 13, 23) C. The political future of the present radical regimes is no more secure than that of their moderate neighbors. Each is vulnerable to sudden military coups or popular turmoil, or some combination thereof. But, even the downfall of all present radical regimes in West Africa would not mean the disappearance of radicalism. All West African states are so fragile and face such formidable problems that the lure of radical solutions will continue to have great appeal. In time the failures of today’s radicals (and Nkrumah) will be forgotten, and some others who rise to power in West Africa will follow a similar path. Indeed, African states now considered to be moderate could quickly become radical by a change of the small governing elite. (Paras. 14–16) D. Probably the most worrisome aspect for the US and the West will be the extent to which the radical Africans will be willing to collaborate with the Communists in subversive activity against moderate states, and in aid to certain of the “liberation” groups which are already susceptible to Communist blandishments. (Paras. 11–12, 22, 27) E. Though Moscow and Peking do not work in tandem, they consider the current crop of West African radical leaders as useful, if uncertain, collaborators. Despite occasional setbacks, the Communist states have acquired an influential position in these countries. The heavy influx of Communist arms and advisors, particularly to Congo (Brazzaville), gives the Communists a base from which to exploit political turmoil elsewhere in Africa. (Paras. 17–22, 27) [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on July 7. 214. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 214. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, July 13, 1966. WWR SUBJECT Progress Report on African Initiatives As you know, the key to the action program announced in the President’s speech is the report of Ed Korry’s task force. 2 Korry says he will have the report for us early next week . As of yesterday, he was beating the recommendations into shape, out had quite a lot left to do. But the fundamental recommendations are clear. I would summarize them as follows: 1. U.S. policy and aid activities in Africa are severely hampered and dissipated by the sheer number of independent bilateral activities. Duplication, overlapping, inability and unwillingness of donors to work together, etc., have confused issues and diluted aid benefits. Thus, Korry’s basic conclusion—which he has discussed at length with George Woods—is that the U.S. and other donors should put the great bulk of their African chips behind the World Bank . Specifically: —The Bank should create a standing group on Africa, with general responsibility for planning and organizing the financing of transport, communication, and power projects. This could be an adaptation of the existing Bank consultative groups on Nigeria and Tunisia. Its first job would be to bring some order to the rash of existing and projected feasibility studies in this area. —The Bank should set up a Rural Research and Development Institute for Africa as a central organ for studying agricultural problems, developing projects, organizing financing, and generally dealing with the overwhelming African problem—agricultural backwardness. —The Bank should create a special fund for Africa, either by earmarking part of the IDA replenishment (as you know, Woods is pushing for a quadrupling of the IDA), or through a private arrangement with the donors that a certain percentage of IDA money would go to Africa. 2. In our bilateral programs, AID should pay relatively more attention to the functional problems of sub-regions (e.g. post-primary education, dry land agriculture, etc.), and relatively less to individual programs in each country. 3. In addition, Korry will have some things to say about the rules which govern AID, the major issues of U.S. commercial policy toward Africa (commodity agreements, trade preferences, etc. ) and the various proposals to expand U.S. private investment in the region. This is not his professional cup of tea, and it looks now as though he will confine himself to passing statements on most of these subjects, with perhaps a stronger pitch on the restrictions which our balance of payments program puts on AID operations. The key to the suggestions involving the World Bank is getting the other major donors—France, Germany, U. S., Belgium, the African Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and the UN Development Program—to agree to use the Bank as the central funnel of aid and source of leverage on local economic policy. There are three basic problems to be dealt with: (1) The tendency of donors to flounder around independently— applying different economic criteria, refusing to accept each others feasibility studies. etc., (2) The resulting tendency of the Africans to play the donors off against one another, and (3) The extreme scarcity of reasonable projects and African capacity to develop them. In my view, the Bank is the most competent organization to take on these problems and Korry’s is not a bad blueprint. Chances of the French joining the crowd are not particularly good, but even a union of everybody else would be a great step forward. The critical element will be getting Woods out in front with our clear backing, but his clear leadership . Involvement of the President will almost certainly be required and it will probably cost us a large increase in contributions to IDA (though no new appropriations until FY 1969). The recommendation on bilateral programs is the fuzziest of Korry’s points, primarily because he has not really made up his mind where he wants to draw the bilateral-multilateral line. His position may reduce to a simple repetition of the new emphasis on health, education and agriculture. I have been pushing him to go further and identify priority areas within sectors (e.g. what kind of agriculture, what level of education, etc. ), to set the stage for multi-country programs which make administrative and economic sense and promote a basis for political regionalism. He seems to be moving in this direction. If he does a thorough job, we will have a basis for levering AID out of its current rut. (None of this denies the fundamental proposition of AID country programming that there are basic differences in cultures, economies, and political tradition which should be reflected in AID policy. It does reflect a belief that in Africa the similarities between four or five countries are frequently greater than the differences, and that a common approach often better serves our political objectives than disparate individual ones.) I have told Korry that—and perhaps eventually the President—will want to meet with him after you have read the report. He will, of course, stay in town as long as he is needed. If the report is on time, I would suggest a Rostow-Korry session the middle of next week, for which I will furnish you a suggested action timetable. Beyond the Korry exercise, AID is pushing ahead with other things the President referred to—measles/smallpox eradication, communications satellite ground stations, and centers of excellence in higher education—as well as the usual run of projects (e.g., last week’s Finchaa Dam, our largest project)—and the largest dam—in Ethiopia. I can give you specific reports on those fronts whenever you like. EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. No classification marking. 2 President Johnson announced the formation of the task force, under the chairmanship of Edward Korry, Ambassador to Ethiopia, during his May 26 address (see Document 211 ). The task force was to review U.S. development policies and programs in Africa. 215. Report of the Task Force on the Review of African Development Policies and Programs 215. Report of the Task Force on the Review of African Development Policies and Programs 1 Washington, July 22, 1966. POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 1. U.S. relations with Africa are distinctly different from those with other regions of the world. The ties that link us are many and significant; they will grow in the future. We hear the voice of Africa in world affairs, a voice with increasing insistence and power in the United Nations where there will soon be 39 African states addressing themselves to such thorny issues as Rhodesia, Southwest Africa, South Africa, the Portuguese colonies—and Viet Nam. We hear it amplifying via such organizations of poor-nation protest as UNCTAD, through the International Coffee Agreement and similar channels. We hear it within the context of race differences in our own society. 2. Yet, our relations with Africa are not of the same order as our intimate historic ties with Latin America, our significant strategic interests in Asia or our massive commercial investment in the Near East. Africa, for the most part, is outside the main arenas of U.S. attention and actions in the world. Our primary concern with Africa has been, and will continue to be for some time, to prevent events in the continent from complicating a search, largely conducted elsewhere, for solutions to the problems of war and peace, or from interfering with our central strategic and political preoccupations in other regions. 3. As we successfully deal with these central interests, the locus of our attention shifts increasingly to the problems of the less developed countries (LDCs), where most of the world’s populations and ills are concentrated. To the extent we succeed in containing and moderating Soviet and Communist power in Europe, the more the confrontation between opposing economic systems and ideologies occurs in the LDCs including those in Africa. 4. A huge land mass with a rich potential for production of food and with large stores of the minerals needed to replenish those being depleted elsewhere, Africa will be of growing interest to the United States. This interest will be constantly reinforced by the obligation we increasingly accept to ameliorate the problems caused by the growing gap between rich and poor nations, between population explosion and food scarcity, between white and colored peoples. The black versus white issue is coming to a head now in Southern Africa. 5. Our aid programs for Africa have been limited both qualitatively and quantitatively by the constraints imposed by our more pressing concerns elsewhere in the world and by the history of Africa’s relations with Europe. Within that framework, our programs and policies have been modestly successful. 6. That limited success is due largely to the Africans themselves, to their desire to maintain their independence, to their yearning for material advance, to the general absence of the worst structural rigidities found in other regions, to their openness to innovation and to their tremendous needs. No one can tell how long these advantages will work to our benefit; we must recognize that attitudes and conditions shift rapidly in Africa. 7. In general, we have been following an economic development policy of helping to eliminate obstacles to growth. In theory, at least, we start by determining, on the basis of the best analysis we can make, what the bottlenecks are to development in the particular circumstances that exist in a given African country. If it appears that the country does not itself have the resources to deal with the problem and if assistance is not likely to be forthcoming from any other source, we try to help meet the problem by providing whatever is appropriate—training, technical assistance, surveys, capital assistance or some combination thereof. Where the United States has made a deliberate and well-thought-out decision to embark on a major development effort in a given country, and a consultative group or other coordinating arrangement has been worked out with other donors, this approach makes sense. When applied generally throughout the continent, the approach has caused serious problems: (a) It has necessarily resulted in so-called “scatteration,” that is to say, in our involvement in hundreds of projects dealing with almost every conceivable activity related to development and at many levels. Even where the selection of the bottlenecks and what we do about them has been very skillful, this procedure produces a pattern that is difficult for our Congress, our citizens, and for Africans not directly concerned to understand. (b) While the lack of understanding could perhaps be overcome eventually by a vigorous educational effort, the administrative problems caused by our attempt to deal with the extraordinary variety of requirements found in Africa too often prevent us from being promptly and fully effective. To think through all the implications of each problem, to devise a sound approach and procedures, and to put people on the spot who are both technically qualified to deal with the specific situation and who have the dedication, broad understanding and ability to work well with Africans in a strange environment—these are formidable difficulties. AID is confronted with what, in practice, is an administrative impossibility if high standards of efficiency are set. It has been forced into a highly complex structure with a multiplicity of tasks and heavy administrative overhead. (c) Less crucial, but a factor of real importance, is that the approach used so far is open to abuses that damage the credibility of aid as an objective instrument of development. It is only too easy, when confronted with an African government’s importunities for a show of support or when some specific political problem arises, for the Ambassador or staff in the field to seize the most useful and practicable of the available projects that appeal to the political leadership and press Washington for its acceptance. While no system is proof against abuse, this approach makes the way of the transgressor particularly easy. (d) Perhaps most serious of all is that this way of conducting an aid program is inconsistent with the actual role of the United States and the amount of resources we have been providing—with the exception, once again, of those few countries in which we have undertaken a major commitment for development. With $220 million annually, plus agricultural surpluses, we cannot pretend to conduct economic development programs in 33 countries. If we were the largest aid donor and were spending, say, a billion dollars or more a year, the theory that we should try to provide whatever is lacking—in any field of activity and at any level of development—might be justified. It is not a sound concept given our present, or even a considerably expanded, role in Africa. 8. The strategy of our present aid program, though modified in many practical ways by the experienced professionals in AID, is a reflection of the unrealistic expectations found both in the United States and in Africa as to what our aid to Africa can achieve. Accustomed to the overriding strategic imperatives for the aid efforts associated with the Truman Doctrine and the Alliance for Progress and the impressive results from the Marshall Plan in Europe, many misunderstand our purposes and misjudge what is possible in Africa. 9. This is not to say that either a different approach to African development or a large increase in our present program would begin to meet these exaggerated expectations. The methods now known to us cannot telescope time to close the chasm between developing and developed nations, least of all in Africa. With all good will and with much of the world’s wealth, we cannot hope to achieve quick results and cannot aspire to enforcing nationhood, to willing wealth, to producing educated, stable governments in the near term. 10. We can, however, take advantage of the special character of our relationship with Africa to play a unique role. Unlike the former colonial powers, we do not have persistent or insistent commercial and political interests of primary concern in Africa. We are able, therefore, to view the continent through a longer-term optic. We can, if we wish, be increasingly single-minded in the pursuit of long-range economic development. 11. It is self-evident that the more concentration that can be placed on purely developmental criteria, the sooner Africa will attain a level of development that will permit it to generate a large measure of its own growth, to satisfy the aspirations of its people, to attain a greater measure of stability and independence, and to make its own contribution to meeting the massive problems of the twenty-first century. If we can be sure that our help is efficiently used, there is strong reason to increase the resources we make available. 12. Further, there is no doubt that if we intend to engage in a major economic development effort in Africa, now is the time to do it. African independence is still a recent phenomenon; the desire to retain true independence is still vital; the ties to the West are still strong. Our essentially disinterested posture enables the U.S. to concentrate more effectively its persuasive influence in world and regional organizations, so that greater coordination among donors and with African organizations and countries can be achieved. Greater cooperation among the Western aid-giving nations (and perhaps eventually the Soviet Union and other Communist countries) could provide a reinforcing and multiplying effect that would be advantageous to donors and recipients alike. We must recognize at the same time that the two major European donors—France and the United Kingdom—are unlikely to increase their aid to Africa and will probably reduce it in the years to come. 13. There is another respect in which the fact of recent African independence is a compelling reason for concentrating now on economic development. The development process is hampered by the large number of political entities in Africa; to be effective a development effort must seek actively to reduce the effect of these many arbitrary divisions. With the passage of each year there is increasing danger that political habits and special interests will introduce still greater rigidities. 14. Now is also the time to concentrate on economic development if Africa is to realize its potential as a major producer of foodstuffs in a hungry world. There should be no further delay in getting solutions to the complex and obdurate socio-economic problems of rural development. Better an orderly development effort today than a wasteful crash program in the 1970’s. 15. And now is the time to do it while the absence of overriding political requirements permits us to make and to hold to objective decisions with respect to those geographic areas and functional sectors on which to focus major developmental efforts, to attain particular competence in chosen fields of activity, and to produce measurable achievements. 16. There are thus strong reasons why we should move further in the direction of the most efficient economic development program we can devise, and why in fact we are in a good position to do so. Each of the considerations cited has a bearing on the achievement of greater efficiency—making better use of all the available resources, and not just our own; encouraging regionalism rather than purely national development and making a careful selection of the functional areas having greatest impact and where we have or can develop a particular competence. Each presents distinctive problems and opportunities. 17. All available evidence points to a confusing incoherence by Western donors (and the Africans) in development activities, by a lack of accord on what to survey as propitious investment opportunities, by an unwillingness to accept each other’s data or surveys, by a conflict of trade and commercial policies, by a duplication of effort, by a disparity of doctrinal approaches in the same fields of activity, and by a wasteful dispersal of effort and of resources. Perhaps this incoherence is best seen in the field of agriculture and of rural development—the sector which must generate African development—in which there is, as yet, no institutional framework for the interchange of information and of experience. Because of this and other failures to coordinate, the U.S. has become enmeshed in an unmanageable range of projects in response to pressures emanating from the Africans. It has produced too many U.S. Government technicians in too many fields under too many AID Missions without yielding the dividend of particular competence in any one sector. At the same time, it has led U.S. officials to think in terms of their activities—education, transport, health—in isolation rather than as integral parts that must be fitted into the development process as a whole. 18. Some of the tools for a better coordinated effort have already been forged. Through Consultative Groups under the leadership of the IBID, Western aid to Tunisia and Nigeria has been made more effective. Others are in the process of formation. But Western nations to a great extent still seek to pursue developmental activities within the classical bilateral framework developed to deal with political, military or commercial relations. 19. The use of existing continent-wide organizations is often suggested. Three are in operation in Africa: the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the African Development Bank (ADB) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). This regional trinity will have a significant psychological influence in the formulation of African attitudes and in developing links between Africa and the international community. But it is clear that these three organizations, with weak financial resources and serious political burdens, are severely limited in the responsibilities they can bear at this stage. The OAU is, in the words of its Secretary-General, a mirror of Africa with all its racial, tribal, religious, political and economic divisions. The ADB has only opened its doors for business this month; it has $34,000,000 in its till; it has excluded all non-African membership; and like the OAU and ECA, it is subject to the political pressures of its members. The UNECA is a staff organization without operational authority and with all the predictable problems of an indigent body askewed by its members, barely able to move and uncertain where it wants to go. At some time in the future, each of these organizations will have a better defined role, better cooperation one with the other, and a better relationship with its members. We should seek to strengthen these institutions, but it would be illusory at this stage to depend upon these organizations to perform essential tasks in the developmental process. 20. The question of the fragmentation of the continent into independent micro-states (24 have populations of less than 5 million) presents even greater difficulties. It is a commonplace that Africa’s boundaries are an illogical and largely accidental inheritance from western colonialism, and that many countries are much too small or ill-endowed or both to permit economies of scale and to support the administrative structures competent to meet the problems of independence. If we base our development effort on the requests of individual national governments, understandably concerned with their own constituencies, or on the basis of convenience and simplicity “in order to have someone responsible to deal with,” the result will be to harden present divisions—and, in the very long term, to set back the course of economic development. 21. There are pitfalls, however, in considering rigid groupings of countries as regions. UNECA, for example, has offered one answer in the form of four “sub-regional” groupings for North, East, West and Central Africa. Our examination has led us to doubt very seriously that for the UN or other outside agencies to define extensive geographic entities is the most effective or realistic approach to the complexities of Balkanization. Although African nations have dutifully paid lipservice to the principle, they have rarely implemented any action program geared to the sub-regions drawn by the ECA. Cooperation between or among African states can only be effected if some identity of specific interest with mutual advantage can be established. The areas of such interest vary with the function: rivers may go in one direction, ecologies in another; thus, what may make sense for a cooperative effort in the harnessing of water power may conflict with an undertaking in agricultural development. Similarly, the logic of sub-regional transport systems, of communications links, of health programs, and so on, will demand different combinations of countries until the time arrives when a significant number of African states have achieved a certain level of development, have acquired a certain amount of coordinating experience and have attained a certain degree of political coherence. Examples of premature and unsuccessful efforts to establish artificial customs unions or federations abound in Africa. The Senegal-Mali union in its brief life probably set back the development of each country a number of years; the East African and the Central African Federations, the Guinea-Ghana Union, to mention a few other examples, failed not because of a lack of will or of vision but because of a disregard for the realities of politics, of geography, of development. On the other hand, several African countries—notably Nigeria and Congo (K)—can reasonably be considered “regions” in themselves. 22. Once clear that we must concentrate our aid activities, that we must press hard for those things that produce real economic development and that we must work more closely with others, we come to the question of choosing what we should do. While recognizing that “every choice is an injustice” we must, if we are serious about concentrating our activities and taking advantage of our greatest skills and competencies, be selective. 23. The selection of certain things on which we as a nation should concentrate does not imply that there are not many other useful and important things that can and should be done. But the fact that an eloquent case can be made setting forth a need does not mean that it is the responsibility of the United States to satisfy that need. We are in trouble—with the Congress, with the American public and with high African expectations—because we have not defined our role and because we have unwittingly assumed too many responsibilities in relation to available U.S. resources 24. To decide upon certain sectors to devote our attention does not mean that we should take on the full obligation. For one thing, we must take into account the views of the Africans. However, if we know where we want to go, if we clarify and refine our objectives, if we devise a plan of action and persist in it over an extended period of time, then we can expect to have greater influence on Africans and on other donors, 25. Neither does our selection of a relatively few sectors at the expense of others mean that we are adopting any particular doctrine on development. It is true that a growing body of overly-refined doctrine is being applied to the real and imperfect world of Africa. As a result, we have tended to make unreasonable demands of the Africans. But although we are not challenging development doctrine as such, we are challenging the view that the United States should be deeply involved, in the whole development process of every African country, whether through “partnership” or some other formula for sharing responsibility. Such a commitment may make sense in Latin America—but not in Africa. 26. The first step in defining a role is to make a clear-cut distinction between those of our total aid resources (technical assistance, capital development, “supporting assistance” and most P.L. 480) that we are prepared to devote to development and those that, for political or other reasons, are to be expended without rigorous application of developmental criteria—though the latter should also be used whenever possible for useful economic purposes. A distinction of this kind has already been imposed by legislation between the funds available for military and economic uses and between “supporting assistance” and other aid. A similar quantitative distinction, though not necessarily a legislative one, between economic development and what is usually described as “political” purposes could benefit both and lead to a more rational adaptation of means to achieve the ends desired. 27. This distinction is important first of all in the management of our own resources. If a project being done primarily for political impact loses its effectiveness through delays because we insist on subjecting it to the full, painstaking examination required for determining priority and optimum form for economic development, we are being irrational. We may also damage a sound and important economic development activity by giving it a political load that it is not able to bear. While the kind of “systems analysis” approach applicable to the military establishment cannot readily be transferred to foreign policy decisions for Africa, we believe that we can be much more rigorous in sorting out clearly what are our goals and fitting the means to the end desired. 28. The distinction is also important because of the effect on the Africans of a lack of clarity or seriousness in applying development criteria. We cannot blame African leaders for misapplying their resources if we ourselves blur the distinction between sound economic activities and political expediency, nor can we then be surprised if they return repeatedly for our assistance because of their political motivation. Some funds should be available for political purposes—in circumstances where both parties recognize the political content and the limitations on its amount. But it is essential that the exceptional nature of expenditures of this kind be widely understood, within the governments of the U. S. and the recipient alike, if the dissipation of both our and their resources is not to be increased. 29. For this reason, it is important that the aid allocated strictly for development should be substantially larger than that made available for expenditure under non-development criteria. The exact proportions that the latter should represent can be decided only after the nondevelopment purposes have been re-examined in light of such a separation. It is not within the purview of this report to suggest the other purposes for which U.S. funds should and should not be expended, but we urge that the traditional political and security considerations affecting aid be carefully thought through and that more explicit criteria be worked out than are applied at present. The present practice of using the same generalized “national interest” justifications for political programs, whether they cost $100,000 or $1,000,000, cannot be justified. 30. We should then determine what our human and financial commitments are toward those few countries where we have undertaken either to participate as a full partner in an organized, multinational effort in support of a development plan for a specified period (e.g., Nigeria and Tunisia) or to help achieve some less broad but major economic goal (e.g., economic rehabilitation in the Congo and financial stabilization in Ghana). Countries falling in these categories have first claim on our development resources and their programs require great flexibility. It is urged that any new commitments of this kind be undertaken not only after great deliberation, but that each be defined with precision and care. In making an important commitment of this kind we should take into account our broad political interests, the ability of the United States to mount an effective program, and both the recipient country’s economic prospects and the implications of the commitment for regional development. 31. In turning to the specific sectors on which we might concentrate our efforts throughout the continent as a whole, there is surprisingly little difficulty in determining those that warrant our highest priority attention. We have found a wide area of agreement among Africanists, businessmen and economists as to what these are. 32. We can make the greatest impact in the next few years on our long-range development goals by focusing investment in basic infrastructure (communications, transport and power) which will tie countries together. We can increase our impact by making sure that our expenditures conform with the broad regional planning now being carried on by international institutions, and by cooperating closely with other aid-giving nations and agencies in a common effort. Infrastructure is the base on which development must take place, a base that in many parts of Africa is lacking or inadequate. Then, too, in a very real sense infrastructure creates the regional groupings within which rational economic development must take place. There is little point to say, for example, that Niger and Nigeria are a part of the same economic region so long as it is cheaper to ship from Port Harcourt in Nigeria around Africa to Dar es Salaam than to Niamey, the capital of Niger. It is easier to telephone from Lagos to London, or from Niamey to Paris, than from Lagos to Niamey. Infrastructure by itself is not sufficient to transform traditional societies. We can look to the time when basic African infrastructure needs will be satisfied by the IBRD and African institutions, freeing more of U.S. resources for complementary uses. But we are far from that time. 33. In addition to infrastructure, the most significant contributions we can make to economic development lie in four areas. These are rural development, certain selected areas of education and of health and the promotion of private enterprise. 34. Africa will be primarily agricultural for as long as we can foresee. In most of Africa, agriculture is the sector that must provide the earnings for further development. The rural areas are those where most of the population subsists and on which the nation-dividing tribal structure is nourished. It is African agriculture that has the most to contribute to a world of growing hunger. A concentrated effort is required to modernize the rural sector, using a variety of methods and channels and operating across the entire spectrum of rural life. Much must be done in the more effective use of what is already known, in developing new materials and knowledge, in learning how to transfer innovations to the land and in helping people organize to perpetuate the evolution, transmission and use of new methods. If there is any field in which Americans can claim a measure of expertise in developing both theory and sound practice, it is in agriculture. 35. Education, defined as including the training of all forms of skills, is another great inhibitor of African progress. There is substantial agreement among educators that, in general, “middle-level” (i.e., post-primary) education and teachers training is the priority requirement. Stated in economic terms, the ratio of increase in productivity to the cost of training tends to be highest in the post-primary years. Aside from the extra effort that the U.S. may be called upon to provide for those countries where a major U.S. developmental effort is under way, the U.S. should, therefore, concentrate its attention on post-primary education, on teacher-training, and on certain “programs of excellence,” as suggested by the President. The United States is pioneering in practical and technical education, in on-the-job training and in the use of exciting new technologies—the fields of greatest promise. We have large-scale resources to devote to post-primary programs in English-speaking Africa in our Peace Corps and in the international education facilities expanding under the President’s new program. 36. Health is important for many reasons, but there are two respects in particular in which it impinges on economic development. The first is where the existence of debilitating disease impedes economic progress. The President’s international health program can be expected to, provide an important further stimulus to meeting this problem. The second is the major question of population control. Population pressures are not, as it is sometimes assumed, largely absent from Africa; they are perhaps greatest where expected least, in the Sahara and around its arid perimeter where available resources are too meager for even the present sparse population. And even where the pressure is not great, soaring rates of population increase eat up the benefits of development. The decisions on population control are those that only the Africans can make, but a number of African leaders appear ready to make these decisions and will be seeking help. The U.S. should respond generously. 37. In making private enterprise a sector for concentration, we reflect the conviction that private initiative is vital to the development of open, pluralistic societies that are receptive to social change. This is not an easy area in which to operate, and we must be careful to make clear that we are not attempting to duplicate in Africa the forms and structures of our own country. But if we are to engage in the business of helping Africans to make their own living, this is not an activity that we can neglect. It is one for which there are too few champions in Africa, in which we tend to have more interest than most aid-giving nations, and in which we have a wide variety of experience to offer. 38. These, then, are the sectors in which our programs should be concentrated, around which regional institutions can be developed, and for which cooperative structures should be devised to make better use of the assistance provided by all donors. It is to achieve these ends that a new rigor and clarity of purpose in adhering to development criteria is so important. It is to increase the, efficiency of our activities and to maximize our influence that changes will also be urged in our administrative methods and procedures. 39. This emphasis on development should not, however, be read as an advocacy of total disregard for political factors in our development programs. We have already suggested that the selection of specific countries in which we might participate as a full partner in a major economic effort should take political considerations into account. Several additional political factors that should be considered warrant comment before proceeding to the recommendations. 40. The conclusion that it is to the U.S. interest to adhere closely to development criteria does not imply that we should feel obliged to pursue a development program regardless of what the country may do politically. Major development activities cannot, of course, be turned off and on like a spigot without enormous waste, and a decision that a country’s political conduct is so distasteful as to require suspending a program can never be taken lightly. We do not believe that it is practicable to use economic development programs—necessarily long-term, with several nations cooperating as donors and, we would hope, several African countries benefiting in a region—for influencing short-run political behavior. Economic development programs are a form of investment, and investment decisions lie within a time frame too long for political manipulation. But the point may on occasion be reached where it is necessary to bring a program to a halt, and we see no merit in the arguments of purists who claim otherwise. 41. A quite different issue, though frequently discussed in the same context, is whether or to what extent economic performance should influence our willingness to engage in a development program, i.e., whether erratic or irrational economic behavior is grounds for reducing or eliminating aid. This question is particularly troublesome in Africa, where in most cases the relative importance of our assistance does not permit us anything like the degree of leverage we have in Latin America and Asia. This problem will take on new dimensions of difficulty as we participate in projects and activities covering groups of countries, some of which may make far better use of their resources than others. There are no easy answers to this question, since the circumstances in each case will differ and must be weighed separately. But an objective determination on economic grounds would seem to us to be the only reasonable guide. Further, we are likely to find advantages, as well as problems, in a situation in which one country’s failure to adhere to sound policies may jeopardize a project that is also of interest to other African countries. 42. The basic principle of mutual respect in international affairs applies to aid as well as to other relations among nations. As for the political instruments that our policies should require—including those necessary to carry out public safety programs, to encourage more effective press, broadcasting and other public communications media, and to meet a variety of other worthwhile needs—we urge only that they be used consciously and to appropriate effect, and not under the pretense that they serve the imperatives of economic development. 43. In considering political issues affecting our aid posture, it should also be noted that a political judgment of far-reaching importance underlies the analysis in this report and should be made explicit. We have concluded, though not without considerable soul-searching, (a) that there are serious and immediate developmental as well as political implications for the United States as a result of a fast eroding British position in Black Africa, and (b) that it is not desirable at this time to challenge the special position of France in tropical Africa. 44. The United Kingdom is unwilling at this time, for a variety of reasons, to pursue policies consonant with African aspirations or with U.S. interests in Africa. A deteriorating financial position, particularly its balance of payments position, prevents it from maintaining its flow of aid, and from taking a forthright position on Rhodesia and South Africa. No change in this British outlook can be expected; on the contrary, it is likely that London will weaken its policies in this regard. The result of such outlooks will be a sharpening of the divisions between Black Africa and the Southern tier and will lead to perpetuation of this geographic split. 45. If, as a result of the U.K. positions on Rhodesia and, in the wake of the recent ICJ decision, Southwest Africa, the U.S. should decide to disassociate itself from the U.K., we will require special political programs with more resources to give political and economic significance to our independent posture. For Zambia in particular, and for Tanzania and Malawi to a lesser extent, we would have to direct our resources to a further restructuring of their transport systems and to a number of emergency ancillary measures. In effect, we would assume a much more important and long-term role in these countries affairs. In the event of such a U.S. decision, we should keep clearly in mind its essentially political character and should, therefore, be programmed to meet its political requirements as well as such economic benefits as an evolving situation will permit. 46. As regards France, the benefits of French influence in terms of stability and the commitment of French resources outweigh on balance, we believe, the disadvantages to U.S. policy. These disadvantages pertain not only to many current matters on which the French are disposed to use their influence to cut across U.S. objectives—color television, satellite communications, educational policy and the like—but still more importantly to the perpetuation of the French preferential trading system and to French views on the proper political organization of the African continent over the long term. 47. A major reason for deciding against a head-on challenge of the French position is that it could not be successful without a large-scale commitment of U.S. resources, including direct budgetary support to a considerable number of small, French-speaking nations for an indefinite period. To the extent that we were successful in modifying the present French structure, there would be an immediate reduction of French and European Common Market aid which is substantially larger than ours. We believe that we can use our resources to better advantage elsewhere in Africa than to substitute for French and Common Market assistance. 48. There is nevertheless a far more serious question for U.S. policy in the French position than is generally realized. It deserves special note because the entire issue should be re-examined carefully at frequent intervals. The recent association agreement between Nigeria and the Common Market underlines the problem. While the extension of the preferential system to Africa’s most populous nation dilutes somewhat the advantages that the preferences bring, Nigerian association with the Common Market is a major step in what we believe to be the long-range French plan to organize “Eurafrica.” This plan envisages replacing the present Yaounde Convention by a preferential trading area embracing all or virtually all of Africa on the one hand and the Common Market (which may eventually include the U.K.) plus the other associates on the other. 49. The creation of a Eurafrican preferential system would bring irresistible pressures to bear on the U.S. to set up a similar arrangement for Latin America. The division of the world into hemispheric compartments along north-south lines would be a far-reaching defeat for U.S. policy, which rightly has sought a global trading community with a minimum of obstacles to the free and economic exchange of goods. French success would force an extremely painful and costly reorientation of Latin American economies, now based on world trading patterns and expectations of supplying much of Europe’s requirements as well as the Western Hemisphere’s for coffee, bananas and other tropical products. French action to provide a protected market for Africa in Europe—and a predominant political place for France in Africa—is a challenge to the global system that must be contained. 50. What posture the U.S. should take on African preferences must depend on our decisions respecting world-wide trading relations between the developed and less developed countries of the world. These lie outside the purview of this report and will be influenced by our attitude on compensatory financing schemes and commodity agreements. But while we have not undertaken to look at proposals of these kinds in detail, we find it impossible to conclude a discussion of aid for African economic development without urging that we pursue more vigorously the effort to prevent catastrophic price declines in the commodities African countries produce—and from which most of their development must, in the last analysis, be financed. Specifically, we regret the failure of the United States to go along with other developed nations in the negotiations for an international cocoa agreement in June 1966 on the key elements of minimum price and the pre-financing of stocks. We cannot but conclude that this action, and any others which will lend themselves to similar interpretation, puts weapons in the hands of our Eurafrican adversaries. SUMMARY OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS 1. We have concluded U.S. interests would best be served by concentration on functional sectors of fundamental importance and on programs around which regional institutions can be built. We believe that cooperative multilateral structures can now be devised to make better use of all donors’ assistance. 2. We deem it in the U.S. interest to redefine and restructure our programs in Africa now because of the unique congruence of opportunity provided by the comparative freedom of U.S. action in Africa and by the formative stage of Africa’s development. 3. We are convinced that the careful selection of specific African countries for a major development effort is sound policy. The U.S. choice should continue to be dictated by a combination of economic and political considerations. 4. We seek a more rigorous effort within the U.S. Government to distinguish clearly between short-term political and long-term development goals. 5. We believe that within this framework AID assistance to Africa should increase year by year in orderly fashion and in modest amounts. More funds should also flow through the IBRD group, particularly IDA, as the multilateral structure begins to work well and as African development progresses. 6. We find that the U.S. role in Africa does not lend itself to the strategies which led to the Marshall Plan and the Alliance for Progress. The U.S. acting by itself cannot have significant impact on the formidable problems of development in Africa. 7. Therefore we commend a strategy that calls for devising multilateral mechanisms for dealing with Africa and for concentrating U.S. activities more sharply. Specifically, we put forward recommendations to give the World Bank a role of greater leadership and involvement, recommendations which, if skillfully handled, the Bank would be willing to pursue. 8. We selected the IBRD group for this essential task because we feel that African institutions are still too fragile to assume the preeminent role, because the U.S. has greater influence in the IBRD and because the IBRD has proved its competence in carrying out its broad development writ. We urge added U.S. resources for IDA. 9. We have placed special emphasis on the infrastructure of development: communications, transport and power. Because the needs are so costly and long-term in these fields, we conclude they can be best met through a multilateral approach. 10. We perceive specific opportunities for U.S. initiatives in communications since this is the infrastructure sector where the most can be accomplished in the shortest span—and without extra cost to the U.S. 11. We call for a much more vigorous attack on the problems of agriculture. Rural modernization is indispensable to African progress, yet it is the field in which Western donors have been least rational in their use of resources, least organized and least committed. We believe that the most can be gained at the least cost through a cooperative effort of Africans and of Western donors, and in particular through the establishment of a continental network for rural research and development. 12. We think the U.S. should also make a particular effort in education, including training, and in private enterprise. 13. We have addressed a number of recommendations to special areas, among them the arms buildup in Africa, public health, population control, Peace Corps activities, refugees from southern Africa, and the UN specialized agencies. We received a number of suggestions, some with merit, which we chose to ignore because they were directed towards activities which, in our view, are peripheral. 14. We have suggested many changes in the administration of AID assistance. We specifically recommend new recruiting procedures designed to reduce the number of U.S. technical assistance officials in Africa, and to substitute an increased number of private Americans. 15. We are persuaded that the role of Britain in Africa will be a diminishing one in terms both of influence and of resources. This prospect has serious implications for U.S. policies in Africa. It may compel the U.S. to take decisions soon concerning the former British colonies bordering the white redoubt in southern Africa. 16. We have concluded we should not seek to overturn the special French position in the ex-colonies, but we should carefully avoid giving indirect support to a French policy that aims at the division of the world into North-South axes. This French thrust towards Eurafrica is harmful to U.S. worldwide policies and interests. [Here follow the report’s recommendations, pages 28–141, and list of consultants, pages142–150.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Review of African Development Polices and Programs as Directed by the President, Edward M. Korry. Confidential. 216. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 216. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 8, 1966. SUBJECT Review of African Development Policies and Programs Pursuant to Your Speech of May 26 1. Ambassador Edward Korry has completed the review of African Development Policies and Programs as you requested, and I enclose for your consideration his report of July 27, 1966. 2 He has, within a very short time span, reviewed an extremely complicated subject. His report, consisting of a proposed policy for development in Africa, a brief summary of strategy, and sixteen categories of recommendations, will be extremely useful to the United States Government as we move ahead on the implementation of your speech of May 26. Assistant Secretary Palmer and I suggest that you send Ambassador Korry a note of appreciation. 2. The Department, in conjunction with AID, has urgently reviewed this report. The recommendations range widely through a series of proposals involving action by the Executive, the Congress, international organizations and other nations. This diversity is reflected in the various kinds of action required. In general, they include:— (a) Recommendations which are either on their way to implementation or which the Executive can on its own authority accept and pursue. (b) Recommendations which we can support in principle, but whose implementation rests at least in part with international agencies, notably the IBRD, with donor nations, e.g. the UK and France, or with African organizations and nations. These will require amplification and negotiation before they can be put into effect. (c) A very few recommendations requiring examination or Congressional action which must be considered further before we can wholeheartedly endorse them. 3. Within this framework, we are in general agreement with the report and recommend that you approve it as a basis for action. 4. There are, in my opinion, compelling reasons for not publishing this report at this time. The report recommends negotiations with international agencies and foreign governments which would be jeopardized by publication. There are frank comments on policies of other nations and international organizations which would sour relations if released. Finally, detailed statement from you, or from the White House staff, could not give sufficient additional information to have a public impact without getting into the matters subject to negotiation. Instead, we recommend that we focus on a date this autumn, such as November 15, by which time we would hope to complete enough of our discussions with international agencies, donors and Africans to permit a more meaningful statement, and to take sufficient steps on those recommendations which we can implement ourselves to present a progress report. 5. This tactic need not preclude a short announcement, which notes the receipt of the report and indicates some of the areas of implementation. 6. Pursuant to the Summary of Strategy in the Report, we are thinking along the following lines: (a) A sounding with Mr. George Woods of the IBRD was taken before his departure from Washington on July 28 to obtain his preliminary reaction to the proposals relating to the IBRD. He was sympathetic to them and thought they presented no serious problems if the US could help line up support among donor nations. Based on this initial encouragement, we are elaborating the lines along which an expanded IBRD participation in African development might take. (b) Within the framework of these ideas, we are planning early approaches to certain donor nations, after which the IBRD would approach the UN Development Program, the African Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Africa, and possibly other institutions whose support is desirable for an expanded IBRD role. (c) The discussion with Africans will be exceptionally complex, since no one organization effectively reflects the continent in such important matters. The IBRD has indicated in principle that it would take the lead in this. Talks between the IBRD and the heads of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and the African Development Bank will follow US diplomatic efforts with donors. The IBRD annual meeting in September provides an excellent opportunity for discussions with African national representatives. We would try to get our own actions completed before then, with a view to asking Mr. Woods to initiate discussions of the new IBRD role with the African group of the Bank at this meeting. It is likely that certain additional African leaders should be approached, in addition to the Finance Ministers, and we would time these approaches to follow immediately after the Bank discussion. (d) It will also be necessary, in due course, to discuss other aspects of the Korry Report with interested nations. For example, the educational recommendations will involve the United Kingdom, and possibly France. There are also subjects outside the realm of IBRD activities which should be discussed with African nations. The substance and timing of these talks will require further thought. (e) It is likely that a coordinated follow-up within the Government can best be initiated by means of a National Security Action Memorandum. (f) Meanwhile, within the Department of State and AID, Mr. Gaud and I are examining our own activities to be certain that policy guidance and operations are smoothly meshed to press ahead with both plans for the above and implementation of those recommendations falling within our immediate jurisdiction. Assistant Secretary Palmer will inform me if additional measures are required to carry forward this task. George W. Ball 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. Confidential. 2 Not attached; see Document 215 . 217. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 217. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 9, 1966. SUBJECT The Korry Report on Development Policies and Programs in Africa Attached is Ed Korry’s Report, approved and transmitted to you by George Ball (cover memorandum at Tab A). 2 George thinks the report is first-rate—as do Secretary Rusk, Bill Gaud, and I—and should be required reading for everyone in the Government connected with African affairs. He recommends that you approve it in general, and direct us to staff out the particulars. (My thoughts on how to do that are below.) Substance of the Report You will wish to read the “Summary of Strategy and Tactics” (green tab—pages 24–27). If your time permits, the opening policy statement (yellow tab—pages 1–23) is also very much worth your attention. The recommendations (white tabs—pages 28–141) are covered by summary sheets for easy skimming. You could get a good sense of them quickly by leafing through the tabs. The last few pages (142–150) contain the impressive list of people Korry consulted. Essentially, Korry argues that, except for the 4–5 countries in which rapid economic growth is feasible and we are prepared to support it on a large scale, our present aid program does not fit the facts of life in Africa. He maintains that Africa is simply not ready for the approach we use in Latin America and South Asia, one which painstakingly identifies obstacles to economic growth in each country and tries to supply whatever kind of resource is needed to eliminate them. The obstacles in Africa are too huge, and our resources are too limited. Korry suggests that we now (1) scatter our money and manpower in a way which Congress and the people will never understand; (2) put an impossible administrative burden on AID; (3) yield too often to the temptation to use aid for narrow political purposes; and (4) mislead the Africans and ourselves as to what can be accomplished with the limited resources we are willing to provide. Moving from our bilateral problems to the broad picture of Free World aid to Africa, Korry finds the situation confused. Donors don’t accept each other’s technical findings, and are often played off against each other. Recipients have little capacity for developing projects, are often bewildered and misled by donor requirements, and find it politically difficult to agree to self-help conditions on bilateral loans. Regional organizations exist, and make an attempt at coordination, but are very weak. In this context, Korry proposes a new thrust with the following major themes: 1. A much broader and more central role for the World Bank in Africa. By request of both donors and recipients, the Bank would be responsible for rationalizing donor operations, identifying recipient needs and abilities, and applying leverage in both directions. Specifically, it should (a) set up a Standing Group for Africa to deal with major infrastructure projects—transportation, communications and power; (b) set up a Rural Development Center to deal with the problems of agriculture; and (c) ear-mark some IDA funds for African projects. 2. Realignment of our bilateral programs to (a) concentrate efforts—outside the few major countries—on health, education, and agricultural programs covering sub-regions, and administered without AID missions in each country; (b) use the promise of a few large capital outlays outside the major countries to stimulate and finance multi-national projects approved by the proposed World Bank Standing Group; (c) sponsor a special bilateral initiative on communications; and (d) strongly support the growth of African regional organizations. Next Steps If you approve the Report in principle, we need to work out (1) a negotiating scenario which will get the other donors to request the Bank to take on the jobs listed above—hopefully in time for the Bank’s annual meetings starting September 26; (2) the country-by-country specifics of the bilateral changes; and (3) a publicity strategy which makes political points and maintains the momentum created by the OAU speech without destroying the impression that we are responding to African initiative. My thoughts on each are as follows: 1. Negotiating scenario . Woods has agreed that the Bank will take on these new assignments if we can get support for the request from our fellow donors. (Essentially, this means the UK, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Japan.) Subject to your approval, our people agreed to try. We propose to send Livingston Merchant to Europe as your Special Representative for this purpose in the first week of September. (Europe virtually closes up shop during August.) We would use the time between now and then to pave the way. If things go well, we could have a package ready to discuss with the Africans by the September Bank meetings. 2. Bilateral program changes : As Ball suggests, we need to set up a State/AID/White House committee to work out the detailed tailoring of our bilateral program and the communication initiative. It would work best if it were done upon your instruction—with a tight deadline—preferably through a NSAM. If you agree, I will get a NSAM ready for your signature immediately. 3. Publicity. As Ball points out, the Report should not be released. Moreover , it would be self-defeating to announce the details of our proposals while we are working on the Europeans and the Africans. Thus, we will probably not have a full-blown story to tell until October or November. However, if you wish we could prepare a short statement to the effect that the Report is finished and has been submitted to you, and that it will provide the basis for new US attention to the needs and problems of Africa, though much more work needs to be done to give it effect. We might then outline the major themes (promotion of regionalism, new stress on health, education and agriculture, etc. ) which wouldn’t get us into trouble. This could be a standard release, an item in one of Bill Moyers’ briefings, or a voluntary at a press conference. Walt Approve Report in principle 3 Speak to me OK for Merchant to go to Europe as my Representative No Speak to me Draft NSAM for my signature setting up group on bilateral program changes Rostow sign NSAM Speak to me Prepare short press statement for early release Prepare no statement now Speak to me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. Confidential. 2 Documents 215 and 216 . 3 The President checked the first option in each of the four groups. 218. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 218. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, September 12, 1966. WWR: SUBJECT A New String in our African Bow 2 As you well know, prospects for U.S. influence in Africa are cloudy. Level-headedness on black/white issues is likely to resemble indifference. Economic progress will be slow at best. As we continue—and rightly—to devote the largest share of our foreign aid to Asia and Latin America, charges that Africa is of second-class interest to us will become louder. Of course, we are not without answers. I won’t linger over our assets: strong commitment to racial equality, substantial aid, expanding private investment, influence with the metropoles and international organizations, etc. But I don’t mean to dismiss them. (As you know, I believe that we can steer a course around the most serious traps in Africa.) My thought is to add to those assets, and at the same time to make progress on a very worrisome problem—the dissemination of sophisticated weaponry throughout the continent. The Arms Problem It is a well-established myth that there are no arms races in Africa. In fact, arms “contests” have already helped to create a number of very volatile situations—e.g., Ethiopia-Somalia, Morocco-Algeria, Tunisia-Algeria. We have tried to hold weapons deliveries to $25 million—mostly to Ethiopia, Congo, Libya, and Morocco—but even that amount, together with our weapons sales and the much larger Soviet and Chinese programs, results in visible increases in the likelihood and scale of potential conflict. Just as important, sophisticated weapons encourage diversion of pitifully scarce local resources to unproductive military uses. We know—and the Soviets almost certainly agree on the merits—that supplying sophisticated weapons to African countries is absurd from a security point of view and very dangerous politics. (See attached cable—which arrived as I was dictating this—reporting that the Soviet Ambassador to Somalia has suggested to our Ambassador a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” banning arms to Ethiopia and Somalia.) 3 The Chinese don’t agree, but their recent reversals have rendered them less important. Moreover, all other things being equal, the Soviets would probably prefer to buy their influence with economic aid if they could be convinced that we weren’t stealing a march on them in the military area. An Arms Control Initiative Suppose, in this context, that the President were to announce a policy of “Safe Conduct for Development” in Africa. Its elements might be the following: —U.S. support for an African disarmament conference to develop arms control rules and techniques for enforcing them. (Tanzanian President Nyerere has already mentioned such a conference publicly; with some encouragement, he might formally propose it. It would be important that the proposal come first from an African leader.) —Quiet exploration with the Soviets of an agreement to limit arms exports to Africa—excluding the UAR—to small arms. Inspection might be done by the UN. —Efforts to get the major countries of Europe to join in putting pressure on the OAU to sponsor the conference and whip its members into line. —A hard line on the U.S. or World Bank economic aid to countries who refuse to join and continue to waste scarce resources on arms. If this approach worked, it might be a model for similar pushes in the rest of the less developed world. If it didn’t, we would have lost very little in a worthy cause. In either event, it would drive home the President’s continuing interest in Africa, add another strand to his peace posture, and dramatize his determination to focus on the real problems of the poor countries. Most important in the short run, it would give us a policy basis for refusing requests for further military aid, which multiply daily. Procedure Three possibilities: 1. An immediate Presidential offer to adopt such a policy—perhaps in the UN speech. 2. An entirely private proposal to the Russians of a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” on a few specific countries. 3. A low-key attempt to get Nyerere, Houphouet-Boigny, Kenyatta, and others to call for a disarmament conference, together with a quiet approach to the Russians seeking agreement to support it—or at least not to oppose it. On balance, I would favor the last of these, followed by a Presidential announcement of our support of the conference proposal. The Africans can be expected to be a bit nervous and suspicious of this enterprise; it will help a great deal if the initiative comes from among their own ranks. More important, their depth of commitment is the basic determinant of success or failure. Whatever route were chosen, the present arms recipients—particularly Haile Selassie—should have some warning and opportunity for reaction. (For an interesting report of HIM’s view of the Nyerere speech, see the attached cable from Korry.) 4 Timing The sooner the better, particularly if we move to your line on non-proliferation language. This proposal would be a perfect handmaiden. 5 EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Arms Control for Africa. Secret. 2 A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “E.H./Interesting. What does AF & Red Duggan think? WR.” 3 Telegram 596 from Mogadiscio, September 9; not printed. See footnote 2, Document 315 . 4 Telegram 1022 from Addis Ababa, September 11; not printed. 5 On September 15, Hamilton sent a follow-up memorandum to Rostow noting that he had talked to Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Wayne Fredericks who was enthusiastic about the arms control idea provided the Africans proposed it initially. Fredericks suggested sending a special emissary who was trusted by the Africans to talk quietly to a few key heads of state. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Arms Control for Africa) 219. Memorandum of Conversation 219. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 24, 1966, 1:15 p.m. SecDel/MC/34 SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY FIRST-SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1966 SUBJECT The United States and Africa—Selected Remarks Made at Luncheon for African Foreign Ministers PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador Nabrit Ambassador Anderson Ambassador Witman Mr. Melone Mr. Toumayan Ketema Yifru, Foreign Minister, Ethiopia Samuel Odaka, Foreign Minister, Uganda Simon Kapwepwe, Foreign Minister, Zambia C.Y. Mgonja, Minister for Community Development and National Culture, Tanzania Arsene Usher, Foreign Minister, Ivory Coast Antoine Guimali, Foreign Minister, Central African Republic Joseph Murumbi, Vice President, Kenya Ibrahim el Mufti, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, Sudan Doudou Thiam, Foreign Minister, Senegal Apedo-Amah, Foreign Minister, Togo Rudolph Grimes, Foreign Minister, Liberia Speaking for the other Africans present, Joseph Murumbi thanked the Secretary for his statements indicating that the US would support African countries in working toward solutions for their problems and in aiding them. African problems were of world-wide dimensions and threats to Africa were threats to the free world. Africa needed the aid of Governments like the American Government. In reply, the Secretary stated that the contention that Vietnam is occupying American attention to such a degree that the US was disinterested in the rest of the world was not true. President Johnson had made it clear that the US was concerned with the problems of Africa and the question central to American thinking was what do the people primarily concerned think about the situation in their own country. This was a simple and fundamental reaction of the American people. Ambassador Goldberg had enunciated American views on Rhodesia and South West Africa and the Secretary wished to repeat that the US would never agree to a situation where a few thousand white men could dominate four million Africans. The problem was not reaching agreement on the nature of the issue but rather on how to arrive at the result we seek. The US had a definite interest in security, the independence and the prosperity of every country represented at the table. On the question of independence of African countries, Africans would always find the US ready to support them. Turning to Vietnam, the Secretary stated that a country can work for a solution within the framework of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 and retain its non-aligned position since both sides have claimed the desire for a settlement based on the Geneva Agreements. The efforts of the US and other countries to bring an end to the conflict by negotiation had no parallel in history. It was very disappointing to see Hanoi and Peking denounce Ambassador Goldberg’s speech as a swindle. The Secretary wished fully to assure the Ministers that the US would say “yes” to any reasonable settlement that could be devised by the minds of men. Returning to Africa, the Secretary said there was a tendency for great powers to play games in a continent where there were only new governments. As far as the US was concerned, it would always strive for African solutions to African problems. It would also support the authentic voice of Africa wherever heard. It was not important that there be 100% agreement between governments but governments should try to control the extent of their disagreement so that it would be possible to build on existing agreements. Liberian Secretary of State Grimes stated he and his colleagues had come to convince American officials of the real problems of Africa. He was thinking not only of problems like South West Africa and Rhodesia, but more generally, of all those the central issue of which was man’s inhumanity to man. Africans could sympathize with the American problem in Vietnam only insofar as they saw a marriage of opinion between it and African problems. That is, if the principle of self-determination in South Vietnam was also applied to the non-self-governing peoples of Africa. The Secretary replied that there should be no difficulty there so far as US policies were concerned but that the US was extremely reluctant to use force. It wanted to make sure every avenue to peaceful settlement was explored. The US had sustained 170,000 casualties since 1945 on behalf of the independence of other countries, and the US there wanted to makes every effort for a peaceful settlement. For the first tine in history the expression “the survival of mankind” was a very real problem for governments. In American minds, the central question in both Vietnam and Africa was what do the parties concerned think about the situation. The US felt that the fact that there was no future in South Africa’s present attitude must be impressed upon the South African Government, but the time factor was such that Rhodesia was a more urgent problem and the situation there must be stopped in its first stage. Replying to the comment that Africa was running out of patience, the Secretary stated that Africa did not have a monopoly on this problem. It was a fact that a permanent solution to the German question had not yet been found, something which had cost the US an enormous amount [in] 1947. The Cuban question created an intolerable situation within the Western hemisphere giving rise to a great temptation to resort to violence. The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan was not resolved and no one dared suggest the use of violence to resolve it. Recourse to violence was extremely disagreeable and must be avoided wherever possible. The Secretary said the US had brought great pressure to bear on South Africa to the point that US influence was feeble and relations tenuous. The US probably had more influence in Dar es Salaam than in Pretoria. Tanzanian Minister Mgonja commented that despite its proclamations, the US had a military alliance with Portugal. The Secretary said that five years ago US interest in the Azores base might have been important but with today’s long range aircraft the usefulness of the Azores was now minimal and the US was not bargaining with Portugal on that. Sudanese Deputy Prime Minister el Mufti remarked that there was a general sentiment in Africa that the US was not really interested in the continent or it would aid the under-developed countries more and assist the non-free areas to gain their independence. Ambassador Nabrit stated that he thought President Johnson had very clearly emphasized in his May speech on Africa where the weight and influence of the US was to be found. The Secretary of State had indicated on many occasions the guide lines of US policy but the US was limited in what it could do in the world. There was no doubt that the weight and influence and opinion of the American Government and people were solidly with the movement for African independence. Amb. Nabrit said Governments had certain objectives in terms of their own interests but in the day-to-day conduct of international relations they were limited by reasons beyond their control. In the cases of Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa, there was no doubt that the US resolutely opposed apartheid, opposed the manner in which South Africa treats its people, believed the International Court of Justice decision was wrong and that African peoples had equal right to a place in the sun. US beliefs, however, must operate within the limitations of what was possible and if the US did not act as Africans would like to have it act, Africa must nonetheless believe that the US wanted full freedom for Africa, that it was not separated from it, and that by cooperating with it Africans would find the US at their side. There was no magic by which the US had managed to escape the limitations imposed on all countries. Vice President Murumbi said that while Rhodesia was a British problem the US should go beyond this as Prime Minister Wilson recognized. Africans did not seek to expel the European population because as had been learned in Kenya, European and African populations needed each other. The Secretary concluded by mentioning the internal difficulties the US faced. If President Johnson last year had presented a program of economic sanctions against Rhodesia to Congress it would have been defeated. Those opposed to the US civil rights program and those who, because some British vessels have entered Haiphong, were against cooperation with the United Kingdom and the United Nations, would have opposed it. President Johnson was far ahead of Congress in his attitude toward Rhodesia. The US would continue to do its best. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Alec G. Toumayan and Harry R. Melone, and approved in S on October 4. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York. 220. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 220. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 3, 1966, 6:30 p.m. SUBJECT Korry Report—Status and Prospects As you know, the Korry Report 2 suggested two kinds of initiatives: a broader role for the World Bank in Africa, and a number of modifications of U.S. bilateral programs. The following summarizes the state of play on each front. At Tab A, for your signature, is a proposed NSAM—explained below—to carry out the changes in bilateral programs. World Bank Position You will recall that George Woods reacted very favorably to the Korry ideas. He agreed in August to discuss them with the African Finance Ministers at the Bank/Fund meetings (September 26–30) if, in the meanwhile, we got the major Europeans to support the proposals. After some groundwork at lower levels, Livingston Merchant went to Europe early in September to solicit help. The results were: (1) enthusiastic support from the U.K., Italy and Canada; (2) a flat turndown from France; (3) inconclusive replies from Germany and Belgium. Woods did in fact raise the proposals in a general way with the African Finance Ministers last week. There was not enough time to get a solid feel for their reactions. Well try to get Woods to follow up as quickly as possible. We also plan further approaches to the Europeans, particularly Germany. Bilateral Program Changes Bill Gaud and Joe Palmer have agreed to receive the attached NSAM. 3 It has also been cleared on the Seventh Floor. Essentially, the NSAM asks State to set up a procedure for reviewing and carrying out each recommendation—absent a compelling case against it—by December 1. It also specifically requires State to consult with the other agencies concerned, and instructs my office to monitor the operation. I think it will do the job. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President’s Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. No classification marking. 2 Document 215 . 3 See Document 221 . 221. National Security Action Memorandum No. 356 221. National Security Action Memorandum No. 356 1 Washington, October 5, 1966. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Administrator of the Agency for International Development Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director, Bureau of the Budget Director, United States Information Agency Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Director of the Peace Corps President, Export-Import Bank SUBJECT Implementation of the Korry Report on Development Policies and Programs in Africa I have approved Ambassador Korry’s Report in principle. Steps are already underway to carry out the several recommendations which involve an enlarged role in Africa for the World Bank. The Secretary of State—together with the AID Administrator—is authorized to take whatever additional actions are appropriate to this end. I would like the Department of State to take primary responsibility in developing an action program to carry out the Report’s other recommendations. I would hope that this program would be in effect by December 1. It should include steps for the implementation of each recommendation unless the Secretary of State finds that a particular recommendation is inappropriate or unsound, or that alternative steps would be preferable. I would like the Administrator of AID to work closely with the Secretary of State or his designate in developing this program. Other agencies should be fully consulted on those recommendations which are of direct concern to them. I have asked Walt Rostow to serve as White House liaison for this effort. In view of the sensitive nature of many aspects of the Korry Report, it should not be made public, nor should its recommendations or plans for its implementation be released to the press except upon the explicit instructions of the Secretary of State. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 356. Confidential. 222. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson 222. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 17, 1966. SUBJECT Action Program to Carry Out the Recommendations of the Korry Report on African Development Policies and Programs Following your approval in principle of the Korry Report last August, and pursuant to NSAM 356 of October 5, 1966, the Secretary of State designated Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer to develop a program of action to carry out the Korry Report recommendations. Mr. Palmer and his staff undertook extensive consultations within the State Department, with AID and with the other ten Departments and Agencies to whom the NSAM was addressed. All these Agencies carefully reviewed the Report and gave Mr. Palmer their views on the recommendations of direct concern to each of them. He also kept in close touch with Mr. Walt W. Rostow and his staff As a result, we now have an “action program” on each of the forty-two recommendations in the Korry Report (Enclosed). 2 Where there was disagreement with the specifics of many of Ambassador Korry’s recommendations, an alternative course of action has been agreed to and a program to carry it out has also been approved. Many of these programs are already under way. Others will now be able to proceed along the approved course of action. There was broad agreement with Ambassador Korry’s proposed strategy and the essential elements of his Report. These could be characterized as follows: —Development and strengthening of multilateral donor coordination mechanisms for dealing with African development; —Concentration of assistance to Africa on functional sectors of fundamental importance and on programs around which regional and sub-regional institutions and activities can be built or reinforced in such fields as infrastructure development, agriculture, education and health; —Stimulation of increased U.S. private investment in Africa: —Concentration of major economic development assistance in those countries where it can be utilized most effectively, and reliance on regional and multilateral organizations and methods as our primary means for development support elsewhere; —A modest annual increase in AID development assistance to Africa, as well as an increase in the total resources available to the IDA so that it can also increase assistance to Africa; —A revision of AID procedures for its work in Africa; —Participation in an effective international cocoa agreement; —Support for arms limitation and control in Africa. While all of the individual action programs should be considered together as a new approach to African development, we wish to draw your attention to certain of them which are of particular interest and are described in the immediately underlying enclosure. Follow-Up At the end of each action program, we have noted the agency which has follow-up responsibility for that program. In keeping with the spirit of NSAM 356, the Secretary of State will report to you again on the status of the major action programs at the end of March 1967 and then as regularly thereafter as he deems advisable to keep you fully informed of how we have implemented the Korry Report. Now that the review of assistance policies and programs in Africa, which you called for last May, has been carried out, we plan urgently to address the question of public presentation of the results. Such presentation must take account of several distinctly different audiences: the recipient African nations, interested European and other donor countries, the United States Congress and the American public. We need to describe how this combination of actions will maximize our responsiveness to expressed African needs, while contributing to orderly economic and social development and serving U.S. national interests. We shall inform you no later than January 1967 of how these courses of action can best be presented to other nations and to the American Congress and public. Nicholas deB Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Korry Report on African Development Policy & Programs. Confidential. 2 Not printed. For the Korry Report, see Document 215 . 223. Memorandum From Halvor O. Ekern of the Operations Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Director of the Operations Staff (McAfee) 223. Memorandum From Halvor O. Ekern of the Operations Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Director of the Operations Staff (McAfee) 1 Washington, March 8, 1967. SUBJECT CIA Operations in Africa Attached are summaries of CIA staffing, and 5412-type operations in each of the countries of Africa. 2 The consolidation of this information into one convenient book poses a serious security risk. Therefore, I have given it an over-all classification of Top Secret. I recommend that it be made available only on an Eyes Only and personal basis to selected officials within the Department, and that this selection be confined to the Secretary, Undersecretary, Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and Mr. Hughes. The material contained herein has come only from DDC files, and the book should not be made available to CIA. The build up of CIA staffing and covert operations which began around 1960 reached its peak a couple of years ago and is now in the phase of consolidation and even retrenchment. Some stations have been closed out, the Congo counter-insurgency program is being liquidated, and some political action programs being scaled down. The recent disclosures of CIA activities could make both foreign governments and our Ambassadors more cautious in the future. The requirements of Vietnam have tended to siphon off French-speaking Agency field personnel. Since DDC has seldom been consulted on projects carried out by the Agency covert action staff (Cord Meyer’s unit), the country summaries are incomplete in this field. 1 Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Top Secret. 2 Attached to the source text are [text not declassified] country summaries. One of the attachments is Document 442 . 224. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 224. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 18, 1967. SUBJECT Status Report on Major Action Programs Stemming from the Korry Report on African Development Policies and Programs On December 17, 1966, I sent you the Action Program to carry out the recommendations of the Korry Report on African Development Policies and Programs (enclosed). 2 This is a status report on the major Action Programs to keep you informed of how we have implemented the Korry Report. In the immediately underlying enclosures 3 are status reports on 22 of the 42 Korry Report recommendations. Among the highlights of the actions taken since December, I wish to draw your particular attention to the following: —The IBRD, the African Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the UN Development Program have met to work out a plan for coordination of African economic development in transportation, telecommunications and power. We hope that their next step will be to involve major interested donor governments. —IBRD and the International Telecommunications Union are beginning to cooperate on the plans for African regional telecommunications development. —The National Academy of Sciences, with AID financing, is organizing an African Conference on Agricultural Research for Economic Development which is to take place in the Congo (Kinshasa) in September and to involve 150 African, European and American agricultural scientists and financial and economic development planners. This is a first stage toward improving African research for increased food production. —AID is about to assist the heads of African universities to form working associations to promote and establish academic centers of excellence in Africa. —AID is contracting with 14 US private financial institutions to seek out investment opportunities in Africa for their clients. Some of these institutions are already actively promoting 26 investment projects. They have shown some interest in another 36; and 106 more are under review. —Four US commercial and investment banks have agreed to take the lead in establishing a private investment finance corporation for Africa. They are negotiating with AID on the terms and conditions; the principal delay relates to requirements for tying AID funds—which are to be loaned to this corporation—to US procurement. —New AID policies for a substantial reduction in the number of African countries receiving bilateral assistance, coupled with increased emphasis on regional and multidonor projects, have been conveyed to Congress in your Foreign Assistance Message, as well as in the AID FY 1968 Presentation. —We are working on proposals for a US contribution to the Special Fund of the African Development Bank, in line with your Foreign Assistance Message. Problems of the timing of submission to Congress, the amount and relative percentage of the US contribution, and tied procurement have yet to be resolved. In view of your decision to maintain the same level of AID assistance to Africa, in the coming fiscal year, the participation in the ADB Special Fund represents the only way of increasing US assistance to Africa. In addition to the 22 major recommendations on which I am enclosing status reports, I can assure you that plans and programs are moving forward, consistent with the Action Program, on the other Korry Report recommendations. In effect, they have become integrated with the regular programs for Africa of State, AID and other agencies. Nicholas deB Katzenbach 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. Confidential. 2 Document 222 . 3 Not printed. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature. 225. Summary Notes of the 572d Meeting of the National Security Council 225. Summary Notes of the 572d Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, July 13, 1967, 12:10 p.m. African Problems In the absence of Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Katzenbach summarized the six major problem areas in Africa. (See attached State Department paper.) 2 1. Rhodesia—We must continue to exchange views with the British who may decide to settle this problem in a way we cannot accept. 2. There is no solution to the Southwest African problem. 3. The Portuguese cannot hang on forever to their African colonies. 4. Developments are favorable to us in East Africa, i.e., Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya. 5. In the Nigerian civil war, we are remaining neutral. Other African states are trying to solve the Nigerian problem to prevent a breakup of the Federation. The trouble arises primarily out of tribal differences. Our AID programs have not been a failure. 6. Congo—We have put in a half billion dollars in aid in the last few years. We do not know the reason for the current revolt of the mercenary troops which has broken out. We must keep Mobutu in power because there is no acceptable alternative to him. It was correct for us to send in our C–130 planes as proof of our support of a black government which was being attacked by white mercenaries. Our aid program is small and any payoff we may get is years ahead of us. The President: Have we learned any political lesson from the intense Congressional opposition to the decision to send in the C–130’s? Under Secretary Katzenbach should background the press. The domestic racial issue kicked off the Congressional debate. Senator Javits should be seen by Assistant Secretary of State Palmer today to explain why we sent in the C–130’s. All members of both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee should be talked to promptly. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, 7/13/67, African Problems. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Another record of this meeting is ibid., Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, July 13, 1967–12:08 p.m., NSC Meeting # 572. 2 Document 226 . 226. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 226. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. AFRICAN PROBLEMS We see six decisive problems whose solution will be important to large areas of Africa and to United States policy toward the continent as a whole. At the north there is the complex of issues in Arab Africa arising from the Near East crisis and deep-seated local tensions. At the south there is the complex of issues arising from colonial control and racial discrimination. Without ignoring a number of other issues in Black Africa, there are three areas in the middle belt of the continent which present critical problems: Nigeria, the Congo, and East Africa (including Zambia). Finally, our aid and other economic policies face obstacles here and abroad, and our responses to these questions will affect our interests in the continent. In dealing with these problems, this paper points to essential conclusions and critical decisions. In view of its rapid preparation, it does not have interagency clearance. 1. The Effect of the Near East Crisis on Africa The Middle East crisis has sent shock waves throughout Arab Africa from Mauritania to Sudan. All condemned “Israeli aggression,” some offered military support to the UAR, all now demand Israeli withdrawal. Algeria, Mauritania and Sudan have broken diplomatic relations with the United States. Algeria has increasingly become a spearhead of Soviet influence. Arab emotionalism caused riots almost everywhere, even in Tunisia. In Libya the foundations of government were shaken. More than half of the 13,000 Americans in Libya were evacuated, the vital flow of Libyan oil to Western Europe was suspended for a month, normal operations at Wheelus Air Base ceased, and we have been asked to negotiate for the relinquishment of Wheelus. Libya is only now slowly recovering, and the outlook remains precarious. The crisis has set back prospects for Maghrebian economic cooperation; it has caused new problems of internal stability in Morocco and Tunisia and new anxieties about the military strength of radical Algeria; it has opened new opportunities for the extension of UAR, Algerian and Soviet influence. The Sudanese, for instance, are now seeking military assistance from Czechoslovakia and the USSR. As a consequence of these events, we face the following principal policy issues: a. The impingement of Near East policy. If methods cannot be devised of dealing with the Near East problem which are tolerable to the moderate governments of Arab Africa, we risk the weakening of Tunisia, Morocco and Libya and a strengthening of views of the extremists like Algeria. Conversely, whatever is done to reinforce the moderates will enhance their prospects of contributing constructively to a Near East settlement. Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and perhaps Libya will be more than ever interested in obtaining US arms. We should adhere to present commitments and resume shipments as urgently as our general arms policy allows. We should be prepared to examine means of strengthening the internal security systems of friendly governments. b. At the same time, we should try to move forward on the President’s proposal of an arms registry. The need of our friends for limited additional military assistance and our interest in arms control need not be in conflict. c. In the emotional atmosphere of politics in Arab Africa, our political actions in the Mediterranean and the Near East will be of primary importance, but economic support will remain an essential element in restoring political stability and American influence. It is therefore extremely important to keep aid going—to expand it where the situation is propitious, as in Morocco and Tunisia, and not to abandon it entirely where the situation is more difficult, as in Sudan. Initial steps in this direction have been taken, but they are bound to run into difficulty; patience abroad and perseverance in Washington will be essential. d. We should give particular attention to what we can do to shore up the regime in Libya. A special contingency paper on Libya will be available this week. 2. The Southern Sixth While the group of problems in southern Africa—Rhodesia, Portuguese Territories, South West and South Africa—are basically different from those of the northern littoral, they have three things in common. They are deep-seated emotional problems on which our influence is limited. They interact on each other, inevitably making our efforts to solve them more difficult. They affect other parts of the continent and adversely affect our interests there. Hence we have an interest in their solution for their own sake and because of their wider effect. Rhodesia . We are committed to supporting British and UN efforts to end the rebellion through economic sanctions. While the British currently through the Lord Alport Mission to Rhodesia are seeking to determine whether there is any basis for renewed negotiations, the British Government remains publicly committed to the pledge of “no independence before majority African rule.” Settlement on any other basis would produce strong anti-British reaction in Africa with the British unpopularity transferred to the US and the West generally. We thus have an interest in the terms of any settlement of the Rhodesian problem. Portuguese Territories . As there is little likelihood of any change in the foreseeable future to the respective positions of the Africans or the Portuguese on this problem, the US should continue to: (1) advocate to both parties a peaceful solution based on the principle of self-determination; (2) assure maximum Portuguese concurrence with our policy that arms and equipment supplied or sold to Portugal not be used outside the NATO Defense Area. South West Africa . Caught in the dilemma of asserting UN responsibility without achieving UN authority over the territory, we have no choice but try to maintain our support of the UN without endorsing action that is totally unrealistic. It is very important that we continue to support through peaceful means the right of the people of South West Africa to self-determination. South Africa . Facing the problem of opposing tendencies—to associate with South Africa or to disengage from it entirely—the pressures have been strong to take actions which swing between the two extremes. A fully consistent policy is probably impossible at this time, since the policies at each end of the spectrum are contradictory but nevertheless have strong attraction and considerable support. One possible formula would be continued economic association; active political dissociation; and progressive strategic disengagement. The aim would be to influence South Africa to accept necessary accommodation to the realities of Africa. 3. Nigeria The outbreak of hostilities on July 6 between the Federal Military Government and the East (Biafra) intensifies our various basic polity problems with respect to Nigeria. We have consistently stated that the Nigerian problem is one for the Nigerians themselves to solve. This policy of non-involvement, however, is being complicated by several factors: the FMG is unlikely to defeat Biafra immediately; Biafra, and perhaps the FMG, may be getting arms from Eastern Europe; and Biafra may obtain sympathy or recognition in due course from some other countries. The policy of urging peaceful solutions has failed for the present. Our refusal to intervene in this internal Nigerian struggle has caused us to limit our active support for the established government, to deny support for the secessionist government, and to refuse to sell arms to either side. It has also led us to cut down on the numbers of Americans in trouble areas and to slow down implementation of our aid programs. This is a conscious policy of limiting commitments and involvement while continuing to recognize the FMG as the government for all of Nigeria. We see our policy coming under increasing pressure during the coming months. With aggressive agility Biafra will probably get more arms, further involve groups in the United States friendly to its cause, and with considerable skill continue its diplomatic efforts for external support. The FMG, more inhibited by its internal divisions, will increasingly react against our neutral stand. Key policy issues will be: (a) UK Role . Given our other commitments, we have no other practical course than continuing to assert that among foreign governments the UK has primary responsibility, in view of its large stake and traditional ties with Nigeria. (b) Arms for the FMG . Provision of arms will destroy our posture of non-involvement, and will progressively open up greater financial and military commitments. We should stay out of this; urge the UK to provide assistance and not try to restrict FMG acquisition of arms elsewhere. (c) Further political assistance to FMG. We should not connive with secession, either in the Nigerian context or because of precedents elsewhere in Africa, nor should we oppose it. (d) Future of AID , Peace Corps, etc. We should reaffirm our goal of helping the people of Nigeria in their long run development irrespective of the political configuration of the country. Subject only to safety of individuals, we should offer to continue programs in all of Nigeria, and we should be prepared to bend legal requirements to this objective. (e) Settlement of the dispute . Given our limited engagement, we have limited influence. Our best course is actively to support Commonwealth, especially African, efforts, with other types of African mediation (e.g. OAU, or an ad hoc group) as an alternative. 4. The Congo The outbreak sparked by the revolt of the mercenaries on July 7 has obscured the basic problems of the Congo and hindered our efforts to assist the political and economic development of the country. We have three immediate objectives in connection with the revolt. (a) To provide emergency assistance, without deeply engaging ourselves on a continuing basis. We have so far done this by providing airplane transportation for Congolese forces on a temporary basis. We expect to draw the line in our own direct involvement at this point. (b) We should exert such influence as we have in both Brussels and Kinshasa to retain maximum Belgian presence in and assistance to the Congo. Belgium is a principal source of further help in strengthening the security and economic development of the Congo. Congo-Belgian estrangement will cause loss of badly needed personnel and resources with consequent pressure on the United States to replace them. (c) To associate responsible African nations with the Congo in dealing with the present revolt. The association either in word (e.g. Kaunda) or in deed (e.g. Ghana and Ethiopia) with Mobutu and our efforts to help his government is already our tactical goal. Similarly, we should try to keep the Congo out in front both in obtaining and using any African support. If successful, this tactic will also make it more difficult for communist forces to reinsert themselves into the Congo. At the same time, we wish to prevent the current situation from ruining the prospects for longer term development in the Congo. The recent devaluation will fail in its purpose if economic development falters. An emergency examination of what is required to keep the Congo going during the coming months may be necessary. Economic development will also be stifled if there is a mass exodus of Europeans from Katanga, and special measures to assure their security may be required. The severance of Belgian efforts in production, transportation and training would also set back development badly. Here we may have to employ a mixture of pressure and economic help to restabilize the situation. 5. East Africa and Zambia The situation in East Africa and Zambia lacks the dramatic impact of the crises in Nigeria and the Congo, but it nevertheless has several important aspects. Several developments during the past months have been encouraging. Each of the East African governments have gradually consolidated its position. Kenyatta and his supporters have clipped Odinga’s power; Obote has so far been successful in his centralizing policy; Nyerere is slowly strengthening his authority over Zanzibar. At the same time, these governments have agreed to expand their cooperative efforts by establishing an East African community. Zambia has made substantial progress in developing alternative transport routes for its imports and exports following the illegal seizure of independence in Rhodesia. This progress could be affected, however, if the offer of the Chinese Communists to build the Tanzanian-Zambian railroad is accepted. Appealing to a deep-seated desire of Nyerere and Kaunda for this link, and exploiting their frustration at failing to get the assistance from the West, the Chinese may be able to consolidate their influence and compensate for their various losses elsewhere in Africa. Our own position in these two countries is also affected by the problems of Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. Frustrated and disillusioned, Zambia and Tanzania have whittled down their relations with and confidence in the United Kingdom. This estrangement has also affected us, since we are Britain’s major partner. This has tended to limit somewhat the initiatives open to us in East Africa and Zambia. In view of the Chinese initiative in the single most important regional project in the area, we may have to challenge this competition by helping to provide valid alternatives to it. We may in this way succeed in convincing the Tanzanian and Zambian governments that we continue to support their aspirations. By such a demonstration of our commitment to their economic development we can also hope to offset somewhat the negative effects of our policies in southern Africa. 6. Aid and Economic Programs Our AID and other economic programs for Africa are running into heavy weather both in Congress and in Africa. Congressional criticism is an amalgam of several views. The fear of involvement which stimulated the country limitations of last year is even stronger. Because the prospects of Africa, were exaggerated and the effects of external aid were overestimated, Congress tends to be disillusioned. The internal difficulties in Nigeria and the Congo contribute to the disenchantment. They have become an excuse for cutting funds, and even our modest aid request ($195 million) is threatened. A number of African leaders (and some Congressmen), on the other hand, are dismayed by our phasing out of bilateral assistance from some twenty-five countries. The Africans see this as a denial of much needed help and a sign that the United States has lost interest in the continent. Certain Congressmen also see it as foregoing much needed US influence. This group seeks, first more flexibility in our policy and progressively moderate increases in the totals. The regional approach—whether through the IBRD, the African Development Bank, formal African groupings, or ad hoc national combinations—is slow in developing. The principal gesture available to us in the immediate future is a contribution to the ADB, which so far has been postponed because of the Near East crisis and other priorities. Commodity prices affect some African nations far more than external assistance. Cocoa is a chief issue. We have worked out acceptable principles for an agreement on price and buffer stocks with Ghana, but the proposals face hurdles: other producers have got to agree, and the concerted and stubborn opposition by US companies must be overcome. Among the key decisions facing us in the coming months are the following: a. Level of Aid . We have got to mobilize support for reasonable assistance levels, or suffer a serious psychological blow in Africa as to the validity of our interest in the continent, to say nothing of the loss of influence. b. Flexibility . Since our inflexibility is due partly to the African situation, to Congressional restrictions and to Executive Branch decisions, we cannot do much right away. We could start first with the “Self-Help Fund” to make it a “Politico-Economic Fund.” We should be sure to make every effort to search out regional possibilities, including selective bilateral help to develop regional capabilities c. Regional Development . As soon as appropriate, we should make known our intention to seek Congressional authorization to contribute $60 million over three years to the ADB special fund, with a minimum of conditions attached. d. Cocoa . We should enlist full Executive Branch support to negotiate the proposed cocoa agreement and to assure its domestic and international acceptance. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, 7/13/67, African Problems. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The paper was discussed at the July 13 NSC meeting; see Document 225 . 227. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Barr), the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach), and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) to President Johnson 227. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Barr), the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach), and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 14, 1967. SUBJECT African Development Bank In your Foreign Aid Message, you stated that we would “seek an appropriate means of responding” to the request made last year for U.S. participation in a soft loan fund to be administered by the African Development Bank. In your Economic Message you also stated our policy of supporting such regional development efforts. Thus far, however, we have not given any answer to the African Bank request. The absence of any U.S. response has in effect stalemated the Bank’s effort to put together a package of contributions to this proposed loan fund. Normally, we would want to obtain thorough Congressional soundings before making a response. However, State, Treasury, and AID have reviewed this matter carefully in light of all of our other plans in the foreign assistance area, and we are agreed on the following points: 1. Our bilateral aid programs for Africa have been designed on the assumption that we will be moving into participation in an African Bank fund; it therefore is important to our own plans for the Bank to get serious international discussions underway. 2. We cannot obtain legislation for an African Bank contribution this session, if only because there is not sufficient time to put together a package involving other contributors. Action in the next Congressional session is entirely feasible. 3 In view of the fights expected this year on the AID bill, the Inter American Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, it would be counter-productive to attempt full Congressional soundings on an African Bank proposal at this time. (In addition, since the African Bank includes the U.A.R., and other Arab North African countries, this is a particularly inopportune moment to discuss the Bank with the Congress.) 4. The Congressional group headed by Rep. Multer that accompanied Under Secretary Barr to Africa this Spring (the group that later met with you on this subject) was strongly in favor of U. S. participation in an African Bank fund, and can be expected to assist in mobilizing Congressional support for a suitable proposal next year. Earlier, very limited soundings on the Senate side also indicated a generally favorable reaction. 5. With essentially every other regional development effort coming up for U.S. action either this year or next, there would be some political advantage to having—and some disadvantage to not having—an African Bank proposal to submit to the Congress next year. 6. The appropriate U.S. participation would be relatively small—about $20 million a year for three years, conditioned upon (a) limitation of our share to about 40 per cent of the total fund, (b) complete “tying” provisions to protect our balance of payments, and (c) a strong U.S. voting position, including a right to prevent the use of our own contribution for a particular project. No authorizing legislation would be sought until 1968, and appropriations next year would be small. We therefore believe it would be desirable to inform the Bank that we would be prepared to approach the Congress next year for authority covering a U.S. contribution along the lines indicated briefly in paragraph 6 above, and in more detail in the attached memorandum (Tab A). 2 If you approve, the first step would be for Secretary Fowler to send the President of the Bank the letter attached in draft form (Tab B). (This would be transmitted in confidence, but we would have to expect that the U.S. response would leak out eventually in the course of international discussions.) Secretary Fowler and representatives of other potential donor countries have been invited to attend the meeting of the Bank’s Governors on August 21–26. Our response will get the most mileage if it is conveyed to the Bank by that time. Joe Barr Concur: Nicholas deB Katzenbach William P. Gaud Recommendation : That you approve our advising the African Bank that we would be prepared to approach Congress next year for authority covering a tied Special Fund contribution of up to $20 million a year for three years, subject to appropriate contributions from other contributors and to other terms and conditions. 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. Limited Official Use. 2 None of the tabs is printed. 3 The “approve” option is checked. 228. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 228. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 22, 1967. SUBJECT What We Are Doing in Africa Senator McCarthy’s speech (ticker clipping at Tab A) 2 charges that we don’t pay enough attention to Africa except in crisis; that U.S. aid should be concentrated on long-term problems, particularly agriculture; and that we are too optimistic about African development. In reply, I would cite the following facts: 1. U.S. aid to Africa in FY 1967—excluding food—totalled $202 million, more than 14% above the 1966 level. The budget request now before the Congress ($195 million) would support a continuation of that high level. 2. Food aid to Africa increased by 18% in 1967 and will rise by a further 11% in 1968—a total increase of 25% over three years. 3. AID is now financing more than 1,800 technicians in Africa working on health, agriculture and education, the long-term problems of development. This is a 20% increase over 1966. The 1968 request provides for a slight increase. 4. About 25% of the 1968 request would be used for agriculture projects, an increase of almost 50% in agriculture spending over the previous year. 5. Supporting Assistance, the AID account which finances non-developmental, crisis-related activities, is declining in Africa. It amounted to about $22 million in 1967, more than $1 million less than in 1966. It should take another drop in 1968. 6. The President has worked harder than any President in history to make sure that U.S. policy toward Africa is energetic, sensible and realistic: —he commissioned the first general study of African development ever undertaken in the U.S. government—the Korry Report. —he gave the first speech entirely addressed to African development problems ever given by an American President (the OAU speech, May 26, 1966). —he sent his Under Secretary of State on the first tour of Africa ever made by an American official of his rank. —within the past year alone, he has received and exchanged views with President Senghor of Senegal, the King of Morocco, Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, President Banda of Malawi, President Kayibanda of Rwanda, and President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Within the next two months he will receive President Diori of Niger, General Ankrah of Ghana, and probably Presidents Ahidjo of Cameroon and Nyerere of Tanzania as well. (Last three not announced; last two not finally approved.) 7. AID’s attitude toward African development problems is evident in the following quote from the Agency’s Congressional presentation for FY 1968: —“Economic problems and the development challenge moved even more to the foreground …(in Africa) … with the difficult realities of the task becoming more widely and clearly recognized and the long-term nature of the development process becoming more generally accepted.” This isn’t rampant optimism. It is recognition that many Africans are finally coming to realize that there is no future in grandiose posturing on the world stage or in gratuitous adventures against their neighbors. More and more, Africa is looking inward to the immense labors required to achieve political stability and economic growth. This doesn’t make those problems any easier; nobody pretends that it does. But it is the first necessary step toward dealing with them at all. We are right to hail it as reason for hope. EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Africa, General. No classification marking. An attached transmittal note from Hamilton to the President reads: “Mr. President: Attached is the memo you wanted concerning Senator McCarthy’s speech on Africa. You should know that the final version of the speech is (1) much more complimentary to us than the AP report suggests, and (2) vastly improved—due to hard lobbying from AID—compared with the original draft which would have called upon you to scrap the current program and start over. I will send a copy of the speech as soon as I can get my hands on it.” 2 An August 22 press release from the Senator’s office about his speech in the Senate that day is not printed. 229. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 229. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, September 8, 1967. SUBJECT The Positive Story in Africa The 1960’s are the shake-down years for African independence. There are only four African nations with as much as a decade of experience as sovereign states. With a few exceptions, the colonial powers left no durable patterns of power and responsibility into which the new local leadership could fit. Moreover, the transition to independence occurred during a period of continent-wide awakening to the possibility of economic progress. Added to the ferment produced by jockeying for position in the slowly-congealing power structure of independent nations has been the urgent insistence of every populace that its government carry out an economic revolution as well. Combined with the racial problems associated with independence and the disrupting influence of the East-West controversy, this is a prescription for turmoil. And considerable turmoil has occurred. But there is a hopeful trend in Africa in the last three years—one which in part reflects our own efforts. Stated in crudest form, it is a shift in political values from flamboyance, ideology and international adventurousness to inward-looking preoccupation with the harshly practical problems each country faces in its own backyard. Perhaps inevitably, Africa had her fling with, the Nkrumahs and the glamour of the international stage. There will always be some temptation to forsake the knotty difficulties at home for the bright lights abroad. Yet it is clear who is built for the long pull in Africa. It is the Nyereres, the Houphouet-Boignys, and the Senghors who are strong and getting stronger. The leader with a future is the leader who tackles the day-to-day problems of the common man—enough food for his family, decent housing, and the rudiments of medical care. It is a cold fact, for example, that the Ivory Coast’s 9% annual growth rate in GNP is more important and durable political phenomenon in Africa than the great inflow of Soviet arms into Somalia, just as the current efforts of Nkrumah’s successors to put Ghana’s economic house in order are much more lasting and important than any of Osegyefo’s political and economic extravagances. And it is not Americans or Europeans who are making these judgments. It is the people of Africa—the people who can enforce priorities with the discipline every politician understands and respects. This trend also shows signs of extending to regional and sub-regional cooperation, particularly economic cooperation. For example: —the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 1963 and has sponsored fifteen Foreign Minister’s meetings and four summit meetings on the full range of African problems. —the Organization of African and Malagasy States (OCAM) was formed in 1965—within the OAU framework—to provide a forum for the Francophones. —earlier this year the three states of East Africa signed a treaty establishing an economic community, with room for expansion to include Zambia. —a customs union between five French-speaking nations was established in 1966, and the basis has been laid for a West African common market. —African nations joined together to form the African Development Bank in 1964, and the Bank began operations in 1966. All of the more than $200 million subscribed for the Bank’s ordinary capital comes from African countries. (This is the only regional bank in the world that does not depend primarily on money from outside.) In addition, countries which share river basins are thinking in terms of joint development with their neighbors; surveys are underway for a transportation network covering Central Africa and a power grid for most of West Africa; the World Bank has undertaken to play a special role—welcomed by the African Bank—in promoting regional and subregional development of shared resources. Obviously, none of these hopeful developments obscures the tragedy of Nigeria, the chronic chaos in the Congo, or the dark portents of racial discrimination in the southern sixth of the continent. These problems will always be better fodder for headline-writers. But if one is to understand Africa, he must keep up with—and encourage—the hopeful forces at work behind the scenes. In the long haul, they will be at least as important as the setbacks—and they have already borne impressive fruit. EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 41. No classification marking. 230. Intelligence Memorandum 230. Intelligence Memorandum 1 Washington, October 19, 1967. No. 1393/67 SOME ASPECTS OF SUBVERSION IN AFRICA 2 Summary In their efforts to gain influence and to reduce the Western presence in Africa, the Soviets and Chinese Communists have come to concentrate most of their efforts on normal overt means such as economic and military aid, student training, cultural exchanges, and propaganda. Externally promoted Communist subversion in the classical sense appears to be limited. This does not mean that covert Communist activity is absent; it is not. Early attempts by the Soviets in the 1960s to promote subversion in the newly independent African states through the use of ideologically oriented, foreign-trained agents was almost a total failure, however. Most of their assets were not able to sustain themselves against the regime in power. Similarly, the Chinese Communists continue clandestinely to assist and aid various antiregime elements, with little success to date. The Communist emphasis on normal diplomatic means stems partly from current conditions in Africa. There are no effective Communist parties, and leftist-oriented labor organizations have yet to become useful tools. Moreover, African political parties with leftist or Communist sympathies are either totally outside the power structure, or are the mass party of a regime whose leaders, although pro-Eastern, have no intention of letting their government evolve into an outright Communist regime. The most immediate threat currently confronting virtually all established African governments is overwhelmingly internal and indigenous. It usually stems from disaffected native elements often motivated by narrow tribal, personal, or professional considerations. Where broader factors are involved these are usually rooted in the misdeeds and failures of incumbent regimes, e.g., their corruption, or economic mismanagement. Instability—the source of most African upheavals—is inherent in the weak economic, sociological, and political underpinnings of nearly every regime. The over-all Communist effort in Africa is considerable in the apparent hope that through aid and the training and indoctrination of individual Africans some Communist regimes may eventually be installed. Since 1954, the Soviets have extended some $900 million in economic aid and about $300 million in military aid, exclusive of Egypt. The Chinese have extended some $350 million in economic aid, and an unknown amount of military aid. In addition to diplomatic personnel, the Soviets and Chinese together have over 6,000 technicians in Africa. The Soviets also have some 225 known or suspected intelligence officers, and the Chinese a considerably lesser number. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. III, 10/66–9/68. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. According to a note on the source text, “This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services.” 2 The Arab countries of Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan are treated only cursorily in this paper. [Footnote in the source text.] 231. Report From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson 231. Report From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 12, 1968. THE VICE PRESIDENT’S TRIP TO AFRICA DECEMBER 30, 1967–JANUARY 11, 1968 At your request, Mrs. Humphrey and I visited nine African countries between December 30, 1967, and January 11, 1968: Ivory Coast, Liberia (for the inauguration ceremonies of President Tubman), Ghana, Congo (K), Zambia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and Tunisia. We were received everywhere with large crowds, genuine enthusiasm, and friendship. The leaders with whom we met, without exception, expressed their admiration for you and for the people of the United States. I was able to meet with the principal leaders of each government, and, in almost all cases, to visit projects indicating our interest in self-help and the practical work of health, education, and agriculture. I was also able to survey a cross section of AID projects; talk with Peace Corps volunteers; meet informally with labor leaders; discuss trade and investment with business representatives; and meet with the American community. Among African leaders, I found a fierce self-pride and healthy nationalism, combined with a sense of pragmatic realism. I was also impressed by the quality of leadership I encountered in almost all the nations visited—a fact I found all the more remarkable when one sees how young these countries are, how generally limited their educational facilities have been, and what heavy burdens they have had to accept. In every case I found that our ambassadors and AID officials and programs were highly respected. My own efforts were greatly strengthened and supplemented by other members of my party, in particular Justice Thurgood Marshall (law and civil rights), Mr. Leonard Marks (Director, USIA), Mr. Peter Straus (Assistant Director, AID), Mr. Dwayne Andreas (business), Dr. Edgar Berman (health and medicine), Mr. Edgar Bronfman (business), Mr. Irving Brown (labor), Mr. Hal Greenwood (housing and savings and loan), Mr. Cecil Newman (press), and Dr. Samuel Proctor (education and Peace Corps). I have attached as an appendix brief reports prepared by these men. Their reports have also been passed directly to the appropriate government departments and agencies directly concerned. As you asked, I attempted to demonstrate the continuing concern of the United States and the American people with the African continent. I also used every opportunity I had to learn what was happening in each country and the continent as a whole. In addition, it was my privilege to extend invitations on your behalf to three African leaders to visit Washington during the coming months: President Tubman of Liberia; Prime Minister Egal of Somalia; and President Bourguiba of Tunisia. It was also my privilege to present the agreement of the Export-Import Bank to help finance the Bandama Dam to President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast; to sign a P.L. 480 Agreement with Ghana; to sign an AID agreement with Somalia to create the Mogadiscio water system; and to announce the intention of the United States to assist Zambia and Tanzania in improving a vital section of the Great North Road connecting these two countries. Finally, I was able to reaffirm the broad lines of our African policy in a speech delivered at Africa Hall in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A text of these remarks is attached in the appendix. 2 General Observations On this trip I saw more urban areas than rural. I naturally met with more leaders than I did ordinary citizens. While I visited as many countries as time would permit, I recognize that my report cannot cover all of the continent’s problems or claim authority based on extended examination of them. However, there were a number of distinct impressions that have, I believe, a general validity. 1. The African continent is filled with new nationalism, with a pride in freedom, and with a confidence that independent Africa has a great future. Colonialism can never be revived, and its entire disappearance from the continent is only a matter of time. 2. In all the leaders with whom I talked, the exuberance of nationalism was tempered by the sober and proper realization that Africa faces tremendous problems at every turn—whether in rural development, urban living, relations with nearby states, or continental cooperation. 3. In every instance, I encountered remarkable good will toward the United States. This was immediately apparent when I presented your letters to the leaders I met. It was evident in a wide variety of personal courtesies, and crowd enthusiasm in the streets and public places. In our official discussions it was often reflected in an unexpectedly sympathetic understanding of your burdens and responsibilities. 4. Within our means, the United States must play an active, imaginative, and well-conceived role in African political and economic affairs. Some 320 million African people in 39 nations cannot be left solely to the care of the former colonial powers, who often lack the necessary understanding and financial resources to help them. Nor should the governments of Africa be driven by economic need to place their fates in the hands of the Communist bloc. No leaders I met would willingly do this But a vacuum should not be allowed to form, where Communist penetration can take place. Africans desperately want our friendship, support and help—while nonetheless knowing the limits on our material resources. 5. The American private sector can and should become far more involved in Africa. For example, American business can, I am convinced, make a major breakthrough in the Congo, even though it may involve some risk and require courage. Foundations, which have already helped significantly in education, should be encouraged to expand their efforts in that field, in health research, and in population planning. The AID-sponsored Investment Guarantee Program should expand its pioneering work, and a broader pattern of government-business cooperation should be developed. The arm of our labor unions in Africa, the African American Labor Center, is making a good start; it should broaden its support from the American unions and progressively expand its activities. Various institutions—cooperatives, savings and loan associations, and others—should be focusing on Africa. And from our 2,000 universities and colleges, we have used but a small part of the talent and resources which should be channeled into solving some of Africa’s educational problems. 6. Youth is the prevailing fact of Africa, and we must act on that fact. Over 40 per cent of the people of this continent are under 16. The secondary educational system is very poorly equipped to handle this population explosion, let alone able to give it practical training for employment in the new, urban economic society of the continent. Despite our generally good relations with the current government leaders in the nations I visited, there is no reason to suppose that this situation will automatically prevail as they give way to the next generation. Indeed, in most cases, African nations will face a challenge to authority during the coming transition period. It is also clear that youth corps, sports clubs, and exchanges between American and African youth all need expansion and improvement, if Africa’s young people of today are not to become its revolutionary proletariat of tomorrow. 7. We should continue to encourage regional cooperation and to stress the regional approach in our AID programs. There has been clear progress in this field in the past six months, such as the OAU meeting at Kinshasa in September and the inauguration of the East African Community in December. The Entente and OCAM (Common Organization of African and Malagasy States)—involving several nations in West Africa—are other cases in point. African nations are increasingly working together on road and communication links; power grids and joint river projects; and regional development of institutions of higher learning. Africa’s organizations are mostly new, under-financed, poorly staffed and little understood. Yet the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa is pioneering ways to stimulate economic growth; the African Development Bank is starting well for its small capital; the East African Community will open up new markets and provide other economic benefits for several African nations; and almost a score of other functional or geographic groupings are emerging in response to the needs of Africa. 8. Despite the value of regionalism, we should not throw overboard our bilateral programs. There are, and always will be, a fairly large number of countries with unique problems or of special importance, where bilateral assistance will be in our national interest. We should not deprive ourselves of this method of carrying out our general policy in Africa. 9. Despite our limited means, more help should be sought for Africa. Our aid to Africa has been running well below 10 per cent of total U.S. economic assistance funds. There are, of course, other sources of help. But until we lead the way in our AID programs, these sources are unlikely either to take new initiatives 10. We should take new initiatives toward world commodity agreements. African nations live at the mercy of world commodity prices. The most immediate problems are coffee and cocoa. Successful negotiation and operation of agreements on their commodities can contribute far more to these countries’ welfare than can our AID programs. I believe our national interests would be best served by re-negotiating the coffee agreement and completing the proposed cocoa agreement. The Executive Branch, moreover, should put its full weight behind obtaining the ratification of these agreements by the Senate. 11. We must more actively recruit qualified Negroes in the Foreign Service and encourage their rise to positions of greater responsibility. Nothing that we can say about change and expanding opportunities for Negroes at home will be as convincing as the presence of responsible Negro Americans in Africa. 12. We need a private Council for Africa, much like the present Council for Latin America. Such a Council would be made up of business firms which would support and benefit from it. Consisting of a board, a small staff, and, most importantly, of representatives in African capitals, it would help American business in its efforts to become established and to operate successfully in Africa. Both Maurice Tempelsman and Edgar Bronfman, Jr., who accompanied us on our trip, expressed interest in helping to organize such a Council. 13. Finally, the United States must take a clearer and more forthright position on self-determination and majority rule in Africa or lose the confidence and respect of responsible and independent African leaders. Since there will always continue to be some gap between those principles and their application vis-a-vis southern Africa—and since in our adherence to peaceful change we shall probably encounter increasing frustration on the part of Africans—we need continuous repetition of our commitment to these principles. I sought to do this in my public statement in Zambia and in my Africa Hall speech in Ethiopia. I believe that at an appropriate time you may wish to renew and amplify the pledges you made in your speech before the OAU Ambassadors in May 1966, in order that Africa may know without doubt where we stand on this central issue. The Future I found during my trip a young Africa which is struggling to master a host of problems attendant upon newly won independence. What kind of Africa will emerge a decade from now? First, over half of the continent’s population will be 21 or younger. This youthful half will have been born during or after the great surge of national independence. It will not know at first-hand the colonial period, and will base its expectation on the accomplishments of independence, not the promises of those who achieved it. Our programs surely must be measured: Are they reaching the young? Second, this Africa will be further tested in its ability to achieve change without violence. There is every likelihood that unpredictability will continue to characterize these years as it has the past. It would be claiming infallibility to predict where violence, coups or counter-coups will occur, but they will certainly happen and they must be lived with. The advantage lies with choosing realistically to take the risks rather than withdrawing to await more certain disaster. Given the relative lack of reliable institutions of government, the hazards of political change in these nations, and the tendency to rely heavily on the personality of a single leader, it would be surprising if unexpected outbreaks or coups did not occur in the next decade. Third, just as internal institutions may bend or break under the challenge and strain of the next decade, so will the international institutions presently emerging have to prove their value or give way to new methods of dealing with Africa’s political and economic problems. Africans are pragmatic and practical. They want to build their countries in ways that work, and will look toward those who offer those ways. Fourth, the present gap between expectations and economic and social reality may well become an unbridgeable gulf, if practical steps are not taken to narrow that gap. It will require ingenuity and greater external assistance to give us any real measure of confidence that we can help reduce the span between the poor and desperately poor of the continent, let alone achieve a significant over-all increase in individual income. Finally, the present tension with respect to southern Africa raises the possibility that relations of the West with Africa will be severely strained and that Communist inroads will be increased, unless we continue to reaffirm through both word and deed our commitment to self-determination and majority rule. All this leads me to conclude that we can best minimize the risks of the decade ahead if we were to do something that neither I nor my colleagues could possibly complete in the short, intensive trip that was just taken. That would be to set ourselves the task of drawing the dimensions of this new Africa more clearly, of estimating more precisely what kinds of resources we shall need to further American policy in light of this new Africa, and to formulate the guidelines that are required to match our policy with what will be our problems. This look ahead should focus on three facts: —that Africa will demand a political commitment from us that is not unlike the commitment the Negro community seeks from the white community in the United States—to transfer into action the principles of individual rights and human dignity that we have endorsed but not fully put into practice. —that new and wider means of communication of understanding in both directions between the United States and Africa will have to be found if mutual disengagement is not to take place during this decade. —that transfer of resources (government assistance and other economic aid) through the traditional means is inadequate to transform the economic life of Africa, and that without this transformation our political commitments will be hollow and our estrangement inevitable. Africa needs meaningful stability—that is, change short of violence. It also needs a new generation firmly committed to achieving this change by democratic means. It can gain or lose both stability and democracy in the years immediately ahead. If we commit ourselves, within our means and priorities, to both goals we can help bring this vast and potentially rich continent, in self-sufficiency and independence, into the 21st century. Individual Country Comments The nations I visited in Africa number less than a fourth of the independent states of this continent. They nevertheless were widespread geographically, diverse in their forms of government, and greatly different in their specific problems. There follows a brief country-by-country summary, along with general observations. I shall make a series of specific project and other recommendations directly to the agencies concerned. I shall also send on to these agencies the recommendations of other members of my party. Ivory Coast—December 31, 1967 I met with President Houphouet-Boigny, officials of his government, and the senior staff of the African Development Bank; visited centers where USAID and Peace Corps volunteers were at work; and saw first-hand the marketplaces in this remarkably thriving city of West Africa. Our programs in Abidjan are among the most complex of any the United States has in former French West Africa. President Houphouet-Boigny was deeply impressed by his meetings with you in Washington last August. He is an extremely astute statesman, who is seeking to create a truly unified country by developing its great agricultural potential. He, likewise, is seeking a broader relationship with the United States. Massive French investment and thousands of French teachers and technicians have been essential parts of his present program. At the same time, he is taking major strides, through the establishment of technical schools and universities, to train the coming generation of Ivorians to maintain the present economic growth. To do this he needs additional external investment and, equally important, satisfactory terms of trade I delivered the offer of the Export-Import Bank to finance some 40 per cent of a hydro-electrical and irrigation project at Bandama Dam. I assured him of our deep desire both to reduce the imbalance between the developed and developing nations, as well as our efforts to support the renewal of the coffee agreement and negotiation of an equitable cocoa agreement. He is deeply concerned about commodity price instability which threatens African economic progress, and advocates international commodity agreements as a stabilizing mechanism. My discussions with officials of the African Development Bank—located at Abidjan but concerned with the whole of the continent—led me to conclude that this institution has made a sound start in using its modest (roughly $47 million) funds. It can be an effective force for regional economic development. It represents a significant initiative by the African states for African social and economic progress. It clearly needs more money if it is to do the job we would like to see it do. Our offer last autumn to contribute to a Special Fund was much appreciated and has been the pioneer offer among the potential donors. The fact that our funds are all tied to U.S. procurement gives the ADB real difficulty. It is less generous than our policy toward other regional banks and infers some discrimination against Africa. It sets a precedent for other donors, even though they may wish to be more flexible. I explained our present trade and fiscal problems which made such conditions necessary, but I think we should be prepared to be as flexible as we can during the next round of conversations on this matter. I urged that ADB make a special effort to obtain European capital and then come back to us for further discussions. My visit confirmed the wisdom of our giving President Houphouet-Boigny steady support. He is a staunch friend of the U.S. He is a most effective spokesman in French-speaking Africa and a leader in the Organization of African Unity. He has understood the basis for our presence in Southeast Asia. Likewise, without prodding, he has taken a number of steps to encourage African regional cooperation. He may be prepared to take a number of initiatives within the OAU on specific problems. I think over-identification with the U.S. could give him some of the same problems he now faces because of his heavy reliance on France. But I also think that frank cooperation and consultation with him will reinforce his constructive influence in the continent. Recommendations : 1. That we keep as many lines as possible open to Houphouet-Boigny through our economic programs and diplomatic consultations. 2. That we keep pressing for coffee and cocoa agreements as essential elements in the prosperity of the Ivory Coast and other West African countries. 3. That we move ahead in our support of the Bandama Dam now that we have made this specific loan offer. 4. That quietly, and with only occasional publicity, we encourage the Ivory Coast to continue its leadership, particularly in West African affairs and also in other general African problems. Liberia—January 1–2 Arriving in Liberia on New Year’s Eve, I found the country fully engaged in a triple festival: the end of the year, the last day of Ramadan, and the inauguration ceremonies of President Tubman. These festivities permeated the entire visit. The Liberians were cordial. As you saw by cable, I also talked in Monrovia with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do of South Vietnam, Vice President Foncha of the Cameroon, and Diallo Telli, Secretary General of the OAU. My visit, of course, was primarily to represent the United States at the inauguration ceremonies. My program was in the hands of the Liberian Government, and my opportunities to examine the structure of American interests in this country were correspondingly restricted, although members of my party did make extensive individual contacts. I had a long substantive conversation with President Tubman and his principal colleagues in the Cabinet Room. I extended your invitation to him to visit the United States. He was obviously pleased and sent you his warmest personal regards We touched briefly on Liberia’s role in harmonizing the dispute between Guinea and the Ivory Coast and more generally on Liberia’s support for moderation in Africa and endorsement of our policies elsewhere in the world. Tubman has a double economic problem. His budget is in imbalance, and he talks about an austerity program. At the same time he is especially concerned to develop infrastructure elsewhere in the country, and the Port of Harper in his home territory is high on the list of his problems. We clearly have a long-term responsibility in Liberia, since Africa looks at Liberia as a manifestation of America. This task is also essential in our interests. U.S. private investment is $300 million, more than a seventh of the investment in Africa’s 40-odd countries and territories. Our Voice of America relay station is a major and well-run institution. It makes us heard throughout Africa south of the Sahara. Our unrestricted access to Roberts Airfield, which we first constructed as a wartime necessity, is an asset which we do not have elsewhere in the continent. Finally, it is in our interest that President Tubman, whose influence among African leaders is greater than the size of his country, continue to play a constructive role He runs his country paternally; corruption is widespread. The young, better-trained and more diligent Liberians need our encouragement for the long-term welfare of the country. This is something you may wish to discuss with President Tubman during his forthcoming visit. Recommendations : 1. Port facilities can pay off. We should be willing to look at the Harper Port to see if it is economical. 2. We must press the Liberians hard to undertake more effective financial austerity and domestic reform (these may be subjects which could be raised with him during his visit). 3. We should strengthen the younger leadership in anticipation of the political transition after President Tubman completes this last term of office. 4. We should look into Liberia’s agricultural production, especially rice, and explore means of using bulgar wheat as a substitute. Ghana—January 3 From the very moment I stepped off the plane, I got the strong impression that Ghana was a reflection of its top leadership: efficient, bustling, forward-looking, pragmatic and intensely aware of the need to progress during the years immediately ahead. I held talks with General Ankrah on Ghana’s problems, and I took a quick trip to the aluminum (Kaiser) smelter and Tema port which, along with the Volta Dam which we also helped finance, make up an impressive power production transportation complex. My talks were especially cordial with General Ankrah. He had been extremely impressed by his visit with you last October. He treasured your photograph and responded most warmly to your personal letter. In our conversation we covered five issues: the need for sound financing development in Ghana, where the prospects are very good in the long run; the necessity for private American investment, on which the attitude of the Ghana government is fundamentally sound but not fully accepted by the political opposition; the problems of southern Africa, where in measured manner Ankrah asked us to keep pressure on the Rhodesian, South African and Portuguese governments; on Vietnam, where Ankrah supports our efforts to negotiate but recommends stronger military measures; and on cocoa, where with greatest urgency he asked that we do all in our power to achieve an international commodity agreement. His arguments in this connection were typical of the man He did not push for high prices; he pushed for stable prices so he could plan his economy. He also recalled his conversation with you in October, when he had raised the issue, and felt that the recent cocoa conference (ending indecisively before Christmas) had harmed Ghana’s welfare. I gave him a very frank outline of Congressional opposition to further commodity agreements but also assured him that I would tell you of the importance he attached to this agreement. The trip to the aluminum-port complex is worth emphasizing. Along with the Volta Dam upstream (we observed it by plane coming into Accra), it represents the single greatest U.S. Government-U.S. private cooperative enterprise in West Africa. We began it when Nkrumah was in power, and were concerned lest it aggrandize him rather than help the people. Our confidence in the people has been vindicated. The project is a success and clearly represents a spectacular American contribution to Africa. We should not be timid in other similar situations. One cannot ignore the ordinary Ghanaian any more than one can avoid respecting Ghana’s leadership. They have tremendous drive, enthusiasm and competence. Accra, in spite of its austerity, advised by the IMF, is thriving. If any country deserves our support, if any people merit our help, Ghana stands high on such a list. Recommendations : We must be as practical in our responses as Ghana is realistic in its goals and requests, with proper guarantees. 1. This is a place to encourage American investment to strengthen its economic growth. Ghana is seeking private partners to run its former State enterprise. We should not be discouraged by occasional complications (one American pharmaceutical firm recently withdrew largely through misunderstanding), but should encourage U.S. private investment. 2. Ankrah has a valid point on the need for more stabilized cocoa prices. In spite of the obvious Congressional and private interests that may oppose this, we should keep moving on this agreement. 3. Ghana has enough resources to be able to take advantage of our various “bank windows.” I signed a P.L. 480 agreement of $12 million during my visit. We should be responsive in other ways as well. Congo (K)—January 4 Congo (Kinshasa) is going through several simultaneous changes. The Belgian colonial establishment continues to crumble. The rudiments of a new Congo are emerging. It shows in the large UN network of technical assistance, in the 40-odd buildings skillfully and rapidly erected for the OAU meeting last September, and in the hopes and desires of the younger elite, of which President Mobutu is the leader. Finally, traditional life in the Congo is changing as Africans flock to the city. My two and one-half hour conversation with President Mobutu illustrated these trends. He was passionately concerned about the interlocking problems of internal security and economic development. His request for assistance in giving mobility to his troops was sensibly based on the sound concept that maneuverability rather than numbers was the key to his present problem. He specifically raised the possibility of buying three C–130 aircraft. Greatly worried by the inability of the Congo to intercept even the most obvious flights over its territory, he also asked for a squad of pursuit planes to give him the rudiments of an Air Force. His discussion of economic problems centered on two points. He seeks greater economic independence from Belgium, and pressed for establishing direct commercial relations with American companies, instead of still having to go through Belgium. He has declared the year 1968 one of concentration on agriculture problems and wants to draw on our expertise in this field. The atmosphere in Kinshasa deserves special mention. Not only did Mobutu warmly reciprocate the good wishes you extended him in your letter, but in an unprecedented action he joined me in touring an AID-assisted housing project. The crowds gave us an enthusiastic welcome as we drove in Mobutu’s open car, greatly overshadowing an earlier minor incident in which a small number of Communist-organized students sought to embarrass the visit. There is a tremendous gap between the Congo’s potential and its present level of political and economic development. It is the size of the United States east of the Mississippi, has only 15 million people, but its copper and industrial diamonds are major world resources and its agriculture potential is greater. It is potentially to Africa what Brazil is to Latin America. Mobutu’s nationalism is self-evident. His sense of pride is great, and the direction in which he hopes to move is sound. For the first time in seven years the country is at peace. He wants to build security and get on with economic development. Only this will make independence meaningful. Only such progress will make it possible for him to resist subversion. We have put almost half a billion dollars into this country during the UN period and thereafter—much of it to maintain the country’s integrity and independence. Now that unity and peace appear to be real prospects, we should do what we can to stimulate the constructive development of this important country during the coming years. President Mobutu clearly regards the United States as the Congo’s best friend. He talked freely, for example, about the dilemma facing him because of the mercenary problem. His attitude was moderate and he recognized both domestic and international aspects of the problem. My encouragement of his taking a statesmanlike attitude seemed to impress him. Recommendations : 1. We should urgently examine the plans to strengthen the Congo’s internal security with a view to assisting primarily in the field of mobility, particularly the C–130 planes and special training. 2. We have been involved in many crash operations in the Congo and could benefit from a long-term examination of the Congo and our policy towards it, pointing toward steady support rather than emergency response from crisis to crisis. 3. Recognizing that the Congo is a high risk but potentially high return area, we should organize a major campaign to expand American enterprise in the Congo during the coming years, looking on this as a long-term proposition and giving it assistance in that context. 4. We should extend ourselves to help Mobutu in his 1968 agricultural year, especially through technical advisers. 5. We should respond to the Congolese interest in the Peace Corps by being prepared to send a small contingent. Zambia—January 5 The inclusion of Zambia in my itinerary was possible only by following a highly compressed schedule. It consisted primarily of a two-hour discussion with President Kenneth Kaunda, and his principal ministers, and a short published statement designed to bolster both American and Zambian policies in Africa (attached in Appendix). 3 I was able to announce our help in upgrading the Great North Road to Tanzania, which is extremely important both politically and economically. It will help give Zambia an option when in a few years it must decide whether or not to invite Communist China to build a railroad from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, to the heart of Zambia’s copper belt. Lusaka has the air of a boom town in the western part of the United States—spacious, with numerous buildings in mid-construction. It is booming, in spite of the deprivations imposed on it by Rhodesian UDI, because the price of copper is high. It is building its nation on a non-racial basis; it is seeking welfare for people scattered over wide spaces; its university buildings are surrounded by scaffolding; its broad streets—named after capitals of Africa—have the raw quality of new construction the world over. At the leadership of this government, is a group of men intensely nationalistic and hard-pressed—as are other leaders who find themselves on the front line of international controversy. Zambia looks south with mixed indignation and fear. The Smith regime in Rhodesia is tough and adamant, and it is backed up by the even tougher Vorster government of South Africa. On the flanks of these two states are the colonies of Portugal—one of which, Angola, not only borders Zambia but has a major rail exit for Zambian copper which it must traverse to reach the sea. They can strangle Zambia, and Zambia knows it. Kaunda and his colleagues feel themselves beleaguered, since only on the north (the Congo) and on the northeast (Tanzania) are there friendly states. They are searching for allies. Although nationalists and preferably neutralists, they are in the first instance products of the West. The United Kingdom bitterly disappointed them when it failed to act more strongly against Rhodesia. As we talked, several points were repeatedly made clear. (1) We have a basic community of principles which support non-racial societies and open opportunities for all; (2) Zambia 5 success in this approach is economically important to the West (over 15 per cent of its copper), and is psychologically important to those governments which have placed their faith in the African ability to mold new political territories into real nations; (3) Zambia’s failure would also be our failure. Not only would it set back our policy supporting Africa’s new nations, but the ensuing turbulence would lead to temporary southern African domination or to Communist infiltration from Tanzania, where they are gaining a foothold. Recommendations : 1. Along with other nations and organizations, we should help make the Great North Road to Tanzania an effective artery for traffic within two years. We should have this link, which benefits both Zambia and Tanzania, in good shape by the time that the Chinese complete their survey of a possible Tanzania-Zambia railroad. This is one thing we could do in the absence of an early solution to the issue of southern Africa. 2. We cannot abandon our efforts to bring peaceful change to southern Africa, no matter how difficult the problem. I recommend we settle in for the long haul. 3. In the much shorter period, however, we need to know Kaunda and his men much better, and he needs to know us. I therefore recommend that he be invited for an official visit during the first half of the calendar year—even though that may tax your schedule of visitors. 4. As in the Congo, I recommend that we explore the establishment of a Zambia Peace Corps project. The need for elementary and secondary teachers is particularly urgent. Ethiopia—January 6 The visit to Ethiopia was crammed with intensive discussion but it was also the point at which I sought to supplement your landmark speech of May 26, 1966, by giving a talk on our general approach to African problems at Africa Hall (see text in Appendix). The contrast between the ancient and the new is symbolized from the moment one lands at the jet airport, passes along ancient camel routes from the lowlands to the capital, and enters a city which is the capital both of the Empire of Ethiopia and of the new regional organizations of emergent Africa. I found Emperor Haile Selassie vigorous, alert and clearly fully in charge of his country’s affairs. He warmly appreciated your letter and reminisced with enthusiasm about his visit to you last year. In my talk with him, he lived up to expectations. His views were based on Ethiopia’s ancient concerns for the strength and integrity of the country, but they were couched in the context of current problems and future potentialities of the continent. If Ethiopia continues to play its role as balance wheel in the changes of the Red Sea Basin and Horn of Africa, and as moderator in the broader spectrum of Africa’s problems, it then rests with us to respond affirmatively, as best we can, to meet the legitimate needs of this country. We discussed a wide range of issues. He is responding constructively to the prospects of a detente with Somalia. He is deeply interested in expanding his educational institutions. He hopes to improve the use of his water resources. The principal additional African subject of conversation was the Congo mercenary problem. Here also I found the Emperor recognizing the need to rid the continent of their influence and cognizant of the nationalist motives underlying Mobutu’s desire to make an example of the mercenaries. He was receptive to the thought that a trial in absentia and their departure from Rwanda might be the combination of action that would best meet this dilemma. From two other discussions, I also received important impressions bearing upon Africa and our African policies. I spent an hour with Robert Gardiner—one of the truly remarkable Africans of these times—who heads the Economic Commission of Africa (ECA). He demonstrated the fundamental and critical nature of Africa’s potential population squeeze. This continent, now over 320 million, will more than double before the end of the century. It already faces recurrent food shortages. Within a decade the problem will be critical; and we will be moving in the direction of the dilemmas presently existing in South Asia. The organizational networks and the present patterns of trade are ill-geared to the tremendous task the continent faces. The ECA is but a start; the African Development Bank desperately needs money; the leadership and even more the habit of regional action is only beginning to emerge. Clearly we can and should help in this aspect. The patterns of trade are at best neo-colonial. Africa must stand on its own feet. Sound commodity practices are desperately needed. A constructive role on our part in coffee and cocoa will be a good start. But more than that, we need to help Africa develop its agriculture production. (A longer note on Mr. Gardiner’s remarks is attached as an appendix.) 4 At the same time, I had a further chance to talk about African political attitudes with the Acting Secretary General of the OAU. The bite into their flesh by Portuguese colonialism is sharp. We cannot solve the southern African problems for them, but we surely can sharpen our historic opposition to colonialism, with respect to the Portuguese territories; implement further our determination to support eventual majority rule in Southern Rhodesia; and continue with undiminished vigor our opposition to apartheid. Recommendations : 1. The Emperor asked for only two specifics in assistance: (a) that we maintain the tempo of our delivery of military equipment; and (b) that we consider special training to help Ethiopian soldiers improve their counter-subversion capabilities. I think we should respond affirmatively to both requests. 2. We need to broaden our exchange of ideas with Ethiopia. When I paid a courtesy call on the Presidents of the Senate and Assembly, the question was raised of expanding Ethiopian Parliamentary visits to the United States. The Parliamentarians were enthusiastic, the Emperor approved the idea, and the Prime Minister asked to join in as well. We should pursue this proposal. 3. We should also encourage more of our Congressmen to get to know Africa. I expect there are 10 visits to every other major continent to one to Africa. Doubling the African number would make the ratio still five to one. 4. We should encourage Ethiopia to participate fully in the detente with Somalia. 5. As a result of my discussion with Gardiner, I am convinced that food production is a starkly urgent need for much of Africa. We should rethink our entire approach to agricultural production and family planning. A population explosion is near in Africa. We must be prepared to head it off, and/or moderate it, by rapidly expanding both family planning and agricultural development. Somalia—January 7 The eight-hour stop in Mogadiscio on January 7 permitted me to have a long discussion with President Shermarke and Prime Minister Egal, both of whom play an active role in the policies of the Republic. I gave President Shermarke your personal letter and greeting which he warmly reciprocated. I also extended your invitation to Prime Minister Egal to visit the United States on March 14 and 15—an invitation which was accepted immediately. In addition, I signed an AID agreement to build an effective water system for the City of Mogadiscio. I also visited a remarkable self-help project involving practical education, Peace Corps and AID activities. A large luncheon hosted by the Prime Minister gave him the opportunity to reaffirm publicly his policy of improving relations with his immediate neighbors and permitted me to give strong encouragement to Somalia’s democracy, to place our full support behind the regional cooperation development in this part of Africa, to reaffirm the principles outlined in my OAU speech with respect to southern Africa, and to stress the danger of tension and ill use of funds involved in arms races in Africa. The Republic of Somalia is poor in natural resources and the bulk of its people are still nomadic in their search for even a subsistence living. But it is clearly a country rich in its democratic way of life. It may well deserve the label of “the most democratic country in Africa.” The present government which was elected last summer, tried valiantly and with considerable success to turn its back on old feuds and to seek a new relationship with its two principal neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia. Since over a million Somalis engage in annual migrations in foreign territory, the seeds of friction were planted generations ago and the bitter results of Somali frustration are hard to forget. Yet peace in northeast Africa can only be achieved if these three countries work together, while continued tension can only lead to further strife and likely exploitation by Communist countries. The Soviets have put close to $100 million into Somalia, a third of which has been in arms. They have not bought this proud, independent-minded people but they are in a position to exploit frustration if tension in the area cannot be reduced. In this context, the Somali Government initiative toward reconciliation with its neighbors at the OAU Kinshasa meeting in September was an act of unusual statesmanship and courage, which was undertaken for the welfare of the country at considerable risk of internal dissension. Fortunately, the inauguration of the East Africa Community in December, of which Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are the core members, led to a bid for access on the part of both Ethiopia and Somalia. In supporting both the detente with Ethiopians, and Kenya in the broader East Africa Community, we are doing three very significant things: asserting our interest in the democratic development of Somalia, encouraging the detente in the whole of the Horn of Africa, and furthering our broad policy of supporting regional cooperation in Africa. At the same time the fact must be faced that Somalia is the poorest of the three countries and desperately needs economic assistance. These considerations open up the possibility of assisting Somali growth by means of regional projects. We may not need to designate Somalia a “concentration” country qualifying for bilateral assistance, as are the other two, but we could still help it within the regional framework. Recommendations : 1. In the political field, I recommend that we strengthen our ties with Somalia through a broader spectrum of visits and exchanges. I have particularly in mind further visits of Somali Parliamentarians to the United States and exploration of private or foundation-supported visits to Somalia. 2. Until regional projects can be formulated and we can begin implementing them, we should not phase out our bilateral AID programs in Somalia. We should use the year or two immediately ahead of us to explore actively additional regional projects. 3. Two valuable and productive projects could be the coordinated development of the Juba and Schebelli Rivers, both of which rise in Ethiopia. They are subject to regular flooding causing much erosion. These rivers could be controlled for the benefit of agriculture and cattle husbandry in both countries. Such binational projects would do much to ease the political tension between Ethiopia and Somalia. 4. We should study sympathetically the desire of Somalia to develop its trained manpower through the establishment of a community college-type educational institution. 5. We should also encourage Somalia’s expressed desire to build a link to the nearly-completed Nairobi, Kenya-Addis Ababa, Ethiopia road. Such a link would help give Somalia outlets for her production and would tie her more closely to her neighbors. Kenya—January 8–9 The contrast between Mogadiscio and Nairobi is so dramatic that the jet traveler has difficulty assimilating the difference. Nairobi is a city of half a million, having a business area crowded with modern ten-story office buildings, a climate both bracing and felicitous, and a people whose economic and educational infrastructure is being rapidly modernized. Nairobi itself can well claim to be a model of “Harambee”—the slogan which its President has popularized of working together without respect to race or creed. My visit to Kenya was limited by time to its capital. I talked with President Jomo Kenyatta—who was delighted by your letter and by your previous correspondence with him—and with his principal Cabinet colleagues. I lunched with him and other Kenyan leaders at Parliament House, where I saw Kenyan democracy at work in an Assembly session. I visited the veterinary school of the rapidly growing University of Nairobi, and the excellent center for administration, both assisted by AID. And, as I tried to do elsewhere, I met and talked with the American community in this city, which numbers 300 American firms, as well as our officials. The structure of political power in Kenya is complex. Tribal politics permeate the scene, and the tribal base of a politician is crucial to his position. At the same time, Europeans and Asians have their own ways of making their influence felt, with the result that power is deployed in widely different ways within the same community. Personality is also important, especially in the case of Jomo Kenyatta, who is a stern father figure to everyone, even his fellow Kikuyu tribesmen. Yet this imposing figure does not stop political maneuvering, and the in-fighting is already active in anticipation of the removal some day of Kenyatta from the political scene. A less prosperous country, and a less able political elite than found in Kenya today, could not stand the strain of this situation. Kenya is relatively well governed because its working Cabinet includes well-trained economists, experienced politicians, and young vigorous nationalists. It retains British personnel in certain key jobs. Kenya got a head start as the commercial and industrial capital of East Africa. While this makes Kenya an object of envy, it gives the country a power position in Africa that adds weight to the influence inherent in a shrewd leader with an articulate support staff. With these strengths, it is not surprising that Kenya is the heartland of the new Economic Community of East Africa. Kenya played the key responding role when a weak Somalia decided to come to terms with its neighbors. The future of our own relations and interests in Nairobi looks good. These advantages should not blind us to a real danger that stability for the moment rests on a remarkable collaboration between an aging patriarch and an aggressive elite. When the patriarch goes, the elite may be torn asunder. An analogy with Nigeria may be extreme, but the fact that we may expect too much and therefore be excessively disappointed if the future brings something else has Nigerian overtones. Recommendations : 1. In spite of the hazards of the future (and they are less imminent than in most underdeveloped countries), I believe we should continue to expand our assistance in those areas where there is either a very persuasive bilateral gain to be made or where the emerging regional cooperation can be strengthened. Thus: a. The water development program for the Northern Province should be undertaken in conjunction with such multilateral assistance as is possible. b. The internal security of Kenya is extremely important if its economic prosperity is to continue. My instinct is, therefore, to favor the proposed help to the police in the form of small aircraft and better communications equipment. I would also respond favorably to Kenyatta’s request to train some of his military in countering subversive activities. c. New regional programs—such as the road to Ethiopia, the regulation of flooding in areas around Lake Victoria, disease control for cattle—should be actively pursued. 2. As elsewhere in the continent, there is too little knowledge of Kenya by American Congressmen, although admittedly Kenya as the hub of East Africa receives more visitors than its sister nations. Its Parliament and our Congress should have exchanges of delegations more often and for long enough periods to permit real study of the country. 3. We should seek to strengthen Kenya’s already real ability to influence events elsewhere in Africa. This means more consultation, though not exhortation; it means a willingness to tolerate an East African way of looking at issues that may not be exactly our own. 4. Finally, we are already deeply engaged in Kenyan education, through various institutes and programs of the university, and the Peace Corps teachers (about half of the 255 PCV’s in the country). We should seek to make the University of Nairobi more regional. We should not only help the University to educate Africans in their continent, but we should also strengthen its ability to take other Africans, including refugees. Tunisia—January 10–11 Tunisia was the high point of my visit to Africa. President Bourguiba, who expressed his firm friendship and admiration for the United States and for you personally, is an historic figure among the leaders of his generation. He is one of the few revolutionaries of the post-war world who has—after his nation’s independence was won—also proved his capacity for governing. Tunisia is poor by American standards. But her human and material resources are under systematic development. She has an established layer of trained leadership. And the country is filled with forward movement and dynamism. In my long conversation with Bourguiba, he expressed himself openly and vigorously. He has a caustic disdain for Nasser and believes we have been mistaken in past assistance to him (“Nasser is a gangster and rules by fear”). He feels we are finally convincing North Vietnam that we will not withdraw from the struggle there (“They know there will not be another Dienbienphu”) and that Hanoi may soon be ready for negotiation. He is willing to play the role of honest broker in the Middle East, in Vietnam, in the Congo and elsewhere in the world where his stature among the “unaligned” nations is unchallengeable. He specifically suggested that direct Israeli-Palestinian talks be undertaken as a realistic way out of the Middle East impasse. You may wish to discuss this with him. He feels that this crisis can be peacefully overcome. He is less confident about the situation in the Maghreb (Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia). He is obviously concerned about the proximity of so much Soviet arms and influence in Algeria. In my talks with economic officials—and in my visit to the agricultural area of the Medjerda valley—I was impressed by Tunisia’s capacity to use our assistance well. Our P.L. 480 Food for Freedom Program is a vital factor in the public works programs, urban and rural. “Food for work” has proven to be effective foreign aid. Tunisia has obvious security problems. Bourguiba has an enemy in Nasser and a possible opponent in Boumediene of Algeria. Together these countries command well over a half-billion dollars of Soviet arms, have five times the population and many times the natural resources of Tunisia. By contrast, Tunisia’s own military program is running at about $5 million a year. We do not have an official commitment to come to Tunisia’s defense, but it would appear that we have one of the strongest moral commitments of any in this particular case. Fortunately, the presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean gives us a capability which in most circumstances is more reassuring than agreements on paper. There is a question about succession following Bourguiba. But there are a number of capable people available. This is a country which has earned, and deserves, our full support. Bourguiba and Tunisia are real assets in the Middle East, in Africa, and in the “third world.” Recommendations : 1. Tunisia should remain one of the principal countries for the concentration of our economic assistance. Tunisia is nearing the take-off point economically and can be a shining example to others. 2. Tunisia’s security is a valid concern for us, because of the location of the country and the stand its government has taken in vital world issues. Within our resource limits, there is no doubt that we have a commitment that should be honored. I believe that we should not cut our military aid below its present level, and should at the same time make our political support more clear. To strengthen Bourguiba is one way to weaken Nasser and Soviet influence. It also puts our prestige and power on the side of the constructive moderates in the Middle East. 3. I was impressed by the way the Peace Corps and our private organizations and foundations have given a major new dimension to our assistance to Tunisia. This is a trend we should encourage. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Secret. 2 Not printed. For text of the Vice President’s January 6 speech at Africa Hall in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, see Department of State Bulletin , January 29, 1968, pp. 129–133. 3 Not printed. 4 Not printed. 232. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 232. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, March 13, 1968. FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN 1968: AFRICA Summary 1. The paper focuses on major foreign policy issues which may come before the NSC or the President during 1968. 2. The U.S. objectives toward which policy should he directed are defined as: (a) safeguarding of U.S. strategic interests; adoption by African governments of favorable attitudes; fostering of U.S. trade and investments; (b) realization of the principle of self determination in southern Africa; (c) achievement of an environment which will permit the African nations to develop their national interests without external interference. 3. In a continental sense, the general problems anticipated during the year will be the continuing prevalence of instability and those arising out of the need for continued economic development. With regard to the latter, our capacity for action will be limited by the reduction in the resources that can be employed to meet Africa’s increasing economic needs and by Congressional restrictions placed on the use of those resources (e.g., Conte-Long amendments). Presidential action may be required when inability to obtain adequate U.S. assistance influences African countries to turn away from the West. 4. In North Africa the situation will be dominated by the cumulative effects of Soviet arms and influence in Algeria and the UAR, and increasing Soviet activity in the Mediterranean. Four issues may arise: (a) whether Soviet arms shipments to Algeria will escalate the arms race in the Maghreb; (b) the problem of protecting the U.S. national interests in the area in the face of legislative restrictions; (c) whether we can maintain our use of Wheelus Air Base; (d) a possible request from President Bourguiba of Tunisia for security assurances when he visits the United States in May. 5. The Horn of Africa is also under pressure from Soviet military activities in the Sudan and less so than formerly in Somalia, which is pursuing a policy of detente with Ethiopia and Kenya. Three issues may arise: (a) whether in the uncertain security situation in Ethiopia we should maintain our communications facilities at Kagnew or turn to alternatives; (b) what our response should be to continuing requests by Ethiopia for more arms, and (c) whether we should consider using our support of Ethiopia, Somalia or Kenya to encourage continued detente. 6. In East Africa the principal problems will be maintaining the momentum of progress in regional cooperation and in averting excessive pressures within Tanzania, either from Chinese or other Communist influence. Three issues may arise: (a) will the East African economic community be but a paper organization without considerable outside encouragement and assistance; (b) whether the purchase by an individual East African country (e.g. Uganda) of sophisticated weapons will restrict our ability to help the region as a whole; and (c) possible nationalization or similar actions by governments of the region (especially Zanzibar). 7. West Africa is subject to multiple internal pressures: malaise between France and francophone countries; repercussions of unrest, the civil war in Nigeria, a possible crisis in the Congo (K), the need for continuing political and economic progress in Ghana. Four issues may arise: (a) should the U.S. remain neutral in the Nigerian conflict? If the disputants succeed in reaching even a temporary accommodation, how we respond effectively to the need for assistance; (b) should we shift the emphasis of our aid in Congo (K) from budget support to development; how would we respond to new needs for C–130 aircraft?; (c) how to strike a balance between encouragement of continued French aid to francophone Africa and reduction of French-inspired restrictions; (d) whether we can develop sufficient consortium assistance to Ghana. 8. In southern Africa the complex of issues will remain. The situation in Rhodesia will present us with serious problems. Portugal will face continuing difficulties in Angola and Mozambique and may take dangerous initiatives with respect to Black Africa. South African issues nay reach a flash point in the United Nations over South West Africa; renewed pressures may be felt on our present policy on arms, naval visits and strategic facilities. Zambia will face intensive pressures for political action and economic development. In all of these we face the problem of establishing our credibility with respect to the application of our principles in southern Africa. Four issues may arise: (a) if Rhodesia settles with the United Kingdom, what should our economic and political policies be? If Rhodesia withstands present economic pressures what will be our stand on moves to widen sanctions or with regard to the use of force?; (b) what decisions we should take if Portugal strikes at Black Africa or puts pressure on us re NATO or the Azores?; (c) what our responses should be to the variety of South African issues; and (d) whether we can channel Western resources to meet Zambia’s economic and security needs. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFR–US. Secret. Drafted by Hadsel in AF/AFI. A March 16 covering memorandum from Read to Rostow reads: “The enclosed paper on African foreign policy issues which may arise during 1968 is submitted as a possible topic for a future NSC meeting. The paper was prepared by the Bureau of African Affairs and has been cleared by the Under Secretary.” 233. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 233. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 22, 1968, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Your Talk with Seven African Ambassadors at Ernie Goldstein’s Luncheon—Thursday, May 23, 1:00 p.m. 2 THE GROUP: Ambassador Debrah, (DEB-rah)—Ghana Ambassador Peel—Liberia Ambassador Iyalla (E-YAL-la)—Nigeria Ambassador Adoula (Ah-DOO-la)—Congo (K) Ambassador Gallin-Douathe (Gal-LAN-doo-WAT)—Central African Republic Ambassador Mayaki (My-YAH-kee)—Niger Ambassador Ohin (Oh-HEEN)—Togo (Attached are State’s fact sheets for each country; the first paragraph is a biographic sketch of the Ambassador. 3 There’s a language problem with this group . Three of them speak little or no English; they’ll probably get the gist of your general remarks but would be embarrassed in a two-way conversation. Background: This is a relatively like-minded group. These Africans: —get along with each other. They’re all clustered together in West and Central Africa; —are moderates putting emphasis on development. Five (Ghana, Nigeria, Congo, CAR, and Togo) are ruled by military “caretaker” regimes; —are pro-Western or “non-aligned.” We have given assistance, in some form, to all of them. Each has or soon will have a Peace Corps program. Our relations are good all around the table; —have been publicly or privately sympathetic to us on Vietnam. (Ghana, Liberia, and the Congo were included on the Vice President’s trip to Africa last January.) The principal interest in common here is economic development. All are struggling to get their economies off the ground—some (Ghana and Togo) after waste and mismanagement under past regimes; others (Nigeria and the Congo) in the face of civil war or the threat of internal subversion. Each needs more outside help. Each would like to get more aid from us. As most Africans, these seven worry that we give the Continent too low priority and are looking for a way to withdraw from Africa altogether. Under the new aid strategy for Africa we are cutting back most bilateral programs in favor of regional projects. But, of this group, the Congo, Ghana and Nigeria (once the civil war is settled) will still be eligible for bilateral help from us. You may wish to take the same approach with these Ambassadors you’ve taken with their African colleagues at past lunches. We are still committed to help those who help themselves, and that certainly goes for Africa as well as other developing areas. However, they should appreciate your problems with the Congress. They must know we couldn’t and shouldn’t do it all; they’ve got a responsibility to encourage other donors. Most important, the poor countries must show they are serious about attacking their problems with their own measures. Talking Points: Along this tack, you may tell the group: 1. Despite Congressional cuts last year and a tough fight on this year’s Aid Bill, we’re pushing for all we can get. The outlook is not as good as it might be, but we are not about to “withdraw” from our common stake in development. 2. The key is not only what we want, but what others produce on their own. Congress rewards self-help and likes to see other donors carry a fair share. Africans can do a lot to help us on both counts. W.W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Non-Vietnam, March-June ’68. Confidential. Drafted by Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff. 2 No record of this discussion has been found. 3 Not printed. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 234. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 234. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 5, 1968, 3:40 p.m. SUBJECT Trip to Africa At Tab A 2 is a possible itinerary for a 9-day trip to Africa in August. It is checked out with Joe Palmer’s Deputy (Joe is in Africa now and for the next month). I think we all believe that it would be a great boost to our policy and image met only in Africa but in all the developing countries. Themes The basic themes of our African policy are support for African development, support for regional and sub-regional groupings to solve common problems and develop shared resources, moral support for the Black African position on the racial question in the South, and discouragement of violence between and within countries. These should also be the themes reflected in your itinerary. The schedule at Tab A is essentially a series of meetings with the various regional groupings which have developed in Africa over the past 3 years. This meets all the above themes and also helps us with a difficult problem of explanations to the 30 countries which you would not have time to visit. The only exception to this rule is the one day in Ghana in which you would have more time to visit Peace Corps projects, AID projects, etc.—while at the same time implicitly recognizing the most dramatic and hopeful change in an African country during the Johnson Administration. Problems We would have to find ways to deal with the following: 1. You would undoubtedly arrive in the wake of a bloody Congressional slaughter of the Aid Bill, which cannot help but have serious effects on our aid to Africa. 2. The proposed visit to Zambia—though terribly important from the standpoint of African policy—will put you face to face with the Rhodesian problem and undoubtedly involve a public reconfirmation of our anti-Rhodesian posture. This will not require new policy departures, but a Presidential statement will add new emphasis. 3. The itinerary is necessarily arbitrary if we are to hold the trip to nine days. For example, it excludes Liberia 3 despite the fact that we have older and more direct historical ties there than with any other African nation. We can expect some flak no matter what itinerary is settled upon. 4. All the meetings suggested in the itinerary would have to be manufactured; none of them are now scheduled. We think they can all probably be arranged, but probably not without a leak. There is also the possibility that some leaders (e.g., the President of Mauritania, with which we have no relations) may refuse to come and make some noise in the press about it. (Upon investigation we can find no events currently scheduled for August which you might attend. The OAU will bring together most African Heads of State September 10–16, but in Algiers, where the welcome mat will almost certainly not be out. The tiny British Protectorate of Swaziland, completely surrounded by South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique, becomes independent on September 6. The Ministers of the East African Economic Community have their second meeting in Zambia September 16–28. But we have assumed these events come too late.) Recommendation If this general itinerary looks acceptable, I would suggest you authorize us to instruct our Ambassadors quietly to sound out the possibility of arranging the suggested meetings. Joe Palmer’s current trip would also be very useful in this regard. If we are to arrange four meetings of Heads of State within a period of 9 days, we need to start now. Walt Itinerary okay; go ahead and take field soundings 4 Hold off Call me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, President’s Proposed Trip to Africa, August 1968. Secret. 2 Not printed. 3 A notation in the margin in Johnson’s handwriting reads: “Can’t we include?” 4 President Johnson checked this option and added the handwritten notation, “if OK by Rusk.” On July 2, Rostow forwarded an undated memorandum from Katzenbach to the President recommending final approval for a 9-day trip in August to Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, East Africa, Zambia, Congo (K), Ghana, Liberia, and Senegal. A handwritten notation on Rostow’s memorandum reads: “We don’t have Secy. Rusk’s formal recommendations. He will discuss privately his recommendation—and reservation.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, President’s Proposed Trip to Africa, August 1968) No record of Johnson’s conversation with Rusk has been found, but the proposed trip did not take place. Ghana Ghana 235. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 3, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, “B.” Confidential. 236. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 11, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 01 Jan.–15 Apr. 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. 237. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of West African Affairs (Trimble) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, February 11, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GHANA–US. Secret. Drafted by Trimble, Mahoney, and Deputy Director of the Office of West African Affairs Leon G. Dorros. 238. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, February 1964. Secret. Drafted by Willis C. Armstrong. Approved in M on February 24, in S on February 27, and by the White House on February 24. The meeting took place at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VI.” 239. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, February 13, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. I, Cables, 11/63–2/64. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was drafted in AF and sent to Rusk on February 13 with a covering memorandum from Williams. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Records, White House Correspondence) 240. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 14, 1964, 1–1:25 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Records, White House Correspondence. Confidential. Drafted by Williams on March 2. The time is taken from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) 241. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 26, 1964,1 p.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 01 Jan.–5 Apr. 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on February 27. 242. Memorandum of Meeting Washington, February 26, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Memorandum of Meetings with the President, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by Brubeck. 243. Letter From President Nkrumah to President Johnson Accra, February 26, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana—Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. Ghana’s Ambassador Miguel Augustus Ribeiro delivered the letter to Johnson on March 11; see Document 245. In a March 7 memorandum, Harriman forwarded the text of Nkrumah’s letter, as telegraphed by the Embassy, and recommended that the President receive Ambassador Ribeiro. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA–US) 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State Accra, March 2, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GHANA. Confidential. 245. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 11, 1964, 12:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA–US. Confidential. Drafted by Williams. Approved in M on March 14 and in the White House on March 18. A March 11 briefing memorandum from Brubeck to the President states that Ribeiro was to give the President the February 26 letter from Nkrumah (Document 243). (Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, “B”) 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, March 17, 1964, 11:01 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 US/Johnson. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted at the White House, cleared by Dorros, and approved for transmission by Marion A. Baldwin of S/S. 247. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State Accra, March 23, 1964, 8:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 248. Summary Record of the 526th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, April 3, 1964, 2 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. I, Tab 7, 4/3/64, Various Topics (Panama, etc.). Top Secret. 249. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to President Johnson Washington, April 3, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64–2/66. Secret. 250. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, April 9, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA–US. Confidential. Drafted by Dorros and cleared by AID/AFR/CA Director Richard M. Cashin. 251. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 11, 1965, 3–3:30 p.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Memo for the Record, 01 Mar.–28 Apr. 65. Secret. Drafted on March 12 by [text not declassified] Deputy Chief of the Africa Division in the CIA Directorate of Plans. Filed with a covering memorandum from Africa Division Chief [text not declassified] to McCone. The time is taken from a CIA transcript of the conversation. (Ibid.) The meeting took place in McCone’s office. 252. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State Accra, April 2, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA–US. Confidential. 253. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 27, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64–2/66. Secret. 254. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 6, 1965, 4:45–5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64–2/66. Confidential. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy on August 11. 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Togo to the Department of State Lome, September 30, 1965, 1435Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Papers, 1961–1966. Confidential. Repeated to Accra, Abidjan, and London. 256. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Embassies in Africa Washington, November 23, 1965, 7:26 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GHANA. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Ghana Affairs Robert P. Smith, and Hendrik Van Oss of AFW; cleared by Trimble, Donald J. Kent of AF/P, Robert F. Andrew of INR/RAF, and Ben Thirkeild of P/ON. Approved by Williams. Repeated to London. 257. Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) Washington, February 25, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64–2/66. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. The source text is filed with an undated handwritten note from Helms to Bundy, apparently sent on February 28, noting that Bundy had expressed an interest in the subject when they talked on Friday (February 25) and adding, “I am particularly pleased to send you a favorable report on your last day.” 258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, February 25, 1966, 6:18 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GHANA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Smith and Pelletreau in AF/AFW, cleared by Gustafson in L/AF, and approved by Trimble in AF. Repeated to London. 259. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State Accra, March 3, 1966, 1845Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 GHANA. Confidential. 260. Memorandum From the President’s Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, March 12, 1966, 10:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Robert W. Komer, Vol. 21, 3/3/66–3/20/66. Confidential. A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates that the memorandum was seen by the President. 261. Letter From Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah to President Johnson Accra, March 24, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66–10/6/66. No classification marking. The salutation and closing of the letter are handwritten. An April 8 memorandum from Ulric Haynes of the NSC Staff to Rostow notes that Williams had sent Ankrah’s letter directly to Bill Moyers, a personal friend from Peace Corps days. Moyers sent the letter to Haynes, who drafted a reply and cleared it with the Department of State. (Ibid.) Rostow forwarded the Ankrah letter and the draft reply to Johnson in Texas under cover of an April 11 memorandum. (Ibid.) 262. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah Washington, April 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66–10/6/66. No classification marking. 263. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 8, 1966, 7:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66–10/6/66. No classification marking. 264. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah Washington, July 12, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66–10/6/66. No classification marking. 265. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 7, 1967. 266. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 11, 1967, 10:40 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66–10/68. No classification marking. 267. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State Accra, May 16, 1967, 1910Z. Source: Department of State, S/S-S Files: Lot 68 D 453. Confidential. 268. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, July 19, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66–10/68. Secret. 269. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah Washington, August 11, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 37. No classification marking. Drafted by Edward Hamilton of the NSC Staff with revisions by President Johnson. The letter was transmitted in telegram 20706 to Accra. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GHANA) Telegram 644 from Accra, August 21, reported that the letter was delivered that day. (Ibid., POL 7 GHANA) 270. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, September 25, 1967, 1956Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GHANA. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Melbourne, cleared by Palmer, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Conakry, Lagos, Kinshasa, London, and CINCSTRIKE. 271. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 9, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Visit of General Joseph A. Ankrah, 10/10/67. Secret. 272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, October 12, 1967, 0048Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GHANA. Confidential. Drafted by Melbourne on October 11, cleared by Hamilton at the White House, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE. 273. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State Accra, January 4, 1968, 0230Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Confidential; Priority. 274. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 15, 1968, 8:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66–10/68. Confidential. 235. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 235. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 3, 1964. I understand that Secretary Rusk in his staff meeting this morning told Soapy Williams that if Ghana starts blaming us for the attempt against Nkrumah 2 that we should be prepared to react vigorously. Mahoney, in the attached telegram takes the same view. 3 However, he goes ahead to face the possible consequences which I think are serious. In Nkrumah’s emotional state we can easily find ourselves in an escalating fight and, given the Congressional (e.g. Dodd) animus against Nkrumah the whole Volta-Valco issue 4 could well be revived. The question is less whether we want to use Volta as a club against Nkrumah than whether we want to expose the President to political embarrassment over the Volta commitment (even though it was President Kennedy’s not his). In sum, if we get into any kind of argument with Nkrumah at this point we might find ourselves in an election year caught between a political fight on Volta at home and the alternative of an Aswan Dam fiasco in Ghana. I have told AF that we would like to see any proposed reaction to such a Nkrumah attack for possible Presidential interest. You might want to suggest to the Secretary directly the President’s potential interest in any such gambit. WB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, “B.” Confidential. 2 A January 3 memorandum from Director of Intelligence and Research Thomas L. Hughes to Rusk reported an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Nkrumah that day and speculated on its possible sources. It warned that Nkrumah suspected the CIA of plotting his removal and that charges of CIA involvement might appear in the leftist press. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. I, Cables 11/63–2/64) 3 Not printed. Ambassador Mahoney suggested in telegram 478 from Accra, January 3, that action be taken, including his temporary recall, if Ghana launched a campaign that implied or stated that the United States was involved in the assassination attempt. 4 Reference is to the question of U.S. funding for the Volta River Hydroelectric Project. For previous documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXI, pp. 337 – 368 . 236. Memorandum for the Record 236. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, February 11, 1964, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Discussions with Secretary Rusk, 11 February 1964 3:00 p.m. [Here follow four items of discussion not related to Ghana.] 5. Discussed the Ghana situation, 2 reviewing the memorandum #0681/64 on Nkrumah anti-American push 3 and stated that despite denials there was no question in our minds that Nkrumah and others in his government were behind the anti-American agitation in Ghana. Advised the Secretary that I felt the substantial aid programs, including the Volta Dam and the Aluminum Project should be reviewed in view of Nkrumah’s attitude and that I thought that he might have a sensitive situation on the Hill unless this was done. The Secretary asked whether General Ankrah might not take over. I stated that we had no indication, observed the General had no political ambition and thought that if it was desired to develop something, we might work with the British on a joint program. No decision was reached. I suggested this be discussed with Home and Butler while they are here. Note: Following this meeting I reviewed the Ghana subject with Governor Harriman and in the course of the conversations advised both Rusk and Harriman that Edgar Kaiser was going to dine with me this evening. [Here follow nine items of discussion not related to Ghana.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 01 Jan.–15 Apr. 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. 2 McCone and Rusk had reviewed the Ghana situation on February 6. According to McCone’s memorandum for the record, Rusk “raised the question of the ability of General Ankrah to take over the government.” McCone replied that “the General, in our opinion, was well respected in Ghana, but not inclined to accept responsibility.” Rusk asked McCone to explore this prospect fully and report to him. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 237. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of West African Affairs (Trimble) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 237. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of West African Affairs (Trimble) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, February 11, 1964. SUBJECT Proposed Action Program for Ghana A. Assumptions The course of action outlined below is based on the following assumptions: (1) By his present actions, Nkrumah is daily rendering our position in Ghana more difficult. He sees us as an ideal scapegoat to cover his domestic shortcomings and a handy whipping boy to promote his extreme brand of Pan-Africanism. In contrast to his leftist advisors, it is doubtful, however, that he wishes us to leave. He probably desires to retain the Volta aid and also some connection with the West to give him a posture of neutrality. But his present conduct can only lead to circumstances under which our position could well become untenable. (2) The U.S. should make a determined effort to remain in Ghana. Voluntary withdrawal of our representation would be interpreted both there and elsewhere in Africa as a defeat for the U.S. and a victory for the Communists. It also would encourage the Communists and leftist elements in other parts of Africa to adopt the same tactics they have been following in Ghana. The Soviet bloc desires us to leave Ghana and is actively engaged in promoting this end. (3) Nkrumah is convinced that the U.S. is the principal obstacle to his program for African unity. He is also convinced that through the CIA we are seeking to engineer his downfall. He is living in a state of fear induced by the several assassination attempts and an overriding sense of insecurity, and consequently is increasingly irrational and irresponsible. (4) Nkrumah’s popularity has markedly declined in the past 18 months, especially among civil servants, police, businessmen, university students and the professions. Though he still enjoys a considerable following among the rural masses, the more politically-minded urban population has lost confidence in him. (5) Time is not on our side. The Parliament, judiciary and police have been emasculated; a purge of the universities is now under way and one of the civil service imminent. Although moderate elements still exert a slight influence on Nkrumah, he increasingly depends for advice and counsel on the small group of leftists in his immediate entourage. Nkrumah is consciously and deliberately creating a police state based on national Marxist principles. (6) Although Nkrumah’s leftward progress cannot be checked or reversed, it could be slowed down by a well conceived and executed action program. Measures which we might take against Nkrumah would have to be carefully selected in order not to weaken pro-Western elements in Ghana or adversely affect our prestige and influence elsewhere on the continent. (7) U.S. pressure, if appropriately applied, could induce a chain reaction eventually leading to Nkrumah’s downfall. Chances of success would be greatly enhanced if the British could be induced to act in concert with us. (8) Failure to act can only result in a further deterioration of the situation to the point where we may feel compelled to leave Ghana, thereby facilitating the chance of Soviet success. B. Summary of Proposed Actions (1) Postponement of Ambassador Mahoney’s Return to Accra Ambassador Ribeiro should be called to the Department and informed by Governor Williams that in view of the Ghanaian Government’s expression of regret at the demonstrations before the American Embassy and the Foreign Minister’s assurance that they would not re-occur, it had been decided that Ambassador Mahoney would return to Accra on February 14. Because of the subsequent expulsion of American professors at the University of Ghana and vicious attacks on an officer of our Embassy, we now intend to postpone the Ambassador’s return. The same statement should also be made to Botsio by our Charge at Accra. (2) Award of Medal of Freedom to Adger E. Player Congressmen Oliver P. Bolton and Zablocki have proposed that the Medal of Freedom be awarded to Mr. Player for his action in preventing desecration of the American flag. The White House has asked for the Department’s views on the proposal. Our response should indicate that a decoration is fully justified, and suggest that it be either the Medal of Freedom or the Legion of Merit. Mr. Player’s valorous conduct has been widely reported in the American press, and the award would constitute tangible evidence of the country’s gratitude and admiration. It would also underscore our contempt for the controlled Ghanaian press in seeking to besmirch Mr. Player’s character. (3) Representations to Nkrumah by Ambassador Mahoney The Ambassador should see Nkrumah as soon as possible after his return to Accra and make clear to him our concern at the course of developments in Ghana and their seriously adverse implications for U.S.-Ghanaian relations. He should indicate that as Ghana has failed to carry out the understandings set forth in the 1961 exchange of correspondence between President Kennedy and Nkrumah, we may be forced to reexamine our commitments to Ghana. He should also express our shock that no action has been taken against the leaders of the demonstrations. The impact of the Ambassador’s remarks would obviously be enhanced if he were in a position to state that he had seen the President just before leaving Washington and had discussed the Ghanaian situation with him. It is felt that the Ambassador should not bring a letter from the President to Nkrumah since it might (a) serve further to inflate Nkrumah’s ego; (b) encourage him to initiate an exchange of correspondence with the President and (c) be quoted out of context by Nkrumah to serve his own purposes. (4) Visit by Edgar Kaiser Mr. Edgar Kaiser should be encouraged to seek an interview with Nkrumah in the near future at which he would stress the unfavorable reaction in the U.S. to recent events in Ghana and indicate that they are causing serious misgivings among the Directors of Kaiser Industries on the desirability of proceeding with the VALCO project. (5) IBRD Review of Its Support of Volta The recommendation should be made to the IBRD, preferably through the Secretary of the Treasury, that it send a team to Ghana to study the desirability of continuing its support of the Volta project in the light of Ghana’s adverse financial situation. (6) Slow-down in Payments on the Volta Dam Project AID and the Eximbank should delay action on pending and future requests for draw downs of loan funds by the Volta Dam. (This course of action is possible only until around July 1, 1964 when the lake starts to form and further delays in construction might cause serious flooding and loss of life.) Because of the IBRD’s direct involvement in the project, it should be informed in advance of any such action. (7) Termination of NIH Facility The Bureau of the Budget is anxious to close down the NIH research facility at Accra as part of its program to reduce the balance of payments deficit. Although useful, the facility has been unable to fully realize its potential as a source of data on tropical diseases because of the uncooperative attitude of the leftist Director of the Ghanaian Institute of Health. Although of marginal value, early announcement of our intention to terminate the facility would be interpreted in Ghana as an indication of our displeasure at recent developments there but should not alienate pro-Western groups. If feasible, the operation possibly on a reduced scale, in deference to Budget’s B/P concerns, should be shifted to Sierra Leone thus making the point entirely clear to Nkrumah and at the same time achieving a favorable impact with moderate African leaders. (8) Psychological Warfare Intensive efforts should be made through psychological warfare and other means to diminish support for Nkrumah within Ghana and nurture the conviction among the Ghanaian people that their country’s welfare and independence necessitate his removal. Themes which might be exploited include: (a) The strong non-Ghanaian element among Nkrumah’s closest advisors and their Communist backgrounds; (b) Suppression of civil liberties as exemplified by the Preventive Detention Act, purge of the judiciary, etc.; (c) Perversion of the trade union movement without regard to the interests of the working people; (d) Announced intention to destroy civil service leadership; (e) Parliament is no longer responsive to public opinion; (f) Threat to academic freedom as evidenced by expulsion of eight professors, invasion of the campus by the mob, campaign to place political commissars in institutions of higher learning, removal of the respected headmaster of Achimoto, etc.; (g) Decline in Ghana’s international prestige and increasing alienation of sister African nations; (h) Introduction of Soviet security agents among the President’s household; (i) Serious deterioration in Ghana’s financial position resulting from Nkrumah’s irresponsible policies; (j) Creation of a police state; (k) Likelihood that Nkrumah’s policies will result in Soviet bloc domination of Ghana, thereby substituting one form of colonialism for another; and (l) Increasingly precarious position of the ordinary Ghanaian citizen. (9) Nkrumah an African Problem We must bring home to other African leaders that Nkrumah is a problem which they must face up to in their own national interest. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GHANA–US. Secret. Drafted by Trimble, Mahoney, and Deputy Director of the Office of West African Affairs Leon G. Dorros. 238. Memorandum of Conversation 238. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Ghana PARTICIPANTS British Side Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom R.A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, The Foreign Office Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador Sir Timothy Bligh, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet US Side The President The Secretary of State Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Richard I. Phillips, Director, P/ON Willis C. Armstrong, Director, EUR/BNA Governor Harriman said we were interested in discussing Ghana where we are greatly concerned over our investment in aid and EX–IM Bank funds for the Volta project. 2 Nkrumah blames the United States for all his troubles, including the attempt at assassination, and he has now sent away some six teachers from the university against the wishes of the excellent British rector. His behavior has become intolerable. The Prime Minister said he was worried about Ghana. Nkrumah has gone very close to being Communist. If the United States took away its aid to the Volta project, it was his opinion that Ghana would go right over to the Russians who would supply the money for the Volta dam. (Sir Alec first said “Aswan”, and then corrected himself.) Governor Harriman said there was a date in March or April when work on the dam could be stopped or could continue to be pursued. If the decision were to proceed, one would have to finish the task because of the flooding problem which would result if the dam were not completed. He thought it desirable to take a look at the situation to see what could be done. Mr. Butler said he was worried about a collapse of the Ghana economy with or without the Volta project, and noted that another difficult question would arise over the implementation of the 7-year plan of development. If the United States could hold up Volta to accomplish certain objectives, this might be useful, but a withdrawal would be extremely serious since aid to Volta is about the only instrument we have in Ghana. Mr. Butler said he also thought one could not be sure how long Nkrumah would last. The President observed that it was going to be difficult to keep on giving aid in the face of public opinion in the United States concerning Ghana’s actions and attitudes. However, the President added, we obviously do not want the Soviets to get a base in Ghana. The Prime Minister asked whether the project could be slowed down and Governor Harriman said that a decision in March or April could stop the project for a year. He wondered if the British could talk to Nkrumah and say that Ghana could not very well expect the project to go forward in view of the present attitudes of the Ghana Government toward the U.S. Mr. Bundy noted that our people have not been able to get at Nkrumah and the Prime Minister said there had been no British contact with him either. The Prime Minister said he had received an offensive letter from Nkrumah recently. The Secretary noted that Nkrumah had not been out of his castle since January 2. Ambassador Ormsby Gore said perhaps the British High Commissioner could get into see Nkrumah if he had a letter from the British Prime Minister. Governor Harriman said that Mr. Kaiser was prepared to go to Ghana promptly if it would be useful. Mr. Kaiser has had some access to Nkrumah. The President suggested that perhaps the Prime Minister could answer the letter from Nkrumah and then Mr. Kaiser could visit Ghana. Mr. Butler remarked that Nkrumah is obsessed with the thought that the US and the UK desire his destruction. Governor Harriman said that Nkrumah has Russian guards in his castle, and has confidence only in them. The Secretary said we recognize fully the consequences of canceling the Volta projects, but that we have to be aware of the fact of the possibility that Congressional resolutions or amendments to bills could require us to terminate aid. He added that our Ambassador to Ghana thinks that Nkrumah is in a stage of personal disintegration. The Prime Minister said he was convinced that Nkrumah had “gone round the bend.” He said he would write to Nkrumah. 1 Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, February 1964. Secret. Drafted by Willis C. Armstrong. Approved in M on February 24, in S on February 27, and by the White House on February 24. The meeting took place at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VI.” 2 At a meeting between Rusk and Butler earlier that day, Butler asked Rusk not to take a position against the Volta River project, and Rusk said the United States would consult with the British before taking any decision to end U.S. support. (Memorandum of conversation, February 12; ibid., Central Files, POL GHANA–US) 239. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 239. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 13, 1964. SUBJECT The Volta Problem The Problem The recent anti-American incidents in Ghana have generated Congressional and public resentment here. There have been some demands that the U.S. now pull out of the Volta Project in retaliation. If we accede to these demands we would destroy our chances of preventing massive Communist influence in Ghana. We must take steps to make Nkrumah realize the grave risk of losing U.S. friendship and assistance if present trends in Ghana continue. Our Objective We want Nkrumah to stop press and other attacks and reestablish friendly relations in accordance with the understanding he had with President Kennedy. Recommendation That you approve the action program outlined below. Proposed Action Program (Timing of these steps will depend upon developments in the Ghanaian situation): 1. A letter of warning from the British Prime Minister to Nkrumah on the adverse consequences of his policies for continued Western aid. 2. An early visit to Nkrumah by Edgar Kaiser to stress the unfavorable reaction in the US to recent events in Ghana and the difficulty for Kaiser Industries to carry out the VALCO Project in the present atmosphere of unfriendliness and even hostility towards the US. 3. Strong representation to Nkrumah by Ambassador Mahoney on his return, including an oral message from the President. 4. Termination of the NIH tropical disease research Project in Accra. 5. An IBRD review of its support of the Volta Project. 6. A letter from the President to Nkrumah, if conditions are sufficiently favorable in terms of success. 7. Send a Presidential Emissary to Nkrumah, possibly the Attorney General, to express deep US concern at developments contrary to Nkrumah’s understanding with President Kennedy. The decision to go ahead on the Volta Project was made by President Kennedy in December 1961 as a calculated risk that Nkrumah would live up to his undertakings to maintain Ghana’s independence and neutrality in foreign relations. President Kennedy made clear to key members of Congress that his decision in no way affected approval of Nkrumah’s regime but was intended to help the people of Ghana. Since 1961 there has been a steady deterioration in Ghana’s attitude toward the US. Press attacks and other evidence of hostility have been markedly noticeable following attempts on Nkrumah’s life. Nkrumah, who exhibits marked signs of mental instability, is apparently convinced the United States is opposing his aims in Africa and intent upon destroying him. We recalled our Ambassador from Ghana following the recent demonstrations before our Accra Embassy. Since we have had: 1. The continuing attacks and vilification of the US by the press and radio. 2. Expulsion of six professors from the University of Ghana of which four are American. 3. Press attacks against patriotic American Negroes like Emerson Player. We have examined the feasibility of exerting leverage on Nkrumah through our participation in the Volta Project. While the Volta seems to offer limited leverage, its use presents significant complications and serious, risks: 1. Advance consultation with the IBRD is required because it organized and participated in the financing of the project. 2. Advance consultation with the UK is required because of intensive UK interests in Ghana and UK financial participation in the project. 3. Adverse African reaction to action stopping or slowing down an IBRD project because of US political interest. 4. Possible violent, irrational reaction by Nkrumah, and prompt Soviet expression of sympathy and support. The attached annex 2 shows the extent of our commitment to this project and the aluminum smelter associated with it. As of now the Dam is 45 to 50% completed with construction scheduled to end in 1965. W. Averell Harriman 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. I, Cables, 11/63–2/64. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was drafted in AF and sent to Rusk on February 13 with a covering memorandum from Williams. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Records, White House Correspondence) 2 Not printed. 3 Harriman signed for Rusk above Rusk’s typed signature. 240. Memorandum of Conversation 240. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 14, 1964, 1–1:25 p.m. SUBJECT Meeting at White House, February 14, 1964 PARTICIPANTS The President Under Secretary Averell Harriman Ambassador William Mahoney, William Brubeck, Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams, McGeorge Bundy, Ralph Dungan, Edward Hutchinson Under Secretary Harriman outlined the Department’s position on the Ghana Situation and our feeling that for the United States now to pull out of the Volta project in retaliation for recent Ghanaian activities would be self defeating. Ambassador Mahoney made a few remarks. The gist of Under Secretary Harriman’s remarks was that we were not coming to the President for instructions but rather were advising him of the situation and the plan of action we would follow unless he should choose to advise us to the contrary. The President took the briefing paper transmitted under cover of February 13th to the Secretary and took up the items one by one. Proposed Action Program 1. He indicated a message would go to Nkrumah from the British Prime Minister. 2. He thought it would be a good idea for Edgar Kaiser to see Nkrumah. 3. He agreed Mahoney should see Nkrumah. 4. He said he didn’t know about the NIH but whatever we did was all right. 5. He said consultations could be undertaken with IBRD. 6. He would be agreeable to sending a letter to Nkrumah if and when it were decided to be advisable. 7. President said he would be pleased to have Under Secretary Harriman go to Accra as he had previously indicated that he had hoped he would go to Africa. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Records, White House Correspondence. Confidential. Drafted by Williams on March 2. The time is taken from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) 241. Memorandum for the Record 241. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, February 26, 1964,1 p.m. SUBJECT Discussion with the President at 1:00 o’clock, February 26th; no one was present [Here follow five items of discussion not related to Ghana.] 6. We were then joined by Secretary Rusk, Harriman, Edgar Kaiser and Mr. Calhoun and engaged in a long discussion on Ghana. Kaiser reported on his conversations with Nkrumah and his absolute and positive insistence that Nkrumah stop the anti-American actions in his country or else he, Kaiser, could not proceed with the work. Furthermore, under the climate that Nkrumah had developed Kaiser could not raise a single cent toward additional investments in Ghana. Nkrumah seemed to agree and said he was writing President Johnson. 2 I insisted that Kaiser explain to the President Nkrumah’s criticism of CIA. This Kaiser did in the manner outlined in Nkrumah’s letter to Mr. Calhoun, a copy of which is attached. 3 I asked Ambassador Mahoney if he felt that CIA was operating independently of his office, whether there was any truth in Nkrumah’s statements (a lot of which were general and no specific examples cited). Mahoney answered absolutely and positively no. The President asked Kaiser what he wished to do. Kaiser stated that he had a contract that had not been broken by Ghana despite the exasperating situation and that he intended to fulfill his contract. He reviewed the situation about as follows: Volta Dam will cost about $200 million of which Ghana is putting up half and the other half is being put up by AID, the World Bank, the British, and the Export-Import Bank in varying amounts and for differing components or parts of the project. The aluminum plant will cost about $150 million, about $100 million has been put up by the Export-Import Bank and about $50 million by the Kaiser-Reynolds Syndicate (Kaiser, 90%—Reynolds, 10%) but all of this is guaranteed by the United States Government. The entire $350 million in the form of loans, there are no grants made. The power that Kaiser will take, representing half of the power generated at the dam, will pay for the entire project in 30 years. Kaiser stated that he could not forecast the permanence of his position in the project. It was entirely possible that Nkrumah would take it over. This was a risk and represented a very serious problem to him because he was proceeding with manufacturing outlets in Europe to utilize the raw aluminum produced. Despite this risk he was going forward. The President was noncommittal. 7. Later Governor Harriman stated he wanted to get together with me to reach a conclusion on our policy concerning the Volta Project. He was in favor of proceeding—here were many who wished to cut and run. He sensed that I would favor staying with the project. What he was seeking was a partner to support his position. 8. At 5:30 p.m. Edgar Kaiser came to my office in East Building. We discussed ways of counteracting Nkrumah’s complaint against the CIA. Also he was trying to get an indication from me of what the President really thought. I told him I didn’t know, that I was sure the President had not made up his mind. Kaiser felt that he should communicate with Nkrumah concerning the CIA charge. Calhoun should do the same and we should help Calhoun with his reply (I warned against being in any way confidential with Calhoun as Nkrumah has Calhoun charmed and anything we tell Calhoun in confidence will go to Nkrumah). I showed Kaiser Sherman Kent’s comments on the Andrew Tully book. Kaiser felt that he should send a copy of that to Nkrumah since Nkrumah had mentioned the book to him. Note: Kaiser feels that Nkrumah will extract a statement from one of the individuals who had attempted to assassinate him that they were CIA agents and that we could expect to read this in the paper most any day. Therefore this matter is urgent and should be pursued promptly and wrapped up prior to my departure. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 01 Jan.–5 Apr. 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on February 27. 2 See Document 243 . 3 Not found. 242. Memorandum of Meeting 242. Memorandum of Meeting 1 Washington, February 26, 1964. MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON GHANA PRESENT Secretary of State, Mr. McCone, Under Secretary Harriman, Governor Williams, Edgar Kaiser, Chad Calhoun, William Brubeck, Ambassador Mahoney Kaiser reported on his talks with Nkrumah 2 concluding that he is not at all confident that, even if Kaiser builds the smelter and starts operations, Nkrumah will make it tolerable for them to stay in business in Ghana. The President asked if this is still a sound project economically and Kaiser said definitely yes. Secretary Rusk asked what were the strongest assurances Nkrumah gave Kaiser with regard to maintaining good relations with the U.S. Kaiser said Nkrumah reiterated several times his need for private investment and his intention to prevent attacks and demonstrations against the U.S. The President asked whether the alleged role of the CIA in Ghana is a matter of great concern to Nkrumah. Kaiser said that it was a major factor in his attitude and McCone agreed. The President asked if Kaiser would recommend a year’s postponement of further financing and construction on the dam, awaiting further political developments. Kaiser said no; we should decide firmly whether to proceed or completely terminate the project. In response to the President’s further questions Kaiser said he thinks Nkrumah has moved further toward the bloc in the last year or so and that his attitude is worse now than it was at the time the contracts were signed in December 1961. In response to another question Kaiser said Nkrumah believes that Kaiser cannot and will not get out of Volta unless the U.S. Government withdraws its support. The President asked where else Nkrumah might get financing and Kaiser indicated that the 20-odd million of U.S financing still to come would be available from the Soviets, internal Ghanaian sources or otherwise. Harriman informed the President that U.S. withdrawal of Volta financing would probably not lead the World Bank to withdraw its own financing. The President and Harriman discussed the timing of a Harriman trip to Ghana and Harriman indicated that he would go in the next few weeks, shortly after Ambassador Mahoney’s return. The President indicated his feeling that the reports from Accra, including Kaiser’s, 3 make the situation look now a little better than it did a week or so ago. WB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Memorandum of Meetings with the President, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by Brubeck. 2 Brubeck reported in a memorandum earlier that day that Kaiser had just returned from 2 days of meetings with Nkrumah. Kaiser had warned Nkrumah that it would be impossible to do business if hostility toward the United States continued. (Ibid., Country File, Ghana, Vol. I, Cables 11/63–2/64) 3 Telegram 700 from Accra, February 24, reported that Kaiser had made clear to Nkrumah that the latter’s wish to meet with President Johnson could not be accommodated unless relations improved between the two governments. (Department of State, Central Files, FSE 12 GHANA) The Embassy commented in telegram 704 from Accra, February 25, that Kaiser had aroused concern in Nkrumah’s mind. (Ibid., POL 12 GHANA) Kaiser’s talks with Nkrumah were further reported in telegrams 691, 695, and 703, February 22 and 24. (Ibid., FSE 12 GHANA) 243. Letter From President Nkrumah to President Johnson 243. Letter From President Nkrumah to President Johnson 1 Accra, February 26, 1964. Dear President Johnson, I wish to take the opportunity of the return of my Ambassador to Washington, after a brief visit to Accra, to send you this personal note concerning one or two matters which are of interest to Ghana and the United States. In the first place, I should like to repeat the expressions of regret already conveyed to your Government over the recent incidents in Accra, and to reaffirm the assurances I gave to the late President Kennedy in regard to my Government’s policy of non-alignment. As you are probably aware, we have pursued this policy unflinchingly from the very day of our independence. In my first meeting with President Kennedy, 2 I explained how dangerous it is for the emergent States of Africa to take sides in the diplomatic manoeuvres and political disputes among the Great Powers. One of our principal aims has been to protect ourselves from the dangers of involvement in these manoeuvres and disputes. It follows from this that Ghana must establish good relations with all countries of the world, irrespective of the political systems of their governments. You will appreciate, Mr. President, that the success of this policy depends on the extent of mutual respect which can be shown in the relationships that subsist between ourselves and the Governments which wish to maintain links with us. It is on this issue that I must express some concern about that which has come to notice within recent times as a result of the activities of certain United States citizens in Ghana. There appears to be two conflicting establishments representing the United States in our part of the world. There is the United States Embassy as a diplomatic institution doing formal diplomatic business with us; there is also the C.I.A. organisation which functions presumably within or outside this recognised body. This latter organisation, that is, the C.I.A., seems to devote all its attention to fomenting ill-will, misunderstanding and even clandestine and subversive activities among our people, to the impairment of the good relations which exist between our two Governments. If my analysis of this situation is correct, and all the indications are that it is, then I could not, Mr. President, view this without some alarm. Neither will any other Government in a developing State, however weak its economic position, accept this situation without demur. We of the Independent African States wish to be left alone to pursue policies and courses which we know to be in the best interests of our people, and at the same time conducive to the maintenance of good relations with other governments of the world. Mr. President, permit me to say a few words here about Ghana’s socialist ideals and the place of foreign investment within the socialist structure which we intend to build. It should be obvious to any one who has followed the history of Africa’s development with impartiality that a planned economy and rapid industrial and agricultural development can be best achieved through a socialist course. Mr. President, the ravages of colonialism and its effect upon the territories now emerging from colonialism make it difficult and almost impossible for us in Africa to follow the traditional path of capitalist development. We must therefore ensure that the public sector of the productive economy expands at the maximum possible rate, especially in the strategic areas of production upon which our economy essentially depends. It is my primary ambition, therefore, to secure and maintain the economic independence of Ghana in such a manner as to forestall the danger of the growth of those social antagonisms which can result from the unequal distribution of economic power among our people. Within the framework of this position there is an open door for foreign investment in Ghana. The Ghana Investment Act—the best in all Africa yet—makes this quite clear. Ghana welcomes foreign investors in a spirit of partnership; they can earn their profits here, provided they leave us an agreed portion for promoting the welfare and happiness of the majority of our people, as against the greedy ambitions of the few. From what we get out of this partnership we hope to be able to expand the health facilities for our people, to give them more and better educational institutions and to see to it that their housing conditions are improved and that they have a steadily rising standard of living. This is, in a nutshell, what Ghana expects to achieve from our socialist objectives. I am sure, in these circumstances, Mr. President, that you could appreciate the aims and aspirations of Ghana. It seems to me, however, that a large section of the American Press either does not understand our way of life, or is unwilling to appreciate the changing scene in Africa. This section of the Press continues to indulge in scurrilous and unjustified attacks, not only on the policies of my Government, but also on me personally. As long as this continues, we can be sure that a kind of Press warfare between Ghana and the United States will continue to be an embarrassment to our two Governments. In the interests of good relations between Ghana and the United States, I, Mr. President, will do whatever in my power lies to ensure that Party papers follow courses which will improve the relationship between our two countries. Mr. President, I have attempted to write as frankly as I can to let you appreciate Ghana’s position. I hope I have been able to indicate that all we wish to do in Ghana is to establish a happy and prosperous State for the good of our people. In this endeavour, all that we wish to do in Ghana, which I know you, Mr. President, generally support, is to establish a happy, prosperous and stable State for our people. In this endeavour we expect nothing but understanding and goodwill from our friends. I am asking my Ambassador, Mr. M.A. Ribeiro, to deliver this message to you personally. Wishing you and Mrs. Johnson continued health and happiness, and with my most sincere and respectful regards, Kwame Nkrumah 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana—Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. Ghana’s Ambassador Miguel Augustus Ribeiro delivered the letter to Johnson on March 11; see Document 245 . In a March 7 memorandum, Harriman forwarded the text of Nkrumah’s letter, as telegraphed by the Embassy, and recommended that the President receive Ambassador Ribeiro. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA–US) 2 A record of Kennedy’s conversation with Nkrumah is printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XX, pp 95 – 98 . 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 1 Accra, March 2, 1964, 5 p.m. 717. Talked nearly hour with Nkrumah this morning, opening with presentation along lines my instructions. 2 I stated I had two conversations with President Johnson, was speaking on his behalf. President and other top officials regard relations between USG and GOG as in grave condition. Nkrumah interrupted to say he also regarded situation as serious. I said American Government and people tending believe GOG does not wish maintain even tolerable relations with US and point to accusations of rumor-mongering, demonstrations, deportation American professors. With respect rumor-mongering, I said everyone in Ghana had heard rumors. Ironically, I had cautioned staff on two occasions re repeating them and had expressed doubt their truthfulness. Nkrumah said he appreciated this. Mentioned he was particularly upset about rumors now going around re his perfectly healthy baby, that it “half animal, half human.” I said every figure in public life subjected to rumor, though these latter below contempt. I was sure American community discreet. Re demonstration, I said it clearly government-inspired. CPP were acting officially and workers brigade of course directly under GOG. Nkrumah tried to excuse CPP action as “independent enthusiasm,” but said now that Ghana has one-party system CPP is same as government. He conceded there no excuse for workers brigade. I pointed out he might as well have had police demonstrating. He did not dissent, said there were two Cabinet members present but they just curiosity seekers. Re deportations, I said GOG had right dismiss anyone it chose. We not trying to tell GOG what to do. But manner in which GOG acted was unfriendly. I had checked background of men in Washington and none had ever been even remotely connected with USG intelligence. I then described feeling of American Congress and people, pointed out President subject to public opinion. If situation continued, we could not continue what we were doing here. Nkrumah agreed that something must be done. He referred to editorial in Los Angeles paper which he said “recommended assassination.” I deplored editorial but said we had free press, and that hostile feeling of press was consequence of Ghanaian press and Ghanaian activity. Nkrumah agreed that nothing could be done about US press and that it would improve when Ghanaian attitudes improved. He asked me whether I had noticed Ghanaian press on my return. I said I had; it was better. He claimed it would take time but would change even more, said he had issued instructions against any broad attacks. I made point that merely shifting attacks UK and Free World was unsatisfactory. He argued that he cannot renounce his principles, must oppose South Africa and UK action in southern Rhodesia. But said from now on attacks will be specific and he will maintain greater control. He said by way of example he was meeting with press immediately after our conversation and would tell them to stop using “Hitler” and “Nazi”; will call Verwoerd’s performance a form of fascism. I stressed view Ghanaian press is Soviet-Bloc enterprise. Bloc almost never criticized. We not seeking such criticism but Bloc must make mistake on some occasion. I gave African student incident in Moscow as example, saying that although it was front page news all over world it suppressed here. Nkrumah became riled at this point (for only time during discussion), though he had nothing to say in rebuttal. He commented that he was planning to maintain closer control over students in Soviet Bloc countries and described mission he has sent to set up CPP branch parties among students in Bloc. Emphasized this will give him control. Said when he first proposed doing this, Soviets strongly objected but he threatened pull students out and Soviets finally agreed. ( Note: CPP official setting up branches is notorious pro-Communist Kweku Akwei.) Nkrumah digressed to discuss his growing concern at extent corruption in Ghanaian public life. Gave example of man he now trying to catch up with who had substantial sum of money deposited abroad. Said European—but not UK or US—firms made practice of signing contracts for Ghana pounds 3 when worth only Ghana pounds 1, paying off GOG officials. He said he announcing seven-year plan soon and will make policy statement against corruption. I then told Nkrumah I would like to take up question of CIA. He said he was glad I brought up matter; he had mentioned CIA in letter sent via Ribeiro to President Johnson. I told him I had discussed possibility of letter with President Johnson and that latter would welcome it. I said [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] that I am in full control of all US Government activities in Ghana. I could assure him without hesitation that during my incumbency absolutely nothing has been done by any US agency which could be construed in any way as being directed against him or his government. Nkrumah replied with words to effect “I will take your word for it,” [ 11–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. I repeated that there had been no conceivable activity on our part to subvert or overthrow him. I pointed out how inconsistent our entire aid effort, aimed at assisting and strengthening his government, is with wild accusations in Ghanaian press that US acting against him. I added that, speaking frankly, our main intelligence effort is to keep an eye on his Soviet and Chinese friends, whose activities are really large scale. I added that it was common over world that good part of so-called Soviet diplomatic personnel were actually intelligence agents. Nkrumah replied he understood this to be so and keeps eye on them himself. Nkrumah brought up matter of his “socialism.” Saying that Western press always jumps down his throat when he mentions socialism. He claimed that he was not talking about Soviet or Chinese forms of socialism, but about Ghana’s own type of socialism developed from Ghana’s communal traditions. His socialism is evolutionary, not revolutionary, and specifically provides for private sector and foreign investment. I commented that just as he resented attacks on his socialism, we resent his press’s uniform condemnation of capitalism, which has changed radically in recent decades. Nkrumah replied that he understood changed nature of capitalism, and said that present economic system of US might better be termed “enlightened capitalism.” Nkrumah agreed with me that we had not talked enough. I said that although I did not wish to burden him, we should get together at regular intervals, so that we could be in touch and be in position to iron out difficulties before they are acute and led to public embarrassment. I suggested semi-monthly meetings and urged him to call me on any occasion. Nkrumah agreed with alacrity to idea of regular meetings, even throwing out idea that we might meet weekly. I told him that we ought try semi-monthly meetings at first and see how they worked out. We left it that I would telephone his secretary twice each month for specific time. In course of conversation, Nkrumah mentioned that he planned to move back to Flagstaff House soon. Speaking of Chou En-lai visit, he volunteered that joint communique had caused him great difficulty, and that Soviet had “come down hard” on him for it. He said that now he is having trouble with his friend Tito and that it seems impossible to please everyone. As I took my leave I repeated that I must say in all candor that President Johnson and my government regard relations between our countries as grave. I had not given up; I had come back to make honest effort to improve relations. Nkrumah agreed that we should make every effort. As we parted he gave me copy of his letter to President Johnson (dated Feb 26; telegraphed separately) 3 and bottle of rum and bitters which he had received from Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad. Comment: 1. Nkrumah was as friendly as I have ever seen him. Only new element was tendency speak very rapidly, making him at times hard to understand. He seemed extremely anxious to please. It was evident from conversation that he realizes some eating of crow necessary. He in fact did so to some extent. 2. He is aware of and concerned by serious state of our relations, although he seems to feel an upward turn has already begun. 3. He has made and will probably continue to make efforts to moderate his press. Although I have no illusions that Nkrumah has basically changed, I believe that likelihood of a period of tolerable peace, of unknown duration, has been strengthened by our conversation. 4. Our personal relationship has been warmed and an opportunity created for more helpful talks. 5. Beginning has been made in effort to dispel some of Nkrumah’s misconstructions on role of CIA. Will follow-up. 6. Pressure should be kept up. Washington could contribute by parallel talk with Ribeiro. Mahoney 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GHANA. Confidential. 2 Reference is apparently to a cable based on a February 27 memorandum from Williams to Harriman, which outlined points to be made by Mahoney in his talk with Nkrumah. (Ibid., POL GHANA–US) 3 See Document 243 . 245. Memorandum of Conversation 245. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 11, 1964, 12:30 p.m. SUBJECT President Johnson’s meeting with Ghanaian Ambassador PARTICIPANTS The President Ambassador Ribeiro of Ghana Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams President Johnson greeted Ambassador Ribeiro very warmly and throughout the meeting treated him with great cordiality. Ambassador Ribeiro for his part was also cordial. President Johnson began the interview by saying he was extremely interested in good relations between our two countries. We have the same objectives. We want to give respect and be respected. He continued that he was concerned about the feeling in Ghana [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. He said this matter had been carefully investigated and that he would be very happy to consider any examples of such conduct the Ghanaians might bring to his attention. [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] He told Ribeiro that if President Nkrumah had any questions or problems he should see Ambassador Mahoney right away. President Johnson then said he was asking Governor Harriman to make a visit to Ghana. He expanded at some length on his confidence in Governor Harriman, saying he had settled more disputes than any other American. Ribeiro asked when Governor Harriman would leave. The Under Secretary replied that he would leave March 19th, spend a day in London where he wanted to discuss East African problems, and then fly to Ghana. Ribeiro was very pleased that Harriman was going to visit Ghana. He said Nkrumah knows Harriman personally and they would be able to “exchange secrets.” Ribeiro pointed out that Nkrumah was worried about the unfriendly attitude evidenced by certain American citizens [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. He said that before he left for Ghana he was assured by both Governor Harriman and Governor Williams that [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. He said that Nkrumah believed what Harriman and Williams had told him but nevertheless felt there were some U.S. citizens who were opposed to him. Ribeiro said that Ambassador Mahoney’s fresh assurances were important to Nkrumah and the suggestion that they meet periodically to settle any problems was an important move. He added that Ambassador Mahoney was highly regarded, particularly by President Nkrumah who had “profound respect” for him. Ribeiro went on to say these incidents had arisen because of Ghana’s suspicion of certain American citizens. He said the matter had been fomented by the press but that the press was now under control. If the U.S. press were reasonable there would be no more such occurrences. The President pointed out that he knew of the commitments that Nkrumah had made to Kennedy and said, “I want you to live up to them, and we will live up to our commitments.” He again assured Ribeiro of our good will toward Ghana. He asked that Ambassador Ribeiro see that Harriman had a good visit. Ribeiro said that he wanted to raise one more thing which was most disturbing, and that was Senator Dodd’s “witch hunting.” 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA–US. Confidential. Drafted by Williams. Approved in M on March 14 and in the White House on March 18. A March 11 briefing memorandum from Brubeck to the President states that Ribeiro was to give the President the February 26 letter from Nkrumah ( Document 243 ). (Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, “B”) 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 1 Washington, March 17, 1964, 11:01 p.m. 541. Request you deliver before March 21 to President Nkrumah the following message from President: Verbatim Text “Dear Mr. President Your Ambassador has conveyed to me your letter of February 26, 1964, 2 and we discussed it in the same spirit of frankness in which it was written. It is my sincere hope that you and I will be able to create together the same kind of open and direct relationship you had with President Kennedy. I appreciate your expression of regret over the recent incidents in Accra, and your affirmation of nonalignment as the policy of your Government. In turn, may I assure you that there is no basis in fact for the allegation that the CIA is carrying on subversive activities in Ghana or attempting to impair the good relations between our governments. If at any time you should have further doubts on this score, I would like you to communicate directly with me. We fully share your desire to see Ghana prosperous, stable, and independent, and our policy towards Ghana has from the start been directed toward working with you to attain these goals. We fully understand your policy that in achieving these objectives Ghana is determined to remain unaligned in its relations with other countries. We concur that foreign private investment can be of crucial help to Ghana’s economic progress both now and in the years to come. As you know, we are contributing as a Government and as private citizens to the development of Ghana. We are therefore naturally deeply concerned when these positive efforts are jeopardized by actions and propaganda that serve no apparent purpose other than to damage our relations. A great deal remains to be done if we are to establish the climate of mutual respect and understanding that is essential if we are to work together in friendship and good will. I am sure you will agree with the importance of this task. In this connection, I have asked Governor Averell Harriman to visit Accra for discussions with you. I am also pleased that Ambassador Mahoney, who has my complete confidence, will be seeing you regularly for frank talks about common problems. I should like to take this opportunity to extend to you and to the people of Ghana my sincere good wishes and those of the people of the United States for happiness and prosperity as your country enters the seventh year of its independence. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson” End Text. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 US/Johnson. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted at the White House, cleared by Dorros, and approved for transmission by Marion A. Baldwin of S/S. 2 Documents 243 and 245 . 247. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 247. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 1 Accra, March 23, 1964, 8:30 p.m. 791. For the President and Secretary from Harriman. Ambassador is dispatching memo of conversations with Nkrumah totaling about three hours plus lunch. 2 We went over in detail his policies for Ghana, problems in our relations, attitude towards Volta project and private investment. Most effective part which was confirmed by Robert Jackson 3 was my insistence that he had personal responsibility and power to see that project was success not only in maintaining atmosphere in which US citizens could work in Ghana but image conveyed through his press and other activities which built up public and political opposition to him and Ghana. I stated this would require constant and frank two-way exchange between him and Ambassador and also between him and President Johnson. He assured us he would accept personal responsibility and I could give President his complete assurances. We believe there is reasonable chance he will keep this assurance at least tolerable minimum providing but only providing we keep his feet to the fire. This means continued hard work by Ambassador and a series of effective Presidential emissaries and visitors. Robert Jackson’s quarterly visits are most useful account his eight years of intimate association. Kaiser must come more frequently. There is no doubt that his leanings are to the left and he pays more attention to his leftist advisers. However, he has many well-trained government officials who help put brakes on to some extent. He is awed with socialist doctrine although when I pointed out Communist failures in agriculture and otherwise and that British and all European socialist leaders were becoming much more pragmatic in policy, it seemed to sink in a bit. I assured him we accepted non-alignment but only true non-alignment. What we could not accept was in fact support of Communist Bloc through his press and otherwise. We discussed African unity and he stressed freedom for all Africa. I explained we accepted Wilson’s position that freedom was indivisible referring not just to Africa but elsewhere, particularly Eastern Europe still enslaved by Moscow. He took this without argument, admitted Moscow had been imperialist but felt Khrushchev was changing, becoming even pragmatic on economic matters whereas China was still rabidly doctrinaire. These generalities may be superfluous to our problems but I believe some one has to keep hammering him. Jackson reports he is encouraged by his and my visit but forecasts difficult financial period ahead account imbalanced budget and continued foreign payments deficit. He expects inflation and drastic import restrictions with resultant economic difficulties. As Ghana is basically rich he expects it to pull through in time. Also cocoa price increase from depressed level would be helpful. Work on the DW impressive and resettlement of some 60,000 persons to be flooded out is progressing rapidly and competently. Relations between Volta authority, Italian contractor and Kaiser are excellent and so far government has put up all funds as required to fulfill its commitments. Canadian Chief Executive Dobson says he has good working relations with Nkrumah and is satisfied he will have his continued support. In sum, Nkrumah has been on his good behavior during my visit and it will require constant effort and skill to prevent too many and too deep relapses. There is, of course, no fundamental change in his beliefs. Ambassador concurs. Mahoney 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Telegram 793 from Accra, March 24, reported Harriman’s talk with Nkrumah in detail. (Ibid., POL GHANA–US) Mahoney commented on the meeting in telegram 794 from Accra, March 25. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) 3 Robert Jackson, a director of the U.N. Special Fund, was a former adviser to Nkrumah. 248. Summary Record of the 526th Meeting of the National Security Council 248. Summary Record of the 526th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, April 3, 1964, 2 p.m. Congressional Leaders—Various Subjects 2 [Here follows discussion not related to Ghana.] The President then introduced Under Secretary Harriman to summarize his recent trip to Africa. (A copy of Harriman’s report to the President is attached. It contains a detailed account which he summarized at the meeting.) [Here follows discussion not related to Ghana.] Mr. Harriman then turned to the situation in Ghana. He reviewed the past of the Volta Dam project and the Kaiser Aluminum plant which is being built to use power produced by the dam. The dam is half finished. The lake is filling and some 60,000 people are being moved out of the flooded area. Nkrumah has left this operation alone and has not so far interfered with its progress. It is about a year ahead of schedule. The dam will cost $200 million. The U.S. has made a $30 million loan on the dam, has guaranteed the $100 million Kaiser investment against expropriation and has loaned money to Kaiser to assist in financing his plant. Mr. Harriman said that Nkrumah was moving to the left. He is afraid of assassination and blames the U.S. and the U.K. for his troubles. He is turning to the East in an effort to gain support. He appears to be heading toward a personal dictatorship somewhat comparable to that of Tito. Mr. Harriman recommended strongly that we continue our support of the Volta project. We cannot stop now because the project is half finished and liquidation would mean loss of our standing and of the money so far invested. There is a reasonable chance that the project will pay out. It is best for us to carry it through. The World Bank is prepared to continue its support. Our policy should be to keep Nkrumah under continual pressure. [Here follows discussion not related to Ghana.] Senator Dirksen asked whether other nations had large investments in Ghana. Mr. Harriman replied that the U.K. had large and expanding investments there. Senator Dirksen asked about press reports of attacks on four U.S. professors in Ghana. Mr. Harriman and Mr. Bell replied that six professors had been fired from a university, four of them were Americans. This was done by Nkrumah who felt that the professors were indoctrinating the students with false ideas. Involved also is the issue of academic control of the university. [Here follows discussion not related to Ghana.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. I, Tab 7, 4/3/64, Various Topics (Panama, etc.). Top Secret. 2 McCone recorded the meeting in an April 3 memorandum for the record. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 01 Jan-5 Apr 64) 249. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to President Johnson 249. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 3, 1964. SUBJECT Ghana Nkrumah is leading Ghana towards what he calls African Socialism which is, in fact, a personal dictatorship. He is impelled by his own proclivities as well as personal fear resulting from his two close call assassination attempts. He suspects almost everybody, even the CIA. This affects his actions domestically and his attitude towards the U.S. He is driven on by his own conceit, blaming others, internally or foreign, for his own failures. The effect is that he has assumed more and more power into his own hands, leans more and more on a small group of leftists who applaud this trend, and cuts himself off from those who oppose. He has developed a one-party political system, in itself not uncommon in Africa, but in Ghana this has meant imprisoning many of his opponents, controlling the press, and recently the courts. All of this trend may project an eventual Tito type dictatorship, with the State assuming all political and economic direction or ownership. However, there are still forces at work within the country which may stem this trend and at least leave the Valco operation uninterfered with. The University is still independent to a considerable degree and run by a forceful Irishman. The students oppose State interference. There is a large and prosperous small farmer production of cocoa, and the historic village owned and individually farmed general agriculture. There is a body of independent women marketers who exert strong political pressures. The Army is Western-oriented although so far it has stayed out of politics. The civil servants are also largely Western-oriented and resist as far as they can this trend. Nkrumah himself has repeatedly stated that foreign private capital is essential to Ghana’s development. He realizes also that foreign private capital is in short supply to meet the needs of the developing nations and therefore must be catered to. His speech outlining the new seven year plan proposed development of a mixed economy with agriculture largely in private hands and “for some time to come” the need for large foreign private investments to develop industry. In my conversation with him he assured me “for some time to come” related only to the period of need to attract new private foreign capital and was not intended to limit the time companies investing could remain. “Kaiser,” he said, “can stay as long as he wants—50 or 100 years.” The success of the seven-year plan as presented clearly requires several hundred million dollars of new foreign private investment. He has strong personal feelings for a few individuals as in the case of President Kennedy and also such men as Edgar Kaiser. Although he is the Chairman of the Volta River Authority, he has supported the Canadian Executive Director—Dobson. The operation has been well directed and the government has fulfilled all of its obligations so far, including putting up its share of the money as needed, more than 50%. There is no financial default on the part of the government which would be a cause for the World Bank, Export Import Bank or AID to stop their financing. President George Woods has stated to me that he sees up until now no basis for the Bank to discontinue payments under its commitment. The Valco, Kaiser’s company, is committed to take a large percentage of the power development by 1966 which necessitates the commencement of work in Ghana and the ordering of machinery this summer. The principal difficulties we are having are the abuse of the U.S. Government, UK, and other Western powers, and the praise for Communist countries in the press, and the recent demonstrations before our Embassy. Also the arbitrary ejection from the country of U.S. and other Western individuals. The leftist trend may augur increasing difficulties. On the other hand, the frank talks by Edgar Kaiser and Ambassador Mahoney, as well as my own, have shown some results in tempering the press and treatment of our Embassy and U.S. citizens. Nkrumah has responded to these personal representations for a time at least. The financial situation of the country is getting into increasing difficulties as a result of an unbalanced budget and adverse balance of payments. There will be increasing inflation and payment difficulties which will necessitate severe import controls. These difficulties may force Nkrumah to turn to the I.M.F. for assistance. Bloc assistance does not usually help in this type of financial crisis. On balance, I recommend we continue our participation in the Volta Project. However, we should constantly watch the situation and plan a campaign of visitors to Accra to bring pressure on Nkrumah whenever his actions indicate they will cause us difficulty. 2 Edgar Kaiser is probably the most effective individual. Sir Robert Jackson, now with the UN Special Fund, visits Accra periodically and has a long-time relationship. Visits of other influential people should be planned to support the Ambassador’s vigilant pressures. The Valco could well be successful in its production and export even if other foreign operations are not. Nkrumah will need the income from the power purchases by Valco to pay off the international debt of the project. It would be impossible for him to operate and sell the aluminum as a Ghanaian government operation, and it would not be easy to attract bloc investment. With Nkrumah’s desire for close personal relations with you and his respect for certain other individuals, I feel there is a reasonable chance that his attitude and activities towards the U.S. Government and Valco can be held within liveable limits. The decision today is not whether to embark on the investment in the Volta project, but whether to continue with our commitment. I am convinced that there is more to lose in backing out now than in going ahead. 3 If we back out now, we will not only lose the money already expended or irreversibly committed but also the confidence of many African and other developing nations. The dam which I inspected is well along, with mountains of earth and rock moved. Some 60,000 people are being displaced by the enormous lake, which will begin to be filled this summer. New more modern villages are being built for them and people are beginning to move in. To stop now would leave an international eyesore. Although little work so far has been done on the Valco project, it is in fact an integral part of the whole project. The company has a fixed contract to take a large block of power. Incidentally if Valco should not go ahead the soundness of the international investment will be jeopardized. On the other hand, I believe there is a reasonable chance of carrying the entire project through successfully. Averell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64–2/66. Secret. 2 Harriman met with Johnson that day at the White House. According to an April 3 NSC memorandum of the meeting, the President agreed with Harriman’s recommendation to keep pressure on Nkrumah through a series of visitors. (Ibid., Bundy Files, Vol. I) 3 An April 15 memorandum from Brubeck to the President recommended that he approve Harriman’s proposal “that we continue participation in Volta and Valco, along with a program of visits and other means to keep Nkrumah under reasonable control.” An attached note, undated, states that the President had approved the recommendation, and a handwritten note on Brubeck’s memorandum states that the Department of State was informed on April 17. (Ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, Africa-Harriman Trip-3/64) 250. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 250. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 1 Washington, April 9, 1964. SUBJECT Action Program for Ghana As a result of your visit to Accra we have developed the following lines of action to enable us to pursue a meaningful dialogue with Nkrumah and keep continuing pressure on him to maintain his relations with the US on a tolerable basis: (1) We should vigorously pursue our program of visits to Ghana by Presidential emissaries and other important visitors. In particular, we should urge Edgar Kaiser to visit Ghana at least on a quarterly basis. A list of other possible visitors is attached (Tab A). 2 We shall consult with the British in the next few days to discuss what contribution they may be able to make in this area. 3 (2) We should endeavor to have some reference to the US attitude toward nonalignment inserted in a speech by President Johnson. (3) We should remain alert to suitable occasions to develop a personal rapport between President Johnson and Nkrumah through exchanges of correspondence or other means. (4) The main object of Ambassador Mahoney’s bi-weekly talks with Nkrumah should be to hold Nkrumah to his undertaking to accept the responsibility for maintaining reasonable relations with the US. Nkrumah should be reminded as often as necessary of his agreement that any complaints he has would be discussed with Ambassador Mahoney to avoid misunderstandings and recriminations in the press and radio. We would also emphasize the role of private investment in Ghana’s economic progress and hold him to his commitment to you to state publicly that foreign investment is welcome to come and stay in Ghana indefinitely. (5) We should respond to a Ghanaian approach for further financing under the Seven-Year Development Plan as follows: (a) The US is already contributing heavily to projects included in the plan and is committed to provide 21% of the total external financing (public and private) called for under the plan. This commitment is almost as much as we have committed to Nigeria, a country many times as large as Ghana. We consider it preferable to see how matters go with our present undertakings before contemplating additional contributions; (b) We are continuing other forms of assistance to Ghana including AID development grants, PL–480 programs, and Peace Corps volunteers; and (c) The US has no objection or desire to impede any Ghanaian request for aid to the IBRD or to other Western countries in approaches Ghana may make either bilaterally or multilaterally. We should endeavor to disabuse Ghana of the notion that the US can significantly influence the IBRD or individual Western donors. (A telegram along these lines has been sent to Ambassador Mahoney for his views—Deptel 607 to Accra, Tab B.) 4 (6) As regards the Volta-Valco projects, we should proceed to implement our commitments as expeditiously as progress on these projects permits. 5 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA–US. Confidential. Drafted by Dorros and cleared by AID/AFR/CA Director Richard M. Cashin. 2 Not printed. Harriman approved most of the suggested visitors, questioned others, and noted “Don’t overdo number of visitors.” 3 Harriman initialed his approval of points 1–4 on April 9. 4 Harriman approved point 5, but in point 5 (a), he crossed out “almost as much as we have committed to Nigeria” and wrote in the margin, “As Nigeria is a red flag, perhaps ’has higher per capita than any African country.’” In a different handwriting, under his notation, is the word “No,” and the notation “Liberia has higher per capita.” Harriman also wrote the notes “Private capital?” next to point 5 (b) and “negative language” next to point 5 (c). 5 Harriman left point 6 blank, and noted “This requires Presidential approval of my recommendation.” 251. Memorandum of Conversation 251. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 11, 1965, 3–3:30 p.m. SUBJECT Ghana PARTICIPANTS The Director of Central Intelligence Ambassador to Ghana, William P. Mahoney Deputy Chief, Africa Division, [ name not declassified ] 1. Coup d’Etat Plot, Ghana: While Ambassador Mahoney felt that popular opinion was running strongly against Nkrumah and the economy of the country was in a precarious state he was not convinced that the coup d’etat, now being planned by Acting Police Commissioner Harlley and Generals Otu and Ankrah, would necessarily take place. He did feel, however, that one way or another Nkrumah would be out within a year. [ 3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] referred to a recent report which mentioned that the top coup conspirators were scheduled to meet on 10 March at which time they would determine the timing of the coup; however, because of a tendency to procrastinate, any specific date they set should be accepted with reservations. In response to the Director’s queries as to who would most likely succeed Nkrumah in the event of a coup, Ambassador Mahoney stated that initially, at least, a military junta would take over, headed perhaps by Acting Police Commissioner Harlley. 2. Ghana Economics: Ambassador Mahoney gave as his strong opinion that the United States should not acquiesce in Nkrumah’s forthcoming request for financial assistance. Not only would a refusal be justified in the interests of further weakening Nkrumah but in Ambassador Mahoney’s opinion, such a refusal would make a desirable impression on other countries in Africa. He felt, however, that the United States should maintain present aid levels and retain the Peace Corps program. Ambassador Mahoney felt that there was little chance that either the Chinese Communists or the Soviets would in adequate measure come to Nkrumah’s financial rescue. He also felt the British would continue to adopt a “hard nose” attitude toward providing further assistance to Ghana. [Ambassador Mahoney described Nkrumah as being emotionally and ideologically pro-Chinese Communist, although realistically he recognized the Soviets were in a better position to provide him economic assistance.] 2 Ambassador Mahoney described how Nkrumah was completely, albeit, mistakenly, confident that both the U.S. and the U.K. would come to his financial rescue. Ambassador Mahoney said that he hoped to have a few minutes conversation with President Johnson on March 12 3 at which time he wanted to impress upon the President the wisdom of refusing Nkrumah’s request for further aid. Commenting on the Volta Dam and Kaiser Aluminum projects in Ghana, Ambassador Mahoney felt that the original decision to undertake and finance these projects had been sound; they provided lasting assistance to the Ghanaian people which will endure and be remembered long after Nkrumah goes. In response to the Director’s comment that the dam had been completed six months ahead of schedule, Ambassador Mahoney stated that it also had been completed at a cost less than originally estimated. 3. [ 4–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 4. Congo: The Director made reference to the apparent improvement in Tshombe’s position in Africa, particularly as evidenced by his showing at the recent OAU meeting in Nairobi. Ambassador Mahoney agreed and added that regardless of the radical African sentiment against Tshombe, latter is an extremely able person and perhaps the only one who can keep the Congo together. [name not declassified] Deputy Chief, Africa Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Memo for the Record, 01 Mar.–28 Apr. 65. Secret. Drafted on March 12 by [ text not declassified ] Deputy Chief of the Africa Division in the CIA Directorate of Plans. Filed with a covering memorandum from Africa Division Chief [ text not declassified ] to McCone. The time is taken from a CIA transcript of the conversation. (Ibid.) The meeting took place in McCone’s office. 2 Brackets in the source text. 3 Mahoney met with the President briefly on March 12 as one of a group of five Ambassadors posted to African countries. No record has been found of the meeting, except that it is noted in the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) 252. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 252. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 1 Accra, April 2, 1965, 6 p.m. 879. Saw Nkrumah for 50 minutes this morning. President began by asking when wife and family would be returning. I said not sure, my future little uncertain, may not be here long enough warrant their return. Remarked that unfortunately during my absence relationship between US and Ghana had deteriorated to marked extent. Nkrumah agreed. By way illustration, I said I was with President Johnson when cable brought in to him describing March 12 attack on library and Embassy. President Johnson was upset; read cable to me. I said USG also very disturbed by unfriendly attack on US in March 22 speech. Told him that whereas Ghana press had regularly attacked US on Congo, I shocked he personally would say what he did about US. I said I would like read some particularly offensive passages. Nkrumah said this not necessary since he knew what in it, but I persisted. Pointed out it grossly unfair to identify US with long Belgium history in Congo. US has been in Congo only since 1960 and to help Congolese. Speech loaded and slanted throughout. Nkrumah admitted as much, but said he had special purpose in mind. He concerned about seriousness situation in Congo and felt speech had to be strong. I replied this no reason not be fair: why criticize everything we do? At this point I read passages about no cruelty being spared in Congo, about identification of US with Rhodesia and South Africa, and about threat to Africa posed by economic imperialism, specifically naming American financiers. I asked Nkrumah if he referring to US presence in Ghana, when he said all African countries threatened by economic imperialism. Nkrumah insisted not at all, only to situation elsewhere Africa. Returning to Congo I said we did not create Tshombe; we surprised as anyone else he returned. Noted also that Governor Williams beseeched Tshombe to seek help from other Africans. What particularly deplorable in speech, I said, was use terms “racist” and “hatred” in reference US, and his use “fascist” as epithet. I noted Ghanaian press so bad I no longer interested in talking about it, but reminded him of conversation I had with him year ago when he said he had admonished press against using offensive epithets. Now he personally talking that way. I said I would never have believed that man of his sophistication and refinement would use language like that against my country, and it shock to hear him do so. Said he knew we were backing self-determination for Africans and making serious effort solve race problem at home. At this point Nkrumah, who had been holding face in hands, looked up and I saw he was crying. With difficulty he said I could not understand ordeal he had been through during last month. Recalled that there had been seven attempts on his life. Also that he upset with problem executions. (“You know why I commuted the sentences?” I replied I assumed it for humanitarian reasons. “It was for Africa, for Africa.”) Asserted he would not have made speech had it not been for what he had been going through. I said I appreciated strain, but this no reason make hostile speech against country trying help. I pointed out that speech had been read throughout world. Damage had been done our relations we might not be able repair. Nkrumah interjected it all because of Tshombe. Said he had been thinking of sending mission to President Johnson to ask US withdraw support from Tshombe. I remarked that if he had made this point in speech, it would have been understandable. But not accusing US of every crime in Africa. Also told him we resented reference to Congo developing into another Vietnam. Pointed out he and his press were constantly taking ChiCom line on Vietnam, and US sick of this. Situation not so simple as he had made out, to which he agreed. I then spent few minutes going over main points in Vietnam white paper, copy of which I handed him. Nkrumah suggested I give Botsio copy. In apparent effort say something nice about US (and perhaps get off subject Vietnam), Nkrumah said, “You know you have great country—the only one that can lead world to peace.” When I commented that one would not guess this from what he said, he replied, “But it is what I believe. You can work with Russians.” I noted that we trying maintain dialogue with USSR, but ChiComs made working with Russians more difficult. Nkrumah agreed, called ChiComs “mysterious” and accused them of being dogmatic and difficult. During conversation, Nkrumah made brief references to Bamako and Nouakchott Conference. Said he had gone to Bamako because Africa falling apart so fast, especially on Congo; something had be done by so-called radicals to stabilize situation. On Nouakchott Nkrumah noted that he had letter from Daddah, in which Mauritanian President named certain powers who were behind conference. (He mentioned in passing that he had also received letter from Adoula.) I said I did not pretend have knowledge of all that went on Nouakchott, but US not force behind it as some claiming. Then remarked we sick of being made whipping boy by certain African states because of their own difficulties, largely brought on by themselves. Said we had about enough of it. Meeting concluded with Nkrumah, eyes still moist, making few warm remarks about our personal relationship. Comment: 1. While Nkrumah made uncomfortable by tough talk, in end there will probably be very little to show for today’s effort. Nkrumah may be slowed down a little, as before, by what I said, but not for long. 2. While Nkrumah apparently continues have personal affection for me, he seems as convinced as ever US is out to get him. From what he said about assassination attempts in March, it appears he still suspects US involvement. 3. Nkrumah gave me impression of being badly frightened man. His emotional resources seem be running out. As pressures increase, we may expect more hysterical outbursts, many directed against US. 4. Uncomplimentary remarks about ChiComs were obvious attempt divert US from idea he pro-ChiCom. He protested too much. Am convinced he emotionally tends be strongly pro-ChiCom. Mahoney 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA–US. Confidential. 253. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 253. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 27, 1965. McGB— FYI, we may have a pro-Western coup in Ghana soon. Certain key military and police figures have been planning one for some time, and Ghana’s deteriorating economic condition may provide the spark. The plotters are keeping us briefed, and State thinks we’re more on the inside than the British. While we’re not directly involved (I’m told), we and other Western countries (including France) have been helping to set up the situation by ignoring Nkrumah’s pleas for economic aid. The new OCAM (Francophone) group’s refusal to attend any OAU meeting in Accra (because of Nkrumah’s plotting) will further isolate him. All in all, looks good. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64–2/66. Secret. 254. Memorandum of Conversation 254. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 6, 1965, 4:45–5 p.m. PRESENT The President, Foreign Minister Quaison-Sackey, the Ambassador of Ghana, Mr. Bill Moyers, Mr. McGeorge Bundy 1. The President greeted the Foreign Minister warmly, and took him and the Ambassador into his small office. He opened the conversation by a friendly reference to the Ambassador’s recent trip to Lake Jackson in Texas. The Ambassador reported that he had enjoyed the trip very much and that he looked forward to an opportunity to show this same work on desalinization to the Minister of his Government mainly concerned with these matters. The President told the Foreign Minister that the Ambassador was going to be regarded as a citizen of Texas, and then turned to the Foreign Minister attentively and expectantly. 2. The Foreign Minister said that he brought the President the very warm greetings of President Nkrumah, and a letter. 2 He handed the letter to the President. The President joked about the large number of red seals on the letter, produced a pocketknife, opened it carefully, and read it aloud. 3. As soon as he had finished reading the letter, the President gave the Foreign Minister a categorical assurance that no U.S. military operations would interfere with any visit to Hanoi by President Nkrumah. The President said (1) we are not bombing Hanoi, (2) we have not intensified our bombing of North Vietnam, (3) the President will be in no danger, and (4) who is he kidding? (probably referring to Ho, not Nkrumah). The President continued that a peaceful settlement would never be blocked because of any action of the United States. If the aggression ceases, our resistance ceases. Nobody wanted peace more than the United States, and if the efforts of Ghana could get the aggressors to stop, we would stop resistance to the aggression. The President repeated that no one needed to be worried about getting hurt in Hanoi—there was no danger in a visit to Hanoi in search of peace. 4. The President told the Ghanaians that they knew what he thought—that he thought all nations should be happy together—that the world should look forward to a time of peace and progress. The President noted that this had been a great day for progress in the United States, with the signing of the voting rights bill, and his guests enthusiastically agreed, saying that they had seen the ceremony on television and been greatly moved by it. 5. The Foreign Minister said that the reason for the letter was the report of the Ghanaian mission to Hanoi which had experienced some difficulties. It had been given military escort from Peking to Hanoi in a flight which gave rise to some concern. It had heard the sounds of guns on many occasions in Hanoi, and it had advised President Nkrumah not to go to Hanoi at this time. But President Nkrumah wanted very much to go, and he therefore asked whether bombings could not cease for three or four days. Then perhaps he could work for a cessation of all hostilities during peace talks. President Nkrumah felt that he must do all he could for a cease-fire, and this was the explanation for what the Foreign Minister had come to call “the fever-heat diplomacy” of his sudden visit to Washington. 6. The President replied that he was happy to see the Foreign Minister and repeated that the Foreign Minister should return to his President and say (1) that we have not bombed Hanoi and that he need not be frightened, and (2) that if he can get the aggression stopped, there will be peace overnight. 7. The President repeated again that no one wanted peace more than the United States, but he said that no one would be allowed to gobble up little countries. We would stay there and ensure the right of self-determination. We would not run out of there. But the President said once again that President Nkrumah need not be concerned by the bombs that had never fallen on Hanoi. 8. The Foreign Minister raised very gently the question whether the President would wish to receive President Nkrumah either before or after his visit to Hanoi. The President said he thought we should wait until after President Nkrumah got back from Hanoi, and then we would see. So far, visitors in Hanoi had produced no hope from the other side. This matter was left entirely open, but it was made quite plain by omission that the President did not expect to see President Nkrumah before his visit to Hanoi. 9. The President, in closing, made it very clear that he himself thought the North Vietnamese suggestion that President Nkrumah would be in danger was a fraud, and the friendly chuckles of his guests made it appear that they personally did not disagree. It was agreed that the meeting would not be discussed in detail, but that the Press Secretary would give a brief summary of the contents of President Nkrumah’s message and of the oral reply which the President had given. The President would send a written reply promptly, 3 and it was tentatively agreed that the two letters would be released after the Foreign Minister had carried the reply back and delivered it to President Nkrumah. 10. With exchanges of further best wishes and expressions of regard and satisfaction, the meeting ended. The two visitors had clearly been both impressed and pleased by their reception. McG.B . 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64–2/66. Confidential. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy on August 11. 2 The text of Nkrumah’s message to Johnson was sent in telegram 72 to Accra, August 7. (Ibid., Nkrumah Correspondence, 1/64–2/66) A copy is also in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. 3 Johnson’s brief reply to Nkrumah was telegraphed to Accra and released to the press on August 7. (Ibid.) 4 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Togo to the Department of State 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Togo to the Department of State 1 Lome, September 30, 1965, 1435Z. 152. From Governor Williams. Ghana Visit. Visit Accra very successful and provided opportunity frank exchange with President Nkrumah, Acting FonMin Botsio and MinDefense Kofi Baako. Also visited industrial complex Tema including Valco. Press treatment excellent with front page coverage in government-controlled press. Nkrumah appeared to be in good health and received me with warmth and cordiality. Highlights during one-hour conversation included (1) Recognition by Nkrumah that cocoa-producing countries must reach consensus on export quotas and production controls in order achieve agreement on cocoa price stabilization with consuming countries; (2) Strong reaction from Nkrumah against Lin Piao’s second revolution theory, contending that Chinese Communists don’t understand African psychology; and (3) Expression regret that he did not have opportunity talk President Johnson about Vietnam and acceptance without argument my explanation of our Vietnam policy. My general impression is that Nkrumah popularity continues to decline owing continued deterioration economic situation. Foreign exchange reserves at critically low level with prices increasing at annual rate more than 30 percent due short supplies and inflationary financing. As purchasing power wage and salary earners decline, present undercurrents dissatisfaction in urban centers likely grow; subsistence farmers which constitute bulk population not seriously affected. Nkrumah appears have firm control over major instruments of power and his security forces are becoming increasingly effective in ferreting out dissident individuals and groups. Good question is whether when Nkrumah feels effects of his disastrous policies he may well begin to base decisions more on rational considerations rather than emotions as in the past. Our present posture toward Ghana is sound and helping to maintain the tremendous reservoir goodwill for U.S. among Ghanaian people including many of Nkrumah’s ministers. OAU meeting came up only incidentally, but Nkrumah did complain that Entente states were frustrating his efforts organize meeting. After noting period good press relations, I cited number examples renewed press attacks on U.S. Nkrumah protested ignorance of any trend in Ghanaian press to renew vituperative comments against America. Did agree to review specific examples to be supplied by Embassy. [Here follow 2 brief paragraphs on administrative matters.] Impressed by excellent relations between Troxel and Ghanaians of all categories and with large and varied diplomatic community. Todman 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Papers, 1961–1966. Confidential. Repeated to Accra, Abidjan, and London. 256. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Embassies in Africa 256. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Embassies in Africa 1 Washington, November 23, 1965, 7:26 p.m. 1002. Embassies pass Consulates. Nkrumah’s Book 1. Following for your discretionary use with senior officials host govt. 2. In Oct Pres Nkrumah of Ghana published book entitled Neo-Colonialism—The Last Stage of Imperialism , and gave copies to African chiefs of state attending OAU conference at Accra. Book contains unmistakably hostile charges against USG motives, actions, and intentions and is clear and comprehensive statement of Nkrumah’s fundamental anti-Western, anti-US bias. His charges against Peace Corps, USIA and CIA have already intensified Ghanaian press attacks on these agencies and constitute official sanction for continuing attacks. 3. Asst Secy Williams summoned Ghanaian Amb to US Ribeiro Nov 18 and lodged stern oral protest of book. Ribeiro was also handed aide-memoire 2 (1) stating USG views Nkrumah’s attacks on US in book with profound concern; (2) noting unprecedented nature such an attack by Head of State of friendly country; (3) informing GOG that book’s hostility and its provocative and anti-American tone are “deeply disturbing and offensive” to USG; and (4) holding GOG fully responsible for whatever consequences book’s publication may have. 4. Gov emphasized to Ribeiro we could not now foresee all consequences of book but that these would “undoubtedly become evident in due course.” 5. Dept recognizes book thus far has had little or no impact in Africa and wants avoid any action which would unduly publicize it, or make USG appear overreacting. Above info should therefore be used cautiously, in low key and only if you deem appropriate in local context. 6. While Dept under no illusions that US response will alter Nkrumah’s views, we believe it important make clear that attack of this nature by Head of State unacceptable. Failure to act may make more credible Nkrumah’s position with other African governments that strong anti-US and anti-Western posture has no serious disadvantages. 7. On Nov 20 Emb Accra delivered note to GOG MinFonAffairs turning down GOG’s long-pending request for over $100 million in PL–480 assistance. 3 No mention made in note of book. At noon briefing Nov 23, Dept spokesman confirmed protest made and PL–480 aid refused. When asked if our PL–480 refusal related to book’s appearance, he replied “no comment.” 8. FYI. If pressed for reasons why PL–480 turned down you may say it impossible for US to grant all requests for surplus food; that quantity of PL–480 desired out of line with what we have provided in other African countries of comparable population. At same time, do not hide our dissatisfaction with book, or deny implication that its publication could well affect our relations with Ghana. We prefer let GOG and others draw own conclusions. If asked about this, your answer should be consistent with above. 9. Dept considering additional measures which, if adopted, will be carefully spaced and timed in order meet above objectives. End FYI. 10. INR research memo on book being pouched. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GHANA. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Ghana Affairs Robert P. Smith, and Hendrik Van Oss of AFW; cleared by Trimble, Donald J. Kent of AF/P, Robert F. Andrew of INR/RAF, and Ben Thirkeild of P/ON. Approved by Williams. Repeated to London. 2 Dated November 17. (Ibid., POL GHANA–US) 3 Dated November 19. (Ibid., AID (US) GHANA) 257. Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) 257. Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) 1 Washington, February 25, 1966. SUBJECT Recent OCI Reporting on Ghana Summary On 24 February, a coup occurred in Ghana while President Nkrumah was en route to Peking. Over the past year, OCI reporting has noted persistent military dissatisfaction with the regime and pointed to a group of army and police officers who were plotting against Nkrumah. Because of government countermeasures and indecisiveness on the part of the plotters, the coup was apparently postponed several times. OCI publications have pointed out that the officers involved favored making their move either while Nkrumah was out of the country or when they could take advantage of an outburst of popular discontent. On 23 February, the day before the coup, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] reported that the commanders of the army’s two brigades and the commissioner of police might be engineering a move to oust Nkrumah during his Asian tour. 1. [ 2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] The embassy also has reported periodic build-ups of coup rumors, especially at times of economic tension. On 10 February 1965, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] noted “plotting is actively underway to oust Nkrumah in the very near future. Plans are incomplete, and this, like previous plots, may collapse before execution.” The CIB of 26 February 1965 commented that “any move to oust Nkrumah would require the support of the army, one of the few power groups not yet under party control.” 2. During the spring and early summer of 1965 a group of senior military and police officers continued to develop coup plots, to discuss tentative dates and occasions for overthrowing Nkrumah, and to vacillate about carrying out their plans. Younger, middle-grade officers were chafing over the failure of top military leaders to act. OCI reporting followed the ups and downs of the conspiracy, as indicated in the following examples. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] 1 May 1965 noted “some of the steam appears to have gone out of the group of senior military and police officers plotting Nkrumah’s overthrow. They are now said to have only vague plans to act sometime in June or July. Public resentment against Nkrumah’s domestic policies remains high, however.” The CIWR of 4 June 1965 indicated that “anti-regime elements of the military and police might try to take advantage of any outburst of discontent to try to oust Nkrumah. Last month some younger officers were reported chafing over the failure of top military leaders to move against him.” The CIB of 19 June 1965 stated “Disaffected military and police leaders could well move against the regime soon, possibly during Nkrumah’s current trip abroad (for the Commonwealth Conference) .… Many military leaders have long been unhappy over Nkrumah’s leadership. A conviction that their personal interests are now at stake could finally overcome their reluctance to move . …The Otus (two brothers who held high military posts) have also recently been in close touch with pro-Western Police Commissioner Harlley, who is said to be thoroughly fed up with the regime and to have aligned himself with them.” 3. As the plotters continued to delay putting their plans into operation, Nkrumah took countermeasures in July which apparently put a stop to the plotting for the time being. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] 28 July 1965 said “Nkrumah’s sudden move today in retiring Ghana’s defense chief (Otu) and his deputy (Ankrah) effectively neutralizes the two as potential coup leaders. Both had been involved in coup plotting for several months but vacillated too long and gave Nkrumah the chance to act first.” 4. The series of recent successful military coups elsewhere in West Africa apparently gave new encouragement to the Ghanaian plotters. This development was reported [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] on 15 January 1966, which noted that “The rash of army coups in western Africa has sparked new plotting against Nkrumah. Last spring and summer, restless military officers were reportedly set to move, but they procrastinated too long and Nkrumah was able to defuse the plot.” On 17 February 1966, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] stated that “There is another plot afoot to kill Nkrumah and take over the government. A clandestine source [ less than 1 line source text not declassified ] reports that a number of important military and police officers were involved.” The latest report, which tied the coup plans to Nkrumah’s trip abroad, was printed [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] on 23 February 1966. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64–2/66. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. The source text is filed with an undated handwritten note from Helms to Bundy, apparently sent on February 28, noting that Bundy had expressed an interest in the subject when they talked on Friday (February 25) and adding, “I am particularly pleased to send you a favorable report on your last day.” 258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 1 Washington, February 25, 1966, 6:18 p.m. 452. Embtel 821. 2 1. Embassy’s prompt, comprehensive and perceptive reporting of coup events much appreciated by Dept. 2. Dept. fully cognizant that pressures for early recognition of new regime will mount. Before deciding how best to cope with this question, would prefer first have reaction of some other African countries. We wish avoid appearing overzealous by acting too quickly, thus lending credence to inevitable charges that U.S. masterminded coup. At same time, we wish move as quickly as feasible into position of mutually beneficial relations with new regime. Would hope be able take positive action soon. While you should make no commitment of any kind, you authorized maintain discreet normal contacts with NLC as necessary, but to extent possible leave initiatives to them at this early stage. 3. FYI: Dept. believes composition of NLC, particularly its Economic Committee, is encouraging 3 and gives grounds for hope that new regime recognizes immense problems it faces. While our public posture influenced by para. 2 above, our attention already being directed toward question of how we might best assist Ghana in regaining its feet. Your comment para. 7 reftel relevant this connection. While speed important, however, technical and other considerations also necessitate certain amount of caution. Much will depend on performance NLC. First move in seeking US assistance, of course, must be initiation by NLC of specific requests for our consideration and that of other countries and with agencies such as IMF, IBRD. End FYI. 4. We also encouraged by absence of bloodbath and generally moderate approach taken by NLC thus far toward Nkrumah’s cohorts. Retention of judiciary and public service particularly welcome, as is apparent desire for rapid return to civilian government. 5. Nkrumah’s hopes of returning to power and his subsequent statements and movements will of course continue be relevant. 6. Your comments and recommendations reftel will figure prominently in discussions here. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GHANA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Smith and Pelletreau in AF/AFW, cleared by Gustafson in L/AF, and approved by Trimble in AF. Repeated to London. 2 Telegram 821 from Accra, February 25, reported that the coup appeared completely successful and requested that major economic assistance be provided to the new regime. (Ibid.) 3 In a February 25 letter to Bill Moyers, Ambassador Williams stated that the successful coup had been “extremely fortunate,” that the new leaders were “strong friends of ours,” and that they had acted with noble motives, to “rid the country of (oppressive)… conditions.” (Johnson Library, Franklin H. Williams Papers) 259. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 259. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 1 Accra, March 3, 1966, 1845Z. 923. Depcirtel 1637. 2 1. In informal call this afternoon on General Ankrah, Chairman of National Liberation Council (NLC), I took opportunity to emphasize US view that most important thing was not timing of recognition, which I told him I felt confident was coming, but nature of relationship that is eventually developed between our two governments. Ankrah replied that he fully understood why US could not get out in front, and said he was certain US recognition would come 24 hours after Africans moved. He asserted that NLC had already received recognition from Liberia, Malagasy Republic, West Germany, and expected Nigeria and OCAM countries to take action momentarily.” He expressed opinion that NLC would have no problem with African countries soon as OAU Meeting Addis is over. 2. General Ankrah requested I inform President Johnson that Ghana will never look east again. He said that NLC may let Soviets and Chinese stay here as diplomatic missions but they will be so restricted that they won’t be able to “do anything.” He described as “crazy” that Ghana which speaks English should have had Russians teaching English rather than Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, Americans or especially British—from our “mother country.” 3. I told Ankrah that we would like to have NLC identify specific kinds of economic aid which they feel are needed, and indicated US prepared to “consider” these requests once they were communicated. He said he had asked Economic Committee to forward requests two days ago, and was disturbed when I told him I had been led to believe that Committee did not intend to send an official request until after recognition. Ankrah said Embassy would have first requests later this afternoon or at the latest tomorrow morning. 4. At close of call, I complimented General on statements he had made so far, and congratulated him on general orderly conduct of police and soldiers since take-over by NLC. He indicated that we would be seeing a lot of one another, and finished with comment “that darn Russian Ambassador was in Flagstaff House every five minutes.” Williams 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 GHANA. Confidential. 2 Circular telegram 1637, March 2, informed West African Embassies that although the United States intended to normalize relations with the new Ghana regime, it preferred that some other African countries (following Liberia’s lead) extend recognition first. (Ibid.) 260. Memorandum From the President’s Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 260. Memorandum From the President’s Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 12, 1966, 10:30 a.m. [Here follows a paragraph on Indonesia.] The coup in Ghana is another example of a fortuitous windfall. Nkrumah was doing more to undermine our interests than any other black African. In reaction to his strongly pro-Communist leanings, the new military regime is almost pathetically pro-Western. The point of this memo is that we ought to follow through skillfully and consolidate such successes. A few thousand tons of surplus wheat or rice, given now when the new regimes are quite uncertain as to their future relations with us, could have a psychological significance out of all proportion to the cost of the gesture. I am not arguing for lavish gifts to these regimes—indeed, giving them a little only whets their appetites, and enables us to use the prospect of more as leverage. But my experience is that the bureaucracy will err on the side of caution rather than initiative; hence my suggestion that, in expressing your pleasure to SecState and others over the Indonesia and Ghana coups, you make clear that we ought to exploit such successes as quickly and as skillfully as possible. You have no idea how important a word from you can be in setting the tone for the bureaucracy. And in this case I strongly suspect that my own suggestion is quite in accord with your own political instinct. If you prefer, I would pass this word to Rusk and Bell; but at the moment there is simply no substitute for direct word from you. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Robert W. Komer, Vol. 21, 3/3/66–3/20/66. Confidential. A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates that the memorandum was seen by the President. 261. Letter From Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah to President Johnson 261. Letter From Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah to President Johnson 1 Accra, March 24, 1966. My dear President Johnson, I am taking this opportunity to write to you personally in order to explain the circumstances that led to the recent change of government in Ghana, and to discuss some of the most crucial problems which the National Liberation Council inherited from the old regime since it assumed power on 24th February, 1966. In view of the fact that there had recently been changes of governments in a number of African States, I thought my explanation would enable you to make a correct assessment of events in Ghana and to view the military take-over in its correct perspective. The Army and the Police Services were compelled to intervene to stem the tide of a growing communist menace in Ghana and the catastrophic deterioration of our economy. As I told the people of Ghana in my nation-wide radio and television broadcast on 28th February, “this grave step was taken because no other means was available to restore to the people of Ghana the blessings of liberty, justice, happiness and prosperity for which we all have struggled for so long”. By his arbitrary use of power, Nkrumah lost the confidence and support of the people of Ghana and in keeping with our tradition we had to remove him from power by the only means available to us. We became convinced that the ex-President and his communist friends, not excluding his party renegades, were determined to use Ghana as a bridge-head for the dissemination of communism and subversion in Africa South of the Sahara. To achieve this, he began by systematically destroying the independence of the judiciary and the legislature. Nkrumah turned the civil service into a political instrument thus weakening its effectiveness and discipline. We watched with dismay the destruction of our civil liberties. The cherished rights of the individual were contemptuously disregarded, and ideologies alien to our culture and traditions were imposed upon us. Trade Unions, Farmers’ organizations and the National Council of Ghana Women were all made integral wings of the banned Convention People’s Party. The press, radio and television services were all rigidly controlled and used as the mouthpiece of the ruling Party. All legitimate opposition to the old regime was ruthlessly suppressed and the people of Ghana could not even voice their grievances without running the risk of arbitrary imprisonment or detention. Nkrumah leaned heavily towards the East and brought into the country hundreds of so-called Chinese, Russian and East German technicians and experts. We knew, however, that some Chinese experts were in fact training saboteurs in special camps to subvert other independent African States. The Russians were also using East German nationals to train the ex-President’s guard and security men. Secret arms and ammunition dumps had been built in many parts of the country by the deposed President and these were only discovered after his overthrow. What is more, by their reckless political adventures and spurious economic theories, the deposed President and his Party drove Ghana to the brink of economic disaster and alienated the sympathy and support of our traditional friends in the West with whom we had enjoyed years of friendship and economic co-operation. At this stage, it is not possible to make a complete assessment of the moral, intellectual and material damage which the former regime has inflicted on the people of Ghana. The National Liberation Council has fully assumed the onerous task of mentally rehabilitating our people. We on the Council are determined to make good the damage which the former President and his colleagues have created in the minds of our young people. We are determined to remove all traces of alien ideological influence from our country and improve relations with our traditional Western friends, among whom we count the people of the United States. We plan to re-educate the youth of Ghana and wean them from the pernicious ideologies with which their minds have been tainted. All these appear formidable for the new regime, but what is even more formidable, Mr. President, is the critical state of our economy. When the National Liberation Council took over the administration of the country, the economy was in a very chaotic state, mainly as the result of gross mismanagement and unbridled spending of public funds on prestige projects of doubtful value. Ghana’s balance of payments is in serious deficit, essential commodities are in short supply and inflationary pressures are mounting by leaps and bounds, while unemployment figures keep on rising. In the face of these difficulties we are being called upon to meet some of our most urgent overseas payments within the next few weeks. The Economic Committee of the National Liberation Council is formulating realistic plans to stabilise the economy. This calls for a drastic re-examination of several projects with a view to eliminating those that are not economically viable. The Committee is also making contacts with friendly countries from the West, the United Nations, the Economic Commission for Africa and the International Monetary Fund for assistance. These will, however, entail some protracted negotiations, but something will have to be done immediately to improve our foreign exchange position, thus enabling us to make immediate payments for essential imports. If we fail to take immediate steps to meet this emergency, Ghana will be plunged into an acute economic crisis of catastrophic proportions. To aggravate this ominous situation, we are also threatened with a famine within the next few months. Should this situation continue unchecked all our efforts to salvage the country’s economy will be nullified and the hopes of millions of Ghanaians for a happier and brighter future obliterated. To tide us over the critical weeks that lie ahead, the National Liberation Council has appealed to your great country, Mr. President, for aid and food, and I do earnestly hope that your response will be swift and substantial. Furthermore, it is my hope that we will establish a line of credit with the United States as soon as possible. While we look to our friends for whatever help they can give us, we are working hard with our very limited resources to ensure the survival of our economy. If the National Liberation Council succeeds to arrest this economic disaster, the people of Ghana will be convinced that they have been ushered into a new era, bright with prospects for a better life. The Council will also have the satisfaction of achieving their objective of restoring to Ghana democracy, the rule of law and economic sanity. The Council will thus hand over the administration, at the appropriate time, to a civilian government. As I said in my recent broadcast, “the Armed Forces and the Police who put their lives at stake to bring about this long-awaited change from Nkrumah’s oppressive regime to a democratic form of Government have no ambition what-so-ever to rule this country indefinitely.” In due course a Constitutional Reform Commission will be set up to produce a Draft Constitution acceptable to all sections of our people and their recommendations presented to the nation for adoption at a referendum. We will also re-introduce the separation of powers of the legislature, the judiciary and the executive which Nkrumah and his Party wantonly destroyed. We know that a strong, viable and democratic Ghana will exert great influence in the councils of Africa and the world. The people of Ghana are determined to turn to their friends in the West. We are conscious of the goodwill and sympathy of the American people with whom we desire to maintain a close and warm friendship. As a developing country, our main pre-occupation is to build our nation as you have built yours since your independence. You can depend on me, my Government and the people of Ghana to support your democratic principles and your way of life. As a great Power, we know you do not want us to play the role of a puppet state, but at least following your example, we can re-educate our children to admire the glories of real democracy. To be able to do this, we definitely need your help and encouragement. I look forward to keeping you informed personally of developments in Ghana from time to time and to hearing from you. I hope that it will be possible in the near future to meet you, exchange views and benefit from your ripe and varied experience. Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration. Yours Very Sincerely, J.A. Ankrah 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66–10/6/66. No classification marking. The salutation and closing of the letter are handwritten. An April 8 memorandum from Ulric Haynes of the NSC Staff to Rostow notes that Williams had sent Ankrah’s letter directly to Bill Moyers, a personal friend from Peace Corps days. Moyers sent the letter to Haynes, who drafted a reply and cleared it with the Department of State. (Ibid.) Rostow forwarded the Ankrah letter and the draft reply to Johnson in Texas under cover of an April 11 memorandum. (Ibid.) 262. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah 262. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah 1 Washington, April 14, 1966. Dear General Ankrah: Ambassador Williams has transmitted your kind letter of March 24 to me. 2 Its honest, straightforward account of the conditions which led to the change of government in Ghana and its frank assessment of the problems to be solved have left a deep impression upon me. I was particularly encouraged to see that you are alert to the dangers of subversion from alien sources. Indeed, we in the United States hail your Government’s efforts to wipe out arbitrary rule in Ghana as you reinstate the rule of law and re-establish those institutions essential to democratic government. The swift diplomatic initiatives undertaken by your Government were reassuring and I look forward to the role which an effective and truly independent Ghana can play in the councils of Africa and of the world. You are to be praised for your immediate recognition of the economic problems facing Ghana and the appointment of an able Economic Committee. Praise is also well-deserved for the prompt actions you took at home and abroad to deal with both your short-term and long-term economic difficulties. The United States is acutely aware of the critical state of Ghana’s economy and of the immediate needs of the Ghanaian people. Our airlift of twenty-five tons of canned milk last week was tangible recognition of your emergency food requirements. It represents a partial delivery of five hundred tons of milk to help prevent the threatened famine situation you described in your letter. It is our hope that the PL–480 food commodity agreement which our two Governments recently signed 3 will help substantially to tide you over the critical period ahead. I greatly appreciate your expression of support for our common belief in democratic principles and the democratic way of life. This is one of the surest ways of achieving the world peace we so fervently desire. It will be my pleasure to reinforce the ties of friendship which bind the United States and Ghana. Therefore, I welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you and I look forward to hearing from you personally from time to time on developments in Ghana. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66–10/6/66. No classification marking. 2 Document 261 . 3 Signed at Accra on April 1; 17 UST 484. 263. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 263. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 8, 1966, 7:15 p.m. SUBJECT Reply to letter from General Ankrah of Ghana At Tab A, for your signature , is a proposed reply to General Ankrah’s June 13 letter (Tab B) 2 reporting on economic progress in Ghana and complimenting your OAU speech. 3 State dragged a bit on the reply—it reached my desk only today—but Ankrah greatly values personal signals from you, and won’t mind the delay. 4 We are enjoying a real honeymoon with him and post-Nkrumah Ghana (you may want to glance at the telegram at Tab C). 5 The reply: (1) encourages the Ankrah Government’s efforts to clear away the economic and financial wreckage left by Nkrumah, (2) thanks the General for his comments on your speech, (3) notes that some of the actions you suggested are underway—two involving Ghana, and (4) gives regionalism a push, encouraging Ankrah to come forward with his ideas. The reply also refers obliquely—“other gestures of good will”—to Ankrah’s recent gift of Soviet anti-aircraft guns and ammunition of the type being used against us in Viet Nam. Ankrah wants to keep this quiet, but our Ambassador reports that he would also like an acknowledgment over your signature. He will get the reference and it shouldn’t excite attention if it leaks. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66–10/6/66. No classification marking. 2 The tabs are not attached. Ankrah’s letter is ibid. For Johnson’s reply, see Document 264 . 3 Reference is presumably to the President’s May 26 address; see footnote 2, Document 211 . 4 At the end of the source text is the following notation in Johnson’s handwriting: “Why did this take so long. Tell Palmer don’t ever let this happen again. From June 13 to July 11 is too damn long and make them realize it. L” 5 Reference is apparently to telegram 23 from Accra, July 5, which reported that Williams had expressed to Ankrah Johnson’s appreciation for some items of Soviet equipment which Ankrah had offered to the United States. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66–10/6/66) A June 23 letter from Ankrah, making the offer, and telegram 1454 from Accra of the same date, which transmitted the text of the letter, are ibid. 264. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah 264. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah 1 Washington, July 12, 1966. Dear Mr. Chairman: I am profoundly grateful for your recent letter and your other gestures of good will. The warm and generous spirit they reflect is great comfort to me. Close relations between us and between our two countries can only strengthen the cause of freedom in Africa and the world. Your vigorous and effective efforts to revive the Ghanaian economy are most impressive. I am told that your Economic Mission made a splendid impression here, due in large part to the sound economic policies already outlined by the National Liberation Council. My experts share your confidence that the program of economic reforms you are now working out with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund will provide a solid basis for a sound combination of stability and growth. I want you to know that we support you in these efforts. I was also deeply gratified by your kind words about my remarks on the third anniversary of the Organization of African Unity. Some of the actions I suggested on that occasion are already underway and others are under active study. I understand that negotiations are now in progress with your own Government to include Ghana in the program to eradicate measles and smallpox in West Africa. I was also pleased to authorize our AID Mission in Accra to talk with your people about exploring the feasibility of a telecommunications system linking your capital with Lagos, Cotonou, Lome, and possibly Abidjan. I hope that success in these enterprises will lead to many more programs of regional cooperation for the common economic good. I would be delighted to have your thoughts and suggestions concerning these and any other promising projects of a similar character. It is a great pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to exchange views and ideas with you. I hope that we can remain in close personal touch. As you press forward with measures to advance social and economic development, you may be certain that you have my personal best wishes and the continuing sympathy and support of the United States. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66–10/6/66. No classification marking. 265. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 265. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 7, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 266. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 266. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 11, 1967, 10:40 a.m. Mr. President: In the attached, Messrs. Gaud, Schultze and Fowler recommend that you approve $35 million in AID loans to Ghana during this calendar year. This would be the U.S. share (about one-third) of a multilateral effort to help the post-Nkrumah government pull itself out of the economic chaos left by Nkrumah. Charlie Schultze’s memorandum (Tab A) 2 is a good short summary of the case for the loan and the Ghanaian self-help record. Bill Gaud’s memorandum (Tab B) 3 provides more detail. Joe Fowler has signed off on the measures we would take to minimize the impact on the balance of payments. The new Ghanaian government has taken really impressive measures to put a very disorderly house into some reasonable economic order. In terms of short-term politics, this government is very pro-American and it is very much in our interests to help it along. In the broader sweep, helping Nkrumah’s successors to clear away the wreckage will go down very well in Africa and throughout the less developed world. On the donor side, we would be providing no more than our fair share in a 9-country donor club which also includes the World Bank, the OECD, and the UN Development Program. In my view, this is a textbook example of the right way our new emphasis on multilateralism should work. I second the recommendation that you approve the loan. Walt Approve loan 4 Disapprove Speak to me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66–10/68. No classification marking. 2 Not printed. Budget Director Charles L. Schultze recommended a $20 million program loan in addition to $15 million in P.L. 480 aid in his May 8 memorandum to the President. He noted that the Ghanaian Government had cut expenditures drastically, that imports had been cut 25 percent, and that others, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and the World Bank, were expected to provide an additional $69–$75 million in aid. (Ibid.) 3 AID Administrator William S. Gaud’s April 24 memorandum to the President is not printed. 4 This option is checked. 267. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 267. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 1 Accra, May 16, 1967, 1910Z. 3412. Subject: Under Secretary’s Trip. 1. Under Secretary, Fredericks and I had 45-minute meeting with Lt. General Ankrah afternoon May 15. Only other person present was E.C. Quist-Therson, DepSec to NLC. 2. Ankrah was in excellent spirits. Extended warm welcome to party and expressed great delight that such high-ranking official had come to Ghana. Said NLC very much appreciated speed with which USG had responded to Ghana’s needs immediately following February 1966 coup. But for this support he stated there would have been confusion and unrest and NLC could have had difficult time to “get going.” 3. Ankrah also expressed gratitude for PL–480 help and for leadership shown by US Delegation at April Paris meeting of donor countries. Said several countries had already responded, and disclosed that UK will extend pounds 4 million ($11.2 million) loan (understand that pounds 3 million is balance of Volta Dam loan which never used). Ankrah remarked this a welcome turnabout for HMG, which up to now had not been too helpful or forthcoming. Cited as example failure UK to release GOG of obligations on frigate. 4. On subject AID program loan, Under Secretary said while he not able give firm commitment since “paper work” not completed, he confident loan in neighborhood $20 million would be agreed upon. 5. As anticipated, Ankrah brought up cocoa and urged once again that we bring pressure on industry representatives to accept a reasonable minimum price. 6. On civilian government, Ankrah indicated he had no confidence in politicians and NLC would not step down until country ready for it. Said NLC wants make certain that constitution truly reflects wishes of Ghanaians. Adoption constitution therefore could take “quite some time.” 7. Ankrah noted he will visit Canada in October, and plans visit Washington, where he hopes it may be possible see President Johnson. Comment: If Ankrah does come to Washington, which need not be State visit, I hope it may be possible for President to see him. Ankrah is great admirer of President, and during Under Secretary’s visit General expressed once again his vigorous and strong support for President’s Viet-Nam policy. Williams 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-S Files: Lot 68 D 453. Confidential. 268. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 268. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, July 19, 1967. No. 5–67 SUBJECT Ghana’s Political and Economic Malaise 2 SUMMARY Ghana’s ruling military-police junta is grappling with the economic and political mess left by Nkrumah. But economic problems are piling up and the government is unsure of how to return to constitutional rule. The junta relies heavily on US aid and advice, and looks to the US for increasing economic support. Yet even with greatly increased US aid, Ghana is not likely in the next several years to make substantial progress toward economic growth and political stability. Indeed, a regime decidedly less friendly to the US might come to power as a result of the slow pace of national reconstruction. I. Introduction 1. Under Nkrumah, Ghana commanded headlines as pacesetter of independence in West Africa, and as one of the leaders of the radical nations of the Third World. But in the process Nkrumah, like Sukarno and Ben Bella, made a shambles of his nation’s political and economic foundations before he was called to account. He squandered Ghana’s $500 million foreign exchange reserves (derived largely from cocoa sales at high world prices in the early and mid-1950’s), and ran up new foreign debts of some $700 million for prestige projects, a variety of unsound state enterprises, and political and diplomatic activities designed to further his own continental ambitions. Now, a year and a half after his ouster, the consequences of his follies have become clear, and Ghana is resuming a character more in keeping with its limited resources and prospects. For Ghana, while better endowed with natural resources and trained personnel than most of its hapless West African neighbors (e.g. Togo), still is essentially a one-crop economy, with a per capita national income of only about US $200. 2. From the outset, the ruling National Liberation Council (NLC), a military-police junta, has sought aid and advice from the US in a multitude of economic, financial, administrative, and security matters. In large measure, this stems from the NLC’s strong pro-Western political inclinations and from its disappointment over lack of support from other Western countries. Its close rapport with the US was dramatically demonstrated during the abortive coup in April, when high ranking Ghanaian officials sought refuge or assistance in US official residences. More recently, the US has considerably increased its aid commitments to Ghana and is considering the scope of future assistance. II. The Current Situation and Short Term Outlook A. Economic 3. To some extent, Ghanaian political stability hinges upon the NLC’s success in attacking the national economic mess. Over the past five years, economic growth has barely kept pace with the increase in population (about 2.6 percent per year). The NLC has made some progress. By trimming the budget, canceling prestige projects, lopping off some notoriously unprofitable state enterprises, and tightening control over others, it has helped curb inflation. Yet the rehabilitation of Ghana’s economy has scarcely begun, and there was substantially no increase in economic output during 1966. 4. The most pressing problem is to obtain sufficient foreign exchange to pay for food imports ($50 million a year) and the raw materials, spare parts, and machinery needed for the restoration of production and efficiency in industry and transport. In 1966, export earnings ($270 million) were no higher than in the 1950’s and fell short of imports by over $80 million. Ghana’s cocoa exports doubled in volume from the early 1950’s to the early 1960’s, but earnings stagnated because of the decline of prices in the world market. In recent years, production has failed to rise because pesticides and fertilizers have not been available and because prices paid to cocoa farmers by the government marketing board have been low. Other export industries (timber, gold, and diamonds) are in the doldrums because of depleted resources, obsolete equipment, or rising production and transportation costs. 5. At the same time, foreign exchange reserves are depleted and additional short term borrowing is limited by terms of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Loans of the type permitted by the IMF will help to reduce this year’s foreign exchange gap, e.g., the US is providing about $35 million in PL 480 and commodity import loans. Nevertheless, Ghana will probably not be able to afford the increase of imports it has planned for 1967. 6. Economic prospects over the next few years are scarcely more encouraging. Though there will be some improvements in the picture, in particular the increased production of aluminum from the new Kaiser-Reynolds VALCO plant, there appears to be little prospect for any very substantial increase in export earnings. Moreover, Ghana now has a foreign debt of some $800 million, of which over $100 million is due in FY 1969 alone. It will need much more external assistance than is now in sight to meet these payments and at the same time finance essential imports. Some relief can be expected by the rescheduling of debt service payments, already envisaged by the IMF; but Ghana will almost certainly look to the US for increased financial support over the next few years. B. Political 7. The April coup attempt, though it collapsed of its own ineptitude, raised questions regarding political stability and the role of the NLC. The junior officers who directed the coup were inspired by personal ambition, grievances over neglect of the army, and suspicions of corruption in the regime. Insofar as the public was aware of a coup, it sided with the NLC, though some 1,000 die-hard Nkrumah supporters were subsequently jailed for prematurely “jubilating” over its demise. However, allegations of corruption are widely believed, and an undercurrent of disillusion pervades the scene. 8. By and large, the political vacuum left by Nkrumah’s ouster persists. The NLC appears uncertain of how to regain public confidence. Most members are well-intentioned and fairly honest, and appear to understand generally the country’s plight; yet they find it difficult to ignite any spark of enthusiasm for civic or economic action. They are disappointed with the lack-luster performance of the civil service, a body well regarded by its British mentors at independence, but degraded and demoralized under Nkrumah. The NLC is installing a kind of sub-cabinet of civilian special commissioners to direct some of the ministries, in the hope that this will revitalize the bureaucracy and at the same time allay the mounting pressure from the educated elite for a restoration of civilian rule. 9. Despite the NLC’s ban on politics, some thinly veiled political activity goes on, but no figure has yet appeared who has popular appeal or could lead the country. Most of the older politicians either are tarred with the Nkrumah brush or, like the former leader of opposition to Nkrumah, Dr. Kofi Busia, have lost their touch and most of their following during their years of exile. General Ankrah and one or two others in the NLC would probably run for office if constitutional procedures were restored, but they would find it hard to overcome popular suspicions of corruption and criticism for the sluggish performance of the economy. For these reasons, it is now very difficult to foresee when a civilian successor regime may re-emerge or who might lead it. 10. Nonetheless, there is little likelihood that the NLC will be threatened by popular uprisings or civilian plots, at least for the next year or two. The current high level of urban unemployment poses little immediate threat to the regime, for the traditional African system of extended family obligations alleviates some distress. The civil service and the labor unions grumble, but are unlikely to formulate or join plots against the government. 11. Problems posed by the army are more likely to trouble the NLC or any civilian successor which might emerge. The 15,000-man force, largely created by Nkrumah as a prestige symbol, serves little useful purpose. The NLC has not found a role for the army to play in national development, nor is it willing to disband any substantial part of the force, in part because of the scarcity of jobs elsewhere. Indeed, because of worries about the loyalty of the army, the NLC may decide to allocate even more funds to the military from a tight national budget. The fact that a military coup easily turned out Nkrumah, and that the haphazard attempted coup of last April against the NLC caught both the government and the bulk of the military by surprise, may encourage other military figures to new adventures. III. Longer Term Prospects 12. Over the next three to five years Ghana’s prospects for economic growth will be largely dependent on a rise in cocoa earnings, a substantial increase in domestic food production, a greater popular acceptance of economic and civic tasks, prolonged forbearance by principal foreign creditors, and a continued high level of external economic aid. 13. It would be unrealistic to expect all or many of these developments in Ghana during this period. Foreign creditors will probably reluctantly agree to debt postponement, because they will have little other choice. Continued large-scale external assistance, if forthcoming, would further ease foreign exchange stringencies, but political and economic rehabilitation will have to come largely from within. Even if capable and dynamic national leadership emerges, the economic malaise is likely to persist for some time. That is to say, there can be scant assurance that over the next few years even with greatly increased external economic assistance, Ghana will be much more than a debt-ridden West African coastal state with uncertain political stability and orientation. 14. The NLC or almost any likely civilian successor will continue to look primarily to the US for help in a variety of ways, but many Ghanaians have exaggerated expectations of what the US can do for them. Hence part of the blame for slow progress will fall on the US. Popular demagogues or disaffected military leaders will then likely claim that the US is not sufficiently attentive to Ghanaian needs, and that more radical solutions are needed. In these circumstances, a regime less friendly to the US, certainly more nationalistic, and probably more radical, could come to power. For the Board of National Estimates: Sherman Kent Chairman 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66–10/68. Secret. 2 This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research in the Directorate of Intelligence. [Footnote in the source text.] 269. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah 269. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah 1 Washington, August 11, 1967. Dear Mr. Chairman: I was very pleased to receive your recent letter. 2 Under Secretary Katzenbach has given me a full account of his extensive conversations with you and your associates during his visit to Accra. 3 Your letter and his report confirm my impression that Ghana is pressing forward with the critical business of progress for her people. I want you to know that I appreciate how difficult many of these steps are for you. The courageous decision to devalue your currency is a particular case in point. I am told that this step, together with the other measures in your economic stabilization program, have already resulted in growing interest in Ghana on the part of foreign investors. I very much hope this trend will continue. General Conway has also reported to me on his conversation with you. 4 I understand that he discussed with you the rigorous legal and budgetary limitations on our military and related assistance programs. Ambassador Williams will be in touch with you on this matter in the near future. 5 Your remarks about regional cooperation were particularly welcome. We too were greatly heartened by formation of the West African Economic Community. I think all of Africa’s friends in the world were also encouraged by your response to President Mobutu’s request for aid in the current difficulties in the Congo. Ghana’s action is bound to strengthen the sense of mutual alliance among African nations. We in the United States could not wish for any more constructive evolution in African affairs. Your interest in international affairs beyond Africa’s borders has also been most constructive. I was pleased to note that our two UN delegations were in harmony during the Special Session of the General Assembly on the Middle East crisis. I also note with appreciation your interest in our efforts to bring a just peace to Vietnam. We continue to make every effort to move the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table. So far, despite our very best efforts, we have received no response whatever. Like you, I deeply hope and trust that we can make progress in this area in the months ahead. I understand that Americans are to have the pleasure of your company in October. If your schedule permits a stop in Washington, I would very much like to see you and to discuss the many vital matters with which we are both concerned. Ambassador Williams will be in touch with your office to work out the details. Mrs. Johnson and I look forward to the pleasure of meeting you. With warm personal regards. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 37. No classification marking. Drafted by Edward Hamilton of the NSC Staff with revisions by President Johnson. The letter was transmitted in telegram 20706 to Accra. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GHANA) Telegram 644 from Accra, August 21, reported that the letter was delivered that day. (Ibid., POL 7 GHANA) 2 General Ankrah’s June 27 letter to Johnson commented on recent developments in Ghana and in international affairs. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 37) 3 See Document 267 . 4 Telegram 3565 from Accra, June 3, reported on General Theodore J. Conway’s visit. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 GHANA–US) 5 A September 21 memorandum from AFW Director Melbourne to Assistant Secretary Palmer recommended that the President tell General Ankrah that the U.S. Government preferred to confine its assistance to the economic field, and that Ambassador Williams should be instructed to make an effort to dissuade Ankrah from raising the subject of military assistance with the President. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 GHANA) 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original. 270. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 270. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 1 Washington, September 25, 1967, 1956Z. 43150. NLC Vice Chairman Harlley met morning September 23 with Under Secretary. He was unaccompanied. AFW Director Melbourne was also present. Conversation was in relaxed atmosphere and lasted some forty minutes. Harlley expressed appreciation on behalf NLC for help US had given Ghana and asked that message be conveyed to Secretary who engaged in OAS meeting this weekend. Under Secretary replied that US wished that it could do more since Ghana apparently using its assistance well and hoped US could continue what it is doing. There is budget problem however, problem with Congress over extent of aid, and financial burden of Vietnam. Other countries also could do more to help developing countries. Harlley expressed his understanding of problems facing US and that it seeking to do all it can. He said NLC is appreciative of US role in Vietnam. Ghana in its way wants to try to keep Communist influence from spreading in Africa and is sensitive to what some West African states are doing to let Soviets come in. Ghana was somewhat concerned about Nigeria since regime there had not had experience with Soviets. To Under Secretary’s query concerning Nigeria Harlley replied that at this time best result hoped for by African states would be for Nigerians to stop fighting. Harlley made passing reference to US aid to Guinea to which Under Secretary responded that amount of assistance was minimal to show Guinean people US interest in their country. US was looking at relations from long range as it had done in completing Volta Dam in Ghana in face of increasingly hostile Nkrumah regime. Harlley appeared satisfied. Turning to subject of Ghana police, Harlley said there was need for modernizing this force and that requests for various kinds of assistance for whatever could be done would be made through US Ambassador and AID Mission in Accra. He emphasized importance of an effective police in Ghana to which Under Secretary responded by saying that we would examine what requests were received but limitations on US help as mentioned earlier were applicable. In response to a query regarding the Congo Harlley asserted that Mobutu was under certain pressures to accept Communist aid such as Cuban mercenaries from Brazzaville and he hoped Mobutu would continue to resist. Ghana had lent some pilots to Congo in effort to help. He thought it curious Castro was active in Africa while OAS also trying to contain him in Latin America. Under Secretary interjected that Castro had never done anything for black Cubans and in fact had discriminated against them at home. He speculated that Castro may be using black Cubans in Brazzaville to keep them out of the way. As for progress toward eventual restoration of civilian government in Ghana, Harlley said Electoral Commission drawing up new constituencies and that new voter lists were needed. Constitutional Commission can proceed to formulate proposals for constitution. By December 1968 he believed election for Constituent Assembly would be near. This Assembly would examine constitutional proposals and if accepted, no referendum would be needed. Country could go straight to general elections under constitution. Under Secretary observed that introduction civilians into government most helpful to NLC since it necessary for Ghana to use all its available talent. He believed NLC was doing well and it had US good wishes. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GHANA. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Melbourne, cleared by Palmer, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Conakry, Lagos, Kinshasa, London, and CINCSTRIKE. 271. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 271. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 9, 1967. SUBJECT Your meeting with Chairman Ankrah (Ank-ra) of Ghana Tuesday, October 10—12:15 PM 2 Schedule 12:15—Informal arrival at diplomatic entrance (no remarks) 12:20–1:00—Alone, with advisers standing by in Cabinet Room 1:00—White House Lunch Papers At Tab A is Under Secretary Katzenbach’s memo. 3 At Tab B are State’s Talking Points. At Tab C is biographic information. Setting This is primarily a courtesy call after Ankrah’s visit to Expo. He is fiercely pro-American and wants to have a close personal relation with you. His National Liberation Council has made real progress cleaning up the mess left by Nkrumah. They have introduced an (unpopular) austerity program to try to make the country solvent. They have turned Ghana away from a mischievous and blustering foreign policy, and become good neighbors toward the rest of Africa as well as the West. Ghana is now a voice for reason and moderation in the UN and the Organization of African Unity. (Ankrah is a prominent and respected member of the OAU mediation team on Nigeria.) The General’s only problem with our policy on Vietnam is that it is too soft to suit him—he may well ask you why we are not using nuclear weapons. Most important, Ankrah and his colleagues haven’t behaved like the usual military dictatorship. They’ve restored some political rights; they’ve convened a citizen’s committee to draft a new constitution, looking toward free elections and a civilian regime. Ankrah doubtless aspires to be the first president of a successor government—and meeting you will surely boost his prestige. It is not at all clear whether he will emerge as the long-term political leader in this new Ghana. Others on the Council have looked stronger in recent months. But he is pretty firmly in the saddle now and a reasonable bet to survive. Substance 1. Economic Assistance —Ankrah will be telling you the job of reconstruction is only started, and that he needs more economic assistance in the years ahead. He says he will not present you with a shopping list. But he will give you some indication of what he will need. This year a group of donors (led by IMF) underwrote Ghana’s foreign exchange with nearly $100 million. Our share was one-third. The World Bank estimates that Ghana will need $100–$125 million in aid each year for at least the next five years if Nkrumah’s damage is to be undone. You might say: —We are pleased by Ankrah’s belt-tightening economic policy. We are certainly aware of the political costs and risks of such policies. —We’ll try to hold up our end of the aid effort, though the current atmosphere on the Hill makes it impossible to make any guarantees. We’ll also keep after the other donors. —We’ve just released the second half of our $20 million program loan (authorized by the President in May). This accurately reflects our confidence in Ankrah and in Ghana. 2. Military Aid —Ankrah might say he needs military aid: (i) to insure against an Nkrumah comeback; (ii) to defend against the “threat” of Soviet MIGs now in Guinea, Mali and Nigeria; and (iii) to raise the low morale of his army. You might say that we understand Ankrah’s security concerns. But the whole range of arms aid is now a terribly tough business on the Hill. We’re not even sure we’ll have any authority to make credit sales. 3. Cocoa —Ghana is the largest cocoa producer in the world. We are the largest consumer. We’ve been working for several years to get a cocoa agreement which will stabilize Ghana’s foreign exchange earnings and head off the tendency to grow more cocoa than the world market will support. We had word last week that terms have finally been worked out in Geneva so that an agreement can be submitted for final negotiation next month. You might say: —We’re delighted that the groundwork has at long last been laid for the agreement. —There will probably be some opposition from our domestic industry, but we’ll do our best to get a reasonable agreement ratified. —We very much appreciate the constructive role Ankrah and Ghana have played in working out the agreement. 4. Intelligence gift from Ghana— Ankrah might mention his personal gift to you of a Soviet ZU–23 anti-aircraft weapon, a sizeable sample of Soviet ammunition, and other intelligence finds. These have been extremely valuable to us, particularly in Vietnam. Even if he doesn’t mention it, you’ll want to thank him for this extraordinary gift. 5. Nigeria —Ankrah is one of six African heads of State on the OAU Consultative Mission to mediate the Nigerian conflict. It doesn’t look as if the Mission will get to Nigeria before the last of this month. By then the fighting may well be over, with nothing left to mediate. You might say (if asked): —We were delighted the OAU took this initiative. We are hopeful the conflict will be settled soon with no more bloodshed. —It was entirely appropriate that Ankrah was chosen for a prominent role in the OAU effort, since he has been a major force for peace throughout the unhappy history of this conflict. —In whatever job is left for the Mission, we certainly want it to succeed. We hope it can get on with its work—the sooner, the better. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Visit of General Joseph A. Ankrah, 10/10/67. Secret. 2 No record of this meeting has been found. Other briefing material for Ankrah’s visit is ibid. and in Department of State, Visit Files: Lot 68 D 475, V–44. 3 The attached tabs are not printed. 272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 1 Washington, October 12, 1967, 0048Z. 52667. Following is FYI Noforn based on uncleared memcon subject to revision on review: 1. Following White House luncheon Oct 10, Under Secretary Katzenbach, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Palmer and Ambassador Williams, called on General Ankrah at Blair House. Talk lasted some 45 minutes in excellent atmosphere. 2. Ankrah said he wished reiterate, as he had said to President, his thanks for what US had done in Ghana’s time of need. In next year he expected country would be out of woods, stabilization period would be over, and Ghana could then plan for economic progress. This also would be accompanied by turnover of government to civilians and he hoped there would never be another necessity for a military coup. 3. Unemployment was country’s current economic problem. Ghana receiving some help from donor countries but it insufficient. Anything US could do would be appreciated. PL–480 assistance helped at start NLC regime to meet this problem, but it needed concrete, substantive development to employ people to produce. Feeder and trunk roads development under US aid was fine project, but disproportion of such funds for feasibility studies was out of phase now. Start should be made on roads already surveyed. 4. Drawing on Ghana’s experience with communists, Ankrah said they had employed large numbers, who did and produced nothing. Gave example of factory where they had not planned how to move one part of product elsewhere. Under Secretary smilingly interjected that they had made no feasibility study. Ankrah appreciated sally and continued that Ghana would welcome anything US prepared to give or efforts to encourage US investors in Ghana to handle unemployment. 5. Under Secretary said US respected and admired what Ghana has done. US however has serious problems, with AID programs in Congress being severely cut. Present is difficult time, with large federal deficit and heavy Viet-Nam budget. It not question of being opposed to aid or help to individual countries. Because of admiration for it in Congress we have been able to do what we could for Ghana. While he personally believed US spending too little on aid to developing countries, Congress will provide still less this year. President has asked for tax increase and Congress wants cut government expenses. Under Secretary believed there little that could be cut from budget, but it hard to say where cuts will come. 6. Ankrah said he considered Ghana in vanguard of all African countries. He could see no use in letting country go back to where it was. When NLC prepared turn over to civil rule, it was determined at that stage country would be able make a go of it. Other countries trying to copy other regimes. Ghana had unique position in this respect. Other OAU states had become convinced that NLC aim was to help Ghanaian liberties. He wanted US, when considering what NLC did, not to think of other African states in preference to Ghana. Regionally Ghana was working with its French speaking neighbors on projects which, in making them more independent, would make them more democratic. Ghana soon would be out of forest, but needed help. 7. Under Secretary thought that PL–480 had some possibilities for help to Ghana. Ankrah said he would appreciate this, but it would cause problems if Ghana had to follow rigidly all PL–480 requirements. He thus urged that terms be flexible. Under Secretary concluded by saying US would seek to do what it could in Ghanaian aid. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GHANA. Confidential. Drafted by Melbourne on October 11, cleared by Hamilton at the White House, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE. 273. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 273. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State 1 Accra, January 4, 1968, 0230Z. 2174. Vipto 58. Subj: VP Trip to Africa. Ghana: Conversation With Gen. Ankrah, Jan. 3. 1. The hour long conversation with General Ankrah opened with his giving Vice President his warmest welcome and sending his best regards to President Johnson. 2 He read with pleasure President’s personal letter. As part of his introductory remarks, he expressed appreciation for US assistance during past two years and stated his confidence that Ghana would be able see through the economic difficulties left by Nkrumah. 2. Southern Africa. In very measured way, Ankrah expressed understanding for US position re South Africa and Portuguese Territories. In latter connection he hoped that US, being member of NATO Alliance with Portugal, would be able persuade it change its colonial policy. With respect Southern Rhodesia, he thought sanctions were not biting deeply enough. He had told PriMin Wilson they should have to be more effective or else force would become inevitable. He hoped US would exert strong pressure solve this problem. VP replied with eloquent assurance that US opposed to principles apartheid abroad and at home. US supported self-determination and majority rule in Africa and elsewhere. In fact, trip to Zambia was for express purpose demonstrating our support of President Kuanda in his difficult situation. 3. Ankrah then turned to problem of cocoa, noting it major problem for his govt, because it represented 60 percent of exports, he said that some measure of price stabilization was absolutely necessary if country were to make intelligent plans for economic development. In very frank but firm manner, he recalled that last Oct he had asked President Johnson’s help in achieving a cocoa agreement. The recent cocoa negotiations, however, went well until end of conf when US Delegation refused to move forward with an accord. He had been shocked by what appeared to be pressures of US manufacturers, and he could not help but feel this action was “real stab in back of Ghana.” He then presented aide-memoire on subject (septel) 3 and concluded with very strong plea to VP to seek reconsideration US stand this matter. VP sympathetically endorsed principle and value cocoa agreement. Noting he had helped push through coffee agreement when in the Senate, he also wished state very frankly that approval for cocoa agreement would face serious obstacles and pressures from US interests. Nevertheless, Executive Branch of USG supported idea of cocoa agreement. He promised to inform President of deep disappointment Ghana in this matter. 4. Ankrah went on to make clear his regret over withdrawal of Abbott Labs but to indicate he and GOG had no ill feeling about matter. He strongly hoped US would tell other American industrialists not be discouraged about Ghana because of this incident. In fact, there might be provision in new constitution encouraging foreign investment. VP expressed understanding of Ghanaian Govt attitude. Knew Abbott Company was responsible firm but not experienced foreign affairs. Perhaps in due course, Parke Davis or Pfizer, for instance, might be interested. VP agreed that it extremely important this matter not cloud prospects for private investment, which should be encouraged by every possible means. 5. VP then commented on current restrictions in US AID capabilities due Congressional cuts. He personally supported AID levels two to three times those at present. But under circumstances he thought it wise study all possibilities of external assistance, e.g., IBRD, IMF, EX–IM Bank, UNDP, ADB and very importantly PL–480. In times financial stringency, he believed it essential that more ingenuity be displayed in external assistance. Within its limits, however, the US would do everything it could to help Ghana. The more reasonable the request, the easier it was to be of assistance. 6. In relatively brief discussion concerning Vietnam, Gen. Ankrah expressed his continued understanding for our general objective in Southeast Asia. He expressed strong hope that Hanoi could be persuaded come to the negotiating table during coming year. If this proved impossible he favored stronger mil action. The Vice President expressed appreciation Ankrah’s sympathy to our position and noted that there were varying views within US concerning method prosecuting war in Vietnam. 7. Meeting closed on note of warm cordiality. Participants then adjourned to nearby room for signature of PL–480 agreement between US and Ghana. 4 Williams 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Confidential; Priority. 2 For Vice President Humphrey’s report to President Johnson on his African trip, see Document 231 . 3 Telegram 2170 from Accra transmitted the text of the aide-memoire. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY) 4 For text of the agreement, see 19 UST 4645. 274. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 274. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 15, 1968, 8:20 p.m. SUBJECT PL–480 for Ghana Herewith Messrs. Freeman, Gaud and Zwick recommend a $7 million PL–480 sale to Ghana. 2 The package is mainly cotton textiles and dry milk. State and Treasury are on board. This sale would supplement the $12 million PL–480 deal for Ghana you approved in January. Their demand for textiles has been stronger than expected, and they need this cloth soon to keep the mills open. This agreement, however, will not add to our budgetary costs or total assistance to Ghana this year. As Zwick explains (Tab A), AID will simply hold back until next year the second tranche of the $15 million program loan you authorized in April. 3 This balances out to an even trade of a PL–480 sale Ghana needs and can use readily in place of AID money, which we will have in figuring next year’s very lean loan proposal. Whether PL–480 or a loan, the effect is to give General Ankrah crucial balance of payments help in rebuilding Ghana after the Nkrumah mess. The new government is doing a good job of self-help with reforms and devaluation; and our share in the Ghana aid group—ten other donors plus the IMF—is dropping. Last year we did 60%; this year less than half; and next year would have to be lower still. There are no Conte-Long or Symington problems with Ghana, since Ankrah is keeping a tight rein on arms spending. You may recall that Charlie Schultze had some misgivings about the relatively new use of textiles in PL–480 when you were deciding the first Ghana package in January. Charlie was concerned then about budgetary costs and inviting pressure from the textile industry. Your advisers agree now that those problems haven’t materialized. Our main textile customers (Indonesia and the Dominican Republic as well as Ghana) haven’t run up the cost of the total PL–480 program. In this sale to Ghana, for example, holding the AID money would make a simple budgetary swap. Moreover, the textile people have not been on us to inflate our shipments. The appeal comes straight from the Ghanaians, who badly need this temporary support to get back on their feet. I vote you approve the sale. Walt Approve 4 Disapprove Call me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66–10/68. Confidential. 2 Copies of the October 4 memorandum from Freeman and Gaud to Johnson and the October 10 memorandum from Budget Director Charles J. Zwick are attached to another copy of Rostow’s memorandum. (Ibid., Saunders Files, Presidential Decisions, Africa, 4/1/66–1/19/69) 3 In an April 10 memorandum for the President, Rostow seconded Zwick’s and Gaud’s recommendations for $15 million loan to Ghana. Johnson marked approval of this recommendation. (Ibid., Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66–10/68) 4 This option is checked. Handwritten notations on the source text indicate that the Bureau of the Budget and Saunders’ office were informed on October 17. Horn of Africa Horn of Africa 275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, January 15, 1964, 4:02 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Galanto and Newsom on January 13; cleared by Hadsel, AFE Deputy Director for Eastern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote, and Director of AID’s Office of Eastern/Southern African Affairs Willard Muller; and approved by Tasca. Sent by pouch to Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Bonn, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, London, Moscow, and Rome. 276. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Moyers) Washington, January 21, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Ethiopia. No classification marking. 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, January 21, 1964, 6:39 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Immediate. Drafted by AFN Deputy Director James J. Blake and Galanto, cleared by W. Paul O’Neill of AFE, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, January 21, 1964, 7:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOM. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Blake and Newsom on January 20; cleared by George L. Warren of G/PM, AFI Politico-Military Adviser Eric E. Oulashin, Muller, Colonel Heffner in DOD/ISA, Harriman, and Brubeck; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Mogadiscio and POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and to Asmara. 279. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 10, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Blake. 280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sudan Washington, February 16, 1964, 11:01 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Newsom and Galanto; cleared by Tasca; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Dar-es-Salaam, Addis Ababa, and Mogadiscio, and repeated to Nairobi. 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, February 20, 1964, 11:33 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Ethiopian Affairs Richard St. F. Post on February 19; cleared by Stephen Christmas of AID’s Office of Eastern/Southern African Affairs, Colonel Junkermann in DOD/ISA, and Newsom; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Mogadiscio. 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, February 20, 1964, 4:31 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI–US. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Lagos, and Nairobi. 283. Editorial Note 284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, February 21, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, February 21, 1964, 5:53 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Harriman and Brubeck, and approved by Tasca. 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, February 21, 1964, 5:59 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom and Post on February 20, cleared by Brubeck and Harriman, and approved by Tasca. 287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, March 6, 1964, 4:59 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Ben M. Zook of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Bloc in INR; cleared by Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs John C. Guthrie and Chief of the Soviet Bloc International Political Activities Division in INR Helmut Sonnenfeldt; and approved by Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Bloc in INR Howard Trivers. 288. Memorandum for the Files Washington, March 17, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. Copies were sent to Edward Little in the Office of Secretary, William Lewis in INR, and Wendell Coote in AFE. 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, March 18, 1964, 4:06 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Post; cleared by Galanto, Officer in Charge of Sudanese Affairs Robert N. Stookey, and Newsom; and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Mogadiscio and Khartoum, and repeated to Asmara. 290. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts Washington, March 21, 1964, 10:32 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ETH–US. Secret. Drafted by Post and Newsom on March 17; cleared by Fuller in CIA, Colonel Heffner in DOD, Deputy Director of AID’s Office of Eastern/Southern African Affairs David E. Alter, Warren, Charles R. Stout of EUR/WE, Coote, Sol Polansky of EUR/SOV, and Herbert V. Olds of AFI; and approved by Tasca. Sent to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Khartoum, Lagos, Asmara, Mogadiscio, Dar-es-Salaam, Cairo, Accra, Aden, London, Rome, and POLAD/CINCMEAFSA. 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, April 1, 1964, 6:20 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 31–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Blake and Newsom and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Khartoum, POLAD CINCMEAFSA Tampa, and Mogadiscio. 292. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 29, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the source text, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 29. 293. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 5, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 091.3 Ethiopia. Confidential. Drafted on June 5 by William M. Leffingwell, Deputy Director of Military Assistance in DOD/ISA. Copies were sent to Sloan and General Wood in DOD/ISA, Ambassador Korry, and to the Offices of Plans and Programs and NESA Region in ISA. 294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, June 18, 1964, 3:28 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–ETH. Secret. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Colonel Junkermann in DOD/ISA and Christmas, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Mogadiscio and CINCMEAFSA. 295. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 11, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 381 Ethiopia. Secret. 296. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Wells) to the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) Washington, July 22, 1964. 297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, September 1, 1964, 6:03 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–ETH. Secret; Priority; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Blake and Newsom, cleared by Lang and G/PM Director for Operations Howard Meyers, and approved by Tasca. 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, November 10, 1964, 9:36 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–3 US–ETH. Secret. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Williams, Newsom, Warren, Lang, Muller, and General Pinkston in ODMA; and approved by Harriman. 299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, November 20, 1964, 8:16 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–3 US–ETH. Secret. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Blake, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Mogadiscio, Asmara, and CINCMEAFSA, and by pouch to Nairobi, London, and Rome. 300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, December 2, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–ETH. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Colonel Heffner in DOD/ISA, Muller, and Blake; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to CINCMEAFSA and also for POLAD/CINCMEAFSA. 301. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Newsom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, March 15, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Galanto. 302. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Blake) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, March 22, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Somalian Affairs Peter C. Walker. 303. Memorandum for the Files Washington, March 25, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–US. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. 304. Letter From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to Ethiopia (Korry) Washington, April 26, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–1/69. Secret; Personal; via Classified Diplomatic Pouch. 305. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State Addis Ababa, May 25, 1965, 1800Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Asmara. 306. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 25, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Walker on August 16. 307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, September 2, 1965, 5:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Hugh Campbell of AFN and Galanto, and approved by Blake. Also sent to Addis Ababa, and repeated to Nairobi and Rome for Ambassador Torbert (Hotel Victoria). 308. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 3, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ETH. Secret. Drafted by Galanto and Blake on November 2. 309. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, February 8, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–1/69. Secret. A copy was sent to [text not declassified]. 310. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) Washington, February 11, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Ethiopia. Secret. 311. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, February 18, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Secret. A copy was sent to Harriman. 312. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, March 31, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–1/69. Secret. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates. 313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, June 29, 1966, 7:43 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH. Confidential. Drafted by AFN Deputy Director Matthew J. Looram on June 28, cleared by AFE Deputy Director for Eastern African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy and Colonel Dregne of DOD/ISA, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Khartoum, and by pouch to Asmara. 314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, August 26, 1966, 8:28 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Lang and Herman Kleine, AID Assistant Administrator for Africa; and approved by Palmer. 315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, September 20, 1966, 2:01 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 AFR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Looram and Walker on September 16; cleared by Lang, Chief of ACDA’s International Relations Bureau’s Political Affairs Division Robert H. Kranich, Hamilton at the White House, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs Malcolm Toon, and Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson; and approved by Fredericks. Also sent to Addis Ababa, Moscow, and Nairobi and repeated to Dar-es-Salaam, Paris, and USUN for the Secretary. 316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, October 1, 1966, 2:13 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Looram and Walker on September 30; cleared by Richard W. Aherne of EUR/FBX, Warren, Philip Megna of AFI, Lang, and Donald R. Morris of IO/UNP; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Asmara, Mogadiscio, Moscow, Paris, Khartoum, Nairobi, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 317. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH. Secret. Drafted by Buche on October 4. 318. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 12, 1966, 8:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ethiopia, 9/1/66–5/31/67. Secret. 319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, October 14, 1966, 6:14 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted at the White House and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. Repeated to Mogadiscio, and by pouch to Nairobi, London, and Paris. 320. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 17, 1966, 5:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Looram of AFNE on October 19 and approved in S on October 26. The conversation was held in the Secretary’s office. 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, November 1, 1966, 5:54 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 AFR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Looram on October 31; cleared by Palmer, AFE Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs Curtis C. Strong, Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs James W. Pratt, and Andrew L. Steigman of S; and approved by Thompson. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Moscow, and Nairobi. 322. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, November 2, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia. Secret. 323. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, January 13, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia. Top Secret. 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, January 18, 1967, 6:49 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Strong and AF Deputy Assistant Secretary William C. Trimble; and approved by Looram. Repeated to Addis Ababa and Nairobi, and by pouch to Khartoum, Paris, and London. 325. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, February 4, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 333 Ethiopia. Secret. 326. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, February 11, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Trimble, Hughes, G/PM Director for Operations Joseph J. Wolf, Lang, and Director of AID’s Office of Eastern and South African Affairs Eugene M. Reed. 327. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 11, 1967, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, CO 73 Ethiopia (Restricted). Top Secret. 328. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 14, 1967, 11:34 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–1/69. Secret. Drafted by Looram on February 16. The conversation was held at the White House. The time and place for the meeting is from ibid., President’s Daily Diary. 329. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, February 14, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie, 2/14–15/67. No classification marking. 330. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 14, 1967, 8 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–1/69. Confidential. Drafted by Korry on February 20. The conversation was held at the White House. 331. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State Addis Ababa, March 1, 1967, 1425Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asmara. 332. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 5, 1967. 333. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 6, 1967. 334. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 27, 1967. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 27. 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, April 28, 1967, 5:33 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Walker on April 27; cleared by Officer in Charge of United Kingdom Affairs Thomas M. Judd, Wolf, and Bader in DOD/ISA; and approved by Looram. Also sent to London, and repeated to Asmara, Paris, CINCMEAFSA, and Moscow. 336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy Washington, May 1, 1967, 6:08 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 13 ETH. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Walker; cleared by Wolf and William B. Dozier in EUR/FBX; and approved by Looram. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Asmara, and Damascus, and by pouch to Bonn, Cairo, Jidda, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Moscow, Sanaa, London, and Paris. 337. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, May 8, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia. Top Secret. 338. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 13, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Ethiopia. Top Secret. 339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, July 25, 1967, 2119Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 ETH. Secret. Drafted by John G. Gloster of AF/AFNE; cleared by Looram; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Asmara, Mogadiscio, and CINCSTRIKE. 340. Telegram From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State Mogadiscio, July 27, 1967, 1040Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 SOMALI. Confidential. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Rome, London, Bonn, the Department of Defense, and Hargeisa. 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, August 16, 1967, 1622Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Palmer on August 15; cleared by AFE Country Director Nicholas Feld, Gloster, and Gordon R. Beyer in AFNE; approved by Palmer. Also sent to Addis Ababa, and Nairobi, and repeated to Rome, Paris, London, and Bonn. 342. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 22, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Looram and Beyer on August 21, and cleared by John P. Meagher in AFE. 343. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Somali Republic (Thurston) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) Mogadiscio, November 7, 1967. 344. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, November 7, 1967, 2314Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH. Secret. Drafted by Gloster and Colonel Kissinger in DOD/ISA; cleared by Colonel Alba in JCS/J–5, Colonel Atkinson in JCS/SAMAA, Colonel Heffner in ODMA, and Looram; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Asmara, USCINCMEAFSA, CHMAAG Ethiopia, and CSAF. 345. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 5, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somalia, Vol. I, 1/64–5/68. No classification marking. Drafted by Rostow, Hamilton, and Roger Morris. 346. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson Washington, March 12, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somalia Republic, Visit of Prime Minister Egal, 3/14–15/68. Confidential. A handwritten notation in the margin reads: “Orig. was attachment to WWR memo 3/13.” Rostow’s memorandum is Document 347. Attached talking points are not printed. 347. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 13, 1968, 6 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 66. No classification marking. Drafted by Edward Hamilton and Roger Morris. 348. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 14, 1968, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somalia, Vol. 1, 1/64–5/68. Confidential. Drafted by Looram. The conversation was held at the White House. 349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, March 16, 1968, 0123Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Palmer, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Lucius D. Battle, Ambassador Thurston, and Steigman; and approved by Looram. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Asmara, and USUN, and by pouch to Paris, Rome, and Bonn. 350. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 11, 1968. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 11. 351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, July 12, 1968, 2213Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Looram; cleared by AFE Country Director Nicholas Feld, John G. MacCracken in EUR/SOV, and Lewis D. Junior in G/PM; and approved by AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas H.E. Quimby. Also sent to Mogadiscio and Nairobi, and repeated to London, Moscow, Asmara, and CINCSTRIKE. 352. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State Addis Ababa, July 29, 1968, 1624Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ETH–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Asmara. 353. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State Addis Ababa, July 29, 1968, 1625Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Confidential. Repeated to Asmara and Mogadiscio. 354. Intelligence Note Washington, September 6, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–SOMALI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted as a memorandum from Director of INR Thomas L. Hughes to Rusk. 355. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, September 6, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Ethiopia, 000.1—1968. Top Secret. 356. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) Washington, December 16, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 ETH–US. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but a typed note indicates the letter was redrafted in U. 275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, January 15, 1964, 4:02 p.m. 341. As March 8 national elections approach, Department believes would be helpful set forth, for Embassy comment and appropriate local use, summary US attitudes and policies toward Somali Republic. We do not intend formal demarche, but do hope salient points can be conveyed to key Somalis in such manner as Embassy believes appropriate and effective. 1. US remains interested in independence and well-being Somali Republic as indicated by our aid program and earlier efforts provide defense assistance. US is in no sense abandoning its continuing interest in close and friendly relations with Somalia. 2. As friend we are disturbed at growing isolation of Somalia in Africa and progressive deterioration of relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. We realize importance in Somali eyes of cause of self-determination for all Somali minorities. At same time in African eyes, colonial boundaries are almost universally recognized even when tribal lines are crossed. Also in African eyes Somali pursuit of claims through propaganda often directed at neighbors appears belie “peaceful and legal means” called for in Somali constitution, creating image of Somalia as trouble-maker, as country swimming against prevailing African currents of legitimacy, territorial integrity, and peaceful settlement of disputes. 3. In US view, GSR is neither as directly implicated in supporting dissidence as IEG and GOK claim nor as uninvolved as GSR officials proclaim. We recognize pressures acting on Somali leaders: domestic pressures to further cause of unification of all Somali people; pressures from Kenya and Ethiopia Somalis to support their activities against GOK and IEG. Nevertheless, in broader sense and in African context, we must also recognize that Ethiopia and Kenya possess sound reasons for construing as unfriendly and hostile acts certain GSR activities such as propaganda, acquiescence in use of GSR territory as a safe-haven for dissidents and gun-running, mere existence of which is troublesome regardless of scale. 4. Source of difficulty in sum is Somali irredentism. While US understands GSR cannot forego interest Somali in neighboring countries, active and militant pursuit of territory of neighboring states isolates Somalia, builds dangerous pressures on its economy and security and creates special difficulties for those who have been longest and most active supporters independent Somali Republic. 5. Pressures are growing on US to assist Somalia’s neighbors in problem they face. The US does not desire create further difficulties with Somalia, nor add to tensions in Horn, yet to extent GSA appears condoning insurgency in neighboring states, US cannot be deaf to appeals of its other friends. 6. It is our impression Soviet arms program will be increasingly viewed as manifestation of unfortunate concentration of GSR on militant aspects of “Greater Somalia” designs. As we have said in past, we are greatly concerned not only by increase of Soviet influence in Somalia but by detrimental impact military build-up will have on priorities of economic development. We believe it is not too late to slow down pace and effect of Soviet arms program. 7. From Africa and elsewhere observers will look upon Somali elections as turning point which in all likelihood will present GSR with three alternative courses of action: first, continuation of present policies which are characterized by partial support of Somali dissidents across the borders and hesitancy to come to grips with the problem by direct talks with Ethiopians and Kenyans; second, stepped up or all-out campaign in support of Kenyan and Ethiopian Somali separatist movements; or third, demonstration of sincere desire on part of Somali leadership to improve relations with Somalia’s neighbors and seek constructive measures for solution or at least alleviation of border and territorial disputes by peaceful settlements and not through force. We believe welfare and acceptance Somalia can be best assured by latter course. Note : Foregoing is Noforn for information posts. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Galanto and Newsom on January 13; cleared by Hadsel, AFE Deputy Director for Eastern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote, and Director of AID’s Office of Eastern/Southern African Affairs Willard Muller; and approved by Tasca. Sent by pouch to Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Bonn, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, London, Moscow, and Rome. 276. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Moyers) 276. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Moyers) 1 Washington, January 21, 1964. We are having a difficult discussion with Ethiopia over the issue of increasing our military aid program there (they already have the biggest MAP in Africa, but we have an important communications facility there). Ambassador Korry in Ethiopia has asked us for a Presidential letter to Haile Selassie because the Emperor is quite unhappy and feels that we have let him down personally. 2 However, we think it better to hold the big guns until we need them more, so the attached cable 3 simply instructs the Ambassador to soothe the Emperor and tell him the President wants to stay in close consultation with him on African problems. We are also going to ease the strain by giving him a little something in additional military aid. 4 I don’t believe the President needs to see this until we take a step that involves him more substantially. However, I would appreciate your judgment as to whether to show it to him before I clear it. 5 Bill Brubeck 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Ethiopia. No classification marking. 2 In telegram 666 from Addis Ababa, January 17, Ambassador Korry reported that the rapid deterioration of Ethiopian-Somali relations on one hand and U.S. relations with Emperor Haile Selassie on the other prompted him to request that the Department consider whether an urgent Presidential message to the Emperor would be advantageous. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI) 3 Not attached; reference is presumably to Document 278 . 4 Telegram 586 to Addis Ababa, January 21, instructed Korry to inform the Emperor that the U.S. Government had agreed to provide “extraordinary additional aid in FY 1964 of not to exceed $1 million beyond programmed $8.5 million.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–ETH) 5 A handwritten notation in the margin reads: “Pres wants a correspondence w/HIM on African problems. WB” 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, January 21, 1964, 6:39 p.m. 353. Deptel 341. 2 Department believes recent manifestations political instability in Tanganyika-Zanzibar area as well as US-Ethiopian bilateral relations require US endeavor impress GSR with growing US concern over threat to stability of Horn region arising out of increasing number reports of GSR arms support for Ogaden Somalis. While not in any sense implying threat, we feel GSR should be aware their pressures on IEG result in counter pressures on US we cannot ignore. Appreciate that depth GSR sensitivities on ethnic Somali parties and particularly sensitive atmosphere preceding March elections may make tactful but nonetheless frank demarche by you difficult. Nevertheless believe recent border incidents, which were subject GSR convocation of Chiefs of Mission January 19, suggest to us increasing tenseness IEG-GSR relations with consequences for Horn area and for GSR which we believe GSR would wish avoid. Dept therefore requests you seek appointment with Foreign Minister early next week at which following points should be made in context of US consideration points made by GSR at January 19 convocation: 1. Dept has noted approach made to Ambassador re border incident. While we are not in position make judgments on incidents in area, our position clear to IEG that we do not condone violations frontiers. Somalia’s troubles with Ethiopia and Kenya come in juxtaposition with other recent East African events which have focused US concern and attention on this area. Violence of any kind, regardless of whether it is done in furtherance of cause which one side believes inherently and unquestionably just, tends to play into hands those forces working against independence and true sovereignty African countries. 2. Against this background, Dept also wishes express its concern over seeming mounting level incidents in Horn area. 3. Through our Ambassador in Addis, we have been trying persuade HIM that purely military solution not answer to Ogaden question, that economic and social measures to improve lot of Ogaden Somalis, coupled with effort seek areas of agreement, however small, with GSR, offer superior chances achieving long-range solution. Increasing reports of arms support to Ogaden Somalis from GSR side of border can only undermine such attempts on part USG, creating situation in which we cannot afford be unresponsive to pressure for further military assistance from IEG. 4. Reports emanating from Addis Ababa and Nairobi, recent conclusion IEG-GOK Defense Pact, and exchange visits by official delegations indicate serious view Ethiopia and Kenya take on matter of GSR support for activities of Ogaden and NFD Somalis. 5. Reports of GSR arms support to Ogaden Somalis also becoming too numerous for USG to discount and tend belie GSR declarations about adhering to peaceful and legal means in pursuing goal of union all Somali peoples. 6. In Horn and East Africa area, priority objective US policy is maintenance of peace and stability. With each member Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle we wish sustain best possible relations. In this context, we have in spirit of frankness and friendship brought this concern to attention GSR. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Immediate. Drafted by AFN Deputy Director James J. Blake and Galanto, cleared by W. Paul O’Neill of AFE, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 2 Document 275 . 3 In telegram 490 from Mogadiscio, January 28, Ambassador Horace Torbert reported that he had delivered the Department’s message to the Somali Foreign Minister on January 27 and had also covered it in substance with the President on January 26. Both had denied any official Somali support to the insurrection. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI) 278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, January 21, 1964, 7:22 p.m. 592. Embtel 666. 2 In lieu formal message at this time desire you seek audience HIM Jan. 23 or earliest possible moment. Primary occasion might be presentation autographed photo of HIM with President pouched Addis January 18. Inscription reads “I hope for the benefit of your counsel and for the continued cooperation of our two countries.” You should indicate President desires convey his concern to HIM over situation in East Africa (specifically current Tanganyika and Zanzibar situations) which poses threat to stability of regimes elsewhere on continent view apparently successful use violence to achieve political ends. Should state President would greatly value HIM’s views and desires exchange information with HIM because of their common interest in orderly development independent, moderate, and politically stable African states. In context of this expression President’s interest, desire you obtain HIM’s advice and counsel re most recent African developments, particularly Zanzibar coup, Tanganyika situation and chances peaceful settlement Algerian-Moroccan dispute as result upcoming meeting Bamako Commission. During this tour d’horizon desire you also present orally points in supplemental aide-memoire contained separate message (incorporating points contained Deptel 557) 3 assuring HIM (a) US keenly aware problems IEG faces in Ogaden; (b) in initial aide-memoire 4 on subject military assistance US sought, in spirit frankness, outline certain problems requiring further action and study. We did not intend convey negative impression and are providing Fonoff supplemental aide-memoire; (c) we working intensively to develop possible answers to problem for IEG consideration; and (d) that IEG and HIM should have no doubt regarding value US attaches to Ethiopia and President’s personal interest in Ethiopia as evidenced by your request for audience. FYI—Elaboration point (c) above will be contained in separate message to Embassy hopefully within 24 hours. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOM. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Blake and Newsom on January 20; cleared by George L. Warren of G/PM, AFI Politico-Military Adviser Eric E. Oulashin, Muller, Colonel Heffner in DOD/ISA, Harriman, and Brubeck; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Mogadiscio and POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and to Asmara. 2 See footnote 2, Document 276 . 3 Telegram 557 to Addis Ababa, January 10, instructed the Ambassador to express the U.S. conviction that a massive military build-up was not the solution to Ethiopia’s problems and to suggest talks on the military level to review how Ethiopian resources might be more effectively mobilized. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–ETH) 4 Not printed. 279. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 279. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 10, 1964. SUBJECT Ethiopia-Somalia Border Clash During the period February 6–8 Ethiopian and Somali forces clashed at the border town of Tug Wajale. Although there was a lull in fighting on February 9, reports now indicate that it has been renewed, is continuing and may have spread to two other border localities. Tug Wajale is in the Northern District of Somalia; it straddles the frontier between Hargeisa in Somalia and Jigjiga in Ethiopia. The border clash has caused the GSR to proclaim a national emergency and reportedly to request urgently a meeting of the Security Council to consider a Somali charge of Ethiopian aggression. However, U Thant has appealed to the Emperor and to GSR Prime Minister Scermarche to end the hostilities immediately. The Ethiopians have proclaimed an emergency in the border area and have requested the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to consider their charge of aggression by Somalia at the Ministers’ meeting on February 12 at Dar-es-Salaam. We have instructed our Embassies to urge both sides to exercise maximum control over their forces and restraint in their public statements in order to ease the tension. 2 We have informed the Somalis that we believe countries which are parties to a dispute in a region should first use regional institutions to find solutions to the dispute. The Somalis, despite their announced intention to see UN action, have indicated to our Ambassador a receptiveness to OAU consideration of their complaint. We are therefore hopeful that the OAU ministers will agree to consider the Ethiopian and Somali complaints and that this will lead to a disengagement of IEG-GSR forces and commencement of a cooling off period. The clash at Tug Wajale is the second between the GSR and the IEG in less than a month. It reflects the tension caused by Somali nationalism and the Emperor’s suspicion that the GSR in pursuit of a “greater Somalia” is encouraging dissidence among the Ethiopian Somalis in the Ogaden by arms and propaganda. This tension will be substantially increased if Ethiopia carries through its announced intention to close the border to Somali herdsmen who have traditional grazing and water rights on the Ethiopian side of the line 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Blake. 2 Telegram 655 to Addis Ababa (also sent as telegram 400 to Mogadiscio), February 11, instructed Korry and Torbert to see the Emperor and President Aden respectively in order to express the deep U.S. concern over the renewal of fighting in the region and to urge prompt action by both Heads of State to provide the basis for a genuine cease-fire and atmosphere for easing tensions. (Ibid.) 280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sudan 280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sudan 1 Washington, February 16, 1964, 11:01 a.m. 190. Reference Mogadiscio’s 561 to Dept. 2 Reftel being repeated all recipient posts. Desire soonest understanding your host government status acceptance Ethiopian-Somali cease-fire. For Addis : Your 778 3 just received. We welcome IEG acceptance and anticipated immediate implementation. While agreeing your 772 to Department 4 that US should not play active role in OAU cease-fire efforts, 5 we cannot remain indifferent in view US interests in area, some US identification with Ethiopia and use American equipment by IEG. Desire you continue every appropriate effort enlist IEG cooperation with OAU and Sudanese efforts. Any indication IEG at fault in implementing cease-fire could erode African sympathy for IEG on frontier issue. For Khartoum : Would appreciate receiving understanding GOS of present cease-fire efforts. If you believe it appropriate, you may say we warmly welcome constructive GOS role this matter. For Mogadiscio : Approve your action. Appreciate reserve with which you are handling Somali reports. What is latest word situation Hargeisa area? Re possibility anti-US disturbances, in view what has happened previously in Mogadiscio, Department desires you take all appropriate steps, including if necessary approach to President, to obtain assurances Government will not stimulate anti-US feeling and that US lives and property will be protected. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Newsom and Galanto; cleared by Tasca; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Dar-es-Salaam, Addis Ababa, and Mogadiscio, and repeated to Nairobi. 2 In telegram 561 from Mogadiscio, February 16, the Ambassador reported that the Police Commandant had told him that Ethiopian troops were attacking all along the border and recommended that all Americans remain home. Torbert said that he had called a “class B alert” until he received confirmation that the cease-fire was actually in effect. He also stated that he did not intend to comment on the rumor that unexploded shells would be publicly exhibited with prominent “made in USA” labels unless he was officially instructed to do so. (Ibid.) 3 Dated February 16. (Ibid.) 4 Dated February 14. (Ibid.) 5 The OAU Council of Ministers, meeting in extraordinary session in Dar-es-Salaam, adopted a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire on February 14. Both sides agreed to a truce on February 16, but border skirmishes continued. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 745–746. 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, February 20, 1964, 11:33 a.m. 693. Department has noted with concern growing number verified reports of penetration by IEG forces, particularly Air Force, into Somali territory during recent fighting. Ethiopian sources for these reports seem feel such incursions fully justified as legitimate acts of self defense. Department does not share this view and feels that apparent IEG adoption this tactic as policy poses grave dangers for future of area and likely prove detrimental both to US and IEG interests. While recognizing approach already made this matter (Embtel 772) 2 we feel that matter should be taken up by Ambassador preferably with Emperor or with Prime Minister at earliest opportunity and suggest approach contain following elements: 1. US conscious grave problems and pressures under which HIM laboring in current crisis. We continue our interest in security and international position Ethiopia. In this spirit we wish raise concern over aspects recent fighting, particularly as friend of Ethiopia involved in strengthening IEG armed forces. 2. US has followed with concern and dismay recent border fighting and its continuance beyond February 16 ceasefire deadline. In discussing fighting we not seeking assess responsibility in absence any such determination by African states although we acknowledge that problem would not exist in present serious form if ethnic Somalis abandoned their goal of Greater Somalia. 3. We have also shared HIM’s distress over vicious propaganda emanating from Mogadiscio and have brought our concern to GSR attention. We hopeful OAU cognizance of importance this element in current crisis will shortly result in cessation such attacks. 4. We were gratified by MinInfo statement of February 10 quoting HIM as having “ordered IEG forces not to counterattack into Somali territory despite attacks against them.” We welcomed this policy as one contributory to containment conflict and to swift attainment disengagement forces. 5. We also felt scrupulous adherence to this policy demonstrably in interests IEG, which has most to lose from having any doubts cast on inviolability of borders. Furthermore, departures from that policy could provide justification for similar GSR incursions in future. We are not unmindful probability acquisition by Somali of more sophisticated ground and air weapons. 6. We therefore disturbed by qualification placed on policy by MinInfo to effect that if “necessities of military action” forced Ethiopians to cross border, they would soon return afterwards and that if Somali forces persisted in aggressive policy situation would become quite different. We now further disturbed by confirmed reports of IEG penetrations well into Somali territory particularly by aircraft during recent fighting. We wanted to ensure that HIM aware of such penetrations and of our views concerning them. 7. We acknowledge extent IEG provoked in current crisis. We also recognize military desirability and consequent temptation presented military commanders to hit supply lines of opposing forces. Nonetheless past experience indicates world opinion favors side able restrain its military commanders in similar instances. Furthermore, it is questionable whether US equipment involved is being appropriately used for “legitimate self-defense” within terms Article I paragraph 2 of US–IEG military aid agreement of May 22, 1953. Further, US Congress wrote into last foreign aid bill provision requiring grant US military aid to Africa be limited to internal security requirements. 8. We therefore confident HIM will wish ensure strict compliance by IEG military with HIM’s order requiring scrupulous respect for borders. Such compliance would be consistent with Ethiopia’s stance re inviolability of frontiers and support international law. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Ethiopian Affairs Richard St. F. Post on February 19; cleared by Stephen Christmas of AID’s Office of Eastern/Southern African Affairs, Colonel Junkermann in DOD/ISA, and Newsom; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Mogadiscio. 2 Dated February 14. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 811 from Addis Ababa, February 21, Korry reported that he had made all of the points in telegram 693 to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on February 19, and that he would continue to try to see the Emperor. The Ambassador also conveyed his own impression that the Emperor was no longer in absolute control of events with his military commanders apprising him after the fact. (Ibid.) 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, February 20, 1964, 4:31 p.m. 424. Ref: Mogadiscio’s 580. 2 Department agrees that disturbing situation in Somalia warrants extensive round of approaches suggested reftel. We differentiate between two problems, primarily African one of Ethiopian-Somali crisis for which burden should be shifted to Africans, and problem of deteriorating US-Somali relations. As for that part of Ethiopia-Somalia problem relating to propaganda truce, believe further US approaches to seek GSR observance now becoming counter-productive. Accordingly we prefer to see Sudanese and other Africans assume this responsibility. Per your request, however, Department has made arrangements for you, Addis and Khartoum to receive broadcasts by cable direct from FBIS London for one week trial period. Concerning US-Somali relations, recommend you include following in your conversations with GSR officials: 1. GSR officials have often expressed in recent months their desire for continued US friendship and understanding. We share this desire. US-Somali friendship cannot help but be eroded, however, by growing and disturbing wave anti-US sentiment within Somalia, a development at least partially abetted by GSR. To mention but a few signs of this feeling, we refer to (a) article and statement in “Unione” of February 7 to effect “Ethiopia has encouragement and support of US in policy hostility and aggression against Somalia”; (b) false intelligence re US operational support; (c) rumors US “stimulating Ethiopian attack against Somalia”; and (d) inferences contained President Aden’s radio speech February 17. 2. Anti-US campaign is precisely type of vicious propaganda which sometimes emanates from and strengthens those forces having vested interest in driving wedge between Somalia and Americans. Believe both US and GSR should be on guard against these pernicious and divisive forces. 3. USG can well understand degree to which recent hostilities have produced tensions and atmosphere of crisis in Somalia. However, we do not believe answer these tensions lies in unwarranted attacks on third countries. 4. USG does not have influence over actions another government such as IEG may take in its own interests, regardless of aid program. We have intervened vigorously on both sides to obtain cease-fire, end to fighting, lessening of tensions, stopping of propaganda and facilitation of OAU considerations. USG stands to gain nothing either from violence in Horn or deterioration in Somali-Ethiopian relations. We earnestly hope GSR will appreciate our true position lest US–GSR relations be gravely and permanently damaged. 5. US interests in Ethiopia, which we freely admit are important, do not deter US from stand of impartiality re Somali-Ethiopian dispute. FYI: We would welcome further suggestions for actions US might take to allay Somali suspicions. We are particularly concerned at President Aden’s attitude. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI–US. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Lagos, and Nairobi. 2 In telegram 580 from Mogadiscio, February 20, Torbert described his protests against the continuation of vitriolic propaganda broadcasts in violation of the propaganda moratorium that was a vital part of Somalia’s cease-fire commitment. The Ambassador also stated his intention of making an urgent round of representations to moderates in the Somali Government unless the Department instructed him that this would conflict with current U.S. efforts to shift the burden to the Sudanese and other Africans. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI) 283. Editorial Note 283. Editorial Note On February 20, 1964, the Special Group approved a political action program aimed at bringing about the election of government and parliamentary officials in Somalia favorably disposed to the West and allocated $200,000 for this purpose. (CIA Memorandum for the Special Group, February 19, 1964; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 112, February 20, 1964; Memorandum from H. Bartlett Wells, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Llewellyn Thompson, July 22, 1964; ibid., Somali Republic, 1963 Thru) During the 1964–1967 period, subsequent funding for the Somali program was approved periodically by the 303 Committee despite the lack of any demonstrable success in achieving the plan’s objectives. (Memorandum for the Record, August 13, 1964; ibid., 303 C. 9, August 20, 1964; Memorandum from Joseph Palmer to U. Alexis Johnson, July 22, 1966; ibid., Somali Republic, 1963 Thru; Country Summary prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, March 6, 1967; ibid., Africa General, 1967–1968) The program was terminated in 1967 following the Somali general election in June. On November 7, 1967, Ambassador to Somalia Raymond L. Thurston sent Assistant Secretary Palmer a memorandum arguing that covert financial assistance alone had little chance of success unless it was part of an overall U.S. policy of economic and political support to the forces the United States was backing, and that responsible political leaders, particularly in a democratic system, ultimately would have to make their decisions based on domestic political realities and not any secret understanding with a foreign government. (Ibid., Somali Republic, April 1967) 284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 1 Washington, February 21, 1964. SUBJECT Courses of Action on Ethiopian-Somali Dispute 1. We have two sets of problems in connection with the present Ethiopian-Somali dispute: (a) how best to use our influence in bringing about a cease-fire and a more permanent settlement within an African context; (b) how to prevent serious deterioration in our relations with either party. 2. In connection with the dispute, itself, we have: a. Encouraged the nations of the OAU which gave preliminary consideration to the problem at Dar-Es-Salaam and are considering it in greater depth at Lagos on Monday. 2 We have provided guidance to Embassy Lagos on our views. b. Encouraged the interest of the African states who have moved individually to mediate. These include the Sudan, Tanganyika and Morocco. The role of the Sudan was the key to arranging the present cease-fire. Both to commend this and to encourage continuing Sudanese interest, we have proposed a Presidential message to General Abboud. We have also proposed to the Sudanese that they suggest the creation of a frontier observation team and the creation of an African group to examine the longer-range aspects, perhaps through the use of some internationally prominent person. 3. Our relations with Ethiopia are in mild jeopardy because of the Emperor’s feeling that we should take his side completely in the dispute. We have, accordingly, proposed a Presidential message to him emphasizing the priority we attached to an end to the fighting. 3 4. Our relations with Somalia are seriously jeopardized because of a growing belief, even among moderate elements including the President, that we are giving undue aid to Ethiopia. Wild rumors are being passed by the Soviets, Chinese Communists and the Egyptians that the US is backing “aggressive policies by Ethiopia.” We have instructed our Ambassador to make demarches to leading figures on this matter and are proposing a message to President Aden. 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. 2 February 24. 3 See Document 286 . 4 See Document 285 . 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, February 21, 1964, 5:53 p.m. Please deliver following message from President Johnson to President Aden: Dear Mr. President: I have followed with deep concern events in the Horn of Africa during the past two weeks. I have been very disturbed to learn that these events may have created misunderstandings in the Somali Republic regarding the position of the United States. We have, as you know, a long history of friendship with Somalia. We value that friendship. We continue our interest in the independence, development, and democratic institutions of your country. Suggestions to the contrary come only from those who seek to disrupt our relationship. The fact of our friendship with Ethiopia in no way lessens our desire for continuing friendship and understanding with you and the Somali Republic. We have expressed strongly to your government our hope for an early end of the hostilities in the Horn. We have made equally strong expressions to the Government of Ethiopia. We are gratified that, through the efforts of other African governments, an approach to peace has been made. We hope that the Lagos meeting of the OAU Foreign Ministers will result in the establishment of a still firmer basis for understanding. I am fully conscious of the serious problems which disturb the peace of the area. We are sympathetic and we will give our full support to sincere efforts to find peaceful and mutually satisfactory solutions to these problems in order to make possible concentration on development of the area in ways that truly benefit the peoples of the region. 2 Please accept my personal good wishes during these difficult times and my strong hope that we may increase that understanding which is the key to friendly relations between nations. I should be pleased to have your further thoughts on these matters and on the means through which your interested friends might assist in furthering the peace and welfare of this region. 3 Lyndon B. Johnson. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Harriman and Brubeck, and approved by Tasca. 2 Telegram 434 to Mogadiscio, February 22, instructed the Ambassador to insert at this point a sentence reading: “We cannot be sympathetic with efforts to employ force in territorial disputes.” (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 586 from Mogadiscio, February 22, Torbert reported that he had delivered the President’s “most helpful message” to President Aden Abdullah that morning, and that Aden had asked him to express his great appreciation to President Johnson and to state that Somalia would welcome any form of international inspection or presence along the border. (Ibid.) In telegram 597 from Mogadiscio, February 27, Torbert reported that he had delivered the revised version of President Johnson’s message with the additional sentence personally to President Aden that morning. (Ibid.) 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, February 21, 1964, 5:59 p.m. 709. Please deliver the following message from President Johnson to the Emperor: Your Majesty: Since Your Majesty’s most considerate and deeply appreciated visit to the United States at the time of President Kennedy’s funeral, I have wanted to exchange thoughts with you on several matters of common interest. I regret that the present occasion for doing so is one involving a dispute between two African nations. I have followed with deep concern recent events in the Horn of Africa affecting Somalia and Ethiopia. I want to assure you that the United States remains, as stated to Your Majesty in the past, fully sympathetic with Your Majesty’s desire to maintain the integrity and security of Ethiopia. I have personally emphasized to the President of the Somali Republic that we will fully support efforts to find peaceful and mutually satisfactory solutions to problems such as those now disturbing the Horn, but that we cannot be sympathetic with efforts to employ force in territorial disputes. In the past two weeks, our primary objective has been to encourage efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The continuation of armed conflict not only drains vitally needed resources, but gives opportunities to those who would undermine leadership friendly to peace. We were gratified that means were found through African intervention to bring about a cease-fire. We hope that the Lagos meeting of the OAU Foreign Ministers may find further means to decrease the tension in the Horn of Africa area, although we recognize that the seriousness of the problems in the area makes for no easy solution. During this difficult period, I wish to assure you of my continued personal interest in Ethiopia and in Your Majesty’s health and welfare. We deeply value our relations with Ethiopia and the opportunity to cooperate in furthering its security and development. We will remain sympathetic and give full support to efforts to find mutually agreeable solutions to the problems of the Horn of Africa. The American people have been particularly impressed with your great efforts toward the establishment of peace in the conception and founding of the OAU—a step of historic importance. We have welcomed, more recently, your successful effort in the Moroccan-Algerian problem. You may be assured, Your Majesty, of my continued personal interest in the furtherance of our close and friendly relations. 2 Lyndon B. Johnson Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom and Post on February 20, cleared by Brubeck and Harriman, and approved by Tasca. 2 In telegram 814 from Addis Ababa, February 22, Korry reported that he had delivered President Johnson’s message that morning to Haile Selassie, who asked him to convey his appreciation to the President. The Ambassador said that he had also raised the question of Ethiopian use of U.S.-supplied planes over Somalia, but that the Emperor denied any such use, saying that if Ethiopia were going to use an air assault, it would be accompanied by an all-out land attack. (Ibid.) 287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, March 6, 1964, 4:59 p.m. 2637. INR sent following Intelligence Note to Secretary March 6 on Soviet intervention in Ethiopian-Somali dispute: Sov Dep Foreign Minister Malik’s second visit Addis Ababa in slightly over a month and two Khrushchev letters to Emperor Selassie on Ethiopian-Somali dispute within roughly same period underscore Moscow’s effort to play “peacemaker” and exercise predominant influence in Horn of Africa. Khrushchev in effect maintained pro-Somali stance by urging Ethiopians to assure peaceful settlement of conflict with Somalia while ignoring latter’s irredentist activities which are cause of dispute’s eruption into hostilities. Soviets probably calculate, and with apparent accuracy to date, that their economic-military support of Somalis will soften Ethiopians up to Soviet overtures rather than alienate them and thus enhance Moscow’s influence with both disputants. Khrushchev’s February 22 letter to Selassie expressing concern over Somali allegations that Ethiopia was carrying out air attacks on Somali territory from French and British airfields may have been partly motivated by Soviet concern, reinforced by that of Somalis, over past bombing-strafing and possibly future Ethiopian moves of even greater magnitude against Somali territory. Recent report Soviet technicians in Somalia will participate directly in defense planning work along Somali-Ethiopian border suggests effort by Moscow to reinforce Somali position as well as gain firsthand knowledge of situation in border area. Khrushchev letter still stops short of open endorsement of Somalia’s territorial claims on Ethiopia, and there are cogent factors impelling Moscow to maintain this position. Open Soviet espousal Somali irredentism would cut across Khrushchev’s circular letter December 21 on peaceful settlement all frontier disputes and deprive Soviets of flexibility they now using so successfully in dealing with both disputants. In addition, it would jeopardize Moscow’s relations with many African countries which are wary of irredentist causes and, even more so, of outside interference in African affairs. Soviets probably see their interests best served by continuation Somali-Ethiopian dispute, but below crisis level that would either create heavy pressure on Moscow to involve itself directly in support of Somalia or lead to internationalization of dispute and curtailment of Soviet role as arbiter. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Ben M. Zook of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Bloc in INR; cleared by Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs John C. Guthrie and Chief of the Soviet Bloc International Political Activities Division in INR Helmut Sonnenfeldt; and approved by Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Bloc in INR Howard Trivers. 288. Memorandum for the Files 288. Memorandum for the Files 1 Washington, March 17, 1964. SUBJECT The Horn of Africa Governor Williams and I met with the Secretary on March 12 to discuss the Horn of Africa. The Secretary asked the following questions which were answered as indicated: 1. What do we mean by a modus vivendi between Ethiopia and Somalia? Does this mean recognition of Somali territorial claims? A: We conceive a modus vivendi to embrace, first, an African peace keeping effort, including an observation group, which would stabilize the situation on the frontier and provide some breathing space for efforts at a broader settlement. The seeds of a broader settlement lie in the possibility of more moderate elements in power in Mogadiscio and in the possibilities of economic development in the general area, including particularly the Webi Shebelli valley. 2. Have we made clear to Kenya where we stand on Somali claims? A: Yes. This has been done. The Secretary made the following comments: 1. We should try to take advantage of the Soviet activities to strengthen our position in Ethiopia. Consideration might be given to informing the Emperor that two ships had arrived in Somalia bearing arms and stating that we were disturbed by the Soviet intrusion since we favored solving the problem in an African framework. The Soviets seem to be supporting Somalia. We might tell the Emperor that, if pressures developed from a Soviet-backed Somalia, we would come to his assistance provided he did not move across frontiers. (The point was made to the Secretary that we had, on many occasions, stressed to the Emperor our interest in the integrity of Ethiopia.) 2. He was leery of the US offering good offices in this situation. The matter should remain in an African context. He did not object, however, to our offering to lend equipment to the OAU for the purposes of a border patrol or observation mechanism. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. Copies were sent to Edward Little in the Office of Secretary, William Lewis in INR, and Wendell Coote in AFE. 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, March 18, 1964, 4:06 p.m. 793. Ref: Khartoum’s 388. 2 Department has welcomed reftel indications Ethio-Somali negotiations now scheduled proceed on or about March 24. Would appreciate confirmation and comment Embassies Addis and Mogadiscio and, if confirmed, conveyance to respective host governments our satisfaction that this further step toward peaceful settlement their differences under OAU aegis has now been taken. For Khartoum: Department desires do all it appropriately can both through parties to dispute and through Sudanese to further successful outcome without becoming involved in active good offices of in any way assuming basic African responsibility for solution to present problem. In discussions of matter with Sudanese, if it would seem appropriate within above context, you may indicate our interest in successful talks and state we have studied problem for considerable period, as have Sudanese. First step, in our opinion, should be to get confirmation of willingness both sides preserve cease-fire and propaganda moratorium. Beyond this you may express view that failure past efforts at talks due in part to attempt at outset attack basic territorial/border problem and that better prospects might result if effort were made find areas where understanding and cooperation were possible, apart from basic issue. To extent Sudanese have opportunity discuss conduct talks with the two participants, they may find useful our own thoughts on problem. You may mention that some possibilities which have been mentioned and to some extent explored in past are: 1. Mutual agreement to pursue actively with international agencies (e.g., UN Special Fund) and other interested parties possibilities for joint development Webi Shebelli River Basin. 2. Exchange of air rights (e.g., traffic rights at Mogadiscio for Ethiopian Air Lines in exchange for overflight rights for Somali civilian aircraft on direct Mogadiscio-Hargeisa run). 3. Somali agreement permit Ethiopian use Somali ports (Chisimaio, Mogadiscio, Berbera) on preferential basis. 4. Ethiopian agreement permit Somali civilian motor transport transit Ethiopian territory via most direct route between Hargeisa and Mogadiscio when Ogaden security situation permits. 5. Somali agreement permit pipeline construction across Somali Republic territory should oil be discovered inside Ethiopian territory. Should progress these matters establish proper atmosphere, it might then be possible proceed to discuss: a. Agreement establish joint committee to study and make recommendations for improvement liaison in border areas and for regularization border-crossing arrangements. b. Agreement establish joint commission to demarcate on ground provisional administrative line between Ethiopia and ex-Italian portion Somalia. Would appreciate further suggestions along above lines which Embassies Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio might wish provide. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Post; cleared by Galanto, Officer in Charge of Sudanese Affairs Robert N. Stookey, and Newsom; and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Mogadiscio and Khartoum, and repeated to Asmara. 2 Telegram 388 from Khartoum, March 16, reported that both Ethiopia and Somalia had agreed to begin negotiations in Khartoum on or about March 24. (Ibid.) 3 In Khartoum, the two sides negotiated a cease-fire beginning April 1 and agreed to establish a Joint Somali-Ethiopian Border Commission to control the movement of troops displaced along both sides of the border. The Commission began its work on April 8. 290. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts 290. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts 1 Washington, March 21, 1964, 10:32 a.m. CA-9629 SUBJECT U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa REF Addis Ababa’s 859 and 904; Mogadiscio’s 633 and 634; Nairobi’s 1450. 2 The following text of a memorandum reviewed by the Secretary is provided as a guide to current Department thinking on the problems of the Horn of Africa, but should not be treated as an action document. Actions required to implement policy decisions will be specifically requested in action communications. I. The Problem A. The basic problem for the US is to maintain our strategic interests in Ethiopia while preventing a substantial Soviet foothold in Somalia. Full support of Ethiopia in a conflict with a Soviet-armed Somalia would only aggravate the basic ethnic and tribal tensions in the area without solving them. The best hope lies in finding, preferably within an African context, a modus vivendi between the two countries which will create an atmosphere permitting an approach to the basic social and economic problems of the region. B. The problem in the Horn arises primarily from pressures for a Greater Somalia, stemming from the secessionist aims of Somalis in Ethiopia’s Ogaden Province and Kenya’s North East Region (NER) and actively supported by the Somali Republic. The problem is aggravated by the recent outbreak of violence and evidence of mounting Soviet interest in the area. Despite general African opposition to boundary changes, Somalia is not without some growing African sympathy for its position. C. The pressures on the US are particularly heavy in Ethiopia, host to a US military communications facility, Kagnew Station, and the recipient of over $80 million of US military aid since 1954: (1) Inadequate US support for Ethiopia in the current crisis could tempt the Ethiopians to offer to remove Kagnew in exchange for reduced Soviet support of Somalia. (2) Substantially increased US support for Ethiopia at this juncture could stimulate accelerated Soviet efforts on behalf of Somalia, engender African resentment at great power intervention, polarize the conflict in a Cold War context, and increase US political and financial involvement in a most intractable problem. Even a full Ethiopian victory over Somalia, if it were possible, would not solve the problem of the Somalis and would further increase the pressures within the Empire. II. Background A. Somalia Republic : Western failure to support Somalia unification aims and a concurrent increase in ChiCom and Soviet aid have resulted in the elimination of the UK presence and a steady decline in US and Italian influence. The Soviet Union, building on a $60 million economic aid program, has recently gained both through the offer of a $30 million military aid program (not yet delivered) and through active diplomatic efforts tending to favor Somalia. Elections scheduled for March 30 have intensified Somali Government militancy on the Greater Somalia issue; at the same time they represent a possible opportunity for more moderate elements. B. Ethiopia : Nine months of unsuccessful campaigning against Somali guerrillas in the Ogaden has sapped resources and the morale of the security forces. Military leaders are chafing at the Emperor’s refusal to unleash them for a punitive expedition intended to choke off aid to Ogaden insurgents (but which would further overextend Ethiopian capabilities). Somali propaganda incites Ethiopian masses to revolt. Ethiopian concern is intensified by Moslem dissident activity in Eritrea. While somewhat shaken by events, the Emperor nonetheless still has the situation under control. C. Kenya : While dissident activity in the NER continues, at the moment the focal point of the problem is in the Ogaden and along the Somali-Ethiopian border. D. Organization of African Unity : OAU aid was sought by both sides when the situation deteriorated into a border war. The OAU has called for direct talks between the Somali Republic and its neighbors. At the moment an uneasy cease-fire prevails and efforts are being made to find a basis for direct talks, possibly in Khartoum. OAU Chiefs of State will consider the problem at their July meeting in Cairo. E. Soviet Union : While its position in Somalia has been enhanced by the current crisis, the Soviet Union has not yet given the Somali cause its full support and appears to be uncomfortable over the possible serious damage to its position in Ethiopia, Kenya and elsewhere in Africa. III. Current US Objectives and Policies (Directed particularly at period between now and OAU Chiefs of State conference in July) A. International : To support both OAU efforts and those of individual African nations to find a basis for a cessation of violence and a modus vivendi between Ethiopia and Somali by: (1) Lending good offices, if necessary, to facilitate direct talks within the context of the OAU resolution at Lagos; (2) Support efforts toward a modus vivendi, including, if necessary, logistic support and equipment for border observation teams; (3) Furthering, where possible, joint economic development efforts in the Horn of Africa area (e.g., the Webi-Shebelli River Basin). B. Ethiopia : To retain Kagnew Station, our major strategic interest in the area, maintain the stability and integrity of Ethiopia, foster a continued useful role for the Emperor in Africa, and prevent further influence for the communists at our expense by: (1) Continuing military aid, including prompt but unostentatious delivery of special supplementary help to meet problems of the Ogaden, while refraining from activities in Ethiopia which might provide substance to Somali charges of US intervention on Ethiopia’s side of the dispute; (2) Continuing economic assistance, now running in excess of $5 million per year, in an effort to assist Ethiopia’s modernization; (3) Being prepared to consider projects which might help stabilize the Ogaden population; (4) Maintaining close consultation with the Ethiopian Government, both on the question of the Horn and concerning internal reforms essential to the continued stability of Ethiopia and the effectiveness of its security forces. C. Somalia : Retain measure of western influence by: (1) Continuing economic assistance (now running in excess of $3 million annually), including significant help to the Somali Police Force; (2) Continuing diplomatic efforts to keep Somali interpretation of US objectives and actions in perspective; (3) Lending discreet support to moderate elements; (4) Encouraging continued Italian efforts in Somalia, especially Italian leadership in western economic assistance, utilizing DAC and local consultations for this purpose. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ETH–US. Secret. Drafted by Post and Newsom on March 17; cleared by Fuller in CIA, Colonel Heffner in DOD, Deputy Director of AID’s Office of Eastern/Southern African Affairs David E. Alter, Warren, Charles R. Stout of EUR/WE, Coote, Sol Polansky of EUR/SOV, and Herbert V. Olds of AFI; and approved by Tasca. Sent to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Khartoum, Lagos, Asmara, Mogadiscio, Dar-es-Salaam, Cairo, Accra, Aden, London, Rome, and POLAD/CINCMEAFSA. 2 Telegram 859 from Addis Ababa, March 2; telegram 904 from Addis Ababa, March 11; telegram 633 from Mogadiscio, March 8; telegram 634 from Mogadiscio, March 9; telegram 1450 from Nairobi, March 9; none printed. (Ibid.) 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, April 1, 1964, 6:20 p.m. 832. Addis Ababa’s 985. 2 For Ambassador. Department strongly supports your prompt expression of concern to IEG officials over Hargeisa bombing raid. We are seriously disturbed by apparent irresponsible character of attack involving US MAP-supplied equipment, by possibility IEG military may be taking matters in own hands, by implications for Khartoum arrangements, and by effect on situation in Somalia, including formation new government. While we appreciate risks to US position in Ethiopia of appearing assume IEG culpability such incidents, we believe seriousness this one requires expression our displeasure at highest levels. Unless, therefore, you see overriding objections, request you seek audience with HIM and convey following prefacing your remarks with reiteration US support Ethiopian territorial integrity and independence: 1. US has, of course, been aware growing strain and tension in Ethiopia as result of Ogaden insurgency problem. Nevertheless, had hoped some relaxation might result from Khartoum talks to which we attached great importance. Therefore, confirmed reports of attack on Hargeisa which laid to IEG following successful conclusion those talks received here with sharp sense of shock and disbelief. 2. HIM must be aware serious complications utilization by IEG of US-supplied equipment in such raid. US has always maintained its MAP to Ethiopia was conditional on IEG undertaking to use equipment solely for defensive purposes. IEG must also be aware Congressional requirement that grant US military aid to Africa be limited to internal security requirements or civic action purposes. 3. Ethiopia remains largest recipient US military aid in Africa. This, we believe, indicates importance we attach to Ethiopia as major factor working for African stability and as symbol African responsibility. Our ability to continue to be responsive to IEG requests for help obviously is not helped by such actions as the Hargeisa attack. 4. US hopes Emperor can assure actions such as Hargeisa attack and border crossings by IEGF do not recur. Failure of Ethiopian armed forces to maintain tight command and control over their air and ground elements, in what is admittedly difficult and often provocative situation, could raise serious questions regarding situation in Ethiopia and intentions of IEG. 5. In frankly conveying foregoing US views to HIM, Ambassador has been specifically instructed to reiterate that US continues to attach great value to Ethiopian friendship and remains deeply appreciative of serious internal security problem with which Emperor is confronted. US therefore believes that tangible US evidence of that friendship and of its support for broadly conceived solutions to insurgency problem should not be made more difficult by such developments as Hargeisa attack. Department has taken into account considerations contained Embtel 988 3 just received and continues believe approach by you desirable. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 31–1 ETH–SOMALI. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Blake and Newsom and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Khartoum, POLAD CINCMEAFSA Tampa, and Mogadiscio. 2 Dated March 31. (Ibid.) 3 Dated April 1. (Ibid.) 292. National Intelligence Estimate 292. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 29, 1964. NIE 75/76–64 IMPLICATIONS OF THE SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA The Problem To examine the current disputes involving Ethiopia, the Somali Republic, French Somaliland, and Kenya; to consider the nature of Soviet and Chinese policies toward them; and to assess the implications for US interests. Conclusions A. The Somali Republic’s campaign to bring under its rule the half-million Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya has embroiled it in controversy with these two states. Within the past year the situation has worsened as insurgency, border incidents, and propaganda attacks have intensified. (Para. 1) B. In Kenya’s Northeastern Region, Somali tribal dissidence, thus far kept under tolerable control, may become increasingly troublesome if, as now intended, the UK withdraws backing for Kenyan security forces. In the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Somali insurgency, encouraged and supported from Mogadiscio, has more serious implications. The Ethiopian army is finding it difficult to cope with the rebels, and Haile Selassie faces the dilemma that failure to take firm action would encourage disaffection both among Ethiopia’s many disparate tribal groups and within the army, while a buildup of the army’s capability and prestige would strengthen a force that could threaten his regime. Prolonged and intensified insurgency in the Ogaden could endanger the Emperor’s political position. In the best of circumstances the Horn is likely to remain a trouble spot for many years. (Paras. 17, 19, 21) C. The Soviets, by agreeing to supply the Somali Republic with some $35 million of military aid, have partially supplanted Western influence in Mogadiscio and are increasing their presence in the Horn in a way which may be useful to them as future opportunities arise. Moscow will probably urge restraint on any large-scale Somali adventure; if open war should develop, it will probably seek to avoid actively taking sides. (Paras. 9, 22) D. Haile Selassie regards the US communications facility at Kagnew as his prime bargaining counter to gain US support for Ethiopian policies. We do not believe that the Emperor will seriously press for US evacuation of Kagnew, but will use African sentiment against foreign military bases to bargain for greater US military and economic assistance. (Para. 23) [Here follows the body of the report.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the source text, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 29. 293. Memorandum for the Record 293. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 5, 1964. SUBJECT Military Assistance Objectives for Ethiopia Ambassador Korry met with Mr. Sloan at 1730, 4 June, to discuss U.S. policy with respect to Ethiopia and particularly future military assistance plans for that country. Ambassador Korry pointed out that our present programs are based solely on assuring continued use of Kagnew. The Ethiopians recognize this and therefore continue to press for more assistance. Ambassador Korry thinks this situation will get worse instead of better and that even if we continue to raise the ante every time the Ethiopians press us, there will eventually come a time when this type of haggling will break down. Our relationship with Ethiopia will inevitably deteriorate unless we change the basis for our programming. Ambassador Korry recommends that we base our program on the development of effective Ethiopian military forces which would be useful in United Nations operations such as the Congo and at the same time would satisfy the Emperor’s and the forward looking Ethiopian officers’ desires for effective forces. Ambassador Korry concedes that this change would probably cost more than we are presently putting into the program, but not more than we are going to have to pay if we continue as at present. I pointed out that such a change would require a change in the national policy paper with respect to Ethiopia and also in the military assistance objectives as stated in the Military Assistance Manual. At present, there is nothing in the Manual which relates to effective forces and there has never been any military justification for military assistance to Ethiopia. Mr. Sloan directed that the NESA Region, in conjunction with CINCSTRIKE and ODMA, review the guidance for Ethiopia in light of Ambassador Korry’s recommendations and, if appropriate, recommend changes. In case, however, that the State Department will not accede to such changes, Mr. Sloan directed that the Region develop recommendations for a minimum program that would at least temporarily satisfy Ethiopian demands. Wm. M. Leffingwell 2 Deputy Director of Military Assistance 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 091.3 Ethiopia. Confidential. Drafted on June 5 by William M. Leffingwell, Deputy Director of Military Assistance in DOD/ISA. Copies were sent to Sloan and General Wood in DOD/ISA, Ambassador Korry, and to the Offices of Plans and Programs and NESA Region in ISA. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Leffingwell signed the original. 294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, June 18, 1964, 3:28 p.m. 1029. Joint State-Defense Message. Ambassador is authorized, at next opportunity, to inform HIM as follows: 1. The US has observed with appreciation and support the leadership which the Emperor and his country are exercising in African affairs and in providing for Ethiopian participation in international collective security efforts. The US is interested in Ethiopia’s further role in supporting such efforts and in continuing to assist the IEG in building an efficient army and air force capable of maintaining internal security and legitimate self-defense which would permit Ethiopia to participate as appropriate in defense of the area or in UN collective security arrangements and measures. 2. While in Washington, the Ambassador discussed fully the US military assistance program to Ethiopia. On the assumption that the USG and IEG share the same objectives, the US reiterates its firm resolve to continue to contribute, through its assistance program, to the improved capability and efficiency of the Ethiopian military forces. 3. To this end certain key items have already been expedited, including the shipment of ammunition by air and sea. 4. The US continues to operate under Congressional limitations in military assistance funds. To the extent funds are available, the US will continue to deliver items to equip a 40,000-man Ethiopian force when this force can, to the satisfaction of the MAAG, operate, utilize and maintain the equipment. 5. To assist in this aspect, the US is ready to accelerate training assistance to Ethiopia and in particular to continue the already successful MTT tactical training program, and to provide advisers for the IEG MOD. 6. The US is prepared to consider accelerating items already funded in approved programs, in accordance with current Ethiopian capabilities. 7. The US is examining the Ethiopian Air Force requirements and has determined thus far that planning may proceed on the basis of an additional F5 jet squadron of 12 F5 aircraft over the next several years subject to the Ethiopian ability to operate, maintain and utilize and the continued support of the F–86 and T–28D squadrons. CH MAAG will provide MOD with details. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–ETH. Secret. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Colonel Junkermann in DOD/ISA and Christmas, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Mogadiscio and CINCMEAFSA. 2 In telegram 1303 from Addis Ababa, June 23, Korry stated that he had conveyed the contents of the telegram to Haile Selassie when he and General Paul Adams, Commander in Chief, Middle East/South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara (CINCMEAFSA), met with him on June 22. The Ambassador reported that General Adams discussed with the Emperor ways in which a reorganized U.S. MAAG could help improve the Ethiopian military establishment. (Ibid.) 295. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 295. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, July 11, 1964. JCSM–591–64 SUBJECT US Policies and Programs for Ethiopia (U) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed US policies and programs for Ethiopia in the context of comments and recommendations received from the US Ambassador to Ethiopia and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA and of discussions in Washington during the period 1–5 June 1964. This review has led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that a substantial and prompt increase in US political, economic, and military assistance to Ethiopia is justified by: a. The importance of Ethiopia to US politico/military interests. b. The recent deterioration in US-Ethiopian relations. c. Sino-Soviet progress in efforts to influence and subvert East African countries. 2. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA has proposed a military assistance program for Ethiopia which includes the following: a. Dollar ceilings (in millions): FY 1965–18.24; FY 1966–20.44; FY 1967–19.56; FY 1968–12.15; FY 1969–10.13; and FY 1970–12.02. b. MAAG manpower ceilings (including training teams): FY 1964–126; FY 1965–231; FY 1966–542; FY 1967–246; FY 1968–246; FY 1969–221; and FY 1970–121. 3. Specific findings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are provided in Appendix A 2 hereto. Appendix B hereto contains background information and discussion of the problem. 4. Consideration has been given to advice from Ambassador Korry and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA concerning the possible appointment of a British military advisor to the Emperor. Diplomatic efforts should be undertaken to discourage such an appointment. If these efforts fail, action should be taken to insure that the UK-Ethiopian relationship is consistent with US interests. In any event, the problems of a British advisor and US support to Ethiopia should be treated as separate issues. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The planned review of the National Policy Paper for Ethiopia 3 be expedited, and that such review reflect increased US interest in the development and security of Ethiopia. b. Priority action be taken to secure approval of a separate, basic US national objective as follows: to organize, equip, train, and support an effective 40,000-man Ethiopian Army and minimum, but effective, Air Force and Navy forces as rapidly as Ethiopian capabilities permit. c. The plan proposed by CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA be approved, in principle, subject to refinements resulting from detailed planning and discussions with the Ethiopian Government. d. Service and Military Assistance Program manpower and dollar ceilings be increased as required to support the proposed plan. 4 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J.W. Davis Rear Admiral, USN Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 381 Ethiopia. Secret. 2 The appendices are not printed. 3 For the National Policy Paper on Ethiopia, December 19, 1963, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXI, pp. 486 – 489 . 4 In telegram 131 to Addis Ababa, August 13, the Departments of State and Defense informed Ambassador Korry and the Chief of MAAG, Ethiopia, that there was an estimated global shortfall in FY 1965 MAP funds of at least $170 million. MAP funds for Ethiopia were currently set at $9.9 million and the possibility of any increase in FY 1965 was unlikely. The agencies were aware of the problems this created at the present juncture in the U.S. military aid relationship with Ethiopia and still hoped to give fullest consideration to the long-range policy approach discussed during Korry’s consultations in June. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–ETH) 296. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Wells) to the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) 296. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Wells) to the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) Washington, July 22, 1964. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Somali Republic, 1963 Thru. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, September 1, 1964, 6:03 p.m. 238. For Ambassador. Embtel 262. 2 We have given consideration very valid points raised and have discussed with DOD/ISA on confidential basis. Deep appreciation present IEG role Congo as well as close past relationship give Ethiopia favorable position in allocation both present and future MAP funds. IEG willingness provide contingents for wider African political stability will also be factor in considering over-all aid level. Fact remains, however, world-wide funds are limited and we must do maximum maintain momentum with what is available, emphasizing training and equipment which Ethiopians clearly able utilize and maintain. We remain keenly aware this entails possibly serious risks of IEG pressures and disappointments but alternative is less desirable prospect of backing away from new approach you have so effectively presented. With additional training, additional funds and F–5’s believe we will have provided significant evidence US responsiveness to IEG requirements. We see benefit, also, in maintaining momentum our discussions reorganization MinDef. View these factors and possibly adverse effects delayed presentation Adams’ memorandum to HIM, request you deliver memorandum soonest. Other comment follows: 1. IEG Armed Forces : Dept continues recognize significant role IEG armed forces have played and can play in promotion African political stability. Also well aware IEG would expect concrete US recognition of Ethiopian role that stability, particularly if made in response US demarches. Believe fulfillment existing US MAP commitment to IEG, (i.e., support for 40,000-man force geared to IEG capability absorb support) rather than US support for building special IEG contingents for international use, remains best means for meeting both situations. To extent we can encourage more limited forces without political damage we should do so. We believe Washington Agencies might be prepared reexamine problem overage soldiers as part arrangement for reducing over-all size forces. 2. Delivery of F–5’s: It remains US objective to deliver F–5’s to IEG at earliest possible date consistent with their availability and IEG ability to absorb. C–130’s involved in Congo not transferred to GOC were sent on purely temporary basis, and continue to be US owned. 3. MAP Funding : Ethiopian program now $9.9 million. Program conceivably could be higher when final allocations made. However, I view serious shortage MAP funds, we have no choice but to squeeze maximum political mileage out of what is already largest African MAP. Funding for MTT’s provided for in addition to $9.9 million MOD advisers will also be funded in addition to $9.9 million. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–ETH. Secret; Priority; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Blake and Newsom, cleared by Lang and G/PM Director for Operations Howard Meyers, and approved by Tasca. 2 In telegram 262 from Addis Ababa, August 27, Ambassador Korry noted that as the U.S. aid package was unwrapped, the United States would have continued difficulties with the Ethiopian Government, particularly after urging dispatch of Ethiopian troops to the Congo. In a broader context, he noted that if the United States were serious about its basic theme that African problems should be solved by Africans, it should be giving some thought to developing politically independent African “fire brigades.” The Ambassador pointed out that currently Ethiopia (or any other African state) was capable of furnishing only the most modest effective military assistance to other African countries. (Ibid.) 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, November 10, 1964, 9:36 p.m. 546. Refs: Embtels 689 and 698. 2 Following is for use in your next audience with Prime Minister for purpose discussions US military aid to Ethiopia: 1. During November 6 meeting Prime Minister and Ambassador discussed series of matters pertaining to US military aid programs Ethiopia, matters which simultaneously receiving maximum attention US Government agencies concerned in Washington. 2. Already before November 6 meeting USG had decided send to Addis for purposes consultation Pentagon official who among most knowledgeable re Ethiopia program. Col. Charles C. Heffner arriving Addis November 10. 3. F–5’s. You may inform IEG in writing US readiness deliver squadron of twelve F–5’s over next several years, with three to four aircraft to arrive during March-June 1966 time frame, subject to IEAF completion their required F–5 preparation as described part two Embtel 483. 3 You may inform IEG orally that US is attempting to get additional FY66 funds from Congress which would enable funding 2 to 3 more aircraft for Ethiopia along with a small number of additional aircraft each for other high priority countries such as Korea, GRC and Turkey. These additional aircraft for Ethiopia if funded would normally be delivered in early 1967. FYI: Any earlier delivery must compete with these other high priority countries mentioned above. End FYI. 4. C–130’s. In order to meet what IEG has set as highest priority needs (F–5’s and support for IEGF) USG because of our own fund limitations not in position provide commitment on C–130’s. 5. MIG problem. You may inform IEG orally USG aware of problem and will take into consideration types of jet fighters USSR delivers to Somalia. USG would expect consult fully with IEG, including exchange of intelligence and estimates, concerning resultant GSR air capability. 6. Re remainder items your 698, suggest you report progress along lines you have already described. Expect you will continue put pressure on IEG for matching performance in readiness to absorb, maintain and utilize. 7. Heffner prepared discuss all these questions in detail with Ambassador and Chief MAAG. Suggest you hold off next week’s return appointment with PriMin until you have had opportunity talk with Heffner. 8. Department appreciative way you handled general policy issues between US and IEG as well as military aid questions in your talk with PriMin. We have found your analysis and suggestions for action on various military aid items most helpful. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–3 US–ETH. Secret. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Williams, Newsom, Warren, Lang, Muller, and General Pinkston in ODMA; and approved by Harriman. 2 Both dated November 6. (Ibid., POL 2 ETH and DEF 19–3 US–ETH, respectively) 3 Dated September 28. (Ibid.) 299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, November 20, 1964, 8:16 p.m. 620. Department has carefully studied your account November 6 meeting with PriMin (Embtels 689 and 698), 2 your talks with Merid and other recent reports from Ethiopia and Somalia. Department appreciates not only tactful way you handled Ethiopian charges but also your resort to frank language when you deemed situation warranted. On theory ounce of prevention worth pound of cure, Department believes this is opportune moment for further frank talks with high IEG officials about Somalia and U.S.-Ethiopian relations. Following talking points for your use in such talks to supplement items you plan bring up yourself. 1. USG is struck by similarity in expressions of alarm we are hearing from both Ethiopians and Somalis about each other’s worrisome intentions. IEG PriMin has described Somalia as determined bring down Ethiopia by attack and subversion, has referred to hundreds of Somali pilots, officers, technicians being trained in Soviet Union and modern military equipment arriving. From Somali side, General Daud and others, we hear reports about IEG troop reinforcements and digging of fortifications along border, fears that Ethiopia will attempt pre-emptive strike at Somalia and speculations that increase in U.S. military aid to Ethiopia has led to harder IEG line towards Somalia. Note also GSR message to HIM about Ethiopian violation demilitarized border strip (Mogadiscio’s 227). 3 We believe climate of mutual mistrust and fear created by endless repetition of charges dangerous to both sides because it leads to false assumptions which can produce disastrously wrong courses of action. 2. On question radio propaganda, USG has in past instructed Ambassador Mogadiscio to express to GSR view such broadcasts, especially in Amharic, are inflammatory and damaging to GSR-IEG relations. We are prepared reiterate this view to GSR in future if circumstances warrant. While we do not condone tone and content of most recent Mogadiscio emissions, we do believe there is some connection between them and HIM’s press conference at Asmara October 25. Moreover, before weighing in with GSR, would be helpful to know whether IEG has protested broadcasts either through Somali Ambassador in Addis or Ethiopian Ambassador in Mogadiscio. If IEG took such initiative, what was GSR reaction? 3. Re question arms build-up in Somalia and threat it may pose to Ethiopia, we note that Embassy Mogadiscio has been sending Addis substantial volume reports about Soviet deliveries, USSR military adviser activities and relationship to Somali capabilities. Used selectively and pulled together, believe this information could give IEG officials better perspective on what Somalia can and cannot undertake militarily. We would also have these additional observations: (a) GSR presently facing financial crisis of grave proportions—Communist China has not renewed its budgetary assistance; (b) on Somali side wounds of February-March fighting far from healed; (c) GSR seems to be following policy of generally keeping army away from border—responsibility for maintaining security on Somali side largely vested in police; (d) GSR military establishment presently showing typical weaknesses and strains caused by conversion former weapons and tactical systems (Anglo-Italian) to new system (Soviet). 4. Since both sides are deeply concerned with reported reinforcements and alleged preparations for aggression, moment would appear opportune for reactivation joint Somali-Ethiopian commission to inspect demilitarized border strip per Khartoum Agreement of March 1964. 5. On subject possible IEG preventive action against Somalia, we aware of recurrent pressures from within IEG military for move this direction. Politically, such a move would be tragic and a terrible blemish on HIM’s reputation as African peace-maker. Most serious consequence, however, would be fall of Abdirazak and his certain replacement by figure far less moderate. We would encourage Ethiopians think more thoroughly about present Somali Government and implications its continued existence or possible demise. US has had frequent occasion to work closely with Abdirazak, first as Interior Minister, later as Minister Public Works. Basis our experience we view him as moderate whose policies aimed primarily at achieving progress on domestic scene—government and administrative reforms, economic development, raising living standards Somalis in Republic. Externally Abdirazak appears desirous downplay pursuit of Greater Somalia objective. His ability walk this tightrope by no means certain. His numerous and powerful adversaries favor a much harder line towards Ethiopia and far more aggressive pursuit of Somalia’s territorial claims. Ethiopians should be encouraged reflect on what sort of government they would expect to succeed Abdirazak should he fall. Additional material on military issues follows by separate cable. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–3 US–ETH. Secret. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Blake, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Mogadiscio, Asmara, and CINCMEAFSA, and by pouch to Nairobi, London, and Rome. 2 See footnote 2, Document 298 . 3 Dated November 18. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 KENYA–SOMALI) 300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, December 2, 1964, 7 p.m. 671. As result of interagency and DOD reviews Secretary of Defense has approved dollar level of $15 million for Ethiopia as part of DOD FY 1966 MAP budget request. Since current MAP submission is for $10.2 million, CINCMEAFSA has requested MAAG provide additional programming data for $4.8 million. Ambassador well understands that $15 million level for FY 1966 is subject to congressional action and that exact figure is classified and therefore should not be disclosed to IEG. Nevertheless, we believe SecDef approval of increased appropriation request begins set stage for progress in two important directions in U.S. relations with Ethiopia. First, should reassure IEG re degree importance USG attaches to IEG military requirements; second, should greatly strengthen Ambassador’s hand in influencing IEG on Congo, general African issues, ChiCom recognition and other matters of importance in the U.S.-Ethiopian relationship. Believe with appropriately qualified language, and bearing in mind requirements of congressional action including possibility of reduction in amount, Ambassador can now use this decision as positive indication U.S. responsiveness IEG requests in area major concern to latter. We do not wish IEG officials gain impression U.S. possesses limitless budgetary resources and financial ability to respond to IEG requests. Re your 860, 2 allocation of funds for specific items FY 1966 MAP program, this will be worked out through normal interagency consultations among Washington, MacDill and field. Harriman 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–ETH. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Colonel Heffner in DOD/ISA, Muller, and Blake; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to CINCMEAFSA and also for POLAD/CINCMEAFSA. 2 Dated December 2. (Ibid.) 301. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Newsom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 301. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Newsom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, March 15, 1965. SUBJECT Suggested U.S. Response to Ethiopia Government’s State of Alarm Ambassador Korry’s March 11 Talks with IEG Prime Minister Upon hearing that our Ambassador was returning to Washington on consultation, the Emperor instructed the IEG Prime Minister to call in the Ambassador late on March 11 to discuss Ethiopian anxieties over their security and budgetary situation. (Addis’ telegram 1299, attached.) 2 The Emperor’s concern stemmed from (1) the substantial deliveries of armor Somalia is receiving from the Soviets; (2) the resulting frustrations in the Ethiopian military which could undermine HIM’s authority; (3) fears that Somalia, as soon as it is able to defend its own borders, will resume support of dissidence inside Ethiopia; (4) UAR-Sudanese support of Eritrean dissidence; (5) Ethiopia’s critical budgetary crisis, caused by military expenditures “to meet the Somali threat.” The Prime Minister had been directed by HIM to explore with the U.S. Ethiopia’s urgent needs for more military equipment and for U.S. budgetary support. The Prime Minister also mentioned the Emperor’s consideration of a “business trip” to Washington to place his problems personally before the President. Ambassador Korry replied with candor that a visit to the U.S. by the Emperor would not be wise, that more military equipment would only aggravate the budgetary situation, and that top IEG military officials agreed that the most essential requirement was to increase the efficiency of the military structure and strengthen it with intensive training. The U.S. was undertaking such action right now. Suggested U.S. Response Against the background of the recent MAP increase from $10 to $15 million, we are not in a good position to provide even more military equipment. We also think the concentration should be on the effective utilization of what they already have. Similarly, we strongly prefer not to get involved in any budgetary support arrangements which are exceedingly difficult to get approved here. We believe nevertheless that in the immediate future certain actions are desired to reassure the Emperor in a situation which obviously causes him serious concern. We propose: 1. An appointment for Ambassador Korry with the President with the recommendation that the President authorize the Ambassador to convey orally to HIM his personal interest and support. 2. An offer to the IEG to send a U.S. intelligence team to brief Ethiopian officials on Somalia’s military capabilities, an arrangement similar to the team we sent to Morocco following its border flare-up with Algeria. (Before we make the offer, however, we first want to see a study which INR is preparing on the relative military strength of Ethiopia and Somalia.) 3. An approach to Somali Prime Minister Abdirazak suggesting that GSR President consider a written reiteration to the Emperor of Somalia’s dedication to pursue its policies by peaceful means alone. To the GSR we would allude to Ethiopia’s increasing pressure on the U.S. for more arms. 4. If in the interim period before Ambassador Korry’s return to Addis the IEG approaches us for a reply, we suggest indicating HIM’s message has been conveyed by the Ambassador, and that the matter is receiving full attention here. If you approve these suggested actions, we can begin to carry them out at once. Over the medium and long term, we recommend these U.S. positions: 1. Military Aid . Continued adherence to our position that Ethiopia’s most critical need is for intensified training and a more efficient military establishment, rather than additional hardware. 2. Consumables . We already have authority from DOD to help out on such consumables as tires and batteries. While Ambassador Korry has been reluctant to use this authority up to now, on the grounds the Ethiopians would then expect such support on a continuing basis, we can nevertheless use it if the situation should so require in the future. 3. Budgetary Support . We look upon this as a last resort. However, in the recent preparation of the new AID strategy towards Ethiopia, AID has indicated its willingness to consider the possibility of assuming local costs for certain projects. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Galanto. 2 Dated March 12; not printed. 302. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Blake) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 302. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Blake) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, March 22, 1965. SUBJECT Trouble in the Horn of Africa During the past week the situation in the Horn of Africa has grown more serious, as indicated in the telegram traffic. As usual, there are conflicting reports. The Ethiopian Government has recalled its Ambassador in Mogadiscio for consultation, charging that Somali propaganda broadcasts have violated the Khartoum truce agreement and contributed to deteriorating relations. TDCS reports from Mogadiscio and Somali press reports indicate serious clashes inside the Ogaden between Somalis and Ethiopian troops, possible moving up of Ethiopian forces to the border (within the demilitarized zone) and alleged IEG overflights of Somali territory. However, IEG sources deny any substantial clashes in the Ogaden occurred and a MAAG advisor who was recently in Ogaden saw no evidence of unusual activity. Prime Minister Abdirazak has expressed to our Charge his deep concern that the situation may escalate and threaten his government and moderate policies. We have prepared messages to Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio concerning steps that might be taken to calm the situation and have discussed these messages with Ambassador Korry. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Somalian Affairs Peter C. Walker. 2 Telegram 336 to Mogadiscio, March 22, instructed the Charge to express to the Prime Minister U.S. concern at reports of fighting in the Ogaden and U.S. support for direct Somali-Ethiopian talks to calm the situation. (Ibid.) Telegram 1035 to Addis Ababa, March 23, instructed the Embassy to informally contact Ethiopian Ambassador Ahadu to elicit his views of IEG thinking before deciding whether to make an official approach to the Foreign Minister to express U.S. concern and to convey to the Ambassador the U.S. view that the most appropriate channel for working out Ethiopian-Somali problems would be direct discussions between the two governments. (Ibid.) 303. Memorandum for the Files 303. Memorandum for the Files 1 Washington, March 25, 1965. SUBJECT Ethiopia: Recent Factors Affecting US–IEG Relations PARTICIPANTS The Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara Mr. Peter Solbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary OSD/ISA Col. Charles Heffner, OSD/ISA Ambassador Korry Mr. James J. Blake, Deputy Director, AFN The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to meet with Mr. McNamara and stated that he wished to summarize several developments that had occurred recently in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa which should be taken into account in US policy toward Ethiopia. These developments were (1) the rapid delivery of substantial quantities of Soviet military assistance to Somalia, particularly armor; (2) the replacement of the Abboud regime in Sudan, with which HIM had had cordial relations, by one which appeared to be supporting the Eritrean liberation movement; (3) continued evidence of the Emperor’s interest, dating from early 1964, in the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists; (4) the offer by the ChiComs of substantial budgetary assistance and of long-term no-interest economic credits; (5) indications of Soviet willingness to provide military equipment to Ethiopia if the latter alters its foreign policy; (6) the strain of the IEG budgetary situation caused by the Ogaden dissident problem; and (7) the heightened importance of Ethiopia to the US in diplomatic terms and in military terms as well as evidenced by the increase in the missions given to Kagnew station and the rise in the number of US personnel stationed there. The Ambassador noted that the IEG has a 93% gold and foreign exchange cover for its currency, several months’ cover for its imports, an excellent international financial reputation, and a 4.5% annual growth in its gross national product. Thus, despite the substantial pressures that have begun to mount on the regime in the financial and economic spheres, the country still was on a fairly sound financial basis. However, Ethiopian officials, at the highest level had expressed their concern to him regarding the country’s financial prospects just prior to his departure for the US. The Ambassador stated that he did not want anything new from the Department of Defense but he did wish to urge DOD to bear in mind the considerations he had just listed in dealing with questions of military assistance for Ethiopia and particularly in handling the delivery of equipment already promised. The Ambassador also asked that these factors be borne in mind in assigning MAAG personnel to Ethiopia. He stressed the importance of staffing the MAAG with highly competent personnel capable of the initiative and imagination needed to work with the IEG. Mr. McNamara asked Mr. Solbert to give him a schedule of what had been promised to the Ethiopians in terms of military assistance, to inform him of any lags in the deliveries, and of any lags that might be expected to occur in the future. Mr. McNamara assured the Ambassador that the Department of Defense would give priority to deliveries of promised military equipment to the Ethiopians. He also agreed with the Ambassador that the MAAG/Ethiopia should be staffed by officers of high quality possessing the kind of imagination and initiative required to do the job in an important country and in a difficult environment. He asked Mr. Solbert to be certain that the MAAG/Ethiopia was given a priority with respect to the assignment of high caliber personnel and specifically asked him to determine whether the new Chief of the MAAG Army Section was on his last tour of duty. Mr. McNamara then alluded to the armor problem described by the Ambassador. He suggested this problem might be solved by delivering M–48s to the Ethiopians, rather than anti-tank guns. The Ethiopian Air Force might also be equipped with materiel that would make it possible for them to counter the Somali armor. He noted Colonel Heffner’s suggestion that napalm could do the job. The Ambassador described the reservations that the Department of State had with respect to the supplying of napalm to the Ethiopians. Mr. Blake stated that insofar as AFN was concerned it continued to have strong reservations on this score. Mr. McNamara reiterated his belief that the tank problem could be overcome perhaps by the delivery of M–48’s but also in the near term by training the IEGAF drop napalm. He repeated that he did not think that anti-tank guns were the answer to Somali armor. The Ambassador then referred to the mobility problem of the IEGF. Mr. McNamara suggested that the answer here might be the Canadian “Buffalo.” He asked Mr. Solbert to look into this. Mr. McNamara stated that the IEGF did not need C–130’s to improve its mobility capability. The Ambassador asked about the possibility of meeting IEG military requirements from surplus stocks. He stated that this possibility had never been explored. The Secretary asked Mr. Solbert to look into this matter. The Secretary concluded the meeting by assuring Ambassador Korry that he agreed with the latter that the Ethiopians should be supplied with the materiel that they could operate and maintain in order to meet “the threat that is there, not the one that may be in their minds.” 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–US. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. 304. Letter From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to Ethiopia (Korry) 304. Letter From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to Ethiopia (Korry) 1 Washington, April 26, 1965. Dear Ed, Have just finished reading your reports on talks with PM and HIM. If even 10% of our other Ambassadors were as forthright and straightforward in stating the case as you are, our relations would be in a much healthier state worldwide. I’ve long felt that candor was the secret weapon of our diplomacy, but diplomats are by definition pre-disposed to caution. In general, we are much too defensive about our policies and about the way we see the world—which is certainly a more sophisticated view than these little countries can command. In the case at hand, I also share what I take to be your view that we ought to straight-talk the Ethiops a bit. If we don’t, we’re in for nothing but trouble. The idea that other countries get a lot more US aid than Ethiopia is ridiculous. For the last three years, it’s gotten more dollar aid than Nasser has. If Ethiopia needed more food, we could provide it (as we do to the UAR). In fact, I believe I’m right in saying that no other African country but Nigeria gets as much solid US dollar aid as Ethiopia. (Tunisia technically gets more, but our three-year $180 million dollar commitment has ended up about $80 million short—moreover, a high proportion of it is surplus food.) So I find the Ethiopian doctrine that they can shake us down for more a thoroughly pernicious one and delight in you stamping on it. More power to you. In fact, any point in my informally calling in Ambassador Dinke and making some of the same points you have? I don’t know whether Dinke is worth talking with and would, of course, check with AF. But a little added counterpoint here (particularly an indication that the WH is aware of the situation) might be salutary. Cordially, R.W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–1/69. Secret; Personal; via Classified Diplomatic Pouch. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 305. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 305. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 1 Addis Ababa, May 25, 1965, 1800Z. 1648. During three and half-hour audience and lunch with Emperor, PriMin, MinFinance and Acting FornMin, Harriman presented keen interest of President in Ethiopian position in Africa and his personal concern over US world problems, particularly course relations other nations with Communist China. Presentation by Harriman at outset of picture of President with warm personal inscription from President launched discussion in most cordial atmosphere. Believe meeting achieved initial objectives of reinforcing Ethiopian awareness US interest and postponing for present Ethiopian recognition Communist China. Ultimate policies IEG this and other matters will undoubtedly depend on outcome subsequent conversations with Ambassador on economic subjects. Hutchinson invited but ill and unable attend meetings. Gov Harriman opened placing present problems in context Emperor’s historical position as leader against aggression and emphasizing President’s present deep concern over aggression in Vietnam and demonstrated Communist influence in Dominican problem. Gov Williams stressed Emperor’s constructive leadership in Africa, indicating this was one important reason continued US assistance, and importance US attached to territorial integrity, to OAU and Emperor’s personal role in progress African unity and frontier disputes. Harriman pointed to advance constructive elements and contrasted with efforts ChiComs undermine independent countries. President he said would be deeply concerned in face such ChiCom efforts and despite confrontation in Vietnam if other African countries were to recognize Communist China. Emperor, reading in part from notes prepared by staff, stressed importance upcoming Afro-Asian meeting Algiers, problems caused by states such as Somalia, need for moderate non-aligned state play significant role, and his continued interest OAU and African unity. Then he posed question whether US was not itself helping countries which were tending toward Communism, referring particularly to Nasser and his belief confluence US aid and Soviet aid enabled Nasser intervene in Yemen with great suffering to innocent. Gov Harriman responded, pointing out US policy was to help those nations desiring remain independent and fact Nasser despite acceptance Soviet aid had suppressed local Communist Party. US, however, had protested actions of UAR in Yemen and Congo and has taken most unusual step of holding up for the moment fulfillment three-year commitment on food aid while suspending other aid. US did not yet know what outcome would be but policy under serious review. This evoked obvious interest on part Ethiopian participants. Emperor concluded formal audience by stating he has confident areas of cooperation between US and Ethiopia expanding; he had just received letter from Chief MAAG (ref A–708) 2 with him on military cooperation which, at first reading, was pleasing and which he wished study further. He hopes this presages further cooperation in economic field. In general luncheon conversation PriMin made lengthy statement Ethiopian policy in Africa which emphasized four principles: 1) Right of people to choose own leader, 2) Territorial integrity, 3) Non-interference internal affairs, 4) Right of true independence. Harriman replied US subscribed fully these principles. He re-emphasized US awareness Ethiopian needs and stated Amb would receive instructions enabling him discuss these further with IEG. In final comment, Harriman stressed once more importance to President of Vietnam issue and recognition of Communist China. In wind up, Emp said he was satisfied with conference and responses to specific questions and remarked that talk was almost as if he had been able to speak with the President himself. In personal conversation with PriMin at lunch, Amb stated he hoped Emperor and IEG understood from Harriman’s statement President’s intense interest and personal preoccupation with ChiCom threat and opposition to ChiCom recognition which was matter of highest priority to USG and people. PriMin responded succinctly “we understand clearly.” PriMin added he very grateful for actions USG appeared prepared to take in response IEG’s needs. Korry 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Asmara. 2 Dated May 20. (Ibid., DEF 19 US–ETH) 306. Memorandum of Conversation 306. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 25, 1965. SUBJECT US-Somali Relations PARTICIPANTS Ahmed Mohamed Adan, Somali Ambassador G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Peter C. Walker, OIC, Somali Affairs Ambassador Ahmed paid his first call on Governor Williams in the course of which he outlined certain basic Somali attitudes toward the problems of US-Somali relations. He said he thought that the fact that Somalia was a successful working democracy, which had resisted the temptation to adopt the dictatorial form of government of certain of its neighbors, was not sufficiently appreciated in the United States. Governor Williams replied that we were aware of the democratic institution in Somalia but that our appreciation of this fact had sometimes been over-shadowed by our feeling that Somalia was coming under the influence of the Russians and by the irredentist policy of the Somali government. Ambassador Ahmed stressed that the desire for unification of all Somalis was an underlying political factor in his country which no Somali government could afford to ignore and long survive. He said that the Somali people considered that the Ogaden was under the colonial rule of Ethiopia just like any other colonial territory. Mr. Walker remarked that President Aden had recently told him that he considered the problem of the Ogaden to be primarily a human problem and that, if the Ethiopian government were to take proper steps to satisfy the political, economic and cultural aspirations of the Somali people in that region, the Somali government could have no quarrel with the situation. With regard to US policy toward Ethiopia, Ambassador Ahmed said that Somali people felt that the US was helping Ethiopia to maintain its hold on the Ogaden and for this reason there was a popular feeling of hostility toward the US. He referred specifically to a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor which he said stated that the US Army Special Forces were training Ethiopians to put down Somali insurgents in the Ogaden. Governor Williams said that our general position was that until the legal sovereignty of a given piece of territory was changed that it was the right of the central government to administer that territory and to maintain peace and order in it. In this respect, therefore, our policy was probably in conflict with the position of the Somali government. The question of the current Ethiopia-Somali propaganda war was discussed and Governor Williams expressed the hope that it would be possible for both sides to agree on calling a halt to such tactics. In parting, Ambassador Ahmed said that he felt it necessary and desirable to speak frankly about some of the problems in US-Somali relations and Governor Williams agreed that a frank exchange of views was always useful. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Walker on August 16. 307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, September 2, 1965, 5:22 p.m. 51. Ref: Mogadiscio’s 101. 2 Ethiopian-Somali Relations. Department welcomes developing dialogue between PriMins. Difficulties which GSR sees from apparent IEG pre-condition against raising territorial problems would perhaps be overcome by verbal rather than written assurances. Further assurance that unacceptable topics not arise might be secured by establishment of agenda to which talks could be strictly confined by mutual agreement either written or oral. Re economic agreements, history of Ethiopian-Somali relations makes it understandable that each side mistrusts other. On other hand, Department considers that very fact of IEG willingness enter discussions on possible areas of agreement in economic field is of itself significant. As talks progress, GSR will certainly be in position to safeguard its interests. FYI: Although USG has been urging these courses of action on IEG for many months, we consider it preferable not discuss present demarche in Addis unless raised with us by IEG. Recommend, however, that Emb Addis check with Burney of IBRD for info and assessment of IEG thinking in field economic cooperation with GSR. End FYI. In event IEG discusses its reported approach with Emb Addis, would seem appropriate point out that any gesture to lessen present tensions would go long way as earnest of intentions, e.g. return of Somali police plane. Emb Mogadiscio may wish same point to GSR. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Hugh Campbell of AFN and Galanto, and approved by Blake. Also sent to Addis Ababa, and repeated to Nairobi and Rome for Ambassador Torbert (Hotel Victoria). 2 Telegram 101 from Mogadiscio, August 31, reported that the Somali Prime Minister had informed the Embassy that the Ethiopian Prime Minister had given the Somali Ambassador for his government’s consideration: 1) a draft bilateral agreement governing cessation of hostile propaganda on both sides and 2) a proposal for a bilateral conference to deal with economic problems on which agreement might be reached. (Ibid.) 308. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 308. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 3, 1965. SUBJECT Former Ethiopian Ambassador Dinke Background Shortly after ex-Ambassador Dinke resigned in mid-June, 2 we recommended to you that we delay making a recommendation to the Immigration & Naturalization Service on his request for permanent residence until we had had sufficient time to assess the Ethiopian Government reaction to his defection and determine whether his permanent presence in this country might prove politically embarrassing to us in our relations with the IEG. You approved our recommendation on July 28. Since then Dinke has sent critical letters to high IEG officials, distributed anti-regime literature and obtained a small amount of publicity in the American press. As a result, we have had several protests from the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister and their new Ambassador to the United States about Dinke’s “political activities.” The Emperor called in Ambassador Korry on October 1 to say he could not understand how the United States, in the interest of good relations, could permit Dinke to carry on activities against a friendly government. The Acting Foreign Minister told the Ambassador on October 16 that the IEG would object if the United States granted permanent residence to Dinke. We have emphasized two points to the IEG: (1) while residing in the United States, Dinke benefits from the same right to freedom of speech as Americans; hence we cannot legally silence him; and (2) if we try to force him to leave, the resultant publicity could damage the Ethiopian and United States Governments. Recent Developments On October 18 IEG’s Ambassador Tashoma called on me at his request. He reiterated then the IEG’s grave concern over the political activities of Dinke in the United States (while discounting his effectiveness) but asked that we take no action on Dinke until he, the Ambassador, had had the opportunity to examine instructions he had just received on the subject, after which he would discuss the matter further with us. To date, Ambassador Tashoma has not requested another appointment regarding Dinke and during a recent call on the Department in connection with another matter, he did not raise the Dinke question at all. Ambassador Korry now thinks the Emperor may be somewhat more relaxed about Dinke than in previous weeks as a result of his discussions of the problem with him. Under the circumstances, we will postpone making further recommendations to you on the Dinke case until we have had the opportunity to determine whether the Emperor’s possibly more relaxed mood is permanent or transitory. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ETH. Secret. Drafted by Galanto and Blake on November 2. 2 On June 15, 1965, Dinke asked the U.S. Government for political asylum. (Telegram 1336 to Addis Ababa, June 15; ibid., POL 17 ETH–US) 3 On August 5, 1966, Secretary Rusk approved informing the Immigration and Naturalization Service that the Department of State had no objection to approval of Dinke’s application for permanent resident status. (Memorandum from Palmer to Rusk, August 1; ibid., POL 30–2 ETH) 309. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 309. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, February 8, 1966. Soapy, it seems apparent that the rule of the Emperor in Ethiopia is in growing jeopardy. Criticism at all levels—even from hitherto loyal sources—is widespread. Coupled with the Emperor’s reported lack of concern, don’t we have some of the essential ingredients of another coup? Would there be any merit in a quiet US campaign to convince the Emperor of the need for some quick domestic reforms designed to eliminate the most threatening complaints? We’ve had success in the past in convincing people like the Shah and King Hassan that they ought to be modern reformist monarchs. Doing so with HIM could buy the time during which more fundamental reforms could be started. If the situation warrants, some gentle advice from President Johnson to the Emperor, as one statesman to another, might provide just the nudge that is needed. I’d be willing to suggest to the President that he write a letter, if you’ll provide a text. A useful preliminary might be to give a frank appraisal of the situation, as we see it, to the Ethiopian Ambassador here (if he has the Emperor’s confidence). In any case, AF might work up a brief for Ed Korry to use in his talks with the Emperor—perhaps including suggestions for reforms and ways in which the US might help carry them out. Given our Kagnew installation and reports of the Soviets building radar installations and a military base in Somalia, I’m sure you’d agree that political stability in Ethiopia is most important to us. I’d be happy to join you in finding ways to help maintain it. R.W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–1/69. Secret. A copy was sent to [ text not declassified ]. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 310. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 310. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 1 Washington, February 11, 1966. SUBJECT Ethiopian Situation Thank you for your memorandum of February 9. 2 I share your concern and appreciate your offer to be of assistance. There are certainly reasons enough to worry about coup possibilities, although it is interesting that Ed Korry now thinks that on balance a coup is not imminent (Addis Ababa’s A–478, February 2). 3 Ed, on his own initiative, had a long private talk with the Emperor on February 3. You have probably seen his report on it (A–499, February 5). 4 The conversation merits close study, for Ed made most of the essential observations and the Emperor in reply ran true to form. It is becoming increasingly difficult to believe that anything or anyone can persuade the Emperor at this late stage of his career to do anything against his “better” judgment. In responding to Ed, the Emperor said he had “heard all these criticisms,” that “time and experience were essentials to all sure progress,” and that he would “soon take steps to arrange matters.” Ed’s comment to us is that he has heard this song before but that his net impression was clearly of a man who after almost 50 years in power was confident he knew how to deal with the present crisis. You may recall that after the 1960 abortive coup we had hopes that the Emperor would see the necessity of instituting reforms. To add to the pressures from his own top advisers (including General Abye Abebe, son-in-law and one of the heroes of the coup days, who fell out of grace as a result), a high ranking British diplomat and long time friend and confidant of the Emperor visited Addis and had a series of private talks with HIM urging reforms. All to no avail. There are similarities with the Shah and King Hassan, but there are also important differences, not the least of which is that the Emperor belongs to a much older generation and has the underlying feel that domestic reforms, instead of strengthening his own position, would strike at the heart of his personal power, as indeed they probably would. Finally, it is of interest that Ed has come to the conclusion that irrespective of all of the obvious dangers, the Emperor will probably stay on top. Obviously we are continuing to watch the situation closely and are looking for opportunities, but I frankly hesitate to use the trump of a Presidential message at this juncture, particularly in light of the latest audience. I suggest we at least wait for a while to see if anything results from the Emperor’s statement about “taking steps soon to arrange matters.” I certainly remain open to persuasion on making use of White House interests and perhaps meanwhile we might examine with Ed means of enlisting the President’s help to best advantage. 5 GMW 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Ethiopia. Secret. 2 Document 309 . Williams presumably received Komer’s memorandum on February 9. 3 Attached but not printed. 4 Attached but not printed. 5 A covering memorandum from Haynes to Komer argues against this “short-sighted approach” and notes that the question is not “whether” there will be an explosion in Ethiopia, but “when.” Therefore, an immediate effort to convince the Emperor to make necessary reforms had to be made, no matter how slim the chances. 311. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 311. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, February 18, 1966. SUBJECT Ethiopian Situation I appreciate your reply of February 11, 2 but feel that our dilemma in Ethiopia is that if we don’t take a few risks now we’ll risk a lot more trouble later. True, past experience tends to indicate that the Emperor “will probably stay on top” over the short-term. But how long is he likely to be around? Moreover, our interests would certainly be better served by a controlled evolution than a chaotic political upheaval when HIM dies, or even before. As Korry too seems to think, the situation calls for an effort now to try and influence events and the risks of moving now seem to me less than those in doing nothing. Why not at least come up with a package of reforms designed to (a) reduce the current widespread disaffection among key elements of the population, and (b) increase the likelihood of gradual rather than violent change? Such a brief would examine such problems as succession, constitutional monarchy, representative government, and economic and social reforms. Then we could decide whether to try out such a brief on the Emperor, perhaps by some high-level personage. It might be a perfect assignment for Gov. Harriman because (a) HIM and Harriman know each other and get along well, (b) HIM considers Harriman his equal in statesmanship, (c) HIM and Harriman belong to the same generation, and (d) HIM would be impressed with our sending our Number One trouble-shooter to see him. I am also mindful of the Gov’s success last May in convincing HIM not to recognize the Chicoms. If the present pattern continues in Ethiopia, our stake there will be in serious jeopardy. The lack of alternatives suggests that a timely effort to stave off trouble would be worth taking, even if its chances of success are slight. What would we lose? If Ed Korry returns on consultation, the Harriman trip proposal could be tried out on him. R.W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Secret. A copy was sent to Harriman. 2 Document 310 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 312. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 312. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, March 31, 1966. No. 5–66 SUBJECT Prospects for Ethiopia SUMMARY Haile Selassie still reigns as supreme authority in Ethiopia, but his declining vigor, his absorption in external affairs, and the growing complexity of government are leading to general immobility of the Imperial system. The elite of the bureaucracy and the army are increasingly alienated from the regime, and the armed forces are hard pressed to put down insurgencies in the provinces. Even with the inspiration of successful coups elsewhere in Africa, however, the odds are against the Ethiopians turning out their Emperor. Nor is the Emperor likely to change the system in any meaningful way. The outlook is for growing internal discontent, continued insurgency in the provinces, and demands on the US for more military aid. The death of Haile Selassie will probably be followed by a period of confusion, with traditional and modernized elements and factions of the armed forces contending for power. In these circumstances, the Ethiopian social and political order as now constituted is likely to be shaken, and even the territorial integrity of the Empire itself may be challenged. At a minimum, the US may find it harder and certainly costlier to retain the Kagnew Station communications base in the post-Haile Selassie period. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–1/69. Secret. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates. 313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, June 29, 1966, 7:43 p.m. 363. Subject: Somali Note. Ref: Mogadiscio’s 716 2 and 720. 3 1. Following are Department’s views for reply to note. 2. Note appears constitute for record Somali position in response recent Ethiopian and Kenyan campaign against Malik and Soviet arms to Somalia. In order not stir up public controversy affecting US–GSR relations or increase tensions in area, we prefer it be treated as confidential at least for present. 3. On assumption Abdirazak’s Government will probably remain in office, Ambassador Thurston on his return should take up substance note with Abdirazak following clarification government’s status as follow up conversation May 29, as well as normal resumption contacts following visit Washington. Hopefully need for written reply can thereby be obviated. 4. In discussing GSR note, Ambassador should make following points stating he speaking under instructions: a. US Government fully shares Abdirazak’s concern over increasing tensions, arms race and risk escalation. Moreover we deeply appreciate his wish seek abatement these tensions and find ways resolve problems with neighbors. b. It is our belief three countries concerned basically interested in maintaining peace, have no aggressive intentions and wish reduce respective arms burdens. We cannot speak for Soviets, which is matter for Somalis to handle, but US would certainly cooperate with any regional agreement for reduction of arms. Thus we strongly hope that Abdirazak in keeping his statesman-like qualities will take initiative either directly with neighbors or through OAU or other neutral governments, possibly Sudanese. c. US Government has strong doubts about appropriateness or practicability of it getting directly involved itself in this African regional problem. We have always believed big powers should not meddle in inter-African disputes, which can usually be solved far more readily and satisfactorily by parties directly concerned. d. Nevertheless US Government strongly favors peace and stability in Horn of Africa. Hardly in US interests—much less in interest of countries concerned—to provide economic assistance to all three countries when they feel obliged divert such large proportion scarce resources to security forces. Thus US would be willing lend helpful hand in background and cooperate fully if three countries wish and if there are genuine prospects for mutually acceptable formula. e. Re US supplying military assistance to Ethiopia, it should be recalled that US military assistance predated Somali independence and neither was nor is directed against Somalia. US purpose has been to assist Ethiopia in maintaining internal security and undertaking collective security roles, i.e. Korea and Congo. Although we fully aware strong Somali feelings this matter, must be frankly recognized that public Somalia statements re status Ogaden and NEP, Soviet military assistance, and tribal and guerrilla activity across borders have given rise strong fears both Ethiopia and Kenya. Will be recalled US Government warned GSR at time it decided accept Soviet military assistance that this would inject cold war element in purely African controversy and lead to arms race. As example, Ethiopian military especially concerned now about arrival new Soviet tanks Somalia and there are indications we will receive strong demands for greater US military assistance. It should be noted this connection that Somali estimates on Ethiopian forces greatly exaggerated, notably size of army and police, tanks for police, destroyers for navy, etc. Similarly size of Kenyan police force distorted. Moreover US does not provide any military assistance to Kenya, yet according reports coming to us armed Somali tribal activity has increased over past months in poorly defended NEP which has obviously preoccupied both Kenya and Ethiopia and which was bound provoke strong reaction. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH. Confidential. Drafted by AFN Deputy Director Matthew J. Looram on June 28, cleared by AFE Deputy Director for Eastern African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy and Colonel Dregne of DOD/ISA, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Khartoum, and by pouch to Asmara. 2 Telegram 716 from Mogadiscio, June 25, reported that the Acting Foreign Minister handed the U.S. Charge a 10-page note expressing grave concern over the U.S.-supplied military build-up of Ethiopia, especially U.S. provision of a “considerable number of supersonic military aircraft (type F5A) to the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force,” which the note called a grave threat to the security and sovereignty of the Somali Republic and to the peace and tranquillity of East and Northeast Africa and the world. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 720 from Mogadiscio, June 25, transmitted the verbatim text of the Somali note to the Department. (Ibid.) 314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, August 26, 1966, 8:28 p.m. 36666. Ref: Addis Ababa 713, 2 641 3 and 545. 4 1. Appreciate your comprehensive expose of dilemma and complex difficulties confronting or about to confront us re imminent Ethiopian demands for more military assistance. Moreover you are to be commended for effective presentation U.S. position to Aklilu. 2. Following is guidance on some of questions you have raised to extent it can be given in advance of receipt Ethiopian request: a. Our primary short and long term objectives in Ethiopia are first maintenance Kagnew and second stability of Horn of Africa area including avoidance arms race. (Objectives are in consonance but admittedly means cannot always be.) b. We do not wish do anything at this juncture which would in your opinion provoke Ethiopian expectation of payoff in hardware request and thus aggravate arms race in region. This includes requirements for more Kagnew land if you deem preferable postpone this request for time being or if you prefer handle land package (Dept’s CA-994) 5 in increments, in which case order of technical priority would be (1) 300 acre easement area, (2) one and half acre conversion to exclusive use, (3) 100 acre exclusive use area adjacent Tract E (which itself acceptable in increments). c. If Embassy’s efforts fail dissuade IEG from presenting shopping list (and we suggest you use every opportunity to continue these efforts) we will examine list carefully together with your recommendations and estimates of likely Ethiopian actions in response turndown before making obviously difficult decision. However, we would be very reluctant contribute to further escalation arms race. Moreover apart from problem of Viet Nam priorities, at this juncture we see no probability of any fund increases above planned program. d. We would not be prepared nevertheless take lying down Ethiopian “vindictiveness” on international issues, Soviet military assistance and advisors, Viet Nam, etc. After all Ethiopia currently receives well over half of all U.S. military aid to Africa and current plans envisage continuation substantial program. Total AID assistance remains considerable with Ethiopia largest African beneficiary development loans for FY 66. e. Re statement on Western support Somali military buildup by economic assistance, presumably you are referring to Italian budgetary support. U.S. programs are limited and exclusively developmental, would not necessarily have otherwise been undertaken by Somalis and thus do not necessarily provide savings to Somali budget but in fact additional charges. Re U.S. assistance to Somali police, amount of arms involved minimal and we recently turned down Somali request for modern weapons for police special force. Whether IEG appreciates it or not, fact is that maintenance of at least some U.S. influence in Somalia remains in Ethiopian interests despite admitted lack success so far in abating tensions and arms race. However, we have not given up and are pleased with your initiative in urging Ethiopian-Somali dialogue to Aklilu. We plan further moves in this direction. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Lang and Herman Kleine, AID Assistant Administrator for Africa; and approved by Palmer. 2 Dated August 19. (Ibid., POL ETH–US) 3 Dated August 15. (Ibid., POL 1 ETH–US) 4 Dated August 9. (Ibid., POL 1 US–VIET S) 5 Dated August 4. (Ibid., DEF 15 ETH–US) 315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, September 20, 1966, 2:01 p.m. 50340. Ref: Mogadiscio’s 596 2 and 651 3 (not repeated Paris). 1. We find your talk with Soviet Ambassador Diukarev on arms race in Horn of Africa interesting. As you know, we have believed on basis previous approach to Soviets with regard arms limitation in Middle East that Soviets would probably not be interested in any “Gentleman’s Agreement” on Horn of Africa arms freeze. Still remains to be seen to what extent Diukarev’s proposal was simply tactical probing our position on his part although we inclined agree he would probably not have put forward idea unless it at least consonant with his view of Moscow’s disposition. 2. We, like you, see possible jokers in Soviet Ambassador’s proposal. Moscow may have decided it does not wish provide any more sophisticated equipment to Somali Army and is willing concentrate on insurgency training and secret deliveries of light weapons, at same time obtaining concession from us on US military aid to Ethiopia. This would tie in with recent [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] report that 20 Somalis from Kenya’s Northeast Province had departed by air for 6 months training in USSR. 3. You have pointed out other pitfalls such as possibility Soviets figure arms moratorium would put relatively more strain on US-Ethiopian ties than on Soviet-Somali relations. Military assistance has been a major element in our overall relations with IEG and the cessation of our aid would have to be handled in a fashion in which it would be clear to IEG that it is in its overall interest. 4. Another difficulty in implementing any arms limitation agreement with Soviets in recent IEG request to French for some $10 million worth of tanks and other equipment, outcome of which we have little control over. 5. Difficult conceive how both US and Soviet Governments on basis mutual understanding could cut off fairly sizable ongoing arms programs to Ethiopia and Somalia without consulting governments concerned and persuading them it would be in their interest to accept such proposal. HIM might resist any arms limitation now, insisting that Ethiopia achieve clear preponderance before agreeing to arms freeze. Soviet position vis-a-vis Mogadiscio probably more tenable since quantities of equipment, supplies and ammunition delivered are commensurate with size of present and foreseeable forces. US on other hand considerably short of achieving Ethiopian objectives in vehicles, parts and ammunition. Foregoing could possibly be rationalized depending on degree of routine follow-on support envisaged under Soviet overture, i.e. prohibition on lethal armament but permissive attrition support. 6. Obviously would be preferable if at all possible for Africans themselves take initiative in limiting arms rather than US and Soviets trying impose it on them. 7. On balance, there seems considerable merit your continuing to explore how serious Soviets are re possible arms moratorium in Horn of Africa with your Soviet colleague in Mogadiscio. Of course, we feel it necessary to obtain Emperor’s reaction, at some point, since otherwise we could seriously jeopardize our position in Ethiopia. Certainly we could not afford assume Soviets would not leak this information or that it would not get back to IEG through other sources. 8. Before deciding how to proceed, however, we would appreciate comments from action addressee posts, which should keep in mind President’s interest in new initiatives in Africa as outlined in May 26 speech. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 AFR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Looram and Walker on September 16; cleared by Lang, Chief of ACDA’s International Relations Bureau’s Political Affairs Division Robert H. Kranich, Hamilton at the White House, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs Malcolm Toon, and Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson; and approved by Fredericks. Also sent to Addis Ababa, Moscow, and Nairobi and repeated to Dar-es-Salaam, Paris, and USUN for the Secretary. 2 In telegram 596 from Mogadiscio, September 9, Ambassador Raymond Thurston reported that he discussed the arms race in Africa and how it absorbed the inadequate budgetary and technical resources of these countries with Soviet Ambassador Diukarev, who had asked why the United States had recently given F–5s to Ethiopia. After pointing out the large deliveries of heavy Soviet military equipment to Somalia during the past year, Thurston asked Diukarev if there was anything their two governments could do to stop this escalation. Thurston then suggested a “Gentleman’s Agreement” under which the two countries would agree to supply no more arms to either Ethiopia or Somalia. (Ibid.) 3 Dated September 16. (Ibid.) 316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, October 1, 1966, 2:13 a.m. 58209. 1. We assume HIM has several motivations in wishing visit Washington so urgently: 2 a. Given Ambassador Korry’s very effective argumentation against need and desirability of more arms for Ethiopia, Emperor wishes make appeal at higher level in view Soviet arms deliveries to Somalia; b. Emperor desires discuss world problems; and c. HIM particularly worried by possibility French Somaliland plebiscite may lead to Somali take over and further Soviet penetration Red Sea area. Re latter we note Aklilu saw De Gaulle Sept. 27 and assume he received some assurances re likelihood French Somaliland may opt for continued association with French which should calm HIM somewhat. 2. We wish steer clear involvement Djibouti dispute, despite fact seems preferable French presence continue in some form owing danger Ethiopian-Somali hostilities and strategic importance Djibouti at entrance Red Sea. Our position in Committee 24 is maintain silence as matter primarily for Africans and French resolve. We have so informed Somali Ambassador here. When we see what if any specific resolution emerges, we will decide how vote. Ambassador Thurston’s interesting suggestion re territorial swap (Djibouti to Ethiopia, Ogaden to Somalia) now complicated by French commitment to plebiscite and in any event situation would probably have to get much worse before Ethiopians would be willing consider such critical decision. Same applies for present to idea of establishing “Free City” under UN auspices which might turn out to be least bad solution, should it appear later on that territory not likely opt for continued association with France. 4. Re Emperor’s tactic of putting squeeze on us for arms: a. We remain strongly disinclined to contribute to further aggravation arms race in region, particularly when in our judgement current Ethiopian military forces capable of coping with foreseeable Somali threat and there is no need for any substantive build-up of Ethiopian capabilities in the categories mentioned by General Iyassu. b. Still believe bi-lateral Ethiopian-Somali negotiations or through third African party desirable objective to continue working toward, despite obvious Ethiopian reluctance. Despite Sadeq’s recent statement Ambassador Weathersby he did not intend pursue mediation idea at this time and Ethiopian suspicions of Sadeq, believe he could be helpful, possibly during forthcoming OAU meeting. We are considering other alternatives. c. We strongly concur with Ambassador Korry’s recommendation to attempt get forthcoming OAU Summit conferees focus on Africa’s arms races. Separate tel being prepared on this. We have doubts, however, re advisability of any USG message to OAU conference emphasizing importance this issue inasmuch as USG would then appear behind what we hope will seem strictly African initiative. d. We see some advantages in trying to buy time and to reassure HIM by discussions on force goals and re-emphasizing desirable overall security structure IEG should concentrate on. Fact is however we will thus have been maneuvered back into position of discussing Ethiopian arms demands, when it looked as though Ethiopian request to French had gotten us off the hook. Moreover, as Ambassador Korry had originally suspected, clear that Ethiopian demands far greater than anything we could meet at this time or that they could support. Presently planned Ethiopian FY 67 MAP program already totals $14 million out of limited funds available for Africa, and funding any additional equipment is highly improbable. Substitution of new items for those already planned would require elimination F–5’s, vehicles, ammo or other materiel which Ethiopians presumably want and which would make more sense for Ethiopian security. Moreover, items raised such as 105’s, APC’s, anti-aircraft, M–48 and UH–1D in terribly short supply and M–41’s frozen. UH–1D helicopters cost $300,000 plus per copy and are questionable with respect Somali threat. Furthermore, open terrain in Eritrea and Ogaden would make helicopters vulnerable, particularly in the attack role where there would be a long exposure time. Ambassador Korry may wish convey to General Iyassu that his requests: I. Far greater than anything we could meet. II. Far exceed what they can support. III. Far beyond what is required to meet foreseeable threat. e. In meantime also concur with Ambassador Korry’s intention obtain clarification of status IEG arms request to French, pointing out USG assumption that French should be able supplement an already very large US MAP. 5. HIM’s desire visit Washington under urgent consideration and separate message will be sent. 6. In sum, we naturally continue attach high importance to US-Ethiopian relations given international stature HIM, our desire contribute to stability Horn of Africa and our interests in Ethiopia, notably Kagnew. However, we obviously not position give satisfaction on French Somaliland and our flexibility re meeting Ethiopian arms requests very limited. Therefore, despite HIM’s increasing and understandable concern over developments in region, Ambassador Korry should continue his excellent efforts point out realities of situation faced by USG. 3 Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Looram and Walker on September 30; cleared by Richard W. Aherne of EUR/FBX, Warren, Philip Megna of AFI, Lang, and Donald R. Morris of IO/UNP; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Asmara, Mogadiscio, Moscow, Paris, Khartoum, Nairobi, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 2 In telegram 1162 from Addis Ababa, September 22, Korry reported that the Emperor had requested that he ascertain if President Johnson would receive him for “only a few hours” in Washington or New York so that he could explain personally the problems facing Ethiopia, including a “second Suez.” (Ibid.) During a short private conversation with Secretary Rusk following Rusk’s September 24 luncheon with African Foreign Ministers at the United Nations, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Ketema said that the Emperor had instructed him to ask for a meeting with President Johnson at the President’s earliest convenience. (Telegram 1008 from USUN (Secto 22), September 24; ibid.) 3 In telegram 1274 from Addis Ababa, October 4, Korry rejected the Department’s thesis that Ethiopia was capable of dealing with threats to its security, and argued that it was a mistake to view the problem solely as a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Referring to the Emperor’s view that U.S. preoccupation with Vietnam was permitting the Soviets and “their chosen instruments” to move with impunity in the Red Sea basin, the Ambassador pointed out that he had warned for 42 months that the Soviets and their friends would attempt to create chaos in Ethiopia and force the United States out of Kagnew. Korry asked for authorization to negotiate the lowest possible price without making any commitments. (Ibid.) 317. Memorandum of Conversation 317. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 1, 1966. SUBJECT Call of Ethiopian Foreign Minister on Assistant Secretary Palmer PARTICIPANTS H.E. Ketema Yifru, Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Tashoma Haile-Mariam, Ethiopian Ambassador to the U.S. Mr. Ayalew Mandefro, Private Secretary of Foreign Minister Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Mr. Matthew J. Looram, Country Director, Northeast African Affairs Mr. John A. Buche, Acting OIC, Ethiopian Affairs Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru said he had come to Washington at the behest of the Emperor in order to clarify the situation concerning the Emperor’s request to see the President. The Foreign Minister said the Emperor was deeply concerned over Ethiopia’s security and desired to speak to the President as soon as possible, preferably before he went to Moscow (toward the end of October after visiting Cairo). Ketema offered two possibilities on the timing, either before October 7 when HIM leaves on his Middle Eastern trip or November 9–13 between the OAU summit and the arrival of the Czech President. Assistant Secretary Palmer explained how crowded the President’s schedule was in the immediate weeks ahead but assured the Foreign Minister that the Emperor’s request was being given the highest consideration and an answer should be forthcoming the first part of the week. Ketema stated there appears to be a basic misunderstanding between the United States and Ethiopia concerning Ethiopia’s security needs. Ethiopia could not accept parity with Somalia which the MAAG mission seemed to be urging on the IEG. He stressed that Ethiopia’s internal security problems and external threats, not only from Somalia but from other Moslem powers, made it imperative that Ethiopia have a stronger security force. He said Ethiopia reckons its needs at 48,000 men and the US insists that 36,000 are sufficient. He said the Somalis were already superior to Ethiopia in tanks, APC’s, artillery and antiaircraft weapons and that the Somali soldiers are armed with automatic weapons in comparison with the M–1’s of the Ethiopians. In addition the USSR was giving Somalia a year’s supply of POL—which some Ethiopians regarded as evidence of offensive intentions on the part of the Somalis. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH. Secret. Drafted by Buche on October 4. 318. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 318. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 12, 1966, 8:30 a.m. SUBJECT Reply to Emperor Selassie’s request to see you At Tab A, Nick Katzenbach recommends that you politely decline Haile Selassie’s request for an early Washington meeting with you. 2 At Tab B is a proposed message which attempts to do this as gently as possible, offering to send a personal representative if the Emperor thinks it would be useful. 3 Selassie is worried about two related problems: possible Somali domination of French Somaliland, which contains Ethiopia’s major outlet to the sea; and fear that the Russians are providing more sophisticated weapons to the Somalis than we are to the Ethiopians. There is some cause for the first worry. The second is primarily a tactic to get us to give him more MAP. Both are the latest manifestations of an old blood feud between Ethiopians and Somalis which is reminiscent of the India-Pakistan problem. Ed Korry has handled the Emperor very well. (You may want to glance at the cables at Tab C.) 4 Essentially, we are trying to keep the lid on—to avoid violence over French Somaliland and/or an escalation of the arms race. There is some evidence that the Soviets are in fundamental agreement at least on the latter. The proposed message (1) avoids a crash meeting which could worsen things by stirring up the Somalis, (2) pushes Selassie toward a less bellicose position, and (3) notes in passing that the real answer might be regional disarmament plan for Africa. (President Nyerere of Tanzania has already suggested this.) I recommend that you approve the message. Walt Approve 5 Disapprove Speak to me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ethiopia, 9/1/66–5/31/67. Secret. 2 Memorandum from Katzenbach to Johnson, October 7; not printed. 3 See Document 319 . 4 Telegram 1162 from Addis Ababa, September 22; see footnote 2, Document 316 . 5 This option is checked. 319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, October 14, 1966, 6:14 p.m. 66484. For Ambassador. Ref: Addis 1162. 2 Please deliver the following Presidential message to the Emperor: 3 “Your Imperial Majesty: Ambassador Korry has kept me fully informed of your recent conversations, and has conveyed to me your desire that we meet as soon as possible. I certainly understand the importance of the matters which prompt your request. Although these issues are, of course, of primary interest to the countries directly involved, they also affect the general peace and welfare of Africa and the world. Thus, under ordinary circumstances I would be most happy to receive you here to discuss them personally and at length. However, as you know, I am leaving on Monday for 17 days in Asia, and I understand that you will also be away from your capital until late this month. My schedule for the period immediately following my return is already crowded well beyond capacity. I am afraid that I must, therefore, suggest that we postpone a personal discussion at least until I have worked my way through the urgent matters which will accumulate during my absence. In the meantime, if you would find it useful, I should be pleased to send a personal representative to Addis Ababa to discuss these matters with you and your associates. 4 I would choose a man in whom I have great personal confidence and who could accurately reflect my views. Perhaps it would be most to our mutual benefit if he were to come after you have an opportunity to talk these problems over with your colleagues at the upcoming meeting of the Organization of African Unity. However, I will be happy to bow to your judgment on the matter of timing, as well as on the question of the usefulness of such a representative. In any event, I hope Your Majesty understands that this reply does not reflect any lack of American interest in the problems which concern you. Ambassador Korry has well conveyed my own thoughts, which are the products of lengthy deliberation and a strong interest in the reduction of tensions in Africa and around the world. I fully recognize your high sense of responsibility for the security of Ethiopia and its trading outlets. But it seems to me of immense importance to Ethiopia and her neighbors that every effort be made to avoid any further escalation of the arms race. Indeed, it appears that all interests could well be served by movement in the direction of a regional armament agreement, perhaps administered through the OAU. All of us need to dig deeply into our reserves of goodwill and imagination in dealing with this kind of problem. Nobody is more aware than I of the complexities involved in dealing with this kind of issue, particularly when there is an absence of mutual trust between the parties to the negotiation. However, with time and patience and self-restraint, progress on the most difficult issues is often possible. I have every confidence that Your Majesty’s leadership and statesmanship will be equal to the challenge of this most critical of the issues facing Ethiopia and her neighbors. If you and your colleagues can work out your differences in a manner which assures peace and stability, your example will be an inspiration not only to Africa, but to all mankind. We stand ready to serve that cause in whatever way we can be useful. My deepest apologies that I must postpone our meeting. Please let me know your views on a personal representative. I want you to know that my thoughts are with you in these difficult days. With warmest personal regards. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson.” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted at the White House and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. Repeated to Mogadiscio, and by pouch to Nairobi, London, and Paris. 2 See footnote 2, Document 316 . 3 In telegram 1409 from Addis Ababa, October 15, Korry reported that he had delivered the President’s message to the Prime Minister’s office that morning. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH) 4 Telegram 68168 to Addis Ababa, October 18, requested Korry’s views on a proposal that Governor Harriman, as special Presidential emissary, visit Ethiopia around November 1 on his return from the Manila Conference. In telegram 1455 from Addis Ababa, October 19, the Ambassador concurred; telegram 69173 to Addis Ababa, October 19, instructed him to proceed. In telegram 1470 from Addis Ababa, October 20, however, Korry reported that the Prime Minister had refused to discuss the possibility of such a visit before the Emperor returned to Addis Ababa on October 29 and also believed that the Emperor would prefer to wait for an opportunity to see the President himself. (Ibid.) 320. Memorandum of Conversation 320. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 17, 1966, 5:30 p.m. SUBJECT US-Somali Relations PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Abdirazak Hagi Hussen, Somali Prime Minister Ahmed Yusuf Dualeh, Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Mohamed Adan, Somali Ambassador to US Abdurahman Abby Farah, Somali Acting Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ismail Kahin, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Matthew Looram, Country Director, AF:AFNE The Secretary said that just before his departure for the Far East this morning, the President had asked him to send his wishes to the Somali Prime Minister. The Prime Minister stated he had hoped very much to see the President. He went on to say that over the past three years Somali-US relations had been good, although there were some problems on the horizon. The US seemed to believe that the Somali Government had made its mistake when it sought arms from the USSR for defense and has wrongly interpreted this move as an aggressive intention. The press had also persisted in putting Somalia in a very unfavorable light in this regard by exaggerating the extent of Soviet arms deliveries. The purpose of obtaining these arms, which were of a modest amount, was solely for self-defense in light of the Ethiopian military build-up over many years. The recent delivery to Ethiopia of US supersonic jets, in addition to all the other arms, had bothered the Somalis very much. Nevertheless, the Government of Somalia has tried to maintain friendly relations with the United States Government and has eschewed making public attacks on arms deliveries to Ethiopia. Moreover, the US seemed to consider that Somalia was relatively unimportant in comparison with its neighbors, and, of course, the US had no vital interest in the country. It is hoped that this impression was not true, but there was some feeling that the USG had decided at the time of the Somali-Soviet military agreement of 1963 to “hold up” aid to Somalia. It seemed to the Prime Minister that the USG should take more interest in Somalia and not leave the field to its enemies. The US did not realize its own power, seemed to have a “complex” about Communism and appeared unduly sensitive to the Soviets coming into any area. The Secretary stated that the US wished to have good relations with Somalia and to see Somalia safe, prosperous and independent. If the Ethiopian Government should move across its frontiers into Somalia, all of the United Nations, including the US, would be with Somalia, and vice-versa. There was no US policy to extend its influence in the area by means of a third country. We were satisfied with Somalia’s position of non-alignment and wished to be friends with all the states in the region. It was unfortunate that we were dragged into the disputes between these countries, with all of whom we were on friendly terms. The Secretary stated that the United States Government regretted very much the escalation of the arms race in the area, and attached great importance to the need for regional understanding on the level of armaments. Otherwise the escalation would continue with unpredictable results, and the economic burden would increase. As to the Soviet aspect, the Secretary stated that the Soviet Union had made substantial shipments of arms to such countries as the UAR, Syria and Algeria, creating a great sense of insecurity in those regions. He was concerned by a similar development in Somalia. Possibly we did have a “complex” regarding Soviet activities; the cost to the US in money and lives as a result of Soviet activities since World War II had been enormous. The Secretary added that there was no policy of “holding up” assistance to Somalia. There were admittedly problems as a result of the Congress’ reduction in appropriations and limitation on the number of recipient countries. Moreover, we would like to see some reduction in the arms race. At the outbreak of Pakistan-India hostilities, the Congress had come very close to enacting legislation prohibiting all assistance to these two countries. Moreover, the West European countries should assume greater responsibility with regard to aid to African countries. US resources were limited, and from a Somalia political point of view, it might be prudent for the Somali Government to have a broad pattern of bilateral assistance. The Somali Prime Minister thanked the Secretary for his views but still felt Somalia was not getting its full share of US assistance. The relative size of the population of Ethiopia as compared to Somalia had been greatly exaggerated. Moreover, the US and others had some responsibility for the arms race in the area. As far back as 1960, the time of Somali independence, Ethiopia created a security problem for Somalia by already having three Army divisions and the Bodyguard. Moreover, Ethiopia did not need to cross any frontier in order to treat the Somali people in a savage and provocative manner. It was not long ago that Somalia’s territory was penetrated by Ethiopia bulldozers building a road. The Ethiopians subsequently found they were wrong when the location of the frontier was ascertained but, of course, refused to admit it. The US supply of arms and particularly the F–5s to Ethiopia compelled the Somali Government to rectify the situation. They had not tried to get similar Soviet planes, but would certainly have been justified in doing so. In response to the Secretary’s question, the Prime Minister admitted that they had obtained “a very few MIGs.” The Secretary concluded by saying that the United States Government hoped very much that all these problems might be settled by talks between the parties concerned in a spirit of goodwill. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Looram of AFNE on October 19 and approved in S on October 26. The conversation was held in the Secretary’s office. 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, November 1, 1966, 5:54 p.m. 76805. Subj: Gentlemen’s Agreement on Arms Limitations Horn of Africa. Ref: State 50340. 2 1. Dept has carefully considered this matter pending Soviet Ambassador’s return Mogadiscio and has come to conclusion we should handle further contacts with Soviet Ambassador on this issue with great caution. 2. In addition reasons given reftel and points made by addressee posts, Secretary brought up subject with Gromyko at opening UNGA, but latter showed no disposition discuss conventional arms question (State 66737 Notal). 3 3. Moreover even if some sort of US-Soviet understanding possible on limitations of arms deliveries in area, likely Soviets would continue support Somali guerrilla action against Kenya and Ethiopia. In fact from reports (if true) that no new Soviet military assistance agreement concluded at time Somali President Aden’s visit Moscow, Soviets may have decided that past and future deliveries of conventional arms under original agreement all that Somalia can absorb and support at this time and that guerrilla warfare more appropriate and profitable under circumstances. 4. Despite limited chances of success, believe far preferable (at least for time being) that African states themselves seek arms limitations between each other, rather than Soviets and ourselves trying reach understanding behind backs of countries directly concerned. 5. Therefore should on his return, Soviet Ambassador raise question with you, you should confine yourself to stating: we have taken note of reports if true of no new agreement for Soviet arms deliveries; we are similarly endeavoring curb arms race; however these efforts being undermined by increased Somali guerrilla activities; and request his comments this aspect of current tensions in area. You should not take initiative on matter. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 AFR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Looram on October 31; cleared by Palmer, AFE Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs Curtis C. Strong, Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs James W. Pratt, and Andrew L. Steigman of S; and approved by Thompson. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Moscow, and Nairobi. 2 Document 315 . 3 Dated October 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LIB) 322. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to Secretary of Defense McNamara 322. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, November 2, 1966. Dear Bob: Our African experts are concerned about the expansion over the past three years of our military communications center at Kagnew Station in northern Ethiopia. Their concern is that by increasing the size of this facility and the numbers of U.S. personnel involved we are giving the Ethiopians a bigger hostage to fortune and a greater leverage on us than they would otherwise have. Since January 1963 the number of U.S. personnel and dependents at Kagnew has gone from about 2,500 to 3,500 and we have recently been asked to acquire considerably more land for the facility. To the Ethiopians such growth is an index of the importance we attach to Kagnew. The price of our tenure could involve us more deeply in the Horn of Africa than our vital interests warrant. I wonder if you might have someone take a look at the military requirements of Kagnew with a view to determining whether we can avoid visible expansion, or even in fact reduce some personnel if possible. Obviously, such a determination depends on a number of facts and upon military requirements that we are not in a position to assess. 2 Sincerely yours, Nick 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia. Secret. 2 On November 14, Secretary McNamara responded that the Department of Defense would study the recent growth of operations at Kagnew Station and the prospects for stabilization or personnel reduction at the facility. (Ibid.) 323. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 323. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, January 13, 1967. Dear Nick: Your letter of November 2, 1966 requested that we look into the prospects for stabilization or reduction of personnel at Kagnew Station in Asmara. 2 We have now completed the review I mentioned in my interim reply of November 14, 1966. Unfortunately, it does not appear that we can make substantial reductions at Kagnew over the near future unless we are prepared to sacrifice some significant capabilities and products which the Kagnew complex now provides. The geographical location at Asmara is uniquely suited for the Kagnew operations. For some of the most important missions, including the bulk of the security agency missions, we do not have feasible alternative sites. The relocation of certain Kagnew activities is technically possible. However, these moves are unattractive because they could not be accomplished without incurring operational and other costs, and they are not sufficient to make Kagnew Station much less conspicuous. We also cannot foresee any early developments which would permit us to carry out any significant portion of the Kagnew operation by other than land-based techniques. We do not presently anticipate, however, any major new growth at Kagnew beyond the additional antenna and facilities acreage we recently asked the State Department to obtain. With regard to manning, it does not appear that the personnel level should increase by more than 300 (including dependents) over the next 5 years. In evaluating the need for Kagnew, we have kept in mind that its operations are by no means confined to serving the interests of the Department of Defense. On the contrary, a major function of the station is to collect and report intelligence which meets national requirements and which is thus important to the State Department [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. You may wish to go into this facet of the Kagnew operations in greater detail. I have instructed my staff to make arrangements for any briefings on this aspect which you or other key officers of the State Department may desire. Sincerely, Bob 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia. Top Secret. 2 Document 322 . 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, January 18, 1967, 6:49 p.m. 121079. 1. Somali Ambassador Adan contacted DeptOff January 17 expressing dismay and concern on learning press announcement of HIM’s imminent visit here. Complained about not being forewarned in order prepare his Government and indicated GSR would undoubtedly attach sinister motives to HIM’s coming before French Somaliland plebiscite. He asked purpose of HIM’s visit. 2. DeptOff explained procedures of informal visits of Chiefs of State Washington, pointing out not customary discuss such visits with third parties until announcement made by White House. Also noted GSR had not informed us in advance of President Aden’s visits Moscow and Peking. 3. DeptOff stated it was largely owing to Somalia’s strident irredentist policies and particularly its guerrilla activities that Somalia’s neighbors were looking to U.S. for assistance and reassurance which in turn posed most difficult problems for USG. No surprise neighbors deeply preoccupied with whole situation in Horn of Africa. While we recognized faults on all sides, as far as Somalia concerned its current tactics seemed provocative and dangerous and were contributing to undermining U.S. efforts to calm and reassure Ethiopia and Kenya. USG continued believe it was essential that every effort be taken to moderate tensions and search for ways reaching modus vivendi between parties concerned. We believed it was not in genuine interests of peoples concerned for governments of very poor and underdeveloped countries in Horn spend vast amounts for military purposes and thereby neglect badly needed economic development. Somali Government was hardly contributing to U.S. objectives in area. Prime Minister Abdirazak had told Assistant Secretary Palmer in response latter’s suggestions for ways moderate tensions there could be no peace until Somalis reunified. 4. Adan urged need for dialogue and said GSR always ready discuss mutual problems but Ethiopians and Kenyans refused. DeptOff asked what there was to discuss if GSR had no alternative proposal to taking over sooner or later one-third of Ethiopia and one-third of Kenya. Adan stated GSR had no choice given popular pressures. DeptOff replied this was exactly what Ethiopians stated when we urged discussions with moderate Somali leaders, such as President Aden and Abdirazak. 5. Adan stressed that President Aden had not gone to Moscow to request more arms and that Soviets were only providing what had been earlier promised. DeptOff wondered if this was the case just why he had gone to Moscow and noted continuous arrival Somalia of Soviet military equipment. 6. DeptOff told Adan he could assure his Government that visit was long standing matter, no one single or immediate issue had occasioned it and that while it would undoubtedly be raised, French Somaliland issue would unlikely be principal subject for discussions. USG’s policy remained to favor peaceful settlements and oppose escalation of arms race. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Looram ; cleared by Strong and AF Deputy Assistant Secretary William C. Trimble; and approved by Looram. Repeated to Addis Ababa and Nairobi, and by pouch to Khartoum, Paris, and London. 325. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 325. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, February 4, 1967. I–20738/67 SUBJECT Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia Emperor Haile Selassie is scheduled to meet with President Johnson on 14 February 1967. The meeting is in response to the Emperor’s urgent request to express personally his grave concerns for Ethiopia’s security. He will point out UAR and Soviet advances in the Red Sea basin and emphasize the Soviet-supported Somali threat to Ethiopian security. In addition to seeing the President, the Emperor has asked to see you and Governor Harriman at Blair House. In preparation for the visit, the Ethiopians have submitted a list of major equipment requirements totaling well over $150 million (including tanks, APCs, antitank and anti-aircraft guns, C–130s, F–5s and helicopters. STRIKECOM has done a comprehensive study of the Ethiopian military capabilities, requirements and the probable threats facing Ethiopia. It is STRIKECOM’s judgment and the Joint Staff’s that the well-balanced Ethiopian forces will be capable of coping with present and future external threats without an increase in forces and major armaments. They see that the main Ethiopian needs as being in the fields of training and logistics. They also see a need, however, for helicopters (to which the Ethiopians attach the highest priority) and, at a later time, transport aircraft. Our objectives during HIM’s visit are to say “no” to his equipment demands and still preserve our good relations with him. If we fail on the latter point, we will run a real risk of unsettling the satisfactory arrangement under which we use Kagnew Station, a key communications-intelligence facility at Asmara. We must do what we can to demonstrate to the Emperor that we are truly interested in Ethiopia’s security and we are responsive where his needs are real. In the latter regard, we plan to speed up deliveries of certain key items already programmed under MAP (e.g. APCs and vehicles). We would also propose to furnish four UH–1D helicopters (instead of eight as requested by the Emperor) as soon as Ethiopian crews could be trained (eight-ten months). These are the only two positive gestures that could be made without substantially increasing the level of MAP. The addition of four UH–1Ds and several other minor items would mean an increase of about $1 million each in the FY 1967 and FY 1968 programs. The Chief of Staff of the Army does not concur with the provision of four UH–1D helicopters. Although there would be no need to divert the aircraft from Vietnam units or those scheduled to deploy to Vietnam, the Chief of Staff is concerned about the shortage of engines for the UH-type helicopters. He recommends that all current and future production of the UH-type helicopters be retained under US Army control at least until 1968 to hold as a reserve for Southeast Asia requirements. Against the contingency foreseen by the Army Chief of Staff, we must weigh the risk of being unresponsive to the Emperor in an area where he has a genuine need. STRIKECOM, J–5 and the State Department share our view that an offer of four UH–1Ds for delivery when Ethiopian crews are trained (eight-ten months) is the minimum response we should make. Accordingly, I recommend 2 that— (1) You approve an offer of four UH–1Ds for delivery when Ethiopian crews are trained. 3 (2) You agree to the Emperor’s request that you meet with him at Blair House. (Alternate times for your consideration are 1530, 14 February or 0945, 15 February.) 4 John T. McNaughton 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 333 Ethiopia. Secret. 2 A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “I make this recommendation solely to provide the President and you with one ’goodie.’ If the Emperor were not visiting us, I would not recommend providing the UH–1Ds.” 3 McNamara initialed his approval on February 6. 4 On February 6, McNamara initialed his approval for a meeting at 1630 on February 14, with the handwritten notation, “The time should be 1630 as I may be testifying.” 326. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 326. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 11, 1967. SUBJECT Ethiopian Emperor’s Visit—Military Assistance Requests The primary difficulty that will be faced during Emperor Haile Selassie’s visit (February 13–15) will be his desire for greater U.S. military assistance. His principal objective is to try to convince you of this need. The Emperor is seriously concerned about external and internal threats to his regime. In addition to his worries about UAR and Soviet efforts to undermine the Red Sea basin in general, he is concerned about the Somali threat in particular. The Somalis have received considerable Soviet military assistance, and they claim the large Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia which is inhabited by Somali tribes. In furtherance of its irrendentist claims, Somalia has sent guerrillas into the northeast province of Kenya (which it also claims) and into Ethiopia. The upcoming French Somaliland plebiscite heightens the tensions. In addition, a Muslim dissident movement in northern Ethiopia has become increasingly serious, particularly as a result of military and financial support given it by various Arab States. (The Emperor will probably gloss over internal dissidence problems.) We cannot and should not at this time satisfy the Emperor’s demands for a great deal more military assistance or a possible request for U.S. guarantees of Ethiopia’s defense. We are already providing $14 million in grant military assistance to Ethiopia in FY 67, of which $11 million is in equipment. This constitutes a very large share of our military assistance to Africa as authorized by the Congress under the $25 million ceiling for defense articles, which can only be exceeded by Presidential waiver. A similar amount is tentatively planned for the next fiscal year. Even if we could provide Ethiopia with significantly more military equipment, it would seriously aggravate the arms race in the area. Greater military training, better trained and equipped police forces and economic and social development are the answers to Ethiopia’s principal problem of internal dissidence—not a great deal more sophisticated hardware. (The West Germans are assisting the Ethiopian police; funds are not available for significantly increasing our own relatively modest police program.) On the other hand, the maintenance of friendly relations with Ethiopia is important to our interests in Africa and especially to the maintenance of Kagnew Station, as essential U.S. military communications installation (with important intercept functions, a fact not to be mentioned to the Emperor) located in northern Ethiopia. There is no alternative site presently available for many of these facilities. Defense is accordingly prepared to provide $2 million more assistance, if possible in helicopters, and to try to expedite shipment of the most important items presently planned for Ethiopia. This will probably not be enough to satisfy the Emperor. If not, there is the risk that he might ask the Soviets for arms (he plans to visit Moscow at the end of the month), harass Kagnew on military jurisdiction questions, or take some other undesirable action. However, despite the possibility of veiled threats to Kagnew, we do not believe that the Emperor would oust us from Kagnew Station completely or affect our operations significantly, given the leverage on us this base gives him. Nevertheless, a special effort should be made to reassure the Emperor of our continuing interest in Ethiopia and to convince him that our present and planned military programs, plus a relatively small additional increment, are sufficient to assure Ethiopian security—and all that we can provide at this time. Our military people are convinced that with our current and planned military assistance programs for balanced forces and particularly with greater emphasis on training, Ethiopia can meet any threat from Somalia. Should there nevertheless appear to be a real danger to Kagnew Station, Defense would be willing to reexamine the situation. Some readjustment in future years programs could be made to accommodate a limited number of additional items. Such changes could be subsequently communicated to the Ethiopian Government through our Embassy at Addis. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Trimble, Hughes, G/PM Director for Operations Joseph J. Wolf, Lang, and Director of AID’s Office of Eastern and South African Affairs Eugene M. Reed. 327. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 327. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 11, 1967, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (Monday-Tuesday, February 13–14) Schedule 5:00–5:30 PM Monday: welcoming ceremony. 10:30–11:30 AM Tuesday: alone, with advisers standing by in Cabinet room. Papers Nick Katzenbach’s briefing memorandum and suggested talking points are at Tab A. 2 Bob Kintner will send in proposed welcoming remarks and dinner toast. The State briefing book is attached. 3 Substance The Emperor will be taking a careful reading of the temperature of U.S.-Ethiopian relations. In particular, he will be trying to get us to increase our military assistance to Ethiopia, now running at about $14 million per year. Though he probably won’t say so, his bargaining leverage flows from his knowledge that our communications base—Kagnew Station—in his country is very important to us. (It is our chief listening post for Europe, the Middle East, and much of the Soviet Union. It contains equipment which could not be effectively operated from any other available location.) Your advisers are agreed that we should not agree to any major increase in military aid to Ethiopia. The Emperor’s real security problems are internal. Moreover, any substantial rise in our arms shipments would put pressure on the Soviets to enlarge their deliveries to the neighboring, arch-enemy Somali Republic, thus adding fuel to an already simmering arms race. Finally, an increase would be next to impossible to finance from current MAP appropriations and very unpopular on the Hill. We do not believe that the Emperor will react to this position by giving Kagnew Station a hard time. He is too dependent on the present flow of aid. We have, however, put together a small package of about $2 million in counter-insurgency help over the next two years which will save him the embarrassment of returning empty-handed. The important thing is to give the Emperor a sense that our interest in the future of Ethiopia—and your personal interest in HIM—remains strong. He is extremely proud of his stature as a world leader and a spokesman for Africa. Butter, strategically applied, can make up for many tons of undelivered guns. Tactics Ed Korry predicts that unless the Emperor has reason to believe that you know something of his problems he will begin with a long, formal statement. It could last 30–45 minutes (add equal time for translation). If your patience and schedule permit, you may wish to hear him out. If you would rather try to cut the lecture short, you might open with the following points: —You have followed developments in the Red Sea Basin, and know the depth and gravity of the problems the Emperor faces—the continuing tension with Somalia, the uncertain future of French Somaliland, the imminent British withdrawal from Aden, and the Moslem dissidence in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea. —We stand firm in our recognition of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. (This point is important to HIM because of Somali irridentist claims.) —The strong and continuing U.S. interest in Ethiopia is reflected in the very substantial economic and military aid we have provided her for many years. (A total of more than $60 million in 1966, more than $300 million overall.) —We are aware of the internal security problems the Emperor must deal with, and are prepared to look into the possibility of modest additional assistance in that area. —However, we are determined to avoid promoting arms races in Africa. We believe that current programs are sufficient to insure Ethiopia against any external threat. An increase would only serve to expand the pressures for a fruitless and wasteful armed confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia. This would be a great tragedy, not only for the cause of peace, but for both peoples (among the poorest in the world), who desperately need to apply their assets to economic problems. —The best hope for a safe passage through the problems of the Red Sea area is the wisdom and restraint of the Emperor himself. You are confident that he will continue to explore every avenue of possible accommodation and cooperation with his neighbors. Session with Ed Korry Korry thinks it would be useful if he could spend ten minutes with you before the Emperor arrives. I have no strong feeling either way. If you approve, I will arrange a time with Marvin. Walt Approve prior Korry appointment Disapproved See me 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, CO 73 Ethiopia (Restricted). Top Secret. 2 Not printed. 3 Not attached; a copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie, 2/14–15/67. 4 No decision is indicated on the source text. The President’s Daily Diary contains no record of a meeting between Korry and Johnson on February 14 or 15. (Ibid.) 328. Memorandum of Conversation 328. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 14, 1967, 11:34 a.m. SUBJECT Ethiopian Request for More U.S. Military and Economic Assistance PARTICIPANTS The President The Emperor of Ethiopia Mr. Walt Rostow Dr. Minassie Haile, Ethiopian Minister of Information Mr. Toumayan, Interpreter (US) After an initial exchange on the value of personal contact between Chiefs of State, the Emperor began the discussion with a review of the mutual benefits of the long association between Ethiopia and the United States. He pointed to the contributions of his own country in support of UN collective security efforts and to the fact that Ethiopia had not recognized Communist China, thus associating itself with the U.S. despite criticism. The Emperor then outlined at length the security problems confronting Ethiopia arising from: Somali irredentism supported by “massive” Soviet military aid; the political influence in Somalia of the USSR and Communist China; the danger to Ethiopia if Djibouti fell into hostile hands; Arab states’ assistance to Somalia; Nasser’s efforts to extend his influence into the Gulf of Aden, with Soviet collusion, and the threat of UAR dominance in the area after the British withdrawal. The Emperor said Soviet military aid to Somalia, which had given the Soviets control over the situation in that country, was excessive for purposes of national defense or internal security. He cited comparisons: The Soviets were arming 20,000 Somali soldiers, one for every 100 inhabitants; in contrast, Ethiopia had one soldier per 625 inhabitants. Somalia had more artillery and armour than Ethiopia. The Emperor also referred specifically to the action of the Somali National Assembly urging Government recognition of rebel forces in Ethiopia and Kenya, stating that Somalia assumed direct responsibility for these forces. The Emperor then requested the following: (a) the US military “commitment” to Ethiopia, undertaken many years ago and until now averaging ten (sic) million dollars annually, to be raised to twenty million; (b) military weapons in hand to be replaced by more modern equipment, in view of Soviet arms aid to Somalia; (c) some sort of direct support for the Ethiopian defense budget to help finance petroleum, housing, etc.; (d) expansion of areas of economic assistance. The Emperor mentioned his visit to Moscow at the end of February, indicating he had wanted to come to Washington first and stating the purpose of the Moscow visit was to ascertain why the Soviet Government was extending so much military assistance to Somalia. He doubted he would get a satisfactory reply. The Soviets had always replied to Ethiopian protests by offering to give them arms also. However, the Emperor stated, he had no wish to embark on military assistance ventures with the USSR. The President stated we stood firm in our recognition of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. We were aware through Ambassador Korry of the Emperor’s concerns and we shared them. Our interest in Ethiopia was reflected by substantial U.S. economic and military assistance totaling more than a quarter of a billion dollars thus far. However, the President pointed out the current difficulties with the Congress particularly with regard to military aid. He stressed the importance of avoiding an arms race. The President said he looked to the Emperor’s statesmanlike restraint in dealing with the situation in East Africa and African problems in general. We shall consider helping Ethiopia further in a modest way with its internal security problem, depending on Congressional appropriations. With regard to Djibouti, the President said we would take stock after the forthcoming plebiscite and be prepared to work through the UN toward internationalization, if that seemed the wise course. On other points, the President suggested they be taken up with the Secretary of Defense and Acting Secretary of State who would meet with the Emperor on the afternoon of February 14. The Emperor could be confident of the friendship of the President and the American people, but candor required him to state what the situation was with regard to Congress. The Emperor replied that it was an excellent suggestion to discuss the details later on and that he also looked forward to meeting with the President again that evening. Moreover, although he was aware of the difficulties the President had with the Congress, the Emperor felt that the President carried a great deal of weight and could influence the situation. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–1/69. Secret. Drafted by Looram on February 16. The conversation was held at the White House. The time and place for the meeting is from ibid., President’s Daily Diary. 329. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 329. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, February 14, 1967. SUBJECT McNamara-Katzenbach Meeting with HIM WWR: McNamara and Katzenbach had a 1–1/2 hour, friendly meeting with the Emperor this afternoon. 2 HIM opened with an abbreviated version of his speech to the President. Again, his specific requests were for a doubling of our MAP and a new program of budget support—amount unspecified. McNamara replied: 1. The Ethiopian army is well-trained, well-equipped, and three times the Somali forces. 2. The long Ethiopian-Somali frontier is difficult to defend, but the Emperor’s army seems well up to it. 3. In our view, a larger force would be an impossible burden for the Ethiopian economy to carry if it were to improve the standard of living at the same time. 4. There may be some problems of maintenance and utilization of present equipment. We may be able to help some in these areas. (McNamara did not spell this out; he apparently means a speed-up in deliveries of current commitments.) 5. It is a fact of life that the Congress looks upon increased military aid with great displeasure. Katzenbach added that we are already supporting the Emperor’s budget through revenues from PL–480 shipments of cotton. He urged the Emperor to seek political solutions to his problems with the Somalis. HIM replied that his hand is always out to Somalia, but that they always refuse it. In summary, it was agreed that: 1. The Emperor would submit their requests and rationale in writing. 2. McNamara, Katzenbach and Korry would undertake a careful personal review of this whole range of issues, and 3. Korry would then give them our replies in detail when the Emperor had returned to Addis Ababa. (The Emperor goes to Sudan and Turkey after leaving here; he won’t be home for a month.) I would suggest the President take the following line in any conversations tonight: 1. He understands HIM’s talks with McNamara and Katzenbach were most useful to both sides—each of us better understands the other’s problems. 2. Assure the Emperor that the promised review of his requests will be thorough and as sympathetic as our restraints allow. 3. Emphasize that we believe there are real possibilities of softening the Ethiopian-Somalian problem through joint development of shared resources—particularly river basins. 4. Repeat that our conception of the Ethiopian security problem stresses internal security and that we will do our best to be as forthcoming as possible. EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie, 2/14–15/67. No classification marking. 2 Another record of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH. 330. Memorandum of Conversation 330. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 14, 1967, 8 p.m. SUBJECT Further Discussion of Ethiopia’s Security Requirements PARTICIPANTS The President The Emperor of Ethiopia The Vice President (for parts of the conversation) Acting Secretary of State, Nicholas de B. Katzenbach U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, Edward M. Korry (for parts of the conversation) The President stated that he understood that His Imperial Majesty’s talks with Secretary McNamara and Acting Secretary Katzenbach were most useful to both sides. He and the Emperor had a better understanding of each other’s problems. He wished to assure the Emperor that the promised review of his requests would be thorough and as sympathetic as our restraints permitted. Candor compelled him to state that he did not wish to underestimate the difficulties he had at present with Congress. He wished to emphasize that in his view there were good possibilities of softening the Ethiopian-Somali problem through joint development of shared resources, in particular river basins. He also wished to stress that our conception of the Ethiopian security problem places the focus on internal security measures. However, we will do our best, within the restraints imposed by Congress and available resources, to be as forthcoming as possible. The Emperor replied that he did not wish to convey an impression that he was pressing for immediate responses. He repeated his rationale about wanting a face-to-face meeting with the President. He understood that immediate decisions could not be reached and he was satisfied with the procedures that had been worked out. He wished to emphasize anew his serious concern over the situation Ethiopia was confronting and his hope that the USG would respond in as forthcoming a manner as possible. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65–1/69. Confidential. Drafted by Korry on February 20. The conversation was held at the White House. 331. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 331. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 1 Addis Ababa, March 1, 1967, 1425Z. 3133. Response to Emperor’s Requests. 1. Following are the answers I would wish to give Emperor shortly after his return: A. Spell out the special efforts on MAP including the four helicopters, 17 tanks and accelerated delivery of trucks, APCs and F–5s. State we also seeking acceleration of delivery other items whereon we will have answers later in spring. On helicopters, because of my belief that Iyassu has been discussing terms for more French helicopters and because I am persuaded French will offer what for Paris will be generous credit terms for choppers and other aircraft, I intend to let MOD know that if they wish other equipment in place of helicopters from US for equivalent value, we would be willing to consider it. Rationale is that since air force probably will get more Alouettes from French and since choppers would be new item in US inventory here, it could be advantageous over long run to have French totally responsible for that item. B. Offer arms for police per my memo to AID Administrator Gaud, detailing how delivery would be linked to formation of units with 5,100 initial force goal. C. Indicate that DOD prepared to consider sales for certain items such as equipment for ammo factory here to turn out bigger caliber items and possibly modified C–119s. Rationale is that increased domestic capacity for in-country ammo production would be highly beneficial to our long-term MAP relationship and relieve part of burden of our supplying ammo. Would also be psychologically beneficial to indicate our desire to have IEG self-sufficient in more items. Therefore would urge DOD authorize good terms for this equipment. Any other items DOD would feel justifiable for sales program should be transmitted in response to this msg. D. Indicate in off-hand manner that if we did not have burden of almost US $1,000,000 annually for navy this money could have been diverted to army and air force. Follow up this idea more specifically with MOD as a personal preference while offering the suggestion that the French and the Israelis might wish to assume this commitment. I continue to believe that this approach might conceivably be successful, particularly if the Israelis who are more concerned about the Red Sea than they are about the land or air forces of Ethiopia, push hard with French in event of a French victory in CFS referendum. It would have extra appeal when I tell Emperor that we can do nothing about the navy now and that the replacement of HMS Ethiopia could not be envisaged before fall of 1968 at earliest and then only with a minesweeper carrying crew of 94. E. Detail efforts of AID to meet stated IEG desire for private agricultural investment, for follow-on to Blue Nile survey, for continued support of the university. Give firmly negative response on budgetary assistance. 2. All foregoing will be packaged in the underlying philosophies and restraints well known to the Dept, and more importantly, on stated assumption of continued good rels between our two govts. 3. It would be helpful to know in advance what transpired in Moscow but I doubt we will have benefit of reliable info since IEG will probably seek to influence our responses to HIM by floating scare stories. 4. For the record, I wish repeat that the soured atmosphere created by limited magnitude of our responses could well, although not inevitably, lead to such diverse reactions as recognition of Red China, withdrawal of IEGF representation from Korea, demand for changes in Kagnew SOFA and other harassment of Kagnew as well as personal abuse, the last being promptest and most inevitable consequence. If we remain cool we should be able absorb heat without too much damage to our fundamental interests in the short run. When and if we arrive at a policy for Red Sea Basin, we can review our position. 5. For the record too, foregoing is in keeping with strategy adopted at Chiefs of Mission Conference in Addis and with successful handling of Emperor’s visit. However wish to note that Dept has thus far evaded equally important commitment it made at same conference to keep heat on Somalia, particularly in field of aid. In contrast to diminution of aid, Dept has in fact been seeking to increase aid projects which not only contrary to Addis CM Conference adopted strategy, and it has been permitting technical difficulties (Reynolds, lack of local funds) to obfuscate real point of our tactics. Indeed it is wining and dining a Somalia parliamentary delegation which has just passed in the face of US warnings a resolution totally opposed to US policies in Africa. Net effect of such tactics is to continue by our actions to encourage the most extreme elements in GYT into believing their policies can be followed with impunity and into putting more pressure on supposedly more moderate segments of society. Nothing could better demonstrate lack of any influence on GSR by USG than the total failure of this tactic over past four years if anyone would bother to read the cables of that period and measure promise against delivery. 2 Korry 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asmara. 2 Telegram 150563 to Addis Ababa, March 7, approved the course of action proposed by Ambassador Korry. In telegram 3258 from Addis Ababa, March 12, Korry reported that on March 10 he delivered the U.S. replies to the Emperor, who had been “unruffled and non-committal” in his responses. (Ibid.) 332. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 332. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 5, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 333. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 333. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 6, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 334. National Intelligence Estimate 334. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 27, 1967. NIE 75/76–67 PROSPECTS FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA The Problem To estimate the implications for the US, over the next two or three years, of growing instability in Ethiopia, Somali expansionism, and the activities in the Horn of Africa of the USSR and certain Arab states. Conclusions A. The likelihood of growing instability in Ethiopia, including the emergency of a potent insurgency in Eritrea, will raise problems for US interests in the Horn of Africa and call into question the future of the US position in Kagnew Station. Haile Selassie will probably retain control of the government and hold the Empire intact as long as he remains reasonably active. We believe, however, that the death or overthrow of the 74-year-old Emperor will usher in a period of prolonged uncertainty, and perhaps violence, in Addis Ababa. In the latter event, government forces would, at least for a time, be unable to maintain control throughout the countryside, and some regions might break away. (Paras. 1–15, 39–42) B. Somali expansionism will continue to aggravate the tensions in the Horn among antagonistic ethnic and religious groups. The Somalia Government will probably continue to avoid provoking a full-scale confrontation with Ethiopia’s superior military forces. It will persist, however, in its assistance to dissident groups in Ethiopia, including Eritrea, in hopes of speeding the collapse of the Empire and improving the prospects for obtaining the Ogaden without open warfare. (Paras. 16–20, 35, 37–38) C. Though French security forces in French Somaliland will probably keep any Somali resistance movement from getting out of hand, agitation in one form or another is likely to keep the territory’s political and economic affairs unsettled. The French will probably withdraw from the territory by 1970 or so, and perhaps earlier. Since the rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia will persist, the danger of a war over Djibouti will again arise. (Paras. 21–24, 36) D. The USSR, particularly through its military assistance to Somalia, seeks to expand its influence in the Horn and to undermine the special US position in Ethiopia. The USSR apparently believes that the trend of events in the Horn and the Red Sea area generally is running in its favor and will probably be cautious about premature exploitation of the disruptive forces emerging there. The UAR is also seeking to extend its influence in the Horn, but the size of its activities is limited by the strain on its resources of its involvement in Yemen and by its desire not to disrupt diplomatic relations with Haile Selassie. (Paras. 2, 25–31, 43–44) E. The persistence of tensions in the Horn and disorders within Ethiopia will prompt Haile Selassie to demand increased military assistance from the US—the quid pro quo for Kagnew. As long as the Emperor remains in charge, however, the Ethiopian Government is not likely to alter sharply the conditions of our use of the facility, though it may at some time demand new status of forces arrangements. After he leaves the scene, Kagnew will probably become increasingly a focus of political attention in Ethiopia. At the least, the cost of our rights there will increase substantially, and there might be a demand to renegotiate the basic Kagnew agreement. (Paras. 33, 45, 47) F. So far, the Eritrean insurgents have not attacked US facilities in Kagnew, but pressures for such attacks from within the ranks of the partisans and from radical foreign sponsors are bound to increase. If Eritrea were to gain independence, the US might not be cast out of Kagnew automatically. The reaction of the new government would depend in part on its susceptibility to radical foreign influences and the availability of alternate sources of foreign aid. (Paras. 12, 46) [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 27. 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, April 28, 1967, 5:33 p.m. 184357. Ref: Addis 3835 and 3776. 2 For Addis. 1. Very much appreciate your efforts discourage IEG obsession with jet bomber purchases, despite difficulties encountered. 2. In your continuing campaign, assume you will point out: (a) if IEG wants provoke Somalis into asking Soviets for bombers, MIG-21’s or SAM’s, this is surest way of doing it; (b) we see absolutely no reason or need for “strategic deterrent,” as we indicated to General Iyassu during HIM visit; (c) in view MinFin Yilma’s request for budgetary aid during HIM visit, and 1966 decline in foreign exchange reserves, not to mention emphasis on economic self-help as basis for US aid, Ethiopian purchase bombers will create most adverse reaction here. 3. For London: Request you clarify apparent discrepancy between assurances from Ambassador Bromley and HMG that normal commercial credit terms being offered and BAC statement that they offering 15-year terms. Leave your discretion whether higher level approach necessary. Depending on information you provide, we considering new approach to UK Embassy here, possibly at higher level. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Walker on April 27; cleared by Officer in Charge of United Kingdom Affairs Thomas M. Judd, Wolf, and Bader in DOD/ISA; and approved by Looram. Also sent to London, and repeated to Asmara, Paris, CINCMEAFSA, and Moscow. 2 In telegram 3776 from Addis Ababa, April 22, Ambassador Korry reported that a British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) salesman was in Addis Ababa to discuss a possible sale of Canberra jet bombers to Ethiopia. The British Ambassador had told him the British Government was offering no subsidies and was staying clear of the discussions, but Korry argued that the United States should try to persuade the British Government to stop the sale. In telegram 3835 from Addis Ababa, April 26, Korry reported that the Ethiopian Chief of Staff had told him his government was now committed to procuring bombers, but that Korry had been trying to stir up “maximum opposition” to the bomber purchases among Ethiopian Ministers interested in development. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 189411 to London, May 6, reported that the British Embassy had officially informed the Department that the British Government had decided to allow the BAC to continue its discussions with the Ethiopians, but that the Export Credit Guarantee Department would not guarantee more than the normal 5-year commercial credit terms for such a sale—terms that were “stiff” and might stop the purchase. (Ibid.) 336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy 336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy 1 Washington, May 1, 1967, 6:08 p.m. 185525. Ref: Rome 5666 Notal. 2 Subject: Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). 1. Re your meeting with Tedla Bairu, former Chief Executive Eritrea and now ELF leader in exile, appreciate your non-committal, tactful handling of talk and information obtained. 2. In light danger our contacts with Tedla Bairu and other ELF leaders might leak back to Ethiopians and because we do not wish give ELF leaders impression of undue U.S. interest in them or concern over Kagnew, Department wishes keep contacts with ELF discreet, appropriately spaced, and at working level. However we see no problem if Tedla Bairu requests another meeting in Rome prior his departure, particularly if only one Embassy officer involved. 3. Assume meeting would again be primarily matter of listening to what he has to say. Nevertheless, if required, you may state that while we appreciate problems Eritreans face, U.S. policy has traditionally been opposed Balkanization of Africa particularly since economic development reasons dictate large and viable country units in Africa. You should give no indication U.S. would encourage or approve secession of Eritrea. 4. At same time we interested in any information which can be discreetly obtained on intentions and policies of ELF, including re Kagnew. 5. FYI: Re Tedla Bairu’s comment on “total lack of attention in Western press to events in Eritrea” there have recently been spate of articles in New York Times and Washington Post which being pouched Rome. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 13 ETH. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Walker; cleared by Wolf and William B. Dozier in EUR/FBX; and approved by Looram. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Asmara, and Damascus, and by pouch to Bonn, Cairo, Jidda, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Moscow, Sanaa, London, and Paris. 2 Telegram 5666 from Rome, April 27, reported that an Embassy officer met with former Eritrean Prime Minister Tedla Bairu for an hour on April 26 at the latter’s request. (Ibid.) 337. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 337. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, May 8, 1967. Dear Bob: Since my letter to you of November 2, 1966, 2 concerning Kagnew Station and your reply of January 13, 3 the gravity of the Eritrean insurgency situation has increased, and our estimates of the stability of the Horn of Africa and specifically Ethiopia over the next few years have become considerably more pessimistic. As a result, I have been giving further thought to the question of Kagnew’s future and what should be done in this connection. The requirements of Defense and the various other Washington users, including State, and the resultant difficulties in trying to diminish the United States presence in Asmara are fully appreciated. Nevertheless, in view of the continued trend of developments in Ethiopia, I believe we should prepare for performing the Kagnew missions elsewhere. Opinions differ as to how long the Ethiopian Government can hang on to Eritrea or at least maintain some semblance of order there. Ambassador Korry doubts that it can be more than five years. In any event, there is a general consensus that when the Emperor dies (which could happen at any time), severe disturbances throughout the Empire and possibly loss of control of Eritrea by the central government can be expected. Moreover, in the interim there is an increasing likelihood of and capability for insurgent harassment of our station at Kagnew, such as the blowing up of antenna towers which cannot be protected or the cutting of roads, sabotage of the Massawa port and terrorism in Asmara itself. I therefore believe that the risks for continued operations at Kagnew are such that it is only prudent to develop a program of action on the assumption that such operations could be placed in jeopardy at any time. I think, as a result, that we should freeze U.S. presence at Kagnew at current levels and prepare plans for an orderly, phased removal of operations from Kagnew as soon as possible without undue prejudice to U.S. security interests. Specifically, I think there should be no further net increases of personnel (including dependents), that we should suspend indefinitely all requests to the Ethiopian Government for additional acreage, and that there should be no further construction at Kagnew, unless necessary for imperative tasks. Of course, any non-essential tasks or levels of operation should be eliminated. I am very much aware that taking steps to relocate the missions performed at Kagnew face us with real problems in establishing them at other locations overseas, in addition to meaning technically less favorable locations than Kagnew. I recognize that it is inescapable for technical reasons that preferred location sites for many of these missions will be in Middle Eastern countries where there are already existing serious problems as to the U.S. presence, which will thus be increased. I would therefore like to ask you to develop as soon as possible a phased program for relocation from Kagnew Station, together with proposed relocation sites, so that we may together review the best course of action to be taken in seeking to reduce our presence at Kagnew and maintain essential intelligence and communications capabilities in this area of the world to meet not only the Kagnew tasks but all others of importance to the national security. The Department will be ready to cooperate with you at staff level in preparing this study (including the possible relocation of the Diplomatic Telecommunications System missions now at Kagnew) for review. I am sending copies of this letter to Dick Helms and Walt Rostow, in view of their obvious interests and responsibilities. Sincerely yours, Nick 4 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia. Top Secret. 2 Document 322 . 3 Document 323 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Katzenbach signed the original. 338. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 338. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, July 13, 1967. JCSM–397–67 SUBJECT Evaluation of Kagnew Station, Ethiopia (U) 1. (S) Reference is made to: a. A memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 15 June 1967, 2 subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to any expansion at Kagnew and a phased reduction of Kagnew missions related to the communications, Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS), and contingency missions of Kagnew Station, including Decamere/Gura. b. JCSM–770–66, dated 15 December 1966, 3 subject as above, which noted that it did not appear that substantial reductions could be made at Kagnew in the near future unless the United States was prepared to sacrifice some significant capabilities and products which the Kagnew complex now provides. 2. (U) Appendices A and B hereto have been prepared in response to reference 1a and contain a plan for relocation and reduction of missions assigned to Kagnew. 4 3. (C) The large degree of interdependence and mutual support between the US Army Strategic Communications (Defense Communications System) Station, the US Navy Communications Station, Kagnew, and the intelligence collection activities collocated there and electrically connected thereto must be considered in any review of the missions of this installation. The support relationship was developed through efforts to improve communications-electronics operations, reduce operating costs, equipment and facility requirements, and improve over-all capabilities of Kagnew Station. 4. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) will undertake a review and consolidation of the plans submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Agency. Since the two responses have been produced independently, they probably do not provide a basis for ready consolidation. As pointed out in Appendix B, the amount of mutual support lost through selection of separate locations for the functional activities and the added communications which may be required may be substantial. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their part, were not able to prepare precise and comprehensive plans due to lack of final circuitry requirements of the Director, National Security Agency, and the inability to perform technical site surveys in the limited time available. In addition, it is recognized that there may be political difficulties in obtaining diplomatic agreement to construct facilities in some of the countries which are technically satisfactory for possible relocation. 5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that: a. Relocation, reduction, or elimination of missions assigned to Kagnew Station would seriously prejudice US security interests and would seriously reduce US military capability in the Middle East, South Asia, and Indian Ocean areas. b. A requirement exists for a consolidated and coordinated plan for the contingent relocation of functions performed at Kagnew Station. 6. (S) It is recommended that the National Security Agency, the military services, and the Defense Communications Agency be directed to prepare a consolidated, coordinated plan for the contingent relocation of functions performed at Kagnew Station and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on the plan. 7. (U) Without Appendix B, this memorandum is downgraded to Secret. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J.O. Cobb Rear Admiral, USN Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Ethiopia. Top Secret. 2 Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia) 3 Not printed. 4 Appendices A and B are not printed. 339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, July 25, 1967, 2119Z. 12830. 1. Ambassador Tashoma at own request called on Assistant Secretary Palmer July 24 to deliver message from FonMin conveying officially IEG decision to purchase Canberras and to present rationale. 2. In reply Palmer expressed our concern on two counts: (a) We not informed earlier nor consulted only learning of plans from other sources, and (b) Doubtful value of Canberras from IEG’s own military viewpoint. Palmer then reviewed fully Ambassador Korry’s and MAAG’s now familiar arguments, including strong statement on danger resultant escalation in Horn. 3. Tashoma (who accompanied by MilAtt and First Secretary) countered with equally familiar arguments on increased threat from Arab World (particularly light IEG stand in UN) addition Somalia and Sudan. While US, with its global interests, might have difficulty understanding depth of IEG concern, it was to them question of national survival. In concluding expressed hope frank talk taken in spirit of friendship and noted separate arms request still before us. 4. Palmer closed discussion same tone, noting in last analysis Ethiopia’s defense her own concern. Our concern only to advise and help where possible. This respect, will continue do our best re arms request within limitations other requirements and priorities. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 ETH. Secret. Drafted by John G. Gloster of AF/AFNE; cleared by Looram; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Asmara, Mogadiscio, and CINCSTRIKE. 340. Telegram From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State 340. Telegram From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State 1 Mogadiscio, July 27, 1967, 1040Z. 218. Ref: Mogadiscio 203. 2 1. The note from new Egal government transmitted in reftel is in refreshing contrast with strident, polemical tone of communications GSR in habit of sending to us in recent years. Its timing (well ahead of critical confidence vote), contents, and style suggest that Abdirascid and Egal are making serious effort to break out of impasse in which GSR finds itself and have decided to make initial moves without delay. 2. Egal himself has long held strong private convictions about what he considered to be suicidal policies that GSR has followed in recent years. These have in his view neither gained intranational support for GSR nor contributed to internal economic and social development of this country. A patriot, he believes that in the fullness of time there will be changes in Horn in favor of the Somali people, but these will not come about until Somalia achieves more respectable international status and greater internal (social and economic) strength. A critic of the GSR break with Britain in 1963, he now comes to power in a government at serious odds with another major power (France) and two relatively strong African neighbor states who enjoy particularly close relations with Britain and the US respectively. The latter while not completely unfriendly has recently shown its displeasure by conspicuously excluding Somalia from its roster of African states slated for US bilateral economic assistance in the years ahead: and US military ties with Ethiopia interject an additional element of insecurity into GSR outlook. In Africa as a whole GSR realistically sees OAU as weak vessel indeed, and its only African “friend,” Sudan, is riven with internal divisions and preoccupations. Whatever be the religious and other ties with countries in both wings of the Arab camp, significance of recent ME denouement has not been lost on new GSR leadership both with respect to the weakness of the Arab states and the prudence (weakness?) of the Soviet Union in this crisis. There had been even earlier a mute GSR disenchantment with the Sovs both in the economic and military spheres. As for China, its internal turmoil and fanatical extremism leave an unfavorable impression here. 3. Such considerations together with the grave financial crisis facing new GSR govt as result Suez Canal closure have no doubt contributed to decision Abdirascid and Egal to embark on new tactical course. They cannot, of course, repudiate Somali irridentist objectives as such, nor is there any assurance given popular sentiments and pressures here and the nature of Somali political institutions that they can succeed in suppressing those subversive and violent aspects of their “cause” that stand in the way of a real detente with their neighbors and elicit the displeasure of powerful and affluent US. Their room for maneuver is limited and whatever initial small steps they venture must be taken in the face of recent official GOK and IEG demands for categorical renunciation by GSR of its irridentist aspirations as sine qua non for normalization of relations (pp 64–65 GOK “White Paper,” April 1967 and IEG note of last March in reply Abdirazak letter). 4. Between present state of “cold war” tensions between states in this area and attainment of enduring regional peace and stability are more modest way-houses which, if reached, would have intrinsic value per se and could constitute springboards for further progress. My Ethiopian colleague with whom I recently went over some of this ground has been sufficiently encouraged by his contacts with Egal govt to recommend to IEG that harassment of Somali Emb in Addis Ababa cease. He contemplates working for early exchange of Ethiopian Airways DC–3 long parked without maintenance at Mogadiscio Airport for SNP Cessna in IEG hands and even goes as far as to talk about exchange of “good will missions” between his country and Somalia (would be helpful have Emb Addis comments on reaction there to new tone from GSR). Other cooperative steps short of definitive settlement would be resumption of trade and air communications with Kenya, establishment of diplomatic relations with GOK, arrangements for Somali “trade trucks” to ply between Mogadiscio and Hargeisa through direct Ogaden route, contacts between high police officials on both sides of frontier, efforts by IEG to control their military from unauthorized expropriations of livestock and other property by Somali tribesmen in Ogaden, GOK measure to relax inhumane “villagization” measures in NED and in due course joint economic projects in frontier areas. Somewhere along this spectrum declaratory and concrete evidences of GSR disengagement from present back-up programs for “Shifta” violence would be indispensable requirement. 5. Considered “bad boy” of the Horn, Somalia has shown in recent weeks a remarkable capacity in African terms to transfer power from one group of political leaders to another in democratic and orderly fashion and has while making moral gestures of support to its Arab friends in their travail over Israel remained carefully aloof from the emotional campaign of abuse and violence against the US unleashed in the Arab world during the ME crisis. Now its new govt has taken another step, modest and tentative, in the direction of reduction of international tensions in the Horn and has asked US Govt to make these glad tidings known in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. It has also requested US Govt “to endeavor to discourage any new attempts to rekindle the armaments race in the area.” While this exhortation is obviously aimed in the first instance at curbing any further arms build-up in Kenya and Ethiopia, it also opens the door for a meaningful dialogue about further buildup of Somali military forces from Soviet or any other conceivable sources. 6. My recent conversations with Abdirascid and Egal and the GSR note under reference, together with foregoing considerations and analysis, thus pose challenging and timely questions which I strongly suggest call for more than routine consideration in Washington. In last year or two we have probably been wise to refrain from formal replies to the several polemical GSR notes that have come our way on the problems in the Horn and from assuming undue risks as an intermediary in what Under Secretary Katzenbach told former Prime Minister Abdirazak last May were insoluble frontier problems. Now the hard-pressed and well-intentioned Egal has provided an opening, the possibilities of which I believe he should explore prudently and in full recognition of the risks and responsibilities involved. The regional frictions are old and perhaps insoluble in toto, a not unusual description of the human condition generally, but there are new circumstances, new motivations and new personalities on the local scene to be taken into account. It is time for a fresh but not too protected look at the situation in this area—and for action. 7. Accordingly I recommend that this Emb be instructed to deliver a response to the GSR note along the following lines: A. An enduring solution to the problems raised must be worked out directly between Somalia and its neighbors. B. However, in view of the constructive tone and intentions expressed in the GSR note and without engaging ourselves in any formal good offices role, we are passing on the substance of the communications, as requested, to the IEG and GOK. C. It is our belief that in such disputes as this all parties concerned must contribute to a solution by concessions and modifications of the positions that have led to the disputes and related tensions. D. Without, therefore, wishing to impute to the GSR unilateral responsibility for the unsatisfactory relations which now unhappily obtain between itself and its neighbors, it is the belief of the US Govt that direct talks with the GOK and IEG can lead to positive results only if the GSR is prepared to demonstrate by deed as well as word that it is prepared to live in peace and cooperation with its neighbors. The cessation of support of hostile activities within the borders of those states is in our view a prime requisite of the detente the GSR states it desires. Inflammatory exhortations in press and radio are also detrimental to the objectives set forth in the GSR note. It would be expected, of course, that should the GSR find it possible to reconsider its position in these respects, similar responses on the part of other govts would be forthcoming, and a stabilized situation would prevail. Under these circumstances US Govt would be prepared to consider how it might best help parties concerned to come together for fruitful consideration of their other mutual problems. E. Re second point in GSR note USG shares GSR concern over arms race in Horn of Africa and has worked to effect an end to this costly and dangerous development whenever and wherever its influence could be brought to bear for this purpose. The establishment of friendly and cooperative relations between GSR and its neighbors would be a major contribution towards halting the arms race in the area and might hopefully lead to understanding among the states concerned that would limit acquisition of arms to levels strictly necessary for internal security and defensive purposes. Should the GSR and its neighbors find it possible to devote appreciably smaller financial resources to the military portions of their national budgets, the US Govt would be disposed in concert with other friendly states and international organizations to find means of matching those savings with equivalent amounts of external assistance for economic projects in the countries concerned. 9. Above recommendations are based on assumption that Egal govt will succeed in obtaining vote of confidence prior to August 15 and that formal reply to GSR should be delayed until that time. However, it would be helpful have in interim instructions ASAP for encouraging verbal reply to Egal. 3 Thurston 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 SOMALI. Confidential. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Rome, London, Bonn, the Department of Defense, and Hargeisa. 2 Telegram 203 from Mogadiscio, July 25, transmitted the text of a note verbale from the new Somali Government which expressed its sincere desire to find a just solution to Somalia’s problems with Ethiopia, Kenya, and France. It asked the U.S. Government to use its good offices with the leaders of Ethiopia and Kenya and to discourage any attempts to rekindle the arms race in the area. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 18567 to Mogadiscio, August 10, instructed Thurston to inform Egal that the U.S. Government was greatly encouraged by his “statesmanlike note.” If Egal survived the initial vote of confidence in the Somali Parliament, the Ambassador could say that the U.S. Government believed an enduring solution to the problems raised must be worked out in direct talks with Kenya and Ethiopia, but that such talks could lead to positive results only if Somalia was in a position to demonstrate that it was prepared to live in peace and cooperation with its neighbors. Telegram 364 from Mogadiscio, August 12, reported that the Somali National Assembly confirmed the Egal government by a vote of 119 to 2 with 3 deputies absent. (Ibid.) 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, August 16, 1967, 1622Z. 21655. Ref: Mogadiscio 203. 2 Following recommended written and oral reply to GSR note under reference: 1. Text aide-memoire to be left with Egal as follows: Complementary opening. (A) USG has studied with interest and encouragement recent Somali Note expressing desire normalize relations with Kenya and Ethiopia. (B) USG believes an enduring solution to problems raised must be worked out directly between Somalia and its neighbors. (C) USG believe that any formal extension of good offices would be premature. Nevertheless, in view of constructive tone and intentions expressed in GSR note, USG is, as requested, willing pass on substance of GSR views to IEG and GOK and do what it can to encourage dialogue. (D) It is our belief that in such disputes as this all parties concerned must contribute to a solution by concessions and modifications of positions that have led to the disputes and related tensions. Complimentary close. 2. Following points for oral presentation only: (A) Without wishing to impute responsibility of part of any of states concerned for unsatisfactory relations which now unhappily obtain among them, it is belief of USG that direct talks with GOK and IEG can lead to positive results only if GSR in position to demonstrate that it prepared to live in peace and cooperation with its neighbors. Willingness to cease lending support to actions of a violent and hostile character within borders those states is considered to be a prime requisite for detente. Inflammatory exhortations in press and radio are also detrimental to objectives set forth GSR Note. It would be expected of course that if GSR found it possible to reconsider its positions in these respects, similar responses on part of other governments would be forthcoming and an improved atmosphere would result. Under these circumstances USG would be prepared consider, in consultation parties concerned, how it could best help them to come together for fruitful consideration of their more fundamental mutual problems. (B) Re second point in GSR Note, USG shares GSR concern over arms race in Horn of Africa and has worked to encourage an end to this costly and dangerous development whenever and wherever its advice and influence could be brought to bear. The establishment of friendly and cooperative relations between GSR and its neighbors would be a major contribution toward halting arms race in area and might hopefully lead to general understanding that would limit acquisition arms to levels strictly necessary for internal security and minimal defensive purposes. Should GSR and its neighbors find it possible appreciably to reduce financial resources devoted to military portions their national budgets, USG would be disposed to consider, in concert other friendly nations and international organizations, means by which it could most helpfully promote economic development and stability in region to benefit of all states, including particularly inhabitants of present areas of tension. 3. Acknowledge receipt this telegram. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Palmer on August 15; cleared by AFE Country Director Nicholas Feld, Gloster, and Gordon R. Beyer in AFNE; approved by Palmer. Also sent to Addis Ababa, and Nairobi, and repeated to Rome, Paris, London, and Bonn. 2 See footnote 2, Document 340 . 3 In telegram 405 from Mogadiscio, August 17, Thurston, reported that he had delivered the U.S. response to Prime Minister Egal that day. (Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–SOMALI) 342. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Rusk 342. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 22, 1967. SUBJECT Somalia Seeks Detente with Kenya and Ethiopia Summary: The new Somali Prime Minister seeks to improve his country’s relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. In light of past pitfalls, as well as the insoluble territorial issue, we are guardedly optimistic about the chances of some success. At the same time, we do not wish to get caught in the middle. Nevertheless, normalization of relations could make such a significant contribution to greater stability in the Horn of Africa, we plan to give a helping hand where appropriate. Background: Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Egal requested our good offices to normalize relations with Kenya and Ethiopia and to reduce the arms race in the Horn of Africa by an official note dated July 23, 1967. 2 We replied in an aide-memoire dated August 7 (see Deptel 21655 attached) 3 that an enduring solution to the problems raised should be worked out directly between Somalia and its neighbors and any formal extension now of our good offices would be premature. In view of the constructive tone and intentions expressed in the Somali Government’s (GSR) note, however, we agreed, as requested, to pass on the substance of the GSR initiative for a detente, together with our reply, to the Ethiopian and Kenyan Governments. Under instructions, Ambassador Thurston orally put forth to Egal the need for Somalia to stop giving materiel and training to Somali dissidents who operate within Kenya and Ethiopia if a detente is to succeed. Were Somalia to reconsider its policy and Kenya and Ethiopia to be similarly forthcoming, the Ambassador said, the United States Government would consider how it could best help all parties concerned to come together to discuss their mutual problems. The Ambassador noted that the establishment of friendly and cooperative relations between Somalia and its neighbors would be a major contribution toward halting the arms race in the area. Prime Minister Egal commented that our response was helpful and encouraging; that he was going to make a serious effort to halt “violent” actions by Somali dissidents in Kenya and Ethiopia; and that though the GSR could not control fully Somalis outside the Republic, his Government would make a maximum effort. Egal realized the GSR had to take the initiative to stop hostile Somali actions, but he hoped Kenya and Ethiopia would find it possible to respond by better treatment of ethnic Somalis living in their lands, Egal said he would try to reduce GSR military expenditures and make more use of the army for national development purposes. If the detente materialized, he hoped to reduce the size of the army significantly. Our Embassies in Addis and Nairobi have since conveyed the substance of this matter to the Ethiopian and Kenyan Governments. (Ambassador Ferguson hopes to discuss it shortly with Kenyatta.) While the Ethiopian Prime Minister voiced the usual suspicions, his reaction was not unfavorable and the Emperor’s was reportedly positive. New Somali Prime Minister: Prime Minister Egal, who was selected for the premiership by the new Somali President, Abdirascid Ali Scermarke, won a nearly unanimous vote of confidence in his new Government on August 12. Egal has long been known in Somalia for his pro-West politics and told us many times before his election that if he were named Prime Minister, he would reduce Somalia’s ties to the East and would seek our help. Relatively young (38 years old) and British educated, Egal, who has never visited the United States, desires to meet with the President either at the outset of the UNGA in September or in the first months of 1968. We have recommended he be invited by the President at the later date. Comment: We believe we have probably done all we can at the moment (apart from Ferguson’s talk with Kenyatta). The next steps, i.e., first talks by Somalis with Ethiopians and Kenyans and disbandment of guerrilla training camps in Somalia, are up to Egal. There is a good possibility Egal will take the opportunity of his attendance at the OAU meeting in Kinshasa or at the opening of the UN General Assembly to meet with Ethiopian or Kenyan officials. (Of course in all this Egal is courageously bucking a strong political tide of popular support for active irridentism and his efforts could be jeopardized at any time by internal pressures.) If Egal succeeds in getting talks started with his neighbors and in reducing tensions in the area, we and other Western donor countries will likely be asked by the GSR for additional economic assistance. In line with the ideas expressed by the Under Secretary in talks with Kenyan and Somali leaders during his recent trip to Africa, we recommend an affirmative response in terms of possible regional and multi-donor projects. Moreover, we shall be on the watch for any other ways in which we might give discreet encouragement or assistance to Egal’s initiative. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Looram and Beyer on August 21, and cleared by John P. Meagher in AFE. 2 See footnote 2, Document 340 . 3 Document 341 . 343. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Somali Republic (Thurston) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) 343. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Somali Republic (Thurston) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) Mogadiscio, November 7, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Somali Republic, April 1967. Top Secret. 11 pages of source text not declassified.] 344. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 344. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, November 7, 1967, 2314Z. 66144. Joint State-Defense Message. Ref: (a) Defense 9939; 2 (b) Addis 1314, 30 Oct 1967 IN 78500. 3 Subject: Delivery F–5 Aircraft. 1. State and Defense have given extensive consideration to Embassy MAAG recommendations, but regret we have reluctantly decided that there no choice but delay delivery of final two F–5s (FY 68 program) at least until Feb 68. Prospects for early resolution of Congressional impasse on FY 68 MAP authorization and especially on appropriation bill are still uncertain. Going forward with two F–5s in FY 68 program now simply not feasible in view strong possibility of significant reduction in entire MAP program. 2. We recognize difficult position of Embassy and MAAG and understand IEG pressures continue unabated. On other hand, we must reiterate hard, cold facts that further legislative restrictions on Africa MAP and significant reduction in over-all level of MAP funds appear inevitable. It is necessary therefore to begin now to look at some of the very tough questions we will face this year working with reduced FY 68 levels and the strong possibility of similar level for FY 69. 3. View of foregoing suggest you use appropriate opportunity to apprise IEG (in low key) of great difficulties MAP facing in Congress. Purpose of approach would be purely to alert IEG officials to realities. Priorities among competing equipment deliveries must be adjudged within final Congressional fund limitations. 4. Subject of F–5 delivery should not be raised again with IEG. If pressed for answer you should inform IEG final word must await results of FY 68 legislation. 5. FYI: In recent mark-up of FY 68 MAP appropriation act sub-committee has proposed a reduced DOD worldwide MAP from $596 million requested excluding NATO HQs to $365 million, including $24 million for NATO headquarters. Furthermore, Continuing Resolution Authority has not been renewed as had been expected and Defense unable to obligate any FY 68 funds at this time. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH. Secret. Drafted by Gloster and Colonel Kissinger in DOD/ISA; cleared by Colonel Alba in JCS/J–5, Colonel Atkinson in JCS/SAMAA, Colonel Heffner in ODMA, and Looram; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Asmara, USCINCMEAFSA, CHMAAG Ethiopia, and CSAF. 2 Not printed. 3 In telegram 1314 from Addis Ababa, October 30, Ambassador William Hall stated that both he and the Chief of MAAG agreed that it would be advantageous to U.S.-Ethiopian relations to have at least one and preferably two F–5s delivered in December 1967 to complete Ethiopia’s F–5 squadron. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–ETH) 345. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 345. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 5, 1967. Mr. President: SUBJECT Your meeting with Ambassador Ray Thurston (Somalia) 5:30 p.m., Wednesday, December 6 This is a brief handshaking-photograph meeting. 2 Thurston wants the Somalis to know he saw you personally to report on the very encouraging progress being made in the East African detente between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. The detente is the first real break in a long-standing quarrel between these three countries over common border areas. The dispute heated up to an undeclared border war several times, but the situation has cooled off considerably in the last few months. The real push for the detente has come from Somalia. They’ve pulled back the guerrillas who were raiding disputed areas in Kenya and Ethiopia, and they’ve stopped hostile propaganda. The Somali Prime Minister had a good meeting with Haile Selassie and Jomo Kenyatta a few months ago. All three countries have resumed diplomatic relations. And only a couple of days ago, the Somali Parliament gave the Government a solid vote of confidence on the policy of detente. All this is very good news for us. We’ve been trying to encourage a reconciliation for a long time, and Thurston has done an able job. If you take a moment to chat, you might tell him: 1. We’re very pleased with the progress of the detente, and especially the show of statesmanship by Somalia. 2. There are bound to be ups and downs in this problem. We know the border dispute is old and deep. 3. But the Somalis have made a very good start toward reconciliation. Thurston and his Mission should keep up the good work of quiet encouragement. W.W. Rostow 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somalia, Vol. I, 1/64–5/68. No classification marking. Drafted by Rostow, Hamilton, and Roger Morris. 2 Ambassador Thurston met with the President from 5:45 p.m. to 5:49 p.m. on December 6. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 346. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 346. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 12, 1968. SUBJECT Your Meeting with Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of the Somali Republic, March 14, 1968; 12:00 noon Prime Minister Egal Egal, 39, took office last summer. He speaks English fluently and, though a Muslim, enjoys a drink. He is a pragmatic African moderate and is pro-West. He has few interests outside politics. Egal has completely reversed Somalia’s policies in the last nine months. Somali irredentism dominated past Government policies. Egal seeks peace and cooperation with neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia. He is pushing for greater economic development at the military’s expense. Somali Republic Somalia is a semi-arid land—much like our South-West. Poor in resources, it has gone in primarily for raising livestock. However, uranium and itrium have just been found near Mogadiscio. If there are large reserves of these metals, as an American company now claims, they could have an enormous effect on the economy. Somalia is one of the few democracies in Africa. Governments and presidents have changed normally since independence in 1960. The country’s tragedy is that European-drawn frontiers have divided the Somali people. Its population is two and a half million; an additional one million live outside the borders, in eastern Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya. Somali irredentism has accordingly plagued the stability of the Horn of Africa. Somalia has a non-aligned foreign policy. Because of U.S. military aid to Ethiopia, it has leaned in the past somewhat to the USSR, which has supplied large amounts of military and economic assistance. What Egal Wants U.S. help with Ethiopia and Kenya in getting them to be more responsive to his efforts to improve relations with them. More U.S. economic assistance in general and designation of Somalia as an AID emphasis country in particular. (Both of these he feels are needed in order to prove the soundness of his new policies to the Somali electorate.) What We Want To strengthen his position and encourage his policies. (His efforts toward regional peace and economic development, at the expense of the military, exceed our most optimistic expectations, and have won more support within Somalia than appeared possible. We should do all we can to assist this most encouraging development.) To demonstrate our interest in one of the few African democracies. Assistant Secretary Palmer will accompany the Prime Minister on his call on you, and Ambassador Thurston will be available at the White House during the meeting. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somalia Republic, Visit of Prime Minister Egal, 3/14–15/68. Confidential. A handwritten notation in the margin reads: “Orig. was attachment to WWR memo 3/13.” Rostow’s memorandum is Document 347 . Attached talking points are not printed. 347. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 347. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 13, 1968, 6 p.m. SUBJECT Your Meeting with Prime Minister Egal (A–Gal) of Somalia Thursday, March 14—12 Noon Schedule: 11:30 AM: Arrival at diplomatic entrance (arrival statements and full military honors) 12:00 Noon: Alone (Egal is fluent in English) advisors standing by in Cabinet Room 8:00 PM: White House Dinner Papers At Tab A is Katzenbach’s briefing memo. 2 At Tab B are State’s Talking Points. 3 At Tab C is biographic information on Egal. 4 Setting Somalia is a poor dry country on the upper east coast of Africa between Kenya and Ethiopia—the “Horn” that juts out into the Indian Ocean just below the mouth of the Red Sea. It became independent in 1960. It is, despite its economic backwardness, a model democracy by African standards. The major factor complicating U.S.-Somalia relations is the very serious tension and arms race between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as a milder form of the same problem with Kenya. We are prime arms suppliers to Ethiopia. The Russians supply Somalia. Until Egal’s election last July, both sides rattled sabers with abandon. The basic problem is tribal irredentism; more than one million Somali tribesmen live in Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia’s traditional policy has aimed at annexing all areas populated by ethnic Somalis—by force if necessary. How Egal handles the border problem will make or break his political future. He has put his chips on a turnaround from belligerence to detente with Ethiopia and Kenya. Over the past few months, with our quiet applause, Egal has begun peace talks with Haile Selassie and Jomo Kenyatta, pulled back the Somali guerrillas raiding the border areas, and cut his military spending. With each of these steps he is walking on eggs in his Parliament. Everybody in Somalia has some clan relative living on the other side of the border. If the detente doesn’t blossom, or if Egal stumbles, the dispute will slip back into the old bitterness—probably all the worse for the failure of this effort. Talking Points 1. Border Problem—You might open by telling Egal how much we admire his courageous efforts to reduce tension with his neighbors, and ask for his views on the prospects for the detente. He will probably give you a lengthy rundown on what he has done and how hard it has been to carry along his own people. He may ask us to work on the Ethiopians and Kenyans. And there is likely to be a strong hint that we make things tougher for him by continuing to supply arms to the Emperor. You might reply that: —We understand his problems. Vice President Humphrey put in a good word for Egal’s policy when he saw the Emperor and Kenyatta in January. —We will continue to give discreet encouragement to all sides. —But only the parties themselves can solve this dispute. Our influence as an outsider is very limited, and a push by us might even be counter-productive. —We don’t think the Emperor has aggressive designs on anybody. We’d hope that the detente will eventually lead to an agreement to limit arms in the area. In the meantime, we are very pleased with the cuts in military spending that Egal has made. 2. Aid —Egal is concerned about our aid cut-back in Africa. Somalia is not one of our concentration countries. Bilateral U.S. aid is scheduled to phase out over the next four years in favor of multilateral and regional projects. This will not affect food or the Peace Corps. Egal may make a strong pitch that he needs aid more than ever to hold the line against his hawks by presenting a credible development alternative. You might say: —We are not withdrawing from Africa in general or Somalia in particular. Congress willing, we hope to put more—not less—aid into Africa in the future than in the past. —We have put more than $70 million in Somalia since 1960, almost $20 million last year alone. —We hope Somalia will join with her neighbors to put together regional projects which will be eligible under our new policy. We know this is tough. But we think it is terribly important. —In any event, the new policy will not affect food aid, the Ex-Im Bank, the Peace Corps, or projects done jointly with other donors. —We are delighted to inform the Prime Minister that we are now ready to sign a $1.1 million PL–480 agreement. This is evidence of our concern. 3. Vietnam (Egal has been silent.) W.W. Rostow 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 66. No classification marking. Drafted by Edward Hamilton and Roger Morris. 2 Document 346 . 3 Not printed; briefing material for Egal’s visit is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somali Republic, Visit of Prime Minister Egal, 3/14–15/68 and Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 SOMALI. 4 Not printed. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 348. Memorandum of Conversation 348. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 14, 1968, noon. SUBJECT Summary of discussions between the President and Prime Minister Egal of the Republic of Somalia PARTICIPANTS United States The President Republic of Somalia H.E. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, Prime Minister of the Republic of Somalia (Continued on Page 2) (This conversation followed a private talk between the President and Prime Minister Egal.) The President said that the Prime Minister and he had discussed a number of things together, including developments in the Horn of Africa. He had expressed to the Prime Minister his pleasure at the reception given the Vice President in Mogadiscio and his pleasure that the Prime Minister had been able to come over to visit this country. He had also asked the Prime Minister to extend his warm regards to the President of Somalia. They had discussed, the President stated, the questions of AID and the Peace Corps. He had told the Prime Minister of his problems with the Congress with regard to AID and the continuation of bilateral assistance. He had noted, however, that, if funds were available, the United States Government was interested in assisting regional projects. Moreover, we were prepared to conclude a PL–480 agreement with the Somali Government. The President went on to say that the USG was discreetly supporting efforts to achieve a detente in the Horn of Africa, although this was best handled by the parties directly concerned. We were most interested in the Prime Minister’s constructive work. We appreciated that some difficulties remained, and we were following these developments closely. Prime Minister Egal stated that he had wanted to give an overall picture to the President and not bother him with details. He planned to take up more detailed matters with the Secretary and Mr. Palmer. United States Participants: The Honorable Raymond L. Thurston, American Ambassador to the Somali Republic The Honorable Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs The Honorable James W. Symington, Chief of Protocol of the U.S. Mr. Edward Hamilton, White House Staff Mr. Matthew Looram, Country Director, Northeastern African Affairs Somali Participants: H.E. Haji Farah Ali Omar, Minister for Foreign Affairs H.E. Ali Omar Shego, Minister of Agriculture The Honorable Haji Mussa Samantar, Undersecretary of Public Works H.E. Yusuf O. Azhari, Ambassador of the Somali Republic H.E. Abdulrahim Abby Farah, Permanent Representative of the Somali Republic to the United Nations Mr. Abdurahman Abby Farah, Chief of Cabinet Colonel Abdillahi Farah Ali, Aide-de-Camp to the Prime Minister Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, Director, Planning Department, Ministry of Planning and Coordination Mr. Omar Mohallim Mohamed, President, Omar Mohallim and Company Mr. Ali Sheikh Mohamed, President, Ali Sheikh and Company 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somalia, Vol. 1, 1/64–5/68. Confidential. Drafted by Looram. The conversation was held at the White House. 349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 1 Washington, March 16, 1968, 0123Z. 131425. Subject: Egal Visit Washington. 1. Following is summary of Secretary’s talk with Somali Prime Minister Egal March 15: 2. Detente in Horn of Africa: In response Secretary’s expression interest current developments, Egal stated progress continuing particularly with Kenya. Somalia still waiting for Ethiopians cancel security measures Ogaden. Establishment joint border commissions with both Ethiopians and Kenyans highly significant. 3. US AID: Egal made strong pitch on both political and economic grounds for U.S. contribution to Juba River Project and construction road linking Addis-Nairobi highway with Port of Chisimaio. Said indication of favorable U.S. decision essential for him politically as well as for his efforts obtain Italian and West German participation these projects. Egal stated he had held up discussing road link project with Kenyans until he got U.S. reaction, but sure Kenyans would be in favor. Secretary stated USG interested Somali economic development and cited PL–480 agreement to be signed today but pointed out Administration’s difficulties with Congress as well problem of Congressional limitation on number AID recipient countries. Believed Somalis would do well look to international institutions particularly World Bank, as well Europeans, for assistance. However suggested Egal discuss further with AID Deputy Administrator. 4. East African Community: In response Secretary’s question whether Ethiopia and Somalia would join, Egal said Somalis definitely would, although there would have to be transitional period of economic reorientation. Community had just appointed negotiating team for discussions with Somali Government. Secretary expressed hope in development regional community whereby national political controversies could be readily resolved or disappear as now case in Western Europe with old issue of Ruhr. 5. U.N.: Secretary stated USG valued active Somali participation in U.N. affairs and opined that Somali delegation in most instances demonstrated moderation and constructive action. 6. Middle East Crisis: Secretary believed formula developed by Ambassador Jarring could be accepted by both sides but feared present delay did not serve peace. Egal stated Somalia supported Arabs and emphasized main obstacle to settlement was question prestige. Irrespective substance, formula would have to appear give concessions to Arabs in light their great humiliation and reluctance any one of Arab leaders make first compromise step. Suggested unconditional Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. Egal fairly sure USSR not urging Arabs reject any settlement. Stated Somali economy had suffered at outset from Suez closure but fairly satisfactory readjustment had since been made, thanks to Italian help. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Palmer, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Lucius D. Battle, Ambassador Thurston, and Steigman; and approved by Looram. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Asmara, and USUN, and by pouch to Paris, Rome, and Bonn. 350. Special National Intelligence Estimate 350. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 11, 1968. SNIE 76.1–68 THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNAL SECURITY IN ETHIOPIA Conclusions A. We estimate that, despite recent improvements in security conditions in Ethiopia, the insurgency in Eriteria will persist and that security problems will continue in other outlying trouble spots. As long as Haile Selassie remains in power, his government will probably be able to keep these problems from getting out of hand. Little will be done, however, to alleviate the underlying causes of the dissidence, because of the rigidity of Haile Selassie’s policies and of the Imperial political system. B. The passing of Haile Selassie, now 75 years old, will usher in a period of great uncertainty in Addis Ababa, which could be prolonged and violent. In these circumstances, government forces would probably be unable to maintain control throughout the countryside, at least for a time. C. A reduction in US deliveries of military assistance to Ethiopia, at a time when the Emperor is seeking an increase, would be likely to strain relations. Though the Kagnew communications facility in Eritrea would probably become a specific issue in Ethiopian bargaining for increased aid, we believe that the Emperor would not go far in threatening continued US use of the facility. After he leaves the scene, Kagnew will probably become increasingly a focus of political attention in Ethiopia. The cost of US rights there will probably increase substantially, and there might be a demand to renegotiate the agreement under which it operates. D. The Eritrean insurgents have not attacked US facilities in Kagnew, though over time pressures for such attacks from within the ranks of the partisans and from radical foreign sponsors are likely to increase. If Eritrea were to break away from Ethiopia, the US might not be cast out of Kagnew automatically. The reaction of Eritrean leaders would depend in part on their susceptibility to radical foreign influences and the availability of alternative sources of foreign aid. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 11. 351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 1 Washington, July 12, 1968, 2213Z. 201631. Subject: Possible Renewed Arms Race in Horn. Ref: Addis 4680; 2 Mogadiscio 3620. 3 1. Fully agree with para one Addis reftel re seriousness situation. Even improvement achieved so far in Somali-Kenyan relations could be endangered by Soviet deliveries of new sophisticated aircraft to Somalia. And unless Ethiopian Government soon makes up its mind on whether or not provide substantive concessions to Egal, Somali Government not likely turn down MIG-21’s which Soviets may be offering precisely to finish off detente, Egal, and latter’s pro-Western policies. Thus action addressee Chiefs of Mission requested make further efforts convince respective governments of desirability trying make progress on detente now before opportunity goes by the board. 2. Re courses of action suggested reftel, we remain of opinion only Egal, possibly with Shermarke, visit Addis for talks with Aklilou and Emperor can get Ethiopian-Somali relations off dead center and hopefully provide Egal with sufficient concessions to resist Soviet blandishments. 3. However, since Ethiopians have apparently not yet decided give such concessions, we see advantages in Shermarke and Egal proceeding with scheduled visit Nairobi. Such bilateral talks likely result in consolidating progress Somali-Kenyan relations. This in turn might conceivably encourage favorable IEG decisions re Somalia and Somalis may wish request Kenyatta urge IEG in this direction. 4. If Council of Ministers has not made up its mind, still do not see how IEG can provide needed encouragement and assurances to Somali Foreign Minister, should his Addis trip be revived, that visit by PM will bear fruit. 5. Request Ambassador Thurston discuss foregoing with Egal. In addition covering points in State 196496 4 and Mogadiscio reftel, Ambassador should explore with latter desirability his (plus Shermarke) visiting Addis following Nairobi, preferably with advance assurances of Ethiopian forthcomingness but even without, given seriousness present situation. Would it be helpful approach Italians on this subject Mogadiscio and/or Washington? 6. Request Ambassador Ferguson discuss situation frankly with Kenyan Government on basis our concern continuing stalemate Ethiopian-Somali relations preventing forward movement on detente and weakening Egal’s political position particularly in face Somali military opposition to detente and reports of Soviet offers more military equipment. Ask if any way GOK might be able to help. 7. Request Ambassador Hall discuss with FonMin Ketema or at higher level if feasible along same lines and urge that favorable decision on proposed concessions be expedited and word to this effect be conveyed to Somali Government. Explore possibility IEG invitation to Shermarke and Egal visit Addis following their trip Nairobi in order discuss outstanding problems including danger further arms race. If useful you may state you speaking under instructions. 5 8. Posts should repeat significant messages this subject to above addressees. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Looram; cleared by AFE Country Director Nicholas Feld, John G. MacCracken in EUR/SOV, and Lewis D. Junior in G/PM; and approved by AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas H.E. Quimby. Also sent to Mogadiscio and Nairobi, and repeated to London, Moscow, Asmara, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 In telegram 4680 from Addis Ababa, July 10, Ambassador Hall commented that Ethiopia and Somalia were perhaps on the verge of a new arms race, which would further limit both countries’ capabilities to progress economically and end hopes for detente, and might lead to another war between them. He agreed that Ethiopia’s Canberra deal was bad, but noted that a Somalia MIG deal would make matters worse. (Ibid.) 3 Dated July 12. (Ibid., DEF 19–6 USSR-SOMALI) 4 Dated July 3. (Ibid.) 5 In telegram 4784 from Addis Ababa, July 18, Hall reported that he discussed the status of the detente and the danger of a new arms race between Somalia and Ethiopia with Prime Minister Aklilou that afternoon, and urged the necessity of an early meeting to discuss detente and to reassure Somalia regarding Ethiopia’s purchase of Canberra jet bombers. The Ambassador warned Aklilou that Egal could not come to Addis Ababa without assurance that he would take back some concrete accomplishment. Hall reported that the Prime Minister said he would ask the Ethiopian Ambassador in Mogadiscio to reassure Egal concerning specific concessions to be made when he came to Addis Ababa and to renew the invitation for a visit. (Ibid.) 352. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 352. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 1 Addis Ababa, July 29, 1968, 1624Z. 4904. Ref: Addis Ababa 4755. 2 1. During my audience with HIM today, I recalled that when I had first arrived in Addis he urged that after I had formed some views on Ethiopian domestic affairs we meet to talk over my personal views. I said I now had some impressions and views, purely personal, and I would be delighted discuss at his convenience, perhaps after Nigerian meetings were behind him. HIM laughed and said if we waited until after Nigeria it would be very long time. He went on, however, to say he would be very glad to talk later and suggested I call him when we both had less pressure. 2. HIM then said he also wished to discuss Ethiopia’s relations with neighbors and with Soviet Union, and relations of neighbors with Soviet Union. He said recent improvement of relations between US and Soviet Union was a good thing for the world, but he was concerned that in considering its relations with Soviets, US should not overlook the harder line Soviets have been taking with Ethiopia and Soviet provision of arms to Sudan, Somalia and UAR. 3. I replied US sought improved relations with Soviet Union, but said we were proceeding with caution and full regard for Soviet relations with our friends and Soviet attitudes toward such countries as Czechoslovakia. I said US does not intend sacrifice its principles or relations with its friends in interest closer relations with Soviets. I said I would be prepared to talk about these problems when we next meet. 4. HIM said he also wished to discuss changed attitude of Congress on foreign assistance and other US activities abroad. In particular, he wished to talk about certain studies of Ethiopian-American relations prepared by FonOff. ( Comment : Min State Tesfaye mentioned these studies some weeks ago. I will seek talk about them with Tesfaye or FonMin Ketema before I meet with HIM.) 5. One final note on audience with HIM is that I observed on his reading table copy of Ayub Khan’s Friends, Not Masters . Book mark would indicate HIM was two-thirds of the way through book. Hall 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ETH–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Asmara. 2 Dated July 16. (Ibid.) 353. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 353. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 1 Addis Ababa, July 29, 1968, 1625Z. 4905. Subject: Ethiopia-Somali Relations. 1. During audience with Emperor today I raised Ethiopian-Somali relations, referring to our earlier discussion this subject. I knew he had been concerned about problem and had been pleased with Egal’s initiative and wished to reciprocate. I expressed personal view there had been slowdown in progress toward detente. Ethiopia had placed Egal in difficult position and time had come to make a positive response. I recounted my conversation with Egal, including his interest in collaborating on such matters as overflights, exchange of vehicles and lifting state of emergency. I said Egal also had expressed hope for cooperation in development of Webi Schebelli and Juba Rivers and in commerce. 2. HIM reasserted his warm personal regard of Egal and belief that Egal was sincerely interested in improving relations with Ethiopia. He said it intent of Ethiopia to respond to Egal’s initiative and noted that IEG had invited Egal to Addis to discuss these matters. The Emperor said there are still problems of Somali agents in Ogaden, guerrilla camps along border and activity of ELF Headquarters in Moga, all of which had aroused increasing concern in IEG. He said IEG feels that progress must be made slowly and must be reciprocal on both sides. He realized Egal’s difficulties and said Ethiopia intended to make gesture. 3. HIM then expressed concern about Soviet-Somali relations. Referring to recent visit of Defense Minister to Moscow and said he felt it may indicate reversal of previous trend in Somali-Soviet relations. HIM wondered whether Egal was not, in fact, now encouraging closer Soviet-Somali relations. I said in my view Somalis preoccupied with vastly superior Ethiopian military strength. When I mentioned Canberra purchase as giving Somalis concern, HIM laughed and said the Canberras were not directed against Somalia. I said our recent supply of additional F–5’s and tanks had also caused concern. Although Egal continued to resist pressures to go to Soviets for more arms, it was questionable how long he could maintain present position. HIM then reiterated his desire improve relations with Somalia and again said he like Egal personally and that IEG would have to make some gesture to reassure him. 4. Comment : From our conversation, it seems probable that Ethiopian intelligence has picked up Soviet-Somali meetings and their discussions of increased training and equipment assistance. As result those skeptical of Egal’s intentions within IEG appear to have effectively planted doubts in HIM’s mind. 5. HIM at the moment is so preoccupied with Nigerian problem that even though I believe he sincerely intends to press ahead on detente, progress will be slow. He clearly considers Nigeria more important problem for Ethiopia and rest of Africa. We will continue to press IEG and may be agreeably surprised, but I doubt that any action will be taken until after the completion of Nigerian talks here. Hall 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ETH–SOMALI. Confidential. Repeated to Asmara and Mogadiscio. 354. Intelligence Note 354. Intelligence Note 1 Washington, September 6, 1968. No. 705 SUBJECT Somali-Ethiopian Relations Turn a Corner Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Egal’s September 1–4 visit to Ethiopia has broken the deadlock between the two countries. The Ethiopians, who had hinted that concessions were in the offing, have agreed to suspend emergency measures in the Somali-inhabited Ogaden, long a stumbling block to improved relations. Ingrained distrust and technical details remain to be overcome but for the first time in many months the detente first offered by Egal in July 1967 has begun to gain momentum. The Ante . According to the communique signed September 4 by Egal and Ethiopian Prime Minister Aklilou Abte Wold, emergency measures will be relaxed on September 16. Ethiopia will return confiscated Somali vehicles with compensation for damages. It has given permission for flights between Mogadiscio and Hargeisa to overfly the Ogaden area of Ethiopia (see map). 2 The two governments agreed to negotiate cultural, telecommunications, and trade agreements. A joint ministerial consultative committee was set up for the periodic discussion of problems between the two countries. Earlier Omens . The break-through ended a summer of deteriorating relations, marked by raids, counter-raids, and mutual recrimination. Egal—faced with doubters in Parliament, threatened by the coming March 1969 elections, and under pressure from his army—badly needed proof of Ethiopia’s good will. In Somali eyes Ethiopia’s posture was unyielding and signified an attempt to exploit Egal’s move toward detente to build up Ethiopian military might. It led Egal to consider purchasing additional Soviet arms. There were mutterings within the Somali Army of a possible need for the military to take over the government. In these circumstances Ethiopia, aware that Egal is its best hope for stabilizing relations with Somalia, at last moved to help Egal with much-needed concessions. Why the Change? Ethiopian action on the detente has often bogged down in acrid dispute between moderates and hardliners. Emperor Haile Selassie, preoccupied by the war in Nigeria, had evidently given little consideration to meeting Egal halfway. Detailed proposals for concessions were, however, submitted to him by Chief of Staff Gen. Iyassu Mengesha on August 14. The US weighed in strongly in favor of a forthcoming response. Shortly afterwards, the Emperor invited Egal to visit Addis Ababa. Changing Signals . Hawkish Ethiopian civil servants and army officers, long conditioned to a philosophy of external threat, have already reacted to the talks by grumbling about a “sellout to the Somalis.” A few higher officials are apparently even assuring them that the measures can be rescinded, blaming the US for pressing Ethiopia to make the concessions. While the Ethiopian negotiators did not insist on a quid pro quo, they will be scrutinizing Egal’s handling of anti-Ethiopian organizations in his country. His actions, and his countrymen’s reactions, will determine how fast Ethiopia moves in following through on its commitments—in particular, in tackling the thorny problems of how it polices the border areas. The Emperor can be expected to throw his weight behind the peacemakers headed by Prime Minister Aklilou, but the actions of lower officials and army officers anxious to throw a monkey wrench into the peace machinery could still create difficulties. Next Steps . The success of the Egal mission, well covered in Ethiopian news media, has given rise to heady optimism in Addis Ababa. Enthusiastic Somalis predict a meeting between the Emperor and Somali President Abdirascid Ali Shermarche, perhaps at the September 13–16 Algiers Summit. Ethiopian officials are allegedly considering secretly financing Egal’s campaign expenses. Prime Minister Aklilou has said that, once the problems of border controls are settled, he is ready to negotiate the elimination of customs duties, and to enter into the joint development of the water resources of the Juba and Webi Shibeli rivers. Egal arrived in Addis Ababa with reservations about Ethiopian sincerity; he left convinced the Emperor supports the detente. The question is now whether the euphoria will be succeeded by concrete accomplishment. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH–SOMALI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted as a memorandum from Director of INR Thomas L. Hughes to Rusk. 2 Not printed. 355. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 355. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, September 6, 1968. Dear Nick: I am writing in response to your request that the Defense Department develop a program that could serve as the basis for a plan of action for relocating our current activities from Kagnew Station in Ethiopia. Alternate sites for the activities now located at Kagnew have been identified, together with costs and time it would take to develop alternate facilities. The activities at Kagnew consist of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] STRATCOM and Navy communications facilities, and a small atomic explosion detection site. The duplication of these activities would entail enlarging existing facilities in Spain, Morocco, Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Iran; building a new facility on Crete (or Cyprus) and a new Navy communications station in the Indian Ocean area; [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. The over-all cost of duplicating the Kagnew facilities would be about $116 million, with completion about four years after funds are made available. The proposed relocation sites would result in little loss in our communications capabilities, [ 13–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] in commenting on the alternative arrangements, concluded that the functions presently being performed at Kagnew could not be relocated without entailing serious risks to US security interests. I believe the impact of relocation—the financial costs, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and the lack of relocation sites which would improve our prospects for tenure—will have to be weighed carefully against the uncertain political situation in Ethiopia before any decision can be made for a phased relocation from Kagnew. In order that your staff might study these factors more carefully, I am enclosing a copy of the telecommunications plan. 2 [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] (The changing political situation mentioned above, which has occurred since the preparation of these plans, will require some modifications in the proposed alternate sites.) In view of the difficult situations confronting our continued presence at Kagnew and other facilities elsewhere as well, I have directed the development of a five-year plan [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] due in September 1969. In the interim, in order to reduce our presence at Kagnew, I have directed the following: —A joint manpower survey to determine what reductions (in addition to those resulting from current budgetary actions) can be made and that until completion of that survey present personnel strength be established as a ceiling. —The cancellation of $1 million in previously approved construction projects. Future construction will be limited to that which you and I agree is essential. Moreover, the Defense Communications Satellite System which is expected to be operational by mid-1971, should enable us to make a substantial reduction in acreage and personnel. Consequently, I have directed a study to assess the feasibility of reconfiguring the Defense Communications System facilities at Kagnew with a view toward reducing the number of high frequency radio systems, and a survey of the utilization of real estate tracts with a view toward consolidating functions where technically feasible. This review will be coordinated with the Department of State to insure that the over-all world-wide Defense Communications and Diplomatic Telecommunications Systems are not impaired. I have requested that your staff be kept fully apprised of the results of these surveys. Sincerely, Paul 3 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Ethiopia, 000.1—1968. Top Secret. 2 Not printed. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Nitze signed the original. 356. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 356. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 1 Washington, December 16, 1968. Dear Paul: I want to thank you for your letter of September 6 on Kagnew Station. 2 A great deal of work has evidently gone into this study. I am sincerely grateful. We have weighed the various factors—first and foremost our security interests and also the volatility of the political situation in Ethiopia and the Horn—in trying to work out the most prudent course of action. Our objective is to find ways of dealing with the heart of the problem: Ethiopia is too uncertain a location for an installation as important as Kagnew. We could decide to accept the risks of being expelled, either by political pressures or by deterioration of the security situation, and try to hold on until that time, or at least almost until the point where we would have to provide troops to protect our people. Alternatively, we can begin a progressive phase-down of our activities at Kagnew, stopping any additions and sorting out those already there as you have suggested, and plan for various contingencies in the future. An early phasing-down of some Kagnew activities would lessen the apparent value of the Station to the U.S., and could thus increase the chances of retaining its most important functions over a longer period; both the IEG and the dissidents would be less inclined to believe the Station provides them with strong leverage over the U.S. Consequently, I propose the following: 1. We confirm our present policy of adding no more functions to Kagnew, undertaking no new construction, and acquiring no additional land. 2. We pursue vigorously a sorting-out of present activities in order to reduce or eliminate marginal ones; select out and reallocate those that could be performed by other systems now or in the next few years; and identify those remaining ones which must either continue to be performed at Kagnew or be relocated, probably with overlap to assure continuity. I recognize that the last category listed above is the most difficult. Therefore, I propose singling out activities which should be continued elsewhere to avoid interruption and those which could be handled temporarily without new construction now at other sites in the event of forced withdrawal. 3. Meanwhile, we should continue to refine our planning for an eventual withdrawal so that we can soon have in hand a scenario that will permit us to carry out an orderly phase-down, if necessary, well before our present agreement expires in 1978. The preparation of such a plan should put us in a better position to anticipate the problems should such a contingency arise. If you concur, I propose that our staffs continue their work and prepare an annual report on progress made toward the objective. Sincerely, Nicholas deB Katzenbach 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 ETH–US. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but a typed note indicates the letter was redrafted in U. 2 Document 355 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Katzenbach signed the original. Nigeria Nigeria 357. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State Lagos, March 25, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Africa, Box 31, Harriman’s Trip, 3/64. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 358. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 30, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Official Use Only. 359. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 2, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Secret. 360. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, August 26, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 26. 361. Editorial Note 362. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Director of the Bureau (Hughes) Washington, January 18, 1966. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Nigeria. Secret. Prepared on January 21. The memorandum was also sent to the Deputy Director of INR George C. Denney, Jr., and to Deputy Director for Research Allan Evans. 363. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, May 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Secret. 364. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All African Posts Washington, August 2, 1966, 5:45 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Samuel Sloan and Roy W. Melbourne of the Office of West African Affairs, cleared by Officer in Charge of Nigerian Affairs Robert P. Smith, and approved by Trimble. Also sent to CINCSTRIKE, Brussels, London, USUN, Paris, Ottawa, Bonn, Canberra, Rome, and Moscow. 365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria Washington, September 28, 1966, 10:57 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 NIGERIA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Robert P. Smith, cleared by Roy M. Melbourne, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Paris, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. 366. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, October 1, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 367. Telegram From the Consulate in Enugu to the Department of State Enugu, October 18, 1966, 0755Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to Lagos and London and repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DIA, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA. 368. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Manila, October 27, 1966, 0220Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria Washington, November 9, 1966, 5:44 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Melbourne, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London. 370. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State Lagos, November 11, 1966, 1510Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Noforn. Also sent to Enugu, and repeated to London, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA. 371. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State Lagos, February 14, 1967, 1230Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London. Passed to the White House and USIA at 5:17 a.m. on February 15. 372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria Washington, February 14, 1967, 8:09 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith and Melbourne, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London. 373. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, February 22, 1967, 3:27 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Robert Smith in AF/AFW, cleared in substance for EUR by Country Director for Canada Rufus Z. Smith, and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Lagos and London. 374. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria Washington, February 23, 1967, 4:56 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Melbourne and Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE. 375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria Washington, March 3, 1967, 5:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to London and repeated to Accra. 376. Telegram From the Consulate in Enugu to the Department of State Enugu, March 10, 1967, 1925Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to Lagos, London, and Accra. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DOD, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, CIA, USIA, and NSA. 377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, March 11, 1967, 3:44 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Smith and Melbourne, cleared in substance by Thomas M. Judd in EUR/BMI, and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Lagos and Accra. 378. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria Washington, March 24, 1967, 11:55 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Smith on March 23, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, Accra, and Enugu. 379. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State Lagos, April 12, 1967, 1500Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DIA, Accra, London, Monrovia, Yaounde, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, CIA, DOD, NSA, and USIA. 380. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State Lagos, April 13, 1967, 1723Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis (Noforn except British). Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DIA, London, Accra, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, USIA, DOD, NSA, AND CIA. 381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria Washington, April 14, 1967, 2:34 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Melbourne on April 13 and approved by Trimble. Repeated to London, Accra, Enugu, Ibadan, Kaduna and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 382. Telegram From Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, April 19, 1967, 10:08 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Melbourne and Country Director for Ethiopia Matthew J. Looram, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to Addis Ababa, Lagos, and London. 383. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State Lagos, April 21, 1967, 1500Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Accra, Addis Ababa, and London. Passed to the White House, DOD, NSA, CIA, and USIA. 384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria Washington, May 5, 1967, 4:01 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL NIGERIA–US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Melbourne and cleared by Trimble. 385. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, May 25, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Secret. 386. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, May 30, 1967, 6:05 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Charles Runyon and Palmer, and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to all posts in Africa and Europe, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and USUN. 387. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, May 31, 1967, 7 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Aides File, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 29. Secret. The memorandum was passed to President Johnson with a May 31 covering note from Rostow at 7:50 p.m. 388. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 6, 1967, 4:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Nigeria-Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. 389. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 28, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Confidential. Prepared by Rostow. 390. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, July 3, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. No classification marking. 391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria Washington, July 20, 1967, 6:57 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 BIAFRA–NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Melbourne and cleared by Hamilton at the White House. 392. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State Lagos, August 8, 1967, 1700Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, London, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. 393. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 27, 1967, p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Nigeria. Confidential. A note in Rostow’s handwriting on the source text reads: “You sound sensible, as usual. R.” 394. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 7, 1968. 395. Airgram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State Lagos, March 7, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA–US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ambassador Mathews on February 29. 396. Information Memorandum From the Western Africa Country Director, Bureau of African Affairs (Melbourne) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) Washington, April 18, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA–US. Secret. Drafted by Alan M. Hardy of AFW. 397. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 2, 1968. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 2. 398. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, August 12, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 8/67–1/69. Secret. 399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria Washington, August 15, 1968, 1553Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Nigeria-Presidential Correspondence. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Hamilton at the White House and Katzenbach, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to London. Repeated to Addis Ababa and the U.S. Mission at Geneva. 400. Editorial Note 401. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 14, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 8/67–1/69. Confidential. 402. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 24, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 8/67–1/69. Secret. 357. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 357. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 1 Lagos, March 25, 1964, 7 p.m. 1723. Personal for President and Secretary of State from Harriman. In long talks with Prime Minister Abubakar and Foreign Minister Wachuku, both expressed great respect for President Johnson and his policies, and manner in which he is giving leadership. They both indicated grave concern over Congo, felt much time had been lost by UN in failing to gain troops and police, and otherwise help Congolese Government. Efforts must now be made to assist Adoula attain stability after UN leaves in June, which will be most difficult. They want to work with us and are ready to consider leaving troops and police if asked by Adoula. Would need, however, burden sharing on formula used in Tanganyika—Nigerians pay salaries but Tanganyikans pay other expenses of troops. They urge we use our influence with Belgian Government as well as Adoula to have Belgians play leading role in every way possible as only country which had needed knowledge and ability. They are ready to work closely with us in all aspects of problem. They fear Soviet and Chinese efforts to undermine as well as Rhodesian, South African and Portuguese support for possible Tshombe military intervention. Both expressed desire our support in achieving African objectives but showed some understanding when I explained difficulties with Salazar. Prime Minister admitted Home had stated categorically that UK would not support economic sanctions against South Africa. Both indicated however they did not agree with Home and felt it was European and US responsibility to force change. Both showed a suspicious attitude towards France and French policy in Africa and also resented French failure to assume any responsibility in Congo and other African problems outside former colonies. They expressed gratitude for our aid and although intend to retain intimacy with UK feel they have much in common with US including growing pains of a federation and post colonial difficulties. Both minimized concern I expressed for Communist takeover in Zanzibar, assured me that if UK and US gave needed help there was no danger of Communist control. Karume was sensible and Babu was primarily African nationalist and would not permit Communist takeover. When I pressed Wachuku, he firmly insisted he could guarantee Babu whom he had personally known a long time. They intended to play leading role OAU, and strongly desire Lagos as headquarters. They have no confidence in Nkrumah and expressed fear, having failed to gain other support, he would fall under Soviet and even more so Chinese Communist domination. Prime Minister expressed personal hostility to British Labor leaders including Wilson because of their criticism if Nigerian justice on Enahoro extradition case. My last call was on President Azikiwe who received me most cordially and informally. He then proceeded to read an eloquent statement of Nigerian objectives and friendship for US. (Statement in separate telegram later released to press by President.) In conversation that followed he confirmed his government’s desire to assist Congo. Also expressed appreciation US aid and asked me to convey warm personal message of respect and admiration to President Johnson. Talks throughout showed a sober determination to take leadership in African affairs and strong desire to obtain our support. They recognized need for moderating influence on impatient African leaders. They are prepared to give help to other countries but recognize their own shortage of trained personnel and resources. Detailed report follows. 2 Scott 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Africa, Box 31, Harriman’s Trip, 3/64. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Further documentation on Harriman’s trip to Nigeria and other African countries during the last week of March 1964 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 HARRIMAN and POL NIGERIA–US. 358. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 358. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 30, 1964. SUBJECT The Situation in Nigeria Both the Department and the acting Nigerian Ambassador (who is a personal friend) insist that press reports out of Nigeria (especially Garrison of the Times ) picture the situation as being far worse than it actually is. That the country is passing through a serious political crisis, no one can deny. There have been irregularities in preparation for the elections being held today. The three southern regions (Western, Mid-Western and Eastern), which politically are represented by the UPGA, contend that the vast Moslem Northern region is returning, unopposed, 68 members of the Legislature, and that this is both unlawful and undemocratic. President Azikiwe (Eastern) has held that, in view of these irregularities, the elections should be postponed for a month; Prime Minister Balewa (Northern) insisted successfully in an all-day bargaining session yesterday that the elections should be held today. Very complicated African politics, in which tribes, religion and economics all play a part, are involved in the situation. The Northern Premier is at odds with the Eastern Premier in whose region large oil deposits have been discovered. In the heat of the election campaign, there have been threats of secession by the East; threats of violence “that would make the Congo look like child’s play” from the North; etc., etc. No one believes these threats actually will be carried out. What we are in for is a period of hard political bargaining which, when they emerge from it, should make the Nigerians more aware of the nature of the internal forces of the country than they now are. As of noon today, the UPGA (the three southern regions) were boycotting the elections and some trade unions controlled by the UPGA had gone on strike. But, according to the Acting Ambassador, who talked to Lagos at seven this morning, much bargaining is going on in the background. He is as much worried about press reports here as he is the situation in his own country. SEB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Official Use Only. 359. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 359. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 2, 1965. Mac— I haven’t bothered you on Nigeria, on a simple premise that if nothing we should do no point in flapping. We decided to take UK’s counsel, rather than that of our Lagos man, and not propose any LBJ intervention. 2 Latest news is encouraging. The two sides have gotten together; while a long period of bargaining (with perhaps some minor violence) is in prospect, odds are against Nigeria falling apart. 3 Of course it’s regrettable that Nigerians will be so wound up in their own affairs as to be less useful on the Congo than we had hoped. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Secret. 2 Telegram 1107 from Lagos, December 30, recommended that the President send a message to Nigerian President Nnamdi Azikiwe declaring support for the preservation of the federal republic. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Nigeria—Presidential Correspondence) 3 Telegram 02477 to Lagos, January 7, requested delivery of Johnson’s congratulations to President Azikiwe and Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa on their statesmanship and spirit of comprise in averting a crisis. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 NIGERIA) 360. National Intelligence Estimate 360. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, August 26, 1965. NIE 64.2–65 PROSPECTS FOR NIGERIA The Problem To estimate probable developments in Nigeria over the next two to three years. Conclusions A. The salient question for Nigeria is whether the federal structure can survive in the face of the many internal strains and tensions. The facts of geography and population assure that under the constitution, the federal government will continue to be dominated by the party representing the tradition-bound Moslems of the North, who are generally contemptuous of the South and unsympathetic to its problems. The southern regions, which are deeply divided along tribal, regional, and party lines, resent northern domination. Some southern leaders cooperate with the North in federal affairs realizing that only thus can they and their interest reap the benefits of participation in government. (Paras. 1–7) B. The economy is based upon agriculture, the beginnings of a modest industrial sector, and a promising petroleum industry. Economic development is hampered by regional and tribal parochialism, the dearth of essential skills, and a high incidence of corruption. There is considerable unemployment and underemployment. At mid-course in a six-year development plan, domestic financial resources are inadequate, although foreign capital is flowing in, particularly in the petroleum industry. Some modest overall economic growth is expected, but the government will be beset by rising pressures from discontented jobless and urban workers. (Paras. 8–16) C. We do not foresee any important lessening of the internal tensions and resentments which threaten the unity of the federation. If northerners and southerners continue to think and act in terms of narrow regional interests, there will be serious danger of a critical North-South confrontation. We estimate that the continuation of the federation and the growth of an integrated nation cannot be taken as assured. Nevertheless, we believe that the chances are considerably better than even that Nigeria will be able to avoid a breakup during the next two or three years, through the disappearance of Prime Minister Balewa from the scene would reduce these odds significantly. Over the longer run, we expect a rise of discontent and radical leaders in the South who will challenge and probably replace present leaders and place national unity in jeopardy. The security forces appear capable of dealing with most disorders, but it is doubtful if they could cope with a national crisis which involved interregional or federal versus regional issues. 2 (Paras. 17–25) [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 26. 2 The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, agrees that Nigeria is not likely to break up during the next 2 to 3 years. He believes, however, that the threat to continuation of the federation is not so serious as the estimate suggests. He considers that the estimate does not give due weight to the accommodation to northern predominance effected by southern leaders in the courses of major trials of strength over the past 3 years and that consequently it misinterprets present north-south relations and undervalues the southern commitment to maintenance of the federation. While agreeing that social and economic grievances are becoming more serious, he considers that the growth of southern opposition to northern leadership will be slowed and limited by southern disunity, division within the labor movement, and the weakness of radical organizations. On the basis of these considerations, he also disagrees with a number of related points of detail and presentation in the Estimate. [Footnote in the source text.] 361. Editorial Note 361. Editorial Note On January 15, 1966, the Nigerian Government was overthrown by a military coup. Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and the other junior officers who led the coup, however, failed to take power. Instead, on January 16, Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, Commander in Chief of the Army, assumed power as Head of the National Military Government. His government announced the death of Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. A Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs note of January 20 informed the U.S. Government that the Council of Ministers had “unanimously decided to hand over voluntarily the administration of the country” to the Army on January 16, that Nigeria would continue to honor its treaty obligations, and that it hoped to continue normal and cordial relations with the U.S. Government. (Telegram 1060 from Lagos, January 20; Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 NIGERIA) The State Department responded by note to the Nigerian Embassy on January 27 that the U.S. Government continued to maintain diplomatic relations with the Government of Nigeria, and expected to continue to do so. (Telegram 1573 to Lagos, January 27; ibid.) The Department issued a statement to this effect at the regular noon press briefing on January 28, and added that the question of recognition did not arise. 362. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Director of the Bureau (Hughes) 362. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Director of the Bureau (Hughes) 1 Washington, January 18, 1966. SUBJECT AF Meeting with CIA Representatives January 18, 1966 PARTICIPANTS AF—Mr. Fredericks and Ambassador Trimble; AFW—Mr. Clark; AFC—Mr. Brown; CIA—[ names not declassified ]; INR/DDC—Ambassador Koren and Mr. Ekern 1. Nigerian Coup [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] agreed with Mr. Fredericks that the chief problem at the moment was the absence of adequate information on what was happening in Nigeria, the identities behind the coup, 2 and what the significance was. Current reporting was reviewed as well as the problems associated with evacuation of Americans should this become necessary. Mr. Fredericks reported on his discussions with the Nigerian Ambassador whom he described as being a “shattered man.” On his way out the Ambassador made the remark that “he was no longer authorized to ask for US intervention,” but Mr. Fredericks was not sure what the Ambassador was trying to tell him. The Ambassador was very much in the dark as to happenings in Nigeria and asked for information we might have on the names of people involved in the coup. Mr. Clark reviewed the E and E plan, and the status of preparations. Mr. Fredericks was concerned over the role Ghana might have played, or its intentions towards the coup. He felt that Nkrumah would attempt to fish in troubled waters, and in particular try to capture Nigerian foreign policy. Should Nigeria go over to the radical coup the loss to the US would be most serious. He discoursed upon the stake the US had in Nigeria, the biggest in Africa. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] recalled that during the recent Commonwealth conference a Communist journalist had been passing out funds in Lagos. Mr. Fredericks phrased the prime questions that had priority for intelligence acquisition purposes: a. Who are the personalities behind the coup and what is their coloration and motivation? b. Can the Army run the government? c. Can the Army hold together? d. What would happen if Ironsi was assassinated? Mr. Fredericks also thought it important that we determine what we should say to other African leaders, if anything. If Nigeria could fall victim to military takeover, then it could happen anywhere in Africa. The stage was set. What sort of advice could we give the remaining civilian regimes? Ambassador Koren suggested that INR and possibly CIA together prepare an agreed assessment of the situation for information of our Embassies, including whatever advice for other heads of government seemed appropriate. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] gave him a preliminary Agency report on this question of shock waves from Nigeria (see attached Tab A). 3 [ 2 paragraphs (12 lines of source text) not declassified ] The meeting then turned to a wide-ranging discussion of the consequences of a really chaotic situation in Nigeria, and the effect on the rest of Africa. 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Nigeria. Secret. Prepared on January 21. The memorandum was also sent to the Deputy Director of INR George C. Denney, Jr., and to Deputy Director for Research Allan Evans. 2 See Document 361 . 3 Not printed. 363. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 363. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, May 30, 1966. SUBJECT Comments on Nigeria Sitrep of 5/30/66 2 Walt— Last week the Nigerian Military Government prohibited all political parties and abolished the four federal regions. This action, taken in a climate of unemployment, rising prices, food shortages, poor administration, increased tribalism, etc., triggered the current uprisings in Northern Nigeria. Both the political parties and the former federal regions were created and supported along distinct tribal lines. They were important safety valves because they provided an outlet for tribal expression and a modern political basis to traditional tribal homelands. The Military Government’s action, therefore, struck at the heart of those institutions which preserved the shaky equilibrium in Nigeria. It is significant that the current disturbances are well-organized and that they broke out in the North. I would attribute this to the fact that all of the Northern politicians from the previous government got off scot-free. (After the coup, the Military Government did not arrest or detain any Northerners for fear of arousing Northern sentiment over the assassinations of the Federal Prime Minister and the Governor of Northern Nigeria, both Northerners.) These politicians have undoubtedly been involved in covert activities against the Military Government. Prognosis : Trouble for some time to come, with little USG leverage to influence the situation. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Secret. 2 The attached situation report is not printed. 364. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All African Posts 364. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All African Posts 1 Washington, August 2, 1966, 5:45 p.m. 20025. Infotel: Nigeria Crisis. Circular 18771. 2 1. Following July 29 army mutiny in western provinces Nigeria, former Army Chief of Staff LTC Yakubu Gowon (a northern Christian) 3 announced on August 1 that he had assumed control of government at “request majority members of National Military Government’s (NMG) Supreme Military Council.” Upon assumption of power, Gowon pledged to continue policies Ironsi government as enunciated in January and made customary assurances to effect all existing treaty obligations and commitments and financial agreements and obligations would be honored. Gowon referred to recent events Nigeria, noted cryptically that “base for unity not there” and said that issue of national standing should be reviewed to see if country can be stopped from drifting away into utter destruction. He stated that a decree would soon be issued to lay a sound foundation for resolution problems which have disunited country in the past. Federal Chief Justice has received assurances from some northern leaders that north would take no action to secede for next six weeks. 2. At present time NMG appears in control military establishment, particularly in north and west, although structure is fragile as result loss many senior officers. Situation throughout country reportedly generally quiet. Gowon has stated Ironsi kidnapped and whereabouts unknown. 3. Following Gowon’s assumption power, in an appeal for cooperation with law enforcement authorities, Eastern Mil Gov Ojukwu 4 referred to Gowon only under previous title as Chief of Staff of Nigerian Army. Ojukwu said he not consulted regarding terms but had agreed to following conditions for “ceasefire” laid down by rebels: that Nigeria be split into component parts and that Northerners and Southerners should be repatriated to their home regions. While stating his doubts that after events recent months, people of Nigeria could ever live together as members same nation, Ojukwu called for discussions among all sections Nigerian people regarding form of future association of Nigerian people in accordance ceasefire terms. (NMG has subsequently denied it plans to partition country or resort to repatriation.) 4. Both US Ambassador Mathews and UKHICOM Cumming-Bruce have made strong representations in opposition to secession of any area of Nigeria. We consider such development would be major political and economic disaster for Nigerian people and severe setback to independent Africa. Approaches along similar lines being made by our Consuls in provinces. 5. MinExtAff official August 2 read prepared statement to Lagos Dip Corps reiterating assurances given earlier by Gowon (para 1), stating that “this govt being continuation of old mil govt, does not require formal recognition.” Dept in any case prefers await more explicit indications of Gowon’s intentions re maintenance national unity before formally embracing new regime. 5 6. So far no reports of any danger US citizens or property. Gowon and MinExtAff have given explicit reassurances of safety foreigners in Nigeria. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Samuel Sloan and Roy W. Melbourne of the Office of West African Affairs, cleared by Officer in Charge of Nigerian Affairs Robert P. Smith, and approved by Trimble. Also sent to CINCSTRIKE, Brussels, London, USUN, Paris, Ottawa, Bonn, Canberra, Rome, and Moscow. 2 Dated July 31. (Ibid.) 3 Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Yakubu Gowon, the Army Chief of Staff under Ironsi and the ranking northern officer, was named to head the National Military Government (NMG) by northern Muslim officers and Army units after their coup of July 29. Ironsi and some other Ibo officers were killed in this action. Gowon was a Christian from a small Middle Belt northern tribe. He had not been involved in the coup, but was very popular with the northern soldiers who made up the bulk of the infantry. Gowon had been a member of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of the National Military Government and replaced Ironsi as Supreme Commander with the approval of the majority of members of the SMC. Shortly after taking power, Gowon changed the name of the military government to the Federal Military Government (FMG). 4 Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu was appointed military governor of the Eastern Region, homeland of the Ibo tribe, after the January coup. Ojukwu, an Ibo, was a member of the Supreme Military Council. 5 Telegram 1781 from Lagos, September 8, reported that the Embassy had been conducting normal business with the Government of Nigeria without taking any formal step. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 NIGERIA) 365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 1 Washington, September 28, 1966, 10:57 a.m. 55552. Ref: Lagos’ 2150, 2246 and 2278. 2 Assistant Secretary Palmer received Sanusi Sept. 27, 3 who presented letter of introduction from Gowon to President and offered following orally: 1. He on good will mission to bring personal greetings from Gowon and to express appreciation for USG stand in Nigeria and for understanding of American people and government. 2. Described current situation as difficult but not impossible, expressed conviction that time on side Nigerian unity. Said loose talk re secession had annoyed and upset Gowon. Referred to useful talk with Ambassador, subsequent diplomatic activity, and said denial by Ojukwu of any thought of secession “most encouraging.” 3. Declared Gowon had no intention to impose government on Nigeria. This up to people, and until they decide, he had duty to protect country, including minorities. During this “transitional period,” Gowon hoped for understanding of old friends like US while time permitted Nigerians to forget and forgive. Assistant Secretary Palmer in response: (1) Reiterated our deep belief in Nigeria and its unity, expressed sympathy and understanding re current difficulties and said we convinced Nigeria’s problems, while difficult, not insurmountable with good will and understanding on all sides. Said we had tried be helpful and would continue efforts to support Nigeria and its unity. (2) Noted we too concerned at talk of secession and were relieved at denial. We also concerned, however, at other reports of possible “forceful solution.” We convinced peaceful solution only viable one in long run and believe it important that all peaceful means continue to be explored. In last analysis, Nigeria must solve problems itself. (3) Said speaking both officially and personally, Nigeria’s problems cannot be so overwhelming as to obscure great potential and prospects it has as nation. He expressed hope and conviction that Nigeria would succeed in coping with its problems. Ambassador Martins, who accompanied Sanusi, raised problem of minorities and asked Sanusi comment. Latter said in addition to rumors of East’s secession, FMG had reports of possible “UDI within UDI” by Eastern minorities. He added that FMG concerned about possible communist infiltration in East, since it found most fertile ground among “labor unions and intellectuals.” He added quickly that this fear largely buried by Ojukwu’s denial. Palmer reminded Sanusi of ULC’s history of resistance to commie infiltration, and ended conversation with expression of hope that dialogue now under way will continue and that consensus will be reached. Comment : Sanusi made no reference to possible recognition of independent Eastern regime as reported done in Bonn. Presentation very low-key as if going through motions. He mentioned bomb explosion by Easterners on eve Lagos conference but made no attempt link them directly with Ojukwu. In response question re security situation and specific examples thereof, 4 he downplayed it, asserting it much improved and in any case alleged it greatly exaggerated by rumors. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 NIGERIA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Robert P. Smith, cleared by Roy M. Melbourne, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Paris, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. 2 Telegram 2278 from Lagos, September 27; telegram 2246 from Lagos, September 26; and telegram 2150 from Lagos, September 22, all concerned approaches by Nigerian special envoys to Washington and European capitals. (Ibid.) 3 Alhaji M. A. Sanusi of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 Telegram 55599 to Lagos, September 28, reported that Palmer talked again that morning to Nigerian Ambassador Martins, emphasizing U.S. concern at a deteriorating security situation in the North and reports of reprisals against Ibos. He stressed the need to correct this situation or events might be set in motion that could force the East into secession. Martins told Palmer that he would inform Sanusi in New York prior to the latter’s return to Lagos. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 NIGERIA) 366. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 366. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, October 1, 1966. THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA 2 Summary Africa’s most populous country (population estimated at 48 million) is in the throes of a highly complex internal crisis rooted in its artificial origin as a British dependency containing over 250 diverse and often antagonistic tribal groups. The present crisis began to take shape shortly after Nigeria became independent in 1960, but for some years the apparent success of a federal parliamentary arrangement concealed serious internal strains. It has been in an acute stage since last January when a military coup d’etat destroyed the constitutional regime bequeathed by the British and upset the underlying tribal and regional power relationships. At stake now are the most fundamental questions which can be raised about a country, beginning with whether it will survive as a single viable entity. At this time, even the immediate further evolution of the crisis is most uncertain. In general, however, the country has appeared in recent months, especially since a second army coup last July, to be moving at an accelerating rate along a downward slope with a consequent diminution of its prospects for unity and stability. Unless present army leaders and contending tribal elements soon reach agreement on a new basis for association and take some effective measures to halt a seriously deteriorating security situation, there will be increasing internal turmoil, possibly including civil war. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 2 Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. Aside from the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level this paper has not been coordinated outside CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Directorate for Plans. [Footnote in the source text.] 367. Telegram From the Consulate in Enugu to the Department of State 367. Telegram From the Consulate in Enugu to the Department of State 1 Enugu, October 18, 1966, 0755Z. 107. Limdis from Ambassador. 1. In long private talk last night Ojukwu stated flatly that East would not participate in resumed constitutional conference Oct 24 or later unless all northern troops removed from Lagos and various other conditions met. Ojukwu also said that in view recent atrocities against Ibos, East firmly determined to accept nothing more than loose confederation. East willing preserve “name of Nigeria” but on own terms. Ojukwu obviously considers chances of continued association East with rest of Nigeria very poor and seems more than reconciled to secession. 2. Shall report in more detail upon return to Lagos this afternoon. 2 Mathews 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to Lagos and London and repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DIA, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA. 2 Telegram 2907 from Lagos, October 18, reported details of Mathews’ conversation with Ojukwu. It concluded: “I regret am unable at this time suggest any way in which USG can help in preventing seemingly inexorable course of events.” (Ibid., POL 23–9 NIGERIA) 368. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 368. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Manila, October 27, 1966, 0220Z. 4645. Secto 23. For Acting Secretary From Secretary. Regarding Mathews’ recommendations 2 summarized in Special Summary 18, 3 I think we should be very careful about nominating ourselves as the supervisor of Nigerian federal unity. I do not object to full persuasion in presenting to the East the great advantages to them of remaining in the federation. I would not, however, start applying threats or sanctions of US initiatives as a means of pressure. The proposed West Indian Federation and East African Federation did not come off. French-speaking Africa broke up into far more units than we expected or hoped for. Singapore broke away from Malaysia. We regret all such divisiveness but it is not up to us to go around telling people how they should solve such problems under pressure of US sanctions. I hope the East will not secede; I hope that we can persuade Mfukwu and Gowon to get together. But if anyone is to go beyond persuasion into actual measures, the British and their fellow Commonwealth members should be way out in front. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Telegram 3120 from Lagos, October 26, reported Mathews’ recommendations that he be authorized to inform Ojukwu that in the event of a unilateral secession the East could expect neither recognition nor support from the U.S. Government and that, unless Ojukwu could give assurances that the East would not secede, U.S. citizens would be advised to leave the East and U.S. Government programs would be suspended there. (Ibid., POL 15 NIGERIA) 3 Special Summary No. 18, transmitted as Tosec 96 to Manila, October 26, reported Mathews’ recommendations and his belief that political and economic sanctions could be effective in thwarting any secession attempt. (Ibid., S/S Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, Box 59) 4 Telegram 73734 to Lagos, October 26, sent prior to the receipt of this cable, stated reservations about Mathews’ proposed actions, including the threat of the evacuation of U.S. nationals and the curtailment of the AID programs, and stated that any approach to the FMG or to Ojukwu should be coordinated with the British. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA) 369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 1 Washington, November 9, 1966, 5:44 p.m. 82010. 1. USG seeks maintain Nigerian unity because it realizes East’s defection would cause grave problems for rest of country as well as for East and because prospects for further fragmentation would be high. Obviously our continuing efforts must depend upon full appreciation by influential Nigerian elements. 2. Department has been giving much thought to US policy in event East should secede. US cannot be expected to serve with UK as guardian of Nigerian territorial integrity if, after long and arduous effort in this direction, a powerful and cohesive section of country should prove determined to disavow its association with rest. Subject has been discussed at IRG meeting in preliminary way. More intensive discussion scheduled for November 17 and will revolve around following general contingency situations and their variants: a. Eastern Nigeria proclaims UDI. FMG declares East in state of rebellion and attempts invasion of East, in conjunction with blockade, to restore its authority. This contingency presents US with its most difficult decisions and poses most serious threat to US citizens resident in Nigeria. b. East intensifies its drift into de facto independence without UDI and is coupled with disturbances and breakdowns in law and order in various sections of country. Lack of adequate military capabilities prevents FMG from invading East, but it mounts general effective political and economic blockade. c. There is prolonged period of continuing drift and uncertainty during which negotiations between East and other regions take place but without any definitive solution being reached. 3. Current approach here to problem may be summarized in these terms. If unity no longer possible despite US–UK efforts, in such environment US must move to protect its own interests, strive for as much stability in area as possible, and seek to maintain its presence in all regions of Nigeria to prevent vacuum which others could enter and exploit. 4. It should be emphasized that outlined contingency approach and brief resume above are tentative pending serious examination. Prior to this on November 17 it would be most helpful if you could give us your views within such a context. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Melbourne, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London. 2 Telegram 3675 from Lagos, November 16, reported the Embassy’s view of Nigeria’s problems. It concluded that the Embassy considered that the Nigerian situation was “not yet hopeless” and that the most urgent problem was to try to help avert the “worst of all contingencies,” namely the fragmentation of Nigeria. (Ibid.) 370. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 370. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 1 Lagos, November 11, 1966, 1510Z. 3562. Ref: State 81686 2 and Enugu 146. 3 1. I spoke to Gowon by telephone morning Nov 10, said Ojukwu had told Barnard Nov 4 they not then in touch and asked whether communications reestablished. Gowon said he talked with Ojukwu by telephone Nov 9 and was sending him letter Nov 10. I asked about prospects Eastern attendance resumed Constitutional Conference. Gowon replied he making suggestions to Ojukwu which he hoped would solve attendance problem. 2. Of thoughtful suggestions Enugu 146, I have incorporated substance of much of paragraph 4 in revised message. Re paragraphs 5 and 6, however, I am reluctant at this stage to extend discussion into difficult area of terms of constitutional settlement. If we did, it would be hard to avoid expressing view, which unlikely please Ojukwu, that way to settlement not eased by region designating elements its position as not negotiable. 3. For Barnard : Following is my message to Ojukwu, revised in light of reftels, to be conveyed orally soonest. I leave it to your discretion whether you paraphrase it in third person or dead it. Also, feel free to amend or delete specific words or phrases which you judge would be unhelpful: A. I have been giving prolonged and troubled thought to your conversation with Mr. Barnard on Nov. 4. 4 The general tenor of your remarks and particularly your questions about military aid and recognition led me to believe that you and your associates had moved very far in the direction of unilateral secession since our talk on Oct 17. Barnard assures me that I read too much into your remarks and attach too much importance to the strongly secessionist line of the news media in the East. I hope he is right. B. In any case, it is only with the greatest reluctance that I address myself to questions which presuppose a complete breakdown of negotiations between the East and the rest of the country. There are many remaining avenues of negotiations, both procedural and substantive, which should be explored before any of us resigns himself to the tragedy of secession. Gowon told me on Nov 10 that he was making new proposals to you resumed constitutional conference. C. Your query to Barnard about military aid was in the context of an invasion of the East by northern troops before eastern secession. This is indeed an hypothetical question. I still think, as I did on Oct 17, that such an invasion is only a remote possibility. The folly and danger of any attempt to solve Nigeria’s problems by resort to force have repeatedly been pointed out to Gowon and other military and civilian leaders. Despite all the recent rumors of troop movements, imminent new attacks on tribal groups, etc., we have been unable thus far to find confirming evidence and to the extent that the rumors forecast specific events, these have not yet occurred. D. Apropos of rumors, one other aspect of your talk with Barnard that dismayed me was that you should have believed on Nov 4 that Commodore Wey was not in Lagos and that Gowon might have left Lagos. Wey’s return to Lagos on Nov 2 from his travels to Accra and Conakry in connection with the Ghana-Guinea dispute was well publicized. During the several days preceding Nov 4, Gowon received various foreign and local visitors, and these public activities were thoroughly reported by press, radio and television. Your Lagos informants should be able to give you reliable information on such simple matters as the whereabouts of Gowon and Wey. E. Since you have raised the question of recognition in the event of unilateral secession, the candor of our past exchanges requires me to tell you what I think is likely to happen, despite widespread sympathy for the sufferings of Easterners, if the East does unilaterally secede. Most if not all African governments would deplore the act, would refuse to recognize the East as a sovereign state and would refuse give political support to the Federal Military Government. Non-African governments could be expected to follow the African lead, as very few, in my opinion, would consider that they could afford to recognize or otherwise support Eastern Nigeria at the expense of relations with the rest of Africa. F. I once again urge you and your associates to give continued careful consideration to the consequences for yourselves, the rest of Nigeria and Africa as a whole if you take the path of unilateral secession. The prevailing emotional tensions and uncertainties leave all of us apprehensive of the future, but I earnestly hope none of us will be led into rash actions by rumors however persistent and alarming. Developments here and abroad since our talk on Oct 17 have only strengthened my conviction that dissolution of the Nigerian union would perpetuate and even intensify the problems and animosities that now plague Nigeria. 5 4. For Barnard : Neither Department nor Embassy has previously dealt with question of emissaries to Washington. I suggest you not reopen subject but should Ojukwu do so take position that new emissaries could add nothing to Onyerjula’s effective presentation Eastern views. FYI: Acting UK HICOM told me Nov 10 London not eager receive Eastern emissaries and proposing take stand that it could do so officially only if FMG concurred. If emissaries appeared in London without FMG concurrence, officials would talk with them informally but only after informing Nigerian HICOM. Acting UK HICOM has agreed that Ojukwu be told FMG concurrence required but has suggested that if emissaries arrive without FMG blessing, they should either not be received or received secretly. Acting UK HICOM also said London not planning respond to Ojukwu’s questions on military aid and recognition. End FYI. 5. For Department : I fully agree that it would be useful if UK emissary, preferably Malcolm MacDonald, 6 could soon be sent to undertake quiet talks in Lagos and all regions to determine whether CW mission could play useful role. Mathews 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Noforn. Also sent to Enugu, and repeated to London, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA. 2 Telegram 81686 to Lagos, November 9, advised that a message that Mathews proposed to send to Ojukwu should be delivered orally by Consul Robert J. Barnard, suggested that Mathews telephone Gowon and convey Ojukwu’s concern at the recent 3-day silence in communications, and requested his views on the possible effectiveness of a visit to Nigeria by a British emissary. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 146 from Enugu, November 11, reported Barnard’s view that while U.S. representatives should make U.S. opposition to secession clear to Ojukwu, they should also assure him that they were trying to dissuade the Nigerian Government from attempting a solution by force. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 133 from Enugu to Lagos, November 4, reported that Ojukwu had requested U.S. consideration of military aid if the East was attacked by northern troops and had asked Barnard whether the U.S. Government would recognize Eastern sovereignty if the East declared independence. (Ibid.) 5 Telegram 160 from Enugu, November 17, reported that Barnard formally presented the Ambassador’s message to Ojukwu on that day, and that afterwards they discussed key elements of the problem. Ojukwu said that he interpreted the Ambassador’s reply to his questions to mean that if the East seceded as a result of an attack by the FMG or the North, the U.S. Government would not give military aid to or recognize the East. Barnard responded that “this interpretation was not correct; we simply were answering a hypothetical question.” He added that “no honest government would promise recognition in advance of secession unless it favored such a move, which we clearly did not.” (Ibid.) 6 Malcolm MacDonald was the British High Commissioner for Kenya. 371. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 371. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 1 Lagos, February 14, 1967, 1230Z. 6143. 1. Distinguishing characteristics of current developing Nigerian crisis are: A. FMG Military and Eastern Military apparently believe that their respective armies are equipped and ready to fight, and acceptance of inevitability of conflict is growing in both Lagos and Enugu. B. Ojukwu’s recent public pronouncements, whether or not by design, have been of nature to goad FMG northerners to force. It is possible that Ojukwu wishes to precipitate crisis, fearing that time may not be on his side. C. Gowon’s personal inclination against resort to force is being eroded, and he may in any case be unable to prevent initiation hostilities by FMG forces. D. Some FMG military and top civil servants are concerned that time is against FMG and unless drastic action is taken soon East will achieve de facto independence. They tend to believe removal of Ojukwu as Eastern Military Governor will end Eastern intransigence. E. Ojukwu and some of his advisers are convinced that FMG is generally unpopular and administratively and militarily ineffective. F. Military Governors of West and Mid-West are increasingly attracted to Ojukwu concept of greater autonomy for regions. G. FMG and Eastern Government are both becoming increasingly aware of critical importance of control of public revenues. H. Confidence and trust between Gowon and Ojukwu at lowest ebb yet and not likely improve significantly. 2. As against attitudes, beliefs and convictions Nigerian contenders, my assessment is that: A. Time is in fact on side of FMG as long as it avoids resort to force and retains control of bulk of public revenues, and general international acceptance as legitimate GON. B. Resort to force, regardless of which army—FMG or East—won battles, would set off tribal violence in many parts of Nigeria, but particularly in Lagos area which still harbours mixture tribal people. C. Consequence of this tribal violence rather than clash between armies would almost certainly lead to breakup of Nigeria into at least three new countries. D. If resort to force can be averted, breakup of Nigeria is unlikely. E. Practicable constitutional settlement will have to fall between retention same degree of federalism as provided in 1963 Constitution being urged upon Gowon by FMG top civil servants, and de facto independence within nominal confederation being sought by Ojukwu. 3. In current circumstances, I reluctantly concluded that intermediary between Gowon and Ojukwu would not be able to accomplish much whether individual involved is General Ankrah, Commodore Wey, Chief Adebo, Ambassador Martins or Malcolm MacDonald. I believe that what is now needed to prevent crisis coming to climax in next six weeks is expression of concern at Nigerian situation and support of FMG by foreign governments. Objective would be to encourage Gowon to continue opposing resort to force and to impress on Ojukwu that he can expect no foreign support for unilateral independence. 4. I propose therefore as matter of urgency that UK with our full support give other African Commonwealth members estimate of current Nigerian situation and urge heads of state to send messages to Gowon (A) Expressing concern at growing tension in Nigeria, (B) Calling upon all Nigerians to abide by Aburi renunciation use of force and to seek peaceful solution their problems, (C) Stating that sender’s government would not recognize unilateral declaration of independence by any part of Nigeria, and (D) Asking that all members SMC be informed of message. Ankrah, Kuanda and Kenyatta would be most effective voices. 5. Consideration should also be given to proposing to Emperor and Tubman that they send similar messages to Gowon. 6. In context these African approaches which would certainly become public, UK HICOM and I should be authorized separately to explain positions our governments to Gowon and other members SMC privately along following lines: A. We consider use of force could only result in breakup of Nigeria, regardless of “military victory” by FMG or Eastern forces. B. If there is to be resort to force, we require advance notice so that our nationals can be removed to places of safety as we do not believe that law and order could be maintained in many parts of Nigeria if FMG and Eastern forces clash. (We would tell Gowon that one of main concerns is safety of our nationals in Lagos itself.) C. We would not recognize unilateral declaration of independence by any part of Nigeria. D. We believe constitutional settlement should be sought in practical accommodation of interests rather than in rigid adherence to doctrinaire “confederal” or “federal” positions. 7. We and British should be prepared to give substance to foregoing position by: A. Advising our companies operating in eastern Nigeria not to acquiesce in demands for payment of federal revenues to Eastern Government. Effect of refusal to pay federal revenues obviously stands or falls on position Shell-BP as largest single source federal revenue in East. B. Complying with FMG decrees closing seaports and airports in East and otherwise seeking restrict international contacts of eastern regions. C. Urge that Department authorize Embassy London to explore this proposal with HMG. Mathews 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London. Passed to the White House and USIA at 5:17 a.m. on February 15. 372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 1 Washington, February 14, 1967, 8:09 p.m. 137143. Ref: Lagos 6143. 2 1. Department appreciates timely analysis in reftel and agrees with Embassy’s outline of major features (para. 1) and assessment (para. 2) of current crisis. 2. Re paras. 3 and 4, Dept. shares doubts on what either Wey or Adebo might accomplish as intermediary between Gowon and Ojukwu. Yet there could be merit in utilizing every potential Nigerian for such role before calling on AF heads of state. In this connection does Wey still plan to visit Enugu? 3. Sufficient time should be available to (1) await results, if any, of Wey’s trip; (2) bring in Adebo, who has just returned Lagos, if Wey fails; and (3) then possibly proceed along lines para. 4 reftel. Dept. recognizes, of course, Embassy may have new info which militates against use of either Wey or Adebo. However, in light widespread agreement that Nigerian crisis must in last analysis be solved by Nigerians themselves, would welcome your views on exploring use of Wey and Adebo 3 more fully before turning to other AF states. 4. Agree encouragement of Gowon to continue oppose use of force is of prime importance. While equally important to impress on Ojukwu that he could not expect immediate foreign support for unilateral independence, Dept. believes some AF commonwealth states would boggle at bald statement suggested para. 4C. Perhaps rephrasing to eliminate recognition aspect but to include thought that FMG will continue to enjoy full support of international community would be more palatable. In light Shell-BP’s exposed position, it possible HMG itself might prefer less exact language. 5. Dept. concurs in thought expressed para 6a. It believes 6b could be modified to say that if there prospect of resort to force, US would be gravely concerned over safety its nationals. Their removal to places of safety would be imperative. Para would continue with your phrasing “as we do not believe, etc.” Re 6C phrasing similar to that in para 4 above might be more suitable. 6. Para 7 requires further study and, at appropriate point, discussion with UK. 7. Would appreciate your additional thoughts on above before Dept. authorizes London to explore with HMG. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith and Melbourne, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London. 2 Document 371 . 3 Telegram 6190 from Lagos, February 15, reported that no Nigerian would be trusted in East as an intermediary. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA) 373. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 373. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 1 Washington, February 22, 1967, 3:27 p.m. 142128. Ref: Accra’s 2350. 2 Nigerian Crisis. 1. Other pertinent messages between Lagos and Department being repeated septels FYI. 2. Department concurs in assessment contained paras. 1 and 2 Lagos 6143 3 and is deeply concerned at rumors of resort to force by either side. First reports of Benin meeting of secretaries to MilGovs are encouraging, but we believe Nigerian situation still extremely dangerous. Dept therefore welcomes apparent Ghanaian initiative reported Lagos 6334. 4 3. Department and Embassy Lagos strongly concur in British view that Ankrah is key figure who should be encouraged take lead in efforts mediate Nigerian dispute. These efforts apparently already underway although we uncertain of their scope and results. 4. Department agrees that we should defer any new initiative re African leaders pending more detailed report of Benin meeting and possible new meeting of SMC (para 2, London 6788). 5 Instead of making specific proposal to Ankrah at this time, therefore, request you outline to him our concern and probe for NLC view of Nigerian situation. You should stress that we believe Ankrah might again be instrumental in reducing Nigerian tensions and encourage him to continue his efforts. Despite our own concern, we recognize Ankrah’s special knowledge of situation and his earlier helpful intervention make him most logical choice to play useful role. We would of course discreetly support his efforts but would prefer remain in background. 6 5. Presume you keeping UKHICOM fully informed. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Robert Smith in AF/AFW, cleared in substance for EUR by Country Director for Canada Rufus Z. Smith, and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Lagos and London. 2 Telegram 2350 from Accra, February 22, stated that Ankrah would not wish to take sides in the Nigerian dispute but was eager to be helpful as a mediator. (Ibid.) 3 Document 371 . 4 Dated February 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA) 5 Dated February 21. (Ibid.) 6 Telegram 2359 from Accra, February 23, reported a conversation that day between Ambassador Williams and General Ankrah, in which the latter expressed confidence that civil war could be avoided. Ankrah stated that he was sending letters to all the military governors asking for their adherence to the Aburi agreements. (Ibid.) The Aburi agreements were made on January 4 and 5 by the members of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) at their meeting in Aburi, Ghana, the first such meeting attended by Eastern Military Governor Ojukwu since July 29. The four Military Governors (East, North, West, and Mid-West Regions) and Gowon were considered the principal members of the SMC, which also included the Navy Commodore, the Police Inspector General, and the Lagos Administrator. 374. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 374. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 1 Washington, February 23, 1967, 4:56 p.m. 142433. Ref: Lagos 6071. 2 For Ambassador from Palmer. 1. As requested reftel, IRG on Feb 21 carefully considered FMG’s request to purchase 106 mm ammunition with full appreciation and discussion your position this subject. 2. In light dangers of present Nigerian situation, with positions of both FMG and GOEN hardening and possibility of attempted solutions by force of looming in background, we have reluctantly and unanimously concluded the approval of sale under present circumstances not possible. This is based in part on your penetrating 6143 which gave major characteristics and your assessment of current crisis. We agree that next several weeks may be critical period and believe our approval of ammunition sale at this time could have unfortunate consequences not only in Nigeria but in our Congressional relations. 3. In light our large AID, Peace Corps and other programs in Nigeria, we believe it unfair and unrealistic for FMG military officers or other officials to attempt make our affirmative action on ammunition request test of good faith. Our support of FMG has been clearly demonstrated and unwavering, but we believe our supplying ammunition during present period of high tensions goes beyond bounds of such support. 4. We are deeply concerned at present rumors of resort to force by either side. Such a course would be disastrous, and we unwilling to be placed in position in which we appear to be contributing to preparations for such action. Also believe that even with spaced shipments, informing FMG now of basic decision to provide ammo could be misunderstood and contribute to rise in level of tension. Such action would also complicate pending critical AID hearings and cause serious domestic criticism. 5. Our fervent hope is that Nigerian situation may soon improve to point where such requests might be approved. Unfortunately, our own analysis of evidence available at present indicates situation deteriorating rather than improving. 6. In lieu of informing FMG of this decision, you may wish consider conveying discreetly to appropriate FMG officials our hope that FMG would refrain from pressing us on this request. To do so could, as indicated above, lead to turn-down and embarrassment of both USG and FMG. We recognize military officers may not be able to grasp our domestic problems, but civilian officials should be able to do so. Would appreciate your recommendations on above, recognizing you may also prefer simply to defer any response to FMG request. 7. I fully appreciate difficulties this decision may cause you but am confident you will understand reasons. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Melbourne and Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Telegram 6071 from Lagos, February 11, urged reconsideration of the “long-standing” Nigerian request for ammunition, and noted that Ojukwu’s claim that the Aburi decisions included agreement not to import arms and ammunition was denied by other SMC participants, and that the British policy was to be as responsive as possible to FMG arms requests. (Ibid.) 375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 1 Washington, March 3, 1967, 5:13 p.m. 148032. Ref: Lagos’ 6586, 6620; London’s 7046. 2 1. Ojukwu’s provocative broadcast, release of Aburi documents in Lagos and broadcast of Aburi tape recording in Enugu have heightened Department’s concern. 2. Re Gowon’s appeal of March 1, Dept. concurs in UK view that our response should be in general terms. We would prefer, however, that US response be oral and informal (Lagos 6714) 3 particularly since we unwilling respond affirmatively to all Gowon’s requests and he apparently prepared accept oral response (Lagos 6586 para 3 A). Believe Ambassador Mathews’ expected meeting with Gowon on March 4 appropriate occasion and consequently we would wish to give him urgent instructions. 3. For London : Request you discuss reftels and substance this message with HMG. Department’s thinking, subject to comments from Lagos and London, along lines succeeding paras. 4. Ambassador would inform Gowon that in light well-known position of US in support for Nigerian unity, our assumption is that his request of March 1 to diplomatic corps directed primarily at governments other than US. However, Ambassador happy to reaffirm our long-standing support for FMG and Nigerian unity as requested. As we have stated in past, however, form of association is for Nigerians themselves to decide. 5. Re Gowon’s specific references to possible blockade and recognition, we unwilling respond in advance to such hypothetical questions. With respect to request not to receive delegations from East, Ambassador could remind Gowon Dept. has already refused receive Oji. 6. In light recent events, Ambassador should also emphasize our deep concern at recurring reports of possible use of force and make clear USG would deplore such action by either FMG or East. While recognizing Ojukwu’s broadcast probably considered by FMG highly inflammatory, we believe resort to “police action” would probably not solve problem but only plunge Nigeria into chaos. It would also endanger lives of American citizens, whose safety is primary responsibility of Ambassador as Gowon has already recognized. 7. US is aware that FMG has made real effort to accept many of East’s demands in face East’s insistence on full execution of its interpretation of Aburi agreements. Should Gowon respond that US appears be advising FMG capitulation to East, Ambassador would state this not the case. It earnest US hope that Gowon will fully support Ankrah’s initiative, since it currently appears to have best chance of pulling Nigeria back from brink. Ambassador also would ask Gowon what other outside initiatives, i.e., Commonwealth or other, might serve useful purpose should Ankrah fail for some reason. 8. Believe it desirable that Embassy Lagos instruct Consul Enugu urgently to approach Ojukwu with similar appeal to avoid further provocative actions and inform Gowon he doing so. Consul could also inform Ojukwu of Ambassador’s expression of support of FMG. HMG may wish DHC in Enugu make similar approach. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to London and repeated to Accra. 2 Telegram 6586 from Lagos, March 1, relayed Gowon’s requests through the assembled Chiefs of Mission for their governments’ reaffirmation of support for the FMG and of Nigerian unity. (Ibid., POL 15–1 NIGERIA) Telegram 6620 from Lagos, March 1, not printed. (Ibid.) Telegram 7046 from London, March 2, not printed. (Ibid., POL 23–9, NIGERIA) 3 Dated March 3. (Ibid., POL 15–1, NIGERIA) 376. Telegram From the Consulate in Enugu to the Department of State 376. Telegram From the Consulate in Enugu to the Department of State 1 Enugu, March 10, 1967, 1925Z. 445. Lagos 6847, 2 6753, 3 Enugu 434. 4 1. Saw Ojukwu Friday March 10 and made points Lagos reftels. He responded that once again I had been instructed to “deliver lecture” to him. I said I not delivering lecture but simply restating USG position—that way must be found other than use of force to settle crisis and that we continued believe in holding Nigeria together as one nation. 2. Ojukwu asked if we so serious about this why is U.S. so unwilling intervene to help bring settlement? I referred to Congressman Resnick’s meeting with him in which Resnick spoke of increasing reluctance in U.S. become involved in other people’s problems; said this part of answer, but more important in terms Nigerian situation, intervention as Ojukwu seemed to be thinking of it was actually adjudication of issues in dispute. Said we remain convinced that crisis is purely Nigerian in nature and must be solved by Nigerians. 3. Although I had not ever alluded to question of recognition if East separated Ojukwu then said USG had shown ability adjust rather quickly to de facto situations in Nigeria over past year and half. He said events January 25 and July 28 could hardly be termed constitutional yet USG seemed have no trouble accepting de facto positions of Ironsi and Gowon. Could not USG be expected do same, he asked, if East were separate? 4. I ducked by pointing out his consistent avowal to me that East did not want and was not planning to secede but sincerely desired find peaceful solution to crisis within framework One Nigeria. 5. Ojukwu said this true but East could not wait forever for others to realize negotiation only acceptable means solve problem; said Easterners very impatient with failure implement Aburi agreements and that East had to have money now for its heavy responsibilities. 6. I replied that Eastern financial problems not disputed but it clear that settlement will take more time than permitted by March 31 deadline; question seemed to be what needs be done persuade him not take unilateral action on finances before end of March which almost certainly would lead to armed conflict. Ojukwu said Yugoslav Amb Karapafdza made same point earlier in week. 7. Then Ojukwu said he would not take unilateral action on finance if Gowon would commit himself publicly to implementation of Aburi agreements as amplified by the (January) meeting of Solicitors General, and set publicly a reasonable time limit “for implementation.” Ojukwu said “reasonable time” could mean as little as three months or as much as a year. He said the critical issue is financial arrangements; agreement on “crash program” meet urgent Eastern needs from internal resources should be possible within very short time. If however, Gowon had to seek foreign assistance to meet longer term financial needs this could take a year. 8. Ojukwu said first step to implement Aburi must be issuance of new decree returning powers to regions. Said draft now circulating is step in right direction and East has sent its comments to Lagos. Second step would be agreement on financial “crash program.” Third step would be to “formalize” military reorganization which already largely accomplished on de facto basis. Fourth step would be for SMC to meet and “reconstitute” itself—“to decide who shall be chairman and all that jazz.” ( Comment : Ojukwu’s position is that when Aburi implemented it immaterial who is Chairman SMC, CINC, and titular head of state.) Fifth and final step would be summon ad hoc constitutional conference and write new constitution. 9. We then talked on various points. I said in present situation it inevitable that doubts arise whether stated intentions are same as real ones. Said some people saying again that East really intends secede and that Ojukwu attempting provoke Gowon into action which would give East excuse for going out. Ojukwu said without hesitation or equivocation that he sincerely wants negotiate settlement by which all can live together in one Nigeria. Categorically denied that East regarded separation as any but last resort. 10. I said we aware that Ghanaians had been talking to Gowon and him and asked if anything coming of this. Ojukwu said that following Aburi Ghanaians had assumed Nigerian crisis on road to settlement and had turned attention to other matters. Said when they discovered Aburi not being implemented they asked Gowon for explanation which they “found unimpressive.” Then sent General Ocran to Enugu to see what could be done avoid head-on collision. Ojukwu did not say what discussed with Ocran, but presumably he repeated Eastern position. 11. On Nigerian Navy moves in Eastern waters Ojukwu said ships 30 miles offshore and that Commodore Wey had assured him by phone today that ships would not come closer without Ojukwu being informed. 12. I mentioned growing anxieties expatriate community because of fear possible invasion. Ojukwu conceded this serious problem for me but said as long as there talk about using force against East he had no choice but take all measures possible be ready. 13. Session concluded with Ojukwu saying as he has many times before that so far as East concerned settlement crisis by peaceful means which would preserve integrity Nigeria hangs on implementation, Aburi added that Gowon appeared either unwilling or unable implement agreements however and had no right therefore claim he supreme commander. I said if Gowon not sitting in Lagos, alternative would be much worse for East. Ojukwu said this not so. Said when he believed North capable overrunning East he was glad to have Gowon in Lagos acting as deterrent to Northern hotheads. Said now that he knows North quite incapable launching successful attack on East, it different matter. If hothead replaced Gowon and attacked East, a clear solution would come much quicker and cheaper than the costly stalemate which has developed under Gowon. Barnard 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to Lagos, London, and Accra. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DOD, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, CIA, USIA, and NSA. 2 Telegram 6847 from Lagos, March 7, instructed Consul Robert J. Barnard to impress upon Ojukwu that his repeated references to an anticipated invasion might cause a wholesale evacuation of foreigners. (Ibid., POL 15 NIGERIA) 3 Dated March 4. (Ibid.) 4 Dated March 7. (Ibid.) 377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, March 11, 1967, 3:44 p.m. 153489. Nigerian Crisis. 1. We had agreed with UK on need to allow Ankrah initiative re easing of Nigerian tensions to run its course before urging him to broaden it in any way or we and UK attempt new ones. However, failure Ojukwu to attend Benin meeting and his scheduled press conference March 13 indicates events have seemingly overtaken Ghanaian initiative. 2. Recent developments have led Dept to reluctant conclusion that if Nigeria is to retain unity in any form, a loose confederation with virtually autonomous powers residing in regions is realistically most that can be hoped for. We of course had hoped that stronger center would be able emerge from present crisis, view which we believe British shared. Evidence accumulating that West and Mid-West leaning more towards East’s position on confederation. In its deepening conflict with East, FMG would be essentially dependent on North, which sharply raises perennial problem of single region seeking to dominate center. This offers increasing prospect of armed conflict as Gowon subjected to stronger urgings of northern military and advisers for drastic action. End result likely be bloodshed and disintegration of country. Such resort to force must be avoided if at all possible. 3. Would appreciate your informing HMG officials of these tentative views and soliciting their own thinking this subject. 2 We have not yet formulated what next step by US and UK might be, but believe frank exchange with UK now called for. In this connection, would also appreciate any ideas UK may have. 4. You should also inform UK of our growing concern re safety Amcits and obtain current UK thinking on safety their subjects in Nigeria. 5. We recognize much may depend on specific results Benin conference and contents Ojukwu press conference. Since events likely move rapidly in coming days and weeks, however, would urge earliest consultations with HMG to make certain our views of situation are similar. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Smith and Melbourne, cleared in substance by Thomas M. Judd in EUR/BMI, and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Lagos and Accra. 2 Telegram 7534 from London, March 17, reported that the British believed that Ankrah had the best chance of bringing about a peaceful settlement. (Ibid.) 378. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 378. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 1 Washington, March 24, 1967, 11:55 a.m. 161782. For Ambassador. 1. Department impressed by extent to which Decree No. 8 appears meet many of East’s fundamental demands for much greater regional autonomy. 2 While recognizing it stops short of granting everything Ojukwu wants, Dept. considers decree represents genuine effort by FMG and other MilGovs to implement Aburi agreements and to retain Nigerian unity in form which least objectionable to East. 2. Consulate Enugu has reported that some prominent and moderate Easterners may incline toward above view. Other advisors to Ojukwu, however, are undoubtedly pressing him to continue hard line with FMG. We consider this dangerous and believe we might be able assist moderates in convincing Ojukwu he should not reject Decree No. 8 out of hand. 3. While secession sentiment in East undoubtedly strong, it may be attributable at least in part to hopeful assumption that USG, despite public posture in support of FMG and unity, would not be able to withstand pressures to recognize independent East. Such assumption also dangerous and Dept believes this could be hammered home to Ojukwu. Dept would appreciate your comment on following proposal. 4. You have long-standing invitation to visit Ojukwu which, with our support, you have not accepted. Issuance of Decree No. 8 has altered circumstances to point where advantages of your visit to Enugu for frank talk with Ojukwu could well outweigh possible hazards. 5. If you saw Ojukwu you would orally inform him of following major points; (a) you acting under instructions; (b) USG has deep sympathy for, and understanding of, Eastern emotions in light of events since July 29; (c) tell Ojukwu substance para (1) above; (d) we believe that East’s failure to accept intent of Decree No. 8 and to build thereon would seriously erode understanding East now enjoys. It could cause USG, as well as other governments, to begin question whether East really wants to remain in Nigeria under any circumstances. Additionally, and on personal basis, you would tell Ojukwu, in same spirit of frankness that has characterized past exchanges, that you fear East making serious mistake if it under assumption that international recognition of independent East would be easily obtained; our info clearly to contrary. 6. Above would be accompanied by appropriate statements making clear our demarche undertaken only reluctantly and as sincere friend of Nigeria. We have no desire or intention to interfere in Nigeria’s internal affairs but believe honesty compels us to ensure there no Eastern misunderstanding of USG views. Gowon would of course have to be informed in advance. 7. Believe similar UK approach could be useful but recognize UK HICOM saw Ojukwu only recently. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Smith on March 23, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, Accra, and Enugu. 2 Telegram 7193 from Lagos, March 17, informed the Department of the details of Decree No. 8, and telegram 7231 from Lagos, March 17, explained Eastern opposition to the decree. (Ibid.) 379. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 379. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 1 Lagos, April 12, 1967, 1500Z. 8014. Ref: Lagos 7981. 2 1. Following brief session with photographers and notetaker present in which Ojukwu and I made standard statements of position, Barnard and I talked privately with Ojukwu over hour. 2. I opened by saying I had instructions convey certain views USG to him and covered points B, C, and D (first two sentences) of paragraph 5 State 161782. 3 In doing so I read closely paraphrased versions of paragraph 1 and first two sentences paragraph 5 (D) Deptel. I also said in view prevailing tension and difficulties travel to and from East, USG temporarily suspending travel its personnel and dependents to East 4 and advising US companies do same. We hoped Nigerian developments would permit early cancellation this temporary measure. 3. I added personal comment with respect post-Aburi disagreements to effect that prominent world statesmen skilled in negotiation sometimes left meetings or conferences thinking they understood each other only to find later that they had widely divergent views as to results of meeting. Was it not therefore possible that meeting at Aburi of military men who not skilled negotiators had resulted in honest misunderstandings. 4. Ojukwu replied there could be no misunderstanding as to what agreed at Aburi. Neither he nor Eastern people would go back from their understanding of Aburi agreements which was only correct understanding. Decree No. 8 does not fulfill Aburi and was therefore not acceptable to East which would not compromise. Ojukwu regretted that USG had “taken sides” by expressing favorable view of Decree No. 8. 5. I asked what specifically was wrong with Decree No. 8. Ojukwu mentioned emergency provisions, composition SMC and timing. Ghanaians, he remarked, had found forty divergences from Aburi agreements in Decree No. 8. Ojukwu said Decree was now only incidental as events had overtaken it and Nigerians had more important issues to resolve. Early resumption of discussions among military leaders was essential to prevent breakup of Nigeria by default. 6. Ojukwu made usual comments to effect he does not recognize Gowon as “leader of Nigeria” and does not consider East in any way subordinate to FMG. He also said Nigeria ceased to exist as federation on July 29. Since then country has in fact been divided in separate parts and now very close to complete split. Only question remaining is how and to what extent parts should work together in future. He reiterated his view that parts could be only loosely associated. 7. I said that it appeared from Ojukwu’s remarks that East was unwilling compromise. If this so, how could there be negotiations with rest of country. Ojukwu replied in effect that there could be no compromise between right and wrong; East was right, and rest of country must see this. 8. I several times raised question of and urged need for another full SMC meeting. Ojukwu carefully avoided saying he would not attend meeting, but consistently responded that he doubted meeting would achieve much, and that each day that passed reduced prospects for and value of meeting. He reviewed reasons why meeting in Nigeria not practicable and mentioned conditions he has recently been attaching to his participation anywhere. He thought Ghanaians getting discouraged and merely going through motions of trying to arrange meeting in Ghana. He had agreed to cooperate with Ankrah’s efforts by withholding major Eastern action until after April 14. He expressed doubt that Gowon really wanted meeting. 9. I asked Ojukwu what he thought African heads of state would do if they participated in SMC meeting. He said he wanted them to mediate. He was confident that even most reactionary heads of state would recognize that East acting in good faith and FMG in bad faith. He also thought they would have restraining effect on “other side.” I asked whether their presence would also have restraining effect on him. Ojukwu replied seriously that he always acted with restraint. 10. Ojukwu reverted to temporary suspension travel US citizens to East and said with emphasis he considered this “discriminatory and another evidence USG ’taking sides.’” I said our action consequence of special circumstances now affecting East only and we had taken similar action in other parts of Nigeria in past. I re-emphasized temporary nature of action. I took occasion to point out that in present atmosphere of preparedness East was not pleasant place for foreigners, and US citizens in region were showing increasing concern about situation. Their concern was not eased by speeches such as that Ojukwu had recently given at ABA which identified unspecified foreign governments as potential “enemies of the East.” 11. Ojukwu said it evident to him that USG and other Western governments would comply with FMG actions such as blockade of East. Eastern people would regard governments so complying as enemies. He foresaw possibility that most foreigners might leave region. He would regret this but East would have to get along without these foreign friends and would look forward to their eventual return. 12. Ojukwu laid great stress on financial aspects and growing economic warfare. He accused FMG of stalling on payments to East and of refusing enter into serious discussions or negotiations on financial problems. He said Ghanaians had tried unsuccessfully to persuade FMG pay statutory debt to East. Ojukwu reiterated that blockade would force East to “strike out alone.” He claimed Lagos progressively tightening screws and situation would soon reach point of no return. 13. In view Ojukwu’s hard line and apparent expectation of early confrontation leading to Eastern secession, I said I greatly depressed by grim prospect he offering and wondered whether he had weighed consequences of Eastern withdrawal from Nigeria. If one could foresee peaceful separation East from rest of country, it might be deplored but accepted. We all, however, knew manifold tribal frictions within Nigeria. I thought Eastern withdrawal would set off process of dissolution throughout Nigeria that was hardly likely to remain peaceful and could disintegrate into situation worse than Congo. East obviously would not be unaffected by such development. 14. Ojukwu made obvious response that Nigeria not Congo, implied tribal situation not so dangerous in Nigeria and went on to say Nigerian problems could not be solved by foreign formulas. While he recognized economic advantages of one Nigeria with large land, resources and population, political considerations were much more important than economic. As far as East and Easterners were concerned, they now motivated by Eastern nationalism and wanted to build Eastern nation. Moreover, federated Nigeria had been block to Pan-Africanism as many other countries feared such large nation. Some African countries think it might not be bad thing if Nigeria broke up into smaller nations and might be willing enter into closer relations with successor states. 15. I pointed out that I had not offered any formula for solution and noted that some propagandists writing for “Outlook” who presumably Nigerian appeared share my view of potential tribal trouble throughout Nigeria as their output seemed directed toward stirring up such trouble. Ojukwu did not attempt deny this. I also said according our information it was not just Western nations who wanted Nigeria to remain one country; this was also view of African countries. I expressed view it would be some time before other African countries would be inclined enter into close relation with states emerging from Nigerian dissolution, in light conditions that would probably prevail here. I dwelt also upon likely reaction of US public and Congress which would be inclined draw back from aid and other involvement in Africa. Ojukwu commented that USG could not withdraw from involvement in Africa no matter how distasteful it found Nigerian dissolution. I responded that I agreed with him in long run, but for medium term popular US reaction would inhibit USG. 16. I remarked that related matter was prospect of international recognition should East secede. I had asked Department for available information in this regard. I concluded from this information that recognition would come very slowly. Ojukwu responded that he assumed US recognition would be slow although in time US national interest would counsel recognition. I rejoined that I was thinking more of recognition by other African countries which would be slow. USG would of course be greatly influenced by what African governments did. 17. Ojukwu suggested twice that USG and other Western governments were more tolerant of North than of East and perhaps thought North more amenable to their interests. I said emphatically this unfounded, USG was impartial as between Nigerian regions and obviously had no special interests in North. 18. As variant of foregoing theme, Ojukwu also remarked he beginning believe Western Nigeria not averse to Eastern secession on assumption it then easier for Yorubas to exploit North in rump federation. 19. At one point in conversation Ojukwu had casually thrown out comment that he might have to order his troops to take Lagos. I later took occasion to observe that I thought it unlikely either Ojukwu or Gowon would order their respective forces to undertake offensive action. I had impression both of them and their senior military advisers were aware of limitations their forces for such action. Ojukwu did not argue point. 20. Discussion ended on note of mutual unhappiness and pessimism. Mathews 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DIA, Accra, London, Monrovia, Yaounde, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, CIA, DOD, NSA, and USIA. 2 Telegram 7981 from Lagos, April 11, reported that the Ambassador was en route to talk to Ojukwu, and that Ojukwu and the East were losing support in the West and Midwest. (Ibid.) 3 Document 378 . 4 Telegram 171192 to Lagos, April 7, concurred in the recommendation to temporarily suspend travel to the East. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA) 380. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 380. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 1 Lagos, April 13, 1967, 1723Z. 8088. Ref: Lagos 7981 2 and 8039. 3 1. I talked almost hour with Gowan and PermRep Extaff Ogbu this noon. 2. Re visit to Ojukwu, I reported he reiterated opposition to Decree No. 8, expressed doubt as to utility SMC meeting but did not say would not attend if Ghanaians able to arrange. Seemed to realize and discount that if East seceded prospects for early international recognition would not be good and took generally pessimistic and hard line re prospects for Nigerian unity. 3. I then asked Gowan how he saw future. He responded that in view increasing intransigence of and provocation by Ojukwu he did not believe SMC meeting would be productive. He was however willing make another attempt and would attend meeting arranged by Ghanaians. He thought this would take place in relatively near future and all members SMC would be present. He dismissed participation other African heads of state. I expressed hope that despite gloomy prospects meeting would be successful. 4. Gowan said bitterly that East continuing to import arms and in view population pressure probably planning to expand North and West. He cited China as parallel. I expressed doubt that East had military capability seriously to contemplate such course. He agreed this true now but if permitted Ojukwu would continue military buildup for future effort. 5. I asked Gowan whether he thought Ojukwu would soon issue formal declaration of secession or independence. Gowan talked around this question, but gist of his remarks was he thought it more likely Ojukwu would continue for time being to move toward de facto independence. Gowan reiterated that it was his responsibility to prevent Ojukwu from breaking up Nigeria and that FMG would have curb East. I commented that I assumed he had only economic measures in mind and urged him to avoid measures that would do lasting damage to Nigerian economy. Gowan nodded assent. 6. Gowan went on to say that except for Ojukwu and some other Ibos, all Nigerians wanted to remain together in one country. This definitely included minority tribes in East who “did not want to be left alone with Ibos.” He had therefore been considering various ways of meeting wishes of most Nigerians. He had thought of possible course of action which he might adopt if upcoming SMC meeting proved abortive. He would then offer Ojukwu and Ibos option of seceding and establishing their own “little Switzerland” within Nigeria. From care with which Gowon led up to this and unusual precision of his language, and keen interest with which Ogbu listened and watched me, it was evident that they regarded this as major if not brilliant gambit. 7. I commented that this was new idea to me and asked whether his reference to Switzerland meant that he had in mind landlocked Iboland. He said yes. I wondered whether this move might not lead other Nigerian groups to seek similar independence along tribal lines and thus end in disintegration Nigeria which he wanted prevent. Gowon stoutly rejected this possibility. He said Ojukwu’s intransigence and arrogance had dissipated sympathy which most Nigerians had had for Ibos after events of last year. Other Nigerians now swinging to view there no living with Ibos and if they want to go let them, but without Eastern minorities. 8. I said I strongly hoped it would not be necessary to take such radical step, and urged that every effort be made to find other solution at SMC meeting. 9. Foregoing interview has not caused me to change analysis in Lagos 8039. Only new element is Gowon’s Iboland idea which Ojukwu would reject out of hand. As psychological warfare ploy, however, it could mobilize anti-Ibo sentiments of many Nigerians and increase Ojukwo’s problems in Eastern minority areas. Mathews 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis (Noforn except British). Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DIA, London, Accra, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, USIA, DOD, NSA, AND CIA. 2 Dated April 11. (Ibid., POL 23–9 NIGERIA) See footnote 2, Document 379 . 3 Telegram 8039 from Lagos, April 12, transmitted Mathews’ estimate that Ojukwu would probably seek early independence, but that the East would probably submit quickly if foreign governments complied with FMG economic measures and otherwise continued to support Nigerian unity. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA) 381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 1 Washington, April 14, 1967, 2:34 p.m. 175217. Ref: Lagos 8039. 2 Nigerian Crisis. 1. Assessment has received careful study and Department accepts substance of evaluation concerning likelihood East’s and Ojukwu’s intentions as given in first 4 paras. However, some reservations arise here in weighing effect of Eastern secession on rest of country and possible success of economic sanctions against East. Divisive elements in other Nigerian regions could erupt within measurable time after secession by East. Department uncertain that continuing foreign recognition of FMG would alone suffice to deter serious internal trouble while FMG seeks to bring East to heel by economic means. Also less certain that East would collapse within six months or longer. 2. It has been consensus of Department and Embassy that Nigerian association could only be maintained by mutual agreement of regions. It highly questionable whether one region could be coerced by others to remain in association. Department considers severe economic sanctions would only feed Eastern flames at time when FMG does not present convincing picture of its ability effectively and unitedly to press toward envisaged goal. In view stage crisis has reached, believe it would be most useful if Embassy and UK HICOM could discuss and evaluate situation and for Embassy to report extent of common conclusions. 3. Because of developments, prospects for SMC meeting to include Ojukwu would appear bleak, wherever held and under whatever auspices. Department considers only prospect now is Ghanaians who may still have sufficient joint credit with disputants to get them together. Commonwealth Secretariat mediation, presumably extending over time, seems unlikely. Thus any proposals which you and UK HICOM might have would indeed be welcome. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Melbourne on April 13 and approved by Trimble. Repeated to London, Accra, Enugu, Ibadan, Kaduna and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 2 See footnote 3, Document 380 . 382. Telegram From Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 382. Telegram From Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 1 Washington, April 19, 1967, 10:08 a.m. 177827. 1. Coup attempt in Ghana may upset plans for meeting there of Nigerian SMC in second Aburi conference under Ankrah auspices. On other hand Ankrah may be spurred to keep meeting on early schedule to use it as clear evidence of stability of NLC. In order to keep momentum of Nigerian mediation efforts, however, request views of Embassies Lagos and London on utility of seeking more active intervention by Emperor of Ethiopia in Nigerian picture. 2. For Addis Ababa . Appreciate in light of Addis 6397 Notal 2 that this may not be most appropriate time seek Emperor’s intervention. Realize moreover that only few days remain (April 22) before his trip Bermuda, US, Canada and West Germany. Nevertheless, in light Ghana developments, Emperor may be only African figure who can still make significant contribution toward prevention disintegration Nigeria. However we would not wish undercut Ghana efforts if there still possibility of success. 3. Embassy Lagos requested discuss possible role of Emperor with UK HICOM and Embassy London with CO re validity of suggested actions by Emperor: a. Emperor would address communication to Ankrah encouraging him to proceed with projected second Aburi meeting. b. In above message to Ankrah he would ask if there were any way he could be helpful during Aburi Two and affirm his willingness to assist mediation in any way possible at beginning of or following his return from trip. c. Send separate message to Nigerian SMC. In this he could state that recent instances of instability in Africa have been damaging to its reputation and future prospects for development and progress. It would be tragedy for entire continent if Nigeria, a key country with bright potential for itself and rest of Africa, should be shattered or if Ghana should fail in this major reconciliation effort. Accordingly he would urge Nigeria’s leaders make major urgent effort resolve their differences in spirit of reason and accommodation at Accra or elsewhere. 4. Embassy Accra’s comments requested on prospects for early meeting there and possible reaction to suggested HIM initiatives. However our possible intervention with Emperor should not be mentioned to GOG. 5. If reactions favorable, Ambassador Korry would seek immediate appointment with HIM or FonMin in order solicit views as to what they or we might do to preserve Nigeria. In such interview talking points would include context suggested message from Emperor to Ankrah, supplemented by our fears of delay in second Aburi meeting. They would be told we recognize Gowon’s sensitivities if he and Ojukwu were singled out as sole disputants. If Ojukwu given equal status with Gowon, latter might well be cool to any initiatives. Among various moves which we think might occur to Ethiopians, three points of Para. 3 above would be raised. Substantive action would be urged as having salutary effect on relationships between Nigerian regions. Hence US making this approach to HIM as a recognized leader of Africa and peacemaker. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Melbourne and Country Director for Ethiopia Matthew J. Looram, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to Addis Ababa, Lagos, and London. 2 Reference is presumably to telegram 3697 from Addis Ababa, April 18. (Ibid., POL 15–1 ETHIOPIA) 383. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 383. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 1 Lagos, April 21, 1967, 1500Z. 8348. Ref: State 179138. 2 Emb shares Dept’s concern over deteriorating Nigerian situation. We have consulted with UK HICOM on proposals for joint intervention set forth in reftel and we agree that any such initiative at this time would not only be resented but probably rebuffed especially by Gowon’s closest supporters and advisers. Feeling among FMG members is said to be that each admonishment by US and UK is in effect a request that FMG accept each new provocation of Ojukwu without reacting; and thus serves to prove to FMG that US and UK pro-East. Several sources close to FMG have indicated that SMC members have become very impatient with external intervention in present situation. Yesterday Edward Enahoro, number three officer in Extaff (who very pro-West and has English wife) informed UK diplomat that FMG fed up with outside gratuitous advice and mentioned US and UK in particular. Embassy, therefore, reluctantly concludes that only outside intervention which likely to receive consideration now is that of the Emperor (Addis 3749). 3 We further conclude as result of information contained in Datt 1130 and ANL 1552 4 that FMG no longer interested in Aburi Two and that today’s meeting of SMC likely to be decisive on courses of action to be pursued by FMG against Eastern acts of insurrection. Information available UK HICOM basically confirms reports transmitted in above messages. Mathews 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Accra, Addis Ababa, and London. Passed to the White House, DOD, NSA, CIA, and USIA. 2 Telegram 179138 to Lagos, April 20, reported the Department’s concern over the possibility that the FMG might try to isolate the Ibos by breaking up the East into mini-states, with the Ibos in the center, before a possible Aburi or comparable meeting could alleviate the FMG-East dispute. (Ibid.) 3 Telegrams 3749 and 3752 from Addis Ababa, April 21, reported Emperor Haile Selassie’s intention to send telegrams to Ankrah and the Nigerian FMG. (Ibid.) 4 Not further identified. 384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 1 Washington, May 5, 1967, 4:01 p.m. 188570. Following is FYI noforn based on uncleared memcon subject to revision on review: 1. Ambassador Martins accompanied by his Counselor met with Secretary for 40-minute talk immediately prior to his departure for Lagos on consultation. AFW Director Melbourne also present. Ambassador presented under instructions aide-memoire outlining events since January 1966 from FMG perspective. Martins in lengthy exposition covered ground of aide-memoire whose main theme dwelt on relations between FMG and East, and outlined program adopted April 22 by Supreme Military Council. Document concluded, “in order to successfully implement this program, FMG would appreciate moral support, sympathy and understanding of all friendly governments particularly Government of USA.” Text being pouched. 2. Ambassador explained he returning Nigeria under instructions to talk with Gowon and key SMC officials and that he intends travel in all regions on personal mission to speak in behalf single Nigeria. He knew Ojukwu well and felt he should make every effort with him. Before his return he thus wished get Secretary’s views on Nigeria. 3. Secretary responded that because of great trials in US history it could understand tensions arising from maintenance of unity in diversity. US had no prescription for Nigerians, who would have to settle problem themselves. However, he wanted to emphasize great importance of finding their way to unity. Perhaps their representatives should stay in conference until they found agreement in manner analogous to Catholic Cardinals’ selection of Pope. He cited great loss to Nigerian people if their experiment should fail including their national safety, decline in world confidence, and loss of their leadership in Africa. Nigeria had real responsibility, for what happens in Africa if Nigeria fails? This great responsibility ramifies externally into deep realities. Therefore, it desperately important Nigerian problems be solved. 4. Martins, gratified at Secretary’s remarks, said he could go to Nigeria with every assurance of US interest. To this Secretary replied we were following situation with interest mixed with affection since we felt very close to Nigeria. Historical importance of crossroads for country could not be over-estimated. Nigerians should understand that it takes much time and effort to make constitution work. 5. On new tack, Martins stated that Department had behaved impeccably and responsibly during course of Nigerian troubles. He did wish to raise on personal basis suggestion for US public statement. In view great US world responsibilities, he suggested US say it believes united Nigeria would be best for Nigerian people and for all of Africa. To Secretary’s query as to effect of such statement in Nigeria, Ambassador asserted he had met no Nigerian from any region who thought a break-up would be beneficial. Secretary simply replied that suggestion would be studied with aide-memoire and he hoped comments would be available to US Embassy Lagos while Martins in Nigeria. 6. In final observation, Secretary emphasized that no Nigerian solution by violence is conceivable. Consequences of such action could be tragic. He only hoped those in Nigeria with responsibility would rise above their short-term differences and in behalf their country’s future let their dreams take over. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL NIGERIA–US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Melbourne and cleared by Trimble. 385. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 385. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, May 25, 1967. WWR: SUBJECT Nigeria I suspect that events are about to take a nasty turn in Nigeria. I won’t bore you with a blow-by-blow, but, on the whole, I think we have played our own hand well. (We simply don’t hold many high cards.) Nevertheless, the fact is that the dissolution of Nigeria is imminent—barring miracles. The primary operational questions we now face are: —Can we salvage the most useful tokens of unity—a common currency, a single representative at the UN, etc? (A common army is clearly out of the question.) —Can we avoid civil war? —Can we provide reasonable assurance of the safety of the 7,000 Americans in Nigeria, and/or evacuate them efficiently if necessary? Let me preface my answers with a brief analysis of the present situation. Where we are There are four major political actors on the Nigerian scene: (1) Colonel Gowon, chief of the central government; (2) Colonel Ojukwu, military governor of the East; (3) Chief Awolowo, leader of the Yoruba tribe which controls the West; and (4) General Katsina, military governor of the North. As you know, the main lines of conflict are between the North and the East. The North is large, populous, and backward; the East is smaller, relatively rich (oil, etc.), relatively well-educated, and dominated by the Ibo tribe which has a long-standing feud with the northern Hausas. The North wants a strong northern-controlled central government; the East favors the loosest possible confederation of autonomous regions. After a long, dreary slide, the parties are now at the following positions: 1. Ojukwu has laid all the groundwork for secession, right down to the name of the new country (“Biafra”). He probably could not stop the train now if he wanted to. Our intelligence indicates that he may be planning either to declare independence within the next few days or to propose tomorrow that the regions form a “confederation” which would leave each with “an international personality.” The federal government would be reduced to a secretariat to nurture economic relations between almost totally separate states. Ojukwu has fomented so much independence fever that he probably couldn’t accept a tighter federal arrangement at this point without threatening his political future. 2. Awolowo has paved the way for secession of the West if the East secedes. He would probably still prefer a federation—the West will have a difficult economic time of it alone. But he thinks the West would be better off on its own than in an unequal partnership with the North. He has persuaded the western Military Governor to demand that Gowon remove all northern troops now stationed in the West. Gowon has agreed to do so by the end of May. It remains to be seen whether he has enough control to carry it off. If he doesn’t, there may soon be fighting in the West. 3. The North is run by a loose collection of Moslem emirs, under the rather precarious control of Katsina . (It is never quite clear who controls whom.) We have solid intelligence that the northern segments of the army are preparing to fight the East if Ojukwu secedes. Katsina’s role in this is uncertain. He may not be able to keep the army quiet in the face of secession even if he wants to, and there will certainly be strong forces at work to dissuade him from wanting to. Aside from tribal hatred, the most powerful northern fear is that dissolution of the federation would cost them their route to the sea. (They are already at work on arrangements for trade routes through Dahomey.) 4. Gowon remains the most reconstructed leader of northern origin, but he is rapidly fading as a major influence. The history of his problems is not entirely to his discredit. But, as things now stand, Ojukwu refuses to have anything to do with him; the northerners are extremely unhappy with his “softness” toward the East; he is distrusted in the West; and he has largely shot his bolt in bargaining terms. He may have sealed his own fate last week with an abortive proposal that British troops guarantee the security of a meeting of the regional Military Governors; Ojukwu dismissed the suggestion out of hand and made it clear that the British are finished as mediators as far as the East is concerned. Gowon made a last-ditch effort to save the day over the weekend by rescinding the economic sanctions against the East, but it now seems that Ojukwu will not reciprocate, and that the only effect of Gowon’s announcement was to multiply his problems in the North. In summary, the probabilities now argue for: (1) an Ojukwu ultimatum calling for a very loose confederation on pain of immediate secession; (2) a wishy-washy answer from Gowon which will not satisfy anybody; (3) a public statement by Awolowo favoring Ojukwu’s proposal, but promising that the West will secede if Gowon drags his feet; (4) serious pressure in the North, probably reflected in the army, for military action against the East—perhaps resulting in violence. Options My own considered judgment is that no foreign power can assert anything like decisive influence on the Nigerian situation without commitment of major resources—troops and money. On balance, I don’t think it is worth such a commitment on our part. Three outside influences are relevant to the Nigerian problem: other African states, particularly Ghana; the British; and the U.S. (All Nigerian factions are opposed to taking this matter up in the U.N. Unless and until there is widespread violence, most Afro-Asians will probably agree.) The Ghanaians have been heavily involved in mediation. General Ankrah has been to see all of the Nigerian leaders several times, and Ghana was the site of the last meeting of Military Governors. Ankrah is not persona non grata with them now; he simply has run out of things to sell—and Ojukwu has built up secession pressure to the point where there is no more time to develop new solutions. Unfortunately, mediation by other African leaders has become a cause celebre, with Ojukwu pushing for a conciliation panel of Nasser, Haile Selassie, etc., and Gowon opposing any non-Nigerian influence. Both sides have made clear that they want nothing to do with the OAU, although Diallo Telli has visited Nigeria several times of late. The British, always viewed with some suspicion, seem now to have ruined themselves entirely by their tacit support of Gowon’s proposed meeting guaranteed by British arms. Both sides have also rejected the idea of a Commonwealth peace mission. Our own situation is by far the best of the three. We have been very strong for unity, but have generally managed to keep from being tarred by either side with favoritism for the other—although we are suspected by both. We also have $15 million per year in technical assistance to use as leverage. The truth is, however, that unless we are prepared to risk another Katanga, we don’t have the bilateral tools to affect the outcome. We can marginally influence the method of change—particularly, I hope, limit violence—but the unity question is beyond us. Our real choice is whether to go all out now with some sort of grandstand diplomatic play, or to keep our powder dry so as to have the best possible start with the successor states. Our best diplomatic play would probably be a Presidential emissary to all the regional capitals—with or without fanfare—carrying a personal Presidential request for a new try at preserving unity. For my own part, I would vote against this, and I am confident Secretary Rusk and Joe Palmer would agree. My principal objection is that it wouldn’t work. We are simply beyond the stage at which anybody with a solely diplomatic mandate could get any of the sides to about-face. We might gain a month; there might even be a new meeting of the Military Governors. But the cost would be much greater U.S. involvement; correspondingly greater subsequent pressure for U.S. intervention when the talks broke down and/or degenerated into violence; and, almost certainly, some feeling in the East that the United States had chosen sides against her. Thus, painful as it is, my advice is that we sweat it out and prepare to deal with whatever configuration of autonomous states emerges . In the meantime, of course, we should continue to press for whatever tokens of unity are possible. I think there is considerable hope that we can preserve a common currency and common public utilities. But we should take no action which would indelibly identify us with any of the factions. Violence and Evacuation We have an elaborate joint evacuation plan with the British. I think it is adequate. We have also worked out detailed contingency plans for all the specific problems which would arise from any of the likely degenerative processes. Of course, any action to evacuate will increase instability and probably enlarge the chances of violence. Thus, the critical question will be when to begin. This should be a Presidential decision. You should know that the evacuation plan does call for the use of one rifle company to guard the C–130s while they land, load, and take off. The British will make a similar commitment. This is the minimum military involvement (about 200 U.S. soldiers) we will be able to get away with if evacuation is necessary. I know this is a bleak picture. I paint it in this detail to demonstrate that the fact that we are not pushing for some Presidential action now reflects neither disinterest nor optimism. It flows from the fundamental fact that we are marginal to the deepest problems in Nigeria, and that it would take an enormous—and unwarranted—investment to become an important influence. You may want to give the President a precis of this situation if opportunity should arise. (You might also remind him that African politics have a way of charging headlong to the very edge of the cliff and then unaccountably drawing back. With luck, we may be treated to another such experience.) EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Secret. 386. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 386. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, May 30, 1967, 6:05 p.m. 204937. Ref: State 204502. 2 Nigerian Crisis. 1. In early hours May 30, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria formally proclaimed Eastern Nigeria sovereign independent Republic of Biafra. Federal Military Government (FMG) has declared state of national emergency and is reacting vigorously to Eastern action. 2. FYI: Since FMG use of military force against East is distinct possibility, our most immediate concern is protection Amcits throughout Nigeria. End FYI. As reported reftel, we advising against unnecessary travel to any part of Nigeria or within that country. To date, Embassy Lagos has not believed that Amcits are in imminent danger or that they should consider leaving country. Further deterioration in situation would of course raise questions of additional steps. 3. It remains our basic position that problem of Nigeria is a matter of primary concern to the Nigerians, to Africa and to the Commonwealth. We continue to support a peaceful resolution of this problem. While continuing maintain our relations with FMG, we intend to maintain consular presence and functioning in East, which is of course not to be construed as USG recognition of Biafra. 4. If queried on Nigerian developments and USG recognition of Biafra posts may draw on above for guidance, avoiding comments on substance of Nigerian crisis and any speculation on recognition question. FBIS report quoting Eastern Nigeria radio to effect USG (as well as other nations) has already recognized Biafra is false and has been denied by US Embassy in Lagos. 5. FYI: We consider attitude of other AF states, Commonwealth countries and perhaps OAU an important factor in determining US position on status and recognition of Biafra and wish await clearer demonstration their intentions, as well as developments in Nigeria. In any event, we wish maintain friendly relations with all parts of Nigeria, including East and any other entities which might emerge. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Charles Runyon and Palmer, and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to all posts in Africa and Europe, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and USUN. 2 Dated May 30. (Ibid.) 387. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 387. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, May 31, 1967, 7 p.m. WWR: SUBJECT Nigeria situation report 1. After eleven months of slow deterioration—in which we played every card in our limited hand to maintain unity—the Eastern region declared itself the independent Republic of Biafra yesterday morning. 2. Gowon responded with a public statement that the East had committed an “act of rebellion” which “must be crushed.” (He later softened “crushed” to “contained.”) He reimposed the economic blockade of the East, and ordered full mobilization of the Federal army. (In practice, mobilization will add little to the 9,000 troops now under Gowon’s command; there are no reserves to call up. The Eastern army totals about 7,000 men—better trained and positioned than Gowon’s troops.) 3. Gowon called in the U.S. and British Ambassadors yesterday afternoon. He said that he planned to take action against the East, and asked for military help, apparently implying troops. Both Ambassadors immediately replied that this was out of the question. Gowon retreated to a request for tactical aircraft and a naval presence. Again the Ambassadors refused. As a final shot, Gowon asked what the U.S./British would do if “others” intervened on the side of the East. The Ambassadors replied that this was a hypothetical question which they could not answer. 2 4. Gowon did indicate in the above conversation that he would cooperate in any evacuation of British and American citizens. 5. Late yesterday afternoon we instructed our Embassies in London and Lagos to approach the British urgently to set in motion our joint evacuation plan for dependents and non-essential personnel. This first stage involves a commercially-operated airlift (PanAm and the British airlines). The instruction reflects our unanimous judgment (Katzenbach included) that we can no longer give reasonable assurance of the safety of more than 7,000 American citizens in Nigeria, and that an evacuation order will not bring on substantially greater instability. 6. HMG (Saville Garner) replied this morning that they can give us no final answer until tomorrow, but that they lean toward the view that the threat is not yet serious enough to justify evacuation. In any event, Garner said, HMG will be heavily influenced by the views of the British Ambassador to Nigeria. 7. The approach to the British in Lagos was even less fruitful. We have the full text of what the UK Ambassador recommended to London. Essentially, he advised against any evacuation of the whole of Nigeria—now or in the future—and against immediate evacuation of the East. His arguments are (1) it isn’t clear whether we face a prolonged conflict or a “foray;” (2) evacuation would seriously disrupt the Nigerian economy, particularly in the East, and would bring the British into disfavor with Biafra; (3) many Brits would refuse to leave; and (4) British citizens might well be safe in a successful attack on the East if they followed instructions and “kept their heads down.” He summarized that he would not recommend evacuation until “British subjects become a target.” 8. At this point, which is about 2:30 this afternoon, the story trails off. We know there are several messages which have been sent from Lagos, but not received. We have received word that our Ambassador has instructed our Consul in the East to advise U.S. dependents to leave that region. We do not know whether he has done the same in the other regions. (This is of great political importance in terms of U.S. even-handedness, which will largely determine the nature of our post-independence relations with Biafra.) Joe Palmer has sent a flash inquiry to find out what is going on. We assume our man is moving forward with a Nigeria-wide evacuation. 9. Whatever the present facts, as I reported to you yesterday we propose to proceed—with or without the British—with commercial evacuation of dependents and non-essential personnel from all regions. We shall probably have to let this be known publicly tomorrow if Lagos has not already announced it. I will furnish George Christian with guidance and stand by to help with the briefing if necessary. EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Aides File, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 29. Secret. The memorandum was passed to President Johnson with a May 31 covering note from Rostow at 7:50 p.m. 2 Telegram 9607 from Lagos, May 30, reported these exchanges and other details of the two Ambassadors’ discussion with Gowon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 NIGERIA) 388. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 388. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 6, 1967, 4:15 p.m. Mr. President: At Tab A, 2 for your approval, is a brief reply to a message from General Gowon of Nigeria. Gowon wired you and many other heads of government urging against recognition of the newly-proclaimed Republic of Biafra—formerly the eastern region of Nigeria. The incoming message is at Tab B. 3 None of your advisers would recommend recognition of Biafra until the Nigerian situation is clarified. However, we did hope to avoid answering this message so as to not appear to favor either the Central Government or the Biafrans. (How we handle the recognition question will greatly affect the tone of our relations with these states in whatever configuration emerges.) However, Harold Wilson has now responded to Gowon’s message to him with a non-committal hope that Nigeria can find her way out of her present difficulties. (A copy of the Wilson response is at Tab C.) If we don’t say at least this much, we will probably wear out some of our welcome with the central government. Thus, the proposed reply takes very much the same non-committal line. Walt Approve 4 Disapprove Speak to me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Nigeria-Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. 2 The attached tabs are not printed. 3 Tab B is a copy of Gowon’s May 30 message. 4 This option is checked. 389. Memorandum for the Record 389. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 28, 1967. SUBJECT Meeting with Nigerian Chief Enahoro, Minister of Information and Labor in the Federal Military Government (June 28–10:30 AM) Enahoro had requested a meeting with the President to present a “personal message” from General Gowon. He was persuaded that the message would reach the President if he gave it to me and to Nick Katzenbach, whom he saw later in the day. 2 There was no written text to Enahoro’s message. The points he made were as follows: 1. General Gowon feels “let down” by the USG. As the defender of Nigerian unity, he believes he deserves a more sympathetic and understanding attitude from us. 2. The USG should take steps to keep the United States from being used as a base for Biafran activity—either propaganda or money-raising. Several Nigerians and Americans are now carrying on such operations here; the State Department knows who they are. As demonstrated in the case of Katanga, the USG does have the legal means to suppress this sort of thing if it has the will. 3. Payments of royalties and taxes by foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria must continue to be made to the FMG, notwithstanding the recent Biafran decree that companies operating in the East must pay the Biafran government. 4. Some Americans seem to have accepted the notion that the FMG is a bloodthirsty leviathan bent on annihilating the gallant and peace-loving Easterners. The truth is that the FMG bears no malice towards the citizens of Eastern Nigeria, and it intends to use no more force than is necessary to maintain Nigerian unity. If the situation evolves to the point where civilians deal with civilians, there is no doubt in Gowon’s mind that the secession would end and peaceful unity be restored. I did not attempt to argue the specifics of Enahoro’s case. I questioned him at several points to clarify his argument, but left detailed response to Under Secretary Katzenbach. I did remark that we are most hopeful that a peaceful solution to Nigeria’s difficulties could be found, and that it is very difficult for us to be helpful in a family quarrel. R 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. Confidential. Prepared by Rostow. 2 Telegram 219423 to Lagos, June 29, described Katzenbach’s meeting with Enahoro. (Department of State, Central Files, POL NIGERIA–US) 390. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 390. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, July 3, 1967. SUBJECT Gowon’s Arms Request As I am sure you know, Gowon sent identical wires to the President and Harold Wilson yesterday asking for immediate sale to the FMG of 12 fighter-bombers, 6 PT-boats, and 24 anti-aircraft guns. He wanted deliveries to begin within 48 hours. He added that if the U.S. and UK were unable to supply these weapons, he would be forced to get them from any source which would make them available—an obvious reference to the Soviets and/or Eastern Europeans. We do not know whether Gowon already has a deal with another arms supplier. We do know that the FMG had a mission in Moscow last week which the Easterners claimed (and the FMG denied) was negotiating for arms. We also know that there has been some traffic in words with the Czechs. The AF judgment is that if there is not yet an agreement in being, there soon will be. Our latest report is that the British are having a Cabinet meeting on this subject today, but that their preliminary disposition is to agree to sell the anti-aircraft guns, but nothing else. Wayne Fredericks (acting for Joe Palmer, who is on leave) and I have worked out the following suggested U.S. position for submission to Nick Katzenbach as soon as possible: 1. The U.S. has consistently maintained that the Nigerian problem is an internal problem in which it could not appropriately interfere. This continues to be our view. 2. Given the prospect that the supplying of these arms could well lead to civil war, the U.S. cannot agree to supply them. 3. We are gravely concerned at the security situation implied by General Gowon’s message. Therefore, we are asking our Ambassadors to approach Kenyatta, President Diori and General Ankrah as possible mediators. (Each is agreed by both sides to be neutral in the Nigerian dispute.) The Kenyatta suggestion dovetails with an imminent meeting of the East African heads of state who plan to take up the Nigerian problem as an agenda item. If Katzenbach buys our recommendation, he would give this position to the Nigerian Ambassador in the form of an aide-memoire. 2 It would not be done in the President’s name. It seems best to us to keep the President out of it as long as possible. The judgment behind this position is that the prospect of Communist arms sales to the FMG—to the extent they are avoidable—is not so forbidding as to make it worth our feeding the flames by selling arms to the FMG. We think the Czechs have also been dickering with the East about arms sales. The Soviets have behaved very correctly throughout the crisis, pressing for unity at every opportunity. It does not appear that the Communists are involved in any campaign to gain political control of Nigeria—and the Nigerian political milieu makes that an unlikely objective, at best. Even if it were otherwise, the political cost of taking sides in Nigeria in the present post-Middle Eastern atmosphere would be very great indeed, particularly to the AID bill. In the present mood of the Congress, I would not be at all surprised if we got a quick resolution banning any such sales and perhaps abolishing MAP at the same time. (Apart from other problems, there are several strong pro-Easterners in the Congress, led by Mr. Resnick.) In summary, we just don’t believe the U.S. can or should forsake our even-handed stance now. I drag you through all this because there is a chance Katzenbach will call you this afternoon. When Wayne talked to him yesterday, he seemed to lean toward an equivocal answer to Gowon indicating that we would be willing to talk, though we obviously could do nothing in 48 hours. Fredericks, Bert Mathews (our Ambassador to Nigeria) and I are all firmly convinced that it would be a great mistake to give Gowon any reason to believe that we might grant his request unless there is some real chance we might actually do so. It would ruin us forever with the Easterners, and it would set us up for a very hard fall with Gowon if, as I strongly suspect, we couldn’t deliver. At a minimum, I think the President should know about any reply other than a clear “no.” It is he who will be stuck with the consequences in Nigeria and face the music on the Hill. Fredericks will (1) try to talk Nick out of the “maybe” tactic and (2) if Nick remains unconvinced, ask him to check with the President before he goes ahead. I suspect that would lead to a call to you. I will keep you informed. I am supposed to be taking some time off this week but I will keep up with events and be available if you need more detail. Edward K. Hamilton 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. No classification marking. 2 Katzenbach gave Martins an aide-memoire on July 3 stating that the United States could not accede to Gowon’s request because of the U.S. policy of non-intervention in Nigerian internal affairs. It reiterated the U.S. hope that all possibilities of reaching a peaceful solution would be fully explored. It did not refer to any approaches to possible mediators. The text was transmitted in telegram 817 to Lagos, July 3. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 NIGERIA) 3 An unidentified hand initialed above Hamilton’s typed signature. 391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 1 Washington, July 20, 1967, 6:57 p.m. 10593. Following is FYI noforn based on uncleared memcons subject to revision on review: 1. Ambassador Martins, with Counselor, met with Mr. Walt Rostow in White House during morning July 20 for half-hour talk to discuss Nigerian situation and US-Nigerian relations. He gave rationale for FMG “police action” against East as last resort after every effort to find peaceful solution. Ambassador added that he understood official US position, but could not correlate it with special position of affection Nigeria accords US and vice-versa. Nigeria had come to US prepared to pay for arms since it trying to put down insurrection. US refused, yet it had assisted Congo. Also Nigerians were active in US in behalf Biafra. N.Y. Times correspondent, after being expelled from Nigeria, had gone to Biafra and filed stories against country with which US had good relations. FMG needed a statement from “right US source” which would declare it wished Nigeria to remain united. 2. Mr. Rostow replied that he would look into activities of Nigerians in US hostile to their government. He knew wide latitude accorded under US law, but wished to be assured that every possible action had been explored. There no doubt US would like to see Nigerian unity, but it hardest for third party to get involved in family quarrel. From 1961, when Rostow had helped set up development assistance program for Nigeria, he believed country had great future and that USG prepared to do what it could in this direction. This hope still holds. US not prepared to put Nigeria in any other power’s sphere of influence and has not been passive in leaving development assistance to others. 2 As for Congo and Nigeria, there were great differences. In former there was external threat disrupting unity and we had sent three C–130’s in carefully limited action in continuity with earlier UN resolutions. Nigeria has not brought its problem to UN. As Ambassador can see from press, Congress does not wish US to be involved in other countries’ affairs unless there is clear external threat. Finally, our margin of influence with foreign countries on vital issues frequently proves quite small. Rostow cited examples of this, which Ambassador agreed supported case for FMG and Biafra settling problem themselves. 3. In afternoon, Ambassador Martins, with Counselor, talked with Under Secretary Katzenbach for 40 minutes and covered ground similar to morning. He sought advice of Under Secretary in explaining US actions concerning Nigeria to his government and public in this “crisis of belief.” The Under Secretary inquired what happened if Ojukwu were eliminated. It hard to understand Ojukwu acting without support and would not same problem exist? Martins briefly said FMG intended first to restore its authority in minority states of East and adopt containment policy for Ibo state, which would have opportunity to be member of federation with full rights. As far as Times correspondent in Biafra is concerned, Under Secretary said, Ambassador could count in any issue of that paper how many editorials were favorable to policies of USG. If USG could not influence paper in behalf its own interests, how could it do so for Nigeria? Activity of correspondent was not US responsibility. If Ambassador pursued matter with Times , he might find there even more difficulties. 4. In long run, said Under Secretary, Nigerian people should not have real difficulty in accepting explanations of US arms policy or difference between Congo and Nigeria. Over past five years US had given primacy to Nigerian development over other African states. Articles in US press on American arms policy should make clear to Nigerians why USG had not been able to license sales to that country. Congo was external problem stirred up by non-Congolese. He knew no African, European or Asian non-Communist state criticizing US for its policies and actions toward Nigeria. He believed that if we were wrong, others would recognize this. As for any Nigerians agitating here for Biafra, Nigerian public really would not expect us to change our Constitution or internal laws. Americans and foreigners here have right to speak up. 5. To help explain US policy to Nigerians, Under Secretary suggested Ambassador could state (a) USG has sought to correct through appropriate comment any false or misleading statements, (b) US not treating Eastern Nigerians in this country working for Biafra any differently than it is doing for its own people, and (c) we cannot be responsible for US manufactured items of military equipment which may be found in East. As matter of fact, US arms can be bought from Communist countries. USG does not possess legal and constitutional powers to halt or impede actions of which Ambassador complained. Under Secretary cited examples of Americans traveling to North Vietnam and Cuba who have reportedly spoken there critically of their country and written critically of US policy on return. Yet, USG unable to take any action against them. 6. Conversational tone in both meetings was frank and friendly. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 BIAFRA–NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Melbourne and cleared by Hamilton at the White House. 2 Circular telegram 216694, June 26, noted the desire to continue existing assistance programs in all parts of Nigeria and discussed efforts to accomplish this goal. (Ibid., AID (US) BIAFRA) However, all Peace Corps volunteers and staff were withdrawn from the East by mid-August, and all Eastern loan projects and the Calabar-Ikom road project were suspended by the end of September. 392. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 392. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 1 Lagos, August 8, 1967, 1700Z. 1294. 1. At Gowon’s behest I met with him and Adegoroye, Deputy Permsec Extaff, for hour this afternoon. Gowon said he wished assure me that he considered misunderstandings which had recently beclouded Nigerian-US relations were now removed. He was still disappointed that USG had been unable permit FMG buy arms in US but he accepted that USG had good and not unfriendly reasons for this position. He referred in this connection to personal letter which I had sent him on first anniversary of his assuming office as head of FMG and to personal letter he had recently received from his good friend, Commander Sommers at CINCSTRIKE. Sommer’s letter had helped him understand why USG could not permit sale of arms to FMG. 2. Gowon then told me that since FMG unable to buy aircraft in US and UK, he had had to get planes where he could. He had concluded deal for Czech aircraft. This was straight commercial purchase for cash and had no overtones of ideology or alignment. He was painfully earnest in urging that USG read nothing into this purchase beyond military necessity. He did not want this development to cast new cloud on Nigerian-US relations and asked USG to recognize his necessities as he had recognized ours. He was fully aware that Czechs would sell as readily to Ojukwu as to FMG and said that Ojukwu had been bidding for planes FMG bought. 3. Gowon pointed out that he had to provide effective air cover for his troops and for civilian population against aircraft which Ojukwu had acquired. Although these aircraft had not been very effective against FMG troops, no soldier liked to have enemy planes flying above him uncontested. Aircraft had bombed and strafed civilians. Latest incident was bombing of marketplace in Benue village. Gowon did not want fight this kind of war himself, but had warned Ojukwu that if latter persisted in such tactics, FMG would have to retaliate. 4. Gowon stressed once again that he conducting police action with limited objectives of removing Ojukwu and restoring Nigerian unity. He was not seeking to overrun or occupy Iboland or to subjugate Ibos. 5. Gowon deplored role of press and radio, in both US and Nigeria, in inflating misunderstandings. He said he was confident that recent spate of anti-Americanism in Nigerian press and radio at end and that normal friendliness between Nigerians and Americans re-emerging. 6. As evidence Ojukwu’s desperation and perfidy, Gowon showed me photostat of document which purported offer Rothschilds of France exclusive exploitation Eastern mineral resources including petroleum for ten years for six million pounds. CAS reporting this in more detail. 7. Main purpose of conversation emerged when Gowon asked me to inform Department that because of misunderstandings which had arisen between Nigeria and US, he would like to send one of his civilian commissioners as personal spokesman to deliver letter to President from Gowon and to explain orally to President FMG’s objectives in police action and FMG’s views on Nigerian-US relations. Gowon said he regarded Nigerian-US relations of such importance that he wanted ensure that President in no doubt as to FMG’s attitude toward US. He knew President very busy and he could promise spokesman would not take much of President’s time and would not “waffle.” Commissioner would come at President’s convenience but Gowon hoped could be soon. 8. I urge that arrangements be made for President to receive Gowon’s spokesman. 2 Gowon obviously wants very much to restore US-Nigerian relations and has convinced himself that direct contact with President is essential element this process. He would feel rebuffed and deeply wounded if we should fail to respond to his sincere desire to pre-sent his government’s case to President. 9. Gowon had received UK HICOM Hunt just before my appointment. I have not had chance to check with Hunt but I assume Gowon covered much same ground with him, excepting request to receive spokesman. As Department aware, PM Wilson has already seen Chief Enahoro. Mathews 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, London, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. 2 Telegram 021552 to Lagos, August 8, reported that a Presidential appointment would probably not be possible due to the pressures of his schedule. (Ibid.) 393. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 393. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 27, 1967, p.m. WWR: SUBJECT Comments on State’s proposed itinerary for a Vice Presidential trip to Africa 1. I think it is a very close question whether the Vice President should go to Nigeria while the civil war is going on. Joe Palmer thinks he should go, and I am not comfortable arguing against a man who has spent three years as Ambassador to Nigeria. But I think we would have to realize that—however carefully the Vice President’s speeches are drafted—his visit would be a clear and unmistakable political signal that we have moved off the hands-off position in the civil war. At the very least, the rebels would broadcast strong statements to the effect that we have abandoned our peace-making role and lined up with the Russians and the British in support of the “neo-colonialist puppet regime in Lagos.” Of course there is a case for doing just that. Our hands-off posture rests in large part on a strong suspicion that the feds can’t lick the rebels, and that we will have to deal with the sovereign state of “Biafra” in the years ahead. The first few months of the war seemed to confirm this prediction. The last few months—since the arrival of Soviet weapons in Lagos—suggest that Gowon’s forces will prevail. Thus, there is an argument that now is the time to repair our relations with the winning side by a gratuitous and newsworthy political gesture such as a Vice Presidential visit. But, on balance, I still think it is more trouble than it is worth: (i) It still isn’t at all clear when or if the Ibo rebels will be put out of business. They are in bad trouble, but they could bounce back fast in the event of a number of plausible contingencies ranging from outside military help (probably Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia) to collapse of the Gowon regime (which always suffers some level of internecine strife). (ii) If we make this gesture and somehow Gowon does get into trouble, we will be in a more difficult position to refuse him military help. (We will, of course, be in a difficult position anyway if a Biafran revival is based on help from the Portuguese and/or the white supremacists.) (iii) Even if the feds win, the Vice President’s visit would make us fair game as negotiators and financiers of the sticky problems of peace—a large group of refugees (perhaps in the millions) fleeing across the border to Cameroon, arrangements for the safety of the conquered Ibos, etc. (iv) There is an excellent chance that a Gowon victory would bring bloody violence ranging from tribal massacres of Ibos to summary trial and execution of the rebel leaders. It may not be a pretty thing to be associated with. (v) There is the added danger that this violence may occur while the Vice President is in Nigeria, or after his public itinerary had been announced, making it politically difficult for him not to go. For these reasons—and recognizing that it is a 51–49 bet—I come out against a Vice Presidential visit to Nigeria in January. 2 [Here follows discussion of other aspects of the proposed itinerary.] EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Nigeria. Confidential. A note in Rostow’s handwriting on the source text reads: “You sound sensible, as usual. R.” 2 Nigeria was dropped from the Vice President’s proposed itinerary. 394. Memorandum for the Record 394. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 7, 1968. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, January-June 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 395. Airgram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 395. Airgram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State 1 Lagos, March 7, 1968. A–469 SUBJECT Nigeria: Annual U.S. Policy Assessment, 1967: A Candid Postscript REF Lagos A–419, February 11, 1968 2 “A deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Nigeria in 1967 was inevitable.” This sentence opening the section on Nigeria and the West in the 1967 Policy Assessment does not mean that the degree of deterioration which actually occurred was inevitable. To the contrary, I believe that much of the damage to our position in Nigeria during 1967 could have been avoided. I offer the following personal analysis of the reasons for this avoidable damage in the hope that it may contribute to preventing similar reverses in future in Nigeria or elsewhere. This analysis focuses on the psychology of our approach to Nigerian developments, on certain aspects of our short range policy and on selected USG actions. Approach Our approach to the conflict between the FMG and “Biafra” has been colored by our revulsion, both official and personal, against the brutalities inflicted on the Ibos in 1966. Our sympathies have been with the Ibos. In addition, many Americans admire Ojukwu. We like romantic leaders, and Ojukwu has panache, quick intelligence and an actor’s voice and fluency. The contrast with Gowon—troubled by the enormity of his task, painfully earnest and slow to react, hesitant and repetitive in speech—led some Americans to view the Nigerian-“Biafran” conflict as a personal duel between two mismatched individuals. The most serious effect of these attitudes on our approach to the conflict has been a consistent underrating of FMG capabilities and overrating of “Biafran” capabilities. This was particularly marked in late 1966 and early 1967 when we were most skeptical of the capabilities of the FMG, most impressed with Ojukwu’s prospects and, consequently, most neutral toward the conflict. It is ironic that in this same period Gowon was anxiously pursuing the same short range objectives as the USG—i.e. the preservation of some kind of a Nigerian nation and the avoidance of civil war—while Ojukwu was whipping up secessionist sentiment in “Biafra”-to-be and accumulating arms. In assessing the FMG’s ability to maintain national unity we concentrated too much on evidences of discontent and disarray and too little on basic factors favoring the FMG. First among these was the strength of the concept of national unity among non-Ibo Nigerians. Others were that Gowon and his immediate associates controlled the only organized power in the country—the military establishment and the police—and that there were no effectively functioning political organizations to oppose the FMG or national unity. The record of Awolowo, the only major political leader left in Nigeria, made it highly likely that his stand would be strongly influenced by his antipathy toward the Ibos and that he would opt for unity if offered a leading role in the FMG. Even after it became apparent that Nigeria was not going to fall apart as a consequence of Eastern secession and civil war, we tended to disregard the wide disparity in available manpower and resources between the FMG and “Biafra.” We were surprised when the FMG captured Nsukka and amazed when it seized Bonny. Only in its short-lived occupation of the Mid-West did “Biafra” measure up to our expectations. We are still prone to cry, “stalemate,” whenever FMG forces suffer reverses or are slow in taking their next objective. Ojukwu and his associates in deciding on their course of action in late 1966 and early 1967 were undoubtedly influenced by awareness of American attitudes. To cite my own case, I have often thought that if when I saw Ojukwu in mid-October 1966 I had shown less sympathy and stressed even more than I did the necessity of keeping Nigeria together, he might subsequently have given greater weight to the difficulties in the way of successful secession. Many other Americans, official and private, with whom “Biafrans” had contact were more swayed by sympathy and admiration than I. The result was that most Ibos convinced themselves that the USG would regard “Biafra” with at least benevolent neutrality. Even now some of them seem to believe that if only they can find the right formula, the USG can still be brought to support their cause. Thanks to the American press and the reactions of individual Americans, Nigerians supporting the FMG are fully aware of our attitudes. They are baffled and resentful. While many of them understand our revulsion against the brutal treatment of the Ibos in 1966, they believe we tend to overlook prior and subsequent events and particularly Ojukwu’s intransigence which in their view is mainly responsible for Nigeria’s present situation. Policy A passive USG policy of non-involvement in situations like the Nigerian crisis is not enough. It did not prevent open involvement of private American citizens in the delivery of obsolete U.S. made bombers to “Biafra” and in the organization and operation of the vital Lisbon-Port Harcourt airlift. By the time the USG tried to discourage these activities, serious damage had already been done to the U.S. position. Many Nigerians simply do not believe that the USG cannot prevent such activities by American citizens and consequently accept charges that these are CIA operations. I have previously urged that we tighten our controls on the removal of aircraft from the U.S. and on the activities of USG licensed pilots and other air crew. Although I still believe we should do this, the experience of the past year makes me fear that the smart operators would even then be at least two jumps ahead of the USG. It seems likely that we could more effectively inhibit American involvement by pressing the hopeful beneficiary rather than American citizens. If we had told Ojukwu in October 1966 after the Warton crash in Cameroun that we would publicly denounce any subsequent attempts on his part to involve American citizens in the Nigerian situation and would take steps to ensure that the FMG was not put at a disadvantage by any military materiel of U.S. origin he might acquire, this active pursuit of non-involvement might well have restrained Ojukwu’s attempts to give his secession an American aura. A related problem arose from Ojukwu’s skillful and persistent efforts to enlist American journalists and other potential publicists in the “Biafran” cause. He was so successful, in part because of the magnificent ineptitude of most FMG propaganda efforts, that the American press usually gave the impression that the U.S. strongly favored “Biafra.” This made it difficult to persuade Nigerians that the USG really was non-involved. We could have helped ourselves by a more active effort to dissociate the USG position from that of the U.S. press. Although apparently regarded in Washington as but one aspect of the policy of non-involvement, our policy of even-handedness during the first half of 1967 had a separate, marked impact on the Nigerian situation. As seen by Nigerians, it was a policy of involvement. Equal treatment of an internationally accepted national government and a dissident and subsequently rebellious regional government could only redound to the advantage of the latter. This was clearly appreciated by Nigerians and “Biafrans”, whose reactions were understandably different. Nigerian reactions ranged from outrage to nonplused dismay, and the resulting scar tissue will abrade U.S.-Nigerian relations for some time to come. The “Biafrans” were delighted. It may be doubted, however, that we have gained lasting credit even with the Ibos whose eventual recollection of our role in their struggle for independence will probably be that we fell far short of their expectations. Actions Refusal to Sell 106mm Ammunition . Our final refusal in early 1967 to fill long-standing FMG orders for ammunition for the 106mm recoilless rifles we had earlier sold Nigeria still rankles in the minds of important FMG military figures who considered the decision unfriendly and our explanations evasive. I am mindful of the domestic considerations which led to our refusal, but the cost in terms of trust and understanding between the USG and the FMG was heavy. I can think of no remedy for this kind of situation except that we refrain from supplying arms to any country unless the U.S. national security interest is so compelling and continuing that we are sure that we shall be willing to provide follow-on support. Resistance to Terminating AID and PC Projects in Former Eastern Region . We came close in June of last year to taking the position that the USG could continue AID and PC projects despite requests from the host government for termination. Certainly the circumstances were difficult and unusual, but unless we were prepared to extend at least de facto recognition to Ojukwu’s government in the former Eastern Region, we had no legal justification to resist the demands of the FMG that we cease our operations in that area. Our brief resistance served only to arouse deep suspicion of our motives on the part of key FMG civil servants and many other Nigerians. Statement concerning FMG Request for Arms . The uproar over the Department’s press statement of last July concerning the FMG request to the USG for arms focused on the mischance that the statement used the words “military assistance” in referring to a request to buy arms. This was fortunate as it obscured a much more important issue—namely, that the USG had breached the confidence of the FMG. It will be recalled that the FMG had classified its requests to the USG and HMG as “Top Secret.” While it was true that the press in the U.S. and the U.K. had got wind of the requests, this did not justify our public disclosure without prior warning to the FMG. Had we told the FMG in advance that we would have to admit to the press that we had received its request, we could have worked out a mutually satisfactory statement. We would thus have avoided much of the public outcry and, of more importance, the memory of our breach of confidence now fixed in the minds of Gowon and other senior FMG figures. Statement concerning the Soviet Supply of Arms to the FMG . In this instance we again disregarded our normal practice of informing a friendly government in advance when we found it necessary to make a public statement affecting its interests. It is hardly likely that the FMG would have given its approval to any USG public pronouncement on the Nigerian purchase of arms from the U.S.S.R., but we could at least have explained our position before rather than after the event. Moreover, if our statement had castigated the Communists for supplying arms to both sides in the civil war, we would have scored more effectively against the Communists, made a greater impact in Africa and given much less offense to the FMG. Conclusion The foregoing analysis has obviously not produced any penetrating new insights. It does, however, suggest the continuing truth of some old platitudes about the conduct of foreign relations. I cite three which seem relevant. 1. Sentiment beclouds policy. 2. Great powers cannot avoid involvement; they can only seek to ensure that it serves their interests. 3. Diplomacy is more effective before than after the event. Mathews 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA–US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ambassador Mathews on February 29. 2 Airgram A–419 from Lagos, February 11, transmitted the 1967 annual U.S. policy assessment. (Ibid.) 396. Information Memorandum From the Western Africa Country Director, Bureau of African Affairs (Melbourne) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) 396. Information Memorandum From the Western Africa Country Director, Bureau of African Affairs (Melbourne) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) 1 Washington, April 18, 1968. SUBJECT Comments on Lagos A–469 (Postscript to Annual Policy Assessment) 2 Summary and Conclusion Lagos A–469 questions some basic assumptions which went into the formulation of U.S. policy toward Nigeria in 1967. It also questions the policy itself and how it was carried out, concluding that “much of the damage to our position (in Nigeria) during 1967 could have been avoided.” In the Department’s view our course of action in Nigeria has been, even in retrospect, the right one. The questions raised concerning it seem to flow primarily from disagreement with the basic premise of that policy, that the United States should not become involved in the Nigerian civil war. Behind our policy has been: (1) a determination not to interfere in the internal affairs of Nigeria; (2) a desire to promote a peaceful, and hence more durable, resolution of the conflict between Biafra and the FMG; (3) a reluctance to follow any course which might lead to an increase in our international commitments; and (4) a desire to maintain the best possible relationships with all the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, particularly those which might have emerged as independent states. This policy of non-involvement, especially as regards arms sales to the FMG has been consistent with Congressional sentiment as expressed in foreign aid hearings and such legislative acts as the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments. The hands-off attitude of the United States was of course strongly objected to by the FMG. The FMG tended to disregard the fact that we considered it to be the only legal government in Nigeria. It also did not appreciate fully that the U.S. still intended to make a positive economic contribution to Nigeria so long as that did not mean taking sides in the civil war. Most of all, the FMG greatly resented the U.S. refusal to license the sale of arms and the U.S. statement of August 21, 1967, deploring its purchase of Soviet arms. 3 Given these U.S. actions, which stemmed from our policy, it is doubtful whether much, if any, of the deterioration of our relations with the FMG in 1967 could have been prevented. This deterioration has to be weighed against our avoidance of the risks of intervention in Nigeria’s internal affairs, our demonstration to other Africans of our desire to avoid big power interference in the affairs of African states, and of not compromising our aid program with Congress. Four major reasons for our policy of non-involvement in the Nigerian conflict are discussed below, as well as the following comments on certain aspects of that policy: the refusal to sell arms to the FMG; the U.S. statements on arms sales to the FMG; and, our even-handed approach to the conflict between the FMG and “Biafra”. Non-interference To some extent, “non-involvement” is a misnomer but it has been used to describe our policy for the lack of a better word. Recognition of the FMG and refusal to recognize “Biafra,” continuation of the AID program in the West and North, urging of negotiations, and even the refusal to supply arms are all forms of involvement. But the real issue was whether the USG was right in trying to minimize its role through its policy of non-involvement and especially in preventing in so far as possible U.S. arms reaching either side. A decision to override the generally applicable principle of non-interference in the case of Nigeria would have required very strong justification in the Department, to Congress and to the American people. Our vital interests were not threatened by the “Biafra” secession. We were not being requested to intervene in behalf of a friendly government which an internal minority, terrorist or otherwise, threatened to take over. Nor were we requested to help combat external aggression or an internal revolt abetted by external assistance. Involvement on the FMG’s side would have needlessly antagonized those opposed to U.S., Soviet, and other foreign interference in Africa. It would have set a precedent to which other African nations would have referred when, in analogous or not so similar straits, they too wanted to enlist us in their cause. Promoting a Peaceful Settlement Prior to “Biafran” secession, the U.S. attempted to persuade both sides to negotiate their differences and to reach agreement on an advantageous form of political association. Unless the FMG and the Ibos became reconciled there was little prospect for stability and economic growth in Nigeria. After the civil war broke out, we continued to urge a negotiated settlement. Now, while sticking to this line in anticipation of an FMG victory, we are urging national reconciliation and magnanimous treatment of the Ibos on the Federal Government. A negotiated settlement before secession did seem possible, but we could not have worked for it with both sides if we had vigorously supported the FMG. It is difficult to see how selling arms to the FMG, for example, could have helped influence it toward a peaceful solution of its differences with the East. On the contrary, it might have had the opposite effect by appearing to condone efforts for a military solution. Now that the civil war is in progress, it is also difficult to see how U.S. material support for the FMG’s prosecution of the war effort could help contribute to a negotiated settlement or could help moderate FMG goals and action in such a manner as to lead to national reconciliation. Avoiding Increased International Commitments The possibility that the United States would be drawn into an ever-increasing role militarily and politically in Nigeria did not have to be a probability to make us wary of granting export licenses for arms to the Federal Government of Nigeria. Wholehearted support of the FMG would have required risks we were not prepared to take given our limited military and economic resources and our commitments elsewhere. Moreover, the United States has always preferred to let the British carry the major burden in Nigeria—both militarily and economically. To substitute for them could have increased the load on us with no net gain to Nigeria. These arguments are particularly applicable over the long run. Not Alienating the East A corollary to maintaining the best possible relationship with whatever political entities might come to the fore in Nigeria was retaining American influence in Nigeria and with the Ibos, in order to protect or further our interests there. Although this was only one of the factors behind the Department’s desire not to become enmeshed in the civil war, it had obvious advantages, especially when it appeared that the Biafrans might achieve independence. As late as mid-May 1967, reports from the field were reinforcing the Washington assessment that the Yorubas under Awolowo might secede from the FMG should the East decide to pull out of the Nigerian federation. It was predicted that this event would lead, perhaps after an interval of chaos, to the establishment of three or four independent Nigerian states. Although this danger has ultimately subsided, it was real and could not be ignored. We do not believe that this danger was overrated or unduly influenced our policy. In 1967 the Department may have underrated the strength and cohesion of the Federal military. However, as long as it appeared that the West and North might not hold together within the FMG (i.e. until the early summer of 1967), an evaluation of the comparative strength of the Federal and “Biafran” armies was only of secondary importance. In August 1967, soon after the outbreak of fighting, the Department, while not considering stalemate impossible, began to appreciate that the FMG military was much stronger than the “Biafrans” and by the year’s end had come to the view that FMG victory was probably inevitable. Yet our basic policy with respect to the Nigerian conflict—non-interference beyond encouraging both sides to negotiate a peaceful settlement—was not changed because that policy was not determined by our estimates of FMG military strength. A desire to protect our interests in “Biafra” did not lead to a pro-“Biafran” and anti-FMG attitude, but an attitude of relative impartiality with respect to the conflict between the two. Ojukwu was told many times that the U.S. would not support his secessionist effort. Unfortunately, without abandoning our policy of non-involvement, there was no way to eliminate entirely any wishful thinking that the U.S. might eventually aid the Ibos. Even had we embraced the Federal Government more warmly, however, it is extremely doubtful that Ojukwu and the Ibos would have changed their minds on secession. An additional consideration on our attitude of relative impartiality toward the FMG and “Biafra” is relevant. While sentiment, wherever it is found, does becloud policy, a natural repugnance against taking sides in a struggle between two friendly parties is not purely sentimental or unreasonable. Nor is a refusal to take sides unreasonable for having taken into account the fact that neither adversary has a markedly better case to justify its actions than the other. While we could not expect the FMG to welcome our policy of non-involvement, we could have expected them to respect the motives behind it and not require that the sole, or even chief, criteria of friendship should have been the willingness to license arms sales, declare ourselves unequivocally for Lagos and come out against its eastern opponents. Both General Gowon and Foreign Affairs Commissioner Arikpo have stated that the FMG has come to understand the consistency of our position. Refusal to Sell Arms to FMG The principal reason the USG gave for not responding to the FMG request to permit it to buy arms from U.S. sources was put forth in an Aide-Memoire given Ambassador Martins on July 3, 1967: the USG wished to maintain its position of non-intervention in Nigeria’s internal affairs. This reasoning was also behind the earlier denial of the request for 106mm recoilless rifle ammunition. The amount of ammunition requested in that instance was small and military confrontation with the East was only emerging as a possibility. However, the U.S. did not want to be wooed by the FMG into adopting an arms policy that was a little bit pregnant. While the adverse effects of refusing to supply follow-on ammunition for the recoilless rifles we had previously sold the FMG had to be considered, they did not outweigh other factors in the scales. It is questionable whether governments should reasonably expect nations supplying them with arms to maintain follow-on supplies when it is no longer in their interest to do so. The refusal to permit the sale of U.S. arms to Nigeria, first the 106mm ammunition, and later jet aircraft, defense boats and anti-aircraft guns, was probably the biggest single irritant in our relations with that country, but given our basic policy was inevitable. U.S. Statements on Arms Sales to the FMG The FMG resentment over the Department’s press statement concerning the FMG request to buy arms in the United States was of less significance and is likely to be a more ephemeral irritant in our relations with the FMG than the refusal to sell arms. However, had it been shorter, had the term “military assistance” not been uttered inadvertently, and had the press not generated pressure for an early statement, it might have been possible for information on the arms request to have been released to the public in a manner less apt to offend the FMG. The FMG, playing its own domestic politics, was apparently only too glad to seize upon the phrasing of our statement and twist it so as to use the United States as a scapegoat for its decision to buy Soviet arms. It cannot be forgotten that Gowon over Memorial Day weekend 1967 gave a virtual 72-hour decision ultimatum to the USG in seeking its approval for export licenses if he obtained aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and patrol boats in the U.S. This also had the earmarks, with Ogbu then in Moscow, of an effort planned to justify domestically the obtention of such material from the USSR. The U.S. statement on Soviet arms sales to the FMG has been of value in calling to the attention of Nigerian leaders to our views concerning Soviet arms supplies, making clear what our reaction is likely to be should they mortgage themselves to the Soviet Union. It was, however, designed to call the Soviet intervention to the attention of other African states and at the same time clarify our position to Congress and the American public. It is highly doubtful whether consulting with the Nigerians prior to issuing the declaration would have softened their reaction. Indeed, our refusal to make alterations in the text to meet FMG objections could have provoked greater FMG resentment. Again, however, pressures in Washington may have resulted in a less ideal statement than would otherwise have been possible. There is little basis for criticizing the purport of the declarations we made concerning FMG arms procurement. It was the purport, not the manner, of those statements which has caused the far greater portion of the deterioration of our relations with the FMG. Approach Our policy on the Nigerian civil war was based in part (1) on recognition that the East was not totally at fault in its conflict with the FMG; (2) on the political advantage which might be harvested at a late date if we retained the goodwill of all political entities likely to become independent; and (3) on encouraging FMG moderation. This called for an even-handed approach in our treatment of the two belligerents on other matters. Thus, we have been careful not to give all-out vocal support to the FMG, although we have firmly declared we sympathize with its desire to maintain Nigerian unity. We have particularly refrained from giving any endorsement to the FMG conduct of the war. At the same time, we attempted to retain our aid program in Eastern Nigeria as long as possible. The cost of these and other attempts at even-handedness seems bearable in the light of the difficulties we might have encountered had we lined up with the Federal Government only to see it disintegrate and “Biafra” establish its independence. In this connection, it is especially important not to confuse the damage to our relations with the FMG caused by the refusal to agree to licensing sales of arms with the relatively minor harm done by our other attempts to maintain an unantagonistic position with respect to the Ibos. In our relations with the FMG the refusal of arms sales licenses was damaging but unavoidable. The attempt at even-handedness, in so far as it went beyond our arms policy, was avoidable but much less damaging. It was worth pursuing in view of other considerations—principally maintaining our position in “Biafra,” reinforcing our posture of non-intervention and, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, trying to use influence with both sides to induce them to negotiate their differences. These considerations were in harmony with Congressional and public sentiment. The Department of State has done everything it could to discourage U.S. citizens from aiding “Biafra” and to keep U.S. manufactured arms and aircraft out of “Biafran” hands. Our legal authority has been severely limited, but there are many documented instances where we have headed off confirmed or probable arms and aircraft sales to “Biafra” by refusing licenses. We have tried to convince American citizens to cease trafficking in arms. We have used every legal means available to discourage them. This is evidenced (1) by our efforts to have the licenses of certain individuals revoked when they violated FAA regulations in connection with their illicit arms deliveries, and (2) by our cooperation with Maltese authorities who impounded an illegally registered aircraft used in the “Biafran airlift.” We believe that the approach and content of our policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Nigeria have not done irrevocable damage to the Western position in Nigeria. It can be argued that over the long run the effect might be salutary. For a limited and temporary setback in our relations, we think we have avoided the many risks of involvement and perhaps caused increasing appreciation among African nations for our efforts to minimize big power intervention on that continent. We believe we have also avoided the possibility of compromising our ongoing AID program with Congress. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA–US. Secret. Drafted by Alan M. Hardy of AFW. 2 Document 395 . 3 For text of the statement, see the Department of State Bulletin , September 11, 1967, p. 320. 397. National Intelligence Estimate 397. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, May 2, 1968. NIE 64.2–68 CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL STRIFE IN NIGERIA Conclusions A. The Federal Military Government’s (FMG) forces clearly hold the upper hand in the Nigerian civil war and a military victory for Biafra seems highly unlikely. We cannot, however, rule out a settlement which left a Biafra with a large degree of autonomy. The Ibos, who dominate Biafra, are resisting stubbornly because they believe that Federal forces are intent upon exterminating them or at least reducing them to subjugation in a reunited Nigeria. B. Whatever the outcome of the war, we believe that political instability will plague Nigeria for some considerable time to come, and that traditional tribal and regional dissension throughout the country will persist. The new internal division of the country into 12 states will exacerbate the divisive trends. Moreover, we see no national leadership in sight capable of winning the broad popular support or otherwise exercising the national control needed to deal effectively with the complicated tasks of political, social, and economic reconstruction. C. The civil war and the preceding months of confusion have virtually halted economic development in areas controlled by the FMG, and have drastically disrupted Biafra’s economy. If the FMG achieves a military victory, it would face complex problems of economic and political reconstruction, and would seek considerable outside help. Although it could expect large petroleum earnings, resumption of economic development will depend on political and security conditions. The economic outlook for a reunited Nigeria over the next several years appears dimmer now than it did a few years ago. D. The position of the Soviets has improved as a result of Moscow’s promptness in providing military equipment to the FMG; this is likely to persist. The US has lost influence primarily because the FMG resents the US policy of noninvolvement in the civil war. After the war, Nigeria is likely to follow a foreign policy more nonaligned and less pro-Western than in the past, and the competition among foreign powers will be a disruptive factor on the Nigerian scene. [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 2. 398. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 398. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, August 12, 1968. WWR: SUBJECT Status Report on Nigeria I thought it might be useful if I elaborated on the points I was making this morning. The Nigerian problem has not changed much in your absence, except to get progressively worse. It now stands as follows: 1. The two sides are in conference in Addis under the auspices of the OAU and the Chairmanship of Haile Selassie. The Feds have tabled a 9-point peace plan which, though still demanding that the Biafrans renounce secession, is by far the most realistic proposal yet offered. The proposal promises outside truce supervision by a neutral force (perhaps composed of Indians, Canadians and Ethiopians) an Ibo-dominated government for the Ibo heartland, a largely Ibo police force in Ibo areas, guarantee against a flood of Federal troops into Iboland, and a somewhat qualified promise of amnesty for the rebels. The Biafrans have flatly and publicly rejected this scheme, because it would require them to give up secession. As of Friday night, our people in Addis thought there was little hope that the talks would survive this week. 2. However, H.I.M. took things in hand and made it very difficult for either side to walk out. They are meeting again today on the basis of his secret proposals (to which we are not privy). Our betting is that Selassie is trying to get agreement on relief as a separate matter from the political settlement, which apparently is not yet possible. 3. We are doing everything we can—which is really very little—to help the Addis talks along. The President approved and sent a public message to H.I.M. before the start of the talks, as well as a confidential message to Houphouet-Boigny, who is likely to be the strongest influence on the rebels. We also made a demarche with Gowon in Lagos. We have now sent contingency messages from Rusk to H.I.M., to be delivered if the talks break down, which press for agreement on relief whatever the status of the political issues. 4. On the relief front, there has been little but frustration. Estimates of the extent of suffering vary, but the range (e.g., 400–600 per day passing the point of no return of protein starvation) are sufficiently horrible to make the differences meaningless. The Red Cross has been flying 16–20 tons of food a night in its lone DC–4 (3 more DC–4’s are due soon). Even these flights have now been stopped, however, because Biafran arms planes have taken advantage of the reduced flak Gowon puts up against mercy flights, so that Gowon has stopped making any special provisions and the Red Cross has had some near misses. Thus, at the moment there is no relief food at all getting into Biafra. 5. Nor, I am afraid, is there a dependable mechanism for getting food in if the political settlement came tomorrow. The Red Cross has been woefully slow and ineffective in arranging the logistics, and I am afraid our Mission in Lagos is too sensitive to the feelings of the Federal Government to have done much pushing. 6. Today, therefore, we launched Bob Moore, Joe Palmer’s Deputy, to Geneva to try to (a) get the Red Cross thinking in terms of the airlift proposition I mentioned this morning, and (b) get the machine built which could provide the food if the politics will allow. Moore’s dispatch was made with a reasonable fanfare, which should help some at home. 7. The constraints on relief remain unchanged. The Nigerians will allow a land corridor, but not an airlift unless we can guarantee it won’t be used to aid arms shipments to Biafra. Biafrans will accept food by air but not by land, on the ground that any food which passes through Federal territory is likely to be poisoned. The Red Cross will not engage in any relief operation which does not have the explicit approval and full cooperation of both sides. 8. There is one possible break this afternoon. The Red Cross thinks Ojukwu is about to agree to set aside a particular airstrip solely for relief use. The Red Cross has instructed its Lagos man to try that out on Gowon. This may work, although Gowon is under immense pressure from his hawks (which include almost the entire Hausa population) not to allow any relief, particularly any which involved air traffic into Biafra. 9. All of this is happening in the shadow of what is pretty clearly a buildup for a new Federal offensive designed to take the 10,000 square miles still held by the rebels. Joe Palmer, who has just returned from Nigeria, thinks this will happen within the next couple of weeks. There are also mounting reports on increased Biafran military activity, allegedly (though probably falsely) led by French officers. If either or both sides take the offensive, the relief problem becomes almost impossible. We have had a strong go at the Feds on this point, but their answer is a forbidding “The other side has left us little choice.” 10. The public pressure here mounts daily. Biafran starvation has been front page news almost constantly while you were away, and I have learned this afternoon that Time now plans to do next week’s cover story on this problem. American opinion is heavily pro-Biafran, though without much knowledge of the facts. Both the Vice President and Senator McCarthy have issued very strong statements urging that we “cut red tape” and “do more than futile gestures.” Unless Haile Selassie can bring off a miracle, we’re clearly down to the nitty gritty on this one with no solution in sight. Gowon cannot accept Biafran secession and hold his Government and the rest of the Federation together. Ojukwu, bolstered by De Gaulle and Houphouet-Boigny, still believes he is better off holding out than allowing his troops to be disarmed and risking slaughter of the Ibos. The Red Cross is slow, timid and inept. The Brits are acting as though they have decided that the only solution is a military solution imposed by Gowon. The French are actively pro-Biafran. The OAU is pro-Nigerian but split by the fact that four of its members recognize Biafra. The Russians are largely disinterested and identify with the Nigerians to the degree that they are interested. U Thant and the Pope make strong statements but are largely powerless. Our own approach has been and is to (a) stimulate the Red Cross to serve as the international cover for a relief operation; (b) press, largely confidentially, on both sides to agree to a settlement, or at least to a relief agreement; (c) offer any and all help necessary to make a relief operation work; (d) push particularly hard on Gowon to dramatize the fact that it is not the Federal Government that is keeping the food out of Biafra; and (e) work out the logistics of the relief scheme so that it is ready to move as soon as political arrangements are made. As I told you this morning, my own view is that our best hope is to persuade Gowon to permit air drops of food from planes departing from Federal territory. This would allow him to inspect cargoes to be sure there are no arms; dramatize the fact that he wants to aid the hungry; and it would actually move sizeable amounts of food into Biafra. From here on in it’s a race between this scheme and the military offensive we think is planned. EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 8/67–1/69. Secret. 399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria 1 Washington, August 15, 1968, 1553Z. 221355. Please deliver urgently following personal message from President to General Gowon. 2 1. “Your Excellency: I have been kept fully informed of the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to make arrangements for the supply of urgently needed food and other relief supplies to the civilian victims of the Nigerian war. We have supported those efforts in the past and continue to do so now. “Knowing that you share my own deep concern over the suffering of those innocent persons, I feel justified in addressing this personal appeal to you to give your urgent agreement to the ICRC proposals for an air mercy corridor. Hopefully, this can be followed by rapid agreement on a land corridor. “Your Excellency, the conscience of the world has been deeply moved by reports of starvation in Nigeria, and tons of food are already in position near the most needy areas. The world will not easily understand any failure on the part of those most concerned to agree to effective, international, humanitarian arrangements to alleviate this suffering. I therefore most earnestly urge you to make it possible for relief supplies to move rapidly into the hands of the needy by facilitating the establishment of this relief corridor on an urgent basis. “I trust that I need hardly add, Your Excellency, that in sending you this message I am motivated solely by compelling humanitarian concerns. Sincerely yours, LBJ.” 2. For London : Inform appropriate HMG officials of above message and urge that UK make parallel demarche. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Nigeria-Presidential Correspondence. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Hamilton at the White House and Katzenbach, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to London. Repeated to Addis Ababa and the U.S. Mission at Geneva. 2 Telegram 11748 from Lagos, August 15, reported the delivery of the President’s message to Gowon that day. Gowon told the Ambassador that he had already decided that the FMG could not accept the ICRC’s proposal for a relief airstrip because the airstrip that Ojukwu had offered was already under attack and likely to fall into FRG hands soon and because he did not like the way the ICRC had handled the matter, attempting to “face the FMG with fait accompli.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–9 BIAFRA–NIGERIA) 400. Editorial Note 400. Editorial Note At a meeting of the National Security Council on September 25, 1968, Representative to the United Nations George W. Ball briefly reviewed issues likely to arise at the forthcoming meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. Notes of the meeting prepared by W. Thomas Johnson of the White House staff record Ball’s comments under the heading of “Biafra” as follows: “Hardships and suffering are enormous. “Both sides are willing to sacrifice millions of lives to win political position. “Very little food getting in. “Africans do not want the U.N. in on it—they say it’s an African problem. “I propose the President designate somebody to deal with humanitarian problems. “There is great pressure to do something on it. We must help the ICRC and other international agencies.” There was no further discussion concerning Nigeria. (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, September 25, 1968, National Security Council) 401. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 401. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 14, 1968. SUBJECT The Next Step in Nigerian Relief It is worth a moment of your time to catch up on the Nigerian situation. Joe Palmer is back from Africa and Nick Katzenbach is engaging himself more deeply than ever. They may be approaching a sharp policy disagreement. For the past several weeks, we have been struggling with a situation with two major elements: 1. The great humanitarian concern for starving people, mostly in Biafra. Our body politic from Ted Kennedy to the major religious-relief organizations has shown increasingly vocal concern not only over the present situation but over a possible major carbohydrate famine beginning in December. Against this background, we in the White House and people at the Katzenbach level in State have become deeply concerned over the thought of Lyndon Johnson leaving the White House with this kind of seemingly preventable disaster at its height. 2. The work-a-day problems of getting aid to the people who need it. AF and AID have pointed all along to the very real difficulties of getting the relief agencies to pull together and of persuading the two sides in the civil war to let them operate as freely as necessary. However, we seem to have reached a point where it is impossible to get either AF or AID to think beyond current limitations, so our recognition of real practical problems has assumed an overtone of pure negativism, at least in the public eye. Nick Katzenbach’s response to this dilemma has been to set up this morning a working group that will report directly to him its analysis of a wide-range of new ideas—some wild, some not so wild. 2 The group will be mostly AF and AID types but Roger 3 will sit in for us. We don’t predict startling success because the problem really is a tough one. However, I think we have done about as well as we could hope to in getting the Department to take a fresh look at what is already a tragic situation and could get a lot worse. You should be aware that Roger deserves full credit for having pushed the issue to this point. Using me as a sounding board, he has carried the ball in engaging the Katzenbach staff and in letting AF know that we just couldn’t afford to let this go on any longer. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 8/67–1/69. Confidential. 2 The working group submitted a memorandum from Palmer to the Under Secretary on “U.S. Alternatives in the Nigerian Crisis,” December 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 BIAFRA–NIGERIA) 3 Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff. 402. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 402. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 24, 1968. W.W.R. SUBJECT Nigeria at Tuesday Lunch Secretary Rusk may raise Nigerian relief at lunch today, recommending that we provide 8 Globemaster transports (1948-vintage) to the international relief effort. Here are the facts: 1. We have a formal request from the church voluntary agencies—Catholics, Protestants and Jews—for 6 of these aircraft. Their application has political clout behind it, including Senators Kennedy, McCarthy, Mondale, Pearson; Speaker McCormack, and several other Congressmen. 2. Excess Globemasters are available, and Defense is ready to turn them over to anybody who can use them. The relief agencies have people to fly these planes. The airfields they are now using can easily accommodate Globemasters (where C–130’s are a problem); and these planes would roughly double their current transport capacity per flight. The voluntary agencies and their champions on the Hill are quite aware of all these facts. 3. Providing the planes would be a straight transfer of ownership. (Defense would “sell” the aircraft to the agencies at scrap prices, and we would juggle relief contributions, in effect, to pay ourselves.) No U.S. military personnel would be involved in any part of the relief operation of the aircraft in or around Nigeria. The transaction would be entirely routine on the grounds that these aircraft are available to any reputable buyer. Our sales contract would stipulate pro forma that the planes would not be used for military purposes. 4. The only real problem here is with the Federal Military Government. They are bound to object to our giving planes, if only because they regard the voluntary agencies as pro-Biafran and sometime gun runners. But everyone agrees that this is manageable: (a) We have come up with 8 planes rather than 6 and can afford to split the contribution between the voluntary agencies and Red Cross, which puts a better face on it for the Feds. (b) The voluntary agencies are ready to accept reasonable inspection arrangements to ensure that their Globemasters are flying strictly relief. In any case, we are persuaded that it is much easier to justify Globemasters to the Feds than to explain the refusal to Kennedy, McCormack et al. And it’s certainly preferable to explain to anybody a simple transaction now of old airplanes rather than U.S.-manned C–130’s a month from now. This deal makes eminent good sense. It will cost us nothing, can save lives, and will, for the time being at least, lessen the Congressional heat here at home. Having nursed this thing personally through the bureaucracy, I recommend you add a strong second to the Secretary, if he raises it. 2 Where We Stand Otherwise Our first priority is to try to get some food in during this Christmas truce. But the prospects are bleak. The Feds have flatly turned down the Emperor’s appeal, and Gowon is “too busy” to see our man today in Lagos. I’ll be huddling again today with Katzenbach and his people to go over ways to break (or publicly condemn) this logjam in Lagos. Meanwhile, there is also the following: —Haile Selassie has asked us for our advice and help in following up his cease-fire plea. We are telling him today (i) he should lean hard once more on Gowon to reciprocate Biafra’s de facto acceptance of the truce; (ii) the Emperor should push both sides on the opening of daylight relief flights and a land corridor (there are up to 2–3,000 tons of food we might get in overland in a matter of hours if both sides cooperate); and (iii) the Emperor might consider calling a conference of interested powers—the U.S., U.K., France, Soviet Union, relief agencies, the Feds and Biafrans—to get more resources and more coordination for the relief problem. The idea of a conference is just a long shot, but it has the advantage of putting some parties—the Soviets and in part the Feds—on the hook. The Emperor can’t do much, of course, so long as the Feds are absolutely inflexible on the cease-fire question. The Biafrans have come to us quietly about outfitting an airfield to be used exclusively for relief, in addition to the one they now have, which takes both relief and arms flights. There are manifold problems with this. But we’re quietly offering to send in an expert from one of the relief agencies to see what they have in mind. We’re telling the Biafrans, as we tell everybody, that we are closing no options on saving lives. If the situation goes true to form, everything above will be over-taken by events 24 hours from now. But I’ll keep you informed as sensibly as possible over the next few days. Roger 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 8/67–1/69. Secret. 2 An attached memorandum from Katzenbach to the President, dated December 24, indicates Johnson’s approval. Southern Africa Region Southern Africa Region 403. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 29, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Secret. 404. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 2, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Botswana, Vol. I, 9/66–1/69. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. 405. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Permanent Representative to the United States (Goldberg) Washington, January 7, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Secret. Drafted by Donald McHenry of IO/UNP on December 28, 1965; cleared by EUR Regional Planning and United Nations Adviser Edward T. Lampson, Captain Asbury Coward of G/PM, Pierson M. Hall of AFE, Colonel James W. Milner of SCI, and UNP Office Director Elizabeth Ann Brown. 406. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 18, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 092 Africa. Secret. Drafted by Bader and Lang on January 15. 407. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, June 9, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Malawi, Visit of President Hastings K. Banda, 6/8–11/67. Confidential. 408. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, November 24, 1967. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on November 24. 409. Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council Washington, November 20, 1968. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/MEMO: #107—11/22/68—U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 47th SIG Meeting. Secret; Noforn. Filed with a November 22 memorandum from Staff Director Arthur A. Hartman to SIG Members transmitting a revised text of the draft National Policy Paper on Southern Africa for discussion at the 47th SIG meeting on December 3. No drafting information appears on the source text, but Hartman’s memorandum notes that the new text reflected certain areas of agreement that emerged from the IRG/AF meeting on November 14, and a number of minor changes and amplifications. The Introductory Notes to the paper state that, when approved, it would rescind the National Policy Paper on South Africa approved by Secretary Rusk on January 18, 1965 (see Document 600), and supersede the preliminary draft NPP on Southern Africa dated April 26, 1967. 410. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 3, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, South Africa. Secret. 411. Memorandum of Meeting Washington, December 3, 1968. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA: #49—12/9/68—Chairman’s Summary of Discussion and Decisions at 47th Meeting, 12/3/68. Secret. Prepared by Arthur A. Hartman. 412. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, December 12, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, South Africa 092. Secret. 403. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to Secretary of State Rusk 403. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 29, 1965. Dear Dean: As you know, we are faced with two difficult Security Council exercises over the next few weeks—one on the Portuguese Territories and one on apartheid. I have had a look at some of the staff papers that have been prepared on both of these questions and have had several long discussions with Joe Sisco regarding our present and future policies. With respect to the Portuguese Territories, I appreciate receiving the go-ahead to try to get the Portuguese and the Africans together in some kind of a dialogue based on the principle of self-determination, defined in such a way as to leave open all possible options, i.e., independence, free association, or integration. I am not sanguine that the Portuguese will show any flexibility at this time, particularly in view of the negative statements being made regarding self-determination in the Portuguese election campaign. Nevertheless, such an attempt on our part will at least help to demonstrate our bona fides to the Africans and might even provide the basis for a Security Council resolution calling for discussions on the principle of self-determination. I know on of the important considerations in our policy has been the need to retain the Azores. I discussed this point with Bob McNamara the other day and he is of the view that while the Azores are useful and convenient, they are not essential. I would like to see the Defense Department clearly on record to this effect so that we will be in a stronger position in the future to persuade the Portuguese to begin a practical dialogue with the Africans. I hope, therefore, that looking toward the future you can seek in a more formal way from the Defense Department its latest assessment regarding the utility of the Azores. Regarding apartheid, although as you know I favor an active interim approach including a number of specific steps, I agree that basically our position is sound, that we should continue to re-state our unalterable opposition to apartheid, that pending the Court decision on South West Africa we should continue to oppose sanctions while maintaining our full arms embargo. However, both as regards any steps we may wish to take now as well as contingency planning for eventualities following the Court’s decision, we are somewhat hampered by our present dependence on the South Africans for our complex of space tracking stations. In the same conversation with Bob McNamara, I asked for his informal judgment on the degree of our dependence, and he once again said that there are practical alternatives available but that Defense would need a little time (presumably a few months) in order to develop other arrangements. Joe Sisco tells me July 1966 is the current target date, but we may not have this much time. For my part, therefore, I should like to urge the need to move along quickly with the plans for these alternative sites. In short, I hope that we can get the Defense Department to focus both on the question of the Azores and on our tracking stations in South Africa from a military point of view in the hope that their current assessment will give us more flexibility to deal with these problems politically. Cordially, Arthur 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Secret. 404. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 404. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, November 2, 1965. McGB Wednesday, November 3, at 4 pm, Bechauanaland Prime Minister Seretse Khama has a appointment to see you . Bechuanaland moved from protectorate to self-governing status this year with Seretse Khama’s party forming a government. Independence—and a wealth of complex problems—will come in September next year. Khama is here to encourage private American Foundations, the US Government, the World Bank and the UN to give tangible support to this impoverished country the size of France with a population of only 350,000. Bechuanaland is, in effect, an enclave in the “White redoubt” of Southern Africa, surrounded as it is by South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa. Its economy is wholly integrated with that of its white-governed neighbors. Therefore, the geographical and economic facts of life make it impossible for the territory to insulate itself from the crises affecting its neighbors. When independence comes, Khama will be faced with the conflicting pressures of accommodation with his racist neighbors and of proving that he is a “true African” in the spirit of the OAU. Our interest is in helping him to develop a more viable model of working multi-racialism in a part of the continent where the pattern is otherwise. So far, Khama’s visit has resulted in the Peace Corps’ decision to send a two-man mission to Bechuanaland at the end of the month to examine ways in which they might be helpful. Khama is delighted with this hopeful sign of US interest. His return to Bechuanaland, followed quickly by the arrival of a Peace Corps mission should further strengthen local support for him. The big question you might raise with Khama is, just how does Bechuanaland plan to meet the crises of Rhodesian UDI and the International Court’s decision in the South West Africa case when they come—as come they will. 2 Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Botswana, Vol. I, 9/66–1/69. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. 2 A memorandum of Bundy’s conversation with Khama on November 5 is ibid. 405. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Permanent Representative to the United States (Goldberg) 405. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Permanent Representative to the United States (Goldberg) 1 Washington, January 7, 1966. Dear Arthur: I agree with the view expressed in your letter of October 29 2 that our flexibility in dealing with the issues of the Portuguese territories, South West Africa and apartheid is limited by our dependence on our base in the Azores and our tracking stations in South Africa so long as these facilities remain essential to us. As you requested, I am asking Secretary McNamara for the latest military assessment of the importance of the Azores to our military requirements, and I am urging the Defense Department and NASA to speed preparations on alternative space tracking facilities so that we may move out of South Africa without undue damage to our space program if this should prove necessary or desirable on political grounds. In the meantime, you should know that NASA now estimates it will not be able to meet its earlier estimate of July 1, 1966 as a target date for the completion of alternative facilities because of difficulties encountered in acquiring the necessary land in Spain. NASA now estimates that suitable alternative facilities will not be ready before December 31, 1966. In addition, NASA has expressed a strong preference to maintain the tracking facilities in South Africa if political circumstances permit since, in its view, this area continues to be the optimum location for instrumentation supporting all unmanned lunar and planetary programs. With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Secret. Drafted by Donald McHenry of IO/UNP on December 28, 1965; cleared by EUR Regional Planning and United Nations Adviser Edward T. Lampson, Captain Asbury Coward of G/PM, Pierson M. Hall of AFE, Colonel James W. Milner of SCI, and UNP Office Director Elizabeth Ann Brown. 2 Document 403 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 406. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 406. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 18, 1967. I–20291/67 SUBJECT Southern Africa The purpose of this memorandum is to alert you to the difficult decisions that will confront the United States when the UN reconvenes in April and focuses its attention once again on Southern Africa. During the last session of the General Assembly, the US actively supported two resolutions involving Southern Africa: one on South West Africa declared that South Africa’s mandate had terminated and established a committee to recommend means for administering the territory under the UN to permit self-determination; 2 and a second on Southern Rhodesia declared mandatory economic sanctions on selected commodities in an effort to bring down the white-minority regime. 3 Neither resolution, of itself, is expected to work. South Africa is not likely to relinquish peacefully its mandate, and the economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia are given little chance of bringing down the current regime as long as South Africa and Portugal refuse to participate. We can expect to be confronted with new pressures for an escalation of measures against Southern Africa when the General Assembly convenes in April. Specifically, we could be called upon to support (i) economic sanctions against South Africa and the Portuguese Territories or (ii) the use of force to implement a blockade against Southern Africa or to intervene militarily in Rhodesia. Extended Economic Sanctions : Extension of sanctions to South Africa would be extremely costly. It would mean an annual balance of payment loss to the U.S. of about $250–300 million and, more importantly, about $840 million to the UK (UK estimates). This impact, plus the possible jeopardy of $3 billion in UK investments, would probably preclude UK participation. But, even with UK participation, sanctions against South Africa would not be expected to succeed because of South Africa’s high degree of self-sufficiency and South Africa’s ability to retaliate by such measures as withholding its gold from the market—it produces about 70% of the West’s annual output of gold. Blockade or Military Intervention : The Joint Chiefs have stated that a blockade against South Africa alone would require four carrier task forces (4 carriers, 24 destroyers and 3 submarines), and treble this number if extended beyond six months because of rotational and repair requirements. The force requirement would be greatly increased if, as would be likely, the Portuguese territories had to be included (also involving us in a possible military confrontation with our NATO ally). In face of present US military involvement in Vietnam, it would be impossible to participate in a military operation of this magnitude without a substantial increase in our present military posture, including the call-up of reserves. (See attachment for military requirements under various contingencies.) 4 Up to now, the US seems to have been working on the promise that we must make every effort to satisfy African aspirations on Southern Africa issues. It is at the least questionable, however, as pointed out in the CIA Special Memorandum at Tab B, 5 whether our short-term relations with Africa would suffer significantly if we took a more moderate stance. In fact, the wiser course of action—particularly when looking to longer-term relationships—would seem to lay in dealing more frankly with key African leaders. If explained properly, they should be quick to understand the factors that militate against the realization of their aspirations over the short term and the unwisdom of pressing the United Nations to adopt courses of action which it cannot carry out. If we continue unrestrained support for the positions pressed by the Africans, we will soon reach a point where we will either have to support more drastic action or back down in an embarrassing fashion. Against this background, I think it would be useful for you, sometime between now and April, to have a quiet word with Secretary Rusk, and possibly the President. From what we can see of Secretary Rusk’s attitude, I believe that he views the matter much as we do, but there are strong forces favoring a more extreme position, and Secretary Rusk would probably welcome your support. John T. McNaughton 6 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 092 Africa. Secret. Drafted by Bader and Lang on January 15. 2 For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), October 27, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 585–586. 3 For text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 232 (1966), December 16, see ibid., pp. 608–610. 4 Not printed. 5 Not found. 6 Printed from a copy that indicates McNaughton signed the original. 407. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 407. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, June 9, 1967. WWR: SUBJECT Visit of Dr. Hastings Banda, President of Malawi—June 8, 1967 This will be a short, largely ceremonial visit connected with Banda’s attendance at EXPO–67. I have talked with his advance man; he has nothing in particular on his mind he wants to raise with the President. He will undoubtedly want to hear about Vietnam (he is with us), and to give the President his conception of the prospects for ameliorating the black/white problems of South Africa. I do not think that he will have anything specific to offer in the latter regard, however. Banda is a unique figure in Black Africa. He is the only Black African leader—except for the Prime Ministers of neighboring Botswana and Lesotho—who willingly does business with the Rhodesians and the South Africans. He is much criticized for this, but it is also widely recognized in both black and white camps that he has no choice. Malawi is heavily dependent on Rhodesia for supplies. The Malawian economy is built around the white expatriate community which is highly sensitive to the morale of expats in Rhodesia and Zambia. Thus, Banda is given very little choice by the economic facts of life; still, he is so strident about currying favor with Smith and Vorster that he draws a great deal of unnecessary fire from his Black African comrades. In my view, the moral of this is to treat him with impeccable manners, but not overwhelming warmth. We should be particularly careful that our toast and welcoming speeches don’t portray him as a great Africa-wide figure. We certainly lose nothing by being correct with him, but we risk difficulties with his many African enemies if we go out of our way to embrace him. You may wish to make some of the following points this afternoon: 1. Banda is U.S.-educated, articulate, and very pro-American. If we can keep the visit casual and keep public statements away from the problems of southern Africa, this short stop should go off without a hitch. 2. Banda does not have any particular problem in mind in visiting the President. We should minimize the business aspects of the meeting, both publicly and privately. 3. We should be particularly careful in drafting toasts and statements to avoid identifying Banda as a leading figure Continent-wide. Ed Hamilton 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Malawi, Visit of President Hastings K. Banda, 6/8–11/67. Confidential. 2 Printed from a copy that bears Hamilton’s typed signature below a typed notation in parentheses that reads: “dictated—not read.” 408. National Intelligence Estimate 408. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, November 24, 1967. NIE 70–1–67 THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA The Problem To estimate the character and prospects of the movements, commonly called liberation movements, that seek to end white minority rule in Southern Africa, their relations with other African states and with Communist countries, and the implications for the US. Conclusions A. The liberation movements which are attempting to depose the white regimes of Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and South-West Africa stand little chance of significant progress through 1970, and probably for some considerable time thereafter. Most of the liberation groups will probably continue to suffer the disabilities, especially the lack of broad indigenous support, that so far have limited their efforts. But even with greater success in recruitment, none of the liberation groups is likely to expand its insurgency operations sufficiently to shake the determination of the white regimes to resist all challenges to their domination of affairs. B. The liberation cause has broad support among African states, and many of these believe that the US and the other great powers should take action that would terminate white rule in Southern Africa. The continued frustration of the liberation movements, therefore, will complicate US relations with African states and also US efforts to garner African support at the UN. But US relations with the African states are influenced by a number of factors and the impact of its positions with respect to Southern Africa will vary. The liberation issue alone will have the greatest impact on US relations with Tanzania and Zambia, states that border on the white dominated areas, are engaged in operational support of liberation forces, and fear retaliation by the white regimes. C. The USSR, Communist China, and Cuba seek to expand their influence in Africa by providing limited, yet much-appreciated, military and financial assistance to the liberation groups. If the capacity of these groups to use aid effectively were to grow, the Communist states would probably provide increased assistance, but it is highly unlikely that the USSR or China would engage in direct military intervention. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on November 24. 409. Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council 409. Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council 1 Washington, November 20, 1968. NATIONAL POLICY PAPER, SOUTHERN AFRICA [Here follow a table of contents, a map of Africa, and Introductory Notes.] SOUTHERN AFRICA—U.S. POLICY Precis The confrontation between black and white-controlled Africa—with the Zambezi the approximate dividing line—is deepening. The African liberation movements, staging through Zambia, Tanzania and the Congo, have stepped up their activities. While these operations remain relatively low-level and containable by white-regime security forces, the outlook is for an insurgency of gradually rising intensity which could lead to cross-border retaliations. The Communists, most strikingly the Chinese through their support of the proposed TANZAM railroad, are responding to the Southern African target by increasing their presence in Tanzania and Zambia and by material support for the African insurgents. The South African government has expanded its area of security operations implicitly to include much of the white-controlled area, a development which makes the South African problem regional rather than national in character. The U.S. relationship to Africa, involving links with both black Africa and the white-controlled countries of southern Africa, is under increasing pressure. On the one hand, the U.S. supports the aspirations of the African states—and implicitly of the African liberation movements—on racial discrimination and colonialism and possesses valuable interests in the black African countries. On the other hand, the U.S. has a range of material and strategic interests in the white-controlled states and a commitment to the peaceful adjustment of racial relations in southern Africa. Essential U.S. objectives in southern Africa are to: —encourage long term constructive change in the area; —moderate trends towards violence and confrontation; and —minimize the adverse effects of violence on U.S. interests. These objectives cannot be satisfactorily achieved either by intensified pressures on, or by closer association with, the white minority regimes of the area. In regard, therefore, to South Africa we need a policy that will: —continue pressures to move towards racial equality and majority rule; —continue to avoid such conspicuous association as would result in U.S. identification with repressive racial policy; —where not inconsistent with the foregoing, continue contacts and relationships of material benefit to the United States (e.g. in the fields of trade, scientific and technical exchange, routine naval visits, tracking stations, etc.); and —encourage wider exposure of South Africans to the outside world through cultural contacts and exchanges in the hope that such exposure may marginally contribute to constructive evolution in South Africa. The other side of the coin is equally important: the strengthening of the black states of the region. To do this we need: —assistance to these states through the UN and bilaterally in all available peaceful means to maintain their territorial integrity and political independence; —maximum utilization of existing USG aid instrumentalities (regional, self-help, Peace Corps, PL–480, investment surveys), and encouragement of private input; —recognition of these countries as eligible for U.S. bilateral aid programs, especially technical assistance; —active cooperation in UN and other Free World aid projects; and —encouragement of their non-political cooperation with neighboring white-controlled states. Vis-à-vis the Portuguese Territories , we should: —maintain our support for the principle of self-determination; —prepare for future change by contacts with Brazil, other European and African states, and the post-Salazar political elements in Portugal; and —avoid involvement in likely bloodshed in those colonies. In Southern Rhodesia : leave lead to UK unless the latter so clearly betrays the principle of unimpeded progress toward majority rule as to force the U.S. to weigh the relative pros and cons of explicit U.S. disassociation from the UK position. In the case of South West Africa : maintain our support for self-determination and the direct responsibility of the UN; protest infringement of the rights of the inhabitants and seek to protect their interests whenever possible through practical programs and judicial relief, while seeking to encourage a South Africa dialogue with the UN on the future of the territory. The foregoing measured approach contains only a limited hope of avoiding inter-racial bitterness and eventual large-scale violence. It may, however, offer some hope of limiting the effects of that confrontation: —by strengthening the stability and independence of the black states; —by identifying the U.S. with their aspirations; and —by avoiding seeming to align the U.S. with repressive white regimes, while seeking to encourage constructive long-term change in these areas. In short, it is a policy which will be damage-limiting for the range of U.S. interests in southern Africa and may ultimately have some slight constructive influence on long-term trends in the area. Meanwhile, by giving tangible support to the black states, we would hope to make them less dependent upon the white-ruled states and prevent achievement by the communists of an eventual monopoly of black aspirations in the area. The major changes in existing policy are: 1. Emphasis on African States In two concrete ways, the present paper innovates policy in connection with the five new African countries of the region: Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. These are: (a) The restoration of U.S. bilateral aid programs (primarily technical assistance) in Zambia and Malawi, where these programs are currently being phased-out; and the establishment of similar bilateral aid programs in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The implementation of this change of policy will require modification of the number-of-country limitations in current aid policy towards Africa. (b) Careful consideration is to be given to justified defense requirements of African states of the region threatened with white-regime retaliatory attacks for insurgent activities mounted from their territory. As a practical matter this is likely to be applicable only in the case of Zambia. 2. South Africa (a) This paper opens the possibility of eventual resumption of austere routine visits to South African ports by U.S. official ships for refueling, supplies and repairs, where such calls can be organized in a way which will not submit U.S. personnel to discriminatory treatment ashore and which can be carried out in a low key manner. (Present U.S. policy has suspended such calls pending a study of the problem.) (b) A requirement is added for a political review by the Department of State of EXIM Bank medium-term loan guarantee applications covering planned exports to South Africa. (c) A study is called for of continued South Africa participation in the U.S. sugar quota. (d) The U.S. would disassociate itself from Inter-Governmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM) projects which aim at the encouragement of European immigration to South Africa. 3. Reinforcement of UN direct responsibilities for South West Africa In the maintenance of continued pressure on South Africa, by protest and other peaceful means, as in connection with the training of South West Africans and on the question of UN issuance of travel documents to such persons, the present paper provides for U.S. support for the UN’s responsibility for South West Africa and for efforts to protect the rights of the inhabitants. 4. Rhodesia Two new policy elements are involved here: (a) The concept of seeking at an appropriate point to persuade the South African Government to use its influence with the Rhodesian regime not only to take a more moderate line with the UK but also to fulfill its commitments under any settlement; and (b), the statement that the U.S. should follow the UK lead in a UK-Rhodesian settlement unless the agreement lacks reasonable protection for progress toward majority rule in which case the U.S. would have to weigh the related pros and cons of disassociation. 5. Toward the Portuguese Colonies (a) The current U.S. self-limitation on the shipment of arms to Portugal which might be used in the insurgent conflict is tightened to include shipment of sporting arms and ammunition (in line with the U.S. implementation of the Security Council arms embargo against South Africa). (b) EXIM Bank loans would not be available to Portuguese colonial agencies for financing major infrastructural-type projects such as the Caborra Bassa Dam in Mozambique. 6. USIA Activities As the result of treating the area for the first time as a single region, rather than a series of individual countries each competing for its share of available resources, priority is given to the independent black African states. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/MEMO: #107—11/22/68—U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 47th SIG Meeting. Secret; Noforn. Filed with a November 22 memorandum from Staff Director Arthur A. Hartman to SIG Members transmitting a revised text of the draft National Policy Paper on Southern Africa for discussion at the 47th SIG meeting on December 3. No drafting information appears on the source text, but Hartman’s memorandum notes that the new text reflected certain areas of agreement that emerged from the IRG/AF meeting on November 14, and a number of minor changes and amplifications. The Introductory Notes to the paper state that, when approved, it would rescind the National Policy Paper on South Africa approved by Secretary Rusk on January 18, 1965 (see Document 600 ), and supersede the preliminary draft NPP on Southern Africa dated April 26, 1967. 410. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 410. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 3, 1968. SUBJECT SIG Meeting on Southern Africa Paper—2:30 p.m. Tuesday, December 3 Attached is the long Southern Africa NPP 2 on the SIG agenda today. It is basically a ratification of present policy with a slight nudge toward tightening our ties with the Black African states in the area. In short, it’s a prescription for a holding operation since the authors are not ready and do not believe we have the capability to come down hard on one side of the issue. Some of the specifics are such as: —Leave our NASA tracking station in South Africa but develop stand-by substitutes. —Resume naval calls only if our people are not subject to segregation or discrimination. —Re-open bilateral aid programs with the Black African countries as soon as we can persuade Congress to let us reverse the present trend toward phase-out. The real choice the paper poses (pp. 27–36) is between (1) a “measured approach” of hoping to erode the walls of apartheid before they come crashing down and (2) a “harder line” of applying sanctions to Portugal and South Africa, and breaking our military and space links with South Africa until they begin to move toward majority rule. The paper’s main argument against the harder line is that it won’t achieve the results we want. I guess this Administration is not the one to chart a new course, and this paper describes the elements of the problem well enough. The one role the SIG might usefully play at this stage is to record its views on whether time won’t soon run out on this holding operation. I suspect it will—both in our own black community and in Africa. If the SIG agrees, it might wish to put itself on record and put this high on the next team’s agenda. Apart from the “alternative strategies” section (pp. 27–36), you need only look at the precis, pp. iv-xi. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, South Africa. Secret. 2 Document 409 . 411. Memorandum of Meeting 411. Memorandum of Meeting 1 Washington, December 3, 1968. SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP Chairman’s Summary of Discussion and Decisions at the 47th SIG Meeting on December 3, 1968 PRESENT The Under Secretary of State, Chairman The Deputy Secretary of Defense General McPherson for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Taylor for the Director, Central Intelligence Agency Mr. Poats for the Administrator, Agency for International Development Mr. Akers for the Director, United States Information Agency Mr. Saunders for the Special Assistant to the President Mr. Hirschtritt for the Under Secretary of Treasury The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs SIG Staff Director DOD—Mr. Lang DOD—General Doyle Commerce—Mr. McQuade State—Mr. Owen State—Mr. Palmer State—Mr. Sisco State—Mr. Witman State—Mr. Ruser A. Objectives The Chairman commended Mr. Witman and the agencies participating in the preparation of the paper. 2 We had a much better understanding of the nature of our problem in South Africa as a result of this work. Mr. Katzenbach said his purpose at this meeting was to seek agreement on a common definition of the problem. He did not propose to approve the paper at this time. Agencies had been requested for final clearance in accordance with NPP procedure. If agencies had further difficulty, he assumed they would reflect these in their final written comments. Mr. Katzenbach said he would like to leave open whether the SIG should submit a formal comment on the NPP to Secretary Rusk. This could be examined further in light of the written comments by the various agencies. B. Mr. Owen’s Remarks Mr. Owen introduced the paper. The issue, Mr. Owen said, was what official posture we should take toward South Africa in light of our inability to exert meaningful influence on events. The authors had looked at three possibilities, each of which had its advocates: —Greater pressure on South Africa and Portugal; —A policy of closer relations; and, —The present course combining moderate pressure and a posture of official aloofness. The authors had concluded that we could not hope to moderate South Africa’s racial policies by either greater pressures or closer, more friendly, relations; but that either course would be costly to our interests. The recommended course was essentially a damage-limiting strategy as between unsatisfactory alternatives. Mr. Owen underlined that, with minor variations, the recommended course of action continued present policy: —For South Africa and the Portuguese territories, the paper essentially maintained our present policy; —For Rhodesia, with one exception, the paper proposed that we follow the lead of the United Kingdom; —For the black African states in the area, the recommendation was for increased United States support, including bilateral aid relations. C. Mr. Witman’s Presentation Mr. Witman said that a key issue was the prospect for peaceful change. On this point, the paper said that there was no way of reliably predicting the course of events. We should remain as flexible as possible to deal with circumstances. The paper discerned elements both of peaceful evolution and of growing tension in South Africa. On the one hand, rapid economic growth was producing rising African living standards, increasing urbanization and association with the modern sector. On the other hand, there was rising dissatisfaction in the African community with the status quo, and an accelerated hardening of white racial attitudes. It was impossible to say conclusively at this time which of these tendencies would win out. One could say, however, that widespread violence ultimately was likely, even probable. The paper had discarded the two extremes as too costly to United States interests. The problem was how to chart a middle course. For this, the paper was proposing six basic criteria: —Strong opposition to South Africa’s racial policies; —Insistence on fully non-discriminatory treatment of United States official personnel; —Low visibility of United States official relations with, and activities in, white-controlled areas (to ensure that our activities would not be misinterpreted in black Africa); —Disapproval of violence by either side as a means of either effecting change or maintaining the status quo (while recognizing that violence might break out at any time); —An effort to build up the African states in the area to help them acquire a measure of independence from South Africa, but without creating obstacles to constructive relations between these states and the white-controlled countries; —An effort to minimize costs to our tangible interests. Mr. Witman said the principal policy innovations proposed in the paper could be summarized: —Increased emphasis on the African states in the area; —Limitation of United States naval activities at South African ports to austere routine calls—provided United States personnel was not subject to discrimination; —Political review of short- and medium-term Ex-Im guarantee applications for South Africa; —An interdepartmental study of South Africa’s sugar quota; —Disassociation of the United States from activities in the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) aimed at promoting European immigration to South Africa; —Further support of United Nations responsibility for Southwest Africa; —Recognition of the possible need for the United States to disassociate itself from a United Kingdom-Rhodesia settlement; —Denial of direct Ex-Im financing for United States participation in large infrastructure projects sponsored by the Portuguese colonial authorities; —Some tightening of our arms supply policy with respect to the Portuguese territories; —Priority, in the allocation of USIA resources, to the independent black African states. Mr. Witman said that preparation of the paper had been an interagency effort and that he had tried to take into account as fully as possible the interests and points of view of the other agencies. The paper had the strong and unanimous endorsement of all our ambassadors in the area. While some would have preferred somewhat different recommendations, they recognized that the paper had to reconcile conflicting policy views and interests. D. Discussion The Chairman said that our problem in South Africa was the classical one of a choice between several undesirable alternatives. The proposed policy was not a very satisfactory one in terms of any single United States interest. But there were two points to make in its favor: —The alternatives offered no major gains but each involved major costs; —Even a minor modification of the present policy would be interpreted as a signal of a major change in policy and have consequences going well beyond the intrinsic technical significance of the change itself. Costs of Present Policy Mr. Nitze wondered whether the proposed course was giving sufficient attention to our “hard” interests. The present policy, it seemed, had to be justified by our interests outside the region, viz.: —United States domestic considerations; —Our problem in the United Nations; and, —The effect of a change in policy on our interests in black Africa and, more generally, the non-white countries. Nevertheless, it was not very clear what precisely the United States was “buying” by continuing its present policy. Also, it seemed to him the paper lacked clarity with respect to our objectives. Essentially, these were of two kinds: —A “declaratory policy” on human rights (including our posture in the United Nations); and, —Our tangible “action” interests in the area itself. For example, the objective of majority rule was declaratory. Conversely, our “hard” interests were very precise and well defined. We were paying a direct and immediate cost for our declaratory objectives without a reasonable hope of actually promoting them through the policy. Mr. Nitze noted that increased Soviet naval activity in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean area had increased the importance of South African port facilities. Our present policy ignored this development. Some Questions About Costs A discussion followed about our tangible interests. Points made included: —Over the long run, the future of black Africa was better than that of the white-controlled areas; —The prospect of eventual widespread violence called into question the wisdom of a policy of closer economic and political relations with the white-controlled areas, whatever might be its merits in the short run; —The confrontation between white and black in Southern Africa presented the Communist countries with excellent political opportunities at minimal risk and low cost—through support of the African cause, including financing of insurgents and assistance to the black-controlled countries (e.g., Tam-Zam railroad project); —It was questionable how much significance we should attach to the Soviet naval activities in the South Atlantic/Indian Ocean area. Soviet capabilities for naval operations in the area remained extremely limited; —Pressures from black Africa for a harder United States line were increasing. There was danger that the situation in the United Nations would get out of hand and that we would have to apply our veto on one or two United Nations resolutions. Comparison of French and United States Position Mr. Bohlen wondered about French success in maintaining a quite different policy. For example, the French were not complying with the United Nations resolution on the critical matter of arms supply. Our policy should take into account that South Africa was a long-term problem. Nothing we were able and willing to do would satisfy the black Africans. We might be better off making the minimal terms of our position explicit. In effect, our present policy was inviting black Africa to apply pressure for a harder United States policy. This pressure would not cease until we firmly said what we were prepared to do and what not. Mr. Palmer said that we, in fact, were on record with the minimal terms of our position. These were: —No sanctions against South Africa; —Disapproval of violence as a means to bring about change; —Continued membership by South Africa and Portugal in the United Nations and other international organizations. We should also recognize: —DeGaulle was paying a high price in economic assistance to black African countries. We had no way of matching the French effort under present funding limitations; —On the other hand, the French presence in Africa was dwindling rapidly; it would be substantially smaller in three to five years. Our problem, therefore, was quite a different one from the French. Our long-term position in black Africa was an important element to consider. Mr. Owen agreed that the paper did set forth a clear set of criteria. In essence, the paper said: Have dealings with the white-controlled regimes to the extent you can without becoming an accomplice. Mr. Bohlen cited language in the paper requiring us to exert pressures for “majority rule.” Mr. Owen said his point referred to the specific recommendations in the paper rather than the rhetoric. Mr. Bohlen reverted to his point: Since there was no possibility of exerting meaningful influence, the only course was to establish a position of firmness—even intransigence. Under the present policy, the United States was giving up its right to deal with its interests realistically. Mr. Palmer responded that our policy in Africa could not ignore our own position, which was quite different from that of the French. Our position was different in the United Nations. And black Africa looked to the United States with different expectations. The Possibilities of Influence Mr. Eugene Rostow said that he had considerable reservations about our course in Africa—which was, in essence, a policy of withdrawal. His own view was that: —We should be much more active in providing assistance to the black African states; —We should clearly oppose the black liberation movements; —We should build up and use our influence in South Africa affirmatively and constructively. Admittedly, there was no quick solution. But, cumulatively and over the long term, we should not discount our influence. Conversely, a policy of total abstention did not help matters. Mr. Rostow noted that he had urged confidential talks with the SAG about Southwest Africa since the spring of 1967. Such discussions were possible and, as the record showed, could be useful. For example, we had been dealing with South Africa on gold policy. But, quite clearly, it was very difficult for South Africa to engage in meaningful talks with us under the present policy. As the South African Finance Minister had put it, for South Africa to talk to the United States was “like talking to God.” As for the Southwest Africa problem, Mr. Rostow said, he believed we should work toward a formula under which South Africa would acknowledge the residual rights of the United Nations in exchange for continued administrative and supervisory responsibilities of the territory. In sum, in formulating our policy toward this area, we had to consider all the lessons of the Holmes Report, the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, and our strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. We should use more aid more effectively in black Africa and we should move in on both sides of the problem—both with the black and the white-controlled states of the area. Mr. Owen, in his response, noted that the report: —urges higher aid levels; —condemns violence by the African liberation movements; —proposes a more active United States role in discussion with South Africa on its racial policies. In one sense, therefore, there was no disagreement. But the paper contained a different estimate of the likelihood that the United States could bring about meaningful change in South Africa’s domestic policies even through an active and intense dialogue. It was not plausible that a country like South Africa would be persuaded to change its domestic policies in response to external representations. Mr. Katzenbach said he thought the possibility of a reversal in South Africa’s racial attitudes quite remote. These attitudes were, ultimately, grounded in fear—the quite understandable fears of the white minority. On balance, while not hopeful, he saw a marginally better prospect of resolution of the problem of the Portuguese territories. Cumulative Effect of Decisions The Chairman then commented on the cumulative effect of decisions. He was sympathetic to the technical arguments for liberalization of our trade and investment rules. It was necessary to remember that reasons for a particular decision often seem persuasive. The cumulative effect of these decisions, however, may be a policy which is very costly. This consideration was pertinent to the South Africa problem. In his view, this was perhaps the strongest argument for leaving things as they are. Economic Policy Guidance A discussion ensued on whether it was possible to change our economic policy without conveying a political signal. Mr. Hirschtritt said the Treasury position was that we should keep the same course but try to pay a lower price in terms of our “tangible” interests. In Treasury’s view, the proposed policy was overly subtle. For example, for the Portuguese territories, Ex-Im would be allowed to make long term guarantees but not long term credits. For South Africa, the policy would allow short- and medium-term Ex-Im guarantees but not direct Ex-Im loans. Mr. McQuade said the changes in Ex-Im lending policy which Commerce was advocating could be explained as minor technical revisions without political significance. For example, there was little difference between five-year guarantees and five-year loans. A change in policy that allowed direct loan financing of exports to South Africa (for up to five years) would be hardly noticed. In this connection, Mr. McQuade noted that United States exports to South Africa would be some $70 million higher if we had maintained our share of the South African market. Mr. Sisco said that black Africa’s attention in fact was beginning to focus more and more on commercial relations. He thought that commercial policy would become an increasingly difficult subject. Mr. Katzenbach said he did not disagree with the rationale for eliminating the distinction between guarantees and loans. He did feel, however, that such a change would be interpreted as politically significant in both black and white-controlled Africa. His question was: Was such a change worth making for what was involved. He recalled that the routine visit of an aircraft carrier in 1967 developed into a major international incident. The Treasury and Commerce representatives suggested that there were a great many possibilities of making a change less conspicuous. For example, a change could be made as part of a series of other technical changes. In response to this view, the Chairman said: 1. If the change did not become known, it would be ineffective; i.e., United States business would not avail itself of the opportunities. 2. If it became known and the Government tried to explain it away, the result would be a credibility gap. 3. There was a good possibility that the Executive Branch could not hold to such a change in policy; to reverse the decision not only would damage the Administration’s position at home and abroad but also aggravate our relations with the white-controlled countries. 4. A reversal would stimulate further pressure by the black African countries for new and harder measures. 5. Even if the first adjustment, because small and innocuous, could be carried out successfully, each succeeding adjustment to improve our competitive position in the South African market would be more difficult. Mr. Katzenbach felt that even if the loss were double or triple the amount suggested by the Commerce representative, he did not feel that it would be worth incurring the political costs of such a change in our economic policy. Mr. Sisco said that in his view any change in our policy would only stimulate those forces which want us to terminate all economic relations with the white-controlled countries. United States Domestic Considerations Mr. Palmer and Mr. Witman reported that academic circles and students seemed to be widely in favor of a considerably harder policy. Mr. Owen said that in his contacts, on the other hand, he had encountered misgivings about the present policy and a disposition toward closer relations with South Africa. Mr. Katzenbach said that the new Administration would find it difficult to make any change in our relations with South Africa. Any action by the new Administration would be interpreted as a signal that the new Administration was planning to move towards a different policy. E. Disposition and Follow-up Mr. Owen noted that other agencies were being requested to give their final concurrence on the paper by December 12, in accordance with the interdepartmentally agreed NPP procedure. Mr. Katzenbach suggested that additionally—without interfering with the NPP process—we should commence an effort to determine precisely the tangible costs of our present policy and, conversely, the likely costs of any change in policy (e.g., the loss in United States exports sustained under the present Ex-Im policy; the effects on United States investment both in the ten countries of the region and in other black African countries; the incremental costs of United States naval operations resulting from the non-availability of South African port facilities). A.A. Hartman Staff Director 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA: #49—12/9/68—Chairman’s Summary of Discussion and Decisions at 47th Meeting, 12/3/68. Secret. Prepared by Arthur A. Hartman. 2 Reference is presumably to Document 409 . 412. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 412. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, December 12, 1968. JCSM–739–68 SUBJECT National Policy Paper on Southern Africa—Third Draft (Revised) (U) 2 1. (C) Reference is made to: a. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 18 November 1968, 3 which requested formal clearance comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the third draft National Policy Paper (NPP) on Southern Africa. b. A memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 22 July 1965, 4 which forwarded “Procedures and Annotated Standard Outline for National Policy Papers,” dated 17 June 1965, and established the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) as the final approving authority for the Department of Defense in formal clearance of third-draft papers. 2. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the third draft of the NPP on Southern Africa and, in accordance with reference 1a and the procedures set forth in reference 1b, submit the following comments. 3. (S) In several areas in the draft NPP, realistic courses of action have not been developed to implement fully and to pursue stated US interests and objectives. Some courses of action presented in the draft NPP impose unnecessary limitations on military activities in South Africa and could be counter-productive or could contradict US interests and objectives. 4. (S) The course of action dealing with conspicuous military association proscribes routine participation by South African military personnel in DOD correspondence courses, high-level visits by South African military personnel to the United States, and visits by ranking US military officers to South Africa. It does not follow that travel to South Africa by ranking US military officers would automatically create undesirable publicity. The conditions surrounding travel and the prevailing political climate could well make it possible to conduct such visits without contravening basic policy objectives. 5. (S) The foregoing restrictions relate directly [ 6–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. It is recognized that working level military contacts and the participation of South African military personnel in DOD correspondence courses should not be routinely undertaken to the point where they become conspicuous. However, [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ]. Therefore, contacts should not be restricted as a matter of principle but considered in relation to the conditions which prevail at the time proposals are made. 6. (S) The draft NPP provides for the eventual resumption of US Navy and MSTS ship visits to South African ports; however, this provision is based on the condition that US personnel not be subjected to discrimination and that port visits be inconspicuous. It is highly unlikely that South Africa will make an official exception to its policy of apartheid in the case of US personnel, which the draft NPP requires before routine naval visits can be resumed. Provision should be made for discretionary liberty and shore leave as recommended earlier by both the US Ambassador to South Africa and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 7. (S) The draft NPP also provides for operational port visits to South Africa in cases of emergency or overriding operational requirements; e.g., when “alternative logistical arrangements cannot be made.” While the definition of “alternative logistical arrangements” could be left to future interpretation, such would not be necessary if the statement were to read “reasonable alternative logistical arrangements.” This would permit transiting US aircraft carriers to make refueling stops in South Africa without resorting to the expedient of diverting, for a period of 45 to 50 days, a fleet oiler from east coast duties for the sole purpose of performing a single underway refueling. 8. (S) In view of the present closure and possible future denial of the use of the Suez Canal to the United States during a Middle East, African, Indian Ocean, or Southeast Asian crisis, ready access to South Africa would provide valuable options to planning required for military operations. Further, many of our larger warships cannot transit the Suez Canal, another factor which makes it highly desirable that we maintain cooperative relations with the Republic of South Africa. Current Soviet naval activity in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean underscores the need for greater flexibility in our approach to utilization of existing bases/facilities in Southern Africa 9. (S) The paper recommends that the United States should be prepared to entertain requests for defensive arms from black African States threatened with attack by white-controlled countries. There is a danger in this course of action which the draft NPP overlooks. Arms could fall into the hands of insurgents, who could then use the arms in their campaign to “liberate” white-controlled Africa. Thus, if such an arms policy were adopted, it could place the United States in the position of appearing to supply and encourage insurgency operations across African State borders and could increase the possibility of retaliation and a conflict that the United States desires to prevent. Therefore, the entertainment of requests for arms from black African States should be considered not as policy but on a case-by-case basis. 10. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the draft NPP be returned to the Policy Planning Council for revision in order to develop realistic courses of action and to align them more closely with stated US interests and objectives, especially with regard to the foregoing comments. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Pete C. Sianis Major General, USAF Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, South Africa 092. Secret. 2 Document 409 . 3 Not printed. 4 Not printed. Portuguese Africa Portuguese Africa 413. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State Leopoldville, January 14, 1964, 2 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG. Confidential. Also sent to Lisbon, Luanda, USUN, Brazzaville, Bukavu, Elisabethville, and Stanleyville. 414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, January 17, 1964, 6:06 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Robert H. Edwards of IO/UNP and Officer in Charge of Portuguese Affairs Robert Barbour; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs William C. Burdett, Cleveland, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green, and Williams; and approved by Harriman and Ball. Repeated to USUN and Leopoldville, and by pouch to London, Madrid, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Abidjan, Tunis, Lagos, and Addis Ababa. 415. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Scott) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, March 16, 1964. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 114, March 12, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler. 416. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts Washington, March 16, 1964, 2:14 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 ANG. Confidential. Drafted by Looram on March 10; cleared by IO/UNP, Francois M. Dickman of NEA, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Hugh G. Appling, Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake, and Deputy Director of the Office of West African Affairs Leon G. Dorros; and approved by Williams. Sent to Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Freetown, Lagos, Leopoldville, Monrovia, Ouagadougou, Rabat, Tananarive, and Tunis. Repeated to USUN, Lisbon, London, Paris, all other African diplomatic posts including Cairo, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Salisbury, Lusaka, and Blantyre. 417. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 17, 1964. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 121, May 21, 1964. Top Secret. 418. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 29, 1964. Source Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. I, Cables, 11/63–7/64. Secret; Special Handling. Drafted by Looram on April 28. Sent through Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. A May 3 covering memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Attorney General Kennedy, Secretary of Defense McNamara, CIA Director McCone, and McGeorge Bundy reads: “Attached is a paper prepared by the Bureau of African Affairs at the request of Secretary Rusk as a basis for the discussion on the foregoing subject at the meeting, 4:30 p.m., May 4. In addition to the considerations with respect to Africa, as set forth in the attached paper, Secretary Rusk suggests that consideration will also need to be given to the effects on our NATO relationships with [sic] and our military interests in Portuguese territory, as well as the place of Portugal in the NATO alliance.” 419. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 4, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, 303 Committee Meetings, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Jessup on May 5. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, Attorney General Kennedy, McCone, McGeorge Bundy, and U. Alexis Johnson. 420. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, May 19, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 ANG. Secret. Drafted by Looram on May 18. Sent through Harriman. A copy was sent to Jerome K. Holloway in EUR. 421. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 21, 1964. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 122, May 28, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Jessup on May 22. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Vance, and McCone. 422. Telegram From the Embassy in Tanganyika to the Department of State Dar-es-Salaam, June 8, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 MOZ. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Nairobi, Kampala, and Lisbon. 423. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, July 1, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on July 1. 424. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 1, 1964. Source: Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 17 cl, Rusk, Dean, 1964. Personal & Confidential. Drafted by Harriman. 425. Memorandum for the Record Washington, August 6, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, 303 Committee Meetings, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on August 8. 426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika Washington, October 28, 1964, 5:17 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOZ–TANZAN. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Jesse M. MacKnight and John P. Meagher of AFE, Curtis Strong of AF/CWG, and Officer in Charge of Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius Affairs George B. High on October 27; cleared by Director of the Office of Central African Affairs James L. O’Sullivan, McKillop, Ludwig Hauschner of AID’s Food for Peace Division, Deputy Director of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs Clement Sobotka, and Thomas W. McElhiney of AF/CWG; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Lisbon, and by pouch to Leopoldville, Lourenco Marques, and Luanda. 427. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central African Affairs (O’Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, November 2, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG. Secret. Drafted by High. Also sent to Fredericks, Tasca, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Samuel Z. Westerfield. 428. Memorandum for the 303 Committee Washington, November 10, 1964. 429. Letter From the Consul General in Mozambique (Wright) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Lourenco Marques, December 14, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Papers of G. Mennen Williams, 1961–1966, Country Files, 1961–1966, Algeria-Zambia, Mozambique. Confidential; Official-Informal. 430. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, January 8, 1965. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 60, NSAM File. Secret. The source text indicates that Ball saw this memorandum. 431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika Washington, March 17, 1965, 8:27 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 MOZ. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Looram on March 16; cleared by Appling, Fredericks, O’Sullivan, and MacKnight; and approved by Director of the Office of West African Affairs William C. Trimble. Repeated to USUN. 432. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, May 10, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 MOZ. Secret; Noforn. Drafted on April 30 by Joanne Curtis of the Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The source text is an attachment to circular airgram CA-11930 to Lusaka, London, Salisbury, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, and Nairobi, May 10. 433. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, August 23, 1965, 6:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL PORT–US. Secret. Drafted by Funseth and Robert H. Edwards of IO/UNP; cleared by George B. High of AFC, Fredericks, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Joseph J. Sisco, George L. Warren of G/PM, Harry A. Quinn of ARA/BR, AID Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Herman Kleine, Thomas Pape of E/ITED, and Col. Smyser, Lloyd, and Colonel Lardner of OASD/ISA; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Luanda and Lourenco Marques. 434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika Washington, September 2, 1965, 5:21 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Looram and Officer in Charge of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea Affairs Lambert Heyniger; cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of Central African Affairs William E. Schaufele, Director of the Office of Central African Affairs L. Dean Brown, and Funseth; and approved by Deputy Director for Eastern African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy. Repeated to Leopoldville, Lusaka, and Lisbon. 435. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, October 25, 1965, 8:02 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Sisco and Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Patricia Byrne; cleared by Fredericks, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Stephen M. Schwebel, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Lisbon and to The Hague for the Embassy, Leddy, and Ambassador Anderson. 436. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, November 3, 1965, 2:33 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Byrne on November 2; cleared by Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs Edgar J. Beigel, EUR Regional Planning and United Nations Adviser Edward T. Lampson, Williams, Sisco, and Schwebel; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Lisbon and London. 437. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, November 20, 1965, 4:16 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by John E. Reinertson of IO/UNP, cleared by Brown of IO/UNP, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Lisbon, London, and Salisbury. 438. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Acting Secretary of State Ball Washington, November 23, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Unclassified. Drafted by Reinertson. A notation on the source text indicates that Ball saw the memorandum. 439. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia Washington, July 27, 1966, 6:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ANG–ZAMBIA. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Southern Rhodesia Affairs Michael P. Hoyt and Heyniger; cleared by Warren, Steve Koumanelis of G/PM–G/MC, Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Thomas W. McElhiney, Dean of IO/UNP, Lardner of DOD/ISA, Funseth, Robert H. Human of L/AF, and Thomas Judd of EUR/BMI; and approved by Trimble. Also sent to Lisbon. Repeated to London, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Blantyre, Dar-es-Salaam, Addis Ababa, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and USUN. 440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, November 25, 1966, 9:02 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ANG–ZAMBIA. Confidential. Drafted by Funseth on October 31; cleared by McElhiney, Brown of UNP, Wyle of DOD/ISA, EUR Country Director for Spain and Portugal George W. Landau, Warren, and Koumanelis; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Blantyre, London, Lourenco Marques, Luanda, Lusaka, USUN, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and CINCEUR. 441. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, November 29, 1966, 8:26 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Funseth; cleared by Lampson, Deputy Director of the Office of U.N. Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen, Heyniger, and Landau; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to USUN, Luanda, and Lourenco Marques. 442. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 6, 1967. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Halvor O. Ekern of INR/DDC. The source text is an attachment to Document 223. 443. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 8, 1967. 444. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State Leopoldville, April 28, 1967, 1523Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. 445. Letter From the Country Director for Central Africa, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius (Brown) to the Ambassador to the Congo (McBride) Washington, June 1, 1967. Source: Department of State, AF/AFCM Files: Lot 70 D 65, Official-Informal Letters, 1967. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Brown on May 26, and cleared by Landau, McElhiney, and Palmer. 446. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, July 5, 1967. 447. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 6, 1967. 448. Airgram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State Kinshasa, October 26, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, PORT 30–2 ANG. Confidential. Drafted by Embassy Political Officer William J. Boudreau on October 25, and approved by Chief of the Political Section Herman J. Cohen. Repeated to Lisbon, Luanda, Lubumbashi, Lusaka, Paris, and USUN. 449. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 27, 1967. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 62, November 10, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Jessup on October 30. Copies were sent to Kohler, Nitze, and Helms. 450. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, November 22, 1967, 2250Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Roy T. Havercamp of AFCM; cleared by AFI Labor Adviser Alvin M. Rucker, Hadsel, Edward W. Holmes of AFSE, and Funseth; and approved by Country Director for Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Burundi, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius Affairs John A. McKesson. Repeated to Kinshasa, Luanda, and Lubumbashi. 451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, February 8, 1968, 0140Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFRICA–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Arthur T. Tienken of AFCM on February 7; cleared by Colonel Kennedy in DOD/ISA, Landau, INR Deputy Director for Coordination William C. Trueheart, Officer in Charge of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea Affairs Ernest B. Dane, Peter Sebastian of AFNW, Country Director for Guinea, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal Affairs Bayard King; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Kinshasa, Conakry, and Dakar. 452. Memorandum From William McAfee of the Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Quimby) Washington, July 16, 1968. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, Mozambique, April 1967–1968. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to the source text is a CIA proposal for [text not declassified]; not printed. 453. Research Memorandum From the Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 9, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 MOZ. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, October 8, 1968, 0007Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–PORT. Secret. Drafted by S.G. Gebelt of EUR/SPP on October 4; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs George S. Springsteen, Landau, Eric Rehfeld of EUR/RPM, Gorman of DOD, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Thomas H.E. Quimby, Holmes, Licht of Commerce, IO/UNP Officer in Charge of Dependent Area Affairs Donald McHenry, Seymour S. Goodman of E/EWT, and John M. Bowie of G/PM–MC; and approved by Deputy Assist-ant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Philip J. Farley. 455. Briefing Memorandum From the Country Director for Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Uganda (Feld) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) Washington, October 28, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–PORT. Secret. Drafted by Alan Logan of AF/E. Copies were sent to Holmes, Havercamp, the Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, and the Embassy in Conakry. 456. Editorial Note 413. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State 413. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State 1 Leopoldville, January 14, 1964, 2 p.m. 1368. GOC Views on Holden Roberto. In call on Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lengema) January 13, I discussed with him Holden Roberto’s reported decision to seek arms from Red China. 2 Lengema expressed GOC views along lines of his press interview in New York Times of January 8. Government did not believe it could “forbid” Roberto from obtaining arms from communist states as long as non-communist states were unwilling to provide them. However, GOC would oppose introduction of communist “volunteers” or training personnel into Congo. Lengema then argued that it was still in power of US to “save” Roberto by doing more to support him. He suggested public statement calling for negotiation between Portuguese and Roberto and thought we could find ways to make transport available to him. Lengema said we should not be surprised to see Roberto turning to communists for help when Western support was so “discreet” as to be virtually non-existent. I told Lengema that there was no possibility of giving Roberto US equipment to wage war in Angola. We were anxious to encourage peaceful settlement of Angolan problem and Roberto, as well as GOC, should realize that actions Lengema advocated we take would result in rupture our relations with Portugal and would thereby destroy our ability to moderate Portuguese position in interests of negotiated settlement. I said that Roberto’s reiterated public statements about seeking help from Red China would produce strongly unfavorable effect on US public opinion and that sending of GRAE delegation to Peiping would further diminish our ability to encourage dialogue with Portuguese. Lengema said that he understood our point of view but repeated that Roberto, while not himself communist-oriented, believed he had nowhere else to turn for material needed to conduct “liberation struggle.” O’Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG. Confidential. Also sent to Lisbon, Luanda, USUN, Brazzaville, Bukavu, Elisabethville, and Stanleyville. 2 On January 4, The New York Times reported that Angolan nationalist leader Holden Roberto had decided to accept assistance from Communist China and other Communist countries. 414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, January 17, 1964, 6:06 p.m. 444. Lisbon’s 559. 2 You should seek early appointment with Fonmin and, if you believe it advisable, Primin Salazar, to consult on following problem. Developments in early months 1964 could significantly affect future course events in Portuguese territories. In first place, it clear from growing Chicom presence and Chou En-lai visits that Red China embarking on major political offensive in Africa. This will see Chicom effort to identify themselves with African movements and to increase their influence among nationalist groups by generous offers of assistance. Recent reports of GRAE leader Roberto’s intention accept these offers show that Chicom offensive cannot fail affect situation in Portuguese territories. This in Chicom view is made-to-order situation pitting non-whites against European, NATO power in “liberation struggle” which offers glittering opportunity deal blow to West and at same time assert superiority Chicom revolutionary ideology over that of USSR. Second, African Fonmin meeting late February will be in effect caucus to outline strategy on Portugal and other issues. Once African line set and announced, flexibility African moderates these issues seriously curtailed. If meeting took place today result would probably be hardened African stance reflecting growing opinion among African states that Portuguese policies antagonistic to aspirations peoples Portuguese territories. These two elements show that situation in overseas provinces becoming more acute, as Under Secretary Ball had predicted, and that moves along lines suggested by Under Secretary more necessary than before. For this reason we desire consult GOP on problem and to solicit suggestions for dealing with it. We also have proposals to make as to immediate actions which we hope will be received as serious expressions of our concern at a trend of events we consider adverse for Portugal unless new elements injected into it. We believe one of most hopeful elements which would in the first instance seize initiative and encourage African response would be Por tuguese move encouraging resumption Portuguese-African dialogue under UNSYG auspices. Review of Fonmin’s statements in Washington indicates GOP prepared meet again with African reps on condition that there be no conditions. While some Africans reportedly prepared urge resumption on this basis, majority maintain talks futile without some Portuguese acknowledgment that self-determination is valid political goal for peoples its African territories. Fonmin has acknowledged that definition self-determination contained UNGA resolution 1514 3 and reaffirmed in SC res S/5481 or December 11, 1963, 4 (“All peoples have right to self-determination; by virtue that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”) has advantages for Portugal (USUN 2502). 5 We believe Portugal disserving own interests by refusing become advocate this principle. Moreover, S/5481 also reaffirmed that self-determination offers options of sovereign independence, association or integration with independent states, thereby meeting Fonmin’s insistence that independence not be posed as sole option. You should therefore propose to Fonmin and/or Salazar that GOP make early public statement endorsing self-determination in this sense as goal Portuguese policies and programs. If Portugal were to make such a statement, US efforts to bring about resumption of talks and place difficulties in way Chicom penetration would be greatly strengthened. If Portuguese have alternate suggestions which would contribute achievement these goals, we would be pleased receive them. In presenting above proposal you may in your discretion also draw on following: 1. Secretary recently told Nogueira in Paris that we keenly aware progress made by Portugal in Africa last year and we regret GOP not making best case for itself internationally. Continued Portuguese rejection self-determination seems unnecessarily injurious its cause in light current reforms (Luanda’s A–107). 6 2. Weeks ahead will be optimum time for Portugal make unilateral gesture unattributable external pressures. 3. As Secretary made clear at Paris, we strongly deprecate violations of Portuguese territories’ borders. Our support of self-determination in no sense implies our support of interventionist or expansionist aspirations or predatory attacks in any form by one nation against territory of another. This position has been set forth publicly and privately. This position, and approaches we have made to Congolese and certain Africans in same sense and to warn of Chicom subversion, are responsive to Franco Nogueira’s insistence that US make same efforts with others as we make with Portugal. However, our chances for success in any approaches we might make to Africans would be limited without Portuguese statement on self-determination. 4. In event Portuguese do make a forthright statement accenting self-determination (as defined by UN SC Res S/5481), we would be prepared publicly to welcome this development to urge again Africans participate in discussions with the Portuguese, and to reiterate our view that they should eschew force in pressing for change in Portuguese territories. (FYI) For your background and such use with Portuguese as you may deem appropriate, following is assessment of Congo-Angola interaction: More than 250,000 Africans have moved from Angolan territory to Congo. Border is vast and we assume its control is extremely difficult. As GOP knows we have repeatedly pointed out to GOC our aversion to violent actions and our hope that Angolan problems will find peaceful solution. Congolese leaders have indicated their personal hopes that such solution might be found, but at same time are faced with great internal and external pressures to favor nationalists and hasten settlement. We shall continue make these views known to GOC leaders. However, it must be realized that our capability in this domain has definite limitations; USG in any event convinced that in unlikely hypothesis Adoula and other moderate Congolese leaders were to take strong measures against Angolan nationalists, their Government would be short lived and would be replaced by less moderate regime which would probably soon turn to Communists for guidance and support. Present GOC recently indicated their concern re Chicom involvement with Angolan nationalists and stated that Chicom technicians would not be welcome in Congo. (End FYI) Should Franco Nogueira question you re possibility Portuguese recourse to Security Council, for example, on Cabinda incident, you should reply in accord memo being forwarded you by Cleveland. You should point out that SC might well follow pattern of 1946 UN Commission to investigate Greek border incidents. Commission given broad mandate conduct investigation in all areas concerned and elucidate causes and nature border violations. Africans likely press hard for including authority examine “underlying causes,” i.e., issue self-deter mination in terms reference UN body created to investigate Portuguese complaint. 7 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Robert H. Edwards of IO/UNP and Officer in Charge of Portuguese Affairs Robert Barbour; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs William C. Burdett, Cleveland, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green, and Williams; and approved by Harriman and Ball. Repeated to USUN and Leopoldville, and by pouch to London, Madrid, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Abidjan, Tunis, Lagos, and Addis Ababa. 2 Dated January 14. (Ibid.) 3 For text of Resolution 1514, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 14, 1960, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960 , pp. 110–111. 4 For text, see ibid., 1963, pp. 161–162. 5 Dated December 14, 1963. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN) 6 Dated November 22, 1963. (Ibid., POL 12 ANG) 7 In telegram 591 from Lisbon, January 24, Ambassador George Anderson reported that he had presented all the items in the telegram to Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira that morning. (Ibid., POL 1 PORT–US) Telegram 591 is scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XII , Portugal compilation. 415. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Scott) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 415. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Scott) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, March 16, 1964. SUBJECT Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group of 12 March 1964 The minutes of the meeting of the Special Group held on March 12, 1964, contain the following item: “Angola—Covert Support to Angolan Nationalist Movement. “On the Angola paper dated 6 March 1964 2 and the Mozambique paper dated 28 February 1964, 3 Mr. Alexis Johnson said he was acting under instructions and that the Secretary of State requested these proposals be referred to a Cabinet-level meeting for resolution. It was noted that other members were in favor of both papers as submitted. A discussion followed in which Mr. Johnson pointed out that State Department has serious reservations because, if the proposals were approved, the U.S. would be almost in a position of joint action with the bloc against a NATO ally. 4 In other words, if Holden Roberto received Soviet and/or Chinese arms and the U.S. provided him with non-military support this would be a form of coincidental collaboration with the Communists against a Western ally. “Mr. Bundy said he was in favor of supporting the nationalist movement because in the maelstroms of loose power on the African continent, the USSR and China will immediately plunge in if the U.S. remains aloof. Mr. Waller emphasized that the Agency was in a position to deal with many of the other GRAE leaders in addition to Holden Roberto with whom they had been in contact for eight years. There is no alternative to covert subsidies. Withdrawal means abandonment of any guidance and/or influence in the nationalist movement. It was pointed out that Soviet or Chinese arms did not necessarily mean the accompaniment of Chinese and Soviet technicians as experts. Subsidization of moderates might minimize additional bloc inroads. “The Attorney General said he felt it was absolutely essential to maintain contact with these movements and that the wave of the future is with African nationalism and not with Portugal. He felt we must be realistic in these matters. “It was determined that the Angola Mozambique package would be referred next week to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Attorney General with representation from the Special Group.” 5 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 114, March 12, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler. 2 Attached but not printed. The memorandum for the Special Group requested authority to provide covert non-military support to Holden Roberto and selected other Angolan nationalist leaders with whom a secure relationship could be developed in order to influence their political orientation and to exercise some control over their program and planning. [ text not declassified ] 3 Not attached. 4 A March 10 memorandum from Assistant Secretary Tyler to U. Alexis Johnson stated that EUR opposed the proposal and did not believe that the U.S. Government should support, secretly or otherwise, revolt against an allied government. In a memorandum to Johnson on the same day, Assistant Secretary Williams expressed his “strong belief” that non-military covert assistance should be provided to the GRAE on the grounds that it was only a question of time before the Angolan people exercised the right of self-determination and that when that happened, the nationalist forces at the helm should not be mortgaged or oriented to the Communists. (Both in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 114, March 12, 1964) 5 No record has been found of such a meeting until May 4; see Document 419 . 416. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts 416. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts 1 Washington, March 16, 1964, 2:14 p.m. CA-9360 SUBJECT Portuguese African Territories FYI: Department and other Government agencies becoming increasingly concerned absence progress toward peaceful resolution issue of Portuguese African territories, the hardening of Portuguese and nationalist positions and obvious danger that as struggle is prolonged, Angolan and Mozambique nationalist movements will tend become more violent, radical, racist and less disposed toward compromise and/or transitional settlement. As situation now developing, any independent states that might emerge would be likely experience turbulent beginnings and have anti-Western orientation jeopardizing future stability southern and central Africa. At present there is a breathing space before UN Committee 24 takes up issue again. We would hope utilize pause for constructive private African-Portuguese talks before issue subjected to acrimonious debate. Moreover, given present dissension within GRAE and current challenge to Roberto’s leadership, Africans may feel less inhibited than heretofore in taking initiatives on their own on this issue. Finally, it is in U.S. interest that African-Portuguese talks be resumed in order to obviate, or at least postpone, head on African-Portuguese collision. End FYI. It is accordingly requested that, unless objections perceived thereto, action addressee post discuss this problem at highest appropriate level along following lines: Reiterate U.S. Government’s grave concern regarding absence any forward movement toward settlement. Both Portuguese and nationalists now appear to rely on force as primary means to obtain respective objectives. Both positions rigid thus undermining any chances for peaceful solution. At same time longer the Angolan struggle drags on, the more it will become an increasingly festering sore on large area of continent and be susceptible to influences extraneous to African interests. It seems to us resumption African-Portuguese talks under UN auspices should be attempted. We aware disillusionment with last discussions and absence any certainty new talks would be fruitful. We also realize Roberto reportedly opposed, as Portuguese probably are, and that Portuguese refusal to date to accept publicly UN definition self-determination poses for Africans formidable obstacle to getting into substantive discussions. At same time it remains our conviction Africans should not give up and instead should persist in exploiting talks, particularly in view advantages of having them under UN auspices. Latter provides unique forum for setting forth reasonableness of demands for self-determination and for showing that Africans disposed explore any and every avenue for negotiations leading to peaceful settlement. Will be recalled that December 11, 1963 SC resolution included all options for self-determination, as well as providing for UN SYG to continue efforts and report June 1. Another possibility which seems to us merits exploring is for certain Africans put out feelers to Salazar or Franco Nogueira with view engaging Portuguese in secret bilateral talks on issue. Possibly chances for some progress more likely in this context. In any event we would appreciate host government’s assessment present situation, prospects for progress and particularly its thoughts on foregoing or any other approaches that might be appropriate and effective. We for our part continue our quiet efforts induce GOP accept and implement principle self-determination. Also, we have programs for relief of Angolan refugees and for educating Mozambican and Angolan refugee students. However seems to us this issue principally of African concern and thus appropriate and desirable that African statesmen take lead in trying bring about solution. Curious in this connection that as far as we aware little attention focused on this issue during Lagos OAU meetings. UN debates important and useful forum for pressing African views. However this only one approach. Moreover we doubtful periodic acrimonious debates in public likely advance issue, especially if not supplemented by continuing African diplomatic initiatives in meantime. FYI: While we would be interested in any information volunteered regarding current reports of internal dissension within GRAE or host government’s views on Holden Roberto’s leadership, including possibilities a different GRAE lineup might have better chance of negotiating with GOP, preferable you yourself not be drawn into discussion this question. If queried as to U.S. views, you should make clear while internal politics GRAE may justifiably be of concern to Africans, not appropriate matter for non-Africans to meddle in. End FYI. For Abidjan: Leave to your discretion how you believe matter should be discussed with Houphouet-Boigny this juncture, given fact he has already made efforts along above lines and our desire while trying to generate bilateral African-Portuguese talks, that GOP not gain impression this is U.S. inspired idea. For African Diplomatic Posts listed as info addressees: Please advise telegraphically should you believe would be useful for you also to discuss this issue with host government. FYI: We planning make comparable approach to GOP. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 ANG. Confidential. Drafted by Looram on March 10; cleared by IO/UNP, Francois M. Dickman of NEA, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Hugh G. Appling, Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake, and Deputy Director of the Office of West African Affairs Leon G. Dorros; and approved by Williams. Sent to Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Freetown, Lagos, Leopoldville, Monrovia, Ouagadougou, Rabat, Tananarive, and Tunis. Repeated to USUN, Lisbon, London, Paris, all other African diplomatic posts including Cairo, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Salisbury, Lusaka, and Blantyre. 417. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk 417. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 17, 1964. SUBJECT Proposal Regarding Holden Roberto I wish to register an emphatic dissent to the proposal to provide [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] to Holden Roberto [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] of the Angolan Provisional Government (GRAE). 2 In filing this dissent, let me make it clear that I do not admire the methods or policies of the Portuguese Government in Angola. Their stewardship of this area is obsolete, brutal—and probably has no long-term future. In fact, I told Dr. Salazar that I did not think that, without a drastic change of methods, Portugal could retain its influence in Angola beyond a limited span of years. 3 I should perhaps point out, however, that I would estimate a longer span than would many of my colleagues since I think the Portuguese are dug in and determined to stay. The French stuck it out in Algeria during seven years of fighting. While Portugal is not France, neither are the Bakongo Algerians. The core of my position is that, in developing an Angolan policy we should not be over-persuaded either by sympathy for the underdog or abstract libertarian principles. We should look at this question hard-headedly in terms of the United States national interest. In those terms, I should like to set out my objections to the current proposal. First, I object to this proposal as a destructive moral precedent for the American Government. The doling out of this money will constitute double-dealing on the part of the United States Government. You have on at least two occasions (in Lisbon and Athens in 1962) assured the Portuguese Foreign Minister that we engaged in no activities with Holden Roberto that we could not disclose to the Portuguese. You did tell the Foreign Minister that we had had for some time an intelligence arrangement for Holden Roberto [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Pursuant to my instructions, I categorically assured Dr. Salazar that we were not providing assistance to Holden Roberto—and, by implication, that we did not intend to do so. To embark on a covert program of aid to Holden Roberto at this point would be a direct violation of confidence. I cannot believe that it is either good morals or good policy to put the United States Government in that position. We all recognized at the time of the Cuban missile crisis that the United States could not act out of character without losing something of its own self-respect. If it was true then, it is true now. And there are practical considerations as well. The question of good faith cannot be considered solely in the framework of United States-Portuguese relations. If we break confidence with Portugal—an acknowledged ally—we shall contribute to a general mistrust of our government that can cause us irreparable damage in the whole area of our international relations. Second, I do not believe that the United States should undertake a joint venture with the Communists to undermine a Western ally. The Agency presentation states: “In January, 1964, Roberto announced his willingness to receive military aid from the Bloc but insisted that such aid be given without commitments”. In arguing for the proposal, the presentation states: “Nationalist leaders intend to seek Bloc arms in order to satisfy the military wing of the movement, upon which their ability to retain leadership ultimately depends. As long as Bloc military support can be controlled by a friendly Congo move, and Bloc personnel excluded, this presents no immediate danger to United States objectives.” The United States role under the proposal would be to provide “constructive” assistance, including the “administrative expenses incurred by the” Provisional Government, “travel and representational costs”, etc. From this I take it that the proposal assumes that the Communists would provide the military weapons while we—as the junior partner—would provide the costs of administration of the Provisional Government. With our combined help Roberto and his colleagues would set about trying to undermine our ally. I do not find this an attractive posture for my country. Third, I believe it wrong to assume that we can exercise “leverage over the direction of the Angolan nationalist movement and … strengthen our relationship with its leadership,” 4 by providing money for administrative support on a covert basis. The proposal assumes that United States involvement would not become known except to Roberto and his immediate associates. If this be the case, then the bulk of the Angolan nationalists would be fighting with arms known to be provided by Bloc sources, while only Roberto and one or two of his colleagues would know that the United States had helped at all. How would this give us effective leverage? I doubt that the United States can build much influence in this manner. At the moment, I understand that Roberto’s hold on the movement is precarious. He is, I am told, a poor administrator and a rather indifferent leader. According to a report received today, he may be ousted by his colleagues on the grounds he is an “American tool”. One accusation against Roberto is that he has been unable to raise adequate funds. What would be the result if he suddenly appeared with substantial funds? Against the background of accusations already made wouldn’t it be evident that he was getting money from the United States? If so, wouldn’t this become promptly known to the Portuguese? If, on the other hand, his followers assumed that he was getting money from the Bloc, wouldn’t this strengthen the Communists? Fourth, I do not believe it in the United States interest to encourage a state of terror in northern Angola. At the moment, the military situation in northern Angola is at a stand-off, and the Portuguese are feeling increasingly confident. The Agency presentation states: “The Portuguese military over the past year has succeeded in containing the nationalist forces, but it has been unable to put down the rebellion or put an end to rebel activities.” Our administrative funds will not significantly alter the military balance. Portugal has 40,000 troops in Angola. I think it is prepared to fight to the finish (although it may withdraw from Mozambique and concentrate in Angola). Under these circumstances, it is almost certain that—without regard to whether or not we give him financial help—Roberto will in time be driven to terrorist methods. This happened in 1961. It will surely happen again as the struggle grows more bitter—and, with increased bitterness, becomes more racist in character. I put, therefore, what I regard as a relevant question: All sentiment aside, is it in the interest of the United States to become an accessory to terrorizing Portuguese settlers in Angola? Isn’t it rather in our interest to discourage such a state of affairs in the heart of Africa? Or, if we cannot discourage it, shouldn’t we at least avoid associating ourselves with it? To put the question in larger terms, is there any hurry about Angola? Left by themselves, the Portuguese will probably be able to sustain a military stalemate for several years. While this may be a continuing source of frustration to the other African states, I don’t see why it need concern us except in the United Nations. Fifth, is it in our interest to stimulate a Portuguese invasion of the Congo? The Portuguese are known to have mobilized a substantial cadre of Katanganese gendarmes. If nationalist activities grow more intense, I think they will almost certainly move to destroy the nationalist camps in the Congo—particularly if they feel we are helping the nationalists. This can create major problems for us and the Adoula Government. Sixth, I do not think that a payment to Roberto is either necessary or useful. I do not think we have to run and get ahead of each nationalist movement in order to keep it out of Communist hands. Genuine nationalist movements have shown themselves resistant to Communist domination, and the test as to the direction of a regime is much more likely to occur when the revolution is completed and the new nation is being established. For this reason, I question the thesis that underlies the present proposal—that we must give covert financial aid to the Angolan Nationalists if they are to be friendly with us after independence. We have regularly supported the principle of self-determination in the United Nations and in our continuing dialogue with the Portuguese. I think we should persist in that course, which is in our great historic tradition. It is because of our open adherence to this tradition that we have won the leadership of the newly-emerging nations. To assume, however, that there is any direct and inevitable relation between financial help to revolutionaries and our relations with a post-revolutionary regime is not borne out by the historical facts. During the Second World War we helped Ho Chi Minh in Indochina and he is no friend today. We have, for the most part, established useful working rela tions with the new governments of Asia and Africa, yet we did not supply them covert support during their revolutionary days. What we have done is to help the new nations that have emerged from revolutionary struggles, and our continuing help is to a considerable extent the basis of our relationship. One lesson can be clearly read in our recent experience: If the question, “What have you done for me lately?” reflects political reality, it also reflects the reality of our relations with the less-developed countries. Finally, I think it unrealistic to assume that, over a period of time, Portugal will remain unaware of our financial assistance to Roberto. The dossier prepared for you by the Portuguese Foreign Minister describing the Angolan camps would indicate that their intelligence is competent. Once the Portuguese are morally certain that we are providing financial help—even if they cannot prove it—our credibility will be wholly destroyed. The question of credibility again is not limited to US-Portuguese relations, since the Portuguese will make it known throughout NATO circles that we have been treating them dishonestly. My conclusion from all this, therefore, is quite clear. I see no objection to looking after Angolan refugees or even providing them with scholarship grants—provided we tell the Portuguese. But I am against furtive aid directed at undermining the interests of our ally. While the observations in this memorandum have been addressed to the proposal to provide funds to Holden Roberto, [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. George W. Ball 5 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 121, May 21, 1964. Top Secret. 2 See footnote 2, Document 415 . 3 As President Kennedy’s Personal Representative, Under Secretary Ball visited Lisbon and met with Prime Minister Antonio De Oliveira Salazar and Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira August 29–30 and September 6–7, 1963. For a record of Ball’s meeting with Kennedy to debrief him on these discussions, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXI , p. 571 . Records of Ball’s mission are in the Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2301; ibid., Central Files, POL 7 US/BALL, POL 19 PORT, POL AFR–US, and POL AFR–PORT; and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal Subjects, Ball Mission. Ball’s own account of his mission to Portugal is in The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp. 276–279. 4 The omitted word in the quotation is “to.” The quotation is from the March 6 proposal cited in footnote 2 above. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 418. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 418. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 29, 1964. SUBJECT Portuguese African Territories Summary The issue of the Portuguese African territories remains stalemated—the present courses of action followed by the Portuguese Government and the nationalists respectively have led to a blind alley. The threat of the rebel movements, our own efforts with Salazar and the attitudes of some of the NATO members have thus far resulted in only limited movement by the Portuguese. At the same time, rebel activity has not met with notable success. Guerrilla actions continue, but they have been contained to a large degree by the Portuguese military at considerable financial cost. Eventually Portugal will have to reach an accommodation with the nationalist movements. In the meantime, however, the nationalists are becoming increasingly radical; they have just admitted extremist and pro-Communist elements into the organizations. The most immediate problem in the overall issue is, therefore, to try to prevent the nationalists from mortgaging their future to the Communists and from reaching a stage where they will no longer be disposed to negotiate a moderate and evolutionary settlement when Portugal finally comes around to offering one. United States long-term interests require that a new approach be made to the issue in order to unblock the present stalemate and thus prevent the future situation of the Portuguese African territories—and with them the future of central Africa—from being gravely jeopardized. We should accordingly propose that the nationalists alter their tactics and develop a political action program with the objective of significantly expanding their political organizations and activities within and outside the territories. Broad-based support and participation would be sought among the populations concerned for campaigns in favor of self-deter mination. The United States would be prepared to provide clandestine assistance for this purpose. Discussion Current Trends in the Nationalist Movements The rebel leaderships of both Angola and Mozambique are now passing through a critical phase. Frustrated by Portuguese military containment and Salazar’s refusal to concede any steps toward self-determination, they have also become embittered by the lack of UN, Western and even African support. The various War Games played at the Department and JCS have shown that as the Angolan conflict was prolonged, the more racist, violent and extremist the rebel movement became and the more the chances for an evolutionary settlement were compromised. Thus we are witnessing today the development of internal dissension within the Angolan nationalist leadership, the emergence of strongly anti-Western tendencies, and overtures for Communist help. Adoula recently told Governor Harriman he was very much concerned about the possibility that Holden Roberto might soon be ousted by extremists. It is now reported that Viriato da Cruz, a pro-Chicom leader of a rival nationalist group, has just been admitted into Roberto’s organization. This is now a critical juncture. If present trends continue unchecked, I fear that the nationalist movements will become more extremist and anti-white, with a possibility of strong Communist influence. Should this occur, there would be little chance for peace and a Portuguese-African compromise solution until and unless Portugal wearies and decides to cut its losses. Under these circumstances the future of Angola and Mozambique would be seriously jeopardized, and with them, the future of central Africa. At the same time, it is probably unlikely that these nationalist movements would become so blatantly dominated by Communist elements as to alienate African support. Despite the reservations of moderate leaders, their fears of another Congo-like situation developing in Angola, and their often-expressed hope (albeit privately) for a peaceful and gradualistic solution, the nationalist cause has such wide African appeal that the African leaders really have no choice but to back the Angolan and Mozambique nationalist movements if they are to survive politically themselves. Thus, almost irrespective of the political coloration and actions of the nationalists, their struggle is likely to remain a burning issue in Africa and a touchstone in our relations with the Africans until the issue is finally resolved. Portuguese Government Attitudes The Portuguese leaders give every sign of being convinced that they can ride out the storm and that if the rebellion can be eliminated within the next few years, they will be safe home. There are reports of returning soldiers being fed up with the struggle and feeling it is hopeless. Moreover, military expenditures are taking up a large portion of the budget at the sacrifice of public investments in the domestic economy. I suspect, however, that Salazar is being told mostly what he wants to hear, and Admiral Anderson reports that there is no indication of any give in Salazar’s position. As in the case of French attitudes toward the Algerian struggle, Portugal will in all probability come around eventually to seeing the hopelessness of trying to maintain the status quo and will make an accommodation with the nationalists. There are those who contend that it is futile to try and move Salazar, at least at present, and that we should wait until the moment is ripe for us to exert pressures. The flaw in this theory is that if we stand by and do nothing until rebel violence finally forces the Portuguese to face realities, by that time the nationalists will probably have reached a point of no return and no longer be disposed to working out with Portugal a compromise settlement. U.S. Objectives Our objective is to bring about an evolutionary settlement of the issue, which will ultimately provide stability for the territories and for the adjacent areas. This requires meeting the nationalist aspirations and at the same time permitting the maintenance of Portuguese presence in some form. Thus the settlement requires African-Portuguese cooperation. In order to make such an objective realizable, some progress has to be made in the meantime, namely before the African and Portuguese positions become wholly unreconcilable and before the orientation of the nationalists becomes such as to preclude a moderate and transitional settlement. A New Approach—Political Action Program In order to avoid a further deterioration and bring about some progress toward settlement, we believe that the nationalists should alter their present tactics and concentrate their energies, with our clandestine assistance, in setting up an extensive political organization within and outside the territories. This organization should be based on non-racial principles and obtain the adherence of as many elements as possible of the populations concerned—the various tribes, as well as the white and mulatto segments of the population. Once set up, the organization should endeavor to set in motion forces favorable to the cause of self-determination and capable of bringing pressures to bear on Portugal to change its policies. Inside the territories, this would consist of political campaigns designed to bring about a political consciousness and manifestations of public support for self-determination. If the nationalists could thus succeed in showing that they did in fact reflect the will of the majority, their cause would evoke significant international sympathy and impress on world public opinion the urgent need for a solution. Under such circumstances, the American public would be prepared to back the nationalists, and our NATO allies might be more disposed than they are now to help cope with the issue. Even the Portuguese might feel obliged to face up to realities, and the nationalists’ emphasis on non-violence might make it more palatable for the Portuguese Government to come to terms with the rebel leadership. Admittedly there is no guarantee that the nationalists, particularly the Angolans, would accept the concept of non-violence when their whole strategy is based on guerrilla warfare. Even if they were to accept it, they might not be able to carry it out. The Angolans and Mozambicans do not have a tradition of passive resistance or, more importantly, a British colonial police to contend with. The nationalists would have to be extremely adept in building up an effective and extensive underground organization that could successfully elude the ubiquitous Portuguese secret police (P.I.D.E.). Similarly, great courage and enormous sacrifices would be required of the indigenous peoples in carrying out passive resistance in the face of ruthless counter-measures by the police. (In the past P.I.D.E. has dealt brutally with any Africans suspected of being involved in strikes, not to mention the treatment meted out to the ring-leaders.) It should also be kept in mind that if the nationalists were to engage in political campaigns, it would probably be unrealistic to expect that all violence and guerrilla operations could be stopped. Roberto has a trained force in being of five to seven thousand men, and for him to try to keep them “on ice” for an extended period of time or attempt to adapt all of them to non-violence tactics could easily lead to his overthrow. Extremist elements in the organization are unlikely to accept a complete change to non-violent tactics. Similarly Algerian-trained guerrillas of Mondlane’s FRELIMO have just returned to Dar, thus adding to the pressures for immediate military action. By the same token events have probably gone too far to persuade the nationalists to turn down all offers of Communist support. (Were they to do so might indicate the existence of our own support.) We would, nevertheless, with our assistance, be in a position to limit the extent of nationalist involvement with the Communists, at least for a certain period of time. Despite these obstacles, the present guerrilla operations have not met with notable success, and an effort should be made to persuade the nationalists to undertake new tactics. Essential of course would be our commitment to provide them with assistance for this purpose. We should, moreover, try to get the support and direct involvement of those African leaders who have an influence over the nationalists. [ 7 headings and 17 paragraphs (5–1/2 pages of source text) not declassified ] 1 Source Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. I, Cables, 11/63–7/64. Secret; Special Handling. Drafted by Looram on April 28. Sent through Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. A May 3 covering memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Attorney General Kennedy, Secretary of Defense McNamara, CIA Director McCone, and McGeorge Bundy reads: “Attached is a paper prepared by the Bureau of African Affairs at the request of Secretary Rusk as a basis for the discussion on the foregoing subject at the meeting, 4:30 p.m., May 4. In addition to the considerations with respect to Africa, as set forth in the attached paper, Secretary Rusk suggests that consideration will also need to be given to the effects on our NATO relationships with [sic] and our military interests in Portuguese territory, as well as the place of Portugal in the NATO alliance.” 419. Memorandum for the Record 419. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 4, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting of 4 May 1964 re U.S. Policy toward the Portuguese Possessions in Africa PRESENT Secretary of State Rusk Secretary of Defense McNamara Attorney General Kennedy Director of Central Intelligence McCone Mr. McGeorge Bundy Mr. Alexis Johnson Mr. Rusk opened the meeting by stating that he thought it was time to have an overall look at United States policy toward the Portuguese possessions in Africa. He made three essential points: [ 1 paragraph (4–1/2 lines) of source text not declassified ] Second, this would be counter to the African tradition of relatively peaceful solutions to self-determination. Granting that Algeria and Indonesia were exceptions, Mr. Rusk stated that 90% of the new nations, including those in Africa, had attained their independence through non-violent means. Mr. Rusk then stated that as Secretary of State he had serious responsibilities vis-a-vis Portugal as an ally and specifically for retaining our position on the Azores base. He said he felt the United States support should be directed toward a political program which allowed for a number of choices. For example, the Lusitanian Commonwealth concept for the Portuguese African territories with Brazil as an influential partner might be acceptable. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] Mr. Rusk elaborated on his concept of a more mature approach by the Angolan movement which would have wider appeal throughout the rest of the non-African world. He emphasized that the current violent trend of the Angolan movement was producing minimal results for them. Adoula was nervous over the trend of Roberto’s movement. Mr. Rusk also pointed out that the present course could well lead to Portuguese punitive incursions into the Congo. Mr. Rusk felt that if Adoula [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] could be interested in the moderate approach they might exert influence on Roberto and his colleagues. There ensued a discussion of how the United States could emerge from the impasse, whether any control factors existed over the Angolan movement after extension of financial aid and to what extent violence could be discouraged. No one present was particularly sanguine about the prospects of averting terrorism. The question of whether the present Angolan movement had any true national base was also explored. Mr. McCone expressed his doubts about Holden Roberto’s long-term stayability as a leader. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Mr. Bundy restated the problem by saying that it was in the United States’ interest not to abandon this movement in the face of Soviet and Chicom competition. He cited the pressure of continent-wide African support and the folly of a stubborn adherence to an antique Portuguese policy. The Attorney General felt strongly that we could not abandon the movement and felt that contacts throughout the movement should be developed and maintained. [ 1 paragraph (4 lines) of source text not declassified ] Mr. Rusk commented that Portugal had been on notice that the United States was officially sympathetic to principles of self-determination. In response to a question by Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara stated that it was “possible to live” without the Azores base. He felt this base problem should not dictate our foreign policy and that keeping the USSR out of Africa was more important than holding Azores base rights. He felt that stronger ties with Spain could obviate the losses of Moroccan transit bases and the possible losses of Wheelus and the Azores. Mr. Bundy said he agreed with the thrust of the African paper and asked for Mr. McCone’s opinion. Mr. McCone said the [ 2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. Mr. Rusk conceded that Roberto might be totally unable to make the shift to non-violence. Mr. Rusk cited certain other factors which did not make the situation inflexible. He noted that Salazar policies were not entirely popular in either Lisbon or the colonies. He referred to conversations between Nogueira and the Committee of Nine in regard to an eventual solution. He felt perhaps the Africans were a bit shortsighted when they promptly rejected any outward association with Portugal in a possible settlement. He then noted that African prime ministers, in his experience, were more moderate in private talks than they could afford to be for domestic consumption. Mr. Bundy returned to the thesis that we should buy a larger share in the movement and retain full tactical flexibility. The Attorney General advocated funneling monies for non-violent activities such as refugees and students until the situation can be re-examined next January. This was approved in principle subject to passing specific proposals through the Special Group mechanism. The exchange of views continued and resulted in a general agreement to proceed with an approach to Adoula [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] with the idea of sounding them out and persuading them that a non-violent, multi-faceted political program would be the best path toward self-determination for the Portuguese territories. It was decided that a letter of instruction in considerable detail would be issued to Ambassadors [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and Godley in the Congo for initial approaches to [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] Adoula, respectively. Depending on their responses, additional steps for covert discussions and support could be initiated. Mr. Rusk suggested that [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] the idea of the OAU making a public statement against the intrusion of the Soviets and Chinese in African self-determination matters could be explored. Lastly, the Attorney General noted that Stanislaus Radziwill had mentioned that, in a conversation with Salazar, the Portuguese President had indicated a slight flexibility toward the principle of self-determination for the territories in question. Messrs. Rusk, Johnson, and Bundy thought that this was worth verifying promptly and if, in effect, Salazar had indicated a relaxation, Ambassador Anderson might be advised to re-explore this avenue. Mr. Rusk also indicated that the attitudes of the new Brazilian government should be explored as an auxiliary weapon. He noted finally that the Spanish Foreign Minister had been talking with the Portuguese for some time to suggest a more realistic approach to their collision with African nationalism, albeit with no discernible effect. Peter Jessup 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, 303 Committee Meetings, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Jessup on May 5. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, Attorney General Kennedy, McCone, McGeorge Bundy, and U. Alexis Johnson. 420. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 420. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, May 19, 1964. SUBJECT Ambassador Anderson’s Views on Portuguese Africa I am taking the liberty of submitting some comments, for whatever they may be worth, on Ambassador Anderson’s letter of April 18 2 regarding our policies on Portugal’s African territories. The Ambassador’s Views If I understand correctly, the Ambassador considers that our present tactics and policies are unrealistic—until the Portuguese political system changes, there are no prospects of Portugal permitting self-determination and it is useless and counterproductive to try to get them to do so. Instead, we should focus on the possible and try to get the Portuguese to accelerate their present economic, educational and social reforms, which would eventually lead to a liberalization and weakening of Lisbon’s all-out control over Portuguese Africa. Finally, we should explain this new concept to our African friends and endeavor to dissuade the Africans from supporting the Angolan rebellion. Comments I can appreciate the Ambassador’s point of view. He is continually charged with the disagreeable task of trying to get some forward political movement out of the Portuguese Government, while still being responsible for maintaining good relations. Moreover, on each approach he runs into a stone wall. Admittedly the prospects for a significant change in Portuguese policies during Salazar’s lifetime do not appear very bright, at least at present. I might be able to agree with some aspects of the Ambassador’s proposed change of U.S. policies if we were ten years back. Now I think it is too late in the light of the decolonization process that has since taken place in the world, particularly in Africa, and in light of the Angolan rebellion. It is indeed a tragedy that Portugal did not undertake a vast reform program a decade ago. She might thereby have preempted the rebellion. However, a program of evolutionary economic, educational and social development of the territories, without concomitant political advance, and implemented over an undefined period of time into the future will not serve to solve the issue now. I do not believe that any aspect of the reforms to date has had a sufficient psychological impact in the territories to win over the loyalties of the indigenous populations to Portugal and thus deprive the nationalist movements of their “raison d’etre.” Nor do I think that future Portuguese implementation of the reforms will be able to do this—it is likely to be “too little, too late.” Whether we like it or not, the Angolan nationalist movement, despite its setbacks, cannot be disposed of and forgotten, and a similar rebellion seems likely to break out sooner or later in Mozambique. It is unrealistic to think that the U.S. could discourage African support for these movements, not to mention the adverse repercussions on our interests in Africa if we tried. Self-determination for the territories has become a popular issue in Africa, and irrespective of what may be their private reservations, most of the leaders have no choice but to espouse the cause. We could no more get the Congolese or Tanganyikans to curb the Angolan and Mozambique nationalists than we could have gotten the Tunisians or Moroccans to have curbed the Algerian FLN. Moreover, were the Africans not to support these movements, the latter would then become solely reliant on and thus dominated by the Bloc. Finally, in the theory that African pressures could conceivably be stopped, what would then be the inducement for the Portuguese to modify the status quo at all, even at a snail’s pace? It may be that our efforts with the Portuguese will be of no avail. If so, it will indeed be a tragedy, because the struggle will inevitably become more violent and racist with few if any chances of an eventual compromise and transitional solution and of a continued Portuguese presence in any form. The final result then could well be chaos. It is precisely in an attempt to prevent such an outcome that I think we have to persist, despite the obstacles and lack of progress to date, in trying to bring about a change in Portuguese policies. As to the tactics, I agree that Portuguese-African talks under present circumstances are not likely to be successful. But for the lack of any better tactic, they at least serve to establish a channel of communications that may some day have a use; they may constitute pressure on Portugal; they serve to educate the Africans as to just what they (and we) are up against, and they divert African focus on us to produce a settlement overnight. Secondly, regarding the Ambassador’s concern that we are not really clear as to what we expect from the Portuguese after they publicly accept self-determination, I think you spelled out to Salazar and Nogueira last summer the type of transitional program we had in mind. What could be sold to the Africans in general and to the nationalists in particular changes as the struggle goes on. I doubt, even with our support, that the Portuguese could now get a cease-fire and agreement to a settlement entailing more than 3–5 years of successive phases of increasing self-autonomy leading to the final decision of self-determination. Our tactic with the Africans including setting forth our aims of self-determination are designed not only to take into account domestic opinion, but are also in the way of a holding operation with the Africans. (CA-9360, 3 to which the Ambassador refers, carried out the decision of the NSC Standing Group.) 4 If the Africans, as well as a large part of the rest of the world, came to the conclusion that the U.S. had abandoned its historic principles of self-determination and turned its back on their aspirations in favor of a very long evolutionary process with an uncertain outcome, we would have abdicated our interests and influence in favor of the Soviets and Chicoms, and the Africans would conclude they had to rely on violence and Bloc support. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 ANG. Secret. Drafted by Looram on May 18. Sent through Harriman. A copy was sent to Jerome K. Holloway in EUR. 2 Not found. 3 Document 416 . 4 A record of the NSC Standing Group discussion of Portuguese Africa on February 18, 1964, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XII . 421. Memorandum for the Record 421. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 21, 1964. SUBJECT Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 21 May 1964 PRESENT Mr. Bundy, Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone Mr. Vinton Lawrence, Mr. Robert Meyers, and Mr. Kinloch Bull, Jr. were present for Item 1 [ name not declassified ] was present for Items 2 and 3 [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] 3. Angola The paper, “Covert Support for Non-Violent Activities of the Angolan Nationalist Movement,” 2 was approved with the following exception: Mr. Hughes stated that the Secretary did not go along with the proposal to allocate [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] GRAE members; it was not his understanding that the meeting summarized in the memorandum dated 5 May 1964 gave approval for subsidies to individual politicians. The Secretary asked that this aspect of the program be deferred for another week pending additional study. Mr. Bundy requested that Mr. Hughes make note of the fact that the other members were unanimous in their approval of the proposal in its entirety. [Here follows discussion of another subject.] Peter Jessup 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 122, May 28, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Jessup on May 22. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Vance, and McCone. 2 Not printed. The paper dated May 18 is a revised version of the March 6 proposal discussed at the Special Group meeting on March 12. (See Document 415 .) [ text not declassified ] (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 121, May 21, 1964) 422. Telegram From the Embassy in Tanganyika to the Department of State 422. Telegram From the Embassy in Tanganyika to the Department of State 1 Dar-es-Salaam, June 8, 1964, 7 p.m. 2317. 1. Frelimo President Mondlane saw DCM today and gave him advance word he planned hold press conference prior his departure abroad this week to reply to Ambassador Anderson’s alleged statements praising Portuguese administration in Mozambique. Mondlane said Anderson’s remarks, which Dar-es-Salaam press has not yet published, had been subject recent Frelimo Executive Meeting and described them as major set-back to his efforts maintain good image of US within Nationalist Movements Headquarters Dar-es-Salaam. In reply question, Mondlane said public reply to Ambassador Anderson’s press statements necessary. They had provided those who wish label US as arch-imperialist with gratuitous ammunition and if he let them go by unchallenged he would be regarded as US stooge. Mondlane preparing detailed rebuttal of Ambassador Anderson’s alleged observations which he intends release to press within next several days. 2. Minister Home Affairs Lusinde told Embassy Officers last night that, if reports Ambassador Anderson’s statements accurate, US position with African Nationalists would be seriously undermined. Lusinde said he had understood USG position vis-a-vis colonial territories was one of sympathetic support for ideal of self-government and inquired whether Anderson’s remarks indicated change in USG policy. We said there had been no change in this firmly established US policy. 3. Would appreciate texts press reports Ambassador Anderson’s observations. 2 Leonhart 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 MOZ. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Nairobi, Kampala, and Lisbon. 2 Telegram 1937 to Dar-es-Salaam, June 17, reported that the Department did not intend to respond to Mondlane’s statements to the press concerning the remarks attributed to Anderson on his visit to Angola and Mozambique. If questioned, it intended to state that the Ambassador’s comments had been in keeping with firmly established U.S. policy, which supported the rights of all the people of Portuguese Africa to self-determination, encouraged Portugal to play a constructive role in Angola and Mozambique, and was aimed at furthering a peaceful and equitable solution based on the principle of self-determination. (Ibid., POL 1 ANG–US) Anderson visited Angola February 29–March 10, and Mozambique March 10–19, 1964. 423. Special National Intelligence Estimate 423. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, July 1, 1964. SNIE 71–64 SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE AFRICAN NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE The Problem To estimate the prospects of the African nationalist movement in Angola and Mozambique over the next year or so. Conclusions A. The guerrilla activities of Angolan nationalists have been for the past two years confined by the Portuguese military to sporadic fighting in a restricted northern area. There is little evidence of active dissidence elsewhere in Angola. The Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE), in Leopoldville, is the political backing of the guerrillas. The GRAE is autocratically but inefficiently controlled by Holden Roberto; it is torn by internal dissension and tribal rivalries and disheartened by its lack of progress. Roberto will probably seek help, including arms, from the USSR and Communist China, and we foresee some increase in Communist influence in the next year or so. (Paras. 8, 11, 14, 16–17, 21) B. Roberto may be forced by others in the GRAE to share control and direction, but probably not for some months at least. The Angolan nationalist movement will be able to keep the rebellion alive at the present level if, as seems likely, it retains access to the Congo sanctuary, but we do not believe it will seriously challenge Portugal’s hold in Angola over the next year of so. (Paras. 18–20, 22–23) C. The principal nationalist movement in Mozambique is Mondlane’s Frelimo. The movement has not yet progressed to the point of open fighting, though a few raids and excursions in the north, based on Tanganyika, are likely during the next year or so. The Portuguese military and security services appear to have control of the situation and the Mozambique nationalist movement is more important in terms of African politics than as a physical threat. (Paras. 28–29, 35–37) D. Despite a few steps to liberalize their colonial policy, the Portuguese have not taken, and are not likely to take, any significant steps to meet the pressures brought on them to move towards self-determination or independence for their African territories. Portugal may be able to preserve its present control of Angola and Mozambique for a good many years. But, we believe that the growing political and military costs of maintaining control of the African provinces will almost certainly force Portugal eventually to accommodate to nationalist aspirations for self-determination and independence. 2 (Paras. 1–5, 41) [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on July 1. 2 The longer term Portuguese position will be discussed in an NIE on Portugal scheduled for August, 1964. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 27.2–64, “Prospects for Portugal,” was issued on August 5, 1964.] 424. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk 424. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 1, 1964. I had an extraordinarily rewarding experience yesterday. At the urging of one of my former colleagues (not now with the government), I invited Edouardo Mondlane to come to my house in the late afternoon. Wayne Fredericks was present. I found him an exceptionally well-balanced, dedicated, serious man, who has a deep sense of responsibility towards his fellow Mozambiquans. I gained quite a different impression of the movement as a result of my talk, and I am sure it would be well worth your giving him a half hour of your time. He will be seeing the Attorney General tomorrow. Wayne Fredericks can arrange for you to meet him at any time and place you request (of course, outside of the Department). 2 Averell 1 Source: Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 17 cl, Rusk, Dean, 1964. Personal & Confidential. Drafted by Harriman. 2 A note in Rusk’s handwriting in the margin of the source text reads: “I do not wish to meet him. DR.” 425. Memorandum for the Record 425. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, August 6, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting of 303 Committee on 6 August 1964 1. The Angola paper was set aside for the time being. 2 2. The [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] paper was set aside for the time being. 3 Note: The reason for this was that McCone stated that in view of the confusion in the Congo, it was probably good judgment to place the Roberto and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] matters on a low key and while we should take such actions as are necessary to “keep our hand in,” and to keep these characters from accepting help from Moscow and Peiping, and hence become their instruments, nevertheless this was not the time to develop the Congo and exacerbate the situation in Angola and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, 303 Committee Meetings, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on August 8. 2 Reference is to a CIA paper, “Covert Support for Selected Angolan Nationalist Leaders,” dated August 3, which requested authority to provide covert support to selected Angolan nationalist leaders [ text not declassified ]. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 7, August 6, 1964) 3 [ text not declassified ] 426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika 426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika 1 Washington, October 28, 1964, 5:17 p.m. 1157. For Fredericks and Ambassador. Re Embtel 826. 2 Mozambique Matters raised reftel pose difficult problems for USG in its efforts limit and hopefully eliminate intrusion Chicom/Soviet cold war presence Eastern and Southern Africa, as well as encourage stability and progress URTZ, see change in Portuguese African policy with acceptance self-determination, develop favorable relations with Africans who we believe ultimately will probably control territory with or without continuing political ties with Portugal. Principal objectives are to exclude Communist influence which as alien to African traditions as colonial rule and foster economic and political development of entire area. Problem not an easy one, as Nyerere presentation clearly indicates. Dept inclined believe best approach to take in responding increasingly complicated questions raised reftel is to indicate USG concern over situation, to express our determination explore any suitable and profitable course to encourage peaceful change, and to stress our desire receive suggestions on possible courses of action. Leave manner presentation to your discretion. We of course wish continue encourage Nyerere’s interest in exploring such situations with us. As he will appreciate, if we have any hope of influencing GOP, we must also preserve our position of independent advice both sides. We concerned lest fruitless go-around may discourage this free flow of ideas and opportunity influence Nyerere thinking. As occasion warrants, believe it useful for you to encourage Nyerere to realize that if he is going to allow nationalist training and safehaven in Tanganyika he has to be prepared accept consequences, as well. While we appreciate Nyerere’s assurances GURTZ not preparing military attack against Mozambique, and we have noted report (Zanzibar’s 359) 3 that PLA company, its weapons and advisers have been withdrawn from border area, GURTZ providing training and safehaven for Mozambican nationalists does create dangerous situation for GURTZ. Violence likely to harden Portuguese attitudes and could lead to retaliation of kind alluded to by Fonmin Nogueira in recent press conference (Lisbon 287). 4 These hardly in best interests African nationalists, URTZ, or prospects peaceful settlement. As Nyerere aware, USG has favored peaceful efforts to resolve problem Portuguese territories. Indicative of fact our stand goes beyond speech making are frank talks with GOP (which have greatly strained US-Portuguese relations), education assistance to Mozambican refugees, and our willingness provide relief to Portuguese African refugees. Seems to us limited utility of force as means to resolve matter demonstrated by present situation in Angola. There Portuguese military has succeeded bringing guerrilla warfare under control and this has served to undermine whole nationalist movement. USG remains committed work for self-determination Portuguese territories and peaceful change. This integral part basic policy toward Africa and stems from our own strong traditions. We continue to press Portugal on its African policies. We earlier raised matter economic assist ance to Portugal to ease peaceful transition in territories. This was rejected by GOP, but we believe this is sound, constructive proposal which we prepared to explore again with Portuguese whenever circumstances seem propitious. As one incentive maintain dialogue for future, you authorized indicate to Nyerere US desire support appropriate humanitarian assistance on refugee problem and relieve GURTZ some of unanticipated economic drain that country. Assume he would agree such assistance might best be handled in international context such as UNHCR and WFP. [Here follows discussion of the Congo.] Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOZ–TANZAN. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Jesse M. MacKnight and John P. Meagher of AFE, Curtis Strong of AF/CWG, and Officer in Charge of Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius Affairs George B. High on October 27; cleared by Director of the Office of Central African Affairs James L. O’Sullivan, McKillop, Ludwig Hauschner of AID’s Food for Peace Division, Deputy Director of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs Clement Sobotka, and Thomas W. McElhiney of AF/CWG; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Lisbon, and by pouch to Leopoldville, Lourenco Marques, and Luanda. 2 In telegram 826 from Dar-es-Salaam, October 21, Ambassador William Leonhart reported a discussion with Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere on the Mozambique problem. Nyerere said that, since the outbreak of fighting in Mozambique in late September, refugees had been streaming across the border and residents of the area were in a panic. Nyerere had ordered Tanganyika army units and one company of Zanzibar troops with Soviet advisers to the area, but he assured Leonhart that there would be no URTZ attacks across the border. He noted that the larger problem was that the Mozambican struggle to free the country would continue. Nyerere suggested that a NATO program of economic aid for Portugal might enable the Portuguese to acknowledge the principle of self-determination for their African colonies. (Ibid.) 3 Dated October 26. (Ibid., OS 12–12 TANZAN) 4 Dated October 22. (Ibid., POL 15/PORT) 427. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central African Affairs (O’Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 427. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central African Affairs (O’Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, November 2, 1964. SUBJECT Deterioration of the Angolan Liberation Movement Considerable thought has gone into Leopoldville tel 1491 (attached) 2 which gives the Country Team’s assessment of the mounting difficulties inside the Angolan liberation movement. The Country Team reports the GRAE complex as a whole seems to be slowly running down and Roberto himself is desperately short of funds. The Congo (Leo) Government has refused to cooperate with GRAE in permitting the importation of arms. The ALNA (the GRAE army) is increasingly ineffective, and has been racked by mutinies and deserted by many of the southerners. It is chronically short of food and ammunition, and largely cut off from its own forces inside Angola where nationalist activity has virtually ceased. The political groupings within the GRAE are at odds with one another, and dissension within each of these groups further undermines the political structure. While a number of the students who left the GRAE with Jonas Savimbi have become disillusioned with him and are turning back to the GRAE, the Embassy questions how significant this support will be over the short term. Savimbi’s new party is still a negligible fact except for weakening GRAE’s claim to represent all of Angola. Embassy Assessment . The Embassy believes it would be a mistake to hold Tshombe responsible for this decline since much of it predated his appointment as Premier. However, Tshombe’s accession has intensified GRAE problems. The Embassy believes most Congolese, including Tshombe, see no Angolan leaders strong enough to lead the country to early independence, and, in contrast, they believe the Portuguese are so strong and determined to hold on that they (the Congolese) are not willing to take many risks. The Embassy ascribes the present declining fortunes of GRAE to: 1. Fragmentation of the nationalist movement. 2. The paucity of materiel and ineffectiveness of political assistance—the reluctance or inability of African powers to contribute needed funds and equipment. 3. The lack of a “nation”-wide uprising in Angola, and the continuing tribal friction in Angola and within GRAE. In the face of this, the Country Team believes it is unlikely that Roberto will long be saved from the consequences of his failure to achieve any marked successes against the Portuguese or in organizing the GRAE. While the Embassy believes Roberto cannot be written off at this point, it reports that some of the most experienced observers in Leopoldville do not believe Roberto is the man to organize the GRAE to enable it to effectively carry on the liberation struggle. It believes the consequences of this decline in the GRAE could be very unhappy for the West. It foresees the most likely alternative leadership to Roberto as being the pro-Chinese Viriato da Cruz or others who can swing the support of the Chicoms or the Russians. With the Western role necessarily circumscribed by relations with Portugal, there will be increasing opportunities for the Communists to extend their influence over the Angolan nationalists, especially as the frustrations of the Angolan leaders grow owing to lack of military and political progress in their campaign. The Embassy comments that if in the meantime Portugal fails to train Angolans to run their own affairs, when independence comes the United States may wake up to find the only effective leadership at the very least is beholden to the Communist bloc. AFC Comment . The Country Team’s views and analysis are very close to our own. John Marcum, the closest American to Roberto, now questions Roberto’s leadership ability and potential. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG. Secret. Drafted by High. Also sent to Fredericks, Tasca, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Samuel Z. Westerfield. 2 Dated October 16, not printed. A copy is ibid., POL 12 THE CONGO. 428. Memorandum for the 303 Committee 428. Memorandum for the 303 Committee Washington, November 10, 1964. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 14, November 12, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text not declassified.] 429. Letter From the Consul General in Mozambique (Wright) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 429. Letter From the Consul General in Mozambique (Wright) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Lourenco Marques, December 14, 1964. My dear Governor Williams: I am enclosing a copy of my last will and testament on Mozambique 2 which I thought you might find of interest. In my opinion the moment of truth for the Portuguese is at hand. The time left for a negotiated settlement of relations with their African territories is fast running out. Dr. Eduardo Mondlane has had to embark on a program of violence which, although it is out of character, is essential if he expects to continue to lead the liberation movement. Recent events in the Congo and East Africa have in my opinion greatly eroded our position with a number of newly independent states. Even moderates like Nyerere and Kaunda find it difficult any longer to counsel moderation in the face of continued Portuguese intransigency. I shall be leaving Lourenco Marques within the next few days in order that I can report to the Inspection Corps January 4. It is my understanding that I am to spend the month of January being briefed on my new assignment. I would hope to have a chance during this period to chat with the people in AF on the situation in Mozambique. [Here follows brief discussion of personnel matters.] I am looking forward to seeing you early in the New Year. With kindest personal regards, Ken 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Papers of G. Mennen Williams, 1961–1966, Country Files, 1961–1966, Algeria-Zambia, Mozambique. Confidential; Official-Informal. 2 Not found. 430. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 430. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, January 8, 1965. SUBJECT Luncheon with Roswell Gilpatric, January 9—Summary of his Report and of Recent Developments in Portugal and its Territories For background use in your luncheon meeting with Mr. Gilpatric, I have summarized below: I. his report on his trip to Lisbon, Angola and Mozambique, August 26–September 15, 1964, and, II. recent developments in Portugal and its territories subsequent to his trip. I. Summary of Gilpatric Report. A. Mr. Gilpatric’s Over-all Impressions 1. Evidence of economic growth and social advancement in provinces. Remaining problems: economic imbalance (particularly in Mozambique), need for capital and job opportunities. 2. Improved status of natives—education, public health, housing, employment and mobility—under admittedly paternalistic system. 3. Recognition that some political change, i.e., more autonomy for provinces, is inevitable; no consensus on timing and no public acknowledgement for fear of generating pressure for deadline. 4. Determination for the present to maintain Portuguese presence—in some form—in provinces and sufficiency of Portuguese forces to insure same under foreseeable conditions. 5. Unlikelihood that Portugal will be swerved from present objectives, given support throughout all sectors of Portuguese society and with prospects of capital investment from South Africa, Germany and Belgium; also recent developments in Congo, Malawi, Southern Rhodesia, etc. B. Gilpatric’s Conclusions and Recommendations. 1. Continued Portuguese administration of overseas provinces is preferable to other immediate alternatives; economic and social progress is now being made consistent with steps needed to prepare for ultimate self-government, institutional forms for which now in formation; without Portugal’s presence there would be a dangerous vacuum inviting major conflict among neighboring powers, particularly over Mozambique. 2. U.S. interim acceptance of status quo south of Congo—Northern Rhodesia, Malawi, Tanzania—would not be inconsistent with support of nationalism in middle Africa. 3. U.S. should not underestimate capacity of Communists—Soviet and Chinese—for mischief in middle Africa through penetration and infiltration on both east and west. 4. Since U.S. cannot change present Portuguese policies, it should avoid, both in bilateral relationships and before U.N., exacerbating differences. Granting that neither side is likely to make major shift in near term—i.e., Portugal will not publicly recognize inevitability of more autonomy and ultimate self-government for provinces or any target dates for those eventualities, and U.S.-U.K. cannot retreat from declared positions supporting principle of self-determination—U.S. and Portugal should make interim accommodations by “mutual example” or reciprocation rather than by agreement: such as a. in case of Portugal , allowing U.S. to establish Loran-C sites and continued occupation of Azores bases, and b. in case of U.S., removing restrictions on purchase by Portugal of spare parts in U.S. and perhaps more U.S. military equipment (with stipulation against use in Africa), and abstaining from U.S. actions inimical to Portugal (assuming latter continues efforts to parley with African neighbors). II. Recent Developments in Portugal and its Territories. A. Non-MAP Aircraft Spare Parts: The United States presently sends Portugal no spare parts for aircraft operating in Portuguese Africa under our policy which prohibits sales of all Munitions List items intended for Portugal’s African territories. A change in the policy would be heavily attacked in the U.N. Mr. Gilpatric’s suggestion that the U.S. remove restrictions on purchase by Portugal of spare parts in U.S. has been under careful consideration, but the Department has not reached agreement on the desirability (or feasibility) of making a basic change in U.S. arms policy towards Portugal at this time. Meanwhile, pending such a decision, we have suspended action on the most recent request by a private U.S. supplier to sell some obsolescent F–84 aircraft engines to the Portuguese Air Force, i.e., we have not rejected the export license application. (The aircraft in question are approximately 22 F–84G jet fighter-bombers which the Portuguese originally received under MAP and which they purchased from us in 1961 for the token price of $6,000 each when the aircraft were declared excess to Portuguese NATO needs and for which the U.S. had no further need.) B. MAP F–86 Aircraft and Loran-C Negotiations: The Portuguese have informed our Embassy that the last of the eight F–86 aircraft of MAP origin were repatriated from Portuguese Guinea to Metropolitan Portugal December 24, 1964. With return evident, Ambassador Anderson had remarked to Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira on December 21 that, with the F–86 problem resolved, he hoped we could now begin negotiations for the location of Loran-C transmitter sites on Portuguese territory. The Foreign Minister said there were still other problems between the United States and Portugal, citing the Azores and “tantalite.” The Ambassador reminded the Foreign Minister that they had already agreed to separate the question of the Azores base question from the Loran-C negotiations. The question of suspected diversion of the strategic ore, tantalite to the Soviet Union, by Portuguese producers in Mozambique, in violation of COCOM rules, is one the Portuguese Government could resolve by imposing the necessary restrictions. Thus far, they have not been willing to take the necessary steps, although we have brought ample information to their attention. C. Portuguese Purchase of German F–86: The most serious problem affecting U.S.-Portuguese relations at present is the Portuguese attempt to purchase 65 F–86 aircraft from Germany which the Germans bought from Canadair, a Canadian firm, in 1956. These aircraft had been produced in Canada under the provisions of a 1949 licensing agreement between the U.S. and Canadian Air Force which prohibited their transfer without the concurrence of the U.S. Government. Our Embassy in Lisbon has reported that the Portuguese Air Force intends to use some of these aircraft in Portuguese Africa, notwithstanding the assurances they reportedly gave to the Germans that the aircraft would be used only for NATO purposes and on the European continent. The Canadians have requested that we join them in an attempt to dissuade the Germans from selling the aircraft. We declined, recommending to Canada that they, having sold the aircraft to Germany, might consider making a formal attempt to persuade the Germans from making the sale. Subsequently, we agreed that the Canadians could inform the Germans that the United States shared Canada’s concern and that, if asked the United States position, they could suggest that the German ask the U.S. government. Ambassador Anderson has stated that if the sale is blocked, the U.S. will almost certainly be blamed, Loran-C negotiations will probably be negated, and there is a chance that the Portuguese will give us an eviction notice from the Azores. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 60, NSAM File. Secret. The source text indicates that Ball saw this memorandum. 431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika 431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika 1 Washington, March 17, 1965, 8:27 p.m. 2670. Embtel 1953. 2 Please assure Mondlane that there is no change in US policy re seeing FRELIMO representatives. You may add that in this particular case Dept had no previous information re individuals in question, their bona fides, or especially whether they had Mondlane’s blessings. Also we normally prefer look to Mondlane himself for discussions on FRELIMO matters. Despite foregoing, in response to delegates’ request have talks with Dept transmitted through George Houser, American Committee on Africa, Dept proposed that if they desired a Departmental officer would go to New York in order meet with them informally. FYI: You are aware limitations on contacts with Portuguese African nationalists as set forth Dept. CA-14448, June 24, 1963. 3 End FYI. However they refused this suggestion according to Houser who said they wanted to be received in Dept. This negative reaction and insistence come to Dept seemed indicate some lack of interest in having talks. FYI: In fact it appeared that their purpose might be principally to embarrass Dept and also US-Portuguese relations. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 MOZ. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Looram on March 16; cleared by Appling, Fredericks, O’Sullivan, and MacKnight; and approved by Director of the Office of West African Affairs William C. Trimble. Repeated to USUN. 2 Telegram 1953 from Dar-es-Salaam, March 14, reported that Mondlane had informed the Embassy that the Department had declined to receive the FRELIMO delegation currently at the United Nations, and that he had asked the Embassy to confirm urgently if the report was correct and if it was now official U.S. policy not to meet FRELIMO representatives. (Ibid.) 3 Sent to Algiers, Conakry, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Elisabethville, Leopoldville, Rabat, Salisbury, and USUN. (Ibid., POL 17 US–AFR) 432. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 432. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, May 10, 1965. PROJECTED COURSE OF THE MOZAMBIQUE REBELLION On the surface, Mozambique appears to be the southern African area most vulnerable to well-organized guerrilla and terror campaigns. The local Portuguese population is clearly suffering from a state of anticipatory nerves. The Portuguese security services have proved to be inadequately prepared to cope with the intensified intelligence needs resulting from the outbreak of rebel attacks in northern Mozambique. The Portuguese military, while heavily reinforced, are experiencing the normal difficulties of pursuing an elusive enemy over terrain which is relatively more advantageous to rebel movement. In addition, Portuguese troops in Mozambique lack special counter-insurgency training, with the exception of a few experienced units transferred from Angola. Military tactics in Mozambique appear to have emphasized intense and indiscriminate retaliation against local populations at the expense of the loyalty and/or cooperation of hitherto apolitical Africans. The length of the borders, which are contiguous to states which, if not actively hostile, are at least providing sanctuary to rebel groups, itself presents a considerable surveillance problem which the Portuguese are not yet fully equipped to handle. Rebel infiltration from Tanzania and Malawi, therefore, has proved difficult to control. Rebel groups, however, have developed only a limited offensive capability, are deficient in well-trained officers and, to an even greater extent, have been unable to turn out well-disciplined and trained recruits to carry the burden of the action in Mozambique. FRELIMO, headquartered in Tanzania, is presently by far the most active group militarily. As far as we can determine, FRELIMO has 150–250 men of officer potential, trained in guerrilla tactics for 3–6 month periods in Algeria, the UAR, Communist China, or the USSR. (The number trained in Communist countries is relatively small.) Training of the bulk of recruits is carried on in 2 or 3 camps in Tanzania, under the direction of Mozambican, Tanzanian, and, we understand, Algerian instructors. FRELIMO leaders have admitted the difficulties of training in a matter of weeks raw recruits who lack even a rudimentary understanding of guerrilla tactics. Portuguese military sources have alleged that the rebels lack sure knowledge of the proper use of their weapons and that they frequently abandon their arms at the slightest sign of resistance on the part of the Portuguese. FRELIMO seems to command adequate arms supplies from the personnel it has sent into the field thus far. Portuguese military officers have indicated that the rebel groups active in northern Mozambique are equipped with modern weapons. FRELIMO public statements claim that the arms are being obtained from friendly African countries. While technically this may be true, it is probable that portions of Russian and, possibly, Chinese Communist arms shipments to Tanzania have been made available to the Mozambicans. The USSR backs FRELIMO in its public media, albeit with a certain amount of reserve. FRELIMO leaders are in frequent contact with Chinese Communist representatives in Dar and Peking. Of FRELIMO’s rivals, the once vociferous MANU is seldom heard from at present. A recent MANU adherent, Leo Milas—formerly “Defense Secretary” for FRELIMO—claims that MANU has attracted a number of disaffected FRELIMO militants. MANU was apparently responsible for a number of the more primitive guerrilla actions in October and November 1964, but it now seems to be no more than a small political exile organization temporarily based in Kenya. A second would-be rival, the UDENAMO faction led by Paul Gumane, lays no claim to guerrilla activity in Mozambique. Gumane engaged in abortive merger discussions with FRELIMO leaders in February 1965. Subsequently, UDEMANO’s Vice-President David Mabunda—once FRELIMO Secretary General—either resigned or was expelled from the organization, leaving it with little claim to cohesiveness or power. The latest entry in the nationalist ranks, a UDENAMO organization led by a Ghanaian protege and suspected Portuguese agent, H. Gwambe, claims to be directing insurgent activities from its headquarters in Lusaka, in coordination with FRELIMO. These claims lack confirmation and appear to be groundless. Rebel Prospects There appears to be little doubt that the rebel groups face a long, uphill struggle before they can seriously challenge the Portuguese military or political position in Mozambique. Considerable preparations, training, and planning are required to achieve this goal. At present, the best the rebels seem able to do is to frighten scattered and isolated European settlements in northern Mozambique, keep the military busy with patrolling duties, and inflict casualties at the rate of 1 or 2 every fortnight. Should there be a change of regime in Malawi, bringing to power a group more wholeheartedly committed to the “liberation” effort, the Portuguese would be required to devote more serious attention to the defense of Mozambique’s borders with Malawi and Tanzania. If this change were accompanied by the beginning of sabotage, strikes, and/or terrorism in Mozambique’s urban areas, the psychological effect would be profound and the retaliation by Portugal on the African population severe. While Tanzania appears fully committed to support of the Mozambique rebels, in practice it is constrained by fears of Portuguese retaliation across the border and distracted by a plethora of domestic problems. Zambia shows no signs of becoming directly involved in support of insurgency. Portugal’s Economic Status Metropolitan Portugal, presently entering its second year of a mild economic upturn, shows no signs of suffering from the financial burden of the hostilities in Portuguese Africa. We estimate that Portugal, given its present situation, could quite possibly support defense costs at twice the existing level without too much strain to the economy. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 MOZ. Secret; Noforn. Drafted on April 30 by Joanne Curtis of the Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The source text is an attachment to circular airgram CA-11930 to Lusaka, London, Salisbury, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, and Nairobi, May 10. 433. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 433. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, August 23, 1965, 6:37 p.m. CA-2167 SUBJECT Instructions to Lisbon to: (1) Reply to Foreign Minister’s Complaints of U.S. Policy; (2) Reaffirm U.S. Interest in Azores Base and Loran-C Negotiations; (3) Introduce New U.S. Proposal for a Peaceful Resolution of the Portuguese African Question With timing at your discretion, the Department would appreciate your seeking an early occasion to continue the discussion with Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira in the light of his meeting with the Secretary and the Under Secretary, June 18, 1965, and of your earlier conversations with him in Lisbon, January 11 and March 5, 1965. We see some advantage to your conveying our oral responses to his catalogue of complaints at the same time as you broach your plan for a peaceful resolution of the Portuguese African problem. Additionally, because the Foreign Minister presented his complaints in the context of a request for a clarification of U.S. policy and of our pending requests for a renewal of the Azores bases agreement and the location of Loran-C sites in Portugal, we would suggest you make reaffirmations of basic U.S. policy objectives of maintaining friendly and constructive relations with Portugal and of our interest in both the Azores bases and Loran-C. We recognize this presents you with a formidable agenda for one meeting but the placing of your plan for Africa in the context of a continuation of earlier meetings might provide a favorable context to introduce your new initiative. However, if in your judgment it would be preferable to separate the response to the complaints and the reaffirmation of our interests in the Azores and Loran-C from your African proposal, you are authorized to request separate meetings. Also, if you believe it desirable, in order to assure that the Prime Minister has an accurate account of our responses to the complaints presented by the Foreign Minister and of your proposal, you may make a similar oral presentation to him—tailoring it for the occasion. There follows an outline of the points we would like you to make in your presentation. [Here follow Sections I–III.] IV. Anderson Plan for Resolving the Portuguese African Question. A. In introducing your proposal for a peaceful solution of the Portuguese African question, you may wish to set the stage by informing the Foreign Minister that you have been instructed to pick up his conversation with the Secretary at the point where the Secretary asked why Portugal did not hoist a flag around which its friends could rally. You should reiterate the remarks of the Under Secretary, June 18, that the U.S. has a good impression of what Portugal is doing in Angola and Mozambique and that we do not believe the Portuguese have as much to be afraid of as the Minister suggested in his reluctance to endorse a public acceptance by Portugal of a fixed date for self-determination. You should also state, that before discussing the proposal, which the U.S. would like Portugal to consider, the Foreign Minister should recall Secretary’s June 18 reaffirmation that the U.S. would accept the results of a genuine plebiscite, notwithstanding a possible rejection by certain other states, and that we noted with great interest the Foreign Minister’s reply to the Secretary that the Portuguese agreed to the U.S. concept of self-determination. Moreover, we would like to reaffirm the Under Secretary’s observation that if there is a possibility of the Portuguese and the Africans working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement, the communists could be out and the security of the Portuguese African territories protected. Finally, it is the U.S. hope, as stated by the Secretary June 18, that Portugal would help itself in seeking a peaceful solution and a U.S. fear that if Portugal hews to the status quo, its position in Africa will steadily weaken. With these thoughts conveyed to the Foreign Minister, you are authorized to orally introduce your proposal as outlined in Embassy telegrams 652, April 13; 799, June 18; 38, July 23, 2 and Department telegrams 671, June 9, 3 and 19, July 19. 4 B. Summary of Anderson Plan—In interest of clarity, there is summarized below your plan as modified by above referenced telegrams. 1. Introduction It is proposed that the U.S. attempt to persuade the Portuguese Government to publicly accept the principle of self-determination for its African territories on the basis of a definite timetable. This action would be combined with a suspension of African nationalist anti-Portuguese activities during that period and carefully tailored political assurances and specified economic inducements being offered to the Portuguese Government in order to forestall the inevitable argument that any deadline would be bound to be telescoped drastically. The proposal is based on the estimate that, at the present juncture when the Portuguese are in a relatively strong position in both Angola and Mozambique, there is an opportunity for Portugal and the Africans to reach agreement for a peaceful resolution of their differences. Key elements of the solution would have to be a transition period leading to self-determination and a cessation of nationalist-inspired violence and subversion, as well as inspiration and support for such actions by the African governments concerned. A full range of choice would be left to the people, and would include maintenance of the present relationship with Portugal, autonomy within a Portuguese commonwealth, or full independence. Aim of the U.S. proposal would be a peaceful transition and creation of stable societies in the Portuguese African territories no matter what political decisions are made by the people. 2. Significant Points to Which the Portuguese would have to agree: a. Acceptance of a fixed date, for a broadly based plebiscite or referendum in Portugal’s African territories. A full range of choice would be given to all of the inhabitants, and would include maintenance of the present relationship with Portugal, autonomy within a Portuguese commonwealth, or full independence. Plebiscite would have to be free and open and observed by U.N. and O.A.U. representatives. In this initial approach, the U.S. would not propose a specific number of years when the plebiscite should take place but would state that an integral part of the plan would be a Portuguese announcement of a specific time period. In the last analysis, the U.S. would expect and prefer that this question be worked out between the Portuguese and the Africans. FYI. Reftels reflect Department’s views on the time period which the Africans would seek and what might be a possible compromise. End FYI. b. Accelerated interim Portuguese effort to improve the social, economic and political status of all of the people of the provinces. (See paragraph 4g, below, for possible assistance to Portugal by NATO allies.) c. Granting of increasingly free political activity in the territories in order to assure a meaningful plebiscite, as well as granting full amnesty and repatriation of all refugees. FYI: Problem of amnesty for nationalist leaders would probably be qualified as Portuguese may adamantly refuse to accept certain such individuals whom they regard as “terrorists.” While we recognize this qualification could be a major stumbling block, we would not want the exclusion of a few individuals to impede the over-all progress on this grave and important problem, affecting the millions of inhabitants of these provinces. End FYI. 3. Significant Points to Which Neighboring African States would have to agree: a. Refusal to permit the use of their national territory as a training or operating base for any anti-Portuguese forces during the interim period preceding the plebiscite. b. Active support by African governments concerned for a cessation of all nationalist-inspired violence and subversion. 4. Significant Points to which other Selected Nations, most especially the U.S. and other NATO partners would have to agree: a. U.S. and other NATO allies would encourage Africans to accept and would urge fulfillment of terms of such an agreement. b. Publicly come out in full support of the agreement once it is adopted. c. Publicly condemn any violation of terms should such occur subsequently from any quarter. We would make all parties concerned aware of our position on this point from the outset. d. U.S. would sympathetically consider Portuguese requests for support for any Portuguese complaint at the U.N. if we were satisfied that deliberate and organized violations had taken place. e. U.S. would be responsive to Portuguese requests for arms purchases if we were satisfied that deliberate and organized violations had taken place. FYI: Likewise, if Portugal violated terms of agreement, the U.S. would consider sympathetically African requests for support. End FYI. f. FYI: U.S. would guarantee to maintain maximum political pressure on Portugal so that rights of all concerned would be protected within the Portuguese multi-racial communities, without distinction or race, creed or color. End FYI. g. During transition period, the U.S. would itself provide and would encourage other NATO allies to provide, if Portugal so requests, economic and technical support for Portuguese efforts to develop its African territories. FYI: Question of participation and observation by U.N. and its specialized agencies in development programs and of possible invitation to OAU member states to provide economic and technical assistance are considered to be second-echelon problems to be worked out with Portugal only after broad agreement in principle had proven to be possible. End FYI. h. At such time as Portugal agrees to U.S. proposal, we would propose to make an initial approach to selected African leaders before Portugal would undertake such discussions. We would hope that Portuguese talks with African leaders would initiate a dialogue which might result in meaningful negotiations. Please confirm by telegram when you have met with the Foreign Minister as it is the Department’s intention to convey the substance of the foregoing to the Portuguese Ambassador following your meeting in Lisbon. 5 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL PORT–US. Secret. Drafted by Funseth and Robert H. Edwards of IO/UNP; cleared by George B. High of AFC, Fredericks, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Joseph J. Sisco, George L. Warren of G/PM, Harry A. Quinn of ARA/BR, AID Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Herman Kleine, Thomas Pape of E/ITED, and Col. Smyser, Lloyd, and Colonel Lardner of OASD/ISA; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Luanda and Lourenco Marques. 2 None printed. (Ibid., AID PORT) 3 Telegram 671 to Lisbon, June 9, stated that the present juncture offered an opportunity for Portugal and the Africans to reach agreement on a peaceful resolution of their differences, and noted that the key elements of such a solution would have to be a transition period leading to self-determination and cessation of nationalist-inspired violence and subversion. (Ibid., POL 10 PORT) 4 Not printed. (Ibid., AID PORT) 5 In telegram 93 from Lisbon, September 3, Anderson reported that he had conveyed the U.S. proposal to Foreign Minister Nogueira on September 2. The Foreign Minister responded that he could not comment immediately and officially upon a proposal of such scope, which would require personal consideration by Salazar and other members of the government. (Ibid., PORT–US) 434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika 434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika 1 Washington, September 2, 1965, 5:21 p.m. 575. Ref: Dar’s 394 to Dept. 2 Leo’s 386 to Dept. 3 Lisbon’s 88 to Dept. 4 Notal. While regrouping of moderate nationalist elements desirable, particularly to counter MPLA, believe on balance we should not get involved internal nationalist matters, especially personal differences, by acting as go-between. Also danger of leak. Similarly do not wish intervene in strictly African matter by appearing endorse Savimbi’s request with Kapwepwe. Therefore if reply to Savimbi required, you may wish suggest he contact Nigerians or other appropriate African Mission. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Looram and Officer in Charge of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea Affairs Lambert Heyniger; cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of Central African Affairs William E. Schaufele, Director of the Office of Central African Affairs L. Dean Brown, and Funseth; and approved by Deputy Director for Eastern African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy. Repeated to Leopoldville, Lusaka, and Lisbon. 2 Telegram 394 from Dar-es-Salaam, September 2, reported that Jonas Savimbi, ex-Foreign Minister of the GRAE, had asked for Embassy assistance in transmitting messages to Holden Roberto and Kapwepwe that he was ready to discuss reconciliation. (Ibid.) 3 Dated August 30. (Ibid., POL TUN–US) 4 Dated September 1. (Ibid., POL PORT–US) 435. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 435. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, October 25, 1965, 8:02 p.m. 968. USUN’s 1371. 2 For Ambassador Goldberg. SC—Portuguese Territories We have given careful consideration to question how best cope with SC exercise on Portuguese territories scheduled begin October 28. Following general guidance for use at your discretion. Will appreciate receiving your recommendations after you have made soundings with parties and key SC members. FYI. Ambassador Anderson continued effort in Lisbon on October 22 to ascertain whether any flexibility existed in Portuguese position on principle self-determination for African territories (Deptels 169 and 171 to Lisbon 3 and CA 2167 4 ). While discussion with Prime Minister Salazar (Lisbon’s 214) 5 disclosed no substantive change in Portuguese thinking, Salazar assured Ambassador GOP would continue give serious consideration US proposal (Anderson Plan). Anderson Plan as whole is known only to US and GOP and should not be surfaced in SC. Moreover, since self-determination has become sharp election campaign issue in Portugal with GOP asserting advocacy such self-determination by opponents “treasonous,” we not optimistic that Portuguese will be willing show some flexibility. End FYI. We believe SC meeting does offer opportunity for you follow up on recent discussions in Lisbon and Yost conversation with Slim with a view to promoting our objective of getting a practical dialogue started between the parties at an early date. Tunisian statement that self-determination could cover full range of future options encouraging, though we recognize that Africans following Accra Heads of State conference unlikely depart publicly from position stated November 1963 communique that only purpose resumption talks would be bring about necessary conditions for direct negotiations leading to accession to independence. We believe that SC res of December 11, 1963, 6 which included in preamble para “recalling GA resolution 1541 (XV) of December 15, 1960” 7 and went on in para 4 of operative section to reaffirm interpretation of self-determination contained GA res 1514 (XV) 8 should be used to advance objective of getting discussions underway. It might be possible, for example, for Council to reaffirm these provisions of December 11, 1963 res, thus making clear all options remain open in connection with exercise of self-determination and to call for talks on this basis. You will wish stress with parties, other SC members, and in any statement you make in SC wide range provided by previous SC res, which could meet both African and Portuguese views, and need for parties to get into dialogue on this basis. We expect Africans will probably press for total arms embargo against Portugal, condemnation of foreign economic interests in territories, appeal to Specialized Agencies to refuse assistance to Portugal, and trade embargo on specific products. Dept continues oppose proposals for sanctions as inappropriate under Charter except in situation falling within Chapter VII. Portuguese territories problem not within Chapter VII. Also do not favor withholding of assistance by Specialized Agencies, on same ground; there is added technical reason that agreements between SAs and UN contain restrictive clauses requiring prior consultation and in some cases assume Chapter VII situation as condition for acceptance SC recommendations. While we could not agree to total arms embargo in view our NATO commitments, assume you will wish reaffirm our continued adherence to partial arms embargo policy. Formulation along following lines is essence of policy: In order avoid actions of any kind which could further increase tensions in area, we have for number of years followed policy of providing no arms or military equipment to Portugal for use outside NATO defense area and we have also prohibited direct export of arms and military equipment to either side for use in Portuguese territories. In view fact SC meeting scheduled October 28, assume you will wish to see Portuguese and Africans promptly to see whether there is any hope of getting a dialogue going. 9 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Sisco and Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Patricia Byrne; cleared by Fredericks, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Stephen M. Schwebel, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Lisbon and to The Hague for the Embassy, Leddy, and Ambassador Anderson. 2 Dated October 15. (Ibid., SOC 14 S AFR/UN) 3 Both dated October 19. (Ibid., POL 10 PORT) 4 Document 433 . 5 In telegram 214 from Lisbon, October 23, Anderson reported that Salazar had argued that the Portuguese experience indicated that civilization and preparation for self-government of native peoples took much longer than the U.S. Government appeared to believe. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT) 6 For text of Resolution 5481, adopted by the U.N. Security Council on December 11, 1963, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963 , pp. 161–162. 7 For text of Resolution 1541, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 15, 1960, see ibid., 1960, pp. 116–118. 8 For text of Resolution 1514, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 14, 1960, see ibid., pp. 110–111. 9 Telegram 1592 from USUN, October 27, reported that Ambassador Goldberg met with Foreign Minister Nogueira at the United Nations. Goldberg expressed the U.S. hope that the Portuguese would renew the dialogue with the Africans and leave all options open in defining self-determination. Nogueira responded that he was prepared to renew discussions with the Africans, subject to instructions from Lisbon. He warned, however, that Portugal was small and weak, and that independence would mean the end of Portuguese and Western influence in Angola and Mozambique. Nogueira argued that no Portuguese Government could remain in power for 30 days if it accepted self-determination leading to the kind of results the Africans were seeking. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN) 436. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 436. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, November 3, 1965, 2:33 p.m. 1063. SC—Portuguese Territories. USUN’s 1677. 2 1. If your efforts bring about resumption dialogue between Portugal and African states are unsuccessful, you have discretion in forthcoming SC meeting either A) make US position clear in debate (without taking public lead but working privately to obtain sufficient abstentions to defeat Res if it contains wholly unacceptable elements), or B) to bring about introduction of resolution reaffirming those provisions of SC resolution of December 11, 1963 which make clear all options remain open in exercise self-determination and calling for renewal talks on that basis. 2. We would very much prefer see discussions resumed, but, if parties unwilling, we see value in making record of US efforts to gain acceptance of reasonable proposal, whether by statement in debate or by resolution as in B) above. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Byrne on November 2; cleared by Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs Edgar J. Beigel, EUR Regional Planning and United Nations Adviser Edward T. Lampson, Williams, Sisco, and Schwebel; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Lisbon and London. 2 Telegram 1677 from USUN, October 30, reported a conversation the previous day between Goldberg and the U.K. representative on the Security Council, Lord Caradon, on the forthcoming Security Council consideration of Portuguese Africa. (Ibid.) 437. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 437. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, November 20, 1965, 4:16 p.m. 1255. Ref: USUN’s 2114. 2 Portuguese Amb. Garin on instructions called on Asst. Secy Sisco November 19 to request US support in opposing res circulated by Ivory Coast, Malaysia and Jordan on Port. Territories (text contained reftel). Garin pointed out Preamb 4, operative paras. 1 and 8 particularly objectionable in Portuguese view, noted that res makes no mention Portuguese proposal for SC Commission of inquiry as to whether situation in territories constitutes threat to peace. Stated that no mention yet made in debate of arms from Warsaw Pact countries, specifically Czech, Russian and some Polish arms, being furnished nationalists. Sisco agreed res in present form not one US could support and suggested Portuguese Permrep New York approach LA SC members whose views not yet known. Reinforcing Goldberg’s talks with FonMin Nogueira in New York Sisco stated that in his view situation required Portugal open discussions with Africans on basis 1514 and 1541, including all three options. He suggested present So. Rhodesian crisis might present Portugal with fateful choice—concerted support of white settler minority would have grave implications whereas another policy might help Portuguese. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by John E. Reinertson of IO/UNP, cleared by Brown of IO/UNP, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Lisbon, London, and Salisbury. 2 Dated November 18. (Ibid.) 438. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 438. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 1 Washington, November 23, 1965. SUBJECT Security Council Vote on Portuguese Territories The Security Council today adopted a compromise resolution on the Portuguese territories by a vote of 7–0–4 (US, France, Netherlands, UK) (Tab A). 2 The resolution, which was sponsored by the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Tunisia, was greatly modified by corridor negotiations resulting in the adoption of two amendments introduced by Uruguay, both of which the United States supported. The first amendment, cutting back the language of operative paragraph one from Chapter VII to Chapter VI by inserting the phrase, “seriously disturbing” international peace and security, was adopted 10–0–1 (France). The second amendment replaced two paragraphs of the original draft that called on all States to impose an embargo to prevent the sale and shipment to Portugal of equipment and supplies for the manufacture of arms and ammunition. The amendment makes the embargo applicable only to such equipment as would be employed to produce arms for use in the territories. Ambassador Goldberg explained that the United States voted for the amendment because its provisions fall within the terms of our present policy toward Portugal. His statement is attached at Tab B. 3 Operative paragraph 8, which called for a total trade embargo of Portugal, was voted on separately in accordance with advance agreement of the co-sponsors and rejected by a vote of 4 (Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, USSR)-0–7. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Unclassified. Drafted by Reinertson. A notation on the source text indicates that Ball saw the memorandum. 2 Not printed. For text of Security Council Resolution 218 (1965), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 176–178. 3 Not printed. 439. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia 439. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia 1 Washington, July 27, 1966, 6:30 p.m. 16415. Angola-Zambian Border Incident. Lusaka 154. 2 1. Following is text reply to be delivered to GRZ Foreign Office: “The Embassy acknowledges receipt of the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated July 23 and has informed the Department of State of its contents. The Embassy has been instructed to reply that the United States Government is concerned over the statement of the Zambian Government that materiel with American markings was found at the site of a reported incident near the Zambian-Angolan border. It would be appreciated if the items referred to in the Foreign Office Note could be made available for examination. “For a number of years the USG has followed a policy of providing no arms or military equipment to Portugal for use in its African territories. In 1961 the USG sought and received assurance from the Government of Portugal that materiel provided by the US to help Portugal meet its NATO obligations would not be diverted for use in its African territories. The USG has also prohibited direct export of arms and military equipment to the territories themselves. It should be noted that large quantities of military items of American manufacture can be purchased commercially on the world market and are not under the control of the USG. Also, military equipment based on original American patterns is manufactured in a number of countries. If more detailed information could be supplied the Embassy on the incident, the USG would consider the action requested in the Note.” 2. You should also make oral presentation to appropriate FonOff official, or at your discretion to Kaunda, along following lines: a. Take up matter MPLA and other insurgent activities reported Lusaka 143 3 and previous, pointing out that as long as exile military activity against Angola based in Zambia continues, retaliatory attacks bound take place. In view sources your information on Angolan exile activities, you should bring up details at your discretion, particularly since it appears Kaunda may not be aware full extent involvement his Ministers and officials in exile activities. It should be noted we have information MPLA and other exiles also have American equipment furnished from sources over which USG has no control. You should emphasize availability US-manufactured military items, such as materiel under question, throughout world including Communist countries, such as USSR and Communist China as well as elsewhere, explaining these items date from World War II stocks and include important quantities arms seized by Chicoms in Korea. b. Make clear we concerned with possible misuse of American arms by the Portuguese in Africa but we of course are not directly involved in bilateral questions of possible border incursions which are direct concern of Portugal and Zambia. We prepared discuss with Portuguese use in Angola of US arms and equipment supplied thru MAP program or via commercial sales if clearly demonstrated such have been used in Zambian territory. c. Re alleged American markings two items, Dept notes discrepancy in Zambian note (Embtel 154) which states “of two (sic) spent shells that were found in destroyed village, two bear American markings” and text Kaunda press statement (Embtel 151), 4 in which he reportedly said, “although they have nothing to identify them with, would appear to be American-made.” Embassy, at its discretion, should seek clarification. From the description provided, it is impossible to identify the origin of the shells in question. If whole shell available, identification may be made but still would be difficult to trace. Even if item determined be of US origin there no way we could establish who had possession or how it had been obtained. FYI: If GRZ offers shells or fragments for inspection, USG would consider sending military officer (perhaps USDAO Blantyre) to Lusaka for this purpose. End FYI. 3. Dept invites Embassy’s evaluation info reported other channel from Lusaka 5 that incident took place inside Angolan territory. 4. Any public disclosure of foregoing suggested course of action could be counter-productive to any discussion we might subsequently have with Portuguese. Therefore, addressees should refrain from any public comment on US action and/or reaction to GRC statements re alleged incident. 5. For Lisbon : Embassy at its discretion may inform GOP that Zambian Govt delivered note to US Ambassador in Lusaka stating that an armed incursion into Zambian territory was made by Portuguese troops based in Angola. The note stated two spent shells were found in the village bearing American markings and requested that the USG bring this matter to the attention of GOP. Embassy may inform GOP that we are discussing question with GRZ in Lusaka and may be meeting with GOP on this matter when we have additional information. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ANG–ZAMBIA. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Southern Rhodesia Affairs Michael P. Hoyt and Heyniger; cleared by Warren, Steve Koumanelis of G/PM–G/MC, Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Thomas W. McElhiney, Dean of IO/UNP, Lardner of DOD/ISA, Funseth, Robert H. Human of L/AF, and Thomas Judd of EUR/BMI; and approved by Trimble. Also sent to Lisbon. Repeated to London, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Blantyre, Dar-es-Salaam, Addis Ababa, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and USUN. 2 In telegram 154 from Lusaka, July 24, Ambassador Robert Good transmitted the text of a letter to him from the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking the U.S. Government to take up with Portugal its use of NATO arms on the Angola-Zambia border. (Ibid.) 3 Dated July 23. (Ibid.) 4 Dated July 23. (Ibid.) 5 Not further identified. 440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, November 25, 1966, 9:02 p.m. 91612. Joint State-Defense. Subject: Angola-Zambia Border Incident. 1. Based on information provided by DAO Blantyre, we have established that bazooka rocket motor fragments examined by him in Lusaka come from two of 15,066 3.5 inch rocket motors, manufactured April, 1952 by Heckethorne Manufacturing and Supply Company, Littleton, Colorado. This batch of 15,066 motors, designated Number 2–449, 4–52, was sent to Cornhusker Ordnance Plant, Nebraska, May 1, 1962 for final assembly and placed into one of two complete round lots, designated: COP 4–225 (9,058 rounds)and COP 4–226 (6,008 rounds). It is not possible to determine from which of these two lots the Lusaka bazooka rocket motor fragments originated. 2. Of the total of 15,066 bazookas, it has been possible only to trace the disposition of 1,952 rounds of lot number COP 4–226, which were shipped to Portugal, December 6, 1963, under Military Assistance Sales for use in the NATO Defense Area. Prior to sale, oral assurance was given MAAG Lisbon officer by responsible Portuguese army official on May 2, 1963 and recorded in May 3 memorandum for record by MAAG officer that ammunition was required to meet needs of Portuguese Army NATO forces remaining in Europe. Sale was approved for implementation on August 22, 1963 by Military Sales Division, Mutual Security Office, Headquarters, U.S. Army Material Command. 3. While there is possibility that fragments in possession of Zambian authorities which they permitted us, at our initiative and request, to examine in Lusaka came from those sold to Portugal, we are unable to specifically to identify them as belonging to the group sold to Portugal in 1963. Moreover, as stated in State 16415, July 27, 2 large quantities of military items of American manufacture can be purchased commercially on world market and are not under control of USG. Conceivably, the Lusaka fragments could fall into this category. As was also noted in State 16415, there is no way we can conclusively establish who had possession of bazooka ammunition from which fragments came or how it had been obtained. 4. For Lisbon: Embassy should inform GOP that Zambian government delivered note to U.S. Ambassador in Lusaka July 23 stating that two spent shells bearing U.S. markings had been found in the Zambian village Chipatala, allegedly fired by Portuguese troops based in Angola. The note requested the USG to bring this matter to the attention of GOP. Before doing so, USG made investigation to determine: (a) if fragments came from U.S.-manufactured ammunition and (b) if of U.S. manufacture, explanation of their use in Africa. Embassy should draw upon info contained in Paras 1 through 2 above, to explain results of investigation and to note possibility that fragments may have come from group sold Portugal which they had provided assurances were required meet needs of Portuguese Army NATO forces remaining in Europe. Embassy should state that USG would appreciate Portuguese investigating disposition 1,952 rounds ammunition sold December, 1963. 5. For Lusaka: GRZ may be informed orally or by note at level appropriate to nature of original GRZ note (and informally to President Kuanda at Ambassador’s discretion) results DOD investigation of rocket shells and of USG approach to GOP as outlined above. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ANG–ZAMBIA. Confidential. Drafted by Funseth on October 31; cleared by McElhiney, Brown of UNP, Wyle of DOD/ISA, EUR Country Director for Spain and Portugal George W. Landau, Warren, and Koumanelis; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Blantyre, London, Lourenco Marques, Luanda, Lusaka, USUN, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and CINCEUR. 2 Document 439 . 3 In a letter of July 25 to the President of the U.N. Security Council, Zambia accused Portugal of using bazookas to shell houses in the village of Chipatala in Zambian territory and said that two of the spent shells found in the village had U.S. markings, thereby confirming the invalidity of the Portuguese claim that weapons supplied through NATO would never be used for aggressive purposes. (U.N. document S/7430) In a December 5 letter to the Security Council, Zambia again charged Portugal with committing acts of colonial aggression on Zambian territory. (U.N. document S/7612) In a December 12 letter to the Security Council, Portugal denied the Zambian charges, saying they were without foundation. (U.N. document S/7632) 441. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 441. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, November 29, 1966, 8:26 p.m. 93308. Subject: Portuguese Territories. Following is based on uncleared memcon, FYI only and subject to revision on review. 1. During courtesy call on Under Secretary, November 29, Portuguese Ambassador Garin said he understood draft resolution now being circulated in UNGA Fourth Committee, similar in substance to that adopted by Committee of 24 in Africa, 2 which would apply Chapter VII language to question Portuguese African provinces. 2. Although emphasizing that he was not speaking under instructions from GOP, Garin said he was confident that GOP assumed and hoped that if draft resolution was similar to earlier Committee of 24 resolution which U.S. had voted against, USG would continue same position and vote no in Fourth Committee. He said if GOP had thought there would be any change USG position, he was sure he would have been instructed to discuss matter urgently. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Funseth; cleared by Lampson, Deputy Director of the Office of U.N. Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen, Heyniger, and Landau; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to USUN, Luanda, and Lourenco Marques. 2 On June 22, the General Assembly’s 24-member Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted a resolution recommending that the Security Council make the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter obligatory against Portugal. 3 On December 5, the U.N. Fourth Committee approved the Afro-Asian draft resolution on the Portuguese territories by a vote of 76 to 12 (including the United States) with 24 abstentions. The resolution was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly as Resolution 2184 (XXI) on December 12 by a vote of 70 to 13 (including the United States) with 22 abstentions. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 132–134. 442. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 442. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1 Washington, March 6, 1967. ANGOLA [ Heading, 2-line table, and 3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] B. CIA Activities and Assets Clandestine activity with regard to Angola has consisted of periodic support for Holden Roberto, President of the Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE), also leader of the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA) and of the Angolan Peoples Union (UPA). CIA has had a relationship with Roberto since 1955. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] AF and CIA proposals for assistance to Roberto have been consistently opposed by EUR over the years. GRAE has had to compete for funds with the rival Bloc-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Angolan nationalists began guerrilla warfare in Angola in 1961. CIA first proposed major assistance to Roberto in March 1962, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. The matter was deferred, however, principally because of EUR opposition. For the same reason a proposal to furnish Roberto [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] to permit him to attend the UN in 1962 was dropped. However, in May 1963 the Department did approve [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] to assist a GRAE delegation to attend the pre-OAU meeting in Addis. [ 1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified ] A CIA proposal [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] to provide non-military support to Roberto and other selected nationalist leaders, supported by AF, was presented to the Special Group in March 1964. However, EUR strongly objected to what amounted to US-Soviet conspiracy against a NATO ally, (separate 303 proposals in May 1964 [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] were deferred meanwhile). This led to a meeting on May 4, 1964 attended by the Secretary, McNamara, Attorney General Kennedy, McCone, Mac Bundy and U. Alexis Johnson at which it was decided that a GRAE non-violent political program would be explored with Adoula, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Governor Williams and Wayne Fredericks saw these leaders in May 1964. As a result another AF-CIA proposal [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] for assistance to GRAE for this type of program was circulated but again dropped because of EUR opposition. Finally in July 1964 another proposal was submitted [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] for support of selected Angolan Nationalist leaders. This was approved by the Secretary over EUR objection but on August 6 the 303 Committee deferred action at the request of the CIA Director. Roberto has received assistance from Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Israel, Congo (L) and the AFL–CIO. 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Halvor O. Ekern of INR/DDC. The source text is an attachment to Document 223 . 443. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 443. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 8, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 444. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State 444. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State 1 Leopoldville, April 28, 1967, 1523Z. 6814. Subj: Angola. 1. Dilolo area: GRAE President Holden Roberto confided to me today that he had promised Mobutu to control GRAE forces Dilolo area closely and prevent attacks on Benguela Railroad (BRR). Said first two attacks on railroad were made by GRAE forces, but were unauthorized. However latest cutting of BRR done by Portuguese themselves at Mobutu’s request. He has sent effective leader (he chose Jorge Peterson) to take command of ATD base at Njolo (phonetic), twelve kilometers from Dilolo. Also has sent his youth leader, Mirando, with instructions to militants that no attacks be made against railroad on grounds that railroad is British property and is vital to Congolese and Zambian brothers. Holden said he had information indirectly from Portuguese intelligence sources that Portuguese were claiming ALN about to make attack on Odixeira de Sousa from Dilolo area (Luanda 550). 2 Portuguese saying that if this happens Portuguese army will make retaliatory attack across border. As result, Roberto has sent word to ALN base in Njolo that ALN forces should be most prudent in days to come. Roberto said he convinced he can control GRAE forces in Dilolo area. These forces becoming stronger and better disciplined all the time. (Note: We have little info on this subject.) He has sent Tunisian-trained political leaders into area to strengthen GRAE’s village organizations. However, he considering moving base and majority of refugees away from Dilolo area at GDRC request, even though this would be big job. Roberto fears that UNITA and particularly MPLA forces likely “continue” make trouble in this area and blame it on GRAE. Said he had given orders that if any MPLA partisans seen in area, they should be killed. 2. Relations with Savimbi: Roberto said, in answer my question, that in principle he ready agree reincorporate Savimbi and UNITA leaders into GRAE, but only as individuals and not as group. Claims Savimbi’s UNITA party is tribally oriented group, although he denied that his own party was tribally oriented, which is utter nonsense. As tribally oriented group, UNITA could not be brought back into GRAE. Likewise, said Pinnock and youth leaders strongly opposed to Savimbi and were fighting his return. Roberto also said he beginning have questions about Savimbi’s orientation. Congolese roving Amb Marcel Lengema had told him (Roberto) that he had seen Savimbi during recent Progressive Summit Conference in Cairo and had impression Savimbi receiving increasing support from UAR, Algeria and perhaps Soviets. 3. MPLA activities in Western Angola and Cabinda: Asked about reports of MPLA infiltration into Angola. Roberto said these infiltrations stopped by cooperation between GDRC and ALN forces. Number MPLA infiltrators arrested and Bas Congo area now clear. Five women, including “Communist agent” [garble], now in GRAE prison in Kinzuku. However, Kinshasa full of minor MPLA leaders, who being “supported” by such persons as Mabika Kalanda (head of ENDA) and even to some extent Minister of Interior Tshisekedi. (John Marcum Lincoln University and one time friend Roberto tells me Roberto admitted that in last two months GRAE has killed over 200 MPLA militants caught in Congo.) 4. Congo-Brazza: Interestingly enough, Roberto claims that Brazza govt beginning withdraw support from MPLA and beginning help FLEC, Cabinda Liberation Movement. GOCB has found from experience that MPLA has had no success in influencing Cabinda population, whereas FLEC is made up of local people. In fact, Roberto claims several members Brazza govt are members FLEC and some are either from or closely related to people from Cabinda. Roberto said aim of Brazza govt is to annex Cabinda as soon as possible and Roberto said this would lead to “war” between Angola and Congo-Brazza. Just yesterday, ALN forces sent with cooperation GDRC and ANC from base at Kinkuzu, south of river, to area west of Tshela in the Mayombe next to Cabinda border to disarm FLEC-controlled refugees. Arms had been coming to these people from GOCB. Operation easily accomplished and in fact not too many arms found. 5. GRAE relations with GDRC: Roberto said his relations with GDRC had never been better. Mobutu and Bomboko operating with him 100 percent, allowing small shipments of arms to pass as needed. In return, he (Roberto) has promised control Dilolo situation. Occasionally, MinInterior Tshisekedi, whom he characterized as pro-MPLA opportunist, gives trouble but we able to regulate this with Mobutu quickly. Relations with Bas Congo provincial authorities which previously very bad have improved. Governor Pauluku of Congo Central cooperating fully with ALN, unlike his anti-GRAE predecessor Moanda. However, Roberto uneasy about continued influence of Kamanda on Mobutu, which he considers to be more pervasive and important than we do for moment, will lead to less support for GRAE in time. He also fears arrival UAR, Algerian and Soviet missions and expects large part of their work to be devoted to work of MPLA in opposition to GRAE. 6. Dept repeat as desired. Blake 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. 2 Dated April 22. (Ibid.) 445. Letter From the Country Director for Central Africa, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius (Brown) to the Ambassador to the Congo (McBride) 445. Letter From the Country Director for Central Africa, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius (Brown) to the Ambassador to the Congo (McBride) 1 Washington, June 1, 1967. Dear Mr. Ambassador: The National Policy Paper on Portugal states inter alia that “we should with extreme discretion further develop and maintain unobtrusive but useful contacts with Portuguese African nationalist leaders in Africa.” This course of action should govern Embassy relationships with Holden Roberto. It would seem appropriate for these contacts to be centered in the office of the DCM and limited to the DCM and the Chief of the Political Section. It should also be the responsibility of the DCM to coordinate actions and contacts of other US Government agencies with Holden Roberto and other nationalist leaders in the Congo. 2 Sincerely yours, L. Dean Brown 3 1 Source: Department of State, AF/AFCM Files: Lot 70 D 65, Official-Informal Letters, 1967. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Brown on May 26, and cleared by Landau, McElhiney, and Palmer. 2 The source text is attached to a May 29 transmittal memorandum from Brown to Assistant Secretary Palmer that reads: “Ambassador McBride has asked me for guidance on contacts with Holden Roberto in the Congo. I have prepared the attached letter which I hope you will approve.” Palmer initialed his approval on the memorandum. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 446. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) 446. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, July 5, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 60, October 6, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 447. Memorandum for the Record 447. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 6, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 60, October 6, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 448. Airgram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State 448. Airgram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State 1 Kinshasa, October 26, 1967. A–190 SUBJECT Comments by GRAE President The reporting officer met with the President of the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile, Holden Roberto, on October 24, 1967 and discussed several topics. Roberto was well-disposed and forthcoming in conversation. African Refugee Conference Roberto is very skeptical that there will be any meaningful follow-through of OAU resolutions arising from the African Refugee Conference which concluded on October 18 at Addis Ababa. His doubts are based primarily on the belief that the African states are incapable of working together for the common good of Africa. He expressed a deep apprehension about the ideology promulgated by a number of African states and he does not wish to involve any of his refugees with these countries for fear of “brainwashing.” Of the proposed Placement Bureau he said in effect that he would have to see it to believe it. He would welcome assistance in education and placement but only from certain countries, e.g., Tunisia, Liberia, Ghana, Senegal. Organization of African Unity As mentioned above, Roberto does not think that the OAU can be a cohesive force in any of its undertakings. When asked about the OAU’s intention to abolish the GRAE’s special status within the organization, he said that it means very little since most members recognize MPLA’s ineffectiveness and thus must rally to GRAE’s cause. He added that the new OAU resolve to pressure the GRAE and the MPLA to work together toward the establishment of a common front will not be pursued. He said that all previous attempts to arrive at an entente between the two groups have been frustrated and there is no reason to believe that any future endeavors along this line would end differently. Education of Refugees Roberto stated that he is very satisfied with the American university-educated Angolan refugees to date. He singled out Alphonse Videira and Sebastien Pinto Ramos, both of whom work for him in the GRAE headquarters, and Pauline Touba, who has recently returned to New York as GRAE representative to the United Nations Committee of 24. He said that the results of an American education demonstrated by these three have strengthened his judgment on the advantages of a Western-orientated education over schooling obtained in Communist-bloc countries. This is based on his findings that the former is more general and therefore more practical for the needs of his people, and is not fraught with ideological propaganda as is the case with studies in the Communist-bloc countries. Contrary to his previous thinking, Roberto is not particularly interested in obtaining scholarships for GRAE members at Louvanium University in Kinshasa. The advantage of proximity is now outweighed by, according to Roberto, a bad climate at Louvanium for GRAE students. He said that this is due to the successful propaganda of a few MPLA students at the university, and particularly one student who is currently in the faculty of medicine. Many non-Angolan students (presumably largely Congolese) are allegedly pro-MPLA, which would make for an unhealthy atmosphere for GRAE students. Roberto also mentioned that the few Congolese Government-sponsored scholarships for Angolans have recently been cancelled, and cited the case of two students at the Institute of Fine Arts in Kinshasa who are unable to continue their schooling for lack of funds. He will send them to the UNHCR representative to seek assistance. Comment: This cut-off of GDRC funds is not likely to be political, but probably ties in with the present Congolese difficulties in the field of education. GRAE Manifesto Roberto stated that he was aware that his representative in Algiers had published a certain paper declaring GRAE solidarity with Afro-Americans, Latin Americans and Vietnamese in their revolutionary struggles. He assured the reporting officer that his man in Algiers had done this without his (Roberto’s) sanction, and upon learning of this, Roberto ordered the immediate destruction of all such tracts. He said that he fully appreciates the efforts being made by the American people and the American Government to reach an equitable solution to a difficult situation in the field of civil rights. Concerning “his declared intention to establish a socialist regime in Angola,” he said that he was not aware that his Algiers rep had published such a declaration, and moreover, Roberto doubted that he would have done so. He denied ever making such an announcement, and maintained that his views have not changed with regard to steering clear of all ideological considerations until after “Angola has won its independence,” and then it will be “for the people to decide which course to follow.” He said that his Algiers representative had apparently added on his own the passages cited in Lisbon’s 350 (notal) to the previously published “Platform of the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA).” Roberto has asked his New York representative to obtain a copy of the newspaper article on the “manifesto” in question so that he can further investigate the matter. Relations with Portugal The reporting officer queried Roberto about a story which appeared in the Koblenz, West German newspaper Rhenisher Merkur on October 6 and written by Wilhelm Schlosser. The author of the article stated that he had seen Roberto in Kinshasa and the latter had told him that the armed conflict with Portugal is to be abandoned in favor of a working-together with the Portuguese toward a peaceful solution. Roberto said that the contents of this article, which apparently appeared in no other newspaper, had been brought to his attention by the Tunisian Ambassador in Kinshasa and that he had denied that there had been any change in his policy. He added that he does not recall ever meeting a reporter by that name, and that he certainly has not seen him recently. Savimbi The reporting officer mentioned to Roberto that he had heard Jonas Savimbi, UNITA President might be on his way to Brazzaville to explore the possibility of a merger of his group with the MPLA. Roberto said that he had received a letter two weeks ago from his representative in Cairo which said that Savimbi was still in Cairo and that he did not appear to be getting ready to go anywhere. In any event, Roberto declared that he seriously doubts that Savimbi would be “foolish” enough to go to Brazzaville, because he is fully aware that he would be “killed” if he did so. He said that the MPLA do not trust Savimbi because the latter has demonstrated that he is nothing more than an opportunist. The MPLA leadership is allegedly angry with Savimbi for having thwarted previous overtures for a MPLA-UNITA merger. Their relations were further strained by the UNITA military clashes with the MPLA in eastern Angola. Roberto said that Savimbi has never replied to the former’s invitation to rejoin the GRAE which was given when the two met in Lusaka at the beginning of 1967. He said that he would still accept Savimbi back but that he would have to come back alone and without his organization as Savimbi seems to want. Comment: Savimbi apparently does not believe that his future would be very secure if he chose to return to Kinshasa without his adherents. Lusaka Office Roberto said that he was originally due to leave for Lusaka on October 24 to open a GRAE office in Lusaka. He has been forced to delay his departure until next week at the earliest because the person who is to accompany him is awaiting the arrival in Kinshasa of his wife from the United States. This man is Fnu Gonsalves (phon) who has been until recently the GRAE representative to the United Nations Committee of 24, and has now been designated as the GRAE representative in Lusaka. Mrs. Gonsalves is said to be an American citizen. According to Roberto, both President Kaunda and the Angola refugees in Zambia have been pressing him to open an office in Lusaka. He said that he has been purposely stalling because it would be useless to open there without the means to deliver supplies to the refugees. By supplies, he implied that he meant arms, and then went on to say that he is incapable of affecting deliveries to Zambia, which is not a problem for the MPLA who are able to transit Tanzania. Roberto cited the case of a quantity of weapons and ammunition which had been flown from Kinshasa to Lubumbashi several months ago with GDRC authorization, but which were impounded at Lubumbashi upon arrival. He said that he has been promised their release from one day to the next by the Lubumbashi authorities but to no avail. He now intends to take up the matter with President Mobutu before going to Lusaka. Relations with GDRC Roberto said that his relations with Mobutu continue to be cordial. He did admit that he is unable to see Mobutu as frequently as in the past but he attributes this to the busy schedule which has pre-occupied Mobutu for the past few months. Roberto is of the opinion that Mobutu’s remarks with regard to the GRAE during the recent OAU summit conference were nothing more than lip-service and that his basic policy toward the GRAE has not changed. He said that he is certain that Mobutu realizes that he (Roberto) would never agree to work with the MPLA, that Mobutu himself does not trust the MPLA, and that Mobutu does not wish to have the MPLA operating from his territory. McBride 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, PORT 30–2 ANG. Confidential. Drafted by Embassy Political Officer William J. Boudreau on October 25, and approved by Chief of the Political Section Herman J. Cohen. Repeated to Lisbon, Luanda, Lubumbashi, Lusaka, Paris, and USUN. 449. Memorandum for the Record 449. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, October 27, 1967. SUBJECT Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 27 October 1967 PRESENT Mr. Rostow, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Nitze, and Mr. Helms Admiral R.L. Taylor was present for all items. Mr. Rolfe Kingsley was present for Item 1. Mr. William Colby was present for Item 2. Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer, Ambassador William Leonhart, Mr. Archibald Roosevelt and [ name not declassified ] were present for Item 3. [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] [ 1 heading and 1 paragraph (4 lines) of source text not declassified ] b. Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer, 2nd, stated that his impression of Eduardo Mondlane was a favorable one—that the man was pro-West—endogenously in favor of peaceful change, and he had been almost led into insurgency by Portuguese unwillingness to recognize modern times. He further felt that Mondlane’s principal concerns were the secondary education and civil training of his Mozambique brethren. c. Former Ambassador to Tanzania William Leonhart reinforced these impressions. He had known Mondlane between 1962 and 1965 and held a good opinion of the man. He reiterated that Mondlane had always hoped for negotiations with the Portuguese and was concerned with bringing the Mozambicans into the 20th century at a time when the Salazar regime kept the province aloof from the political process. He added the independence movement would certainly continue, Mondlane was a force for moderation and that the other African states, so deeply committed to self-determination, would sense any U.S. pro-colonial posture. By continuing support to Frelimo, we would reindorse Mondlane’s pride and affection for the USA, buy some investment in stability for the movement, and keep a better watch on the direction of the struggle. [ 2 paragraphs (4 lines) of source text not declassified ] Peter Jessup 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 62, November 10, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Jessup on October 30. Copies were sent to Kohler, Nitze, and Helms. 450. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 450. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, November 22, 1967, 2250Z. 73567. Ref: Lisbon’s 624, 2 629, 3 Kinshasa 5780. 4 Subject: Press Allegations: US Aid to GRAE. 1. If you questioned by GOP or press concerning Radio Brazzaville allegations reported Lisbon 624, you may reply along following lines: 2. As reported Kinshasa’s 5780, Embassy Kinshasa never has had nor does it now have section dealing with Angolan problems or GRAE or any of its affiliates. Any Angolan refugees in Congo who appear at Embassy on legitimate business would be received. As reported, Kinshasa reftel, no one named Hitter or Bapb at Embassy and Embassy knows of no official American collaborating with Holden or any other Angolan liberation movement. 3. Holden has not asked USG for technical-military assistance and there are no American soldiers anywhere in Congo or elsewhere collaborating with any Angolan liberation movement. 4. Department has no way of knowing about approaches made by UPA to private organizations or individuals such as ICFTU, American Unions, or John Marcum. We know nothing of Charles Doki, Bernard Manert, or Carlos Kassel none of whom associated with USG. 5. Do not believe we should volunteer any comment on Radio allegations but foregoing plus info Kinshasa reftel should be of assistance in event you asked. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Roy T. Havercamp of AFCM; cleared by AFI Labor Adviser Alvin M. Rucker, Hadsel, Edward W. Holmes of AFSE, and Funseth; and approved by Country Director for Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Burundi, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius Affairs John A. McKesson. Repeated to Kinshasa, Luanda, and Lubumbashi. 2 Telegram 624 from Lisbon, November 16, quoted Lisbon press reports charging that the United States was providing aid to Roberto and that the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa had opened a new Angolan section directed by Americans who collaborated closely with Roberto. (Ibid.) 3 Dated November 20. (Ibid.) 4 Dated November 21. (Ibid.) 451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, February 8, 1968, 0140Z. 111904. Ref Lisbon 947, 2 Conakry 1129, Dakar 1822, 3 Kinshasa 7420. 4 For Ambassador. 1. Your reply to Fonmin’s latest complaint about alleged US official cooperation with anti-Portuguese guerrilla forces and about alleged US military activities in Congo was exactly correct—both in substance and in tone. 2. Based on concurrence of all appropriate USG agencies here as well as replies from field (which you have seen), you may reaffirm to Fonmin a categoric and outright denial of all allegations. 5 3. Specifically, you may inform him that you have been instructed to respond that there are: a. No official American citizens, civilian or military, are either in Senegal or Guinea working with anti-Portuguese forces, nor are there any official Americans associated with GRAE or any other Angolan group in Kinshasa or elsewhere in Congo; b. No arrangements have been made with GDRC re Kamina or Kitona; c. No American military personnel have arrived in Congo for purposes manning either base nor has USG any intentions man bases in future; d. Role of US military personnel in Congo is solely to provide advice and assistance to GDRC military forces. 4. We believe you should generally consider info provided by Kinshasa, Conakry and Dakar for your own background. You may, if asked or if you deem it advisable, however, in case of Senegal and Guinea state that US military personnel have provided advice to Senegalese and Guinean military on use of engineer equipment associated with road construction projects. In deciding whether to discuss now terminated US Army civic action project in Guinea, you may wish consider that we do not recall Portuguese ever raising this project so there remains possibility that they were not aware of its existence. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFRICA–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Arthur T. Tienken of AFCM on February 7; cleared by Colonel Kennedy in DOD/ISA, Landau, INR Deputy Director for Coordination William C. Trueheart, Officer in Charge of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea Affairs Ernest B. Dane, Peter Sebastian of AFNW, Country Director for Guinea, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal Affairs Bayard King; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Kinshasa, Conakry, and Dakar. 2 In telegram 947 from Lisbon, January 31, Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett described Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira’s questions involving allegations of U.S. official cooperation with anti-Portuguese guerrilla forces and military activities in the Congo and in Guinea and Senegal. (Ibid.) 3 Both dated February 2. (Ibid.) 4 Dated February 5. (Ibid.) 5 In telegram 995 from Lisbon, February 13, Bennett reported that he met with the Foreign Minister that day and, as instructed, provided a categoric denial of Nogueira’s allegations. (Ibid.) 452. Memorandum From William McAfee of the Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Quimby) 452. Memorandum From William McAfee of the Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Quimby) 1 Washington, July 16, 1968. SUBJECT Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 12 July 1968 The minutes of the 303 Committee meeting, 12 July 1968, contained the following item: [ Heading and 1 paragraph (13 lines) of source text not declassified ] 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, Mozambique, April 1967–1968. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to the source text is a CIA proposal for [ text not declassified ]; not printed. 453. Research Memorandum From the Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 453. Research Memorandum From the Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 9, 1968. RAF-17 SUBJECT Mozambique: The Status of the Rebellion The rebellion in Mozambique has intensified since a year ago, but the Portuguese and the rebels are still fighting each other to a standoff. Neither side appears able to break the stalemate in the near future, although unforeseen events could alter the present balance without much warning. We examine below recent developments in the conflict. Abstract The Rebellion Goes On. Despite Portuguese claims that the areas of rebel activity have been steadily reduced over the last few years, the rebels are now operating over more of Mozambique than at any time in the past. An incontrovertible fact is that the rebellion has persisted since the first outbreak in September 1964. The Portuguese in Mozambique have resigned themselves to living with insurgency for the indefinite future. The Tempo Rises. In the first six months of 1968 the rebels significantly increased the number and frequency of their attacks. The effects of their offensive have been reflected in the highest monthly Portuguese casualty rates of the war. But the recent activity may have brought the liberation groups to at least a temporary high water mark. There is evidence that FRELIMO forces in the north are having difficulty extending their campaign more than a moderate distance from their traditional strongholds. In the west COREMO has mounted a few low-level actions north of the Zambezi but will not pose a serious threat unless and until it overcomes a chronic shortage of arms and material. The military stalemate therefore continues. The Rebels Face Uncertainty. In addition to their difficulties inside Mozambique the liberation groups face an uncertain future as exiles. The strains of a protracted struggle may have adverse effects on their capacity to direct the struggle inside the country. Leadership challenges, tribal rivalries, recruitment problems, diminishing resources, and the limits of tolerance from their host countries—all present potential threats. The Portuguese are Determined … The Portuguese, too, have problems, but none so serious as to overcome their strong determination to retain Angola and Mozambique intact. Despite some evidence that the war effort has stimulated the economy, military expenditures in Mozambique, as well as those in Angola and Portuguese Guinea, are an undeniable strain on a relatively poor nation, but one so far willingly borne. A more intangible problem may result from one of the strategies adopted to counter the guerrillas—the practice of resettling the African population on the fringes of the war zone in defended villages (aldeamentos). The program has been ostensibly successful to date, but the Portuguese have had to abandon several of the more “exposed” aldeamentos and may be creating resentment among peasants who are forced to abandon their ancestral lands. On present evidence the Portuguese should be able to maintain the upper hand for some years to come. They were spurred by the outbreak of the African rebellions to invest far more heavily in economic infrastructure than before. Once begun, however, they are proceeding in the confidence that their investments will be returning dividends for a long time. They have the military capability to contain anything less than a major increase in the scale of the insurgency for as long as they are willing to pay the price. Furthermore, present evidence suggests that the liberation groups may be in for a period of increasing internal strife that could damage their ability to prosecute the struggle. … But So Are the Rebels. Their determination is equal to that of the Portuguese. Despite quarrels and inevitable military setbacks, there is no sign that the rebels are likely to abandon the struggle, or even that the Portuguese can capture their strongholds and reduce them to isolated bands of outlaws. When Will the Stalemate End? How and when there might be a fundamental change in this situation will probably depend on developments outside Mozambique. Several possible events could unbalance the equation: political change in Portugal that challenged the present government’s commitment to its African policies; an intensification of racial conflict in other areas of southern Africa; a Vietnam settlement favorable to the communists, that might bring about intensified communist aid to African liberation movements and renewed dedication to the idea of “revolutionary warfare;” or a collapse of Portuguese resistance in Portuguese Guinea, where the rebels have made far more substantial inroads than in Mozambique. Any one of these or other, now unforeseen, events might provide a sufficient stimulus to the rebels, or check to the Portuguese, to break the stalemate. Because of this high degree of uncertainty, we cannot estimate when the stalemate will be broken. It could continue for a considerable period of time. It could be ended much sooner. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 MOZ. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, October 8, 1968, 0007Z. 251405. Ref: Lisbon 2055. 2 1. USG policy remains firm that no military equipment, weapons or munitions from US stocks or American firms can be supplied to GOP without clear assurance that they will be used only in North Atlantic Treaty area. 2. Regarding non-munitions list commercial aircraft and vehicles (including trucks) with specifications practically identical to those in normal military use, USG will continue to review each such order on individual basis. When any order appears intended for counter-insurgency or is probably destined for police or armed forces use in African provinces, approval will presumably not be given. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–PORT. Secret. Drafted by S.G. Gebelt of EUR/SPP on October 4; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs George S. Springsteen, Landau, Eric Rehfeld of EUR/RPM, Gorman of DOD, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Thomas H.E. Quimby, Holmes, Licht of Commerce, IO/UNP Officer in Charge of Dependent Area Affairs Donald McHenry, Seymour S. Goodman of E/EWT, and John M. Bowie of G/PM–MC; and approved by Deputy Assist-ant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Philip J. Farley. 2 In telegram 2055 from Lisbon, October 2, Bennett reported that the Portuguese Government was interested in purchasing “sorely needed” transport aircraft, trucks and wreckers, helicopters, and surveillance aircraft. He requested advice as to whether any of the items would be licensed for export to Portugal for unrestricted use. (Ibid.) 455. Briefing Memorandum From the Country Director for Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Uganda (Feld) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) 455. Briefing Memorandum From the Country Director for Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Uganda (Feld) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) 1 Washington, October 28, 1968. SUBJECT U.S. Military Assistance to Portugal Following the charge by Tanzanian Ambassador Lukumbuzya on October 23 that the United States was assisting Portugal, you asked Alan Logan for information on the type and level of military assistance which we are in fact providing the Portuguese. According to available data, from FY 50–67, $317.6 million was authorized for Portugal as grant aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Annual programs were substantial in the 50s and early 60s. However, since FY 1965, it has been limited to about $1 million a year with actual expenditures projected through FY 1974. According to EUR, recent aid has consisted almost entirely of spare parts for equipment previously provided under MAP or purchased directly by Portugal, primarily aircraft and radar. In the past two years, it also included radar for two frigates supplied by other European countries under NATO arrangements. While Portugal can buy additional military equipment and materiel in the U.S., in view of the U.S. embargo on arms for Portuguese Africa, all such purchases must be reviewed and licensed and assurances provided by the GOP, in order to assure that it will be used only in the NATO Treaty area. The U.S. Government has even gone to the point of reviewing each order for export of dual purpose equipment, such as trucks and jeep-type vehicles, which could be used to increase Portugal’s transportation capacity in its African colonies unless Portugal assures that it will not be so utilized. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–PORT. Secret. Drafted by Alan Logan of AF/E. Copies were sent to Holmes, Havercamp, the Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, and the Embassy in Conakry. 456. Editorial Note 456. Editorial Note Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar underwent emergency brain surgery on September 6, 1968, and slipped into a coma on September 16. On September 26, President Americo de Deus Rodrigues Tomas announced that Salazar would not recover and appointed Marcello Caetano as his successor. Secretary Rusk visited Lisbon November 18–19 and met with Prime Minister Caetano and Foreign Minister Nogueira. Memoranda of conversation recording the Secretary’s discussions with Caetano and Nogueira are in Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Three of these memoranda are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XII . Rhodesia Rhodesia 457. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 26, 1964, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, October 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of U.K. Affairs in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Thomas M. Judd and approved in U and S on November 9. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s conference room. 458. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 20, 1964, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, November 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Chalfin on November on November 23, cleared by Mulcahy, and approved in U on November 25. 459. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia Washington, April 5, 1965, 5:42 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD–ZAMBIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Mulcahy on April 1–2; cleared by MacKnight, Judd, and Fredericks; and approved by Williams. Also sent to Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, Nairobi, and Salisbury. 460. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 29, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63–1/66. Secret. Copies were sent to Gordon Chase and Komer. 461. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia Washington, May 6, 1965, 6:36 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 RHOD. Secret; Priority. Drafted by William C. Kinsey of AFE, cleared by Judd, and approved by Williams. Repeated to London, USUN, and Lusaka. 462. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, May 10, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Kinsey, and cleared by Judd and Charles A. Schmitz of L/AF. Copies were sent to Komer, Harriman, L, IO, and EUR. 463. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 28, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. 464. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 14, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Rhodesia. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. 465. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, July 12, 1965, 10:15 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12. Confidential. 466. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 13, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. 467. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 20, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Mulcahy on September 21, and approved in S on September 25. The source text is marked “Section II of V.” 468. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, September 29, 1965, 8 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret. 469. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia Washington, September 29, 1965, 8:14 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Kinsey on September 28; cleared by Fredericks, Runyon, and Judd; and approved by Acting Secretary Ball. Also sent to London for Coote, and repeated to Lusaka and USUN. 470. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, September 29, 1965, 8:56 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, George S. Springsteen, Jr.; cleared by Mulcahy; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Salisbury. 471. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State Salisbury, October 2, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. No time of transmission appears on the source text, but the telegram was received at 9:12 a.m. and repeated to London, Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam, and USUN. Passed to the White House at 9:50 a.m. 472. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, October 2, 1965, 1:24 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Terrell Arnold of the Economic Bureau’s Temperate Products Division; cleared by USDA Foreign Agricultural Service Administrator Raymond Ioanes, Director of the Economic Bureau’s Office of International Commodities George R. Jacobs, Chief of the Economic Bureau’s Temperate Products Division Fred H. Sanderson, Springsteen, Mulcahy, and Judd; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Salisbury, Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam, and USUN. 473. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in New York Washington, October 2, 1965, 4:41 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by MacKnight; cleared by Joseph F. Starkey of EUR/BNA, Springsteen, John J. deMartino of S/S, and Haynes (in substance); and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to London, Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka, and Salisbury. 474. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, October 4, 1965, 7:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret. 475. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Acting Secretary of State Ball Washington, October 5, 1965, 3:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Britain III, 11/24/64–12/31/65. No classification marking. 476. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, October 5, 1965, 3:17 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret; Via Private Wire to London. No drafting information appears on the source text. 477. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, October 6, 1965, 9:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. No classification marking. 478. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, October 6, 1965, 11:15 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Kinsey, Springsteen, and Special Assistant to Ball Jacob Myerson; cleared by Fredericks, Leddy, and Komer; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Salisbury and USUN. 479. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, October 9, 1965, 1115Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to USUN and Salisbury. Passed to the White House. 480. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 11, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. VII, Memos and Miscellaneous. Confidential. Drafted by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, J. Harold Shullaw, and approved in S, U, and G on October 19. The source text is marked “Part 4 of 6.” The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 481. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, October 12, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret. 482. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, October 13, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on October 13. 483. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) Washington, October 19, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63–1/66. Secret. “To McGB.,” with a question mark, appears in Komer’s handwriting on the source text. 484. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, October 22, 1965, 12:36 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ball, cleared by Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Salisbury and USUN. 485. Message From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, October 29, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Memos and Miscellaneous, Vol. VII. Secret. This typed message, which was apparently prepared for transmission to the LBJ Ranch, was directed to Special Counsel to the President Jake Jacobsen for delivery to the President. 486. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia Washington, October 29, 1965, 12:44 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Fredericks and Read, and approved by Ball. Also sent to London and to USUN for Ambassador Goldberg. 487. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State Salisbury, November 1, 1965, 1200Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential. Repeated to London. 488. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, November 1, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Memos and Miscellaneous, Vol. VII. Secret. 489. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, November 9, 1965, 12:48 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Thomas W. McElhiney on November 8; cleared by Williams, Deputy Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs Francis T. Underhill, Judd, and Buffum; and approved by Ball. Sent to Accra, Blantyre, Canberra, Dar-es-Salaam, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Nairobi, Ottawa, Pretoria, Salisbury, Wellington, and USUN. Repeated to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE. 490. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 10, 1965, 7:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer. 491. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State Salisbury, November 11, 1965, 1220Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Unclassified; Flash. Received at 8:09 a.m. Repeated to London, Dar-es-Salaam, Pretoria, Lusaka, USUN, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USIA at 9:53 a.m. 492. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 11, 1965, 8:05 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McElhiney, cleared by Judd, and approved by McElhiney. Repeated to Salisbury, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE. 493. Notes of Telephone Conversation Washington, November 12, 1965, 9:34 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, Alpha Series, Rusk. No classification marking. The source text bears no indication of the drafter. 494. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Fowler and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, November 13, 1965, 11:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Britain III, 11/24/64–12/31/65. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials “jt.” 495. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, November 13, 1965, 2 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Britain III, 11/24/64–12/31/65. No classification marking. The source bears the typed initials “jt.” 496. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia Washington, November 13, 1965, 6:31 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Flash. Drafted by McElhiney, cleared by Williams, and approved by McElhiney. Repeated to London. 497. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 18, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63–1/66. Confidential. 498. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 27, 1965, 3:52 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 RHOD. Confidential. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Jonathan Dean on November 26; cleared by McElhiney, Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Peter H. Pfund of L/UNA, Director of the Office on Inter-African Affairs Fred L. Hadsel, and Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Mortimer D. Goldstein; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Salisbury, Lusaka, Pretoria, Lisbon, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE. 499. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State Salisbury, November 29, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the source text but the telegram was received at 11:20 a.m. Repeated to London, Lusaka, and Pretoria. Passed to the White House DOD, CIA, CINCLANT, CINCSTRIKE, and USIA at 11:58 a.m. 500. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 29, 1965, 8:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Herbert B. Thompson of S/S, cleared by Bromley Smith, and approved by Read. 501. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts Washington, December 3, 1965, 6:48 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Southern Rhodesian Affairs Michael P. Hoyt; cleared by Kinsey, McElhiney, William D. Rogers of U, Officer in Charge of Ethiopian Affairs Fred J. Galanto, and Goldstein; and approved by Williams. Sent to Nairobi, Kampala, Blantyre, Lusaka, Lagos, Addis Ababa, Dar-es-Salaam, Abidjan, and pouched to Salisbury and London. 502. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 6, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Rhodesia. Secret. 503. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 8, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63–1/66. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. 504. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, December 8, 1965, 7:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Exdis. Drafted at the White House and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. 505. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, December 9, 1965, 12:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, S. Rhodesia, 10/2/65–5/10/66. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials “vh.” 506. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, December 9, 1965, 7:39 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential. Drafted by Rogers and Daniel K. Mayers of U; cleared by Goldstein, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon, Mary J. Wichser of AID’s Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Williams, and Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs Murray J. Belman; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Lusaka and USUN. 507. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, December 11, 1965, 11:40 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, S. Rhodesia, 10/2/65–5/10/66. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials “jm.” 508. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, December 13, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, S. Rhodesia, 10/12/65–11/2/66. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials “jt.” 509. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 14, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 17. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. 510. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 15, 1965, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer. 511. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, December 16, 1965. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Rhodesia 091. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the source reads: “Sec Def has seen.” 512. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, December 16, 1965, 9:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, PM Wilson Visit, 2/17/65. Secret. 513. Memorandum of Conversations Washington, December 16–17, 1965. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2567, Visit of Prime Minister Wilson, December 15–19, 1965, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Prepared in the Department of State. 514. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, December 20, 1965, 4:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 515. Special Memorandum No. 30–65 Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency Washington, December 21, 1965. 516. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to President Johnson Washington, December 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. 517. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia Washington, December 22, 1965, 11:02 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 11–2 RHOD. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Mann and Mulcahy; cleared by Williams, Solomon, and McElhiney; and approved by Mann. Repeated to Dar-es-Salaam, Leopoldville, London, and Salisbury. 518. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) Washington, December 23, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, Chrono (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Confidential. 519. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia Washington, December 29, 1965, 8:36 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by McElhiney and Chalfin on December 23, cleared by Mann and Haynes, and approved by Williams. 520. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 30, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Memos. Confidential. Copies were sent to Komer and Saunders. 521. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 6, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer. 522. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 7, 1966, 4:56 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted, cleared, and approved by Bruce Lancaster of S/S. 523. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 7, 1966, 5:11 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted, cleared, and approved by Bruce Lancaster of S/S. 524. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, January 7, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. No classification marking. A covering note from Bundy to the President dated January 8, 11:30 a.m., reads: “Mr. President: Bob Komer has negotiated the attached rather short and straightforward message to Prime Minister Wilson (Tab A) in answer to his message of yesterday on Rhodesia. I think it meets the requirements. You may also want to look at a second message which came in yesterday (Tab B), but which does not require an additional answer. McG.B.” A handwritten notation indicates that the President’s message was sent at 3:30 on January 8, presumably through the “privacy channel” referred to in Document 523. 525. Note From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 8, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos. Secret. 526. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 11, 1966, 4:58 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by John P. Walsh of S/S, and approved by Mann. 527. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, January 13, 1966, 11:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret. “For Information Only” is handwritten at the top of the source text, which also bears a handwritten “L,” indicating that the President saw the memorandum. 528. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, January 14, 1966, 11:20 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates that the President saw the message. The message was sent to the President along with a January 14 memorandum from Komer noting that the key point was probably the agreement with Kaunda that Zambia should not cut its economic links with Rhodesia until at least mid-February; that airlift demands would “go way up” when that happened; and that Wilson was “quietly trying to position himself to use force for the final kill.” (Ibid.) 529. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) Washington, February 2, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, Chrono (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Confidential. 530. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, February 17, 1966, 4:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 3/66–12/68. Secret. 531. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, April 4, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 236, SIG/DOC: 3—4/14/66— Southern Rhodesia: Next Talks With the British. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text which is filed with a covering note of April 4 from Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) Harry H. Schwartz transmitting the paper for consideration at the fifth SIG meeting scheduled for April 5. The meeting was subsequently rescheduled and held on April 12. 532. Record of Agreements and Decisions at the Fifth Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Washington, April 12, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA: #5—May 3, 66—Discussion on France, NATO, and Rhodesia. Secret; Exdis. 533. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 18, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Confidential. 534. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, April 27, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. 535. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 16, 1966, 2 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stoessel, and approved by the White House on May 18. The meeting took place at the White House. 536. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, May 20, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 67 D 262, Presidential Correspondence, UK/Wilson to Pres. Secret; Nodis. 537. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Salazar Washington, June 10, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 5, 5/26/66–6/29/66. 538. Memorandum of Conversation London, June 10, 1966, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on June 20. The meeting took place at the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street in London. The source text is marked “Part III of III.” 539. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Secret. 540. Memorandum From Halvor O. Ekern of the Operations Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs (Shullaw) Washington, August 24, 1966. 541. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, September 8, 1966, 11:27 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Dean, cleared by Ball, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Salisbury, Capetown, and Lisbon. 542. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, September 24, 1966, 11:45 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Exdis. The text was received from the White House and approved by Read of S/S. Repeated to USUN. 543. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 14, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Goldstein, and approved in S on October 28. The source text is marked “Part 4 of 7.” 544. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, October 18, 1966, 6:59 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. Drafted at the White House and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. 545. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Manila Washington, October 20, 1966, 6:32 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. Repeated to London for the Ambassador. Secretary Rusk was in the Philippines October 21–27 for the Manila summit conference on Vietnam, October 24–25. 546. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 16, 1966, 5:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Goldstein, and approved in S on November 21. The source text is marked “Part 1 of 3.” The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. 547. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson Washington, November 29, 1966, 2030Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Top Secret and Strictly Personal; Nodis. The source text does not indicate how the telegram was sent. An attached note from Read to Palmer, Sisco, and Leddy states that, because of the unusual caveat at the beginning of the Prime Minister’s message, it was uncertain if the U.K. negotiators in Washington knew of the information. Read’s note cautioned the recipients not to indicate any knowledge of the message to the British. The text of the message was transmitted to the Embassy in London in telegram 93323, November 29. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD) 548. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 1, 1966, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential. Drafted by Holmes, cleared by Fredericks and Sisco, and approved in U on December 5. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. 549. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, December 4, 1966, 2:55 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted at the White House, and approved by Larry C. Williamson of S/S. Repeated to Pretoria. 550. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, December 4, 1966, 1:58 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by McElhiney, cleared by Read, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London and to the White House. 551. Intelligence Memorandum Washington, December 9, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only. A note on the source text states that the memorandum was produced solely by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Research and Reports and the Office of National Estimates. 552. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) Washington, December 13, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential. 553. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, January 23, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 250, Rhodesia-Nyasaland, Federation of. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but a covering memorandum from Executive Secretary Bromley Smith to the National Security Council refers to it as a State Department paper for consideration at the January 25 NSC meeting. 554. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 250, Rhodesia-Nyasaland, Federation of. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A copy is filed as an attachment to Document 553. 555. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 24, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Briefing Papers for NSC Meeting January 25, 1967. No classification marking. 556. Summary Notes of the 567th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, January 25, 1967, 12:10–12:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, Tab 49, 1/25/67, Southern Rhodesia. Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. 557. Memorandum of Conversation London, February 24, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in S/S on February 27. The source text is marked “Part III of III.” 558. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 6, 1967. 559. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, May 29, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Visit of PM Wilson, 6/2/67. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas A. Fain of AFSE; cleared by Leddy and Springsteen, Goldstein, Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Ruth S. Gold of E, McElhiney, and Trimble. 560. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, October 25, 1967. 561. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, November 10, 1967, 1010Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 RHOD. Secret; Noforn; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Country Director for Spain and Portugal George W. Landau, cleared by Leddy, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Salisbury, USUN, and London. 562. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 8, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. 563. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, May 9, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Cables, 2/66–12/68. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. A May 9 covering memorandum from Read to Rostow reads: “I enclose for your information a report on the UN Security Council’s current consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia. It supplements my memorandum of April 6 which indicated that the British Government, in an effort to deflect Afro-Asian proposals in the Security Council for the adoption of radical measures to deal with the Rhodesian problem, was trying to develop support for less far-reaching proposals of its own.” A copy of the Department’s earlier Status Report on Southern Rhodesia (dated April 7, not April 6) is ibid., Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. 564. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson Washington, May 28, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968. Confidential. 565. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (Quimby) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 10, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential. Sent through Under Secretary Katzenbach. Drafted by Fain and Thomas J. Carolan of IO/UNP on March 6–7, and cleared by Brown, Goldstein, and Edward W. Holmes of AFSE. 566. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, June 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 567. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Quimby) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, June 20, 1968. 568. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, October 8, 1968, 1736Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Read. 569. Telegram From the Embassy in Zambia to the Department of State Lusaka, October 19, 1968, 1017Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD–UK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to London, Pretoria, Salisbury, and USUN. 570. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Swaziland Washington, October 25, 1968, 2222Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Country Officer for Southern Rhodesia Robert L. Bruce and AFI Policy Reports Officer F. Virginia Montague; cleared by Holmes and Edward J. Alexander of AF; and approved by Director of the Office of Inter-African Affairs Fred L. Hadsel. 571. Telegram From the Department of State to All African Posts Washington, November 1, 1968, 2223Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD/UN. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Hadsel, cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen and Holmes, and approved by Hadsel. 572. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 15, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Secret. 573. Letter From President Johnson to President Kaunda Washington, November 25, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD–UK. No classification marking. 457. Memorandum of Conversation 457. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 26, 1964, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Southern Rhodesia PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary The Under Secretary William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard I. Phillips, P/ON Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA UK Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary The Lord Harlech, British Ambassador Sir Eric Roll, Economic Minister, British Embassy Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign Office Michael Stewart, British Minister Reginald M. Hadow, Head of Foreign Office News Department John N. Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary Kenneth Scott, First Secretary, British Embassy Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker said that the outgoing British Government on election day had informed the Southern Rhodesian Government that they would not send observers to the independence referendum. The present British Government had confirmed this action. Commonwealth Relations Secretary Bottomley had offered to have talks with Prime Minister Smith, if he could also see Sithole and Nkomo. Prime Minister Wilson had also asked Smith if he would come immediately to London for talks. Smith had refused, as expected, but did say he would come after the referendum. Mr. Gordon Walker went on to say that HMG would be issuing a statement on October 27 warning the Southern Rhodesians of the grave consequences resulting from a unilateral declaration of independence. HMG wanted to shock the Southern Rhodesians and stop them if it could. At the very least, HMG hoped to encourage resistance to Smith. Smith has until this afternoon to agree that there will be no unilateral declaration of independence. Otherwise, the statement will be issued. The Foreign Secretary said he hoped that the U.S. would be able to support HMG in this matter. Perhaps we could issue a statement showing our support. The Secretary replied that the U.S. did support HMG’s policy and that we would follow the British lead. 2 He inquired as to the solidity of the white group in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Gordon Walker replied that it was difficult to say. If the British did nothing, the police and the army would probably go along with Smith. With the statement that HMG was going to make, it was just possible that Smith would have a difficult time putting through unilateral independence. The Foreign Secretary noted that the statement was a little vague on trade. This was because HMG realized that the Southern Rhodesians could get help from South Africa and the British, in any case, did not wish to do anything about tobacco. Under Secretary Ball asked if HMG would have any problems with economic sanctions in view of the precedent this would create for South Africa. Mr. Gordon Walker replied that this would indeed cause problems. There was a general discussion of what type of representation the U.S. and the UK should maintain in Southern Rhodesia in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence. Secretary Rusk said that we were inclined to maintain a consulate there. Mr. Gordon Walker, for his part, thought that the British would probably not be able to keep any kind of representation but his preliminary reaction was that it would be a good idea for the U.S. to keep a consulate. It was agreed this matter would be discussed again later. 1 Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, October 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of U.K. Affairs in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Thomas M. Judd and approved in U and S on November 9. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s conference room. 2 On October 28, the United States issued a statement of support for Prime Minister Wilson’s October 27 message to Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith warning the Rhodesian Government of the serious consequences for all Rhodesians if it continued to follow its present course. For text of the U.S. statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , p. 823. 458. Memorandum of Conversation 458. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 20, 1964, 11 a.m. SUBJECT Effect on Zambia of a Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence PARTICIPANTS The Under Secretary Zambian Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe Zambian Ambassador J.H. Soko Edward Mulcahy, Acting Director, AFE Seymour Chalfin, OIC, Malawi, Rhodesian and Zambian Affairs After the usual greetings, Mr. Kapwepwe said that he had spent Monday and Tuesday in London. After talks between Prime Minister Wilson and Prime Minister Kaunda, the latter had decided to send Mr. Kapwepwe and Finance Minister Arthur Wina to the United States; however, Mr. Wina was unable to come because he had other important matters to take care of. Rhodesian Independence Threat The Foreign Minister explained that his principal mission on his present visit to Washington was to prepare the way for President Kaunda’s talks with the United States Government. 2 He had one urgent subject to discuss. This concerned Southern Rhodesia. The Zambians are convinced that Rhodesia is determined to go ahead with a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). HMG is totally against such a step, and the Zambians are assured that the British will do everything in their power to stop it either through negotiations or by economic boycott. The Rhodesian Government, Mr. Kapwepwe said, has started building detention camps for Europeans who are opposed to UDI. When these camps are ready, Rhodesian authorities will start arresting these Europeans and go on to imprison African nationalists as well. In all likelihood, the Rhodesian “round-up” will include European business men, Indians and even unsympathetic army officers. Unfortunately, HMG will probably not be able to stop a Rhodesian seizure of independence. Consequences for Zambia With this strong likelihood of UDI, continued Mr. Kapwepwe, the Zambians have begun to consider what is likely to be the consequences for their country. The Zambian Government firmly believes that the Rhodesian Government intends to: 1) close down electrical power from the Kariba Dam; 2) shut off the coal supply to Zambia’s copper mines; and 3) deprive Zambia of railroad facilities for the shipment of copper, Asked why Rhodesia should take such steps, Kapwepwe replied that it was probably due to Zambia’s political stand vis-a-vis Rhodesia. Continuing with his recitation on the consequences to Zambia of the above Rhodesian actions, Kapwepwe opined that they could probably get electricity from the Congo but they see no substitute sources for coal. If coal supplies are cut off, the copper mines will have to shut down. In this event, the Zambians fear that the world copper market will be completely upset. Copper prices would rise and force consumers to use aluminum instead. This would be a permanent and disastrous loss to the Zambian economy. There would also be, in the event of the closure of the copper mines, a complete discharge of labor which presently comes not only from Zambia but as well from Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Malawi and the Congo. Others who would suffer, Kapwepwe continued, are overseas investors in the copper industry and the World Bank to which Zambia would have to default on its loan payments arising from the Kariba Dam. Given the magnitude of this threat to Zambia’s life blood, said Kapwepwe, they are approaching the United States to see whether we can exert influence on the Rhodesians to desist from their course. The Zambians are also convinced that South Africa is encouraging Rhodesia to hurt Zambia. Possibly the United States can express its displeasure to South Africa on this score. British Undertake to Help Asked by Mr. Ball about the attitudes of the copper companies to the situation, Kapwepwe referred to conversations which Prime Minister Kaunda had had in London with Sir Ronald Prain, Chairman of the Board of Rhodesian Selection Trust. According to Kapwepwe, Sir Ronald feels that Rhodesia is determined to go ahead with UDI. He further added that HMG and the United States Government are not doing all they can to dissuade Rhodesia away from this path. Sir Ronald came up with a suggestion that the problem of coal supplies might be partially met by sending British coal through Tanzania. The route would be through Suez to Tanganyika and to the Lake Tanganyika port of Kigoma and across the lake to the Zambia port of Abercorn. However, this would require very complicated, expensive and time-consuming arrangements. Kapwepwe went on to say that the copper mines have tried to stock-pile as much Rhodesian coal as possible but the Rhodesians have been limiting supplies to one month’s requirement. This is a further sign of Rhodesia’s intentions. US Will Discuss with Kaunda Under Secretary Ball concluded the meeting by saying that all this is a most disturbing prospect. The United States would study the problems further in preparation for its discussions with President Kaunda. We would also consult with the British. We recognize that copper is a life and death matter for Zambia and would approach the situation sympathetically and look for ways to help out. It would be of great assistance, he added, if we could have some idea of the magnitude of coal, electricity and copper shipments. Mr. Ball asked whether Mr. Kapwepwe had any other topics to discuss. He replied that he was leaving everything else to President Kaunda who, he believes, would like to raise questions on the Congo and US technical assistance. Mr. Ball added that we are anxious to discuss the Congo problem. Note: During a brief absence of the Under Secretary, Mr. Mulcahy asked the Foreign Minister whether his government planned to give a haven to a Rhodesian nationalist government-in-exile should UDI occur. The Minister made it plain that the Zambian Government had no such intention; indeed, they had talked to the ZAPU leaders, Nyandoro, Chikerema, to convince them of the expense and folly of such a move. 1 Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, November 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Chalfin on November on November 23, cleared by Mulcahy, and approved in U on November 25. 2 Documentation on Kaunda’s visit, November 30–December 2, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Zambia, Kaunda Visit, 11/30–12/2/64. 459. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia 459. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia 1 Washington, April 5, 1965, 5:42 p.m. 1878. Ref: Lusaka tel 1232. Following summary of agreements reached at US–UK London talks re Rhodesia-Zambia relations and related Southern African issues 2 should be useful as background info in planning regional meeting suggested reftel: Rhodesia and Zambia Agreed there were great difficulties bringing about the kind of solution which we and Africans would like to see, and danger of UDI had to be guarded against at every turn. Following suggestions were made as possibly helpful lines of action: 1. President Kaunda (and perhaps other African leaders) should at right time be encouraged use his influence with African Nationalists in Rhodesia to respond favorably to any initiative which looked as though might hold out hope resolving constitutional deadlock. 2. Any information effort open to us should be made to try persuade Europeans in Rhodesia all was not chaos and communism in black north. Agreed two Governments should urgently concert together on further enquiries suggested into means protecting Zambia against consequences of UDI. Education in Southern Africa Various efforts to improve educational opportunities in Southern Africa noted: UN proposal for education of South Africans, US efforts with respect refugees from South Africa; Southwest Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese territories and UK efforts, assisted by US, in HCT’s. Agreed this was extremely important long-term effort and both governments should examine carefully what additional efforts could be made. UK agreed to see whether it could take even few refugee students from Portuguese territories. Both parties agreed give further consideration to UN project for education of Southern Africans, with thought this might be expanded to include Africans from other parts of Southern Africa. Attention also directed to efforts presently being made in HCT’s territories, with general understanding these continued be worthy sympathetic consideration. General Approach to Southern African Problems In view intractibility Rhodesian problem and line which we were bound take over sanctions on South Africa, agreed further thought should be given to following suggestions for broad approach to problems of Southern Africa, with view to reducing tensions, buying time for ourselves and meantime giving African governments positive indication our interest in their problems and their future: 1. Discussions might be opened with selected Governments in Eastern Africa on broad handling of whole situation south Zambesi on basis neither US nor UK prepared see Rhodesian problem settled by military force nor apply economic sanctions to South Africa, short of violation of ICJ decision; 2. Desirability introducing into talks of this kind prospect of developing transportation links between Zambia and Tanzania, as something positive on which we might help; 3. Drawing on broad spectrum of sources (perhaps consortium of private companies IBRD, ECA et al) we should explore possibility developing assistance package of such attractiveness it would encourage countries on borders of southern Africa turn from difficult political problem of southern Africa to strengthening of their own countries. Separate telegram follows with Department comments on other points raised reftel. Copies entire conclusions being pouched soonest. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD–ZAMBIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Mulcahy on April 1–2; cleared by MacKnight, Judd, and Fredericks; and approved by Williams. Also sent to Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, Nairobi, and Salisbury. 2 The U.S.-U.K. talks on Africa took place in London, March 22–24. The discussion of Southern Rhodesia and Zambia on March 23 is recorded in a memorandum of conversation ibid., POL UK-US. 460. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 460. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, April 29, 1965. McGB SUBJECT Southern Rhodesia—Possible Weekend Flap FYI. African member-nations of the UN have successfully requested a Security Council meeting on the Southern Rhodesian question which they consider a threat to international peace and security. The sessions will begin tomorrow (Friday) at 10:30 a.m. with Senegal, Algeria, as spokesmen for the Africans, and the Soviet Union taking up most of the time venting their spleen on the UK for its failure to take stronger action to grant political rights to Southern Rhodesia’s African majority. The Security Council will probably adjourn over the weekend and reconvene on Monday. The UK is expected to give its formal reply some time on Monday along the following lines: 1. UK will not grant independence for Rhodesia under conditions other than majority rule; 2. UK will resort to sanctions if the Southern Rhodesian Government unilaterally declares itself independent; and 3. UK will continue to negotiate with the Southern Rhodesians to find a way out of the current impasse. The US is expected to speak on Tuesday in general support of the UK. Our ace-in-the-hole is a public announcement of our policy of a total arms embargo (already in effect) on Southern Rhodesia. We’ll save this ace for the most propitious time. 2 The UK would prefer to defeat an unfavorable Security Council resolution by obtaining five abstentions. However, they are prepared to exercise the veto, if necessary. 3 I’ll follow closely. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63–1/66. Secret. Copies were sent to Gordon Chase and Komer. 2 In a June 15 speech on U.S. policy toward Rhodesia, Assistant Secretary Williams stated that the United States had supplied no military arms or equipment to Rhodesia since the dissolution of the Federation in December 1963. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents , 1965, pp. 677–679. 3 On May 6, the Security Council adopted Resolution 202 opposing a possible Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence by a vote of 7 to 0 with 4 abstentions (including the United States and the United Kingdom). For text, see ibid., pp. 675–676. Ambassador Stevenson explained that the U.S. delegation had abstained because the resolution called for action exclusively by the United Kingdom, and he stated that the United States would not recognize a unilateral declaration of independence. 461. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia 461. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia 1 Washington, May 6, 1965, 6:36 p.m. 754. Urtel 712 rptd 193 London, 47 USUN. 2 For McClelland from Williams. Offensive SRG Aide-Memoire 3 should be returned soonest through same channels as received. No written record your oral statement to be transmitted to avoid possibility publication later. Return of document coupled with US statement UNSC May 6 on non-recognition SRG in case UDI may have beneficial effect in correcting SRG illusions re USG policy toward SR and reaction to UDI. Drawing on Deptel 737, 4 last para Deptel 738 and five points comment your A–676, 5 you should stress USG shock, regret and irritation at inaccuracies, unrealistic tone, intemperate and undiplomatic phrasing and offensive lecturing tenor of document. US has repeatedly attempted to make SRG see error of ways, most recently in my talks with Bennett 6 on his departure and with Lord Graham 7 during visit Washington. Other Deptoffs have engaged in running dialogue with Towsey 8 and Congenoffs have expressed USG position clearly to SRG. You should state firmly USG hopes SRG will have no further illusions re USG policy toward SR in its desire for peaceful, mutually acceptable agreement on SR future between HMG and SRG. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 RHOD. Secret; Priority. Drafted by William C. Kinsey of AFE, cleared by Judd, and approved by Williams. Repeated to London, USUN, and Lusaka. 2 Dated April 30. (Ibid.) 3 Airgram A–676 from Salisbury, April 15, transmitted the April 14 aide-memoire, which formally protested the U.S. Government refusal to sell T–28 aircraft to Rhodesia. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 6941 to London, sent as telegram 737 to Salisbury, April 30, instructed Charge Philip Kaiser to meet with Rhodesia’s Minister in Washington, who was in London, and stress the seriousness with which the United States viewed current Rhodesian developments and the “particularly offensive” Rhodesian aide-memoire. (Ibid.) 5 Telegram 738 to Salisbury, April 30, and airgram A–676 from Salisbury, April 15. (Ibid.) 6 Rhodesian Minister in Washington, Oliver Bennett. 7 Rhodesian Minister of Agriculture, Lord Graham. 8 Rhodesian Counselor in Washington, Kenneth Towsey. 462. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 462. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, May 10, 1965. SUBJECT US Contingency Planning for Southern Rhodesian UDI You have requested Mr. Fredericks to provide you with information concerning our planning for contingencies arising from a possible unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in Southern Rhodesia. The following information summarizes our preparations to the present time. The basic US Contingency Paper for Southern Rhodesia of July 2, 1964 2 is still valid. The Contingency Paper (copy attached) is based on the assumption of a severance of constitutional relations with HMG by the Southern Rhodesian Government. This could occur by a UDI of the SRG or by usurpation of Crown authority through “enacting” independence by a two-thirds majority in the SR Parliament. The Legal Adviser’s Office has prepared an addendum to the SR Contingency Paper which has now completed Department clearance (copy attached). 3 The addendum discusses the legal status of the American Consulate General in Salisbury in the event of a UDI. It is based on our policies of supporting the UK in our relationships with a post-UDI Southern Rhodesia and of retaining an official US presence in SR for as long a time as feasible. Our Emergency and Evacuation Plan is current and no major problems are foreseen in evacuating the 1825 American citizens and their fireside aliens resident in SR at the end of March 1965. The country is divided into seven areas; each area is the responsibility of a “key man.” Seven telephone calls could alert the key men who in turn would alert US citizens in their areas. In addition, most missionary groups maintain radio contact with their outposts. The US position in case of a severance of constitutional relations between HMG and SRG would be largely dependent on the extent to which HMG and the Commonwealth would go in imposing punitive action on Southern Rhodesia. US resources available for use in case of UDI are limited, but our national interest dictates support for HMG and the Commonwealth action. We are now engaged in informal consultation with HMG and the Government of Zambia on a possible contingency operation to save Zambia, which is dependent on its copper exports, from economic collapse in case normal transportation, electricity and coal from SR are cut off for any reason following a UDI. The current US planning position in case of a UDI is based on support for HMG and Commonwealth punitive actions which were most recently threatened by UK Prime Minister Wilson on April 29. These would be of an economic and financial nature primarily. Punitive military action by HMG has been eliminated from HMG planning, at least for the present. Recognition of any minority SRG by the US soon after a UDI would be politically impossible but we would attempt to maintain a skeleton staff at our Consulate General as a symbol to SR Africans of US concern for them. We would cooperate with Commonwealth and African nations working toward a solution of the SR problem. While our traditional policy does not favor recognition of Governments-in-Exile, we would maintain friendly contact with major SR exile organizations. We would support the UK in its appeal to the UN Security Council immediately upon the severance of constitutional relations between HMG and SRG and would support UK endeavors to mobilize UN and world support for economic and financial action against the rebel colony. HMG has hinted guardedly that it might not oppose the entry into SR of an international military force under certain conditions and guarantees. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Kinsey, and cleared by Judd and Charles A. Schmitz of L/AF. Copies were sent to Komer, Harriman, L, IO, and EUR. 2 A copy of the Southern Rhodesia Contingency Paper of July 2, 1964, is ibid. 3 Not printed. 463. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 463. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 28, 1965. Mac— FYI, there’s a big flap over proposed Tanzania-Zambia railroad , designed to give Zambia an alternate outlet to sea for its copper if S. Rhodesia goes sour. The IB turned down this $400 million boondoggle as economically infeasible and AID feels the same way. But now Kaunda of Zambia sent word to Harriman and Williams at Addis Conference that Chou En-lai (due in Tanzania 3 June) was going to offer to build it. Kaunda pled for a Western pre-emptive offer, and all our Africanists sent in a fervent plea to keep Chicoms out of heart of Africa. Rusk and Ball thought this nonsense and signed [so did] LBJ on Tuesday. But Averell and AF are unwilling to take “no” for an answer, and former is in London trying to get UK excited. So we’ll probably have a second round on this one. I’m staying loose for now, but doubt that one Chicom railroad means curtains for us in southern Africa. 2 RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. 2 A notation in Bundy’s handwriting in the margin of the source text reads: “OK—keep an eye on it.” 464. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 464. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 14, 1965. McGB SUBJECT “Strong” Speech by “Soapy” Williams on Southern Rhodesia “Soapy” Williams will deliver a speech on Southern Rhodesia tomorrow in Chicago before the Chicago Chapter of the Federal Bar Association. 2 What distinguishes this speech from other public statements by American officials on the same subject is “Soapy’s” announcement (cleared by the Department) that the USG has ceased supplying any arms to the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The announcement of the cessation of arms shipments is in accord with your recommendation of about a month ago. “Soapy” will also state that the USG will follow the UKG lead in responding to a UDI. These statements are in the process of being cleared with the UK Embassy in accordance with our established policy of coordinating our actions with them. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Rhodesia. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. 2 For text of Assistant Secretary Williams’ speech, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 677–679. 465. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 465. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 12, 1965, 10:15 a.m. Tanzania-Zambia Railroad . This is to bring you up to date on a looming problem. We now hear that the Chicoms did make an offer to Nyerere of Tanzania to (a) survey the Tanzania-Zambia rail route, and (b) possibly build the Tanzanian segment. Chicom “surveyors” reportedly will soon arrive in Tanzania for this purpose. President Kaunda of Zambia was apparently unaware of how deeply Nyerere had become involved with the Chicoms. The British are sore at Nyerere for having brought in the Chicoms while a private railroad survey offer by a British firm is still under consideration. The British are ready to finance half its cost, and a Zambian mission is currently in Tanzania in an attempt to formalize arrangements. Some experts think the likely cost of a railroad has been grossly inflated, but we still think a road would be cheaper and better. So we’ve offered a parallel highway study by a US firm. Kaunda seems interested, but Nyerere’s determination to construct a rail link for political reasons makes us dubious that he’ll accept. At any rate we’ve probably bought some time. This whole question arises primarily because of landlocked Zambia’s fear of having its main copper export routes cut off following a possible unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia and a break in its relations with Zambia. To avoid dire effects on the Zambian economy, we and the UK are developing contingency plans. But an alternate rail route via Tanzania may not be the best solution: (a) it could take ten years or more to complete, by which time the Rhodesian threat might be long past and the railroad a multi-million dollar “white elephant,” and (b) the present mutual interdependence of Zambia and Southern Rhodesia through common ownership of the existing rail route is precisely what discourages each from taking precipitous vindictive action against the other. Also the Chicoms may lack the financial resources for a mammoth railroad construction effort. Although Nyerere says the Chicoms have made a firm offer to survey, he says in the same breath that their agreement to construct is only a “possibility.” But this whole problem bears close watching, since a major Chicom bridgehead in East Africa could be highly painful. R.W. Komer Ulric Haynes, Jr. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12. Confidential. 466. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 466. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, September 13, 1965. McGB SUBJECT Possible Speeding up of Southern Rhodesian UDI European sentiment in Southern Rhodesia is heating up to press Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front (RF) government to make an immediate unilateral declaration of independence. Lack of progress during the past six months dialogue between Salisbury and London has driven both Rhodesians and British to the point of mutual exasperation. With the principals in this state, anything can happen. Indeed, there are indications that the Rhodesians are preparing an imminent UDI: (a) appointment (opposed by the UK) of an autonomous Rhodesian “diplomatic representative” to Portugal; (b) the impatience for UDI shown by right-wingers at the late August RF Party Congress against which most observers agree Smith cannot hold out beyond the end of the year; (c) recent Rhodesian proposals to Zambia that they negotiate a mutually agreeable formula for the division of the unified Zambia-Rhodesian Railroad system; [ 2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] (e) PM Smith’s desire to meet with PM Wilson in London. On a recent African tour, Bottomley was disturbed to find deep concern among all African Commonwealth members over the UK’s failure to solve the Rhodesian crisis. So great was the concern that UK officials fear the Commonwealth itself could be threatened if the UK backed off from its position of independence for Rhodesia only under a Constitution granting majority rule with strict guarantees of minority rights. The situation is further complicated by the split of Rhodesia’s African nationalists into two equally ineffective groups: the Zimbabwe African Political Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Event he OAU’s African Liberation Committee has thrown up its hands in disgust over ZAPU and ZANU refusal to unite and evolve an action program. In short, neither group offers the material out of which a majority African government could be fashioned. The US has little leverage in this situation, but there are great risks to us that a sudden deterioration in the Rhodesian situation could trigger similar deterioration in other potential trouble spots in Southern Africa: i.e., Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, South West Africa, Zambia and Malawi. The US has already (June 1964) suspended its modest AID proj-ects in Southern Rhodesia. Soapy Williams has publicly announced (June 1965) that we have ceased supplying any arms. In the UN we have consistently supported the British position of (a) no independence without majority rule; (b) economic sanctions in the event of UDI; and (c) continued UK-Rhodesian negotiations. We had hoped to deter UDI and preserve the admittedly shaky status quo in order to buy time to work out an accommodation agreeable to both parties. So far we have not succeeded. However, with Rhodesia now on the brink of UDI, Komer and I feel that a more aggressive deterrent effort is called for. Therefore, we plan to suggest that the US: 1. Touch base again with the UK as to current seriousness of the situation in Southern Rhodesia; 2. Decide whether the US should make a unilateral approach to the Rhodesians telling them that in the event of UDI we will fully support the UK and that we suspect the UN will do the same; 3. Perhaps send Harriman on a trouble-shooting trip to Salisbury to deliver the above message if we decide to approach the Rhodesians unilaterally. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. 467. Memorandum of Conversation 467. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 20, 1965. SUBJECT Southern Rhodesian UDI and Ramifications PARTICIPANTS The Honorable, Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations Sir Savile Garner, Permanent Under Secretary, CRO Mr. Michael Stewart, Minister, British Embassy Mr. Angus Walker, Second Secretary, British Embassy The Secretary J. Wayne Fredericks, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy, Deputy Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs The Secretary told the Minister of State that he would like to discuss the Southern Rhodesian problem and its impact on the UK and the US. Mr. Hughes summarized the most recent developments for the Secretary. Last February Smith was clearly ready to make concessions; today “he is the captive of the extremists of his party,” he said. He is a hard man to deal with, not very intelligent but very shrewd. During the talks that had gone on regularly for several months with Smith and during his own visit to Salisbury in July, HMG had stuck to insisting upon its three principles: (1) assurance that the safeguards embodied in the “entrenched clauses” of the Rhodesian 1961 constitution would be preserved, (2) guarantees for African political and social advancement and (3) removal of all racial discrimination (including specific repeal of the Land Apportionment Act). For some time Smith seemed to be reasonable and to be prepared to make concessions himself. Now things had changed for the worse. The Minister of State said that HMG was “anxious to avoid a unilateral declaration of independence.” But the present situation was viewed as most serious by the UK because of its probable impact on the Commonwealth and its potential adverse effect on the already precarious UK balance of payments picture. The tolerable relationship had worsened recently when Smith took to the offensive with the Reedman appointment to Lisbon. However, HMG would have to stand firm on this issue. The Portuguese were being watched very closely. As the next step, the Minister of State indicated, Commonwealth Secretary Bottomley would go to Salisbury on October 12. Bottomley will make an effort to have Smith come to London for a final confrontation with Prime Minister Wilson. The situation promises to remain very critical for the next few weeks. The Secretary asked whether HMG had felt the discussion last week in the NATO Council had been useful. From the UK’s point of view, Mr. Hughes and Sir Savile agreed, it had been very encouraging to have such a solid display of support for its position. The backing given by the US had been especially appreciated. The Secretary said that he had talked with three Zambian cabinet ministers last week 2 and had been impressed with their story of the new coal deposits (at Kandabwe) that Zambia was developing. Mr. Hughes agreed that this was an encouraging development but it would be too little to make a real change in the prospects facing Zambia in the event of UDI and the possible cutting off of the Wankie coal sources. Sir Savile said that HMG was coming back to the thought that only an airlift could keep the Zambian economy afloat if worse came to worst. Mr. Hughes agreed, adding that President Kaunda would probably have to yield to African pressures to take a firm stand against the Rhodesian rebels after UDI, bringing the full wrath of the Smith Government down on Zambia. Sir Savile added that, under such circumstances, Rhodesia would lose trade worth 30 million pounds a year. This in addition to the other measures that could be taken by the UK and the rest of the world might succeed in bringing Southern Rhodesia to her knees. The Secretary asked whether the British believed that Kaunda would assist infiltrators to enter Southern Rhodesia after UDI. Mr. Hughes and Sir Savile thought it was likely that Kaunda would ultimately have to yield to African pressures to do so. In addition, he would probably have to give a haven to a Rhodesian government-in-exile and probably to a Mozambique government-in-exile. Mr. Hughes said he felt that if Smith could be removed from the bad influence exerted on him by Harper, Lilford, Knox, Gaunt and Benson it might be possible to deal with him more rationally. But the situation was becoming critical and HMG was bending very effort to “postpone the evil day” when UDI would come. There were a few good members in Ian Smith’s cabinet, he said, citing Mr. Howman as an example, but their influence was not strong. They were a small group, the Minister said. Mr. Fredericks inquired how the Governor (Sir Humphrey Gibbs) stood in the present controversy. Mr. Hughes and Sir Savile agreed that he was tired and asked often to be relieved of his heavy duties. In the present situation he was “quite powerless.” Sir Savile stated that only the judiciary had been able to resist the SRG’s efforts to control it, otherwise Smith held all the cards. The Secretary asked whether there was any possibility of using British troops to quell a rebellion after UDI. The British officials indicated that there was not the slightest chance of this. There were not enough troops in any case and none near enough to be of any use. Mr. Hughes said that the only conceivable circumstances under which he could envisage the use of British troops would be upon the request of the SRG if absolute chaos within the country occurred (implying a massive African uprising), but he saw little probability of that. Mr. Fredericks agreed that our estimate of African nationalist capability to provoke violence also made such a situation unlikely. Secretary Rusk inquired whether the British officials felt the US and UK were “in line” with regard to the Southern Rhodesian problem. Mr. Hughes and Sir Savile unhesitatingly said that they were confident we were “in line.” Mr. Hughes then said that we would have to give much thought to keeping “in line” when and if it came to handling the question in the UN after UDI. He believed it important that HMG seize and maintain the initiative in the UN. The Secretary said he agreed and asked whether they believed the African members of the Commonwealth would be together with the UK in the UN debate. Sir Savile indicated there was room for doubt on this point since the African Commonwealth members would probably join in a demand for some form of UN military action, which Britain, of course, would have to oppose. He added that, on his recent West African trip with Mr. Bottomley, the Southern Rhodesian question was the main subject of interest everywhere. Feelings on it were very strong, he said. Strangely enough, however, the only leader who did not raise the issue with them was President Nkrumah, although his Foreign Minister had done so. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Mulcahy on September 21, and approved in S on September 25. The source text is marked “Section II of V.” 2 A memorandum of the Secretary’s conversation with the Zambian Cabinet Ministers on September 14 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Zambia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 8/64–9/68. 468. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 468. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 29, 1965, 8 p.m. Perhaps imminent Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) would present us with certain problems. The UK must react strongly, under pressure from its African Commonwealth members. Firm US support of the UK seems warranted: (a) UDI is both legally and morally wrong, (b) our UK ties argue for helping them in a tough situation, which threatens them economically and politically; and (c) almost all Afro-Asians oppose UDI, and will be watching the US as well as UK response. With the UNGA on, we need African votes. We have told the UK that we’d consider actions they felt appropriate to discourage UDI, and support them when and if Rhodesia declared UDI. The British may ask us to: A. Back their request for Security Council support for UK measures against the Rhodesians. Their strategy here would be to pre-empt disruptive Afro-Asian and Soviet Bloc initiatives. B. Join in a Commonwealth boycott of Rhodesian tobacco, as well as in other economic measures. This would work little hardship on us, as our trade with Southern Rhodesia is minimal compared to that of the UK. C. Join in discouraging intervention by Afro-Asian nations or Rhodesian African nationalists. We might also be asked to help discourage Afro-Asian withdrawals from the Commonwealth over this issue. Effect of UDI on Zambia . Since Rhodesia shares power and rail transport with neighboring Zambia, the Rhodesians might just cut off these essential services if Zambia reacts violently to UDI. If so, the UK might ask us to help execute a Zambian contingency plan which we are cooperating in developing. 2 The most extreme contingency envisaged is an airlift of Zambian copper out and general commodities in. We’ve told the UK that the most we could contribute is personnel for manning the essential flight control centers. The plan is designed to help the UK economy as much as that of Zambia. Immediate actions . State is considering (a) telling our Consul General to issue a statement of the US position to warn off the Rhodesians; (b) sending a high-level US mission to London and possibly Rhodesia for the same purpose. We may be able to help at least marginally to forestall UDI. This memo is to advise you on current planning. McGB & RWK 3 Goldberg’s views are attached. 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret. 2 Telegram 1661 to London, September 29, instructed the Embassy to advise the U.K. Commonwealth Relations Office that it might inform the Zambian Government that the U.S. Government was willing to participate in a joint, on-spot contingency study of airlift requirements in both Tanzania and Zambia. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ZAMBIA) 3 Bundy initialed for himself and Komer above Komer’s typed signature. 4 Not printed. 469. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia 469. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia 1 Washington, September 29, 1965, 8:14 p.m. 184. Subject to HMG agreement re timing of delivery following is text oral statement re UDI referred to in Deptel London 1666. 2 Congen instructed to request urgent appointment with Primin Smith to deliver following oral message making it clear you are acting on specific instructions. Written record of US statement not to be transmitted. “The course of events in Southern Rhodesia in recent years has given increasing concern to the Government of the United States. As you know from the official public statements of US officials and from numerous bilateral talks between officials of GSR and US, the United States consistently supported the efforts of Her Majesty’s Government to arrive at a solution to the question of Rhodesia’s future satisfactory to the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. “The pronouncements of Rhodesian officials threatening a unilateral declaration of independence under certain conditions have caused grave concern, not only in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth countries, but in the United States as well. For many years ties between Southern Rhodesia and the United States have been very close and friendly through war and peace. It would indeed be tragic if these ties were to be severed by an ill-considered and irrevocable unilateral action on the part of your Government. In this connection, it would be a grievous error to assume that the United States could in any way condone an attempt of the Government of S. Rhodesia by unilateral action to deal with such important issues as are involved in the discussions which concern the future of your country. “The GSR will recall United States public support for Prime Minister Wilson’s October 27, 1964 warning of the disastrous consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. As you know, the USG supported the Prime Minister’s public reiteration of that warning on April 29, 1965. The United States Government does not intend to deviate from its course of strong support for Her Majesty’s Government’s position now and—if it occurs—after a unilateral declaration of independence. “At the same time, you are assured, should your Government and Her Majesty’s Government achieve a constitutional solution which is satisfactory to the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole, the Government of the United States would be prepared to support such a solution through diplomatic channels in international fora and with other governments.” 3 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Kinsey on September 28; cleared by Fredericks, Runyon, and Judd; and approved by Acting Secretary Ball. Also sent to London for Coote, and repeated to Lusaka and USUN. 2 Telegram 1666 to London, September 29, stated that unless the British Government raised serious objections, an oral statement on U.S. policy would be delivered to Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith in advance of his departure for the meeting in London. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. VI, Cables and Memos, 1/65–9/65) 3 Telegram 1411 from London, September 30, reported that CRO Permanent Under Secretary Savile Garner believed that it would be a mistake to deliver this message, which would infuriate Smith. The ostensible purpose of Smith’s trip was to reach agreement with the United Kingdom, and the U.S. statement assumed in advance that he would fail to do so. Garner suggested that McClelland see Smith before his departure and indicate that the U.S. Government was very concerned about the situation and earnestly hoped that the Rhodesians and the British could find a solution. (Ibid.) Telegram 198 to Salisbury, October 1, stated that the Department was yielding to Garner’s advice, and instructed McClelland to see Smith before his departure if possible and make the points suggested by Garner. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD) 470. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 470. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, September 29, 1965, 8:56 p.m. 1669. For Kaiser from Acting Secretary. I have seen London’s 1373 rptd Salisbury 44 2 and, in view of possible imminence of UDI, believe it essential that we and British thoroughly understand steps each can take should UDI occur. Our support for HMG position on UDI is not without qualification. We cannot undertake, for instance, to make up any balance of payments losses—whether they be 50 million pounds or 200–300 million pounds—which UK suffers as result of sanctions imposed in event of UDI. While British may be aware that there is some thought here that we might provide substitute for UK imports of SR tobacco by sales from CCC stocks of US Virginia leaf tobacco we not yet sure this can be done promptly, that we have authority for exactly this type transaction, or that it could be done without balance of payments costs to UK. Similarly, another suggested course, that of suspending SR sugar quota on US market to complement removal of access to Commonwealth markets for SR sugar, requires further study as to exact steps necessary to achieve it. Finally, course of embargoing all US trade—imports and exports—with SR presents problems which require further study here. In short, we not in position now to give unqualified support to UK economic proposals in event of SR UDI and British should be aware that our political support is not to be construed as blank check for support in other spheres. While I have instructed Department to do its staff work and get on top of these matters urgently, and we will inform you more specifically of what we can and cannot do, believe you and other Embassy officers should be guided by foregoing in discussions with British authorities. At same time, seems clear that as hour of decision approaches, HMG not precise as to what it will or can do. Believe we should have from them clearer indication of their proposals, their ability to undertake them, and rapidity with which they might move. In using foregoing as guidance you should avoid making it possible for HMG to seize upon our yet-to-be-determined ability or inability to follow the UK fully or partially on sanctions or of our unwillingness to offset balance of payments losses as excusing them from taking action or permitting them to place blame for lack of action at our door particularly in justifying themselves to other Commonwealth countries. 3 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, George S. Springsteen, Jr.; cleared by Mulcahy; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Salisbury. 2 In telegram 1373 from London, September 29, Kaiser reported that the British were faced with a dilemma in deciding how far to go in imposing economic restrictions against Rhodesia in the event of UDI. He noted that the British Government believed that it had received firm assurances of U.S. support no matter what it decided, and he advised that if the U.S. Government had any doubts about unqualified support of the eventual British decision, it should make these known to the British as soon as possible. (Ibid., POL 19 RHOD) 3 In telegram 1418 from London, October 1, Kaiser reported that he had told Garner that while the U.S. Government fully supported the British political position on Rhodesia, there was a question at this point as to how far it could go on economic actions. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD) 471. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State 471. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State 1 Salisbury, October 2, 1965. 163. Pursuant Deptel 198 (1720 to London) 2 saw PM Smith, who received me on an hour’s notice, at 11:20 am. MinExtAff Dupont was with him. In accordance London’s 47 (1411 to Dept) 3 made following points: 1) expressed deep concern USG over critical stage now apparently reached in GSR-HMG relations; 2) Stated USG would follow forthcoming GSR-HMG negotiations in London with closest attention; 3) Voiced earnest hope USG, GSR and HMG would succeed in reaching agreement acceptable to all parties; 4) Said USG would view failure this respect as tragic and likely have grave repercussions throughout Africa and indeed world. In reply Smith said he thanked SecState for his message which he regarded as “constructive” and “positive.” Asked me convey following additional points to USG: 1) He considered it “ironic” that HMG now appealing to USG for assistance, as he had heard on the “grapevine,” against potentially rebellious colony whereas situation was just the reverse in 1775; 2) GSR does not intend to do anything “rash or irresponsible.” On other hand it was his duty protect Rhodesia from becoming another Tanzania, for example, dangerously infiltrated by Chicoms. To avert such a development GSR would feel fully forced take this extreme step, which he still hoped avoid; he trusted USG would refrain from “interfering” with situation. Such outside interference would only make matters worse, particularly for Africans in SR; 4) If vindictive and harmful sanctions were taken against SR we should not delude ourselves that repercussions would be confined to SR alone. Neighboring countries, such as Zambia and Malawi, could also be hurt. (Smith referred here to 500,000 Zambian and Nyasa workers in SR who figured in earlier GSR whitepaper.) Comment: I did not attempt argue any of these points since Smith indicated he considered interview, which reasonably friendly and relaxed, terminated. I regard points 3) and 4) as essentially tactical threats calculated deter US since GSR clearly apprehensive over possibility USG may back up and reenforce UK economic sanctions. Alacrity with which I was received at time when Smith very taken up is further sign, my view, of definite GSR concern over position US will take on SR case. 4 McClelland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. No time of transmission appears on the source text, but the telegram was received at 9:12 a.m. and repeated to London, Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam, and USUN. Passed to the White House at 9:50 a.m. 2 Dated October 1. (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 3, Document 469 . 4 Telegram 1458 from London, October 4, reported that the British were very pleased with McClelland’s approach to Smith. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD) 472. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 472. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, October 2, 1965, 1:24 p.m. 1730. Rhodesian UDI. Following is Department thinking re possible solutions UK tobacco problem: 2 1. Department and USDA could arrange PL–480 Title IV program to substitute UK requirements Rhodesian tobacco in event UDI. However, this appears least desirable. Use of this program for UK probably would have adverse psychological effects, especially other Commonwealth countries. Extension PL–480 assistance Britain would be sensitive issue here. 2. It is our expectation UK would anticipate living off present tobacco stocks—estimated at twenty-one month supply—for an interim period upward six months or more. Further, we anticipate UK would try to cover as much as possible tobacco needs from increased buying Commonwealth sources and purchase enhanced quantities soft currency sources before resorting to US. Possibilities for making substantially larger purchases from Commonwealth and soft currency sources would increase over time. We believe this well understood by British tobacco trade. In any event, we have ample stocks equal and better than Rhodesian tobacco which available if necessary to cover entire amount normal UK purchases Rhodesia. 3. We prepared make available following credit terms on commercial purchases: (a) UK now receives six-month CCC credits on tobacco purchases. This can be extended to three years on short notice. (b) In the event longer credit terms desired, CCC prepared seek special five-year credits. In both instances transactions would remain in private trade, therefore, not subject criticisms likely surround PL–480. 4. Possibilities for making US price terms more attractive are difficult predict, because we cannot know state actual markets at future date, especially in event UDI precipitates aggressive Rhodesian market activity. However, at present, CCC stocks tobacco of approximate Rhodesian quality could be landed UK at prices closer Rhodesian price and cheaper than US higher quality tobacco normally sells UK. Additional stocks could also be obtained under barter such as AID offshore procurement in which UK tobacco concerns already participate. Price incentives tobacco barter trade also understood by UK trade. 3 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Terrell Arnold of the Economic Bureau’s Temperate Products Division; cleared by USDA Foreign Agricultural Service Administrator Raymond Ioanes, Director of the Economic Bureau’s Office of International Commodities George R. Jacobs, Chief of the Economic Bureau’s Temperate Products Division Fred H. Sanderson, Springsteen, Mulcahy, and Judd; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Salisbury, Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam, and USUN. 2 Telegram 1409 from London, September 30, reported that Rhodesian tobacco was a substantial part of the total 50 million pounds of the estimated British balance-of-payments loss in the event to a trade embargo against Rhodesian goods. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD) 3 Telegram 1786 to London, October 5, stated that the British decision on a tobacco embargo should be made on its own merits and without regard to a possible alleviation of the tobacco supply problem from U.S. sources. If such a decision were made and the British Government approached the United States for assistance, the substance of telegram 1730 could be delivered. (Ibid., POL 19 RHOD) 473. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in New York 473. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in New York 1 Washington, October 2, 1965, 4:41 p.m. Tosec 53. Following is text letter on Rhodesian UDI from PriMin Wilson to President Johnson delivered this afternoon by Stewart, UK Emb, who under instructions asked text be given to Secretary soonest: “As you know, we have been keeping in close touch about Rhodesia with your Administration at all levels and we are most appreciative of the support which we have received. “We are now entering a crucial phase and the discussions I am to have with Smith next week are likely to be final and decisive. He seems to have retreated from the basis of negotiation which the Commonwealth Secretary established with him earlier this year, and I do not think it likely that we can now reach any agreement with him. The risk of unilateral declaration of independence must therefore be regarded as serious and I know you share with us the belief that this could escalate with disastrous consequences for the whole area and serious damage to Western interests. “If our negotiations unhappily fail, I shall do everything possible to bring home to Smith the consequences of an illegal step in the hope of deterring him from it. If there is still any chance of deflecting him and his colleagues from such a disastrous course I believe that your influence might be a decisive factor. I wonder therefore if you would be prepared to approach Smith in whatever way you think best calculated to bring home to him the gravity of the step which he is apparently contemplating. Subject to the way things go in the next few days I think that a message from you would be most effective immediately after a break-down in the negotiation. Since the timing of such a message could be crucial we will keep your Ambassador closely informed of the progress of our discussions with Smith. I hope very much that you will feel able to intervene in this way and to do so publicly since your message would then have the maximum effect on the Rhodesian public.” USUN requested pass to Komer. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by MacKnight; cleared by Joseph F. Starkey of EUR/BNA, Springsteen, John J. deMartino of S/S, and Haynes (in substance); and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to London, Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka, and Salisbury. 474. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 474. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 4, 1965, 7:30 p.m. Message from PM Wilson. He’s in with attached personal appeal that we support the UK against Southern Rhodesia. 2 Specifically he urges that we join the UK in warning Rhodesia’s PM Ian Smith, and making this warning public if Smith’s negotiation with Wilson on 6–7 October fails. He is also appealing for help to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Rhodesia’s key trading partners. We here agree that we ought to back the UK on this issue, if only to stay on the right side of all the Afro-Asians. We’ll probably be compelled to do so in the UN should Rhodesia kick over the traces. So this is a good opportunity to be helpful to the UK. The best tack is, as Wilson suggests, to help deter Smith from declaring independence in the first place. So we propose at Tab 3 a forthcoming reply to Wilson which: (1) authorizes him to tell Smith the US will also oppose him; (2) volunteers a direct, private US approach to Smith, either before he sees Wilson or after; and (3) agrees to make our position public if needed to warn off the Rhodesian electorate. We suspect Wilson may be angling for a personal message from you to Smith but doubt this would be useful. The UK has not yet decided how hard to hit Rhodesia if it goes astray, but may use economic sanctions. Even if we went this far it would not be too great a problem, since our Rhodesian trade is small. The UK’s most immediate problem if it uses sanctions is tobacco, so we might be able to help out by offering Title IV PL 480 tobacco, or easing the terms on CCC credit sales. Approve message 4 Disapprove R.W. Komer 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret. 2 See Document 473 . 3 See Document 476 . 4 This option is checked and a handwritten note reads: “Check with me and lets follow his ideas in our message. L.” Bundy’s handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text reads: “I’m against a message from you to Smith. And if you prefer we can answer Wilson on the Rusk-Stewart channel. But on substance I agree. Mac.” 5 Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 475. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Acting Secretary of State Ball 475. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Acting Secretary of State Ball 1 Washington, October 5, 1965, 3:15 p.m. Bundy called regarding the proposed message to the Prime Minister on Southern Rhodesia. (It was ascertained during the course of the conversation that the draft Bundy was discussing was not the final version, but one which had been sent over previous to the draft which was in the Secretary’s office.) Ball questioned putting the President in the position of telling Wilson how to handle Smith. As a matter of policy, Ball felt we should say to the British, “You take the lead and we will follow to the extent we can; but we are not going to try to tell you how to do it.” Then the British can’t turn on us if there is a blowup. Ball said he has not discussed this question with Wilson, but the general problem. The British are playing a game of trying to push us out in front. Ball said he has had trouble keeping the Department in line on this. Bundy replied this was not a big issue; the White House was more in line, however, with the Bureau’s thinking than with Ball’s. Ball felt a letter from the President would not be in order and Bundy replied that he was not recommending this; he had, instead, recommended against it. Bundy’s main worry is that we have not made our views known to Smith. Ball replied the reason we have not is because the British didn’t want us to spoil the waters with Smith until after they worked on him. Bundy still felt we have not made a strong case with Smith and the British, at certain levels, agree. For Smith to go to London with the idea the Americans don’t give a damn about UDI is a mistake, Bundy felt. We have not stated it as strongly as we may want to. Ball felt it came down to the basic question whether the President wants to weigh in with this fellow before he talks to the PM. Bundy said he was talking about the USG weighing in, rather than the President; it is agreed the USG has not done so. Bundy suggested the message from the President be changed to say we will do this promptly if you wish us to. Bundy said he was not talking about a Presidential message to Smith in either case. The differences are not substantive. Bundy said he was only sorry he did not know Ball’s feelings before-hand. Ball explained the draft had not come to the 7th floor until this morning and he had redrafted it; that Bundy did not have the latest draft. Bundy said this was the result of the time factor. Bundy said he would send it along with the change and Ball raised no objection. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Britain III, 11/24/64–12/31/65. No classification marking. 476. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 476. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, October 5, 1965, 3:17 p.m. CAP 65594. To: Prime Minister Wilson. From: The President. We agree that the Southern Rhodesia affair could quickly become a calamity, with potentially serious damage to Western interests. We also agree that deterring Smith from any fateful step is by all odds the best course open to us. If you see fit, we would be glad if you would tell Smith when you see him that we as well as you would take a very poor view of UDI, and that we would necessarily have to oppose it vigorously. We would also be prepared, as you suggest, to approach Smith directly along the above lines, either through our Charge in London or by calling in the Rhodesian Minister attached to your Embassy here. And if deterrence is our prime objective, it may be better for us to convey our views before your decisive meeting with Smith, rather than after. We will do this promptly if you wish. Should negotiations fail, we would certainly be prepared to make our views public in an appropriate way. I am glad that our two governments are in close touch, since it is important to coordinate our efforts with yours in dealing with this unhappy problem. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret; Via Private Wire to London. No drafting information appears on the source text. 2 On October 6, Prime Minister Wilson thanked the President for his support and agreed that deterrence was the main U.K. objective. Wilson told Johnson that it would be very helpful if Johnson were able to make his administration’s views known to Smith before the decisive meeting. He would leave it to the President to judge the best way of doing this, but suggested the possibility of using both techniques. (Ibid.) 477. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 477. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 6, 1965, 9:30 a.m. RE Southern Rhodesia and the United Nations I think you will want to know that with British support we are quietly urging the usefulness of a carefully phrased resolution on Southern Rhodesia in the General Assembly. This is a matter on which Goldberg, Rusk and I have consulted, and we are all in agreement. We are also acting with British encouragement. Our object is two-fold: First, to give additional clarity to the fact that Smith will face very strong international opposition if he insists on UDI; Second, to have our own language in the field and thus to avoid the much more inflammatory and tendentious resolutions that hot-headed Africans would prefer. We hope that we can get friends to sponsor our moderate resolution, but it is a possibility that we would have to put it forward ourselves. I think you will want to give Goldberg tactical flexibility on this, but if you have a strong view, I know he would want to hear it. He will, of course, act under Dean Rusk’s guidance. A copy of the draft resolution is attached. 2 Mc.G. B. Let Rusk and Goldberg handle it 3 Speak to me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. No classification marking. 2 Not printed. 3 This option is checked. A handwritten notation in the margin reads: “See memo to Sisco attached.” In this memorandum, Bundy informed Sisco that the President had delegated to the Secretary and Ambassador Goldberg the tactical authority to decide whether such a resolution should be sponsored by others or by the United States, and noted that the President was clearly sympathetic with the basic objective. 478. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 478. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, October 6, 1965, 11:15 a.m. 1790. For Kaiser from Acting Secretary. In light of most recent communication from Prime Minister to President re Southern Rhodesia, 2 you are requested to seek an immediate appointment with Prime Minister Smith in order deliver following message. Message is to be delivered orally by your reading from verbatim text and with no additional comment other than that you are delivering it upon instructions of your government. Begin Verbatim Text: In view of the highly important discussions now underway between HMG and GSR, the USG wishes to make clear its position and concern with this problem. The course of events in Southern Rhodesia in recent years has given increasing concern to the Government of the United States. As you know from the official public statements of US officials and from numerous bilateral talks between officials of GSR and USG, the United States has consistently supported the efforts of Her Majesty’s Government to arrive at a solution to the question of Rhodesia’s future satisfactory to the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. The pronouncements of Rhodesian officials threatening a unilateral declaration of independence under certain conditions have caused grave concern in the United States. For many years ties between Southern Rhodesia and the United States have been very close and friendly through war and peace. It would indeed be tragic if these ties were to be severed by an ill-considered and irrevocable unilateral action on the part of your Government. The United States considers that a political solution acceptable only to the minority in Southern Rhodesia and unresponsive to the interests and rights of the vast majority of the population would be a grievous error. My Government could not condone such a solution. The GSR will recall United Sates public support for Prime Minister Wilson’s October 27, 1964 warning of the disastrous consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. As you know, the USG supported the Prime Minister’s public reiteration of that warning on April 29, 1965. The United States Government does not intend to deviate from its course of strong support for Her Majesty’s Government’s position now and—if it occurs—after a unilateral declaration of independence. At the same time, you are assured that, should your Government and Her Majesty’s Government achieve a constitutional solution that is satisfactory to the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole, the Government of the United States would be prepared to support such a solution through diplomatic channels in international bodies and with other governments. End Verbatim Text. Please advise HMG of appointment. Bentley called in to receive similar message here. 3 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Kinsey, Springsteen, and Special Assistant to Ball Jacob Myerson; cleared by Fredericks, Leddy, and Komer; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Salisbury and USUN. 2 See Document 473 . 3 In telegram 1526 from London, October 7, Kaiser reported that he had delivered the oral message to Prime Minister Smith that morning. Smith responded that the United States did not understand the situation and argued that independence under the present constitution was acceptable to the majority of Rhodesians. He declared that, if all else failed, Rhodesians would have no choice but to take their independence; this was a matter of “life and death.” The Prime Minister also referred bitterly to the British “crawling” to the United States for assistance, and compared the present Rhodesian situation to the American one in 1776. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD) 479. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 479. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, October 9, 1965, 1115Z. 1569. Private Secretary of Prime Minister Ian Smith has just delivered the following letter to me: “Dear Charge d’Affaires, “You were good enough to call upon me yesterday to deliver a message from your government relative to the Rhodesian government and the British government over the grant of independence to Rhodesia. In receiving the messages I informed you that I was grateful to your government for their interest and concern and I would now like you to convey this reply to your government in acknowledgement thereof. “Would you please say to your government that the Rhodesian government are approaching these negotiations in a spirit of goodwill and conciliation but, at the same time, with the knowledge that what they are proposing to the British government as a settlement of the problem of Rhodesian independence is one that has the acceptance and support of the majority of the people in the country, both European and African. “Rhodesia is working for independence on its 1961 Constitution, a constitution, freely negotiated between the then British government, the government of Rhodesia and representatives of all political parties and of all racial groups in the country. This constitution contains the fundamental elements which provide for a widely representative government when the time comes. But it is the claim of the Rhodesian government that it is for them to decide the pace of the evolution towards majority rule. Therefore, the government of Rhodesia, while they will take the very closest account of all the views expressed to them by friendly governments like the government of the United States, must in the end consider the ultimate good of the country of Rhodesia and must assume the final responsibility for deciding what course is in the best interests of that country. “The Rhodesian government would be failing in their duty not only to themselves but to the ordinary people of the country and to the cause of Western civilisation on the continent of Africa if they were persuaded to abandon the stand they have taken and to expose the people of the county to all the unhappiness and conflict which stems from unbridled racial government, which would be the result of immediate majority rule. Yours sincerely, I. Vaughn Smith.” Thompson told me that Harper and Wrathall were returning to Salisbury tonight but that Smith would probably not be leaving until Monday or Tuesday. Kaiser 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to USUN and Salisbury. Passed to the White House. 480. Memorandum of Conversation 480. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 11, 1965, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Southern Rhodesia PARTICIPANTS U.S. Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara Under Secretary Ball Ambassador Thompson Assistant Secretary Leddy Ambassador Bruce J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA Assistant Secretary Sisco Deputy Assistant Secretary Fredericks U.K. Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under-Secretary of State The Viscount Hood, Deputy Under-Secretary of State Denis A. Greenhill, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Michael N.F. Stewart, Minister, British Embassy Lord Chalfont, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs The Foreign Secretary outlined the political and economic measures which the UK proposed to take in the event of a Southern Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence. He prefaced his summary with the statement that the UK would employ military force only in the unlikely circumstance that the situation in Southern Rhodesia deteriorated to the point where the Southern Rhodesian authorities themselves requested it. If UDI is announced the UK will: 1) dismiss all Southern Rhodesian ministers; 2) end Commonwealth preferences; 3) exclude Rhodesian tobacco exports to the UK; and, 4) call immediately for a meeting of the Security Council. In the UN the UK will seek a resolution welcoming the measures which it has taken and calling on all members to assist the UK in making these measures effective. The object, Mr. Stewart said, would be to head off wilder action which might otherwise be taken in the UN. The Foreign Secretary said that unfortunately some of the economic measures and possible Rhodesian retaliatory action against Zambia might undo some of the good work which has been done, with U.S. help, to strengthen sterling. He said that the UK hoped if financial difficulties for sterling arise from the economic measures taken, that the U.S. will give further help. He estimated the potential strain on sterling resulting from possible UK measures and SR retaliation at as much as #200 million. He said he was making this point at the request of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If Smith does not make an early declaration of independence, the UK will wait two or three weeks and then try to get a constitutional conference organized to draw up a new constitution. The Foreign Secretary said that it is not clear to what degree Smith has been moved by world-wide opposition to UDI. Secretary Rusk asked whether economic sanctions would require legislative action in the UK. Mr. Stewart replied that legislation would not be necessary since action could be taken on the grounds of rebellion against the Crown. The Under Secretary said that the practical economic measures we can take without Congressional action are limited. We can apply export controls against SR but are doubtful that it would be very effective since there are alternative sources of supply for the commodities involved. So far as imports are concerned, we cannot apply the Trading with the Enemy Act in the absence of a state of war or the declaration of a national emergency. The only possibility we can see at this time would be action pursuant to a resolution by the Security Council under Article 41 of the Charter. The US could help the UK on tobacco through medium-term commodity credits. It was our understanding, however, that in view of the level of tobacco stocks in the UK, there would be no immediate problem. We could not help with respect to the sugar quota which would require legislative action and this would be controversial in Congress. Mr. Leddy asked if the UK believed that economic sanctions would force Southern Rhodesia to change its political stance, and observing that economic sanctions had not been historically effective for this purpose. The Foreign Secretary replied that he would hope so but it would take time. Meanwhile, white-black relations would be exacerbated throughout Africa. The Secretary and Under Secretary, referring to the estimate of 200 million pounds sterling loss in the first year, if Zambian copper exports were cut off, gave the UK representatives no encouragement regarding the willingness of the US to give additional support to sterling in these circumstances. Sir Paul Gore-Booth pointed out that Southern Rhodesia can easily cut off power to Zambia. Furthermore, Zambia itself may make it inevitable that Southern Rhodesia will take action against it. The Under Secretary asked if Zambia could be kept under control so that it did not provoke Southern Rhodesian retaliation. The Foreign Secretary said he hoped so. A further difficulty would arise if Southern Rhodesia expelled laborers from Zambia and Malawi. In discussing the Portuguese attitude both the Secretary and the Foreign Secretary expressed doubts that Portugal would recognize Southern Rhodesia immediately. Also it was doubtful that South Africa would give early recognition. The Secretary expressed concern that a two-thirds majority might be found in the General Assembly for a peacekeeping force. Mr. Stewart agreed and said it would be difficult for the UK to oppose such a proposal without encouraging the colored races of the world to turn against the Western powers. In discussing possible airlift requirements for assuring the continuation of Zambian copper exports, Mr. Fredericks said a survey indicated that as much as 100,000 tons of copper would have to be brought out and coal brought in. The Secretary said he was skeptical of the estimates of the carrying capacity of the railroads and thought they were probably low. He said the US would be reluctant to call on military air transport to transport coal and copper when commercial transport was available. Secretary McNamara endorsed this view. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. VII, Memos and Miscellaneous. Confidential. Drafted by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, J. Harold Shullaw, and approved in S, U, and G on October 19. The source text is marked “Part 4 of 6.” The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 481. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 481. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 12, 1965. Developments in Africa . The number one problem continues to be the crisis over the imminent Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independ-ence (UDI). Another crisis may develop in the Congo if President Kasavubu forces Tshombe’s resignation—perhaps this week. [Items in brackets are those too sensitive for use.] 2 Rhodesia . As predicted, Rhodesian negotiations with the UK over independence broke down last week. Pursuant to your exchange with Harold Wilson, our Charge in London presented a US message to Smith advising against UDI and warning of the consequences. [Similar warnings were sent to Smith by Australia, New Zealand, Canada, West Germany and Japan.] Zambia’s President Kaunda immediately cabled you his personal appreciation for the US stand. 3 So far our efforts to seize the initiative in the UN on this issue have met with success. Ambassador Anderson’s speech on UDI met with an encouraging response and an anti-Rhodesian resolution was overwhelmingly adopted by the General Assembly: 107 for, 2 against (Portugal and South Africa) and 1 abstention (France). 4 The UK did not vote, although it confidentially concurred in the language of the resolution. Wilson has asked us to publicly release an official statement along the lines of our message to Smith; we are preparing one. UK strategy is to appeal to the more moderate elements of the Rhodesian population. The UK is considering a top-level Commonwealth “Peace Mission” to Rhodesia, to be led by Australian PM Menzies. Wilson appears today on BBC in connection with this crisis. Smith has returned to Rhodesia. His first moves will probably be to (a) meet with his Rhodesian Front party leaders; (b) call a cabinet meeting; and (c) recall parliament. It’s anyone’s guess how long thereafter UDI will follow. Smith himself is now speaking in terms of “before Christmas.” In any case, this is still primarily a UK problem. We will continue to march no faster than they. [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.] R.W. Komer 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret. 2 Brackets in this and the following paragraph are in the source text. 3 Telegram 501 from Lusaka, October 9, transmitted Kaunda’s message to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD) 4 For text of Resolution 2012 (XX), adopted October 12, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , p. 680. 5 Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 482. Special National Intelligence Estimate 482. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, October 13, 1965. SNIE 72–65 REPERCUSSIONS OF A UNILATERAL DECLARATIONOF INDEPENDENCE BY SOUTHERN RHODESIA [Here follows a table of contents.] Note This estimate is primarily directed to the few months following a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia, though some longer range estimates are made. Conclusions A. We believe that for the next several years at least, political and economic sanctions would not dislodge white rule in Southern Rhodesia and that effective military intervention from any quarter is highly unlikely. Rhodesia’s white minority government would probably be able to maintain internal security following independence; it would be unlikely to undertake serious economic measures against neighboring African states unless severely provoked. (Paras. 22, 20, 16, 6–7) B. African frustrations over Rhodesia’s ability to sustain itself would cause recurrent difficulties for the West in the UN and African forums, and bring down new pressures on African moderates, particularly Kaunda in neighboring Zambia, and on the UK and the US, to take stronger measures against Rhodesia. (Paras. 9–10, 15–19, 21, 24) C. The situation might lead to severe strains between Britain and the African states in the Commonwealth and a few of the latter might withdraw. (Para. 18) D. The probability that the West will be unable to resolve the Rhodesia issue to the satisfaction of the Africans will provide opportunities for Communist propaganda. While Western influence will suffer a considerable setback, the West will, however, retain an important presence in Africa, and Africans will continue to look to the West for the bulk of their economic, technical, and other assistance. (Paras. 20, 22) [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on October 13. 483. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 483. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 1 Washington, October 19, 1965. RWK FYI. Wayne Fredericks tells me that this morning George Ball took the position that the US has nothing to worry about in the event of a Rhodesian UDI. Wayne and Joe Sisco argued to the contrary and pressed again for the public release of our message to Smith. Ball’s initial reaction was that UDI is inevitable and there is no point in releasing our statement to coincide with it. Fredericks and Sisco insisted; Ball then agreed to refer the whole matter to the Secretary. 2 AF is, therefore, preparing a telegram to Salisbury for the Secretary to sign off on authorizing the release of our message. Already UK Embassy officials here are wondering why we seem so reluctant to release the statement. I presume the same concern is growing in London. Time is running short and the release of the statement is our last remaining deterrent trump card. Is there any chance that Bundy might give the Secretary a gentle nudge on this one? 3 Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63–1/66. Secret. “To McGB.,” with a question mark, appears in Komer’s handwriting on the source text. 2 A memorandum from Haynes to Bundy later on October 19 stated that Ball had referred the matter to the Secretary, who refused to clear release of the statement. (Ibid.) 3 The following sentence is added in Komer’s handwriting: “After all, the President did tell Wilson we’d make appropriate public noises.” 484. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 484. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, October 22, 1965, 12:36 p.m. 2129. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Please deliver the following message from the Secretary of State to Prime Minister Wilson as soon as possible: “We have given careful thought to the most useful way in which we can assist you in deterring the Rhodesian Government from going over the cliff. Our considered judgment is that any further public statement on our part at this eleventh hour would run the risk of driving the Smith Government further into a corner and stiffening their desperate resolve. At the same time, we wish to leave no ambiguity in Prime Minister Smith’s mind as to our condemnation of the step he is proposing. The President has asked me to tell you, therefore, that he would be entirely agreeable to your conveying to Smith the following views as coming directly from him: 1. The United States is gravely concerned at the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia. 2. The United States Government fully supports the efforts that the British Prime Minister and his Government are making to arrive at a solution to the question of the future of Southern Rhodesia satisfactory to that colony’s population as a whole. 3. A unilateral declaration of independence unresponsive to the rights and interests of the majority of the population and in violation of the existing constitution would be a tragic mistake. If such a step should be taken, the United States would feel compelled to sever the traditional close and friendly ties that have characterized its relations with Southern Rhodesia through war and peace. 4. The United States Government believes that most people in Africa and in the world at large share the hope that with British help the Rhodesian people will find a peaceful solution to their constitutional problems and eventually take their place in the world community as a united and democratic nation.” 2 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ball, cleared by Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Salisbury and USUN. 2 Telegram 1842 from London, October 23, reported the delivery of the Secretary’s message to 10 Downing Street. (Ibid.) 485. Message From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 485. Message From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 29, 1965. The following message from Prime Minister Wilson arrived here at 2 a.m. It asks for a personal plea from you to Prime Minister Smith in Southern Rhodesia. I have talked with Acting Secretary Ball, and he and I fully agree that we cannot reject Wilson’s request. We further agree on a draft message to Smith, which follows the Wilson message to the President. The language of this draft carefully follows language we have used in earlier non-Presidential messages and contains no new position. Wilson’s preferred time for this answer had already arrived when his message reached us, so we have decided to hold this until you could deal with it this morning. Text of Wilson message to the President follows: Attachment 2 Personal for McGeorge Bundy from Wright. Following is text of a message for President from Prime Minister which will be coming to you via the Embassy. Message Begins: I was most grateful for the message which Secretary Rusk sent to me with your authority for delivery to Mr. Smith if I thought it helpful. 2. After three days of intensive discussion here, 3 with the government, with the African Nationalist leaders, Nkomo and Sithole, and with every representative body of opinion including the churches, business, the financial community and the defeated opposition, not to mention ex-Prime Ministers of Rhodesia, I have come to the reluctant conclusion that a message from you delivered through me would not have the necessary impact. 3. The situation is bleak. Although I have tried every method of persuasion the African Nationalists are prepared neither to work together nor to make any move from their extreme position to any extent necessary to win even a breathing space. The government are impervious to argument and are collectively like a suicide on a windowsill waiting to jump. Moderate European opinion is paralyzed by a sense of helplessness before impending doom, and subject to personal intimidation which saps their will to oppose. The government is manipulating the organs of publicity such as radio and television although the press is still free. 4. Although I have the sensation of witnessing the final act of a Greek tragedy, there is just the slightest chance that catastrophe may be avoided. I have today pulled out all the stops in working on Smith and have put to him a reasonable alternative to a U.D.I. which no rational man could refuse, namely a Royal commission. The terms of reference would be to seek the highest common factor of agreement between all shades of opinion in Rhodesia on the terms for independence. In these circumstances, a message direct from you to Mr. Smith delivered through your Consul General here in Salisbury would be of infinitely greater value than a message delivered through me. To make its maximum impact it should preferably be delivered by 9:00 a.m. Salisbury time, tomorrow Friday. Since I have found some doubt here in Salisbury not only in government circles, but also more generally, about the attitude of the United States to a U.D.I., I hope that your message might state your position in unequivocal terms. Even this may not do the trick: but when I think of the consequences of failure to deter this suicidal government, I believe that no means of pressure should be neglected. Message Ends. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Memos and Miscellaneous, Vol. VII. Secret. This typed message, which was apparently prepared for transmission to the LBJ Ranch, was directed to Special Counsel to the President Jake Jacobsen for delivery to the President. 2 Secret; Personal. The attachment does not indicate place of origin or channel of transmission. 3 On October 24, Prime Minister Wilson traveled to Salisbury in an attempt to break the deadlock in the negotiations. 486. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia 486. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia 1 Washington, October 29, 1965, 12:44 p.m. 342. You should seek an immediate appointment with Prime Minister Smith to deliver following message from the President: “Dear Mr. Prime Minister: In these days of decisive importance for the future of Southern Rhodesia, I believe you are entitled to know at first hand of our thinking here in the United States. While we fully recognize that the matter is centrally one between the British Government and the people and Government of Southern Rhodesia, it would be irresponsible for us to run the risk of any misunderstanding of our own position in the matter, so I think you should know of our views direct from me. The United States has consistently supported the efforts of the British Government to arrive at a solution in Rhodesia which will be satisfactory to the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. While we recognize that there are grave and difficult issues still to be worked out in pursuit of this objective, we are convinced that a unilateral declaration of independence would be a tragic mistake which would serve the true interests of no one. The United States would have to make known its strong opposition to any such decision, and we do not intend to change our course of firm support for the position of the British Government after any such unilateral declaration. It is our present understanding that Prime Minister Wilson has made further proposals, and that the road to agreement and understanding remains open. With full recognition of the great difficulties which you face, and the strong feelings with which you are surrounded, I express the hope that you and your colleagues will avoid a course which, in addition to all its other consequences, would inevitably break the strong ties of friendship and understanding which have bound our countries together in war and peace. We in the United States strongly value these ties, and we remain convinced that a peaceful, honorable and constitutional solution can be found. Such a solution will have our full support. 2 Lyndon B. Johnson” Note: It is important that knowledge of this message not originate from US sources. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Fredericks and Read, and approved by Ball. Also sent to London and to USUN for Ambassador Goldberg. 2 In telegram 280 from Salisbury, October 30, McClelland reported that he delivered the President’s message to Smith at 9 a.m. that morning, and that the Prime Minister expressed gratitude for the “courteous and reasonable tone” of the message. Prime Minister Smith also said that a significant last minute breakthrough had been achieved when the two sides agreed to a Royal Commission of Inquiry to examine the Rhodesian independence problem. (Ibid., POL 19 RHOD) 487. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State 487. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State 1 Salisbury, November 1, 1965, 1200Z. 281. Received this morning following reply from PM Smith to President’s letter of Oct 29 (connectives omitted): “Dear Mr. President: Roswell D. McClelland, American Consul General, has delivered to me your urgent personal message dated 29th October and, in receiving message, I asked him thank you very much indeed. I appreciate tremendously fact that Chief Executive of United States, in midst of his heavy responsibilities, can find time to give his consideration to future of Rhodesia. I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that it is firm intention of Rhodesian Government to seek solution of its problems with British Government through patient negotiations and discussion. I and my colleagues in the government will go on trying as long as hope remains. Current negotiations have by no means been suspended and we are continuing exchange ideas although Mr. Wilson has, naturally enough, in view of his own many duties, had to return to Great Britain. We have made significant steps forward and there is hope that differing views of two governments will be brought together eventually in support of successful conclusion. We in Rhodesia reciprocate with utmost sincerity your conviction that peaceful, honorable and constitutional solution can be found. To this end we also have made proposals to British Government and are hopeful we will reach solution and that British Government will contribute materially towards this by conceding reasonable and statesmanlike compromises. It is encouraging to know that such a solution will have full support of Government of USA. You may rely upon us to do our best to bring about this happy state of affairs. Yours sincerely, I. Douglas Smith” Original by pouch. McClelland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential. Repeated to London. 488. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 488. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, November 1, 1965. CAP 65642. I am now back in London after a week in Rhodesia and shall be making a statement in Parliament this afternoon. I have asked our Ambassador to let you have the full text of the statement which sets out pretty fully the position we have now reached. It was an exhausting and in many ways a depressing week, depressing because so many people have their minds in blinkers and they are wrapped up in cocoons of self-delusion which it is terribly difficult to penetrate. To be in Salisbury was to have the sensation of being present at the fifth act of a Greek tragedy. I tried every method to persuade the African Nationalists both to work together and to work the existing constitution: but to no effect. Moderate European opinion, represented by business and finance, is paralyzed by a sense of helplessness before impending doom and, what is worse, subject to the personal intimidation which saps their will. Smith has quite a nice little police state in embryo there. The government have control of television and radio, although the press is still free. Most of Smith’s cabinet are impervious to argument and divided only on whether they should commit suicide now or later. One thing is certain and that is if I had not offered on Thursday, October 21 to go to Rhodesia, U.D.I. would have been with us on Friday, October 22. But I fear that the most I may have achieved is the respite of a little more time before Smith and his cabinet go over the brink. But time is the most precious commodity of all in this problem. My chief purpose was therefore not to negotiate, although I had many hours of tough discussions with Smith and his colleagues, but to see whether, as a last hope, there was any chance of changing the political climate and finding some last minute formula which would give Smith pause and give the moderates of all races something to support. Hence my talks with every conceivable representative body to whom I gave the carrot and stick treatment: I had to get home to them both the tragic consequences of U.D.I. and the fact that no one was faced with a simple choice of U.D.I. or majority rule tomorrow. There were many alternatives. Hence the proposal for a royal commission, which gives them a way out if they have the will to take it. Quite frankly, there are so many Gadarene minds in Rhodesia, and that goes for most of Smith’s cabinet, if not totally for Smith himself, that I doubt whether good sense has much chance of prevailing. So while I am hoping for the best it is only sensible to prepare for the worst. The worst may come quite quickly but we are quite ready for it. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Memos and Miscellaneous, Vol. VII. Secret. 489. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 489. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, November 9, 1965, 12:48 p.m. 857. Subject: Rhodesia. 1. From Wilson-Smith correspondence, supplemented by US–UK discussions in London, Salisbury and here, it appears that neither British nor Rhodesians believe Royal Commission will produce mutually acceptable constitutional basis for Rhodesian independence. From outset British have conceived of Commission as device gain time. British believe Smith willing go along, with same objective in mind. In addition, according Emboffs here, Wilson attempting widen split in Rhodesian Front. Pursuit these objectives obviously carries risk replacement Smith by more militant pro-UDI Prime Minister in Rhodesia. It is conceivable, if Smith finally commits self publicly or privately to work on alternative to UDI, that British may seek U.S. help to shore up his position. 2. Emboffs believe if discussion of Commission and subsequent Commission activities can be dragged out until January, prospect of UDI substantially reduced at least for several months, primarily because Rhodesian tobacco farmers unable at that late date switch to marketable food crops. 3. British appear believe five basic principles on which they have stood (second paragraph Depcirtel 597) 2 need not be compromised as this game is played out, although Emboffs here acknowledge pressure to compromise becoming stronger as exchange continues. However, they say Parliament would not accept solution which departs from principles and, in any case, departure would put such powerful weapon in hands Conservatives to use against Wilson that he most unlikely compromise on principles. We believe consequences might be equally serious within Labour Party and in relations with Liberals. In addition we assume Commonwealth pressures would be in direction maintenance principles. Our concern with maintenance of five principles is not only that they offer long-term solution most acceptable to Rhodesian majority, but also that they provide framework within which we committed support British. We believe British share our view that continuing adherence to principles vital to maintenance both British and U.S. positions elsewhere in Africa. 4. Disillusioning results Wilson’s soundings of African nationalist opinion in Rhodesia served as reminder that nationalist intransigence may well become main obstacle not only to ultimate resolution Rhodesian problem but also to successful pursuit current British tactical objectives. If nationalists refuse cooperate with Commission or denounce in advance any Commission recommendation other than immediate far-reaching revisions of constitution, use of Commission to gain time would be jeopardized. Intransigent African attitudes likely become firmer as result greater isolation which may well result from National Emergency measures. 5. In light foregoing, we see four general problem areas: A. Smith’s position on time-gaining devices and UDI, reactions to his position within Rhodesian Front, and possible British decision support him if he agrees seek alternative to UDI. B. Pressures to compromise five principles and how British will meet them. C. Lack of constructive attitude on part Rhodesian African nationalists. D. If Royal Commission time-gaining gambit works, problems resulting from lack of progress toward genuine solution. 6. Would appreciate action addressees’ comments this analysis and recommendations re how meet problems posed paragraph 5, insofar they pertinent at your post. Analysis should be closely held. You should not approach host government in connection drawing up your comments and recommendations. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Thomas W. McElhiney on November 8; cleared by Williams, Deputy Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs Francis T. Underhill, Judd, and Buffum; and approved by Ball. Sent to Accra, Blantyre, Canberra, Dar-es-Salaam, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Nairobi, Ottawa, Pretoria, Salisbury, Wellington, and USUN. Repeated to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Circular telegram 597, October 12, listed the British Government’s five conditions for granting independence: 1) Unimpeded progress toward majority rule; 2) Firm provisions against any retrogression by the Rhodesian Government on constitutional guarantees for majority rule; 3) Immediate constitutional advance for Africans; 4) Progress in reduction of racial discrimination including repeal of the Land Apportionment Act; and 5) Satisfactory evidence that the majority of Rhodesia’s population accepted the present 1961 Constitution as a basis for independence. (Ibid.) 490. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 490. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, November 10, 1965, 7:30 p.m. McGB Rhodesian UDI FYI. The Rhodesian situation has not changed since my Situation Report to you of yesterday. Our Consul General in Salisbury reports today that the “GSR gives more ominous signs than yesterday of being poised, indeed impatient, to take UDI.” As you requested this morning, I am attaching (Tab A) 2 three copies of State’s draft of a proposed Presidential statement in the event of UDI. It has not yet been cleared on the seventh floor, although clearances have been obtained from AF, EUR, IO, and L. Besides the draft Presidential statement, you might also want to take with you to Texas copies of the following (all attached): (1) State’s recommendation to the Secretary for US policy and action when UDI occurs (Tab B). (n.b., As of c.o.b. November 10, this document had not yet been approved by the Secretary.) 3 (2) L’s memo on “Legal Considerations Bearing on Release of Copper from US Stockpiles” (Tab C), 4 which concludes that surplus copper can be released to the UK if the President decides that it is in the best interest of the “common defense.” There is good reason to believe, however, that we will not be faced with this problem as alternate overland routes for the export of Zambian copper to the UK appear adequate. (3) Copies of the most recent telegrams from London (Tab D) 5 containing details of what the UK intends to do when UDI occurs and evaluating the situation. You will find Tab B most useful for general background purposes as well as for details of what our immediate response to UDI might be. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer. 2 Not printed. 3 Tab B is an Action Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Williams to Secretary Rusk dated November 10, not printed. A handwritten notation in the margin of the memorandum printed here reads: “See pp. 5–6.” (AF’s recommendations for action.) The copy of Williams’ memorandum in State Department files bears the handwritten notation: “Overtaken By Events.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD) 4 Not printed. 5 Not printed. 491. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State 491. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State 1 Salisbury, November 11, 1965, 1220Z. 335. Ref: Contel 334 at 13.15 local time Nov 11. 2 PM Smith read GSR proclamation declaring Rhodesian independence with continuing loyalty to Crown and promulgating new constitution “identical to existing constitution, with exception certain provisions necessary for country enjoying full sovereignty.” Smith asserted GSR had negotiated as long as possible, reassured country on ability to weather sanctions, reiterated Rhodesian desire to continue peaceful relations with other countries and not to take steps against neighbors and warned others not to underestimate Rhodesian determination to defend heritage. Concluded: “We have today assumed our sovereign independence.” Full text Smith address being transmitted USINFO. Tape also being airmailed. McClelland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Unclassified; Flash. Received at 8:09 a.m. Repeated to London, Dar-es-Salaam, Pretoria, Lusaka, USUN, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USIA at 9:53 a.m. 2 Not printed. 492. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 492. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, November 11, 1965, 8:05 p.m. 2550. British Emboff (Killick) delivered note today informing us that Office of Minister for Southern Rhodesian Affairs closed and appointments members that office terminated. Appointments terminated on grounds Southern Rhodesians in Embassy “in response formal questioning failed state they do not support action former GSR.” All Southern Rhodesian officers, including non-white Lot Senda, failed renounce action former GSR. Killick asked us not be hasty in taking such action as revoking diplomatic visas, since he felt Senda and possibly one other might change minds. We agreed take no action until British Embassy approached us again, probably in about 48 hours. We have had no contact with Southern Rhodesians except that Bentley, former Counselor Rhodesian Affairs, has requested appointment with the Secretary. Subsequently British Emboff (Walker) informed us by phone Embassy instructed formally request USG announce that we did not intend recognize SR regime and that we withdrawing McClelland. 2 Also, HMG would understand if we vague on possible US countermeasures until HMG acted. According Emboff, further instructions on way re relations US officials with former SR officials such posts as Lisbon. Still later, Walker dictated over phone note informing USG that HMG considered SRG’s declaration of independence “an act of rebellion,” that Queen had dismissed SRG PM and other Ministers, and that British High Commissioner withdrawn from Salisbury and SR High Commissioner London asked leave. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McElhiney, cleared by Judd, and approved by McElhiney. Repeated to Salisbury, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 For text of Secretary Rusk’s statement after meeting with the President at the LBJ Ranch on November 11, see Department of State Bulletin , December 6, 1965, p. 895. 493. Notes of Telephone Conversation 493. Notes of Telephone Conversation 1 Washington, November 12, 1965, 9:34 a.m. PRESIDENT JOHNSON’S NOTES ONCONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY RUSK Secretary said: “Mr. President, Arthur Goldberg will have to talk in about 45 minutes to the U.N. Security Council on Rhodesia. We feel that he ought to be as specific as he can on particular points for two reasons—to head off an African reaction that may bounce back on us on the Chinese communists issue and second to try to head off an African demand that armed forces be employed. “Now the first point that we would suggest is that we put an embargo on the shipment of arms and ammunition to Southern Rhodesia, second that we suspend action on applications for U.S. Government loans or cut in credit guarantees—there is only one case now with General Electric; third that we suspend that small sugar quota (6000 tons for Southern Rhodesia) and a lot of countries will be prepared to pick that up; fourth that we discourage American private citizens from traveling to Southern Rhodesia. “And I wanted to know if you would be prepared to go along with the aforementioned.” 2 President Johnson said: “Yes. Yes sir.” [Here follows discussion of another subject.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, Alpha Series, Rusk. No classification marking. The source text bears no indication of the drafter. 2 For text of Ambassador Goldberg’s statement on November 12, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 686–688. 494. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Fowler and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 494. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Fowler and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, November 13, 1965, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT Southern Rhodesia Ball said we are under great pressure from the British and all the African nations to go as far as we can down the British path. We have looked at the law and told Michael Stewart when he was here that under the law the President had authority to do something about our exports to SR but to take action with regard to imports would require application of trading with the enemy and this would mean a declaration of emergency or declaration of war. It would be very awkward to have a trading with the enemy act applied to SR. It would be difficult to do something about exports without also doing something about imports. Ball said he has asked the Dept to study this. If we stop our exports it would be quite a net loss. We would not be able to curtail imports and even if we did they would be imported from other countries. Also there would be an effect on our own investments not so much from expropriation but from the fact that the SR Govt might take some action that would interfere with repatriation of earnings. Ball thought SR would probably do so whether or not we act on the export control line. Ball said we had already taken a certain number of actions which have more visual than actual effect. Ball said in talking with the President at the Ranch he had told him before making a definite recommendation with regard to the export-import laws he would discuss it with Fowler. Ball said the Zambians are under great pressure from the other African nations to stop trading with SR. If they do so the SR would probably cut off the power and this would create a great mess. If there is an economic war the impact on sterling would be tremendous. Ball said when Stewart was here he asked us to be prepared to give them support. Ball said he had replied that we were in no position to make any commitment of this kind and they should not count on it. Fowler agreed we were in no position to help in this way. Ball said PM Wilson had complained in London to Bruce that Ball had not been nearly as responsive as they had expected the US Govt to be and that Ball had thrown cold water on any idea that we would help them if they got into trouble there. Fowler said we could not take on this kind of undertaking. Ball said we had made that clear. Ball said we do have this immediate question of whether we move on export licensing. The practical effect will not be very much. They can buy 90% of it from the South Africans. Fowler said he was working on something that might be offered as a substitute. It is to change the Federal Reserve Board Regulations and any other pertinent executive order documents to take SR out of the less developed country status and priority status it has on bank lending and anything else. It is mainly cosmetic but to the extent it is effective it is effective our way. (FYI. This was a hint dropped by John Stevens as something we might consider.) Ball thought this would be very good. Ball said the politics of this thing are complicated. The American Negro community regards this as a test case of the bona fides of the Administration. The President will be under a lot of heat but his inclination is the same as both Ball’s and Fowler’s. We don’t like doing things that are costly just for a political effect. Ball said he thought it would be better if they made a joint recommendation to the President. Fowler asked how long he had to thrash out this question. Ball suggested they shoot for being able to move on this Tuesday 2 morning. Ball said he would see that our material is in shape on the export problem and he would get up a memo which could be incorporated into a joint memo with Fowler’s. Ball said Solomon would be working on it in State. Fowler said Trued would be in charge but is out of town until Monday. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Britain III, 11/24/64–12/31/65. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials “jt.” 2 November 16. 495. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 495. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, November 13, 1965, 2 p.m. [Here follows discussion of an unrelated topic.] Ball then discussed the Rhodesian situation. He said it was getting confused with the copper situation because of the Zambians, and before twisting the Chileans arms too much we should look at the real problem. Bundy thought twisting the Chileans arms would be hard. We would have a moral victory if we could just get them to stay put. Ball said he agreed but our African people have turned up an answer to Kaunda’s letter which is not satisfactory—it tells him to keep his shirt on as far as sanctions against Southern Rhodesia until we get our contingency plans made. Ball said this is nonsense, because if they get into an economic war the sterling goes to “pot” unless we go in and bail the British out. Bundy said the President was clear that anything that “busts” the copper market open is of no use to him. From our point of view economic warfare between SR and Zambia is against their welfare. Ball said he was wholly on board on this one and the problem is the Security Countil is getting hysterical. Ball said he was talking to Sisco and the Africans had come in with a resolution which we might not be able to stop by abstension. It would be a Chapt. 7 Resolution and call for economic sanctions and the use of force. Ball said the French have taken the position that up to this point it is an internal British problem and have stayed out of it and abstained. Ball thought it might put the British up against the veto on this and it could be quite critical over the week-end. Ball said it would be hard for the British Govt to accept a resolution which could require British troops in against the Rhodesians. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Britain III, 11/24/64–12/31/65. No classification marking. The source bears the typed initials “jt.” 2 On November 12, the Security Council adopted, by a vote of 10 (including the United States) to 0, with 1 (France) abstention, a brief interim resolution condemning the unilateral declaration of independence and calling upon all states not to recognize or render any assistance to the illegal regime established by it. For text of Resolution 216 (1965), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 688–689. 496. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia 496. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia 1 Washington, November 13, 1965, 6:31 p.m. 707. Ref: Embtels 711 2 and 720. 3 You should see Kaunda (or other appropriate GRZ official if he unavailable) immediately. Inform him we consider it absolutely imperative GRZ take no further measures against Rhodesia, however minor, until you have opportunity discuss matter in more detail with him on basis instructions you will be receiving shortly. 4 Inform UK HiCom, if possible before you see Kaunda. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Flash. Drafted by McElhiney, cleared by Williams, and approved by McElhiney. Repeated to London. 2 Telegram 711 from Lusaka, November 12, reported that Zambia had requested that its friends, primarily the United States and Britain, provide contingency and economic assistance in order to permit it to impose a total boycott on all Rhodesian imports. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 720 from Lusaka, November 13, reported that the Zambian Government had that day introduced a series of economic and financial measures against Rhodesia, which it described as “only initial steps.” These included withdrawal of Commonwealth preference for Rhodesian goods and instructions that all government departments refuse to accept Rhodesian currency. (Ibid.) 4 In telegram 775 from Lusaka, November 14, Ambassador Robert C. Good reported that he told President Kaunda that the Department felt it imperative that Zambia take no further measures against Rhodesia. Kaunda responded that he wished to reassure the United States that he was not contemplating any provocative steps. (Ibid.) 497. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 497. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, November 18, 1965. SUBJECT 1965 Sugar Quota for Rhodesia As you know, on November 12, the President decided that the 1966 Rhodesian sugar quota of 6,094 tons would be withheld. There remains the question of what, if anything, should be done about the 1965 Rhodesian quota. The entire 1965 Rhodesian quota of 9,542 tons has been contracted for earlier this year by a US importer and is on the high seas at the present time. As I understand it, the decision reached in Texas was that we would give firm support to the British but not get out in front. Our information is that the British, although withholding their 1966 sugar quota, do propose to honor contracts entered into prior to November 12 for importation of Rhodesian sugar. For us to suspend the 1965 quota would, therefore, involve a deviation from the Texas decision. Arthur Goldberg feels very strongly, however, that we should suspend the 1965 quota. He is joined in this by our African Bureau. The AFL–CIO also feels strongly on the Rhodesian issue. The fear both in New York and among the State Department experts is that the appearance of a boatload of Rhodesian sugar at an East Coast port would cause considerable excitement at the United Nations and cast doubt on the good faith of our determination to bring down the Smith regime. Representatives of the Afro-Asian Bloc at the United Nations are apparently aware of the projected arrival of this shipload of sugar and may well undertake to start some kind of demonstration if it is permitted to arrive in the United States. The Legal Adviser’s Office of the State Department advises that the President has the authority to suspend the 1965 quota under this year’s amendments to the Sugar Act of 1948. While this might result in legal action against the US purchaser and perhaps the Government, they regard it as unlikely that such an action would be successful. Possible damages involved are on the order of $760,000, based on the difference between the contract price and the current world price of sugar. The matter is of some urgency. The ship is due to dock at Yonkers on December 10, and it is desirable to give the owners as much time as possible to divert the shipment. The Agriculture Department would prefer not to interfere with the 1965 Rhodesian quota in view of adverse comment in the trade and the possibility of legal actions. However, Under Secretary Schnittker advises that he will go along if it is determined that such action is called for by overriding political considerations. White House guidance is requested. 2 Benjamin H. Read 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63–1/66. Confidential. 2 The President decided on November 18 to suspend the 1965 and 1966 U.S. sugar quotas for Southern Rhodesia. (Memorandum from Ball to Johnson, November 19; Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Read signed the original. 498. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 498. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, November 27, 1965, 3:52 p.m. 2997. Deptel 2950. 2 UN Role in Possible Oil Embargo Southern Rhodesia. 1. In connection study feasibility oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia, should be noted as additional consideration that it may be difficult to make clear to Afro-Asian UN members solely through feasibility analysis on paper that implementation of oil embargo would have many practical difficulties. It may prove necessary in order demonstrate good faith for UK and US to actually apply some restrictive measures regardless of prognosis for success of embargo. 2. In any case we would expect US–UK study to consider following UN aspects of an oil embargo program. 3. Clearly desirable to have broadest possible support and participation any embargo program which results from present study as this would maximize pressure to comply on obvious weak links as South Africa and smaller brokers. Depending on actual content of feasibility report and on need for positive US–UK proposals in next round SC consideration of Rhodesian problem, 3 it might prove desirable seek SC Res embodying main points of whatever program US–UK may agree on, and urging all member states to support and apply it. In addition, SYG might be given role as recorder and publicizer of compliance and non-compliance. Finally, we exploring possibilities for sharing burdens of embargo and other measures against Southern Rhodesia among UN member states. Above points raised with British Embassy November 26. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 RHOD. Confidential. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Jonathan Dean on November 26; cleared by McElhiney, Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Peter H. Pfund of L/UNA, Director of the Office on Inter-African Affairs Fred L. Hadsel, and Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Mortimer D. Goldstein; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Salisbury, Lusaka, Pretoria, Lisbon, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Dated November 24. (Ibid., FT 11–2 RHOD) 3 On November 20, by a vote of 10 to 0 with France abstaining, the U.N. Security Council adopted a compromise resolution calling upon all states not to provide arms and military equipment to Rhodesia and to do their utmost to break all economic relations with it, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. For text of Resolution 217 (1965), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 689–690. 499. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State 499. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State 1 Salisbury, November 29, 1965. 448. With UDI nearly three weeks old, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn: A. Although sanctions are bound to have effect on local economy in long run, there are no signs of major repercussions in immediate future; some businesses, particularly in luxury trades, are being affected and there may be some shifts in employment, but these should not produce critical problem for several months. B. Despite some acts of intimidation, partially successful strikes in both Salisbury and Bulawayo areas, and incidents of stoning and petrol bombing, security forces remain firmly in control of country. C. Smith regime has made no moves against Zambia and continues to affirm its determination to live harmoniously with its neighbors. D. Perhaps single most important conclusion to be drawn is that white Rhodesian community appears united and solidly behind Smith regime. Because of press censorship, fact that Parliament is in recess until Feb 22, and general feeling among whites of “all hanging together or each hanging separately,” it would be extremely unwise to base hopes of any immediate change in this situation on divisive elements. 2. There is widely-held intense animosity among Rhodesian whites against person of UK PriMin Wilson, but continuing conviction that HMG will not follow through with measures to cripple Rhodesia. Among those who aware, retention sizable UK HICOM staff strengthens belief. [If] the British measures do in fact prove to be less stringent than originally expected, brunt of Rhodesian anger will concentrate on USG which already commands little affection. 3. Distasteful though prospect is, ConGen hopes USG contingency planning will include possibility of relatively long tenure Smith regime. If Smith survives for more than year, without any outside encouragement except from South Africans and Portuguese, chances will have increased geometrically that Rhodesia will fall completely into South African clutches. At that time it may well be too late to do anything to change situation short of all out military efforts. 4. If UK makes attempts aimed at finding modus operandi for renewed dialogue, this would appear from here to be all to good. The larger mentality will do more to keep regime and its followers united than anything else. It is only by introduction of fresh breaths of air that we can hope to have any constructive influence with moderate elements that might change course of events. Gebelt 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the source text but the telegram was received at 11:20 a.m. Repeated to London, Lusaka, and Pretoria. Passed to the White House DOD, CIA, CINCLANT, CINCSTRIKE, and USIA at 11:58 a.m. 500. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 500. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, November 29, 1965, 8:40 p.m. 3031. White House has received following message to President from Prime Minister: “I was very glad to have a talk with Bob McNamara and George Ball last week about the various problems that confront us. 2 I am much looking forward to discussing all these matters with you when we meet on December 17. George Ball told me that you have now asked Gilpatric to return to your service to take charge of the whole of the Rhodesia operation. This is just to say that we should be very glad to see him just as soon as he has got his eye in. On that subject, as you may know, Malcolm MacDonald has just spent a few days in Zambia with Kenneth Kaunda and has brought back with him a whole series of requests. Kenneth Kaunda, understandably, is in a very apprehensive and jumpy mood: He desperately wants to be sensible and statesmanlike but he is under great pressure from his own extremists who want him to take energetic but suicidal action against the Smith regime and from the Organization of African Unity who are pressing him to allow Zambia to be used as a base for African inspired operations against Rhodesia. In these circumstances, he has asked me to provide a British military presence in Zambia. He has two requests: First, a detachment of British troops to take over and guard the Kariba installations on the Rhodesian side of the frontier and secondly an RAF presence in Zambia to deter the Rhodesia Air Force and to pre-empt the O.A.U. He also has made a great number of economic requests. We considered these requests this morning. We decided to decline to mount the Kariba operation, not least because Smith may well have mined the installations and an operation by us might well accelerate what we want to avoid. We decided to meet the second request by sending a squadron of Javelins to Ndola. The operation, which has been planned on a contingency basis for some time, will start today and should be completed by Tuesday or Wednesday of this week. The Javelins will go into Ndola, the radar environment to Lusaka and men of the RAF regiment will go to both airfields and possibly to Livingstone as well to guard against sabotage etc. We shall thus be in occupation of all the main airfields in Zambia. We have made it a condition of acceding to this request that Zambia will invite no other foreign forces into the country without our agreement. At the same time H.M.S. Eagle, which sailed from Singapore some ten days ago, is off Dar-es-Salaam able to cover this operation, and provide a second strike in the highly unlikely case of its being necessary. Let me make it quite plain that the purpose of this operation is entirely defensive. Its main purpose is to reassure Kaunda and pre-empt a hostile (e.g. Ghanaian or U.A.R.) African presence which might well develop communist overtones. It should also indicate to the Smith regime that we are in earnest and it should enable Kaunda to resist further pressures from the more extremist of his African friends who incidentally, seem to be the more extreme the further they are away from the scene. Kenyatta and Nyerere are both being very reasonable and moderate in this whole business. I do not expect that Smith will react violently, but we are ready for him if he does. Nor do I think that this will make him react on the copper front: This would be a two-edged weapon for him, and one of the rebel ministers on television only last night emphasized Rhodesia’s interest in normal relations with Zambia. But we are well aware that a defensive military presence in Zambia, valuable though it will be, will not of itself quell this rebellion. The economic measures which we and our friends have so far taken may well do the trick, but they will take time and will not start to bite until after Christmas. We have therefore decided to go for the quick economic kill. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will be turning the financial screw more tightly: We shall add all agricultural commodities, minerals and metals to tobacco and sugar on the list of prohibited imports and hope that all other importing countries will do the same. Sir N. Kipping, former Director-General of the F.B.I., has been out to Zambia, and has a plan for replacing Zambia’a imports from Rhodesia from other sources. We shall also want to talk to the principal suppliers about cutting out exports to Rhodesia of economically important commodities. There remains the question of oil sanctions. Here action by Britain alone, even if it were thought desirable, would not be effective without international backing. This is a subject which we want to discuss with your people in the first instance, and discuss very quickly, so I hope you will agree to send Gilpatric to talk to George Brown, who is in charge of the whole economic side of our operations, as soon as possible. Meanwhile we shall take advantage of the presence here of Tom Mann to talk all these measures over with him as well as the contingency plans to keep Zambia going if relations between her and Rhodesia deteriorate. Overriding everything is my awareness which I know that Kenneth Kaunda shares, that unless we in Britain deal promptly with this rebellion and if possible without force, there is a danger of a racial war in Africa with all that that means for the free world. It is therefore encouraging that not only Kaunda, but Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote as well, should be taking the view that it is only the presence of British forces in Central Africa which can avert this catastrophe. You will, of course, realize the relevance of all this to our East of Suez role, on which McNamara will no doubt report to you.” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Herbert B. Thompson of S/S, cleared by Bromley Smith, and approved by Read. 2 Telegram 2443 from London, November 27, transmitted a memorandum of conversation of the Prime Minister’s talk with Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Ball in London on November 26. (Ibid., POL UK-US) 501. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts 501. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts 1 Washington, December 3, 1965, 6:48 p.m. 1059. Southern Rhodesia 1. You should approach host government soonest to make clear USG strongly believes most useful action on Rhodesia at present is to support British measures designed both put pressure on Southern Rhodesia to topple rebel regime and to protect Zambia from probable retaliation from SR as consequence these pressures. Indications are that some countries, specifically UAR and Tanzania, hesitant grant over-flight clearance to UK aircraft supporting movement military forces to Zambia. OAU Ministerial Conference on SR opening Dec 3 in Addis Ababa will undoubtedly discuss UK measures. 2. In approach to governments, following concrete measures undertaken by UK may be pointed out: A. Embargo on almost all imports from SR. B. Stringent financial controls, which largely remove SR control its foreign exchange held abroad. C. Direct and substantial financial assistance to Zambia. D. Dispatch of RAF unit and possibly other military forces to Zambia. 4. US firmly supports UK in its policy and is convinced UK determined bring down rebel regime. We believe UK will exert maximum economic pressure on SR and will help Zambia in event rebel regime reacts with retaliatory measures. Actions on part of any state which interferes with or blocks these British measures appears only to detract from their effectiveness. Violent and premature statements on part of other states could embarass Kaunda in his negotiations with Wilson on arrangements between these two countries on use of increased UK military forces. 5. Objective of approach to governments would ideally be instructions to their delegations in Addis Ababa designed produce resolutions assist UK and Zambia in present measures being taken. At very least, it would be hoped that no resolution would be passed which would condone activity hindering these concrete steps UK taking assist Zambia. 6. For Addis Ababa : Above may be used in approach to IEG and may be drawn upon discreetly in your continuing reporting contacts for exchange of views with delegation members. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Southern Rhodesian Affairs Michael P. Hoyt; cleared by Kinsey, McElhiney, William D. Rogers of U, Officer in Charge of Ethiopian Affairs Fred J. Galanto, and Goldstein; and approved by Williams. Sent to Nairobi, Kampala, Blantyre, Lusaka, Lagos, Addis Ababa, Dar-es-Salaam, Abidjan, and pouched to Salisbury and London. 502. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 502. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 6, 1965. Mac— I’m becoming quite concerned lest Rhodesia rapidly get out of hand. So I’ve redrafted my memo to make this point, and to help the President by showing that there’s more than one option, even at cost of appearing an advocate. The reason is that State has to my knowledge never given him the whole picture, only a set of piecemeal tactical requests, and a general philosophy that this is a situation in which we can make haste slowly. Partly of course this is because no one wanted to bother LBJ unduly during convalescence, and also because the Seventh Floor professes to feel that he himself wants to stay as far away from yet another mess as he can. However, this is also the Seventh Floor’s own feeling and I’m not at all sure their wish isn’t father to the thought. Hence my memo which you might just leave at the Ranch. It has the merit of giving the other side of the story. Nor do I feel apologetic for my consistent instinct—now amply supported by the evidence—that State’s counsels of caution ignore the likelihood that such crises tend to get worse if we let them drift, and that we’re likely to get sucked into this one sooner or later anyway. It is also sheer inconsistency for State to send the President a Strengthened Africa Program, but not warn him that our stance on Rhodesia will have a far more decisive impact on our influence in that dark continent. RWK Attachment Washington, December 6, 1965, 5 p.m. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The Rhodesia Mess. Without mounting a neighing charger (I agree with Bruce that we should look any UK gift horse in the mouth), I offer this broader look at a looming problem than the piecemeal tactical requests put up to you so far. Moreover, at risk of being frankly partisan, I think that you should be given the case for action now to match against the counsels of caution natural in this situation. As the recent OAU meeting shows, 2 the Rhodesia crisis is already moving a lot faster than the UK bargained for. There is a mounting risk that Wilson may lose control of it to a gaggle of irresponsible Africans, perhaps with Soviet support. All this is happening while the British (and we) debate whether the UK should go for some kind of “quick kill” strategy, or a much slower economic strangulation. However, this question may soon become academic. The real question for the UK may rapidly become one of whether it can move fast enough to forestall African escalation. This in turn may depend on the kind of support we can offer, because the UK will find it very hard to carry out any effective strategy without such support. Thus we probably can exert a decisive influence on HMG’s choice. A. Why get involved in Rhodesia? There’s no doubt that we ought to duck this mess if we can afford to, leaving it to the British or others. We already have enough even larger problems on our plate. But can we? Rhodesia itself isn’t very important to us. But the point is that it’s critical to all the other Africans. They see it as a straight anti-colonial issue, and all their anti-white instincts are aroused. So our stance on this issue will greatly affect our influence throughout Africa—it will be a test of whether we mean what we say about self-determination and racialism. It will be far more significant than the Congo in this sense. Next, we’re already involved. We’ve declared ourselves at the UN and imposed some sanctions. We’ll be under great Afro-Asian and UN pressure to do a lot more. Nor would I discount the likelihood of growing domestic pressure here for supporting in Africa what we insist on at home. Third is the rapidly growing risk that the UK may lose control of this game, or even throw up its hands and let the OAU take over. The radical Africans are already trying hard to force the issue. They’ll plug for use of overt force or guerilla warfare, thus posing the UK (and US) with the dilemma of either helping out or seeing the Soviets, Chicoms, and Nasser do so (or maybe even being pressed to join with them). Thus the longer this crisis rolls, the greater the chance of it becoming a far bigger and less controllable affair, with pressures on us to block the Communists a la the Congo. Fourth is the inevitable pressure on a quarter of the world’s copper supply if Zambia and Katanga are cut off by the Rhodesians. Finally, as Arthur Goldberg points out (NY 2411), how we handle Rhodesia will also directly affect the remaining agenda of Portuguese territories, Southwest Africa, and apartheid. The longer the Rhodesian boil goes unlanced, the sharper the confrontation over the Southern third of Africa will become. Conversely, if we can lick Smith quickly, it may induce greater Portuguese and perhaps even South African flexibility as they see the handwriting on the wall. For all these reasons, it is unrealistic to think we can stay aloof. The odds are that if the British don’t move fast—which they probably won’t without our support—we’ll probably be compelled to get involved anyway, but under far worse circumstances. If so, then it might be much better—and less costly in the long run—to try and help the UK choke Ian Smith quickly. This case is outlined in more detail below. B. Will a slow economic squeeze work? The answer seems to be “no,” as the UK itself is coming to realize. Economic sanctions will take time and could prove ineffective. Time may also play into the hands of Ian Smith and his crowd. With South Africa and perhaps Portugal quietly determined to sustain the Smith regime, the key to an effective sanction campaign is missing. This is one reason for Wilson’s reluctance to invoke total economic sanctions, or to support an oil embargo unless other nations comply. So Ian Smith is betting that, with a little belt tightening, he can outwait the UK, the UN, and the Africans, who will soon adjust to a fait accompli. The UK has talked of the Smith regime’s collapse in terms of three to six months, since the real bite may be delayed till the tobacco sales next spring. But the longer it stays afloat, the less chance for its downfall. C. The Likelihood of Escalation . But an even more compelling reason is that economic sanctions won’t have time to work because the Africans will probably force the issue first. African frustration is growing in direct proportion to UK and UN inability to bring Rhodesia to heel. As during the Congo crisis, African pressure for direct military action, fed by the Chicoms and Soviets, will probably increase rather than fade out. Bitterly dissatisfied with UK action to date, they are trying to up the ante, either by prodding the UK to take more drastic steps or by taking the initiative away from it. D. The key is what Rhodesia’s neighbor Zambia does . Unless it joins the other Africans, they will be noisy but largely impotent. But Kaunda is under increasing pressure to act, even though Rhodesian retaliation would cripple Zambia’s economy and put great pressure on copper. To ease this pressure, Kaunda has pled for UK forces. The UK is sending a fighter squadron and probably an infantry battalion too. HMG is also talking about shifting to a “quick kill” strategy, though we don’t know yet whether these moves—and bold words—are designed mainly to pacify Kaunda and others, or betoken a really new UK plan. In any case, such moves might actually encourage Kaunda to take precipitate action in the expectation that the UK and US would bail him out. Almost all of Zambia’s hydro power, coal, POL, etc. comes in from or through Rhodesia. Smith hesitates to cut it off, because Rhodesia would lose its most lucrative customer (with much greater economic impact than from the present sanctions). But he might do so in desperation. US/UK studies show that it would be very hard and quite expensive to keep Zambia afloat. The biggest problem would be to get enough coal in to run Zambia’s railroads and provide power for its mines, and then to get copper out. Alternate rail routes are not very good, and depend mostly on tacit Portuguese cooperation. A civilian airlift seems very expensive for more than a minimum of emergency supplies. One partial hope would be to step up coal output quickly from a new Zambian mine, though it’s lower quality coal. All this leads to three conclusions : (1) At present reading this crisis will probably get much worse rather than tail off; (2) the UK may lose the whip hand, which would make the mess even worse; (3) sooner or later Zambia will clash with Rhodesia, and then appeal for a rescue operation—which would be very expensive. E. What are the US options? Barbara Ward listed them in the analysis she sent you. They boil down to (1) stay loose and let the UK do what it can; or (2) back the UK in taking a stronger line. But if I’m right, we don’t really have two options; instead it’s more a choice between helping the UK move faster now (with our backing), or being dragged in later when the UK may no longer be in control. It’s the perennial question of whether it would be wiser—and cheaper—to move vigorously to choke off a crisis, or to play it more gradually. F. Could tougher measures bring Smith to heel quickly? There is no easy answer. The key is to convince the Rhodesians that they’re going to be in impossible hot water if they don’t back down. Preliminary troop dispositions and tougher economic measures would help, and may also be essential to keep the other Africans to give the UK a chance. The mere threat of forceful seizure of Kariba could have an enormous psychological impact, both within and outside Southern Rhodesia. The case against such “quick kill” threats is that they might only trigger Rhodesia to cut Zambia’s water off. But once again the point is that if the UK doesn’t move fast, African pressure on Zambia may force it to self-inflict this wound anyway. And once the Africans themselves get going on a military solution the chances of a UK-style solution will be compromised. Thus there may even be a strong case for urging the UK to consider use of force. This would be highly painful to Wilson, but less so to us. I’d hazard that our commitment could be limited to airlift of UK troops. This would be a lot less expensive than bailing out Zambia. G. What would it cost us to back the UK fully now? Wilson is operating both politically and economically so close to the margin that it will be hard for him to act decisively unless he can count on us. His people have already presented a bill of particulars (London 2488 attached). We just don’t know yet how much these measures would cost us. Presumably stockpile releases for the “common defense” would be done on a deferred barter basis without B/P impact; if done as a sale they would help our payments balance. Most of what we lent or supplied to help Zambia (locomotives, rail cars, cargo planes) would doubtless be US-made too. These things need careful study, but I’d hazard that the costs would be less than those if the Africans take over, with Soviet support. And if the plan misfired, we’d be no worse off than we would be anyway if Zambia’s links with Rhodesia will be cut sooner or later in any case. H. Conclusions . (1) We can’t stand aloof from the Rhodesia crisis—events won’t let us; (2) a gradual economic squeeze already seems inadequate to bring Smith to heel; (3) the slower the UK moves the more likely the Africans will take over—with unpredictable results. Nor does a cautious US policy really protect us from eventual greater involvement; it may merely postpone this until after the crisis has become much worse. If all this is so, then urging the UK toward a quick kill—provided that it seems to have a fair chance of working—may be our best bet. HMG isn’t asking to take over, but only to back it. All we need say is that we’ll consider doing so, if the UK plan looks reasonable (they haven’t really shown all their cards as yet). But Washington’s inclination will be to err on the side of caution unless you call for a serious look at a quick kill. To do so would not commit you, merely offer a better basis for choice. R.W. Komer 3 Attachment The UK has asked for our reactions to the following questions (State’s preliminary reactions are also given): 1. Will the US take actions corresponding to the UK’s intensified trade and financial sanctions, and support UK efforts to get others to do the same? We are willing to approach private US companies to encourage their voluntary support of UK sanctions; we already have Presidential authorization to regulate US exports to Rhodesia and can match UK action commodity by commodity; we would support UK efforts to enlist the cooperation of other countries. 2. If the US cannot support an immediate oil embargo, how far are we prepared to go? We don’t want to commit ourselves to more than consultations on this subject because an oil embargo is ineffective without a naval blockade. 3. Would the US agree to meet the cost of any equipment, more quickly obtainable in the US, which Zambia urgently needs for contingency planning? We first need to study the contingency planning exercise. 4. Would the US join the UK in the financing (insofar as Zambia is unable to finance) and planning of an airlift? We would agree to join in planning, but not in financing. 5. Would the US release manganese from stockpile and help persuade the Belgians to take it in order to release freight cars to carry additional Zambian copper out via the Congo? We’d agree to sell manganese from stockpile to the Belgians. 6. In the event of a copper shortage, would the US agree to help the UK and Europeans from our stockpile? We would not be able to release stockpile copper. 7. Would the US participate in an economic mission going to Zambia next week to delve into the economic ramifications of UDI? We would not participate; however, we’d send an economist to our Embassy to work with the mission. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Rhodesia. Secret. 2 The OAU Foreign Ministers met in Addis Ababa December 3–5 and voted to break diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom by December 15, if it had not crushed the Rhodesian rebellion by that date. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 503. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 503. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 8, 1965. McGB Situation Report: Rhodesian Crisis 1. Most of the African governments are looking for face-saving ways to avoid complying with the December 15 deadline for a diplomatic break with the UK. The present reading indicates that the hard-line holdouts are the UAR, Tanzania, Ghana, Guinea, Congo (B) and Burundi. 2. Ball’s meeting with the UK officials continues late into the afternoon without any firm indication of the atmospherics. The most I’ve been able to hear was a second-hand quote from a UK Embassy officer: “The air is thin.” 3. In Salisbury, Smith has threatened severe retaliatory measures against the UK’s economic sanctions: a) repatriation of Africans from Zambia and Malawi, if UK sanctions cause unemployment; b) requiring payment in non-sterling foreign currencies for goods delivered to Zambia; c) possible increase in the price of Rhodesian coal; d) possible increase in railway charges to Zambia; e) reductions of imports from the UK. 4. The latest on-the-spot report from our Congen in Salisbury indicates that “at the end of the first month of illegal independence, the regime is firmly in control and not under any obligation, as a result of internal pressure, to yet turn back.” Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63–1/66. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. 504. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 504. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, December 8, 1965, 7:22 p.m. 3246. The following message from the President was transmitted today to Prime Minister Wilson: “Thank you very much for your thoughtful message on the Rhodesian situation. I cannot express too strongly my admiration for the calm but forceful way you have taken personal responsibility of this complex and difficult problem. Within the limits imposed on us by Vietnam, we intend to give our utmost support for your efforts to reach an acceptable solution in Rhodesia. As you know, our people are tightening the economic noose. We have established administrative machinery for controls on exports and will put these into effect in tandem with yours. We are asking our importers to restrict the shipment of Rhodesian goods to our shores, though total value of these imports last year amounted to only $11 million. We will recognize the authority of the newly-appointed Board of Governors of the Rhodesian Bank. And we are prepared to talk with our oil companies about termination of shipments to Rhodesia, depending on the outcome of your analysis of this particular dilemma. We all hope that these measures will produce the desired objective. At the moment, however, we here feel that it is hard to be certain of favorable results in a short period of time. Because of this, we are convinced that the maintenance of Zambia-Katanga copper exports must take a high place in our planning. Our long-term interests indicate that the only sensible course of action is that which avoids strangling the Zambian economy and dislocating world copper markets for any substantial period of time. The efforts involved and the possible dangers, both economic and political, are so great that I think we should, as you suggest, arrange to have our people get together before our meeting on December 17. Although Roswell Gilpatric will not be available for this, George Ball has himself organized a group within his own office at the State Department which is acting as a focal point for the Rhodesian situation. They are presently discussing with your representatives measures in East Africa and at the UN in the coming difficult weeks and going over the Rhodesian items to come up at our meeting—to which I look forward with great pleasure.” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Exdis. Drafted at the White House and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. 505. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 505. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, December 9, 1965, 12:15 p.m. RE Southern Rhodesia B reported things are going well in the meetings with Roll 2 and Dean re above. They have until the 15th on the ultimatum—that means they should have an announcement by Monday 3 or Tuesday so that the Africans don’t start a stampede which would be hard to reverse. B feels the thing that would have the most effect on the Africans would be oil. We have gone into this in detail; there are only three companies involved. If the British, as sovereign in Rhodesia, took some kind of legal action against the import of oil and we could get our companies to go along with the British; B felt the French would also join, etc. The immediate question B needs guidance on is: Does Bundy think the President would object to our getting the American companies in on the assumption the British get theirs, asking them to comply. Bundy thought this would be all right but suggested Ball send the President an informational memorandum in the night’s reading, saying this is what we are doing, following the British lead which is designed to tamp down African reaction. We could back it up later, if the President should need it. It would be better coming from Ball to the President than any other way. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, S. Rhodesia, 10/2/65–5/10/66. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials “vh.” 2 Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Under Secretary, U.K. Department of Economic Affairs. 3 December 13 . 506. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 506. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, December 9, 1965, 7:39 p.m. 3274. Thursday PM meeting ended two days of talks with UK officials headed by Sir Eric Roll. Last meeting summarized discussions: Economic sanctions : US has scheduled meetings with asbestos and lithium importers seeking voluntary controls. Similar meeting to be held with chrome importers after consideration has been given to stockpile availability. Voluntary controls on these commodities would approximate 80% US imports from Rhodesia, putting US roughly in line with UK import bans. UK is refining information on exports to Rhodesia. UK will consult with Embassy London when it has reached decisions on UK export bans. UK considering possibility of complete UK export ban rather than selected items, and thinks this would have its advantages even if US banned only selected exports. US stated it would cooperate in any event in matching export controls insofar as possible. UK, through consultation with third countries, hopes to raise cut-off of Rhodesian exports from present 25–30% level to 50–60% in near future. Our Embassies have been instructed to cooperate with UK demarches in this regard (Cir. 1070). 2 Recent UK financial measures aimed at cutting off Rhodesian credit and forcing cash payments for Rhodesian imports. US has recognized UK-named Board of Rhodesian Bank. US told UK it cannot control private Rhodesian accounts, but US suggested it might talk informally to NY banks to discourage any short-term credit to Rhodesian importers. US gave UK reps memorandum outlining possible UK legal actions that might cause economic uncertainty and administrative difficulties for Rhodesia. Zambian contingency planning : Timing of UK mission to Lusaka still not firm. UK suggests Reed should consult High Commissioner when he arrives Lusaka. UK requested information what financial aid, if any, US might supply for maintenance Great North Road, Benguela route, airlift. “Every little bit helps.” US took questions under advisement and indicated difficulty obtaining contingency funds. On POL airlift, UK now talking of Leopoldville-E’ville lift as supplement or alternative to Dar-Lusaka route. In view December 15, US urged UK to announce or commence some airlift ASAP. US to give UK Embassy Washington FAA analysis joint airlift study tomorrow. If US decides it can contribute airlift, joint planning will take place in London. UK to approach immediately Belgians and Congolese in effort to overcome reported reluctance to upgrade efficiency of BCK line. UK will report results to US. US to repeat to London Michell’s preliminary report from Dar so it available before Michell’s London stopover. Bridgman will also stop over. POL Embargo : London’s 2605 3 overtaken. Scenario now as follows, all pending highest level agreement both sides: (1) UK immediately to evaluate likelihood of Smith cut-off Zambia POL supply, latest info re Zambian POL reserves, effect embargo announcement would have in Africa and time within which airlift could be mounted and ground transport brought into operation. UK then will notify US of its willingness to institute embargo provided US can obtain voluntary compliance of its companies. (2) US will then seek voluntary compliance its companies. (3) UK and US to seek compliance by three other countries involved in Umtali refinery consortium (Netherlands, France, Kuwait), and secondarily to seek cooperation of other exporting nations who could fill the gap left by consortium embargo. (4) Assuming some support three principal other nations, public announcement embargo to be made. December 15 is target date, although obviously difficult. Copper : UK to send copper expert here next week, probably Wilks, Board of Trade. US told UK it unwilling to consider release copper stockpile, or international allocation of domestic consumption, leaving main area for discussion allocation based on import movements. However, agreed formally there would be no preconditions to discussion. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential. Drafted by Rogers and Daniel K. Mayers of U; cleared by Goldstein, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon, Mary J. Wichser of AID’s Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Williams, and Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs Murray J. Belman; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Lusaka and USUN. 2 Dated December 4. (Ibid., FT 11–2 RHOD) 3 Dated December 6. (Ibid., PET 17–2 RHOD) 507. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 507. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, December 11, 1965, 11:40 a.m. Ball said we have been giving a very hard look at the whole Rhodesian problem; we have been talking with the British, etc. Ball said we are seriously contemplating voluntary oil embargo on Rhodesia and effect would probably be that Rhodesia would cut off flow of POL into Zambia and we might have to have some airlift. British have asked if we would set up separate airlift, but we are considering one ancillary to British. Ball said he thinks time has come where we should sit down and take a hard look at this with some of Vance’s people. Vance asked what sort of quantity Ball had in mind and Ball said initially about three Connies. Ball said one of limiting factors is hard stands at the two airports. Vance said MAT supply is short right now. Ball asked about availability of a few planes and Vance said he thought it could be done. Vance said he would look into it and have his people get together with Ball’s. Ball said should be tomorrow as British want to move on announcement of oil embargo before December 15. Vance said he was coming over for Noon meeting and they could talk further about it. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, S. Rhodesia, 10/2/65–5/10/66. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials “jm.” 508. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 508. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, December 13, 1965. 7 p.m. Ball said he had a problem which he thought he would have to give an answer to the British tonight. It is the question of the airlift for oil in Rhodesia. The situation is that we have agreed with the British that we will get our oil companies to stop sending oil into Rhodesia if they will do the same with theirs. Our oil companies were in this afternoon and Ball thought they would go along. Ball said he had told the British to get an order in council which would help the oil companies with their own directors. Ball thought they would do this. B said the oil that goes into Rhodesia goes into a refinery in Rhodesia which in return supplies Zambia. If we cut off the oil to Rhodesia their first impulse is to husband their supply and they would say they have to cut off oil to Zambia. Ball said we could not have this for very long because their stocks are very low. The mines would have to stop pumping and we would be in trouble with copper. Ball said an airlift has to be set up on a temporary basis to enable them to carry oil in for about two months. The British have asked us to join them—we would have one from one point and they from another. Ball said he had told the British we could not do this but we would explore the possibility of putting additional men and planes in. The Air Force does not have the planes to do it and we would get civilian planes on charter. Ball said the total cost of the operation would be about half million dollars. There would be no problem on the balance of payments (gold outflow) because for the most part the planes and crews would be US. However, Ball said he thought we should get the Boss’ reaction and the British would like an answer tonight. Ball said he planned for this to be a public arrangement and we want to be able to announce that we are reinforcing the air lift because we want to get some kudos out of the Africans ourselves. Bundy said he would do his best to reach the President and he would have to do it within the next half hour. If not they would just go ahead. 7:05 p.m. Bundy had one question—why do we need to join in something that is as low in cost as this? Is this something we want to do? Ball replied that he thought we wanted to do it and the British say they are putting in a lot more money and that it will exhaust the supply of planes readily available to them which they could get for sterling in the UK. Ball said he told the British the most we would be prepared to do would be to reinforce them. Bundy asked why it would be for two months. Ball said by that time they will be able over the rail facilities to get enough oil in to stock it and could manage. 7:10 p.m. Bundy said the President said o.k. go ahead. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, S. Rhodesia, 10/12/65–11/2/66. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials “jt.” 509. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 509. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 14, 1965. McGB: Situation Report: Rhodesian Crisis 1. At Kenya’s request, today’s UNSC meeting on Rhodesia has been cancelled; Kenya reserves the right to call for another meeting later this week. 2. State’s approach to the major US suppliers of oil to Rhodesia on voluntary compliance with an oil embargo met with a reluctantly favorable response. While doubting the efficacy of an oil embargo, the oil companies’ sole condition was that the UK issue an order-in-council to provide them with “legal cover” for voluntary compliance. 3. Approaches to US importers of Rhodesian lithium, chrome and asbestos (accounting for about 75% of US imports from Rhodesia) for voluntary compliance with sanctions met with no apparent dissent. However, compliance would raise technical problems for some importers. 4. We have told the UK we are prepared to support a Zambian airlift with either three DC–7C’s or one 707 provided, (a) support is limited to a 2-month period, (b) cost is kept below $300,000 per month, and (c) it is understood this is not an open-end undertaking. 5. An IBRD Vice-President is enroute to Rhodesia and Zambia to explore the possibility of the Bank acting as a trustee or custodian of the Kariba Dam installation. Comment : The cancellation of today’s UNSC meeting temporarily takes some of the pressure off the US and UK to broaden and intensify sanctions. Kenya’s request for cancellation is probably due to the lack of any instructions from the Kenyan Government. With increasing defections from the OAU December 15 deadline for a diplomatic break with the UK, the position of the Africans is both confused and weakened. The next move is the UK’s when Wilson addresses the UNSC on Thursday. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 17. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. 510. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 510. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 15, 1965, 1 p.m. McGB: Situation Report: Rhodesian Crisis (Sensitive information is bracketed) 2 1. So far, Guinea is the only African state to break diplomatic relations with the UK pursuant to the December 15 OAU deadline. 2. HMG has told the Tanzanians and Kenyans that it had moved to a position in support of mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII and to some form of IBRD presence at Kariba. This probably provoked the Kenyan cancellation of its request for a UNSC meeting and also may account for Tanzania’s silence on a diplomatic break with the UK. (3. UK Embassy sources here tell us that HMG has now changed its position in support of Chapter VII economic sanctions. So far, neither Tanzania nor Kenya has been informed. Having altered their respective positions on the strength of the UK’s representations to them, Tanzania and Kenya will undoubtedly feel betrayed. The result will be terrifically intensified problems for the US and UK in trying to keep African responses to UDI in constructive channels. US concern has been relayed to London.) 4. Zambia is sending a 4-man ministerial mission to London on Sunday to discuss the safeguarding and securing of the Kariba Dam with troops. If talks with the UK fail, the mission will split in two with the Foreign Minister coming to Washington and the Finance Minister going to Moscow for talks on the same subject. (5. Wilson has sent word of his approval of an oil embargo and Zambian airlift on our terms. We have replied that UK approval ignores the UK order-in-council upon which the voluntary cooperation of our oil companies is predicated. We have proposed that they announce the order-in-council in London. Whereupon, we would be prepared to make a simultaneous announcement of the details of our support for the UK.) 3 ( Comment : At present the UK position seems confused. Our understanding of their strategy is hindered by the absolute UK black-out on information regarding the substance of Wilson’s speech to the UNGA tomorrow. We have repeatedly pointed out to the British that their failure to take us into their complete confidence could affect the outcome of the President’s talks with Wilson later this week.) (The timing of the UK’s reneging on its support of Chapter VII economic sanctions could not be worse: (a) African frustration is at its highest over their inability to comply with the OAU Foreign Ministers’ resolution; (b) Kenya and Tanzania have altered their public positions in reliance on UK assurances; (c) Zambia, a key country, is moving toward a more aggressive stance.) Addendum . Rhodesian PM Ian Smith is scheduled to appear on CBS’ Face the Nation on December 26th. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer. 2 In fact, that information is in parentheses. 3 For text of the December 17 statement issued by the Department of State supporting the British decision to prohibit oil imports into Rhodesia, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 693–694. 511. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 511. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, December 16, 1965. JCSM–882–65 SUBJECT Measures Against Rhodesia (C) 1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–27, 885/65, dated 6 December 1965, 2 which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze Rhodesian defense capabilities, estimate the nature and size of military force required to accomplish specified objectives, and point up any particular military problems in mounting the operation. 2. (S) From the standpoint of plausible national involvements in Rhodesia, including a United Nations force, there are almost unlimited combinations of military force that could be examined. Since Rhodesia is an area of recognized UK primacy, it appears that military intervention in Rhodesia, if any, will most likely be accomplished primarily by UK forces. 3. (S) The detailed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the information requested are contained in the Appendix. 3 A summary of these views is set forth below: a. The small Rhodesian active Army (3,000), Air Force (69 assorted aircraft), and Police Force (5,100) are well led and in a high state of readiness. The Rhodesian Government can mobilize an additional 6,000 reservists on extremely short notice. This force is capable of successfully meeting any likely threat posed by African states, but it could not repulse a major UK military effort. The major Rhodesian strength is her ability to make deliberate preparations for defense behind the formidable Zambezi River obstacles and the ability to destroy the critical Kariba Dam power facilities and the Wankie coal mines. The major military weaknesses of the Rhodesians are the limited size of their forces and difficulty in replenishing ammunition, spare parts, and POL supplies if confronted by a major UK military force. b. The estimated nature and size of the UK force required to take and hold the Kariba Dam area and the Wankie coal field are: one airborne/infantry division force, three tactical fighter squadrons, combatand logistic support forces, and necessary airlift. Two brigades would be employed to secure the Wankie coal mines and maintain a rail line of communications to the Zambian border, and one brigade would be employed on the south bank of the Zambezi River to seize and hold the Kariba Dam. c. An estimate of the UK military force required to overcome Rhodesian resistance and restore lawful government is: two airborne/infantry division forces, five tactical fighter squadrons, combat and logistic support forces, and necessary airlift. One airborne division would be employed to seize and hold the Kariba Dam and the Wankie coal mining areas; and, subsequently, one reinforced infantry division would be used to seize and hold the capital city of Salisbury. d. Major problems which bear on a UK military operation in Rhodesia are as follows: (1) The loyalties of the 225,000 white Rhodesians are difficult to determine; but, initially, the majority would probably be loyal to the Smith government. Over an extended period, the white urban population would be inclined to accept the authority of Her Majesty’s Government. The rural white Rhodesians, however, would probably resist and harass a UK force. (2) South Africa and Portugal would probably furnish major economic support to Rhodesia. South Africa might furnish some military supplies and volunteers to Rhodesia, but it is doubtful that either South Africa or Portugal would overtly deploy forces to Rhodesia to fight against the United Kingdom. (3) There is a shortage of UK troop transport to meet this and other commitments. (4) The United Kingdom would have difficulty in mustering adequate combat forces, both ground and air, because of current commitments. (5) It is probable that military action in Rhodesia would result in destruction of the Kariba Dam facilities and certain Wankie coal fields. 4. (S) If the United Kingdom should request US military assistance, it would most likely be for military airlift for deployment of UK forces to the area and their continued logistical support. There are three AFSTRIKE troop carrier squadrons which could be committed if implementation were directed. Their employment would, however, result in the cancellation of other commitments such as deployment of one troop carrier squadron to Southeast Asia, support for GEMINI recovery, programmed USAFSTRIKE support of MATS, and airlift support for deployment of one tactical fighter squadron to Southeast Asia. 5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that any US military commitment in Rhodesia is militarily unsound because of the resultant degradation of the US strategic military posture. Present major military commitments in NATO, Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Dominican Republic do not permit an additional significant military commitment wherein the depth of involvement is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that no US military forces be committed to operations in the Rhodesian crisis. 6. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is downgraded to Secret. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: David L. McDonald Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Rhodesia 091. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the source reads: “Sec Def has seen.” 2 Not printed. A copy is ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 092 Rhodesia. 3 Not found. 512. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 512. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 16, 1965, 9:30 a.m. SUBJECT The Wilson Visit You currently have three meetings with Wilson: 5:15 today (1–1/2 hours), lunch at 1:00 tomorrow with a small working group, and a third meeting, with a communique, at 4 p.m. tomorrow. There are six main subjects which I list in the order of their importance to the British: 1. Rhodesia 2. The British defense review 3. Vietnam and Malaysia 4. India/Pakistan 5. Non-proliferation and East/West relations 6. Nuclear arrangements with the Germans Dean Rusk will be here tomorrow morning but not before, and for this reason I think you might wish to save Vietnam, Soviet relations, and nuclear arrangements with the Germans until tomorrow. That would leave Rhodesia, British defense, and India/Pakistan for this afternoon. (1) Rhodesia This is Wilson’s make-or-break issue. He must go the limit to break Smith without shooting, and we are not at all sure he can do it. So far we have given full support on economic measures, including airlift support for oil to Zambia. But Wilson may use this meeting to lay the basis for more: in particular, he may feel us out on help to keep Zambian copper moving or even for access to U.S. stockpile copper. We have resisted any such feelers, and you may want to hear George Ball on this subject. [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, PM Wilson Visit, 2/17/65. Secret. 513. Memorandum of Conversations 513. Memorandum of Conversations 1 Washington, December 16–17, 1965. VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF PRIME MINISTER WILSON December 16–18, 1965 [Here follows a record of a private meeting between the President and Prime Minister Wilson, December 16, 5:15–6:10 p.m.] Cabinet Room Meeting, December 16, 1965, 6:10–7:20 p.m. (From notes dated December 17 prepared by Francis Bator) PARTICIPANTS The President Acting Secretary George Ball Ambassador Bruce Ambassador Hand (Part of time) McGeorge Bundy William Moyers Francis Bator Jack Valenti (Part of time) Prime Minister Wilson Ambassador Dean Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet Derek Mitchell, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.] Rhodesia President : Asked Mr. Ball to summarize our position on providing support for the oil embargo of Rhodesia. Mr. Ball: Very tough problem. We can manage to help you in ameliorating a crisis—but if copper supply dries up completely and serious sterling troubles, there will be real difficulty. We can help you with an oil embargo if you will go ahead with an Order in Council, thereby providing protection for our oil companies against any damage claims. We can supplement your airlift to supply oil to Zambia in case Smith retaliates by cutting off the flow of oil to Zambia. It is our judgment that such an oil embargo would put real pressure on Rhodesia even if it is not airtight. We would have to get the Germans, Italians, and French to go along. We think they would probably cooperate. There might be problems with the South Africans. Prime Minister: We must expect Smith to retaliate by cutting off oil to Zambia—we could manage to offset this. More serious, they could cut the electricity. We have warned Smith that we would retaliate by cutting off his electric supply. If they take the third step and cut off coal, this would pose “a phenomenal problem”. The best we could probably do would be to provide Zambia enough oil to keep the mines pumping. But there would be no output of copper. There are three questions: (i) Will the large oil companies cooperate—what if they do not play? What about a free booter? Any such leakage would lead to very great pressure for a blockage in the UN. (ii) Angola—two frigates could probably stop that. (iii) South Africa—we are not overly pessimistic about this; though they do some very evil things, they are very law-abiding; it’s possible that they would not, in fact, try to break down an embargo. We will go forward with an Order in Council—a bit worried about it with our thin parliamentary situation, and will qualify it (“as long as Smith’s government lasts”); but we will do it. Zambia is the key to the entire situation; hope they remain reasonable. It is important to keep things in the UN as quiet as possible, and to have the right answers for the Zambian missions to Moscow, Washington and London. We are quite clear about what to do if and when Smith does fall; UK will have to resume effective government of Rhodesia; UK will have to take parliamentary control on all matters of human and civil rights; troops will have to go back under British control. It will put us back 40 years, but it can’t be helped. Hope President will agree to George Ball’s proposals, and that Arthur Goldberg will help in the UN to keep things quiet. Mr. Ball: I have talked to Arthur and he is fairly optimistic. UK must keep the initiative and responsibility on this; the principle we must follow is that these are UK measures, which the U.S. is reinforcing—not joint measures. President: We will reinforce and supplement what you do. Prime Minister: Should like to work out the language on the airlift as soon as possible so as to indicate that we are “not alone.” We have a specific question that I will have to decide this evening. Do we divert a ship on its way to Rhodesia? It carries a two-week supply of oil. A tough problem; it is probably safer to let it go through despite the two-week supply. Mr. Ball: We do not want to inhibit your decision either way. The President has approved the program we outlined to you so that our position is clear. Prime Minister: “Quite right. We have got your mind on the general situation and will make our own decision on the immediate problem.” Meeting at British Embassy, Morning of December 17 PARTICIPANTS Prime Minister Wilson Ambassador Dean Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to Cabinet Derek Mitchell, Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister Under Secretary Ball Secretary McNamara Mr. McGeorge Bundy Rhodesia was the principal subject of discussion and agreement was reached on the announcements to be made of an oil embargo and U.S. participation in an airlift for Zambia. No detailed record of the discussion is available. White House Lunch for Prime Minister and Subsequent Conversation December 17, 1–3 p.m. (Based on Comments of Assistant Secretary Leddy and Ambassador Bruce) PARTICIPANTS The President Secretary Rusk Under Secretary Ball Ambassador Bruce Ambassador Hand McGeorge Bundy Assistant Secretary John Leddy William Moyers Jack Valenti Francis Bator Prime Minister Wilson Ambassador Dean Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet Michael Stewart, Minister Derek Mitchell, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister Oliver Wright, Assistant Private Secretary to the Prime Minister Lloyd Hughes, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister John Killick, Counselor Rhodesia The Prime Minister concentrated during lunch on the subject of Rhodesia. He expressed appreciation for United States backing, particularly on the oil sanctions and the airlift for Zambia. The Prime Minister took an optimistic view of the prospects of bringing down the Smith regime in a short time through economic action. While the Prime Minister did not give a specific time estimate, Oliver Wright, Assistant Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, subsequently told Ambassador Bruce that it was hoped to achieve this result in a matter of weeks. [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.] 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2567, Visit of Prime Minister Wilson, December 15–19, 1965, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Prepared in the Department of State. 514. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 514. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 20, 1965, 4:30 p.m. Rhodesia becoming a US problem. The Africans in their frustration are turning increasingly to the US in their disillusionment with the UK. This will put us more and more under the gun. 2 Nyerere of Tanzania has written you (Tab A) 3 asking US support for (1) mandatory UN sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter; and (2) a UN peace keeping force to take over the Kariba dam. He told us he wanted to fly here and discuss this at the UN and with you; now he’s dropped the idea for the moment. Zambia’s Kaunda has also written (Tab B) 4 asking for some C–130s for the emergency airlift he needs because the US/UK oil embargo led Rhodesia to cut off Zambia’s oil. We’re allotting 3 civilian DC–7s to the airlift, but reports suggest that present US/UK plans will fall far short of the demand. Pressures on us for more help will mount steadily. There are new African calls for OAU meetings, Security Council Sessions, and Commonwealth meetings. Out of these will come further pressure on the UK, and new appeals to us. Also, if Zambia cuts itself off from Rhodesia, or if Ian Smith clamps down on Zambia, we’ll have a real mess. Airlift demands will skyrocket if we’re to get coal in and copper out. The simple fact of the matter is that Ian Smith can strangle Zambia a lot faster than Britain can strangle Smith. My own sense is that this Rhodesia crisis is likely to get a lot worse rather than better, unless the UK can come up with something more than economic strangulation. The longer the crisis lasts, the greater the chance the UK will lose control, and the more painful the choices which will be put to us. So you might want to ask State for a full dress analysis of this gloomy prospect, and whether there isn’t some other way out which we ought to be pushing on the UK. R.W. Komer Ask State 5 Hold off 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 2 A December 20 note from Komer to Bundy reads as follows: “Attached is another try on Rhodesia. I realize the problem, but to my knowledge LBJ simply hasn’t been told the likely dimensions of this mess. Rick and I feel that all the evidence shows that it is getting steadily worse, not better, and will continue to do so. HMG is in a spot, caught between the Tories at home and Africans abroad, but the point is that we’re going to become the African target too shortly. So the harder we push the Brits, the better off we’ll be. Attached is best device I can think of for smoking out State.” (Ibid.) 3 Not printed. 4 Telegram 993 from Lusaka, December 16, transmitted the text of Kaunda’s letter; not printed. 5 This option is checked. A handwritten note in the margin reads: “RWK: Your hunting license. MGB.” 515. Special Memorandum No. 30–65 Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency 515. Special Memorandum No. 30–65 Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency Washington, December 21, 1965. [Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Rhodesia 091. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 516. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to President Johnson 516. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 22, 1965. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON THERHODESIAN CRISIS 2 The African states do not believe that the present U.K. program of economic sanctions will be adequate to bring down the Smith regime. They doubt Wilson’s sincerity. They favor the use of military force and have, so far, looked to the U.K. to supply that force. Wilson has, on the other hand, publicly stated that the U.K. will not use military force against the Smith regime. U.K. officials claim that British public opinion would not support military action. The British have hinted that many of their officers, particularly those in the air force, might resign their commissions if ordered to attack the Smith regime. On the other hand, an unknown percentage of officers in the Rhodesian armed forces are, according to some estimates, loyal to the Queen and might not wish to fire on British forces. Fast-moving political developments in Africa and elsewhere, British preoccupations that failure to deal quickly and effectively with the 200-odd thousand whites in Southern Rhodesia may cause a large part of the Commonwealth to break away, and the risk that communist countries may be able to use the crisis to extend their influence or power in Africa, may cause the British to reconsider. Ambassador Bruce believes that the British consider this their most serious crisis since Suez. It is an Africa-wide crisis with impact on the U.S. as well as the U.K. Today the British Ambassador informed us that Wilson had sent a message, through Governor Gibbs in Rhodesia, for Smith. The letter stated that it was unlikely the U.K. could delay more drastic action for more than a short period of time. This tends to confirm the intelligence report which is at Tab A. 3 The Ambassador stated that Smith subsequently indicated that he is willing to negotiate for the establishment of a constitutional government in Rhodesia. The Ambassador asks that this information be treated as top secret. The British have also considered a possible naval blockade in order to make the oil embargo and other economic sanctions more effective. They have told us, however, that this is not in the cards because, among other problems, it would mean a confrontation with South Africa (where Britain has important investment and trade interests) and possibly Portugal as well. If the British ultimately decide to use force, they could (and hopefully would) decide, instead of attempting to occupy Southern Rhodesia, to take over the Wankie coal fields some 38 miles from the Zambian border and the Kariba Dam, which is on the border and jointly owned but controlled from the Southern Rhodesian side. Southern Rhodesian machine-gun emplacements are believed to be at the Kariba Dam; Smith may have taken similar precautions at the coal fields. If the U.K. should attempt to secure these two facilities, there is a risk that the Smith forces would sabotage generators and other electrical facilities at the dam site, blow up a high bridge at the frontier over which the coal moves to Zambia, and perhaps sabotage the coal mines themselves. We cannot predict the extent to which the Smith forces would offer resistance otherwise to a limited operation of this kind. The Africans are probably right in their estimate that economic sanctions alone will not quickly bring down the Smith regime. There is, however, a good chance that they would work in the long run. But for several reasons the British probably do not have the time they need to give the sanctions program a fair chance to work: First, all of the Zambian copper, more than half of the Katangan copper, and a large part of Zambian imports move over a railroad which runs through Southern Rhodesia. As is pointed out later, adequate alternate overland facilities are not immediately available. Second, Zambia also depends on the Smith regime for coal needed to run its copper industry (one ton of coal is needed for every ton of copper) and other facilities. Work has already started on developing a low-grade deposit of coal in Zambia, but it will take some time to get production going, when it is going it will be inadequate for Zambia’s total needs, and it cannot be used to smelt copper without costly and time-consuming changes in smelting machinery. Smith has already raised export duties on coal to Zambia from 14 cents to 14 dollars a ton. This poses for Zambia a difficult political problem. If they pay the export tax they will appear to be subsidizing the Southern Rhodesian economy. If they refuse to pay the tax, it will cost even more to import coal from other sources even if adequate alternate overland transportation facilities were available, which they are not at this time. Smith also has the power to cut off electricity generated at Kariba. While thermoelectric facilities are available in Zambia to meet essential requirements for electricity, they require coal which may not be available. The World Bank has not been successful thus far in persuading Smith to allow it to maintain an effective presence on the Rhodesian side of the dam. And even if the Bank were to win Smith’s consent, the few security guards it would use to protect the property against sabotage could not resist the armed forces of the Smith regime if he decided to use them. In short, given the kind of economic blow and counter blow which is in prospect, Zambia will, in the short run, be hurt far more than Southern Rhodesia. Third, Kaunda is under great pressure from extremists within his own country to retaliate against Smith. It is not clear he can resist these pressures even if he wanted to. If, as seems likely, there is an escalation of sanctions, pressures on the U.K. (and the U.S.) to supply Zambia’s economy with its essential needs will be very great. The British are planning on keeping the Zambian economy going on a “care and maintenance basis”, i.e., tight rationing and austerity. We doubt, however, that the fragile Zambian government can hold together for an extended period of time under severe pressures of this kind. Fourth, if, as seems probable, a substantial part of Zambian (and perhaps Katangan) copper—which together constitute 24% of the world supply—is cut off for a period of months, the U.K. will lose substantial amounts of foreign exchange. If the crisis continued for a long period, confidence in the pound could be impaired, thereby generating pressures on us for large-scale assistance. And there would immediately be demands on us for some scheme to share our copper with the U.K. and our other allies. (We are asking Joe Califano to call a meeting to discuss this facet of the question; we have suggestions to offer.) Against this background, we have agreed to support the U.K. airlift of POL products for Zambia. The Canadians have offered four C–130s. We have asked for bids and are requesting today the President’s authorization to spend two million dollars of AID funds to defray the cost of three or four chartered airplanes for a two months period. This amount will be inadequate even for the U.S. part of the POL airlift if the airlift continues for longer than two months or if it is expanded in size. We are making every effort to get our planes on the ground as soon as possible. But the POL airlift is addressed only to a fraction of the total problem. On the assumption that Smith denies to Zambia electricity and coal and use of the railway through Southern Rhodesia, our estimates are that it would require a capital expenditure of between 125 and 150 million dollars, plus an additional amount in ordinary expenses to improve alternate overland transportation routes on a crash basis. If this amount of money were spent, it might be possible to supply the minimum requirements of the Zambian economy under a very austere standard and permit the export of some 400,000 tons of Zambian copper (present exports are 700,000 tons a year). Even this level could not be achieved except gradually over a period of one year on the most optimistic assumptions. A map indicating the alternate overland transportation routes and a memorandum giving details on the costs and timing estimates are attached at Tab B. We cannot be sure, even if we or the British spent this amount of funds, that the Africans would have the patience or the Zambians the discipline to wait out this period. And, if, in the fast moving political scene, there should be an early political or military solution of the overall problem, these funds would be to a large extent wasted. The Africans would gain somewhat through the improved overland facilities but the alternate routes of communication are not efficient as compared with the railroad through Southern Rhodesia. Another facet of the problem is the possibility of additional action by the UN Security Council. The Zambian Foreign Minister is reported by the press to have announced Zambia’s intention to ask the Security Council for mandatory sanctions and “the use of United Nations Forces.” This would involve a determination that a threat to the peace exists; thus it would bring into play Chapter VII of the UN Charter under which Council action can legally bind all UN members to take certain steps. At an early stage the British were tentatively prepared to accept a Chapter VII determination by the Council but backed off at the last minute. We believe that, whenever the next Council meeting is held, mandatory, economic sanctions are very likely to be imposed unless the British or we veto. Unless South Africa and Portugal complied, the next succeeding measure in the Council might well be to call for a naval blockade against them. Moreover, if economic sanctions did not bring down the Smith regime, the Council would thereafter be likely to call for the use of force against Southern Rhodesia, which again would face the British with the dilemma of casting a veto or permitting the Council to force a decision upon them. This might in fact be easier for Wilson than taking such a decision on his own volition. In sum, we believe that under great pressure the U.K. has been forced to announce an economic sanctions program which will probably not achieve its objectives either in terms of maintaining the U.K.’s relationships with the African Commonwealth states or of bringing down quickly the Smith regime. We should bear in mind that African resentment against the U.K. will inevitably rub off on the U.S. Conclusions 1. The hard decisions have yet to be taken by the British. The U.K. must, and presumably will, make the necessary decisions as soon as they estimate their situation permits. 2. We have thus far refrained from recommending any particular action to the British on the ground that this is an internal Commonwealth affair. This should continue to be our attitude for the foreseeable future. 3. We should continue to express to the U.K. our doubts that the sanctions thus far proposed will achieve U.K. objectives or indeed even enable the U.K. to maintain control of the situation for a long period of time. And we should continue to make clear to the British that they should not count on us for large-scale financial aid which we think is likely to be wasted. 4. We are consulting with the Department of Defense on the military aspects of this question. Our tentative thinking from a political point of view is as follows: If the British raise with us the question of military force, we should make clear this is a decision for the U.K. to make. If they ask for U.S. troops we should decline. If the U.K. decides to use force and we have a chance to express an opinion between a limited action to secure Wankie and Kariba and a larger type of action, we should express an opinion in favor of the former. If they ask for an airlift to move and support a British force we should probably react sympathetically. Thomas C. Mann 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. 2 A December 28 covering memorandum from Komer to the President states that attached was Mann’s “excellent analysis of the Rhodesian crisis.” Komer notes that the gist of Mann’s “gloomy report” was that the British program of economic sanctions, while it would probably work in time, would not have time to run its course. 3 The tabs are not attached to the source text. A handwritten notation on Komer’s memorandum reads: “Tabs did not go forward with memo.” Tab A is presumably Document 515 . 517. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia 517. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia 1 Washington, December 22, 1965, 11:02 a.m. 1032. Ref: Embtel 1045. 2 Please point out again to Kaunda that action proposed by him would be far more harmful to Zambia than to Smith regime. It is obvious that alternate overland transportation routes are inadequate meet Zambia’s needs. US is not rpt not in position extend assistance on scale GRZ would require if Kaunda stops copper shipments through Rhodesia. Present US commitment is assist British in meeting emergency POL shortage. No existing combination current outward transportation capacities and limited port facilities is currently adequate to ship entire Zambian copper production. A premature escalation of economic sanctions is therefore not in Zambia’s own self-interest. If Kaunda nevertheless determined to move in the direction indicated, agree you should try to persuade him to refrain from specifying any particular quantity of copper so as to leave room for greatest possible flexibility. While continuing to support British position you should not commit US to measures beyond those already taken by USG and announced. We have already asked for bids on charter aircraft for POL lift and hope complete arrangements soon. Will telegraph latest developments on this point. Unable to give estimates at this moment on quantity of copper that could be moved on airlift as now planned after allowing for space for empty drums but believe quantity would be small. Will cable separately additional estimates on this point. FYI: Recent Department analyses indicate full Zambian rescue operation likely cost about $150 million. Funds are not available. As indication magnitude US contribution you have been informed we currently thinking in terms $2 million. End FYI. More guidance follows. If you can delay conversation with Kaunda even for hour or two, would be preferable. If this impossible, proceed on basis foregoing guidance. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 11–2 RHOD. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Mann and Mulcahy; cleared by Williams, Solomon, and McElhiney; and approved by Mann. Repeated to Dar-es-Salaam, Leopoldville, London, and Salisbury. 2 Telegram 1045 from Lusaka, December 22, reported that President Kaunda was planning to stop all copper shipments through Rhodesia if by noon on December 24 Smith had not revoked a 5 pound surcharge on coal exported to Zambia. (Ibid.) 518. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 518. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 1 Washington, December 23, 1965. RWK FYI. Most of the points made by the Zambian Foreign Minister and Minister of Mines at Soapy’s dinner last night covered old ground. 2 However, a couple of arguments not often heard are worth noting: 1) Most observers in the UK and US seem more concerned about the political consequences to the Wilson Government, if the UK resorts to force in Rhodesia. Such observors ignore the political consequences to the Kaunda Government, if force is not used. (Comment: This is a valid point. If the Wilson Government falls, its successor will still be a responsible government with which we can deal. If Kaunda falls, leftist radicals will assume power, and racial strife and chaos could result throughout Southern Africa.) 2) The GOZ wants the UK to pay the extra royalty and taxes imposed by the Rhodesians on coal and coke going to Zambia. They suggest that payment be made from the Rhodesian funds blocked in the UK. Thus far, the UK has been non-committal. 3) The Minister of Mines underscored the danger that European and Japanese industrial users of Zambian copper might permanently adapt to other metals, if the uncertainty caused by the rebellion continues. In this event, the effect on the Zambian economy would be irreparable and disastrous. 4) In its meeting today, the GOZ mission will probably press for US support to get the UK to put down the Rhodesian rebellion by force. They would probably reluctantly settle for our promise to approach the UK to reimburse the GOZ for the extra charges on coal and coke. ( Comment : If the UK were to agree to reimburse the GOZ, this might ease the pressure within Zambia for the use of force until after the Christmas holidays. By that time, the UK predicts the “bite” of sanctions will be severely felt in Rhodesia.) 3 Rick Haynes 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, Chrono (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Confidential. 2 A Zambian mission composed of Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe and Minister of Mines A.G. Zulu visited Washington December 22–27 to discuss the Rhodesian situation. 3 The joint communique issued on December 27 states that Secretary Rusk confirmed that the United States planned to begin to make a significant contribution to the airlift of oil supplies to Zambia in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada in the first week of January 1966. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , p. 694. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 519. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia 519. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia 1 Washington, December 29, 1965, 8:36 p.m. 1084. Embassy is requested to deliver the following reply from President Johnson to President Kaunda’s letter of December 15 (urtel 993): 2 “Dear President Kaunda: Thank you for your letters of December 15 and December 18 in which you express your concern which I share for the situation in Rhodesia and its ramifications on your own country. By now you have been informed of our willingness to assist the British in mounting an airlift to provide Zambia with the petroleum products denied to your country by Southern Rhodesia as a consequence of the recently declared oil embargo. I want to assure you that I am most sympathetically aware of Zambia’s difficult position and that we will continue to be as helpful as possible during these trying days. Secretary Rusk and other officials of the Department of State welcome the opportunity that you gave them for direct conversations with Foreign Minister Kapwepwe and Minister of Mines Zulu. The exchange of views we have had with them has been most useful and constructive. Rest assured that the United States is keenly aware of the need to safeguard the position of Zambia in this period of crisis. Lyndon B. Johnson” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by McElhiney and Chalfin on December 23, cleared by Mann and Haynes, and approved by Williams. 2 Dated December 16. (Ibid.) See footnote 4, Document 514 . 520. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 520. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 30, 1965. McGB FYI. 1. The mystery of the President’s OK on $2 million for the Zambian airlift has been cleared up. In a conversation with Tom Mann this morning, I asked if he had been informed of the President’s approval. His reply was, “yes, by a female secretary from the ranch on Christmas day”. 2. If he has not already been in touch with you, Mann will be calling you today and sending over a memo, seeking quick Presidential approval for an additional $3 million in AID funds for Zambian contingency plan . This additional money is required because (a) our participation in the Zambian oil airlift has proven more expensive than anticipated, and (b) we still need to fulfill our agreement to help improve overland transportation routes to and from Zambia. The $3 million will be obtained by juggling around existing SA allocations for Africa. 3. As Komer and I have been predicting, the operation to protect Zambia is proving more and more expensive to the US. At this stage, our support for the Zambian operation represents a two-month commitment. If the Smith regime does not collapse within that period, the UK and Zambia will surely be back to us for even more support. 4. Having gone this far in support of the Zambian airlift, I would certainly recommend that the President approve the additional $3 million. However, State should increase pressures on the UK for the “quick kill” in Rhodesia, stressing that we are fast reaching the financial limits of our support. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Memos. Confidential. Copies were sent to Komer and Saunders. 521. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 521. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 6, 1966. McGB Situation Report: Rhodesian Crisis 1. We have finally received some indication of the UK strategy (see London’s T–3099 attached) 2 to bring down the Smith regime. In brief, it is based on the assumption that, once Zambia is allowed to participate, economic sanctions will work by late spring. At that time, the British predict the Governor of Rhodesia could form a new government with wide internal support. (Our assessment is much more pessimistic.) A UK military presence might be necessary to back up such a government for a time. 2. The UK strategy leaves unanswered an important question of US involvement: Since the US commitment in the Zambia protection effort is for two months only, what will the UK expect of us if economic sanctions don’t work by the end of February? 3. A working-level US mission arrives in London today to try to gain a better understanding of the UK’s thinking. 4. African pressures on the UK have weakened considerably as they have failed to reach agreement on a unified policy or course of action: (a) The Commonwealth Conference in Lagos on January 11 promises to be a fizzle with indications that Australia, New Zealand, Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago and Tanzania will not participate. Even those who plan to attend probably will not be represented by their PMs. Wilson himself will attend but would have liked to avoid going. His non-attendance would have hurt Nigerian PM Balewa’s standing in Africa. (b) There’s a good chance that the OAU Summit Meeting on Rhodesia proposed for January 19 will not take place. Already some 11 member nations have objected to the meeting. (c) Because of the recent spate of coups in French-speaking Africa, the 13-nation OCAM meeting in Madagascar may be postponed. Rhodesia was one of the agenda items. (d) The early rush to break diplomatic relations with the UK has ceased with only nine nations having broken. 5. US participation in the POL airlift to Zambia commenced on January 4 and apparently the combined UK, Canadian and US effort will keep Zambia adequately supplied. 6. Smith has announced his willingness to (a) refine and ship Zambia’s POL and (b) stop the $14 per ton export royalty on Rhodesian coal shipped to Zambia. Kaunda has rejected (a) and has not reacted to (b) on the grounds that these are Smith’s propaganda ploys to divert world attention from the central issues. So far, the UK agrees with Kaunda. Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer. 2 Dated January 5; not printed. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, IT 7–16 TANZAN–ZAMBIA. 522. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 522. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, January 7, 1966, 4:56 p.m. 3894. For Charge only. Following message received by President from Primin Wilson January 7: “Before I set off for this rather extraordinary Commonwealth meeting at Lagos, I thought I would let you know how I see things developing in Rhodesia. I need hardly tell you that I have very considerable qualms about going: but I have decided that it would be more harmful to absent myself than to be present. Faced with this choice of evils, I have decided it was right to go: first, because I think it is in all our interests to try and keep the Commonwealth together and secondly because I am sure that we must do all we can to maintain the prestige and standing of moderate African leaders like Abubakar. 2 “When we last met I told you that I thought that the euphoria of independence and of Christmas would carry the Smith regime over into the New Year, and that they would thereafter start to suffer from post-hogmanay gloom. Thanks to your Administration’s ready agreement to join with us in an oil embargo and to help us with a consequential airlift to Zambia and to fairly general support throughout the free world for what we are doing, this is precisely what is now happening. With the introduction of petrol rationing, the dolce vita of the European population is starting to come to an end. Responsible business leaders are forecasting considerable European unemployment before long. Added to that there is severe drought in Matebeleland where the maize harvest has failed (though this throws up further problems) which we are looking into. Two Johannesburg papers, originally pro-Smith, are now saying he cannot win: the South African Government is cautiously neutral and the Portuguese seem to be hedging their bets. “As economic difficulties begin to press upon the regime, I think we shall find that, administratively, they will not have the experience or competence to deal with it. Indeed, the evidence is now starting to accumulate that many thinking people in Rhodesia realize that the Smith regime cannot win. It is only a matter of time before more and more people come to realize that life can only get worse and that the alternative of returning to constitutional rule is better than any prospect that Smith has got to offer. It is tempting but unwise to try and put a date to the turning point, and I will not attempt to do so: but I personally am convinced that it will come and that it could come sooner than we think. “I am therefore totally convinced, privately, that we have Smith on the run, and that it will not be long before this becomes clear publicly. It may soon be wise to start thinking of peace terms. While we want to bring Smith down and bring him down quickly, we must be able to discredit Smith utterly if we are to make sense of the reconstruction period. There can be no question of negotiating with Smith as equals. But this does not mean that we should not be thinking of methods of restoring the rule of law in Rhodesia and we are hard at work on this. As soon as our ideas are clearer I will be in touch with you again. Any public announcement of our peace aims will need very careful timing: I cannot afford to lose my African audience by giving them any reason to think that we are weakening in our resolve to bring Smith down: equally I must make a statement early enough to give the Europeans hope for better things if they reject Smith. The problem of my four constituencies is always with me. “The next immediate hurdle is of course the Lagos meeting. Now that, with your help, and with that of all our allies and friends, sanctions are clearly beginning to bite, I am more hopeful of being able to turn discussion into constructive channels than I was when Abubakar first made his proposal and visited London before Christmas. “I shall have to give our Commonwealth partners a very frank account of what we are doing and try to make them share my own conviction that this rebellion will be brought to heel. There will also be some talk about Zambia’s problems. I shall, moreover, have to listen to some fairly severe lectures on the need to introduce one man one vote at the earliest possible moment. But I am resolved not to give way to demands for the use of force at once and I shall at this stage be able to do no more than listen to their advice about how to handle matters in the future. It would be fatal to spell out in detail our ideas for constitutional development. It would be bound to offend one or more of my constituencies. If I can keep the Africans quiet for a few more weeks and avoid senseless action in the Organization of African Unity and embarrassing initiatives in the United Nations the visit will have been worthwhile. “I will let you know how I get on and keep you in touch with my thinking for the future. My people were in touch with yours about the details of current strategy and tactics. I am much encouraged by your resolute support. We shall win.” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted, cleared, and approved by Bruce Lancaster of S/S. 2 Sir Abubakar Balewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria. 523. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 523. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, January 7, 1966, 5:11 p.m. 3896. For Charge only. Following is message received from the Prime Minister to President via privacy channel: Begin Text: “In my earlier message today, I mentioned that drought in Rhodesia was presenting Smith with problems and might have repercussions on ourselves. My colleagues and I discussed this further this morning and it is clear that the drought is prevalent throughout central Africa. We have therefore decided that it would be right, on humanitarian grounds, to prevent starvation and on practical grounds to prevent starvation leading to rioting and bloodshed to see what we can do to help. As we are proposing to press sanctions on Rhodesia on other fields, we might appear to be inconsistent: but I think that opinion generally would draw the necessary distinction. I have therefore this morning been in contact by telephone with both Bob Menzies and Mike Pearson and we have agreed to look into the possibilities of a joint commonwealth initiative to relieve the famine. If wheat is a suitable substitute for the failure of maize, then both Australia and Canada will be able to help from their own stocks: we should of course make a financial contribution. If maize is essential, then we may have to make this a combined operation bringing you in. But you have done so much already that we shall not do so unless it is absolutely necessary. I know that famine in India is in all our minds. I shall be letting it be known, informally, this afternoon that Menzies, Pearson and I are in touch on this problem.” End Text. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted, cleared, and approved by Bruce Lancaster of S/S. 524. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 524. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, January 7, 1966. It was most considerate of you to share your thoughts on the Rhodesian crisis again on the eve of your departure for Lagos. We on this side certainly appreciate the delicacy of the situation you face, as well as the problem of supplying Zambia while applying sanctions to the Smith regime. After your meeting in Lagos, we shall look forward to getting your latest estimates and plans. There may be serious difficulties ahead, particularly as to whether the African states will sit still long enough to permit sanctions to bring Smith down. My best wishes for every success at Lagos. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. No classification marking. A covering note from Bundy to the President dated January 8, 11:30 a.m., reads: “Mr. President: Bob Komer has negotiated the attached rather short and straightforward message to Prime Minister Wilson (Tab A) in answer to his message of yesterday on Rhodesia. I think it meets the requirements. You may also want to look at a second message which came in yesterday (Tab B), but which does not require an additional answer. McG.B.” A handwritten notation indicates that the President’s message was sent at 3:30 on January 8, presumably through the “privacy channel” referred to in Document 523 . 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 525. Note From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 525. Note From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 8, 1966. Mac: FYI: According to Mann, Pat Dean said that it would help enormously if we could issue a statement Monday asking our companies not to import asbestos and lithium from Rhodesia. This is apparently a play to back British contention of total embargo at Lagos. I agreed with Tom that a low-key State announcement to this effect would cause no problem. Our imports are marginal. However, this would bother US Vanadium which has a major chrom mine in Rhodesia. Vanadium fears that if it is then asked to cut off chrom imports, Rhodesians will retaliate by letting the mine flood, at substantial cost. Tom and I thought this contingent problem worth risking. 2 RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos. Secret. 2 A notation in the margin in Bundy’s handwriting reads: “I agree.” 526. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 526. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, January 11, 1966, 4:58 p.m. 3979. The following message was received today from Prime Minister Wilson through White House channels: “(1) In my last message on the Rhodesian problem I said I would keep you informed about how I get on in Lagos. Now that I am here, I am hopeful that with a modicum of luck we should get through this meeting all right. But having spoken to Malcolm MacDonald, who is here from Lusaka, it appears that the situation in Zambia is far from good. I have therefore decided, at very considerable inconvenience that it would be right for me to pay a brief visit to Kaunda to try to get him on the rails again. (2) The facts of the situation are these. At the right moment, the closing of the Zambia border with Rhodesia could be of decisive influence in giving Smith a coup de grace but it is essential that this card should be played at the right time. If it is played too early before the Smith regime and Rhodesian opinion are convinced that the game is up and before we have taken all the necessary steps to see that Zambia could survive the few weeks of final collapse in Rhodesia and possible cut off of supplies from the copper belt, this key move in the whole process could ruin Zambia without overthrowing Smith. The timing is therefore of the essence. Kaunda, who is understandably, in a very nervous frame of mind, is threatening to close the border before we are ready for it, before he can survive it and before it will be really effective in terms of bringing Smith down. (3) My main objective in going to Lusaka will be therefore to try and steady him and to get our strategy better co-ordinated. There are in addition other things to discuss with him. I plan to be in Zambia on Wednesday evening and Thursday morning. It would be an immense help to me if you felt able, before my arrival, to send a personal message to President Kaunda through your Ambassador in Lusaka saying that I have explained our strategy fully to you, expressing your confidence that economic sanctions were working, that the crunch with Smith might be approaching but that it was essential in everybody’s interests to get the timing of the final sanction of closing the Rhodesia border with Zambia right; and that you would hope that he, Kaunda, and I would reach agreement on this in everybody’s interest. He simply must be made to realise that the vast efforts which you and we are making at great cost to ourselves need to exert their maximum effect but that given time they should put Zambia in a position where she could safely administer the final blow.” 2 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by John P. Walsh of S/S, and approved by Mann. 2 On January 12, the President sent a message to Wilson saying that he was “weighing in at Lusaka in an effort to steady Kaunda.” (Telegram 1445 to Lagos, January 12; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 67 D 262, Presidential Correspondence, Pres. to UK/Wilson) Telegram 1195 to Lusaka, January 12, transmitted a letter from Johnson to President Kaunda urging close coordination with Prime Minister Wilson, and emphasizing his own belief that it would be harmful if the border between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia were closed before Zambia was prepared, as a result of the programs currently being carried out, to meet the situation. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 7 UK) 527. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 527. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 13, 1966, 11:45 a.m. Rhodesian Sitrep. Wilson, who is handling Rhodesia personally, seems to have bought some time by his skillful handling of the Commonwealth Conference. However, the key remains Kaunda, whom Wilson is seeing today in an attempt to get Zambia to hold off cutting its own economic lifeline until sanctions have had a chance to work. Wilson’s effort, backed by your message, should suffice for a time—though many of us are skeptical that Kaunda will sit still long enough to give Wilson’s strategy a full run. Meanwhile, there are mildly encouraging signs that sanctions are beginning to bite in Rhodesia. We hear that the business community is hurting. State’s best experts are now coming around to the view that it’s no longer a question of whether sanctions will work but of whether Smith will cave before Kaunda or other Africans do something foolish. If Smith caves, Wilson’s plan is to restore direct UK rule via the Governor (who is still holding the fort in Rhodesia) and devise a new plan for gradual progress toward black majority rule. There is a risk, however, that even if Smith caves soon other extremists will take over, creating a chaotic situation in which Wilson may have to fly in troops. In sum, even we skeptics are a little more hopeful now that Wilson’s strategy may work. If so, he will have pulled our African chestnuts out of the fire along with his (although the success of economic sanctions will create an ominous precedent for the Portuguese and South African problems still down the road). R.W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret. “For Information Only” is handwritten at the top of the source text, which also bears a handwritten “L,” indicating that the President saw the memorandum. 2 McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 528. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 528. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, January 14, 1966, 11:20 a.m. I am now back in London after my round Africa safari having seen all seven African heads of government with whom we are in relations, the only notable omissions being of course Nkrumah and Nyerere. It has been well worth while and I think my Commonwealth and African constituencies are now quiescent at least for the time being. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting at Lagos went in the end far better than I could reasonably have hoped. The meeting itself was not without its moments, particularly my debate with Field Marshal Margai of Sierra Leone about an opposed landing in Rhodesia on the first day and a very rewarding closed session at the end of the second day when only heads of government were present without their advisers and in the course of which I was able to take them pretty fully into my confidence both about present policies and future objectives. As you will have seen from the communique the Commonwealth as a whole have reaffirmed their recognition that Rhodesia is a British responsibility and while in a sense I have had to account to them for that responsibility, they are now content to let me discharge it for the time being in my own way. There were some members—a minority I am glad to say—who still hankered after the use of force: but the Commonwealth collectively has agreed to give sanctions a fair run. Your own decision on asbestos and lithium could not have been better timed to make maximum impact. The meeting was I think a victory for moderation. It has strengthened the Commonwealth vis-a-vis the extremists of the Organization of African Unity and it has held at least for the time being, the position in the United Nations on Chapter VII. It has added to the prestige of the sound moderate leaders like Abubakar; above all, I have avoided being pressed any further than my public position in the House of Commons. The price of this has been the very modest one of the establishment of two committees to meet in London and an undertaking to meet the Commonwealth again if, by July, sanctions have still not succeeded in their objective, to that extent time has been gained. All in all commonsense and realism prevailed. I then went on to Lusaka where I have had very good meetings with Kaunda, both privately and with his ministers. Your own very helpful message had eased my path for me. I had two main objectives: first, to secure Kaunda’s agreement that plans for the quick kill (the closing of the Zambian frontier with Rhodesia) should be carefully coordinated between Zambia and Britain, Kaunda is no longer suicidal and I managed not only to secure acceptance that we should not proceed to the second front before mid February, but I also have a fair prospect of getting their agreement, that even when the Zambian frontier is closed to Rhodesian industrial goods, coal will be exempt, with all that that means in airlift terms. This date of mid February is the earliest at which, on the best expert advice, it would be prudent to contemplate delivering the death blow to illegality. Even so it may mean that Zambia will be reduced to a care and maintenance basis for a period of indeterminate length. My second objective was to try and persuade Kaunda to accept British forces in Zambia so that at the right moment, they would be ready to move into Rhodesia either invited or unopposed. On this I think I have got Kaunda away from his insistence on placing troops across the Zambia and though he has not yet agreed to accept a Commonwealth presence on the Zambian side of the frontier with Rhodesia, he is now, I think, at least more ready to contemplate something along lines I could accept. All in all, he is a bit more relaxed, much more ready to give sanctions a chance, and does at least accept that we really mean to bring Smith down. He does of course feel himself very exposed economically and, politically, he finds it very difficult to accept a position in which Zambia, for purely practical reasons, is forced to take up a less uncompromising attitude than his fellow Africans towards commercial ties with Rhodesia, because of the inevitable interdependence of the two neighbor economies. For the time being, however, I think we have got him on the rails again. In Nairobi I had an hour meeting with Kenyatta, and found him as usual wise, relaxed and completely sympathetic, both on sanctions and on the inevitability of gradualness towards majority rule in the reconstruction period. As you will have seen, the Commonwealth Secretary did not in the end manage to get to Salisbury to see the Governor. But as I indicated in my earlier message, I can play at home the difficulties about personal safety and recognition as usefully as if he had gone in. My qualms about the Governor remain, home African and world fronts now in tolerable order—and I realize of course that the most overworked phrase in this message has been for the time being—I can now concentrate on the internal Rhodesian situation. All in all, the past week has been time well spent. The situation has of course been transformed by the oil sanctions and the working of the Zambia airlift. In consequence the Commonwealth in general and Commonwealth Africans in particular now accept Britain’s responsibility and good faith and this means that we can now make the running ourselves. The point of major difficulty which lies ahead is how to translate economic hardship in Rhodesia into a political readiness to capitulate. For this the Europeans in Rhodesia will have to be given some assurances for their future as well as evidence of continuing and growing hardship if they persist in rebellion. The time is approaching therefore when I shall have to make a public statement on our peace aims. This I shall probably have to do before Parliament reassembles during the last week of January. This will have to be accompanied by a further tightening of the sanctions screw in order to demonstrate that we are not peace-making from weakness. You have experience in such strategy. I will be in touch with you again. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates that the President saw the message. The message was sent to the President along with a January 14 memorandum from Komer noting that the key point was probably the agreement with Kaunda that Zambia should not cut its economic links with Rhodesia until at least mid-February; that airlift demands would “go way up” when that happened; and that Wilson was “quietly trying to position himself to use force for the final kill.” (Ibid.) 529. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 529. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 1 Washington, February 2, 1966. RWK FYI. The following are the main points of interest to come out of yesterday’s US–UK talks 2 on the Rhodesian crisis: 1. UK feels they can hold off Zambia’s participation in sanctions until the latter half of March (in spite of the Wilson-Kaunda previous agreement on a February 15 date). 2. Rhodesia should run out of POL products in mid-April with serious distribution problems arising before that time. 3. Sir Hugh Beadle predicts that white Rhodesian confidence in the Smith regime will crack when a complete POL cut-off occurs because of Smith’s assurances to his supporters that this would never happen. 4. Coal from the Kandabwe mines will start reaching the Zambian Copper Belt at the rate of 15,000 tons per month by mid-February. 5. During the period of Zambia’s participation in sanctions, there will be no copper production because available coal will be used exclusively to generate the power needed to keep the copper mines pumped out. 6. UDI is now being referred to as “IDI” by the British, i.e., “Illegal Declaration of Independence.” 7. According to British estimates, the chances are very slim for majority rule in Rhodesia even within five years after the end of IDI. 8. The UK plans to hold a meeting around the end of February to determine how friendly governments and private foundations could help them in the rehabilitation of Rhodesia after IDI. 9. Specific UK requests for US assistance: a) continuation of airlift support through the end of April; b) US assistance in calming down African governments when and if there is an increase in African pressures on the UK for the “quick kill.” My general impression of the talks on Rhodesia is that the British are surprisingly optimistic about the success of their scenario. They are certainly much more optimistic than we are. 3 Rick Haynes 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, Chrono (Haynes), 3/1/65–6/15/66. Confidential. 2 The annual U.S.-U.K. talks on Africa were held in Washington February 1–3. The U.S. delegation was headed by Assistant Secretary Williams and the British delegation was headed by Sir Roger Allen, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The discussions are recorded in memoranda of conversation in Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. 3 A February 3 memorandum from Haynes to Komer summarizes items of interest raised during the concluding sessions of the talks. It states that the British indicated that they intended to rely on economic sanctions to bring down the Smith regime and did not want to use force because of the consequences to Zambia, the negative attitude of the British public, and the risk of more direct aid to Rhodesia from South Africa. They were prepared to use British forces after Smith’s downfall, however, if necessary to guarantee internal security. (Johnson Library, Name File, Haynes Memos) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 530. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 530. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 17, 1966, 4:10 p.m. The Rhodesian situation is heating up again and attracting a lot more press coverage—some of it with adverse ramifications on us. Unlike the British, our experts feel that while economic sanctions have succeeded in hurting the Rhodesian economy, they are far from achieving the political objective of Smith’s downfall. The situation in Rhodesia remains calm and local authorities are in firm control. Smith’s ability to hold out this long has earned him virtually the solid support of the white minority. The African majority is still quiescent. Smith’s continued ability to hold out is being reinforced by (a) an increasing trickle of POL from private South African sources, (b) effective radio and press censorship, (c) the fact that economic sanctions are not 100% effective, and (d) Harold Wilson’s widely disseminated announcement that HMG will not use military force to end the rebellion. The longer the Rhodesian problem remains on the boards, the more difficult it will become for the US. Already, the US is being criticized by Africans for permitting the reopening of the Rhodesian Information Office here last week. (The Governments of Ghana and Nigeria have officially protested, and the African Ambassadors in Washington have been meeting to work out some concerted action.) The Justice Department points out that because the Rhodesians have registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, there is no quick way to close down the office. 2 Our explanation that registration in no way implies US approval of the Rhodesians’ activities or US recognition of the Smith regime has not silenced critics. Already connections are evident between the reopened Rhodesian Information Office and extreme rightwing US groups. In connection with our support for economic sanctions, we are also faced with the possibility that some of the US tobacco companies may not cooperate with the recent UK ban on the export of and trade in Rhodesian tobacco. Finally, with Zambia chafing at the bit to participate fully in sanctions and pressuring Wilson for a forceful military solution and with white resistance in Rhodesia increasing, the UK may well be obliged to commit a lot more military might to achieving an ultimate solution than if it had gone for the “quick kill” at the outset. The UK’s measured approach to ending the Rhodesian rebellion seems to ignore the financial and practical limits to US support of efforts to keep Zambia afloat during the crisis. In fact, yesterday the UK put out feelers to test our willingness to extend our airlift participation beyond mid-April. That they plan to do so is further evidence that Wilson is no longer counting on bringing Smith down in two months or so. The longer the crisis goes on, the greater the risk that African frustration will be turned on the UK and on us. R.W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 3/66–12/68. Secret. 2 A February 25 letter from Under Secretary Mann to Henry J.C. Hooper, the registered agent for the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, formerly attached to the British Embassy, stated that since Hooper was no longer a diplomatic representative of the British Government and the United States did not recognize any independent state of “Rhodesia,” he had no official capacity in the United States. If he wished to remain as a private citizen, he could apply to the Department of Justice for adjustment of his status to that of resident alien. For text of Mann’s letter, see Department of State Bulletin , April 11, 1966, pp. 588–589. 3 McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 531. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 531. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, April 4, 1966. SUBJECT Southern Rhodesia: Next Talks with the British The Problem The purpose of this paper is to obtain the approval by the Senior Interdepartmental Group of “a set of instructions for a frank talk with the British Government shortly after the British elections which would set forth the limits of U.S. involvement in the Rhodesian problem.” There are listed below (a) a statement of the basic objectives the U.S. seeks to achieve in its relations with the U.K. on the Rhodesian problem (at this stage strictly for internal USG use) and (b) talking points for use by an American spokesman designed to elicit from the British their current assessment and future plans. Information elicited from the British would be used to define U.S. objectives more precisely before we inform the British of the limits of our involvement. Basic U.S. Objectives in Relations with British 1. The U.S. should encourage the U.K. to reach a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian problem that would be compatible with the spirit and intent of (a) Security Council Resolution of November 20, 1965, and (b) Prime Minister Wilson’s six principles. (It is understood that such a settlement can be negotiated only when HMG can deal from a position of greater strength than at present, which would probably have to be based on a tightening of the present economic sanctions and/or some troop deployment carrying a credible threat of force.) 2. We should endeavor to avoid a situation in which effective African pressures could be mounted to invoke mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. We should therefore encourage the British to take courses of action which would minimize this possibility. 3. In consideration of our relations with Zambia and other African governments and quite apart from our relations with the British, it is in the U.S. interest to continue to help mitigate the effects of UDI upon Zambia. However, HMG should understand that Congressional attitudes could prevent the use of appropriated funds for this purpose or other purposes connected with the Rhodesian problem unless positive steps are taken soon by the U.K. to end traffic with North Viet Nam by British-lag (Hong Kong-registered) shipping. 4. The U.S. should make clear to the British that it cannot commit itself to direct military involvement in Rhodesia. 5. The U.S. should keep the burden of responsibility clearly on the British to find an acceptable solution to the problem. We should therefore confine ourselves initially to endeavoring to obtain a clearer indication of British intentions and should refrain from encouraging or discouraging them with respect to any particular course of action at least until after this has been accomplished. Talking Points 1. The policy of the U.S. is to continue to support the Security Council Resolution of November 20 and, to the extent possible, to support British efforts to reach an early settlement of the Rhodesian problem. 2. On the basis of recent intelligence do the British now believe that the Smith regime can be brought down through economic sanctions alone within the time limits that appear politically tolerable? 3. Do the British believe that it is wise to encourage Zambia to sever completely its economic relations with Southern Rhodesia unless or until it is clear that by so doing Zambia would be contributing to the early downfall of the Smith regime? HMG’s estimate as to when this cut-off might take place is desired. 4. In view of the leakages in the oil embargo, does the U.K. believe that further approaches should be made to Portugal and South Africa to reiterate earlier warnings of dangers inherent in the Southern Rhodesian situation for those countries helping the illegal regime? 5. How do the British assess the prospects of rising African pressures for mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII and how could we best coordinate our positions to deal with these pressures? 6. What does HMG consider are the prospects for success in negotiations with Rhodesian elements on a basis compatible with the Security Council Resolution of November 20 and with Prime Minister Wilson’s six principles? 7. With whom might the British be willing to negotiate a settlement: With the Smith regime? With the Rhodesian Front without Smith? With a coalition of white elements after the downfall of Smith? With a coalition of anti-Smith whites and moderate Africans? With a coalition of Africans and moderate whites? With the African nationalists? 8. In the event that the sanctions program does not appear to be achieving the U.K.’s objective within the time frame which HMG considers tolerable, what alternative or supplementary measures does HMG believe it could take in order to strengthen its negotiating position or otherwise terminate the rebellion? 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 236, SIG/DOC: 3—4/14/66— Southern Rhodesia: Next Talks With the British. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text which is filed with a covering note of April 4 from Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) Harry H. Schwartz transmitting the paper for consideration at the fifth SIG meeting scheduled for April 5. The meeting was subsequently rescheduled and held on April 12. 532. Record of Agreements and Decisions at the Fifth Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group 532. Record of Agreements and Decisions at the Fifth Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group 1 Washington, April 12, 1966. PRESENT The Under Secretary of State (Chairman) The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Administrator, AID The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Deputy Director, USIA The Deputy Director, CIA The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Walt W. Rostow The Staff Director Mr. Dean Acheson The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs [Here follows discussion of an unrelated topic.] 2. Rhodesia : It was decided that American officials should, as a matter of urgency, talk to the British on this subject not only to attempt to determine the nature of British thinking, but also to inform them of our thinking: a. The United States will not in any way permit itself to be involved militarily in Rhodesia. b. We think that economic sanctions have reached a level beyond which further escalation would not be profitable. The Group also discussed the broad choices open to the British—the use of force or negotiations which could lead to a reasonably acceptable political settlement. If the British choose to use force they must understand that it will be done without us. Consideration was also given to the more positive role the U.S. might play in trying to create conditions which, hopefully, could lead to a speedy political settlement of the Rhodesia problem. [Here follows discussion of an unrelated topic.] Harry H. Schwartz Staff Director, SIG 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA: #5—May 3, 66—Discussion on France, NATO, and Rhodesia. Secret; Exdis. 533. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 533. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 18, 1966. The following is a brief situation report on the Rhodesian crisis bringing the events of the past two weeks up to date. I. UN Activity —At the UK’s request, a UNSC meeting was finally held on April 11, at which the UK’s resolution on Rhodesia was passed in spite of African and Communist Bloc efforts to broaden and strengthen it. As passed, the resolution called the breach of the voluntary oil embargo “a threat to the peace” and authorized the UK to use force to stop tankers carrying oil for Rhodesia from docking at the port of Beira in (Portuguese) Mozambique . 2 II. Consequences—On the strength of the UN resolution, the UK has prevented two tankers with oil for Rhodesia from being unloaded . Both tankers are Greek-owned and their cargo was purchased for Rhodesia by a South African firm The Portuguese are angry with the UK for making them the scapegoat for an “oil leak” into Rhodesia which originates solely in South Africa . Because of the UN resolution, the Smith regime has withdrawn its skeleton representation from London and ordered the UK to close down its residual mission in Salisbury . The UK has recalled its Ambassador to South Africa for consultations and instructions. He will probably return to South Africa with instructions to make the following pitch to Prime Minister Verwoerd: (a) South Africa should cooperate in the oil embargo in its own interest and perhaps (b) request Verwoerd to intercede with Smith to end the Rhodesian crisis . Dissatisfaction with the UN resolution has led the Africans and Communist Bloc to re-group in the UN’s Committee of 24 to press for a stronger UNSC resolution calling for (a) total economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and (b) the UK to use force to put down the Rhodesian rebellion. III. At Stake —The longer the Rhodesian crisis continues, the harder it becomes to solve and the greater the risks for UK and US prestige and influence in Africa. Some obvious considerations are: (a) Prolongation will result in the Rhodesian crisis being tied into the crisis of South Africa’s compliance with the International Court’s decision in the South West Africa case in June or July; (b) Wilson’s failure to put down the Rhodesian rebellion prior to the July Commonwealth PM’s meeting could precipitate African members’ leaving the Commonwealth; (c) Prolongation is having a serious adverse economic and psychological impact on Zambia and could topple the government of the moderate President Kaunda; (d) US Civil Rights groups are beginning to focus on the problem; (e) If economic sanctions cause the disintegration of the Rhodesian economy, the cost of reconstruction to the UK will be prohibitive; (f) Prolongation encourages the determination to resist of the Smith regime and its supporters. IV. Our Moves —State is currently taking quiet and discreet soundings in London and with the Australians and New Zealanders to explore possible approaches based on mediation leading ultimately to negotiations by the principals. 3 Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Confidential. 2 For text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 221 (1966), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 597. 3 A handwritten notation in the margin of the source text reads: “Stewart coming. Mann in charge. We want a negotiation approach—Wilson is reported leaning that way.” 534. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 534. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, April 27, 1966. I was very grateful for your kind reaction to my message about the Rhodesian feeler. 2 As you can imagine, things have moved fast since then. Wright’s report of the businesslike talk he had with Smith and his general impressions of the situation derived from this talk and from what the Governor and Beaddle said to him was sufficiently forthcoming, in our view, to justify continuing the dialogue. Briefly, Wright recognized that only the next round of talks could establish whether a basis for negotiation existed. But he thought that the omens were pretty good and firmly recommended that we should at least go on to the next round. Accordingly, I sent him back to reach agreement with Smith on the holding of strictly informal talks with no pre-conditions to establish whether a basis existed for the subsequent negotiation of an acceptable settlement. We are appointing Duncan Watson, with Oliver Wright, to represent us at these talks and have proposed that the first round at least should be in London, though it may be desirable for the subsequent rounds to take place in Salisbury. Before Wright had been able to put this to Smith, the news had begun to break in the South African press, though it is not absolutely clear whether the leak was in South Africa or in Salisbury. At all events, I had been convinced that we should not be able to keep this secret and had told Wright to warn Smith that if the news broke, a statement would have to be made. He managed to agree to a short text with Smith and this is contained in the first paragraph of the statement I shall now make in the House this afternoon. The text of this is attached. 3 To protect Smith, we have agreed not to say specifically that he first approached the Governor. But the text clearly implies that the initiation was made in Salisbury. With luck, this publicity should not make it too difficult for us to pursue these exploratory talks. But you will realize that it is still an entirely open question whether the talks will reveal that any solid basis exists for an eventual solution. I know that you share our hopes. I am sure that you also share our recognition of the pitfalls. I will, of course, continue to keep you posted. 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. 2 In an April 22 message, Wilson had informed the President of a secret feeler from Rhodesia indicating that Ian Smith was interested in beginning talks to settle the present situation with no preconditions whatsoever. (Ibid.) Johnson’s reply of April 23 expressed the President’s support for Wilson’s efforts to settle this “critical problem” peacefully. (Ibid.) 3 Not printed. 4 A new round of British-Rhodesian talks began in London on May 9. 535. Memorandum of Conversation 535. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 16, 1966, 2 p.m. SUBJECT Message to President from Prime Minister of Portugal concerning Rhodesia PARTICIPANTS U.S. Side The President Mr. Walter W. Rostow Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (EUR) Mr. Chester C. Carter (S/CPR) Portuguese Side Ambassador Garin Ambassador Garin said that he appreciated all of the demands on the President’s time and therefore was most grateful that the President had been able to receive him. He then presented to the President an envelope which he said contained a letter from Prime Minister Salazar with regard to the Rhodesian problem, which was causing concern and alarm to Portugal. 2 The Ambassador said that Portugal had desired to follow a policy of neutrality in connection with Rhodesia and had been ready to accept the British contention that the matter was an internal problem for the UK to resolve. However, the Portuguese Government now found itself involved in the situation more than it had wished. The Security Council resolution against Portugal had been unfair and unjust. Now the SC would be meeting tomorrow to consider a draft resolution prepared by the African countries. This is an extreme resolution which would oblige the Portuguese to stop trade and other relations with Rhodesia and it caused Portugal much concern. In addition, the Ambassador said, the British Government is now making serious military preparations with a view to military intervention in Rhodesia. A large part of the British fleet is in the Mozambique channel. The port of Beira is under surveillance and there are reports of British troop movements and shipment of heavy equipment from Portsmouth and Southampton. While much of this is based on rumor, the Portuguese have had many reports of this kind, which are most alarming. If the British decide on intervention in Rhodesia, the Ambassador continued, there are three ways in which this could be carried out. The British troops could come through Zambia, but Kaunda has said that he does not wish this and will not permit his country to be a base of operations against Rhodesia. The British could attempt to come through South Africa, which would cause obvious problems. Lastly, they could come through Mozambique. With its port facilities, railways and pipeline, Mozambique is the ideal way for the invasion of Rhodesia. The military action could come through a sudden unilateral move by the British or as a result of UN action. If the British attempt to enter Mozambique, the Portuguese would destroy the port facilities, South Africa would become involved, and “there would be a conflagration”. The Ambassador thought that the U.S. inevitably would become involved. For all these reasons, the Ambassador said, the Portuguese hope that the talks now going on between the British and the Rhodesians on Rhodesia will be successful. Prime Minister Salazar is asking the President in his letter to use his influence to this end. In response, the President said he would be very happy to read the Prime Minister’s letter, which would be given careful study. He hoped very much that the situation would not develop in the manner outlined by the Ambassador but that it would be resolved in a peaceful way through negotiations. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stoessel, and approved by the White House on May 18. The meeting took place at the White House. 2 Salazar’s letter, the text of which was transmitted to Lisbon in telegram 573, May 16, declared that Rhodesia was situated in the most developed, progressive, and prosperous part of Africa and warned that if a convulsion were provoked in the region, the West would face a very serious military crisis affecting the defense of the South Atlantic and access to the Indian Ocean. It stated that the Portuguese Government had counseled moderation with the Rhodesians, but only the U.S. Government was in a position to do this successfully with the British. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD) 536. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 536. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, May 20, 1966. I should like you to know that we shall be making an announcement at 5:00 P.M. London time today (1:00 P.M. Washington) that the talks between the British and Rhodesian officials will be adjourned to enable both sides to report back to their principals. We shall also announce that the talks will resume shortly but shall not at this stage announce the date or place of resumption. For your own private information the date is likely to be about Whitsun (May 29) and the place Salisbury. If possible at Government House, if not at some neutral place like the University. The officials have had some nine meetings all told and the general impression we have received is that although the Rhodesians have certainly not come to Canossa and have not abandoned rebellion as a fall back position, they are genuinely looking for a way out and would now like to negotiate the independence they so foolishly seized last November. They have told us that they accept that independence, if granted, must come within the ambit of our six principles. Indeed, they have shown particular interest in our sixth principle, which envisages protection for the European minority after majority rule. This suggests that Smith, at any rate, has accepted the inevitability of African assumption of power and is now looking for adequate safeguards to guarantee the security of Europeans when that day arrives. Another promising line of thought to emerge was the idea that the Westminster type of constitution, with its all or nothing characteristics, may not really be the answer to Rhodesia’s practical problems. There might be scope for useful discussion on these lines, for one of the advantages of an alternative system would be to give the Africans some power now, immediately, and to enable the Europeans to retain some power after majority rule. There are still a lot of hurdles ahead, in particular the question of the return to the rule of law. But I am not unhopeful. We have not abandoned our stand of principle of last November. But our ideas, which then fell on deaf ears, are now finding better receptivity. Sanctions are clearly working, inexorably, if slowly, and Smith will be negotiating against a deteriorating economy. But our basic aim is reconciliation, not punishment. To secure a just and decent future for all races in Rhodesia must be a major British interest and, I would have thought, a major free world interest too. I am beginning to allow myself to hope that we may be able to bring it off. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 67 D 262, Presidential Correspondence, UK/Wilson to Pres. Secret; Nodis. 537. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Salazar 537. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Salazar 1 Washington, June 10, 1966. My dear Mr. Prime Minister: I was pleased to receive your thoughtful letter of May 11 2 on the grave problem of peace in southern Africa. Our two countries have enjoyed friendly and fruitful relations since the founding of the United States. We are proud of that history and of our present cooperation in the Atlantic Alliance which we both helped create. I have carefully reflected on your views and was particularly gratified to note that we are in agreement on the principle of government by express consent of the governed. If this principle had been genuinely accepted and applied in Southern Rhodesia, we might not be confronted with the dangerous situation of which you have written. Even now, I am confident that prompt application of this principle would lead to peaceful reconciliation of divergent interests and make possible a transition to majority government with adequate protection for all minorities. Please understand, Mr. Prime Minister, that I do not minimize the difficulties involved in the Rhodesian situation. But I have faith that if all those in authority in southern Africa would strive to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect by word and deed, the forces of peace and progress could triumph over those of violence and destruction. I also believe public declarations of intention and concrete evidence of application would enhance, not jeopardize, achievement of this objective. We have supported the British Government in its efforts peacefully to restore constitutional rule in Rhodesia because we believe that eventual majority rule is essential to the political stability of the area. We have been encouraged by the resumption of talks looking toward a peaceful solution, and we have cautioned against untimely action in the United Nations or elsewhere which would prejudice the successful outcome of these talks. I was pleased to learn from you that there is a desire in Salisbury that the conversations prove successful and that you have been counselling moderation. With patience and strength and with the support of responsible men everywhere. I am convinced that just and lasting solutions can be found to the problems of southern Africa. I welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you and will always be pleased to receive your thoughts on subjects of interest to our two countries. 3 Sincerely, LBJ 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 5, 5/26/66–6/29/66. 2 See footnote 2, Document 535 . 3 In telegram 765 from Lisbon, June 25, Charge Harvey R. Wellman reported that he delivered the President’s letter to Salazar on June 24. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original. 538. Memorandum of Conversation 538. Memorandum of Conversation 1 London, June 10, 1966, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Rhodesia PARTICIPANTS U.K. Prime Minister Wilson Foreign Secretary Stewart Defense Secretary Healey Sir Burke Trend Michael Hall Michael Paliser U.S. Secretary Rusk Ambassador Bruce Minister Kaiser Ronald I. Spiers The Secretary asked how the Prime Minister saw the situation in Rhodesia now. The Prime Minister said things were going a good deal better. There is now no doubt that the economic sanctions are causing severe problems for Smith. The effects of the credit squeeze have been considerable and unemployment is growing. The result of the last British election, the tobacco boycott and oil embargo have also been setbacks. This was a case of sanctions having real effects in a hundred different ways. Smith, who was a sophisticated economist, should see the situation in its true light. The white emigres to Rhodesia, who had gone there for an easier living, were now finding that things were not so good. The Prime Minister said that, at the end of the day, all of this would force Smith into real negotiation. The hope was that he would break away from the hardliners and form a government of national unity. The British would continue to insist on a return to constitutional rule. The Prime Minister continued that his own view was that there would be a month or two of very constructive discussions and haggling. The big question, however, was whether Smith would have the courage to break away from the “wild men” or whether he would pursue a “scorched earth” policy, bringing the house down with him. The U.K. thought it would be possible to get a settlement giving independence to a responsible government, with a guarantee of moving to majority rule within a specified period of time. It is not clear, however, that such a settlement would be palatable to Black Africa, even though last November it had appeared ready to stomach it. There has been a weakening of the Africans ability to act cohesively. The OAU cannot even organize itself to meet. Nevertheless, inflammatory speeches continue and may cause trouble. The Secretary said that he had the impression the Africans may be more interested in words than in facts. This is a truth that the Spaniards had seen and there may be some lesson here applicable to Rhodesia. The Prime Minister thought the situations were not the same. There had been a deep emotional crisis in Africa over the U.K., beginning with Kenya. Sir Burke Trend said that the CRO would like to get in touch with the U.S. as soon as possible regarding help to Zambia. The Secretary said that flying out 12,000 tons of copper per day was “not on”. Trend said that they were thinking of small-scale help in transport, harbor-dredging etc. The Secretary said that he would raise this question with his colleagues when he returned to Washington and let the U.K. know through our Embassy as soon as possible. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on June 20. The meeting took place at the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street in London. The source text is marked “Part III of III.” 539. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 539. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Discussion of Rhodesia with Prime Minister Wilson 2 Recommendations: 1. If Prime Minister Wilson requests US support for a settlement of the Rhodesian problem negotiated with the white minority Smith regime, I recommend that you avoid a commitment pending study of the terms of the agreement. 3 2. If Prime Minister Wilson does not raise the Rhodesian problem, I recommend that you ask him to inform you of the kind of settlement the British Government is prepared to accept. Background: From what we know of the present British position on Rhodesia, it seems likely that (1) the UK is prepared to grant Rhodesia independence under a regime headed by Ian Smith, hence before majority rule is achieved and (2) the grant of independence will not be accompanied by enforceable lasting assurances on a transition to majority rule. We have always been skeptical that the economic sanctions program would succeed in “bringing the rebel regime to an end” as the Prime Minister last November publicly expressed the hope that it would, but we have suggested no alternative lines of action for accomplishing this objective. Now we are faced with the possibility of serious damage to our relations with African governments if we are closely associated with such a Rhodesian settlement, which would be clearly unpalatable to them. US support for such a settlement would clearly be at variance with the spirit if not the letter of your May 26 remarks to the African ambassadors, which included the statement that we were supporting UK and UN efforts “to restore legitimate government in Rhodesia” because “only when this is accomplished can steps be taken to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia—not just six percent of them.” Without regard to the disadvantages for us, there is some question as to whether such a “settlement” would in fact settle the problem. The white minority is probably too small a part of the population to hold out indefinitely if the African majority organizes itself for militant action. There is a considerable risk that, after independence, the white minority would use repressive measures to maintain its position, the Africans would respond with violence, and there would be a breakdown of law and order. The British would doubtless try to build into any settlement some sort of “guarantees” of progress to ultimate majority rule, but really effective guarantees would be very difficult to achieve. “Inviolate” constitutional provisions can be violated by a determined minority and reliance on international guarantees protecting a constitution would be unrealistic. However, if effective assurances could be devised that are credible to the international community, this should affect our attitude positively. Suggested Questions To Be Raised: 1. The Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on July 5 that “there would be no purpose in reaching agreement on the constitutional future of Rhodesia if that agreement did not at the same time win for Rhodesia acceptance in international society.” How does the British Government intend to ascertain this international acceptability? 4 2. Is the British Government prepared to grant Rhodesia independence before majority rule? If so, with what guarantees of progress to majority rule? Will these guarantees be credible and enforceable if the Rhodesian Front is in control of Rhodesia? 3. What does the Prime Minister believe the African reaction will be to a grant of independence to a white minority regime? If adverse, what implication does the UK think this may have for its position in Black Africa? Dean Rusk 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Secret. 2 Prime Minister Wilson visited Washington July 28–29 and met with the President on July 29. 3 There is no record of any discussion of Rhodesia by the President and Prime Minister Wilson. Memoranda of their conversations on July 29 are in Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. A memorandum of remarks by the President concerning his private talks with Wilson, which also excluded Rhodesia, is ibid., POL 15–1 US/Johnson. 4 The Prime Minister also announced on July 5 that the British-Rhodesian talks in Salisbury were being suspended and that the British participants were returning to London for consultations. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 540. Memorandum From Halvor O. Ekern of the Operations Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs (Shullaw) 540. Memorandum From Halvor O. Ekern of the Operations Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs (Shullaw) Washington, August 24, 1966. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Southern Rhodesia, 1965–1966. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 541. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 541. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, September 8, 1966, 11:27 a.m. 42780. Subj: UK Question on Sanctions for Rhodesia. 1. At own request, UK Minister Stewart called on Assistant Secretary Sisco (IO) late Sept 7 with HMG request for US assessment of feasibility of an SC res on Southern Rhodesia which would impose mandatory sanctions on all transit of POL for Rhodesia through Mozambique and forbid importation by UN member states of certain Rhodesian products, possibly including pig iron and chrome ore. 2. As background, Stewart said meeting of UK Cabinet in London yesterday had decided with regard Rhodesia that it would be difficult hold Commonwealth together solely on basis of UK agreement to a Canadian suggestion for a selective ban on Rhodesian exports. Cabinet had decided this step inadequate and they would have to go further but wanted take only minimum action in UN necessary to hold Commonwealth together “without risking UK vital economic interests” or “putting UN on dangerous course.” Stewart said Cabinet therefore considering package res which would ban transit of POL for Rhodesia through Mozambique and forbid importation by UN members of pig iron and chrome. Cabinet wished avoid risk of being forced into oil sanctions against South Africa. Stewart said he had been instructed to ask US assessment on chances such package res in SC. Cabinet would consider question tomorrow AM and wished US views by that time if possible. 3. Sisco replied that he would have to report this conversation to Mr. Ball who returning same evening and to Ambassador Goldberg to obtain official US view. Meanwhile, he could only give preliminary observations of purely personal nature. Sisco said effort to limit res to transit POL through Mozambique unlikely to wash in SC, would probably elicit immediate move to broaden res to include SA in light of known fact that South Africa main source oil supply to Rhodesia and Mozambique mainly transit area for POL originating in South Africa. Second, such step would clearly discriminate against Portugal and elicit very strong Portuguese reaction against those who supported it. 4. Leaving aside question of general advisability Chapter VII action this subject, Sisco said sanctions on pig iron might not, to limited extent his information on this subject, cause great economic dislocation for US because our imports Rhodesian pig iron sporadic and infrequent. Chrome was more important issue because high grade chrome ore in short supply on world market and important US companies now dependent on Rhodesian sources. He added important consideration here was that such action taken by itself was highly unlikely impress Commonwealth members or to hold back pressure in SC for extension of measures to cover imports into Rhodesia including POL. 5. Sisco said real question raised by UK query is ultimate UK position on sanctions toward South Africa. If UK decided that oil embargo against South Africa was an ultimate possibility in order meet political demands of maintaining Commonwealth, this would be important factor in overall equation. If on other hand, UK not planning take this decision and considered potential damage arising from it outweighed risk to Commonwealth, it would then appear unwise to take steps in SC on Rhodesia which would at minimum raise African expectations, whatever the tactical advantage. Stewart agreed that this was fundamental problem posed by his instructions. He added that HMG apparently felt it would not be in position veto Chapter VII res on South Africa and wished if possible to avoid being boxed in on this. 6. Dept has reviewed UK proposal. You may inform FonOff that Sisco’s remarks represent Dept’s assessment. Minister Stewart being informed here. We also reaffirming to him what Ball told Brown in London: we cannot veto res involving South Africa under conditions projected. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Dean, cleared by Ball, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Salisbury, Capetown, and Lisbon. 542. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 542. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, September 24, 1966, 11:45 a.m. 53836. Following message received by President from Wilson September 23: Begin Text: 1. I have purposely not troubled you so far with messages about Rhodesia. I know that David Bruce and Pat Dean between them will have kept both you yourself and Dean Rusk well in the picture of recent events and particularly of the exceptionally difficult discussion we had at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, as well as the background and reasons for the Commonwealth Secretary’s present visit to Rhodesia. 2. But I believe we shall shortly reach a moment of decision in this Rhodesian crisis. As you will have heard, I came under the strongest pressure during the Commonwealth Conference to use force against the Smith regime, to declare categorically and unconditionally that there would be no independence before majority rule and also to move a resolution of comprehensive mandatory sanctions in the Security Council. None of these propositions was acceptable to us, but I had to fight an excessively difficult and at times bitter action against them. In the end, I believe we came out reasonably well. The majority of the Commonwealth tacitly accepted that we could not be expected to use military force; and that it was reasonable that we should have a little more time to give the regime one last chance of coming to its senses. But in return, I had to agree that, if that last chance were not accepted by the regime, we would support limited mandatory sanctions against Rhodesian exports of raw materials and perhaps at a latter stage an extension of the oil embargo to cover all imports via Mozambique. Provided that the Commonwealth supported us at the United Nations in limiting the impact of the sanctions in this way (i.e., so as to avoid, if possible, an overt clash with South Africa), I also agreed that we would then withdraw all previous offers made to Rhodesia and declare that there would be no independence before majority rule. This was the price we had to pay to buy this additional time for a last showdown with Smith. But it was also necessary if we were to hold the Commonwealth together. And I know that this was an objective that you also strongly desired, given the immense racial tensions in the world and the value of the Commonwealth as a truly multi-racial association in helping to mitigate those tensions. I had broadly two main objectives throughout our Rhodesian discussions: to hold the Commonwealth together and to keep the Rhodesian situation under our own control, so far as possible. 4. There were times when I doubted whether either objective could be attained. As it turned out, we managed to secure both, at least for a limited period of time; and I truly believe that the Commonwealth has emerged stronger rather than weaker from this great test. 5. But time really is now of the essence. The Commonwealth Secretary, whose reports this week show that he is playing a difficult hand with shrewdness and skill, is doing his best to make Smith realize that we and the rest of the Commonwealth mean business and that there really is a limit to our willingness and ability to carry the can internationally for Rhodesia. We believe that the terms we are offering as set out in the Commonwealth communique genuinely represent an honorable way out for Smith. But if he is to accept them, he will almost certainly have to bring himself to ditch his own extremists. And I am bound to say that his talks so far with the Commonwealth Secretary do not encourage us to hope that he will have the guts to do this. 6. But if this rather pessimistic forecast proves right, then we are going to be faced with the need for the measures agreed at the Common-wealth Prime Ministers Conference. I hope that initially we can agree in the Security Council on limited sanctions and that this will not therefore involve us immediately in a clash with South Africa. But we can certainly not be sure of this: and in any case a decision to move to further mandatory sanctions of this type may well hasten the day when a clash with South Africa becomes inevitable. This is something which is, I believe, equally repugnant to you and to us. The consequences (as I explained to the Africans at the Commonwealth Conference and as many of them in their heart of hearts fully recognize) are incalculable. They could in the longer run lead to armed conflict with the South Africans and would certainly produce economic warfare, the effect of which, for both our countries in particular but also I believe for Western economic interests generally, would be excessively damaging. But equally I feel bound to repeat the warning that George Brown gave George Ball during the latter’s recent visit here to the effect that we must not be counted on to incur the immense international odium that would result from a British veto in the Security Council on any measures bound to result in conflict with South Africa. This is a case where I think you and we would have to stand or fall together; which is why I am addressing you now in the hope that, by judicious action before the moment of decision arrives, you may be able to help us avert the dangers I have just outlined. 7. It is difficult, and indeed inappropriate, for me to suggest what it might be possible for you to do to help us at this juncture. If you felt that it would be productive, I should welcome any action by the U.S. Government that you might think appropriate, designed to bring Smith to his senses and get him to accept that we all of us mean business, and that there is nothing but isolation and disaster at the end of the road for Rhodesia unless he is now prepared to reach an agreement on the basis of this last offer of ours, even if this has to be at the price of breaking with some of his associates. 8. I also believe that South Africa’s influence on Smith is potentially of the greatest importance. If you saw any prospect of being able to induce the South African Government to bring pressure on Smith for a settlement, in their own best interests, this might well be the most useful of all. In addition, of course we hope that, if we are forced before the end of the year to work for limited mandatory sanctions at the United Nations, we shall be able to count on your help with other countries designed to keep the sanctions limited. We have made it clear that we shall only work for these sanctions provided we have full support from the Commonwealth for keeping them limited. We mean to stick to this. But equally we must expect that at least the Zambians and a number of other Afro-Asians will press for a great deal more. However, what we really want, if at all possible, is to induce Smith to come to terms. 9. I am sorry to worry you with our troubles when you have quite enough of your own. But I feel justified in doing this because, as I say, I think these are really our joint troubles; and if there is anything you feel you can usefully do now, we may be able to avoid finding ourselves jointly in a much more difficult situation which may confront us within the coming months, particularly at the United Nations and in what may follow from the debates there. End Text. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Exdis. The text was received from the White House and approved by Read of S/S. Repeated to USUN. 543. Memorandum of Conversation 543. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 14, 1966. SUBJECT Africa PARTICIPANTS UK George Brown, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Sir Michael Stewart, British Minister Lord Hood, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office Denis A. Greenhill, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office US Dean Rusk, Secretary of State Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary-designate for Political Affairs John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to the United Kingdom Francis Bator, Special Assistant to the President M.D. Goldstein, Acting Country Director, EUR/BMI With regard to Rhodesia, Secretary Rusk thanked the Foreign Secretary for keeping the US Government so well informed. The Foreign Secretary said that the results obtained at the recent Commonwealth Conference were the best that Britain could have achieved in the circumstances. The Commonwealth, he thought, will hold together on the Rhodesia problem at least until the deadline (end of November) for the acceptance of a settlement by Smith, unless the Africans take fright. An awkward moment is coming up. Sir Morrice James is returning to Salisbury with the latest word from the British Cabinet; his discussions there could be misunderstood by the Africans. The Foreign Secretary went on to say that, if Smith rejects the British proposals, the UK will have to join in a UN resolution to apply mandatory selective sanctions to Southern Rhodesia. The situation in the UN at that time can be delicate, and the UK and the US will have to work closely together. The Foreign Secretary hoped that, as agreed at the Commonwealth Conference, the African countries would stay with the UK in seeking a resolution for selective sanctions only. Denis Greenhill said that a draft of such a resolution had already been prepared on a contingency basis and will be discussed soon with US officials. In reply to a question from Secretary Rusk, the Foreign Secretary said that the felt certain that tobacco was not being exported from Rhodesia in important amounts; he also felt confident that foreign dealers were not buying Rhodesian tobacco and leaving it in Rhodesia for storage. Secretary Rusk noted that, had we put our Rhodesian policy before Congress three or four months ago, it would have been defeated, partly because of the views of members from the Southern states and partly because of the movement of British flag ships to North Vietnam. He thought, however, the situation was much better today and thanked the Foreign Secretary for what had been done to reduce the number of calls by British flag ships at North Vietnamese ports. The Foreign Secretary said that he did not think economic sanctions had significantly hurt or helped Smith within Rhodesia. He was convinced that Smith was the one man who could lead Rhodesia either to continue in its illegal position or to accept a settlement with the British. Secretary Rusk reaffirmed that the US does not wish to step out ahead of the Commonwealth in dealing with the problem. The Foreign Secretary expressed concern at the movement of Rhodesian chrome to the United States. It was pointed out to him that the chrome was moving from Mozambique to which it had been shipped by an American producer in Rhodesia. In a brief discussion of Zambia, the Foreign Secretary requested that we try to have a calming talk with President Kaunda when he comes here. Sir Michael Stewart mentioned that Zambia seemed to be moving toward accepting the British aid package of 14 million pounds. The Foreign Secretary said that the US must not rely on the British to veto alone a UN resolution calling for economic measures against South Africa. The British Government has not made a decision on what it would do. Secretary Rusk said that the US has not reached a decision either. In responding to a question, the Foreign Secretary said that he thought the French would play a mischievous role if a resolution against South Africa became a current issue. In a brief reference to South West Africa, Mr. Greenhill said he would not preclude the possibility of having to face a vote on the original resolution introduced into the UN by the African states and others. There is, however, a good chance of obtaining an acceptable outcome since the small countries dearly want an affirmative vote from the US and the UK on some kind of resolution dealing with South West Africa. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Goldstein, and approved in S on October 28. The source text is marked “Part 4 of 7.” 544. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 544. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, October 18, 1966, 6:59 p.m. 68392. For Ambassador. Following message was sent today by private channel to Prime Minister from President Johnson: “In reply to your good message on Rhodesia, 2 let me begin by saying that I greatly admired the way you handled the Commonwealth Conference. You were certainly right to concentrate on holding the group together and retaining control of the Rhodesian situation. As you say, the Commonwealth is very important to all of us—the more so as racial problems multiply. If Smith throws away his last chance, you may depend on our full support for the moves spelled out in your letter. Specifically, we will support your withdrawal of all previous offers to Smith, your adoption of a position of no independence before majority rule, and your proposal of limited mandatory economic sanctions in the Security Council. I know you are aware that there will be strong pressures to broaden the sanctions and to apply them to South Africa. My people—both at the State Department and in New York—seriously doubt that there will be support in the Council for limiting the scope of export sanctions or for restricting to Mozambique any subsequent oil embargo. They believe that the drive to enlarge the target to include South Africa is likely to be overwhelming. Nevertheless, I fully appreciate your problems with a UK veto of such an enlargement. I do not think that we can help through direct contact with Smith. If you believe it would be useful to have a go at Vorster, I am willing to have my Ambassador reiterate our firm support for your policy and for UN resolutions designed to end the Smith regime. He would try to persuade them that their own interests dictate that they comply with the present voluntary sanctions. He would also point out that the Security Council is likely to impose mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, and that South African refusal to comply would lead to pressures to extend them to South Africa which would be difficult for us to resist. Perhaps your people in Pretoria could make a similar approach. In any event, I would suggest that we use the time you have gained to discuss the problems presented if you are forced to give effect to your conference commitments, as well as the contingencies which could arise if things go badly in New York. If you agree, I will get my people in touch with yours. I want you to know that I think you have been a great force for good in this matter. I know it is a heavy cross, but you are doing Africa and the world a great service.” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. Drafted at the White House and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. 2 See Document 542 . 545. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Manila 545. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Manila 1 Washington, October 20, 1966, 6:32 p.m. 70145. Tosec 4. 1. Following message from Prime Minister Wilson to the President was received this morning via private channel: “Many thanks indeed for your very helpful message on Rhodesia. 2 We are truly grateful for your promise of support if Smith throws away his last chance. We of course share to some extent the apprehensions of your people, both in Washington and in New York, about the likely difficulties of trying to limit the scope of export sanctions or restricting any oil embargo to Mozambique. But such indications as we have had from Commonwealth Heads of Government are that they will do their best to honour their part of the conference bargain. We shall just have to work hard to achieve the desired result: and this is why your promise of support is of such real practical value to us. I fully accept what you say about the difficulty of your helping through direct contact with Smith. But I warmly welcome your offer to have a go at Vorster. I believe this could be very helpful, especially if it can be done soon. Without being too sanguine about the likelihood of the South Africans pressing Smith really hard to accept this last chance, I think there is at least a worthwhile prospect of their doing so. George Brown worked on the South African Ambassador here as a preliminary to meeting Muller in New York: and, at that meeting, Muller undertook to think over very carefully what George had said and, for the first time in our dealings with him, he appeared seriously to contemplate the possibility of using South African influence. Accordingly, when he got back here, George sent a further message to Muller, confirming what he had told him of the terms we have now put to Smith and warning him that, as Smith was on the brink of a decision, any South African action would have to be immediate to affect it. We do not, of course, know whether the South Africans have yet taken any action but I shall be very grateful if you will, as you suggest, now instruct your Ambassador in Pretoria to act on the lines you propose. 3 This will most usefully reinforce our own approach to Muller. Moreover, the timing should be just right. Smith yesterday gave our emissary in Salisbury his oral reply. As we expected, it temporises. Smith promises us a written reply within the next week or so. His oral reaction has been essentially negative: But I still think there may be an outside chance of getting somewhere with him before our end-November deadline: and, perhaps more important, before the November 11th Anniversary of I.D.I. If the South Africans can be induced to weigh in constructively while he and his colleagues are still deliberating, this might yet tip the scales. Meanwhile, however, we clearly have to prepare for the worst: and I am sure it is right, as you suggest, that our people should get together to consider the contingencies. I am not quite sure at what point this will reach you in your present travels. But it brings you my warmest wishes for a profitable outcome. George has given me a heart-warming account of his reception in Washington and especially from yourself. Clearly there can be no room for excessive optimism about current trends in Soviet attitudes. But it seems as though there may be at least a chink of light at the end of the tunnel.” 2. White House relaying Canberra. 4 Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. Repeated to London for the Ambassador. Secretary Rusk was in the Philippines October 21–27 for the Manila summit conference on Vietnam, October 24–25. 2 See Document 544 . 3 Telegram 71381 to Pretoria, October 21, instructed Ambassador Rountree to make U.S. views known orally to Prime Minister Vorster and to leave an aide-memoire expressing firm U.S. support for British policy on Rhodesia. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD) In telegram 529 from Capetown, October 24, Rountree reported that he met with Vorster for 75 minutes that day and gave him the aide-memoire. (Ibid.) 4 President Johnson was in Australia October 20–23 for a State visit preceding the Manila conference. 546. Memorandum of Conversation 546. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 16, 1966, 5:30 p.m. SUBJECT Rhodesia PARTICIPANTS U.K. Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Sir Michael Stewart, Minister, British Embassy U.S. The Secretary M.D. Goldstein, Acting Country Director, BMI Ambassador Dean said that he was instructed to hand to the Secretary the text of Smith’s reply to the British Government’s proposals for settlement of the Rhodesian question. He observed that the reply seemed basically designed for publication. It amounted to a rejection of the British proposals, though it did not explicitly say so. The British Government expected to have to take the Rhodesia question to the UN. Before doing so, however, the Government has asked Smith to state his position on (1) providing guarantees for uninterrupted progress to majority rule; (2) participation in an interim broad-based Rhodesian government before promulgation of a new constitution, the acceptability of which would remain to be determined by Rhodesians as a whole; and (3) reversion to the Governor of control over the military, the lifting of censorship, and the release of political detainees. The Ambassador said that Sir Malcolm McDonald was explaining to Uganda, Nigeria, and Kenya what the British Government was doing, and Lord Caradon had talked to President Kaunda along the same lines. The Secretary, referring to his own conversations with Kaunda, noted that Kaunda did not say as much then as he did in his speech at the UN: their talk was quite relaxed and Kaunda used no invective or florid language in expounding his unhappiness with the British. In almost an hour’s discussion he spent perhaps ten minutes on Rhodesia. Kaunda was very much concerned that the passage of time was allowing for the consolidation of the Smith regime. The Secretary went on to say that Kaunda stressed that sanctions against Rhodesia could not succeed without the cooperation of South Africa. When Kaunda raised the question of using force in Rhodesia, the Secretary expressed strong reservations—he noted that the situation could require two divisions—and Kaunda did not argue the point very much. Kaunda pointed out that 600–700 people had signed the Governor’s book in Salisbury and that, while this was not a large number in itself, in the circumstances it probably reflected a considerable body of anti-Smith sentiment in Rhodesia. The Secretary concluded by recalling that Kaunda did not ask for anything specific from the United States. He seemed to be waiting for the present British schedule to run out. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Goldstein, and approved in S on November 21. The source text is marked “Part 1 of 3.” The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. 547. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 547. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 29, 1966, 2030Z. I want you to know, for the strictly personal information of yourself and Dean Rusk at this stage, that I hope to be able to tell the House of Commons tomorrow that the Commonwealth Secretary and I will be meeting Ian Smith later this week. If he agrees to this, it will be a final showdown between us. Our prolonged probings of his position, culminating in Bowden’s visit this last weekend, coupled with Smith’s developing realisation of the pressures building up on him—our Commonwealth undertakings, the threatened UN action, South African representations to him (and I am confident Vorster has done this) and even signs of possible division within the Rhodesia front—all these things have, I believe, at last brought him to recognise that he stands now at the brink. And, as he gazes at the abyss ahead, I believe too that he is, perhaps for the first time since November of last year, seriously thinking that he must come to terms with us, because he understands how much worse for him and for Rhodesia any alternative course would be. This, at all events, is the conclusion that my colleagues and I have drawn from the attitude he took last weekend with the Commonwealth Secretary. I need not trouble you with the details. He has not come all the way to meet us—far from it. The gulf is still wide between us. And, if it is to be bridged, the initiative must come from him. We shall stand firm on our six principles, on a return to legality and on guarantees both against any fresh IDI and on unimpeded advance to African majority rule. But Smith has said enough to make it clear to me that I could not justify, to my country or my conscience, a break with him now and the implementation of paragraph 10 of the communique, with all the consequences that would flow for Rhodesia, for Britain and for the world as a whole, without one last personal effort to bring this narrow, obstinate, but not, I think, fundamentally dishonorable man to face up to the realities. If I fail, that will be that, and we shall go ahead as undertaken at the Commonwealth Conference. If I succeed, this will, I know, be only the beginning of many further difficulties—with the African Commonwealth, at the United Nations—and with some of our own supporters here. But there will be no agreement with Smith that does not meet our stated requirements and that I can not therefore with honour defend to Parliament. So I am prepared to face up to these difficulties and see them through, as the inevitable but acceptable price of a favourable settlement. I do not want to make this message any longer. But you have given us such staunch support throughout this Rhodesian business, and despite the misgivings that I know many of your people have felt, that I wanted you to have this advance warning of our plans. Joe Garner can fill in the State Department on some of the background. And I shall of course keep you posted of progress—if any. This is a very crucial moment. But we are going into it with clear heads and no illusions. If I was a betting man, I should wager against a settlement. But the odds are not so steep that the gamble is not worth taking: and the stakes, for all of us, are high. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Top Secret and Strictly Personal; Nodis. The source text does not indicate how the telegram was sent. An attached note from Read to Palmer, Sisco, and Leddy states that, because of the unusual caveat at the beginning of the Prime Minister’s message, it was uncertain if the U.K. negotiators in Washington knew of the information. Read’s note cautioned the recipients not to indicate any knowledge of the message to the British. The text of the message was transmitted to the Embassy in London in telegram 93323, November 29. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD) 2 Telegram 93835 to London, November 30, transmitted a message from Wilson to the President stating that he had not yet been able to announce the proposed meeting because Smith had asked for extra time to consult his colleagues. The Prime Minister noted, however, that Smith had now confirmed his willingness to come, and that their meeting later that week seemed likely to be delayed by only a few hours. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD) 548. Memorandum of Conversation 548. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 1, 1966, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Rhodesian Situation PARTICIPANTS Sir Saville Garner, Permanent Under Secretary, Commonwealth Office Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Nicholas deB Katzenbach, Under Secretary Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary, AF Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, IO J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF Donald R. Morris, Special Assistant, Under Secretary’s Office Edward W. Holmes, Alternate Country Director, AFSE Sir Saville Garner stated that broad agreement had been reached by the two sides in yesterday’s talks on Rhodesia. 2 There had been a difference regarding the tactics to be employed with respect to oil sanctions, but no differences on the broad objectives to be achieved. Both sides wished to avoid escalation of the matter toward economic warfare with South Africa. The British now had to ponder two questions: (1) Should HMG support an amendment to their resolution calling for broad oil sanctions? (2) Should the UK make a statement regarding its strong desire to avoid confrontation with South Africa at the time the amendment was discussed in the Security Council? It is clear that South Africa is worried; presumably we should do nothing to relieve this worry. South Africa is the key to the Rhodesian problem. The Under Secretary said that probably no outcome would be totally satisfactory. We must all play our cards carefully to bring about the best possible solution. In reply to the Under Secretary’s question, Sir Saville stated that the next Commonwealth meeting would probably be held in March or April of next year. He recalled the communique’s provisions for another meeting. If, however, a settlement were to be reached with Smith, pressures for a meeting would undoubtedly rise and it would presumably be held fairly soon. Sir Saville emphasized that he could not comment on the chance of a settlement. He recalled that the Prime Minister carefully refrained from committing himself on this aspect in his message to the President. 3 It is clear there has been some recent shift in Smith’s position. Smith has now agreed at least to consider a return to the 1961 Constitution and to give up independence. Nevertheless, he had by no means agreed to go nearly as far as the UK had wanted. The Rhodesian Prime Minister would still be responsible to the present parliament whereas the British had wanted the parliament to be dissolved. It is likely that the effect of sanctions and the influence of business and financial circles in Rhodesia had prompted Smith to move somewhat. The Under Secretary remarked that Smith would likely have moved in due course even without sanctions. His policy was so completely against the world trend of events that he could not have maintained it indefinitely. In discussing the general situation, Sir Saville remarked on the striking lack of public opposition to the Smith regime by Africans in Rhodesia. They had been amazingly quiescent. The Under Secretary remarked that perhaps the Africans had been hoping the situation would be resolved in other ways. If no solution were to be reached, they might in time be driven to take action themselves. He wondered how Africans in Rhodesia must feel at seeing their fate decided by white Rhodesians and white Britons in consultation with white Americans. Mr. Fredericks pointed to the efficient Rhodesian security force and its willingness to operate in ways unlike those employed by the British in the colonies in the past. Mr. Palmer remarked that the history of the Mashonas gave no particular expectation of strong action by them. Sir Saville declared that if a settlement with Smith were to be announced in the next few days, it would jolt most Africans. He would expect an extremely critical reaction. Much would depend on how a settlement were explained and handled. In view of the very complicated nature of likely constitutional arrangements, it would be extremely difficult to explain them to the ordinary man. The Under Secretary agreed that it would be very difficult to sell a settlement, even if the agreement to be obtained were better than now seems likely. In his view it would be better to emphasize the conclusions of a settlement rather than the specific details. Mr. Fredericks pointed out that in view of South Africa’s history with entrenched clauses in a constitution, it would be very difficult to obtain favorable African reaction to a settlement with Smith. Sir Saville agreed, stating that once independence is granted to a country, there is really nothing outsiders could do to control its subsequent actions. That is why the UK had wanted a British force in Rhodesia following any settlement. Any paper guarantees could be changed. In reply to a question, Sir Saville stated his belief that if Smith and Governor Gibbs made a joint appeal they would get the backing both of the Rhodesian armed services and the majority of the people. He believed that the vast bulk of Rhodesians would breathe a sigh of relief if an agreement with the UK were to be achieved. In conclusion, the Under Secretary and Sir Saville agreed that we must all wait to see what would happen with regard to the Rhodesian problem in the next few days. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential. Drafted by Holmes, cleared by Fredericks and Sisco, and approved in U on December 5. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. 2 U.S.-British talks on Rhodesia were held in Washington November 30–December 1. 3 Document 547 . 549. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 549. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, December 4, 1966, 2:55 p.m. 96316. For Ambassador. Following message from Prime Minister Wilson was delivered today to President and is sent to you FYI: Text: I write this to you in the plane on my way back from one more of these strangely tantalizing and—yet again—ultimately disappointing meetings with Smith. I say tantalizing because, after two days (and nights) of argument, discussion and very plain speaking, it seemed by yesterday evening that an honourable agreement was at last within our grasp. I need not trouble you with details. We discussed the three main issues—indissolubly related in our minds: to be dissociated so far as possible in his: the independence constitution: the prior return to legality and the formation of the interim government: and the essential external guarantees of the eventual settlement. By late yesterday we had hammered out a document which gave Smith a better deal in all three respects than he conceivably deserves: and on which my two colleagues and I had to reflect very carefully before we decided that this was something we could with honour recommend to Parliament. On the text itself, argued over line by line, paragraph by paragraph, there seemed in the end to be agreement between us. Why then have we had to make the indecisive short statement today which will have been shown to you? The answer I am afraid, is that we are dealing with a very devious and schizophrenic personality. Smith agreed to meet us on the absolutely clear understanding, to which he specifically assented that each of us came with full powers from our respective colleagues to settle. But on Friday 2 he recanted on this and insisted that he could not go further than agree with us a text which he would recommend to his colleagues as acceptable. By Saturday evening we had such a text. But then he recanted again: he would go no further than take it back and think over whether or not to recommend its acceptance. This was intolerable. But we were so resolved that the chance of a settlement should not slip through our fingers through any fault of ours that we have, as you see, given till noon tomorrow to give us a plain yes or no to the document, without any modification whatever. I think there is still an outside chance that he, or some of his colleagues will come to their senses. Before he left late last night, I spoke to him in rougher and more brutal terms than ever before of the appalling dangers for himself, for Rhodesia and for the whole of Southern Africa which were bound to be the consequence of a refusal. I may have shaken him (I certainly shook his colleagues). But what still sticks in his gullet as he put it, is the idea that he must return to legality before there can be the test of Rhodesian opinion in the new constitution. If he could not remove this bone on board the Tiger, I doubt if he will in Salisbury. At all events, by noon tomorrow the die will be cast, one way or the other. If, by then, he has not said yes to our text, we shall go straight ahead with the programme of action we promised to the Commonwealth in September. Garner has reported on the extremely helpful and thorough talks which he had with your people last week. I am sure that we must continue to act in the closest concert as we go forward to this next stage, fraught as it is with so many difficulties and I am glad to know that there is such close understanding between us. It is clear to us from our exchange with the South African Government that they have been leaning pretty heavily on Smith to reach a settlement. We have informed them of the content of the text we worked out with Smith, in the hope that even at this eleventh hour they may be able to exert some further pressure. I hope you may be willing to consider most urgently whether, by saying anything to them today, you too might help persuade them to try their hand again in Salisbury before noon tomorrow. End Text. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted at the White House, and approved by Larry C. Williamson of S/S. Repeated to Pretoria. 2 December 2. 3 On December 6, Prime Minister Wilson announced to the House of Commons that the Rhodesians had rejected the working document signed by Smith on December 3, leaving the United Kingdom no option but to appeal in the United Nations for the invocation of selective mandatory sanctions against the illegal Smith regime. 550. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 550. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, December 4, 1966, 1:58 p.m. 96312. Deliver following message from Secretary to Muller immediately, stressing that it is strictly confidential and personal, not for publication. “Prime Minister Wilson has informed President Johnson that he has worked out with Mr. Ian Smith a tentative formula for the settlement of the Rhodesian issue. 2 Mr. Smith is now considering whether to recommend its acceptance to his colleagues in Salisbury. The point of difficulty for Mr. Smith appears to be that he must return to legality before there can be a test of Rhodesian opinion in the new constitution. “While we have not seen the text of the formula, I understand that it conforms with the Six Principles and the requirements set forth in the September Commonwealth Conference communique. I understand you have been informed of the contents. “If this is the fair and equitable settlement it appears to be, I believe that the interests of all of us lie in Mr. Smith’s accepting it. If you agree, I would urge you to try to convince him of the wisdom of reaching agreement with the British. The matter is one of considerable urgency, since the British Government has been compelled by its commitments to the rest of the Commonwealth to require Mr. Smith’s reply by noon Monday. I understand you have been helpful in the past and I sincerely hope you will once again be willing to bring your influence to bear at this crucial moment.” For London: Text of Wilson letter in separate cable. You may inform appropriate FonOff officials of Secretary’s message to Muller. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by McElhiney, cleared by Read, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London and to the White House. 2 See Document 549 . 551. Intelligence Memorandum 551. Intelligence Memorandum 1 Washington, December 9, 1966. No. 2206/66 THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE SMITH-WILSON TALKS Summary Prime Ministers Wilson and Smith claim to have agreed on a constitutional settlement for Rhodesia, but they split over who should have effective power within the country during the period of British sovereignty before the granting of independence. London now is asking the UN Security Council to impose selective sanctions on Rhodesian exports. It is trying to come to terms with African demands that sanctions on oil import into Rhodesia also be covered—a move which Britain fears might make it harder to avoid a confrontation with South Africa. Whatever resolution the UN adopts is unlikely to have much effect on Rhodesia’s economy. It is also unlikely to satisfy African governments, but most of these will probably continue to put priority on their domestic problems. There may be further efforts to end the dispute outside the UN, perhaps including further negotiations between Salisbury and London. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only. A note on the source text states that the memorandum was produced solely by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Research and Reports and the Office of National Estimates. 552. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 552. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 1 Washington, December 13, 1966. SUBJECT Significant Developments During Your Absence—November 29–December 13 1. Southern Rhodesia Following the failure of negotiations with the Smith regime in a last-minute attempt to reach a settlement of the Rhodesian problem, the UK introduced a draft resolution in the Security Council on December 8 calling for the application of selective mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. Ambassador Goldberg spoke in support of the resolution on December 12. On behalf of the African nations, Uganda, Nigeria and Mali submitted to the Council on December 13 proposals to amend the British resolution to include a comprehensive oil embargo, sanctions on Rhodesian coal and manufactured goods, and a reminder that “appropriate action” would be taken against violators of mandatory sanctions. The African amendments would also call on the UK to declare categorically that it would not grant independence to Rhodesia until majority rule was achieved, determine that the situation in Rhodesia constitutes a threat to peace, and deplore Britain’s refusal to use force to end the rebellion. Consultations between the U.K. and African states on these amendments are now going on. The British have indicated they will not oppose the oil provision, but they find most of the other amendments unacceptable and hope to muster enough abstentions to block their adoption. We expect the Assembly to approve a resolution imposing selective mandatory sanctions (including oil) on Rhodesia before the end of this week. 2 [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential. 2 On December 16, by a vote of 11 (including the United States and the United Kingdom) to 0 with 4 abstentions, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution imposing certain mandatory economic sanctions upon Rhodesia, including a comprehensive embargo on the supply of oil and oil products. For text of Resolution 232 (1966), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents , 1966, pp. 608–610. 553. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 553. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, January 23, 1967. SOUTHERN RHODESIA Background 1. Since 1923 Southern Rhodesia has been an internally self-governing colony with a high degree of autonomy. A new constitution granted by Great Britain and approved by a predominately European electorate in 1961 removed most of the few remaining legal controls held by the United Kingdom. This constitution was abrogated on November 11, 1965 when Ian Smith unilaterally broke with the British Crown. 2. The colony’s estimated population of 4,350,000 is composed of about 4,105,000 Africans, 224,000 Europeans (white), and 21,000 of other ethnic groups—or a ratio of almost 20 Africans to 1 European. The whites are largely British or South African in origin. 3. The significant features added by the 1961 constitution were a bill of rights and the introduction of a second electoral roll with lower franchise qualifications, permitting a limited number of Africans to qualify. The African leaders refused to cooperate in implementing the constitution, which they considered a device to perpetuate minority rule, and few Africans registered to vote. 4. The European electorate showed little desire to accept African demands and progressively replaced their more moderate party leaders. In April 1964 Winston Field, a Rhodesian Front Prime Minister, was replaced by his deputy, Ian Smith, when Field failed to move rapidly enough for the more authoritarian elements in his party in independence negotiations with the British. The replacement of Field by Smith was a continuation of the trend evident since the 1950’s when each Prime Minister was more right-wing than his predecessor. On November 11, 1965, after nearly 2 years of unsuccessful negotiations with the British Government, Ian Smith illegally and unilaterally declared the territory independent from the United Kingdom and proclaimed a new constitution. 5. The British still appear willing to grant the colony its independence under conditions which provide for majority rule coupled with guarantees of minority rights. 6. The six principles set forth by the British in the talks provide for unimpeded progress toward majority rule within a constitutional framework acceptable to the Rhodesian people. 7. The United States and other nations have accepted the British Government’s position that Southern Rhodesia is a British colony. We continue to recognize the sovereignty and legal authority of the United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesia. No country in the world has recognized Southern Rhodesia’s declaration of independence. 8. Soon after the unilateral declaration of independence on November 11, 1965, the British, by a vote of 10–0–1 (France), won approval in the Security Council for a measured policy of economic sanctions against the regime. The voluntary sanctions program has caused some deteriorations in the Rhodesian economy, although there has been serious circumvention throughout South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique. The Rhodesian economy continued to function reasonably well and the Smith regime remained in firm political control. The British began in April 1966 another series of exploratory talks with the Smith regime at the official level aimed at finding a basis for negotiations. 9. Prior to the Commonwealth Conference in London (September 6–15), rumors of an impending UK “sell-out” to Smith were widespread. Zambia threatened to leave the Commonwealth if British policy toward Rhodesia was approved by a majority of the members. The conference communique reflected the wide divergence of opinion within the Commonwealth over British policy on Rhodesia. The UK received general support from only four countries, i.e., Australia, New Zealand, Malta and Malawi, with Canada playing the role of mediator. The other 16 called in varying degrees for more positive action by the British to bring down the Smith regime. (Tanzania did not attend.) The communique did record, nevertheless, the UK’s intention to put proposals to the Rhodesians designed to give the illegal regime one last chance to return to constitutional rule before the end of the year. If these proposals were not accepted, the communique noted that the British Government would jointly sponsor mandatory sanctions in the UN prohibiting the import by member states of selected Rhodesian products. 10. A meeting took place between Wilson and Smith aboard HMS Tiger December 2–4. There, the two sides drafted a “working document” to be submitted to the British and Rhodesian Cabinets. The British Cabinet announced its approval of the document shortly after Wilson’s return to London. The Smith regime, however, stated on December 5 that it was prepared to agree to Wilson’s constitutional proposals but that it had to reject the Tiger proposals as a whole because it could not accept a return to legality (i.e., rule by the Governor for an interim period of about four months). Thereafter, Wilson went to Parliament and reaffirmed the British commitment in the Commonwealth communique not to grant independence before majority rule. Under the terms of the “working document,” independence would have preceded majority rule. 11. UK Foreign Minister Brown on December 8 submitted a resolution to the UNSC calling for mandatory economic sanctions on selected Rhodesian products. On December 16, 1966 a resolution (No. 232) was adopted by the Security Council imposing selective mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. US Interests and Objectives 12. A number of important US interests are involved. We want to maintain our political influence in Black Africa and help to create conditions conducive to stability and progress. Continued lack of movement toward a Rhodesian solution could be exploited by extreme African elements, as well as by the Communists, to our disadvantage. Our goals are to avoid a racist war in Southern Rhodesia and serious deterioration in race relations elsewhere in Africa (particularly Zambia). We are trying also to prevent closer political and economic cooperation among the white-dominated countries of southern Africa. We share the British view that a phased movement toward majority rule in Rhodesia is the best way to achieve our aims. Interests and Objectives of the UK 13. The basic issue between the British Government and the Rhodesian regime has been the timing of independence in relation to majority rule. The British have been willing to grant independence before majority rule, but only if unimpeded progress toward majority rule were assured. The Africans and other members of the United Nations have urged the UK to allow independence only after the establishment of majority rule. 14. The UK initially supported a voluntary sanctions program (adopted by the UN Security Council in November, 1965) and subsequently backed the mandatory economic sanctions resolution against Southern Rhodesia in the hope that such pressure on the Smith regime would bring about a settlement of the problem based on the six principles. The British are most reluctant to see sanctions extended to South Africa, from which Rhodesia has been buying most of its petroleum products. Such economic warfare with the South Africans could gravely affect the British balance of payments. 15. The British Government has ruled out the use of force in the belief that (1) this would lead to open warfare; (2) public opinion in the UK would not accept such a course; (3) South Africa might intervene; and (4) it would be a big operation necessitating the moving of UK forces from Germany or the Far East. US Strategy and Past Actions 16. On the same day that the Smith regime declared its independence from the United Kingdom, we announced the recall of our Consul General in Salisbury and the closing of the US Information Office in Rhodesia. The US Government at present maintains a small housekeeping consular staff in Salisbury by virtue of authority granted by the UK. 17. Following the UNSC resolution in November 1965 calling for voluntary economic sanctions in Southern Rhodesia the US Government urged US companies importing various Rhodesian products into the United States to find alternate sources of supply. We later imposed controls on exports to Rhodesia from the United States. 18. On April 9, 1966 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution noting its concern that substantial oil supplies might reach Rhodesia and result in a “threat to the peace” by encouraging the illegal regime. When it became apparent to the British Government that the voluntary sanctions program was not having the desired effect, we were asked to support a UK request in the UN Security Council for a resolution calling for mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. We agreed and, following the collapse of the HMS Tiger talks, the British introduced their resolution. On December 16 UNSC resolution No. 232 was adopted (11 (US)-0–4 (USSR, France, Mali and Bulgaria)) imposing selective mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. The list of embargoed items covers some 80 percent of Rhodesian exports. On January 5, 1967 Executive Order No. 11322 was issued prohibiting activities by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that are proscribed by the resolution. Future Actions 19. The UK continues to have primary responsibility for the situation. The US Government must, nevertheless, maintain close touch with the British as the sanctions program evolves. We must do whatever we can to provide the British with maximum leverage to use with Rhodesian regime to reach an acceptable settlement. However, the US Government must avoid any action vis-a-vis the British which might be interpreted as pressure on our part to make further concessions to Smith. 20. We should hold frank discussions with the British on the special problem posed by the attitudes of Portugal and South Africa in complying with the sanctions resolution. The British should approach both Portugal and South Africa to convince these two countries that their own long-range interests will best be served by compliance with the Security Council’s decision. As a follow-up, the US should make similar approaches. The above approaches should not foreclose the use of South Africa as a means of influencing the Rhodesians. 21. We should question the British as to how they see the effect of mandatory sanctions on Southern Rhodesia in both the short and longer term. We should also try to learn what further means of bringing about a satisfactory settlement they have in mind. The British should not be given the impression, however, that the United States is so interested in a solution as to be urging concessions to Smith which would be unacceptable to the international community. 22. Since the use of force against the Rhodesian regime appears to be ruled out, no early solution of the problem can be anticipated. The US should nevertheless continue its policy of non-recognition of the Smith regime in order to protect our credibility and position throughout Africa. 23. The foregoing discussion reflects the current assessment of a variety of considerations relevant to US policy. Our policy should be given continuing consideration in the light of the anticipated future problems discussed below. Anticipated Future Problems The Enforcement of Mandatory Sanctions 24. The most likely cause of failure of the mandatory economic sanctions program will be non-compliance by key countries. There is, however, some doubt that, even if sanctions were complied with fully, they would in fact bring about an early settlement in Southern Rhodesia based on the six principles. 25. The countries most likely to violate the sanctions are of course Portugal and South Africa. 26. The question that the Security Council will be faced with in March 1967, when a review by the Security Council of the effectiveness of sanctions is scheduled, is what action to take should there be evidence of non-compliance by UN members. Should there be considerable evidence of non-compliance by Portugal and South Africa, there is the strong possibility that various African countries and others will urge the extension of mandatory sanctions to both South Africa and the Portuguese African territories. 27. The UK is most reluctant to engage in economic warfare with South Africa and we would find ourselves in a difficult position should we support such an extension. While our commercial and investment interests are not as extensive in South Africa as those of the UK, we nevertheless have considerable national interest in seeing economic conflict avoided with South Africa so as not to increase the strains on the value of the pound and speculation in gold. One possibility for the US would be to seek reaffirmation of the present sanctions and a renewed call for compliance. 28. Should there be non-compliance by South Africa and the Portuguese territories, various UN members may not only call for an extension of sanctions to these areas but may also request an armed blockade of the coast of the area to force these governments to comply. The Soviet Union would probably encourage and support such moves in order to bring economic pressure on the West for its own ends. 29. The failure of mandatory economic sanctions to bring about the restoration of constitutional authority in Southern Rhodesia would create hostility toward the US and the UK not only in Africa but in other areas of the world. American domestic criticism from both right and left of the US position on sanctions is likely to continue and support for the UK and UN actions may become more difficult to maintain. The prestige of the UK and US is involved as well as that of the UN. 30. If present measures are not effective, the African states can be expected to increase pressure for an independent US policy on Southern Rhodesia. Although US policy has been represented to the Africans as independently arrived at, certain key African leaders persist in the view that the US has been merely following the British lead. The Declaration of a Rhodesian Republic 31. In the event of a declaration of a republic in Rhodesia (which Smith has stated will not take place without a vote of “the people”), we would be faced with the problem of our representation in Salisbury. Depending on what the British do and the terms on which the Rhodesian regime would accept our continued presence, we might find it to our interest (a) to withdraw the small staff that is presently there, (b) to maintain some unofficial liaison with the regime, or (c) to remain in place, on the theory that an illegal regime cannot become any more illegal by action going beyond the unilateral declaration of independence. Racial Conflict in Southern Africa 32. In the event that serious racial conflict develops in southern Africa, Communist countries will attempt to win over nationalist elements among the Black Africans. A racial conflict in Southern Rhodesia would be difficult to keep from spreading into other areas both to the north and south. It would be difficult for the United States to remain totally aloof from such a conflict and we would be faced with the possibility of being urged to support either the “white settlers” for the sake of stability or the “black nationalists,” who would probably have Communist backing, for the sake of our position in Africa and in other non-white countries in the world. 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 250, Rhodesia-Nyasaland, Federation of. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but a covering memorandum from Executive Secretary Bromley Smith to the National Security Council refers to it as a State Department paper for consideration at the January 25 NSC meeting. 554. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 554. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, undated. RR IM 67–1 RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA: FROM VOLUNTARY TO MANDATORY SANCTIONS 2 Summary Mandatory economic sanctions imposed by the UN against Rhodesia are not likely to have the desired result. Essentially, the Security Council Resolution of 16 December 1966 makes binding on all UN members many of the voluntary sanctions which have been in effect for more than a year. These sanctions have failed to force Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to reach an accommodation with the United Kingdom, largely because of South African and Portuguese support. Both South Africa and Portugal have indicated that they will ignore the Security Council’s demands. Thus the economy of Rhodesia will probably be able to function at close to present levels. Voluntary sanctions also failed because the United Kingdom underestimated the white Rhodesians’ commitment to the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). Their determination is probably even greater now than a year ago. Most of the adverse effects of voluntary sanctions have fallen on Zambia, whose economy is considerably shakier now than when Rhodesia proclaimed its independence on 11 November 1965. Zambia has had little success in its frenetic efforts over the past year to find alternative transport routes and thus reduce its critical dependence on Rhodesia. If present trends continue, Zambia will almost certainly have to make further concessions to Rhodesia to prevent economic deterioration. (For major transport routes in central Africa, see the map.) Rhodesia, moreover, retains its capacity to retaliate against sanctions by refusing either to supply Zambia with goods or to carry the bulk of that country’s imports and exports. Rhodesia could thus quickly bring the modern economy of Zambia to a halt and there would be little that UN members could do to supply Zambia with even its minimal needs. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 250, Rhodesia-Nyasaland, Federation of. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A copy is filed as an attachment to Document 553 . 2 This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Research and Reports and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence; the estimates and conclusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of January 1967. [Footnote in the source text.] 555. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 555. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 24, 1967. Mr. President: The State Department paper 2 contains a useful summary of the history of the Rhodesian problem. It is less helpful about future U.S. policy. Ambassador Goldberg is expected to make a strong appeal to continue our present policy in the UN. He has been asked to speak no more than seven minutes and to address his remarks to where we go in the future. The two questions are: a. What is Prime Minister Wilson going to do if Rhodesia won’t give in, and economic sanctions don’t work primarily because South Africa won’t comply? b. How are we going to work our way out of this black/white African problem —without drifting into a situation involving the use of force, —upholding the United Nations, —maintaining our good relations with Britain, —avoiding a showdown with South Africa, and —retaining our influence in black Africa? Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Briefing Papers for NSC Meeting January 25, 1967. No classification marking. 2 Document 553 . 556. Summary Notes of the 567th Meeting of the National Security Council 556. Summary Notes of the 567th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, January 25, 1967, 12:10–12:45 p.m. U.S. Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia The President: The purpose of this meeting is to review our current policy toward Southern Rhodesia, to see where we are now, as well as where we expect to end up. Secretary Rusk will outline the State Department paper 2 (copy attached) and Ambassador Goldberg will give his views on the problem as seen from New York. Secretary Rusk: This is first a UK problem, then a UN problem, and only then is it a U.S. problem. We should not take a dominant role but should seek to get the parties together. When the issue was brought to the UN Security Council, we voted our principles. We rejected efforts to settle the problem by force and we took our lumps. We will be criticized by both extremes as having done too much or having done too little. We can expect increasing trouble here and in Africa. Economic sanctions will not bring down the Smith Regime in Rhodesia. We must get UK Prime Minister Wilson talking to Smith and exert our influence behind the scenes. This problem cannot be settled by force. The thought of using U.S. troops is appalling. A multi-division effort would be necessary. We must get negotiations going again because there is rising support in the UN for sanctions against South Africa which is not complying with the UN resolution of limited sanctions against Rhodesia. Ambassador Goldberg: The Rhodesian problem causes us difficulties with domestic public opinion and with Congress. There is in the U.S. a very active Rhodesian lobby. In the U.S. business community, there is more support than opposition for our policy. We were obliged to vote in the UN as we did because to do otherwise would have caused us domestic racial difficulties and hurt our business interests in every African country. We have a strong political interest in keeping moderates in control of the problem. Our military interests, i.e., tracking stations in African countries, can be affected by the policy we pursue. We have been talking to U.S. Negro leaders trying to convince them that we are not pulling UK chestnuts out of the fire as they believe. Senator Russell was told that no military commitment is involved in our current policy. He relaxed after he learned that we do not plan to use U.S. troops and of my promise to veto any proposed use of force in Africa. Secretary Rusk: The House Foreign Affairs Committee was reassured when told that our vote in the UN for sanctions against Rhodesia is not looked upon by the Administration as a first step toward the use of U.S. forces. Ambassador Goldberg: Our role is a moderating one. We are not egging anyone on. African radicals are not happy with our policy. The Communists are actively troubling the waters in Africa. Sanctions will not work against Rhodesia. However, their economy may be affected sufficiently to induce them to negotiate. We have told the British to settle this issue honorably. Meanwhile, we will have to take current criticism. Even Haile Selassie cannot take a firm stand. Senator Dirksen is not in as great a sweat as appears. He acknowledges we can’t control the actions of our junior partner. Acting CIA Director Taylor: Zambia is harder hit as a result of the current difficulties than is Rhodesia. It depends on Rhodesia for copper ore and coal. It is now toying with the idea of working out a deal with the Soviets. The President: What are the British going to do if Rhodesia won’t give in, and economic sanctions don’t work, primarily because South Africa won’t comply with them? A blockade would not be effective and there is no way to stop South African oil from going to Rhodesia. The British would be hurt if South Africa moves against them. We can’t prevent South Africa from giving aid to Rhodesia. Secretary Rusk: The British do not have a plan to propose if the selective sanctions do not force Rhodesia to negotiate an honorable settlement. The President: How are we going to work out of this black/white African problem: (a) without drifting into a situation involving the use of force; (b) upholding the UN; (c) maintaining our good relations with the UK; (d) avoiding a showdown with South Africa; and (e) retaining our influence in black Africa? Secretary Rusk: We must tell the British to resume their negotiations with the Rhodesians. At one point the parties were close to a compromise agreement which would not make black Africans happy but would get closer to a peaceful solution. Ambassador Goldberg: To push for this kind of a solution is a delicate policy decision. We will be charged with selling out black Africa. Deputy Secretary Vance: There is one thing which is quite clear; namely, no U.S. ground or naval forces are to be used to settle this problem. Secretary Fowler: Concurs in the proposed policy direction. The Rhodesian problem is having a serious effect on sterling and the UK economic situation generally. The talk of sanctions against South Africa may have an impact on the U.S. dollar. The State Department paper should be revised to deal with the U.S. financial aspects of the Rhodesian problem. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, Tab 49, 1/25/67, Southern Rhodesia. Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. 2 Document 553 . 557. Memorandum of Conversation 557. Memorandum of Conversation 1 London, February 24, 1967. SUBJECT Rhodesia PARTICIPANTS Foreign Secretary George Brown Donald Murray, Foreign Office Walt Rostow Philip Kaiser The Foreign Secretary then turned to Rhodesia. He said that the evidence indicates that Smith is having increasing difficulties, but so far no alternative to his Government is emerging. Business is deteriorating and the Rhodesians are now faced with the problem of disposing of the second crop of tobacco since sanctions were originally imposed. The real problems, the Foreign Secretary said, are Portugal and South Africa. If sanctions are to be fully effective, the borders of Portuguese Africa had to be sealed off and, as we know, the British were currently discussing this matter in Lisbon. If we were really successful with the Portuguese, then it was essential that the South Africans not fill the gap in the Rhodesian economy resulting from Portuguese cooperation. The South Africans would never, of course, join in sanctions, but Brown thought there was a good chance of their cooperating “discreetly” by not increasing trade with Rhodesia above “normal” levels. Brown also mentioned the fact that there is a good deal of informal, unofficial talk going on between various Rhodesians and the British Government. Some of the Rhodesians involved were in the Smith camp. Others were businessmen, etc., who were “anti-the present-situation” and were looking for a solution acceptable to both sides. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in S/S on February 27. The source text is marked “Part III of III.” 558. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 558. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 6, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967–1968. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 559. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State 559. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, May 29, 1967. HWV/B–1 VISIT OF UNITED KINGDOM PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON June 1967 2 SOUTHERN RHODESIA Summary: Following the unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesian Front regime of Ian Smith from the United Kingdom on November 11, 1965, the UN Security Council, at the request of the British, approved a voluntary economic sanctions program against Southern Rhodesia. During 1966 intermittent talks were held between the United Kingdom and Rhodesian representatives and, with the rejection on December 5 of the HMS Tiger “working document” by the Rhodesian “cabinet,” the UK requested the Security Council to impose limited mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to strengthen and supplement the voluntary program. Such sanctions were approved by the Council on December 16 with the concurrence of the US. Discussion: Under voluntary sanctions, total exports from Southern Rhodesia are estimated to have fallen from nearly $400 million in 1965 to an estimated $224 million in 1966, a drop of some 40%. (These figures do not include gold or re-exports. Gold exports amount to approximately $21 million annually.) Under the mandatory sanctions program, a further reduction in Rhodesian exports of approximately $55 million is anticipated if South Africa and Portugal, while not complying with the program, do not increase their trade with Southern Rhodesia. Although it is estimated that the gross domestic product fell by 15% in 1966 compared to 1965 and present estimates suggest a further drop of about 10% by September 1967, the Rhodesians have not sought a settlement with the UK. In late April a conversation was held in Salisbury between the British Governor and Ian Smith, apparently on the Governor’s initiative. Smith’s remarks were subsequently dismissed by Commonwealth Secretary Bowden as not having contained any real concessions and, therefore, as not providing a promising basis for re-opening talks. It seems likely, however, that over the next two or three months the British will seek to create opportunities for re-opening negotiations with the Smith regime. If exploitable opportunities seem to exist, the British may be prepared to make further concessions to the so-far intractable Rhodesians in an effort to reach a settlement. UK Position: In the Commonwealth communique issued in London, September, 1966, the UK stated that, should the Smith regime not take steps to return to constitutional government by the end of 1966, it would: (a) withdraw all previous proposals made to the Rhodesians; (b) not propose to Parliament a settlement involving independence before majority rule; and (c) provided full Commonwealth support was obtained, seek selective mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in the UN. With the collapse of the HMS Tiger talks, the UK sought and obtained Security Council action on mandatory economic sanctions. The UK continues to make clear both publicly and privately that it wishes to avoid economic warfare with South Africa and that it hopes to avoid having sanctions against Rhodesia affect British-South African trade. In any future discussions at the UN, the British would probably oppose any call by others to expand sanctions to include the Portuguese territories and South Africa, although they might not go so far as to use the veto. As in the past, the British would very probably oppose any proposal to use force against the Smith regime. US Position: The entire international community acknowledges that Southern Rhodesia is a British colony. We believe it is important that the present sanctions program be made as effective as possible in the hope that the Smith regime will be led to reconsider its position and agree to a settlement to open the way to majority rule with minority rights protected. In cooperating with the international community in the sanctions program, we have been careful to commit ourselves only to the present program. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Visit of PM Wilson, 6/2/67. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas A. Fain of AFSE; cleared by Leddy and Springsteen, Goldstein, Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Ruth S. Gold of E, McElhiney, and Trimble. 2 Prime Minister Wilson visited Washington June 2–3. No record of discussion of Rhodesia during his visit has been found. 560. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) 560. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, October 25, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 62, November 10, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 561. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 561. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, November 10, 1967, 1010Z. 67914. Subject: Southern Rhodesia—Under Secretary-Portuguese Foreign Minister Conversation. 1. In his November 9 talk with Under Secretary, Portuguese FonMin Franco Nogueira regretted fact that world opinion seemed to hold Portugal responsible for failure of UN sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. He expressed hope that USG was correctly informed and did not blame Portugal for fact that oil and other goods reached Southern Rhodesia. He said oil arrived in Mozambique in British and American ships and there was active trade from all parts of world. It is true, he said, that Portugal has stated that it would not abide by UN resolution, because it maintained that there must be freedom of transit. Therefore supplies marked for Southern Rhodesia were permitted to cross Mozambique. Portuguese could not be the world’s “gendarme” and stop shipments which arrived in transit to Rhodesia. 2. In reply to Under Secretary’s question, FonMin stated that Mozambique refinery had not increased production, but it was known that South African purchases of Mozambique oil were transshipped back through Mozambique into Rhodesia. He said that sanctions would fail because South Africa had the potential to supply oil to Rhodesia indefinitely. Because no major power wanted to confront South Africa, Portugal had to be scapegoat. 3. FonMin said that the wanted to bring all this to US attention as he expected this matter to come up in UN soon. He complained that SYG had failed to reply to various questions about legality of sanction program and that Portugal was entitled to a reply. When Under Secretary inquired whether Portugal would accept a reply from the Security Council, FonMin somewhat evasively said that he certainly would accept a ruling from the International High Court of Justice. 4. Franco Nogueira said that trade between Portugal and its territories on one side and Southern Rhodesia on the other was insignificant but that large countries including US, UK, Japan and others had to stop trading with Southern Rhodesia if they wanted sanctions to work. 5. Under Secretary said that it was obvious Portugal and the US took different views of the UN resolution on Rhodesian sanctions. He then explained difficulties US faced in requesting foreign subsidiaries of US firms to comply with US regulations. 6. Franco Nogueira concluded by reflecting his belief that Smith would survive because South Africa could supply him and continue to do so without difficulty. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 RHOD. Secret; Noforn; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Country Director for Spain and Portugal George W. Landau, cleared by Leddy, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Salisbury, USUN, and London. 562. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 562. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 8, 1968. SUBJECT Rhodesia Ambassador Dean has asked to see you very privately to discuss Rhodesia. 2 I assume that Ambassador Dean was instructed to take this matter up with you rather than leaving it in the hands of the British Mission in New York because the Foreign Office recognizes that Lord Caradon ordinarily wants to go much farther than his Government on African issues. His call is probably prompted by recent UN activity in the Human Rights Commission and the Committee of 24 arising out of Rhodesia’s execution of three prisoners despite commutation of their sentences by the Queen, as well as by reports of an early African initiative in the Security Council looking toward imposition of broader sanctions against Rhodesia. We now anticipate a Security Council meeting on Rhodesia about the end of next week. Mandatory sanctions now in force against Southern Rhodesia under the SC resolution of December 16, 1966 3 prohibit (a) imports from Southern Rhodesia of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, and hides, skins and leather; (b) exports to Southern Rhodesia of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles and petroleum and petroleum products; and (c) any activities that promote or are calculated to promote such imports and exports. During recent months there have been reports that the British were considering the advisability of extending mandatory sanctions to cover (a) oil shipments to Rhodesia via Mozambique; (b) a ban on communications with Rhodesia (principally telecommunications); (c) a ban on the export of television film materials to Rhodesia; and (d) a total embargo on trade with Rhodesia. On March 7 UK representatives in New York told our Delegation that the UK might be prepared to extend sanctions to telecommunications and a total embargo might even be within the realm of possibility. I am skeptical regarding these reports given the present financial straits of the UK. So far as the present sanctions are concerned, the major loopholes have been (a) Portugal and South Africa, who ignore the SC resolution; (b) the activities of Japanese, French, Germans and others who continue to trade in embargoed commodities while their governments look the other way; and (c) the activities of certain overseas subsidiaries. US regulations issued to implement mandatory sanctions, like British regulations, do not extend to the activities of American overseas subsidiaries registered in countries other than Southern Rhodesia. We suggested such coverage to the British at the time our regulations were being drawn up, but they refused to agree to it. I recommend that you simply note any proposals the Ambassador may make. You should be aware that the present sanctions are not achieving the desired goal of inducing Ian Smith to negotiate on UK terms and that it is our best judgment no piecemeal additions to the present sanctions can do the job. I would be generally discouraging regarding extension of sanctions. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. 2 Telegram 127765 to London, March 9, reported Ambassador Dean’s conversation with the Secretary and Ambassador Goldberg on March 9. Dean said that the British Government wanted U.S. views on what action to take at the United Nations in view of the likelihood that the Afro-Asian members would raise the executions in Rhodesia and the British failure to prevent them in the Security Council. Rusk and Goldberg suggested that a first step might be to have the Security Council express its abhorrence and call upon Rhodesia to refrain from further executions. If Rhodesia ignored such a call, they might examine the desirability of some extension of sanctions. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD/UN) 3 See footnote 2, Document 552 . 563. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 563. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, May 9, 1968. STATUS REPORT ON SOUTHERN RHODESIA Two draft resolutions on Southern Rhodesia are now before the Security Council. The first resolution, introduced as a negotiating tactic by the Afro-Asians on April 18, calls upon the United Kingdom to use force to end the rebellion and provides a basis for the imposition of Chapter VII enforcement measures against South Africa and Portugal for their continued non-compliance with sanctions. The second draft, introduced by the UK on April 23, would (1) make comprehensive the present limited mandatory sanctions on trade with and investment in Southern Rhodesia; (2) prohibit the transfer to the territory of most private remittances; (3) attempt to restrict emigration to Southern Rhodesia; (4) impose a limited ban on travel from and air transport to Southern Rhodesia; (5) exempt landlocked states in southern Africa from full compliance with sanctions; and (6) expand the role of the Secretary-General and the Security Council in supervising implementation of sanctions. Two weeks of British negotiations with the Afro-Asians in New York have produced slight accommodations by both sides toward a mutually acceptable draft resolution, but the Afro-Asians insist that any final resolution include (1) calls for UK action to prevent further executions in Salisbury and to end the rebellion “all effective measures”; (2) censure of South Africa for having assisted the Smith regime in defiance of sanctions; (3) termination of all communications with Rhodesia; (4) prohibition against transfers of funds from Rhodesia; (5) severance of consular relations; and (6) an injunction against further UK consultations with the Smith regime. Both the British and we find these additional proposals unhelpful and most undesirable. However, reports from New York indicate that several friendly Security Council members are prepared to support many of them. For this reason, we followed the UK on May 2 in making representations in Asuncion, Copenhagen, Ottawa, Paris and Rio de Janeiro in an effort to muster enough abstentions in the Council so that the question of vetoing the Afro-Asian proposals will not arise. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Cables, 2/66–12/68. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. A May 9 covering memorandum from Read to Rostow reads: “I enclose for your information a report on the UN Security Council’s current consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia. It supplements my memorandum of April 6 which indicated that the British Government, in an effort to deflect Afro-Asian proposals in the Security Council for the adoption of radical measures to deal with the Rhodesian problem, was trying to develop support for less far-reaching proposals of its own.” A copy of the Department’s earlier Status Report on Southern Rhodesia (dated April 7, not April 6) is ibid., Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. 564. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 564. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 28, 1968. SUBJECT Proposed Security Council Resolution on Southern Rhodesia After lengthy negotiations between the British and the Africans in New York, they have agreed on a new Security Council resolution on Rhodesia which we believe is livable from our point of view and which avoids more drastic action previously demanded by the Africans. The UK has taken the lead throughout and, as a result of a decision in London, will vote affirmatively for the resolution. This would also be our intention. The resolution is likely to be adopted unanimously. Specifically, the resolution: (a) Extends the existing sanctions on exports to and imports from Southern Rhodesia to cover all commodities except medical, educational and humanitarian supplies. Since the bulk of our trade with Rhodesia is already embargoed as a result of UN action, the practical effect on US trade is very marginal (only a total of about $5 million in imports and exports is involved). (b) Prohibits investments or transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia except for humanitarian purposes. Again this feature is marginal, since it does not touch past investments and no new American investments are expected in any case. (c) Tightens transportation and air travel restrictions with regard to Southern Rhodesia in ways which do not directly affect the U.S. (d) Bars entry into the U.S., except on humanitarian grounds, of persons travelling on Rhodesian passports and persons likely to work against the sanctions program or further the interests of the Rhodesian regime. The resolution also establishes a Security Council Committee which would supervise the sanctions program and seek to ensure better compliance than in the past. We pressed for this provision in response to the desire of our own commercial interests who feel they are being asked to adhere to the sanctions program more strictly than commercial interests in certain other countries. Finally, the resolution has two non-mandatory provisions: a request that member states take action which would have the practical effect of cutting off communications with Rhodesia; and a recommendation that consular and trade representation be withdrawn from Rhodesia. Ambassador Goldberg would make clear in his explanation of vote that we consider these two paragraphs to be non-mandatory. At the same time he would indicate we believe the flow of information and communication with Rhodesia should continue. He would not make any specific statement with respect to the closing of our Consulate General in Salisbury leaving the option open as to what we might do in the future. The vote is expected on either Wednesday afternoon or Friday morning. Ambassador Goldberg agrees with this course. 2 Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968. Confidential. 2 On May 29, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 253 (1968). For text, see Department of State Bulletin , June 24, 1968, pp. 847–849. On July 29, the President issued Executive Order 11419 implementing the mandatory provisions of Resolution 253. For text of the Executive Order and a Department of State announcement of the same date, see ibid., August 19, 1968, pp. 199–201. 565. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (Quimby) to Secretary of State Rusk 565. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (Quimby) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 10, 1968. SUBJECT UN Security Council Recommendation for the Withdrawal of all Consulates from Southern Rhodesia Discussion The Security Council’s new Rhodesian resolution, adopted unanimously on May 29, presents a special problem for us since it emphasizes “the need for the withdrawal of all consular and trade representation in Southern Rhodesia . …” At the time of the vote Ambassador Goldberg explained that we would give careful consideration to this non-mandatory provision but, in doing so, would have “to take into account our profound belief in a free flow of information and communication through- out the world, which we feel should apply to Rhodesia as well.” He pointed out that the US has no trade representation in Southern Rhodesia. In terms of our public position as well as the Department’s own requirements, it is essential that we decide promptly whether to remove or maintain our consular establishment in Salisbury. After considering carefully all the factors involved, we have concluded that it is in our interest to maintain the already sharply reduced staff of the Consulate General, at least for the time being and barring such developments as a mass exodus by other governments from the territory. In any case, we propose to leave the question open so that should we consider it proper we may withdraw the consular staff in the future. We recognize that a decision to remain in Salisbury will draw some criticism from the Afro-Asians and that, by virtue of being the biggest target, we can expect to receive more than our share of criticism in the United Nations. The following considerations, however, argue in favor of maintaining our small staff in Salisbury: (1) Reporting —Political and economic information obtained at first hand in Salisbury has proved valuable. The Consulate General’s reporting, particularly with respect to the effect of sanctions on the Rhodesian economy, has helped us base our policy on our own information. (2) Protection for American Citizens—There are over 1,000 American citizens in Southern Rhodesia, some three- fourths of whom are missionaries and their families. Our Consular officials in Salisbury perform a number of essential services for these people in passport and citizenship matters and welfare activities. (3) Intentions of Other Governments —Ten foreign consulates have remained in Salisbury since 1965. The Japanese have announced the closing of theirs on June 5. (This action by Japan—which claims no nationals resident in Southern Rhodesia—is an effort to regain some favor with the Afro-Asians after being a prominent sanctions-buster for some time.) We do not expect that many of the other governments concerned (Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa and Switzerland) will follow suit. The UK will maintain its residual mission there. We believe the advantages of retaining our Consulate General at Salisbury outweigh the disadvantages. We would propose, therefore, to make our intentions on this subject known shortly after the President signs the Executive Order implementing the mandatory provisions of the Security Council resolution. We would say that, although the matter will remain under continuing review, we intend to maintain our small staff in Salisbury for the time being. We would emphasize our convictions about the free flow of information and communications everywhere, and we would lean heavily on the rationale of providing essential services for Americans residing in Southern Rhodesia. A draft statement for press guidance is attached. Recommendations 2 1. That, subject to future developments, we continue to maintain our consular office at Salisbury. 2. That the decision be made public shortly after the issuance of the US Executive Order, along the lines of the attached press guidance. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential. Sent through Under Secretary Katzenbach. Drafted by Fain and Thomas J. Carolan of IO/UNP on March 6–7, and cleared by Brown, Goldstein, and Edward W. Holmes of AFSE. 2 Secretary Rusk initialed his approval of both recommendations on June 17. 3 The attachment is not printed. 566. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 566. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, June 1968. ER IM 68–71 RHODESIA: A THIRD ROUND OF SANCTIONS 2 Summary The comprehensive sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on 29 May 1968 against Rhodesia are unlikely to have much more effect in forcing Salisbury to relinquish its independence than have previous limited sanction efforts. So long as South Africa and Portugal refuse to comply with the Security Council’s demand, Rhodesia will almost certainly be able to sell sufficient exports and obtain necessary imports to maintain its economy. Most of Rhodesia’s foreign trade has been reoriented to adjust to previous sanctions and already either is with South Africa and Portugal or is carried out through disguised trade arrangements. Moreover, the country is more self-sufficient now than at the time of its Unilateral Declaration of Independence in late 1965 and is, therefore, better able to cope with the increased sanctions. Zambia and Congo (Kinshasa) will not be able to apply trade sanctions fully against Rhodesia without bringing serious economic damage to themselves. Without Rhodesian coal, Zambian and Congo copper production would have to be cut back drastically. Moreover, Rhodesia can retaliate against sanctions by refusing to supply Zambia with electric power, which is essential to the copper industry, or by refusing to carry most of the country’s imports and exports, on which the Zambian economy is dependent. Although the UN resolution requests member states to assist Zambia, there is little that can be done over the next few years to replace the essential goods and services supplied by neighboring Rhodesia. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 2 Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence. [Footnote in the source text.] 567. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Quimby) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) 567. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Quimby) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, June 20, 1968. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 70, June 21, 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 568. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 568. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, October 8, 1968, 1736Z. 251566. Following message to President dated October 7 from Prime Minister received by private channel: Begin Text: Your people will have told you of my plans for a further meeting with Ian Smith to see if we cannot at last thrash out together an honourable settlement of this tragic Rhodesian business. We shall not announce it until early tomorrow afternoon (our time) because, although my senior colleagues principally concerned are naturally at one with me in the enterprise, I have to seek the endorsement of the full Cabinet at our meeting tomorrow, the first that has been possible since our conference last week. Assuming, as I hope and believe, that my colleagues endorse this action, I plan to meet Smith in Gibraltar on Wednesday afternoon, on board a warship and to allow as much time as may be needed during the next week or so to negotiate an agreement. I need not trouble you with the detailed background to our position. Your people will know it. In this message I only want to say two things. First I am determined that, if no settlement can be agreed, this will not be through lack of goodwill, patience or resolution on our side. This conflict has been a tragedy not only in the relationship between Britain and Rhodesia but also for the development of our Commonwealth ties and, more widely, for the international community as a whole. Its continuation not only threatens the future peace and prosperity of the Rhodesian Africans but also causes the danger of a wider and continuing conflict throughout southern Africa. I know what difficult problems it has raised for you and I have been most grateful for the support and understanding that you have so consistently displayed. Secondly, if a settlement can be achieved, I am equally resolved that it shall not represent a sacrifice of the rights and interests of the peoples of Rhodesia—and especially the African peoples. We have made absolutely clear to Smith that for us certain points are not negotiable—and these points relate essentially to the protection of the rights of the African majority and to the need to ensure that substantial change of circumstances in Rhodesia which, as I have said repeatedly, will be essential before there can be any question of our going back to the Commonwealth to re-open our commitment on no independence before majority rule. I will not pretend that I am optimistic. Long experience in dealing with this problem—and in dealing with Smith personally—has made me too wary for that. But recent developments in Rhodesia, the pressures of sanctions (and other pressures too: I am sure for example that South Africa would like us to settle), coupled with the way Smith has handled some of his own right wing extremists have all created a situation in which, once again I am convinced that we should be wrong not to try. I am confident that I can count on your good wishes for our success: and this will be a source of encouragement to me throughout the difficult and delicate discussions that lie ahead. End Text. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Read. 569. Telegram From the Embassy in Zambia to the Department of State 569. Telegram From the Embassy in Zambia to the Department of State 1 Lusaka, October 19, 1968, 1017Z. 2782. For Katzenbach and Moore (AF) from Palmer. Subj: Concern Should UK-Rhodesian Settlement Be Reached. 1. Following discussions with Kaunda and country team (including O’Neill from Salisbury) wish record concerns I have for US position in event UK-Rhodesian settlement reached on basis Gibraltar proposals. 2. As Kaunda sees it, any settlement which does not include British control during interim period before independence is a “sell-out” (septel). 2 Although our view of Rhodesia and what would constitute satisfactory settlement do not necessarily coincide with Kaunda’s, our aim of unimpeded progress to majority rule has always been firm. Therefore, before we subscribe to any settlement on Gibraltar terms we should have hard look at details and likelihood Rhodesian good faith in carrying proposals out. In this connection, I do not think we can exclude possibility UK agreeing on something less than Gibraltar. UK HICOM Pumphrey (protect) candidly emphasized to me last night how anxious PriMin Wilson is to be rid of Rhodesian problem. 3. Ultimately, leaving Smith in control depends on question of trust in him and Europeans in general to carry out agreement in good faith. On basis past record and evident British unwillingness use force even if agreement violated, this is slender reed. 4. We also need to find out more specifically what British have in mind on implementation certain details. How would sanctions be dismantled? Supposing resolution withdrawing sanctions was vetoed? Would threat of sanctions reimposition be requested of Security Council by UK? A most important element is how test of acceptability would be carried out. Just when and how quickly would cases restricted or detained nationalists be reviewed? If these nationalists were clearly willing give agreement a try, there would be favorable atmosphere. What happens, however, if Zanu leader Sithole is for and Zapu Leader Nkomo against or vice versa? Suggest London explore these questions with CO. 5. Agreement does not currently seem too likely in light Smith’s attitude. However, in light forgoing factors, I urge USG proceed cautiously, take reserved attitude should agreement materialize quickly and avoid any advanced commitments at least until full analysis can be made of implications for US positions in Africa and elsewhere. Good 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD–UK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to London, Pretoria, Salisbury, and USUN. 2 Telegram 260164 to Pretoria, October 23, stated that the Department appreciated Kaunda’s concern regarding the lack of provisions in the Fearless proposals for an interim period of British control before independence, but noted that the United Kingdom was insisting on safeguards against possible retrogressive amendments to the proposed constitution. It noted that while the Department was volunteering no public comment on the substance of the talks, the U.S. Government would be under great pressure to go along with any agreement and would probably do so. (Ibid.) 570. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Swaziland 570. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Swaziland 1 Washington, October 25, 1968, 2222Z. 262085. For Palmer from AF. Ian Smith has sent to Prime Minister Wilson Southern Rhodesia’s formal reply to British “Fearless” proposals. While we do not have exact text, we understand that Smith indicated his willingness to reach agreement if British drop insistence on appeal to Privy Council on constitutional matters. Since Wilson has already told Parliament he is not averse to abandoning the appeal to Privy Council in favor some other “guarantee,” way seems open to a settlement. Afro-Asian nations have begun criticizing what they interpret as British “sell-out.” They introduced resolution in UNGA calling on Britain “not to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia unless it preceded by establishment of a government based on free elections by universal adult suffrage and on majority rule,” and calling on all states “not to recognize any independence to Southern Rhodesia without prior establishment of a government based on majority rule . …” We instructed our delegate to abstain and to make no statement. Vote in GA October 25: 92 yes; 2 no (South Africa and Portugal); 17 abstentions (including US, Botswana and Malawi). Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Country Officer for Southern Rhodesia Robert L. Bruce and AFI Policy Reports Officer F. Virginia Montague; cleared by Holmes and Edward J. Alexander of AF; and approved by Director of the Office of Inter-African Affairs Fred L. Hadsel. 571. Telegram From the Department of State to All African Posts 571. Telegram From the Department of State to All African Posts 1 Washington, November 1, 1968, 2223Z. 265503. Subject: Rhodesian GA Resolution. 1. Since US voted against Rhodesian resolution passed (89–9–15) by Committee Four October 30, 2 it may appear to interested Africans that we have shifted position on general question. This not the case, and following background information may be used as appropriate in conversations host government. 2. US sought to obtain paragraph-by-paragraph vote, since there several paras advocating use of force which we could not accept and others on which support or abstention possible. US del stated that in case paragraph vote accepted, US could abstain on resolution as a whole. Although consistent with GA practice, paragraph voting opposed by ASAFS because large number LA and some Asians and Scans would have joined other Western countries in opposition to most paras of resolution. Moreover, US not consulted on preparation of resolution. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD/UN. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Hadsel, cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen and Holmes, and approved by Hadsel. 2 On October 30, the Fourth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly adopted a 50-power draft resolution condemning the failure of the United Kingdom to take effective steps to bring down the illegal regime in Rhodesia, calling on the United Kingdom to use force to put an end to that regime, and drawing the attention of the Security Council to the “urgent necessity” of imposing sanctions on Portugal and South Africa. Resolution 2383 (XXIII) was adopted by the General Assembly on November 7 by a vote of 86 to 9 (including the United States) with 19 abstentions. 572. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 572. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 15, 1968. WWR: SUBJECT Rhodesian Talks The odds now favor some break on Rhodesia in the next few weeks. Here’s a quick look: 1. Wilson is clearly anxious to be rid of this problem. British public sympathy for the black Rhodesians has gradually melted into resignation or indifference. Sensing the moment, powerful economic interests in the City are pressuring the PM for a “practical” settlement. 2. Though he seemed steadfast in the Fearless talks, Wilson made important concessions on the question of legitimizing Rhodesian independence. The last obstacle was the old British ace-in-the-hole: an external guarantee that the white-dominated Rhodesian Parliament wouldn’t renege, after the fact, on the negotiated constitutional provisions for eventual majority rule. Wilson’s vehicle for the guarantee was a Privy Council—with a majority of Commonwealth watchdogs—to review and annul any infringement of the process. Smith, of course, rejected the idea on the grounds that the Council posed an unacceptable violation of Rhodesian sovereignty. 3. Now the British have gone back to Salisbury with a very attractive compromise to dilute the powers of the Privy Council. The rather elaborate legal formula is described in the attached cable. 2 The point is that it papers over another British retreat. 4. If Smith et al. buy this proposal—and most of us think they will—there could be a formal settlement within 2–3 weeks. State counts no more than 30 or 40 Labor votes against Wilson on this, and with overwhelming Conservative support he’ll easily carry the House. Our Reaction In the short run, the consensus around town is that we adopt a wait- and-see attitude pending the reaction of the black Rhodesians. No one is altogether sure how nationalist leaders like Nkomo and Sithole will view the settlement from the Salisbury jail, or how the two squabbling terrorist organizations in Zambia will respond. Waiting on local reactions is a plausible line in public. And it should do as a first answer to Kaunda, who has already written to the President about the British “sell out.” Nick Katzenbach will be sending over a memo recommending this tack, along with a proposed reply to Kaunda. I’m abreast of the policy-making process in State. The Long Run This position is likely to blunt the initial African outcry when Wilson announces his deal. It does give everybody a chance to ponder the legal merits of the agreement. I’m afraid, though, that agony is inevitable. However judicious the formula, the fact will remain that Wilson gave up independence without majority rule. In African eyes, the Privy Council will be a poor substitute even for the gossamer dream of British intervention. Nkomo and Sithole have a calculated taste for martyrdom. The counter pressures within the terrorist groups (who are beginning to make slight dents in Rhodesian security) will be enormous. Kaunda, who soon faces an election, and Nyerere, who has to keep an eye on his Chinese patrons, will have compelling reasons to reject the settlement out of hand. This adds up to a judgment that no realistic Rhodesian settlement could carry the black Africans with it. We buy time by waiting for a fair reading of the African reaction. We may even purchase a few more months, amid mounting criticism, by urging that the settlement be given a fair chance to operate. But sooner or later, the President or his successor will face a tortuous decision: our moral and political position in black Africa vs. a public break with the British (on what will be celebrated in their next election as a major accomplishment of the Wilson Government). 3 Roger 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 2/66–12/68. Secret. 2 Telegram 14297 from London, November 13; not printed. 3 On November 16, the head of the British negotiating team in Salisbury announced that the principal stumbling block to a settlement was the Rhodesian refusal to accept the British proposal that the Privy Council in London constitute the court of final appeal against racially discriminatory laws in Rhodesia. No British-Rhodesian settlement was reached. 573. Letter From President Johnson to President Kaunda 573. Letter From President Johnson to President Kaunda 1 Washington, November 25, 1968. Dear Mr. President: I much appreciated your thoughtful letter about the recent talks between the British Government and Mr. Ian Smith. 2 As you know, the United States has fully supported and carried out the United Nations’ mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. We have done this in the hope that those sanctions would influence the Smith regime to agree to a peaceful settlement opening the way to majority rule. We are still hopeful that a fair and just solution—one that serves the aspirations of all the people of Rhodesia—will eventually be reached. You can be sure, Mr. President, that America shares your deep and abiding concern for the future of the African majority in Southern Rhodesia. I think our own recent history is ample proof of our commitment to human rights. We have chosen the path of freedom and equality at home; we want no less for all mankind. It was good, as always, to have your personal views on this grave problem. I know you will do all you can to promote peaceful progress and justice in Southern Africa. The United States is working toward the same goals. With warmest personal regards. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD–UK. No classification marking. 2 In his October 25 letter, President Kaunda expressed concern that the rights of Southern Rhodesia’s African majority would be sacrificed if a settlement were reached on the basis of the Fearless proposals. (Ibid., POL RHOD–US) South Africa South Africa 574. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 9, 1964, 2:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14–1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Hall on January 10, and approved in M on January 20. 575. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, January 11, 1964, 3:17 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs Peter Hooper on January 8; cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Charles Runyon, G/PM Director for Operations Howard Meyers, C. Edward Dillery of SCI, Colonel Hatch of Joint Staff, IO/UNP Officer in Charge of Dependent Area Affairs Richard V. Hennes, Sloan in DOD, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Jesse M. MacKnight, and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; and approved by Williams. Sent to Cape Town and repeated to Pretoria. 576. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, January 25, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Secret. 577. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Cape Town, February 12, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London and Pretoria and passed to the White House. 578. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Rollefson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, March 9, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 15 S AFR–US. Secret. Drafted by C. Edward Dillery of SCI on March 6. Copies were sent to Kitchen, Rostow in S/P, and Cleveland. A March 9 covering memorandum from Rollefson to Williams states that the attached was a revision of his February 18 memorandum on the same subject. (Ibid.) He noted that NASA had undertaken a further intensive review of its requirements and had been able to modify them. It now appeared possible that the requirement to provide tracking coverage for the monitoring of Project Apollo orbits could be met in part through the use of airborne and shipborne equipment. In addition, negotiations had been completed for the location of a second NASA deep space instrumentation facility in Spain. 579. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, March 10, 1964. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Box 7, NSC Subcommittee Meeting, January 1 through December 31, 1964. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. 580. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, March 18, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63–10/64. No classification marking. 581. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Cape Town, March 19, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, USUN, and Pretoria. 582. Memorandum for the Record Washington, March 20, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 470 South Africa. Secret. Prepared by Frank K. Sloan. A stamped notation in the margin reads: “Mr. McNaughton has seen.” 583. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, April 13, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Africa 381 (28 Mar 64). Secret. 584. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, April 20, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. 585. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Cape Town, April 22, 1964, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 S AFR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, USUN, Pretoria, and Lagos. 586. National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 Washington, April 24, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. An information copy was sent to the Secretary of Commerce. Copies were sent to Bundy, Brubeck, Haynes, Johnson, and NSC Files. 587. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, May 4, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, “B.” Confidential. 588. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 20, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 20. 589. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, May 22, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Africa 381. Secret. 590. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs (Hooper) to the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hilliker) Washington, June 5, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 S AFR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Runyon and Hall. 591. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 5, 1964. 592. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 18, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14–1 S AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Director of the Office of UN Affairs William B. Buffum and Hennes. 593. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, July 30, 1964. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 295. Secret. Drafted by Hooper; cleared by Fredericks, Dillery, P. Wesley Kriebel of IO/UNP, Officer in Charge of U.K. Affairs Thomas M. Judd, George L. Warren of G/PM, and William R. Duggan of the Policy Planning Council. 594. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63–10/64. Confidential. 595. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 22, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63–10/64. Secret. 596. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63–10/64. Secret. 597. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, November 20, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Cables and Memos, Vol. I, 11/63–10/64. Secret. 598. Memorandum for the Record Washington, November 30, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63–10/64. Secret. Prepared by McGeorge Bundy. Copies were sent to Rusk and McNamara. 599. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/64–9/66. Secret. 600. National Policy Paper Washington, January 18, 1965. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, South Africa. Secret; Noforn. The preface states that Part One of this paper is a comprehensive, authoritative, and approved statement of U.S. policy toward South Africa, and that all agencies and bureaus with major responsibilities affecting U.S. relations with South Africa participated in drafting it and concurred in the strategy and courses of action it sets forth. Secretary Rusk approved and signed the paper on January 18. 601. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, March 31, 1965, 4:28 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14–1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Republic of South Africa Affairs W.B. Campbell on March 25; cleared by AFE Special Assistant for Southern Africa Economic Affairs Peter H. Delaney, Sarich in Commerce, and Hooper; and approved by Williams. Sent to Cape Town, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and Durban, and repeated to all other Africa posts, London, and USUN by pouch. 602. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, April 12, 1965, 3:46 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR–US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Meyers; cleared by Captain Coward in OPNAV, Williams, and Hooper; and approved by Kitchen. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria. 603. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, April 13, 1965, 6:24 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Campbell and Kriebel; cleared by Hooper, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Stephen M. Schwebel, Sisco, Buffum, MacKnight, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Frank D. Taylor, Runyon, Fredericks, and Komer at the White House; and approved by Williams. Sent to Cape Town and London, and repeated to Pretoria, Paris, Rome, USUN, Bonn, Ottawa, Tokyo, The Hague, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Oslo by pouch. 604. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 3, 1965. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139. Secret. 605. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Cape Town, May 5, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR–US. Confidential; Immediate. No time of transmission appears on the source text; the telegram was received at 3:13 p.m. Repeated to Pretoria and Defense. 606. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, June 10, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11. Secret. 607. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, July 13, 1965, 9:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12. Confidential. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson that reads: “Mr. President: I think this memorandum, drafted by two members of my staff, is worth reading. The statement referred to in the last paragraph will not be issued except in response to questioning. For your information, Charles Johnson is a veteran NSC Staff Officer who monitors NASA and AEC. Rick Haynes is a talented young Negro Foreign Service Officer who covers Africa under Bob Komer. It was Johnson’s initiative that led to the contingency planning which had given us a prospect of alternative facilities if we run into a dead-end with the South Africans. McG. B.” 608. Note From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, July 29, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, Cables, 11/64–9/66. Secret. 609. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, July 31, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. Sent under cover of a July 31 memorandum from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to McGeorge Bundy at the White House. No drafting information appears on the source text. 610. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) Washington, September 2, 1965. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 295. Secret. 611. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 7, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 S AFR–US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hall on September 8 and approved in S on September 21. 612. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 13, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, 11/64–9/66. Secret. Copies were sent to Bator, Cooper, Johnson, Keeny, and Komer of the NSC Staff. 613. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An October 15 covering memorandum from Read to Bundy reads: “In response to Mr. Komer’s memorandum of September 2, 1965, we have prepared the attached supplementary comment concerning the Department’s status report of July 31, 1965, on National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964.” See Document 610 for Komer’s questions concerning the report. 614. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, December 7, 1965, 7:28 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14 S AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of U.N. Political Affairs Patricia M. Byrne of IO/UNP; cleared by Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Williams, EUR Regional Planning and United Nations Adviser Edward T. Lampson, and Legal Adviser Leonard C. Meeker; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs David H. Popper. Repeated to London and Pretoria.1 615. Memorandum From the Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Frutkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, December 14, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, to the Department of State’s Acting Director of International Scientific and Technological Affairs Herman Pollack, and to NASA Administrator James E. Webb 616. Memorandum From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 15, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, South Africa. Secret. 617. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) Washington, February 21, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Secret. 618. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) Washington, February 24, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, South Africa. Confidential. 619. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, June 2, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on June 2. 620. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 22, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 7, 5/26–6/29/66. Confidential. 621. Summary Notes of the 561st Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, July 14, 1966, 12:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 43, Southwest Africa, 7/14/66. Top Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. 622. Memorandum Prepared by the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, July 14, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, July 14, 1966. Confidential. Filed with a covering memorandum to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, the AID Administrator, USIA Director, and Director of Central Intelligence. 623. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson Washington, July 23, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/64–9/66. Secret. 624. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, August 17, 1966, 8:14 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buffum, cleared by Palmer and Meeker, and approved by Buffum. Sent to Cape Town, also sent to Pretoria and USUN, and repeated to London and by pouch to Monrovia and Addis Ababa. 625. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, September 6, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/64–9/66. No classification marking. Attached is a note from Rostow to the President that reads: “Mr. President: The attached memorandum is self-explanatory. I believe the risks of our silence are greater than the risks of our candor; but I did not wish to clear this without your guidance.” Prime Minister Verwoerd was stabbed to death in the South African Parliament on September 6. 626. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, September 21, 1966, 8:29 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Ralph W. Stephan of AF/AFS and Runyon, cleared by Campbell and Popper, and approved by Palmer. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria, London, and USUN. 627. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, November 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 S AFR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Sent under cover of a November l memorandum from the CIA’s Director for Research and Reports William N. Morell, Jr. to Assistant Secretary Palmer. 628. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. III, 10/66–9/68. Confidential. 629. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, December 1, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on December 1. 630. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, January 4, 1967, 8:26 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central File, DEF 7 S AFR–US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Donald R. Morris and Frank A. Sieverts of U and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to Pretoria, and repeated to Cape Town. 631. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, February 3, 1967, 11:51 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR–US. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Country Director for South Africa G. Edward Clark; cleared by Deputy Assist-ant Secretary for African Affairs William C. Trimble and Captain Coward of G/PM; and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria. 632. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, February 12, 1967, 8:09 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR–US. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Clark; cleared by Palmer, Morris, and Coward; and approved by A. Hugh Douglas of S/S–O. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria and Durban, and to DOD. 633. Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) Washington, February 21, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, 092 South Africa. Secret. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary of State and the Director of the National Security Agency. 634. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy (Nitze) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) Washington, March 4, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 680.1 South Africa. Secret. 635. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, April 5, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 680.1 South Africa. Secret. 636. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, April 15, 1967, 1:39 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Popper on April 13; cleared by Deputy Legal Adviser Carl F. Salans, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen, Palmer, and Clark; and approved by Sisco. Sent to USUN, Ottawa, Rome, Tokyo, and London, and repeated to all African posts. 637. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, April 28, 1967, 8:47 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by IO/UNP Officer in Charge of Dependent Area Affairs Donald McHenry; cleared by Brown of UNP and Clark; and approved by Sisco. Also sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria, London, Rome, and Ottawa. 638. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 4, 1967. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the source text, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 4. 639. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) Washington, May 11, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Elizabeth Ann Brown. 640. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 21, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Coward on July 11. 641. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 10, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. Limited Official Use. 642. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Foreign Minister Muller Washington, August 26, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL S AFR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Clark and cleared by Coward, Gleysteen, Charles H. Gustafson of L/AF, Byron B. Morton of SCI, and Palmer. 643. Editorial Note 644. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 21, 1967, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Lesotho (Basutoland), Vol. I, 8/66–5/68. No classification marking. 645. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 30, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 S AFR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Peter F. Krogh of S/S on October 6, and approved in S on October 16. The meeting took place in Secretary Rusk’s office. The source text is marked “Part 6 of 8 parts.” The other parts are ibid. 646. Memorandum of Conversation Lusaka, October 4, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 13 AFR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Second Secretary of Embassy Frank Crump on October 11. The source text is an enclosure to airgram A–138 from Lusaka, repeated to Dar-es-Salaam and Pretoria. 647. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, October 19, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, South Africa, 333—452.1, 1967. Secret. 648. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) Washington, November 15, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, South Africa, 333—452.1, 1967. Secret. 649. Letter From Senator Robert F. Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 15, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. No classification marking. Sent to Under Secretary Katzenbach with a covering memorandum from Kennedy to Katzenbach that reads: “Dear Nick: I understand you know something about this. I hope you can get the State Department to do something. Best, Bob.” 650. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, November 28, 1967, 0113Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by McHenry and Martin Jacobs of IO/UNP; cleared by Clark, Runyon, Gley-steen, and Philip B. Heymann of U (info only); and approved by Popper. Repeated to Pretoria. 651. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, December 20, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Secret. 652. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 17, 1968, 1852Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by McHenry and Jacobs on December 5, 1967; cleared by Irving Cheslaw of EUR/BMI, Deputy Legal Adviser Murray J. Belman, Seymour S. Goodman of E, Burns of Commerce, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Philip J. Farley, Rush W. Taylor of EUR/AIS, Gleysteen, and Clark; and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to Pretoria and Rome, and repeated to Johannesburg, Ottawa, Paris, and USUN. 653. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, February 10, 1968, 2230Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Clark; cleared by Palmer, Donald F. Herr of U, and Runyon; and approved by Clark. Sent to Cape Town and Pretoria, and repeated to London, Ottawa, and USUN. 654. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, March 9, 1968, 2112Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S AFR–US. Secret. Drafted by Palmer and Clark; cleared by Van Dyke in the Vice President’s Office, Runyon, and Jacobs; and approved by Palmer. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to USUN and Johannesburg. 655. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, March 28, 1968, 2336Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Runyon; cleared by Clark, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Herbert K. Reis, Brown of UNP, and Francis J. Seider of U; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Thomas H.E. Quimby. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to London, Pretoria, Johannesburg, and USUN. 656. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, April 11, 1968, 2009Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell on April 9; cleared by Clark, Gleysteen, Runyon, and Palmer; and approved by Thomas O. Enders of M. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to USUN, Pretoria, Durban, Johannesburg, and Port Elizabeth. 657. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, April 17, 1968, 0012Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Campbell and Runyon on April 16; cleared by Clark, Richard W. Bogosian of NEA, Brown of UNP, Edward W. Holmes of AFSE, ARA Country Director for Brazil Jack B. Kubisch, Joseph Godson in EUR, and John T. Dreyfuss of ARA; and approved by Palmer. Sent also to Blantyre, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Brussels, Canberra, The Hague, Helsinki, London, Madrid, Ottawa, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, and Vienna. Repeated to Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and USUN. 658. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 19, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. III, Memos and Miscellaneous, 10/66–9/68. Confidential. 659. Memorandum of Meeting Washington, May 23, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, South Africa 463. Secret; Exdis. Prepared by the Special Assistant and Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group in the Office of the Under Secretary, Arthur A. Hartman. 574. Memorandum of Conversation 574. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 9, 1964, 2:15 p.m. SUBJECT South Africa’s Racial Policies PARTICIPANTS Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Dr. W.C. Naude, Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa Mr. A. Gardner Dunn, Counselor, South African Embassy Mr. Pierson M. Hall, AFE Mr. Frederic M. Chapin, Special Assistant to Governor Harriman Ambassador Naude began by saying that this was his first opportunity to call on the Under Secretary and that, at this time, he wished only to pay his respects. Mr. Harriman replied that there are a hundred ambassadors now accredited to Washington and he tried to discourage those who only wanted to pay their respects, but he was always glad to see those who had matters of substance to discuss. Naude said that, while his was a courtesy call, it would be impossible for a South African ambassador to avoid politics for two minutes, even if he should want to do so. Naude pointed out that Secretary Rusk had told him there are only a few differences between the United States and South Africa. He, Naude, went on to say that if the United States welcomes diversity, as it apparently does, it should be easy to find common ground. Naude said he had striven since his arrival to enlarge this common ground and help the two nations find additional areas of agreement. Governor Harriman pointed out that this is an ambassador’s job. They would get along better, the Governor said, if they recognized there is little chance to agree and he added that many Americans haven’t even come to an agreement with some of their southern friends in the United States. The Governor stated that the United States Government is irrevocably opposed to apartheid and will never compromise in the slightest degree on the issue. Racial discrimination is completely unacceptable to most Americans. Mr. Harriman then said he would like to give the Ambassador some unsolicited advice—he shouldn’t try to get Americans to accept apartheid because they never will. President Kennedy had met the issue of segregation head-on. The opposition of the United States Government to discrimination goes back to Franklin Roosevelt and will certainly continue under President Johnson. The President was, in fact, a disciple of Roosevelt. The Governor continued that, while there are certain areas of agreement between the South African and American governments, there are diversities which can never be accepted just as Hitlerism and Communism could not be. The United States doesn’t go out looking for trouble. We want to leave others alone since we don’t really like sticking our fingers in other people’s pie, but in our position such action is sometime unavoidable. For example, we simply cannot ignore the apartheid issue. Ambassador Naude said South Africans do not like the word apartheid. One must not equate segregation and apartheid since they are quite different. Apartheid envisages eventual freedom and equality for Negroes. Hence apartheid does not have the same meaning in the United States that it carries in South Africa. Governor Harriman said he was grateful for that. Discrimination has never gone to the extremes in the United States, he said, that it went to in South Africa. Naude stated that the whole character of his country would be lost, the economy ruined without separate development. Such development is the only answer to South Africa’s problem. His government doesn’t maintain that this is the answer in the United States. South Africa is trying to respect the character of its ethnic groups; it has built-in diversity in its society. Circumstances of the two countries are so different. The American Negro is no longer a Negro and yet he isn’t an American either. He is basically insecure. The South African Bantu hasn’t lost his African character nor his basic security. South Africa is trying to maintain the racial integrity of the Bantu. The Governor then asked Naude to recommend a balanced book on the subject of apartheid and assured him he would read it. The Ambassador said he would send down something which was not propaganda-inspired. He went on to say that the South African Government is accused of violating basic principles of human rights such as labor standards, the right to work, universal suffrage, freedom of movement, etc. But, the Ambassador added, the Bantu are better off than the inhabitants of most other countries and, while there is an area of discrimination in the Republic, it will disappear in time. A chief problem is that of the franchise but this too will be solved. Few countries have a general per capital income as high as that of South Africa. Governor Harriman asked for figures on such incomes in South Africa and in representative other nations. The Governor inquired about South West Africa and expressed our concern that South Africa should make some concession in the Territory such as agreeing to a form of UN presence there. Naude replied that his country has had a lot of experience with the UN and that most of it was bad. The South African Government proposed on several occasions that the President of the General Assembly and various UN Commissions visit the Territory but such efforts had not been fruitful. For example, one visit—that of the Carpio Committee—was a fiasco. South Africa accepted the report of the Committee and went to the UN to discuss it. Suddenly, without warning, the document was disavowed by the Committee chairman. This action was very confusing to his government, Ambassador Naude averred. Now nothing further could be done until the report of the Odendaal Commission has been received. The Governor asked about the contentious case before the International Court of Justice and the Ambassador expressed his hope that the Court would not rule against South Africa; however, he said he would not presume to prejudge the case. Governor Harriman replied that many of South Africa’s friends (Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom) feel as the United States does, that some concessions should be made in South West Africa. Naude acknowledged that this was true. On the other hand, he said, President Wilson and Marshal Smuts were largely responsible for the establishment of the mandate system. The whole idea behind the mandates was that they would eventually be incorporated by the mandatory power. Class C mandates, such as South West Africa, were particularly dependent upon the mandatory and were to be administered as an integral part of that power. South West Africa is as much a part of South Africa as the former territory of Wyoming was of the United States. Just because South Africa forbore to annex this contiguous area it is being asked to hand over the Territory to the UN—scarcely a friendly organization. Governor Harriman said that the case of South West Africa is somewhat different since the South African Government has assumed international obligations for the area. The Governor concluded by stressing the continuity between the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations. The goal of both was, and is, an Africa wedded to the West not to the East. With the withdrawal of Khrushchev from the African continent and the entry of Chou En-lai new problems are arising. South Africa is deeply involved in these programs, and its government must face up to them. The Governor said he very much appreciated the willingness of Ambassador Naude to discuss in a frank manner the issues affecting his country. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14–1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Hall on January 10, and approved in M on January 20. 575. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 575. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, January 11, 1964, 3:17 p.m. 2. Embtel 765. 2 Embassy requested make following points in response SAG note reftel: 1. US aide-memoire of June 15, 1962 3 assuring SAG it would “give prompt and sympathetic attention to reasonable requests for purchase of military equipment required for defense against external aggression” was applicable as undertaking to give such attention to SAG requests within framework USG arms policy then in effect. Even under that policy assurance did not require that we respond affirmatively at all times and in all contexts to SAG requests for supply of military equipment of the types referred to in the assurance. 2. USG does not consider assurance now withdrawn, but still applicable in restricted sense current arms policy toward South Africa announced by Stevenson on December 4 and August 2, 1963. 4 We hope SAG will appreciate that this restricted current arms policy constitutes integral part USG effort assist toward peaceful solution southern African problems and is related to other matters where (as in our position at UNSC on economic embargo and UN expulsion) we have tried to be helpful and moderating influence. It remains intention of USG to expedite consideration of any SAG requests relating to supply of military equipment and to supply same if the USG considers such equipment required in sense of Stevenson statement for maintenance of international peace and security and for the common defense effort in the interest of the world community. In this connection Sole’s interpretation reported para 2 Embtel 733 5 is correct, if by “now” he meant “at this time” and not “from now on”; this, of course, should be read in connection with two preceding sentences of this paragraph. 3. Recent SAG military requests were put forward in relation uranium barter negotiations despite earlier notification from USG that it not prepared consider requests for purchase military equipment in connection these discussions. One defense item specifically separated from these discussions is still pending consideration as SAG aware. FYI. A. Embassy should not encourage separate SAG application for new military shopping list under peace and security exception in view of present world security situation. If SAG should seek invoke exception at this time, result our consideration would probably be negative. B. We recognize South African willingness proceed with negotiation on tracking station was, in fact, affected by US willingness proceed with separate affirmation described in quoted language para 1 above. This relationship was indicated by SAG aide-memoire, 15 June 1962. However, SAG did accede US insistence Tracking Station Agreement must be separate from affirmation. Moreover, Jooste, with whom negotiation conducted, assured Ambassador latter not precondition of former. C. In any event, SAG can now at any time and at its option give us six months notice intention terminate tracking station agreement; however we would hope line suggested paras 1–3 above would help discourage possible SAG initiative terminate agreement by giving six months’ notice. D. We believe comments para 3 above indicate SAG does not have legal basis for claiming US arms policy change as grounds to cancel agreement immediately, without six months’ notice. E. We would appreciate Embassy views re likelihood SAG employment option terminate agreement on six-month notice as threat against implementation of variety of US foreign policies it may find repugnant. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs Peter Hooper on January 8; cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Charles Runyon, G/PM Director for Operations Howard Meyers, C. Edward Dillery of SCI, Colonel Hatch of Joint Staff, IO/UNP Officer in Charge of Dependent Area Affairs Richard V. Hennes, Sloan in DOD, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Jesse M. MacKnight, and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; and approved by Williams. Sent to Cape Town and repeated to Pretoria. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXI, Document 395, footnote 4 . 4 For excerpts of Ambassador Stevenson’s remarks on December 4, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 694–698. For text of his remarks on August 2, see ibid., pp. 683–689. 5 Not found. 576. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 576. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, January 25, 1964. I–20675/64 Dear Alex: As you recall, President Kennedy in September 1963, approved our plan for preliminary discussions with South African officials regarding the sale of submarines, provided that no commitment was made or implied that a decision to sell would be made prior to the end of 1963. Further, the President indicated at that time that the decision to sell submarines to South Africa would be forthcoming after the end of 1963 “in light of the circumstances at the time.” 2 You may further recall that we sent a team to Pretoria in November 1963. In summary, the team concluded that the South African Government has a definite interest in the purchase of submarines and more specifically are impressed by a craft of small design which was discussed as an alternate to their interest in the Barbel class submarine. As to the financing, since the South African officials did not raise the question of credit, none was offered. Instead our team members indicated that either (1) cash transaction or (2) an arrangement whereby the manufacturer would accept a blocked bank deposit or line of credit, allowing a draw down of funds according to an assumed progress payment schedule (Incl. 1), would be possible. At that time, South African Government officials expressed a desire to further explore the feasibility of desired changes to design and specification before making a final decision to purchase the small submarine. It was made clear that no decision could be made on the possible submarine sale before December 31, 1963, and that the visit of the team to Pretoria should not be interpreted as an approval in principle to sell submarines to South Africa. The recent action by the South African Government in associating the potential submarine sale with the continuation of the U.S. tracking station in South Africa combined with our earlier indication that a U.S. decision would be made on the submarine sale after the end of 1963 prompts me to request: a. Final White House approval, in principle, to the sale of three conventional type submarines to South Africa, subject only to agreement between our respective defense establishments on specifications and price. Since credit has not been raised we assume that the transaction would be on a cash basis and that the sale including spares, technicians, etc., could range from $45 million, for three submarines of the smaller class proposed by the Electric Boat Company, to $90 million for the Barbel class in which the South African Government originally expressed interest. b. Assuming a favorable decision is made to consummate the sale, the Department of Defense will, with your concurrence, extend an invitation for South African Government officials to visit the U.S. at an early date for the purpose of beginning negotiations leading to the conclusion of a purchase arrangement. Sincerely, Frank 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Secret. 2 See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXI, Document 409 , for a conversation between South African Ambassador Naude and Secretary Rusk on arms sales to South Africa. 577. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 577. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 1 Cape Town, February 12, 1964, 5 p.m. 49. Reference: Deptel 32, 2 Embtel 48. 3 Following is confidential aide-memoire I presented FonMin Muller and FonSec Jooste this afternoon. Witt accompanied me. Stephenson is making parallel representations today. 1. My government has noted the intention of the South African Government to proceed with public discussion and the possible legislative and administrative implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa affairs (Odendaal Commission) 4 in the near future. It has also noted that the Commission’s Report related its recommendations to the view of the South African Government that the mandate has lapsed (Report, page 57, para 196), despite the judgment to the contrary of the International Court of Justice in 1962, in the Court’s disposition of preliminary objections to jurisdiction. 2. It is clear that the recommendations of the Commission which further extend apartheid and which shift administrative controls in South West Africa relate directly to issues currently pending before the International Court of Justice. 5 3. We accordingly urge your government in its own interest to postpone legislative and administrative implementation of all aspects of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission which are at issue while the case is pending in the International Court of Justice. This postponement would of course be without prejudice to any economic or welfare benefits not related to further extension of apartheid or to basic administrative changes in South West Africa. 4. You will recall that despite considerable difficulty we have restrained actions by the United Nations on the South West Africa issue by calling on members to await the outcome of the pending case in the International Court of Justice. Action by the South African Government to implement the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission now would remove the basis of such restraint. Consequently we urgently request assurances by the South African Government that it will hold such implementation in abeyance pending the adjudication of the International Court of Justice. Report follows. Satterthwaite 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London and Pretoria and passed to the White House. 2 Dated February 6. (Ibid.) 3 Dated February 12. (Ibid.) 4 The Commission’s report, or the Odendaal Report, dated January 27, recommended the establishment of 10 separate “homelands” for the non-white groups in South West Africa. It also called for expenditure of $218 million for development in the territory over a 5-year period. 5 In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia brought an action before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) charging South Africa with violation of the South West Africa Mandate on several counts. Previous ICJ opinions communicated to the U.N. General Assembly had advised that South Africa remained bound by the Mandate, that it must accept U.N. supervision, and that it could not terminate or alter the Mandate without U.N. consent. 578. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Rollefson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 578. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Rollefson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, March 9, 1964. SUBJECT Space Tracking Activities in the Area of Southern Africa I. Problem To assess (1) the need for ground facilities in the area of Southern Africa for support of the U.S. space program through 1970 and (2) the steps which should be taken to meet that need. II. Introduction 1. Given the present state of the art and our launching sites in Florida and California, the area of Southern Africa is the most critical single area abroad for the U.S. space program. Almost all of our major space programs are supported at critical phases by ground stations located in that area. At the present time these include four stations in the Republic of South Africa and one on Madagascar. In addition NASA requires one new tracking station in the area, and other increments may be necessary before 1970. All these stations should be land-based, but three of them could be ship-borne with substantial degradation of their reliability and mission performance. These facilities are requisite to long-range missile testing, earth orbiting unmanned satellites, lunar and planetary probes and—in the Apollo program—to both earth orbiting and lunar manned flights. The Department should be fully aware of the continuing need for these stations; of the requirement to explore new and alternate sites, if needed to assure uninterrupted operation; and of the necessity to advise DOD and NASA promptly, if relocation appears necessary. III. Conclusion 2. This office has concluded that the continued use and extension of ground facilities (tracking, data acquisition and command stations) under U.S. control in the area of Southern Africa over the next five years is a critical requirement, if the United States is to carry through the space program to which it is committed within this decade. Although technical and programmatic options in our space program are such that this requirement is not absolute, there is no satisfactory alternative. Failure to meet this requirement will be costly in time and money. More important, it will jeopardize the success of key space missions and may, in the long run, damage the image of U.S. technological and scientific achievement which we seek to foster abroad through a successful space program. 3. Within the general area of Southern Africa only the Republic of South Africa offers a location common to all these requirements wherein satisfactory logistic support, communications and local technical cooperation are available. The several minimum technical requirements of our program could be met by relocation of these facilities in southeastern Bechuanaland or separately among a variety of other locations, but only at substantial cost and under circumstances which would reduce seriously the practical probability of successful operation. 4. We recognize that the prospects of retaining these facilities, or relocating them within nearby areas which are technically acceptable, are far from assured. We realize also that the need to do so may limit severely our freedom of action in dealing with other critical problems created by the circumstances in that area. Nonetheless we feel that the Department must take all reasonable steps to meet these requirements. IV. Recommendations 5. It is recommended that, as a matter of urgency, the Department a. Assess the possibility of continued use and extension of the ground facilities in the Republic of South Africa for support of the missile-testing and space programs of DOD and NASA or, alternatively, their relocation in nearby areas which are technically acceptable; b. Frame a program of political actions to meet this need; c. Inform NASA and DOD (through SCI and G/PM respectively) no later than April 15, if possible, of the Department’s assessment and of the steps which DOD and NASA should take in consonance with the course of action to be taken by the Department; and d. Inform the White House and interested committees of the Congress of our assessment and proposed course of action. [Here follows Section V.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 15 S AFR–US. Secret. Drafted by C. Edward Dillery of SCI on March 6. Copies were sent to Kitchen, Rostow in S/P, and Cleveland. A March 9 covering memorandum from Rollefson to Williams states that the attached was a revision of his February 18 memorandum on the same subject. (Ibid.) He noted that NASA had undertaken a further intensive review of its requirements and had been able to modify them. It now appeared possible that the requirement to provide tracking coverage for the monitoring of Project Apollo orbits could be met in part through the use of airborne and shipborne equipment. In addition, negotiations had been completed for the location of a second NASA deep space instrumentation facility in Spain. 579. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State 579. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, March 10, 1964. SUBJECT South Africa and South West Africa BRIEFING FOR NSC STANDING GROUP Summary 1. Current and contemplated actions of the South African Government in South West Africa threaten to bring about a critical situation in the Security Council involving strong and legally valid demands for enforcement measures to support International Court decisions any time from April this year through the spring or summer of 1965, when a final Court judgment on the merits of pending cases is expected. New and extreme apartheid measures in South Africa will complicate this situation further when reflected in the report of the UN Study Committee on this subject in June. 2. A review of basic US interests, of the urgent timetable and of the risks and advantages of various courses of action open to us in the face of predictable developments points to the following recommended courses of action: a. Delay UN confrontation with South Africa as long as possible through a series of diplomatic actions, and attempt to put off consideration of major enforcement measures until after a final Court decision next year. b. Undertake immediate review of problems relating to our space tracking stations in South Africa and move to locate them elsewhere as quickly as possible. c. Continue our existing policy of refusing sales to South Africa of arms, ammunition, equipment to manufacture arms, military vehicles, firearms and other items of significant use in combat or in training for armed police or para-military forces, except for the fulfillment of existing contracts and the reservation of right to supply under the “strategic exception” provision in case the international situation so warrants. Continue to postpone decision on possible sale of submarines, other naval vessels and spare parts and equipment for naval vessels, pending developments with respect to the South West Africa situation. Decisions on the latter category would be made in the light of developments with respect to South West Africa, and might constitute an element which can be utilized as an inducement to bring about a change in South African policy. d. Warn major US investors of new risks they face in South Africa and cease US Government loans and guaranties for investments in South Africa during this critical period. e. Undertake a modest program of increased contact with and limited covert aid to non-communist African political refugee leaders from South Africa and moderate groups of all races within South Africa. f. Launch without delay a series of studies to permit evaluation of the probable effectiveness of various possible measures against South Africa, which to some extent may ultimately be needed to support a final judgment of the International Court of Justice and to protect basic US interests elsewhere. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Box 7, NSC Subcommittee Meeting, January 1 through December 31, 1964. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. 580. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 580. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, March 18, 1964. RE Your Meeting with Ambassador Naude 1. On February 12 US and British Ambassadors in Capetown presented parallel aide-memoires urging South African Government postpone implementation of Odendaal report apartheid policy in SWA pending ICJ decision. 2 They noted that we have urged other UN members to sit still awaiting ICJ decision and could not restrain them if South Africa moved. 2. In aide-memoire reply of March 3 3 South African Government insisted its SW A administration is “in spirit of the mandate”; that it cannot postpone Odendaal implementation because of ICJ case; that it can separate “overall design” of report from inoffensive “economic welfare benefits”; that “separate development has been fundamental to administration of SWA from the beginning and is not new issue”; denies that implementation of Odendaal would justify cease and desist order. 3. US and British Ambassadors submitting second aide-memoire this week (attached) 4 asserting—that South African implementation would precipitate ICJ action; that if Security Council called upon to support cease and desist order USG would “respect authority of ICJ” and “could not be expected to shield ICJ consequences of its action”. Urges SAG to wait for final ICJ decision. 4. It might be very useful to draw Naude out on what it would take to move South Africa toward some accommodation. Bill Brubeck 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63–10/64. No classification marking. 2 See Document 577 . 3 Telegram 85 to Cape Town, March 5, reported that on March 3 Ambassador Naude had delivered a South African aide-memoire replying to the February 12 U.S.-U.K. demarche. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN) 4 Not attached. The U.S. aide-memoire originally transmitted in telegram 65 to Cape Town on March 5 was corrected by telegram 73 to Cape Town, March 14. (Ibid.) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 581. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 581. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 1 Cape Town, March 19, 1964, 3 p.m. 115. Reference: Deptel 73, 2 Embtel 107. 3 Odendaal Commission Report. I presented aide-memoire to PriMin Verwoerd this morning as scheduled. ForMin Muller was also present. I told Dr. Verwoerd I would not read aide-memoire unless he wished me to as he had received from my British colleague yesterday an aide-memoire of substantially same text. PriMin said this was not necessary. Referring to previous exchange of aide-memoires I said this one expressed continuing and great concern of my government that his government might take steps to implement those parts of the Odendaal report having to do with the extension of apartheid and basic administrative changes in SWA relevant to issues pending before ICJ. If they did so applicants would in our view be certain to apply for provisional measures under article 41 of the court’s statute. If as we believed probably court granted such measures and his government did not comply with them question would then be brought by applicants before UNSC where we would be compelled to support authority of court. I then said that I had been requested by my government to emphasize a few points orally which I proceeded to do in accordance with Deptel 65, 4 making points in deleted paragraph 4 of Deptel 65 and emphasizing significance to my government of article 19. I read more or less textually final two paragraphs of Deptel 73. At termination of my presentation PriMin said that since legal issues were involved he would not undertake discuss these with me then and was sure I would agree that it would be better for him to give a written reply clearly setting forth points of view of his government. PriMin said he was surprised at concern of my government in view of firm belief of his legal advisers that there was no real cause for concern. He pointed out that implementation of Odendaal report would be a very long process, that it involved a first five-year plan followed by another five-year plan; while political aspects of report were fundamental to its implementation he implied that such steps as were taken would not give grounds for action by applicants. Verwoerd continued that if the report were accepted in principle by his government it seemed unreasonable and beyond bounds of possibility that court would interpret this in way we fear. He said that foundations for report’s implementation had to be laid. He thought however that processes of the court in pending case might well catch up with implementation of Odendaal report before any decisive steps were taken. As case in point he mentioned Ovambaland. The Ovambos he said had always in effect ruled themselves although his government had had a small number of advisers there. SAG had taken and intended take only steps similar to those which British and French governments had taken in areas such as Nigeria in years past. Verwoerd then discussed briefly complicated questions of financing recommendations of report which would themselves take considerable time to resolve. I told PriMin we recognized that there were many favorable aspects of Odendaal Commission report, especially willingness of his government to spend considerable sums for economic development. I again expressed our concern and said I hoped his government would not make any miscalculations. In closing PriMin made interesting remark that his government would of course take very much amiss any representations containing nature of a threat. However he would not at all take amiss representations made by friendly governments simply expressing reasons for their concern, his smile indicating he considered ours to be of latter nature. Interview lasted fifteen minutes and was friendly in tone through- out. I saw UK Ambassador Stephenson last night before his departure on official visit to other parts of SA. He was good enough to furnish me copy of his report to his government re his interview, which was also brief and friendly. Most interesting aspect of Verwoerd’s remarks to him were Verwoerd’s expressed view that if ICJ thought that proposals in Odendaal report prejudiced those issues before the Court he could only conclude that court was biased and wished to appease the Africans. He could not therefore understand why HMG was so perturbed, as it would take many years to put report into effect and its economic provisions would of course be tackled first. Even more significant perhaps were his remarks to Stephenson that SAG was certainly not looking for trouble and that he would therefore study UK memo carefully and let him have considered reply in due course. 5 Satterthwaite 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, USUN, and Pretoria. 2 See footnote 4, Document 580 . 3 Dated March 17. (Ibid.) 4 See footnote 4, Document 580 . 5 On April 29, Verwoerd issued a White Paper indicating that he would not implement the broad apartheid proposals of the Odendaal plan in South West Africa before the ICJ judgment expected the following year. 582. Memorandum for the Record 582. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, March 20, 1964. I–22469/64 SUBJECT South African Arms Policy Mr. Vance has reported to me the following conclusions, and his own observations, on the NSC Standing Group Meeting, Wednesday, 18 March, concerning U.S. policy toward the Republic of South Africa: 1. Tracking Station. General conclusions were that we have a maximum of 18 months to two years before the SAG will invite us out of the tracking station at Grootfontein, in view of the fact that we cannot relax our pressure on the SAG to revise its apartheid policy, and further in view of the fact that the squabble over Southwest Africa following the World Court decision (next year) will also find us on the side of the UN against the SAG. Accordingly, Mr. Vance instructed that the appropriate agencies within DOD should continue to survey alternative sites for the tracking station on a carefully controlled basis so as not to reveal our intentions to the SAG. 2. Arms Policy. It seems to be the general opinion of the Standing Group that the gold flow considerations involved in the proposed submarine sale are no longer sufficient to support the sale and that we should not go any farther with it. He said that his own feeling was even stronger than that of the Standing Group that this was the sort of visible support to the South Africans that we should not provide. NESA and ILN should take such actions as are necessary to dampen out the submarine question. Mr. Vance is also of the opinion that the Standing Group will support a policy of supplying not only the spare parts and equipment for which contracts were in existence in August 1963, but also any spare parts or components that would be ordinarily necessary to keep equipment purchased from the U.S. in operation, together with limited supplies of other materials associated therewith and not designed to improve the internal security capabilities of the South African forces. As there was no firm decision on this point at the Standing Group Meeting, the next step indicated seems to be a conference between ISA and Alex Johnson’s shop to get the matter ironed out. 3. Summary. I think the principal aim of the U.S. Government should be to maintain the SAG in an equable frame of mind as long as possible in order to protect the tracking station, while realizing that our basic policy in South Africa is certain to bring the arrangement to an end sooner rather than later. F. Sloan 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 470 South Africa. Secret. Prepared by Frank K. Sloan. A stamped notation in the margin reads: “Mr. McNaughton has seen.” 583. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 583. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, April 13, 1964. JCSM–309–64 SUBJECT US Policy Toward Republic of South Africa (U) 1. By JCSM–290–64, dated 8 April 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided their views on the National Policy Paper on South Africa, 2 and on US Policy toward South Africa by JCSM–292–64, dated 7 April 1964. 3 In extension of these views, they are concerned that, in implementing its policy toward the Government of South Africa with respect to sales of military equipment, the United States may be compromising US military interests in the country. 2. Previous views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on US military requirements in South Africa were provided by JCSM–528–63, dated 20 July 1963, for use in developing a US position on issues expected to be raised in the July 1963 session of the UN Security Council. 4 These views on South Africa were stated, however, in the context of a comparative analysis of US military interests in strategically located Portuguese territories and US interests in North Africa and were therefore properly ranked as of secondary importance. This comparative analysis may have obscured some of the absolute values of strategic military importance represented by South Africa. Active military interests consist of a missile tracking station, a NASA deep space probe satellite tracking station, and a communications facility at Pretoria providing the terminus of the Atlantic Missile Range arterial long-haul communications system. Essential military interests lie in the strategic geographic location of South Africa and the need to deny it to the communists. There remains the need to maintain a rapport with the South African military to provide for cooperation and assistance to fulfill US contingency requirements. 3. Subsequent to the establishment of an arms policy toward South Africa, the Department of State has held in abeyance final negotiations for the sale of three submarines (new construction) to South Africa. It is noted that this action has been taken despite Presidential approval to proceed with preliminary discussions with South Africa (in September 1963). It was indicated at that time that the decision to sell submarines would be forthcoming after the end of 1963 “in light of the circumstances at the time.” As a consequence, the South African Government now considers that the United States has failed to respond to legitimate requests for the purchase of items which by their nature would be used in a common defense effort and not in actions associated with apartheid. South Africans are now beginning to reflect dissatisfaction and resentment in their military relations with the United States. 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, as indicated in JCSM–292–64, that US policy toward South Africa is sufficiently flexible to permit the United States to pursue its diplomatic objectives and, at the same time, safeguard important military objectives in the country. In the application of US arms policy, it should be possible to distinguish between weapons suitable for use or likely to be used for internal repression and weapons which, by their very nature, would be applicable only to external defense. It is recognized that there are political considerations which make it necessary to limit the introduction of certain types of military equipment, but this should not preclude the sale of appropriate military equipment to the South African Government. An early decision should be made, as indicated in JCSM–292–64, to proceed with the sale of submarines and other appropriate military equipment. Suitable conditions for such transactions can be ensured by a combination of (1) careful selection of the types of equipment to be delivered, (2) quantitative limitations upon such deliveries, and (3) effective arrangement for post-delivery audit with respect to location and utilization of the equipment in question. 5. It is estimated that the favorable effect on our international balance of payments by the sale of three submarines and related types of equipment, during the next three years, would be an in-flow of at least $150 million. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Department of Defense position with respect to sales of military equipment to the Republic of South Africa reflect the views expressed above, that these views be included in the formulation of policies toward South Africa, and that the Department of State be advised of this position. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. Taylor Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Africa 381 (28 Mar 64). Secret. 2 JCSM–290–64 is not printed. (Ibid.) For the final version of the National Policy Paper on South Africa approved by Secretary Rusk on January 18, 1965, see Document 600 . 3 JCSM–292–64 provided the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the proposed National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) concerning U.S. policy toward South Africa. (Ibid.) See Document 586 . 4 Not printed. 584. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 584. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 20, 1964. Sometime within the next year, and perhaps within the next month or so South Africa may refuse to abide by a World Court decision which will probably forbid South Africa to extend apartheid to its mandated territory of South West Africa. We would have no real alternative except to uphold the Court’s authority, particularly in light of our own Article 19 case, and therefore may find ourselves in the near future in a major confrontation with South Africa. The attached NSAM represents the substantial agreement of State and Defense on a program to deal with this problem. 2 Specifically the NSAM will— 1. Suspend military sales (already being done, in practice) and government loans or guarantees. 2. Begin contingency planning for alternate tracking station sites if we have to give up our South African facilities. 3. Direct the State Department to develop a program to persuade the South African Government to accept the authority of the Court. The only significant disagreement with this NSAM is that of the JCS who continue to want military sales to South Africa. However, their position has been previously overruled and they are now restating it for the record. In any event the JCS can reopen the question any time Defense wishes to do so. I believe, therefore, we should proceed with the NSAM but I have prepared it for my signature rather than involve you directly so that you can more freely reconsider the issue at a later time if this becomes necessary. Under this program, we have a year in which to solve the World Court problem, and, at the same time, make a start on the underlying problem of getting the South Africans to adopt a more practical policy than apartheid. I don’t think we can get the imagination and flexibility, or the high level talent, or the kind of action we need, however, if we depend on the usual processes of the State Department. Instead I propose to discuss with Secretary Rusk the appointment of a special representative to handle South Africa—a distinguished man, on a part-time basis but with a staff of his own and with full authority, reporting directly to the Secretary. I think we would also need a new Ambassador in South Africa with some real skill in personal diplomacy and I propose to explore this with Walter Jenkins and Ralph Dungan. If you agree I will sign off the NSAM and talk with the Secretary along these lines. Approve 3 Talk to me about this McG.B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. 2 The attached draft is not printed. For NSAM No. 295, April 24, see Document 586 . 3 President Johnson checked and initialed this option. 585. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 585. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 1 Cape Town, April 22, 1964, 11 a.m. 168. Reference: Department telegrams 116 and 118, Embassy telegrams 158, 164 and 167. 2 Rivonia Trial. 3 I read following statement to FonSec Jooste yesterday afternoon: “Nigerian Foreign Minister Wachuku has expressed to our Ambassador in Lagos his view that if death penalty should be imposed and carried out on Mandela and other defendants in Rivonia sabotage trial it would place moderate African leaders like himself and Government of Nigeria, who are attempting to follow a reasonable course on SA problem, in an impossible situation. I know that you are aware that Mr. Wachuku has taken a moderate position regarding SA and I thought that SAG would wish to know his thinking.” I then said I would take advantage of opportunity to make following observation: “While I fully realize that Rivonia case is before the court, and that SAG as well as everyone else must wait court’s findings, I also think that SAG should be aware that considerable concern exists among Americans, who follow SA developments within and outside of USG, about possibility and consequences of death sentences in Rivonia trial.” Jooste took careful notes. His reaction to Wachuku’s statement was calm. To my own observation however he reacted rather violently saying he thought that any comment on trial in process was interference with SA’s domestic affairs and judicial procedure. He asked why it was that SA was only country in world which is being subjected to such treatment. Observing that SA courts were known for their fairness and objectivity, he asked whether USG, which is leader in fighting Communism, would stand for a minute for any interference by SAG in any trial of subversives going on in US. Moreover he said defendants in Rivonia trial were being tried for crimes against Constitution and laws of SA. Had we, he asked, made similar observation to other governments whose names he would not mention where no trials were held for persons simply op- posing government? Did my government, he asked, pass on to US court trying the Rosenbergs the international protests that were made or comply with their pleas for clemency? To this outburst I pointed out that I was not making a representation but only an observation and reminded him of Plimpton’s explanation of our vote on October 11 resolution quoted Department telegram 2077 to New Delhi. 4 Jooste calmed down and said he recognized that views I had expressed were indeed moderate in tone. Comment : Strong reaction of Jooste, who is reasonable man of moderate views and great experience and skill in international affairs, to my very moderate statement convinces me that any further representations on our part while trial is in process can only be counter-productive and could indeed contribute to a state of mind on part of SAG which might lead it to reject appeals for clemency if death sentences should unfortunately be imposed and upheld by Appellate Division of SA Supreme Court. I would like to add very serious warning that any reply to appeal of the Apartheid Committee along lines of Stevenson draft as reported to us by the British (Embassy telegram 167—we apologize for misspelling his name in that telegram) could be expected to provoke sharp reaction from SA Government and have counter-productive effects as far as possibility of death penalties is concerned. It could also endanger our current highly delicate diplomatic efforts with SAG re SWA. Satterthwaite 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 S AFR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, USUN, Pretoria, and Lagos. 2 Telegram 116 to Cape Town, April 17; telegram 118 to Cape Town, April 20; telegram 158 from Cape Town, April 17; telegram 164 from Cape Town, April 20; telegram 167 from Cape Town, April 21; none printed. (Ibid.) 3 In the “Rivonia” trial, nine African Nationalist leaders, including Nelson Mandela, were charged with planning and carrying out sabotage. The Rivonia trial was so called because of the arrest of a number of the defendants on a farm in Rivonia, Transvaal. 4 Dated April 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 S AFR) 586. National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 586. National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 1 Washington, April 24, 1964. MEMORANDUM TO Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Secretary of the Treasury Director, U.S. Information Agency Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration SUBJECT U.S. Policy Toward South Africa 1. The State Department should as a matter of urgency develop a comprehensive program of diplomatic activity, based on the response of the South African Government to our two aide-memoires, to the end of assuring that the implementation of the Odendaal report is deferred as long as possible and, hopefully, until the decision on the merits of the case in the International Court of Justice. In developing this program, the Department should consider all available diplomatic techniques, including the use of special emissaries, Presidential communications, etc. It should include modes of securing concerted or parallel action by other interested governments, particularly those in Western Europe. 2. Existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa will be continued. Decision regarding possible sales of submarines or any variations in existing policy will be postponed and considered only in light of further developments, including those in the South West Africa-ICJ problem. 3. US Government lending agencies will for the time being suspend action on applications for loans or investment guarantees with respect to South Africa. There should be no avoidable disclosure of this policy to interested parties, however, and agencies should continue to accept and process applications. No policy of warning private investors not to invest in South Africa will be undertaken pending further developments. 4. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense should immediately undertake such planning for and construction of alternative stand-by facilities as would be required if it became necessary to evacuate the facilities in South Africa on six months’ notice. In support of this, the Department of State will determine immediately the political acceptability of countries which the DOD and NASA may indicate as technically feasible and desirable. The Department of State will give priority to accomplishing required site surveys and negotiating necessary base agreements and assisting in needed land acquisition recommended by DOD and NASA. This program shall be carried out in such a manner as to avoid its coming to public notice as long as feasible, and in close consultation with the Department of State particularly so that the public aspects and the diplomatic aspects of our relations with South Africa may be coordinated. 5. The State Department will develop a program for actions during the months ahead, pending final ICJ decision in the South West Africa case, aiming to persuade the South African Government to acceptance of the Court’s decision. In addition to use of available pressures, particular attention will be given to exploring possible bases for accommodation and understanding with more moderate members of the South African white community along the lines proposed by the State Department’s memorandum of March 10th. 2 6. The State Department, in consultation with other interested agencies, will develop a program to explain privately to interested African countries the character and objectives of our program in order to try to obtain their understanding and cooperation. 7. The Department of State shall immediately undertake a comprehensive analysis of the various sanctions that could be considered if South Africa does not accept the ICJ decision on South West Africa. This analysis should include an estimate of the effectiveness on South Africa of the sanction if general compliance were obtained and of the prospects for obtaining such compliance. McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. An information copy was sent to the Secretary of Commerce. Copies were sent to Bundy, Brubeck, Haynes, Johnson, and NSC Files. 2 Reference is to the March 10 Department of State briefing paper prepared for the NSC Standing Group; see Document 579 . 587. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 587. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 4, 1964. Attached is proposed US position for UN Security Council debate and resolution later this month on South Africa. Key points we will support— 1. Appeal for clemency in South African sabotage trials against nationalist leaders. 2. Security Council committee study of possible economic sanctions against South Africa (but making clear no US pre-commitment on sanctions). Essentially, there are just minimum concessions we think must be made to African pressures in order to win Security Council vote; our immediate purpose is to buy time pending next year’s World Court decision on South Africa’s mandate policy in South West Africa, and this should do it. B. 2 Approve 3 Disapprove Attachment Washington, May 3, 1964. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT Security Council Meeting on Apartheid The United Nations Security Council will probably be called into session by the African states about mid-May to consider again the problem of apartheid. Continuing failure of the Government of South Africa to mitigate its discriminatory racial policies, the trials of leading African nationalists and the completion of recommendations on next steps by a UN expert study group will lend impetus to demands for more far-reaching UN action against South Africa. We expect the Council to focus on four major subjects: (1) the trials in South Africa of several hundred people in the past year under various South African security laws; (2) a multi-racial conference involving the UN in South Africa on the country’s future; (3) establishment of a committee to study sanctions; and (4) the imposition of sanctions on South Africa in the event the first two subjects are not satisfactorily settled. Our objectives in the meeting will be to maintain our posture of opposing apartheid without going so far as to invite a rupture of our ties with South Africa and to defer a substantive decision on the imposition of economic sanctions until close to the time (1965) when the International Court of Justice hands down its ruling on South Africa’s conduct of its mandate in South West Africa. To maintain the credibility of our anti-apartheid position, to avoid being faced with a vote on a resolution which we could not support, and to demonstrate our continuing concern about the need for movement by the South African Government, we plan to take an active lead in seeking support for a resolution containing the following major elements: 1. an appeal to South Africa to end arrests and detentions without charges and without trials, to exercise clemency in the trials of African leaders, and to grant amnesty to political prisoners who have not been guilty of common crimes; 2. provision for UN-sponsored educational and training programs for South Africa; 3. establishment of a committee of all Security Council members to make a broad study of sanctions, including those cited in the report of the UN Expert Study Group; however, we would make clear our support for such a study does not commit us to implement sanctions at some future date; and 4. endorsement of the need for a multi-racial dialogue in South Africa. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, “B.” Confidential. 2 McGeorge Bundy initialed below Brubeck’s signature. 3 This option is checked. 588. Special National Intelligence Estimate 588. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, May 20, 1964. SNIE 73–64 SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA Conclusions A. The Nationalist government is firmly entrenched in power, despite some internal differences on specific applications of apartheid policies. The white opposition is divided. Virtually all the white population supports white supremacy. The nonwhite majority has virtually no political rights and is disorganized. The police are well armed and highly efficient and will ruthlessly suppress any outbreaks of violence. We do not believe that internal developments alone will cause a significant change in basic domestic policies for the next year or two and probably for considerably longer. (Paras. 1, 5–10) B. Calls for more severe international action, particularly economic sanctions, may come in response to the bloody suppression of rioting, as a result of various discussions in the UN, or in the event of a South African refusal to comply with UN demands arising from the final ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on South West Africa. (Paras. 17–20) C. We consider it unlikely that any outside pressures brought to bear on South Africa would cause the government to alter its basic domestic policies. 2 They might only harden the Nationalists in their determination to go their own way. However, there is some flexibility and possibility of accommodation with respect to South West Africa. South Africans regard the US attitude toward international pressures as important and almost certainly believe that the US and UK would be likely to take a strong position in respect to a final ICJ decision on South West Africa. (Paras. 12–16) [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 20. 2 The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that there is an even chance that a military enforced blockade against South Africa would produce a realignment of forces within the white community and a shift away from present apartheid policies. [Footnote in the source text.] 589. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 589. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, May 22, 1964. JCSM–439–64 SUBJECT National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 on United States Policy Toward South Africa 1. In a memorandum, dated 3 April 1964, subject: “U.S. Policy Towards South Africa,” the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a draft National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) relating to US policy toward South Africa. These views were provided by JCSM–292–64, dated 7 April 1964. 2 The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently have noted that their views were not reflected in NSAM No. 295, dated 24 April 1964. 3 2. The NSAM requires: a. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense to undertake immediately “such planning for and construction of alternative stand-by facilities as would be required if it became necessary to evacuate the facilities in South Africa on 6 months’ notice”; b. The Department of State to give “priority to accomplishing required site surveys and negotiating necessary base agreements and assisting in needed land acquisition” for alternative facilities in other countries; c. US Government lending agencies to “suspend action on applications for loans or investment guarantees with respect to South Africa”; d. The Department of State to undertake immediately “a comprehensive analysis of the various sanctions that could be considered” if South Africa does not accept the pending decision of the International Court of Justice on Southwest Africa; and e. The postponement of any decision regarding the possible sale of submarines to South Africa, and any variation in existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa, without reference to the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCSM–309–64, dated 13 April 1964. 4 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the thrust of these provisions of NSAM No. 295 may lead the United States to an inflexible position of attempting, without likelihood of success, to force South African compliance with external views in seeking precipitate solutions to South Africa’s racial problems and the problem of Southwest Africa. Such provisions at this time are believed to be counterproductive to US interests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that such provisions are reminiscent of attempts made by the United States, with tragic consequences, to influence the domestic policies of the Chiang Kai-shek government in 1946 and the Batista government in 1958. In both of these cases, the political, military, and economic support necessary to maintain in power anticommunist governments was withheld. This should not be permitted to happen in South Africa. 4. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their views that the objectives of the United States toward South Africa should include its alignment with the Western Powers and the continuance of existing deep-space and tracking facilities in South Africa. As long as communist penetration and racial discord in Africa remain an active threat to Free World interests, stability in South Africa is desirable and the United States should do everything that its political and moral position permits to contribute to this. It should be noted that these views are in consonance with those of the US Embassy in South Africa which has stated that “We should not risk our valuable defense, space and economic advantages in South Africa by making a major demarche in support of proposals which would be so radical in view of the South African white population that extremists could rally most of the whites in rejecting them”; and that radical measures “… would disrupt the highly developed South African economy and the maintenance of internal security, both of which are necessary preconditions for real progress on race problems.” The Embassy has also stated that “We are not operating under threat of any immediate drastic security crisis in South Africa and the only threat to peace is from outside South Africa.” 5. It is recommended that, as a matter of urgency, you discuss these views with the President and the Secretary of State and that you advise them to revise NSAM No. 295 to avoid precipitate measures that could result in the loss of South Africa in the strategy of Western defense. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. Taylor Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Africa 381. Secret. 2 See footnote 3, Document 583 . 3 Document 586 . 4 Document 583 . 590. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs (Hooper) to the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hilliker) 590. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs (Hooper) to the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hilliker) 1 Washington, June 5, 1964. SUBJECT Item for the President’s Evening Reading Memorandum The Rivonia Trial More than 90 trials for subversion and sabotage in South Africa have taken place since January 1963. The most important of these is the “Rivonia” trial, held at Pretoria, in which the court is expected to hand down a judgment about June 11. The nine defendants are charged with planning and carrying out sabotage and six have confessed their guilt. Our Embassy estimates that the death penalty will not be imposed on any of these six and that one or more others may be acquitted. The trial has dramatized, through defendants’ statements, the degree to which ever harsher measures denying opportunities for peaceful political protest against apartheid in South Africa have influenced the non-whites to turn to violent methods. Two of the best-known leaders of the African political opposition, who are officers of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, are among the accused. The trial has already occasioned world-wide attention and protests by church and civil rights groups and there has been considerable public concern about these and other political trials evidenced in this country. International support for amnesty for South African political prisoners and clemency for persons convicted in trials such as the “Rivonia” trial has been growing. In April our Ambassador conveyed to the South African Government our concern over the possibility and consequences of death sentences in the “Rivonia” trial. In our view such sentences, if carried out, would seriously increase the obstacles to a peaceful solution of South African problems. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 S AFR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Runyon and Hall. 2 On June 9, by a vote of 7 to 0 with 4 abstentions (including the United States), the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 190 (1964) appealing to the South African Government to end the Rivonia trial. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 796–797. For text of U.S. Representative Plimpton’s statement expressing U.S. opposition to interference in the judicial process of South Africa, see ibid., pp. 797–798. On June 12, eight of the nine defendants were found guilty of sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment. 591. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 591. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 5, 1964. [Source: Department of State, INR Files, Country Files, Republic of South Africa, 1964 Thru. Secret; Special Handling. 3 pages of source text not declassified.] 592. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk 592. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 18, 1964. SUBJECT Security Council Adopts Resolution on Apartheid Early this afternoon, the Security Council adopted by a vote of 8–0–3 (USSR, Czechoslovakia, France) the Norwegian/Bolivian resolution on apartheid in South Africa (Tab A). 2 Particularly noteworthy was the affirmative vote of the United Kingdom. Although the British had continued to be unwilling to work openly for the resolution’s adoption, their position changed from a reluctant abstention to a guarded endorsement of the resolution. In addition, the British for the first time agreed to participate in the sanctions study committee. I believe our talks with them last week—on which I have reported to you—contributed substantially to allaying British fears by convincing them that (a) a study committee was a useful time-consuming device; (b) we would seek to assure that the committee’s work was serious and constructive; and (c) that UK participation would help assure a responsible approach by the committee. The African members of the Council (Morocco and the Ivory Coast), while supporting the resolution, expressed disappointment that it did not include sanctions. I consider this was a sop to the more radical segments of African opinion who had played a very tough negotiating game throughout the proceedings. In the last analysis, however, they all recognized the art of the possible and apparently considered that even this modest step is a net gain in their war on apartheid. Creation of the committee, however, is admittedly a far cry from the recommendations of the Expert Study Group which called for the application of sanctions against South Africa if the South Africa Government refused to respond satisfactorily “by an early date” to a Security Council invitation to discuss the formation of a National Convention of all races of South Africa. The Communist powers, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, explained their abstentions on the ground that the resolution was too weak and that it did not invoke sanctions against South Africa. They blamed this alleged deficiency on the U.S., the U.K., and France. The France explained their abstention by their opposition to UN intervention into the internal affairs of a member state. On balance, I think we came out very well in this exercise. We were able to maintain every essential aspect of the position you approved following your discussion with Governor Stevenson last April. The main carrot in this position, the sanctions study committee, may well prove of considerable utility by introducing a new note of realism into calls for sanctions in colonial and racial situations. Of course, the concept of the sanctions study committee was hedged in by appropriate reservations, both on our part (first paragraph on page 4 of Governor Stevenson’s speech at Tab B) 3 and that of the British and Norwegians to the effect that support for the study committee was without prejudice to our ultimate position on the application of sanctions. The next item on the agenda is to organize ourselves and our friends on the Security Council to turn the sanctions study committee to useful ends, along the lines of the US–UK agreed paper (Tab C). 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14–1 S AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Director of the Office of UN Affairs William B. Buffum and Hennes. 2 For text of Security Council Resolution 191 (1964), June 18, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1964, pp. 802–804. 3 For text of Ambassador Stevenson’s statement in the Security Council on June 16, see ibid., pp. 798–802. 4 Not printed. 593. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 593. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, July 30, 1964. STATUS REPORT ON NSAM NO. 295 OF APRIL 24, 1964—SOUTH AFRICA Following numbered paragraphs correspond to the seven numbered paragraphs of NSAM 295: 2 1. Defer Implementation of Odendaal Report in South West Africa a. Action taken: After negative South African Government responses to US and UK representations to Foreign Minister Muller on this subject in February, we convinced the British after some discussion that a second effort should be made with Prime Minister Verwoerd directly. Our approaches to the Prime Minister on March 19th brought a much more conciliatory, but not entirely clear South African response on March 27. Meanwhile Mr. Clarence Randall, whom we had briefed and enlisted before his private trip to South Africa, made strong personal representations to both Muller and Verwoerd in mid-March. Applicants in the International Court cases, Ethiopia and Liberia, were kept generally informed of progress and their Counsel was encouraged to refrain from seeking interim ICJ action. b. Results: In a Government White Paper and statement to Parliament on April 29, Prime Minister Verwoerd came round to full acceptance of our representations with regard to postponement. Citing South African technical reasons for delay, as we had suggested, he said inter alia and included in the White Paper the statement that the South African Government would “refrain from action which may be regarded—even theoretically—as detrimental or prejudicial to the alleged rights of the applicant states, or which may unnecessarily aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court”. In effect, all controversial aspects of the Odendaal Report were postponed pending Court judgment and certain economic and social development projects not involving shifts of population or changes in administration were approved for action. Ethiopian and Liberian Ambassadors expressed satisfaction with this achievement and indicated that interim Court action which might have precipitated a Security Council crisis this year would not be sought. The larger problem of South African intentions after Court judgment is still very much with us. While agreeing to postponement of implementation of the Odendaal Report, Dr. Verwoerd nonetheless accepted it “in broad principle” and said “it will be implemented when the time is ripe.” Thus, twelve to fourteen months’ time was gained, but the issue will become even more critical by mid-summer 1965 when final Court decision on the merits is expected. 2. Policy Regarding Military Sales Thus far during 1964 the South African Government has not initiated any official requests for arms or military equipment. Existing policy has been adhered to save for two technical exceptions under which it was decided to approve the sale of 100 helicopter firing heads (a safety device, not a weapon) and 12 sets of MK 32–5 torpedo tubes and 6 control panels as accessory equipment for torpedoes purchased by South Africa prior to inauguration of our arms embargo policy last August. 3. Suspension of Action on Applications for US Government Loans and Investment Guarantees Implementation of this policy has involved refusal of only one application thus far and no others are presently pending. The application which was not approved was in the form of a request for a special political risk guarantee covering a proposed loan of approximately $7 million by Chase Manhattan Bank to the Palabora Mining Company of South Africa. The loan was to have been for purchase of mining machinery and equipment. The Palabora Company, an international consortium including Newmont and American Metals Climax of the United States, has since obtained alternate capital. The venture involves development of an extensive copper mine complex in the Republic of South Africa to begin production in 1966. There has been no repercussion from the South African Government as the result of the Ex-Im Bank action. A high functionary of the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) did complain irately to one of our Embassy officers and vowed that in retribution the mining equipment would not be purchased in the United States. Ultimately about 95 percent is to be purchased in the United States, however, because letters of intent had already been signed for much of it and Palabora technicians insisted for the rest only US-manufactured machinery would be satisfactory. Knowledge of the Palabora refusal has spread to some extent among American firms under contract for equipment as well as other US firms, some involved in the venture and some not. However, the general policy has been kept secret and no action beyond that indicated in the NSAM has been taken. US private investment is contributing at a high rate in South Africa because of unusually favorable returns. Depending on future developments it may become necessary to review the policy of no warnings late this year or early in 1965. 4. Alternative Space Tracking Facilities NASA and DOD are proceeding actively with plans and preparations for alternate space tracking facilities. NASA will locate various alternative facilities in Malagasy, Spain and Ascension Island. Separate equipment will be installed and used in supplementary fashion pending any possible requirement to substitute entirely for present South African stations. NASA expects to complete its alternate sites by late 1965. Consent of the Spanish and Malagasy Governments has been obtained. The Ascension site is still subject to final negotiation with the British. DOD requires only stand-by land for a transfer of equipment which can be accomplished within six months. Malagasy is the prospective site for this. At some point later this year South African technicians will be able to deduce the purpose of alternate NASA facilities despite plausible and to some extent real additional reasons for their existence which NASA is fully prepared to make known. It is anticipated that the South African Government will not be likely to raise the issue with us in present circumstances so long as NASA and DOD continue normal operations in South Africa as planned. The questions of whether and when we should inform the South African Government about our alternate sites are still under consideration. 5. Program to Persuade South Africa to Comply with ICJ Decision and to Encourage Moderate Whites in South Africa The State Department has discussed this problem in preliminary fashion with Mr. Millard of the British Foreign Office. The British had been thinking of taking a renewed diplomatic initiative re South West Africa after the Court decision next year. Mr. Millard conceded during discussions in Washington in June that there might be some risk in waiting until that stage to take diplomatic action. We told him that we were developing a plan for approaching the South African Government later this year to allow time for repeated discussion and for the South African Government to develop an alternative to the Odendaal Report (which took two years), before the Court decision and resultant heightening of international pressures make South African adjustment much more difficult, if not impossible. The British will be prepared to explore with us in late summer or early fall the possibility of cooperating in such an earlier approach. The substance and strategy of new diplomatic approaches to the South African Government concerning the future of South West Africa are currently in the process of inter-agency review as part of the final draft National Policy Paper on South Africa. This is scheduled for final inter-agency clearance by mid-August. During the past few months discreet liaison with and encouragement of the major opposition party, United Party, in its active campaign against the Odendaal Report has been successfully carried out by AmEmbassy Pretoria. More effective liaison between interested private American groups and similar groups in South Africa has been assisted in response to inquiries to the Department of State from American groups in the fields of business, labor, religion, youth and science. 6. Program to Explain US Objectives to Interested African Countries Background and instructions have been provided USUN and all US diplomatic missions in Africa on our objectives concerning South West Africa and the Odendaal Report. These have been used as the basis for private conversations to bring about greater African understanding of the US position. To some extent this effort may have contributed to African willingness to go along with our current position on thorough and time-consuming study of sanctions in the UN Security Council. 7. Analysis of Sanctions A comprehensive series of studies of sanctions and other possible enforcement measures, including estimates of their effectiveness, costs and prospects for compliance, has been launched in the State Department. First drafts on all topics are scheduled for completion between July 31 and August 15. These will be timely and useful both for the purposes envisaged in the NSAM and as supporting information for USUN participation in the Security Council Study Committee on enforcement measures. The British are doing a similar series of studies and have indicated willingness to exchange views and information with us as they proceed. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 295. Secret. Drafted by Hooper; cleared by Fredericks, Dillery, P. Wesley Kriebel of IO/UNP, Officer in Charge of U.K. Affairs Thomas M. Judd, George L. Warren of G/PM, and William R. Duggan of the Policy Planning Council. 2 Document 586 . 594. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 594. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, August 17, 1964. Under a long standing US-South African bilateral on peaceful uses of atomic energy, South Africa has imported an Allis-Chalmers experimental reactor which is due to go critical this winter. Under license already issued, a private US supplier will ship the fuel in the next several months. These events will be publicized in South Africa, which will unquestionably kick up a nice propaganda storm elsewhere about US nuclear cooperation with South Africa. AEC apparently feels strongly enough about the integrity of its peaceful uses program that it would be very difficult to cancel the project at this late date. However, I propose to ask AEC to insure, quietly, that there is no fuel shipment or other cause for publicity until December. B . Approve 2 See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63–10/64. Confidential. 2 This option is checked. 595. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 595. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, September 22, 1964. SUBJECT Proposed Lockheed Sale to South Africa I. Problem On August 31, the South African Air Force informed Lockheed orally that unless a reply was received within three weeks regarding South Africa’s proposal to purchase 16 Lockheed P3–A ASW aircraft, South Africa would instead order French Breguet Atlantique planes (which will not be operational until 1966–68). The Lockheed deal would involve $64 million for aircraft delivered over 12 month period, beginning 14 months from order, plus a $30–40 million five-year spare part program, all for cash on delivery. (All this is Lockheed information in meeting with Kitchen at State last week, no information from South Africans.) Kitchen informed Lockheed representatives that any early decision is “extremely doubtful” and they indicated their awareness of the problems. Treasury strongly supports the sale on balance of payments grounds; Commerce agrees and adds considerations of foreign trade and domestic employment. Defense argues that an effective South African anti-submarine warfare capability is essential to maintain control of sea lines of communication around the Cape of Good Hope (British Shackletons now in use are obsolescent). You are familiar with State’s views. II. Background A primary consideration is the precise character of US commitments regarding arms embargo on South Africa. On July 16, 1963 in a personal meeting, President Kennedy informed Tanganyikan President Nyerere that “It remained US policy not to export arms to South Africa which could be used to influence racialism at home. 2 He was now considering a further step which would be a unilateral and voluntary refusal by the United States to export any arms to South Africa.” In view of necessary consultations President Kennedy “asked President Nyerere to hold what he had said in confidence for the time being,” and Nyerere agreed to do so. Pursuant to Presidential decisions Ambassador Stevenson took these steps in the August 1963 UN Security Council debate on South Africa: 1. In a voluntary statement of August 2 3 announced that the US intended “to bring to an end the sale of military equipment to the Government of South Africa by the end of this calendar year.” However, he added: “The Council should be aware that in announcing this policy the United States as a nation with many responsibilities in many parts of the world, naturally reserves the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security. If the interests of the world community require the provision of equipment for use in the common defense effort, we would naturally feel able to do so without violating the spirit and intent of this resolution.” 2. Voted for a Chapter VI (non-mandatory) UN Security Council Resolution of August 7 4 which “Solemnly calls upon all states to cease forthwith sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa.” In an accompanying explanation of his vote he referred back to his speech and said “It will be recalled that we naturally reserve the right to interpret this policy in light of any future requirements for the common defense effort in assuring maintenance of international peace and security.” In spite of the careful language the US position was widely understood as, de facto, a complete arms embargo. When Stevenson reported the understanding of several key Africans that the US “strategic exception” clause would apply only in the event that “world-wide conflict occurred,” the Department specifically rejected this interpretation. It advised Stevenson that “if in our judgment of world-wide strategic picture, US national interest requires cooperation with South Africa in common defense, the provision to South Africa of, for example, ASW equipment, we (as power with world-wide responsibilities, the efficient exercise of which is also in interest of all Africans) reserve right to make that judgment and provide such equipment.” (Dept. 317 to USUN, attached.) 5 In USUN’s 404 and 816 (attached) 6 Stevenson states his definitive case against any arms sales including submarines, arguing that the US “strategic exception” statement “seemed clearly intended to convey and did convey to all concerned idea that we did not regard such requirements to exist presently and reservation would apply only in changed world circumstances . … to enter now into new contracts even for such strategic materials as submarines would in the eyes of the world directly controvert our announced policy as publicly understood.” In applying the arms embargo State (Alex Johnson) subsequently determined, and it was announced, that after completing outstanding contracts, or further commitments to South Africa presently involved only spare parts for C–130s already sold (approved by President September 18). At the same time (Bundy-Rusk memo of September 20) the President agreed to permit continued discussion of submarine sales to South Africa but with “no implied commitment to sell” and an understanding that “The US can make no decision before the end of this year regarding sales and any eventual decision will be taken in the light of circumstances at the time the question is considered, under our policy stated in the UN Security Council in August.” 7 During the past year (presumably on the basis of indicated South African interest) North American, Northrop, Grumman, Douglas, and others have inquired informally about US Government attitude on sales of Naval bombers, jet trainers, helicopter engines, etc.; there have been indications of South African interest in anti-submarine warfare gear. From these indications, it seems likely that there is a possible market, within the limits of the “strategic exception” clause, of perhaps $3–4 hundred million in military sales to South Africa over the next five years. However, all of these possible sales have been turned down or shelved not only under the terms of policy as outlined above, but pursuant to NSAM 295: “2. Existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa will be continued. Decision regarding possible sales of submarines or any variations in existing policy will be postponed and considered only in light of further developments, including those in the South West Africa-ICJ problem.” III. Discussion While the “strategic exception” clause provides us legal justification for a Lockheed sale, there would be a considerable emotional reaction against the US—in Africa and Asia, a lot of propaganda, as well as criticism by American liberal and negro groups and many newspapers. Because the African nations have interests of their own to protect, they won’t break with us on this issue. But their emotions some times out run their reason. We might, for example, lose the Chirep issue in the General Assembly in November on just this one point—or some base or overflight rights. Certainly, for what it is worth, we will lose an enormous amount of respect and good will in Africa and our “deal” with the South Africans will probably be tied to our supposed deal on Tshombe and the Congo. Next year, we may find ourselves in a serious impasse with the South Africans over the World Court decision on South West Africa. We are doing a number of things against that eventuality, (under NSAM 295, the only point at which President Johnson has ever considered the South African problem) mostly directed at being able to have as much freedom of action and as few hostages to South Africa as possible if and when that happens. To get involved in a long term aircraft contract would run exactly counter to that policy. McNamara and Rusk have agreed, like Stevenson, that “It will be difficult to justify to world public opinion, particularly Africa, what will be claimed to be an abrogation of US policy enunciated in the Security Council” (regarding submarine sales but also applicable here). (September 16, 1963 memorandum to the President.) 8 In spite of these considerations a case can be made for the sale to South Africa. They are trying to buy, largely for internal political reasons, respectability and membership in the Western alliance club, and that is about all they really want for their money. Likewise, it can be argued that we can have more influence on the South Africans by dealing with them than by isolating them. Furthermore, all we are doing on something like an embargo on ASW weapons and the like is making irrational political concessions to the black Africans; there will be no end to their demands so we can’t win at this game anyhow. And this South African Government—and its problems—will be with us for a good many years to come. On balance of payments, not only does Lockheed sale open the way to other sales to South Africa; Lockheed argues with some cogency that it strengthens their chance of several hundred million dollars of additional sales of P3–A to other countries, particularly by limiting the French Atlantique’s cost competitiveness outside NATO area. Regarding Defense considerations, it should be noted that at the time of the Security Council problem in August 1963 Secretary McNamara thought that South Africa’s strategic importance was less then that of the Portuguese Azores and did not override foreign policy considerations. This is a pretty complicated issue and I don’t think we should try to strike the balance on these considerations now. I don’t think, however, that a decision as significant as the Lockheed sale should be taken whimsically, and without regard to its impact on an overall policy. I don’t think we really have such a policy now in spite of all the discussion of the past year. All I am really arguing, therefore, is that we should hold the problem open until November so that we have real freedom of decision at that time. I would therefore recommend that we: (a) Advise Lockheed that we cannot approve a sale at this time but that, without any commitment, their best chance is to give us time to deal with the problem at a later date; and that, in the meantime, we will try to keep the question open with the South Africans. (b) Request State and Defense, pursuant to the above, to explore South African interest and perhaps, to buy time, send experts to South Africa to discuss the matter (we have had no communication with the South African Government on this transaction). (c) Try to get a real high-level agreement over the next several months as to what the policy of this Administration is going to be on the question of South Africa. B . 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63–10/64. Secret. 2 For a record of Kennedy’s meeting with Nyerere, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXI , Africa, Microfiche Supplement. 3 For text of Stevenson’s remarks on August 2, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 683–689. 4 For text of Security Council Resolution 181 (1963), see ibid., pp. 689–690. 5 Not attached. Telegram 317 to USUN, August 3, 1963, is in Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14–1 S AFR/UN. 6 Not attached. Telegram 404 from USUN, August 9, 1963, is ibid., FT 18 S AFR; telegram 816 from USUN, September 13, 1963 is ibid., FT 18 S AFR–US. 7 Bundy’s memorandum to Rusk announcing the President’s decision (dated September 23, not September 20) is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXI, p. 649 . 8 See footnote 2 , ibid. 596. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 596. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, September 23, 1964. Further to the Lockheed-South Africa problem— 1. I should, and did not, make clear that the problem of avoiding trouble through November involves the UN General Assembly session as well as the US election. If there is public disclosure of a Lockheed sale to South Africa before or during the General Assembly the reactions there will be pretty messy, both rhetorically and in possible practical consequences—i.e. US ability to marshal votes on issues of interest to it, such as the Article 19 case. I doubt that a decision now to approve the sale could really be held from disclosure till after the UNGA. 2. You should realize that in the eyes of almost all the world this sale associates us with the British, French and Portuguese as helping the South Africans—and the rest of the world includes, with varying degrees of intensity, everyone from NATO partners like Norway, through Latin America to the Afro-Asians. I don’t want to overstate the practical significance of this, but its symbolic and emotional impact does count for something—the racism issue is, in the long run, a real one in coping with the Chicoms. 3. If we are going to spend a policy counter like this (and I am quite willing to consider it) let’s wait and do so in a context that serves some policy purpose, not just balance of payments. B . 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63–10/64. Secret. 597. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 597. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 20, 1964. This memorandum confirms my assessment last week that the sale of P–3A aircraft to South Africa is a political decision. While providing these aircraft would improve South Africa’s anti-submarine capabilities around the Cape of Good Hope, I do not consider this essential to our national defense. Similarly, if South Africa should deny us the use of its facilities for missile and satellite tracking, our needs could be met by obtaining the use of facilities in other countries in the area. Robert S. McNamara 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Cables and Memos, Vol. I, 11/63–10/64. Secret. 598. Memorandum for the Record 598. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, November 30, 1964. SUBJECT Lockheed Aircraft In accordance with the President’s decision, I have informed Mr. Vernon Johnson of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation that the United States Government is not able at this time to give its approval for the sale of P–3 aircraft to South Africa. I made it clear to Mr. Johnson that this decision implied no judgment on either side of any possible future consideration of this question, and I gave him no time limit on the present judgment. I did, however, make it clear that I had no reason to suppose that there would be a different judgment in the next few weeks or months. McG.B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63–10/64. Secret. Prepared by McGeorge Bundy. Copies were sent to Rusk and McNamara. 599. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 599. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 23, 1964. SUBJECT South African Reactor Fuel Problem Mac— It looks as though this problem is under control. Harriman has talked with Foreign Minister Muller and plans to talk further with him this afternoon along the following lines: (1) For obvious reasons we wish to delay shipment a reasonable time—about two to three months—but we will honor our contractual obligation to supply the fuel. (2) We expect the publicity on our shipment will be minimized. (3) We wish to apply IAEA safeguards to the South African nuclear program and we would like to do this even before the present agreement expires in 1967. (The present agreement provides that IAEA controls will be accepted at the end of the agreement or the agreement will not be extended.) Harriman seems confident that Muller will go long with at least the first two points, which will get us past our immediate political problem. Harriman had also been considering the possibility of having the UK supply the enriched uranium. Following a meeting this morning, he has discarded this idea. This note covers both Bob’s activities and mine. 2 CEJ 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/64–9/66. Secret. 2 A notation in Bundy’s handwriting in the margin reads: “Good.” 600. National Policy Paper 600. National Policy Paper 1 Washington, January 18, 1965. [Here follow the preface and table of contents.] NATIONAL POLICY PAPER—SOUTH AFRICA PART ONE—US POLICY I. The Problem South Africa’s worsening racial situation and increasingly isolated international position pose complicated problems for US foreign policy. The probable long-range effects on US security interests of the Nationalist Government’s repressive apartheid policy in South and South-West Africa require that every reasonable effort be made to improve the situation there and to mitigate its repercussions abroad. At this moment, Verwoerd’s regime appears to be both strong and secure. It seems impervious to change, despite a wide variety of international pressures for its reform or redirection. It now appears likely that the issue over the mandatory status of South-West Africa may soon bring about the first major confrontation looming between the world community and South Africa. This confrontation also has serious implications for the authority of the UN, the International Court of Justice. It will bring into sharp focus the potential danger for unilateral action by Communist countries which could jeopardize our long-term interests in Africa. A workable, but not necessarily satisfactory, resolution of the South-West African problem, while extremely difficult to achieve, might produce some political realignment in South Africa during the course of which Western pressures might be brought to bear with some hope of success. By mid-1965 the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on South Africa’s obligations as Mandatory over South-West Africa is likely to bring into sharp focus the issue of South Africa’s responsibility to the UN for its administration of the Territory and the question whether apartheid (separate development) is compatible with the best interests of South-West Africa’s inhabitants. Whether South Africa complies with the Court judgment, resists it, or gives up the Territory, the issues for the US are important. There will be wide support at home and abroad for the authority of the ICJ in its judgment on a contentious proceeding. Inevitably the United States and other major powers will be faced with a major international issue involving both race relations and the future welfare of peoples of a dependent territory. Early in 1964, it became apparent that implementation by South Africa of the recommendations of the Governmental Odendaal Commission regarding South-West Africa could lead to a crisis in the US Security Council involving possible collective measures to uphold a restraining order of the ICJ. Under the Odendaal Commission’s recommendations, measures of economic development would have accompanied the creation of racially defined homelands and tightened control of native affairs by the South African Government. The Commission’s premises were frankly those of the apartheid policies of the present SAG and would have intensified apartheid in South-West Africa. Similarly, the Commission rejected the possibility of United Nations supervision, as called for repeatedly by the UN backed by earlier Advisory Opinions of the ICJ. Viewing such action by the SAG as highly prejudicial to their rights as applicants in a contentious proceeding before the ICJ, Ethiopia and Liberia considered seeking a restraining order from that Court. In this proceeding, applicants, as former League of Nations members, are seeking a judgment establishing that South Africa’s administration of South-West Africa violates its obligations under the Mandate for South-West Africa conferred on it by the League. The plaintiffs might have succeeded in obtaining a restraining order and could have asked the Security Council for measures to enforce it. (Under Article 94 of the UN Charter, they could have obtained majority support in the Security Council for measures to enforce the Court Order.) To forestall this development, and permit the case to proceed to a judgment on the merits, probably by mid-1965, without intervening crisis, the United States, in concern with the UK sought to dissuade the SAG from immediate implementation of controversial elements of the Odendaal plan. This effort succeeded, and, at present, the SAG is holding back, so that applicants have not felt constrained to seek a restraining order from the Court. It is our best estimate that the ICJ will decide the case before it by mid-1965 and that its decision will be unfavorable to South Africa’s contentions respecting its asserted freedom from legal obligations under the Mandate, freedom to apply apartheid in South-West Africa and freedom from UN supervision. As the gap between South Africa’s actions and world opinion widens, the dilemma of balancing conflicting US interests is becoming more difficult and potentially hazardous. South Africa’s Nationalist Government is increasingly repressive in applying its apartheid doctrine, despite the actuality of economic integration. By constraint and legal restriction it is inhibiting the press, perverting news media and curbing academic freedom. It is arming heavily to defend its way of life. In the process it is employing increasingly repressive measures and eroding personal rights. Both the trend in the UN and the immediate thrust of US domestic policy are running strongly counter to South Africa’s practices of racial segregation and domination. Many countries, particularly Afro-Asian, are increasingly insistent that effective international action be taken respecting South-West Africa and apartheid in the Republic—this in light of the fact that South Africa has completely disregarded over thirty UN resolutions condemning South African policies. With the recent creation of the Organization of African Unity, determination to help resistance movements in Southern Africa and to embarrass countries friendly to South Africa in gathering momentum. With a population of 3 million Whites as opposed to 11 million Blacks, 1.5 million Coloureds (mulattoes) and .5 million Asians (mainly Indians), the ratio of Whites to non-Whites in South Africa is 1 to 4 as compared with a ratio of 9 Whites to 1 Black in the US. Thus, the problem of integration in South Africa is far more knotty than in the US. Until now the White populace has been divided by the hostile feelings of the Boer War with 55% Afrikaner and 45% of British and foreign extraction. The English-speaking Whites have become increasingly receptive to Afrikaner racist theories in the face of internal and external pressures. Although liberal elements in South Africa and the world at large have made efforts to soften South Africa’s hard line on racial attitudes, no real softening has yet been achieved. In its main effort to placate world opinion and to curtail, artificially, the ratio of Blacks to Whites, the South African Government has recently introduced the concept of “Bantustan.” This idea embodies the eventual creation of a series of scattered Black African tribal states in a confederal or “Commonwealth” system, but with South Africa retaining central direction for several decades to come. Thus far, the idea envisions assignment of 13% of South Africa’s land (470,000 square miles) to 70% of its population. The plan lacks administrative infra-structure, essential development capital, and clear-cut promises of eventual autonomy or independence. It fails to resolve the problem of the urban African. It is even criticized by right-wing Nationalists as “giving too much to the Kaffirs.” Thus far, in the Transkei, the South African Government has shown little evidence of good faith in giving the territory adequate economic backing or progressive movement toward actual autonomy. Yet, by its very vagueness, the Transkei (or other Bantustans yet to be created) may be awakening new political and social desires among South Africa’s Blacks, could unleash forces South Africa may not be able to control. Given the gravity of the South African problem, it will be important to watch the development of the Bantustan concept in the possibility that, over the long term, it or a variant thereof could help to provide a solution. South Africa has a growing, effective military establishment and a highly efficient police-security system. The Republic possesses a modern air force, an expanding army and an organization of home guard volunteers referred to as “Commandos”, and a small, efficient navy. South Africa could field a force of 200,000 men within ninety days. She possesses armed might superior to any existing military combination of nations of the African Continent today, She is swiftly increasing her production of armaments and is seeking complete economic and military self-sufficiency. South Africa’s economic base is broad and her trading position strong. Her only basic shortages are petroleum products, some automotive and airplane parts, wheat, cotton and rubber. She is heavily depend-ent on foreign flag shipping. She is seeking to overcome her deficiencies by producing motor fuel from coal, by expanding storage and refinery facilities, by establishment of an elaborate new petrochemical complex, and by expanding domestic wheat and cotton production. She is also expanding production of essential strategic mechanical components and armaments. Producing over 50% of the world’s gold, marketing 80% of its diamonds, and selling large amounts of uranium to US and UK under long-term contracts, South Africa has forty-five commercially exploited minerals. Her export trade in livestock, sugar, wool and fruits is also large. UK investment in South Africa exceeds $3 billion while the US investments surpass $600 million. Businessmen are receiving high returns on their South African investments, which net from 12% to 30% annually. Both US and UK business interests are contributing to South Africa’s current drive for self-sufficiency and are being propelled into strengthening its strategic capabilities in partial contradiction to official US and UK policies of arms embargo. In the same vein, our trade policy becomes embarrassing in terms of our relations with the rest of Africa. While economic sanctions and trade boycotts have been imposed on South Africa by various nations, results thus far have been limited. South Africa’s economy appears to have many strengths and few weaknesses. The whole complicated problem of what measures might be effective against South Africa should the occasion arise is under study within the US Government and, following a resolution of June 18, 1964, by the Security Council. Difficulties of enforcement, adverse effects on the people of South Africa as well as the race relations situation, and consequences for other countries, such as the UK, all need the more searching analysis that is currently being undertaken in the Department of State. Much more realism needs to be injected into UN consideration of possible enforcement measures. Toward this end USUN will strive for a thorough and truly expert study of the problem in the Security Council over the next several months. The strategic importance of South Africa to the US is based on requirements of an alternate to the Suez Canal as a sea route between the Indian and Atlantic Oceans; availability of air and naval facilities in South Africa for US forces and limited South African military capability to contribute to the security of Southern Africa in event of hostilities inimical to over-all Western or US interest. In addition, the Republic of South Africa is geographically located so as to provide excellent facilities for our DOD and NASA missile and space tracking requirements. While our present South African tracking and space facilities are preferable to alternative facilities, acceptable alternative sites in the general area can be found. Confusion of American attitudes and interests is reflected in conflicting activities of US private citizens and organizations as well as US government agencies. Both in Washington and in Pretoria, South Africans have reasons to regard US policy toward them as ambivalent. They frequently find it contradictory and occasionally unsupported or even undercut by our own representatives, official and private. The present course of events, which we may be able to influence only in minor ways, and only over the short term, promises to be detrimental to all if the trend continues. Ultimately, the US would wish to avoid choice between South Africa and the other African countries; instead, it finds itself in an awkward position at home and abroad in attempting to maintain friendly relations with two hostile factions and at the same time maintaining a basic domestic principle of racial equality. The probabilities of new dilemmas over the South-West Africa issue, of sporadic racial outbreaks in the Republic, increasing campaigns of sabotage and terrorism, and the eventual possibility of widespread disorder, make necessary a reappraisal of our policies toward South Africa. This reappraisal must include a full assessment of US interests and activities in the Republic; the inter-action of international pressures and forces at work within South Africa; the kind of resolution of the international treaty issue concerning South-West Africa for which we should strive, and the significance of South Africa vis-a-vis race relations on the US political scene. In this reappraisal, certain questions are paramount: Should the US avoid intervention in South Africa because the short-term situation is relatively stable and might be worsened by interference? Should the US join in treatment of South Africa as a pariah nation and back up this condemnation with pressures going beyond the arms embargo? Is apartheid so dangerous to international order in Africa and so susceptible to Communist exploitation that the US must seek ways to resolve the issue? Should our own racial problems lend strength to our stand against apartheid, or should they only heighten our awareness of the complexity of race relations and Nationalism? Are there constructive ways in which the US and its allies can show South Africa a path toward racial harmony? Are there ways in which the few liberal elements remaining in South Africa can be rallied and coalesced? Can we help to establish a forum for negotiation and eventual compromise between the races in South Africa? Can we help to avert an open, dangerous confrontation between South Africa and the rest of the world over the problem of South-West Africa? Failing these, should we progressively dissociate the US from South Africa with respect to arms, space, investment, trade and cultural relations? [Here follow Sections II and III on U.S. Objectives and Interests.] IV. A New Strategic Approach National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964, states, inter alia: “The State Department will develop a program for actions during the months ahead, pending final ICJ decision in the South-West Africa case, aiming to persuade the South Africa Government to acceptance of the Court’s decision. In addition to use of available pressures, particular attention will be given to exploring possible basis for accommodation and understanding with more moderate members of the South African white community along the lines proposed by the State Department’s Memorandum of March 10th.” A. Background The probable harmful effects on US interests in Africa resulting from the South African Government’s continued repressive apartheid policies in South and South-West Africa require that every reasonable effort be made to improve the situation there and to mitigate its repercussions abroad. The South African problem can also test the viability of the UN; in the long run over the issue of racial oppression and peace in Southern Africa; in the short run over the issue of South-West Africa. For the US, with its significant ties to various sectors of Africa and with its own domestic racial situation in an acute stage of resolution, the situation in South and South-West Africa, as elaborated elsewhere in this paper, poses grave policy problems. The usual arguments for the status quo policy are that South Africa needs a long time to modify significantly its racist policies, the problem is intractable, outside pressures will only worsen the situation, and the alternative is chaos. These are counsels of caution but hardly justifications for a policy of inaction. The weakness of the status quo approach is that the world and Africa are moving fast in one direction while the South African Government since 1948 has been moving as fast in the opposite direction. Thus, the ground is being rapidly eroded from under the policy of precariously balancing what are at times contradictory US interests. An alternative to the status quo policy is needed. An examination of alternatives indicates that a combination of pressures—national and international, internal and external—offers the best hope for the future. As a maximum, a program is necessary to deal constructively with the South African situation by promoting a non-violent approach, if possible; as a minimum, the program should limit the adverse international effects of the situation on US interests. A pressure program to be effective should aim to achieve (1) compliance with the judgment of the ICJ next year regarding South Africa’s obligations as Mandatory of South-West Africa, (2) realistic contingency planning by the South African Government, well in advance of the judgment, regarding the broad economic, social and political implications of compliance, (3) moderation in South Africa’s domestic policies in order to facilitate a workable accommodation on the South-West Africa issue, and (4) in the long run (possibly as an indirect consequence of a UN-South African accommodation on South-West Africa) promotion of an eventual dialogue among leaders of all groups in South Africa itself about race relations and government by consent. The ICJ decision could have a major impact on internal political alignments in South Africa. However, it would not necessarily weaken the general commitment to apartheid or some form of separate development. In the event of SAG relinquishment of responsibility, probably the most effective immediate way to influence favorably the situation in South Africa would be to ensure an efficient, enlightened administration of South-West Africa which would aim at rapid progress toward well-distributed prosperity and self-rule. South-West Africa’s resources and favorable foreign trade balance would facilitate this objective. Since the South African problem and the South-West African issue are closely linked, any program of action for one must include at the same time attention to the other. Similarly, an accommodation in South-West Africa or on the other hand an intensified application of apartheid policy regarding South-West Africa would profoundly affect the South African situation. If the Verwoerd Government successfully defied the Court on the South-West Africa issue, the possibility of any flexibility within the Republic itself would virtually vanish. Conversely, the establishment of UN authority over the Territory, by persuasion or force, would be a severe blow to the prestige of the Verwoerd Government. Whether the circumstances attending assertion of UN authority tended in the short run to divide or coalesce the white community in South Africa, undoubtedly the defeat would intensify the pressures on apartheid. Our first objective then should be to make a maximum effort to encourage the South African Government to change course in South-West Africa and prepare the way for accommodation to the findings of the Court. There have been a number of indications that the South African Government anticipates an adverse Court judgment and realizes that its continuance as Mandatory is in jeopardy. At the same time, the SAG has consistently rejected efforts on the part of the UN to exercise any supervisory authority. However, it is worth noting that in 1951 South Africa proposed an agreement with the three remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers of World War I (US, UK and France) for her continued administration of South-West Africa. This was rejected by the three countries because it constituted an effort to sidestep the authority of the UN. Nonetheless it indicated that South Africa might be more willing to discuss the future of South-West Africa with the US, UK and France than with the U.N. as a whole. In any event the results of US/UK demarches earlier this year on the Odendaal Plan suggest that (1) some useful progress may be made through such diplomatic approaches and (2) it would appear that the South African Government was anxious to avoid a major confrontation over South-West Africa at that time. The South African Government was clearly anxious to buy time to strengthen its security situation during the year remaining before the Court decision. However, it might, through sufficiently credible and forceful approaches, be persuaded to avoid a full-scale confrontation following upon the ICJ judgment of mid-1965. B. Proposed Plan We therefore set down in general terms the outlines of a two-phase operational approach to the South African Government. The essence of the plan is to reveal our concern, in the first phase, with securing South African compliance with the judgment of the ICJ. The second phase of the plan would be concerned with events following the ICJ decision and would depend on the nature of the decision and South Africa’s reaction thereto. Both these phases would constitute the principal thrust of the US response to the increasingly disturbing situation in South Africa with its implications for US national interests in Africa. It is recognized that the following program, if invalidated by unforeseen events, could require new contingency plans and new objectives. Problems such as the effect of South African withdrawal from the UN; the future of the port of Walvis Bay; the future prospects for confederation or further more satisfactory, development of Bantustans; and development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons capabilities, etc., may well be considered as subjects for Working Group study under new contingency situations. 1. Diplomatic Approach to South Africa on South-West Africa (Phase One) During the months remaining before the judgment in the South-West Africa case, a basic, high-level diplomatic approach to South Africa would appear to have some utility for inducing the SAG to prepare for an accommodation in South-West Africa. To underline the need for South African action this approach should be made together with the UK (and possibly France) as soon as feasible. If the UK should prove reluctant to join with us in carrying out this plan, we should be prepared to make some concessions in planning and timing because of the value of joint US–UK participation. Actions to Institute the Diplomatic Approach: As soon as possible we should consult with the UK (and France) to determine whether it (they) would be prepared to proceed now to work out a common diplomatic strategy for persuading South Africa to accept and adjust to a probable adverse ICJ decision on South-West Africa. We should be prepared to proceed with a US–UK effort if France is unwilling to join and the US should “go it alone” should the UK refuse. South Africa has three main choices re the ICJ decision on South-West Africa: (1) non-compliance; (2) relinquishment of the mandate; or (3) compliance. Any of these courses might also involve South African procrastination and legalistic delay before a choice were eventually made. Any one would have far-reaching consequences for South Africa and the UN. Non-compliance with the judgment would bring into being, with even greater force, the perils the US and UK impressed on the South African Government during the Odendaal crisis. These perils have been spelled out elsewhere in this document. The very existence of the Security Council study committee on sanctions should help impress on South Africa the serious problems which might confront it should it fail to comply with the Court’s decisions. Relinquishment of the mandate would create an administrative problem for the UN, but it would be manageable for such a sparsely populated and relatively prosperous territory. Such a solution would be a blow to South Africa’s pride. However, apartheid within South Africa might even further be strengthened. Yet it would bring to an end one major problem in South African-UN relations. This is a decision South Africa might make when fully cognizant of the difficulties the other choices entail. Compliance would raise many serious problems for South Africa, the US and other states. Assuming the Court’s judgment parallels the 1950 advisory ruling, it would necessitate the utilization of UN supervisory machinery. Presumably South Africa would be required by the Court to be accountable to the UN General Assembly only to the extent that it was to the League of Nations. However, it is likely that the Court also will decide that apartheid is not reconcilable with the obligations of the mandate system. Ethiopia and Liberia allege this, and South Africa’s response is that apartheid is necessary and desirable. Prime Minister Verwoerd publicly recognized this on May 5, 1964, in telling Parliament that the adjudication “concerns the policy of the Government of South Africa, namely the policy of separate development.” Loss of this aspect of the case for South Africa would mean that compliance would entail administration of a non-racial policy by a racist-minded Mandatory. Many South Africans as well as others believe Prime Minister Verwoerd would find giving up the mandate less schizoid. There will be strong pressures in the UN for South Africa to give up the Territory. South Africa might also attempt a legalistic sort of compliance, probably involving procrastination and delay. Verwoerd said on May 5 that “the Government of South Africa is a stickler for doing what is juridically correct.” Under the Class C mandate agreement, South Africa is not specifically obligated to advance the indigenous population politically. However, Prime Minister Verwoerd and other South African spokesmen repeatedly have proclaimed that they aim at self-determination of peoples. On June 5, 1964, Verwoerd said that the prospective British grant of independence to Basutoland amounted to the fulfillment of one of the purposes of the separate development policy. The Republic was prepared to help the High Commission Territories along the road to independence, he said, in the same way it was assisting the Transkei. Although the mandate agreement does not require political development of the indigenous population, the South African Government would be inconsistent in attempting to deny to South-West Africa the self-rule that it claims to project for territories within South Africa itself, such as the Transkei, and to welcome in the Basutoland enclave. Assuming that the Court judgment prescribes a non-apartheid policy and the General Assembly insists that the Territory be treated as a whole rather than as a collection of Bantustans, South Africa’s declared intention to carry out the Odendaal proposals would prove untenable, both legally and politically. There would be nothing to preclude South Africa from engaging in a new series of legal maneuvers to blunt the Court action. This would frustrate the Black African States and would pose new difficulties in the UN and for the US. Substance of a Proposed Oral and Informal Approach to the South African Government: (a) The US, UK (and France) would explain that our purpose was to forewarn, not to threaten, and that we have a special interest (stemming from our position as the remaining principal and allied powers of World War I) in the finding of a solution for South-West Africa which is acceptable, if not entirely satisfactory to the parties concerned (the South African Government, the inhabitants of South-West Africa and the UN). (b) We would suggest extensive informal and secret discussions in advance by experts of the four (three or two) countries to consider various possibilities for a solution in South-West Africa acceptable to the UN, the inhabitants of the Territory, and South Africa. (c) We would state our conviction that to have a reasonable prospect for success, an essential step must be South Africa’s acceptance of UN supervisory authority (already ruled upon by the ICJ), and the South African Government must be prepared for unreserved acceptance and compliance now with the final ICJ judgment or, alternatively, for relinquishment of the Mandate. (d) We would explain, as there is a strong possibility at least that the Court may find in favor of the applicants on some of the issues, very possibly including that of the practice of apartheid in the Territory, we are convinced that apartheid must be eliminated in South-West Africa, we are convinced of the wisdom of frank exploration with the Government of South Africa and other key governments of what can be done in this direction before it is too late. (e) Finally, we would point out the necessity for South Africa to prepare contingency plans for the future of the Territory of South-West Africa which would move away from the present practice of apartheid in the Territory and establish a practicable basis for the eventual according of self-determination to the inhabitants. Follow-Up Approach: If the first “oral” diplomatic approach fails to elicit any constructive responses, a second more specific and written demarche should be made. Its primary and immediate purpose, like the first approach, would be to maximize within the South African Government realistic thinking either about how to comply with the Court judgment or about the alternative of withdrawal from South-West Africa before involving South Africa itself in an escalating confrontation with the UN and its key member states (including the US). In order to achieve a constructive engagement of South Africa, this approach would be worded in a way as not to negate its primary purpose by provoking the Nationalist Government into an intransigent attitude during the South-West Africa crisis. These demarches have the merit of beginning a dialogue well in advance of the ICJ decision. An important secondary purpose of the written demarche would be to buttress our propaganda position in the event the Verwoerd Government refuses to comply with the judgment or chooses to withdraw from the Territory. At that point in time it is proposed that the demarche would be released to the public. To be a useful element in US propaganda the demarche should be designed to have maximum appeal to moderates of all parties and groups. It would be intended to throw on the Nationalist Government the onus of either loss of the Mandate or the hardships resulting from increasing pressures against South Africa. Its purpose would be to strengthen the moderates and encourage their coalescence into a more effective opposition to the Verwoerd regime. It would also be aimed at weakening the resolution and unity of the extremists. Supporting Actions on South-West Africa : As an important supplement to diplomatic efforts, the Department of State, with appropriate assistance from other agencies, should provide full briefing on the South-West Africa issue to prominent American business and professional people who in the course of their normal activities have access to influential South Africans. Aside from that regularly provided to USIA, special guidance for US diplomatic and other personnel who engage in frequent conversations with South Africans should also be prepared on this issue. In short, a total US effort, official and non-official, public and private, should be devised with the end of persuading influential South Africans in and out of Government that accommodation to the ICJ judgment is essential to their best interests, and that the major nations including the US have no alternative to supporting respect for the authority of the ICJ and the rule of law. 2. An Alternative to Apartheid in South Africa (Phase Two) Under present conditions a major diplomatic approach to the South African Government proposing alternatives to apartheid in the Republic would probably be rejected. It might diminish our prospects of influencing the South African Government beneficially on the more immediate South-West Africa issue. At a later stage, however, after the judgment of the International Court on South-West Africa has been made, it might be opportune to make such an approach. A South African Government cooperating with the UN in South-West Africa and discovering that a reasonable alternative to apartheid can be made to work there, might be more amenable to suggestions for constructive change at home. On the other hand, if the South African Government should resist the Court’s judgment and UN measures supporting the Court, the publication by the US and others of a minimum, positive program for re-orientation of South African society by South Africans might serve as a rallying point for moderates and perhaps a way of dividing extremists and reducing their resistance to the UN. This could be useful if the South-West Africa issue shakes South African racial politics into flux. Because either the opportunity or the necessity may thus arise in the next two-year period for a major diplomatic approach on apartheid in South Africa, it is considered useful to have prepared within the context of this paper the general lines which such an approach should follow. The immediate aim of a comprehensive and practical proposal for moving toward a modus vivendi acceptable to all races in South Africa would be the beginning of informal discussions about South African race relations by spokesmen of all groups. The governments making representations would stress: (a) The best solution would be one worked out by the South Africans themselves. The associated states do not desire to impose a settlement. (b) The South African Government should create the proper atmosphere for discussions by relaxing oppressive laws and discrimination. (c) The associated governments would support agreed proposals covering all groups’ and individuals’ minimal rights and opportunities, under the protection of the law as means of achieving full equality. (d) Rejection of the combined approach would necessitate a reassessment of the participants’ relations with South Africa. Should the South African Government reject the combined approach, the details would be released at the most opportune time and exploited to the full. [Here follow sections on Courses of Action and Perspectives and Conclusions, and Part II, the Supporting Analysis.] 1 Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, South Africa. Secret; Noforn. The preface states that Part One of this paper is a comprehensive, authoritative, and approved statement of U.S. policy toward South Africa, and that all agencies and bureaus with major responsibilities affecting U.S. relations with South Africa participated in drafting it and concurred in the strategy and courses of action it sets forth. Secretary Rusk approved and signed the paper on January 18. 601. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 601. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, March 31, 1965, 4:28 p.m. 1838. Re Dept’s CA-8425. 2 Following summary of conversation is uncleared, FYI, Noforn and subject to revision. In meeting with Secretary March 23 delegation from “Conference on South African Crisis and American Action” urged economic measures against South Africa. Conference had resolved in favor full economic sanctions but delegation stressed definite policy of discouraging loans and investment would be major forward step in lessening US involvement, bringing pressure to bear on South African whites, and improving US relations with other countries. Secretary pointed out UN membership not ready use sanctions to enforce human rights. US did not have much influence on major trading countries’ policies. Unilateral action might only cause South Africa to shift trading patterns. He was not sure that economic pressures would induce South Africans to change their policies. Discouragement of investment would depend to large extent on developments in South Africa and on outcome of Court case regarding South West Africa. However, with respect to President’s balance of payments message, US investment in highly developed SA economy should be slowed down (Under heading “US Delaying Any Move on South Africa” AP item in Evening Star, Washington, March 24, page 20, said Houser told reporters after delegation’s talk with Secretary that its minimum request had been for curb on investment and trade but Secretary had indicated Administration wanted to wait for Court judgment expected in autumn.) Secretary stressed objective was change in South Africa, not warm glow of feeling at home or approval from other countries. Court judgment on South West Africa, he said, might provide handle for influencing South Africa situation since solid international stake existed and US had obligations derived from World War I and mandate system. US might have to consider sanctions in UN, he said, depending on nature of judgment and South Africa’s response. George Houser, organizer of conference said delaying tactics might draw out proceedings so long that issue might be before UN bodies for years with little result. Secretary replied USG had warned SAG it should cooperate and not stall. Background About 400 persons from 38 organizations—churches, unions, students, civil rights—attended conference organized by American Committee on African and Consultative Council on Africa. Main aim was to do what is “right” rather than be restrained by UN Charter limitations and concern about effectiveness or consequences of actions. Congressman Fraser of Minnesota’s speech effectively expressed conference attitude: US should oppose apartheid forcefully because it was wrong, by restraints on investment and trade, even unilaterally if need be. Conference was another manifestation of growing ties between apartheid and American civil rights issues. Leaders of CORE and other civil right organizations were prominent. Day before conference opening American Negro Leadership Conference members met with 25 African ambassadors. CORE member of delegation told Secretary American Negroes and civil rights movement would insist on identifying Sharpeville with Selma and demand forceful action, whether or not it was successful. Labor and civil rights spokesmen, however, disagreed among themselves about ability of leaders to arouse rapidly mass interest of unions and civil rights organizations in remote South African situation. Sidelight was tribute Victor Reuther paid courageous unionists who were struggling for genuine labor principles in South Africa. AFL–CIO, he said, favored increasing ties with them. Demonstrations were held March 19 in New York City, Boston and San Francisco against US firms in business with South Africa. Main demonstration was by students and CORE against Chase Manhattan’s Wall Street office, where 49 were arrested. On March 23 conferees demonstrated at Commerce Department and were received by Commerce officials. Embassy authorized use background on conference and demonstrations in its discretion in informal conversations with South African officials to impress them with growing concern American interest groups over racial discrimination Southern Africa and with seriousness USG views Court issue. Remarks of Secretary to delegation, however, are FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14–1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Republic of South Africa Affairs W.B. Campbell on March 25; cleared by AFE Special Assistant for Southern Africa Economic Affairs Peter H. Delaney, Sarich in Commerce, and Hooper; and approved by Williams. Sent to Cape Town, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and Durban, and repeated to all other Africa posts, London, and USUN by pouch. 2 Dated February 16. (Ibid.) 602. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 602. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, April 12, 1965, 3:46 p.m. 111. Joint State-Defense message. Re: Visit USS Independence (Capetown’s 129). 2 Appreciate SAG clearance of visit USS Independence. Number of flights from Independence to Capetown involving landing onshore will be few, and generally limited to those necessary to assure in advance of Independence docking all necessary actions have been taken to facilitate mooring of ship, handling mail, etc. In informing SAG of foregoing, however, you should indicate to Duplooy USG cannot accept any stipulation regarding utilization crew members including any which would result in racial segregation. If SAG should make such a condition of visits US will have to plan its Naval operations to exclude calls in Republic. Ship’s aircraft including helicopters will of course refrain from taking photographs of military establishments and their immediate environment in Cape peninsula area as requested. Further details should be handled by Embassy Naval Attache through establishment channels, as indicated Deptel 67. 3 FYI. We recognize visit of vessel such as Independence bound stimulate public interest, as noted Embassy’s 130. 4 Will provide press guidance as soon as possible. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR–US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Meyers; cleared by Captain Coward in OPNAV, Williams, and Hooper; and approved by Kitchen. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria. 2 Dated April 7. (Ibid.) 3 Dated February 25. (Ibid.) 4 Dated April 8. (Ibid.) 603. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 603. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, April 13, 1965, 6:24 p.m. 114. Ref: Deptel 74 to Cape Town. 2 US and UK agreed at London Africa talks March 23 desirable both countries make early confidential approaches to SAG about ramifications SWA problem after ICJ judgment. Aim would be continuing discussion with appropriate levels in SAG, if possible, to keep fully advised SAG thinking and to encourage contingency planning by SAG for response following judgment which will avoid UN-SAG confrontation and facilities accommodation. British initially anticipated difficulties beginning discussions now but subsequently concluded current SAG efforts in London to discuss sanctions questions with UK officials might provide basis for broader talks to include consequences of ICJ judgment. Embassy Cape Town should discuss soonest with British Embassy timing, level of approach, and content of these first representations. US should then begin dialogue with Foreign Minister Muller. If UK Embassy not prepared to make own representations within reasonable time of your first talk with Muller or if there substantial disagreement on content, Embassy should request further instructions. In Dept view commencement of dialogue should be low key, such as incidental to call on Foreign Minister concerning some other matter or informal exchange of views on possible nature of judgment and of choices available to parties to case and to UN after judgment. Developments of past year in South Africa, in US and in US relations in Africa and elsewhere emphasize it essential we make clear US policy with respect South Africa under administration President Johnson continues be one of firm support for rule of law and racial justice. There has been no softening on these fundamental issues. Significance growing and articulate interest American public, particularly churches, trade unions, students and, above all, civil rights groups in South African situation and ICJ case may not be realistically appreciated by SAG. Based on reports of American visitors to South Africa, probing pressures by SAG on such items as Ford boycott, and conversations with SAG representatives in US and elsewhere, there is reason believe SAG may be operating on mistaken premises that USG softening its policy. This is not so. Both UK Ambassador and SAG Fonoff should understand USG desires dialogue because in its view SA course respecting ICJ judgment can have most importance consequences for SA position in world and USG policies toward SA. Initial talks should cover at least following six points: 1. US believes it would be useful to initiate conversations with SAG on problems which may arise as result of ICJ decision whatever its substance. USG regards these as logical follow-up to representations made in Spring 1963 and as extension continuing frank exchanges on matters mutual concern. US appreciative of spirit in which past conversations, including those in Spring 1964, received by SAG. 2. US interest in subject stems from policy of support for rule of law and authority of ICJ and its participation in UN which is bound to be seized of various aspects of South West African problem, as well as USG constant desire for peaceful disposition of SWA issues. 3. USG would welcome views of SAG on shape it thinks ICJ decision might take. 4. Without wishing to prejudge outcome of Court case USG believes it would be prudent to discuss all contingencies including those ICJ rulings and UN responses which might be most unsatisfactory from SAG point of view. 5. US would welcome opportunity to continue conversations on this subject from time to time as desirable. 6. Should ICJ judgment follow 1950 advisory opinion that SWA still under Mandate, that SAG still subject to Mandate and Article 22 of Covenant, and that UNGA has succeeded to League’s supervisory functions, prompt declaration by SAG of readiness to comply, and action by SAG evidencing intention to respect judgment, for example by sending annual report and negotiating appropriate supervisory machinery to give effect to judgment, could forestall precipitate UN action. Such an approach essential to counter efforts in GA to terminate Mandate or pressure for SC action under Article 94. 7. As to apartheid, even if judgment rules certain practices incompatible with Mandate obligations, we would hope SAG would not react negatively, and would take time consider all implications and advantages maintaining its traditional attitude of respect for ICJ and the law. Rejection of judgment on racial matters would create major complications jeopardizing any prospect for moderate solution of SWA problem. Embassy may wish to cover point 7 in subsequent conversation because of SA sensitivity and possibility judgment may be less clear about apartheid. In London talks UK expressed view that SAG might prefer give up Mandate rather than submit to international supervision, provided territory demilitarized. Dept believes talks should proceed on assumption SAG wishes to retain Mandate but Embassy should note any indication of SAG consideration of relinquishing Mandate rather than submit to international supervision. Following Embassy report of opening talks Cape Town Dept will arrange similar conversations with Ambassador Taswell whose first meeting with Secretary still pending and unscheduled. N.B. London’s 4939 to the Dept 3 indicates UK Emb Cape Town has already been instructed make similar approach to SAG. For Embassy London: Advise Fonoff and report reaction to Dept and Cape Town. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Campbell and Kriebel; cleared by Hooper, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Stephen M. Schwebel, Sisco, Buffum, MacKnight, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Frank D. Taylor, Runyon, Fredericks, and Komer at the White House; and approved by Williams. Sent to Cape Town and London, and repeated to Pretoria, Paris, Rome, USUN, Bonn, Ottawa, Tokyo, The Hague, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Oslo by pouch. 2 Telegram 74 to Cape Town, March 4, expressed the Department’s belief that the United States and the United Kingdom should initiate and carry on a dialogue about the South West Africa problem with the South African Foreign Office during the months remaining before the ICJ judgment. (Ibid.) 3 Dated April 9. (Ibid.) 604. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk 604. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 3, 1965. Dear Dean: Pursuant to the National Policy Paper on South Africa, 2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed an analysis of the feasibility of using U.S. military forces as a part of a possible UN peace-keeping action, either to enforce a decision of the International Court of Justice regarding South West Africa or to enforce economic sanctions against South Africa. A copy of this analysis is attached. The most significant factor in the Chiefs’ analysis involves the magnitude of forces which might be required. If the South African Government were to reach a decision to use force in resisting an adverse ICJ decision, the Chiefs believe that it would employ two light infantry divisions in South West Africa, keeping other South African units in reserve for the defense of South Africa proper. Against the units in South West Africa, the Chiefs consider that at least a four division force would be needed, at an overall force strength of about 160,000, supported by three wings of land-based aircraft and three carrier task forces. These forces would be supplemented by air and sea lift forces. Needless to say, if an action against South Africa proper were contemplated, considerably larger forces would be needed. In the opinion of the Chiefs, the imposition of a naval blockade against South Africa alone would involve four carrier task forces, comprising four carriers, twenty-four destroyers and eight submarines on station. An extension of the blockade to the Angola and Mozambique coasts would entail an additional three carrier task force. The normal requirements of rotation, repair and the like would treble the overall number of ships if a blockade were maintained for an extended period. The difficulties in mounting either military operation would be formidable. There would first be the task of finding the equivalent of four U.S. divisions that could fight together effectively against the forces of a modern, well-equipped and well-trained adversary. There would then follow the problems of organization, command, logistic support and other complexities associated with a military operation under international auspices. It is at least questionable whether the UK, France or any other of our NATO allies would contribute to either a land operation or a naval blockade and, as a result, the brunt of any Western contributions would fall on the United States. The consequence would be an extremely costly diversion of U.S. forces. In light of the above and other politico-military consequences which the Chiefs also note, they have strongly recommended against any military involvement in support of UN actions in southern Africa. I believe that you will find the Chiefs’ view particularly helpful in putting the dangers of such involvement in proper perspective. I am sending a copy of this letter to McGeorge Bundy. Sincerely, Bob 1 Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139. Secret. 2 Document 600 . 605. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 605. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 1 Cape Town, May 5, 1965. 163. Department pass Defense. Reference Deptel 130 2 and previous ref USS Independence. I called on Foreign Minister Muller at his request at 5 p.m. Naude and Dunn were with him. Minister first expressed regret that arrangements which had previously been handled at military level had gotten into political sphere. I pointed out it had gotten into that sphere by action of his own department. Muller then referred to our mixed receptions. He said SAG feels very strongly that diplomats should observe customs of country. I said I had explained why we could not do so in this case to Prime Minister when matter first arose. Muller continued that reason he raised this question was that US Embassy did nevertheless pursue its legal right to do what it pleased in our Embassy. SAG therefore intended insist on same right with reference to its two airports whose use we had requested here. I raised question whether there was any difference in international law between a war vessel and a military aircraft or between our use of harbors and airports. Minister thereupon made it clear he was trying to confine issue in this case to use of DF Malan and Ysterplaat Airports and not to use of harbor by Independence. Minister then went on to say that in future where groups of Americans wished to use SA facilities they would be required to observe SA rules. I said in other words you are raising in this case what was first put as a suggestion to a condition. He said yes this was so but that he hoped this issue might fall away in present case. Reason for this was that military (who are obviously anxious for Independence to call here) felt assured that in present case there would in fact be no violation of rule he had just stated. I said I could give him no such assurance and was confident that no naval commander could or would take step to segregate any navy crew in any naval aircraft. Indicating concern at my negative reply Muller then explained that if our policy could be complied with while at the same time USN observed SA’s policy there would be no problem. Both Naude and Dunn from their remarks made it clear that they were very hopeful that this formula, namely that if both SA’s and our policies were observed (presumably because of absence of mixed crews), it might make it possible for visit to take place. In course of conversation I pointed out that USN aircraft with non-white members had in fact used these same airports before. I also said that of course it would be a convenience for Independence to stop at Capetown. Furthermore our naval vessels had especially enjoyed using SA ports because of the hospitality that had been rendered them. Comment : Conversation lasted some 40 minutes. Foregoing how- ever is essence of what was said. Miller kept expressing regret that matter had gotten to political plan. By this he may well have meant that he had had to refer it to Prime Minister. Minister, Naude and Dunn all seemed concerned that I had reacted negatively throughout to their proposed solution. If sufficient importance is attached to visit of Independence to Capetown, problem can of course be settled by making no use of aircraft on board Independence. Minister made it abundantly clear that use of harbor by ship was most welcome. I am not however recommending this. From foregoing it is clear that SAG not only has not given an inch on this issue but has raised what was only a suggestion to a condition. It also seems clear they would like Independence to call at Capetown but on their own terms. Unfortunately their equation of use by our naval aircraft of the two local airports with our multi-racial entertaining makes their terms even less acceptable. Prime Minister may well believe that our need to refuel Independence is so great that he can take this opportunity to teach us a lesson. I recommend that we not permit him to do so. I gave no indication of what I thought reaction of my government would be but said simply I would report our conversation to Department. 3 Satterthwaite 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR–US. Confidential; Immediate. No time of transmission appears on the source text; the telegram was received at 3:13 p.m. Repeated to Pretoria and Defense. 2 Dated May 4. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 133 to Cape Town, May 7, instructed the Embassy to inform the South African Government that the U.S. Government was withdrawing its request for a Cape Town port visit by the USS Independence. (Ibid.) 606. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 606. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 10, 1965, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Your meeting with Harry Oppenheimer at 6 PM today South African industrialist Harry Oppenheimer (biography attached) 2 has come to Washington to discuss Southern African affairs. Oppenheimer is a liberal South African whose views on race relations conflict with those of South African Prime Minister Verwoerd (“fair-VOR T”). Before his appointment with you, he will see Rusk and Ball. Because of his great influence in the commercial world and excellence contacts, your meeting could serve to (a) obtain his informed estimate of future trends in Southern Africa, and (b) impress on him certain US ideas for passing to political and business leaders in South Africa. Oppenheimer’s visit is probably prompted by his concern over the slow deterioration in US political relations with South Africa. For example, the South African Government has increased its public criticism of the US Embassy’s inter-racial entertaining. Most recently, South African restrictions on the use of inter-racial crews on flights from the carrier Independence resulted in our cancelling its port call at Cape Town. We are in turn deeply concerned about the accelerating trend toward Government-sanctioned racial discrimination (“apartheid”) and extreme political repression in South Africa. “Apartheid” in particular is a major handicap to the Free World in its efforts to stabilize the political situation in Africa and keep the Chicoms and Soviets out. Our determination to solve our own racial problems in America, and our dedication to the democratic ideal, make it difficult to maintain friendly relations with South Africa. The gut problem in our relations with South Africa is that the policies of the Verwoerd government are driving the rest of the world into a kind of opposition which in turn will probably only make the South Africans more bitter and determined. We have had to stop selling arms to South Africa and there will be heavy pressure for further action if and when the International Court of Justice rules against the South Africans on their application of apartheid to South West Africa. We receive Negro and liberal deputations all the time which ask us to apply “sanctions.” We tell them that such measures would only make such things worse, but what is there that would make things better? Oppenheimer, as the attached biography shows, is a man who might have the answers, if anyone does. So I think you may want to feel him out on this central question. R.H. McG.B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11. Secret. 2 Not attached. 607. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 607. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 13, 1965, 9:30 a.m. Status Report—Tracking Stations in South Africa. For his own domestic political reasons Prime Minister Verwoerd is taking a tough line toward our non-segregation policy. In a recent speech he said that South Africa would not permit US Negroes to work at US space tracking stations in his country. His statement following only weeks after South Africa’s similar ban on mixed aircrews from our carrier Independence and after repeated official criticism of the US Embassy for holding multi-racial functions. Your accomplishments in race relations and civil rights here at home make it essential that our position on similar issues abroad be consistent with domestic policy. Failure to do so if this issue becomes widely publicized, would alienate some members of Congress, American Negroes, civil rights groups, labor, church groups and liberals in general. It would also jeopardize our continued use of important installations in the rest of Africa, and could result in some loss of Afro-Asian and Latin American support in the UN. However, it might also force us to get out of certain US installations in South Africa. NASA, DOD and the Smithsonian have space facilities manned by 143 South African contract employees and 53 Americans. None of the Americans is Negro. Some of these facilities are required to read out “Mariner IV” pictures of Mars this month, and for the first attempts at a “Surveyor” lunar landing in the fall of 1965 and spring of 1966. We’ve anticipated this problem, and through sensible contingency planning alternate facilities are now under construction in Madagascar, Spain and on Ascension Island. They will be fully operational by June 1966. To meet expected continuing pressure to accommodate to South American racial practices, we are (a) examining emergency measures to be taken if early evacuation becomes necessary; and (b) fixing the timing of the scheduled transfer of facilities to assure the least interference with our on-going space programs. In the past, the US has quietly complied with South African racial practices by not spending Negros to represent us at our Embassy or other official establishments. However, we probably cannot continue to avoid the issue. Therefore, the State Department is considering issuing a statement emphasizing that (a) the tracking station agreements contain no racial clauses, (b) the South African Government has not approached us for modification of these agreements, and (c) the US cannot accept the imposition of racial conditions by the South African Government at our tracking facilities. While avoiding a confrontation, this approach puts us on record as firmly opposed to racist conditions on our activities in South Africa. It remains to be seen if the South African Government will choose to press the issue. Charles E. Johnson Ulric Haynes, Jr. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12. Confidential. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson that reads: “Mr. President: I think this memorandum, drafted by two members of my staff, is worth reading. The statement referred to in the last paragraph will not be issued except in response to questioning. For your information, Charles Johnson is a veteran NSC Staff Officer who monitors NASA and AEC. Rick Haynes is a talented young Negro Foreign Service Officer who covers Africa under Bob Komer. It was Johnson’s initiative that led to the contingency planning which had given us a prospect of alternative facilities if we run into a dead-end with the South Africans. McG. B.” 608. Note From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 608. Note From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, July 29, 1965. McGB 2 FYI. In response to this incredible and unprecedented request from the SAG for the transfer of three senior members of our Embassy staff, 3 AF is recommending the following courses of action to the Secretary: 1) that Ambassador Satterthwaite be immediately recalled for consultation; 4 2) that before the Ambassador’s departure he be instructed to make a stiff statement of our position to the SAG Foreign Minister; 3) that the Secretary recommend to Dr. Weinberg, Director of the Oakridge National Laboratory, that he not go to South Africa next week to attend the opening ceremonies inaugurating the American-made research nuclear reactor. Should the SAG resort to the extreme measure of declaring the three Embassy officers PNG, AF would recommend our immediate retaliation against three already identified members of the South African Embassy here in Washington. 5 Rick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, Cables, 11/64–9/66. Secret. 2 Komer crossed out the initials “RWK” and wrote “McGB” on the source text. 3 In telegram 97 from Pretoria, July 28, Satterthwaite reported that Acting Foreign Secretary Naude, under instructions from the Prime Minister, had suggested that the Ambassador should have three senior members of the Embassy staff (William H. Witt, Patrick O’Sheel, and Argus Tresidder) and Consul Horace F. Byrne at Port Elizabeth transferred because the South African Government had “lost confidence in them.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 US–S AFR) 4 A notation in Komer’s handwriting in the margin of the source text reads. “Grrr.” 5 A handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text reads: “This is the kind of problem the State Department can handle—a highly esoteric form of tit-for-tat. RWK.” 609. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 609. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, July 31, 1965. STATUS REPORT ON NSAM NO. 295 OF APRIL 24, 1964—SOUTH AFRICA 2 Key Factors in Current Relations with South Africa Apartheid and Tracking Stations The South African Government has informed our Ambassador that it does not wish or intend that past public statements relating apartheid to tracking stations should lead to official confrontation. The Prime Minister’s extemporaneous speech at De Aar on June 25 was for internal political consumption according to Foreign Minister Muller. No South African official has commented in public on the issue since that date. It appears that the South African Government in the face of sharp attacks from its political opposition and some growing concern among business leaders is prepared pro tem to abandon the subject, except for lingering echoes in the Nationalist press. Alternate Sites As the result of actions begun over a year ago, NASA and DOD would be prepared, if necessary, to move all space tracking operations from South Africa to alternate sites (principally Malagasy, Spain, Ascension) by June 1966 without serious degradation to scheduled programs. (See details below in action on paragraph 4 of NSAM 295.) Timing of ICJ Judgment on South West Africa The best current prediction is that the ICJ, now in summer recess, will not make its decision on the pending South West Africa cases until March or April 1966. This is based on recent estimates by the Court Secretariat and by Ernest Gross, Counsel for the Applicants. The South African Government has called up numerous witnesses and will continue this process when the Court resumes session this fall. Future Action Lines of action set forth in NSAM 295 and the National Policy Paper on South Africa continue to comprise adequate policy framework. NASA and DOD are proceeding as rapidly as possible to complete and equip alternate tracking stations. Other issues will continue to complicate our relations with South Africa, and Prime Minister Verwoerd may well move to create new incidents. We are currently involved in a serious situation involving a South African Government initiative against personnel of our Embassy. This was unpredictable. A further deterioration in increasingly strained relations may come with a possible showdown between South Africa and the United Nations over South West Africa in late 1966. Between now and then the perennial problem of apartheid resolutions in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly may complicate relations with Afro-Asian powers. Pressures may increase in Security Council and General Assembly sessions this coming fall for more concerned UN action against apartheid in South Africa. Consideration is being given to US–UK strategy during the period still ahead before the ICJ decision. Diplomatic discussion designed to persuade South Africa that its best long-range interests would be served by complying with the ICJ decision will be resumed later this year. Informally this point is being made whenever the opportunity arises in talks with both official and non-official South Africans here and at our posts in South Africa. Consideration of additional measures such as higher level approaches will be reserved until the date of the ICJ judgment approaches. NSAM Decisions—Implications and Prospects Following numbered paragraphs correspond to the seven numbered paragraphs of NSAM 295: 1. Defer Implementation of Odendaal Report The South African Government has continued to postpone action on controversial political recommendations of the Odendaal report. However, the Government has continued to lay the groundwork for dividing South West Africa into little Bantustans largely responsible to departments of the Republic. Such actions include buying land to facilitate redistributing the population, a propaganda ploy about Ovambo chiefs petitioning for an Ovambostan, a Government-sponsored visit by South West African chiefs and headmen to the Transkei “State”, and planning by a South African Government committee for administrative reorganization of the relationships between South African and South West African units of government. The South African Government also has rushed economic and social development such as roads, airfields, schools and hospitals in an obvious attempt to influence favorably the International Court of Justice and world and South African opinion. To ensure that this outpouring of funds is fully appreciated, the South African Government has invited the Court to visit South Africa and South West Africa as well as other parts of the continent. 2. Policy Regarding Military Sales The arms ban policy continues to be carefully observed. Consistent with the posture adopted by the President in the case of the proposed sale to South Africa of Lockheed Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft, United States representatives in the appropriate NATO committee have been successful in deferring action on the sale to South Africa of a NATO consortium-sponsored aircraft, the Brequet Atlantique. So called “Gray Area” items continue to arise either in Commerce or in the Department of State, and they are treated on an ad hoc basis. These are items suitable for either military or civilian end use but not on the controlled Munitions list; or on the Munitions List, but covered by exceptional treatment accorded in the case of some follow-on spare parts. 3. Suspension of Action on Applications for United States Government Loans and Investment Guarantees In June 1965, the Department interposed no objection to an application to the Eximbank for a guarantee to cover diesel engines manufactured in the United States to be supplied to South Africa for assembling in 25 locomotives for the Mozambique Department of Port, Railroad and Transportation Service. We looked upon this transaction as mainly concerning the United States and Mozambique. Only one other rather special case has arisen in connection with this policy. A New York firm had applied to FCIA for Short Term Political Risks Insurance coverage, including $30,000 in military equipment to be exported to South Africa in the next twelve months. The Department requested the Eximbank to advise the exporter that, because of our strict arms embargo policy, the Eximbank would not be prepared to cover any proposed military shipments to South Africa. 4. Alternative Space Tracking Facilities By June 1966 NASA and DOD space stations in South Africa, if necessary or desirable, could be closed down without damage to programs other than relatively minor degradation. NASA and DOD have been planning and arranging for facilities alternate to those in South Africa. NASA’s needs can be met elsewhere by mid-1966 through: (1) the completion of alternate facilities at Ascension Island by April 1966, and in Spain and Malagasy by June 1966; (2) the continued use in South Africa by DOD on NASA’s behalf of DOD’s GLOTRAC system near Pretoria through the second quarter of 1966 to support NASA’s testing of the Centaur launch vehicle (to be used by Surveyor); and (3) the assumption by NASA on Madagascar of certain DOD tracking and telemetry tasks being performed now at the DOD station in South Africa. These latter tasks include support of NASA launches. The NASA facilities in Malagasy are being planned to handle these DOD tasks, if DOD were to withdraw from South Africa. DOD’s needs can be met on six-months notice by equipment installed, or removed, to available sites elsewhere. Thus, after the completion of the Centaur tests in the second quarter of 1966, the DOD facilities will not be critical for either DOD or NASA projects, provided NASA can assume certain tracking and telemetry tasks on Madagascar. Negotiations for additional land in Malagasy and Spain were initiated in May and June 1965, respectively. Completion of negotiations in Spain is expected by mid-October. In Malagasy, oral agreement has been obtained; however, these negotiations relate only to NASA facilities. It is now believed that the Malagasy Government’s approval should be obtained for NASA to cover certain DOD requirements. No difficulty is expected, but a delay in obtaining the necessary approval may occur. Such delays in negotiations need not slow up the contingency program, however. 5. Program to Persuade South Africa to Comply with International Court of Justice Decision and to Encourage Moderate Whites in South Africa US–UK Talks with Foreign Minister Muller. Due primarily to the number of witnesses South Africa is using, the judgment of the International Court of Justice on South Africa’s obligations as Mandatory of South West Africa is now not expected until March-April 1996. The British and American Ambassador separately commenced in April 1965 a dialogue with the South African Foreign Minister about the South West Africa issue. They sought to influence the South African Government in the direction of contingency planning for prompt compliance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice, whatever its substance might turn out to be. Ambassador Satterthwaite stressed United States support for the rule of law and for the authority of the Court, and the advisability of contingency planning by the South African Government for the possibility of an ICJ decision adverse to South Africa. The Independence and tracking station incidents in May-July 1965 delayed resumption of the United States talks; but the British Ambassador on May 24, in an interview with Foreign Minister Muller before going on long leave, brought up the subject a second time. He used a possible Security Council debate on the report of the Security Council Committee on Measures as the occasion for mentioning the desirability of avoiding a confrontation. The British Embassy in Pretoria, like our own, intends to raise the South West Africa issue with the Foreign Affairs Department as occasions arise. United States contingency planning for the prospective Security Council session on apartheid and the next General Assembly could provide such occasions for resumed talks with Muller. Other Talks and Briefing . In the Department at all levels opportunities are used to implant among South African as well as foreign diplomats of countries such as Canada, Australia, Japan, Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Belgium the importance of the International Court of Justice judgment and the serious problems, if the South African Government were to fail to comply. Non-official Americans on the way to Africa and South Africa, such as jurists and historians, and South Africans also are briefed thoroughly on this subject, particularly those likely to discuss this matter with influential South Africans. After further talks with Foreign Minister Muller, it will, at an appropriate stage, be desirable to make more systematic our conversations about the issue with governments other than the British. These could be carried on in Washington, various capitals and New York in conjunction with talks about the prospective Security Council session on apartheid and sanctions, and before and during the upcoming United Nations General Assembly session. The Department repeatedly has endeavored to encourage writers—scholars as well as journalists—to treat adequately in their publications the potential significance of the International Court of Justice case to South Africa’s future prospects, in a manner to bring maximum realization to South Africa of the possible consequences of failure to comply without delay. The Department discreetly has encouraged public ventilation of the issue in ways likely to impress South Africans. Encouragement of Moderate Whites . In diverse ways efforts have been made to help moderate whites in South Africa. On the initiative of the Department of State, an AFL–CIO officer has been working with the multiracial South African Trade Union Council for several months training labor organizers. The United Automobile Workers are arranging to send a fraternal delegation to South Africa. A special effort is being made by the Embassy and Consulates to reach South African youth. Religious and educational groups in the United States have been encouraged to support the moderate Christian Institute in South Africa and to maintain closer contact with their sister churches in South Africa. American businessmen and scientists have been urged to encourage their moderate South African contacts, the businessmen by their example as well as in discussions. Most such briefings have been with individuals, but Ambassador Satterthwaite in South Africa and Governor Williams in Washington have talked to groups of American businessmen along these lines. United States officials have carefully avoided actions which would further strengthen extremists in South Africa—actions such as public espousal of “one-man, one-vote” for South Africa or a United States Government contribution to private funds for legal and welfare aid to persons on trial in South Africa. At the same time, the United States positions during the Independence and tracking station incidents were in part encouragement to moderate whites critical of the South African Government’s racialism. 6. Program to Explain United States Objectives to Interested African Countries In addition to supplying copies of the National Policy Paper on South Africa to all our embassies in Africa, background and instructions about our objectives regarding South West Africa are provided on a continuing basis to USUN and to all United States diplomatic missions in Africa. A special effort is made to brief our Ambassadors going out to Africa, the many visitors here from Africa, including students, and Americans likely to discuss the subject with influential Africans. American leader grantees from the legal and judicial fields have been briefed on the South West Africa case and sent to the Hague during the ICJ proceedings prior to their visiting African countries (including South Africa), where they have discussed the issue with influential persons and groups. Departmental officers on African trips also have emphasized the issue in discussions with Africans as well as our own missions. Because the judgment of the Court is not expected until Spring 1966, the United States and the United Kingdom will be increasingly exposed to African pressure for action now regarding apartheid in South Africa itself. To relieve such pressure in the Security Council and General Assembly, instructions to the field have included emphasis on the comprehensiveness of the United States arms embargo and have suggested the desirability of making the embargo effective on the part of other countries. Before the United Nations is asked to consider additional pressures on South Africa, co-operative action should be instituted to close existing gaps in the arms embargo. 7. Analysis of Sanctions The respective bureau heads of the Department concerned with the comprehensive study of possible sanctions against South Africa have been asked for final clearance of the study by August 2, 1965. United States and United Kingdom United Nations delegations in the near future will conduct a series of joint discussions in tactics and strategy in the United Nations after the Court decides the current case on South West Africa. The Department is developing proposals, for discussion with the British, of possible limited measures which could, as appropriate, be used in case of non-compliance by South Africa with the Court’s decision. This is still in the preliminary stage. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. Sent under cover of a July 31 memorandum from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to McGeorge Bundy at the White House. No drafting information appears on the source text. 2 NSAM No. 295 is Document 586 . 610. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) 610. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) 1 Washington, September 2, 1965. SUBJECT US Policy Toward South Africa—Status Report on NSAM 295 The July 31, 1965 Status Report on NSAM 295 2 raises some questions which deserve a close look. 1. Would US policy objectives be furthered if we were to enlist the support of friendly countries with diplomatic representation in South Africa to join in US–UK approaches to the South African Government on apartheid and the South West Africa case? 2. Is there any political advantage to be gained for the US and its policy objectives by transferring our space tracking facilities in South Africa before events force us to do so? R. W. Komer 1 Source: Department of State, S/S–NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 295. Secret. 2 Document 609 . 611. Memorandum of Conversation 611. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 7, 1965. SUBJECT South African Foreign Minister’s Reply to Secretary’s Note on Four Officer Situation PARTICIPANTS The Secretary His Excellency Harold L. T. Taswell, Ambassador of South Africa Pierson M. Hall, AFE Ambassador Taswell said he had a verbal message from Foreign Minister Muller to deliver. The Foreign Minister wished to express his thanks for the Secretary’s Note regarding the four officers 2 and said it remained his earnest desire that there be no cause for further trouble. The Foreign Minister would like to leave it there. He had approached the problem in a friendly manner and certainly desired no publicity. He was sorry the USG had not been more responsive. South Africa wanted friendly relations with the U.S. but, if there was any further trouble, more drastic steps would have to be taken. The Secretary asked if the Foreign Minister would be going to New York for the General Assembly. The Ambassador said he would attend part of the session and is expected to reach New York about September 23. The Secretary said he might take up the matter with Foreign Minister at that time. He was not sure he understood the full implications of the Foreign Minister’s message as conveyed by the Ambassador. Ambassador Taswell replied, the intent of the message was as follows: if there was any more difficulty with the officers in question, his government would have to declare them persona non grata with, he supposed, attendant and unfortunate publicity. The Secretary said if it should come to that, he would prefer formal to informal action. The Secretary then thanked the Ambassador for the Foreign Minister’s message and ended the interview. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 S AFR–US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hall on September 8 and approved in S on September 21. 2 See Document 608 . Telegram 206 to Pretoria, August 9, transmitted a message to Foreign Minister Muller from Secretary Rusk stating that he had found no evidence of improper conduct on the part of the four U.S. Foreign Service officers concerned and was satisfied that they had performed their official duties in accordance with normal and accepted practice for conduct of diplomatic representatives. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 S AFR) 612. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 612. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, September 13, 1965. SUBJECT 20th General Assembly—Strategy Session On Saturday, there was rather a large meeting in State to discuss strategy for the 20th General Assembly which is scheduled to start on September 21. Rusk chaired the meeting which included Ball, Goldberg (accompanied by assorted aides), Tommy Thompson, Mann, Butch Fisher, Rostow, a number of regional and functional Assistant Secretaries, and a health contingent from IO. Here are the major items of discussion. [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.] 9. South Africa and Apartheid —Goldberg said that we must do something about our posture on this issue and went on to propose that the U.S. Government announce publicly a voluntary program to curb U.S. investment in South Africa. The proposal brought forth a number of reservations. Rusk said that moving into the human rights field with sanctions poses some tough problems and wondered what we are prepared to do about, for instance, Eastern Europe, Liberia, and countries with one-party regimes. Ball said that we could not expect the British to join us in this effort, and that the South Africans would surely retaliate in one way or another; as a matter of fact, there might be actions South Africa could take in the economic field that would really hurt. Ball went on to say that a voluntary program wouldn’t work anyway. Others noted the ambiguity of the Africans themselves, some of whom still trade with South Africa. Goldberg rebutted. It is true that we can’t solve all the human rights problems of the world, but apartheid is something special; its enormity makes it so. We simply must square our position on this issue with our efforts in this area in our own country. And remember, we are not talking about sanctions but about a voluntary program. Soapy Williams supported Goldberg, noting that such a program would make us a lot more credible with the Africans. He went on to rebut the argument that such a voluntary program wouldn’t work. Among other things, he said that banks are frequently asked by potential investors about prospects in South Africa and that the banks, at present, cannot discourage these people because “the Government has not taken a stance.” Williams went on to say that his talks with one big investor—Engelhart (phonetic)—indicate that he probably would not have gone in to South Africa had he clearly known our views. [Here follows discussion of another subject.] GC 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, 11/64–9/66. Secret. Copies were sent to Bator, Cooper, Johnson, Keeny, and Komer of the NSC Staff. 613. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 613. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. COMMENTS ON STATUS REPORT ON NSAM NO. 295 OF APRIL 24, 1964—SOUTH AFRICA 1. Support of Friendly Countries for US–UK Approaches to the South African Government on Apartheid and the South West Africa Case Among the sixteen other nations with diplomatic representation in Pretoria, those most likely to lend useful support to US–UK approaches to the South African Government on South West Africa and related aspects of apartheid are Canada, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Australia, Sweden, Israel, Brazil and possibly Belgium. As indicated in the status report of July 31, 1965, the Department plans to approach such governments in Washington and in their respective capitals in a systematic series of briefings and efforts to enlist support following the next round of US–UK talks with the South African Foreign Minister. It is anticipated that this should take place soon after the Foreign Minister’s return from the United Nations in October. Ultimately we would probably canvas all sixteen other nations with diplomatic representation in Pretoria except for Rhodesia and Portugal. U.S. policy objectives would indeed be furthered if support could be enlisted for US–UK approaches from a number of these friendly countries. Some may wish to defer their separate representations to the South African Government until after the ICJ decision on South West Africa. However, it would be our aim to seek maximum action as the date for the decision approaches, while welcoming additional overtures soon after the Court decision is announced. 2. Political advantage in transferring space-tracking facilities from South Africa, before events force us to do so Important continuing U.S. military and scientific space requirements make it disadvantageous to withdraw U.S. space-tracking facilities from South Africa prior to July 1, 1996, when alternative facilities will be available and could be used with relatively minor impact on planned programs. The completion of these alternative facilities will substantially lessen military and scientific considerations from our planning. (We may, however, still have to take into account the six months’ termination notice provided for in the DOD agreement; there is no such grace period in the NASA agreement.) Once the alternative facilities are ready, therefore, the decision as to their immediate use or their reservation for use only if we were forced to evacuate can be taken on largely political grounds. United States-South Africa relations have become considerably strained as a result of the Independence incident, South African criticism of United States diplomatic receptions, South African efforts to remove certain U.S. diplomatic personnel, and public efforts by Verwoerd to apply racial restrictions to our space-tracking stations. The possibility therefore exists that the South African Government will unilaterally decide to terminate its space-tracking agreements with the United States. At present, South African action of this kind appears slight in view of Prime Minister Verwoerd’s failure to follow up with any official request or action after his speech of June 25, 1965, in which he publicly aired the view that American personnel in such facilities are subject to racial restrictions, or after the United States publicly denied and rejected this view. The Prime Minister’s more recent public statements have indicated a desire on the part of the South African Government to back away from the issue. For the moment, therefore, the initiative on vacating present facilities in South Africa remains ours. To take that initiative could be politically advantageous in that such an act of dissociation would be approved by the Afro-Asian states. To take it with respect to the military tracking station alone would be fully consistent with our posture of caution in military relations with the South African Government. In addition to their concentrated efforts to persuade the United States and others to institute economic and military sanctions against South Africa, the Afro-Asians have sought the termination of all agreements with South Africa, specifically citing our space facilities, which might in some way encourage South Africa’s pursuit of its present racial policies. The transfer of American facilities out of South Africa would not diminish pressures for military and economic sanctions. However, since any overt dissociation with South Africa would be welcomed by the Afro-Asians and others, would remove one element of criticism of our South Africa policy, and would strengthen our hand in counseling moderation pending an ICJ decision, there would be some political advantage in moving the stations as soon as alternative facilities are available. It would seem of greater political advantage, however, to reserve such a step for use as one small way to bring psychological leverage on South Africa in connection with the ICJ proceedings on South West Africa. The expected time of the decision (April-June 1966) is sufficiently close to the completion of alternative facilities to enable us to keep open the option of withdrawal from the tracking stations at our initiative in connection with the South West Africa issue. Such withdrawal would have more effectiveness if it were directly linked vis-a-vis both South Africa and the Afro-Asian states to the clearly delineated objective of producing South African compliance with the ICJ decision or were taken to show disapproval of a negative South African reaction to it. In the event of such a negative South African reaction, the tracking stations would probably become an unnecessary liability which could be jettisoned. In the absence of new factors, we believe we should reserve decision on the question of withdrawal until July 1, 1966. In the meantime, the preparation of alternative facilities should proceed as rapidly as possible so that the option belongs to the United States. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An October 15 covering memorandum from Read to Bundy reads: “In response to Mr. Komer’s memorandum of September 2, 1965, we have prepared the attached supplementary comment concerning the Department’s status report of July 31, 1965, on National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964.” See Document 610 for Komer’s questions concerning the report. 614. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 614. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, December 7, 1965, 7:28 p.m. 1431. SPC-Apartheid. USUN’s 2486 2 and 2531. 3 Dept concurs your recommendation abstention on general apartheid resolution as whole provided separate negative votes can be registered on operative paragraphs 1 and 7 and with strong statement explaining our position situation in South Africa not now threat to peace within meaning Chapter VII and therefore sanctions inapplicable. We also agree your recommendations on paragraph votes. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14 S AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of U.N. Political Affairs Patricia M. Byrne of IO/UNP; cleared by Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Williams, EUR Regional Planning and United Nations Adviser Edward T. Lampson, and Legal Adviser Leonard C. Meeker; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs David H. Popper. Repeated to London and Pretoria.1 2 Telegram 2486 from USUN, December 3, transmitted the text of the draft resolution on apartheid supported by 45 Afro-Asian nations. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 2531 from USUN, December 6, reported that the U.S. Delegation recommended that the United States abstain on the resolution as a whole, provided that it had the opportunity to vote “no” on operative paragraphs 1 and 7, which called for economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa. (Ibid.) 4 On December 15, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 2054 A (XX) by a vote of 80 to 2 with 16 abstentions (including the United States). For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 665–666. 615. Memorandum From the Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Frutkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 615. Memorandum From the Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Frutkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 1 Washington, December 14, 1965. SUBJECT US Action toward South Africa Since the conference you called in your office on impending South African questions, I have discussed this matter with Mr. Webb and wish to confirm the position I took for this agency in that discussion. NASA fully appreciates the importance attached to a political crisis in relations with South Africa and has moved with the utmost dispatch to establish the agreed substitute facilities in three other locations. Delays in the Spanish area, over which we have had no control, make it possible that the South African situation might become critical before we are prepared to shift ground support coverage for the critical Apollo and Surveyor programs from South Africa to Spain. The US would then have to decide whether (1) to press a confrontation with South Africa and risk a delay in the manned lunar program, or (2) to delay the political confrontation in order to assure continuity in the lunar landing program. Obviously two considerations of great national importance are involved, both involving major national commitments before the world. The decision as to which should be given precedence, in the circumstances which exist at the time, must, we believe, be made with the full knowledge of the President. 2 Arnold W. Frutkin 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, to the Department of State’s Acting Director of International Scientific and Technological Affairs Herman Pollack, and to NASA Administrator James E. Webb 2 On December 16, Komer sent Frutkin a memorandum asking for the earliest date on which the alternative tracking facilities in Spain could be completed. He also asked for information on how NASA had prepared to assure continuity in the lunar landing program in the event of a confrontation between the United States and South Africa precipitated either by the Rhodesian crisis or by reactions to the coming ICJ decision in the South West Africa case. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 616. Memorandum From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to Secretary of State Rusk 616. Memorandum From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 15, 1966. Dear Dean: I share your concern over the grave questions of U.S. policy in South Africa, and regret that the importance of our tracking and data acquisition facilities there imposes certain restraints. Specifically, if the South African facilities are denied to us before the alternative contingency facilities in Spain are available, we will, at the time this is definitely known, have to establish methods by which we can reschedule and thereby delay some of the planned Surveyor soft lander missions and/or some of the Orbiter mapping missions. This would be unavoidable because the single existing Madrid facility can support only one mission at a time. Our schedule during the last nine months of 1966 calls for simultaneous flights of Surveyor and Orbiter missions, but it is not possible to assure, for any substantial period in advance, which flight will be ready or which should have priority. Our problem will become one of pressing forward with each project and deciding at the latest date possible the one to launch. The information about the moon that these unmanned missions will provide is urgently needed to provide an adequate basis for making some of the most critical decisions relating to the execution of the Apollo manned lunar effort; delay in its acquisition will erode the already thin margins we have been able to retain for the program to land upon the moon within the decade. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has already launched four spacecraft in a vigorous effort to achieve a successful unmanned lunar soft landing. Further delays in the Surveyor schedules would strongly reinforce their chances of being the first to accomplish this important mission, which would attract a great deal of attention. Thus the delay would affect two important objectives. The loss of the South African facilities would place us in the position of complete dependence upon the long-term availability of facilities in Spain to support our future missions for manned exploration of the moon. We have already taken strong action to accelerate the timetable for the additional Madrid facility. We do not yet have access to the land but have assurances this can be obtained by the end of this month. If this materializes, the second Madrid station could possibly be operational as early as February 1967. We can identify no steps that would significantly shorten the construction and checkout schedule. This situation argues for every effort to retain the South African facilities, at least through early 1967. If overriding policy considerations require actions that lead to the loss of these facilities, the risks involved in meeting the Apollo objective of a landing in this decade substantially increase and throw us one step nearer the possibility we may have to attempt a landing with men before we can get surface data from an unmanned vehicle. Further, we may well have to absorb the negative impact of a Soviet first in the unmanned soft landing area. With high regards, I remain Sincerely yours, James E. Webb 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, South Africa. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Webb signed the original. 617. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) 617. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) 1 Washington, February 21, 1966. Tom, I gather that we are about to decide whether to approve an export license for the sale of eight civilian Cessna aircraft to the South African Air Force. This issue is a tough one. On the one hand, NSAM 295 on US Policy Toward South Africa calls for our arms embargo to remain in effect unless “further developments” warrant a change. On the other hand, does sale of civilian aircraft, even to the South African military amount to violation of that arms embargo? To me the public relations disadvantages tend to outweigh the arguments that the sale is justified because it will help our balance of payments or that “if the US won’t sell, someone else will.” The amount involved is minor, and the legal justifications won’t suffice to offset a likely burst of criticism at the very time when there is (a) significant South African support of the Rhodesian rebellion, (b) a Congressional hearing next month on apartheid, (c) increased racial and political repression in South Africa, (d) a decision of the ICJ adverse to South Africa anticipated in the South West Africa case, and (e) members of the OAU and UN are focussing attention on the remaining problems of racism and colonialism in Southern Africa. The trouble caused by the reopening of the Rhodesian Information Office here in Washington shows the kind of furor which can be raised over such minor issues. I suspect the same would be the case in a Cessna sale. Wouldn’t the small advantage to our balance of payments be more than offset by widespread domestic and international criticism of the USG? Bob Komer 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Secret. 618. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 618. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) 1 Washington, February 24, 1966. SUBJECT Cessna Aircraft for South Africa The question is whether an export license should be granted for the export to South Africa of eight twin engine Cessna aircraft (Model 411) for 1.5 million dollars. An additional sale of $250,000 in spare parts may be requested later. Senator Carlson and Senator Pearson point out that similar aircraft can readily be procured elsewhere by South Africa; that export licenses for the sale of 50 Cessna planes to South Africa have already been approved this year; that denial of the licenses may mean the loss by the manufacturer of future sales in South Africa ($39 million was the value of US aircraft exported to South Africa last year); and that refusal “will uselessly endanger” our gold position and “needlessly restrict an American manufacturer engaged in international commerce.” Ambassador Goldberg and the UN and African bureaus strongly urge that the license be denied. Ambassador Goldberg believes that statements of our officials made in the United Nations after clearance with the Department have already committed us to deny the license. I have three recommendations: First, the application for these particular eight aircraft be denied because: a) These particular aircraft are intended to be registered in the South African Air Force and flown by Air Force pilots. b) They are, I am informed, each to be equipped with a special type of radar and used by the South African Air Force for surveillance to locate smugglers. In case of hostilities they could, and probably would, be used for air reconnaissance and possibly for other military purposes. The sale could therefore be said to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963 which “3. Solemnly calls upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa.” Second, for the time being, that sales of this type of Cessna aircraft to South Africa be continued when it is determined that the end used is civilian rather than the military and when it is not equipped with special radar facilities. Radar facilities of the type normally used by aircraft for safety purposes could be provided. Third, that no public statements or commitments be made, for the time being, that could result in the discontinuance of our engagement in trade in peaceful goods in South Africa. We have said in the United Nations that, in practice, “the embargo of the United States on all arms and military equipment to South Africa has extended to materials which are likely to be used for or are easily adaptable to military purposes.” If this statement were strictly interpreted, virtually all US trade with South Africa would be prohibited, since it is hard to imagine what exports would not be consumed or used in the event of war by the South African government or population. Clearly this would not be in our interest. On February 25, Komer sent Mann a memorandum that reads: “Tom, I fully agree with the three recommendations in your memorandum of February 24, 1966, on the sale of Cessna aircraft to South Africa. As set out in your memo, your interpretation of our arms embargo accurately reflects the intent of NSAM 295 from which our policy guidelines on this subject are derived.” (Ibid.) 2 Thomas C. Mann 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, South Africa. Confidential. 2 Would you let me know if these three recommendations are acceptable as policy guidelines. Our export policy towards South Africa needs defining. 619. Special National Intelligence Estimate 619. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, June 2, 1966. SNIE 70–66 PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA ISSUE Conclusions A. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) will soon render its decision on the case brought against South Africa concerning its mandate over South-West Africa (SWA). Irrespective of the terms of the decision, we expect the black Africans and their sympathizers to take the occasion to press the UN to end apartheid in SWA and eventually in South Africa itself. They will put particular pressure on the US and UK who, they believe, could bring South Africa to terms if they really tried. (Paras. 1, 8–9, 20) B. South Africa, in order to improve its legal and political position, might comply with provisions of the judgment which did not dilute its control over SWA. South Africa is highly unlikely to give in to pressure for further steps and its opponents will probably seek strong UN action. Although the UK could ill afford to join full economic sanctions, it may not veto Security Council action and no other permanent member may do so. If, as is likely, economic sanctions were ineffective, the matter of military sanctions would arise, though sufficient support in the UN for such sanctions is highly unlikely. We do not believe that the South Africans would capitulate in the face of economic sanctions or the threat of military sanctions. 2 (Paras. 15–19) C. The African states will portray firm US action against South Africa as the touchstone of US relations and influence in Africa. If the UN does not force South Africa to retreat, the Africans and their sympathizers will keep the issue alive, in the UN and out, and it will trouble Africa’s relations with the West. (Paras. 20–22) [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on June 2. 2 Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, dissents from the estimates in the last two sentences of this paragraph, because he believes that they depend significantly on future US policy decisions. Cf. his footnotes to paragraphs 18 and 19. [Footnote in the source text.] 620. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 620. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 22, 1966. Mr. President: The attached memorandum from George Ball 2 presents to you a choice between: a) permitting the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt to fuel and provide shore leave to its crew at Capetown, or b) fueling it from an oiler at sea in the same general area. As you will note, there are two political problems: the possibility that the International Court of Justice decision on Southwest Africa may come out at about the time in July when the ship goes through; and the interpretation that might be put on the trip inside South Africa and elsewhere, in the light of Senator Robert Kennedy’s recent visit. To explore whether this choice could be avoided, I asked Paul Nitze to give me a personal assessment of the options open to the Navy. He reports as follows: a) The attack carrier could refuel and have most satisfactory shore leave at Rio de Janeiro; but it means keeping the carrier on fighting station off Viet Nam an extra four days. b) It could refuel from a tanker at Diego Suarez (Malagasy). The cost of sending out the tanker is between $100,000 and $200,000. Diego Suarez is a town of 4500 people, all colored. At this moment the Navy says that it would prefer to go straight through rather than have shore leave there. Secretary Nitze concludes that you do have some flexibility here. The Navy would vastly prefer Capetown. But the ship going out contains fresh men, and shore leave is less important than it would be if they had been on battle station for some time. He says that the Navy’s willingness to forego shore leave at Diego Suarez indicates to him that the men’s situation is not desperate. I assess the risk of an unpleasant political reaction as about 4 out of 10. The unpleasantness would be moderate, if we hit the 4. The question is whether, to avoid that risk, you wish either to: —spend an extra $100,000 or so; —or hold the present attack carrier on station an extra four days. Walt Go via Capetown Go via Rio 3 Refuel at sea Refuel at Diego Suarez 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 7, 5/26–6/29/66. Confidential. 2 Not printed. 3 This option is checked. 621. Summary Notes of the 561st Meeting of the National Security Council 621. Summary Notes of the 561st Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, July 14, 1966, 12:10 p.m. Southwest Africa The President: Groups of U.S. officials should be organized to point up pressing problems in each geographic area. These groups should include the National Security Council area man, the Assistant Secretary of State, an AID official, and a USIA official. They should draw up lists of best quality personnel for their area, organize a reserve of persons to move in when a crisis develops, organize a working relationship with the appropriate Congressional subcommittees, and make a major effort to stay on top of emerging problems. Under Secretary of State Ball: Presented the background of the Southwest Africa problem speculating that the International Court would rule against South Africa on July 18 on all counts. After stalling, South Africa will reject the Court ruling and any UN actions to enforce the ruling. The decision will be a blow to sterling, thus creating a major problem for the British. We should avoid supporting economic sanctions against South Africa. We must expect that black Africans will try in the UN to get military and economic sanctions against South Africa. We are trying to get South Africa to accept the Court’s decision when it is handed down. It is doubtful whether we have authority to join other nations in imposing sanctions against South Africa. If the question of sanctions comes up in the UN, the British will be obliged to veto. No UN action will solve the Southwest African problem, but we cannot give the black Africans the idea we are lying down, nor can we permit a breakdown of the International Court and the international legal system. Secretary McNamara: No recommendation need be made until we know how the Court rules. We should limit ourselves to working out a preliminary statement to be made immediately after the Court ruling if it goes against South Africa. USIA Director Marks: We are working on a statement to be made as soon as possible after the Court rules. Secretary Fowler: We should look close at the economic factors involved, especially U.S. trade and U.S. investments in South Africa. In addition, the gold problem becomes important because of the large amounts produced in South Africa. The London gold market is losing gold and its future is precarious. In deciding U.S. policy, a major factor should be the impact on the gold problem. CIA Director Helms: South Africa is one of the least vulnerable countries in the world to economic sanctions. The President: We should get together all those officials in the U.S. Government who are involved in African problems and work out a statement which could be made from the White House. Arthur Goldberg should be included in this group. We should draft an immediate response to be made as soon as the Court acts and arrange a holding action until we know what our next move is to be. We should stay in close touch with everyone in Congress who is interested in Africa. Possibly, we can relieve some of the pressure which will arise. We should try everything. Even a blind hog may find an acorn. Secretary Fowler: We should be in touch with officials of private enterprises which have investments in South Africa. OEP Director Bryant: We should dampen down now African expectations as to what is going to happen when the Court rules. The President: Reaffirmed the need to organize groups or task forces of U.S. officials. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 43, Southwest Africa, 7/14/66. Top Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. 622. Memorandum Prepared by the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 622. Memorandum Prepared by the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, July 14, 1966. Following the National Security Council meeting today, the President asked the Secretary of State to set up a task force on the South West Africa problem composed of those officers in State, Defense, AID, USIA, CIA, and the NSC Staff, who are primarily responsible for African Affairs. The task force is to prepare: (1) a suggested U.S. statement for use immediately following the court decision; (2) a short term “holding” position to permit us time to assess the decision and reactions to it at home, in Africa and among our allies; (3) a longer-range plan for dealing with this issue in Africa, in the Western alliance, in the East-West arena and in the UN. The task force is to work closely with Ambassador Goldberg and his staff. The task force should establish and maintain close relations with those members of Congress and their staff who are interested in African problems. W.W. Rostow 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, July 14, 1966. Confidential. Filed with a covering memorandum to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, the AID Administrator, USIA Director, and Director of Central Intelligence. 623. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 623. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 23, 1966. SUBJECT South West Africa You will recall that at the National Security Council meeting on July 14, we had a full discussion regarding the ICJ decision on South West Africa, and based on the assumption that the Court would rule against South Africa, it was agreed that a special Task Force should do a priority study and make recommendations regarding the U.S. position. Circumstances, of course, have changed by the unexpected nature of the Court’s judgment. 2 Therefore, the priorities that we had in mind at the July 14 meeting have been somewhat altered. In the first instance, we will have to develop quickly our overall strategy and tactics for handling this matter either at the annual General Assembly in September, or at a special session of the Assembly or in the Security Council meeting which may be called sometime before then. This we will do through normal channels in concert with Ambassador Goldberg. The Court’s decision, of course, does not alter the need for a fundamental review of our contingency planning since a number of the questions confronting us are much the same regardless of the fact that the Court refused to rule on the merits of the case. Our Interdepartmental Regional Group on Africa offers an appropriate forum and its members have already been asked to undertake such a review. Assistant Secretaries Palmer and Sisco will concert in the handling of follow-up to the Court’s judgment both inside and outside the UN. George W. Ball 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/64–9/66. Secret. 2 On July 18, the International Court of Justice rejected the Ethiopian/Liberian complaint against South Africa on the technical ground that Ethiopia and Liberia had not established “any legal right or interest in the subject matter of their claims.” On July 27, the Department of State issued a press release stating that the United States considered that the July 18 judgment in no way diminished the legal authority of earlier ICJ advisory opinions on South West Africa. For text, see Department of State Bulletin , August 15, 1966, p. 231. 624. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 624. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, August 17, 1966, 8:14 p.m. 30257. Subj: South Africa Aide-Memoire on SWA. FYI: Noforn—Following Based on Uncleared Memcon. 1. SA Ambassador Taswell delivered Aide-Memoire August 17 to Acting Secretary on ICJ judgment re SWA. Text transmitted separately. 2 In essence, Aide-Memoire: (a) takes exception to Dept. press release July 27 which indicated we considered earlier ICJ advisory opinions still valid; (b) argues present ICJ decision suggests Court itself regards correctness of 1950 opinion as open question and strongly suggests there is no longer any obligation on part SA to report on SWA to anybody; (c) stresses importance of abandonment by Ethiopia and Liberia of allegations of oppression in SWA which implied basis of repeated UN condemnation of SA administration of SWA was false; (d) expresses hope Western countries will in future adopt more objective attitude on SWA, and those who would have pressed for observance of ICJ judgment adverse to SA will now oppose attempts to persecute SA in or outside UN. 2. Acting Secy made following comments: a. US considered ICJ judgment purely procedural, and not a decision on substance of SWA case. b. Legal situation remains same as before ICJ judgment. Dept’s July 27 press release reflected this view, including our conclusion that previous ICJ advisory opinions remain applicable, although we recognize they do not have the same force as would a binding decision in a contentious case. c. As far as policy of apartheid concerned, our attitude well known and not changed by ICJ decision. d. We had erroneously anticipated ICJ would make substantive judgment against SA, and our Aide-Memoire to SAG 3 intended merely to express hope SAG would cooperate and minimize problems expected to flow from Court decision. e. While we do not have substantive finding by Court, we expect African UN members to seek political action in UNGA. We must reserve our position until we see what form requests for such action take and how they fit into our general policy. f. We do believe UNGA succeeded to supervisory responsibilities of League of Nations; we will take note of SA Aide-Memoire but believe SAG is mistaken in concluding any substantive question settled by ICJ decision. 3. Taswell made rather disjointed and mildly impassioned plea in support SAG position that latest ICJ verdict indicated Court threw out case because it was ill-founded. However, he recalled, Courts traditionally rule on minimal number of questions. 4. Acting Secy responded ICJ had indeed acted on minimal number of questions, to wit, merely that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked standing. 5. Legal Advisor Meeker re-enforced these points by stressing Court merely said ICJ found that Article 7 did not permit applicants to obtain a judgment on issue of whether SA properly carrying out its mandate since this kind of issue had been entrusted by mandate to League of Nations; ICJ never got to the merits of the case. 6. Taswell recalled our emphasis on need to support rule of law, said sauce for goose is sauce for gander, and expressed hope we would assure that at GA UN majority will support rule of law. 7. Acting Secy said we fully agree rule of law should be supported but again disagreed with SAG conclusion that any substantive point of law decided by recent ICJ decision. 8. Taswell asked for copies of “notes passed to Liberia and Ethiopia” at time our Aide-Memoire delivered them. Asst Secy Palmer said he thought no useful purpose served thereby and that it unclear as to whether our views this matter delivered in writing at these posts. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buffum, cleared by Palmer and Meeker, and approved by Buffum. Sent to Cape Town, also sent to Pretoria and USUN, and repeated to London and by pouch to Monrovia and Addis Ababa. 2 Telegram 30116 to Cape Town, August 17, transmitted the text of the South African aide-memoire delivered August 17. (Ibid.) 3 The text of the U.S. aide-memoire delivered July 15 was transmitted in telegram 7135 to Pretoria, July 13. (Ibid.) 625. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 625. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, September 6, 1966. SUBJECT U.S. Connection of Verwoerd’s Assassin Verwoerd was killed by Demetrios Tsafendakis, a Portuguese national who was deported from the United States to Greece in 1947. We know nothing yet about his time here except that he was a foreign seaman employed by the Merchant Marine in World War II. His whereabouts between 1947 and 1965 are also vague. He appeared at our consulate in Capetown last November to file a claim for $100,000 in damages resulting from his being deported to Greece, rather than to South Africa (which, he maintained, was his home country). He said that he had made earlier attempts to file his claim at American consulates in France, Switzerland, and Portugal. Our consul in Capetown informed Tsafendakis that such claims could be filed only through his country’s embassy in Washington or in U.S. Federal Court. He seemed to accept this quietly. He reappeared at the consulate in May, however, and asked that his affidavit be given to Senator Robert Kennedy when the latter arrived in early June. The consulate immediately returned the affidavit with a letter pointing out that Kennedy’s visit was to be very short and busy, and suggesting that Tsafendakis write to him in Washington. (A five-hour search of the Kennedy files this afternoon has yielded no such letter.) This was the last known U.S. contact with the assassin. We must now decide whether and when to tell the South Africans what little we know about Tsafendakis. Rountree wants to tell them and has asked for instructions. State plans to tell him to go ahead, but will do nothing without White House clearance. I think we should clear the instruction. In doing so, we run a risk of nasty insinuations by the SAG; but the risks involved in not disclosing information which is certain to be discovered soon seem to me much greater. EH Clear message 2 Instruct Rountree not to inform SAG 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/64–9/66. No classification marking. Attached is a note from Rostow to the President that reads: “Mr. President: The attached memorandum is self-explanatory. I believe the risks of our silence are greater than the risks of our candor; but I did not wish to clear this without your guidance.” Prime Minister Verwoerd was stabbed to death in the South African Parliament on September 6. 2 This option is checked and a notation in an unknown handwriting reads: “What does Palmer say?” 626. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 626. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, September 21, 1966, 8:29 p.m. 51780. Ref: a) State 30251; 2 b) State 45251. 3 1. Aide memoire ref a) delivered by Asst. Sec. Palmer to SA Ambassador Taswell Sept 21. 4 Following based on uncleared memcon: 2. Palmer emphasized a) U.S. view our aide-memoire July 15 did not represent “interference by bringing unwarranted pressure bear” on SA; b) our view July 18 judgment in no way diminishes authority ICJ advisory opinions; and c) US will continue be guided by concern for well-being of SWA inhabitants and rule of law. Taswell persisted that a) US July 15 aide-memoire constituted interference; b) USG clearly had anticipated and made elaborate plans only for judgment adverse to SA as demonstrated inter alia by time taken to give US reaction to judgment and our failure provide SAG copies of parallel US pre-judgment demarches to Liberia and Ethiopia; c) applicants had withdrawn charges of oppression SWA clearly absolving SA of charges; d) USG hopefully equally concerned over welfare inhabitants Ethiopia and Liberia in order that their standards might be brought up to those of inhabitants SWA and e) Gross and Ambassador Goldberg at UN struggling cover up fact Liberia and Ethiopia had withdrawn charges of SA oppression SWA. 4. Palmer a) maintained view USG demarche appropriate and not interference; b) emphasized US demarches to SAG, Ethiopia and Liberia strictly matter US diplomatic relations with individual countries; SAG publicly referred to our approach to it; other two have not done so; US could not have reacted complex judgment on merits any faster than to judgment rendered; c) emphasized narrowness of issue (jurisdiction, not merits) decided by ICJ on July 18 and d) said he could not accept Taswell’s inappropriate remark re Ambassador Goldberg suggesting if SAG had any question it would be one to be taken up by SA UN Del with Ambassador Goldberg. 5. Palmer said SAG would do service to all by carrying out continuing obligations regarding SWA and he hoped SAG would take careful account of present UNGA which could prove unusually difficult one for SAG. 6. Interesting Taswell put more emphasis on shift in applicants’ contention before ICJ than on any implications from obiter dicta in judgment in seeking paint judgment as vindication of SAG. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Ralph W. Stephan of AF/AFS and Runyon, cleared by Campbell and Popper, and approved by Palmer. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria, London, and USUN. 2 Dated August 17. (Ibid.) 3 Dated September 12. (Ibid., POL 15–1 S AFR) 4 For text of the aide-memoire of September 21, see Department of State Bulletin , October 10, 1966, pp. 567–568. 627. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 627. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, November 1, 1966. CIA/RR ER 66–25 FEASIBILITY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 2 Summary Black African countries are now demanding in the General Assembly that the UN act to end the Republic of South Africa’s mandate over Southwest Africa, an action which could lead to political and economic sanctions. Enforcement of sanctions would be difficult and costly, particularly for the United States and the United Kingdom, but even with a naval blockade, sanctions would not seriously damage South Africa’s economy. The vulnerability of the South African economy to sanctions is not great. The country has a strong agricultural sector and rich natural resources, and recent South African governments have encouraged the development of an industrial sector that is oriented to the use of domestic raw materials (see Figure 1). Moreover, sanctions aimed at the Republic could have disastrous effects on other southern African nations such as the new countries of Botswana and Lesotho. The problem of enforcing sanctions would be considerably complicated should the UN confrontation with South Africa involve the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola. In this case, the adverse effects of sanctions could spread to Malawi, Zambia, Rhodesia, and the Province of Katanga in Congo (Kinshasa)—all of which depend in large measure on transport routes through the Portuguese territories. [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 S AFR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Sent under cover of a November l memorandum from the CIA’s Director for Research and Reports William N. Morell, Jr. to Assistant Secretary Palmer. 2 This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Research and Reports and coordinated by the Office of National Estimates and the Office of Current Intelligence; the estimates and conclusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 24 October 1966. [Footnote in the source text.] 628. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 628. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 14, 1966. WWR: SUBJECT Meeting with South African Ambassador and Minister-Counsellor Botha This is one of a series of soundings which the South Africans are taking around town. Their concern is our position on South West Africa. Their line is that there is no real difference between U.S. and South African interests, values, and aspirations in southern Africa, but that the United States is making a serious error in encouraging black Africans to “disrupt” the “peace and harmony” of the “only stable part” of the continent. Current Situation As you know, the General Assembly—with our outspoken support—revoked South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa and directed the Secretary General to form a 14-nation commission to develop practical ways to implement the revocation. 2 Negotiations are now underway on the membership of the Commission. There is still some doubt, but it looks as though we will agree to join. The Commission must report in April, probably to a special session of the GA. Predictably, the South Africans refuse to recognize the U.N. action. (You will recall that their legal position is that the U.N. is not the successor of the League of Nations and has no jurisdiction over the mandate.) They have said that they will continue to administer South West Africa and meet with force any attempt to forcibly divest them of the territory. They have not, however, quite—or even threatened to quit—the U.N., which had been widely predicted. They seem to be making a real effort to play the situation as coolly as their domestic politics will allow. They will probably say: —South Africa is also committed to self-determination for African peoples. Apartheid is built on the concept of gradual Bantu independence in their “tribal homelands.” (This is a farce—there is no real Bantustan territory left in South Africa, and “gradual” in their lexicon means several decades at least.) —South Africa has done and is doing a great deal for the black majorities in its own territory and in South West Africa—roads, schools, etc. (There is truth to this, but most of this spending benefits the whites at least as much.) —The danger is that the northern black Africans will stir up trouble among the docile and contented southern blacks and force South Africa into more restrictive policies, thereby retarding the progress of the blacks. —Thus, it would be helpful all around if the U.S. were to use its influence in the 14-nation commission to steer it away from economic or other sanctions against South Africa which would require South Africa to respond in kind. (The U.K. has about $3 billion invested in South Africa; we have about $600 million.) You might say: —There can be no doubt where we stand on the general question of racial equality. The President made this clear last May before the OAU ambassadors. Goldberg has repeatedly reemphasized it in New York. —We cannot and will not accept the notion that white subjugation of black majorities in southern Africa must continue into the indefinite future. —We agree that South Africa has done much for the economic condition of the blacks under her jurisdiction, but we cannot agree that it is an adequate substitute for freedom and equality. —We do not control the views and actions of the great majority of U.N. nations which supported the SWA resolution, nor will we control the 14-nation commission—if it develops that we are members. We will use whatever influence we have to promote peaceful and reasonable approaches to these problems, but we are as convinced of the necessity to make progress as are the black Africans. —We strongly believe that the interests of South Africa would be best served by cooperation with the U.N. Commission. There is room in the SWA resolution for reinstatement of South Africa as administrator if she shows signs (which, in the present situation, means any signs) of accepting the thrust of world opinion and reversing the trend toward full apartheid in South West Africa. (Indeed, if the South Africans would take one minor step in this direction, the pressure on the Europeans—particularly the British—to relax would probably be intolerable.) If Pretoria is—as it appears—testing to see how committed we are, this line should get across to them that we cannot and will not save their bacon in a crunch. Goldberg, the Secretary, and others to whom the South Africans have talked have used the same tack. (As you know, there is a large element of bluff—or, at least, of intangible costs and benefits—involved in this pitch. Our economic leverage on South Africa is very small and very dangerous. If she folds, it will be because of an uncharacteristically clear-eyed view of the quality of life as an international pariah.) Rhodesia The South Africans may raise the problem of Rhodesia. If so, my suggestions are as follows: Facts: You will recall that the British committed themselves at the Commonwealth Conference, if a last effort with Smith were unsuccessful, to withdraw all previous offers, adopt a position of no-independence before majority rule, and propose limited mandatory economic sanctions in the Security Council. Wilson then wrote the President asking for support. The President assured him that we would back these moves and agreed—without much hope—to have Rountree approach Vorster to try to convince him that it is in South Africa’s interest to cooperate with whatever measures the Security Council imposes. (The President also pointed out that we don’t think it will be possible to keep sanctions from being applied to South Africa.) South Africa has not played ball with the voluntary sanction program against Rhodesia now in effect (although the South Africans claim they have gone to some lengths to avoid open violation). Vorster listened politely to Rountree and seemed rather more receptive to U.S. influence than Rountree expected, but didn’t give an inch. Since then Smith has been after him several times to reaffirm South Africa’s support. (Smith needs South Africa—particularly for oil—in the event of mandatory sanctions which, if they work, will close off the present oil supply from Mozambique.) Smith has just delivered to Wilson his “final” answer to the “final” British offer. Both positions are, if anything, less conciliatory than their predecessors. The British have about decided to give it up and go to the U.N; Smith, although hinting that it would be valuable for the Minister of Commonwealth Relations to have another try, seems reconciled to the fact that there will be no settlement. They will probably say: —U.S. should refuse to support mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. —In any event, the U.S. should firmly oppose extension of these sanctions to South Africa. —The U.S. should work on the British to have another try with Smith. You might say: —We fully support the British commitments. Smith has been given every chance. Goldberg has made it clear that we are against any minority government in Rhodesia. —We strongly believe that it is in the interests of South Africa to cooperate in any program of sanctions which emerges. We have grave doubts that it will be possible to keep sanction proposals from being extended to South Africa in the first instance. But if that line is held, it will only hold as long as the South Africans cooperate with the program. EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. III, 10/66–9/68. Confidential. 2 For text of Resolution 2145 (XXI), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on October 27, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 585–586. 629. Special National Intelligence Estimate 629. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, December 1, 1966. SNIE 70–2–66 PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION TO TERMINATE THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA MANDATE The Problem To estimate probable developments, particularly reactions of key countries, following the recent UN General Assembly resolution terminating South Africa’s mandate in South-West Africa and placing the territory under direct UN responsibility. Summary and Conclusions A. The October 1966 UN General Assembly resolution ending South Africa’s mandate in South-West Africa and placing the territory under direct UN responsibility has set the stage for a confrontation between the UN and South Africa. Talks through diplomatic channels may produce some new South African proposals, perhaps leading to a plan by which Pretoria would continue to administer the territory under UN supervision. But it is highly unlikely that the South Africans will agree to give up administration of the territory or to accept UN supervision of its administration. 2 We believe the African states will settle for nothing less than the ouster of South Africa from South-West Africa. (Paras 1–2, 9) B. We believe it unlikely that the Security Council would adopt mandatory economic or military sanctions against South Africa. Even if the Security Council did adopt mandatory economic sanctions, it is unlikely that all important countries would effectively enforce the measure. If all South Africa’s major trading partners cooperated in applying economic sanctions over a protracted period, this might bring some modification in South African attitudes. But in this case, we think it more likely that the South Africans would become even more intransigent. (Paras. 11–17, 21–24) C. We further believe that any attempt forcibly to dislodge South Africa’s hold on South-West Africa would require a major military effort, even if backed by a Security Council resolution or by a “Uniting for Peace” resolution of the General Assembly. It is virtually certain that none of the major European powers, including the USSR, would provide sufficient financial or military force to oust South Africa from South-West Africa. (Paras. 25–26) [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on December 1. 2 Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes it is possible that the South Africans might accept some degree of UN supervision over their administration of South-West Africa, although he agrees that the chances are against such an arrangement. [Footnote in the source text.] 630. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 630. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, January 4, 1967, 8:26 p.m. 112608. Ref: Pretoria 1522 2 and 1574. 3 Subject: F.D. Roosevelt Visit to Capetown. 1. Department would like use occasion of operationally desirable refueling visit of FDR to Capetown Feb. 1–4 to establish principle that related flights from carrier would be permitted without racial conditions, along lines proposed in Pretoria 152 2. Charge therefore requested informally approach Sole or other appropriate DFA official along following lines: a. FDR will be returning from Viet-Nam towards end of January. As Sole knows, on recent trips such ships have refueled at sea thus obviating visits to Capetown which both US and SAG had in past found advantageous. For operational reasons refueling stop at Capetown would be desirable at this time from USG point of view, and you think such a visit would be in interest both countries b. In this connection, you would like to inquire informally and on personal basis whether routine flights from this carrier would be permitted in connection with this port call. You do not know whether such flights will in fact be operationally necessary, but if they are you would like to feel confident they would be permitted to land without conditions on racial composition of aircrews. c. If Sole or other official gives desired assurance you should further note that, in view publicity given to previous carrier incidents, you hope SAG will understand may be necessary for US spokesman to state in reply to questions that no racial conditions had been attached to this visit. 3. FYI. It may be necessary for FDR to refuel in Capetown, so approach should be handled in manner that would permit this even if SAG not willing give advance assurance as requested even on informal basis. We do not in fact know whether flights in connection with this visit will be desired, so your ignorance on this point can be genuine. In view long lead time for scheduling alternative fueling arrangements request you carry out above inquiry ASAP. End FYI. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central File, DEF 7 S AFR–US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Donald R. Morris and Frank A. Sieverts of U and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to Pretoria, and repeated to Cape Town. 2 In telegram 1522 from Pretoria, December 23, Hooper noted that top South African Government officials had repeatedly said during the past few months that they would welcome a U.S. aircraft carrier port visit and had implied that the problems that had interfered with the USS Independence visit need no longer arise. Hooper recommended, however, that the United States request advance flights from the carrier to the shore in order to establish a fully acceptable basis for future port calls. (Ibid.) 3 Dated January 3. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 621 from Cape Town, January 13, reported that Deputy Foreign Secretary Sole stated that the South African Government would welcome the visit and that detailed arrangements should be worked out at the service level. (Ibid.) 631. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 631. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, February 3, 1967, 11:51 a.m. 130663. Ref: Embtel 708. 2 Subject: FDR Call. 1. Dept has been informed by DOD that Navy has issued orders to CO FDR that crew may go ashore only in connection with organized integrated activities of any type. 2. Ambassador may wish consider organizing additional affairs, especially for enlisted men, to cover gaps which may result from restrictions individual liberty. 3. Embassy and CO FDR should coordinate in carrying out Navy instructions. 4. SA Embassy Washington being informed; you may also advise SAG. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR–US. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Country Director for South Africa G. Edward Clark; cleared by Deputy Assist-ant Secretary for African Affairs William C. Trimble and Captain Coward of G/PM; and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria. 2 Telegram 708 from Cape Town, January 30, reported that the Embassy and Naval Attache staff, with the cooperation of Cape Town officials and local residents of all races, were establishing a program for the FDR officers and crew designed “to maintain maximum possible multi-racial approach to shore activities within limits of laws and regulations and to be in American terms least offensive in manner of handling activities where segregation unavoidable.” (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 736 from Cape Town, February 3, Ambassador Rountree reported the embarrassing and difficult situation caused by the lateness of the Navy orders: over 1,000 citizens from organizations of all races had gone to considerable trouble and expense to arrange activities on a non-segregated basis for the crew, activities which would have to be cancelled. Arguing that a literal interpretation of the orders would result in deep resentment on the part of South Africans of all races, he asked for urgent reconsideration. (Ibid.) Telegram 131502, February 3, informed Rountree that the Navy’s orders could not be modified further. (Ibid.) 632. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 632. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, February 12, 1967, 8:09 p.m. 135747. Ref: Capetown 783. 2 1. Reuters reports Sword Knot Captain Yates stated on radio-telephone interview tonight (Sunday) that he is sailing in to Durban Monday or Tuesday. Reporter quotes Yates as saying he is taking decision himself after waiting five days for diplomatic clearance. 2. MSTS sending Captain urgent orders not to enter Durban until he receives clearance and instructions from Washington. 3. If Emb is in contact or can establish contact with Sword Knot, it should repeat warning to Captain to stand by and not enter Durban unless and until he receives positive instructions through USG channels. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR–US. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Clark; cleared by Palmer, Morris, and Coward; and approved by A. Hugh Douglas of S/S–O. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria and Durban, and to DOD. 2 Telegram 783 from Cape Town, February 10, reported that a Military Sea Transport Service ship, the Sword Knot, had been off Durban since February 8 awaiting diplomatic clearance. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 136558 to Cape Town, February 14, instructed the Embassy to inform the South African Government that, in light of the present intensity of anti-apartheid sentiment generated in the United States by the FDR visit, the U.S. Government might decide not to use the Durban facilities and send the ship to another destination instead. (Ibid.) Telegram 137419 to Cape Town, February 15, reported that the Department of Defense had issued orders to Sword Knot not to enter Durban but to proceed to Mombasa, Kenya. (Ibid.) 633. Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) 633. Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) 1 Washington, February 21, 1967. MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of the Navy Secretary of the Air Force Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Defense Research and Engineering Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs SUBJECT DoD Requirements for Facilities and Contractual Support in the Republic of South Africa (U) I would appreciate your developing for me on a priority basis an assessment of the minimum DoD requirements for use of Republic of South Africa ports, yards, airfields, real estate, and the like. This assessment should specifically address the following: (1) The use of South African ports and yards for U.S. Naval war ships, other USN ships, and any ships or vessels which DoD components operate directly or under contractual arrangements to satisfy other DoD or NASA requirements; (2) Land-based tracking facilities; (3) Search and rescue arrangements; (4) Any contractual agreements DoD has with the South African Government or with private South African businesses or industries for goods and services provided DoD components in South Africa; and (5) Any other DoD requirements for South African facilities. I would also appreciate your analyzing various alternatives for satisfying the DoD requirements outlined above should South African facilities no longer be available to DoD. I plan to forward your analysis to the Under Secretary of State as part of an over-all review of U.S. policy toward the Republic of South Africa. Cyrus Vance 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, 092 South Africa. Secret. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary of State and the Director of the National Security Agency. 634. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy (Nitze) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) 634. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy (Nitze) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) 1 Washington, March 4, 1967. SUBJ DOD Requirements for Facilities and Contractual Support in the Republic of South Africa (U) This is in response to your Memorandum of 21 February 1967 2 which requested an assessment of DOD requirements of RSA (Republic of South Africa) and an analysis of alternatives for satisfying such requirements should RSA facilities no longer be available to DOD. The analysis at Tab A 3 identifies the three-way importance of RSA to the Department of the Navy. First, with respect to ship deployments to seas near southern Africa in support of NASA and NSA mission requirements, RSA ports are extremely useful but not indispensable. Use of these ports enable us to utilize our ships more efficiently than would otherwise be possible. NASA and NSA support ships could be serviced from other ports, but we would be depriving ourselves of an arrangement of proven benefit. Secondly, with regard to fuel for aircraft carrier transits to and from the Pacific theater through the Indian Ocean, RSA ports are convenient but again there are alternatives. We could divert oilers from other important tasks to fuel the carriers at sea or we could eliminate or reduce reliance on oilers by building an austere naval fueling facility on Diego Garcia as previously proposed. Finally, the strategic location and potential wartime value of RSA are of even greater importance to the USN than its obvious short term utility. RSA, with its five major ports, ten major airfields, and technical competence, represents a potential that could, in time of war, be of significant value to the United States. From the naval viewpoint, the use of facilities in RSA would be essential to control of vital sea lanes to the Indian Ocean and Far East should the Suez Canal be denied for any reason. In this connection it should be noted that the UAR has recently limited US military overflights and could bar Suez to US ships in the same manner as it has already barred Israeli ships. All of the above paragraphs are classified Secret. Paul H. Nitze 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 680.1 South Africa. Secret. 2 Document 633 . 3 Not printed. 635. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 635. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, April 5, 1967. JCSM–191–67 SUBJECT DOD Requirements for Facilities and Contractual Support in the Republic of South Africa (U) 1. (U) Reference is made to a multiple addressed memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 21 February 1967, 2 subject as above. 2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the requirements and analyses forwarded by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and note that these submissions include matters of concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the views on these matters expressed by the Secretaries. 3. (S) Although use of South African facilities is highly desirable, alternative solutions can be found for all current military requirements for facilities or contractual support in the Republic of South Africa. However, resort to alternative solutions would increase costs and result in less efficient use of available manpower, ship, and aircraft assets. 4. (S) Denial of airbase and overflight rights in South Africa would seriously complicate air operations in South African and adjacent areas. Loss of other South African facilities would also reduce the US capability to react to contingency situations in Africa South of the Sahara and in the Middle East. Loss of the tracking station at Pretoria, together with airfield and port rights, would degrade the tracking and telemetry capability for space flights as well as the DOD capability to support space programs. Finally, the use of facilities in the Republic of South Africa, in time of war, would be essential if control of vital sea lanes to the Indian Ocean and Far East is to be maintained. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J. O. Cobb 3 Rear Admiral, US Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 680.1 South Africa. Secret. 2 Document 632 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Cobb signed the original. 636. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 636. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, April 15, 1967, 1:39 a.m. 176137. Subj: South West Africa. 1. This message contains guidelines for use of USUN and Embassies in consultations preceding Special UNGA opening April 21. 2. Our overall objectives re SWA continue to be those set out in Goldberg UNGA statement of October 12, 1966, 2 Nabrit UNGA statement of October 27, 3 and Rogers statement in Ad Hoc Committee on January 26, 1967. All three make it clear that US considers South Africa has forfeited its right to continue to administer South West Africa; that consequently UN must discharge responsibilities re SWA; and that these responsibilities include the determination of practical means of administering SWA in interest of inhabitants and above all to enable them to exercise their right of self-determination. UNGA Resolution 2145 (XXI) 4 conforms quite closely to these objectives. We, together with 113 other UN members, supported it as most comprehensive formula on which overwhelming majority of UNGA could agree. We would like if possible to maintain this broad consensus in Special GA. 3. Impasse in SWA Committee resulting in Committee’s failure to adopt any substantive proposal indicates that it will be very difficult to reach consensus acceptable to us in Special UNGA. Fundamental problem is that Afro-Asian majority tends to regard Resolution 2145 as a decision that UN should assume direct control over SWA and should bring it to independence within short, and definite, period, using enforcement measures in Security Council as required for this purpose. US has not accepted and does not accept this interpretation. In all three U.S. statements, U.S. has repeatedly insisted that approach to problem must be “practical,” and SWA Committee was enjoined in GA Res to recommend practical means by which SWA should be administered. In Nabrit statement, we specifically declared that US had undertaken no commitment as to SC action, and stressed our desire for peaceful action for benefit of SWA population. Peaceful implementation must continue to be our objective. 4. Unpopular though it may be in UNGA atmosphere, we must continue to take line that we do not regard Resolution 2145 as in any way committing US or UN to enforcement action. From US standpoint, we could not in present circumstances envisage use of forceful means or mandatory economic sanctions to carry out resolution. Hence, from UN standpoint, a GA resolution which threw SWA problem into SC in hope of Chapter 7 action, particularly while Rhodesian problem hangs in balance, would gravely engage UN prestige and pave way for most serious setback for UN as an instrumentality for dealing with race relations problems in Southern Africa. Accordingly, we shall have to resist extremist proposals which could not be carried out. We shall also have to avoid to extent possible ambiguous compromise proposals which could later be construed as committing UN or US to unrealistic course in SWA. 5. Task for US will be to persuade Afro-Asians that there is a distinction between the pronouncement of objectives and the determination of the pace and means with which these objectives will be pursued. We remain unshaken in our opposition to the practice of apartheid in SWA and in our espousal of the principle of self-determination for its people. But we are convinced that these objectives can best be attained gradually through various types of pressure and dialogue with South Africa, maintained over a period of time. This will be unpalatable doctrine among extremists. Its force would be demonstrated, however, if Afro-Asians persisted in pressing for drastic resolution along lines of African proposal in SWA Committee, at cost of large number of abstentions or negative votes, particularly by those states whose cooperation is most necessary if South Africa is to be brought around. We imagine that this choice between moderation and consensus on the one hand, and divisive extremism on the other, will be the basic issue at Special GA. 6. One relevant consideration is question of relations with South Africa in next phase of SWA problem. Afro-Asians are likely to contend either that any effort toward dialogue with South Africans is fruitless or else that dialogue should be conducted only on ways and means of carrying out Resolution 2145. Though prospects for a successful dialogue are clearly slight, we believe every effort must be made to carry through with it before we contemplate further substantive UNGA recommendations. We do not believe South Africans can realistically be expected at this stage to discuss implementation of GA Resolution 2145, but we do believe that UN and South Africa may conceivably have certain common concerns with respect to advancement of people of SWA and that in search for common ground, new insights may be gained for dealing with problem which will help us to avoid ultimate costly confrontation. 7. More time would be useful in working through the possibilities of a dialogue. Time might also help in exploring limits to which UN should go in seeking truly effective action in SWA situation. Optimum outcome of Special GA, from our standpoint would therefore be procedural resolution which, while permitting further study, in effect puts matter over to 22nd GA. 8. We recognize this result likely be attained, if at all, only after consideration of substantive texts. In this regard, US should make clear from outset where it stands on ground covered in resolutions considered by SWA Committee. We were unable to accept either African resolution or Latin American resolution in that Committee; indeed, we felt that in reaching agreement with Italians and Canadians on our own proposal, we went about as far as we could go in direction of Committee majority. We would not wish to be jockeyed much further toward African position by pressures at Special Session. Without excluding minor changes, we should resist further compromising our existing position solely for the sake of broad agreement. We should also be wary of signing on to subtle, implied commitments like those in Latin American proposal which edge us toward immediate establishment of administrative machinery in SWA and a UN commitment to immediate implementation. Accordingly, we should use the leverage we have—ability to maintain through our agreement the broadest consensus—to prevent erosion of points covered in Italian-Canadian-US Resolution. 9. Specifically, we would hope to avoid adoption of following points likely to figure in any African-Asia proposal. (a) Request for Security Council action (b) Proposals to establish in SWA, over South African opposition, a system of UN administration (c) A take-it-or-leave-it proposal to South Africa to negotiate for implementation of Resolution 2145 (d) A directive to a UN Council to promulgate laws and regulations for SWA, or to establish a constituent assembly in SWA (e) A decision or recommendation that a UN police force be established for SWA 10. We can accept the following points in a resolution (a) General reiteration of Resolution 2145 as continuing objective of UN for South Africa (b) Appointment of a UN Special Representative or High Commissioner, and/or a UN Council or Committee, to exercise UN functions re SWA (Question of representation of US on Council should be left open for time being.) (c) Planning, study and liaison functions for Special Representative or Council (d) Language permitting contact by UN agents or UN members with South Africa for purposes indicated in preceding paragraphs (e) Recommendations to Specialized Agencies and member states re appropriate measures of assistance by them (f) Provision for further substantive discussion at 22nd GA (g) Reference to disapproval of action described in South African statement on Ovamboland which appears to contradict para. 7 Res 2145. 11. Discuss soonest with friendly delegations and report reaction. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Popper on April 13; cleared by Deputy Legal Adviser Carl F. Salans, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen, Palmer, and Clark; and approved by Sisco. Sent to USUN, Ottawa, Rome, Tokyo, and London, and repeated to all African posts. 2 For text of Ambassador Goldberg’s October 12 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 583–585. 3 For text of Representative Nabrit’s October 27 statement, see ibid., p. 587. 4 For text of Resolution 2145 (XXI), see ibid., pp. 585–586. 637. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 637. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, April 28, 1967, 8:47 p.m. 179410. Subj: South West Africa: Dialogue. Ref: Dept’s 153195; 2 Capetown’s 1081, 1079. 3 1. After handing Asst. Sec. Sisco Aide-Memoire, April 20, 1967 (reported septel), 4 Amb. Taswell recounted South Africa’s legal position re GA res on SWA and practical problems involved in implementation of the resolution. He then called attention to and laid heavy stress on following para of aide-memoire: “The South African Government is willing to discuss with any other genuinely interested government the problem of development in South West Africa provided that government is prepared in good faith to make a constructive contribution to such discussions and is not solely looking for ways and means of implementing the recent General Assembly resolution.” 2. Sisco noted and Ambassador Taswell confirmed that the formulation contained above para meant discussions without preconditions and did not exclude discussion of the implementation of recent UN resolution. 3. Asst. Sec. Sisco welcomed Taswell’s confirmation and recalled that in earlier approach he had urged conversations along these lines as the only means of achieving common objective of peaceful solution. He also welcomed South African Prime Minister Muller’s affirmation that South Africa recognized an international status for SWA and the right of the people to self-determination. (Capetown’s 1079) Mr. Sisco stated that US, of course, did not agree with South Africa’s definition of self-determination but that it was not necessary to agree on substantive points of this kind prior to unconditional discussions. What was important was that unconditional talks begin in effort to find a peaceful solution to SWA problem. 4. Sisco then stated that the US viewed with concern stories reported in South African newspapers re proposed dialogue. (Capetown’s 1081) In US view such stories were injurious to establishment of a dialogue since they in effect publicly laid down conditions for discussions and would place US and others in very difficult position publicly. Minister Botha replied that South Africa had had inquiries in Washington prior to appearance of stories in Capetown. Taswell denied government responsibility pointing out stories were in opposition press. He could understand US concern but because stories appeared in opposition press he did not attach much importance to them. He said he would seek clarification from his Govt. 5. Sisco stated US would study the aide-memoire and would make prompt reply. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by IO/UNP Officer in Charge of Dependent Area Affairs Donald McHenry; cleared by Brown of UNP and Clark; and approved by Sisco. Also sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria, London, Rome, and Ottawa. 2 Dated March 10. (Ibid., POL 19 SW AFR) 3 Both dated April 20. (Ibid., POL 19 SW AFR/UN) 4 Telegram 179411 to USUN, April 20. (Ibid.) 638. National Intelligence Estimate 638. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, May 4, 1967. NIE 73–67 SOUTH AFRICA The Problem To estimate developments in South African domestic and foreign policy over the next five years. Conclusions A. South Africa’s economy is strong and growing. The white population is united in its support for white dominance. The government is competent and the security forces exceptionally effective. Non-whites are denied political and other rights, though they have some share in the economic prosperity. Most of the Bantus accept such economic benefits and modern amenities as are available, resigning themselves to the government’s repressive policies. 2 (Paras. 6–8) B. The present South African Government, under Prime Minister Vorster, has made some effort to promote good relations with neighboring black African states. Its hopes of improving relations with tropical black African states are unlikely to be realized. It is likely to maintain its current support of the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia. (Paras. 30, 32–33) C. We believe it highly unlikely that South Africa will voluntarily give up South-West Africa or accept UN supervision of the territory. We further believe that any attempt forcibly to dislodge South Africa’s hold on the territory would require a major military effort, probably including significant participation by the US. (Paras. 28–29) D. South Africa especially wants to improve relations with the US and, if possible, to obtain some expression of US approval for its attempts to appear more flexible. It will probably permit the US to use present space and tracking installations at least during the period of this estimate, provided the US does not participate in significant sanctions against South Africa. We believe, however, that the whites will hold steadfastly to their policy of white dominance and that significant changes in South Africa’s policies either in response to domestic developments or external pressures are highly unlikely in the next five years. (Paras. 37–38) 3 [Here follows the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the source text, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 4. 2 Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that “resigning themselves” is not sufficiently descriptive of African reaction and prefers “cowed and politically inactive as the result of the government’s repressive policies.” [Footnote in the source text.] 3 Rear Adm. Eugene B. Fluckey, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believes the economic, labor, and domestic conditions are overly drawn in the estimate, and that South Africa’s foreign policy is more influenced by its relationship with other African states, and its desire to maintain buffer states in their present status quo, than is indicated in the estimate. He also believes the current situation, and the prospects for South Africa’s future—in particular with regard to distribution of the products of the economy, political stability, and easement of domestic difficulties—to be better than stated in the estimate. [Footnote in the source text.] 639. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) 639. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) 1 Washington, May 11, 1967. SUBJECT “Your Luncheon with Ambassador Taswell of South Africa Since I understand that you are lunching today with the South African Ambassador, I thought it might be helpful for you to have a current rundown of the situation in New York and of where we stand on our efforts to initiate a dialogue with South Africa on South West Africa. You may recall my comments at a recent staff meeting to the effect that there were indications the South Africans were trying to drive a wedge between Washington and New York, or at least to see whether there are not some differences in approach between Washington and New York, which South Africa can exploit, on how to achieve the objectives of General Assembly Resolution 2145 (attached) 2 for which we voted last October. I know you recognize how important it is for all of us to speak with one voice at this particular juncture when we are seeking to negotiate a satisfactory resolution in New York which will keep all doors open. The current situation in New York is very fluid. The Afro-Asians have tabled an extreme resolution looking toward immediate UN takeover in South West Africa and calling for necessary implementing action by the Security Council in the event South Africa defies the UN. The Soviet bloc have told them they cannot support this. The Latin Americans have been discussing possible amendments with the Afro-Asians which would stress the necessity for dialogue and which would leave implicit the threat of possible enforcement action by the Security Council. We have been working with Canada, Italy and the UK on a proposal of our own which would provide for a UN Council and a UN representative to continue the efforts to find practical ways to achieve the objectives of Resolution 2145. The Afro-Asians describe our proposal as involving new delays in the desired UN take-over in South West Africa. However, discussions are continuing since the Afro-Asians appreciate the desirability of maintaining as much unanimity as possible in support of the objectives of Resolution 2145. The Scandinavians also have been working on a proposal setting up a UN body to follow through on Resolution 2145. A Possible Dialogue with South Africa on South West Africa . Just before the Special Session convened the South African Ambassador in Washington delivered an aide-memoire, which was subsequently handed to all diplomatic representatives in Pretoria and circulated at the UN, which expressed South Africa’s willingness “to discuss with any other genuinely interested Government the problems of development in South West Africa provided that Government is prepared in good faith to make a constructive contribution to such discussion and is not solely looking for ways and means of implementing the recent General Assembly Resolution.” The Ambassador confirmed that this language meant discussions without preconditions and did not exclude discussion of the implementation of GA Resolution 2145. Just before the Special GA convened Ambassador Goldberg suggested to UK Foreign Secretary Brown the possibility of exploring prospects for a dialogue at a London meeting between the two of them and South African Foreign Minister Muller. Brown was favorably disposed but believed any such effort should be deferred until after the Special UNGA took action. Consequently we have deliberately not responded to the aide-memoire since so much necessarily depends upon the outcome of the Special Session. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Elizabeth Ann Brown. 2 See footnote 4, Document 636 ; not printed. 3 On May 19, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 2248 (S–V) by a vote of 85 to 2 (Portugal and South Africa), with 30 abstentions (including the United States). It established an 11-member U.N. Council for South West Africa, responsible to the General Assembly, to administer the Territory until independence. The Council was to be based in South West Africa and was requested to contact South Africa immediately to arrange for transfer of the Territory. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 264–266. 640. Memorandum of Conversation 640. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 21, 1967. SUBJECT Guidelines for South African Arms Policy PARTICIPANTS G—Mr. Kohler (Chair) EUR—Mr. Leddy AF—Mr. Fredericks G/PM—Mr. Kitchen G/PM—Mr. Wolf IO—Mr. Popper L—Mr. Belman G—Mr. Low IO—Mr. Gleysteen AF—Mr. Delaney G/PM—Capt. Coward On June 21, 1967 the participants met to review the Guidelines the USG follows in implementing the UN Arms Embargo for the Republic of South Africa. Focus was principally upon the matter of licensing U.S. componentry for export to “third” countries for installation in end-times destined for South Africa. Decision was taken to amend the January 7, 1964 Guidelines 2 to provide for such licensing, providing the component was neither a weapon nor an element thereof. In implementing the foregoing, it was agreed that previous actions, such as that in the Beagle-Cessna case, would not be affected. It was noted that foregoing modification might attract attention (perhaps in the Congress) at some future date and thus a contingency justification statement should be prepared. The central theme of this paper to be that this step is an interpretation, rather than a change in policy, which will permit the Guidelines to be more consistent with a comprehensive global economic policy. In reviewing the difficulties encountered in implementing the UN Arms Embargo, Mr. Kohler pointed out that to make the latter truly effective, it was necessary for the major supplying nations to agree on a single interpretation. Although aware of the lack of success of efforts to date, he stated that a new initiative was called for and thus would welcome ideas regarding new tactics which might be pursued. Finally, participants were enjoined to keep the Guidelines, particularly the specific items restricted from licensing such as those included in the Munitions List, under constant review to ensure reasonableness and consistency. G/PM is currently modifying the Guidelines. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Coward on July 11. 2 A copy of the January 7, 1964, Guidelines is attached to a January 21, 1964, memorandum from Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson to the Secretary. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 295) 641. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 641. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 10, 1967. SUBJECT Extension of Nuclear Energy Agreement with South Africa The Department of State has requested your approval in principle of the renewal of our present agreement with South Africa on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which will expire on August 21, 1967 unless renewed. AEC agrees with the conclusion of the Department of State that on balance it would be in our interest to renew the agreement. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has somewhat reluctantly come to the same conclusion. In addition, Ambassador Goldberg has been consulted and recognizes the importance of the reasons that have led the State Department to favor renewal. The attached State Department memorandum outlines the pros and cons and the extent to which the State Department has consulted members of Congress and others who will be affected. I recommend that you authorize the State Department to proceed with the renewal of the agreement. If you agree, I will sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State. It’s a tough decision; but, on balance, necessary, I believe. 2 Walt Approved 3 Disapproved See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66–1/69. Limited Official Use. 2 Rostow wrote this sentence by hand. 3 This option is checked. 642. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Foreign Minister Muller 642. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Foreign Minister Muller 1 Washington, August 26, 1967. Dear Mr. Minister: Thank you for the reiteration in your recent letter 2 of the Prime Minister’s statement regarding the importance of relationships between our two countries. We too very much hope that our differences can be re- solved and cooperation strengthened in as many spheres as possible. I also appreciated receiving your explanation regarding the intended role and control of the nine Cessna 411 and three Mystere 20 aircraft which your Government seeks to purchase. However, our support of the UN arms embargo requires that we take all practical steps to avoid association with any sales of equipment which by virtue of its capability or ownership could be readily utilized for purposes contrary to the intent of the embargo. In keeping with this policy, I regret that our position with regard to the Cessnas cannot be altered. Our view on the Mysteres, in which a third government is involved, is still under review and I shall have to defer a final answer until a later date. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL S AFR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Clark and cleared by Coward, Gleysteen, Charles H. Gustafson of L/AF, Byron B. Morton of SCI, and Palmer. 2 Foreign Minister Muller’s letter of June 1 to Secretary Rusk reiterated a statement made by the Prime Minister in a February 17 speech. (Ibid.) 643. Editorial Note 643. Editorial Note On September 13, 1967, Ambassador Goldberg summarized for the National Security Council the major issues facing the United States in the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly session. Goldberg forcefully stated his view, which he acknowledged did not prevail in the administration, that U.S. dealings with South Africa were over-extensive and did not advance the national security of the United States. The Ambassador urged disengagement from South Africa, saying that current U.S. dealings with South Africa provided no diplomatic benefit and would hurt U.S. relations with other African states. He predicted that, in the future, U.S. business leaders would ask for a more liberal policy in Africa because U.S. investments in Africa were many times larger than U.S. holdings in South Africa. He also argued that military gains from U.S. relations with South Africa were becoming less and less meaningful. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4. Tab 57, 9/13/67, Major Issues of the 22nd UN General Assembly, Secret; Sensitive) 644. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 644. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 21, 1967, 6:30 p.m. SUBJECT Your meeting with Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho (11:30 AM tomorrow) 2 This is a short, informal office call. No lunch or dinner is involved. Nick Katzenbach’s general briefing memorandum is at Tab A. 3 State’s suggested talking points are at Tab B. Biographic information on Jonathan is at Tab C. Jonathan is the first Prime Minister of Lesotho (Les-soo-too), a tiny independent enclave completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. Lesotho is firmly aligned with the West and generally votes with us in the UN except where it would involve trouble with South Africa, which could bankrupt her overnight at will. We have a few very small AID projects in Lesotho ($43, 000 worth), plus about $100,000 in scholarship grants to her university. We also help with food through the World Food Program. Except for small amounts of PL 480, we can’t do more as long as the Congress keeps enacting strict limits on the number of aided countries. Jonathan will want to tell you about the problems of a country of blacks in the middle of apartheid. He knows that we can’t help much under present circumstances, but he will ask you to remember him if and when conditions change. He will also tell you about his speech to the General Assembly on Monday in which he will call for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. (His line is strictly pro-talks. He doesn’t lecture us; he urges both sides to find a way to the table.) In addition to a general discussion of Vietnam, you may wish to make some of the following points: —We know it must be terribly difficult to live with the fact of economic dependence on South Africa, but we hope that Lesotho can carry on necessary trade and economic cooperation while maintaining her in- dependence and freedom of expression. We completely understand the necessity for Jonathan to temper his foreign policy in order to deal with the economic realities of his position. —Our direct help to Lesotho will be limited to food for the foreseeable future. We will try to be as generous as possible. —We will continue to keep Lesotho’s interests in mind in using our influence in the World Bank and other international aid institutions. —We congratulate Lesotho on its first anniversary of independence (October 4). She has already taken her place at the UN and elsewhere in the community of responsible nations. W.W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Lesotho (Basutoland), Vol. I, 8/66–5/68. No classification marking. 2 No record of this conversation has been found. 3 None of the tabs is printed. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 645. Memorandum of Conversation 645. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 30, 1967. SUBJECT The Secretary’s Conversation with Foreign Minister Muller of South Africa; South West Africa PARTICIPANTS South Africa: Foreign Minister Muller of South Africa Ambassador (to U.S.) Taswell United States: Assistant Secretary Palmer, AF G. Edward Clark, Country Director Peter Krogh (note taker) The Secretary asked Muller to what extent his government acknowledged an international interest in SWA. Muller said that SWA has a separate international status, that its administration was undertaken by S.A. in trust under the League, and that S.A. was carrying out its responsibilities under that trust. With respect to international status, Muller said that the SAG had never, for example, enjoined UN debate of SWA on the basis of Article 2(7) of the Charter. After making this statement, Muller was not sure it was correct, but the Secretary said that it seemed to him to be the correct position whether or not the SAG had been practicing it. Muller went on to say that the Secretary was aware of the SAG reaction to the Resolution terminating the mandate and once again urged the Secretary to take a look at the progress being made in SWA. Paraphrasing a line from the SWA Survey 1967, Muller said that if we realized how closely SWA was linked to S.A., we would see how unrealistic it was to take the administration of SWA out of SAG hands. The Secretary then asked Muller if he didn’t see any basis for S.A. administration of SWA that would be acceptable to the UN. Muller replied that they were hopeful that once it was understood how much progress was being made under SAG administration the existing administrative arrangement would become acceptable to the UN. Muller concluded that there was really very little he could add to this subject which was not already in his letter to Thant. The Secretary then asked if Muller expected very many S.A. whites to move to SWA. Muller said that he did not expect any such movement either way nor could he see any reason for it unless, for example, some new mines were opened up in SWA. The Secretary said that he wanted to study the Survey more carefully. Muller asked that the Secretary pay particular attention to the political section of the Survey. The Secretary asked Muller how many non-whites in SWA went on to higher education. Both Muller and Taswell said they did not know. Muller did say that great progress was being made in education which would be apparent to any visitor to SWA. The Secretary asked if the S.A. invitation to Ambassadors to visit SWA included other diplomatic personnel. Muller said that initially the invitation had been extended only to Ambassadors and Consuls General and that now that several Ambassadors, including the Dutch and British, had visited SWA it would be unfair to them to permit sub-Ambassadorial representatives from other countries to visit SWA. Hence the SAG had turned down the USG request to send someone other than its Ambassador. The Secretary told Muller that the SAG would be better off if it created the impression that SWA was there for all to see. Muller replied that his government did not like “busy bodies” and furthermore that they deny visas to anyone even visiting the Republic whom they felt had ulterior motives. The Secretary suggested that such restrictive policies did not win friends for South Africa. Muller said his government wasn’t getting credit for the progress it was making anyway and that as a consequence there was a hardening and toughening of the SAG attitude toward the outside world. The Secretary pursued the subject by telling Muller that if people were simply told of progress and could not see it freely for themselves, they would not feel that they were being adequately informed. Muller said that his government’s attitude was hardening, and implied that his tougher view was particularly addressed to the U.S. He referred, as he had in the previous bilateral talk, to the Goldberg speech and contrasted it to the more accommodating speeches of the Soviets, Europeans, and Latin Americans. He said the Goldberg speech had “worried” the SAG. Muller said that he hoped the Secretary would visit S.A. The Secretary replied that he had tried to plan a trip to Africa several times but could not figure out a way to go without inadvertently offending some countries. Muller said that there had been recent visits to S.A. by ministers from the governments of Germany, Belgium and Japan. Muller complained that even Mr. Palmer had not visited South Africa. Mr. Palmer replied that he had visited South Africa twice, in 1941 and 1958 and hoped to do so again. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 S AFR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Peter F. Krogh of S/S on October 6, and approved in S on October 16. The meeting took place in Secretary Rusk’s office. The source text is marked “Part 6 of 8 parts.” The other parts are ibid. 646. Memorandum of Conversation 646. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Lusaka, October 4, 1967. SUBJECT SWAPO’s Views on Current South West African Developments PARTICIPANTS Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West People’s Organization Mr. Solomon Mifima, SWAPO Lusaka Representative Ambassador Good Frank Crump, Second Secretary of Embassy Nujoma appealed for the support of the United States in the upcoming United Nations consideration of the South West African problem. He said that the Council created by last spring’s Special Session would inform the Assembly of the refusal of the South African government to deal with it. The General Assembly would then have to decide what to do. Nujoma expressed the hope that the issue would be placed before the Security Council for further action, but he did not specify what action he would favor. The Ambassador responded by reviewing the deep and continuous involvement of the United States in innumerable world problems for the past twenty-five years. He concluded that in view of this, and of serious and burdensome commitments elsewhere at the present time, the American people would be unlikely to support an active United States engagement in the South West African issue in the near future. Nujoma emphasized the importance of distinguishing between the various problems in Southern Africa. He said that the issues in South West Africa were quite different from those in Mozambique or Rhodesia and so were the responsibilities. In his opinion the United Nations’ obligation to act on the South West African issue was clear and direct. Nujoma thought this distinction should be made very clear, and especially hoped that it would be made clear to President Johnson. The Ambassador said he thought this was well understood. He asked whether Nujoma thought it would be helpful for other governments to discuss South West Africa with the South African government and urge a change in policy. Nujoma said it would be no use for African or Asian countries to do this, but he would be very pleased if the United States and Britain would do so. Nujoma expressed pessimism about the trend of developments in South West Africa. He said that the trials were having the effect of terrorizing the population and that SWAPO, which had active groups in many places in South West Africa as recently as a year ago, now had to go underground. He did not respond directly to the Ambassador’s question about the current effectiveness of SWAPO organizational and propaganda efforts in SWA. Asked about the prospects of a successful armed struggle, he said that it would take a very long time, and that in the near future SWAPO would have to rely upon guerrilla tactics, in which small bands of men would attack South African installations, and generally hope to keep the South Africans on edge. Concerning cooperation between SWAPO and other liberation organizations, Nujoma said that each organization would first have to fight its own battles on its own soil. He said that SWAPO tried to be neutral as among the various Angolan liberation organizations but this was not easy. SWAPO sometimes helps Angolan refugees to get to Zambia through Botswana. However when they arrive in Zambia they are given freedom to choose with which organization they would affiliate. He implied that their choices had led some of the Angolan groups to charge that SWAPO was influencing them in one way or another. Mifima said that one of the problems which UNITA faced in Zambia was that many of its members had been in Zambia before independence and that the Zambian government has issued a general directive to the parties not to organize among such people. Mifima said that Savimbi was now in Cairo. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 13 AFR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Second Secretary of Embassy Frank Crump on October 11. The source text is an enclosure to airgram A–138 from Lusaka, repeated to Dar-es-Salaam and Pretoria. 647. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 647. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, October 19, 1967. Dear Nick: Attached is a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2 expressing (i) their concern with the drift of U.S. policy toward disengagement with South Africa, (ii) the importance of relaxing restrictions which now prohibit U.S. Navy and MSTS ships from making operational and maintenance stops at South African ports, and (iii) [2 lines of source text not declassified]. The JCS comment points to the need, to which we have both previously agreed, for the urgent completion of the interagency review of U.S. policy to South Africa which was started last February. I understand that under present schedule the redraft of the National Policy Paper on Southern Africa circulated last May may not be ready for interagency consideration until mid-December at the earliest, 3 and that consideration is being given to broadening the paper to include Malawi and Zambia. I would hope that the review could overcome further delays and suggest that we might wish to set a target date of 15 December 1967 for completion of interagency review. If it is unrealistic to expect completion of agency review by that time, I suggest that we take an immediate look at the present interim policy regarding ship stops in South Africa. Sincerely, Paul 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, South Africa, 333—452.1, 1967. Secret. 2 JCSM–525–67, September 26; not printed. 3 See Document 409 . 648. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 648. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 1 Washington, November 15, 1967. Dear Paul: Thank you for your letter of October 19 2 on South Africa and enclosing the JCS comments. I have asked our people to move ahead as quickly as possible on the new regional National Policy Paper on Southern Africa, 3 which is designed to cover situations like those described in the JSC memorandum. A new draft may be available for circulation early next month. Discussion of this paper would clearly be the most useful basis for making decisions on the problems highlighted in the JCS memorandum. As for an immediate look at the interim policy of visits, I doubt that consideration of this aspect of the problem can usefully be separated from the full spectrum of our policy of which it is actually a key element. On the other hand, should operational business require an interim decision regarding a given case in a South African port, I think we should be able to deal with the case in the SIG. Sincerely yours, Nick 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, South Africa, 333—452.1, 1967. Secret. 2 Document 647 . 3 See Document 409 . 649. Letter From Senator Robert F. Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk 649. Letter From Senator Robert F. Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 15, 1967. Dear Mr. Secretary: Later this month or next month proceedings will commence in Pretoria in the trial of Eliaser Tuhadeleni and some 36 other citizens of Southwest Africa who are charged by the Republic of South Africa under the Terrorism Act enacted by that nation on June 21, 1967. As matters now stand, it is my information that this trial could culminate in capital sentences, and that a mass hanging may take place. This would not only be morally unacceptable, but I strongly believe it would also involve great potential danger both in the near future and in the long run to the political stability of that part of Africa and to broad American interests there and in the rest of Africa. In any event, there can be no question but that a great and irretrievable injustice will be done if the course of events is not changed. As I am sure you are aware, the acts charged against the defendants in this proceeding all occurred before the law making them criminal had been enacted. In fact, it is an inescapable conclusion that the Act was passed in June 1967 solely for the purpose of making criminal action taken by the defendants between June 27, 1962, which is “deemed” to be the effective date of the Act, and June 21, 1967, which was the date of its enactment. The charging of a capital offense for acts which were not even criminal at the time they were done is, of course, completely contrary to the entire history of western law in both common law and civil law countries in recent centuries. It is particularly indefensible when the acts made criminal in this ex post facto fashion include acts of an essentially political nature, as is the case in the Terrorism Act of 1967 in South Africa. Among other things, it makes unlawful actions (even though taken before the statute was passed) which “had or was likely to have had” any of a number of results, including a result “to embarrass the administration of the affairs of the State.” Furthermore, it puts the burden of proof on the defendant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not, by whatever act he took, intend the result described. In addition, the statute expressly defines the territory over which jurisdiction is asserted to include the territory of Southwest Africa. This is done despite the virtually unanimous revocation by the United Nations before the Act was passed, of the mandate which the Republic of South Africa formerly exercised over Southwest Africa. Accordingly, it seems plain that if the revocation of the mandate by the United Nations, which the United States fully supported, is to have any real effect, the Republic of South Africa cannot have the capacity to rely upon the Terrorism Act of 1967 to prosecute inhabitants of Southwest Africa. This is wholly apart from the fact that simply the recitation of the history of the Terrorism Act of 1967, and of its provisions, chose it to be in violation of the obligation that the Republic of South Africa had towards the inhabitants of Southwest Africa under the Mandate Agreement prior to its revocation. I understand that informal consideration is being given to the possibility of a General Assembly resolution which would submit to the International Court of Justice the question of the capacity of the Republic of South Africa to prosecute inhabitants of Southwest Africa in the manner I have described. I most earnestly urge that you give the most thoughtful consideration to the role the United States might play in these events, and to supporting as vigorously as possible any such action in the United Nations. I am enclosing a copy of the Terrorism Act. 2 Sincerely, Robert F. Kennedy 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. No classification marking. Sent to Under Secretary Katzenbach with a covering memorandum from Kennedy to Katzenbach that reads: “Dear Nick: I understand you know something about this. I hope you can get the State Department to do something. Best, Bob.” 2 Not attached. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 650. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 650. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, November 28, 1967, 0113Z. 75384. Subj: South West Africa. 1. As indicated in report of SWA Council, Afro-Asians and LAs can be expected in forthcoming plenary debate press for Security Council action to implement GA injunction that SWA Council take over SWA. South African actions implementing Odendaal recommendations, trial of 36 South West Africans under Terrorism Act, and SAG refusal to communicate with SWA Council will serve to increase pressures for strong UN action. Nevertheless, in keeping with guidance contained in SWA position paper Dept continues to oppose coercive measures as impractical and sees little possibility that any resolution on implementation GA Res 2145 which US could support could be adopted. 2. It likely that current trial of 36 South West Africans under the Terrorism Act will play large part in GA considerations. As Mission aware, Joel Carlson, defense attorney of 36 South West Africans, proposed during recent US visit that friendly Governments introduce Res (septel), in current UNGA referring questions on legality Terrorism Act and trial to International Court of Justice. 2 Dual purpose of Res would be to exert international pressure on SAG to mitigate sentences of those now being tried, and over longer term, strengthen legal case against continued SA administration of SWA. 3. Carlson has worked out with Professor Richard Falk of Princeton a model Res, which they have shown or discussed with US, UK, Swedish, Ethiopian and other representatives to UN, as well as members UNSec. Falk told DeptOffs that he has made effort canvass as many African Dels as possible to promote support for Res. Dept unaware African reactions but understands that Ethiopians have undertaken to discuss Res with other ASAF Dels. 4. Dept has original Carlson/Falk draft under study and is not now prepared take decision on its utility. We fully cognizant chances GA adoption this approach are marginal and we would not wish US to be identified as sponsor. Our preliminary reaction is that Res is not harmful to our interests and might have some merit if properly handled. Although some may look on it as a legal substitute for direct political action, it need not conflict with political actions in UN re replacement South African administration. Appears, however, that extensive changes original text Res may be desirable to attract necessary wide support in UNGA and to guard against repeat unhelpful ICJ opinion as in 1966. From this standpoint, it regrettable that Carlson/Falk’s broad exploration may already have involved Dels and others who may not be helpful. We understand, for example, that Reddy (UNSec) favorably disposed toward ICJ referral but by SC rather than UNGA. 5. Dept would be particularly interested in information regarding African reactions Carlson/Falk model Res. Suggest Mission undertake discreet consultations with UK and Swedish Missions to ascertain their views and any info they may have re ASAFS. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by McHenry and Martin Jacobs of IO/UNP; cleared by Clark, Runyon, Gley-steen, and Philip B. Heymann of U (info only); and approved by Popper. Repeated to Pretoria. 2 The text of the proposed resolution was transmitted in telegram 75385 to Pretoria, November 28. (Ibid.) 3 On December 16, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 2324 (XXII), co-sponsored by the United States and 72 other countries, calling on South Africa to discontinue the “illegal” trial of the 37 South West Africans. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 270–271. 651. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 651. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, December 20, 1967. SUBJECT South African Arms Sales I held a meeting of all the interested parties. The basic problem is that we adhere to a more restrictive interpretation of the Security Council Resolution than most other countries, while France openly ignores it. At the same time, any change in policy on this sensitive subject—perhaps even a change to bring our interpretation closer to that of the U.K., which Foy’s new guidelines 2 propose—might stir up another swarm of hornets, and editorials. The immediate source of poison in the situation is the unresolved conflict over Southwest Africa, from which spring the terrorist trials, and the resultant outcry. I remain of the view that we should try (and try urgently) to work out an understanding with South Africa about these territories, based (a) on de facto recognition on their part of a U.N. interest in the territories, (b) asserted through a carefully chosen U.N. Committee that would allow South African administration, subject to reporting and advice. Only such an agreement could change the political atmosphere, and permit a rational disposition of issues like those before us. At the meeting, AF and IO argued (1) that any change in our present policy would have disastrous political repercussions in Africa and at home; (2) that any change would also be the wrong signal to the South Africans. At the moment, the South Africans are firmer than ever in enforcing apartheid, and are under severe criticism from us and others for their terrorist trials, their toughening position on Southwest Africa, etc. IO is also concerned about the adverse effect any change would have on our ability to obtain African votes on other issues before the UN. The other bureaus concerned (E, EUR and G/PM) feel that some minor adjustments in the policy guidelines are needed to reduce conflicts with third countries who wish to sell South Africa some items with American components. Those items are not military, but might be used for some military purposes. Communications equipment is a case in point. In each instance the conflict arises because our construction of the Security Council Resolution is more severe than that of the third country concerned. The changes recommended by Foy would not call into question our fidelity to the Resolution, or to interpretations given in the past by Adlai or Arthur. They would bring our interpretation nearer to that of the United Kingdom, and should help minimize the kind of conflict represented by the file. Even if the new guidelines are adopted, our policy under the Security Council Resolution would continue to be more stringent than that of any other country. I conclude that while there might be some fall out if we adopt these guidelines, they are sensible, and the fall out would be more than balanced by advantages. I also recommend that we attempt to block the sale of the Italian Piaggio aircraft and the French (Mystere) aircraft to the South African Government. This position, I think, is indicated even under the Kohler guidelines, although such transactions would be permissible under the British regulations. I am impressed by the difference between an executive jet aircraft like the Mystere and slower planes which might be used for military purposes along South Africa’s borders. However, if we allowed the French plane with U.S. engines to be sold we would have trouble with our own manufacturers and with the British as well. I believe it would be impossible to make a convincing case for the Mystere sale based on distinctions between different types of unarmed civilian aircraft. It would be a paradox, to say the least, to approve the French transaction now, after we had said “No” to our own manufacturers and to the British. This recommendation illustrates why I think we should go beyond the Kohler guidelines if the political climate can be changed enough to let us examine the problem rationally. Disparate standards, especially between us and the British, are causing increasing difficulty with our own domestic manufacturers and with European governments. The British feel that within the terms of the embargo, they can supply civilian aircraft such as the Beagle 206 for use in air/sea rescue, maritime reconnaissance and communications. Thus far, they have been prohibited from doing so because the planes had U.S. motors. The South African Government has now gone to the Italian Piaggio firm for similar planes. Although the Piaggio plane has U.S. components, it is not clear that we can block the sale legally, although we may (or may not) be able to persuade them to go along on political grounds. The South Africans may well make the plane themselves, or buy it from the French. The net result is that the U.S. balance of payments suffers, the British balance of payments suffers, we create friction with our European allies and give De Gaulle another chance to say that you cannot do business with the United States without ending up having the United States dominating your foreign policies. The result is the normal consequence of boycott and embargo plans—frustration all around, and a failure of sanctions. I think we must begin to move towards a more realistic application of the arms embargo and to attempt over time to bring our practice more in line with the present British one. I agree with Arthur that we should not change our basic policy in the present political climate, and not give the South Africans a political “victory”, at least until the Southwest Africa problem can be moved. But standing pat is not in our interest either. The present policy is not working. The South Africans are getting the equipment they need. And their policies are hardening, not softening. The trial of the Southwest African terrorists is an important signal in this respect. Before the Middle East war intervened, it had been agreed that Arthur or someone make a trip to South Africa and attempt to work out a modus vivendi with them on the status of Southwest Africa. Some discussion of the arms embargo policy would be useful in this context and a proposal to loosen our guidelines further—that is beyond the Kohler formula which I recommend we adopt now—might well help them take a more forthcoming attitude. I propose that we consider permitting civilian-type U.S. aircraft or engines to be shipped to the South African Air Force when we are assured that they are destined for such use as VIP transport or unarmed marine patrol if we can get some positive movement from the South Africans or Southwest Africa. I think we should do this before the South African position becomes more fixed than it is now. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Secret. 2 Kohler’s proposed modifications dealt mainly with the question of the extent to which the very restrictive U.S. policy on direct shipments from the United States to South Africa was also applied to U.S.-origin components in equipment shipped by third countries whose policy was less restrictive. He recommended that the United States not apply the embargo in cases where the U.S. components were non-weapons in nature and were included in third-country equipment. His views were set forth in a draft memorandum to Rusk, filed with a December 14 covering memorandum from Katzenbach to Under Secretary Rostow asking for the latter’s views. (Ibid.) 652. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 652. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, January 17, 1968, 1852Z. 99988. Subj: Light Aircraft Sales to South Africa. 1. Dept has reviewed all aspects problem of sale of light aircraft and components to SA, keeping in mind our desire to maintain even-handed application of US arms embargo policy as it affects third countries. Consistent with our (a) original denial of Cessna aircraft to SA Air Force, (b) subsequent efforts resulting in prevention of sale of Beagles and Mysteres, which contain US origin components and were intended in part as substitute for Cessnas and (c) reaffirmation of Cessna denial, we have decided as follows: 2. For Rome —Emb should inquire with appropriate Italian officials re status of alleged SA efforts to obtain Piaggio and other light aircraft. Emb should explain basis US concern results from our earlier denial Cessna aircraft which destined for SA military to be used in part for police purposes and, therefore, sale inconsistent with US implementation of UNSC arms embargo against SA. US informed all parties including SAG, British, French and American manufacturers, that US would have no objection to the sale of US aircraft or aircraft containing US components provided the aircraft were (a) of civilian type, (b) registered and operated by a civilian entity, (c) not flown by active duty military personnel and (d) were to be utilized only for civilian purposes such as transport of government and other officials. Because of failure to meet these criteria, US took position that in event Beagle or Mystere sale consummated and subsequent application made for license to export US made engines or spares for these items for South African military, US would be obliged to deny such application. Further, U.S. would be obliged to scrutinize closely and subsequent application for license to export to Piaggio of U.S. made engines and spare parts. 3. GOI will understand that in light history of this situation, which we believe known to Italian manufacturers, sale of Piaggio and Italian light aircraft containing US origin engines and components would constitute circumvention US efforts to implement UNSC arms embargo and would give unfair competitive advantage to Italian manufacturers, thus creating difficulties for US in relations with British, French and US manufacturers. 4. Drawing on above, Emb should discourage Italian aircraft sales containing U.S. origin engines and components for use by South African military. 5. For Pretoria —US will inform SAG in letter to Muller, to be handed to Taswell shortly, that US will make no change in policy respecting light aircraft sale to SA including specifically the Mysteres. FYI: This decision taken apart from current high level Dept review of broad policy question involving sales by third countries. End FYI. 6. For London —Stonehouse (British MinEc) being informed above actions in reply to letter reported London 4171. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by McHenry and Jacobs on December 5, 1967; cleared by Irving Cheslaw of EUR/BMI, Deputy Legal Adviser Murray J. Belman, Seymour S. Goodman of E, Burns of Commerce, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Philip J. Farley, Rush W. Taylor of EUR/AIS, Gleysteen, and Clark; and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to Pretoria and Rome, and repeated to Johannesburg, Ottawa, Paris, and USUN. 2 Dated November 24, 1967. (Ibid., AV 12–2 S AFR) 653. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 653. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, February 10, 1968, 2230Z. 113604. Subject: Trial of 37. Ref: 113548. 2 1. Following based on uncleared memcon (Noforn). Under Secretary called in Amb Taswell 11:30 AM Feb 10 and handed him Terrorism Trial Aide-Memoire (text reftel). In doing so Mr. Katzenbach noted that we reiterate points made previously and relate them now to recent sentencing. He said that he was unimpressed by SAG bringing in common law at this late date, an unusual legal procedure. 2. After reading document Taswell said that certain aspects of Act, such as retroactive provisions and placing onus on accused to prove innocence, “go against the grain” and are unfortunate. While South Africa doesn’t like to do such things, they are compelled to take such measures because of the kind of people they are dealing with—murderers, terrorists, people with no respect for law. He claimed that the accused were part of organized movements originating in Zambia, Tanzania, Algeria and elsewhere and that SAG had to take steps to protect South Africa. If it didn’t, it would be subject to severe criticism at home. Taswell asserted that his government had “seen what was happening in other parts of the world” and it was determined to stamp out such possibilities in its own country. If SAG took strong action now it might have salutary effect on others contemplating similar moves. Anyone so inclined will know he must face consequences. 3. Taswell observed that he and Under Secretary had discussed before and continue to disagree as to whether SAG has right to conduct trial and take other actions vis-à-vis SWA. He said Mandate Agreement gives SAG right to administer Territory as integral part of SA and asserted SAG believes it carrying out “spirit” of mandate. He promised to pass Aide-Memoire to his Government, “but didn’t think they would do anything about it.” Court has acted and sentences will be carried out. 4. Pointing out certain phrases in text such as “gravest concern” and “outraged”, 3 Taswell commented that they are beginning to lose significance through repeated use and he was unable to gauge just how strongly US really felt on this matter. Under Secretary replied: “This churns me up about as much as anything I have run into in quite a while.” Mere fact that one may be dealing with some people “who are not very nice” does not justify any government disregarding accepted legal practices. Noting recent news photos of executions, Taswell remarked that people have been summarily shot in VietNam and there is no great protest. The Under Secretary replied that the US had in several meetings protested the action to which Taswell referred. Taswell asked if the US had put its protest in writing; if so he would like to have a copy. The Under Secretary said that he had given the Ambassador his assurance that the US had protested such actions. The Ambassador could repeat that assurance to his Government. 5. Noting press report that USUN Del has stated US would wish associate itself with any initiative to bring matter of trial before SC again, Taswell said that he hadn’t heard of us taking Vietnamese executions to the Security Council. Mr. Katzenbach observed that there was a difference between the whole situation in VietNam and in SWA and between actions taken in the heat of the moment outside the law in actual fighting or in an insurgency situation, reprehensible as they might be, and the actions of a government which passes laws and takes actions through its courts which denigrate the meaning of law. Taswell asked if US wanted SA to wait until they had insurgency and “situation was so bad” that they could act without fear of censure. Mr. Katzenbach reiterated his distinction and asserted that in his opinion it was greater crime to do such things in court than in heat of moment. He said that continuation of SAG’s present actions would lead to corruption of its legal system. He could not understand why SA was willing to pay such a high price. 6. Later Taswell asked Deptoff if Emb Cape Town would be furnishing copy Aide-Memoire to DFA. He was told such was intent, although time delivery might be affected by fact that it was already Saturday night in SA. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Clark; cleared by Palmer, Donald F. Herr of U, and Runyon; and approved by Clark. Sent to Cape Town and Pretoria, and repeated to London, Ottawa, and USUN. 2 Telegram 113548 to Cape Town, February 10, transmitted the text of the aide- memoire, which stated that the U.S. Government considered that the South African Government had no right to apply these Acts and other similar legislation to the inhabitants of South West Africa and therefore was obligated to release and repatriate those South West Africans who had been held under this legislation, including those recently sentenced at Pretoria. (Ibid) 3 The aide-memoire states that the United States viewed “with gravest concern” the outcome of the Pretoria trial. It does not, however, use the phrase “outraged.” 654. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 654. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, March 9, 1968, 2112Z. 127749. Ref: Embtel 705 2 and Jo’burg 328. 3 For Ambassador from Palmer. 1. Vice President’s recent statements on Southern African issues, 4 including reference “one man-one vote”, intended as strong, authoritative high level reaffirmation oft-repeated basic principles US policy, foreign and domestic, consistently emphasized by US leaders from time of Thomas Jefferson. As with all such fundamental principles, we believe they are timeless in their validity and that mankind will be the better off the earlier they are realized. This speaks for continued pressure to achieve their earliest possible acceptance. For US to appear to qualify application of principle on question of timing would undermine confidence in US attachment to principle itself. 2. At same time, there is nothing in Vice President’s remarks which precludes an orderly, phased, transitional program to achieve these objectives. His statements of principle should be read in full context his Addis and other speeches: “Important question for today is—in what direction are we going?” He sets no timetable; nor does he presume to prescribe any specific form that realization of these principles should assume in SA. Neither are his remarks at variance with position US has consistently taken in UN and elsewhere in emphasizing our support for orderly transition and peaceful solution to SA problems. We must, however, as VP has done never let South Africans forget imperatives of objectives. South Africans, in their own conscience or their own guilt, may place various connotations on this, and even rationalize their rejection of the principles involved by rejecting the timing. But timing will be determined by a complex of international and internal events and we should not ourselves seek unilaterally to define or interpret what it should be. For those liberal minded South Africans who themselves share our hopes for all inhabitants of the area, we can only trust that they take the trouble to analyze and understand US statements in correct context and fullest implications. For the less liberal, we can only hope that determined and tempered reiteration of world principles will persuade them to start moving in direction Vice President’s suggestions. 3. Comment on paras 5 and 6 follow septel. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S AFR–US. Secret. Drafted by Palmer and Clark; cleared by Van Dyke in the Vice President’s Office, Runyon, and Jacobs; and approved by Palmer. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to USUN and Johannesburg. 2 In telegram 705 from Cape Town, February 28, Rountree reported that a wide segment of the white population of South Africa was concerned that recent statements by Vice President Humphrey in support of “one man-one vote” indicated that U.S. policy was now directed toward early implementation of that concept, which was opposed by virtually all white South Africans; even the Progressive Party favored a gradual extension of the franchise to non-whites. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 4 For text of the Vice President’s January 6 speech in Addis Ababa, see Department of State Bulletin , January 29, 1968, pp. 129–133. 655. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 655. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, March 28, 1968, 2336Z. 138195. Terrorism Act Trials. Refs: State 85072, 2 113548, 3 113604, 4 115154, 5 130909 (notal). 6 1. As consequence latest Security Council resolution SWA, 7 USG called upon to make further effort re Terrorism Act and trials. Pursuant resolution UK recently instructed Embassy Cape Town make démarche its behalf. Accordingly, Embassy requested deliver aide-memoire (para 4) at appropriate level Dept ForAffrs. 2. If Embassy does not have texts accompanying speeches Goldberg and Abram, it may in its discretion arrange subsequent delivery texts (copies by unclassified airpouch Thursday March 28 Registry No. 1273812 via Pretoria addressed Hooper) or delay delivery aide-memoire for their arrival. 3. Suggest that in oral presentation stress be laid on (1) humanitarian concern USG as indicated paragraphs concerning SW Africans particularly affected by Terrorism Act; (2) distinction common to all aide-memoires between USG general long-run position on SAG legal rights and duties (in short, 2145 v. SAG views) and USG special concern legislation such as Terrorism Act exceeds what is necessary or permissible on any view of where responsibility lies for maintenance of law and order; (3) degree to which continued imprisonment of SW Africans under Terrorism Act creates obstacle to efforts from any quarter toward moderation in treatment this and other issues existing or arising between SAG and members international community. 4. Text of Aide-Memoire : Reference is made to aide-memoires of December 16, 1967 and February 10, 1968 to which the replies of the Government of South Africa are awaited with interest. The United States Government transmits to the Government of South Africa with the present aide-memoire copies of statements made by Ambassador Goldberg on March 14, 1968 and February 16, 1968 8 in the course of consideration by the United Nations Security Council of the question of South West Africa, and especially the trials, convictions and sentences flowing from charges under the Terrorism Act (No. 83 of 1967), together with a statement made on February 9, 1968 by the United States Representative, Mr. Morris Abram, in the United Nations Human Rights Commission on the same matter. These statements reaffirm positions taken earlier by the United States Government and explain the basis of its support of the most recent resolution of the United Nations Security Council, No. 246 of 1968 (March 14, 1968). The United States Government has considered carefully the information and views presented by the Government of South Africa in its reply to the Secretary General of the United Nations, dated February 15, 1968 and published as United Nations Document A/7045/Add.9. The United States Government cannot consider that reply as a sufficient response to the various resolutions of the United Nations Organs, supported by the United States Government, or the aide-memoires referred to above. Since the Terrorism Act stands for all to read, the reply cannot, and does not seek to deny that the Act includes the principal elements (retroactivity, indefinite detention, conditions of detention, presumptions, definitions, place of trial, etc.) toward which attention has been directed in previous aide-memoires and in debates at the United Nations. Rather, the reply argues that the provisions are reasonable, especially since the threat of “terrorism” requires measures to “supplement the traditional rules and procedures.” Yet, the reply also states that “the main charge against the accused in the trial instituted in 1967 under the Terrorism Act comprised activities such as conspiracy to murder, armed robbery, arson, possession of firearms, firing on the police and violently resisting arrest—all with the object of endangering law and order.” In the view of the Government of the United States, a highly developed system of law like South Africa’s suffices, without “supplement,” to deal with such offenses. The United States Government considers that this view finds support in the debates in Parliament when the Terrorism Act was considered, the judgment and statements of Judge Ludorf concerning sentencing in State v. Eliaser Tuhadeleni et al. and available reporting on the matter. The United States Government has especially taken account of ordinary laws, including the common law, normally related to the protection of life and property in the Territory. It has sought also to take account of the efficacy of the Courts and the capabilities of the authorities in illegal occupation of South West Africa. On the basis of all the available evidence, it is forced to conclude that provisions such as those of the Terrorism Act are redundant as well as inadmissible, and that attempts to justify them as matters of dire necessity fail on two grounds: (a) the facts do not show that the Courts and authorities require such extraordinary provisions, and (b) those provisions are themselves a contradiction of the pursuit of law and order, in that they violate the rights of the people of South West Africa and depart from civilized legal process as it has evolved western and other legal traditions. Of continuing interest and urgent importance is the question of the well-being of South West Africans particularly affected by the Terrorism Act and other comparable legislation. There are those individuals who have been released. From the scant information available in the public press it would appear that Jason D. Mutumbulua, Johannes G. Otto and Immanuel G.N. Machuirili have been released and that Gabriel Mbindi and a number of others who have been detained in police custody as potential witnesses or accused may also have been released. The United States Government requests such facts as the Government of South Africa may have concerning the welfare and whereabouts of these persons. The United States Government would welcome any suggestions as to how best contact may be established with such persons, so that a proper humanitarian response—official and unofficial—may be forthcoming. As to those who are now serving sentences under the Terrorism Act, the United States Government specifically requests of the Government of South Africa that, above and beyond such restricted rights to visit as may currently be accorded under the prison regulations, cooperation be extended to the United States and other interested parties so that arrangements may be made for visits, especially by persons of legal, medical, educational and religious qualification, as may be appropriate to each individual case. As to those who remain under detention under the Terrorism Act or similar legislation, the United States Government renews requests made in prior aide-memoires, adding of course, its special concern that there should be no further trials of inhabitants of South West Africa under such legislation. In this connection it has particularly in mind a recent announcement by the Attorney General of the Transvaal of another such trial. The United States Government continues to urge upon the Government of South Africa the wisdom of reconsidering its position in the matter of the application of legislation such as the Terrorism Act in the context of the entire problem of South West Africa. Noting the dangerous division between the Government of South Africa and the international community, the United States Government invites the Government of South Africa at this time to seek to preserve a chance for easing this division. It urges that the Government of South Africa suspend implementation of unilaterally conceived plans, such as have been elaborated in the Report of the Odendaal Commission, and come to the conference table to reach agreement on appropriate courses of action. In particular, the United States Government believes that an atmosphere conducive to constructive consideration of the complex problems of South West Africa can best be achieved if the Government of South Africa would cease the application of South West Africa of legislation such as the Terrorism Act. This would of course entail an end to the detention, trial or imprisonment of South West Africans pursuant to that Act. The United States Government would appreciate a direct reply from the Government of South Africa to the detailed observations, recommendations and requests embodied in the present and past aide-memoires on this matter. End of Aide-Memoire . 5. For London and USUN : Embassy and USUN may inform UK this latest démarche and show them text on strictly confidential basis when advised delivery by Embassy Cape Town. 9 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Runyon; cleared by Clark, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Herbert K. Reis, Brown of UNP, and Francis J. Seider of U; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Thomas H.E. Quimby. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to London, Pretoria, Johannesburg, and USUN. 2 Telegram 85072 to Cape Town, December 15, 1967, transmitted the text of an aide-memoire. (Ibid., POL 29 SW AFR/UN) 3 Telegram 113548 to Cape Town, February 10, transmitted the text of an aide-memoire; see footnote 2, Document 653 . 4 Document 653 . 5 Dated February 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR) 6 Dated March 15. (Ibid.) 7 Security Council Resolution 246 adopted unanimously on March 14 demanded that South Africa “forthwith release and repatriate the South-West Africans concerned.” For text, see Department of State Bulletin , April 8, 1968, p. 477. 8 For text of Goldberg’s statements on February 16 and March 14, see ibid., pp. 474–477. 9 In telegram 938 from Cape Town, April 2, Rountree reported that he delivered the aide-memoire to Foreign Secretary Fourie that morning. Fourie said he would have to study the document, but emphasized that the passages in it stating or implying the illegality of the South African presence in South West Africa could not and never would be accepted by the South African Government. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR) 656. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 656. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 1 Washington, April 11, 1968, 2009Z. 145178. Subj: SWA and UN. 1. Amb. Taswell delivered to Under Secy. Rostow April 9 two communications from SAG to UN SYG on Terrorism Trial and SAG willingness receive representative of SYG, and copy of parliamentary bill authorizing SAG proceed with steps toward Bantustans in SWA. 2. Ambassador specified SAG not willing discuss release of prisoners with SYG’s representative, but he would be allowed look over conditions in Territory. Ambassador gave usual arguments for SA distrust of UN and for methods of repressing terrorism and separating groups in SWA. SAG would continue to govern in spirit of mandate, he said. Under Secy. welcomed SAG’s willingness receive UN representative. 3. Ambassador agreed with Under Secy. retroactive character Terrorism Act regrettable but refused accept argument usual principles of justice should be followed in Ovamboland. He repeated references to street executions in Saigon and Israeli crossing of frontiers as actions making SAG look moderate. 4. He rejected view war situation not analogous with situation in Ovamboland on ground SAG wanted nip any unrest stimulated from abroad before could develop. 5. Under Secy. agreed to study documents and comment if appropriate. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell on April 9; cleared by Clark, Gleysteen, Runyon, and Palmer; and approved by Thomas O. Enders of M. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to USUN, Pretoria, Durban, Johannesburg, and Port Elizabeth. 657. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece 657. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece 1 Washington, April 17, 1968, 0012Z. 148039. Subj: SWA: Homelands Legislation. Ref: Cape Town 1018 (being repeated action addressees). 2 1. Dept preparing strong protest for prompt delivery to SAG against proposed legislation (see reftel) as clear violation SA’s international obligations toward inhabitants and UN and highly injurious to well-being of inhabitants. Such an approach would avoid problem of “rigid new prescriptions for SWA’s future,” which Embassy flagged. Since SAG has delivered Bill and memo defending SAG action to US and all other diplomatic missions at Cape Town, Dept believes response necessary and appropriate. 2. Addressees requested approach host governments at high level in spirit of para 9 reftel. US hopes in this way encourage widespread reaction of disapproval, which would be conveyed directly to SAG, of this application extreme SA apartheid to international territory. We cannot afford to miss opportunity, however slight, for approach which might cause government have second thoughts. Bilateral representations could reinforce criticisms of parliamentary opposition and help cut ground from under familiar SAG theme that UN resolutions, which likely come in reconvened GA, are merely product African emotionalism and general political expediency. 3. SAG holds door open to dialogue—whether as matter lip service or genuine concern international opinion or both—and members inter- national community should not hesitate speak up. Basic premise, as Dept sees it, consistent with 1950 Advisory Opinion and GARes 2145, is direct UN responsibility, which almost all members of international community recognize. Complementary premise is continuing obligation of SAG as illegal occupant SWA to respect rights of inhabitants. At present juncture members international community must continue demand through bilateral representations that SAG respect rights of inhabitants. Such action is necessary and proper prelude to any GA consideration and will complement longer term efforts to bring SAG negotiate with UN as responsible agency of international community on modalities of SAG peaceful withdrawal from SWA. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Campbell and Runyon on April 16; cleared by Clark, Richard W. Bogosian of NEA, Brown of UNP, Edward W. Holmes of AFSE, ARA Country Director for Brazil Jack B. Kubisch, Joseph Godson in EUR, and John T. Dreyfuss of ARA; and approved by Palmer. Sent also to Blantyre, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Brussels, Canberra, The Hague, Helsinki, London, Madrid, Ottawa, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, and Vienna. Repeated to Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and USUN. 2 Telegram 1018 from Cape Town, April 12, reported a South African memorandum sent to all diplomatic missions concerning a bill tabled in Parliament to establish separate ethnic homelands in South West Africa. (Ibid.) 3 On May 3, Assistant Secretary Palmer delivered an aide-memoire protesting the proposed South West Africa homelands legislation to Ambassador Taswell. (Telegram 158297 to Athens, May 3, ibid.) Telegram 1318 from Cape Town, May 17, reported that the South African House of Assembly had passed the homelands bill on May 16 and that adoption by the Senate was expected the following week. (Ibid.) 658. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 658. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 19, 1968. SUBJECT Civil Aviation Agreement with South Africa Attached is a memo from Nick Katzenbach 2 recommending that you approve an amendment to the 1947 U.S.-South African Air Transport Agreement. The amendment will: —enable the South African airlines to fly to the U.S. for the first time. They probably would open service to New York near the end of the year—at the earliest. (South Africa was given rights to serve the U.S. in the original agreement, but the routes were not defined. Up to now, they did not wish to exercise their rights.) —give U.S. airlines additional routes to South Africa. The overall agreement and the new route exchange is a very good economic bargain for the U.S. TWA is completely satisfied with the amendment; and Pan American has not objected. The CAB recommends approval. The only problem is political. The UN General Assembly in 1962 passed a resolution, without U.S. support, requesting member governments to refuse landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft. We may, therefore, receive some criticism in the UN from African states, and from domestic critics of South Africa. On the other hand, neither we nor any other industrial country apply commercial sanctions to South Africa. At present the South African airline flies to the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Australia and other industrial countries. Checks on the Hill did not turn up any opposition to the amendment. In fact, most of the sentiment was favorable. I concur in State’s recommendation that you approve this amendment. Walt Approve 3 Disapprove Call me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. III, Memos and Miscellaneous, 10/66–9/68. Confidential. 2 Not printed. 3 This option is checked. 659. Memorandum of Meeting 659. Memorandum of Meeting 1 Washington, May 23, 1968. ANNEX A TO THE CHAIRMAN’S SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION AND DECISIONS AT THE 38TH SIG MEETING ON MAY 23, 1968 2 III. South Africa Ship Visit The Chairman 3 asked General Johnson to introduce the problem which had been posed by General Wheeler’s memorandum. 4 General Johnson explained the background of the proposal to permit the carrier Intrepid to stop at a South African port for refueling en route from Atlantic to Pacific waters. He cited the inability of the UK to provide a tanker for refueling at sea as they had done on three previous trips, and referred to the progressive deterioration of the capacity of the US Atlantic fleet in this regard as a result of the transfer of men and ships to the Pacific to support our efforts in Vietnam. Ordering a US oiler to proceed solely for the purpose of refueling the Intrepid at sea would mean a special 42-day round trip at an estimated cost or roughly $336,000. The succeeding discussion centered on the question of whether the estimate could be considered a true additional cost, since the US Navy oiler would be on operational exercises in any case, and the relationship of our policy towards South Africa to a decision on a problem of this type. The Chairman stated that he felt that if we desired to change our policy towards South Africa, we should do so by means of a formal statement and be prepared to take the necessary consequences—not by taking an ad hoc decision on an operational matter. Furthermore, the Chairman said, he was by no means persuaded that the South African Government would accept a visit on the terms we would be likely to propose, i.e., only for refueling with no liberty for the crew. Finally, such a highly visible call at a South African port by a US carrier in the middle of July would almost certainly have serious repercussions for us at home. Mr. Walt Rostow added that without doubt there would also be complications for us in the UN, where we were attempting to secure the support of African nations for the NPT. The Chairman agreed, but reiterated that the possible domestic effect of the visit in mid-summer was the decisive factor in his mind. Mr. Earle stated that he believed Mr. Clifford would agree with that view, and questioned whether the matter should be referred to the IRG/AF for consideration. The Chairman summed up the discussion by stating that, despite his sympathy for the Navy’s problem in the case of the Intrepid, he felt that a visit to South African port this summer would be ill advised, and the possible dollar costs of arranging refueling at sea were not a factor of sufficient importance to cause him to reverse his decision. The proposal for the visit of the Intrepid therefore was disapproved. The Chairman requested that all members exercise special care to avoid publicity on this decision. A.A. Hartman Staff Director 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, South Africa 463. Secret; Exdis. Prepared by the Special Assistant and Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group in the Office of the Under Secretary, Arthur A. Hartman. 2 The Chairman’s Summary is not attached. A copy is in Department of State, SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Records of Action, SIG/RA: #39—May 24, 1968—Chairman’s Summary of Discussion and Decisions at the 38th SIG Meeting. 3 Under Secretary Katzenbach served as SIG Chairman. 4 Not attached. A copy of JCS Memorandum CM–3332–68 is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, SIG Memorandums, SIG/MEMO: #69—5/21/68—JCS Request for Consideration of Ship Stop in South Africa. A record of the Department of State pre-SIG meeting on May 23 is ibid., SIG Documents, SIG/DOC: #27—5/23/68—South African Ship Visit. Index Index Abbott Company, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 273 ] Abboud, Gen., 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Abdellah, Slaheddine, 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Abdirascid, Ali Scermarke, 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 342 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] Abdirazak, Hagi Hussein, 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Abebe, Gen. Abye, 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 310 ] Abell, Bess, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 98 ] Aberkhan, Mohammed, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 38 ] Abidia, Fathi, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] -70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] Abram, Morris, 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 1103 [ Pg. 1103 is part of Doc. 655 ] Acheson, Dean, 900 [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs: Congressional criticism, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 228 ] European involvement in Africa and, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 215 ] -347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Implementation of, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] Johnson’s speech re, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 209 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 211 ] Korry’s inquiry and recommendations, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 216 ] Adams, Gen. Paul, 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 294 ] Adan, Ahmed Mohamed, 529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 324 ] Aden Abdullah, Osman, 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 324 ] Adoula, Cyrille, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 419 ] African American Labor Center, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 231 ] African Development Bank (ADB), 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 215 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 227 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 231 ] African National Congress, 992 [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] African Refugee Conference, 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] Afro-Asian Conference of 1965, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 26 ] Agency for International Development (AID): Accomplishments in Africa, 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 228 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 228 ] Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 224 ] Algeria, 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] Ghana, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] Libya, 70 n [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 40 ] Morocco, 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] Regional policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 206 ] Tunisia, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 163 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 163 ] Agriculture Department, U.S., 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] Aherne, Richard W., 9 n [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] Akers, Robert W., 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] Aklilu, Abte-Wold Tsahafi, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 305 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 354 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Alba, Col., 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] Alexander, Clifford L., Jr., 296 n [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 194 ] Alexander, Edward J., 958 n [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] Algeria ( see also North Africa ), 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Anti-American agitation, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] Ben Bella’s approach to governance, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9 ] -25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 9 ] Ben Bella’s proposed U.S. visit, 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 13 ] Coup attempt of 1967, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Coup of 1965, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25 ] Denuclearization issue, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] Economic situation, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] Four Areas Project, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] France, relations with, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 8 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 158 ] -239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 158 ] Harriman’s visit, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] Ho Chi Minh letter, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] Intelligence reports on, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 37 ] Internal security problems, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 37 ] Investment Guaranty Agreement, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] Johnson’s meeting with Guellal, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 24 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 25 ] Komer’s meetings with Guellal, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] Leadership role in Arab world, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] Military situation, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] Morocco, military threat to, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] -151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 138 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 138 ] Non-alignment policy, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 31 ] Oil issues, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] Opposition elements, alleged U.S. support for, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 39 ] Political situation, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] -13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] Revolutionary movements, support for, 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Rusk’s meeting with Guellal, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] Six-Day War and, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] U.S.-Algeria relations, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 13 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 25 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 38 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Diplomatic relations, break in, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 63 n [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 38 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] 49, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 28 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 31 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 38 ] U.S. military assistance, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] U.S. policy toward, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] Action Plan for Algeria, 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] -23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 8 ] U.S. recognition of Boumediene government, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] War for independence, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 2 ] Ali, Col. Abdillahi Farah, 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] Allen, Sir Roger, 895 n [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] Allen, William G., 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Alter, David E., 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Amamou, Mohamed, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Ammar, Hamed, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Anderson, Amb., 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 481 ] Anderson, Burnett, 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] Anderson, George W., Jr., 720 n [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 430 ] -750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 758 n [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 435 ] Andreas, Dwayne, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 231 ] Andrew, Robert F., 451 n [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Angola. See Portuguese Africa . Ankrah, Lt. Gen. Joseph A., 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 236 ] Ghana: U.S. recognition of government, 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Cocoa prices, 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] -477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 273 ] Coup of 1966, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 261 ] Foreign investment policy, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 273 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 273 ] Humphrey’s visit, 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 231 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 273 ] Soviet military equipment provided to U.S., 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] U.S. development assistance, 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] U.S. military assistance, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] Johnson’s correspondence with, 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Johnson’s meeting with, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] Katzenbach’s meetings with, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 272 ] -479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Nigerian civil war, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] Nigerian political crisis, 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 385 ] Vietnam war, 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 273 ] Anthis, Gen., 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] Apedo-Amah, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] Appling, Hugh G., 722 n [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] , 751 n [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 431 ] Arab League, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Arms control, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 218 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 218 ] Nuclear free zone issue, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 205 ] U.S.-Soviet arms freeze in Horn of Africa, proposed, 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] -543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Armstrong, Willis C., 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] Arnold, Terrell, 812 n [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 472 ] Arthur, Geoffrey, 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 78 ] Atkinson, Col., 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] Australia, 889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] Awolowo, Chief, 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 385 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 385 ] Azhari, Yusuf O., 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] Azikiwe, Nnamde, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] Azores, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 430 ] Baako, Kofi, 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 255 ] Babu (Nigeria), 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] Badeau, John S., 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Bader (DOD), 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 694 n [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] Al-Badri, Abd-al-Qadir, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] Bakkush, Abd al-Hamid, 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] -146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] -148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 98 ] Balafrej, Haj Ahmed, 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] Baldwin, Marion A., 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 433 n [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Balewa, Sir Abubakar Tafawa, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 357 ] -611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 360 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] Ball, George W., 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 518 n [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 717 n [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] , 828 n [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 831 n [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 834 n [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 216 ] Algeria, 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] Ethiopia, 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 286 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 313 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 299 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 299 ] Ghana, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 256 ] Horn of Africa, proposed U.S.-Soviet arms freeze, 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] -543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 315 ] Libya, 70 n [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 40 ] Morocco, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] Nigerian civil war, 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] Portuguese Africa, 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] -728 [ Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 437 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 438 ] Rhodesian Government, international campaign against: Economic sanctions, 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 470 ] -810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] -913 [ Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 541 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Wilson, 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] Johnson’s meetings with Wilson, 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] Military options, 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] Oil embargo, 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] -861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 508 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 513 ] U.K. tobacco problem, 812 [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 472 ] -813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] U.S. contingency planning, 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 480 ] U.S. program of sanctions, 841 [ Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 494 ] -842 [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 494 ] Zambia, U.S.-U.K. assistance for, 863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 508 ] -865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] Zambia-Rhodesia economic warfare, 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue: Johnson’s correspondence with Smith, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Wilson, 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] -814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] U.S. policy re, 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] -808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 469 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 478 ] -820 [ Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 483 ] U.S.-U.K. coordinated approach, 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] -794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 470 ] -810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] -816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 475 ] U.S.-U.K. protests, 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 457 ] Zambia’s concerns, 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 458 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] Somalia, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 313 ] —539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 313 ] South Africa, 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 620 ] South West Africa, 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621 ] -1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 621 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 624 ] -1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] -1060 [ Pg. 1060 is part of Doc. 626 ] Banda, Hastings K., 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] Barber, Arthur, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] Barbour, Robert, 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 169 n [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 717 n [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] Barnard, Robert J., 626 n [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379 ] Baron, Albert R., 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Barr, Joe, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 227 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 227 ] Basutoland, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] -330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Bator, Francis, 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 1040 n [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] Battle, Lucius D., 263 n [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 597 n [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] Beadle, Sir Hugh, 896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 529 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 534 ] Bechuanaland. See Botswana . Beigel, Edgar J., 149 n [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] Belgium, 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 357 ] Belk, Samuel E., 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 358 ] Bell, David E., 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 248 ] Belman, Murray J., 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] Ben Barka, Ahmed, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 138 ] Ben Bella, Ahmed, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] Approach to governance, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9 ] -25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 9 ] Algeria: Coup of 1965, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25 ] Opposition elements, alleged U.S. support for, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] Proposed U.S. visit, 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 13 ] Ben Salah, Ahmed, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Bengelloun, Ali, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 106 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 170 n [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 119 ] -177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Benhima, Ahmed Taibi, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 119 ] Benhima, Mohammed, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Bennett, Oliver, 796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 461 ] Bennett, W. Tapley, 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 451 ] , 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] Bentley, Amb., 820 [ Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 492 ] Bergus, Donald C., 123 n [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Berman, Edgar, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 231 ] Beyer, Gordon R., 585 n [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 341 ] , 586 n [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Biafra. See Nigerian civil war . Bishti, Ahmad, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Black, Robert B., 232 n [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] Blake, James J., 26 n [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 162 n [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 169 n [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 232 n [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 490 n [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 531 n [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 722 n [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] Blake, Robert O., 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 444 ] Bligh, Sir Timothy, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] Bogosian, Richard W., 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 411 ] Bolton, Oliver P., 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 237 ] Bomboko, Justin, 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 444 ] Botha, J.S.F., 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] Botsio, Kojo, 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 255 ] Botswana (Bechuanaland), 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 409 ] -702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 409 ] Bottomley, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] -804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 467 ] Bouabid (Morocco), 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 119 ] Boudreau, William J., 775 n [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] Boumediene, Col. Houari, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] Algeria: Anti-American agitation, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] Coup attempt of 1967, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Coup of 1965, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Harriman’s visit, 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 31 ] Political situation, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] -13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] U.S., relations with, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 25 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 25 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 26 ] Bourguiba, Habib, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 223 n [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Algerian coup of 1965, 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Johnson’s correspondence with, 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Johnson’s meetings with, 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Tunisia: Arab League agenda, rejection of, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Humphrey’s visit, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 231 ] -403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 231 ] Israel, policy toward, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 175 ] Military situation, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] Nasser’s military threat, 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] Political situation, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] Turkey as source of military equipment, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 177 ] U.S. military assistance, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 168 ] U.S. security guarantee, proposed, 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 175 ] Vietnam war, policy re, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] U.S. visit, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] 43, 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Bourguiba, Habib, Jr., 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Algerian coup of 1965, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] Johnson’s meetings with, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 150 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Komer’s meetings with, 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] -223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] North African regional defensive arrangement, proposed, 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 158 ] Rusk’s meetings with, 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Tunisia: African nations, relations with, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] Civic action program, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 159 ] France, relations with, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] Libya, relations with, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] -223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Morocco, relations with, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] Nasser’s military threat, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 158 ] Six-Day War and, 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] U.S. development assistance, 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] -221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 150 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] U.S. military assistance, 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 172 ] Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 63 n [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 38 ] Bowie, John M., 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] Brezhnev, Leonid I., 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Britain. See United Kingdom. British Aircraft Corporation (BAC), 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] Bronez (DOD), 71 n [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 105 ] Bronfman, Edgar, Jr., 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 231 ] Brown, Elizabeth Ann, 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] , 763 n [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 437 ] , 767 n [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 846 n [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 943 n [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 952 n [ Pg. 952 is part of Doc. 565 ] , 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 614 ] , 1076 n [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 1079 n [ Pg. 1079 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1102 n [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] Brown, George, 850 [ Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] -918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] -921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] -943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 1080 [ Pg. 1080 is part of Doc. 639 ] Brown, Irving, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 231 ] Brown, L. Dean, 156 n [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 170 n [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] Brown, Theodore, 295 n [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 193 ] Brubeck, William H., 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 499 n [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 984 n [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] -975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] -987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 587 ] , 998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] -1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 596 ] Bruce, David K. E., 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] Bruce, Robert L., 958 n [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] Buche, John A., 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Buffum, William B., 834 n [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 993 n [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1056 n [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 624 ] Bull, Kinloch, Jr., 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] Bundy, McGeorge, 16 n [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 25 n [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 71 n [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 101 n [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 151 n [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 220 n [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 729 n [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 825 n [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 481 ] , 827 n [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 828 n [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 831 n [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 874 n [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 892 n [ Pg. 892 is part of Doc. 527 ] , 1032 n [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 1041 n [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 1045 n [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 615 ] Algeria, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 28 ] Botswana, 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] Ghana, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Libya, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 91 ] -136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Morocco, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 155 n [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 106 ] Nigeria, 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] Portuguese Africa, 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] Regional policy regarding sub-Saharan Africa: Internal security assistance, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Johnson’s interest in African affairs, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 306 n [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 199 ] Nuclear free zone issue, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Strengthened African Program, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] U.S. Negro leadership’s interest in, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 194 ] Rhodesia, U.S. arms embargo against, 795 [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510 ] , 885 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 521 ] , 893 n [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 528 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Wilson, 889 n [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] Johnson’s meetings with Wilson, 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] -871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] Military options, 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] Oil embargo, 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] -861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 508 ] U.S. program of sanctions, 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 497 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] U.S. stake in outcome, 852 [ Pg. 852 includes portions of Doc. 501 and Doc. 502 ] Zambia, U.S.-U.K. assistance for, 864 [ Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 508 ] -865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 520 ] Zambia-Rhodesia economic warfare, 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue: Johnson’s correspondence with Smith, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] UN actions re, 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 477 ] U.S. policy re, 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 468 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] U.S. response to Rhodesia’s declaration, 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 489 and Doc. 490 ] U.S.-U.K. coordinated approach, 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] -816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 475 ] South Africa, 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] Johnson’s meeting with Oppenheimer, 1028 [ Pg. 1028 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] -1029 [ Pg. 1029 is part of Doc. 606 ] Nuclear energy program, 998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 599 ] U.S. military sales, 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 596 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] U.S. non-segregation policy for personnel in South Africa, 1030 n [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 607 ] U.S. policy toward, 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] -982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 584 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] -986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] U.S. space tracking stations in, 1030 n [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 607 ] South West Africa, 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] Tunisia, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 150 ] Wheelus Air Base: Negotiations re, 85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] U.S. action program re, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] U.S. negotiating strategy, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 65 ] Burati, Valery, 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Burdett, William C., 717 n [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] Burrows, Sir Bernard, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 76 ] Burundi, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] Busia, Kofi, 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 268 ] Butler, R. A., 417 n [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 238 ] Buuri (Libya), 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Byrne, Horace F., 1031 n [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] Byrne, Patricia M., 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] , 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 614 ] Caccia, Sir Harold, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] Caetano, Marcello, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 456 ] Calhoun, Chad, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] Califano, Joseph, 879 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 516 ] Campbell, Francis R., 9 n [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 120 n [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 121 n [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 122 n [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] Campbell, Hugh, 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Campbell, W. B., 1019 n [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1059 n [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 1106 n [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 656 ] , 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] Canada, 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] Caradon, Lord, 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562 ] Carlson, Frank, 1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] Carlson, Joel, 1093 [ Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 650 ] Carolan, Thomas J., 952 n [ Pg. 952 is part of Doc. 565 ] Carter, Chester C., 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 535 ] Cashin, Richard M., 441 n [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 250 ] Castro, Fidel, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 270 ] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 195 ] Algeria, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Angola, 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415 ] Covert operations in Africa, 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 191 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415 ] Ethiopia, 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 509 n [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 292 ] Ghana, 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 244 ] -430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 268 ] Libya, 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 108 n [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Morocco, 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Nigeria, 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 397 ] Portuguese Africa, 740 n [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 742 n [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 442 ] -771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 826 n [ Pg. 826 is part of Doc. 482 ] , 876 [ Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] , 930 n [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 554 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 566 ] South Africa, 988 n [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1077 n [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] South West Africa, 1050 n [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 619 ] , 1065 n [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] Chabaani, Col., 27 n [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] Chalfin, Seymour, 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 883 n [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] Chapin, Frederic M., 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 574 ] Chase, Gordon, 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] -1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] Chase, Robert W., 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 169 n [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 177 n [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 230 n [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] Cherkaoui, Mohammed, 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] Cheslaw, Irving, 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] China, People’s Republic of, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 252 ] Ethiopia, relations with, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 305 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Ghana, relations with, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 261 ] Nationalist movements of Southern Africa and, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 409 ] Portuguese Africa, 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 432 ] Subversive activity in Africa, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 230 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 232 ] Tanzania-Zambia railroad, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] Chou En-lai, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] Christian, George, 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 387 ] Christmas, Stephen, 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Civil rights developments in U.S., African reaction to, 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 187 ] -284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 187 ] Clark, G. Edward, 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 1068 n [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 1069 n [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 1073 n [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1076 n [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 1083 n [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 645 ] , 1093 n [ Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 650 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1099 n [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 653 ] , 1101 n [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 654 ] , 1102 n [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 1106 n [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 656 ] , 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] Clark, James, 247 n [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 164 ] Cleveland, J. n, 717 n [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 971 n [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 578 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] -994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 592 ] Clifford, Clark, 1110 [ Pg. 1110 is part of Doc. 659 ] Cobb, Rear Adm. J. O., 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 338 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 635 ] Cocoa prices, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] -477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 273 ] Cohen, Herman J., 775 n [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] Colby, William, 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] Commerce Department, U.S., 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 201 ] Common Market, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 215 ] Congo, People’s Republic of the, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 444 ] Congo, Republic of the, 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 357 ] CIA covert operations, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 191 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 191 ] Humphrey’s visit, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 231 ] -395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 231 ] Portuguese Africa, 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 448 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 448 ] Revolt of the mercenaries, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 226 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] Congress, U.S., 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 1020 [ Pg. 1020 is part of Doc. 601 ] -1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] Conway, Gen. Theodore J., 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] Cook, Mercer, 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] Cooper, Richard N., 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 1040 n [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] Coote, Wendell B., 275 n [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 722 n [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] Coward, Capt. Asbury, 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 1021 n [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 1068 n [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 1069 n [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] , 1083 n [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] Crump, Frank, 1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] Cruz, Viriato da, 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 427 ] Cuba, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] Curtis, Joanne, 752 n [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 432 ] Czechoslovakia, 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 392 ] Daddah, Moktar Ould, 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 252 ] Dane, Ernest B., 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 451 ] Daud, Gen., 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 299 ] Davies, Rodger P., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] Davis, Rear Adm. J. W., 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 48 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 295 ] -514 [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Davis, John, 295 n [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 193 ] De Gaulle, Charles, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] Dean, David, 18 n [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] Dean, Jonathan, 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 846 n [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 912 n [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] Dean, Sir Patrick, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] -923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 548 ] -948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 562 ] Debrah, Amb., 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Delaney, Peter H., 1019 n [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] DeMartino, John J., 813 n [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] Democratic Movement of Algerian Renovation (MDRA), 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Denney, George C., Jr., 615 n [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] Denuclearization issue. See Nuclear free zone issue . DeSeabra, Jose, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 177 ] Deus Rodrigues Tomas, Americo de, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 456 ] Dickman, Francois M., 722 n [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] Dillery, C. Edward, 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 971 n [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 578 ] , 995 n [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] Dinke, Amb., 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] -532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 308 ] Diori, Hamani, 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] Dirksen, Everett M., 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 556 ] Disarmament. See Arms control . Disoway, Gen., 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] Diukarev (USSR), 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] Djibouti, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 328 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] Dobson (Canada), 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 249 ] Dodd, Thomas J., 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Doki, Charles, 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] Dorros, Leon G., 413 n [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 433 n [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 441 n [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 722 n [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] Douglas, A. Hugh, 1069 n [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 182 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 357 ] Doyle, Gen., 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 411 ] Dozier, William B., 575 n [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 336 ] Dregne, Col., 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 232 n [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 313 ] Dreyfuss, John T., 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] Driss, Rachid, 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 165 ] -249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Dualeh, Ahmed Yusuf, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] Duggan, William R., 995 n [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] Duke, Angier Biddle, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 177 ] Dumont, Amb., 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] Dungan, Ralph, 16 n [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 584 ] Dunn, A. Gardner, 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 574 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 605 ] Economic Commission for Africa, 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 188 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Economic Community of East Africa, 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Edwards, Robert H., 717 n [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] Egal, Mohammed Ibrahim, 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 340 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 586 n [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 342 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Ekern, Halvor O., 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 770 n [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 442 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] Enahoro, Chief Edward, 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] Enders, Thomas O., 1106 n [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 656 ] Eritrea, 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 350 ] Ethiopia ( see also Ethiopia-Somalia dispute ; Horn of Africa ), 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 970 n [ Pg. 970 is part of Doc. 577 ] China, relations with, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 305 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Dinke’s defection to U.S., 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] -532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 308 ] Economic situation, 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 303 ] Eritrean insurgency, 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 350 ] France, relations with, 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 316 ] -546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Harriman’s meeting with Haile Selassie, 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Humphrey’s visit, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 231 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 231 ] Intelligence report on, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 350 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Haile Selassie, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 286 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 319 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 319 ] Johnson’s meetings with Haile Selassie, 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 330 ] Johnson’s proposed meeting with Haile Selassie in 1966, 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 319 ] Kagnew Station military base, 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 337 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 356 ] Kenya, relations with, 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] McNamara’s meeting with Haile Selassie, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 329 ] Palmer’s meeting with Yifru, 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 317 ] Policing functions in Africa, 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 297 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] Political reforms, U.S. encouragement of, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 309 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 311 ] Political situation, 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 334 ] “Shake down” policy re U.S. assistance, 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] Soviet-Somali relations, concerns re, 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 353 ] -604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] U.K. military sales, 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 339 ] U.S. military assistance, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 489 n [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 297 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 303 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 313 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 313 ] Congressional action re, 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Ethiopia’s requests for increased assistance, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 301 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 314 ] -541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 325 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] FY 1966 MAP program, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 300 ] FY 1967 MAP program, 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 316 ] JCS position, 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 295 ] -514 [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] U.S. objectives re, 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] U.S. objectives and policies, 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 290 ] U.S.-Soviet relations, concerns re, 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 352 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute: Bilateral resolution efforts of 1965, 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] Border clashes, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 279 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 302 ] DZtente initiative, 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 340 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] -601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Intelligence report on, 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 292 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Joint Somali-Ethiopian Border Commission, 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Mutual mistrust, 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 299 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 299 ] Preventive action, Ethiopia’s consideration of, 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 299 ] Propaganda problem, 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 299 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 299 ] Soviet intervention, 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] U.S. bilateral relations and, 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] U.S. mediating role, proposed, 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] U.S. position re disputed territories, 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] U.S.-supplied military equipment, Ethiopia’s alleged use of, 500 n [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 291 ] Eurafrican preferential system, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 215 ] -347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Eurich, Alvin, 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 72 ] European Economic Community (EEC), 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 215 ] Evans, Allan, 615 n [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] Export-Import Bank, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] Fain, Thomas A., 943 n [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 952 n [ Pg. 952 is part of Doc. 565 ] Falk, Richard, 1093 [ Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 650 ] Fanfani, Amintore, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 38 ] Farah, Abdulrahim Abby, 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] Farah, Abdurahman Abby, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] Farley, Philip J., 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] Fekini, Mohieddine, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] Feld, NichoNicholas, 585 n [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 341 ] , 600 n [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] Ferguson, John H., 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 151 n [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 153 n [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 351 ] Field, Winston, 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 553 ] Fisher, Adrian S., 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] Fluckey, Rear Adm. Eugene B., 1078 n [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 638 ] Follestad, Robert T., 18 n [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] Forrestal, Michael, 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] Foster, John, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Fourie, Bernardus Gerhardus, 1105 n [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 655 ] Fowler, Henry H., 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 494 ] -842 [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 494 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 621 ] France: Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs, attitude toward, 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Algeria, relations with, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 8 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 158 ] -239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 158 ] Algerian-Moroccan tensions and, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 138 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 138 ] Ethiopia, relations with, 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 316 ] -546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Eurafrican preferential system, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 215 ] -347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Ghana coup of 1966, 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Horn of Africa, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 334 ] Morocco, relations with, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] Nigeria, relations with, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 357 ] Nigerian civil war, 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 398 ] North Africa, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 158 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] South Africa’s apartheid policy, 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 592 ] Southern Africa region, policy re, 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 411 ] -709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 411 ] Tunisia, relations with, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] Franco, Generalissimo Francisco, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Fredericks, J. Wayne, 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 170 n [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 207 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 745 n [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 751 n [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 792 n [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 813 n [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 831 n [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 995 n [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] Algeria, 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] -23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 8 ] Nigeria, 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 362 ] Portuguese Africa, 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 420 ] -738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 442 ] -771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] Freeman, Orville, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 274 ] French Somaliland, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 334 ] Frutkin, Arnold W., 1045 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 615 ] Funseth, Robert L., 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 767 n [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 780 n [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] Gabon, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Galanto, Fred J., 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 494 n [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 518 n [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 531 n [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 851 n [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] Gallin-Douathe, Amb., 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Gardiner, Robert, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 231 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 231 ] Gargoni, Khalid al, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 92 ] Garin, Vasco Vieira, 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 437 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 535 ] -905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] Garner, Sir Saville, 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] -805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 808 n [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 469 ] , 810 n [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 548 ] -927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 549 ] Gaud, William S., 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 227 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 274 ] Gebelt, S. G., 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] -848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 499 ] Germany, Federal Republic of (FRG), 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 430 ] Ghana, 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Aluminum plant project, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 249 ] Ankrah government, U.S. recognition of, 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Anti-American campaign, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 424 n [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 256 ] China, relations with, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 261 ] CIA covert operations, alleged, 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 244 ] -430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 246 ] Civilian government, restoration of, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 270 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] Cocoa prices, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] -477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 273 ] Corruption problem, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 244 ] Coup of 1966, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 257 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 261 ] Economic situation, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] Foreign investment policy, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 243 ] -427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 249 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 273 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 273 ] Harriman’s meeting with Nkrumah, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Humphrey’s visit, 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 231 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 273 ] Intelligence reports on, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 268 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Ankrah, 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Nkrumah, 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] Johnson’s meeting with Ankrah, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] Johnson’s meeting with Quaison-Sackey, 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] Johnson’s meeting with Ribeiro, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Kaiser’s meeting with Nkrumah, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] Katzenbach’s meetings with Ankrah, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 272 ] -479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Katzenbach’s meeting with Harlley, 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Mahoney’s meetings with Nkrumah, 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 252 ] Military situation, 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 268 ] Nigerian political crisis, 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 376 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 385 ] NIH research facility, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 237 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 237 ] Nkrumah government, 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 237 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 261 ] Nkrumah’s Hanoi visit, 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] Non-alignment policy, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 243 ] Police force, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 270 ] Political situation under military-police junta, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 268 ] Socialist policies, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 243 ] -427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Soviet military equipment provided to U.S., 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 261 ] U.S. Action Program, 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 237 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 239 ] -421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 250 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] U.S. development assistance (see also Volta River project below ), 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 274 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 274 ] U.S. military assistance, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] U.S. psychological warfare program, 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 237 ] Volta River project, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 249 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 251 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Williams’s meeting with Nkrumah, 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 255 ] -451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Gibbs, Sir Humphrey, 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 467 ] -805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 467 ] Gilpatric, Roswell, 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 430 ] -749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] Glenn, Edmund S., 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 176 ] Gleysteen, William H., 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 959 n [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 571 ] , 1073 n [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] , 1083 n [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 1093 n [ Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 650 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1106 n [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 656 ] Gloster, John G., 580 n [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 341 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] Godley, G. McMurtrie, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 419 ] Godson, Joseph, 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] Gold, Ruth S., 943 n [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] Goldberg, Arthur J., 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 831 n [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 486 ] Portuguese Africa, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 761 n [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 438 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 840 [ Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 497 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 556 ] -941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 556 ] , 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 564 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 is part of Doc. 565 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue, 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 477 ] South Africa, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 403 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 618 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 1083 [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] -1084 [ Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] South West Africa, 1080 [ Pg. 1080 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 1103 [ Pg. 1103 is part of Doc. 655 ] Goldstein, Mortimer D., 846 n [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 851 n [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] , 943 n [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 952 n [ Pg. 952 is part of Doc. 565 ] Goldwater, Barry, 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 187 ] -284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 187 ] Gonsalves, 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 448 ] Good, Robert C., 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 844 n [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 496 ] , 957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 569 ] , 1088 [ Pg. 1088 is part of Doc. 646 ] -1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] Goodman, Seymour S., 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] Gordon Walker, Patrick, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 457 ] Gore-Booth, Sir Paul, 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 480 ] Gowan, Maj. Gen. Yakubu, 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] Nigerian civil war, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 388 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] -669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 399 ] Nigerian political crisis: Countercoup of July 1966, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] -619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 364 ] Iboland option, 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 380 ] Mediation efforts, 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 380 ] Military conflict, prospects for, 629 [ Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] -630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 371 ] Secession issue, 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 380 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 380 ] U.S. analysis of, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 385 ] U.S. public attitude toward, 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 395 ] Graham, Lord, 796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 461 ] Green, Marshall, 717 n [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] Green Denis A., 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 543 ] Greenwood, Hal, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 231 ] Grey, R. T., 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Grimes, Rudolph, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 219 ] Gromyko, Andrei, 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Gross, Ernest, 1033 [ Pg. 1033 is part of Doc. 609 ] Guedira, Ahmed Reda, 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 153 n [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 101 ] Guellal, Cherif, 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] Algeria: Ben Bella’s proposed U.S. visit, 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 13 ] Coup of 1965, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25 ] Morocco, military threat to, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Non-alignment policy, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] Oil issues, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] Opposition elements, alleged U.S. support for, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] U.S.-Algerian relations, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 13 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 25 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 34 ] U.S. military assistance, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] Johnson’s meeting with, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 24 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 25 ] Komer’s meetings with, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] Morocco’s Ben Barka case, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] Rusk’s meeting with, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] Guimali, Antoine, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] Guinea, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 270 ] Gullion, Edmund A., 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 191 ] Gumane, Paul, 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 432 ] Gustafson, Charles H., 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 1083 n [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] Guthrie, John C., 500 n [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Gwambe, H., 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 432 ] Hadow, Reginald M., 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] Hadsel, Fred L., 320 n [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 780 n [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] , 846 n [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 958 n [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 959 n [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 571 ] Haile Minassie, 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 350 ] Ethiopia: Dinke’s defection to U.S., 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 308 ] Humphrey’s visit, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 231 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 231 ] Kagnew Station military base, 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Political reforms, U.S. encouragement of, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 310 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Political situation, 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 312 ] Soviet-Somali relations, concerns re, 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 353 ] -604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] U.S. military assistance, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 571 n [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] U.S.-Soviet relations, concerns re, 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 352 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 500 n [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 354 ] Harriman’s meeting with, 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Johnson’s correspondence with, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 286 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 319 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 319 ] Johnson’s meetings with, 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 330 ] Johnson’s proposed meeting in 1966, 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 319 ] McNamara’s meeting with, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 329 ] Nigerian civil war, 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 402 ] Nigerian political crisis, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 382 ] -651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] Hall, Michael, 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] Hall, Pierson M., 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 574 ] , 992 n [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 is part of Doc. 611 ] Hall, William, 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 600 n [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 352 ] -604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] Hamilton, Edward K., 472 n [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 665 n [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 399 ] Malawi, 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] Nigerian civil war, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 387 ] -660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] -665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] -670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 398 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 398 ] Nigerian political crisis, 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 385 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 385 ] Regional policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 218 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 228 ] -381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 229 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 628 ] -1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] South Africa, 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 625 ] -1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] South West Africa, 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 628 ] -1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 628 ] Hand, Lloyd N., 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] Hardy, Alan M., 676 n [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396 ] Harlech, Lord, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] Harlley (Ghana), 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 71 n [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 101 n [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 160 n [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 220 n [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 425 n [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 428 n [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 499 n [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 535 n [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 717 n [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 736 n [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 797 n [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 552 ] Algeria, 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 38 ] Economic and political progress in newly indent nations, 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 188 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Ethiopia, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Ghana: Meeting with Nkrumah, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] U.S. Action Program, 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Volta River project, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 249 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 249 ] Libya, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Morocco, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Nigeria, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 357 ] -611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] Portuguese Africa, 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] South Africa, 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 574 ] -965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 574 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 599 ] Tanzania-Zambia railroad, 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] Tunisia, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 168 ] Wheelus Air Base, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] -81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 89 n [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 58 ] Hart, Parker T., 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] Hartman, Arthur A., 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 699 n [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 704 n [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] , 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] -1110 [ Pg. 1110 is part of Doc. 659 ] Hasan, Crown Prince of Libya, 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Haselton, Norris, 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] Hassan II, King of Morocco, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] Algerian coup of 1965, 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Bourguiba Jr.’s assessment of, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] Johnson’s correspondence with, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Johnson’s meeting with, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 124 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Morocco: Algerian military threat, 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Ben Barka kidnapping case, 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Economic development and private investment, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 120 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] Harriman’s visit, 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Military situation, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] Mutual defense arrangement with U.S., proposed, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 139 ] Political situation, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 119 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 149 n [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 128 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 128 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] -185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] U.S. military assistance, 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] U.S. withdrawal from military bases, 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 100 ] Hatch, Col., 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] Hauschner, Ludwig, 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] Havercamp, Roy T., 780 n [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] , 786 n [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] Haynes, Ulric, Jr., 458 n [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 535 n [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 813 n [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 883 n [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 984 n [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] Botswana, 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] Nigerian political crisis, 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Regional policy regarding sub-Saharan Africa: Johnson’s interest in African affairs, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 198 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 198 ] Problems areas for U.S., 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] -330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Strengthened African Program, 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 198 ] U.S. Negro leadership’s interest in, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 194 ] Rhodesia, U.S. arms embargo against, 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] -800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503 ] -859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] -867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 518 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 885 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 521 ] -886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] -896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 529 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] -902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue, 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] -795 [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] -802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 489 and Doc. 490 ] -837 [ Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 490 ] South Africa, 1028 [ Pg. 1028 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] -1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] Tanzania-Zambia railroad, 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] Hazam, Col., 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Heffner, Col. Charles C., 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 149 n [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] Height, Dorothy, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 194 ] Helms, Richard M., 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 330 n [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 257 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 682 n [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] , 1050 n [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 619 ] , 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 621 ] , 1065 n [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] Henderson, John N., 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] Hennes, Richard V., 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 993 n [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] Herr, Donald F., 1099 n [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 653 ] Heuser, Henry, 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 72 ] Heymann, Philip B., 1093 n [ Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 650 ] Heyniger, Lambert, 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 441 ] High, George B., 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] Hilliker, Grant, 992 [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] Hinman, Carroll S., 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 149 n [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Hirschtritt, Ralph, 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 411 ] Hobson, Jesse, 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 72 ] Ho Chi Minh, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 417 ] Holloway, Jerome K., 736 n [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 420 ] Holmes, Edward W., 780 n [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] , 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 786 n [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 952 n [ Pg. 952 is part of Doc. 565 ] , 958 n [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 959 n [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 571 ] , 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] Hood, Lord, 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] Hooper, Henry J. C., 897 n [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 530 ] Hooper, Peter, Jr., 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] , 995 n [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1019 n [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] , 1021 n [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1067 n [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 630 ] Hoopes, Townsend W., 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Horan, Hume A., 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Hornig, Donald F., 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 96 ] Horn of Africa ( see also Ethiopia ; Ethiopia-Somalia dispute ; Somalia), 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 232 ] Djibouti dispute, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 328 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] Intelligence report on, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 334 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 334 ] U.S. policy in, 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] U.S.-Soviet arms freeze, proposed, 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] -543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 231 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 416 ] -724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Hourani, Cecil, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] Houser, George, 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 is part of Doc. 601 ] Hoyt, Michael P., 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 851 n [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] Hughes, Cledwyn, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] -805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 467 ] Hughes, Lloyd, 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] Hughes, Thomas L., 12 n [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 614 n [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 360 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] , 1050 n [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 619 ] , 1066 n [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 629 ] , 1078 n [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 638 ] Algeria, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 37 ] Portuguese Africa, 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 453 ] -784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 453 ] Human, Robert H., 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] Humphrey, Hubert H., 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] -40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 1101 [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 654 ] Hunt (UK), 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] Husayn I, King of Jordan, 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] Hutchinson, Edmond C., 101 n [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 160 n [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 169 n [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 219 n [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 223 n [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 224 n [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] Hutchinson, Edward, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 240 ] Idris Al-Sanusi, Muhammad, King of Libya, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 148 n [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 98 ] Johnson’s correspondence with, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 74 ] Libya: Internal security situation, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] Mutual defense arrangement with U.S., proposed, 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] Political situation, 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] U.S. military assistance, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] U.S. security guarantee, 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] -141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] U.S. technical assistance, 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] U.S.-U.K. military planning re, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] Middle East situation, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] Threatened abdication, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Visit to Turkey, 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] Wheelus Air Base, 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Israel-related concerns of Libyans, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 92 ] Libyan Air Force and, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 92 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] Libya’s public statements on termination of U.S. rights, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] Negotiations re, 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] U.S. discussions re, 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Imhof, Johannes V., 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] Interdepartmental Regional Group for Africa, 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 129 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). See World Bank . International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 399 ] International Court of Justice (ICJ), 965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 574 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 600 ] -1008 [ Pg. 1008 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1055 n [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 623 ] International General Electric, 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] International Monetary Fund (IMF), 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 268 ] International Telecommunications Union, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 224 ] Ioanes, Raymond, 812 n [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 472 ] Iran, 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Ironsi, Maj. Gen. Johnson Aguiyi, 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] Israel ( see also Six-Day War ), 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 223 n [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 175 ] Italy, 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Ivory Coast, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 231 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 231 ] Iyalla, Amb., 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Iyassu Mengesha, Gen., 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 354 ] Jackson, Sir Robert, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 249 ] Jacobs, George R., 812 n [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 472 ] Jacobs, Martin, 1093 n [ Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 650 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1101 n [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 654 ] Jacobsen, Jake, 829 n [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] James, Sir Morrice, 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] Japan, 953 [ Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 565 ] Jarring, Gunnar, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Javits, Jacob Kcob K., 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Jenkins, Walter, 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 584 ] Jernegan, John D., 50 n [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] Jerusalem, 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] Jessup, Peter, 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] Johnson, Charles E., 1006 [ Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 599 ] , 1030 [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 607 ] -1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] , 1040 n [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] Johnson, Gen., 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] -1110 [ Pg. 1110 is part of Doc. 659 ] Johnson, Lyndon B., 54 n [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 187 n [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs: Implementation of, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] Johnson’s speech re, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 209 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 211 ] Korry’s inquiry and recommendations, 331 n [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Algeria: Meeting with Guellal, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 24 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 25 ] U.S.-Algerian relations, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 25 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 25 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 34 ] Congo, Republic of the, 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Ethiopia: Correspondence with Haile Selassie, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 286 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 319 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 319 ] Meetings with Haile Selassie, 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 330 ] Proposed meeting with Haile Selassie in 1966, 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 319 ] U.S. military assistance, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 330 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] Ghana: Aluminum plant project, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] CIA covert operations, alleged, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 246 ] Cocoa prices, 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] -477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] Correspondence with Ankrah, 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Correspondence with Nkrumah, 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] Coup of 1966, 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Harriman’s meeting with Nkrumah, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] Meeting with Ankrah, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] Meeting with Quaison-Sackey, 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] Meeting with Ribeiro, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Nkrumah’s Hanoi visit, 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] Soviet military equipment provided to U.S., 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] U.S. Action Program, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 240 ] U.S. development assistance, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 274 ] U.S. military assistance, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] Volta River project, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 249 ] Lesotho, 1084 [ Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] Libya: Bakkush’s proposed U.S. visit, 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 146 n [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 96 ] Correspondence with Idris, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 74 ] U.S. security guarantee, 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] U.S. technical assistance, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Morocco, 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] Ben Barka kidnapping case, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Economic development and private investment, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 126 ] Correspondence with Hassan, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Meeting with Hassan, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 124 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Meeting with M’Hammedi, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 130 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] U.S. military assistance, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 206 n [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 144 ] Nigerian civil war, 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 388 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 690 n [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 402 ] North Africa, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] Regional policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa: Accomplishments of, 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 228 ] Civil rights developments in U.S., African reaction to, 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 187 ] Communist subversion concerns, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 181 ] Economic and political progress in newly independent nations, 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 188 ] Humphrey’s trip to Africa, 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Interest in African affairs, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 198 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 199 ] Meeting with African Ambassadors, 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] Military takeovers of political power and, 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Proposed trip to Africa, 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 234 ] Soft loan fund, participation in, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 227 ] Strengthened African Program, 298 n [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 206 ] U.S. Negro leadership’s interest in, 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 192 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 876 [ Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 is part of Doc. 527 ] Commonwealth Conferences re, 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 544 ] Correspondence with Kaunda, 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 891 n [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 573 ] Correspondence with Wilson, 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] -851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] -860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] -889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] -891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 528 ] -895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 534 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] -906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 542 ] -916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 544 ] -921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] -924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 547 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] -929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] -956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] Economic sanctions, 897 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 530 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] , 951 n [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 564 ] Failure of campaign, U.S. contingency planning re, 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 555 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 556 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 556 ] “Fearless” proposals, 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 573 ] Meetings with Wilson, 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] -874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 539 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 539 ] Peace terms issue, 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 539 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 539 ] Portugal’s concerns, 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 535 ] -905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 537 ] -908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] U.S. program of sanctions, 840 [ Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 846 n [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] -860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] Zambia, U.S.-U.K. assistance for, 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 520 ] Zambia-Rhodesia border closing, 891 n [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue, 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] Correspondence with Smith, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] -833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] Correspondence with Wilson, 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] -814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] -830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] -834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] UN actions re, 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 477 ] U.S. policy re, 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 468 ] U.S.-U.K. coordinated approach, 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 815 n [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 477 ] Somalia, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] South Africa: Civil aviation agreement with U.S., 1108 [ Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Meeting with Oppenheimer, 1028 [ Pg. 1028 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] -1029 [ Pg. 1029 is part of Doc. 606 ] Nuclear energy program, 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] UN actions re, 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] U.S. military sales, 1005 [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] U.S. non-segregation policy for personnel in South Africa, 1030 [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 607 ] U.S. policy toward, 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 982 n [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 584 ] U.S. ships’ port visits, 1051 [ Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 620 ] -1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621 ] U.S. space tracking stations in, 1030 [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 607 ] Verwoerd’s assassination, 1058 n [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 625 ] South West Africa, ICJ ruling re, 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621 ] , 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 621 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 623 ] Tanzania-Zambia railroad, 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] Tunisia: Bourguiba’s U.S. visit, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Correspondence with Bourguiba, 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Meetings with Bourguiba, 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Meetings with Bourguiba, Jr., 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 150 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Turkey as source of military equipment, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 177 ] U.S. development assistance, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 150 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] U.S. military assistance, 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] Vietnam war, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] Wheelus Air Base: Harriman’s assessment of situation, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] -81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 50 ] Libya’s public statements on termination of U.S. rights, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] Negotiations re, 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] U.S. action program re, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 53 ] U.S. negotiating strategy, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] Johnson, Vice Adm. Nels C., 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Johnson, U. Alexis, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] -546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] -721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 729 n [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 738 n [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 576 ] , 984 n [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 is part of Doc. 595 ] Johnson, Vernon, 1005 [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] Johnson, W. Thomas, 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): Ethiopia: Kagnew Station military base, 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 338 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] U.S. military assistance, 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 295 ] -514 [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Morocco: U.S. military assistance, 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] U.S. military contingency facility in, 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] Regional policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa: Military training school, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Nuclear free zone issue, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 205 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 511 ] -870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] South Africa, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 635 ] U.S. military involvement in support of UN actions, possible, 1025 [ Pg. 1025 is part of Doc. 604 ] -1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] U.S. military sales, 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583 ] -981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] U.S. policy toward, 989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] -991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 589 ] U.S. ships’ port visits, 1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] -1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] Southern Africa region, U.S. policy re, 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 412 ] -715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 412 ] Wheelus Air Base, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 48 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] Jonathan, Chief Leabua, 1084 [ Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] -1085 [ Pg. 1085 is part of Doc. 644 ] Jones, G. Lewis, 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] Jones, Jim, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 96 ] Jooste, G.P., 967 [ Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 585 ] -984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] Jordan Waters problem, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] Judd, Thomas M., 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 122 n [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] , 792 n [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 795 n [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 797 n [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 812 n [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 472 ] , 834 n [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 838 n [ Pg. 838 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] , 995 n [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] Junior, Lewis D., 600 n [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] Junkermann, Col., 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Kagnew Station military base. See under Ethiopia . Kahin, Ismail, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] Kaiser, Edgar, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 249 ] Kaiser, Philip M., 796 n [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 461 ] , 809 n [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 810 n [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] -821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 479 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] Kalanda, Mabika, 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 444 ] Kamanda, 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 444 ] Kapwepwe, Simon, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 458 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 882 n [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 518 ] Karumearume (Nigeria), 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] Kassel, Carlos, 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] Katsina, Gen., 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 385 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 385 ] Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 952 n [ Pg. 952 is part of Doc. 565 ] , 1067 n [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 630 ] , 1068 n [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 1084 [ Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs, 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] -365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] Algeria, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 34 ] Ethiopia, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 337 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 356 ] -609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 356 ] Ghana, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 272 ] -479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Horn of Africa, proposed U.S.-Soviet arms freeze, 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Libya, 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 96 ] Morocco, 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 144 ] Nigerian civil war, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 391 ] -667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 402 ] Nigerian political crisis, 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 372 ] -633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 381 ] Portuguese Africa, 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] Regional policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 227 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 410 n [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 234 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 548 ] -927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 561 ] -947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] -951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 564 ] , 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] Somalia, 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 346 ] South Africa, 1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] -1091 [ Pg. 1091 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 650 and Doc. 651 ] , 1108 [ Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] -1110 [ Pg. 1110 is part of Doc. 659 ] South West Africa, 1091 n [ Pg. 1091 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 653 ] -1100 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 653 ] Southern Africa region, U.S. policy re, 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 411 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 411 ] Wheelus Air Base, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Kaunda, Kenneth D., 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 231 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 448 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 481 ] , 844 n [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 496 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 881 n [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 517 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] -923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] -957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 569 ] , 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 573 ] Keeny, Spurgeon, 1040 n [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] Keita, Modibo, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Kenitra naval communications center, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 133 ] Kennedy, Col., 123 n [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 451 ] Kennedy, Edward, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 402 ] Kennedy, John F., 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 574 ] -964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 574 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 576 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 595 ] Kennedy, Robert F., 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 729 n [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 1091 [ Pg. 1091 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] -1092 [ Pg. 1092 is part of Doc. 649 ] Kent, Donald J., 451 n [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Kent, Sherman, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 268 ] Kenya, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 510 ] Ethiopia, relations with, 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Humphrey’s visit, 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 231 ] -402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 231 ] Somalia, relations with, 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 340 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 59 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] Kenyatta, Jomo, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 231 ] -401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 528 ] Khama, Seretse, 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] Khartoum Conference of 1967, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] Khoja, Fathi, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] Khrushchev, Nikita S., 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Killick, John, 838 [ Pg. 838 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] -839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 492 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] King, Bayard, 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 451 ] King, Martin Luther, Jr., 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 194 ] King, Samuel, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 177 ] Kingsley, Rolfe, 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] Kinsey, William C., 795 n [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 797 n [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 851 n [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] Kintner, Bob, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 327 ] Kipping, Sir N., 850 [ Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 500 ] Kirn, Rear Aear Adm. L. J., 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 115 ] Kissinger, Col., 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 78 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 121 n [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 149 n [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 971 n [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 578 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 595 ] , 1021 n [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] Kleine, Herman, 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] Klibi, Chedli, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Kohler, Foy D., 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] , 1095 n [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 651 ] Komer, Robert W., 169 n [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 300 n [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 692 n [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 797 n [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 799 n [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 489 and Doc. 490 ] , 858 n [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503 ] , 865 n [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 885 n [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 521 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1040 n [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 1045 n [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 615 ] Algeria, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 25 n [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] Ethiopia, 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , Ghana, 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Libya, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] -102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 79 ] Morocco, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 106 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] Nigeria, 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] Regional policy regarding sub-Saharan Africa, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 199 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 202 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 208 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 852 [ Pg. 852 includes portions of Doc. 501 and Doc. 502 ] -858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] -875 [ Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 518 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 889 n [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 is part of Doc. 527 ] , 893 n [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 530 ] -898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue, 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 468 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] -815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 481 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 483 ] South Africa, 1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] -1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] , 1049 n [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 618 ] Tanzania-Zambia railroad, 798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] Tunisia, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Wheelus Air Base, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -5–87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Koren, Henry T., 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Korry, Edward M., 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 490 n [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 500 n [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 319 ] Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Ethiopia: Dinke’s defection to U.S., 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 308 ] Harriman’s meeting with Haile Selassie, 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Johnson’s meetings with Haile Selassie, 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 330 ] Johnson’s proposed meeting with Haile Selassie in 1966, 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] Policing functions in Africa, 515 n [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 297 ] Political reforms, U.S. encouragement of, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 310 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] “Shake down” policy re U.S. assistance, 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] U.K. military sales, 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] U.S. military assistance, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 514 n [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 303 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 331 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 281 ] Nigerian poisis, 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] Korry Report, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 215 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Koumanelis, Steve, 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 767 n [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] Kranich, Robert H., 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] Kriebel, P. Wesley, 995 n [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] Krim, Belkacem, 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 39 ] Krogh, Peter F., F., 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 645 ] Kubisch, Jack B., 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] Ladgham, Bahi, 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Lampson, Edward T., 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] , 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 614 ] Lancaster, Bruce, 886 n [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 888 n [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] Landau, George W., 197 n [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 767 n [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 774 n [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 451 ] , 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 946 n [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 561 ] Lang, William E., 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 169 n [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 206 n [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 288 n [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 310 n [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 694 n [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 411 ] Laraki, Ahmed, 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 138 ] Lardner, Col., 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] Lawrence, Vinton, 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] Leddy, John M., 112 n [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 480 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 923 n [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 943 n [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 946 n [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] Lee, Arthur R., 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] Leffingwell, William M., 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Lengema, Marcel, 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 444 ] Lennon, J.H., 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Leonhart, William, 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] Leroy, Michel, 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 39 ] Lesotho, 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 409 ] -702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 1084 [ Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] -1085 [ Pg. 1085 is part of Doc. 644 ] Lewis, William, 501 n [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Liberation movements of Southern Africa. See Nationalist movements of Southern Africa. Liberia, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 231 ] -392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 970 n [ Pg. 970 is part of Doc. 577 ] Libya ( see also North Africa ; Wheelus Air Base ), 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Bakkush’s proposed U.S. visit, 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] -146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] -148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 98 ] Economic situation, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Idris’ threatened abdication, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Intelligence report on, 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Internal security situation, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Idris, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 74 ] Mutual defense arrangement with U.S., proposed, 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] Newsom’s appointment as Ambassador, 110 n [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] Oil issues, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 2 ] Political situation, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Rusk’s meeting with Bishti, 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Six-Day War and, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Tunisia, relations with, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] -223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] U.K. military presence, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 81 ] -123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] U.S. action program, 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] -102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] U.S. development assistance, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] -70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 72 ] U.S. military assistance, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] U.S. security guarantee, 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] -141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] U.S. technical assistance, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 91 ] -136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] U.S.-U.K. military planning re, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 77 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] Licht, Irving H., 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] Lightner, E. Allen, Jr., 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 110 n [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] Little, Edward, 501 n [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Lloyd, Wingate, 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 140 ] Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] -1005 [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] Logan, Alan, 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] Looram, Matthew J., 121 n [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 553 n [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 575 n [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 580 n [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 586 n [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 595 n [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 597 n [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 600 n [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 650 n [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 722 n [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] , 729 n [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 736 n [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 751 n [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] Lukumbuzya, 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] Lusinde, 740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] Maaziq, Husayn Yusuf. See Maziq, Husayn Yusuf . Mabunda, David, 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 432 ] MacCracken, John G., 600 n [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] MacDonald, Malcolm, 629 [ Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] Machuirili, Immanuel G. N., 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 655 ] MacKnight, Jesse M., 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 751 n [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 792 n [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 813 n [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] Mahoney, William P., Jr., 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 413 n [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 251 ] 443–446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 252 ] Malawi, 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 409 ] -702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 409 ] Mali, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Malik, Yacov A., 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Malmborg, Knute, 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Mandefro, Ayalew, 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Mandela, Nelson, 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 585 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] Manert, Bernard, 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] Manhard, Philip W., 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] Mann, Thomas C., 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 876 [ Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] -880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 881 n [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 517 ] , 883 n [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] , 897 n [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 530 ] , 902 n [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] , 1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] -1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 618 ] Marcum, John, 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] Marks, Leonard H., 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 621 ] Marshall, Thurgood, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 231 ] Martin, Gen., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Martins, N. Ade, 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 664 n [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] -667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] Mathews, Elbert G., 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 624 n [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 380 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] -669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] -675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 395 ] Mattingly, Gen., 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Mauritania, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Mauritius, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] Mayaki, Amb., 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Mayers, Daniel K., 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] Maziq, Husayn Yusuf, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] Mbindi, Gabriel, 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 655 ] McAfee, William, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452 ] McBride, Robert H., 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] -778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 448 ] McCarthy, Eugene, 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 402 ] McClanahan, Grant, 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 108 n [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 232 n [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] McClelland, Roswell D., 795 [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 808 n [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 469 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] -811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 831 n [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] McClintic, Stephen H., 151 n [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] McCloskey, Robert J., 18 n [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] McCone, John A., 34 n [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 509 n [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 729 n [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 740 n [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 988 n [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] Ghana, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 251 ] Portuguese Africa, 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] -743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] McCormack, John, 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 402 ] McDonald, David L., 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 511 ] -870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] McElhiney, Thomas W., 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 767 n [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 774 n [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 834 n [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 838 n [ Pg. 838 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] , 844 n [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 496 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] 883 n [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 929 n [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 943 n [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] McHenry, Donald, 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 1076 n [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 1093 n [ Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 650 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] McKesson, John A., 780 n [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] McKillop, David H., 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] McNamara, Robert S., 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 729 n [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] Ethiopia: Kagnew Station military base, 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 338 ] Meeting with Haile Selassie, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 329 ] U.S. military assistance, 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 303 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 329 ] Morocco, 165 n [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] Portuguese Africa, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 419 ] Regional policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 511 ] South Africa, 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 1002 [ Pg. 1002 is part of Doc. 595 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] , 1025 [ Pg. 1025 is part of Doc. 604 ] -1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 635 ] South West Africa, 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 621 ] Southern Africa region, U.S. policy re, 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 412 ] Tunisia, 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 232 n [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] Wheelus Air Base, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 48 ] McNaughton, John T., 165 n [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 315 n [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 316 n [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 325 ] -559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] -696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 978 n [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 582 ] McPherson, Gen., 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] Meade, Frazier, 92 n [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] Meagher, John P., 586 n [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] Meeker, Leonard C., 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 614 ] , 1056 n [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 624 ] Megna, Col. Philip, 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] Meinecke, William H., 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Melbourne, Roy M., 472 n [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 620 n [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 625 n [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 634 n [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 650 n [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 665 n [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396 ] -681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 396 ] Melone, Harry R., 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] Menzies, Robert, 889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] Merchant, Livingston, 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Meyers, Howard, 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 1021 n [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] Meyers, Robert, 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] Mgonja, C. Y., 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 219 ] M’Hammedi, Driss, 156 n [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 170 n [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 120 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] Mifima, Solomon, 1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] Milas, Leo, 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 432 ] Milner, Col. James W., 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] Mitchell, Derek, 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] Mobutu, Lt. Gen. Joseph D., 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 231 ] -395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] -772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 448 ] Mohallim Mohamed, Omar, 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] Mohamed, Sheikh Ali, 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] Mohamoud, Ahmed Mohamed, 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] Mondale, Walter, 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 402 ] Mondlane, Eduardo, 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] Montague, F. Virginia, 958 n [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] Moor, Carol C., 232 n [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] Moore, Bob, 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] , 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] Morell, William N., Jr., 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 627 ] Morin, Laurent E., 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 38 ] Morocco ( see also North Africa ), 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Algerian coup of 1965, 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] Algerian military threat, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] -151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 138 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 138 ] Ben Barka kidnapping case, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 138 ] Cuba, trade with, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 138 ] Economic development and private investment, 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 126 ] Economic situation, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 106 ] -162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 109 ] France, relations with, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] Germany (FRG), relations with, 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 119 ] Harriman’s visit, 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Hassan, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Johnson’s meeting with Hassan, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 124 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Johnson’s meeting with M’Hammedi, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] Manganese exports to U.S., 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] Military situation, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] Mutual defense arrangement with U.S., proposed, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 139 ] Nonalignment policy, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 116 ] Political situation, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Rusk’s meeting with Benhima, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Rusk’s meeting with Laraki, 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 128 ] Rusk’s meeting with Prince Moulay Abdullah, 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] Six-Day War and, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 138 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 149 n [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 128 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 128 ] Spain, relations with, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] Territorial claims, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Tunisia, relations with, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] U.S. economic development assistance, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] -185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 130 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 131 ] -195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 143 ] U.S. military assistance, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] -151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] -172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 140 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 144 ] U.S. military contingency facility in, 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] U.S. withdrawal from military bases, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 100 ] Voice of America relay transmitter in, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 133 ] Morris, Donald R., 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 1067 n [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 630 ] , 1069 n [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] Morris, Roger, 406 n [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 402 ] -690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 572 ] -961 [ Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 572 ] Morton, Byron B., 1083 n [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] Moulay Abdullah, Prince of Morocco, 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] El Mouldi, Ferid, 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 165 ] Moyers, Bill, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 198 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] Mozambique. See Portuguese Africa . Mufti, Ibrahim el, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 219 ] Mulcahy, Edward W., 538 n [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 809 n [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 812 n [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 472 ] , 881 n [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 517 ] Muller, Hilgard, 921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 599 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] -1028 [ Pg. 1028 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 is part of Doc. 611 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1083 [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 645 ] -1087 [ Pg. 1087 is part of Doc. 645 ] Muller, Willard, 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 300 ] Multer, Abraham J., 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 227 ] Muntasir, Mahmud, 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 70 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Murray, Donald, 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] Murumbi, Joseph, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Mutumbulua, Jason D., 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 655 ] Myerson, Jacob, 819 n [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 478 ] Nabrit, James M., 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 219 ] Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 71 n [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 172 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 305 ] National Academy of Sciences, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 224 ] National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 971 n [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 578 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 997 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 615 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 616 ] -1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] National Intelligence Estimates (see also Special National Intelligence Estimates): NIE 36.5–65 , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] NIE 60–1–66 , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] NIE 60–66 , 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] NIE 60/70–65 , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 195 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] NIE 62–64 , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] NIE 64.2–65 , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 360 ] NIE 64.2–68 , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 397 ] NIE 70–1–67 , 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 409 ] NIE 73–67 , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] -1078 [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 638 ] NIE 75/76–64 , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 292 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] NIE 75/76–67 , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 334 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 334 ] Nationalist movements of Southern Africa (see also Portuguese Africa ), 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 409 ] National Security Action Memorandums: No. 291 , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] No. 295 , 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] -982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 584 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] -986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] -991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] -998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] -1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] -1043 [ Pg. 1043 is part of Doc. 613 ] No. 356 , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] National Security Council (NSC): Meetings, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 1083 [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] -1084 [ Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] 526th , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 248 ] 561st , 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621 ] -1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 621 ] 567th , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 556 ] -942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] 572d , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Naude, Willem C., 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 574 ] -965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 574 ] , 974 n [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 605 ] , 1031 n [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] Negro leadership in America, interest in U.S. African policy, 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 194 ] Neilson, Waldemar, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 211 ] Nelson, Charles J., 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 50 n [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 225 n [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Neo-Colonialism (Nkrumah), 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 256 ] Neuman, Robert H., 123 n [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] New Policy for Africa. See Strengthened African Program . Newman, Cecil, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 231 ] Newsom, David D., 16 n [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 18 n [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 30 n [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 71 n [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 123 n [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 149 n [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 220 n [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 494 n [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 499 n [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] Ethiopia, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 301 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 301 ] Libya: Appointment as Ambassador, 110 n [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] Internal security situation, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] U.K. military presence, 122 n [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] U.S. military assistance, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] Newsom, David D.—Continued U.S. security guarantee, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] -141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] U.S. technical assistance, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] U.S.-U.K. military planning re, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] Middle East situation, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] Wheelus Air Base: Israel-related concerns of Libyans, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 92 ] Libyan Air Force and, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 92 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] Negotiations re, 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] Six-Day War, crisis related to, 128 n [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] Nigeria ( see also Nigerian civil war ; Nigerian political crisis ), 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 357 ] -611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 360 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 585 ] Nigerian civil war, 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 226 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 226 ] Economic consequences, 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 397 ] Evacuation of foreigners, 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 385 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 387 ] -660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 387 ] Gowan’s spokesman to see Johnson, proposed, 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 392 ] -669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] Humanitarian assistance, 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 398 ] -690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 402 ] Humphrey’s proposed visit to Nigeria and, 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] -670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 393 ] Intelligence report on, 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 397 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Gowon, 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 399 ] Mediation efforts, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 402 ] Military purchases by belligerents, 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] -665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 395 ] -675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 396 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 396 ] Onset of, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 387 ] Recognition of Biafra issue, 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 388 ] U.S. development assistance and, 674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 395 ] U.S.-Nigerian discussions re U.S. policy, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] -667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] U.S. nonintervention policy, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] -681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 396 ] U.S. public attitude toward, 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 398 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 398 ] Nigerian political crisis ( see also Nigerian civil war ): Aburi agreements, 634 n [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 376 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379 ] Autonomy offer for Eastern region, 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379 ] Confederation option, 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] Countercoup of July, 1966, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] -619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 364 ] Coup of January 1966, 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Economic warfare, 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 385 ] Elections of 1964 , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 358 ] Federal government’s requests for international support, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 375 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 384 ] Foreigners’ departure from Eastern region, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379 ] -645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379 ] Iboland option, 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 380 ] Intelligence reports on, 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 360 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 366 ] Mediation efforts, 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 372 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 380 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 382 ] -651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 385 ] Military conflict, prospects for, 629 [ Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] -631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 375 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 379 ] Political prohibitions, 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Secession issue, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -629 [ Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379 ] -646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 380 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 380 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 381 ] U.S. analysis of, 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 385 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 385 ] U.S. military assistance, requests for, 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] -635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 374 ] U.S. policy re, 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 369 ] -626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 376 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 385 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 385 ] U.S.-U.K. consultations re, 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] -641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] Nilsen, Sylvia E., 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Nitze, Paul R., 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 411 ] -708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 620 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 is part of Doc. 634 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] -1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] Nkrumah, Kwame, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 467 ] Assassination attempt on, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] Ghana, 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 237 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 261 ] Aluminum plant project, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] Anti-American campaign, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 424 n [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 256 ] CIA covert operations, alleged, 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 244 ] -430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Corruption problem, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 244 ] Coup of 1966, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 257 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] -459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 261 ] Foreign investment policy, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 243 ] -427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 249 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 249 ] Non-alignment policy, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 243 ] Socialist policies, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 243 ] -427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 244 ] 430 Volta River project, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 249 ] Williams’ meeting with Nkrumah, 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 255 ] -451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Hanoi visit, 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] Harriman’s meeting with, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Johnson’s correspondence with, 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] Kaiser’s meeting with, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] Mahoney’s meetings with, 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 252 ] Mental instability, 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 252 ] Nogueira, Franco, 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 720 n [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] -755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 758 n [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 761 n [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 451 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 456 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 561 ] -947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562 ] North Africa ( see also Algeria ; Libya ; Morocco ; Tunisia ), 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 232 ] Arms race, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] Border problems, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Economic development, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] -6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] Food problems, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Historical-cultural overview, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 2 ] Intelligence reports on, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] NSC meeting on, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] Oil and gas production, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 2 ] Polarization problem, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Radicals vs. moderates in, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] Regional defensive arrangement, proposed, 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 158 ] Regional economic cooperation, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] Six-Day War and, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 226 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 226 ] Strategic importance, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] U.S. policy toward, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] Nouakchott Conference of 1965, 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 252 ] Nowfel, Camille, 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] Nuclear free zone issue, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 205 ] Nujoma, Sam, 1088 [ Pg. 1088 is part of Doc. 646 ] -1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] Nyerere, Julius, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 595 ] Nzeogwu, Maj. Kaduna, 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] Obote, Milton, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] Occidental Petroleum, 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Ocran, Gen., 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 376 ] Odaka, Samuel, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] Ogbu, 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 380 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 380 ] Ohin, Amb., 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Ojukwu, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] Nigerian civil war, 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 398 ] Nigerian political crisis: Aburi agreements, 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 376 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379 ] Autonomy offer for Eastern region, 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379 ] Countercoup of July 1966, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] -619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 364 ] Economic warfare, 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379 ] Foreigners’ departure from Eastern region, 644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379 ] -645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379 ] Mediation efforts, 634 n [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379 ] Military conflict, prospects for, 629 [ Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] -630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 379 ] Secession issue, 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 370 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379 ] -646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 379 ] U.S. policy, 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 376 ] U.S. analysis of, 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 385 ] -655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 385 ] U.S. public attitude toward, 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 395 ] Olds, Herbert V., 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Omar, Haji Farah Ali, 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] O’Neill, W. Paul, Jr., 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] Oppenheimer, Harry, 1028 [ Pg. 1028 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] -1029 [ Pg. 1029 is part of Doc. 606 ] Organization of African and Malagasy States (OCAM), 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 229 ] Organization of African Unity (OAU), 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 215 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 290 ] Civil rights developments in U.S., African reaction to, 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 187 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 289 ] Johnson’s speech to OAU Ambassadors, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 209 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 211 ] Nigerian civil war, 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 398 ] Nuclear free zone issue, 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 186 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 853 n [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 502 ] Roberto’s assessment of, 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] -776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 448 ] Ormsby-Gore, Sir David, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 238 ] O’Sheel, Patrick, 1031 n [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] Osman, Ahmed, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 140 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] O’Sullivan, James L., 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 751 n [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 431 ] Otto, Johannes G., 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 655 ] Otu, Gen., 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 257 ] Oufkir, Mohammed, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] Oulashin, Eric E., 92 n [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Owen, Henry D., 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 411 ] -706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 411 ] Palabora Mining Company, 996 [ Pg. 996 is part of Doc. 593 ] Paliser, Michael, 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] Palmer, Joseph, II, 9 n [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 215 n [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 472 n [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 553 n [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 341 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 597 n [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 625 n [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 634 n [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 636 n [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 641 n [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 650 n [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 774 n [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 451 ] , 923 n [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1056 n [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1069 n [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 1073 n [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1083 n [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 1099 n [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 653 ] , 1101 n [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 654 ] , 1106 n [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 656 ] , 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 1108 n [ Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 222 ] Algeria, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] Ethiopia, 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 339 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] Palmer, Joseph, II—Continued Libya, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 80 ] Morocco, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 140 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] Nigerian civil war, 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 688 n [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 401 ] Nigerian political crisis, 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 365 ] Portuguese Africa, 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] Regional policy regarding sub-Saharan Africa, 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] -957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 569 ] Somalia, 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Southern Africa region, U.S. policy re, 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 411 ] -709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 411 ] South West Africa, 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] -1060 [ Pg. 1060 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 645 ] -1087 [ Pg. 1087 is part of Doc. 645 ] Tunisia, 243 n [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 165 ] Pan-African Military School, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Pape, Thomas, 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] Pauluku, Gov., 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 444 ] Pearson, Sen., 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] Pearson, Lester, 889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] Peel, Amb., 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Pelletreau, Robert H., 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 258 ] Peters, Cmdr., 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Peterson, Jorge, 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 444 ] Pfund, Peter H., 846 n [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] Phillips, Richard I., 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] Pinckney, Maj., 122 n [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Pinkston, Gen., 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] Pinto Ramos, Sebastien, 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 448 ] Player, Adger E., 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 237 ] Plimpton, 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 992 n [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] Poats, Rutherford, 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] Polansky, Sol, 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Polk, Leslie D., 101 n [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Pollack, Herman, 1045 n [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 615 ] Pompidou, Georges, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Popper, David H., 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 438 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 614 ] , 1059 n [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 1073 n [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] , 1093 n [ Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 650 ] Porson, S., 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Porter, William J., 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9 ] -25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 44 n [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] Portugal ( see also Portuguese Africa ), 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] -782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 522 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 535 ] -905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 537 ] -908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 554 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 561 ] -947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562 ] Portuguese Africa ( see also Southern Africa region, U.S. policy re ), 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 226 ] African-Portuguese talks, proposed, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] -720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] -724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 420 ] -738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 435 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] Anderson Plan for self-determination, 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] -758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 435 ] Azores issue, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 430 ] Communist assistance for nationalist movements, 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 432 ] Economic burden on Portugal, 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] Gilpatric’s report on, 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 430 ] -749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 430 ] Internal dissension in nationalist movements, 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 416 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 448 ] “Manifesto” of nationalist movements, 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 448 ] -777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 448 ] Mondlane’s U.S. visit, 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] Political action program for nationalist movements, proposed, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 419 ] Portugal’s policy toward, 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 418 ] -731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 418 ] Portugal’s reform program in, 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 420 ] -737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 420 ] Portugal’s use of U.S./NATO military equipment, 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] -768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 440 ] Refugee problem, 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] Regional effects of fighting, 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] -768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 440 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 444 ] Rusk’s meetings with Portuguese leaders, 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] -787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 456 ] Self-determination issue, 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] -720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] -724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] -758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] -763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 437 ] UN actions re, 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 438 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 441 ] U.S. contacts with nationalist leaders, 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] -778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 448 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] U.S. covert support for nationalist movements, 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] -721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] -728 [ Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] -739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] -743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 442 ] -771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] -782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452 ] U.S. education program for Angolan refugees, 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 448 ] U.S. military assistance for Portugal and, 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 430 ] -750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] U.S. objectives re, 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] U.S. reports on nationalist movements, 740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] -741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 432 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 453 ] -784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 453 ] Wright’s views re, 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] Post, Albert, 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Post, Richard St. F., 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 499 n [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Prain, Sir Ronald, 791 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 458 ] Pratt, James W., 553 n [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Proctor, Samuel, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 231 ] Pumphrey, 957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 569 ] al-Qadhaafi, Wanis, 148 n [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 98 ] Quaison-Sackey, 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] Quimby, Thomas H. E., 600 n [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452 ] , 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 is part of Doc. 565 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 1102 n [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] Quinn, Harry A., 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] Quist-Therson, E. C., 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] Rabida, Albert A., 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Radziwill, Stanislaus, 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 419 ] Randall, Clarence H., 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] Randolph, Phil, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 194 ] Read, Benjamin H., 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 9 n [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 151 n [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 831 n [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 497 ] -846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 849 n [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 914 n [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 923 n [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 929 n [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 949 n [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 563 ] , 955 n [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 1032 n [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 1041 n [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] Reddy, 1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 650 and Doc. 651 ] Reed, Eugene M., 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] Regional policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa ( see also Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs ): Accomplishments of, 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 228 ] -381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 229 ] 381 Arms control initiative, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 218 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 218 ] CIA covert operations, 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 191 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] Civil rights developments in U.S., African reaction to, 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 187 ] -284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 187 ] Communist subversion concerns, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 182 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 195 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 230 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 232 ] Economic and political progress in newly independent nations, 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 188 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Humphrey’s trip to Africa, 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] Independence and majority rule, support for, 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 202 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Internal security assistance, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Johnson’s interest in African affairs, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 198 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 199 ] Johnson’s meeting with African Ambassado06-408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] Johnson’s proposed trip to Africa, 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 234 ] Military take-overs of political power and, 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 207 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 208 ] Military training school, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Military transport flights, 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 183 ] New Policy for Africa. See Strengthened African Program below . Nuclear free zone issue, 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 205 ] Problem areas for U.S., 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 195 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] -330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Rusk’s meeting with African Foreign Ministers, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Soft loan fund, participation in, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 227 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 227 ] Strengthened African Program, 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 206 ] -319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 206 ] Telecommunications system for Africa, proposed, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 198 ] U.S. Negro leadership’s interest in, 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 194 ] West African radicalism and, 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Rehfeld, Eric, 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] Reinertson, John E., 763 n [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 437 ] , 764 n [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 438 ] Reis, Herbert K., 1102 n [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] Resnick, Congressman, 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 376 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 390 ] Reuter, Dick, 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] Reuther, Victor, 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] Rhodesia ( see also Rhodesian government, international campaign against ; Rhodesian unilateral independence issue ), 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 226 ] Nationalist movement, 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] -699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 467 ] U.S. arms embargo, 795 [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 461 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] -800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against: Africans in Rhodesia and, 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 548 ] Commonwealth Conferences re, 885 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 521 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 522 ] -888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 542 ] -916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 544 ] Consulates’ withdrawal from Rhodesia, 952 [ Pg. 952 is part of Doc. 565 ] -953 [ Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 565 ] Economic sanctions ( see also Oil embargo and U.S. program of sanctions below ), 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 470 ] -810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 480 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] -862 [ Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 506 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 929 n [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 552 ] Extended mandatory sanctions, 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562 ] -951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 564 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 566 ] Impact on Rhodesia, 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] -848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 499 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] -888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 is part of Doc. 527 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] -909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 559 ] Mandatory UN sanctions, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510 ] -867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 516 ] -880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] -913 [ Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 541 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 is part of Doc. 553 ] -937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 554 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562 ] -948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 562 ] Rejection of sanctions by Portugal and South Africa, 938 [ Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 554 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] -943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 561 ] -947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562 ] Rhodesia’s retaliatory measures, 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 554 ] Time-related concerns, 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 516 ] -880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 530 ] -898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] U.K. strategy, 885 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 521 ] , 896 n [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 529 ] Failure of campaign, U.S. contingency planning re, 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] -875 [ Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 555 ] -942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] Famine relief, 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] -889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] “Fearless” proposals, 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] -958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 572 ] -961 [ Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 572 ] , 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 573 ] Intelligence reports on, 826 [ Pg. 826 is part of Doc. 482 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 554 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 566 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Kaunda, 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 891 n [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 573 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Wilson, 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] -851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] -860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] -889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] -891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 528 ] -895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 534 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] -906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 542 ] -916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 544 ] -921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] -924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 547 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] -929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] -956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] Johnson’s meetings with Wilson, 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] -874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 539 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 539 ] Military options, 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 511 ] -870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] , 876 [ Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] -877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 518 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] -923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 556 ] Naval blockade option, 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 516 ] Oil embargo, 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] -847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] -861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 506 ] -863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 508 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] -902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 561 ] Peace terms issue, 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 522 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 539 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 539 ] Portugal’s concerns, 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 535 ] -905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 537 ] -908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] Rhodesians’ reaction, 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 499 ] Rhodesia’s Information Office in U.S. and, 897 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 530 ] South Africa’s contacts with Rhodesians, 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] -921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] -930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] U.K. contingency planning, 822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 480 ] -824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] U.K. interests and objectives, 934 [ Pg. 934 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] U.K. military presence in Zambia, 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] -852 [ Pg. 852 includes portions of Doc. 501 and Doc. 502 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 535 ] -905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] U.K.-Rhodesia negotiations, 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 534 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] -906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 911 n [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] -924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 547 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] -929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 559 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] -956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] , 961 n [ Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 572 ] U.K. tobacco problem, 812 [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 472 ] -813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] UN actions re, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 843 n [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] , 847 n [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510 ] -867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 516 ] -880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] -902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 563 ] -953 [ Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 565 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 571 ] U.S. analyses of Rhodesian situation, 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 553 ] -937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] -945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] U.S. contingency planning, 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 462 ] -798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 480 ] U.S. interests and objectives, 934 [ Pg. 934 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] U.S. limits on involvement, 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] -901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] U.S. program of sanctions, 840 [ Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 493 ] -842 [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 494 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 497 ] -846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] -860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] U.S. refusal to recognize government, 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 492 ] U.S.-South Africa discussion, 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 628 ] -1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] U.S. stake in outcome, 852 [ Pg. 852 includes portions of Doc. 501 and Doc. 502 ] -858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503 ] U.S.-U.K. discussions ( see also Johnson’s meetings with Wilson above ), 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] -863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] -896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 529 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] -909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] -918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] -923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 548 ] -927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] -943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] Wilson’s meeting with Kaunda, 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 528 ] Zambia, U.S.-U.K. assistance for, 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 468 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 506 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 508 ] -865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 517 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 518 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 538 ] Zambia-Rhodesia border closing, 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 528 ] Zambia-Rhodesia economic warfare, 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 496 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 is part of Doc. 502 ] -856 [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 516 ] -878 [ Pg. 878 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 517 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] Zambia’s economic decline due to, 938 [ Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 554 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 566 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue: Agitation in Rhodesia, 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] -802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 466 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Smith, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] -833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Wilson, 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] -814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] -830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] -834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] Rhodesia’s declaration of independence, 838 [ Pg. 838 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] -839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 492 ] Rhodesia’s position, 820 [ Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] -821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 479 ] Royal Commission of Inquiry, 830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 831 n [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] -836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 489 and Doc. 490 ] U.K. conditions for granting independence, 835 n [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 489 ] U.K.-Rhodesia negotiations, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] -814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] -825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 481 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] -830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] -834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] UN actions re, 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] -795 [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 481 ] , 843 n [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] U.S. policy re, 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] -802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 468 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] Public statement on, proposed, 827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 484 ] Smith informed of, 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] -808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 469 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] -811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 478 ] -820 [ Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] U.S. response to Rhodesia’s declaration, 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 489 and Doc. 490 ] -837 [ Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 490 ] U.S.-U.K. coordinated approach, 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] -794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] -805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 470 ] -810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] -818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 484 ] U.S.-U.K. protests, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 457 ] Zambia’s concerns, 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 458 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 468 ] Ribeiro, Miguel Augustus, 425 n [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 256 ] Rivonia Trial, 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 585 ] -984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] Roberto, Holden, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 416 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 442 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] -778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 448 ] Rogers, William D., 851 n [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] Roll, Sir Eric, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] Rollefson, Arthur M., 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 578 ] -972 [ Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 578 ] Roosevelt, Archibald, 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] Root, John F., 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 50 n [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 38 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 122 n [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 123 n [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 140 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 215 n [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Rostow, Eugene V., 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 411 ] -710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 971 n [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 578 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 1106 [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 656 ] Rostow, Walt W., 101 n [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 320 n [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 535 ] , 949 n [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 563 ] Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 209 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] 325, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 222 ] Al Algeria, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] Ethiopia, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 327 ] -564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 347 ] Ghana, 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 274 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 274 ] Lesotho, 1084 [ Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] -1085 [ Pg. 1085 is part of Doc. 644 ] Libya, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Malawi, 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407 ] Morocco: Johnson’s meeting with Hassan, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 124 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] -195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 131 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] -185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 130 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 131 ] -195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] U.S. military assistance, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 144 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 144 ] Nigerian civil war, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 388 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] -666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 402 ] Nigerian political crisis, 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 385 ] Regional policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 234 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 555 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] -943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 572 ] Somalia, 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 347 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] South Africa, 1051 [ Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 620 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1108 [ Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] -1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] , 1110 [ Pg. 1110 is part of Doc. 659 ] South West Africa, 1054 [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 622 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 628 ] , 1079 [ Pg. 1079 is part of Doc. 639 ] Southern Africa region, U.S. policy re, 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] Tunisia: Bourguiba’s U.S. visit, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] U.S. economic development assistance, 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 175 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] U.S. military assistance, 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] U.S. security guarantee, proposed, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] Rountree, William M., 921 n [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 628 ] , 1069 n [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 1101 n [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 654 ] , 1105 n [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 655 ] Rowan, Carl T., 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 187 ] -284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 187 ] Roy, J. Stapleton, 9 n [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] Rucker, Alvin M., 780 n [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] Runyon, Charles, III, 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 992 n [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1059 n [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 1093 n [ Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 650 ] , 1099 n [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 653 ] , 1101 n [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 654 ] , 1102 n [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 1106 n [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 656 ] , 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] Ruser, Claus W., 215 n [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 411 ] Rusk, Dean, 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 9 n [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 12 n [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 54 n [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 187 n [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 324 n [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 1005 n [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs, 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 210 ] Afro-Asian Conference of 1965, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] Algeria: Anti-American agitation, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] Internal security problems, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Non-alignment policy, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] Opposition elements, alleged U.S. support for, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Meeting with Guellal, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] U.S., relations with, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 34 ] U.S. recognition of Boumediene government, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] Ethiopia: Dinke’s defection to U.S., 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 308 ] Eritrean insurgency, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 336 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Haile Selassie, 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 319 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 319 ] Johnson’s meetings with Haile Selassie, 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] -561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 326 ] Johnson’s proposed meeting with Haile Selassie in 1966, 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] Kagnew Station military base, 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 326 ] Policing functions in Africa, 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 297 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] U.K. military sales, 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 339 ] U.S. military assistance, 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 297 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 314 ] -541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 325 ] -561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] U.S. objectives and policies, 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 290 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute: Bilateral resolution efforts of 1965, 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] Border clashes, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 291 ] Detente initiative, 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 341 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] -601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 351 ] Soviet intervention, 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] U.S. mediating role, proposed, 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] U.S.-supplied military equipment, Ethiopia’s alleged use of, 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 291 ] Ghana, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 241 ] Anti-American campaign, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 239 ] Coup of 1966, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 258 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Harriman’s meeting with Nkrumah, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 247 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Nkrumah, 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 246 ] U.S. Action Program, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 239 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 239 ] Volta River project, 417 n [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 239 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] Horn of Africa, 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Libya, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] -70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 77 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 81 ] -123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Morocco: Algerian military threat, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] -151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] Ben Barka kidnapping case, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Economic development and private investment, 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Hassan, 155 n [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 103 ] Johnson’s meeting with M’Hammedi, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] Manganese exports to U.S., 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] Meetings with Moroccan officials, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] —167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 128 ] Political situation, 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] U.S. development assistance, 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] U.S. food and agricultural assistance, 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 143 ] U.S. military assistance, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] -151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 165 n [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 143 ] Nigerian civil war, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] -667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 402 ] Nigerian political crisis: Autonomy offer for Eastern region, 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 378 ] Confederation option, 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] Countercoup of July 1966, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] -619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 364 ] Federal government’s requests for international support, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 375 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 384 ] Mediation efforts, 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 382 ] -651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] Military conflict, prospects for, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 375 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Secession issue, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 365 ] U.S. military assistance, requests for, 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] -635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 374 ] U.S. policy, 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 369 ] -626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 384 ] U.S.-U.K. consultations re, 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] -641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] North Africa, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 158 ] Portuguese Africa: African-Portuguese talks, proposed, 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] 20, 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] -724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 435 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] Anderson Plan for self-determination, 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] -758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 435 ] Azores issue, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] Communist assistance for nationalist movements, 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] Internal dissension in nationalist movements, 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 416 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] Mondlane’s U.S. visit, 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] Political action program for nationalist movements, proposed, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 419 ] Portugal’s use of U.S./NATO military equipment, 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] -768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 440 ] Regional effects of fighting, 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] -768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 440 ] Rusk’s meetings with Portuguese leaders, 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] -787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 456 ] Self-determination issue, 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] -720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] -724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] -758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] UN actions re, 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 441 ] U.S. contacts with nationalist leaders, 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 431 ] U.S. covert support for nationalist movements, 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 450 ] -782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452 ] U.S. objectives re, 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] U.S. reports on nationalist movements, 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 453 ] Regional policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 410 n [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 234 ] Strengthened African Program, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 201 ] -312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 206 ] Rhodesia, U.S. arms embargo against, 795 [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 461 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 850 [ Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 539 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 571 ] Consulates’ withdrawal from Rhodesia, 953 n [ Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 565 ] Economic sanctions, 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] -862 [ Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 506 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] -909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562 ] Failure of campaign, U.S. contingency planning re, 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 556 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 556 ] “Fearless” proposals, 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] Military options, 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] -923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 556 ] Oil embargo, 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] -847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 506 ] -863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] Peace terms issue, 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 539 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 539 ] South Africa’s contacts with Rhodesians, 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] -930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] U.K. contingency planning, 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 480 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] U.K. military presence in Zambia, 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] -852 [ Pg. 852 includes portions of Doc. 501 and Doc. 502 ] U.S. program of sanctions, 840 [ Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] -860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] U.S. refusal to recognize government, 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 492 ] U.S.-U.K. discussions, 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] -910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 543 ] -918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] -923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] Zambia, U.S.-U.K. assistance for, 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 506 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 517 ] , 882 n [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 518 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 538 ] Zambia-Rhodesia economic warfare, 844 [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 496 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 517 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue, 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 486 ] -832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 837 n [ Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 490 ] Rhodesia’s declaration of independence, 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 492 ] Royal Commission of Inquiry, 834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] -836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 489 and Doc. 490 ] UN actions re, 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 477 ] U.S. policy, 827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 484 ] U.S.-U.K. coordinated approach, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] -805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 484 ] U.S.-U.K. protests, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 457 ] Six-Day War, U.S. policy, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 172 ] -262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 172 ] Somalia: Anti-American campaign, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 282 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Haile Selassie’s U.S. visit, concerns re, 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 324 ] Irredentist policies, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 275 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 277 ] -488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 324 ] Meeting with Abdirazak, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Meeting with Egal, 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 320 ] U.S. economic development assistance, 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] U.S. objectives and policies, 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] South Africa, 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 574 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] Apartheid policy, 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 1019 [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] -1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 614 ] Economic sanctions issue, 1019 [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] -1020 [ Pg. 1020 is part of Doc. 601 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] “One man-one vote” issue, 1101 [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 654 ] -1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] UN actions re, 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 587 ] -988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] U.S. Embassy staff transfer, South Africa’s request for, 1039 [ Pg. 1039 is part of Doc. 611 ] U.S. military involvement in support of UN actions, possible, 1025 [ Pg. 1025 is part of Doc. 604 ] U.S. military sales, 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] -967 [ Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 1002 [ Pg. 1002 is part of Doc. 595 ] , 1083 [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] -1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 652 ] U.S. non-segregation policy for personnel in South Africa, 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] -1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] U.S. ships’ port visits, 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 630 ] -1069 [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] U.S. space tracking stations in, 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 967 [ Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 616 ] South West Africa: Homelands for non-white groups (Odendaal plan), 1107 [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] -1108 [ Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] ICJ ruling re, 1054 [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 622 ] Terrorism Act trials, 1091 [ Pg. 1091 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 1093 [ Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 650 ] -1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 650 and Doc. 651 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 653 ] -1100 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 653 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] -1106 [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 656 ] UN administration issue, 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 636 ] -1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] U.S.-U.K. coordinated approach re, 1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] -1024 [ Pg. 1024 is part of Doc. 603 ] Tunisia, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Arab League agenda, rejection of, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] Bourguiba’s U.S. visit, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Civic action program, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 159 ] Meetings with Bourguiba Jr., 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Meetings with Driss, 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 165 ] -249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Six-Day War and, 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] U.S. economic development assistance, 225 n [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] U.S. military assistance, 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] -233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 163 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 165 ] -249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 169 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] -265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] U.S. security guarantee, proposed, 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 169 ] Vietnam war, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 219 ] Wheelus Air Base: Instructions for U.S. negotiators, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] Israel-related concerns of Libyans, 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Libyanization program, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Tunisia’s security and, 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 158 ] U.S. action program re, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 53 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] U.S. discussions with Idris re, 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] U.S.-Libyan relations and, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] U.S. negotiating strategy, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 44 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 97 [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] Russell, Francis H., 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 177 ] Russell, Richard, 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 556 ] Sacksteder, Frederick, 142 n [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Salans, Carl F., 1073 n [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 636 ] Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, 728 [ Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] -787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 456 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 535 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 537 ] Samantar, Haji Mussa, 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] Sanderson, Fred H., 812 n [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 472 ] Sandys, Duncan, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 182 ] Sanusi, Alhaji M. A., 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 365 ] Sarrell, Amb., 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Satterthwaite, Joseph C., 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] -970 [ Pg. 970 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] -977 [ Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 581 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 585 ] -984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] -1028 [ Pg. 1028 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] , 1031 n [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 609 ] Saunders, Harold H., 11 n [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 300 n [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] Algeria, 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 51 n [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Libya, 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] -148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 98 ] Morocco, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] Nigerian civil war, 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] -688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 401 ] Southern Africa region, U.S. policy re, 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] -704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] Tunisia, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 167 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] Wheelus Air Base, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] -96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 68 ] -104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Savimbi, Jonas, 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 448 ] -778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 448 ] Schaufele, William E., Jr., 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] Schlosser, Wilhelm, 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 448 ] Schmitz, Charles A., 797 n [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 462 ] Schultze, Charles L., 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Schwartz, Harry H., 898 n [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] -901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] Schwebel, Stephen M., 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] Scott, Joseph W., 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] -721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415 ] Scott, Kenneth, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] Seaborg, Glenn T., 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Sebastian, Peter, 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 451 ] Seider, Francis J., 1102 n [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] Senegal, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] Senghor, Leopold Sedar, 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group, 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] -901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] -1110 [ Pg. 1110 is part of Doc. 659 ] Shego, Ali Omar, 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] Shullaw, J. Harold, 121 n [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] Sianis, Maj. Gen. Pete C., 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 412 ] -715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 412 ] Sibley, Gen., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] Sieverts, Frank A., 1067 n [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 630 ] Sisco, Joseph J., 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 169 n [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 437 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] , 846 n [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] -913 [ Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 541 ] , 923 n [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562 ] -948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 562 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 is part of Doc. 565 ] -953 [ Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 565 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1073 n [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] -1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1079 [ Pg. 1079 is part of Doc. 639 ] -1080 [ Pg. 1080 is part of Doc. 639 ] Sisulu, Walter, 992 [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] Six-Day War, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 226 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 226 ] Slaoui, Driss, 151 n [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] Slim, Taieb, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 435 ] Sloan, Frank K., 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 576 ] -969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 582 ] -979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583 ] Sloan, Samuel, 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] Smith, Bromley K., 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 849 n [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 932 n [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 621 ] Smith, Ian, 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 553 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against: “Fearless” proposals, 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 572 ] U.K.-Rhodesia negotiations, 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 534 ] , 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] -924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 547 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] -929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 559 ] Zambia-Rhodesia economic warfare, 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue: Johnson’s correspondence with, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] -833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] Rhodesia’s declaration of independence, 838 [ Pg. 838 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] Rhodesia’s position, 820 [ Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] -821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 479 ] U.K.-Rhodesia negotiations, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] -830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] U.S. policy re, 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] -808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 469 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] -811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 478 ] -820 [ Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] U.S.-U.K. protests, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] Smith, Robert P., 451 n [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 620 n [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 633 n [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 634 n [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 636 n [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 641 n [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 399 ] Smith, Rufus Z., 633 n [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] Smyser, William R., 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] Sobotka, Clement, 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] Soko, J. H., 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 458 ] Solbert, Peter, 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 303 ] Sole (South Africa), 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 630 ] , 1068 n [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] Solomon, Anthony M., 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 494 ] , 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 881 n [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 517 ] Somalia ( see also Ethiopia-Somalia dispute ; Horn of Africa ), 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] Anti-American campaign, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 282 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Arab-Israeli conflict and, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Egal government, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 340 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 342 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] Haile Selassie’s U.S. visit, concerns re, 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 324 ] Humphrey’s visit, 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 231 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 231 ] Irredentist policies, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 275 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 277 ] -488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 279 ] -491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 334 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Aden, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 285 ] Johnson’s meeting with Egal, 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] Kenya, relations with, 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 340 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] Rusk’s meeting with Abdirazak, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Rusk’s meeting with Egal, 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 353 ] -604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] U.S. covert operations, 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] U.S. economic development assistance, 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 347 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia, protests re, 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 313 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 313 ] U.S. objectives and policies, 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] Williams’s meeting with Adan, 529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Sommers, Cmdr., 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 392 ] Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 500 n [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] South Africa ( see also South West Africa ), 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 226 ] -372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 357 ] Apartheid policy, 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 574 ] -965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 574 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 is part of Doc. 600 ] International initiatives re, 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] -994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 1018 [ Pg. 1018 is part of Doc. 600 ] -1019 [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 614 ] U.S. popular campaign against, 1019 [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] -1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] Black nationalists, actions against (Rivonia Trial), 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 585 ] -984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] Blockade issue, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 406 ] -696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 406 ] Civil aviation agreement with U.S., 1108 [ Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] -1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] Economic sanctions issue, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 600 ] -1011 [ Pg. 1011 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1019 [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] -1020 [ Pg. 1020 is part of Doc. 601 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] -1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 629 ] Economic situation, 1010 [ Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 600 ] Homelands policy, 1009 [ Pg. 1009 is part of Doc. 600 ] -1010 [ Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1084 [ Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] -1085 [ Pg. 1085 is part of Doc. 644 ] Intelligence reports on, 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] -989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] -1078 [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 638 ] Johnson’s meeting with Oppenheimer, 1028 [ Pg. 1028 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] -1029 [ Pg. 1029 is part of Doc. 606 ] Military situation, 1010 [ Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 600 ] Moderate whites, U.S. support for, 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 609 ] Nationalist movement, 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] -699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] Nuclear energy program, 998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] -999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 599 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] “One man-one vote” issue, 1101 [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 654 ] -1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] Political situation, 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] -989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 1078 [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 638 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 522 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 549 ] Contacts with Rhodesians, 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] -921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] -930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] Economic sanctions, rejection of, 938 [ Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 554 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] -943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 561 ] U.S.-South Africa discussions, 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 628 ] -1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue, 791 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 458 ] Strategic importance to U.S., 1011 [ Pg. 1011 is part of Doc. 600 ] UN actions re, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 403 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] -988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 992 n [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] -994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 614 ] U.S. disengagement, proposed, 1083 [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] -1084 [ Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] U.S. Embassy staff transfer, South Africa’s request for, 1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] -1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 is part of Doc. 611 ] U.S. loans and investment guarantees, 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 is part of Doc. 593 ] -997 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 is part of Doc. 609 ] -1035 [ Pg. 1035 is part of Doc. 609 ] U.S. military involvement in support of UN actions, possible, 1025 [ Pg. 1025 is part of Doc. 604 ] -1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] U.S. military requirements for facilities and contractual support, 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 633 ] -1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 635 ] U.S. military sales, 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] -969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 582 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583 ] -981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] -1005 [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] -1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 618 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] -1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 1083 [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 650 and Doc. 651 ] -1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 652 ] U.S. non-segregation policy for personnel in South Africa, 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] -1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] -1028 [ Pg. 1028 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] , 1030 [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 607 ] -1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] -1033 [ Pg. 1033 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1042 [ Pg. 1042 is part of Doc. 613 ] U.S. policy toward, 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 is part of Doc. 579 ] -974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] Explanation of policy to African countries, 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 609 ] -1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] JCS position, 989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] -991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 589 ] National Policy Paper, 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 600 ] -1019 [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] NSAM No. 295, 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] -982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 584 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] -986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] -991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] -998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] -1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] -1043 [ Pg. 1043 is part of Doc. 613 ] U.S. ships’ port visits, 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] -1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] -1028 [ Pg. 1028 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 620 ] -1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 630 ] -1069 [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] -1091 [ Pg. 1091 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] -1110 [ Pg. 1110 is part of Doc. 659 ] U.S. space tracking stations in, 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 967 [ Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 576 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 578 ] -972 [ Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 578 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 582 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 997 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1030 [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 607 ] -1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] -1033 [ Pg. 1033 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 1042 [ Pg. 1042 is part of Doc. 613 ] -1043 [ Pg. 1043 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 615 ] -1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] , 1078 [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 638 ] Verwoerd’s assassination, 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 625 ] -1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] Southern Africa region, U.S. policy re, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] -715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 412 ] South West Africa, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 600 ] -1008 [ Pg. 1008 is part of Doc. 600 ] Homelands for non-white groups (Odendaal plan), 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] -970 [ Pg. 970 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] -977 [ Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 581 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] -996 [ Pg. 996 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1107 [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 657 ] -1108 [ Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] ICJ ruling on, 970 n [ Pg. 970 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 600 ] -1008 [ Pg. 1008 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621 ] -1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 624 ] Intelligence reports on, 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 619 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] -1066 [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 629 ] Mandate system, 965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 574 ] Nationalist movement, 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] -699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 1088 [ Pg. 1088 is part of Doc. 646 ] -1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] Terrorism Act trials, 1091 [ Pg. 1091 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] -1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 650 and Doc. 651 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 653 ] -1100 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 653 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] -1106 [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 656 ] UN administration issue, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 574 ] -965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 574 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 628 ] -1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 628 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] -1066 [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 629 ] Dialogue with South Africa re, 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] -1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1079 [ Pg. 1079 is part of Doc. 639 ] -1080 [ Pg. 1080 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 645 ] -1087 [ Pg. 1087 is part of Doc. 645 ] General Assembly Resolution 2248, 1080 n [ Pg. 1080 is part of Doc. 639 ] U.S. position, 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 636 ] -1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] U.S. aide-memoire re, 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] -1060 [ Pg. 1060 is part of Doc. 626 ] U.S. policy re, 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 is part of Doc. 579 ] -974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 586 ] -986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] , 997 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 593 ] -998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 600 ] -1018 [ Pg. 1018 is part of Doc. 600 ] U.S.-U.K. coordinated approach re, 1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] -1024 [ Pg. 1024 is part of Doc. 603 ] , 1033 [ Pg. 1033 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 is part of Doc. 609 ] -1036 [ Pg. 1036 is part of Doc. 609 ] Friendly countries’ support, 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] -1042 [ Pg. 1042 is part of Doc. 613 ] Soviet Union, 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 352 ] Algeria, relations with, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Arms control, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 218 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 218 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Ghana, relations with, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 261 ] Horn of Africa, 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 334 ] U.S.-Soviet arms freeze, proposed, 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] -543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Morocco, relations with, 149 n [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 128 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 128 ] Nationalist movements of Southern Africa and, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] Nigerian civil war, 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 398 ] North Africa, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 4 ] Portuguese Africa, 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 432 ] Six-Day War, 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 172 ] Somalia, relations with, 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 353 ] -604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] South Africa’s apartheid policy, 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 592 ] Subversive activity in Africa, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 230 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 232 ] Spain, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] Spanish Sahara, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 133 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Special Group, 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] -721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] -739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates ( see also National Intelligence Estimates): SNIE 70–2–66 , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] -1066 [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 629 ] SNIE 70–66 , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 619 ] SNIE 71–64 , 740 [ Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] -741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423 ] SNIE 72–65 , 826 [ Pg. 826 is part of Doc. 482 ] SNIE 73–64 , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] -989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] SNIE 76.1–68 , 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 350 ] Spicer, R. Peter, 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 165 ] Spiers, Ronald I., 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] Springsteen, George S., Jr., 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 809 n [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 812 n [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 472 ] , 813 n [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 943 n [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] Starkey, Joseph F., 813 n [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] Steigman, Andrew L., 553 n [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 597 n [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] Stephan, Ralph W., 1059 n [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] Stephenson, Amb., 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 977 [ Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 581 ] Stern, Thomas, 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Sterner, Michael, 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] Stevens, John, 842 [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 494 ] Stevenson, Adlai E., 795 n [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 595 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 is part of Doc. 595 ] Stewart, Sir Michael, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 480 ] -824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 494 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 902 n [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] -913 [ Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 541 ] , 918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 543 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 546 ] Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 767 n [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 535 ] Stoltzfus, William A., Jr., 26 n [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] Stookey, Robert N., 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] Stout, Charles R., 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Straus, Peter, 215 n [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 231 ] Strengthened African Program, 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 206 ] -319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 206 ] Strong, Curtis C., 97 n [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 318 n [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 553 n [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] Sub-Saharan Africa. See Regional policy regarding Sub-Saharan Africa . Sudan, 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Suddarth, Roscoe S., 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Sunay, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 172 ] Swaziland, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 409 ] -702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 409 ] Symington, 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] Symington, James W., 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] Symmes, Harrison M., 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Talbot, Phillips, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] Tanzania (Tanganyika), 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 510 ] Tanzania-Zambia railroad, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] Tasca, Henry J., 18 n [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 26 n [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 71 n [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 219 n [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 494 n [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 499 n [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 518 n [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 745 n [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] Morocco, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Tashoma Haile-Mariam, 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 339 ] Task Force on the Review of African Development Policies and Programs, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 215 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Taswell, Harold L. T., 1024 [ Pg. 1024 is part of Doc. 603 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 is part of Doc. 611 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 624 ] -1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] -1060 [ Pg. 1060 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1079 [ Pg. 1079 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 645 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 653 ] -1100 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 653 ] , 1106 [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 656 ] , 1108 n [ Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Taylor, Frank D., 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583 ] -981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] -991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 589 ] Taylor, Adm. R. L., 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] Taylor, Rufus, 572 n [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 698 n [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 556 ] , 1077 n [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] Taylor, Rush W., 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] Tedla Bairu, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 336 ] Telecommunications system for Africa, proposed, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 198 ] Telli, Diallo, 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 385 ] Tempelsman, Maurice, 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 231 ] Thant, U, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 398 ] Thiam, Doudou, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] Thirkeild, Ben, 451 n [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Thompson, Herbert B., 263 n [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 849 n [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 553 n [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] Committee, 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425 ] -743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 449 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452 ] Thurston, Raymond L., 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 340 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 586 n [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] -591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 597 n [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 351 ] Tienken, Arthur T., 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 451 ] Tito, Marshal, 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 244 ] Todman, Terence A., 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Toon, Malcolm, 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] Torbert, Horace G., 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 490 n [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 494 n [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 498 n [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Touba, Pauline, 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 448 ] Toumayan, Alec G., 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Toure, Sekou, 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Towsey, Kenneth, 796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 461 ] Tran Van Do, 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 231 ] Trend, Sir Burke, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 538 ] Tresidder, Argus, 1031 n [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] Trimble, William C., 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 123 n [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 232 n [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 237 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 625 n [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 633 n [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 634 n [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 636 n [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 641 n [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 650 n [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 751 n [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 812 n [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 472 ] , 943 n [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 1068 n [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] Trivers, Howard, 500 n [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Tron, Rene A., 9 n [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 50 n [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Trued, Melvyn, 842 [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 494 ] Trueheart, William C., 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 451 ] Tsafendakis, Demetrios, 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 625 ] -1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] Tshombe, Moise, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 427 ] Tubman, William, 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 231 ] -392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 231 ] Tuhadeleni, Eliaser, 1091 [ Pg. 1091 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] Tully, Andrew, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 241 ] Tunisia ( see also North Africa ), 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] African nations, relations with, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] Algerian coup of 1965, 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] Arab League agenda, rejection of, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Bourguiba’s U.S. visit, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Civic action program, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 159 ] Economic situation, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] France, relations with, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] Humphrey’s visit, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 231 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] Israel, policy toward, 223 n [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 175 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Bourguiba, 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Johnson’s meetings with Bourguiba, 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Johnson’s meetings with Bourguiba, Jr., 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 150 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Komer’s meetings with Bourguiba, Jr., 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] -223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Libya, relations with, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] -223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Military situation, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] Morocco, relations with, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] Mutual defense arrangement with U.S., proposed, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Nasser’s military threat, 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 158 ] Political situation, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] Rusk’s meetings with Bourguiba Jr., 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Rusk’s meetings with Driss, 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 165 ] -249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Six-Day War and, 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Territorial claims, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Turkey as source of military equipment, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 177 ] U.S. development assistance, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] -221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 175 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] U.S. military assistance, 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] -233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 163 ] -254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 169 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] -265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] U.S. security guarantee, proposed, 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Vietnam war, policy re, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] Turkey, 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 177 ] Tyler, William R., 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 720 n [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 721 n [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 430 ] -750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] Uganda, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] Underhill, Francis T., 834 n [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] United Arab Republic (UAR) ( see also Six-Day War ), 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 305 ] United Kingdom ( see also Rhodesian government, international campaign against ; Rhodesian unilateral independence issue ): Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs, attitude toward, 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Decreasing involvement in Africa, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 215 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] East African military presence, 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] Ethiopia, 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 339 ] Ghana, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 238 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Libya, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 77 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 81 ] -123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 92 ] Nigerian civil war, 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 385 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 387 ] -660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 398 ] Nigerian political crisis, 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 370 ] -629 [ Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] -641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 385 ] South Africa, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] South West Africa, 997 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] -1024 [ Pg. 1024 is part of Doc. 603 ] , 1033 [ Pg. 1033 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 is part of Doc. 609 ] -1036 [ Pg. 1036 is part of Doc. 609 ] Zanzibar, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] United Nations ( see also South West Africa ): Nuclear free zone issue, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 205 ] Portuguese Africa, 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 438 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 441 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 843 n [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] -847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510 ] -867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 516 ] -880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] -902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 563 ] -953 [ Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 565 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 571 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue, 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] -795 [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 481 ] , 843 n [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 495 ] South Africa, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 403 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] -988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 992 n [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 590 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] -994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 614 ] United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 215 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 231 ] United States Information Agency (USIA), 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] Usher, Arsene, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] Valdes, Philip H., 18 n [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 149 n [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] Valenti, Jack, 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] Van Oss, Hendrik, 451 n [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Vance, Cyrus R., 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] -89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 582 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 633 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 is part of Doc. 634 ] Verwoerd, Henrik F., 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] -977 [ Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 581 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] -996 [ Pg. 996 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1031 n [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] , 1042 [ Pg. 1042 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 625 ] -1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] Videira, Alphonse, 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 448 ] Vietnam war, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 254 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 273 ] Voice of America, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 197 ] “Voice of the Arabs” radio, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 50 ] Volta River project. See under Ghana. Vorster, B. J., 921 n [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 628 ] Wachuku, Agnes, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 357 ] -611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 585 ] Walker, Angus, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 492 ] Walker, Peter C., 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 575 n [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 336 ] Walsh, John P., 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 859 n [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 890 n [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] , 919 n [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 920 n [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] Ward, Barbara, 856 [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 502 ] Warren, George L., 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 232 n [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 767 n [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 995 n [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 593 ] Watson, Duncan, 903 [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 534 ] Webb, James E., 1045 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 615 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 616 ] -1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] Wellman, Harvey R., 908 n [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] Wells, H. Bartlett, 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] West African Economic Community, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 269 ] Westerfield, Samuel Z., 745 n [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] Wey, Commodore, 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 370 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 376 ] Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] Wheelus Air Base: Closure issue, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 40 ] Defense Department position, 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] -89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 68 ] -104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Harriman’s assessment of situation, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] -81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 50 ] Idris’s position, 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Israel-related concerns of Libyans, 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 92 ] Libyan Air Force and, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 92 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] Libyanization program, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 60 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 65 ] Libya’s public statements on termination of U.S. rights, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 41 ] Negotiations re, 85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 92 ] Instructions for U.S. negotiators, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 59 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] U.S. negotiating strategy, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Relocation of military functions, contingency planning for, 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Six-Day War, crisis related to, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Strategic value to U.S., 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 48 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] Tunisia’s security and, 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 158 ] U.S. action program re, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 53 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] U.S. discussions with Idris re, 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] U.S.-Libyan relations and, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] White, Lee C., 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 190 ] Wichser, Mary J., 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] Wilkins, Roy, 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 295 n [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 194 ] Williams, Franklin H., 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 634 n [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] Williams, G. Mennen, 16 n [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 30 n [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 149 n [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 169 n [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 219 n [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 220 n [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 223 n [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 224 n [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 225 n [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 288 n [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 419 n [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 428 n [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 717 n [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 722 n [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 416 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 436 ] , 792 n [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 795 n [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 834 n [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 837 n [ Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 490 ] , 844 n [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 496 ] , 851 n [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 881 n [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 517 ] , 883 n [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 895 n [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 966 n [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 575 ] , 1019 n [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601 ] , 1021 n [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 1022 n [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 614 ] Algeria, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 28 ] Ethiopia, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] -532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 309 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 311 ] Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 279 ] -491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Ghana, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 250 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 255 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 256 ] Libya, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] -70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 72 ] Morocco, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 110 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] Portuguese Africa, 720 [ Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 721 n [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418 ] -732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 442 ] -771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] Rhodesia, 795 n [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 462 ] -798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] -800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] Somalia, 529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] South Africa, 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 578 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 612 ] -1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 615 ] Strengthened African Program, 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 200 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 206 ] -319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 206 ] Tanzania-Zambia railroad, 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] Wheelus Air Base, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] -81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 50 ] Williamson, Larry C., 927 n [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] Wilson, Harold, 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 388 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] Rhodesian government, international campaign against: Commonwealth Conferences re, 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 522 ] -888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 542 ] -916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 542 ] Economic sanctions, 850 [ Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] -888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] -909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 538 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 929 n [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] Famine relief, 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] -889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] “Fearless” proposals, 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 572 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Wilson, 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] -851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] -860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] -889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] -891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 528 ] -895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 534 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] -906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 542 ] -916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 544 ] -921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] -924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 547 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] -929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] -956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] Johnson’s meetings with Wilson, 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] -874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 539 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 539 ] Oil embargo, 850 [ Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 500 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 513 ] Peace terms issue, 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 522 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] U.K. military presence in Zambia, 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 500 ] -851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 528 ] U.K.-Rhodesia negotiations, 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 902 n [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 534 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] -906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 911 n [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] -924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 547 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] -929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] -956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] U.S.-U.K. discussions, 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] -909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 538 ] Wilson’s meeting with Kaunda, 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 528 ] Zambia, U.S.-U.K. assistance for, 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 513 ] Zambia-Rhodesia border closing, 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 528 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence issue: Johnson’s correspondence with Smith, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] -830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 485 ] Johnson’s correspondence with Wilson, 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] -814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] -830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] -834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] U.K.-Rhodesia negotiations, 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] -814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] -834 [ Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] U.S.-U.K. coordinated approach, 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] -814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 484 ] U.S.-U.K. protests, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 457 ] Wina, Arthur, 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 458 ] Witman, William, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 411 ] -707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 411 ] Witt, William H., 1031 n [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] Wolf, Joseph J., 123 n [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 575 n [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 640 ] Wood, Gen., 510 n [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Woods, George, 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 216 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 249 ] World Bank, 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510 ] Action Program on African Development Policies and Programs, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 214 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 216 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 224 ] Ghana, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 249 ] Morocco, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 126 ] Tunisia, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] World Youth Festival, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 19 ] Wright, Ken, 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] Wright, M. A., 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 72 ] Wright, Oliver, 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 534 ] Yaker, Layachi, 50 n [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 38 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Yarmolinsky, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] Yates, Capt., 1069 [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] Yifru, Ketema, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 317 ] Yost, Robert L., 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 435 ] Zablocki, Clement, 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 237 ] Zambia ( see also Rhodesian government, international campaign against ), 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 409 ] -702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 448 ] Humphrey’s visit, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 231 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 231 ] Nationalist fighting in Angola, 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 439 ] -768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 440 ] Rhodesian unilateral independence, concerns re, 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 458 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 468 ] Tanzania-Zambia railroad, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] Zantuti, Brig., 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 92 ] Zanzibar ( see also Tanzania), 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 182 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 357 ] -611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 357 ] Z’Biri, Col., 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Zook, Ben M., 500 n [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Zulu, A. G., 882 n [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 518 ] Zwick, Charles J., 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 274 ]