FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XX, ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, 1967–1968 Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XX Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968 United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XX) Contents Historian's Statement Preface Sources for the Foreign Relations Series Abbreviations Persons Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968 (Documents 1-376) Index Historian's Statement Historian's Statement The Department of State released today Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XX , Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968. This volume, part of the ongoing official record of American foreign policy, presents the record of the Johnson administration's efforts to cope with the aftermath of the June 1967 War. The volume's account of developments opens in the wake of the adoption on November 22, 1967, of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which sought to establish a framework for settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. U.S. policy objectives at that point were to participate in efforts to salvage an enduring peace out of the war while limiting the flow of arms to the area and discouraging Israel from adding the dangerous element of nuclear arms into the mix. The documentation published in the volume illustrates that by the time that President Lyndon Johnson briefed his successor on foreign policy developments in November 1968, the record of U.S. policy in the Middle East following the 1967 war consisted of a series of unrealized objectives, which left the new administration with daunting prospects. The United Nations mediation effort launched in November 1967 with strong U.S. support continued throughout the waning months of the Johnson administration but accomplished very little, despite the sustained efforts of UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring. The Jarring mission served to confirm that the June War had intensified mutual suspicion between Israel and its Arab neighbors. As prospects for the overall peace settlement promoted by the Jarring mission dimmed, U.S. officials sought to foster an agreement between Israel and Jordan. A series of secret exchanges between senior Israeli and Jordanian officials proved to be equally inconclusive. While the Johnson administration was attempting to promote a peace settlement, it was also trying to reduce tensions in the area, which it saw as leading to an arms race. At the end of 1967 the United States was attempting to hold the line against a fresh infusion of weapons into the area. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was pouring a steady stream of weapons into the region to offset Arab losses during the war. The Israeli Government worried that the end result of the Israeli victory might be Arab military superiority unless the United States increased the flow of weapons to Israel. Jordan, the lone Arab combatant that looked to the West for military supplies, also pressed the United States to offset its heavy losses. To shore up Israeli security, and to prevent Soviet influence from supplanting that of the United States in Amman, the Johnson administration agreed during 1968 to new weapons programs for Israel and Jordan, including the introduction of a major new weapon into the area — the F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber — which President Johnson ultimately decided to sell to Israel. The volume documents the tense negotiations over the sale of the Phantoms, during which U.S. officials sought to tie the sale to Israeli agreement to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel rejected the effort as an infringement of its sovereignty and viewed its potential for nuclear capability as a brake on Arab aggression, which should not be discarded lightly. Like most other Arab states, the United Arab Republic broke relations with the United States during the 1967 war on the specious grounds that U.S. military forces had been actively involved on Israel's side during the fighting. There is documentation in the volume on the U.S. response to hints from President Gamal Adbel Nasser that he would have liked to reestablish relations as a counterbalance to Soviet influence in Cairo. The United States and the United Arab Republic differed, however, on what would make a rapprochement possible, and relations remained broken. U.S. influence in the Arab world waned as the Arab states perceived the United States as Israel's major supporter. The decline in U.S. influence in Arab capitals reduced the prospects for promoting a peace settlement in the Middle East. Those prospects were grim at the end of 1968, as terrorists tested Israeli resolve, and Israel and the United Arab Republic engaged in what became a war of attrition. Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Volume XX , Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968 The Office of the Historian has prepared a summary of the volume. For further information, contact David S. Patterson, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-1127; fax: (202) 663-1289; e-mail: history@state.gov. The texts of the volume, the summary, and this press release will soon be available on the Office's Web site: www.state.gov/r/pa/ho. Copies of volume XX can be purchased from the Government Printing Office. Sources for the Foreign Relations Series Sources for the Foreign Relations Series The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Many of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration. The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files for these years have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, those that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sources for Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XX In preparing this volume, the editor made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. The bulk of the foreign policy records at the Johnson Library are in the country files and other component parts of the National Security file. Within the National Security file, the NSC Meetings file, the NSC Histories file, and the Special Head of State Correspondence file proved to be of particular value. The editor also made extensive use of the files of National Security Adviser Walt W. Rostow and Harold Saunders, the member of the NSC staff with primary responsibility for the Middle East. Transcripts of President Johnson's conversations recorded in the Cabinet Room of the White House added important depth to the record. Second in importance only to the White House records at the Johnson Library were the records of the Department of State. Because the Ambassadors in the countries of the region played a major role in the formulation of policy, the volume includes a selection of telegraphic correspondence between the Embassies and the Department of State. The Department's central files contain the cable traffic recording U.S. diplomatic relations with Israel, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Lebanon, and other Arab countries; memoranda of diplomatic conversations; and memoranda proposing action or providing information. Some important documents are found only in the Department's lot files. The conference files maintained by the Executive Secretariat contain briefing materials as well as records of conversations. Documentation on initiatives that were not approved is often found only in desk or bureau files. Files of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs provide insights into the roles played by key policy-makers such as Joseph J. Sisco and Rodger P. Davies. Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Central Intelligence Agency provides the Department of State historians access to intelligence documents from records in its custody and at the Presidential libraries. This access is arranged and facilitated by the CIA's History Staff, part of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding. This volume includes a number of intelligence records. Among the intelligence records reviewed for the volume were those in country and intelligence files at the Johnson Library, CIA operational files on the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute, the files of Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, CIA intelligence reports and summaries, the CIA files containing National Intelligence Estimates, and the historical files of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the Department of State records is in process, and many of those records are already available for public review at the National Archives. The declassification review of other records is going forward in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12958, under which all records over 25 years old, except file series exemptions requested by agencies and approved by the President, should be reviewed for declassification by 2000. Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files . See National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files . These files may be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59. INR/IL Historical Files Intelligence files, including records of the 303 Committee, containing records from the 1950s through the 1970s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. NEA Files: Lot 70 D 237 Files of Joseph J. Sisco as Deputy Assistant Secretary and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 1963-1968. NEA Files: Lot 71 D 79 Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 1967-1969. NEA Files: Lot 71 D 384 Files of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Rodger P. Davies, 1967-1969. NEA Files: 72 D 39 Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 1967-1970. NEA Files: Lot 73 D 376 Files of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Rodger P. Davies, 1967-1970. NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102 Files of the Director of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1960-1975. Rostow Files: Lot 69 D 196 Files of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow, October 1966-January 1969. S/P Files: Lot 71 D 382 Top Secret files of the Policy Planning Council, 1964-1970. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Nixon Presidential Materials, National Security File, Kissinger Office Files Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State Central Files AE ISR: atomic energy, Israel AID (US) 15-4 ISR: PL 480 agreements, U.S.-Israel AID (US) 15-8 ISR: Title I, commodity sales for foreign currency, Israel AID (US) 15 JORDAN: PL 480, Food for Peace Program, Jordan AID (US) LEB: general policy, U.S. aid to Lebanon AV 12 ISR: aircraft and aeronautical equipment, Israel CUL 6 ISR: commemorative celebrations and holidays, Israel DEF LEB: defense affairs, Lebanon DEF 8 ISR: exhibitions, shows, parades, Israel DEF 12-5 ISR: armaments procurement and sale, Israel DEF 12-5 JORDAN: armaments procurement and sale, Jordan DEF 18-6: arms control and disarmament control measures DEF 19-4 JORDAN-US: military assistance agreements, Jordan-U.S. DEF 19-4 US-JORDAN: military assistance agreements, U.S.-Jordan DEF 19-6 US-JORDAN: Communist bloc assistance, U.S.-Jordan DEF 19-8 US-ISR: defense equipment and supplies, U.S.-Israel DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN: defense equipment and supplies, U.S.-Jordan IT 11-16 UAR: canals, rivers, lakes, UAR POL ARAB: foreign policy trends, Arab states POL ARAB-ISR: political affairs and relations, Arab-Israeli dispute POL ISR-JORDAN: political affairs and relations, Israel-Jordan POL ISR-US: political affairs and relations, Israel-U.S. POL JER: foreign policy developments, Jerusalem POL PAL: foreign policy developments, Palestine POL 7 ISR: visits and meetings with Israeli leaders POL 7 LEB: visits and meetings with Lebanese leaders POL 13-10 ARAB: extremist organizations, Arab states POL 14 LEB: Lebanese elections POL 15-1 UAR: head of state and executive branch, United Arab Republic POL 27 ARAB-ISR: Arab-Israeli military operations POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR: Arab-Israeli truce, cease-fire POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM: Arab-Israeli truce, cease-fire negotiations POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR UN: U.N. oversight of the Arab-Israeli truce POL 33 GULF OF SUEZ: waters, boundaries, Gulf of Suez POL 32-1 ISR-LEB: Israel-Lebanon boundary disputes POL JORDAN-US: political affairs and relations, Jordan-U.S. POL 15-1 JORDAN: head of state and executive branch, Jordan POL 23 JORDAN: internal security and counter-insurgency, Jordan POL 23-8 JORDAN: demonstrations and riots, Jordan POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER: Jordan river water rights POL 15-1 SYR: head of state and executive branch, Syria POL 32-6 TIRAN: Tiran island claims POL UAR-US: political affairs and relations, United Arab Republic-U.S. POL 1 UAR-US: general policy and background, United Arab Republic-U.S. POL 7 US/BLACK visits and meetings of Eugene Black POL 7 US/BUNDY: visits and meetings of McGeorge Bundy POL 7 US/HARRIMAN visits and meetings of W. Averell Harriman POL 7 US/McCLOY: visits and meetings of John J. McCloy POL 7 US/SCRANTON: visits and meetings of Gov. William Scranton POL 15-1 US/NIXON: Head of State, Executive Branch, Pres.-elect Richard M. Nixon POL US-UAR: political affairs and relations, U.S.-U.A.R. POL US-USSR: political affairs and relations, U.S.-U.S.S.R. REF ARAB: refugees and migration, Arab states REF UNRWA: refugees and migration, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine UN 7: visits and meetings of UN officials Lot Files Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271 Files of the Under Secretary of State, September 1966-January 1969. Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192 Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, including texts of speeches and public statements, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversations. S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139 Top Secret files of the Policy Planning Council, 1963-1971; country files, 1965-1969. S/S Files: Lot 71 D 370 Presidential correspondence with foreign governments, 1961-1968. S/S Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182 Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials and on major conferences attended by the Secretary of State from January-November 1968, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. S/S Conference Files: Lot 70 D 418 Official visit chronologies, January 1968-December 1969, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S-S:CMS Files: Lot 70 D 263 Files of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, March 1968-January 1969, as maintained by the Communications Control and Management section of the Executive Secretariat. Central Intelligence Agency Job 79 R 01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files Job 80 B 01285A, DCI Files, Chronological files of DCI Richard Helms Job 80 R 01580R, DCI Files, Executive Registry subject files Job 00105A, DDO/NE Files, Critchfield Files, including SIG and IRG/NEA files Job 79-207A, DDO/IMS Files Job 78-07173A, O/DDO Files, Files of Thomas H. Karamessines, Assistant Deputy Director of Plans, April 1962-September 1967, Deputy Director of Plans, September 1967-February 1973 Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919 Top Secret files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1967. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498 Secret files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1968. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499 Top Secret files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1967-1968. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351 Top Secret files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1963-1969. OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468 Files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1967. OSD Files: FRC 91-0017 Top Secret Files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1949-1969. Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson National Security File Country File Agency File Cabinet Papers Special Head of State Correspondence File Memos to the President NSC Histories NSC Meetings File Files of Walt W. Rostow Files of Harold H. Saunders Special Files Meetings Notes File President's Daily Diary President's Appointment File (Diary Backup) Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room White House Central File Confidential File Subject File Other Personal Papers Papers of H. Barefoot Sanders Published Sources U.S. Government Documentary Collections U.S. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin , 1967-1968. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967-1968. ————. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956 . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970. Memoirs Eban, Abba. An Autobiography . New York: Random House, 1977. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point . New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1971. Parker, Richard B. The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East . Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993. Rostow, W. W. The Diffusion of Power . New York: Macmillan, 1972. Rusk, Dean. As I Saw It . New York: Norton, 1990. Abbreviations Abbreviations AA, anti-aircraft AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AID, Agency for International Development Amb, Ambassador APC, armored personnel carrier BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation ChiCom(s), Chinese Communist(s) CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CINCMEAFSA, Commander in Chief, Middle East/South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command CT, Country Team DAO, Defense Attache Office DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission Dept, Department of State Deptel, Department of State telegram Deptoff, Department of State officer DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DirGen, Director General DOD, Department of Defense DOD/ISA, Department of Defense, International Security Affairs DMZ, DZ, Demilitarized Zone EDT, Eastern Daylight Time EmbOff, Embassy officer EST, Eastern Standard Time Exdis, Exclusive Distribution (extremely limited distribution) FAA, Federal Aviation Administration FMS, foreign military sales FonMin, Foreign Minister FonOff, Foreign Office FY, fiscal year FYI, For your information GA, General Assembly (United Nations) GAA, General Armistice Agreement GOA, Government of Algeria GOI, Government of Israel GOJ, Government of Jordan GOL, Government of Lebanon GUAR, Government of the United Arab Republic HMG, Her Majesty's Government IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency IAEC, Israeli Atomic Energy Commission IAF, Israel Air Force IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization IDF, Israel Defense Forces IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group JAA, Jordan Arab Army JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum LBJ, initials of President Lyndon B. Johnson Limdis, Limited Distribution MAP, Military Assistance Program ME, Middle East Memcon, Memorandum of conversation MIG, A.I. Mikoyan i M.I. Gurevich (Soviet fighter aircraft named for designers Mikoyan and Gurevich) MilAtt, Military Attache NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/IAI, Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/UAR, Office of United Arab Republic Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NESA, Near East and South Asia Nodis, No Distribution (other than to persons indicated) Noforn, No Foreign Dissemination NPT, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSC, National Security Council NUMEC, Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense PCC, Palestine Conciliation Commission (United Nations) PermRep, Permanent Representative (United Nations) PFLOP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine P.L., Public Law PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization PM, PriMin, Prime Minister reftel, reference telegram Rep(s), Representatives Res, Resolution (United Nations) RG, Record Group SARG, Syrian Arab Republic Government SC, Security Council (United Nations) SecDef, Secretary of Defense Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State septel, separate telegram SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group SP AA, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns SSM, surface to surface missiles SYG, Secretary-General (United Nations) TDCS, Timely Dissemination of a Clandestine Service Message TDY, Temporary duty telcon, telephone conversation TIAS, Treaties and International Acts Series Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State UAR, United Arab Republic UARG, United Arab Republic Government UK, United Kingdom UN, United Nations UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNSC, United Nations Security Council USAF, United States Air Force USG, United States Government USRep(s), United States representatives USS, United States Ship USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UST, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations VN, Vietnam Persons Persons Allon, Yigal, Deputy Prime Minister of Israel and Minister for Immigrant Absorption from August 1968 Anderson, Robert B., Secretary of the Treasury, 1957-1961 Argov, Shlomo, Minister of Israeli Embassy from June 1968 Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from January 1967 Ball, George W., Representative to the United Nations, June-September 1968 Barbour, Walworth, Ambassador to Israel Battle, Lucius D., Ambassador to the United Arab Republic until March 1967; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, April 1967-September 1968 Bergus, Donald C., Principal Officer of the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic from July 1967 Black, Eugene R., former President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank); Special Adviser to the President Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France until February 1968; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Boutros, Fuad, Lebanese Foreign Minister from March 1968 Buffum, William B., Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until August 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, September 1965-December 1966; thereafter Deputy Representative to the United Nations Bull, Lieutenant General Odd, Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Clark, Ramsay, Attorney General Clifford, Clark M., Secretary of Defense from March 1968 Comay, Michael S., Israeli Permanent Representative at the United Nations in 1967 Daoud, Colonel Muhammed, Jordanian liaison with Israel in Sandstorm talks Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Dayan, Moshe, Israeli Minister of Defense from June 1967 Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States Eban, Abba, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Edde, Pierre, Lebanese Finance Minister from February 1968 Eilts, Hermann F., Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Eshkol, Levi, Prime Minister of Israel Evron, Ephraim, Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Washington until June 1968 Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia Farra, Mohammed Hussein El, Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations Fawzi, Mohammed, Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic until 1967 Feinberg, Abraham, Chairman of the Executive Committee, American Bank and Trust Company, New York City Foster, John W., member of the National Security Council staff Freeman, Orville, Secretary of Agriculture Gaud, William S., Administrator, Agency for International Development Ghorbal, Ashraf, Minister of the United Arab Republic Interests Section of the Embassy of India in the United States from January 1968 Goldberg, Arthur J., Permanent Representative to the United Nations until June 1968 Hakim, Georges, Foreign Minister of Lebanon until February 1968 Handley, William J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harman, Avraham, Ambassador of Israel until February 1968 Hart, Parker T., Ambassador to Turkey until October 1968; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Hassan, Crown Prince of Jordan and younger brother of King Hussein Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence Helou, Charles, President of Lebanon Hod, Brigadier General Mordechai, Commander, Israel Defense Forces Air Force Houghton, Robert B., Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, January 1967-July 1968 Hussein I, ibn Talal, King of Jordan Jarring, Gunnar, Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union; detailed to the United Nations to serve as Special Representative, United Nations Middle East Mission Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States Johnson, W. Thomas, White House Deputy Press Secretary Jones, Jim R., Assistant to the President under Marvin Watson, February 1965-January 1968; Deputy Special Assistant to the President, January-May 1968; Special Assist-ant to the President from May 1968; also, from January 1968, served as the President's Appointments Secretary Karame, Rashid, Prime Minister of Lebanon until February 1968 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Under Secretary of State Khammash, General Amer, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Jordan Khouli, Hassan Sabri al-, Representative of President Nasser at the Arab League; member of UAR delegation to Khartoum Conference in August 1967; also President of the Council of Ministers Kony, Mohammed Awad El, Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations McCloy, John J., President's Special Emissary for Near East Arms Limitation McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense until February 1968 Meeker, Leonard C., Legal Adviser, Department of State Murray, Robert J., Deputy Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Nasser, Gamal Abdel, President of the United Arab Republic Nitze, Paul H., Deputy Secretary of Defense from July 1967 Parker, Richard B., Country Director for United Arab Republic Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from August 1967 Porter, Dwight J., Ambassador to Lebanon Rabin, Lt. Gen. Yitzak, Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces until December 1967; Ambassador of Israel from February 1968 Rafael, Gideon, Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, May 1967-November 1968; thereafter Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Riad, Mahmoud, Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic; head of the UAR delegation to the 22d Session of the UN General Assembly, September-December 1967 Riad, Mohamed, Counselor, UAR Foreign Ministry; member of the UAR delegation to the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly, June-September 1967, and the 22d Session of the UN General Assembly, September-December 1967 Rifai, Abdul Moneim, Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs from April 1968 Rifai, Zaid, Secretary-General of the Royal Court of Jordan; King Hussein's private secretary Rostow, Eugene V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Rostow, Walt W., Special Assistant to the President Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Saunders, Harold H., member of the National Security Council Staff Schwartz, Harry H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission Seelye, Talcott, Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from July 1968 Sharaf, Abdul Hamid, Jordanian Ambassador to the United States from August 1967 Shazar, Zalman, President of Israel Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from September 1965 Smith, Bromley K., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Stewart, Michael, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from April 1968 Symmes, Harrison M., Ambassador to Jordan from November 1967 Talhouni, Bahjat, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan from October 1967 Tcherniakov, Yuri N., Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy until December 1968 Tekoah, Yosef, Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Touqan, Ahmad, Deputy Prime Minister of Jordan Walsh, John P., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State until September 1967; thereafter Acting Executive Secretary Warnke, Paul C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from August 1967 Weizman, Brigadier General Ezer, Chief of Operations, Israeli Defense Forces Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wiggins, James R., Permanent Representative to the United Nations from October 1968 Woods, George, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank); U.S. Coordinator on the Israeli Desalting Project Yafi, Abdullah, Prime Minister of Lebanon from February 1968 Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968 Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968 1. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, November 25, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Jordan. Secret. Drafted by Robert B. Houghton and Davies. 2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, November 25, 1967, 2218Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.; cleared in substance by Harry H. Schwartz and Richard B. Parker; and approved by Rodger P. Davies. 3. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, November 27, 1967, 1730Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 4. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 28, 1967, 7:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. 5. Memorandum From the Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq (Houghton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) Washington, November 29, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Houghton and Marshall W. Wiley of NEA/ARN and cleared by Davies. 6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 4, 1967, 2338Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Henry Precht in NEA/IAI and Atherton, cleared by Joseph J. Sisco and Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown (IO), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, London, Jerusalem, Paris, and USUN. 7. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 4, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 53, December 1-10, 1967. Secret. 8. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 6, 1967, 11:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at 11:55 a.m. 9. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, December 6, 1967, 1350Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, Moscow, London, and Tel Aviv. 10. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, December 7, 1967, 0122Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Arthur R. Day, cleared by Sisco and Brown in UNP, and approved by Battle. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Cairo, Algiers, Khartoum, and Aden, and repeated to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 9, 1967, 0136Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, USUN, London, Moscow, Paris, and Cairo. 12. Letter From President Nasser to President Johnson Cairo, December 9, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. No classification marking. The letter was delivered to President Johnson by James Birdsall on December 18; see Document 21. 13. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, December 10, 1967, 0915Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The Spanish Government assumed protection of U.S. interests in the United Arab Republic following severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and the United Arab Republic on June 6. Rostow transmitted the text of this telegram to President Johnson on December 10 in White House telegram CAP 671037 along with the following assessment: “With the Russians trying to take over from Nasser in the Yemen, it is, indeed, possible that he wants to get close to us to keep independence from Moscow.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68) 14. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 11, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. 15. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson Washington, December 11, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 11, 1967, 1747Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret. Drafted by George B. Lambrakis; cleared by Atherton, William D. Brewer, and Davies; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Jidda and USUN. 17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 12, 1967, 0125Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by George B. Lambrakis; cleared by Davies, Atherton, Houghton, Robert H. Neuman (L/NEA), and Day; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, Beirut, London, Paris, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 18. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, December 12, 1967, 1606Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret;Exdis. 19. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 13, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. 20. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 15, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. 21. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 18, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, United Arab Republic, 4/1/66-12/3/67. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is dated December 19. 22. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, December 19, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Sensitive. 23. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) and James Birdsall Washington, December 20, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 71 D 79, 1967-1968. No classification marking. Drafted by Battle. 24. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 26, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 25. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 27, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 26. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, December 28, 1967, 2341Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV. Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret. 27. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, December 29, 1967, 1600Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL JORDAN-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 28. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, December 29, 1967, 2231Z. 29. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, December 30, 1967, 1545Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 30. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, January 2, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, January 3, 1968, 2332Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Parker on December 21; cleared by Battle, Davies, and Bromley Smith; and approved by John P. Walsh in S/S. 32. Memorandum From Secretary of the Interior Udall and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson Washington, January 3, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 1/1/67-2/29/68. Confidential. For additional documentation on the Israeli desalting project, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 130-174. 33. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 5, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit Briefing Book, 1/7-1/8/68. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at the LBJ Ranch on January 6 at 10 a.m. 34. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, January 6, 1968, 1400Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 35. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, January 6, 1968, 1639Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, Memos and Miscellaneous, 1/7-1/8/68. Secret. 36. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, January 6, 1968, 2333Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, Memos and Miscellaneous, 1/7-1/8/68. Secret; Eyes Only. 37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, January 7, 1968, 0625Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-6 US-JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Houghton on January 2; cleared by Davies, Battle, Paul C. Warnke, Counselor of the Department Robert R. Bowie, and Wotring at the White House; and approved by Rusk. 38. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, January 7, 1968, 1330Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 39. Memorandum of Conversation LBJ Ranch, Texas, January 7, 1968, Session I. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Battle on January 12. During his visit to the United States, Prime Minister Eshkol was a guest of President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch January 7-8. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the living room of the Ranch from 5:30 to 7:35 p.m. (Johnson Library) 40. Memorandum of Conversation LBJ Ranch, Texas, January 8, 1968, Session II. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Battle on January 12. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the living room of the Ranch from 11:55 a.m. to 1:50 p.m. (Johnson Library) 41. Memorandum of Conversation LBJ Ranch, Texas, January 8, 1968, Session III. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Battle on January 12. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the living room of the Ranch at 2:45 p.m. (Johnson Library) 42. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, January 9, 1968, 0645Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to the President on January 9 with the observation that “It was a close thing with Hussein.” He added: “We shall have to talk to the Jordanians about more than arms.” (White House telegram CAP 80213; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/67-2/68) 43. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, January 10, 1968, 1720Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret. 44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, January 12, 1968, 8:46 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Precht; cleared by Battle, Atherton, and Houghton, and in L in draft by Neuman; and approved by Acting Secretary Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, London, Cairo, Paris, Jerusalem, and USUN. 45. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, January 13, 1968, 2:17 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Parker and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, London, Jidda, USUN, and Jerusalem. 46. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson Washington, January 16, 1968. 47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, January 17, 1968, 1930Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on January 16 in NEA/ARP by Brewer; cleared by Atherton, Battle, and in the White House by Saunders; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Jidda. 48. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 17, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret;Exdis. 49. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 17, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, Jordan, 000.1-333. Secret. 50. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, January 18, 1968, 1715Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Cables, 5/67-2/68. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Roger Channel. 51. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 18, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XII, 1965-1968. Secret; Nodis. 52. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, January 18, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 71 D 384, Special Documents-1968. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on January 18. 53. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 19, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Visit of Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel, January 7-8, 1968. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders and cleared by Rostow. 54. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, January 19, 1968, 1320Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN. Secret; Nodis. 55. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 20, 1968, 3:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received at 5:20 p.m. Another handwritten notation reads: “Mr. Saunders notified 1/22/68.” 56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, January 20, 1968, 1756Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Wiley on January 19; cleared by Atherton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper, and Houghton; and approved by Battle. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Beirut, and USUN. 57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, January 20, 1968, 2156Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 57, 1/16-24/68. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in EUR/SOV by Malcolm Toon and in S/S by Walsh; cleared by Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Leddy, Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Bromley Smith at the White House. Repeated to London. 58. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 22, 1968, 4:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 57, 1/16-24/68. Secret. 59. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, January 24, 1968, 1020Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. 60. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 25, 1968. 61. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, January 26, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, January 28, 1968, 2005Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Parker on January 24; cleared by Walt Rostow, Battle, Davies, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Walt Rostow also cleared the telegram with the President on January 28. (Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68) 63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, January 30, 1968, 2113Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL JORDAN-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton and Day on January 25; cleared by Deputy Assistant Administrator in AID's Bureau for Near East and South Asia Joseph L. Wheeler, Sisco, Davies, Handley, Eugene Rostow, and Katzenbach; and approved by Rusk. 64. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 30, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received at 1:10 p.m. 65. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 31, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos 12/67-2/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received in the President's office on February 1 at 9 a.m. 66. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, February 3, 1968, 2145Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos 12/67-2/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received in the President's office on February 1 at 9 a.m. 67. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 5, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Jerusalem. Secret. Drafted by Sidney Sober on January 31, and cleared in draft by Sisco (IO), Deputy Legal Adviser Carl F. Salans, and member of the Policy Planning Council John C. Campbell. 68. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 5, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Meeting Notes File, 11/67-4/68. Secret. 69. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, February 6, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Meeting Notes File, Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, February 6, 1968. Secret. 70. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 6, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 71. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, February 6, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. 72. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 6, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Meeting Notes File, 11/67-4/68. Secret. 73. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 7, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Saunders. 74. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 7, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 4:20 p.m. 75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 9, 1968, 0048Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by James H. Bahti (NEA), cleared by Brewer and Atherton, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Jidda. 76. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 10, 1968, 12:30 p.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, Jordan, 000.1-333. Secret. Drafted by Schwartz and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in McNamara's office. This memorandum of conversation was summarized in telegram 113633 to Amman, February 11, and the text of the attached draft memorandum of understanding was transmitted in telegram 113634 to Amman, also February 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, February 11, 1968, 0636Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton, cleared by Atherton and Walt Rostow and in substance by Sisco and Davies, and approved by Richard W. Finch (S/S-O). In a February 10 memorandum to the President, Rostow also cleared the telegram with the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Jordan—8/1/67-7/31/68) 78. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, February 12, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 13, 1968, 0120Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and Day on February 12; cleared by Battle, Sisco, and Andrew L. Steigman in S; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to USUN, Amman, and Cairo. 80. Memorandum From Eugene R. Black to President Johnson Washington, February 14, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. No classification marking. Rostow sent copies of this memorandum to Rusk and Katzenbach on February 23 at the President's request. (Ibid.) 81. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 14, 1968, 1125Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 82. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, February 14, 1968, 1650Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 15, 1968, 6 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret. 84. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, February 16, 1968, 1355Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN. Secret; Nodis. 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, February 17, 1968, 0122Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Houghton on February 16; cleared by Sisco, Battle, and Bahti; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv and to USUN. 86. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, February 17, 1968, 1212Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. 87. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, February 19, 1968, 1500Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 88. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 20, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 63, 2/17-21/68. Secret. 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, February 20, 1968, 1639Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wiley and Houghton on February 19; cleared by Battle, Davies, and Murray in DOD/ISA; and approved by Under Secretary Katzenbach. 90. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, February 21, 1968, 0131Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Davies, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and USUN. 91. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 21, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab 64. Secret. Drafted on February 26. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 12:37 p.m. (Ibid.) 92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 24, 1968, 1908Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret, Exdis. Drafted by Atherton on February 23, cleared by Davies and H. Eugene Bovis, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, and USUN. 93. Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States Moscow, February 27, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 64, 2/22-29/68. No classification marking. A note on the message indicates that it is an unofficial translation. This message, conveyed by Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Rusk on February 27 as an oral message, was a reply to the message conveyed to the Soviet Government by Ambassador Thompson on January 22 (see Document 58). A memorandum of Rusk's subsequent conversation with Dobrynin concerning the prospects for a peace settlement in the Middle East is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 64, 2/22-29/68. 94. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 29, 1968, 2:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret; Limdis. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:45 p.m. 95. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, March 1, 1968, 1510Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 2, 1968, 0307Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Precht on March 1; cleared by Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Betty Jane Jones (IO/UNP), Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer, Atherton, Bovis, and Wiley; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 2, 1968, 0319Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Day and Precht; cleared by Sisco, Leonard C. Meeker, Davies, Houghton, Atherton, and Bovis; and approved by Secretary Rusk. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, and USUN. 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, March 2, 1968, 1546Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bovis; cleared by Johnstone, Atherton, Houghton, and Davis; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Tel Aviv and Amman. 99. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, March 2, 1968, 1725Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 100. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 4, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Confidential. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received at 12:46 p.m. 101. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, March 4, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. 102. Telegram From the White House to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, March 5, 1968, 6:50 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret; Nodis. 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 7, 1968, 0043Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Day (IO/UNP) on March 5, cleared by Battle and Atherton, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 104. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, March 8, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. 105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, March 9, 1968, 0234Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sisco and Eugene Rostow, cleared by Battle, Walt Rostow, and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John M. Leddy; and approved by Rusk. 106. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 10, 1968, 0212Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Deputy Executive Secretary John P. Walsh, and approved by Samuel G. Wise (S/S-O). Repeated to USUN. 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, March 12, 1968, 0007Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wiley and Houghton; cleared by Davies, and Katzenbach in substance; Schwartz of DOD/ISA was informed of the substance of the telegram; and approved by Battle. 108. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, March 12, 1968, 1345Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 14 LEB. Secret; Limdis. 109. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, March 12, 1968, 1615Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. 110. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, March 13, 1968, 0238Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, Davies, and Jones on March 12; cleared by Houghton, and in draft by Sisco and Battle; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Amman and repeated to USUN, London, Tel Aviv, and Moscow. 111. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, March 14, 1968, 0700Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 112. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, March 14, 1968, 0820Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv,USUN, and Jerusalem. 113. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, March 14, 1968, 1400Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. 114. Memorandum From John W. Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, March 14, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret;Nodis. 115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 16, 1968, 2216Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Day, cleared in substance by Davies and Sisco, and approved by Day. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, and USUN. 116. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, March 19, 1968, 1915Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 20, 1968, 1943Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Atherton and Houghton, cleared by Day and Battle, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 118. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 20, 1968, 7:25 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 3/1/68-7/3/68. Secret. 119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 21, 1968, 0511Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton and Houghton on March 20, cleared by Battle and Walt Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, March 21, 1968, 0540Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted at the White House and approved by W. E. Ledbetter (S/S-O). Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. The Embassy reported that the message was delivered to the King's private secretary at 9:40 a.m. (Telegram 3922 from Amman, March 21; ibid.) 121. Information Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, March 21, 1968, 7:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret. 122. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, March 21, 1968, 1030Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 123. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 22, 1968, 7:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 3/1/68-7/31/68. Secret. 124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 23, 1968, 2001Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Bahti; cleared by Atherton, Day, and Saunders in the White House; and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 125. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 26, 1968, 8:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret. 126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, March 28, 1968, 0138Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton and Houghton on March 27, cleared by Davies, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 127. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, March 29, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President on March 30 under cover of a brief memorandum recommending that the President read it. Rostow noted a third possibility not mentioned by Saunders that could alter developments significantly in the Middle East: the fall of Nasser; but Rostow added: “I don't believe a U.S. policy can be based on that hope.” (Ibid.) 128. Memorandum for the Record Washington, March 29, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 3/1/68-4/30/68. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders on April 1. 129. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 1, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret;Nodis. 130. Editorial Note 131. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson Washington, April 4, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret;Nodis. 132. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 5, 1968, 9:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 70, 4/1-5/68. Secret. 133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, April 6, 1968, 0229Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Atherton and Battle, and approved by Davies. A copy was sent to the White House for Saunders' information. 134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, April 6, 1968, 0516Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted at the White House, cleared in substance by Atherton, and approved by Walsh. Repeated to USUN, Amman, and Cairo. 135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan and to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, April 7, 1968, 0131Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on April 6, cleared by Popper, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN. 136. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, April 8, 1968, 1214Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 137. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, April 8, 1968, 3:04 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Precht; cleared by Wiley, Wehmeyer, and Day, and in draft by Bovis and Atherton; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, USUN, London, and Jerusalem. 138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, April 8, 1968, 2348Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Wiley and Houghton on April 5; cleared by Atherton, Davies, and Battle; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman. 139. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders and John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 9, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. 140. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, April 9, 1968, 1204Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 8 ISR. Secret;Limdis. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, London, and USUN. 141. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 9, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. 142. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, April 10, 1968, 0810Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, USUN and Cairo. 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, April 11, 1968, 2330Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Davies; cleared by Battle, Houghton, and Sisco; and approved by Katzenbach. 144. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 11, 1968. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 11. 145. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, April 15, 1968, 0815Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Secret; Nodis. 146. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 17, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret. 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, April 18, 1968, 0101Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 8 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Precht on April 17; cleared in draft by Sisco, Colonel Abba of DOD/Joint Staff, and by Colonel R. H. Jenkins of DOD/ISA; cleared in substance by Country Director for Northern Africa John F. Root and by Neuman, Battle, Atherton, and Houghton; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Aden, Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, USUN, Paris, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, and STRIKECOM. 148. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 18, 1968. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 18. 149. Airgram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, April 19, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Political Officer J. Thomas McAndrew and cleared in draft by Ambassador Porter. Repeated to Aden, Algiers, Ankara, Amman, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and USUN. 150. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 23, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:02 p.m. 151. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, April 24, 1968, 0107Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Parker on April 22, cleared by Atherton and Day, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Tel Aviv, USUN, and London. 152. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 26, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President on April 26 with an attached note summarizing the conversation. (Ibid.) 153. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, April 27, 1968, 1130Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis. 154. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, April 27, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret. 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, April 28, 1968, 1707Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Priority. The text of a Presidential message was received from the White House for revision as a letter from Secretary Rusk. The telegram was approved by Rusk and Davies. Repeated to USUN and Geneva. 156. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 30, 1968, 6:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Exdis. A notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:45 p.m. 157. Letter From the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 30, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel 3/1/68-7/31/68. No classification marking. 158. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 1, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. 159. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, May 1, 1968, 1246Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, May 1, 1968, 2359Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, and USUN. 161. Letter From President Nasser to President Johnson Cairo, May 1, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic-Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. The letter was sent through the UAR Interests Section of the Indian Embassy in Washington. According to telegram 2280 from Cairo, May 2, the text of the letter was sent by Nasser to all chiefs of state represented on the UN Security Council. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US) 162. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 2, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Davies on May 6 and approved in S on May 7. 163. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 2, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel 3/1/68-7/31/68. Secret; Nodis. 164. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson Washington, May 3, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary McNamara. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President on May 3 under cover of a memorandum in which he noted that “the JCS remains relatively complacent about the balance even after taking into account the French decision on the Mirages for Israel.” (Ibid.) 165. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, May 3, 1968, 1202Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. Repeated to USUN and the Mission in Geneva. 166. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 4, 1968, 1:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Confidential. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:05 p.m. 167. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, May 6, 1968, 0701Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 168. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, May 8, 1968, 1325Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. 169. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 10, 1968, 11:55 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 12:09 p.m. 170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 10, 1968, 12:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic-Presidential Correspondence. Top Secret. 171. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, May 13, 1968, 2341Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted at the White House; cleared by Battle, Goldberg, Sisco, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by John P. Walsh (S/S). Repeated to USUN, Amman, and Tel Aviv. 172. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, May 13, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. 173. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, May 14, 1968, 1335Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 174. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, May 15, 1968, 1647Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, and DIA. 175. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, May 17, 1968, 1015Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 176. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 17, 1968, 1-3:15 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy and approved in S/S. The memorandum is “Part II of V.” The meeting was held in the Secretary's dining room. 177. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 17, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Exdis. 178. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, May 21, 1968, 1549Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Day and Davies on May 20, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN. 179. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) Washington, May 21, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, NSSM 81. Secret. Copies were sent to Davies, Atherton, Sober, Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Granville S. Austin, and Katzenbach's Executive Assistant Philip B. Heymann. Saunders also sent a copy to Walt Rostow under a May 21 covering memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68) 180. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, May 23, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Confidential File, CO 1-6. Secret. 181. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, May 27, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret;Exdis. 182. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 29, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. Drafted by Brewer and cleared by Atherton, Deputy Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy James E. Atkins, and Davies. Saunders sent an advance copy of this memorandum to Walt Rostow on May 24 under cover of a note that reads in part: “Here's Bill Brewer's speculation on what the Israelis are up to on Tiran island.” (Ibid.) 183. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, May 31, 1968, 2300Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis. 184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon Washington, June 4, 1968, 0042Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 LEB. Secret. Drafted by Houghton on June 3, cleared by Battle and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Harry W. Shlaudeman, and approved by John P. Walsh in S/S. Also sent to Jerusalem, Amman, Tel Aviv, London, and USUN. 185. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 4, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret;Nodis. Drafted by Atherton. 186. Editorial Note 187. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson Washington, June 4, 1968. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Files, Chrono 1 Jan.-31 Jul. 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. 188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, June 4, 1968, 2027Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton and Davies on May 31; cleared by Atherton, Popper, Handley, Katzenbach, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to USUN. A record of a June 4 luncheon meeting with the President indicates that President Johnson also cleared the message. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968) 189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, June 6, 1968, 1959Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Battle and Sisco, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN. 190. Message From Foreign Secretary Stewart to Secretary of State Rusk London, June 10, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Confidential. Transmitted to the Department by British Ambassador Patrick Dean. 191. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, June 14, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis. 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, June 15, 1968, 1755Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-LEB. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Houghton; cleared by Day, Popper, and James H. Bahti; and approved by Handley. Also sent to Beirut, and repeated to London, Amman, Jerusalem, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 193. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, June 16, 1968, 1421Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos, 6/68-1/69. Secret; Sensitive. 194. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 17, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret;Nodis. 195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel and Jordan Washington, June 19, 1968, 2304Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Bahti, cleared by Houghton and Atherton, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Jerusalem, London, Beirut, and USUN. 196. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 20, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by George B. Lambrakis and Senior Research Officer Susan T. Tait in the Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia in INR; cleared by Atherton, and in draft by Austin. 197. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 21, 1968, 7 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis. 198. Memorandum of Conversation Reykjavik, June 23, 1968, 4:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 300. Secret. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs John I. Getz, and approved in S on June 24. The meeting was held at the Embassy in Reykjavik, where Secretary Rusk headed the U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting June 24-25. 199. Notes of Meeting Washington, June 25, 1968, 1:20-2:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, June 25, 1968-1:20 p.m.-Tuesday luncheon. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. 200. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 27, 1968, 7:45 p.m. 201. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 28, 1968, 10:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, June 28, 1968, 2338Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco and Atherton; cleared by Battle, Day, Davies, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to USUN. 203. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 28, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to Katzenbach and Battle. Rusk initialed the memorandum to indicate that he had read it. 204. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 29, 1968, 1:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 9/68-1/69. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:20 p.m. 205. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, July 2, 1968, 0921Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 18-6. Secret; Limdis. 206. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 2, 1968, 3 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Confidential. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 3:15 p.m. 207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, July 4, 1968, 0020Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Day, cleared by Acting Country Director for Soviet Union Affairs Adolph Dubs and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Malcolm Toon, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, London, Amman, and Cairo. 208. Telegram From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas Washington, July 4, 1968, 1834Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. Repeated to Walt Rostow at the LBJ Ranch. 209. Telegram From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas Washington, July 4, 1968, 1851Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos, 6/68-1/69. Secret. Repeated to Walt Rostow at the LBJ Ranch. 210. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford Washington, July 6, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray in NESA. 211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, July 13, 1968, 1847Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Drafted by Day, cleared by Davies in substance and by Saunders at the White House, and approved by Popper. Repeated to Paris for Ball and Sisco. 212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, July 13, 1968, 1849Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Jerusalem, USUN, and Moscow. 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, July 17, 1968, 0645Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Jerusalem, USUN, and Moscow. 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, July 17, 1968, 0930Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to USUN and to Beirut and Amman for Ball and Sisco. 215. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, July 17, 1968, 0930Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to USUN and to Beirut and Amman for Ball and Sisco. 216. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, July 17, 1968, 0737Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Nodis. 217. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, July 17, 1968, 1515Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Moscow, Jidda, Beirut, Cairo, USUN, and London. 218. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, July 18, 1968, 1906Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, Moscow, Jidda, London, USUN, and Jerusalem. 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, July 18, 1968, 1906Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, USUN, and Jerusalem. 220. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, July 18, 1968, 2106Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, July 20, 1968, 0650Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Beirut, London, Jidda, Rome, Tel Aviv,USUN, and Cairo. 222. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, July 22, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Exdis. 223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, July 24, 1968, 2247Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by James K. Matter (NEA/IAI); cleared in draft by Williams Beal (E/OA), and in substance by Parker (NEA/UAR) and Peter Sebastian (AF/N); and approved by Davies. Also sent to Rome, Cairo, and USUN, and repeated to Algiers, Tel Aviv, London, and Montreal for USRep ICAO. 224. Information Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 26, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. 225. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, July 29, 1968, 0748Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. 226. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, July 29, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Confidential. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 5:45 p.m. 227. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, August 3, 1968, 1505Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Policy; Exdis. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv,USUN, Jerusalem, and Cairo. 228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, August 4, 1968, 1813Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 ISR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Peter Sebastian (AFN), cleared by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph Palmer II and Atherton, and approved by ARN Country Director John F. Root. Repeated to Algiers and Tel Aviv. 229. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) Washington, August 5, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. 230. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, August 5, 1968, 1015Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. 231. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, August 6, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch on August 8 at 10:15 a.m. 232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, August 7, 1968, 1844Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Marshall W. Wiley, cleared by David L. Gamon (NEA/ARN), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Beirut, USUN, and London. 233. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, August 8, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch on August 9 at 1:45 p.m. 234. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, August 9, 1968, 0900Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, London, Jidda, Jerusalem, Cairo, and USUN. 235. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant (Jones) in Texas Washington, August 12, 1968, 1444Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. 236. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, August 14, 1968, 2334Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. 237. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, August 14, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis. 238. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, August 16, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Syria, Vol. I, Cables and Memos, 4/64-10/68. Secret. 239. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, August 17, 1968, 0124Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Stuart W. Rockwell and Eugene Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, London, Tel Aviv,USUN, and Moscow. 240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, August 17, 1968, 0129Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco on August 16, cleared by Rockwell and Eugene Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, London, USUN, and Moscow. 241. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, August 19, 1968, 0915Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and USUN. 242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, August 21, 1968, 0205Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bahti (NEA/IAI), cleared by Day, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, London, Moscow, and USUN. 243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, August 30, 1968, 2131Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Robert P. Paganelli (NEA/ARN); cleared by Director of AID's Office of Near Eastern Affairs John Eddison, Assistant AID Administrator for Near East and South Asia Maurice J. Williams, Murray and Colonel Bradburn (DOD/ISA), Seelye, Senior Regional Adviser for Regional Affairs in NEA John Buckle, Battle, and Claus W. Ruser of the Senior Interdepartmental Group; and approved by John P. Walsh. 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, September 4, 1968, 1130Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, and CINCSTRIKE. 245. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 4, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen. 246. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, September 4, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis. 247. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 9, 1968, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle on September 10. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the White House from 5:24 to 5:40 p.m. (Ibid.) 248. Notes on President Johnson's Meeting With Congressional Leaders Washington, September 9, 1968, 5:45-7:24 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, September 9, 1968, 5:45 p.m. to 7:24 p.m. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The Congressional leaders including Speaker of the House John McCormack and Congressmen Carl Albert, Gerald Ford, Leslie Arends, and Melvin Ford. Also present were Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Walt Rostow, Budget Director Charles Zwick, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Arthur Okun, and Legislative Counsel to the President Harold Barefoot Sanders. A heading describes the notes as President Johnson's notes, but they were prepared from a tape recording by either President Johnson's secretarial staff or by his staff in Austin after the President left office and began his research for his memoirs. The tape recording on which the notes are based is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings. The notes have been corrected to accord with the tape recording. 249. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 10, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Chlodnik, Box 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the Eyes of the President and Secretary of State Only. 250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, September 11, 1968, 2148Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by John D. Leonard (NEA/IAI), cleared by Battle and Atherton, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, Jidda, and USUN. 251. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 12, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, UAR, 1/1/68-1/20/69. Confidential. Copies were sent to Walt Rostow, Walsh, Battle, and Parker. 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, September 14, 1968, 1913Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Betty Jane Jones, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Battle. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Amman, Moscow, Cairo, and Paris for Ball and Sisco. 253. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, September 17, 1968, 1624Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Cairo, and USUN. 254. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 17, 1968, 18 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Middle East and Vietnam Negotiations, Sept. 1968. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. 255. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 18, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 94, 9/12-18/68. Secret; Exdis. 256. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 18, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Davies on September 19. 257. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 19, 1968, 13:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:50 p.m. 258. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, September 19, 1968, 1121Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and London. 259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, September 19, 1968, 2208Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Thomas J. Carolan, Jr. (IO/UNP); cleared by William H. Gleysteen (IO/UNP), Atherton, Popper, and in draft by Parker and Seelye; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv and Cairo and repeated to USUN and London. 260. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 24, 1968, 17:25 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Confidential. 261. Summary Notes of the 591st Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, September 25, 1968, 12:05-13:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5, Tab 13, the 23rd UNGA. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. An attached list indicates that among those attending, in addition to the President, were Rusk, Ball, Sisco, Clifford, Nitze, Fowler, Helms, Wheeler, Walt Rostow, and USIA Director Marks. 262. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 25, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. 263. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable Washington, September 25, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos, 6/68-1/69. Secret; Routine; No Foreign Dissem. 264. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 27, 1968, 16 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 4:03 p.m. 265. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 27, 1968, 18:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 96, 9/26-30/68. Secret; Sensitive. 266. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 29, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle on September 30 and approved in U on October 9. 267. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 30, 1968, 11:35 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 11:45 a.m. Attached is a September 30 memorandum to the President from CIA Director Helms with a subject heading that reads: “Israel-Jordan Secret Talks.” See also Document 186. 268. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, October 1, 1968, 1915Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Sandstorm. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, and Tel Aviv. 269. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, October 2, 1968, 1258Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and London. 270. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, October 2, 1968, 2333Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 319. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted at USUN by Buffum. 271. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, October 3, 1968, 1552Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and Cairo. 272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon Washington, October 4, 1968, 2218Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Bryan H. Baas (NEA/ARN), cleared by Michael Sterner (NEA/IAI), and approved by Talcott W. Seelye. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 273. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 5, 1968, 14 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:40 p.m. 274. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 6, 1968, 19:30-22:45 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 321. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer and approved in S on October 17. The meeting took place over dinner in Suite 42A at the Waldorf Towers. The conversation was summarized in telegram 6889 from USUN, October 7. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB/ISR) 275. Telegram From the Department of State to Selected Posts Washington, October 9, 1968, 1008Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Country Director for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden William D. Brewer and Atherton; cleared by Davies and Country Director for Ethiopia, Somali Republic, and Sudan Affairs John F. Root; and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to Aden, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Dhahran, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and USUN. 276. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, October 11, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, Vol. 8, 45th Meeting, 10/10/68. Secret. 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, October 11, 1968, 1610Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Seelye and Paganelli (NEA/ARN); cleared by Davies, Atherton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper, Symmes, Parker T. Hart, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 278. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, October 12, 1968, 1325Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to London and USUN. 279. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, October 14, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A copy was sent to Spurgeon Keeny. 280. Letter From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, October 15, 1968. 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, October 17, 1968, 2343Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret. Drafted by Michael Sterner, cleared by Atherton and Brewer, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, October 18, 1968, 0020Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker and revised by Eugene Rostow, cleared by Davies, and approved by Eugene Rostow. 283. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 21, 1968, noon. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cheslaw and approved in S on October 22. The meeting was held in Rusk's office. 284. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and Foreign Minister Eban Washington, October 22, 1968, 10:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; No Distribution. Prepared by Walt Rostow. 285. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol Washington, October 23, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68. No classification marking. The text of this letter was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 261396, October 24, for delivery to Prime Minister Eshkol. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR) 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, October 23, 1968, 0049Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL JORDAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Seelye, Baas, and Paganelli; cleared by Hart and Davies; and approved by Rusk. 287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, October 23, 1968 , 2123Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Hart and Rusk's Staff Assistant Jay P. Moffat, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, October 24, 1968, 2205Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Hart, and approved by Walsh. 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, October 24, 1968, 2156Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Hart, Eugene Rostow, Katzenbach, and Harold Saunders; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to USUN and Amman. 290. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 25, 1968, 2:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Nodis. 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, October 25, 1968, 1909Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 292. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, October 28, 1968, 1905Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 293. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, October 28, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Syria, Vol. I, Cables and Memos, 4/64-10/68. Secret. 294. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson Washington, October 28, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. 295. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford Washington, October 29, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel 452 (Sen). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A stamped notation with a November 4 date reads, “Sec Def has seen.” 296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, October 30, 1968, 2120Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Day (IO), cleared by Hart, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, October 31, 1968, 0255Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Davies, and approved by Hart. 298. Action/Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 31, 1968, 11:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 102, 10/29-31/68. Secret. 299. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clifford Washington, November 1, 1968, 10:15 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, Box 930. No classification marking. Prepared by Mildred Asbjornson of the Secretary's office. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, “No Dist.” 300. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford Washington, November 2, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel. Top Secret; Sensitive. 301. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 3, 1968, 0653Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, and Tel Aviv. 302. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 3, 1968, 2245Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv and Cairo. 303. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, November 4, 1968, 1902Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 103, 11/1-4/68. Secret. 304. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, November 4, 1968, 0720Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN. Confidential; Flash. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Beirut, London, Cairo, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 305. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 4, 1968, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Literally Eyes Only. 306. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 4, 1968, 2-2:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office at the Pentagon. 307. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 5, 1968, 1650Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo, and Amman. 308. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 5, 1968, 2:10-2:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked “Second Session.” 309. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 8, 1968, 6:10-6:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked “Third Session.” 310. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 8, 1968, 11:10 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 104, 11/5-8/68. Secret. 311. Draft Memorandum for the Record Washington, November 9, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Harry Schwartz. 312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, November 9, 1968, 0111Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Seelye, Paganelli, and Jones; cleared by Sisco, Atherton, Davies, and Harold Saunders; and approved by Katzenbach. 313. Memorandum for the Record Washington, November 9, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. 314. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 10, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Parker. 315. Editorial Note 316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, November 11, 1968, 1857Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Atherton, Davies, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Rostow also cleared the telegram with President Johnson. (Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, November 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 11/1/68-1/20/69) 317. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 12, 1968, 3:30-4:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked “Fourth Session.” 318. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 12, 1968, 0246Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and Cairo. 319. Letter From George D. Woods to President Johnson Washington, November 12, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 11/1/68-1/20/69. Confidential. 320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, November 13, 1968, 2218Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Davies and Sisco, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Moscow, and USUN. 321. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 14, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 10/1/68-1/20/69. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Harold Saunders. Copies were sent to Walt Rostow, John Walsh, Philip Heymann, Rodger Davies, and Roy Atherton. 322. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 15, 1968, 1:05 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret;Nodis. 323. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, November 16, 1968, 1295Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON. Secret; Flash; Exdis. 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, November 16, 1968, 2100Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John P. Walsh. 325. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 18, 1968, 2:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. 326. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, November 19, 1968, 1400Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 327. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, November 20, 1968, 1240Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 107, 11/19-22/68. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Walt Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on November 20 under cover of a memorandum in which he concluded that Nasser appeared to be under conflicting political pressures and unable to decide or to lead. But, Rostow noted, there were some factors that seemed to be operating in the direction of a settlement in the Middle East. (Ibid.) 328. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, November 20, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 12:26 p.m. 329. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 22, 1968, 1:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2 p.m. 330. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 22, 1968, 5:40-6:15 p.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel, 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked “Fifth Session.” 331. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 23, 1968, 3:35 p.m. 332. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 26, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel, 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive. 333. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin) Washington, November 27, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray. 334. Memorandum for the Record Washington, November 27, 1968. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, DCI Executive Registry Files, Box 11, Folder 240, MFR. Secret. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency on December 2. 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, November 30, 1968, 0127Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Atherton, and approved by Davies and Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 336. Notes on Meeting Washington, December 4, 1968, 12:30-1:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, December 4, 1968, 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. No classification marking. Prepared from a tape recording by either President Johnson's secretarial staff or by his staff in Austin after the President had left office and begun research for his memoirs. The tape recording the notes are based on is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings. The notes have been corrected to accord with the tape recording. Secretary Rusk's comments were preceded by a discussion unrelated to the Middle East. The tape recording picks up Rusk's briefing at the point indicated. 337. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 4, 1968, 3 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker. 338. Information Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, December 4, 1968, 4 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 4:12 p.m. 339. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 4, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved in S/S on December 10. 340. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 5, 1968, 0137Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Hart. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Jerusalem, USUN, and Cairo. 341. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 5, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Jordan, 8/1/68-1/20/69. Secret; Exdis. 342. Memorandum of Conversation Beirut, December 5, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Edward P. Djerejian and approved by Ambassador Porter. The memorandum is Enclosure 1 to Airgram A-1505 from Beirut, December 13. 343. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, December 7, 1968, 1036Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Exdis. 344. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, December 9, 1968, 1532Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. 345. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, December 9, 1968, 2025Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. 346. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, December 11, 1968, 0845Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 347. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, December 11, 1968, 0850Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 348. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 11, 1968, 8:55 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:25 p.m. 349. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 12, 1968, 12:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68. Secret; Nodis. 350. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, December 17, 1968, 1310Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 351. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, December 17, 1968, 2204Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Parker, cleared by Ambassador Leonhart in S/NL, and approved by Davies. 352. Action Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, December 18, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Confidential; Exdis. Saunders sent this memorandum to the President under a December 18 covering memorandum in which he indicated that Walt Rostow had asked him to forward it to the President in his absence. (Ibid.) The President wrote the following instruction to Jim Jones on the covering memorandum: “Hold until I'm back & Walt returns.” On December 23 Jones sent the memorandum to Rostow with the suggestion that Rostow take it up with the President after luncheon on December 24. (Ibid.) 353. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, December 19, 1968, 1415Z. Source: National Records and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. 354. Note From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State Washington, December 19, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Exdis. The text is a translation prepared in the Division of Language Services. The original of the note has not been found. A handwritten notation indicates that the note was handed to Secretary Rusk by Soviet Charge Tcherniakov on December 19. Telegram 290908 to Cairo, December 21, which transmitted the text of an unofficial translation of the note prepared by the Soviet Embassy, indicates that Tcherniakov gave the note to Eugene Rostow rather than Rusk. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) See also Document 355. 355. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 20, 1968, 5:10-5:30 p.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray on December 21 and approved by Schwartz. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. 356. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, December 21, 1968, 0139Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Eugene Rostow, Hart, and Parker; cleared by Day (IO/UNP); and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 357. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, December 21, 1968, 1827Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Murray (DOD/ISA) and Robert P. Pag-anelli (NEA/ARN); cleared by Hart in draft and by Sidney Sober, Murray, Seelye, and Lewis D. Junior (G/PM); and approved by Davies. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and London. 358. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, December 24, 1968, 2228Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker; cleared by Hart, Sisco, Davies, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, and Amman. 359. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, December 24, 1968, 2236Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted by Davies; cleared by Atherton, Seelye, Sisco, and Katzenbach; and approved by Hart. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 360. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 24, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Top Secret; Sensitive. 361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 24, 1968, 2323Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Day and Hart, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Moscow, Cairo, and USUN. 362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 25, 1968, 0054Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Day in draft and by Hart, and approved by Eugne Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Moscow, Cairo, and USUN. 363. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, December 25, 1968, 1827Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Paganelli and Davies, cleared by Hart, Seelye, Atherton, Sisco, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. 364. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, December 26, 1968, 0900Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. 365. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 26, 1968, 1:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:45 p.m. 366. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 26, 1968, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:45 p.m. 367. Editorial Note 368. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, December 28, 1968, 0057Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by James Johnston (NEA/UAR) and approved by Davies. 369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 29, 1968, 0123Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Root (AFN) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George S. Springsteen, and approved by Hart. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Aden, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, London, Paris, Athens, Ankara, Tehran, Jerusalem, Rome, Bonn, and Moscow. Walt Rostow repeated the text of the telegram to President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch in White House telegram CAP 82946, December 29. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69) 370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon Washington, December 29, 1968, 2123Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Hart, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv, Amman, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Aden,Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, London, Paris, Athens, Ankara, Tehran, Nicosia, Dhahran, Jerusalem, Khartoum, and USUN. 371. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, December 30, 1968, 1419Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 JORDAN. Secret. Repeated to Beirut, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and USUN. 372. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, December 30, 1968, 1459Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE. 373. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, December 30, 1968, 1440Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. 374. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, December 31, 1968, 0118Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 112, 12/26-31/68. Secret; Sensitive. 375. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut,December 31, 1968, 1008Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Tel Aviv, USUN, and DIA. 376. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, December 31, 1968, 2142Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 112, 12/26-31/68. Secret. 1. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, November 25, 1967. SUBJECT Arms for Jordan There is attached a telegraphic memorandum from Ambassador Symmes [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. 2 Ambassador Symmes is concerned that one of the first matters of business which the King will take up with him when he returns to Amman November 26 is to ask what further response the USG may have made to his request for arms. The Ambassador is certain that Hussein feels that the passage of the U.K. resolution 3 was facilitated by his own diplomatic efforts. In addition, the Ambassador points out that it will be indispensable to Hussein in continuing to work for a political settlement to have his Army solidly behind him. The Army, according to reports reaching our Embassy, has been generating pressure on the Government to resupply equipment lost during the June war. Ambassador Symmes believes that the November 21 incidents, with the bombardment of the Karama refugee camp and the Israeli air attack, will heighten this pressure. The Ambassador fears that if the King becomes suspicious that we will not be able to help him out, he could quickly become so frustrated that he might decide to go to the Soviets for arms. The Ambassador reports that the Embassy expects within the next day or so a list of those items whose delivery the Jordanian military command considers absolutely essential. The Ambassador concludes his message by stating that our willingness to lift our embargo on arms for Jordan and to exert efforts to help Jordan obtain arms from other suppliers may soon become critical to our relationship. 4 Comment: We subscribe to the Ambassador's analysis of the pressures which are working on the King to procure arms to re-equip his Army and the likely consequences if we are not in a position to help him. As soon as we have received the list of items which the Jordan Army considers absolutely essential, we will recommend to you a course of action with regard to the shipment of arms to Jordan. In the meantime, we intend, as an interim measure, to query the King as to the status of his efforts to obtain some of his requirements from European sources in the event that we might be able to facilitate his efforts. The Ambassador would make clear that in so querying the King we were trying to be helpful and in no way indicating that we had decided not to supply arms to Jordan. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Jordan. Secret. Drafted by Robert B. Houghton and Davies. 2 Dated November 24 and addressed to Assistant Secretary Battle. 3 Reference is to Resolution 242, adopted by the UN Security Council on November 22. (UN doc. S/RES/242 (1967)) For documentation relating to the adoption of this resolution, which outlined the basis for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume XIX . 4 In telegram 74860 to Amman, November 25, the Department responded that the question of arms for Jordan was under intensive review, but in view of the complexity of the problem it was impossible to predict an outcome. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) On November 27 the Embassy reiterated the pressing need for a positive response to the Jordanian Government's request for a recommencement of arms supplies to Jordan. (Telegram 2395 from Amman; ibid.) 2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, November 25, 1967, 2218Z. 74858. Ref: Tel Aviv 1611. 2 1. You may inform Eshkol that status Weizman request remains as conveyed to GOI representatives here. We continue actively to staff out request within USG but unable say at this time when our internal procedures will be completed. With respect to additional A-4's, Eshkol may be assured that we are aware of special lead time problem on Douglas A-4 production line and are taking this factor fully into consideration. More generally, we are sensitive to Israel's need retain adequate defensive capability and remain convinced that Israel retains sufficient margin of safety for foreseeable future to permit orderly completion of thorough and deliberate analysis Weizman request which we are still in process of making. Our decision to unfreeze sizeable backlog of orders for parts and components, to give continuing case by case consideration to new pipeline requests, and to confirm delivery of A-4's under 1966 contract—a decision which was not politically easy for us—should reassure GOI of our continued sympathetic view of Israel's security requirements. FYI. SIG is scheduled consider Near East arms policy, including Weizman request, week of November 27, and we hope have decision one way or other, at least with respect to additional A-4's, soon thereafter. JCS say that, with arrival 48 A-4's already promised, Israeli military superiority over any combination of Arabs will be assured for three to five years, even without additional 50 Mirages from France. Israeli MilAtt here has conveyed some sense of urgency about A-4 add-on request, largely related to fact Douglas Aircraft must soon make decision about future production line programming. On other hand, MilAtt fairly relaxed about other components of Weizman request. In addition, he has indicated Israel no longer pressing for M-113 APC's approved May 23 and wishes instead early USG approval for GOI purchase of used APC's from European surplus stocks for cannibalization purposes. We are now giving active consideration to this request as well as to pending IDF orders for Piper Cub aircraft and $11 million in additional tank parts. End FYI. 2. Following is for your guidance should Eshkol raise Nasser speech. 3 While speech does not augur well for early progress toward political settlement, we have never felt progress would come easily and assume GOI has not thought so either. It is not without precedent for Near Eastern political leaders to strike hard line public bargaining pose and remains to be seen how much of what Nasser said about settlement terms is for bargaining purposes. This should become clearer once UN Special Representative becomes active. 4 Meanwhile, we do not discount potentially serious implications of Nasser speech—particularly references to Suez Canal, withdrawal terms, and military preparations—which, at very least, will make job of UN Rep more difficult. At same time, it important to bear in mind that main purpose of speech appeared be to boost domestic morale in context of somber review of enormity UAR military defeat in June. On future course of Arab-Israel problem there are number of ambiguities and contradictions in speech which could, if Nasser chooses, leave door open for some compromise. For example, he (a) describes UN resolution as “insufficient” but does not reject it, and (b) while speaking of need to prepare for new military round, acknowledges possibility that political settlement may make this unnecessary. In latter connection, possibly significant is Nasser's statement that “We believe that reaching a sufficient degree of strength may be a substitute for using it in fact.” Given past experience, we are not inclined take comfort from any of this. At same time, we assume GOI will agree it would be mistake to assume on basis one speech in essentially domestic context that Nasser's position completely inflexible and that he is irretrievably launched on path to new war. Negotiating process has dynamic of its own which must be allowed develop before any final conclusions are reached. 3. Re present state of UAR military preparedness, we prefer base our judgment on what we know to be case and not on such ambiguous, unsubstantiated and contradictory statements as were contained in Nasser's November 23 speech. For example, while he says in one place that “the real power of our armed forces exceeds the real power prior to the start of the battle,” he says in another that “our armed forces have restored a considerable part of their military strength” and that “we must realize that we cannot achieve everything all at once.” In context, Nasser's comments about his armed forces make clear that he envisages and is preparing his people for a fundamental and long drawn-out process of reorganization and rebuilding. Again, we do not discount potentially serious implications of this, but we see in it no basis for altering our assessment of present relative military strengths in area and time factors involved which, in our judgment, remain in Israel's favor for foreseeable future. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.; cleared in substance by Harry H. Schwartz and Richard B. Parker; and approved by Rodger P. Davies. 2 In telegram 1611 from Tel Aviv, November 24, Ambassador Barbour reported that Prime Minister Eshkol asked whether the U.S. position on military supplies for Israel remained as stated by Battle on October 6. (Ibid.) Documentation concerning the position taken by Battle on October 6 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume XIX . 3 Reference is to the State of the Union message delivered by President Nasser to the UAR National Assembly on November 23. The speech was summarized in telegram 1015 from Cairo, November 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 UAR) Excerpts from this speech are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 , pp. 619-620. 4 Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on November 22, called on the UN Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East “to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist the effort to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement” in accordance with the principles and provisions of Resolution 242. (UN doc. S/RES/242 (1967)) On November 23 the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the appointment of Gunnar Jarring, Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, as the Special Representative. (UN doc. S/8259) 3. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 3. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, November 27, 1967, 1730Z. 1638. Ref: State 74858. 2 1. As expected, in meeting with me today, PM Eshkol began by referring to Nasser speech of Nov 23. He likened Hussein-Nasser relationship to see-saw, with Hussein making encouraging noises in world capitals only to have his efforts frustrated by warlike pronouncements by Nasser. He described speech of Nov 23 as dagger in back of cause of peace. Eshkol said he had hoped with some confidence that Six-Day War would be followed by real peace in Middle East and he still hopes so but with considerably less confidence. The “superlatives” of Nasser's expression did not augur well. In any event, Israel must be careful and remain on guard. 2. Israeli military capability is adequate on ground. “Center of gravity” is the Air Force and there Israel is very vulnerable. Without repeating details, which had been given by Gen Weizman, Eshkol mentioned only that effective fighter strength now is some 90 planes, and they are no “spring chickens.” 3. PM Eshkol said he is pessimistic about getting the 50 French Mirages. In any case, even if he gets those, his estimate is that Israel will be in a ratio of one to three in light of Soviet replacements to Egypt, worse if Algerian reinforcements should be forthcoming, and this only after arrival of last of 48 A4s which not scheduled until 1969. He thinks this ratio is too dangerous for Israel to contemplate with equanimity. 4. PM noted he aware US desire not become sole Israeli supplier and GOI also would prefer have more than one source. But, with French out of picture, US is only one to which Israel can turn. He has thought of alternative of building planes here but expense and time involved such a project make it most unattractive. 5. In circumstances, Eshkol wishes make most earnest plea for two steps by US: A) Agree to provide 27 more A4s and 50 Phantoms and B) expedite delivery 48 A4s already agreed. He urged we make this decision with minimum delay, although he appreciated processing through governmental machinery of US magnitude time consuming. He noted Gen Weizman's report that his representations had received most cordial and sympathetic hearing, for which GOI grateful. But, he begged in most eloquent terms he could muster that GOI also get the hardware. 6. I gave Eshkol full substance State's most helpful reftel (obviously without FYI section). He made no particular comment, except to reiterate his growing doubts as to Nasser's intentions. I also urged that, despite his present uneasiness about the attainment of a peaceful settlement, he should not abandon hope of success at the end of what would be a hard road. He agreed. Further, I remarked that as the events of May and June receded in peoples' memory, Israel will have to give increasing attention to her image in the world. Her position as the victim of an attempt by her neighbors to annihilate her becomes less credible the longer she sits in her present posture as an occupying power in large areas. She must exercise the “magnanimity of the victor” in her own interest. Eshkol concurred, reminding me that I had once commented that Israel is now the power in the Middle East and has additional responsibility in the search for peace. He concluded that all this is dependent on Israel having real security, to which his present requests are directed. FYI. Various readers of this message will recall that this air force imbalance has given me concern since the Soviet replacement program to Egypt began, and I had several occasions to mention it when in Washington recently. I do not take issue with our military experts' conclusion that for some time to come, Israel will be superior overall in military capability to any likely combination of powers which may be ranged against her, and this probably whether we make the additional 77 planes requested available or not. But I submit that, if the Israelis themselves do not think so, their increased nervousness will be likely to make them at worst tend toward more adventurous courses to avoid possibly imaginary Arab efforts to exploit such imbalance, and at best more difficult to persuade to take steps involving increases to their security risks, which may be necessary if progress is to be made toward final peace. Also, despite expert assessments, I would like to see from a strict consideration of US interest in stability in the region, that additional margin of safety to be provided by these airplanes in the hands of responsible (also could read, non-Soviet) Israelis. Accordingly, as heretofore, I continue to endorse these requests and urge US agreement as soon as possible. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 2 Document 2 . 4. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 4. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 28, 1967, 7:40 p.m. Mr. President: Bob Anderson dropped in to see me this afternoon to chat about the Middle East and told me the following: 1. While seeing his Arab friends in New York, he found the Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad and Dr. Kahouli disappointed that we have not moved to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cairo, as have the British. 2. When he pointed out that Arthur Goldberg had told Riad Secretary Rusk would be glad to see him in Washington, Riad had said that he wanted a more explicit invitation and some assurance that the U.S. was in fact willing to move forward toward normal diplomatic relations. 3. When Kahouli raised the question of whether President Nasser should write to President Johnson and asked how such a letter could be delivered, Bob Anderson said: Why not deliver it in Cairo via Don Bergus? The response was: He is only a clerk. How can a Presidential message be delivered through a clerk? 4. Kahouli then asked if Anderson on his next trip to the Middle East (which is soon—to Iraq on sulphur) could stop in Cairo. Anderson said flatly: No. 5. Kahouli then said: If I delivered a letter for President Johnson to you in Beirut, would you receive it? Anderson told him: I would receive it, but only as a messenger boy. That is how it was left. 6. I asked Bob what he thought the Egyptians would do about acknowledging that we were not involved in the war and reparations. He said they took the view that their official newspapers have already published in Cairo the fact that we were not involved and it would be very difficult for them to go further. As for reparations, they would be made when diplomatic relations were established, but not immediately, because they were terribly short of money. Bob Anderson's view was that this could be the first issue we raised after diplomatic relations were established. 7. Bob showed great sensitivity to the fact that we must do absolutely nothing to interfere with UN Representative Jarring and his contacts and negotiations in the Middle East. 8. Bob underlined his view that we are likely to have to deal with Nasser for some time; that he believes from his long personal discussions that Nasser has learned a painful lesson; and that it is in our national interest to establish relations with him soon. 9. His mission to Iraq is to get American firms involved in exploiting the biggest sulphur deposits in the world. A personal letter to the Iraqi President from de Gaulle had been sent urging that French firms take the contract. Bob is reasonably confident that his more experienced firms will win out. I talked with Luke Battle, who is very doubtful that Nasser will in fact send a letter to you via Anderson; although a resumption of diplomatic relations is obviously much on their minds, and should be on ours also. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. 5. Memorandum From the Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq (Houghton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) 5. Memorandum From the Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq (Houghton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) 1 Washington, November 29, 1967. SUBJECT Arms for Jordan Ambassador Symmes' Position We strongly urge that you discuss the problem of Jordan arms at the SIG meeting scheduled for November 30. Ambassador Symmes has urgently recommended that we make available to Jordan certain military equipment which the Jordan Army considers essential. In support of his request, the Ambassador points out that it will be indispensable to Hussein in continuing to work for political settlement to have his Army solidly behind him. The Army, according to the Embassy, is not pressing for full replacement of equipment lost last June, but is seeking reassurance that the King has a plan to obtain certain priority items. The Ambassador believes that the November 21 incidents with the bombardment of the Karama Refugee Camp and the Israeli air attack will heighten Army pressure on the King. The Ambassador fears that if the King becomes suspicious that we will not be able to help him out he will quickly become so frustrated that he might go to the Soviets for arms. The Ambassador further argues that our willingness to lift our embargo on arms for Jordan and to exert efforts to help Jordan obtain arms from other suppliers may soon become critical to our relationship. King Hussein informed the Ambassador on November 28 that the Jordan Army leadership was pressing him very hard and stressed that the need for him to take some action was “becoming a matter of days.” Jordan Requirements The Ambassador has discussed Jordan's requirements with General Khammash, Chief of Staff of the Jordan Army, who maintains that the list which he gave Colonel Jordan last August represents the Army's current minimal essential requirements. Ambassador Symmes and the Defense Attaché have come up with a sanitized version. It includes items from the Khammash list which they consider least likely to cause us problems. They make clear, however, that the sanitized list does not meet Jordan's complete desires nor it requirements. The Ambassador does believe that the revised list would meet Hussein's main need to hold the loyalty of the Jordanian Army and at the same time would avoid serious embarrassment at the forthcoming Arab Summit, reportedly scheduled around the beginning of December. A detailed list, which we estimate would cost approximately $9 million, is enclosed. 2 The main elements of the list are as follows: (1) 106 mm recoilless rifles with truck M151A1C. (2) Ammunition primarily for small arms and antiaircraft with some light artillery and antitank ammunition. (3) Communication equipment, including 340 radios and 1,000 telephones. (4) 40 2-1/2-ton trucks. M35A2. (5) Aerial target drone system and ancillary equipment. (6) Automotive, weapon, and communication spare parts and medical supplies. Discussion Our short-term stake in Jordan is clear. Hussein has taken the initiative and leadership on the Arab side in seeking a settlement with Israel. He can probably do this only with Nasser's support. Dubious as the prospects for a settlement are now, they may well become nil should Hussein fall or be forced into a more radical posture. To a large extent he has staked his lot on working with the West and particularly the US. Consequently he is seeking arms from us not only because he needs them but also because of the tangible evidence of US support which the supply of such arms would give him. There would be a gap between the time of our informing him of our willingness to supply him arms and the delivery of these arms. The announcement itself, however, would tend to strengthen Hussein's position vis-a-vis the Army as well as bolstering his position vis-a-vis the radical Arabs. It would have a stabilizing influence in Jordan at the time the UN Special Representative begins his important mission. He has been trying since last June to secure arms from the US. He was given in August what a reasonable man could interpret as a US commitment to supply him arms. He asked again when he was recently in Washington. Jordan is the only Eastern Arab state which considers it has legitimate arms requirements and is making little or no progress in meeting them. It is difficult for Hussein to justify to his people his continued reliance on the West. Those who have worked with the Soviet Union can more convincingly prove the benefits from their association. Our position in Jordan has declined since the war. The Embassy reports increasing frustration and bitterness by the Jordanians against the US. The Jordanians consider our Near Eastern policy discouragingly under the influence of the Zionists and the Israelis. Nonetheless we still have resources in Jordan but their strength is waning. The pattern of our relationship is being steadily whittled away. The few arms which Ambassador Symmes recommends we provide 3 could help arrest this trend. The quantity is small and could hardly constitute a threat to Israel or alter the arms balance in the area. The Joint Staff considers the ammunition requested as minimal in both quantity and type. The most deadly item, the 106 mm recoilless rifle, is primarily an anti-tank gun and lacks the protection needed for offensive deployment. The arms requested are replacements for a portion of the arms lost in fighting and not additions to Jordan's arsenal. We shall encourage the GOJ to seek European suppliers for some of its requirements particularly in the heavy weapon and aircraft fields. We do not think we should do so for this list. As a matter of fact, for some of the items such as spares it is not practical. In general, procurement of this type of ground equipment from West European sources would create further problems for the Jordanian Army as its training, maintenance facilities and tactical doctrine are now based primarily on US weapons. More important, however, is the impact that a refusal to carry out our previous commitments would have on USG-GOJ relations. A ruler in Hussein's position has an obvious need for a reliable source of external support—both economic and military. If we tell the King that he is on his own and should shop for weapons wherever he can obtain them from Western sources, he will feel that we are opting out of the role of external supporter. The USSR has offered to take over this role and there is a real danger that the King, under pressure from Nasser and the radical Arabs, may decide that Soviet sponsorship, with all its drawbacks, is the best of the options left open to him. The actual weapons involved are of less significance than the symbolic value to Hussein and to his Army of our continued willingness to play the role of supporter. Recommendation The only valid reason why such small sales cannot be made available is because the Zionists and Israel, unless otherwise persuaded, can cause difficulties in Congress and elsewhere if we send any arms to Jordan. We think that our own interests in this matter are of sufficient importance to justify a difference of opinion with the Israelis and their domestic partisans here. We strongly urge that we go ahead on arms for Jordan. If you agree, we suggest (a) that you consult again with Congress and (b) that Mr. Katzenbach or Rostow inform the Israelis. It should be made clear, however, that whereas we would endeavor to persuade Western Europeans to supply arms to Jordan, we, in our own interest, should continue to provide small quantities ourselves. Our rationale would be the strengthening of Hussein's position to permit him to proceed on the path of settlement with the Israelis and to maintain his moderate pro-Western position. We recommend that: (1) You raise the issue of Jordan arms along the lines discussed in this paper and seek the SIG's concurrence in your taking the necessary steps to enable us to release the arms requested by Ambassador Symmes. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Houghton and Marshall W. Wiley of NEA/ARN and cleared by Davies. 2 Not printed. 3 Some of this equipment would be sold to the GOJ and some items could be provided under the MAP as previously scheduled. [Footnote in the source text.] 6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 4, 1967, 2338Z. 79148. Subj: Discussion with Comay on Refugees. 1. At GOI suggestion as follow-on to Secretary's discussion of refugees with Eban October 23, 2 Comay had lengthy conversation December 1 with Battle, Sisco and other Department officers. Discussion of UNRWA debate tactics reported septel. Detailed memcon being pouched. 3 Highlights follow: 2. In general, we were reassured by Comay's presentation of Israeli tactical approach. With exception attitude on new refugees, their thinking on delicate pre-settlement period conforms to ours. Comay repeatedly stressed GOI belief refugee problem could and should be solved and importance it attaches to overall political settlement for achieving this objective. 3. New Refugees- -In response to our inquiries and arguments re return of post-June refugees, Comay indicated that for all practical purposes movement from East to West had stopped for time being. Although family reunification scheme could help (and Comay attributed poor performance to GOJ), substantial movement of refugees must await movement on political front following progress of Jarring's contacts. (Comay will also have GOI responsibilities for negotiations with Jarring.) Comay gave customary GOI line on refugee return, detailing August and September operations and asserting that, for reasons of family ties, income sources and political uncertainties, bulk of refugees did not really wish to return. 4. GOI Activities During Pre-Settlement Period —In addition to ascertaining GOI thinking on refugee planning, object our discussion with Comay was to forewarn against statements or activities which could prejudice chances for settlement. Comay cited careful GOI contingency planning for eventual refugee solution but said there would be no formal, public announcement of master plan. GOI thought such plan would have dramatic and for GOI beneficial public relations effect but also knew publicity would cause adverse Arab reaction seriously damaging chances for settlement. Neither would GOI undertake any specific projects which would similarly jeopardize negotiations with Jarring. 5. GOI concern during interim period would be to promote economic well-being of refugees. Comay mentioned stepped-up vocational training as non-controversial program which would prepare refugees for better life in situ or elsewhere but which would not arouse Arab fears. Refugees would benefit from 100 million pounds being budgeted for civilian administration in occupied territories in current GOI fiscal year ending March, 1968. Comay emphasized that GOI had moved quickly to restore normalcy in occupied areas and had developed effective cooperation with UNRWA with only minor difficulties arising mainly from security requirements, i.e. restricted movement of Arab personnel in Israel. 6. Long-term Refugee Planning —Comay said GOI was drawing up recommendations from studied conducted by various technical teams (water, land, economics, etc.) for presentation to Cabinet in near future. Perhaps early next year GOI could have contact with US experts. GOI recognized, however, that long-range plans for refugees could not be divorced from question of political future of area. Even within GOI, opinions were divided on such questions as what size, shape and future borders of Israel should be. GOI waiting to see what its options were. It could make no decisions until these were clearer. Meanwhile, it was doing its homework to fill gaps in its knowledge of refugees and of economic potential of occupied areas. It realized that what it could do on its own to solve refugee problem was limited not only by economic factors but by political and juridical considerations as well. When time came, GOI would be prepared cooperate to fullest extent in finding solution to refugee problem, but unable say now what this might involve. Comay made point of emphasizing that, notwithstanding appeal of West Bank from sentimental and security standpoints, GOI had made no decision to incorporate area in Israel, and it was mistake to draw general conclusions to this effect from specific actions taken by occupation authorities for local reasons. 7. Without commenting on specifics of GOI planning, we emphasized that these and other elements of any meaningful refugee solution must come in context of general settlement. Comay agreed and said refugees should in GOI views have “top priority” in settlement. We noted important contribution which well-staffed GOI refugee plan could make to settlement and Comay agreed it would be useful and important approach Jordan with proposals on refugees when negotiations under way. 8. Comay emphasized GOI working hard on planning and aware US also developing ideas on refugees. He expressed great willingness exchange views with us on preliminary, non-committed basis. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Henry Precht in NEA/IAI and Atherton, cleared by Joseph J. Sisco and Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown (IO), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, London, Jerusalem, Paris, and USUN. 2 This conversation is summarized in telegram 58735 to Tel Aviv, October 24, scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume XIX . 3 A memorandum of this conversation was transmitted to Tel Aviv as an attachment to circular airgram CA-4218, December 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, REF ARAB) 7. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 7. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 4, 1967. SUBJECT Nasser's November 23 Speech and the Mood of the Arabs Ten days after Nasser's November 23 “State of the Union” speech, it's worth reflecting on where it leaves us. Speech Consistent with Khartoum The Israelis see the worst in it. Eshkol described it to Barbour as a “dagger in the back of the cause of peace” (and then went on to stress his need for more aircraft). Foreign Minister officials—some more relaxed than others—see it as bearing out their interpretation of the Khartoum meeting that Nasser's ultimate aim is war. Politically conscious Arabs from New York to Saudi Arabia interpret it as a “moderate” speech consistent with Nasser's effort since Khartoum to keep the initiative away from extremists. They all say it “didn't slam any doors.” A few lump his harsher statements with Israel's as a prelude to bargaining. Everyone (including Federenko) agrees that Nasser soured the atmosphere, but Arabs and Israelis alike agree that the speech did not depart from Nasser's position at Khartoum as he has interpreted that position to both King Hussein and Robert Anderson. This is borne out by two subsequent official UAR clarifications which slightly soften the initial hard impact of the speech in our press: —The official text of the passage on “never” allowing Israel to pass through the Canal indicates that the following qualifying sentences were lost in applause: “Passage through the Canal is an indivisible part of the original Palestine question. It is not part of the problem of eliminating the effects of the aggression.” In the official text, the word “never” becomes “will not.” Whatever Nasser actually said, official UAR policy still links the Canal to a refugee settlement. —Nasser's official spokesman on November 26 qualified Nasser's statement that there could be no “peace” with Israel by saying he had not rejected a peaceful settlement but only a “peace treaty.” The Israelis put no stock in this distinction, but the Egyptians have carefully maintained it since Khartoum and seem to think it increases their flexibility in arriving at a settlement. Khartoum Position: A Two-phase Strategy? The main argument over Nasser's position, then, boils down to interpretation of the position he took at Khartoum, not of the 23 November speech. The Israelis say their reports on Khartoum show a two-phase strategy: Nasser's long-run objective remains the destruction of Israel. Their short-run aim is to get Israel out of occupied territories. They can't push Israel out by force, so they're ready to make marginal political concessions to get their land back. At the same time, military preparations continue for a future second stage-war against Israel. They quote Hussein at Khartoum: “Once the Israelis withdraw, we will return to our previous ways.” We agree that Nasser at Khartoum took to the political track because he has neither the military nor the economic power to get the conquered lands back by force. But our transcript of the Khartoum conference reveals no consciously conceived two-phase plan . In fact, the radical leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization tried to force the leaders there to focus on solution of the overall Palestine problem, and they literally shouted him down. They insisted that the only subject they were discussing was how to get the Israelis out. They talked abut rebuilding military strength, but mainly so they don't have to negotiate flat on their backs and in order to use force eventually if political means fail. The truth about Khartoum, I think, is that Nasser hasn't really thought beyond Israeli withdrawal one way or another. There was almost no talk at Khartoum about the “lasting peace” we talk about. And the Israelis are probably right in fearing that leopards don't change their spot. But for the moment, we don't think they're talking about a second phase, if any. The same, incidentally, is true of the Israelis. Yaacov Herzog, Eshkol's Chef de Cabinet, told me two weeks ago that Israeli leaders are deeply divided over whether they should risk a political settlement, if the right terms can be negotiated, or sit tight on their expanded boundaries and rely for survival on the added military security they provide. He says he won't know for sure what Israeli strategy is until the Cabinet votes on a specific proposal (though he thinks “peace” will win). Operational Significance There may be small comfort in saying that Nasser for the moment is so preoccupied with Israeli withdrawal that he's not focusing right now on longer range objectives. But there are two important operational points here: 1. No one should trust Nasser. He broke his word to us last May. He's trying to recoup his losses at the lowest cost. His main objective is to be Mr. Big in the Arab world, and anti-Zionism will continue to be his one reliable rallying cry. He honestly believes we're to knock him off and would happily see us cut down to size—even though he knows he needs our power in the area to push Israel back and to hold the USSR at bay and preserve his freedom. 2. But no one should assume that Nasser is so irrevocably committed to a two-phase strategy that no reasonable deal is possible . a. Some Israelis would like an excuse for not having to face up to the tough decisions they'd have to make to achieve a real settlement. b. Some Americans assume that, since the odds seem against a settlement, we shouldn't invest too much more in pressing the parties—especially Israel in an election year—toward a settlement. They believe realism suggests we wash our hands of the whole process as much as possible now that the UN representative has the ball. The danger in working exclusively from this assumption is that we would give up an honest effort to build something on the President's June 19 foundation . It's one thing to be on our guard against the worst in both the Arabs and the Israelis and to assess our chances realistically. It's another to decide that we should fold our tents with all the consequences for our interests in the Middle East. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 53, December 1-10, 1967. Secret. 8. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 8. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 6, 1967, 11:30 a.m. Mr. President: At my request, our Hal Saunders did these two thoughtful memos on: —the choice of ahead in the Middle East; 2 —the meaning of Nasser's Nov. 23 speech. 3 My view is: the Arabs are still confused, humiliated, looking for revenge in part of their minds. But they have no long-term plan. Therefore, we must: —struggle for an Arab-Israeli settlement: —then follow through with policies to strengthen moderate Arabs so that, with the passage of time, the attractiveness of economic and social development gradually, slowly overtakes the passion for revenge. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I , 6/65-3/68. Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at 11:55 a.m. 2 Saunders sent a memorandum on this subject to Rostow on December 5. It was a covering memorandum for his assessment of the meaning of Nasser's November 23 speech, and essentially summarized that memorandum. (Ibid.) 3 Document 7 . 9. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 9. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, December 6, 1967, 1350Z. 2530. Subject: Arms for Jordan. Ref: State 79171. 2 Amman 2519 3 and 2528. 4 1. By prior agreement I stayed on with King Hussein following Senator Ribicoff's audience for a brief discussion of arms situation. Arms question had already come up in general way during meeting with Senator. 2. I said I was pleased His Majesty had had opportunity mention Jordan arms requirements to the Senator, who had seemed quite sympathetic to Jordan's needs as described by the King. I had been concerned, however, to learn through EmbOff on 4th (Amman 2528) that Soviet economic survey mission scheduled to come to Jordan later this month would, at Soviet request, include three Soviet military officials. I could appreciate sense of frustration felt by His Majesty. I felt obliged nevertheless to say I personally believed presence in Jordan of Soviet military, if it became known, would tend prejudice our efforts gain approval for resumption of U.S. arms shipments to Jordan as well as for our general efforts in support of Jordan. I had noted Jordan press article that morning stating that Soviet survey mission would not arrive until after first of year. I hoped this was true because it would allow time for USG to arrive at what I believed would ultimately be favorable decision on resuming some arms shipments to Jordan. 3. His Majesty responded that he was not sure when Soviet mission would arrive. It might be before end of year. Soviet Ambassador in informing him only a few days ago of mission's coming had stated mission would include three senior military officials but that latter would not be identified as such in order to avoid embarrassing Jordanian Govt. King said he had been taking line with Soviets that he still intended obtain his arms from usual sources. Nevertheless, he had not felt he could tell Soviet Amb to delete three military from survey mission. For one thing, Soviets had been taking very moderate line recently. They were supporting U.N. resolution in talks with Jordan and had stressed Israel's right to existence. Soviet Amb had also spoken of Soviet efforts to dampen Syrian extremism. He considered Soviets, despite some outward appearances, had been playing a generally constructive role with regard to Arab-Israeli problem. This factor also led him to feel he could not tell Soviets not to send mission at this time or not to bring military personnel if they did. On other hand, it was his intention to see that Soviet military only looked around in general way and that they did not get into any specific discussion of Jordan's requirements. This was understood, he emphasized. 4. I commented that His Majesty was, of course, best judge of GOJ interests in this respect. Some of us, however, still have suspicions about Soviet motives in the Near East. Only in last few days Soviets had been making noises of willingness to discuss some form of arms limitation in area; yet with Jordan they were pursuing what could only be considered a significantly new arms supply role in Near East. Although Soviets more cautious and seem to recognize danger of escalation of Arab-Israeli incidents, some of us still believe they will pursue their spoiling operations in Near East wherever possible. I personally was suspicious enough of their motives to wonder if they could be counted on to keep presence in Jordan of three military personnel quiet. 5. Conversation concluded with my telling His Majesty I had new word from Washington indicating high level USG officials fully appreciate urgency GOJ requirements and actively reviewing matter. I was therefore hopeful of a favorable decision on Jordan arms shortly after Congressional action is completed on foreign aid appropriation bill. I thought this could be before Christmas. King seemed to appreciate these assurances. He said earlier in morning he had spoken to assembled senior JAA officers to tell them he expects soon to be able to provide them with specifics regarding military equipment supplies. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, Moscow, London, and Tel Aviv. 2 Telegram 79171 to Amman, December 5, informed the Embassy that the question of resuming the supply of arms to Jordan was under active high-level discussion. The question would have to be explored with Congressional leaders, however, so a decision was not imminent. The Department instructed the Embassy to try to persuade the Jordanian Government to be patient. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 4 In telegram 2528 from Amman, December 6, the Embassy reported that King Hussein was being pressed by the Soviet Union to continue a military dialogue begun during the King's recent visit to Moscow. The Soviet Union planned to send a military delegation to Amman to explore Jordan's military requirements, and the Soviet Ambassador in Amman had told the King that his government was prepared to supply Jordan's arms need at bargain prices and under favorable terms. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 10. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 10. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, December 7, 1967, 0122Z. 80712. Deliver to Ambassadors at opening of business. Subj: UN Representative Jarring Mission. 1. Timing of departure from NY to UN Rep Jarring following consultations there with SYG and Staff, parties and others, including USUN, not yet definite due to complications related to projected Arab Summit. However, he will probably proceed to area within next week or two. His headquarters will be in Cyprus. 2. Jarring faces formidable difficulties. Issues themselves are so numerous and complex that even with generally cooperative spirit from parties, it is not to be expected that agreement will come quickly on any problem. In addition, of course, there is danger that either or both sides will be so intransigent as to bring negotiations to stalemate. 3. In light these difficult circumstances, we have considered what activity on our part might be useful in improving chances Jarring's success and have concluded that US approaches to parties concerning general US attitude would be useful. Prospect of new Arab Foreign Minister and Summit meetings provide additional reason for us to urge moderation and flexibility on Arabs at this time, since stand meetings take will probably have important influence on progress of Jarring Mission. Action posts should therefore unless they see serious objections seek opportunity to discuss our current views with appropriate host govt official. Posts should make it clear we are making similar approach to Israelis. 2 4. In making any approaches it is very important that posts avoid giving any impression that we are directly involved in Jarring's mission or seeking to impress our views on him concerning either his methods of operation or substance of his discussions. It will be for Jarring to carry on substantive negotiations with parties. Our purpose at present should be to urge that all parties extend fullest cooperation to achievement of a peaceful solution.FYI. At later stage, depending on developments, we will have to consider whether and how we should support specific proposals. There may well be a time, as when issues have crystallized into clear bargaining situation, when diplomatic support of US and others may be necessary to bring parties to agreement. In such cases we will be prepared to act in accordance with Amb Goldberg's Nov. 22 pledge in SC. 3 End FYI. 5. Approach should draw on following: (a) SC res, 4 which is best possible in circumstances, provides opportunity to set in motion a peace-making process with which both sides can in good conscience cooperate. Res is balanced and nonprejudicial to positions of any of parties. Its adoption culminated most difficult period during which it often appeared that effort to find means of progress toward a settlement would end in complete stalemate. Opportunity provided by Jarring's mission may well be one-time chance, therefore, since it would appear most unlikely that same or similar conditions as those which made possible agreement on SC Res could be recreated at any future time. That opportunities, once lost, do not return has, as Arabs know too well, been one of lessons of past twenty years; it could well be so again if present opportunity missed. (b) We consider SC Res entirely consistent with policy of USG as set forth by President Johnson in June 19 statement 5 and by Ambassador Goldberg in statements in UN since then. We are prepared, therefore, to support the UN's efforts fully. As Ambassador Goldberg said in SC Nov. 22: “The Special Representative will need all the help and support he can get—both from parties and from international community. I have already given my Government's pledge on this score—and I wish to reiterate it again today—a pledge to this Council and to parties concerned that the diplomatic and political influence of USG will be exerted in support of efforts of UN Rep to achieve fair and equitable and dignified solution so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquility.” (c) Res itself only provides framework of principles for peace-making efforts. Success in that effort will depend ultimately on parties themselves—spirit in which they receive and work with UN Rep, willingness to reach accommodation, and respect for others' vital interests and legitimate grievances. Need for good will on both sides extends beyond negotiations themselves to general posture and actions of parties. Policies and actions leading to mistrust and tension in area can be just as detrimental to chances for success as positions taken in negotiations themselves. Posture assumed and policies embraced by govts at Arab Summit very important in this regard. (d) Res will not bring instant peace. We do not expect any early or easy success. There is no question of expecting immediate acquiescence by any of the parties. But we do urge all of them to avoid talking intransigent positions, either in private or public, which could close doors to settlement that may now hopefully be opening. (e) US has no blueprint for settlement. We continue to believe that, in final analysis, secure, just and lasting peace must rest upon agreements between the parties, whatever form they make take or whatever modalities are used to reach them (i.e. direct negotiations or some form of intermediary). It is only the parties in the last analysis who can determine whether just and lasting peace can be achieved through a settlement which will endure. 6. In view of Arab moderate leaders' helpful role in period leading up to adoption SC res, posts should as appropriate show appreciation for assistance rendered by host govts; Embassies in Arab countries not directly involved should encourage moderate leaders to work toward objective that UN Mission receive fullest possible cooperation from states directly involved. 7. FYI. When Jarring comes to area, posts should leave to him initiative in contacts. If he should seek help, they should provide all appropriate assistance in furtherance his mission, referring to Dept for guidance any requests about which they may have some question. He will probably not initiate formal contacts, although we would not expect him to avoid casual contact with American or other officials whom he might meet at social affairs. 6 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Arthur R. Day, cleared by Sisco and Brown in UNP, and approved by Battle. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Cairo, Algiers, Khartoum, and Aden, and repeated to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 2 The Embassy in Tel Aviv was instructed on December 9 to urge the Israeli Government to be as forthcoming as possible in dealing with the Jarring Mission. (Telegram 82248 to Tel Aviv; ibid.) 3 In his November 22 statement before the UN Security Council, Goldberg pledged U.S. support for the Special Representative and urged other nations to make a similar pledge. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 , pp. 617-618. 4 Reference is to Security Council Resolution 242. 5 In a speech before the Department of State Foreign Policy Conference for Educators on June 19, President Johnson outlined five principles for peace in the Middle East which the United States would support. See Department of State Bulletin , July 10, 1967, pp. 31-34. 6 There is extensive reporting from Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Beirut on Jarring's initial efforts to promote a settlement in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Jarring's efforts through December are summarized in Document 30 . Jarring's initial efforts are also summarized in the report Secretary-General Thant made to the UN Security Council on the Jarring Mission on January 5, 1971. See Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations , Vol. VIII, U Thant, 1968-1971 . 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 9, 1967, 0136Z. 82331. 1. Ambassador Harman called on Assistant Secretary Battle December 7 to present GOI study 2 updating data and rationale for Israeli aircraft request presented by General Weizman in September. Summarizing highlights of study, Harman made following points: A. Study points up seriousness of Soviet resupply of Arabs in terms of quantity, quality and strike capacity of Arab airforces. For example, UAR, Syria, Iraq and Algeria now have 550 fighter aircraft and 62 bombers against total of about 155 for Israel; B. Concept of joint air operations against Israel now incorporated into Arab planning, and Israel must assume it would in future face coordinated Arab air attack; and C. Arab air bases have increased in number and have been rendered less vulnerable to attack. 2. Harman said that, while Weizman had made clear his request looked to future and not based on fear of imminent attack, latest information on Arab capabilities, coupled with increasingly bellicose Arab statements, now gave request added sense of urgency. Any indications of Israeli weakness would encourage attack. Israel therefore needed additional aircraft to provide credible deterrent or, in event irrational Arab actions in face of such deterrent, to assure its survival. Further factor was French arms policy which not only deprived Israel of aircraft it had already contracted for but, if latest press reports re lifting of French embargo for Iraq were correct, indicated Iraq might get planes originally intended for Israel. Harman said two schools of thought existed in Arab world, one favoring resort to force and other urging moderation. Israel needed strength to convince Arabs that force would not work. This would bolster moderates and contribute to success of Jarring mission. 3. Battle asked if Israel was convinced French would not deliver on Mirage contract. Harman said he feared this was the case. In any event Israel must now base its planning on assumption it would get no aircraft from France. In response further question from Battle, Harman said Israel had found no possibility of obtaining Mirage aircraft through third countries. Further disturbing factor was new info that Soviets to supply Arabs all-weather MIG-23's in 1968. 4. Harman stressed that Weizman request looking toward inventory of 250 modern aircraft by late 1968 had shaved margin very fine. That request had assumed French would deliver, and failure receive Mirages would thus aggravate already serious situation. Harman said he detected tendency in USG to overrate Israeli ability and hoped we would not give Israel benefit of too many doubts. In response Battle comment that we based our assessment on past Israeli performance, Harman said that previous success had come from knocking out Arab airforces on ground. Arabs were aware of this and now planning accordingly. Fifty planes could literally make difference between life and death of Israel. 5. Battle commented that we shared Israeli concern about Soviet resupply and other activities in area and were watching them carefully. We did not believe Soviet resupply had brought Arab forces above pre-war levels or had altered their basic nature. Views might differ on relative strengths of Arab and Israeli forces and we might not agree with Israeli assessment, but we remained sensitive to Israel's security needs. Weizman's request was receiving urgent consideration and we hoped to have reply soon. 6. Battle said we were particularly concerned about arrival of Soviet bombers in Egypt and about Soviet airlift of equipment to Yemen. Re former, we had no indications that bombers to remain in Egypt permanently, but if such visits became a pattern this was nevertheless a serious development. Harman asked whether we had considered raising this question at high level with Soviets. Battle said we had not. On other hand, we had raised arms control problem in general with Soviets on number of occasions. We were not discussing this subject with Soviets at the moment but wouldn't rule out possibility should right moment come. 7. Re Yemen, Harman thought situation difficult for Soviets whose only access was by air. He speculated that advantage lay with those who had strength on ground and thought Royalists therefore might have upper hand. This was factor which various forces in Yemen should be able to exploit. 8. Turning to new subject and emphasizing that he knew Israeli views and did not expect Harman to comment, Battle said Israel should know that we still had question of arms for Jordan under consideration. We had not reached decision, and if we did decide go forward, it would be on modest scale. We had evidence, however, that Soviets were prepared to provide Jordan anything it wanted. Situation in Jordan was extremely delicate and we would need to come to decision in next few weeks. In response Harman's question whether Jordan exploring France as source of supply, Battle said there had been some talk of this but to best our knowledge it had gotten nowhere and French had in fact made no offer to Jordanians. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, USUN, London, Moscow, Paris, and Cairo. 2 A copy of this study was given by Harman to Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze when he discussed the issue with him on December 8. A memorandum of Harman's conversation with Nitze is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, 333 Israel. The study is ibid., OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, 452 Israel. 12. Letter From President Nasser to President Johnson 12. Letter From President Nasser to President Johnson 1 Cairo, December 9, 1967. Dear Mr. President: I take this opportunity to extend my best wishes to you and your family. At this time which is sacred to both our people I feel that good relations should exist between our people. I have sent a special message through Mr. Birdsall. I trust you will receive it in the spirit which I send it. With highest personal regards. Sincerely, Jamal Abdul Nasser 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. No classification marking. The letter was delivered to President Johnson by James Birdsall on December 18; see Document 21 . 13. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 13. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, December 10, 1967, 0915Z. 1136. 1. Birdsall 2 saw Nasser for over two hours last night and I debriefed him this morning. 2. Birdsall says he was given “formal message” by Nasser to be delivered to no one except President Johnson. (Nasser told Birdsall that not even his Foreign Minister aware Birdsall's presence Cairo.) 3. From Birdsall's subsequent long and rambling conversation feel fairly sure about contents of “formal message.” Nasser believes that Russians are increasing their pressure on him and that in absence any ties with USG he increasingly powerless to resist. Nasser hinted at strong Russian pressure re use of Alexandria, possibly involving permanent fueling facilities and barracks for Soviet naval personnel. Nasser also complained about magnitude of Sov concentration in UAR armed forces. 4. Nasser said he willing accept non-belligerency with Israel with all that implies. If Israel will pay just and adequate compensation to Palestinian refugees, Nasser will exchange Ambassadors with Israel. 5. Nasser was quite contrite for the grave mistakes he made in May and June, and acknowledged that Egyptians had been soundly defeated, mostly because they did not know how to use Soviet weapons. Nasser also expressed regret for past speeches he made accusing U.S. of “war of starvation” and so forth, indicating some of these statements had been made to please Soviets. 6. Nasser wishes resume diplomatic relations with the United States. He wants some time to consult with other Arabs but feels he can encourage other Arab states which broke relations he has no influence whatsoever. 7. Nasser said he fully understood that there no question resumption any form U.S. economic aid to UAR for foreseeable future. 8. Re big lie, Nasser made ingenuous statement that he had never accused USG of military participation in June war. He claims that all he did was quote Hussein directly on this point. ( Comment: If that is case, why did UAR break relations with U.S.?) 9. Birdsall leaving Cairo today for London and plans return New York December 14. He will upon arrival request meeting with President Johnson. His thesis will doubtless be that USG cannot afford stand idly by in face of Soviet takeover of UAR and ultimately other Arab states in Eastern Mediterranean. 10. Recommendation: I would hope that if all possible President Johnson could receive Birdsall if only for a few moments before turning him over to White House or Departmental advisers. 3 Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The Spanish Government assumed protection of U.S. interests in the United Arab Republic following severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and the United Arab Republic on June 6. Rostow transmitted the text of this telegram to President Johnson on December 10 in White House telegram CAP 671037 along with the following assessment: “With the Russians trying to take over from Nasser in the Yemen, it is, indeed, possible that he wants to get close to us to keep independence from Moscow.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68) 2 James Birdsall was a lawyer who practiced in New York and had developed contacts in the United Arab Republic in his capacity as attorney for ALCO Products. His contacts in Egypt were facilitated by the Geneva representative of ALCO, a Mr. Siddiqui, who was Pakistani. In October 1966 Nasser invited Birdsall to Egypt to discuss his desire to improve U.S.-UAR relations and his belief that the United States was determined to overthrow his government. See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 341 . Birdsall's visit to Cairo in December 1967 was again at Nasser's invitation. (Telegram 78791 from Cairo, December 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3 Bergus telegraphed his assessment of Birdsall's conversation with Nasser from Cairo on December 13. He believed Birdsall's report because he thought Nasser was desperate to enlist the United States as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. Bergus recommended a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Nasser and the UAR in light of Nasser's démarche. He felt that Nasser might speak for Egypt and much of the Arab world for some time, and he could not envision a settlement of the Middle East crisis that did not presuppose tolerable relations between the United States and Egypt. (Telegram 1149 from Cairo; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US) 14. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 14. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 11, 1967. WWR: I know Luke Battle has talked with you about the attached. 2 State today is working on its final recommendation on how we should handle Birdsall's request for an appointment with the President when we get it. Although we certainly don't want to cut off any reasonable communication, I have the following reservations about this exercise. —Nasser is sending whatever this message is without even the knowledge of his Foreign Minister. Given our questions about who speaks for the UAR today, I wonder how much credence we could give to whatever Birdsall says even if he is reporting accurately. —Nasser's reported comment that he will exchange Ambassadors with Israel is so far out of line with everything else we have that it causes me to question either the accuracy of Birdsall's reporting or Nasser's mental consistency and stability. —As you said when we talked about this a couple of weeks ago, the time has come when the Egyptians have to stop giving us vague signals under the grandstand and give us their requests through a reasonable channel. In retrospect, it is clear that we could have gotten ourselves in a terrible bind by responding to one set of signals last summer that could have tied us into the whole Amer conspiracy. Coupled with our worries is the request to Don Bergus when he arrived that we consider him our main point of contact to the exclusion of all others. State will have its recommendation for us shortly but I wanted to give you these thoughts in case Birdsall should get home early. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. 2 Telegram 1136 from Cairo, Document 13 . 15. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson 15. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 11, 1967. SUBJECT Arms for Jordan and Israel The attached memorandum (concurred in by Rusk and McNamara) sets out alternative courses of action for dealing with the priority arms problem in the Middle East. 2 We have deliberately given you these various options, although I am sure you will recognize that the choices on Jordan are narrow indeed. It may be useful to you, in making this difficult decision, to have my views on how you might play it—particularly in light of the potential domestic problems. Israel has asked for 27 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, to be delivered in 1969. (These are in addition to the 48 Skyhawks now scheduled for delivery in 1968). It has also asked for 50 F-4 Phantom jets, to be delivered in 1969-70. The military balance is in Israel's favor and should remain so for at least a year. But I believe there is a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968. King Hussein is pressing hard for some arms deliveries—both as evidence of our continued support and to meet minimum equipment needs for his defeated army. Hussein's position is threatened by his efforts in favor of a settlement, his association—in Arab eyes—with the West, and his resistance to attractive Soviet arms offers. If it can be done without endangering Israel's security, it is in our national interest—as well as Israel's—to avoid further substantial US arms commitments until we know more about the chances for a negotiated settlement. I therefore conclude that: 1. The US should tell Hussein before Christmas that we are willing to supply certain of Jordan's minimum requirements. But doing something for Jordan, no matter how little, will almost certainly be strenuously opposed by Israel. This will mean some political trouble for you on the domestic front. 2. We must give some indication now to the Israelis on how we propose to deal with their requests. We should: —assure Israel that a delay in committing ourselves to sell them A-4s does not mean that the 1969-70 delivery date would slip (assuming we decide to go ahead with the sale); —indicate that the US would be prepared to divert F-4s from other contracts in order to meet a clearly demonstrated Israeli need (i.e., French cancellation of Mirage deliveries; delivery of substantial numbers of Mirages to the Arabs, escalation of Soviet aircraft supplies to Arabs). 3. In terms of dealing with the domestic situation here, and the likely Israeli reaction to our moving on Jordan, I do not believe we should tell the Israelis more than the foregoing. By withholding firm word on our intentions until Eshkol's visit in February, we may be able to dampen Israeli opposition to Jordan sales. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. 2 Attached was a December 11 memorandum from Katzenbach to President Johnson, with the same subject heading. The memorandum laid out to greater length the policy options and recommendations and posed the option of whether the President wanted the Department to proceed with consultations with Israel and Jordan on the basis of those recommendations. There is no indication on either memorandum of the President's response. 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 11, 1967, 1747Z. 82530. Subject: Tiran Island. 1. At lunch December 6 Undersecretary Rostow raised with Ambassador Harman continuing Israeli occupation Tiran Island. 2 Rostow suggested cooperative relations with King Faisal of great importance in period ahead, not only for Yemen but also because of Faisal's influence on UAR, Jordan and elsewhere in process of settlement. He said continuing Israeli presence political irritant to US relations with Saudis and unnecessary due to presence Israeli forces at Sharm al-Sheikh. Our Ambassador in Jidda believed it would be possible arrange that Saudis not occupy island if Israelis withdraw. He (Rostow) would appreciate answer to our several approaches in Tel Aviv this subject. 2. Harman took note of Rostow's request. He asked why Saudis had allowed Egyptians occupy island and asserted categorically that Egyptian troops had been on island just before arrival of Israelis in June. 3. Tel Aviv may wish refer to this conversation in further sounding out Israelis as opportunity arises. 3 Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret. Drafted by George B. Lambrakis; cleared by Atherton, William D. Brewer, and Davies; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Jidda and USUN. 2 Israel occupied Tiran Island in the Straits of Tiran during the Six-Day War in June. The island was the territory of Saudi Arabia and, after Israeli occupation of the island was confirmed in August, the United States on several occasions encouraged Israel to withdraw from Tiran Island and the neighboring Saudi island of Senafir. Documentation on these initiatives on Saudi Arabia's behalf is ibid. 3 Under Secretary Rostow returned to the subject of Tiran Island in a conversation with Ambassador Harman on December 21. Rostow again urged Israel to withdraw from the island, a move that he argued would not affect Israel militarily and which would be very helpful politically with Saudi Arabia. (Telegram 88486 to Tel Aviv, December 21; ibid.) 17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 12, 1967, 0125Z. 83026. Subject: Terrorism and Reprisals. Ref: State's 72151 and 75924. 2 1. During lunch tour d'horizon with Ambassador Harman December 6, Under Secretary Rostow reviewed sequence of border violations, terrorist raids, and Israeli reprisals. He said we concerned about destruction of villages, which raises serious questions international law. Our legal adviser had come to view that some of these episodes probably violated accepted principles of international law and Geneva Convention of 1949, 3 to which both Jordan and Israel were parties. There were no military operations justifying razing of villages. Referring to Atherton-Yaish conversations (reftel) Rostow said episodes were having adverse political effect on Israel's reputation and on general political atmosphere. He said he had found feeling in Europe that Israeli position is “hardening,” even among officials who knew that Israel's official goals for negotiation have not changed. 2. Harman commented that problem of terrorism—all, in his view, emanating from Syria—could be dealt with only in three ways. Jordanians could interdict terrorists within Jordan (he said there had recently been a raid coming directly into Israel from Syria; the others all crossed via Jordan). Or Israelis could interdict in territory held by Israel. Or, after a time, if that didn't work, Israelis might have to undertake another raid to cool situation a bit. In retrospect, worst mistake Harman had to reproach himself with, he thought, was the recommendation that Israel to go Security Council in fall of 1966 rather than strike directly against Syria. The Soviet veto in the instance and the weakness of the Western position, led straight to Samu, and then to May and June. Could war have been prevented by a hard blow against Syria a year ago? 3. Rostow said we recognized full gravity of problem of terrorists. We were inclined to think that for moment a stronger U.N. presence between Israel and Jordan could be helpful. 4. Harman dismissed the idea. U.N. forces had done no good. Problem was too large to be dealt with by a border patrol. It had to be met within Jordan, or, if saboteurs penetrated the West Bank, by Israel within the area. Israel was getting good cooperation from West Bank people, who were more and more disenchanted with Amman, and inclined to help Israelis. In any event, U.N. forces had proved their inadequacy. Right procedure was that of cooperation between the Israeli and Jordanian forces. When Jordanian interests were involved, Jordanians met Israelis at Allenby Bridge. But when issue was that of stopping terrorism, Jordanians raised an issue of political principle. With Security Council Resolution passed, Jordanians should begin to take a less belligerent posture, and forget absurd idea that they cannot talk with Israelis. 5. Re para 1 above, following is basis of our conclusion that Israeli destruction of Jiftlik and other villages is violation of Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: (A) Article 2 provides that Convention applies to cases of partial or total occupation of territory of a Party; (B) Article 33 states that “no protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties … are prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited;” and (C) Article 53 specifically prohibits destruction by occupying power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons or public authorities, except where such destruction is rendered “absolutely necessary by military operations.” Israeli measures such as destruction of Jiftlik do not constitute “military operations,” since hostilities are ended and cease-fire is in effect. We think it would be useful for Embassy, drawing on foregoing, to seek appropriate opportunity in discussions with GOI to follow-up Under Secretary Rostow's comments to Harman in this connection. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by George B. Lambrakis; cleared by Davies, Atherton, Houghton, Robert H. Neuman (L/NEA), and Day; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, Beirut, London, Paris, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Telegram 72151 to Tel Aviv, November 20, noted that the Embassy had taken up with the Foreign Ministry reports of destruction of West Bank settlements by Israel, which the United States found “most disturbing.” In telegram 75924 to Tel Aviv, November 28, the Department reported that the Israeli Embassy explained that the West Bank villages were destroyed because they had been abandoned during the June war and had subsequently become centers for infiltrators from Jordan into Israel. (Both ibid.) 3 Reference is to the conventions signed at Geneva on August 12, 1949, on the protection of victims of war. (6 UST 3114, 6 UST 3116, and 6 UST 3117) 18. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 18. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, December 12, 1967, 1606Z. 1796. 1. At outset meeting this morning arranged by mutual request (I had another matter, reported separately, to raise with him on instructions),FonMin Eban gave me following aide-memoire which he described as summarizing the views he wished to present: “ Aide-memoire December 12, 1967 The Soviet military presence in the Middle East is becoming progressively more blatant and intense. A. Rearmament of the U.A.R. Since June the USSR has replenished over 80 percent of Arab losses in equipment and stores. At the present rate the resupplying of Egyptian forces to pre-June strength will be completed in approximately five months. Some of the equipment will be qualitatively superior to that being replaced. SU-7 aircraft will be in greater proportion than before. T-34 tanks are being replaced by T-54 tanks; howitzers by new field guns. Ground to ground missiles are being introduced in numbers and quality yet to be determined. B. Naval presence Since June the Soviets have established a naval force in the Mediterranean second only to the Sixth Fleet. The present ratio between the two forces is estimated at upwards of 5.3. The coordination between this force and those of the Government of the UAR marks an escalation of Soviet involvement in the affairs of the region. C. Aerial demonstration Following after these naval developments the Soviets yet despatched a squadron of TU-16 bombers to Egypt for a visit of unspecified duration. It is reported that other such visits will follow. The motives may be to strengthen the Nasser regime on the eve of the summit conference and of Ambassador Jarring's visit. The Egyptian interpretation is exuberant. Cairo is becoming less convinced than ever of the necessity to seek a settlement. D. South Arabia The Soviets have just taken the unprecedented step of intervening actively in the Yemen war by employing Soviet-manned aircraft against Royalist forces. In Arab eyes this gives further credibility to the prospect of Soviet direct intervention elsewhere. The question is whether this escalation in the Soviet involvement should remain unchallenged. If it does Arab policy will be based on the assumption of eventual Soviet supremacy. It is earnestly recommended that the Soviet Government be apprised of the U.S. Government's concern and serious reservations over these far reaching maneuvers. The absence of any United States reactions will encourage further Soviet intrusions. The psychological effects of passivity will be grave both in the Soviet and Arab context. At the present stage the political effects are stronger than the strictly military effects. The tendency noticed in November for Arab governments to attach decisive weight to United States influence will be dissipated. Furthermore we strongly urge the U.S. Government to come to an early and positive decision on Israel's pending request for additional military aircraft. Such a decision would have the following positive effects: 1. It will help redress the political and military gains achieved by the Soviets through their recent actions. 2. It will have a sobering effect on Egyptian planners and policy-makers. They know that hundreds of aircraft have reached the UAR while not one single aircraft has reached Israel . It would be extraordinary in such a context if the UAR were to show a conciliatory front. 3. It is essential to demonstrate the U.S. determination to ensure a viable balance of armament in the area. The French defection has helped to create an impression that Israel can soon be intimated. It is astonishing to record such a position so soon after the June fighting. The chances of progress in the United Nations conciliation effort are considerably less than they were a few weeks ago, as a result of these cumulative disturbances in the existing and prospective balance of power. To allow this derangement to proceed without counterbalancing action would, in our view, be an error of great scope. Experience shows that decisions of war or peace in this region are determined not so much by the reality of strengths as by the impression and appearance of it. The significance of the above developments would not be greatly affected by an objectively positive analysis of American power or Israel's strength. The danger lies in the impression that American and Israeli strength have for some months been static, while Soviet and Arab capacities have been growing in swift momentum.” 2. In the ensuing conversation Eban elaborated on this presentation with particular reference to the psychological and political effects he sees resulting from the increased Soviet presence in the Middle East. Reiterating the Israeli assessment reported on various occasions that Nasser and the Egyptians appear embarked on a two-pronged policy (A) an effort to achieve a political solution on their terms if possible and (B) at the same time rebuilding their military potential to such an extent that if a political solution fails or they ultimately decide that they prefer a renewal of hostilities they will be in a position to defeat Israel at the next attempt, Eban said that he felt in November Nasser was definitely emphasizing the desirability of alternative (A), a political solution, but that there are now serious indications that he is less dedicated to that course. This change Eban attributes to the psychological impact of recent moves in the area. Eban is apprehensive that if this is the case the Egyptians will be less anxious to reach agreement politically than they would have been heretofore. His particular concern is not a real imbalance in US-Soviet force in the area in the favor of Soviets but rather the appearance of additional Soviet activity which might have such an effect on Arabic thinking as to influence them in direction of unrealistic further adventures or, obviously a lesser but still serious course, might persuade them toward adamancy in political negotiation. Turning to a question of arms supply to the Middle East and particularly US arms for Israel, Eban again stressed the psychological importance of a favorable decision on the Weizman requests as a demonstration of U.S. determination to counter effectively Soviet moves. He assumed that Israel would not get French Mirages. But he stressed that even if they did eventually it would not affect the validity of Israel's present request to the U.S. As for numbers, even before the June hostilities Israel assessed its requirements until 1970 as 75 A-4's and 100 Mirages. The first 50 of the latter to be acquired 1968 to be followed by additional 50 in '69. With the rearming by the Soviets of Egypt and other this Israeli requirement still remains valid. Thus the 27 A-4's and 50 Phantoms requested by Weizman are necessary regardless of whether the 50 Mirages come from France or not. Eban concluded by expressing view that he hoped firmly, based on the Weizman conversations and his own subsequent ones in Washington, that U.S. would not argue about numbers perhaps on a theory which would not make sense to him that a few more or less would have some useful effect in lightening the impact of U.S. supply. On contrary, if we should do so the psychological counter to the USSR would be diminished and Israel would in effect be left in dangerously short position on these essential defense items. 3. I said that while I did not have anything in addition to what he has been told in Washington as to the present state of U.S. consideration of this matter, it is my understanding that the problem is being actively pursued. I added that I felt Israeli concerns have been clearly enunciated and brought to the attention of appropriate authorities in Washington 2 but that I would of course report the additional comments he had set forth today. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret;Exdis. 2 On December 13 Ambassador Harman called on Acting Secretary Katzenbach to reinforce the points made by Eban with respect to Israeli concerns about growing Soviet influence and involvement in the Middle East and to emphasize the pressing need for arms to enable Israel to meet the threat posed by the influx of Soviet arms into the area. (Telegrams 84998 and 84999 to Tel Aviv, both December 15; ibid.) 19. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 19. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 13, 1967. SUBJECT Arms for Jordan and Israel The attached memos from Nick Katzenbach 2 lay out the trickiest Mid-East arms decisions we face—Jordan and Israel. We don't believe we can string King Hussein along much longer. A Soviet economic delegation with a few military members is in Jordan now. The King feels he has to give his army some assurance that US equipment will be available or consider Soviet offers. Nick thinks we should do something before Christmas. He recommends a small package from pre-war programs (roughly $6.5 in spares, automotive and commo gear, some anti-tank guns and ammo). He knows the Israelis won't like this, but says it won't affect the arms balance. He proposes letting the key members of Congress know what we plan to do and then informing King Hussein. 3 That would leave us with the problem of how to handle Israeli aircraft requests. As you know, they've asked for (a) 27 additional A-4 Skyhawks to be delivered in 1969 on top of the 48 that will be delivered in 1968 and (b) 50 F-4 Phantoms for delivery in 1969-70. The questions with Israel are not so much “whether” but “when” and “how many.” In principle, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara believe we should go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks to replace Israel's war losses and provide a margin of safety. They do not believe we have to decide on the 50 Phantoms until later in 1968 since the Arab-Israeli military balance today is at least as favorable to Israel as it was on June 5. Nick would prefer not to give the Israelis a definite answer now because he does not want to do anything to jeopardize Ambassador Jarring's peacemaking mission or trigger a new round of Arab demands on Moscow. He would like to hold off at least until Eshkol's visit in early February. To meet predictable Israeli pressures, he'd assure them that we can't decide for another month or two but we will take steps to be sure that this delay will not delay eventual delivery of the aircraft if we go ahead. He would also say that, if the military balance tips sharply against Israel, we would be prepared to divert aircraft from other contracts to meet Israel's needs quickly. The alternative is to go ahead with 27 Skyhawks now to balance our move with Jordan. With the substantial Soviet resupply to the Arabs over the summer, no one could argue seriously that 27 aircraft to Israel would upset chances for peace. The Israeli pressure is beginning to build up here. Therefore, the following decisions are before you: 1. Can we go ahead with a limited program for Jordan in the next week or two, after appropriate Congressional consultation? Yes No Hold for discussion 4 2. If so, which is the better way to handle the Israelis? —Delay decision but assure Israelis our delay won't delay delivery? 5 —Or tell the Israelis now we'll go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks and talk about the rest later? This situation is complex enough that you may want to talk it over with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Nick Katzenbach before your decide. However, this will give you a chance to consider the problem beforehand. Hold for discussion 6 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. 2 Reference is to the two December 11 memoranda from Katzenbach to the President; see Document 15 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 Rostow sent another memorandum to President Johnson on December 13 in which he noted that Assistant Secretary Battle had been summoned to testify before the Middle East subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Rostow asked if Battle could inform the subcommittee of administration thinking about pressures to respond to requests from Israel and Jordan for arms. Johnson responded: “Just say no decision on acct Cong aid provisions etc.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68) 4 President Johnson checked this option. 5 President Johnson checked this option. 6 President Johnson checked this option. 20. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 20. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 15, 1967. SUBJECT Arms for Israel and Jordan You have asked to discuss these decisions: (1) Shall we resume now a limited ($6.5 million) program for Jordan to keep the USSR out? (2) When should we answer Israel's aircraft requests? I. Time is running out on our stringing Hussein along without resuming military shipments. We would go ahead in a minute except for one problem—reaction from Israel, our Jewish community and Congress. But we still feel Israel is better off with a controlled number of US arms in Jordan than with unrestrained Soviet shipments. This is a painful decision, but the Secretaries feel we must go ahead. II. We must provide Israel with some aircraft (Tab C), 2 but we're divided on two issues—how many? and when? The Arab-Israeli balance today is at least as favorable to Israel as on June 5. The question is how quickly we must act to keep pace with Soviet resupply. The 48 Skyhawks we are already delivering will replace Israel's war losses by the end of 1968 and bring Israel's air strength qualitatively somewhat above its June 5 level. General Weizman asked for 27 more Skyhawks and 50 F-4 Phantoms to increase that level (from 200 to 250) and permit modernization. Everyone agrees that we should go ahead with the 27 added Skyhawks soon and hold on the Phantoms until the need is clearer (e.g. French decision on 50 Mirages). But a debate on timing ranges between these choices: —Nick Katzenbach (Tab A) 3 would hold our decision until the Eshkol visit. He believes that we should not jeopardize Jarring's mission and that we can keep the Israelis quiet about Jordan by assuring them we'll avoid lead time delays and will divert aircraft from other contracts if Israel needs help quickly. —Gene Rostow (Tab B) 4 believes we must go ahead now, mainly to disabuse the Arabs of any false hopes that rapid supply of Soviet equipment has given them. I doubt we can hold domestic pressures comfortably until Eshkol comes. I'd be inclined to go ahead now with the 27 Skyhawks, both to balance our Jordan move (if you approve) and to show we mean it about wanting Israel to be militarily self-sufficient. 5 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. 2 Tab C is Document 15 . 3 Tab A is a December 14 memorandum from Katzenbach to Rostow, not printed. 4 Tab B is a December 13 memorandum from Rostow to Katzenbach, not printed. 5 Rostow sent a follow-up memorandum to President Johnson on December 16 in which he reported on a conversation he had had the previous evening with Israeli Minister Evron on the issue of arms for Jordan. Evron indicated that his government would understand and be helpful if the United States felt it had to go ahead with arms for Jordan. Rostow added that he felt that Evron was assuming that the United States would simultaneously agree to provide the additional 27 Skyhawk aircraft to Israel. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68) On December 17 Rostow reported in a memorandum to the President that he had, on the President's instructions, discussed the question of the Skyhawk aircraft for Israel with McGeorge Bundy. BUNDY felt, on balance, that it would be better to proceed with the decision to provide the aircraft rather than postpone it until Eshkol's visit. (Ibid., Israel, Vol. XII, 1965-68) 21. Memorandum of Conversation 21. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 18, 1967. PARTICIPANTS President Lyndon B. Johnson Mr. Walt Rostow Mr. James E. Birdsall Assistant Secretary of State, Lucius D. Battle Mr. Birdsall called on President Johnson at approximately 4:15 p.m. on December 18. Mr. Birdsall presented to President Johnson a letter from President Nasser, 2 a copy of which is attached. Mr. Birdsall also said he had an oral message for the President. 3 President Nasser had asked him to convey expressions of the highest personal esteem for President Johnson. President Nasser also wished President Johnson to know that he regrets the break in relations between the United States and the United Arab Republic. President Nasser desires to resume relations and will endeavor to induce other Arab countries who broke with the United States to resume relations. President Nasser hopes that President Johnson will use his influence to bring about an Israeli withdrawal. At the same time President Nasser would permit himself to accept a “state of nonbelligerency” between the United Arab Republic and the Government of Israel. President Nasser hopes that after resumption of relations, President Johnson will make a gesture of friendship to the Arab nations. At the same time he understands United States relations with the Government of Israel. President Nasser would appreciate an invitation to visit the United States. President Nasser hopes that President Johnson will acknowledge the messages conveyed by Mr. Birdsall to President Johnson. President Johnson expressed his gratitude to Mr. Birdsall and said he would consider the messages as well as what form an appropriate reply might take. 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, United Arab Republic, 4/1/66-12/3/67. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is dated December 19. 2 Document 12 . 3 In a December 14 memorandum from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to Rostow, the Department of State recommended that Birdsall be encouraged to deliver the oral message to Rostow and Battle rather than directly to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68) On December 18 Rostow sent a memorandum to the President in which he stated that Birdsall felt obligated to deliver Nasser's message directly to the President. If he could not follow Nasser's instructions, Birdsall told Rostow and Battle that he would have to report to Cairo that he had failed in his mission. Rostow noted that Nasser would be certain to regard such a failure as a personal rebuff, and he therefore recommended that the President meet with Birdsall. (Ibid.) 4 Birdsall supplemented his oral message with a 9-page memorandum, dated December 19, in which he detailed the background to his meeting with Nasser, as well as the meeting itself. (Ibid.) 22. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 22. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, December 19, 1967. Dear Nick: We have looked into the problems involved in delaying a final decision on the sale of A-4H Skyhawk and still making delivery, if it later seems desirable to do so, within a reasonable period of time. We have also looked again at the availability of F-4 aircraft. We have several possible lines of approach to the problem of A-4Hs. A. First, we could postpone any decision for up to a year and deliver the first of the additional 27 A-4Hs 24 months after a final contract and agreement with the Israelis. This would be the normal delivery lead time. B. Second, we could postpone any decision until after Prime Minister Eshkol's February visit and still deliver the first of the additional 27 A-4Hs in January, 1970. This would require a commitment of from $1.1 to $9.4 million in funds, either U.S. or Israeli, for procurement of long lead time items, if a final decision and agreement is not made by April 1968. C. Third, we could make a tentative decision before 1 January 1968, and commit from $7.6 to $12.3 million in DOD funds to advance procurement of long lead time items. We could then delay a final decision until May, 1968 and still deliver the first of the additional 27 A-4Hs in May or August 1969. This third alternative, however, would require that the Israelis agree to a stretch-out into 1969 of the delivery of the latter portion of the 1966 buy of 48 A-4Hs. Also, the commitment of DOD funds for such an advance procurement of long lead time items will present some problems, especially if we cannot reach a final decision and agreement with Israel by May, 1968. There would also be some loss to DOD if the tentative decision and commitment of funds were not followed by a sale, but this may be partly offset if the Israelis were willing to buy some of the items peculiar to the A-4H for maintenance of the 48 A-4Hs they are now receiving. More specific information on the second and third alternatives (B and C) analyzed by DOD are attached. 2 The crucial points as I see them are whether we are prepared to commit from $7 to $13 million in DOD funds by 1 January 1968 for advanced procurement of long lead items; how important it is to be able to deliver the first of the 27 additional A-4Hs before 1 January 1970; and when we will be ready to make a final decision and agree with Israel to sell the 27 additional A-4Hs. With respect to F-4 Phantoms, we can delay the decision for a year or more and still deliver the first F-4s 24 months from point of contract. Delivery to Israel in less than 24 months from date of final agreement would mean either diversion from active U.S. Navy or Air Force units or from U.S. production earmarked for these units; or advance procurement of long lead time items as in the case of the A-4H. We continue to believe that to introduce F-4s into the Near East in the foreseeable future may well escalate the arms race, is not now necessary from a military point of view, and could hurt our overall position in the area. The major difference between Arab and Israeli military effectiveness, as was demonstrated last June, is in the intangibles of leadership, organization, training, maintenance, logistics, morale, and unity of action rather than numbers of aircraft. But should the French fail to deliver the Mirage V to Israel or should Arab capabilities rise appreciably as a result of Soviet supply and training assistance, we may wish to reverse this recommendation. We will continue to watch the military situation closely. 3 Sincerely, Paul 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Sensitive. 2 Not found attached. The attachments to this letter are attached to a copy of the letter in Washington National Records Center,RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Middle East 400. 3 On December 19 the JCS sent to Secretary McNamara an assessment of the Arab threat to Israel which drew the conclusion that “There have been no significant new developments in the Middle East which would require further increases in the Israeli aircraft inventory.” They added, however, that the situation could change if the Soviet Union continued aircraft deliveries to the Arab states, or if France failed to deliver the Mirage aircraft Israel had contracted to receive. (Ibid., Israel 452) Nitze forwarded a copy of this memorandum, JCSM-700-67, to Walt Rostow on December 29. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XII, 1965-1968) 23. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) and James Birdsall 23. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) and James Birdsall 1 Washington, December 20, 1967. Mr. James Birdsall called me on Wednesday, December 20, to report that he had received a call from Mr. Siddiqi who wanted to know whether Mr. Birdsall had been able to deliver the communication from President Nasser to President Johnson. Mr. Siddiqi had received a call from Mr. Hafiz in Cairo who indicated once again that he had spoken for President Nasser. Hafiz apparently had stated that Mr. Nasser was eager for a reply as soon as possible and intended to issue a statement praising President Johnson as a man of peace, assuming a favorable reply was forthcoming to the communication. It was suggested also (by whom was not clear) that Mr. Birdsall return to Cairo and give his reaction to President Johnson [ Nasser ?], as well as convey any reply. Mr. Birdsall, while he repeatedly said that he wished to do whatever we wanted him to do, obviously would like nothing better than to make another trip to convey the message. I informed him that the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between two countries always required detailed negotiations, paperwork, etc., and it was also imperative that we get the matter, assuming agreement in principle, into governmental channels. Mr. Birdsall agreed and then made a series of arguments in favor of his own continued involvement. I told Mr. Birdsall that in view of the President's trip to Australia he would not have an opportunity to deal with this matter for at least a week. Mr. Birdsall had already conveyed to the Egyptians that the President was away and that he (Mr. Birdsall) could not possibly make a trip before the early part of January. I agreed to be back in touch with Mr. Birdsall when we had had an opportunity to consider the matter further. Mr. Birdsall said that he had informed the Egyptians that the President had received him warmly and that both Mr. Rostow and I had been very constructive in our approach to the matter. He also had told the Egyptians that he was sure a reply would be forthcoming and that it would be both polite and helpful. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 71 D 79, 1967-1968. No classification marking. Drafted by Battle. 24. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 24. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 26, 1967. SUBJECT Israel's Changing Focus on the Middle East A distinct shift in Israeli attitudes has become apparent in recent weeks. It's hard to know whether the new attitude derives from a new appraisal of the situation or whether the Israelis have decided that their new line will serve better in pushing us toward an arms decision. The new line seems to be to emphasize Soviet activity in the Middle East above all else. The unexpected Soviet moves in Yemen—on which Israeli intelligence is almost as good as ours—and the Soviet bomber visit to Cairo have at least coincided with this shift, if not caused it. The main operational result of the shift in emphasis is that the Israelis seem more resigned to our resuming some military assistance to Jordan. It is impossible for them to say that the biggest threat facing them is this increased Soviet activity and yet still say that they don't care whether Jordan accepts a substantial Soviet presence. Even Evron is now willing to conceive that resumption of some military aid to Jordan appears the lesser of evils. It may simply be that we have convinced the Israelis that the Jordan arms decision is tied to their aircraft decision and that the aircraft override all other considerations for them. In this case, we can consider that we've worn them down. It may be however that the Israelis also genuinely fear the implications of being surrounded by Soviet-influenced governments. 2 Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 2 A list at the bottom of the page indicates that telegrams 1763, December 11, and 1886, December 21, from Tel Aviv were attached to this memorandum. Both telegrams reported on conversations between the DCM and Foreign Office officials who expressed concern about the visit of Soviet bombers to Egypt. The Soviet Air Force visit was represented as part of a Soviet “grand scheme” to surround Israel with hostile forces. 25. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 25. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 27, 1967. SUBJECT Surplus APCs for Israel Instead of New Ones You will recall approving last May the sale to Israel of 100 new Armored Personnel Carriers. The Israelis have now said they don't intend to buy these new APCs if we will release 375 surplus World War II half-track personnel carriers for them to cannibalize. Apparently they captured enough new equipment in June to hold them for the moment and are mainly concerned with keeping their present inventory operational. The old APCs they want originally went to our NATO allies and are now back in our control as surplus in French and Italian depots. Of the 375, 143 are the balance of a sale we had already authorized last March but suspended when war broke out. Secretaries McNamara and Katzenbach recommend that we go along with this Israeli proposal. This would avoid introducing a new and modern piece of heavy equipment into the Israeli inventory, and the deal would attract less attention from the Arabs. Our approval would be consistent with your recent decision to supply spare parts to the Israeli military since these would be cannibalized. From the Israeli side, the half-tracks have the advantage of immediate delivery and cost only about $130,000, contrasted to the 18-months lead time and $3.5 million for new vehicles. I am checking this with you mainly because of your personal battle for the new APCs last spring. I assume, however, that you would have no problem with this suggestion since this is what the Israelis want and it is easier for us. The only question is whether we go ahead now or wait till you've seen Eshkol. Since we get the better end of this deal, I'd be inclined to tuck it under our belts right now. We don't get a great deal of credit for letting them have what everybody else has now laid aside as military junk. However, even though aircraft will be the main focus of your talk with Eshkol, you may want to give the impression of a hiatus in decisions before he comes. Walt Approve now Approve now but hold until after Eshkol visit 2 Call me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 2 Johnson checked this option, but added a handwritten note which reads: “I have some reservations. Let's talk.” 26. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 26. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, December 28, 1967, 2341Z. CAP 671220. On your instruction we passed the following message to King Hussein: 2 “The President has indicated that he will make decision on Jordan arms recommendation by New Year's. He is inclined to be sympathetic to Jordan's needs, and hopes the King will not make a major decision before hearing from us.” We continue to get reports from Jordan that time is running out and that King Hussein feels it necessary to make some decision on Soviet arms by the first of the year. We have strung him along since mid-August and doubt we can do so much longer. The package which Nick Katzenbach recommends would total about $6.5 million of spare parts, automotive and communications gear, some anti-tank guns and ammunition. We all know the Israelis won't like this but we have been interested to note in the last few weeks a much more relaxed Israeli attitude toward Hussein. In any case, this equipment will not affect the Israeli-Jordanian arms balance. Since this is a token move to reopen the door and block the Soviets. I should think we could sell it to the Israelis who will not want to jeopardize their aircraft requests by making a fuss over such an inconsequential package from Jordan. If you are ready to go ahead, the next step would be to authorize Ambassador Symmes to offer this package to Hussein. 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV. Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret. 2 Sent to Amman on December 26 in telegram 89454. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN) 3 There is no indication of the President's approval or disapproval. An attached note, dictated by telephone at 9:30 p.m. on December 28 by Jim Jones to Rostow, gives the President's response as follows: “Make the views expressed in the first paragraph my views. Let's get their reaction first. I'm not going to hug him to give him some arms.” 27. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 27. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, December 29, 1967, 1600Z. 2815. Ref: Amman 2795. 2 Subj: Demonstrating US support for Jordan. 1. Amman 2795 reporting PriMin Talhouni's reaction to our decision to discontinue budget support highlights psychological considerations that require us to move quickly if we want to prevent further deterioration of our relations with Jordan. We believe it is generally accepted that a moderate Jordanian regime with which we can maintain a constructive dialogue will be a highly important, perhaps decisive, element in a viable solution to the Arab-Israel dispute. In the longer term, moreover, a moderate Jordan with a reasonable Western orientation should be an asset in dealing with the now greatly expanded Soviet presence in the Middle East. Conversely, an unfriendly, unstable Jordan would tend to contribute to further Soviet gains and would generally undermine the force of moderation in this area. 2. We still have a chance—however fragile—to achieve a reasonably stable solution of the Arab-Israel impasse, yet in Jordanian eyes we appear at this same time to be diminishing sharply the material evidence of our support that has been the basis for our relationship and influence with Jordan. We have continued the ban on military supplies for Jordan—even a minimum of spare parts and logistic equipment—while we have released major arms, including aircraft, to Israel and other Arab countries. We suddenly (albeit with sound economic rationale) cut off budget support to Jordan. We have carried forward a minimum program of technical assistance and have only one smaller development loan project going. A major American company (Grace) pulled out of Jordan's potash scheme on “political” grounds, thereby putting the entire complex package in jeopardy. We have not yet been able to authorize commencement of negotiations of an estimated $3 million PL 480 3 wheat sales agreement—more than a month after a formal note of request was submitted. In contrast to the British who in very straitened circumstances are paying their budget support through 1967, we propose not to fulfill the total of $27 million budget support in 1967 (as we had previously indicated). Instead we propose to substitute a grant for up to $3 million for feasibility and sectoral studies and the aforementioned PL 480 sales agreement for the expected $6.2 million fourth quarter payment. 3. The Jordanian reaction to such actions as discontinuance of budget support must be evaluated against the very real and growing vulnerability of both the regime and the country to political and economic deterioration. The Jordanians argue they are far from self supporting economically, and they have past experience of the unreliability of Arab aid. We are well aware of their innate fiscal conservatism from our discussions with them in brighter periods. Now this conservative fiscal approach makes them distinctly reluctant (particularly in the present murky political climate) to spend to the limit of current liquid resources or to start down the slippery slope as they see it of internal borrowing to meet major, chronic budget gaps. The Jordanians are fully aware they can meet their foreseeable cash outlays in the coming twelve months; but they see themselves being cut afloat with a very uncertain future and no basis for future planning. 4. The seriousness and immediacy of our problem, however, lies in the cumulative psychological effect of our several actions and reactions as summarized in reftel particularly paras 4 and 6. 5. State 89149 4 informing us of imminent approval of the PL 480 program and indications of elements of existing loans and other aid that might be suggested for inclusion in the GOJ budget document is helpful. We believe, however, that considerably more of a positive nature is going to be needed if we are to deal adequately with the psychological problems we face. We see a real need to move quickly on number of fronts. 6. Release of military shipments is an essential first step. (This may also facilitate the dialogue on budget support.) While we must continue and expand the dialogue we have already started on the shift from budget support to more effective evidence of our continued support for Jordan. As noted above, urgent action on the PL-480 program (we hope by the new year) and offer of a grant of $3 million for specific development purposes will be helpful. However, these two elements—especially the latter—unfortunately will tend to be caught up in probable recrimination over our failure to pay the total 1967 budget support as promised. Something more is clearly needed. Tangible progress on the potash scheme is perhaps the most promising possibility. We should encourage Tenneco to make a move as soon as possible to confirm its interests and intention. At the same time, we should take the initiative to get the World Bank to express willingness to move ahead on the overall scheme without private partner if Tenneco does not intend to proceed. On the problem of showing US support in published budget, reference to existing loan availabilities may help. Even more useful would be the possibility of saying something in the budget document about our intention to make the potash loan in calendar 1968 (thus either USFY 68 or 69). 7. On the budget support question itself, perhaps we could suggest to the Jordanians a specific timetable for review of Jordan's fiscal situation, e.g. August-September 1968. This might be more concrete evidence of continuing concern for their economic situation and thus ease their feelings of uncertainty. We would reaffirm readiness to review earlier in event of unforeseen developments or need. 8. The most valuable assistance we can afford Jordan in the period immediately ahead is support for certain necessary elements in the political settlement with Israel as envisaged under the UN resolution, especially a viable arrangement on Jerusalem. The King and his advisors have already shown unease as to the actual meaning of the support we have promised. Their adherence to the moderate course directed at political settlement—no matter how much they desire it—is conditioned by the extent to which they believe it is possible. Both the establishment and the Jordanian public see the US role as critical, and they continue to look for something tangible to confirm the US intention to provide this support. A strong public or even private statement consistent with our even-handed policy, or a position that favored Jordan on some key issues, preferably Jerusalem or possibly on refugees, could have significant favorable effect. If we can find some way to make our promise of support for an acceptable settlement more credible, or if we can take some action that will clearly demonstrate our ultimate intentions and capacity to deliver, the problem of developing a rational and mutually satisfactory overall relationship will be greatly simplified. Conversely, if our demonstration of our capacity effectively to support a satisfactory settlement is inconclusive in the immediate future, the achievement of understanding and acceptance of our posture including aid will be much more difficult. 9. With the foregoing in mind, therefore, we recommend that the following courses of action be considered on a priority basis: A. Release of military shipments followed by authorization to begin talks with the Jordanians about force goals taking into account the disappearance of the UAC and compatible with a peaceful solution of the current crisis. B. Telegraphic authorization to begin negotiations of PL 480 sales program. C. Authorization to offer up to $3 million for development (including feasibility studies). D. Urgent attention to moving potash project forward. 1. State/AID approach to Tenneco to obtain firm statement of intention proceed with potash project. 2. State/AID approach to IBRD to gain agreement in principle that potash project can move ahead with appropriate technical and management assistance on contract basis in lieu of private partner. 3. Obtain any necessary approvals sign project agreement for test pans construction. E. Approval of mention in GOJ budget presentation of contemplated development loan operations, to include potash as well as existing loan availabilities. (This will need to be authorized urgently since printing of this final section of the GOJ budget document is scheduled momentarily.) F. Propose to the GOJ a definite date to review their fiscal position in the light of situation after mid-1968, expressing also readiness to examine earlier if circumstances warrant. G. Explore what encouraging indications we could give to show our support for an Arab-Israel settlement with which Jordan can live, e.g. 1. A letter from Secretary to PriMin Talhouni reaffirming our intention to lend all diplomatic and other support for a settlement and providing reassurance on our support for Jordan's well-being on the basis of sound economic development and political stability. (Suggested draft by separate message.) 2. A public statement reciting established Arab rights in Jerusalem and environs (such as private property ownership) and expressing disapproval of measures pretending to change these. 3. Revival of pressure on Israel for repatriation of significant numbers of newly displaced persons prior to settlement. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL JORDAN-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 2 Telegram 2795 from Amman, December 28, reported on a December 27 conversation between Ambassador Symmes and Prime Minister Talhouni. Symmes reported that Talhouni “let down his hair” and stated that he regarded the U.S. decision to discontinue budgetary support for Jordan as another sign of U.S. disapproval of him personally. Talhouni added that some leading members of his government felt that discontinuing budgetary support, like the failure to resume arms shipments to Jordan, was meant to punish Jordan for its role in the June war, and constituted economic pressure to force Jordan to agree to a Middle East settlement on Israel's terms. (Ibid.) 3 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954; 68 Stat. 454, as amended. 4 Dated December 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15 JORDAN) 28. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 28. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, December 29, 1967, 2231Z. CAP 671244. Lacking his secretary, who alone has security clearance in his office, Bob Anderson expressed the following views on the Middle East, which he asked me to make available to you. 1. It is his quite objective judgment that we are on the way to losing the Middle East rapidly. In a matter of months there will be a military confrontation in which the Soviet Union will be prepared not only to arm the Arabs, but directly to engage, perhaps via technicians, if not more openly. They will use the same techniques as we have used in Vietnam and a similar rationale; namely, that they have a right to help their friends deny others acquisition of their territory. The Israelis have no more right to impose their government on the West Bank of Jordan than the North Vietnamese have a right to impose their government on the South. They will accuse the Israelis of aggression; and, as we know, the concept of aggression can be defined in ways that suit the interests of the party making the definition. 2. Bob said that he is wholly aware of our legitimate sense that the Arab leaders have proved themselves unreliable. They have created by their own statements and actions a monster in their public opinion which makes it impossible for them to negotiate directly with Israel. They are widely divided among themselves except on the issue of Israel. 3. Specifically, Bob believes it is unwise for us—and unwise for the Israelis—to increase Israeli arms in order to balance Arab arms acquired from the Soviet Union. He believes it would be a disaster if we made dramatic announcement when Eshkol is here of increased arms for the Israelis. It would be tantamount to a U.S. commitment to engage the Russians directly in the Middle East. 4. Positively, we believes we must now make a move towards the Arab moderates. We must indicate that our concept of territorial integrity applies not only to Israel, but to the Arabs. We must pick up Nasser's offer to re-establish relations promptly and not insist on our concept of apologies. The Russians are unpopular throughout the Arab world. There are moderates who want peace. They will accept any amount of U.S. commitment to the integrity of Israel and its borders. They will accept the President's five points of June 19. 2 But if we appear to throw out weight fully behind Israel and ignore their overtures to us, they will turn, whatever the cost, to the Russians. 5. We must understand, Bob says, that in the Arabs we are dealing with a different breed of cat than any others in the world. To them, face is more important than substance. It means more to them than to the Israelis or to us. Moreover, he believes that if we help them save face, we have the possibility, if we ac fast, of getting a livable settlement for Israel which would block Soviet influence out of the Middle East, He underlined that we must more fast. He concluded that we are on the edge of a war in the Middle East, at least as serious for us as Vietnam, unless we balance our accounts with the moderate Arabs and avoid, on the occasion of the Eshkol visit, any dramatic move in the arms field with Israel which would polarize the Arab world again and lay the basis for their turning once and for all to Moscow. WWR Comment: 1. I believe Bob's comment that we are heading toward a new military confrontation assumes that there is no progress toward Israeli withdrawal and a peace settlement. Ambassador Jarring is now on his second round of talks, and you will be discussing with Eshkol the importance of Israel's doing everything possible to encourage the Arabs to negotiate rather than fight. We don't know what this will bring, but we've told the Arabs we'd put our weight behind Jarring. 2. While we're all wary and unsure of Soviet intent, I'm less certain than Bob that the Soviets are ready for the kind of involvement he predicts. We've seen them shy away from it several times this year. 3. I agree that there should be no dramatic announcement of an arms deal in connection with the Eshkol visit. But I do believe we have a clear interest in Israel's being able to defend itself. 4. We have the following in the works for the Arabs: —I am sending you separately a proposed reply to Nasser. 3 It's restrained but positive. Maintaining a relationship with Cairo is central to competing with the USSR in the area. —You are aware of the arms discussions with Hussein. —Gene Black is going to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAR in January and can do some handholding for us if we wish. 4 Luke Battle is also considering a trip to the area. 1 Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 55, 12/20-31/67. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 See footnote 5, Document 10 . 3 See Document 31 . 4 Saunders sent a memorandum to Rostow on December 18 in which he observed that Eugene Black was planning to visit the Middle East in late January in his capacity as a Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The question, Saunders noted, was whether to encourage Black to visit Cairo with a message for Nasser. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country Series, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68) 29. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 29. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, December 30, 1967, 1545Z. 2832. Ref State 91343, 2 Amman 2831. 3 1. I saw King Hussein this afternoon to take up reftel. I told him I had another personal message for him from the President and explained that the President would like assurances we would not subsequently be faced with Jordan's acceptance of Soviet arms offers. 2. King responded that providing such assurances gave him no difficulty at all. This had always been his understanding of arms arrangements with us. He has no desire to buy arms from the Soviets provided his legitimate requirements can be met by the United States. He said he realized that resumption of shipments would not “bring tanks to Jordan immediately.” But he did need to have a clear understanding of what the USG is prepared to do for Jordan. In giving us assurances about not going to the Soviets he did not want to be left in position of having some of his essential requirements unsatisfied. 3. I responded that shipments to be resumed initially would include some of items on General Khammash's “emergency list.” I said I saw this as an important beginning. It would remove pressures from him and would give us all time to see what success Jarring would have. We would all gain time to form a better picture of what kind of military establishment Jordan would need in the years ahead. 4. The King said he would want in any case to have General Khammash proceed at once to the US to discuss Jordan's requirements. I said I recognized he would want Khammash to discuss Jordan's requirements in detail at some point, but I believed it should be put off until things had settled a bit, until we could see where we stood. 5. At this point King asked if I could wait while he called Khammash to the Palace to join our discussion. When Khammash arrived we went over most of the same ground again with Khammash emphasizing that he could not keep the army loyal to the King if Jordan was only to be provided with a “few spares” and other equipment from his “emergency list.” He was not asking for all of Jordan's needs at once, but he believed His Majesty would have to have a clear understanding of what the USG proposes to do beyond the “emergency list.” Discussions with the Soviets could be postponed, but Jordan was faced with a summit meeting on Jan 17 and had to be in a position to state authoritatively that its needs were going to be met by the USG. Revival of the UAC is on the summit agenda, and he (Khammash) has already been told that Jordan and other Arab countries at the summit will be expected to indicate how their re-equipping is being accomplished. Beyond this, there is the seriously deteriorating morale of the Jordan army to be considered. They had to have an idea of what comes after the “emergency list.” 6. Discussion went back and forth over the same ground. The King at one point introduced the Israeli F-4 Phantom request and said he earnestly hoped the USG would not take this step. In the course of our conversation I, of course, emphasized that buying Soviet arms might help to meet a short-term problem but would in its train bring a host of long-term problems. The King's comment was “I am sorry to have to say that you will have been responsible if that happens.” 7. Our discussion was concluded with the King suggesting an oral message to the President. We went over the substance of such a message several times, and it has been transmitted separately. 8. Comment: I tried throughout conversation to talk the King into going along with a general statement of resumption of shipments at this time and putting off a Khammash visit until we could see where things were going. Both he and Khammash were prepared for such moves on my part and had no intention of leaving things fuzzy. Although they did not say so, it was obvious that Khammash's visit would mean much to them psychologically. It would be a sign that we had moved back together and would be so interpreted by Jordanians and other Arabs. Both the King and Khammash made a special point of emphasizing “legitimate requirements,” and they reiterated statements made in other recent conversations to the effect that if Jarring is successful, their longer term military requirements would change. Although they were fairly insistent that they will need to know before January 17 what we are prepared to do (with the implication that this means the longer term), we believe that discussions with Khammash need not take the form of a complete long-term statement of force goals and equipment. It seems to us that it would be acceptable to the King and Khammash if we approached the problem in stages. We could resume shipment of our recommended list now and try to agree with Khammash on making up some of Jordan's other losses and deficiencies in a series of stages. This will enable both sides to buy time and provides, we believe, sufficient scope for Khammash's discussions to satisfy the King before the summit meeting. 9. The object of this whole exercise has been to buy time, to maintain our position here while a Middle Eastern settlement is being worked out. This object is still important to us, and therefore we strongly recommend that Khammash be invited to proceed to Washington as requested by the King. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2 Telegram 91343 to Amman, December 30, informed the Embassy that President Johnson wanted an assurance that if the United States decided to meet some of Jordan's military needs, it would not be embarrassed by having Jordan also accept military assistance from the Soviet Union. 3 Telegram 2831 from Amman, December 30, transmitted the text of an oral message from King Hussein to President Johnson, which Hussein asked be passed to the President on an urgent basis. Hussein indicated that he was and remained a friend of the West and had no desire to buy arms from the Soviet Union. He noted that he had been patient in waiting for a U.S. decision to resume arms shipments to his country. To meet U.S. concerns in making that decision, Hussein offered an assurance that if the United States supplied Jordan's needs he would not buy military equipment from the Soviet Union. He offered that assurance, he noted, on the assumption that in due course Jordan's legitimate requirements would be met. He added that it was imperative that he be able to say that Jordan's military requirements were being satisfied by the time of the scheduled Arab Summit meeting on January 17. To pave the way for the necessary understanding, Hussein proposed to send his Chief of Staff, General Khammash, to Washington as soon as possible to meet with the appropriate U.S. authorities. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Cables, 5/67-2/68) 30. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 30. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, January 2, 1968. SUBJECT Status Report on the Jarring Mission—For Your Talk with Evron 2 Eppie probably just wants to set the stage for Eshkol's visit, but you ought to know how the Jarring mission stands before you see him. The Israelis presumably know all of this, although they may not know how much we know. We got some of it from the Egyptians. Jarring hasn't had much luck so far. On the plus side, he has gotten the Israelis to release 500 Egyptian prisoner and apparently has talked Nasser into letting the ships trapped during the Six Day War leave the Suez Canal. On the minus side, no one has moved from the positions of two months ago on the major issues of settlement. The Israelis are still taking the position that peace treaties have to be negotiated. They outlined their stand in a letter to Jarring which he passed on to the Egyptians. 3 The Israelis have not come out with any specific solution to problems, but the letter to Jarring mentions agreed boundaries, normal economic relations, free navigation and recognition without mentioning the refugee problem. The UAR is holding to the line that Israel must withdraw its troops as the first step. There is no indication that Nasser is willing to talk directly to the Israelis. 4 The Jordanians also are pushing for an Israeli withdrawal, but haven't revealed their position on the specifics of a solution. The Lebanese appear willing to accept almost any solution, but they're the least of Jarring's problems. The Syrians won't talk to Jarring. In sum, Jarring has managed to get a highly indirect dialogue going between the Israelis and the Arabs, both sides still say they want peace, and positions have not hardened during his travels. He is certainly no farther from a solution than when he started, but Jarring himself says he doesn't expect too much. It looks as if the next job may be how to help Jarring break through to some meaningful exchanges. I think the main point with Eppie is to get pre-Eshkol atmospherics from him. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 2 No record of Rostow's meeting with Evron has been found. 3 The text of this letter was transmitted to the Department in telegram 1276 from Cairo, January 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68) 4 The UAR position was outlined in an aide-memoire handed to Jarring by Foreign Minister Raid on December 30. The text was transmitted to the Department on January 1 in telegram 1275 from Cairo. (Ibid.) 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, January 3, 1968, 2332Z. 92844. Cairo's 1136. 2 1. President Johnson received Birdsall briefly afternoon December 18. 3 Birdsall delivered letter and oral message from Nasser. Letter extends greeting to President and his family, and has short substantive text as follows: “At this time which is sacred to both our people I feel that good relations should exist between our people. I have sent a special message through Mr. Birdsall. I trust you will receive it in the spirit which I send it. With highest personal regards. Sincerely. Signature, in Arabic.” 2. Oral message was: (1) Nasser asked Birdsall convey expressions of his highest esteem for President and wished him to know that he regrets break in relations, desires resume them and will endeavor induce other Arab countries who broke relations to resume. (2) Nasser also expressed hope President will use his influence to bring about an Israeli withdrawal. At same time Nasser would permit himself to accept “state of non-belligerency” between UAR and Israel. (3) Nasser hoped solution to refugee problem consistent with continued existence Israel could be found. (4) He hoped President would make gesture of friendship to Arab nations after resuming relations, but he understood our relations with Israel. (5) Nasser would appreciate invitation to visit United States and hoped that President would acknowledge messages conveyed by Birdsall. 3. President thanked Birdsall and said he would consider messages and what form appropriate reply might take. 4. Birdsall in separate conversations with Walt Rostow and Battle was somewhat fuzzy on details and it difficult to tell how much of oral message was Nasser and how much Birdsall. 5. We believe we should reply to Nasser in reasonably forthcoming manner but do not think we should send special emissary for purpose. Accordingly, and unless you think it would be unwise do so, you should seek immediate appointment with Khouly and tell him you have Presidential oral and written messages for delivery Nasser only. We can visualize some difficulties arising from fact Khouly apparently unaware of Birdsall visit, but Nasser presumably able to handle that. You should decline discuss contents messages except with Nasser. When you see Nasser you should explain that we are taking the extraordinary step of asking for your meeting with him because we do not know who in his government is privy to the Birdsall conversations and wish both to avoid embarrassment to him and to insure that he gets the message in its original form. 6. Following is text of written message. 4 “Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your kind letter of December 9 and for your greetings to myself and my family. In turn, I send best wishes to you and your family, and special greetings for the New Year. I share your belief that good relations should exist between our people and your regret at the break in relations between us. I hope that we can move calmly and deliberately to the restoration of those relations on a basis of mutual trust and respect. Mr. Birdsall has delivered your special message to me and I am asking Mr. Donald Bergus to convey my reply to you personally. He is fully authorized to convey any response you may wish to send and enjoys my full confidence. Sincerely, signed Lyndon B. Johnson.” 7. Following is verbal message from President: 5 (a) I share President Nasser's desire for resumption of relations. It is imperative, I believe, that diplomatic relations be resumed in a climate conducive to friendship between our two countries. Diplomatic relations cannot be isolated from the attitudes of trust and confidence that they should represent, and I would suggest that each of us examine ways in which we can improve the atmosphere both in the United States and in Egypt. I have in mind, for example, an effort to clarify public misapprehensions surrounding the unfortunate events of June 5. It is inconsistent with friendship to leave an impression that the United States engaged in military actions against his people which caused loss of life and hardship, when we in fact had no part in them. Mr. Bergus is prepared to discuss further steps. (b) I am pleased to note President Nasser's readiness to accept a state of non-belligerency with Israel. We hope he shares our belief that a resumption of hostilities is unthinkable. With regard to his request that I use my influence to get the Israelis to withdraw, the United States Government is prepared to put its full weight behind a reasonable settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute within the terms of the November 22 Security Council Resolution, which I am pleased that the UAR supported. As President Nasser knows, that resolution affirms that a just and lasting peace should include Israeli withdrawal as well as the termination of all claims and rights of belligerency. To achieve this end, I think it essential that all of us cooperate fully with the Secretary General's personal representative, Ambassador Jarring, and that we seek to find a settlement all parties can accept. I assure him of my willingness to cooperate with all parties in an effort to bring success. (c) I share President Nasser's hope that a solution to the refugee problem consistent with the continued existence of Israel can be found. President Nasser may be assured that when I said on June 19 that any solution must include justice for the refugees, I meant it. (d) It is not clear what President Nasser has in mind in asking that I make a gesture of friendship to the Arab nations and we are not sure whether Mr. Birdsall has reported this request accurately and in its proper context. Perhaps President Nasser would wish to clarify. In meantime, I would like to point out that we have long sought to maintain an even-handed policy as between the Arab states and Israel and to have good relations with both sides, and we have helped in the economic development of the entire Middle East. The deterioration of our relations with the UAR in the past year has been due largely to unfortunate misunderstanding of our motives and tragic suspicions as to our intentions. If now the UAR wishes to move into a new period of friendship based on trust, I think friendly and mutually satisfactory relations are possible. If they are not ready, I do not think isolated gestures of friendship by either side will have much effect. There must be a basic wish for meaningful relations and a determination to bring them about. (e) I have noted President Nasser's interest in a trip to the United States and would be pleased if such a visit can be arranged in the wake of a settlement of the Arab-Israel crisis. (f) President Nasser should be assured that I have great respect for his person and his country. Although we have had our share of problems in recent years, this need not prevent the establishment of a relationship based on mutual respect for each other and mutual recognition of the limitations each of us must face in dealing with our common problems. 8. You authorized provide substance of above to Nasser as an aide-memoire if you deem appropriate. Since Elsie Hafez aware Nasser message, you may use him as channel rather than Khouly if you wish. 9. Signed original being pouched. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Parker on December 21; cleared by Battle, Davies, and Bromley Smith; and approved by John P. Walsh in S/S. 2 Document 13 . 3 See Document 21 . 4 A signed copy of this letter, dated December 30, which was subsequently sent by pouch to Cairo, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR-Presidential Correspondence (1 of 2). 5 A copy of this message, dated December 30, is ibid. 32. Memorandum From Secretary of the Interior Udall and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson 32. Memorandum From Secretary of the Interior Udall and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 3, 1968. SUBJECT Israeli Nuclear Desalting Plant In addition to the background material which the State Department has prepared for this item, which has been discussed with our Departments, the following views of our agencies concerned with the principal programmatic matters of nuclear desalting plants may be pertinent: 1. Construction of the plant will significantly advance the Department of Interior and AEC program on large-scale nuclear desalting which you have strongly supported. We need to have several large-scale nuclear desalting plants constructed in order to get this new technology successfully launched. 2. Israel has characteristics which make it uniquely suited for the early application of large-scale nuclear desalting. Its natural water resources will be fully committed by the mid 1970's, and further expansion of water supply for industry and agriculture in Israel can be accomplished only through desalting. The advanced agricultural practices in Israel enable a higher value to be assigned to the water than in most areas of the world. 3. It has been recognized from the outset that the plant would not meet conventional economic criteria for AID financing, and that some additional financial assistance would be required. This is often the case for multipurpose power and irrigation projects. Because of the large investment involved, the cost of the water produced by the project will depend heavily on the terms of financing. Financing which would lead to a water cost of no more than 30 cents per 1000 gallons (corresponding to an average interest rate of 2.7%) may allow Israel to proceed with the project, although Israel will undoubtedly propose a much lower target initially. 4. There is extensive Congressional support as evidenced by the Baker Resolution, co-sponsored by 53 Senators, which expressed the support of the Senate for a large-scale regional nuclear desalting program in the Middle East. Congressional action to support the financing of the project will probably be needed. Sen. Anderson made it clear that adoption of the resolution should not interfere with proceeding with this project. If appropriate otherwise, we believe that it is timely to reaffirm to Prime Minister Eshkol our serious interest in the project. We therefore recommend that you take the following approach in your discussions with him. (a) That the United States is prepared to continue to consider seriously, jointly with Israel, whether a mutually satisfactory basis for financing the project can be found, pointing out that our ability to proceed with the project may well be influenced by the rate of progress toward a political settlement in the region. (b) That to expedite action on this project, you will shortly name a successor to Ambassador Bunker as a special negotiator, and (c) That we look upon the Israeli plant as a first step in a broader regional solution to the water problems of Israel and the Middle East. Toward this end, we would want to include in the further consideration of the project alternatives which will provide additional water to meet at least some regional needs. We would also want to initiate at the earliest appropriate time a broader regional study, involving the role that large-scale nuclear desalting can play in meeting the area's water needs. Respectfully submitted, Stewart Udall Glenn T. Seaborg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 1/1/67-2/29/68. Confidential. For additional documentation on the Israeli desalting project, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 130 - 174 . 33. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 33. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 5, 1968. SUBJECT The Issues for Eshkol You are so fully immersed in this problem that I need not go into detail, but I do want to found up for you in capsule form where we stand on each major point you will be discussing. I am attaching a one-page checklist of these points, an interpretation of Eshkol's political position and Secretary Rusk's comprehensive memos. 2 1. The main issue—peace . The real issue between us is that the Israelis think the Arabs will come around if they just sit tight and we think the Israelis may have to go more than half way to get the Arabs to negotiate. We can't dictate Israeli tactics, and we may not even know of some secret contacts. But we must be assured that the Israelis aren't going to sit themselves tight right into a “fortress Israel” that we would not want to be tied to. In this context, Eshkol may ask you what kind of support he can count on from the US if he gambles territorial security for an uncertain peace deal with the Arabs. One point we haven't discussed with you recently is our willingness to facilitate Arab-Israeli contacts anywhere it makes sense. We don't want to get in the middle, but we think it would be worth offering to help if we can be useful. 2. Israeli moves toward peace. When we say the Israelis shouldn't just sit tight we have in mind specifically their: proposing a refugee settlement that would include compensation and some repatriation; offering Hussein some accommodation in Jerusalem; letting refugees from the June war back onto the West Bank; evacuating Tiran Island which is Saudi territory; and avoiding further actions that convince the Arabs they're just consolidating their conquests. 3. Nuclear weapons and missiles . We have been at the Israelis ever since your last talk with Eshkol in 1964 to get assurance that they won't go nuclear or acquire surface-to-surface missiles. The most they'll say is that they won't be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Mid-East and that they're developing missiles with French help just “in case they have to counter Arab missiles.” We'd like to stop the Mid-East arms race short of either weapon, but so far we haven't made much headway. With prospects for an NPT improving, we may have a new handle on this problem. I think we ought to make it clear that we expect Israel to sign and that we think Israel's long-term security will be well served by signing. Eshkol may say he can't give up his nuclear option unless he can be assured that the Arabs won't achieve conventional superiority. I think we might well pose that problem to the Russians if Eshkol makes it a condition for signature. It might also be worth finding out whether he'd give up getting missiles if the Soviets would not give them to the Arabs. 4. Soviet penetration . Eshkol may claim that Israeli action in June stopped the momentum of Soviet-UAR gains. We're not so sure. The USSR lost a few yards in June, and we set them back in the UN. But they seem to have picked themselves up quickly to exploit new openings in the area. I think we want to shake Eshkol's reliance on Israeli force and intransigence to stop the USSR. We think a peace settlement is the only thing that can give any of us a real chance to build a Mid-East where constructive nationalism and regionalism can block the Soviet thrust. Meanwhile, we want Eshkol's acceptance of our resuming aid to Jordan. 5. Vietnam . You will be the best judge of what would help you most. We've had one report via Dick Helms that Eshkol may be thinking of an open endorsement of our Vietnam effort and even some active help. We ought to look at that pretty carefully because it would further fix the image of Israel as our stooge—an image we need to blur if we're ever to persuade the Arabs that Israel won't just do what we tell it. It may be that the best help Eshkol could give us would be some strong words to the Conference of Presidents of major Jewish organizations in New York and a modest endorsement in his departure statement. 6. Balance of payments . Israeli reserves are about $720 million. Of this, $45 million is in gold and about $600 million in dollar holdings. Last year, they put about $200 million in long-term dollar securities. They expect reserves to decline this year by maybe $100 million, largely because of lower remittances from the US. They hesitate to put more of their reserves into long-term dollar holdings because of their war chest psychology and consequent concern for liquidity. Nevertheless, once you've thanked him for past help, Secretary Fowler thinks it would be reasonable to suggest that he put another $100 million into long-term holdings plus an amount equal to any increase in their reserves. We can assure them we'd make these liquid if they really needed cash. 7. Aircraft . To keep the Skyhawk production line going, we have to decide soon, and I think we should give a secret go-ahead on the 27 additional Skyhawks. The 48 already being delivered will replace Israel's war losses, and the extra 27 would bring inventory to about 225 (pre-war 200) even if France delivers nothing. The real issue is the 50 Phantoms because that's what the Israelis really want and it is so clearly superior to anything the Arabs have that it would introduce a significantly advanced weapon into the area. (You might be interested in reading the comparison of these two planes and Soviet aircraft in the briefing book at the red tab under Background Tab A.) I suggest saying we will amend the present Skyhawk agreement to add 27. We will deliver as quickly as the production line permits. (At present view, the most compressed plan would deliver the first plane in May 1969 and complete delivery in March 1970.) We would like to make this a cash sale (about $32 million) but could consider credit if they press. We must hold off the Phantom decision for another few months until we have a clearer picture of Soviet and French policy and of Jarring's progress. But you can assure Eshkol that we would not delay one day if we thought it would jeopardize Israel. The crucial point is how we satisfy Eshkol that delay in our decision will not delay their acquisition because of lead-time if we decide to go ahead. One possibility is to offer to divert from our own production if the Arab strength increases unexpectedly. Another proposal which Eshkol may put to you is for us to let the Israelis (a) begin engineering discussions with the manufacturer to decide on the configuration they might want and (b) even finance some long lead-time items with no commitment from us on our ultimate decision. We had actually been considering financing these items ourselves. Letting the Israelis do it would unquestionably make it harder for us not to sell later. 8. Desalting . We are not ready to make a decision. What we know now is that the project as originally planned (100 million gallons per day water, 200 megawatts electricity) would cost about $216 million. The Israelis have since considered two larger plans-one to increase electrical output to 300 megawatts for $224 million and a second to increase electrical capacity to 350 megawatts and water output to 175 MGD for $336 million. For the $336 million plant, there would be a gap of about $150 million that would need to come from “soft” (30 years, 2% or less) loans even if the Israelis paid $84 million in local costs, the US were able to contribute research and development grants of $25 million and $75 million in commercial financing could be found. In addition to overcoming financial problems, we feel strongly that this project should become a stepping-stone to more rational overall management of the water in the Jordan Valley. We suggest you discuss frankly with Eshkol the substantial financial gap and then try to get some sense of how much Israel is willing to put in and how willing Eshkol is to integrate this into a regional system (apart from just watering Gaza, which he probably hopes to keep). The one concrete step we can take at this stage would be to appoint a Mid-East water man to pick up where Bunker left off. Our bureaucracy is still divided (memo from Secretary Udall and Commissioner Seaborg 3 is in your briefing book at Background Tab C but this is not the whole story.) A new Bunker may be needed to whip a recommendation into shape. 9. PL 480. The Israelis have asked for about $32 million in wheat, feedgrains, tobacco and vegetable oil. This is larger than last year's $27 million program because the Israelis took no wheat when we were tight. State has some reservations about a larger program which could be interpreted as our support for Israeli conquests, but I think the difference is narrow enough to be manageable. If you wish, you can simply say we can do at least as much as last year. The other issue is that the Israelis will want at least the 50/50 split between local currency and dollar purchases. Treasury and Budget argue rightly that there is no economic justification—given our aid criteria—for this not to be a 100% dollar sale. I believe we have to keep moving toward 100% to meet Congressional requirements, but I think you could get away with a 75% dollar sale this year if you want. You may not want to be this specific with Eshkol, but you might avoid later misunderstanding by mentioning the problem. [ 1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified ] Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit Briefing Book, 1/7-1/8/68. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at the LBJ Ranch on January 6 at 10 a.m. 2 A briefing book prepared in the Department of State including memoranda dealing with all of the issues anticipated in the discussions between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol was sent to the White House on January 5 under a covering memorandum from Rusk, which incorporated suggested talking points. The interpretation of Eshkol's political position was in a January 5 memorandum from Saunders and John Foster to Rostow. All of these documents, including the checklist, are ibid. There is also a full set of the briefing materials in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 418, PM Eshkol Visit, Briefing Books I and II. 3 Document 32 . 34. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 34. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, January 6, 1968, 1400Z. 1310. 1. I was received by Nasser at his residence at 12:30 PM today (Jan 6). Conversation lasted forty minutes. Nasser seemed in excellent health and good spirits. He was clad in sweater and slacks. There were no manifestations of his nervous habits, such as knee-jiggling or finger-cracking although he still has his little giggle. He was friendly and cordial throughout, making usual inquiries about family, etc. 2. I referred to Birdsall visit to Cairo Dec 9, Birdsall's return to US and his being received by President Johnson Dec 18. I then handed text of letter from President Johnson to Nasser which he carefully read. 2 3. I then stated that in addition to delivering letter from Nasser to President Johnson, Birdsall had also passed an oral message. 3 I then reviewed five points set forth in para 2 State 92844. 4 Nasser's eyes got bigger and bigger as I read this. I said one of main reasons why I had asked to see him personally was that we were not sure how much of these five points had been Nasser and how much Birdsall. This got a big laugh from Nasser. 4. I then slowly and carefully read out President Johnson's verbal message to Nasser. He listened attentively after which I handed him aide-memoire summarizing substance of verbal message. 5. Nasser began his remarks by asking me who was Birdsall (whom he calls Birdswell) and who was Saddiqi. I gave as much biographic data as I could, emphasizing fact that Mr. Birdsall and his associates had no connection whatsoever with USG. Nasser said he had come to conclusion that Birdsall was a purely unofficial emissary. Since Birdsall visit Dec 9, tentative arrangements had been made at Birdsall's request to receive him in Cairo again on Jan 4. However, Nasser had subsequently heard from Birdsall that response to his messages to President Johnson would be coming through another channel. 6. Nasser then, using aide-memoire based on verbal message as text, went over it and commented on a number of its points. 7. First of all, he said he had made no requests through Mr. Birdsall. He had told Birdsall that he did not believe there was any direct conflict between the United States and the UAR and that the UAR had good intentions toward the US. There were, however, a number of “indirect questions” which troubled US-UAR relations. 8. As to diplomatic relations, Nasser said he had told Birdsall that their resumption would be to the mutual interest but this would take time despite the fact that there were good intentions on both sides. Nasser was pleased at steps recently taken to improve the atmosphere in US-UAR relations. He mentioned specifically the return of American personnel, the American University at Cairo, and the prospective return of the Ford Foundation. 9. Nasser then went into the question of charges of US military participation in June war. He mentioned he was aware of suggestion I had made to Vice President Mohieddin last October that Heykal publish denial in El Ahram . When Mohieddin had conveyed this suggestion to Nasser, latter had said, “What is there to deny?” Nasser went on to say that apart from what may have appeared in the newspapers, there had never been any official declaration that US aircraft had taken part in the attack on the UAR. He said he had been asked by his own high command at noon on June 5 to issue statement that US and British aircraft were participating. He had told high command that he would not make such a statement until they could produce American pilot or plane. He then reviewed history of telephone call with Hussein, etc., and said he had only quoted what Hussein had told him. He noted that Hussein had since retracted. He therefore felt that question was being exaggerated and that one should make distinction between what was said officially and what appeared in the papers so far as direct US assistance to Israel was concerned. He went on to state that there remained the question of “indirect participation” of the United States in that the US had given Israel considerable quantities of arms and money. 10. Nasser then moved on to para B of verbal message, saying UAR had made clear its policy re Arab-Israel settlement. If Israel willing to withdraw, UAR willing to accept state of non-belligerency. If Israel unwilling to withdraw, then it not only Nasser's policy but his duty to liberate Egyptian territory occupied by Israel. Nasser asked if his FonOff had shown me Eban letter to Jarring. I replied affirmatively. Nasser said he took this message as indication Israelis “were not very serious.” As to the Suez Canal, Nasser said it was well known that this issue was linked to the question of justice to the Palestinian refugees. 11. On para D of verbal message, Nasser disclaimed any request that the US make a special gesture towards the UAR or the Arabs generally. He said that he had told Birdsall his feeling that the US stand at the United Nations had been one hundred percent in favor of Israel. He had told Birdsall that he did not want economic aid from the United States, he wanted justice. He repeated to me now that that was still his position. He preferred justice to aid. He referred favorably in this connection to statements made by President Kennedy to effect US would oppose aggression from any quarter in the Middle East. 12. As to British Security Council resolution, 5 Nasser recalled that his government had asked through me for assurances of US support for this resolution.GUAR valued subsequent USG assurances and celerity with which they had been given. 13. Nasser then dwelt at some length on second half of para D of verbal message where it refers to “new period of friendship based on trust” and “tragic suspicions.” On “tragic suspicions” he referred to his 1966 conversation with Birdsall which he said was based largely on suspicions created by Mustapha Amin affair. At this point I interposed that I had spent over five years of my life directly concerned with improvement and strengthening of US-UAR relations. I felt that dark suspicions were perhaps the major obstacle. I had discussed this many times with his associate and my good friend, Hassan Sabri El Kholi, and urged that whenever suspicions arose, we should talk them out together fully and frankly. Nasser made approving but noncommittal noises. Nasser then went on to say, “If I told you that it was now possible to move into a new period of friendship based on trust, I would not be myself. It is impossible for me to say that as of today I now have full confidence and trust in US Government. I think we can get these but it needs time. We must work together to build confidence.” 14. Nasser denied that he had asked Birdsall to tell President Johnson that Nasser would like to visit the US. It had been Birdsall who raised this point. He said, “Of course, I would like to visit the United States but I know that it would be impossible in the absence of diplomatic relations between us.” 15. At this point I said that my government would not agree with some of the statements of substance which President Nasser had made. I had discussed these issues at length, however, with members of his government and I was sure that he was aware of our viewpoint. Nasser said he was. 16. Nasser then turned to President Johnson's written message to him. He said he would like to thank the President for this letter and to express all his best wishes to the President and his family. He hoped we could work for better relations between the two countries based on trust and confidence. He also hoped we could work for the resumption of diplomatic relations which might take some time. He thanked the President also for his verbal message. 17. Nasser said he was always prepared to discuss any question with which the United States wished to deal and that he was “ready to receive Mr. Bergus at any time the United States Government so desired.” 18. Comment: I will be pouching details of circumstances under which this meeting was arranged. I have, however, assured GUAR of willingness that Nasser's receiving me would be kept secret. 6 Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 2 See Document 31 . 3 Documents 12 and 21 . 4 Document 31 . 5 See footnote 3, Document 1 . 6 Bergus reported on January 8 that Nasser told Foreign Minister Riad that he was pleased with the tone and content of President Johnson's message and that Johnson had mentioned a possible Nasser visit to the United States. (Telegram 1313 from Cairo, repeated by Rostow to President Johnson on January 9 in White House telegram CAP 80218; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Cables, 8/67-7/68) 35. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 35. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, January 6, 1968, 1639Z. CAP 80151. We sent to you in the pouch early this morning two late memos on Eshkol from Dick Helms 2 without comment. After reflecting on them this morning, I find that they bring the following points into sharper focus: 1. More than just seeking a specific number of aircraft, Eshkol may be looking for a firmer commitment to Israel's security. He must understand that security guarantees and treaties are out, but he may seek a guaranteed source of arms. According to Dick's plausible report, the June war destroyed Eshkol's policy of putting out as many support lines as possible. His French and Russian policies are bankrupt, and he now seeks the closest possible tie with us. 2. To seal this relationship, he may come offering to associate Israel with our position in Vietnam. 3. He is apparently willing to acquiesce in our resuming military aid to Jordan. To do otherwise would be inconsistent with his increased fear of the USSR. If this report is true—and we have to make the normal allowance for the fact that it reflects only one [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] man's opinion—it raises the problem of Eshkol trying to get too close to us. His possible offer to associate with us on Vietnam runs the risk of sharpening the image of Israel as our stooge and driving the wedge further between us and the Arabs. We want to consider whether Eshkol's quiet support wouldn't help you as much while avoiding damage abroad. It's hard to know how much the Israelis are pushing the Soviet threat merely to justify their case for more arms. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, Memos and Miscellaneous, 1/7-1/8/68. Secret. 2 The CIA memoranda, both dated January 5, have subject lines that read: “Agency Views Regarding the Political Future of Eshkol” [ text not declassified ]. (Ibid.) 36. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 36. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, January 6, 1968, 2333Z. CAP 80159. Secs. Rusk and McNamara, Clark Clifford, Luke Battle, and I had lunch today. Following this memorandum is the consensus of all, as expressed by Sec. Rusk. In Clark's view the “overriding consideration” must be our avoiding a polarization of the Middle East in which a small Israel, backed by a U.S. with an ambiguous commitment, faces the Arabs, led by extremists and backed by a determined USSR. The positive elements for Eshkol here are, essentially two, one general, the other specific: —“We are prepared to see that Israel receives weapons needed to defend itself.” This is hedged about in various ways but it is a very important message for Eshkol to take back to his Cabinet in the light of French and Soviet attitudes. —As for the Phantoms, Bob McNamara can offer 12 month lead time on delivery (or perhaps less) whereas the Israelis are thinking of 24 months. Therefore, they and we really do have time to examine: —What the French do about Mirages; —What the Russians do about further deliveries; —What Jarring can accomplish. As noted, there would be real advantage in releasing the Hussein message 2 before Eshkol arrives. Sec. Rusk's memorandum 3 follows. Subject: Your forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Eshkol. In accordance with your instructions I had lunch today with Secretary McNamara, Walt Rostow, Clark Clifford, and Luke Battle to review the Israeli arms request which will be before you in the course of the visit of Prime Minister Eshkol. It is our conclusion after a lengthy discussion that the security of Israel cannot be assured by military hardware alone but must involve an arrangement for peaceful existence with the Arab states. In addition, Soviet penetration of the area cannot be limited by the provision of military hardware alone but necessitates that Israel finds some means of establishing a basis for peace beginning as soon as possible with a step of encouragement to the moderate Arabs in their contest with extremist Arab states. We concur, after having reviewed the situation, with the recommendation of the original position on arms as set forth on page 5 in Tab A of the papers provided you. 4 We emphasize the important first sentence of the recommendations which states “we are prepared to see that Israel receives weapons needed to defend itself, but must avoid arms shipments not warranted by the actual threat.” In addition to the points made in the paper, we would like to add, on the basis of Secretary McNamara's assurances, that the lead time for the delivery of F-4 Phantom aircraft could be shortened to twelve months or less rather than the twenty-four months which we assume the Israelis contemplate. The delivery of fifty such planes could be made without serious problems to United States needs based on any situation presently foreseeable once the decision is made by the United States to provide the planes. We would like to point out that it is highly desirable to avoid a total polarization of the area with the USSR lending full support to an Arab world led by extremists against an Israel with qualified American support. The United States should continue to avoid being cast in the role of principal supplier of arms to any country in the area. Until such time as an understanding with respect to arms limitations in the area is reached, we consider it essential that there be, to the maximum extent possible, a diversity of suppliers. We continue to be concerned about the situation with respect to Jordan. A Russian mission including military experts will arrive in Amman on January 9 and undoubtedly a new offer of Soviet arms will be made to King Hussein who is increasingly despondent with respect to his relations with us particularly in connection with arms supplies. Moreover, the King will be attending, as presently planned, the Arab Summit meeting beginning on January 17 when the pressure will be very strong from the radical Arab countries for him to accept Soviet arms in the absence of a United States willingness to continue its traditional role. An arrangement with the Russians could have attractions from a financial point of view given the likelihood that the United Arab Command can arrange financing through Soviet channels for Jordanian purchases, possibly without cost to the Jordanians. If the response to King Hussein is to have the maximum effectiveness, it should be made prior to the arrival of Prime Minister Eshkol to avoid the charge that will be leveled at the King that the minimum equipment to be released to him grew out of an understanding reached at that meeting and with Prime Minister Eshkol's concurrence. We therefore recommend that you act favorably, if possible today, on the telegram before you in response to King Hussein's latest message on this subject. 5 Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, Memos and Miscellaneous, 1/7-1/8/68. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 See footnote 3, Document 29 . 3 The original of this memorandum is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, Memos and Miscellaneous, 1/7-1/8/68. 4 See footnote 2, Document 33 . Tab A to Rusk's January 5 memorandum to the President listed suggested talking points. Pages 5 and 6 suggested that in discussing the Israeli arms request the President might want to say, in addition to the sentence quoted in Rusk's memorandum that the United States would be prepared to amend the Skyhawk agreement to include an additional 27 aircraft, that the Israeli request for F-4 fighters would be kept under review, and that if the U.S. position changed in the months ahead, an effort would be made to be helpful with regard to lead time. 5 A handwritten note by Jim Jones apparently gives the President's response to this final recommendation: “OK—We'll act favorable on this altho I'm [ sic ] think mistake.” For the telegram the President approved, see Document 37 . 37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, January 7, 1968, 0625Z. 94729. Ref: Amman's 2831. 2 1. President has requested following oral message be passed to King Hussein in reply King's message of December 30: 2. “I appreciate the assurances you have given me in your oral message of December 30 with regard to Jordanian procurement of arms from the Soviet Bloc. On our part, we are prepared in principle to resume arms shipments to Jordan and would begin with the following items from the priority requirement list which General Khammash gave to Colonel Jordan in London August 1967: 106 mm rifles 2-1/2-ton trucks communications equipment aerial target drone systems ammunition and spare parts for previously delivered US equipment. We welcome General Khammash's contemplated visit to Washington and would expect to discuss with him details (including quantities) of the above shipments and various aspects of the arms question in general. We would hope that he might arrive in Washington around January 10.” 3. FYI. We would resume arms shipments to Jordan with the $6.5 million package contained in Amman's 2396. 3 End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-6 US-JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Houghton on January 2; cleared by Davies, Battle, Paul C. Warnke, Counselor of the Department Robert R. Bowie, and Wotring at the White House; and approved by Rusk. 2 See footnote 3, Document 29 . 3 Telegram 2396 from Amman, November 27, 1967, transmitted eight categories of priority requests for military equipment from a list prepared by General Khammash. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 38. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 38. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, January 7, 1968, 1330Z. CAP 80169. Herewith Secretary McNamara's views on Israeli aircraft. I shall have with me today a copy with statistical tables attached. 2 Subject: Aircraft for Israel. In response to your request of yesterday, here is my assessment of the threat Israel faces, Israel's aircraft requirements, and my recommendations with respect to the Israeli request for A-4 and F-4 aircraft. The threat to Israel and Israel's response. Air superiority is crucial to military success in the Arab-Israeli environment. Israel knows this, and assumes the Arabs have learned this lesson. General Weizman, Israeli Air Force, argued here last September that the Arabs are acquiring more and better aircraft from the Soviet Union, and will continue to do so into the 1970s; that they will now be providing better protection for aircraft at existing airfields and will be building new airfields and improving techniques and training; and that the Arab states will now cooperate more efficiently in their military and political efforts against Israel. Israeli representatives continue to press these points. Weizman concluded that Israel needs additional versatile aircraft in order to confront successfully a growing Arab capability, and also to make up Israeli war losses (43 combat aircraft) and to replace certain of Israel's order aircraft. Weizman projected an air force of 250 combat aircraft by the end of 1968 and 350 aircraft in the early 1970s. (Comparisons of Arab-Israeli aircraft capabilities and inventories are attached.) We agree, by and large, with the Israeli data on current Arab air inventories and on post-war Soviet resupply. And although uncertain, the Israeli numerical projections of Arab (including Algeria and Saudi Arabia) inventories for 1970, totaling 924 aircraft, appear reasonable. The number of aircraft in Arab inventories has never been, however, the principal factor in the Arab-Israeli military equation. Israel always has been numerically inferior. But despite their large numbers of aircraft, the Arabs have never been able to maintain or use these effectively; thus the numbers of aircraft which can be brought to bear effectively against Israel is much smaller than the totals of their inventories. The offensive (attack) capabilities of the Arab aircraft are limited, and considerably inferior to those of Israel. Also, not every Arab state is militarily relevant to the conflict. Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Algeria, for example, cannot bring effective power to bear against Israel. The decisive factor is the superior overall quality in the maintenance, command and control, training, equipment and, especially, personnel of Israel. Their training, organization, technical competence, and will to fight is far superior to the Arabs. This will remain so for the foreseeable future. Although Arab aircraft losses will undoubtedly be fully replaced by the Soviets in coming months, the Arab military forces were decimated and their morale shattered; it will take them a number of years to exceed their pre-war capabilities. Arab territorial losses will make it more difficult in the future to conduct air or ground operations against Israel-the Sinai will surely be demilitarized, even if returned to Egypt. In sum, the Israeli military position has improved markedly since 4 June. I am sure that the Arabs will learn some lessons from the recent conflict, and that there will be improvements in Arab air forces. They have shown some modest evidence of this already. They are unlikely, however, to make dramatic gains. And Israel's air force is itself improving: the supply of 48 A-4H aircraft is underway, and we have recommended to you the sale of an additional 27 A-4s. Israel would thus be adding over the next 18-24 months at least 75 new attack aircraft to its inventory, more than overcoming, quantitatively and qualitatively, Israel's June losses. Israel will have by the end of 1969, an inventory of over 225 combat aircraft. I believe this is presently adequate for Israel to maintain its security. The Joint Chiefs have stated: “The Israeli capability to prevail in any renewal of hostilities, even without the Mirages, is considered assured for at least the next 18 months. Release of the 27 additional A-4s would further raise this level of assurance.” Further, although the delivery of the 50 new French Mirage V remains uncertain, there is a reasonable possibility that France will deliver these as earlier promised. Israel would then be able to phase out some older aircraft, and have an air force clearly superior to the Arabs. This would preserve Israel's margin of superiority into the 1970s without further aircraft from us. Israel further hopes to buy or fabricate 100 F-1 French aircraft when this airplane is produced (1972-4). A-4H Skyhawks. We agreed in March, 1966 to accede to the Israeli request of the previous October for attack aircraft, to supplement its inventory of high-performance French fighters and fighter-bombers. 3 On 2 June 1966 a specific agreement provided for the sale of these 48 new production A-4 attack aircraft, plus support, for $70.6 million to be credit-financed over ten years at 3-1/2 percent interest. 4 Delivery was to be in Israel in flyable condition, commencing with four in December 1967 (which have been delivered), and completed by December 1968. These terms and delivery schedules are being adhered to. The agreement was to be secret. The Israelis agreed to look primarily to Europe for arms and noted our expectation that they would request no additional US military aircraft for at least five years. Israel now wishes 27 additional A-4H Skyhawks and I recommend we accede to this request. To minimize the possible impact, we propose to amend the 1966 agreement to increase the number sold by 27 (for a total of 75 A-4H's). We prefer to sell these for cash. Military sales credit funds have been sharply curtailed and Israel's financial position permits a straight cash sale. If some credit seems desirable, however, we suggest offering to finance up to $20 million of the A-4H program (which will probably total between $30 and $35 million for the 27 aircraft plus support) at 5-1/2 per cent interest. If necessary, we could finance the whole sale, but at the cost of reducing the credit available for other sales, including any for Israel. Delivery of the additional 27 A-4H's cannot start before June 1969. This is because certain components peculiar to the Israeli version of the A-4 have a long production leadtime. Delivery would be completed in April 1970 under normal conditions. We could shorten this to December, 1969 without much difficulty, by diverting from U.S. military requirements. The Israelis have repeatedly pressed for speedier delivery of the 48 Skyhawks ordered in 1966 and will surely urge quick delivery of the additional 27. The present schedule for delivery of the 48 A-4H's by the end of CY 1968 cannot be expedited without curtailing production for Navy requirements; even by diversion, delivery could not be completed until September, 1968, only three months ahead of schedule. More importantly, the least costly and most efficient way to meet Israel's request for the 27 additional A-4H's, is to delay the delivery of the last of the aircraft in the existing order of 48 until the production of the additional 27 can begin, thereby preventing a break in the production line. We could deliver F-4 aircraft to Israel beginning 24 months from date of contract, provided Israel did not want extensive modifications made to the aircraft or on maintenance and support procedures. This would be the normal delivery. If necessary we could, by diversion from U.S. force requirements, deliver F-4's to Israel in 12 months. Israel is arguing that the production leadtime of 24 months or longer from decision to first deliveries of F-4's, coupled with the uncertainties about Soviet/Arab and French intentions, requires some positive decision now. The Israeli Defense Attache has proposed that we at least agree to undertake joint engineering studies on possible configuration changes and permit Israel to finance advance procurement of long leadtime components. There are persuasive arguments against the sale, or even the promise of a future sale, of the F-4. The history of the Arab-Israeli arms race is a long one. The Arabs (particularly Egypt) and the Israelis have competed with one another, at very high cost, in maintaining modern armaments. The acquisition of a superior aircraft by one has stimulated the other to acquire a yet more superior airplane. The F-4 would clearly be the most sophisticated aircraft in the Middle East and its delivery there would risk the beginning of still another cycle in the arms race, contrary to your June 19 call for an end to the arms race. The Soviet Union hastily replaced most Arab aircraft losses from the June war but these aircraft losses have not been fully overcome, and Soviet supply activities have returned to their pre-war level. The supply of F-4's to Israel would cause a sharp reaction from the Arabs and may bring irresistible pressures on the USSR to supply more, or more sophisticated, aircraft to them. F-4 aircraft are not militarily required by Israel to assure its security. Although Soviet and French intentions, and the speed with which the Arabs can overcome their considerable military disabilities, remain uncertain and require close and constant scrutiny, there are no indications that Israel's advantageous security position will be upset for the foreseeable future. Should conditions change, we are able to deliver F-4's to Israel from new production within 24 months, even 12 months if we divert from U.S. force requirements. There is no need at this time, as has been suggested by Israel, to insure our ability to deliver these aircraft quickly by advance procurement of long leadtime items. (We could, if necessary, use our own funds to buy these items, without informing Israel, and reduce the leadtime to about 18 months.) Finally, it is my view that implicit or explicit agreements now for the sale of these aircraft may jeopardize the Jarring UN mission seeking a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement, upon which Israel's long-term security more clearly depends. Recommendations. I recommend you approve the sale of 27 additional A-4H aircraft, preferably for cash but, if desirable, for credit at 5-1/2 per cent with amounts and terms to be subsequently determined, and with the important condition that the transaction be kept secret until the United States determines otherwise. I recommend against expedited delivery of any of the A-4H aircraft and recommend that you refer any questions about this subject to me. I will, with your approval, discuss this subject with Eshkol when I see him in New York on 10 January; or we could discuss the problem in Washington with Israeli military representatives. I recommend against any commitment to sell, or to buy long leadtime items in anticipation of a future sale, of F-4 Phantom aircraft. I suggest you assure the Prime Minister that we will follow closely the activities of the Soviets and the French supply policies. We will continue to scrutinize the situation in the coming months. You may assure the Prime Minister that, if significant changes require it, we could deliver the F-4 promptly—if necessary, as soon as Israel would receive them if we made an agreement today. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 2 A copy of McNamara's January 7 memorandum to the President includes a 2-page attachment providing a comparison of aircraft held or sought by Israel and the Arab states. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, Arms Deals with Israel) 3 Regarding the March 1966 agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 283 . 4 The text of this agreement is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, Arms Deals with Israel. 39. Memorandum of Conversation 39. Memorandum of Conversation 1 LBJ Ranch, Texas, January 7, 1968, Session I. SUBJECT U.S.-Israeli Talks PARTICIPANTS U.S. Side The President Secretary of State Rusk Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA Israeli Side Prime Minister Eshkol Ambassador Avraham Harman Minister Ephraim Evron Mr. Bitan Dr. Herzog After an exchange of pleasantries, the Prime Minister read an opening statement as follows: “Mr. President: “Before discussing the main purpose of my mission, I want to express my appreciation for many things which happened in the first week of June and in the political arena since then. Having met you in 1964, your emphatic stand and principles during 1967 on matters of the most fundamental importance to the existence and security of my country are engraved for all time on the tablets of Jewish memory and indeed world history. “The heart of my mission is how can we build peace in the Middle East between the Arab States and Israel. This matter occupies my attention throughout. May I touch on it from three angles: “A. The Middle Eastern situation; “B. The question of the arms race; “C. Russian policy and penetration in the Middle East. “A. “1. The Six Day war may have possibly, for the first time, stirred in the Middle East the beginnings of a process leading to peace. “2. The world community accepted that there can be no return to the conditions which gave the Arabs strategic and other possibilities of aggression. “3. Regretfully the Egyptian and Syrian armies are being rebuilt at a menacing rate under Soviet guidance as their leaders contemplate the possibility of renewing hostilities. “However there are signs of other views. There are those who ask whether war will not lead to new Arab disasters; there are those who are sitting on the fence; there are those, here and there, who may even be thinking in their heart of hearts of peace. In this situation, the essential first contribution towards peace is to block the road to war. “4. Our policy is direct negotiations leading to peace treaties. We take this line not because of any obstinate adhesion to any particular formula but because we believe that face-to-face contact and reasoning together will create a new psychological reality. Without that, as we have learned for twenty years through bitter experience and as you yourself have noted, any other arrangement has no validity. “5. We support the Jarring mission. In talks with him in Jerusalem, we have made several gestures to help him. Firstly, we have given him two agendas—one for Cairo and one for Amman—which contain suggestions for the subjects to be discussed at any direct meeting. Secondly, we have told him that we will agree that he should preside over a meeting of the two sides to discuss the agendas for negotiations and to define the issues. Thirdly, all contact at this stage can be secret including such a meeting. In order to create a better atmosphere, we have agreed that foreign ships at present in the Bitter Lake can be taken out through an arrangement with General Bull within the framework of our existing agreements on the ceasefire. We have also made a gesture in returning an additional 500 Egyptian prisoners of war without reciprocation. We shall continue to facilitate Jarring's mission. “6. On the refugee problem, we are convinced that within a peace context this is a question that can and should be solved and we will make our contribution. “7. We are doing everything possible to restore the situation on the Western Bank and in the Gaza Strip to normalcy. In this fiscal year we are investing at least $30 million in order to develop the economy and provide employment for the local population including the refugees. “In order to stimulate the beginnings of more moderate trends in the Arab world, two factors are crucial. With your permission, I will touch on these two aspects in some detail: “ B. The Question of the Arms Race “Three of the Arab countries whose forces were engaged in hostilities against us in June—Egypt, Syria and Iraq, had in November combined forces of 460 fighters and 47 bombers, or a total of over 500 planes. Egypt alone had over 80% of its June strength and I believe that by now it is nearly back to its June strength. From now on continued Russian supply may be an increase of the pre-June strength. These figures do not take into account countries like Algeria which supplied planes to Egypt in June and its air strength is over 100-150 planes. “In tanks the Egyptians are steadily progressing towards their pre-war position. Egyptian navy is stronger than in June with special emphasis on rocket-equipped naval craft. The Egyptians are planning an overall increase of their land forces as against June. “We have every ground to suppose that Russia has introduced ground-to-ground rockets into Egypt. “The quality of Egyptian planes is much superior to what it was in June. “The Egyptian air force is now deployed with a view to increasing the safety of aircraft. “Continuous and vast efforts to improve training of Egyptian armed forces under Soviet guidance. We assess at least 2,500 Soviet military experts are in Egypt. “ Our Situation: At most we have 150 planes of which at least 25 Mysteres and 41 Ouragens are out of date. “50 additional French Mirages to Israel are very doubtful. Even if DeGaulle will deliver, he will balance it with planes to the Arabs. “Even if we were to get the 50 Mirages and adding to that the 48 Skyhawks from the U.S., we would not have vital minimum for 1968-69 nor the right mix of planes. We ourselves will have to put out of service the Mysteres and Ouragens. Thus we will be left with only 170 planes. The only plane which has necessary range, defensive capacity and versatility to face up to the new situation is the Phantom. We need of course the additional Skyhawks we have asked for but we cannot have minimum security unless we get Phantoms. All my military advisers, without exception, are unanimous on indispensability of the Phantom. “Unless the Arabs know that we have necessary defensive capacity, the tendency to renew hostilities will be strengthened and peace possibilities heavily prejudiced. Israel is extremely vulnerable. One defeat in field—can be fatal for our survival. “We need 50 Phantoms as rapidly as possible. “Over the years, I think that you and I are agreed that we must avoid a situation where Israel will not be able to meet aggression by its forces alone. The one effective way of assuring this and of interpreting the continuous American concern for Israel's security which I so deeply appreciate, is by translating this commitment into making the necessary arms available for us. “What I ask from you is the minimum. I cannot take risks with the security of my country. This means that crucially we must have Phantoms and then Skyhawks. “ C. Soviet Policy and Penetration “We believe that your historic action in warning the Soviets in June ‘hands off’ influenced them away from any thought of active intervention. “What has happened in Yemen gives apprehension that they may wish in certain eventualities to provide indirect support to Arab aggressive forces. We know of your concern in this respect. “We believe that the Six-Day War blocked the taking over of the Middle East by the Soviet Union. “Side by side with giving us the necessary planes, we think it is crucial that the Soviet Union know that the U.S. will not tolerate any Soviet military intervention in the area direct or indirect. “This has been U.S. policy since 1946 and received Congressional affirmation in 1957, in the passage of which you, Mr. President, played a central role. “I would submit that this position be re-affirmed in the clearest terms. “To sum up, then, we believe the course of peace can be enhanced in the area if the U.S. and other nations support direct negotiations leading to peace, if Israel has the necessary military deterrent capacity and if the Soviets are effectively warned that no unilateral intervention, direct or indirect, will be tolerated. “Mr. President, I have no sense of boastful triumph nor have I entered the struggle for peace in the role of victor. My feeling is one of relief that we were saved from disaster in June and for this I thank God. All my thoughts now are turned towards getting peace with our neighbors—a peace of honor between equals.” The Prime Minister then added that military experts had predicted that Israel would win. It is, however, difficult to be precise. If Israel had waited one day more, the outcome might have been different. Israel must live in the Middle East for centuries ahead. It will do all possible to live there peacefully. It needs tools, however, to assure the peace. He regretted that the U.S. was the only source of these tools. It was an “either/or situation”. Either the U.S. must provide the arms or leave Israel to its fate. The Arabs would know that the Americans and the French had said “No”. Even if France gave 50 planes, it would not be enough. Israel needs 350 first-rate planes. By 1970 the Arabs will have 900 planes. The Israelis plead for help. President Johnson said that he was impressed with the statement made by the Prime Minister. The U.S. is intensely concerned with conditions in the Middle East. It is encouraging to know that the Prime Minister had his thoughts turned to peace with honor. This subject takes most of the President's day, although not entirely with respect to the Middle East. We have, however, had other serious situations in the Middle East such as Cyprus. We have a difficult situation in Southeast Asia calling on our resources. Now we have a difficult balance of payments problem. If possible, we are as concerned to bring peace in the Middle East as are the Israelis. The U.S. wishes to work with Israel in any way possible, and we believe we have shown that. Since June, the U.S. has ascertained what is most likely to lead to peace in the area in line with President Johnson's five points to permit 2-1/2 million Jews to live in harmony with many millions of Arabs. We have made it clear to the world that we do not believe might makes right nor that big nations should be permitted to swallow up little nations. We will resist aggression whether it be Hitler, Nasser, or Israel. Other discussions between our countries have dealt with other problems we face, including the difficulties in the Congress with respect to the supply of arms to various parts of the world. The conflict between India and Pakistan where we found ourselves providing arms to both sides of a conflict had had an impact on our Congress of serious proportions. This is not a country where there is one-man rule. The Church amendments, the defeat on the aid bill, all underlined the difficulty we had with the Congress with respect to military assistance programs. The President wished to remind the Israelis that when agreement was reached for the 48 Skyhawks, it was agreed that Israel would look elsewhere for equipment beyond that covered by that understanding. The Prime Minister interjected here that the Israelis would be delighted to look elsewhere if we would “give them an address.” President Johnson said that the Prime Minister had to be guided by the best military advice he could get. So does the United States. What's before us is not a question of our not wanting to see Israel secure although there might be differences as to what was required to assure this security. The President reviewed other defense arrangements, pointing out that he had in the past gone somewhat above the level of equipment recommended from a military point of view. He said that in connection with the request for additional A-4's and the F-4's we had reviewed the matter very carefully, and he had spent much time on this subject. The President said that he regretted that the visit was so closely tied to the request for Phantoms. There are much broader problems. Phantoms won't determine security. Planes won't change things that basically. The big problem is how 2-1/2 million Jews can live in a sea of Arabs. We searched for a formula in the same way that we searched for a formula during the Greek and Turkish problems over Cyprus and in Vietnam. But success can't be measured by planes alone. What can be done to implement the five points? This did not mean we were unsympathetic to the military requirements. We had agreed to expedite the 48 Skyhawks, and we were sympathetic on other requests since any loss of face by Israel would be a serious loss to us. However, the President was being criticized for commitments he made, and he must proceed slowly. He followed carefully Israel's military situation and would not sit idly by and see Israel suffer. This had been made clear by act and by deed. Tomorrow we would review with the military officials of the U.S. the present military situation. At the moment, the President considered it wise to review what steps could be taken toward peace with honor. Neither the Israelis nor the Americans nor anyone else has done all that it should do toward peace, and we were fearful of the consequences of inaction. Secretary Rusk said that he could not help comparing the situation to our problem with the Russians. The situation growing out of arms races had now reached a situation potentially suicidal for everybody. A finger on a button, and we are all finished. Someone on the diplomatic side must be active to see what is possible in other than military rounds. The Arabs could double any efforts the Israelis made in the military field. How can we come to an arrangement in which Israel could live in peace? The Arabs will not back down from the military race but will call upon the Soviet Union for military help. However, by and large, the Arabs have resisted the Soviet Union. If the Arabs see an Israel with which they cannot live, they will turn increasingly to the Soviets. There is no way we can stop penetration if the Arabs themselves decide that the situation is intolerable. The territorial problem is central. We recognize that there are no agreed boundaries. But the Soviets have made the territorial question the central one in the General Assembly from the beginning and have not changed their position on this point. With the passage of time, unless there is movement, moderate voices will give way to radical voices; and penetration will begin in a manner we cannot stop. We hope you can find it possible to tell us what kind of Israel you want the Arabs to live with and the American people to support. In June, there were discussions with the Congressional leadership, and there was an almost unanimous view that the U.S. should involve itself in the Middle East only in a multilateral framework. While we recognize that Israel is impatient with the United Nations, this organization still might offer the best hope. We are at an impasse in the present situation in our talks with the Russians. Without movement, the Russian position is strengthened in the Arab world and U.S. strength diminishes. The danger cannot be resolved by hardware. Is it possible that Israel could give signals more important than it has given so far? For example, is there some possibility of a solution on the refugee problem? Tiran Island is of no importance to Israel. Despite what Faisal says about Israel, there is a common interest between the Israelis and the Saudis in keeping the Soviet thrust in the area under control. Another possibility concerns the Straits of Tiran. We understand there is no problem in the UAR with respect to the use of the Straits. If the UAR had said so on June 1, there would have been no war. Could the Israelis, through the Jarring mission, permit a U.N. force in Sharm-el-Sheikh with a clear understanding that the Strait is an international one? This costs nothing and removes the charge that the Israelis intend to retain all territory presently held. It is difficult for us to describe the Israelis the Arabs are expected to live with. The Prime Minister said these were difficult remarks. Israel is not ready to return to the Israel of June 4, the map of the former Israel. Israel did not want war. It could have lived 50 to 100 years in the prior situation. Now that the war has happened, however, it is impossible to return to the former Israel. Israelis cannot accept a Suez Canal open to all the world except the Israelis. The Prime Minister recalled the signs in Russia, “No Jews”. That cannot be forgotten. When the issue had arisen in 1956, President Eisenhower had said that there was no promise nor was there a treaty. Nevertheless, President Eisenhower had said that the Government of Israel has a right to the use of the Suez Canal. If Nasser tries to interfere, President Eisenhower said he believed the international family of nations will take a firm hand. The Israelis cannot live forever with the feeling that they are untouchable. They have won the war. It is an impossible situation not to find peace. With respect to Sharm-el-Sheikh, perhaps this was negotiable. Secretary Rusk had suggested that the guards be changed and the U.N. permitted to take over. But what had the U.N. action of withdrawal caused before? When Nasser asked for withdrawal of U.N. troops, the U.N. had said take Sharm-el-Sheikh as well. Who can guarantee against a “welch” in two or three years. Secretary Rusk said that the points were valid. If the U.N. has a role, it must be very clear, and the Security Council must be required to approve a change. This had been the missing ingredient before. No one wants an end to the state of belligerency more than President Johnson as has been repeatedly evidenced. We had insisted in our discussions with the Russians that free passage in waterways must be described in the plural, and the Russians had understood that this included the Suez Canal and that the matter cannot be dealt with by whim. The Prime Minister said that the Israelis want to see a treaty of peace. It is not enough that Nasser say there is an end to belligerency, and perhaps he can admit that Israel exists. After three wars, Israel deserves peace. Syria is ungovernable. It ignited the war and probably is now willing to continue the terrorism of the past with the hope that the UAR and other “big brothers” will take care of the situation. The Israelis cannot live with bazooka shots into villages and houses demolished. This is a last ditch stand for the spirit of a nation—the Jewish spirit. This we believe in. It is our history. We will try to be cooperative with Jarring. However, Syria won't talk with him, and Nasser has not been forthcoming. The Prime Minister said that he could not recommend after all that has happened that there be another U.N. force. Given this history, the Israelis put a low value on U.N. troops. While the Cabinet has not considered the matter, he would now say that Jarring should try to bring us together with the Arabs and then leave us alone to negotiate. We will try to be as forthcoming as possible, but we cannot go back. Israel could be exterminated in one day. It will fight tooth and nail with tools, but it must have those tools. There was some hope. Bourguiba had made helpful statements. The attitude of the King of Morocco was known and acceptable. Turkey and Ethiopia were all right. The Prime Minister said that he had mentioned the UAR but had not said that they would or would not try to keep Sinai. There was no one with whom they could discuss the matter. Israel wants security and simple human rights in Suez and in the Straits of Tiran. It is difficult to know what is happening with Jordan and with a King some people say is not stupid. Why would he get in with Nasser whose cause was already lost? The King had not lived up to the agreement that was made with respect to the tanks which prohibited the tanks from crossing the river. The Prime Minister said he was aware of our difficulties in the balance of payments field, and Israel wished to help. The Government of Israel has $200 million in U.S. banks; and to lessen the burden on the U.S., he could see a way which would double that amount on deposit in our banks, making it roughly equal to gifts Israel receives. In this connection, he must point out that the U.S. had encouraged Israel to spend dollars in France for French Mirages. The Mirage is now as famous as beer from Milwaukee. With respect to refugees, it has been apparent for some years that the problem would not be difficult to solve if those concerned could talk like friends. Agreements could be reached. Water in the Gaza strip could make a great difference. For example, water would open new areas for settlement. Iraq has land and could be told the world would help and the Israelis would participate. All these problems need careful study. At this point the meeting adjourned. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Battle on January 12. During his visit to the United States, Prime Minister Eshkol was a guest of President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch January 7-8. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the living room of the Ranch from 5:30 to 7:35 p.m. (Johnson Library) 40. Memorandum of Conversation 40. Memorandum of Conversation 1 LBJ Ranch, Texas, January 8, 1968, Session II. SUBJECT U.S.-Israeli Talks PARTICIPANTS U.S. Side The President (Present as noted in text) Secretary of State Rusk Secretary of Defense McNamara General Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA Israeli Side Prime Minister Eshkol (Present as noted in text) Ambassador Avraham Harman Minister Ephraim Evron Mr. Bitan Dr. Herzog General Hod General Geva Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by saying that while the President and the Prime Minister were talking privately, 2 it had been suggested that there be an assessment by those present of the Russian input of arms into the Middle East and of the ability of the Israelis to defend themselves. General Wheeler said that there was no basic difference between U.S. and Israeli assessments of Soviet input or of projections for the future in terms of hardware. Contrary to Israel's opinions, however, the training, maintenance, command and control structure of the Arab forces will not be as markedly successful as the Government of Israel appears to think. The Arabs have a long way to go. Their maintenance is bad; their morale is shaken. While they do have Soviet technicians, time will be required for them to be effective. The Arabs have taken a tremendous blow. Air and ground destruction has been great, but even more important is the damage done to morale and organization. In the opinion of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Israeli Air Force will for the next 18 months continue to be in a superior position in the event of confrontation between any likely combination of Arab forces. In reaching this conclusion, it is important to understand the basis for it. The effectiveness of Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia is completely discounted. Algeria is pretty substantially discounted due to geography. That leaves the UAR, Syria, and Iraq as main factors to be considered. Several problems exist and several contingencies have a bearing on the matter. The French could continue to renege on their contract for Mirages for Israel. The USSR could enlarge on the extent of military assistance provided to the UAR. The French could enter into a supply arrangement for high-performance aircraft for radical Arabs, offsetting, perhaps, those that they might provide to the Israelis. The United States and the Government of Israel must keep a close eye, particularly on high-performance aircraft supplied by the French or Russians to the Arab states. Ambassador Harman said that the Israeli case was based on obtaining the supply of planes from the United States. He seemed confident that if the French supplied the Israelis with the planes to which they are committed, the French would then neutralize this supply by providing planes for the Arab states. General Hod said that right after the war the U.S. Defense Attache in Tel Aviv had asked how long it had taken to plan the operation that the Israelis had just successfully completed. The reply had been that it had taken 19 years. In this context 18 months was a long [ short ?] time by comparison. Steps were needed now to be sure that the situation could be dealt with in 18 months if necessary. The Israelis do not want to be victorious again with the price paid in the six-day war. They doubt that they have the strength necessary to deter an attack. Therefore, the Israelis considered they must buy planes now to anticipate needs even within the estimates put forward by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ambassador Harman said that Syria, the UAR, and Iraq have over 500 planes. Syria and Iraq are better off than they were pre-war. The UAR is close to being as well off as it was before June. What must be remembered is the quality of the mix of planes. The Arabs had a better mix than before and had learned many things regarding the use of an air force; for example, the wisdom of putting planes beyond the range of the Israeli planes. Moreover, naval strength has been increased in the UAR. All this adds up to a real need on the part of the Israelis. The obsolescence factor is getting serious. Old planes already heavily used are not reliable. With the 48 Skyhawks, there will be a total of 200 planes, but the obsolescence factor must be considered. The Israelis need a minimum of 250 for the 1968-69 period. Even assuming the delivery of the 50 Mirages, the Israelis need approximately 70 planes from the United States. Moreover, the UAR has reduced its reaction time, formerly eight minutes, to four minutes. Algeria could not be written off as lightly as the Joint Chiefs wish to do, as the first source of resupply to the UAR had been Algeria. Planes could be supplied with or without crews to the UAR. Moreover, there was no second-strike capability on the part of the Israelis. It is impossible for them to take chances. Therefore, the slightest threat required a reaction when a more stable situation might deter an aggressor and avoid a war. General Hod reviewed the Israeli losses during the recent war in terms of their current needs. In response to Secretary Rusk's question, General Hod said that the TU-16's which were out of range of Israeli planes would not need to refuel to reach Israel but could go from Iraq and return. Both Port Said and Alexandria are blocked by modern SAM-3's. (At this juncture, the President and the Prime Minister joined the meeting.) The President said that he and the Prime Minister had touched on several problems in their meeting, including apparent differences of views between the U.S. and the Israeli military authorities with regard to relative strength and the needs confronting us. They had also discussed the President's meeting with Prime Minister Kosygin at Glassboro and the likelihood of there being discussions between the U.S. and Russia including the question of Middle Eastern arms. No date has yet been set, but we still hoped to find a means of reaching some sort of understanding on the arms race. If none is possible, a different policy from the present situation is required; but that remains to be seen. The President wished to emphasize what he had said in the meeting the preceding night which was that the United States wished to explore every possibility of peace, including the opportunity afforded by Ambassador Jarring's mission. We must also know what kind of Israel we would be expected to assist. He must know what headway could be made in order to deal with the Russians, the U.S. Congress, and others. The President pointed out that Secretary Rusk had mentioned several “low cards” that could be played by the Israelis that could be helpful in a move toward peace. The President hoped for much more detailed conversations on these matters during the course of the day. He said that peace was not to be saved by 27 or 50 new planes. Much more was required, including positive moves toward a peaceful settlement. The President said he wished to hear the military authorities speak and then to determine whether the views could be reconciled. But very importantly, he wanted answers to the question raised by Secretary Rusk in order to gain an over-all look at what was before us on which his important decisions must rest. The President said he was deeply concerned about peace in the Middle East, including the security of Israel. There was no lack of interest on his part in either element. That must be understood. There might be differences of judgment as to how to bring about these aims, but his commitment to peace in the area and to assist the Israelis in finding peace was basic. Prime Minister Kosygin had tried to move him from his basic position in July. He had not succeeded. Whether it was decided in these meetings for X, Y, or Z numbers of planes, this would not solve the basic security problems. The most useful thing that can be done is to reach agreement with the Soviets on the arms race. The chance might be slight, but it must be tried before the U.S. could embark along an irrevocable road. The Prime Minister said that he hoped that there was someone in the world who could tell him when and how there could be peace between Israel and its neighbors. Israel feels weaker than before the war. It is a small country of 2-1/2 million Jews with now thousands of Arabs as well. The Arab countries surround Israel. They far outnumber the Israelis in planes which are increasingly of sophisticated types. Israel cannot wait until Russia gives the Arabs a great many more planes and then have them say in a condition of great strength that they might be ready to come to terms. Many people considered in the past that a one to three ratio between Israel and Arab planes was adequate. There is a limit. The Israeli fighters are better, but they can't face unlimited planes. The Prime Minister said he had hoped to avoid the war, particularly knowing of the stand of the U.S. and of President Johnson. The decision kept being delayed. But who knows? A minute or an hour might have changed the situation. This is Israel's last chance. The Jews were there to have a sovereign state which they hoped would increase in population. If France is out as a supplier, “the Israelis would welcome another address where they could buy.” By 1970, the Arabs will have 900 to 1,000 planes. The Israelis must have 350 to 400. Only the Skyhawks agreed to before the war were being supplied to them, and even this group required one year to effect delivery. Moreover, the Prime Minister had a problem if he returned from the United States without a commitment for planes. The citizens of Israel would be deeply troubled, and the Arabs would know and say that Israel was abandoned. This could mean war, but what the Prime Minister wants is a deterrent army. General Hod at this point repeated his analysis of relative strengths as set forth above, adding only that Russian pilots were flying over Cairo as recently as two weeks ago. He pointed out also that Russians are in the UAR in great numbers. He expressed the opinion there were 2,500 experts. He repeated again that the Israelis don't want to win a war again. They want a deterrent to war. To do so, there must be a second-strike capability or they could never take chances on any Arab act of first strike. There is no substitute for Phantoms. General Wheeler said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had given an estimate before the June war of what would happen and had been within 1/2 day of accurately predicting the outcome. While the fact that they had been right once did not mean they would be right next time; nevertheless, it gave a certain support to their views. There is no basic difference on numerical factors either now or projected. Both the U.S. and the Government of Israel agree that 1970 will be the critical year and that the Air Force is the critical service. However, in looking at the Air Force and discounting Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan and to a degree Algeria, we are forced to concentrate on the UAR, Syria, and Iraq. Assessing what had happened, the inventory on hand, and all other factors, the JCS believe that the Israeli Air Force can cope for the next 18 months with any potential threat they face. The JCS does not question the figures on losses although it wishes to emphasize that what the Israelis really destroyed was morale, motivation, and confidence. These cannot be recovered quickly. He repeated the same factors considered earlier; i.e., whether the Soviets will continue to increase the number of high-performance aircraft, whether the French will honor their commitment for 50 Mirages, and whether the French would counterbalance a sale of 50 Mirages with a sale to the Arabs. General Wheeler agreed that the situation must be watched carefully and recognized that events could lead to change to the detriment of Israel in, say, about a year. Secretary McNamara said that he had carefully considered the evidence which Ambassador Harman had submitted, and it seemed clear to him that Israel can prevail over any potential Arab enemy. The action taken with respect to the planes could bring a reaction which the Prime Minister should consider. Two and a half million Jews could not stand against the whole Arab world particularly if they were assisted by the Russians. Actions on the plane request could have a bearing on this situation by bringing further Russian support. There is no reason for the Israelis to say that Israel is abandoned. This will not occur while President Johnson is President. What must be considered is how the sale of 50 F-4's would affect deGaulle. Secretary McNamara believed that such a sale would greatly reduce any chance for a French deal. It might also increase the flow of planes from Russia. What effect would such a sale have on Jordan? Probably not helpful in the total context of things. With these unknowns, we should move cautiously. General Hod said that the arms race had never been affected by what the GOI had available. MIG-15's and MIG-17's arrived without relation to the planes the Israelis had. It appeared to the Israelis that the Russians had sent planes as fast as the UAR could absorb them. The Egyptians would probably get MIG-23's now if the UAR could in fact absorb them. Secretary McNamara stressed the view that both the Americans and the Israelis agreed that it would be better for the U.S. not to be the only supplier of planes. Secretary McNamara challenged the statement on abandonment by referring to the 48 A-4's supplied to the Israelis as well as numerous statements in the United Nations and elsewhere of help. Prime Minister Eshkol said that the question had been raised as to what the Israelis were doing to bring peace in the area. He repeated the statements made the preceding night with respect to support for the Jarring mission, the release of Egyptian prisoners, and the cooperative attitude with respect to ships in the Bitter Lake. He added that the Israelis had not fought the sale of arms to Jordan. Dr. Herzog said that in past assessment of the possibility of war, Israel had accepted the U.S. view. No war was expected before 1970. He mentioned the Jarring mission, Soviet global policy, and the search for direct dialogue between the Arabs and the Israelis as elements that will unfold in coming months. We could not be sure what these three processes will do, but to help the process of peace and help bring about a direct dialogue, it is essential that the Israelis be in a position of strength. He also pointed out that any arms arrangement could be kept secret. General Hod said that the only chance of assuring that there would be no reason for sending U.S. troops is a strong Israeli Air Force. President Johnson said that he regretted that we talked only of planes. We talked of political requirements in Israel. What was he able to say to the American people with respect to steps toward peace? Ambassador Harman pointed to the limit of the absorptive power of the Arabs for hardware. He felt that estimates on UAR build-up had to do with how fast they could absorb. What is required as a precondition to peace is to block the road to war. Syria does not want peace. It was playing the same role now that it had played in April and May. The Syrians had refused to meet Jarring in Damascus. In the UAR there is a growing sense that they are “feeling their strength.” The Elath incident had helped morale greatly. Other forces in the Arab world perhaps were hesitant and wanted to look before they leaped. Perhaps there were such forces in the UAR. But the important thing was to block the road to war which could be done by Israeli strength. He mentioned Nasser's speech of November 23 in which President Nasser had said that the Egyptians cannot tolerate another defeat. The Prime Minister then picked up the discussion of the preceding night and asked whether we really considered it conceivable that the Israelis abandon Sharm-el-Sheikh. How could they do so without peace treaties? Secretary Rusk said that he confesses to a bias. He wanted a political settlement and not a military settlement. Peace cannot be assured by hardware. The U.S. is less secure now than it was before it spent billions of dollars on defense. He had difficulty seeing his way out of two points. The Government of Israel faced the danger of isolation in the U.N. It had been prevented so far only by extraordinary effort. A comfortable position in the U.N. might even be greater security than 50 Phantoms. He hoped the Israelis would keep the situation under reasonable control. In terms of the modalities, he wanted to point out that there were many situations in which there was peace but no peace treaty. For example, between Japan and the USSR. Next, Secretary Rusk wished to mention the effect of time on the situation. The U.S. believes time hurts the moderates and helps the radicals. Our problem is not just the problem of Israel. The responsibility of the United States Government goes much beyond that. We needed help on those aspects of U.S. interest that we needed to manage. Israel has a stake in this. He was not sure how we can keep the U.N. situation under control and not sure how we can break Soviet influence. Some indication towards the moderate Arabs would be helpful. He referred to his suggestion of the preceding night that the Israelis evacuate the Straits of Tiran. He also had mentioned possibly turning over of the responsibility for patrolling Sharm-el-Sheikh to the United Nations which could lead to withdrawal from the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula under arrangements assuring free passage through the Straits and requiring Security Council approval before the troops could be withdrawn. He hoped the Israelis would help us find other examples which would improve the chances of a solution. The interests of the U.S. were world wide and involved. The Prime Minister said he must ask who would assure free passage through the Suez Canal. The Secretary said he was not suggesting that the Israelis withdraw until the issue of the Canal is settled. Ambassador Harman said that there was no equivalence of position in the Security Council. Whatever the Arabs wanted the Soviets supported, and the Arabs had a Soviet veto for anything they opposed. At this point the meeting adjourned for lunch. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Battle on January 12. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the living room of the Ranch from 11:55 a.m. to 1:50 p.m. (Johnson Library) 2 According to the President's Daily Diary, Johnson and Eshkol met privately from 11:35 to 11:55 a.m. (Ibid.) 41. Memorandum of Conversation 41. Memorandum of Conversation 1 LBJ Ranch, Texas, January 8, 1968, Session III. SUBJECT U.S.-Israeli Talks PARTICIPANTS U.S. Side The President Secretary of State Rusk Secretary of Defense McNamara General Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA Israeli Side Prime Minister Eshkol Ambassador Avraham Harman Minister Ephraim Evron Mr. Bitan Dr. Herzog General Hod Following lunch, President Johnson convened a meeting of those listed above. The President opened the meeting by saying that the group had touched at various times on the problem of desalinization in the area. He said that he felt it desirable from our point of view to find the best person possible to work on this important study and that he would soon designate the best qualified individual he could find to deal with the matter. The President then mentioned the communique agreed upon by his staff and that of Prime Minister Eshkol. 2 There appeared to be no objection from either side to the text. The Prime Minister then said that he had been considering how he could help with the matters raised concerning possible steps toward peace. He said that the U.S. had raised the question of Tiran. He wished to point out that from that island it was possible to hinder navigation in the Straits of Tiran. Could the U.S. work out an agreement with Faisal that would prevent the island from being armed so that this interference could not occur? The basis for any agreement must be that the island “not become a tyrant”. It is a small island, and it is doubtful whether anyone would want or could live there. If the U.S. can go to Faisal and take up the matter with him, and if the U.S. will then tell the Government of Israel in writing that this island will not be used to hamper or hinder navigation, the Prime Minister would have something new to take to his military people and to his Cabinet which might permit an understanding. The Prime Minister said he wished to point out that he was looking for things to limit President Johnson's burdens and would continue to do so. Secretary Rusk then said that we would examine what could be done with respect to the island of Tiran. President Johnson said that he hoped the Prime Minister would join with him in instructing Foreign Minister Eban and Secretary Rusk to explore together every possible factor that could be fitted into the search for peace. The world will expect a great deal from us, and we must do what we can to find ways toward solution of the problems. The President continued by saying that Israel's security is important to us. That is basic to much that had been said, and he wished to emphasize it. We also had other problems in the area. We had considered what could be done with respect to Jordan. Is it better if we do nothing and leave the vacuum for Russia to fill? We consider it better that we enter into a small program rather than to run the risk that the Russians will arm Jordan without limitation. The Prime Minister said that he preferred that any country in the area be tied up with the U.S. rather than the Soviets. If the U.S. finds it must provide equipment to avoid Jordan's obtaining it from the Soviets or Nasser, he hoped it would be as little as possible. The Israelis will not criticize the decision. However, he hoped the U.S. will not say that Israel agrees or approves. When questioned as to whether he would prefer arms shipments to Jordan from the U.S. or the Soviets, he must obviously say the U.S. While he would prefer no arms at all, if the U.S. considered something necessary, go ahead. The President then reaffirmed his concern for the security of Israel. He said we must have very straight talk between the two countries on a continuing basis. He thought both sides could agree on three objectives. First, there is the need to do what can be done to bring about a stable peace in the Middle East. We are particularly anxious not to be charged with impeding Jarring's peace mission. Again, the President stated his hope that the Foreign Minister and Secretary Rusk would explore every avenue to bring success in the search for peace. Second, both of us are anxious to deter if possible an arms race in the Middle East and to avoid escalation of that race. The United States wants to give no excuse to the Soviets for an increase of arms in the area. The U.S. is uncertain what the Russians will do in this area, but in any event it is our joint purpose to deter an arms race. Third, the U.S. has as a hope and purpose the goal of assuring, if necessary, adequate equipment to the Israeli Air Force to defend itself. What the U.S. does will reflect the judgment of the President; but the judgment of the Israelis will affect his final decision. Again, Foreign Minister Eban and Secretary Rusk in the search for contributions toward peace should carefully check other aspects such as all ship movements, Soviet military shipments into the area, etc. In connection with this third goal, the President wished to suggest the addition of the following sentence to the communique: “The President agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others into the area.” This statement would show that the third goal was possible. The U.S. will be helpful. This statement is a deterrent to the Arabs and might push them toward restraint. The statement also says, “Stop, look, and listen” to the Soviets. It is not as contentious as arms shipments would be, but it will help give the people of Israel something to stand on. Meanwhile, both sides must stay in touch through intelligence authorities and hope for an agreed assessment of the threat. The President said that the generals on both sides are agreed on what to expect in the future. They agree that the Israeli Air Force might not be adequate to meet its needs in January of 1970 depending on what happens. In order to have the tools needed, the Israelis urge that a decision be made now. The President said he wished to ask Secretary McNamara in the event the President decided to deliver a certain number of planes to take steps to minimize the time required so as to have these planes in Israeli hands by January, 1970. The Israelis must decide how much time they need in order to get pilots trained and ready to operate on that date. The U.S. will take steps to be ready to respond, and Secretary McNamara would establish when we have to decide in order to deliver Phantoms in January, 1970. The President stated emphatically that he was not prepared to make that decision today. He would add, however, 27 A-4's or 30 A-4's. Perhaps another 10 if actually needed. And he would assist on a crash basis in training crews for the Phantoms in order that there be no gap between delivery and ability to operate, providing a decision was, in fact, later made to deliver. General Hod said that he could train pilots in 12 to 18 months. The question of delivery schedule on the F-4's was discussed. Secretary McNamara said that lead time on F-4's was 24 months. The U.S. has, however, a large production, and by December 31, 1968 it may be possible to deliver in 12 months. The delivery schedule for the Skyhawks (A-4's) was discussed. The Prime Minister asked whether the delivery of the Skyhawks could be accelerated. Secretary McNamara replied that we could not move up delivery. We would try to deliver the 27 at approximately the rate of four per month beginning in January 1969 so that there would be a steady flow coming after the 48 A-4's already contracted for. It will take about six months to get the unique Israeli equipment necessary for these planes, and it will be cheaper for the Israelis to have an even flow of delivery. He was not sure the earlier delivery of the 27 was possible; but he would try. The President said he wanted Secretary Rusk and Mr. Eban to start to work immediately—which was a basic requirement—on the steps toward peace. At the same time he wanted Secretary McNamara to give him a statement of the latest possible date for a decision that would put him in a position to deliver Phantoms by January 1970—provided he later made that decision. He wanted to make clear there was no commitment to deliver Phantoms. However, he wanted Secretary McNamara to work out the schedule to permit implementation of the President's decision if he decided to deliver Phantoms by January 1970. The agreement must be secret and any leak would present major problems; and all arrangements were null and void if secrecy is not maintained. The President continued by saying that he wished to talk with the Soviets, the Arabs, and with the U.S. Congress. He also hoped that the Israeli military authorities would discuss with General Wheeler the problem of training pilots and ground crews. If any pilots were trained prior to any decision to send F-4's, it was essential that this arrangement be kept secret. The Prime Minister then asked whether instead of January 1970, it would be possible to step up delivery of the Phantoms to the middle of 1969 if necessary. Moreover, he would consider it a favor if the President could find some way to tell him that in 1968 he would send one dozen F-4's and the rest later. The response to this question from the U.S. side was negative. Secretary McNamara mentioned that there had been no arrangements on financing and that this would have to be worked out. Thirty A-4's would cost some $39 million or more, and 50 F-4's would cost something like $200 million depending on what electronic equipment, etc. was included. The Prime Minister returned again to the thought that some F-4's could be delivered during 1968. The President repeated that he wanted the generals on both sides to tell him when the decision must be made in order that planes and pilots be ready for delivery by January 1, 1970 provided he decided to do so. The President rejected the idea of starting in 1968. The Prime Minister again asked for delivery soon; for example, for one per month in 1968. The President said what is at issue here is not the number but the decision. The Soviets and Arabs must prove the Israelis are right before the President would make this decision. In response to a comment by Dr. Herzog, the President said that he had outlined the basis for doing exactly what the Israelis had asked and on the time-table they have requested provided he decided it was necessary. Meanwhile, we must try to get the Russians to reach an understanding and to urge the Arabs to exercise restraint. The President remarked that President Nasser seemed to be feeling somewhat more subdued, and there were some indications that he wished to find a road to peace and an avenue to a resumption of relations with the United States. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Battle on January 12. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the living room of the Ranch at 2:45 p.m. (Johnson Library) 2 The joint communique was issued from the LBJ Ranch on January 8. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book I, pp. 20-21. 42. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 42. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, January 9, 1968, 0645Z. 2912. For Asst Secy Battle or Deputy Asst Secy Davies. Deliver opening of business January 9. 1. We have had a series of very grim discussions with Jordanians today. With considerably difficulty we have just obtained King Hussein's agreement to postponing the visit of a high-level Soviet military delegation (two lieutenant-generals and four other senior officers scheduled to arrive in Jordan on the eleventh) pending discussions of General Khammash with our military people in Washington. (Khammash's travel plans will be subject subsequent message.) The King has also agreed to withdrawal of a letter written by Zaid Rifa'i to me incorporating the King's response to the President's oral message I delivered to the King yesterday. 2 I obtained the King's agreement to withdrawal of this letter, which stated basically that our response had come too late, against my personal assurances to him that the President's message implied that the “legitimate requirements” of Jordan would be discussed in a positive way with Khammash in Washington. The nature of these “legitimate requirements” as the Embassy understands them from the King and Khammash will be spelled out in a separate message. 3 3. Today's situation came about primarily because we were late in responding to the King's oral message of December 30 to the President. 4 Beyond that, however, the King apparently had decided we were only stringing him along, that we had no intention of discussing or supplying more than token arms to Jordan, and that in effect we had called his hand. Reliable Jordanian sources and an Embassy officer who knows him well said the King has been under considerable psychological tension on this matter. My own limited experience with Hussein confirms that he has become quite desperate and somewhat overwrought. Prime Minister Eshkol's visit and the recent series of difficulties on the border have contributed to his sense of being cornered. We are also informed he has developed a deep sense of guilt about the events of June. 4. I would emphasize that in agreeing (1) to postpone the visit of the Soviet military delegation, (2) to withdraw the letter and (3) to send Genl Khammash to Washington, the King understands we seriously intend to come to a meeting of the minds with Genl Khammash on what arms we are willing to supply to Jordan. Khammash will have full powers to discuss this matter. I think he and the King recognize they may not get all they want, but they do expect more than token satisfaction and playing for time. If we are not able to agree on “legitimate requirements,” then the King will consider he has no alternative to rescheduling the visit of the Soviet delegation and, presumably, accepting Soviet offers. 5. King Hussein requested my personal undertaking that under no circumstances would we reveal that at our request (1) he had postponed the Soviet visit or (2) withdrawn Zaid Rifa'i's letter. I assured him he would be protected in both cases. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to the President on January 9 with the observation that “It was a close thing with Hussein.” He added: “We shall have to talk to the Jordanians about more than arms.” (White House telegram CAP 80213; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/67-2/68) 2 See Document 37 . 3 In telegram 2913 from Amman, January 9, Symmes laid out in greater detail the difficult meetings he had with King Hussein on January 8, when Hussein responded to the oral message from President Johnson by indicating that the U.S. response was too little and too late. After persuading the King to postpone the Soviet military mission, Symmes met with Hussein and Khammash to discuss in some detail the Jordanian desire to expand Khammash's “emergency list” of priority requirements. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN) Symmes amplified on his “traumatic evening” with the King and Khammash in a January 14 letter to Rodger Davies. (Ibid., POL JORDAN-US) 4 See footnote 3, Document 29 . 43. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 43. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, January 10, 1968, 1720Z. CAP 0247. Subject: PL 480 Agreement for Jordan. Secretary Freeman, Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze recommend you approve a $2.1 million wheat agreement for Jordan. Treasury concurs. This would cover 30,000 tons for dollars over twenty years. This agreement will partly substitute for aid dollars. Since Jordan for the moment is receiving all the foreign exchange aid it needs, we suspended our budget support as of the final quarter of 1967. Our strategy is to combine this PL 480 deal and $3 million in aid technical assistance funds as a substitute for that last quarter of budget support to cushion the transition to no support in 1968. We plan to use the aid money for feasibility studies that will help the Jordanians use the Arab money they have to good permanent advantage. This would be useful politically, too. It is one of the few positive things we've been able to do. The Jordanians are upset that we are ending budget support, and we are just barely scraping through on the military side. We got our response on arms out the day after Hussein had agreed to receive Soviet mission. Harry Symmes had to persuade Hussein to withdraw a letter stating that our response had come too late and to put off the Soviet visit. He succeeded, but we may still have a hard enough time responding adequately to his arms requests. A move on the economic side would help a little. Now that we have Israeli acquiescence to our blocking the Soviets in Jordan, I think we need to get back into business in every way we reasonably can. Fortunately, PL 480 is one of the few resources we can use relatively freely. You should know that this is the first substantial agreement to be processed under the new “Symington amendment” 2 to the aid bill which requires the President to “take into consideration” whether such aid will be diverted to military ends or enable the recipient to support unnecessary military expenditures. As you know, we have kept the Jordanian military budget within agreed limits. The percentage of total expenditures has been quite high but declining. The Jordanians are the only Arab combatants in the June war that have not purchased substantial replacements for their loses. We would like to get this out as quickly as possible since a Soviet economic mission is already in Jordan. 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret. 2 The Symington Amendment was Section 620 (s) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. (P.L. 90-137; 81 Stat. 445) 3 The approve line is checked to indicate the President approved the recommendation. A handwritten note by Jim Jones reads: “Jones told Rostow.” Telegram 97470 to Amman, January 11, informed the Embassy that the Texas White House had announced approval to negotiate a P.L. 480 program for Jordan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, (US) 15 JORDAN) 44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, January 12, 1968, 8:46 p.m. 98261. Deliver to action officer Saturday morning. Ref: Tel Aviv 1980. 2 1. Front page NYTimes today reports GOI “expropriation” 838 acres in crescent reaching from Mount Scopus to Sanhedrin sector of Israeli Jerusalem. About 225 acres privately owned by Arabs, remainder GOI property. GOI Finance Ministry said property destined for public institutions, roads, parks and 1,400 housing units, including 400 residences for Arabs who were removed from Old City. Requisition order signed by Pinhas Sapir as Acting PM. Land assigned to GOI Land Administration for lease according to need. 2. NYTimes Jan 10 reported GOI announced detailed plans for restoration of Jewish Quarter of Old City. Projected work now begun will take more than a year for completion and will include restoration of buildings, construction of urban facilities and transfer of religious institutions. About 75 Arab families remaining on site will be moved and compensated. Compensation grants of $25,000 have already been paid. Article also reported Mayor Kollek as saying master plan for city will be completed by midsummer. Plan will call for reduction in congested Old City population. 3. On urgent basis request you verify these statements and supplement them with any additional pertinent information. 4. Unless NYTimes reports are false, you should at earliest opportunity express to Foreign Minister Eban deep concern of USG over these Israeli measures, which ignore and directly conflict with often stated USG position on Jerusalem. We have repeatedly made clear that we do not recognize unilateral action affecting the status of Jerusalem and that its status must necessarily be considered in the context of all problems arising out of the recent conflict. Of particular pertinence, the President and Prime Minister privately in their Texas talks instructed the Secretary and Eban to consult on ways of advancing the cause of peace, and the Secretary plans to write Eban shortly in this connection. Israeli actions appear to undercut that assignment before it has begun. Further, Israeli actions affecting status of Jerusalem have direct bearing on chances for success of Jarring negotiations and are thus inconsistent with language of joint statement of the President and Prime Minister endorsing UNSC Resolution and mission of Ambassador Jarring. As Israelis should be aware, Jerusalem will be a critical issue in any peace settlement. Consequently Israeli measures described in NYTimes article will further strengthen Arab suspicions that Israelis are not serious about an equitable peace settlement and will discourage Arabs from a serious posture towards negotiation. 3 Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Precht; cleared by Battle, Atherton, and Houghton, and in L in draft by Neuman; and approved by Acting Secretary Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, London, Cairo, Paris, Jerusalem, and USUN. 2 In telegram 1980 from Tel Aviv, December 31, 1967, the Embassy commented, as background to the Eshkol visit, on a December 20 article in the Washington Post reporting that Eshkol had stated that a number of government departments and several hundred Israeli families would be relocated to the Arab section of East Jerusalem by the end of December. The Embassy stated that the report was oversimplified and misleading. (Ibid., POL 7 ISR) 3 Katzenbach returned to this issue on January 20 in a personal message to Ambassador Barbour. Katzenbach stated that Israeli measures in East Jerusalem were creating a situation in which a decision to annex East Jerusalem was becoming increasingly irreversible. He felt that some modification of Israeli policy was essential if there was to be an agreed Arab-Israeli settlement. He was concerned that the Israeli Government might be underestimating the strength of the U.S. views on this issue, and he instructed Barbour to take every opportunity to stress the U.S. position. (Telegram 102224 to Tel Aviv; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 45. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 45. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, January 13, 1968, 2:17 p.m. 98453. 1. Ashraf Ghorbal, newly arrived officer in charge UAR interests section Indian Embassy, called at Department for marathon discussion January 12. Burden his remarks was that Arabs had come a long way to meet our requirements since last summer but US continued unalterably pro-Israel and upped the ante every time Arabs showed any sign of reasonableness. Said he had seen both Zakariyah Muhieddin and Mahmoud Riad on eve his departure and was authorized by both of them to say UAR sincerely interested in peaceful settlement and would like to remove Palestine problem from agenda. Toward this goal they thought they following Secretary's advice to be wise and reasonable, but they genuinely perplexed to know what USG wanted. 2. Ghorbal maintained that since last June there had not been one public statement of US appreciation for moderation being shown by Arabs. Furthermore we had announced we were giving offensive aircraft to Israel immediately following its inhuman attack on Suez, and now President Johnson had told Eshkol he understood latter's problems in trying to obtain peace in Middle East, because he was having same sort of problem in Viet-Nam. This was unfortunate comparison. Fact was Israelis were ones who did not want peace and it had been Israelis who invaded Egypt, not vice versa. Egypt had been looking for peaceful way out of dilemma and had been ready to send Muhieddin to Washington, when Israelis had attacked. Egyptians had listened to our warnings not to attack, but Israelis had not heeded them. Now Egypt wanted peaceful settlement but Israelis were consolidating their gains and US not doing anything to stop them. For Egyptians, sine qua non of peaceful settlement was Israeli withdrawal, and only US could effect that. If we not prepared exert our influence to that end, entire area would be irretrievably lost to West. 3. Deptoff replied we still prepared put our full weight behind settlement within terms November 22 UN resolution, but we could not impose solution on any of parties. Package must be something everyone could live with. It quite true we had put no pressure on Israelis to withdraw, and would not do so in absence reasonable proposals for settlement. Israelis maintained with reason that they could not be expected to fight war of national survival every ten years and could not return to unstable status quo ante. They had also indicated however that their stated positions not inflexible and there was room for bargaining. We saw Jarring's task as that of exploring positions of both sides and establishing outlines of settlement. We hoped he would come up with something workable, but had taken decision not to get involved ourselves at this stage because we did not wish to affect chances of settlement by having proposals identified as ours. Although questions of Jerusalem, Suez and Gaza posed difficulties, we thought honorable global settlement was possible. Settlement would include non-belligerency and withdrawal to agreed boundaries. We had reached no firm position on what those boundaries should be, but assumed armistice lines would be basis. There would have to be some rectifications however and there would have to be some demilitarization. Essential element in getting such settlement was that UAR have some faith in our intentions. 4. Ghorbal said Deptoff remarks confirmed Egyptian suspicions we were in fact supporting Israelis in their efforts to dictate terms. We were saying in effect that Israelis would not withdraw until they had what they wanted, and that we supported them in this. We could not expect Egyptians to put any faith or trust in us under these circumstances. Comment: Ghorbal personally somewhat depressed by problems setting up house in Washington and dealing with American public opinion and his remarks reflect this. They also appeared reflect however genuine sense of frustration on part UARG that implementation UN resolution proceeding at such leisurely pace and that Jarring not showing more dynamic approach to problem. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Parker and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, London, Jidda, USUN, and Jerusalem. 46. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson 46. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson Washington, January 16, 1968. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 1/1/67-2/29/68. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, January 17, 1968, 1930Z. 99998. State 97760, Dhahran 464. 2 Tiran. 1. Ambassador requested deliver following personal message in written form from Secretary to FonMin Eban re Tiran problem: “Dear Mr. Minister: As you know, the continued presence of Israeli troops on the island of Tiran was one of the matters we discussed during the President's recent cordial discussions with Prime Minister Eshkol in Texas. 3 We noted to the Prime Minister the desirability that Israel provide public indications of its willingness to reach understandings with the Arabs and suggested that withdrawal of your troops from Tiran would be one example of what we had in mind. The Prime Minister expressed understanding of this view but indicated that it would be difficult for your government to contemplate withdrawal from Tiran in the absence of assurances regarding the consequences of this act for Israel. Encouraged by these exchanges, I subsequently instructed the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia to explore this question further with King Faisal. Our Ambassador had a frank and detailed discussion of this subject with His Majesty on January 13. The King's comments made clear: (a) that he regards Tiran Island as part of Saudi territory, and that, for example, his government has granted a concession covering the island; and (b) that he has no plan to militarize Tiran or to use it to impede freedom of navigation into Tiran Strait. I am greatly encouraged by His Majesty's position. On the basis of his assurances to our Ambassador, I believe that the problems the Israeli side foresaw if your government withdrew will not arise. Specifically, I would expect neither alienation of this portion of Saudi territory, its militarization nor its use in any way to interfere with freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran. I would therefore hope that your government would now consider that its troops can be withdrawn from the island without incurring adverse consequences for Israel. As we have earlier indicated to your government, such action will remove a serious embarrassment in our own relations with the Saudi authorities. I therefore look forward to receiving a favorable response from your government. It will, of course, be immediately communicated to King Faisal and will, I am sure, have a useful and helpful impact. 4 Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk” 2. Since much of good effect of forthcoming Israeli position on Tiran would be vitiated by public disclosure of King Faisal's attitude, we assume that FonMin will agree that this aspect should receive no publicity. For record, we will take a similar line with Saudis when conveying Israeli decision. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on January 16 in NEA/ARP by Brewer; cleared by Atherton, Battle, and in the White House by Saunders; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Jidda. 2 Neither printed. 3 See Documents 39 – 41 . 4 In a conversation with Battle on February 5, Ambassador Harman stated that Foreign Minister Eban was prepared to take up the issue of Tiran Island with the Israeli Cabinet but first needed a U.S. response to a number of “clarifications.” Harman asked if the United States could obtain Saudi Arabian acknowledgment that the Straits of Tiran was an international waterway. Israel also asked whether the United States could obtain from Saudi Arabia a “binding written undertaking” that Tiran Island would remain permanently uninhabited. Israel also asked whether the United States would underwrite any such Saudi undertakings by making them a matter of U.S. “responsibility and commitment” as regards Israel. Harman indicated that he was instructed to stress the need for “absolute precision” in these assurances. (Telegram 111432 to Tel Aviv, February 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN) Ambassador Eilts in Jidda assessed the Israeli response to Secretary Rusk's letter as “very disappointing,” and noted that Israel was proposing conditions that King Faisal could not accept. Eilts felt that the Israeli conditions raised the question of whether Israel had any intention of leaving Tiran unless forced out. (Telegram 2776 from Jidda, February 10; ibid.) 48. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 48. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 17, 1968. SUBJECT Mid-East Arms Limitation Approaches During your talks with Prime Minister Eshkol, you instructed Secretary Rusk to approach both the Soviets and the Arabs to urge restraint on further arms shipments and to see whether we can avoid another round in the arms race. The Secretary raised this with Dobrynin before he returned to Moscow. Now, to make sure everyone understands this is a serious effort, he recommends two more steps: 1. Instruct Ambassador Thompson to follow up with Dobrynin in Moscow, giving him the broad outlines of our aircraft decision, underlining your desire to avoid a new round in the arms race and urging some indication of his Government's reaction. (Tab A). 2 2. Instruct our ambassadors in Arab capitals to make clear our restraint and to let Arab leaders know that further decisions will depend on what they and the Soviets do. (Tab B). State would follow this up with specially tailored stronger approaches in Cairo and one or two other key capitals, perhaps urging them to talk with the USSR. We believe it is important to lay it on the line that we have decided to sell a few more Skyhawks. If we don't, both Russians and Arabs can throw this back at us when it comes out formally, saying we've already voided our plea for restraint and pushed the arms race a step further. We will try to say we've deferred our decision on Phantoms in such a way as to preserve the deterrent value of a decision still to be made. While I realize this describes to a pretty broad audience the simpler elements of your decision, I think this is necessary if we're going to put real substance in a major pitch for limitation. I recommend you approve the attached. Walt Approve Tabs A and B See me 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret;Exdis. 2 The proposed draft cables at Tabs A and B are not printed. 3 This option is checked. 49. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 49. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 17, 1968. SUBJECT Visit of Major General Amer Khammash, Chief of Staff, Jordan Arab Army General Khammash arrives in Washington today for talks beginning Friday. 2 King Hussein has asked us to receive him to discuss Jordan's military requirements. Hussein expects us “to come to a meeting of the minds” with Khammash on what arms we are willing to supply to Jordan. Our Ambassador in Amman states categorically that we must be prepared to do so or risk Hussein's acceptance of Soviet arms offers. (Relevant cables are at Tab D.) 3 The kinds of arms that Khammash probably will be looking for are tanks, artillery, APCs, and a continuous flow of support items. A draft position paper prepared by State, and cleared by Under Secretary Katzenbach, is at Tab A. 4 In brief, it says: 1. The President has agreed to resume limited arms shipments to Jordan and has approved a $6.5 million package. This decision has been communicated to Hussein. (Package details are at Tab B.) 5 2. The King and Khammash consider that this modest amount ($6.5 million) is insufficient to demonstrate to their army that progress is being made in reequipping the Jordanian forces. Hussein wants a commitment on major ground force items and continuing support items. 3. The King is prepared to forego Soviet arms offers (his assurance to this effect is at Tab C) 6 but unless Jordan can get equipment from the West “there seems little doubt but that the King will turn to the Soviet bloc.” 4. In our discussions with Khammash, we should: a. Confirm and provide details on the Presidential decision on the $6.5 million package; also tell him we will consider sympathetically in the coming months further requests for similar-type equipment. b. Try to get him to agree to meet requirements for tanks, artillery, APCs, and similar items in Europe, offering to support him in this endeavor; but if this proves unacceptable to Khammash, c. Agree to meet Jordan's arms requirements from the U.S. if they are not obtainable elsewhere. d. Discuss the modalities of cancelling the F-104 contract at the lowest possible cost to Jordan. e. Make no commitments on credit. I agree in general with the State paper. I think, however, it overstates the probability of Hussein going to the USSR for military equipment: he continues to depend upon us to help him in negotiations with Israel for his lost territory, he surely wants our continuing economic assistance, and his physical security depends on his association with the West, particularly the United States, and with the moderate Arabs, particularly Faisal of Saudi Arabia. While there certainly is a risk that he will go to the Soviets for military equipment. I believe we have more leverage with Hussein than the State paper implies. I think also that it ignores the implications of the Conte-Long Amendment 7 for any decision we make concerning Jordan. This requires further discussion and analysis with State. The State proposal (subparagraph c, above) of course goes beyond what the President has already approved. State is not seeking approval for this position now, but recommends waiting until after at least the initial discussions with Khammash. I agree. Khammash will begin substantive discussions with State on Friday afternoon. Harry Schwartz, in my absence, will carry the subsequent and more detailed discussions for DOD. I strongly recommend you see Khammash briefly, and have tentatively blocked your calendar for 1700 hours, 23 January 1968. 8 Paul C. Warnke 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, Jordan, 000.1-333. Secret. 2 January 19. 3 Not found attached. An apparent reference to telegrams 2912 and 2913 from Amman; see Document 42 and footnote 3 thereto. 4 Reference is to a January 17 memorandum from Battle to Katzenbach that outlined the Department's position on the impending negotiations with Khammash. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 5 Not printed. 6 Not printed; see footnote 3, Document 29 . 7 Reference is to the Conte-Long Amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment was adopted as Section 119 of the Appropriations Act on January 2, 1968. The amendment directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (P.L. 90-249; 81 Stat. 936) 8 McNamara's handwritten response, dated January 19, reads: “I believe we must be forthcoming—c is a minimum. After we obtain agreement on c as the govt's position, I will see him.” 50. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 50. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, January 18, 1968, 1715Z. 3040. For INR Hughes and NEA Battle. Subj: Terrorist plans to assassinate Israeli officials. 1. At the end of our conversation today, King Hussein said there was a very sensitive matter that he felt he should mention to me. He then explained that when he was in Saudi Arabia last week he had heard from a “high level” that “some of the Arab terrorist organizations” are planning the assassination of certain Israeli officials, with Moshe Dayan being a principal target. (The King said he had voiced his strong disapproval of such a course of action, and implied that his source also disapproved of these alleged terrorist plans.) With some embarrassment he said he left it to me as to how or whether these reports should be brought to the attention of the GOI. He said he wanted to make it absolutely clear that he is opposed to terrorism in general and to assassination of individuals in particular. 2. In connection with terrorism, King Hussein said his intelligence information is that the situation is becoming much worse. More terrorists are coming from Syria and others are coming in from Gaza and Iraq. He has issued orders to insure that the situation in South Jordan is cleaned up completely. He believes that terrorist threats can be handled more easily in that region but the situation opposite the West Bank remains difficult. He volunteered that one purpose of his forthcoming trip to Baghdad (which will now be delayed until early February) will be to speak to the Iraqis about getting PLO and terrorist elements out of Jordan. He noted parenthetically that he expects he and others may also become terrorist targets. 3. Comment: From the way the King spoke to me about the terrorist plans against Israeli officials, I judge that he had received some fairly hard information that some of the terrorist groups may try hard to get Dayan. I leave to the Dept how best to get this information conveyed to the Israelis without compromising King Hussein as source. Symmes 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Cables, 5/67-2/68. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Roger Channel. 51. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 51. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 18, 1968. SUBJECT Your Understanding with Prime Minister Eshkol PM Eshkol asked Ambassador Harman to clear up any misunderstandings before he briefs his political intimates. He arrives home tonight. Luke Battle has drafted the attached notes, 2 checked them with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and compared them with Ambassador Harman's. There are two points of disagreement. 1. View of the threat. The Israelis believe General Wheeler and Hod agreed that the Israeli air force will not be adequate, if certain things happen, to meet the Arab threat 18 months from now. Wheeler says his point was that Israel faced no problem for the next 18 months but in the period after that might have a problem, depending on what the Soviets and others did. Unless you intended to state a different point of view from Wheeler's, we will stick with the Wheeler-McNamara view. These two views are in brackets at “A” on the attached text. Approve US language 3 Approve Israeli language 2. Number of Phantoms in January 1970 . Did you say that, if you decide to sell Phantoms, you would prepare to deliver in January 1970 a batch of say 30, 40 or 50 planes? Or did you have in mind starting the production line rolling then with delivery at the normal rate of about 4 a month thereafter? The Israelis interpreted you as implying the possible delivery of a batch of planes in January 1970 if the situation required. They know Secretary McNamara had in mind normal production line delivery, but they thought you expressed a different view which indicated that you would even pull planes out of inventory and deliver in a batch if the threat required. These two views are represented in the brackets at “B” on the attached. Approve US language 4 Approve Israeli language Secretary Rusk isn't enthusiastic about this exercise, but he admits that we owe Eshkol some help in describing your understanding accurately to his colleagues. If you agree, Luke Battle could just share these notes with Evron. I think either he or I should call Harman and say that, while we've argued over language, no one here intends to dilute in any way the spirit of your talks. Walt Call me 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XII, 1965-1968. Secret; Nodis. 2 Reference is to a 3-page undated memorandum headed “Notes on Meeting Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol January 7-8, 1968.” 3 This option is checked. The proposal Israeli language reads: “would not be adequate to meet its needs 18 months from now.” The McNamara-Rusk language reads: “may not be adequate to meet the threat in January 1970.” Rostow added another option that reads: “No language-via telephone.” 4 This option is checked. The U.S. language reads: “Delivered to Israel beginning in January 1970.” 5 This option is checked. The draft notes on Johnson's meeting with Eshkol, as approved by the President, were sent to Tel Aviv on January 19 in telegram 101300, for delivery to the Israeli Foreign Ministry. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US) 52. Special National Intelligence Estimate 52. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, January 18, 1968. SNIE 11-9-68 SOVIET INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES IN ARAB STATES The Problem To assess Soviet policy toward Middle East since the June war, and to estimate Soviet intentions, particularly with respect to the UAR, Yemen, and Jordan. Conclusions A. The main Soviet objective in the Middle East remains essentially the same as before the June war—to win for the USSR a position as dominant foreign power in the area. The Soviets face both new problems and new opportunities. Nonetheless the radical Arabs are now more dependent on the USSR, and the Soviets probably judge that the new opportunities will compensate for such losses as they suffered as a result of the Arab defeat. B. The Soviets are not likely to make binding military commitments to any Arab states, and they will almost certainly remain wary of direct involvement even in limited conflicts in the Middle East. They probably do not intend to establish actual Soviet military bases in the area, but will seek instead to help the Arabs develop ports and air bases which might be used by Soviet forces on a limited basis. The Soviets will improve the capabilities of their naval forces in the Mediterranean and of their sea and airlift capabilities in general. They will probably continue to use their forces in the Middle East for essentially political purposes-to influence events and to improve their position in the region. Nonetheless, resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities would produce a dangerous and essentially unpredictable situation, in which the risks of Soviet involvement, by accident or miscalculation, might be greater than before. C. The Soviets will probably continue to give strong, though not unlimited, backing to Nasser, whom they continue to regard as their chief Arab ally. Despite some mutual irritants, and despite Nasser's desire to maintain independence, Soviet and UAR policies on important issues are congruent-notably, opposition to US influence in the area, a cautious policy toward Israel, and at least short-term accommodation between Arab radicals and moderates. D. In Jordan, the Soviets are attempting to extend their influence by generous offers of military aid. We believe that Hussein will accept Soviet arms if the Western Powers fail to offer an acceptable alternative. He would still try to maintain countervailing ties with conservative Arabs and the West, but over time revolutionary forces in Jordan would be strengthened. E. In Yemen, Soviet military aid and activity is probably aimed at preventing the collapse of the Republican regime. But the Soviets have now moved to limit their involvement, possibly because they have revised their estimate of Republican prospects, and they are encouraging a negotiated settlement. They will, however, probably continue some aid as long as the Republican regime can make use of it, hoping in this way to preserve some influence in Yemen and eventually to promote Soviet interests in South Yemen. In doing so, they will probably try to avoid the kind of overt bid for dominance which would kindle adverse reactions in the area, particularly among their Arab clients. [Here follows the 7-page Discussion section of the estimate.] 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 71 D 384, Special Documents-1968. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on January 18. 53. Memorandum of Conversation 53. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 19, 1968. Late January 18, Mr. Walt Rostow called Israeli Minister Evron to discuss our final decision on “Notes on the Meeting Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol”, 2 which had been passed to Mr. Evron. Mr. Rostow made the following points: 1. On the question of when the Israeli air force might face a serious threat, the President felt that was an issue for Generals Wheeler and Hod to settle. He did not commit himself to any particular intelligence assessment. The President had said he was concerned with Israel's security, and we should leave it at that. 2. What concerned the President was to make sure he would be in a position, if he delayed a decision on supplying Phantom aircraft to Israel, to deliver those aircraft, if he decided later to do so, as if he had made a decision the day he talked to Prime Minister Eshkol. He recognized that normal lead times would require him to decide right now; he wanted to delay decision and yet still preserve the option to deliver as if he had decided today. 3. The question he did not address is how we might deal with some emergency-for instance, a sudden influx of Soviet arms. That is a separate problem. That wasn't the problem he was confronted with at the Ranch. That was outside the scope of decisions made there. 4. We do not have a formal record of the President's views on delivery schedules. He knows the normal production schedule of aircraft, but this point was not addressed by the President, and it is not wise to try to force him to decide now. At this point, Mr. Evron asked whether he might tell Prime Minister Eshkol that the President had instructed Secretary McNamara to keep open the option of delivering an unspecified number-20, 30, 40-of aircraft in January 1970. Mr. Rostow replied, “I can't say that. We didn't address the question. We were thinking of normal build-up. The only question the President addressed was allowing himself some turnaround time before having to decide and still be able to meet a normal schedule.” 5. In conclusion, what we need to do is (a) get the intelligence people working hard and steadily and (b) get the latest date for decision from Generals Wheeler and Hod (on training) and from Secretary McNamara (on production). But on the issue of emergency diversion from existing production, don't raise this contingency matter until you have reason to raise it. The President has not now addressed rates of delivery. Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Visit of Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel, January 7-8, 1968. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders and cleared by Rostow. 2 See footnote 2, Document 51 . 54. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 54. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, January 19, 1968, 1320Z. 3047. Subj: Jordanian request for help with anti-terrorist measures. 1. In conversation with Emboff Jan 9 MajGen Muhammad Rasoul Kilani, Chief of GOJ GA General Intelligence Directorate (GID), requested assistance from the USG in the field of terrorist interdiction and suppression. Gen. Kilani stated that the GOJ wishes to accomplish two things: (A) completely stop the flow of terrorists through Jordan and break up their organizations; and (B) do this in such a way that it will not incite the people of Jordan (who are generally pro-terrorist) to insurrection against the regime. 2. Gen. Kilani said that one of his main concerns is that if the terrorists build an effective organizational structure, sooner or later this could be used against the GOJ instead of the Israelis. King and PM already believe this intent. He added that he had been exposed to some of the philosophy and tactics of counterinsurgency when he had been a student at the counterinsurgency school at Fort Bragg, he felt that between the US Army and CIA there could be developed a set of tactics which would help Jordan in this problem. 3. Rasoul said that he was not asking for “experts” to be sent TDY from the US, but rather asking for a thorough review of the Jordan/Israel cease-fire line situation which would make some concrete recommendations. He expected that the recommendations might very well entail use of some new and sophisticated technical devices, which he would then request and employ operationally. While he would not shrink from using armed force when necessary, he would like as much as possible to be able to keep the anti-terrorist campaign “under cover” and avoid alerting the people to the GOJ's real intent. 4. Emboff agreed to report Kilani's request. Emboff later asked Rasoul's deputy whether GID was having serious problems with villagers and refugees when it worked against various terrorist groups, and he answered that the problem was quite serious and promised to become more so if this political settlement issue remained stagnated. 5. Emboff understanding was that Rasoul thinking along lines of installing anti-infiltration devices on Jordanian side of the cease-fire line under some pretext which would convince people that these were protective devices. He also seemed to be searching for new ideas to use in convincing the population that anti-terrorist activity was either not going on or was in fact aimed at another target. Rasoul gave no hint to suggest he would consider cooperating with Israel in this activity. 6. Comment and Recommendations: (A) Jordanian leadership has consistently maintained anti-terrorist posture. Best recent evidence that this posture is genuine has been provided by obvious dismay over Eilat incidents which they fear can trigger reprisal against Aqaba, with both political and logistical damage to Jordan. (B) At the same time, popular support for spirit of resistance personified by infiltrators is growing along with continued frustration of hopes for peaceful solution. Capacity of leadership to enforce anti-terrorist infiltration campaign is correspondingly being eroded. (C) On top of this complication, physical problems of policing cease-fire line which provides good infiltration access at many points impose practical limits on what can be done even with the best of will. (D) Also it is only realistic to recognize that will to enforce measures will vary down through the rank and file and that there will be loopholes. (E) Given prospects for continued slow progress toward a solution (assuming continued progress), the problem of infiltration and terrorism promises to increase. (F) We are not in a position to judge the practical merit of sophisticated infiltration measures which might be employed pursuant to Rasoul's thinking. We believe this should be evaluated and that we should respond as constructively as possible to this overture. Over and above the possible practical effects on reducing terrorist infiltration, we have major concern for reducing tensions on both sides over issue and moves such as this may help. Incidentally, GOJ would likely find future use for such equipment along any permanent frontier with Israel for some time to come as well as along Syrian frontier. 7. Suggest Dept may wish repeat to Embassy Tel Aviv. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN. Secret; Nodis. 55. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 55. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 20, 1968, 3:45 p.m. SUBJECT Resuming Relations with Nasser Nasser was pleased with your message, 2 and I think on the whole your exchange improved the atmosphere. Bergus' account of his talk with Nasser is attached. 3 The main question now is our next step. Bob Anderson has volunteered to see a representative of Nasser in either Geneva or Malta next week, and Gene Black will be in Cairo on a regular visit January 31 to February 6. Do we want to use either? There are two issues: —Do we ask to discuss details of resumption? You have already told Nasser that you share his desire to resume relations and that Don Bergus is prepared to discuss details. From Nasser's failure to have the Foreign Office get down to cases with him, we begin to assume that he wants us to initiate discussions so they can say we came begging. Commissioning Anderson or Black to offer to begin talking specifics would lay you open to the kind of news stories the Cairo press launched during Anderson's last mission picturing you as running after Nasser. —How do we handle retraction of the false charges that we took part in the June war? Nasser told Bergus he didn't make any, but those charges were the reason Nasser gave for breaking with us. We probably can't expect Nasser himself to retract, and a casual retraction in one of their newspapers wouldn't help us too much. But it might be possible for us to say unilaterally we assume that, by resuming relations, Cairo had acknowledged that the basis for breaking was unfounded. 4 Or we could say Egyptian officials had told us they acknowledged the charges were wrong. We'd have to pre-arrange this with the Egyptians, but I assume you still feel we ought to get some satisfaction on this subject. I would vote against using Bob. He could take this line: We're ready; talk to Bergus. But that seems hardly worth a trip from Cairo to Geneva and back. Besides, a special meeting of this kind might attract more publicity than we want. I think Gene Black could serve a useful purpose in Cairo. I would recommend authorizing him to say two things: —Urge Nasser to have his Foreign Office get down to specifics with Bergus. You are ready to resume. —You have a political problem that requires setting the record straight on the false charges. Can't we work out a formula that will meet both your needs and Nasser's? I think it's worth using Gene. I don't have any illusions about changing our relations with Nasser much, though I do think we're better off with a U.S. presence in Cairo to show we're not abandoning the field to Moscow. But resumption with Cairo would pave the way for resuming business in other Arab capitals-a first step toward repairing the damage to our position throughout the Arab world. No one will move till Nasser does. We don't honestly know whether Nasser really wants to resume. He believes we're 100% behind Israel, and he frankly admitted to Bergus that suspicion of us is so great that it is not yet possible to move into a new period of friendship based on trust. But another probe by Gene Black seems to risk little for the chance of a worthwhile gain. Walt Approve Black talking to Nasser about this subject 5 I would prefer that Black just listen and stick to generalities Approve the line you have suggested Call me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received at 5:20 p.m. Another handwritten notation reads: “Mr. Saunders notified 1/22/68.” 2 See Document 31 . 3 Document 34 . 4 Bergus proposed this formula for breaking the impasse on the issue of the “big lie” in a conversation on January 18 with Foreign Ministry official Mohamed Riad. Riad saw some merit in the suggestion, and Bergus recommended it to the Department. Bergus and Riad also reviewed other aspects of Bergus' January 6 conversation with Nasser. Bergus made the point that since the United Arab Republic had broken relations the initiative for the resumption of relations should come from Cairo and that relations, if restored, should be substantive rather than formal. Riad noted that his government feared that an initiative from Cairo might meet with an embarrassing public rebuff from Washington. Bergus responded that President Johnson's response to President Nasser's message should put to rest any concerns that the United States was setting a trap for the UAR. Bergus and Riad also discussed the issue of compensation for U.S. property damaged during the June war and agreed that it should not pose a problem. (Telegram 1413 from Cairo, January 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US) Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on January 21 under cover of a memorandum in which he stated: “It is clear we are beginning to communicate.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 57, 1/16-24/68) 5 Johnson checked this option. 56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, January 20, 1968, 1756Z. 102185. Ref: Amman 3043. 2 1. Department increasingly concerned that recent outbreaks of terrorism in areas of Israel near Jordan and on West Bank may lead to further escalation of hostilities. We are particularly concerned that incidents such as that of Eilat will strengthen in Israel the hands of the advocates of retaliation as an answer to terroristic activity. We have been persistently urging restraint on the Israelis but we are not sanguine about consequences if tempo of incidents continues. We cannot overemphasize the crucial importance of the GOJ's doing everything within its power to restrain terrorist activity. You should again take up this subject at appropriately high level of GOJ drawing on the following as you deem appropriate: (a) USG deeply concerned over possible escalation of hostilities between Israel and Jordan sparked by terrorist activity. (b) We are strongly urging Government of Israel not to take countermeasures which could escalate into armed hostility between Jordan and Israel. (c) We realize that GOJ has been making a major effort to interdict saboteurs on Jordanian territory. We hope these efforts will continue and be intensified. (d) We commend GOJ initiative in suggesting talks on terrorism with Israelis and hope that some way can be found to hold these meetings. For example, would it be possible to arrange meetings along lines suggested by Tekoah in USUN 3411? 3 Israelis appear to be dissatisfied with rank of officer who has previously met with them at bridge. Has GOJ given consideration to having higher ranking officer accompany Twal for preliminary meetings with Israelis? (e) Present period while Jarring consultations are under way is especially critical for future of area and it would be a tragedy for all concerned if actions of terrorists, although not representative of responsible Arab opinion, were to jeopardize chances of working out more stable relationships. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Wiley on January 19; cleared by Atherton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper, and Houghton; and approved by Battle. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Beirut, and USUN. 2 Telegram 3043 from Amman, January 19, reported on a conversation on recent terrorist incidents between an Embassy official and the head of Jordanian intelligence. The terrorist incidents which prompted U.S. concern included a mortar attack by Palestinian infiltrators on the Israeli airfield at Eilat on January 13 and a Palestinian attack the following day on the Israeli border settlement at Neot Hakikar. According to Jordanian intelligence, both incidents were the work of the Al-Fatah organization. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 3411 from USUN, January 19, the Mission reported on a January 17 meeting between Ambassador Pedersen and Israeli Permanent Representative Tekoah. In the course of the conversation, Tekoah stressed the importance of the direct contacts between Israel and Jordan that had taken place at the Allenby bridge without a UN presence, and added that such contacts were viewed by his government as particularly important in light of the terrorism problem. (Ibid.) 57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, January 20, 1968, 2156Z. 102228. For the Ambassador. Request you seek early appointment with Kosygin to make following statement: (If Kosygin not available within next day or so, you should see Gromyko and ask him to transmit to Kosygin soonest.) Begin Text . [Here follows the portion of President Johnson's message to Chairman Kosygin dealing with the proposed non-proliferation treaty.] On the question of arms to the Middle East, the Chairman will have received by now Ambassador Dobrynin's report of his conversation with Secretary Rusk on January 9. This matter, too, is urgent and the President has asked me to stress his deep concern at the impact that continued arms traffic may have on the Middle East situation. We know from past experience that resort to arms is an ever-present danger in the Middle East. Not only does such action not resolve the problem, but it poses the danger of the spread of war beyond the confines of the area. The President has watched with growing concern the extensive delivery of arms to the area from the Soviet Union. The United States is under considerable pressure, as a consequence, to take matching action. Despite this pressure, my Government has exercised great restraint, most recently in its agreement to provide Israel with only limited numbers of aircraft, without new models, and only in continuation of our agreement with Israel of 1966. By agreeing only to this limited extension of the 1966 agreement and by deferring decision on the introduction of new advanced aircraft into the area, we have exercised restraint and it is the President's earnest hope that this will be reciprocated by the Soviet Government. In this way our two governments could assist Ambassador Jarring in carrying out his vital mission and thus make a substantial contribution to prospects for a just and peaceful settlement in the Middle East. End Text . For Ambassador Bruce: You should bring this message to the attention of Prime Minister Wilson prior his departure for Moscow. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 57, 1/16-24/68. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in EUR/SOV by Malcolm Toon and in S/S by Walsh; cleared by Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Leddy, Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Bromley Smith at the White House. Repeated to London. 58. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 58. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 22, 1968, 4:40 p.m. Mr. President: Herewith Kosygin responds to your message: 2 —He will let us know later about ABM-ICBM's; —He wants the U.S. and USSR to join together to force a Middle East settlement, with special emphasis on getting the Israelis to go back to their borders. Despite the lack of balance in his position, I have a feeling we ought to explore this a bit further. W. W. Rostow 3 Attachment 4 Copy of Moscow 2529 from Ambassador Thompson, Jan. 22, 1968 Ref: State 102228. 5 1. I saw Kosygin at 11:30 a.m. today and delivered message per reference telegram. 2. Kosygin said the Soviets would study message and express their views later. However, he could make a few preliminary comments. 3. Re the NPT, Kosygin said the Soviets are also gratified with the progress achieved. They had done everything to expedite a solution of the outstanding issues and believed the NPT should be signed as soon as possible. Thus, on this question, the Soviet and US views coincided. 4. Re strategic weapon systems, Kosygin said the Soviets are still studying the problem. They would also study points made in the President's message and give their views later. 5. Turning to the Middle East, Kosygin asserted everything depended on US and the President. There was, of course, a UN resolution in existence. When he talked with the President, such questions as opening of canal, recognition of Israel, and Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories had been discussed. As regards Soviet aid, he wished to point out that the Soviets never rendered assistance to aggressor, always to victim of aggression. One could not equate Arabs and Israelis, since the Israelis had launched aggression. The Middle East problem could be solved easily if the occupied territories were vacated by the aggressors. Kosygin said he felt that time had come for the US and USSR to join their efforts to achieve Israeli withdrawal. This could be done through various contacts and through joint pressure on Israel. Jarring mission was, of course, proceeding, but he was concerned it was becoming a routine operation. If US and Soviets did what he was suggesting, the canal could be opened and other elements of the problem resolved. His impression was that some people in the US wanted the Middle East tension to continue. While he did not want to mention any names, the Soviets did have some information about attitudes in the US. Thus, Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories was required. The US and USSR should join their efforts to this end, and he wanted me to convey this to the President. Kosygin continued that the Soviets are very concerned about the Middle East situation. On the other hand, while saying it did not want continued tension in the area, the US is doing nothing about removing it. For example, the US did not seem to be concerned about the plight of Arab refugees. If roots of conflict were removed, i.e., if the problem of occupied territories were resolved, other things, including the question of armaments, would fall in place. What the US was raising were subordinate questions, although Soviets knew that US is helping Israel. 6. I said I would inform President of Kosygin's remarks. Noting that origins of present situation are well known, I said I saw no need to discuss them again at this time. Stressing our concern about the situation, however, I pointed out the President's restraint in his discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister was an effort to help the Jarring mission and implementation of UN resolution so that a successful solution of the problem could be achieved. I also pointed out that the problem involved not only question of occupied territories, but also status of Israel, refugees, etc. 7. Kosygin concluded the conversation by repeating that if the question of occupied territories were resolved, i.e., if troops returned to their original positions, the whole problem could be settled. Thompson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 57, 1/16-24/68. Secret. 2 See Document 57 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 4 Secret; Nodis. 5 Document 57 . 59. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 59. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, January 24, 1968, 1020Z. 2264. Subject: Jarring Mission. Ref: Tel Aviv 2257. 2 Subsequent to conversation between DCM and Argov in which latter gave details Eban's meetings with Jarring January 17 and 22nd reported reftel, I had occasion meet with Eban separately. He referred to report he had of meeting between W. Rostow and Battle and Evron on 22nd in which U.S. side said we detect signals of unfreezing in Arab attitudes and hope for something significant to happen, perhaps January 25th. Evron's telegram said the specifics were not available. Eban said he very interested this possibility. Referring to his conversation with Jarring on the 22nd, he said was somewhat discouraged since Arabs seemingly maintaining hard and fast position that first step towards settlement must be Israel's withdrawal to June 4th lines. Eban had emphasized to Jarring that the November resolution contained seven or eight provisions, that no priorities had been established by that resolution, and that it disappointing that Arabs refused discuss anything except withdrawal. Eban stated British interpretation that resolution to be taken as a whole and that unilateral action not required of anybody. Jarring felt he could only succeed in his mission by personal contact, that he does not regard himself as an itinerant salesman and there no hope unless procedural problems can be sorted out so that negotiations will in fact take place. Eban said he suggested possibility secret emissaries proceed to Jarring's Cyprus headquarters but Jarring thought that procedure premature. Jarring said there three possibilities, (1) he could conclude the parties too far apart for any progress and report failure to the UN, (2) one side might change its position, or (3) some kind of negotiations could continue to be sought. So far Jarring still prepared to keep at it in hope latter alternative materializes. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. 2 Telegram 2257 from Tel Aviv, January 24, reported on information received from the Foreign Ministry on Eban's meetings with Jarring on January 17 and January 22. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 60. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 60. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 25, 1968. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 61. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 61. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, January 26, 1968. SUBJECT Where Jarring Is Now and What We Do About Him There seem to be two schools of thought about Jarring's performance. One considers him a skilled diplomat, tackling the easier problems first to stay in business while he gets a grip on the harder ones. The other notes his refusal to describe himself as a mediator or to propose solutions himself. One feels he is beginning to bore in; the other talks of “stalemate” and “impasse.” We are trying to help him break through his first roadblock by leaning on the Israelis to say they accept the November resolution. 2 We're doing this on our own because it's so obviously important. But how much we get into his act generally is a tougher problem. Before he left, Jarring told us he would not contact us in the field, so we feel some constraint against contacting him. Without consulting him, we hesitate to get too involved in passing positions back and forth—as Eppie suggested-lest we undercut some phased presentation he wants to try. We're trying to come to terms with this problem in New York via Bunche so we can make Rusk's letter to Eban 3 on peace initiatives as useful as possible, but preoccupation with North Korea has slowed us. The case for prodding Jarring into action isn't clearcut. He has made some progress: —Movement toward release of ships trapped in the canal. —Egyptian-Israeli prisoner exchange, apparently including six Israelis long held by the UAR (the main Israeli goal in the exchange and one which the USG and private American groups have long tried to achieve). —Enough lessening of Egyptian resistance to talks so that there are vague reports that some sort of Rhodes-type negotiations 4 are in the wind. (The UAR official position is still pretty hard, however.) —Israeli proposals to the Arabs through Jarring and without direct talks, and possibly a vague agreement that there are other ways to get at the problem than a formal peace conference. —Probably most important, enough weakening of the Jordanian position so that Hussein is proposing methods of getting around the withdrawal-direct talks impasse. The difficulty with Jarring's method is that he is running out of gap-fillers. If he can win Israeli acceptance of the resolution, he will have climbed his first range of mountains. That would increase the flow of ideas, at least from the Arabs. However, he would still have one more procedural obstacle to handle-the mechanics of talks. The main question for us is how to encourage the parties to move from the general to the specific without pushing either them or Jarring too hard. This depends in part on whether we believe Jarring will come out of his shell or will remain essentially a telephone booth. How much perseverance he has, we just don't know yet. My own feeling is that he is digging in gradually and that we owe him a little more time. That doesn't mean we can't weigh in on obvious issues like Israeli acceptance of the resolution, and we must go ahead with our Rusk-Eban initiative stemming from Eshkol's visit. But I'd be inclined not to push him yet. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 2 According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Saunders on January 26 of a meeting that day between Walt Rostow and Ambassador Harman, Rostow urged that the Israeli Government accede to the Arab request made through Ambassador Jarring that Israel accept the November 22 UN Security Council resolution as the basis for negotiation. Rostow pointed out that the United States had “bled in the halls of the UN” to establish the position that all elements of the resolution must be treated as a package. (Ibid., Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 11/1/67-2/29/68) 3 See Document 79 . 4 Reference is to the negotiation of armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states January-March 1949. The negotiations took place at Rhodes with Ralph Bunche serving as UN Acting Mediator. The negotiations involved separate meetings by Bunche with each delegation on substantive items until discussions reached an advanced stage, whereupon joint informal meetings were held. 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, January 28, 1968, 2005Z. 106083. Ref: Cairo's 1413. 2 Subject: US-UAR Relations. 1. Following for use in your next discussion of subject with Muhammad Riad. 2. Although frequent repetition UAR line that we are being negative about resumption relations is beginning raise question whether Egyptians trying use issue as stick with which to beat us, we are prepared accept at face value Riad's assertion that UAR desire for resumption is genuine. For our part, as we have made clear to UARG on number of occasions, we believe diplomatic relations most useful in difficult times and would be glad to see them resumed. We are ready to agree in principle to formal resumption now and to work towards restoration of friendly and cooperative relations thereafter. We have conveyed our interest in resumption to highest levels UARG and have as yet received no specific proposals. If Egyptians want to resume, they should get down to cases. 3. Question of who is taking initiative no longer seems relevant, given statements of interest made by both sides already. We willing settle for joint statement along lines proposed para 10.C of Cairo's 1413 3 and if UARG wishes proceed on that basis it should authorize appropriate official to inform us, privately if it wishes, that it is prepared resume relations and is ready to negotiate details. (We need some official confirmation, as opposed unofficial expression of opinion, that UARG in fact ready to resume. We have already indicated our willingness to resume relations. UARG should reciprocate.) 4. With respect to UARG allegation that British and American planes were involved in June war, we set no conditions and have asked for no apologies. We do, however, stand on our position that public misapprehensions regarding events of last June should be clarified and that it is inconsistent with good relations to leave an impression that the United States engaged in military actions against Egyptian people when in fact we had no part in them. In the perspective of Egypt's good relations with the American people, which both governments desire rebuild, it would be wise now officially to make it clear that the charges of American and British involvement were based on mistakes and misinformation. UARG should realize that American people saw and heard spokesmen for Egypt repeat these accusations daily on TV and radio and that these accusations have done a great deal of harm to our mutual interests. Hussein's dignified statement on subject won him much respect in the United States and cleared the air. We have no particular formula to suggest, and we reject none in advance. We would welcome suggestions from UARG. 5. FYI. Your suggestion of unilateral statement by us that UARG acknowledged last June's allegations based on misinformation has merit and in final analysis we would be prepared settle for such a formula. Before doing so, however, we believe we should endeavor get UARG take action of its own to clarify misapprehensions. If it appears there no hope of getting UARG over a multilateral hurdle, you may discuss idea of unilateral statement, but you should not propose specific language or reveal our willingness to accept such formula. End FYI. 6. Compensation —Total amount involved is not large. Although impossible make accurate estimate without survey of buildings in Alexandria and Port Said, we believe total damage for which we should expect restitution from UARG is under $1 million, most of which probably payable in local currency. We do not propose make agreement on amount condition precedent for resumption, but before resumption we should have agreement in principle to payment of compensation. We assume UARG will be prepared give us such an undertaking in response to our taking a leaf from British book as suggested para 10.E your 1413, 4 but undertaking should be explicit, such as personal assurance from Fonmin Mahmoud Riad that compensation will be forthcoming. 7. If question is raised about representation once agreement on resumption is reached, you may say that while we plan to resume at Ambassadorial level, we do not now envisage immediate exchange of Ambassadors but would plan to keep our representation at Charge level initially. Our reasons for this are administrative rather than political. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Parker on January 24; cleared by Walt Rostow, Battle, Davies, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Walt Rostow also cleared the telegram with the President on January 28. (Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68) 2 See footnote 4, Document 55 . 3 In paragraph 10C of telegram 1413, Bergus proposed the text of a joint statement to be released in Washington and Cairo signaling a determination to reestablish diplomatic relations. 4 In paragraph 10E of telegram 1413, Bergus suggested that the United States state in the course of negotiations that it assumed that upon the resumption of relations timely and adequate compensation would be paid for the damage to U.S. property. 63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, January 30, 1968, 2113Z. 106935. Ref: Amman's 2815. 2 1. Embassy should deliver the following letter from the Secretary to Prime Minister Talhouni: 2. “Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am writing with respect to some of the concerns about US Government policy towards Jordan you expressed in recent discussions with Ambassador Symmes. I want to confirm his assurances of our support for Jordan in meeting the problems that confront Your Excellency's Government in these days. 3. The record of American-Jordanian relations over the past two decades manifests the support which my Government has consistently provided to the Kingdom. While I know I need not dwell on the high regard which President Johnson has for His Majesty King Hussein, underlying those friendly ties between the leaders of our two countries is a strong fabric of friendship between Jordanian and American officials as well as the private citizens of our two countries. The recent Arab-Israel hostilities have created problems in our relations, but these are not insurmountable and are, in fact, being overcome. 4. By now you are aware of our decision to resume arms shipments to Jordan. We are now negotiating a PL-480 program for Jordan. We are continuing our technical assistance programs and are anxious to assist Jordan in aggressively pursuing its economic development program. These actions constitute concrete evidence of our firm intention to continue our traditional policy toward Jordan. 5. In this connection, I regret the interpretations that may have been placed on the discontinuance of budgetary support at this particular time. Let me assure you that our decision was based solely on fiscal considerations, i.e., pledges of Arab financial assistance for Jordan reached at the Khartoum Conference, other contributions received by Jordan, and Jordan's very strong foreign exchange position. Congress has cut back our foreign aid resources and we would jeopardize our other AID programs to Jordan if we were to provide budget support that does not appear to be currently needed. As Ambassador Symmes has confirmed to Your Excellency, we continue our interest in Jordan's financial well being and are prepared to review your Government's budgetary situation whenever you consider that such a review is warranted. 6. The major problem in the area is the establishment of a peace which is just and lasting. Its achievement is of critical importance to all of us, and both of our countries are dedicated to this goal. Let there be no doubt, Your Excellency, that our efforts in this regard have been and will continue to be unremitting. We welcome as a first step the Security Council's adoption on November 22 of the resolution under which UN Special Representative Jarring was appointed. Ambassador Jarring's mission provides an opportunity to work toward settlement which is not likely to recur. It is of great importance that the parties make the most of this opportunity by cooperating energetically and with as much flexibility as possible in the negotiating process. 7. The United States, for its part, is fully committed to supporting Ambassador Jarring's efforts. Ambassador Goldberg said in the Security Council on November 22 ‘the diplomatic and political influence of the United States Government will be exerted in support of the United Nations Special Representative to achieve a fair, equitable and dignified settlement so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquility.’ Jordan can count on the United States to do all it can to further a just and reasonable settlement. We are deeply conscious of the importance which the two issues of Jerusalem and the West Bank have for Jordan. When King Hussein recently visited the United States, we explained to him our position on these problems. Our policy on this has not changed. 8. Your Excellency and your Cabinet colleagues have done much to help maintain an atmosphere enhancing the prospects for a political solution of the Middle Eastern situation. I have noted in particular the actions your Government has taken in seeking to prevent terrorism and in encouraging the resumption of normal activities on the West Bank, such as the operation of schools and commercial traffic. 9. I am keenly aware of the many serious problems facing Your Excellency and the Kingdom as a whole, including the major one of alleviating the tragic plight of the refugees. My Government has, of course, continued its very substantial contributions to meet the more recent emergency situation. We have also supported the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council actions on this problem that were taken during recent months. These included resolutions calling upon the Government of Israel to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled following the outbreak of hostilities, resolutions which we continue to believe must be implemented to the fullest extent possible. We have repeatedly made clear to all concerned, both publicly and privately, our position on the ‘new refugees’, as well as on the need for an overall solution to the refugee problem. I can assure you that my Government remains dedicated to the principle that a just settlement of the refugee problem should and must be found. The present efforts to establish conditions of peace afford an opportunity to come to grips with this problem at last. 10. In closing, let me say that we recognize Your Excellency's appointment as Prime Minister last October as a reaffirmation of the special confidence that King Hussein has long placed in your leadership. We continue to wish you success as Jordan grapples with the many difficult problems resulting from the June war. We want to help wherever and to the extent possible. I hope that Your Excellency will continue the frank and friendly dialogue that you have already established with Ambassador Symmes in whom I repose complete confidence. Sincerely, Dean Rusk.” 11. We assume that the GOJ will treat this letter as classified and will not release any part of it without our consent. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL JORDAN-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton and Day on January 25; cleared by Deputy Assistant Administrator in AID's Bureau for Near East and South Asia Joseph L. Wheeler, Sisco, Davies, Handley, Eugene Rostow, and Katzenbach; and approved by Rusk. 2 Document 27 . 64. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 64. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 30, 1968. SUBJECT Israeli Approaches on the Suez Canal Attached is a memo from Dick Helms saying that the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] sees a new crisis brewing over the Suez Canal. 2 The Israelis agreed via Jarring to allow the Egyptians to clear the southern half of the Canal enough to let 15 trapped ships out. The UN is now pressing Israel to let the Egyptians begin surveying the northern half. This could lead to re-opening the whole Canal. Eban has warned U Thant that Israel will oppose that, and this morning's firing along the northern portion of the Canal gives credence to [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] statement that they will oppose by force if necessary. They see any Egyptian moves without their approval as a violation of the August cease-fire agreement. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]says the UAR is working secretly to clear the whole Canal without Israel's approval. He suggests that the Egyptians may provide information on the remaining obstacles in the Canal to permit Soviet vessels in Port Said to transit the Canal and present Israel with a “fait accompli.” He then said he believes Israel and the US have a common interest in keeping the northern part of the Canal blocked to keep the Soviet navy away from Yemen, Aden and the Persian Gulf. Eppie Evron came in late last evening to state the same case and ask us informally to help relieve the pressure on them from New York to let Egyptian surveying go ahead in the northern part of the Canal. 3 I asked him whether he was proposing keeping the Canal closed “forever” to keep the Soviets out of the Red Sea or whether Israel's desire to keep the Canal closed would end if Egypt offered to let the Israeli flag through. He said he couldn't answer. This is serious business, and I am passing Eppie's request to Secretary Rusk. 4 We have to be careful with the way the Israelis [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and the strategy of containing the USSR with their own bargaining interest in keeping the Canal closed. For the moment, I just want you to have this background against which to read today's stories of firing on the Canal. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received at 1:10 p.m. 2 Not printed. The attached January 29 memorandum is a covering memorandum forwarding a memorandum prepared in the CIA, also dated January 29, with the subject heading: “Israeli Position on Opening the Suez Canal To Permit the Exit of Trapped Ships.” 3 A memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Saunders on January 30, is in The Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. 4 In his January 30 memorandum to Rusk, Rostow noted that the immediate operational question posed by the Israeli request was whether the United States should approach the UN Secretariat to urge strict adherence to the August 1967 cease-fire agreement relating to the Suez Canal. (Ibid.) On February 3 Battle and Sisco sent a memorandum to Rusk recommending against such an initiative, noting that the UAR had halted all operations connected with the release of the ships, and had indicated, through the semi-official al-Ahram newspaper, that such operations would not be resumed until there was a settlement of the Middle East crisis. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, UAR-Jan 1 through June 30, 1968) 65. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 65. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 31, 1968. SUBJECT PL-480 Program for Israel Attached is a Freeman-Poats-Fowler-Schultze recommendation on Israel's PL-480 request. 2 There are two separate issues to decide: 1. Quantity . Israel requested a $33 million program. The Departments recommend $27 million (same as last year) because Israeli and US experts differ over Israeli requirements, even after we sent a specialist to Tel Aviv. Our problem is not selling so much that we hurt our markets. This is a technical disagreement with some Israeli bargaining thrown in. If you go ahead, three courses are open: a. Approve the Departments' $27.1 million program b. Approve the Departments' program but tell Israel we'd consider adding later if they need more 3 c. Give the Israelis what they ask for and write into the agreement safeguards to protect our program 2. Terms . Last year you approved a 50-50 split between dollar credit and local currency. Israel requests the same terms this year. But everyone agrees that 100% dollar credit for 20 years are the softest terms justifiable on economic grounds, since Israel is doing well. These are the terms we give Jordan, which is in much worse shape. If you wish to make a concession, your advisors recommend at least 75% dollar credit to continue progress toward 100% dollar sale as the Congress has asked. Your choices are: a. 100% total credit (20 years at 2-1/2%) 4 b. Compromise at 75% dollar credit c. Approve Israeli request for 50% dollar credit I agree that Israel can afford hard terms and is just trying to get aid wherever it can. But I also recognize your needs and personally would suggest the middle course-75% dollar credit this year (2b) for the $27 million program with the promise of a little more later if the Israelis need it (1b). If you wish to tighten up just a bit more, we could more easily justify a move to 100% dollar sale than being tight on quantities. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos 12/67-2/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received in the President's office on February 1 at 9 a.m. 2 Not printed. Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and Acting AID Administrator Poats put their joint recommendation to President Johnson in a January 24 memorandum. (Ibid.) On January 27 Director of the Bureau of the Budget Schultze sent a supporting memorandum to the President, noting that the Agriculture-AID recommendation was also supported by Secretary of the Treasury Fowler. (Ibid.) 3 President Johnson checked this option. 4 President Johnson checked this option. 66. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 66. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, February 3, 1968, 2145Z. 3270. Subject: Actions needed to forestall further Jordanian moves toward Soviets. 1. After sending King's message to General Khammash today through special channels (in essence King told Khammash that if USG does not meet his requirements he will buy Soviet arms), I arranged meeting with King's private secretary and confidante Zaid al-Rifa'i to try to obtain better insight into King's current mood. I also wanted to get Zaid's advice on whether it would be wise for me to try to see King before Khammash returns with arms package. 2. Zaid told me that Hussein himself had drafted message to Khammash. He said that King has become increasingly convinced about the correctness of his view of larger context in which he now sees USG policy toward Middle East. Zaid then explained King's analysis very much along lines King had taken with me on Jan 25 (Amman 3129). 2 US is tied down in Far East and other areas and has little flexibility or, for that matter, will to act constructively to promote just peace in Middle East. Soviets have been moving in, particularly since June war and, rightly or wrongly, are credited by Arab leaders with right motives and sympathetic policies in Middle East.USG is judged to be both unwilling and unable to control Israel. Thus, moderate Jordanians agree with King Hussein that time has come to “stay a step ahead of situation by moving toward Soviets.” 3. King feels he has gone “ninety percent of the way” with the US. After June the US seemed to forget completely all that he and other moderate Jordanians had done over past decade and more to help preserve stability and moderation in Middle East. US had done nothing to help Jordan out since June. To the contrary, we had in effect, voted against Jordan on Jerusalem question; we had posed continuous difficulties about matters of mere words in Security Council resolutions; we had finally lifted arms embargo for Israel and certain other Arab states but pointedly excluded Jordan; and then we had discontinued budgetary support which had become symbol of our relationship. Although subsequently we had affirmed our continued support of Jordan in general way, fact was that totality of our actions toward Jordan had been negative rather than positive. Finally, King's reception in US in November, particularly in contrast to later reception of Eshkol, had been serious psychological blow. 4. Zaid explained that he separately and later together with PriMin Talhouni today had argued at some length with King to effect he should accept US arms package, even if it provides only 50 percent of Jordan arms strength as of June 4. They had urged it would be better go along with us in present situation because Soviet arms deal would not contribute to solution Middle East problem and, in their view, would further obstruct solution. King had pressed his own analysis in paragraph 2 above in response to this advice. 5. In Zaid's view there is much to what King says. He said he believes that if US arms package proves inadequate in King's view, only way to keep King from going to Soviets for arms is to be able to cite something tangible and dramatic to indicate that US does have continuing positive interest in Jordan and does in fact intend “use its muscle” to prevent Israelis from carrying off a massive fait accompli. Zaid said that “statements without practical effect” simply are not enough. Jordan must be able to point to something tangible to show that USG intends to implement its statements about Jerusalem and the Jarring Mission. It is not enough to say USG will exert pressure;USG must actually exert pressure and point to results. In the past decade and more the King felt that Jordan had given everything and gotten nothing in trying to live with Israel. USG had spoken a great deal about human and legal rights in Viet Nam. What about Arab rights? What about villages that had been levelled on West Bank by Israel? What about people who had been evicted from their homes in Gaza, Jerusalem, and West Bank? What about UN decisions that had been consistently flouted? What about recent US statements about not accepting unilateral Israeli actions? Fact is that USG is accepting Israeli actions and doing nothing about them. 6. Throughout this conversation Zaid emphasized that these are things King is thinking. This is his reading of situation. Actually his advisers are trying without much hope of success to convince him to make no drastic moves. Yet, many Jordanians now believe the Soviets can call the tune in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. They are beginning to believe the Soviets [garble—are able?] to challenge the US Sixth Fleet in the Middle East and that the Soviets also have Marines and helicopters to land in Middle East if necessary. Thus, many Jordanians and other Arabs now see a possibility of Security Council or other UN action to face Israel with sanctions similar to those that had been put on Israel in 1956 by the US. But in this case it would be the Soviets that would take the credit for forcing the Israelis to respect world opinion, not the US. 7. I shall not detail rejoinders and comments I made to Zaid with regard to foregoing. I sought his reaction to idea I might seek an audience with Hussein tomorrow or Monday before Khammash returns in order to try to dispel some of King's apparent misinterpretations of our policies and actions. Zaid counselled me against seeing King but said he would let Hussein know I was available whenever he wanted to see me. (I will in any case accompany Eugene Black in call late on sixth.) He thought it would be better for me not to see King until Khammash has returned with “package,” but he emphasized it would be essential for package to be approximately what King wanted and for it to be placed in best possible light. More important, however, would be some kind of US action with regard to Jerusalem or Jarring Mission that could be cited as real evidence of US intentions to use its muscle to bring about a peaceful settlement. 8. As Zaid was leaving he said he and PriMin Talhouni had obtained King's grudging agreement to let King Faisal know if he finds US package unacceptable. According to Zaid, Talhouni had said to King that even he, who had never had good relationship with Americans, believed it would be in Jordan's interest to do everything possible avoid changing “political balance” in area at this time. Zaid and Talhouni, however, are not sanguine Hussein will go again to Faisal if US package appears too far short of his requirements. (Dept may wish inform Ambassador Eilts of most recent developments.) 9. Comment: A. At this stage we need something more than a gimmick. We need an earnest of our intentions with regard to Jerusalem and the UK resolution. Jordan accepted the UK resolution and has categorically stated this to Jarring. Jordan is willing to make a public statement to this effect as soon as Israel similarly commits itself to Jarring and publicly accepts resolution. In my opinion even more important than giving Hussein double the arms he has requested would be a clearcut public statement with practical effect of our intentions re Jerusalem and Jarring (or failing that, unpublicized evidence through Jarring or otherwise that Israelis will cease their unilateral actions in Jerusalem and will accept UK resolution as basis for negotiations). In this regard, I must emphasize that Jordanians immediately picked up and began to suspect phrase “in spirit of” in reference to Israeli attitude toward Jarring Mission as carried in Eshkol-Johnson communique. B. I think we also might consider giving immediate publicity to our decision supply arms to Jordan thus making it more difficult for King to more towards Soviet arms relationship. This statement would have to be to effect we have decided satisfy legitimate requirements of Jordan because of our long and cordial relationship, because of its moderate views, and because we think Jordan is entitled satisfy its defensive requirements. C. Dept may wish repeat this on Nodis basis to USUN and Tel Aviv. Symmes 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos 12/67-2/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received in the President's office on February 1 at 9 a.m. 2 Not printed. Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and Acting AID Administrator Poats put their joint recommendation to President Johnson in a January 24 memorandum. (Ibid.) On January 27 Director of the Bureau of the Budget Schultze sent a supporting memorandum to the President, noting that the Agriculture-AID recommendation was also supported by Secretary of the Treasury Fowler. (Ibid.) 67. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk 67. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 5, 1968. SUBJECT Policy on Jerusalem Discussion We have been giving careful study for some months past to the question of Jerusalem, a “crunch” issue in any prospective settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Various Israeli statements and actions indicate a closed mind on Jerusalem, although we cannot be sure how much Israel's position may be tactical and how far it might be willing to recede as part of a settlement package. But in any event we cannot passively accept Israel's unilateral dominion over Old Jerusalem (actually the Old City plus adjacent areas). To do so would ignore the interests of Jordan and of the traditional Arab residents of Old Jerusalem, as well as the interests of the major religions. Our IRG has considered a plan for the partial internationalization of Old Jerusalem, and has agreed that if offers a possible solution. This plan is described in the attached paper. 2 I believe the specifics of the plan are not as vital as the principles behind it, and that various details—such as the nature of the administration for the city or its precise boundaries—will have to be kept under review as time and negotiations progress. Whereas we need not tie ourselves to any specific formula for the City's future administration, we believe we should be guided by the following principles for a Jerusalem solution: 1. A plan for Jerusalem and the timing of its employment should contribute to, rather than impede, progress toward an overall settlement. 2. Greater Jerusalem should remain a city without barriers. 3. International interests in Old Jerusalem should be recognized, and specific provision made for protecting those interests. 4. There should be freedom of access from both Israel and Jordan. 5. The economic well-being of the residents of Old Jerusalem should be assured without prejudice and its economy closely linked to the economies of Jordan and Israel. Scenario The following steps seem appropriate: 1. Continue to keep pressure on the Government of Israel to avoid policy pronouncements and actions that tend to rigidify the present de facto situation in Jerusalem. Draw as desirable on the above points in explaining the principles which guide our approach to the question. 2. If Ambassador Jarring indicates a desire to discuss the question with us, inform him of the principles governing our approach; if he seeks specifics, tell him of the nature of our internationalization proposal, making it clear that we are not tied to any given plan. 3. At least so long as the Jarring mission remains active, hold back on surfacing the plan with the various interested governments. We should consider the utility, however, of some public statement of our principles on Jerusalem if it would be helpful in terms both of our relations with the Arabs and of the peace-making effort. 4. Continue to sharpen up our views on various alternatives for the Jerusalem regime, with an eye to eventual private discussions with the governments concerned, and perhaps public discussion (possibly in the UN), when and as appropriate. Recommendation I should like to have your approval for our proceeding along the lines of the above scenario. Joe Sisco, whose staff has worked closely with us in formulating this position, concurs. We should like also to have an early occasion to discuss these questions with you, particularly in regard to your views on internationalization and some of the alternative methods of dealing with an open Jerusalem. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Jerusalem. Secret. Drafted by Sidney Sober on January 31, and cleared in draft by Sisco (IO), Deputy Legal Adviser Carl F. Salans, and member of the Policy Planning Council John C. Campbell. 2 Not printed. The attachment is a paper marked IRG/NEA 68-4, January 23, entitled “Jerusalem—A Proposal for Partial Internationalization.” The Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) had a subgroup that dealt the Middle East. 3 Rusk wrote “OK DR” in the margin opposite this paragraph. On a handwritten option line of “See me,” February 8, 11 a.m., is written in an unknown hand. 68. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 68. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 5, 1968. SUBJECT Background on Jordan Arms Package The attached from Harry Symmes 2 is the best background I could give you for your decision on the arms package for Jordan, which will be coming up in the next day or two. It also provides a useful backdrop for Harman's farewell call tomorrow. What strikes me is not the familiar point about buying Soviet arms if we can't meet Jordan's needs but the increasing Jordanian conviction that we are bowing out of the Middle East and only the USSR can bring justice to the Arabs. We told our Arab friends last fall that, if they went along with a balanced UN resolution, we'd do all in our power to help bring Israel around. Until last Thursday, 3 the Israelis had refused to tell Jarring they accepted that resolution. In addition, they keep making their own changes in Jerusalem, either feeling they have us in their pockets or discounting our view entirely. The Arabs are beginning to believe that we aren't even trying to press Israel. In fact, we can take some credit for Eban's acceptance of the resolution last week. 4 But we haven't made a dent on his Jerusalem position, and we are trying today to keep the Jordanians from calling a Security Council meeting on Jerusalem. Our dilemma is that it's hard to lean on the Israelis until negotiations produce a reasonable proposition to throw our weight behind. But if we can't persuade the Arabs now that we're willing and able to get some results, we may not get to negotiations because they may figure the Jarring mission is hopeless without our behind-scenes help. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Meeting Notes File, 11/67-4/68. Secret. 2 The attachment is telegram 3270 from Amman, Document 66 . 3 February 1. 4 Telegram 2396 from Tel Aviv, February 4, reported that Foreign Minister Eban in his February 1 meeting with Ambassador Jarring put forward the following formula with respect to UN Security Council Resolution 242 to be passed by Jarring to Cairo: “I can affirm that we are ready to seek agreement on the establishment of peace in a negotiation embracing all matters included in the S.C. res. 22 Nov which either side may wish to raise.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 69. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 69. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 6, 1968. You have asked that I inform you of “the latest date on which the President could make a decision to supply Israel with Phantom aircraft of appropriate configuration to be delivered to Israel beginning in January 1970.” If your decision is made on or before December 31, 1968, we can begin the delivery of Phantoms to Israel in January 1970. The Israeli request was for 50 aircraft. We would plan to deliver them at the rate of approximately 4 per month. Robert S. McNamara 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Meeting Notes File, Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, February 6, 1968. Secret. 70. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 70. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 6, 1968. SUBJECT Aircraft Sale to Israel Just to give you a full response to your queries Sunday, the Israelis and Defense signed the agreement on January 30 for 40 more Skyhawks. 2 They did this on the basis of your statement to Eshkol that you would add 27-30 Skyhawks to the present agreement-or another 10 if needed. Israel asked for 40. I think we get two things out of this: First, for the first time we have made a 100% cash sale to Israel for arms—$60 million. They were in a hurry since the contract had to be signed by 1 February to take advantage of the production line arrangements Secretary McNamara worked out at your request. Second, we will take advantage of your having gone the extra mile with Eshkol in our coming approaches to Eshkol and Eban to get the Jarring exercise off dead center. Third, with this response and our generous handling of General Hod we seem to have bought a calm on the subject of aircraft for Israel. It remains to be seen, but we hope we may also have bought quiet-at least from the Israelis themselves-on our Jordan arms package. In addition, you should know that Generals Hod and Wheeler had a good series of talks. Hod went back to Israel to do some homework and sent four of his officers back for technical discussions. If any cover was needed, the negotiations for the added Skyhawks provided it. Now General Wheeler is waiting for the final answers he needs from Hod to prepare the memo you asked for following the Eshkol visit. One other point you should be aware of is that Secretary McNamara has married the current Skyhawk production line to the new one so as to slow the present one slightly but complete delivery of all Skyhawks by January 1970. This means that 4 were delivered in December; 28 will be delivered in 1968; 56 will be delivered in 1969 and January 1970. This pushes 16 originally scheduled for 1968 delivery into 1969, but the Israelis have agreed. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 2 The text of this agreement, conveyed to the Israeli Embassy on January 30 in a diplomatic note from the Department of State, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Israel-Jan 1 through June 30, 1968. 71. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 71. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 6, 1968. SUBJECT Recommended Arms Package for Jordan as a Result of the Khammash Negotiations General Khammash, Chief of Staff of the Jordan Arab Army, arrived in Washington on January 17 as a result of our decision to resume arms deliveries in Jordan. Since the June Arab-Israeli hostilities the Jordanians have pressed us to resume arms shipments to make up at least part of the losses they suffered in June. We were not responsive until January 7. You will recall that in December in an oral message to you King Hussein agreed that he would not purchase arms from the Soviet Union if the United States would meet his legitimate defensive arms requirements. 2 Not having heard from us, the King decided that the pressure for arms from his army was such that he could no longer resist persistent Soviet offers of military equipment. As a result of our Ambassador's intervention, Hussein postponed his decision until General Khammash could determine in Washington what we are willing to do. Unless we can convince the King that we are willing to resume our previous role of arms supplier to Jordan, there is little doubt that, in his present critical situation, he will turn to the Soviets for arms. Upon his arrival, General Khammash presented us with a list of military requirements totalling approximately $200 million. (The details are outlined in Tab A.) 3 We have met with him periodically during the last two weeks to discuss his requirements and we have explained to him our very serious problems in meeting them. He admitted that his requests were the maximum. Because of the critical situation in which Jordan now finds itself he maintains this list, which in fact exceeds Jordan's losses by a substantial amount, is necessary to restore the morale of the armed forces. It is apparent that he will stand on his original request until we make a counter proposal. Khammash argues strongly that he must go back with explicit assurances of resumed US support for the Jordan armed forces; that he, Khammash, has continually assured his officers and men (based on discussions with us last summer) that American help was coming, but that his assurances are wearing dangerously thin; and that pressures on the King to meet arms needs, even from the USSR if necessary, are mounting. Our Ambassador confirms this assessment. We have also had disturbing reports of a deterioration in the internal security situation in Jordan. It is clear that the very modest arms package we recommended to you in December will not meet the political objectives we have set ourselves, namely, (1) to shut off any further temptation on the part of the King to accept Russian arms; (2) to increase the morale of the armed forces and their loyalty to the King; (3) to increase his prestige and stature with respect to his Arab neighbors; and (4) to strengthen Hussein so that he can better carry out his role as principal proponent of a settlement with Israel. The principal problems presented by the Khammash list, in addition to its size, are his requests for tanks and aircraft. Khammash wishes to pursue his pre-war plan of standardizing on American tanks and phasing out his British Centurions. He has asked for 200 M-48 A-4s with diesel engines and 105mm guns. He has also asked for 36 “multi-purpose, versatile jet aircraft.” Both the tanks and the aircraft are troublesome because of their high cost and relatively large numbers, and because we would then be almost the sole supplier of major equipment items for Jordan. The problems with Israel would be increased if we agreed to supply Jordan with tanks with 105mm guns as opposed to the 90mm guns with which their present tanks are equipped. Recommendations We have put together a counter proposal which we recommend that our negotiator offer to Khammash. The details of this proposal are at Tab B. In essence, we would: (a) Agree to deliver ground force items suspended after the war. These are a combination of cash sales and prior year grant MAP items totalling about $10 million. There are no major items of consequence included. (b) Make up Jordan's war losses not included in (a) with the exception of heavy artillery and some of the tanks. (c) Offer 88 M-48s instead of 200-and without the larger 105mm gun, and (d) Agree to go ahead with our F-104 contract by selling 18 F-104s now and, subject to certain conditions, consider a second 18 aircraft at some point in the future. We would plan deliveries and financing over two and a half fiscal years; actual deliveries after 1968 would be subject to an annual review of Jordan's military requirements, taking into consideration the political and economic situation then prevailing and particularly progress towards an Arab-Israeli settlement and progress of efforts towards arms limitations in the area. The considerations which would be the subject of the annual reviews are at Tab D. The installation for the first fiscal year would cost approximately $32 million in cash sales for both ground and air force items. Of this amount, $10 million has already been paid under the previously concluded F-104 contract. The installment for the second fiscal year would cost approximately $36.3 million while the third would be $10.3 million. The estimated cost of the total program would be approximately $49 million for ground force items and $33 million for air force items, a total of $82 million inclusive of shipping and related charges—a substantial reduction from the cost of his request. About $3.8 million of this would be in prior year grant MAP and the balance in cash sales. Jordan can pay cash for the 1968 tranche; neither we nor they can promise anything definite about availability of funds thereafter. We believe cash sales will cause less opposition in Congress than credit sales. (See financial summary at Tab C.) We propose the F-104 aircraft for the following reasons: (a) By resuming arms shipments to Jordan we are in effect placing it in the category of countries for whom we selectively lifted our arms suspension on 23 October. The suspension for Jordan specifically included the F-104's, and we would thus be doing for Jordan now what we did for the other “moderates” last October. (b) Jordan has on deposit $10 million against the F-104 contract. Spares, ground support and other equipment were shipped to Jordan prior to June. Twelve aircraft are currently in storage awaiting delivery. Some Jordanian pilots and technicians have been trained and others are now in training, and (c) the delivery time for the F-104 is almost immediate. If the morale of the armed forces is the key political factor in our aid to Jordan, they should have on their airfields some US planes as soon as possible. We could put to Khammash a counter proposal which included 18 F-104's but excludes any tanks, making him meet his tank requirements in Great Britain. We consulted the British last week and they could make available their Centurion tank at a price comparable to our M48A1, in quantities of up to 200, with deliveries beginning in six months. They could, in about two years, upgun these Centurions to 105mm. This proposal is not, however, likely to meet Jordan's minimum requirements; Jordan would want at least a partial fulfillment of its tank needs from American sources. Part of their reasoning is military: they now have a mixture of American and British tanks, but very few of the latter are in operable condition. It would be less expensive and more efficient to standardize, at least for their two armored brigades, on American tanks. An offer of about 88 US M48A1 tanks would permit them to equip their two brigades with American tanks. (Their total inventory of American tanks would then be 181, 64 less than pre-war.) The more important reason is political. Tanks are the most important element of their ground forces and consequently they want them to be American, as evidence of our continued support. The King's mood is one of increasing frustration. In spite of his efforts, there has been no significant progress towards a settlement. His army is the only one in the area which has not been substantially re-equipped since the June war. The King wants the assurance of continued American support which our supply of major military items would imply. Given our traditional close relationship with Jordan, Hussein's demise or his acceptance of Soviet arms would be a serious blow to US prestige and interests in the area and would be interpreted as a significant Soviet victory. In the circumstances, we recommend that you approve the recommendation below. If you approve, the Secretary of Defense will present this proposal to General Khammash. Recommendation: That you authorize us to negotiate on the basis of the arms package outlined in Tab B on the understanding that we would first try to persuade the Jordanians to accept British tanks. We would plan deliveries and financing over two and a half fiscal years; actual deliveries after FY 1968 would be subject to an annual review of Jordan's military requirements, taking into consideration the political and economic situation then prevailing. If you approve, we would consult with members of Congress. Should they raise strong objections, we would return to you. 4 Dean Rusk Robert S. McNamara 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. 2 See footnote 3, Document 29 . 3 None of the tabs is printed. 4 There is no indication of the President's approval or disapproval of the recommendation. 72. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 72. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 6, 1968. SUBJECT Jordan Arms Package In the attached, 2 Secretaries Rusk and McNamara recommend 3 what they feel is the minimum package that King Hussein might see as meeting his legitimate needs. This poses two separate issues: (1) whether you are now ready to go ahead with a substantial program; and (2) if so, how to handle the difficult Conte-Long amendments. 4 I. The package contains 18 F-104 aircraft, 88 M-48 A-1 tanks, medium artillery and a range of support equipment. This $82 million (FY 1968-FY 1970) package contrasts to Hussein's $200 million request, which included 36 aircraft and 200 M-48 A-4 tanks. Our rationale for paring his request is to help replace war losses except for some planes and tanks and heavy artillery. We would have to be willing to consider something beyond this package later but would suggest starting with this. Our paring may leave this too little to meet what Hussein considers his needs. He lost 179 tanks in June, and we are offering half that. He wants tanks with a diesel engine (greater range) and a 105 mm. gun (which we sold the Israelis). We couldn't supply what he wants for two years. Our plane offer has a better chance, since we would just pick up our 1966 contract where it was suspended but offer half the number of planes now. Our two hopes for flexibility are (a) that he can get British tanks to his specifications much sooner (they're available) and (b) that he might take some British aircraft if the Saudis would give them and we would supply a few more tanks instead. But the Secretaries feel we have to offer to supply both if neither of these deals works out. Jordan could pay cash for the FY 1968 installment (about $32 million, of which $10 million already paid under the 1966 contract). The cost in FY 1969 would be $36.3 million and in FY 1970 $10.3 million. Neither Khammash nor the USG yet knows definitely how the FY 1968 and FY 1969 tranches might be financed, so we would have to feel our way. This package will be painful to approve, but the alternative is accepting the probable consequences of not going ahead now. Eshkol acknowledged to you that he wished no one had to give arms to Jordan but he'd rather see us there than the USSR. Dayan in a published interview on January 19 said: “We shall not profit by it in any way if the Americans lose their influence in Jordan.” I should hate to see this presented to you simply as selling arms to block Soviet military aid, because the issue is now much broader. We have reached the point in Jordan where the question is whether they think they have a better chance of achieving their objectives with US or Soviet help. If we are ending our aid relationship and are unable to press Israel toward a settlement, then Hussein is wondering whether a Soviet ring around Israel wouldn't better bring Israel to terms. This is, of course, the thinking of an increasingly desperate man who sees his choices diminishing. It would just about end chances for the kind of settlement we'd like. There are other things we must do on the diplomatic front such as presenting a clearer position on Jerusalem and helping get the Jarring exercise moving. But unfortunately, this military aid decision has become a symbol to Hussein. We have strung him along since last June, and Khammash has been here since January 17. Now Hussein has told you he would continue to avoid Soviet arms if he could be sure of meeting his legitimate needs in the US. That is the purpose of this exercise. Approve Secretaries' approach 5 Disapprove Call me II. The Conte-Long amendments require you to withhold aid from Jordan in an amount equal to its expenditure for sophisticated weapons unless you waive on the ground that the Jordanian purchases are “vital to the national security of the United States.” The airplanes, the tanks, and the howitzers in this package are pretty clearly sophisticated weapons. If you do not waive, we would have to eliminate all economic aid to Jordan for at least the next two years. It would be possible to weave a complicated legal argument which might allow you to maintain aid without a waiver. But it would be very dubious and would certainly cause serious trouble on the Hill. Therefore, Rusk and McNamara recommend that you make the waiver. This will be the first use of the waiver provision. I think the Secretaries have a strong case, but you may want to have some fast checking done on the Hill. I don't think we should seek agreement from Conte, Fulbright, Morse, Church and the others most interested in this topic, but you may want to be able to say that you notified them beforehand. (The law requires you to make formal notification of waiver to the Congress within 30 days.) III. If you approve this package, Secretary McNamara would go over it in detail with Khammash. In view of the importance of your personal intentions as Hussein sees them, there could be great advantage in your inviting him in before he leaves for a heart-to-heart talk. I'll see him I'd rather not 6 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Meeting Notes File, 11/67-4/68. Secret. 2 Document 71 . 3 A handwritten note by Dorothy Territo indicates that the attachment was not attached when the memorandum went forward to the President. She added another note in which she stated that Rusk and McNamara had not yet signed their memorandum to the President. Rostow apparently summarized that memorandum from an advance copy. 4 See footnote 7, Document 49 . 5 There is no indication of the President's response to the options. Telegram 111563 to Amman, February 7, however, informed the Embassy that the President had agreed in principle with the recommended arms package, subject to Congressional consultations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN) 6 Neither option is checked. 73. Memorandum of Conversation 73. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 7, 1968. PARTICIPANTS President Lyndon B. Johnson Ambassador Avraham Harman Ambassador Harman opened his farewell call on the President yesterday by expressing his appreciation for the honor of having worked with the President and of having represented his country in the United States for this past eight years. He thanks the President for his understanding. The President responded by saying he had Israel's deepest interests at heart. The President said he felt this deeply and personally. If at any time we reached different conclusions it was because of our different viewpoints rather than because of any lack of interest in Israel's future. The President went on to express his deep concern over the odds working against Israel. He knew the Israeli people were superior in ability to their neighbors, but he feared they might not be superior to the Soviets. The President recalled how the Soviets had poured arms into the Arab countries after the war. He said he was not sure what Soviet intentions were. He had thought after talking to Premier Kosygin that they wanted to live at peace with us, and now after the summer of arms shipments into the Mid-East and events in North Korea, he was not so sure. The President said, however, that he could not afford to give up hope. He had agreed with Premier Kosygin to talk about the Middle East and nothing has happened. Kosygin has moved on the NPT, and the President hopes something can be done to achieve arms limitation in the Mid-East. He is not confident, but he can not afford to give up hope. He intends to make every effort to reach some sort of understanding before he makes any more decisions on aircraft. Ambassador Harman nodded his understanding. In the context of discussing Soviet penetration of the Middle East, the President said, “I am going to do something for Jordan. I told your Prime Minister that and I am just going to have to go ahead.” Ambassador Harman again nodded his understanding. Of Nasser, the President said he had come into office with the hope of getting along with the Egyptian leadership. He had found, however, that Nasser was unreliable, untrustworthy, and undependable. He hoped we could achieve some sort of working relationship but did not know exactly what we could work out. The President described the problem created for him by the depth of opposition in the United States to our extensive international commitments. The President suggested that what the Israeli Ambassador and his Minister ought to be doing is to tell their American friends at every turn that the United States cannot play a responsible role in the world if they pull out on obligations like Vietnam. The President said he didn't see how Americans could live with their consciences unless they met these obligations around the world, but he was having a very difficult time persuading many Americans on that point. He said many Americans believe that our problems would end if we got out of Vietnam, but he knew it “wouldn't be 24 hours before we faced new ones.” The Ambassador said a few kind words about his successor. The President said that he did not know how the Israelis could improve on Ambassador Harman's work but that he looked forward to working with General Rabin and said he would find the President just as receptive as Ambassador Harman had. He told Ambassador Harman that he liked all the Israelis he knew. He was fond of Eshkol and liked to do business with him. He would not like to do anything to hurt his feelings. Then he said he would like to see Moshe Dayan when he visited the United States, but did not know how to do it without hurting Prime Minister Eshkol's feelings. Ambassador Harman said that, with the President's permission, he would see whether he could do something to ease the President's problem. The President reiterated that he fully understood Eshkol's sensitivities on this subject and would have the same ones if their positions were reversed. But he, the President, would like to know as many Israeli leaders past, present or future as possible. In parting, the President asked the Ambassador to take his warm wishes to Mrs. Harman. He also asked the Ambassador to tell Prime Minister Eshkol, “I may not worry as much as Prime Minister Eshkol does about Israel, but I worry as deeply.” H.H.S. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Saunders. 74. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 74. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 7, 1968. SUBJECT Gene Black in Cairo Gene Black will seek an appointment with you when he comes back about February 16, but I thought you might wish a preliminary report on his talk with Nasser. 2 On the subject of resuming relations, Black told Nasser he understood that discussions on mechanics were going on and simply expressed his view that resumption of relations would be a good thing for both of us. Nasser agreed but said he would need a little time to inform the other Arab states of his intentions. He said it would be a little harder to resume relations with the US than it had been with the UK because we have not made the same sort of gestures friendly to the Arabs as the British had. We will just have to wait and see whether Nasser is really moving ahead or stalling. Don Bergus sees his Foreign Minister contact tomorrow and that may shed more light. Black also reports that Nasser was interested in the fact that Secretary McNamara will shortly take over as head of the World Bank. He may suggest that Bob visit the UAR soon. We will wait until we hear Black's full report before doing anything further. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 4:20 p.m. 2 Black's meeting with Nasser on February 4 was reported in telegrams 1563, February 6, and 1571 and 1572, both February 7, from Cairo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US, POL 15-1 UAR, and IT 11-16 UAR, respectively) 75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 9, 1968, 0048Z. 112564. Subject: Tiran Island. Following based on uncleared memcon. Noforn,FYI and subject revision. 1. In course farewell call by Israeli Ambassador Harman, Secretary said he was disappointed by GOI reply (State 111432) 2 to his January 17 letter to Eban on Tiran Island. 3 Secretary said he viewed response as thinly-disguised “no.” Added he thought it unreasonable to expect SAG promise island would remain permanently uninhabited. Evacuation island was tiny gesture Israel could easily make. 2. Harman replied potential danger of island must not be overlooked. Guns located there could close Strait Tiran. Secretary replied militarization was not issue; GOI was seeking SAG assurance island would never be inhabited. 3. Harman asked whether SAG agreeable leave Tiran demilitarized. Secretary said this point covered in his letter to Eban. Harman said he would convey Secretary's concern to Foreign Minister. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by James H. Bahti (NEA), cleared by Brewer and Atherton, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Jidda. 2 See footnote 4, Document 47 . 3 See Document 47 . 76. Memorandum of Conversation 76. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 10, 1968, 12:30 p.m. SUBJECT Secretary of Defense Meeting with General Khammash PARTICIPANTS U.S. Side Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense Honorable Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Mr. Harry H. Schwartz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Jordanian Side Major General Amer Khammash, Chief of Staff, Jordan Armed Forces Mr. McNamara expressed his admiration for the King which General Khammash said was reciprocated; Mr. McNamara also apologized for the length of time that the General had been kept waiting in the United States and General Khammash indicated that he understood why. Mr. McNamara invited the General to expose his views on the situation in Jordan. General Khammash made reference to the enormous pressure under which the King is now living, including the division of the country and almost daily clashes on the border, and he alluded to the restlessness of the Jordanian army. He hoped that what would be offered him would be something the King could approve. But he was worried about the results if the King did not because he considers that this mission is the last chance the King will give him in the United States. He asked for help and made the point that the maximum good political effect will flow from the rapid arrival in his country of arms from the U.S. He asked in this connection concerning air shipment of some items and the possible negotiability of the package. The Secretary of Defense made clear that General Khammash's original list of items was for us a very tough one and would cause us most serious problems with the Congress. He pointed out also that Jordan and the U.S. have the same basic objective of stable relations between countries of the area and that this was an objective which would not primarily be met by arms. We are limited in what we can do with respect to arms particularly because of the need to justify supplying arms to both Jordan and Israel just after they have had a war. Also there is the problem of diversion of resources from economic development which the purchase of arms causes. Mr. McNamara then briefly outlined what we could do: 1. 12 F-104s by June (possibly air-shipped, if this seems necessary) and 6 more by December. 2. We propose an annual review of the problem. In the course of such an annual review we could consider the possibility some time in the future of 18 more such aircraft. 3. We would ship the suspended MAP items, and 4. The remaining ground equipment from past sales (both of these could be shipped at an early date by sea). 5. Replace ground equipment losses, except for tanks and heavy artillery. Mr. McNamara then pointed out that we had gotten some very recent information from the British on the availability of Centurions, specifically, that if 200 were really what Jordan needed, they could be bought in Britain, that the spares and ammunition were available-and would be available well into the 70's—that they could be converted to 105mm guns in Jordan. General Khammash's lack of interest in tanks from the British, however described, was clear. Mr. McNamara then responded that we could only make available 88 M48A1s (and this number was inserted in the draft Memorandum of Understanding 2 which General Khammash took with him). General Khammash expressed a strong need for 7 to 10 155mm guns which he had lost during the war and Mr. McNamara promised to see what we could do for him in this respect. 3 6. Mr. McNamara went on to point out that the payments would be spread over a period of 2-1/2 years and that the cost of the package described would be between $80 and $85 million, including the $10 million Jordan has on deposit here. He said that we would need $22 million, in addition to the $10 million on deposit, before July 1, 1968. When General Khammash asked what negotiating latitude there was on the planes, Mr. McNamara replied that in our opinion the F-104 is a good plane for Jordan and that others are either not available, or not as applicable to Jordan's requirements as the F-104. He said, in response to the General's question, that a Presidential Determination under the Conte-Long Amendment would not change the type of plane which we are considering. Mr. McNamara did say, however, that, once the 18 F-104s are delivered, we could consider some time in the future another 18. As to the negotiating flexibility of other items Mr. McNamara said that, as to tanks, this depended on the acceptability of British tanks. On other items, there was some but not much because of financial considerations. Finally, the Secretary of Defense suggested that General Khammash take the draft Memorandum of Understanding with him, ask us any questions he had, and then present it to the King. He pointed out that it could be signed in Jordan by our Ambassador if General Khammash wished to avoid making another trip to the United States. General Khammash thanked the Secretary for all the work that had been done in his behalf and said he would now see what he could do with the King. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, Jordan, 000.1-333. Secret. Drafted by Schwartz and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in McNamara's office. This memorandum of conversation was summarized in telegram 113633 to Amman, February 11, and the text of the attached draft memorandum of understanding was transmitted in telegram 113634 to Amman, also February 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 2 The attached memorandum of understanding is not printed. 3 Harry Schwartz called Khammash later in the afternoon on February 10 to say that there were no 155-mm guns available in the United States. He added that U.S. officials would try to find some elsewhere. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, Jordan 333) 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, February 11, 1968, 0636Z. 113645. For delivery to the Ambassador at opening of business. You are authorized to deliver the following letter from the President to King Hussein. Begin text , “His Majesty, King Hussein, Amman, Jordan. Your Majesty: I send you this personal word in advance of the report General Khammash will give you. The General has argued your case well. Our two countries have enjoyed a warm, close, mutually beneficial relationship for a long period. There are few other countries in the world with which we have worked as closely as with Jordan. I assure Your Majesty that it is our policy and our interest to continue that relationship and our support of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. While the June war has created strains and problems for both of us, it has never altered our fundamental policy towards Jordan. Despite the current heavy demands on our resources, General Khammash is returning with an arms package which we consider to be a substantial response to your request for us to meet your legitimate arms requirements. We intend this package to be a strong reaffirmation of our support. I also assure you that we have not altered our firm resolve to extend our full diplomatic and political support of Ambassador Jarring to reach a just and durable settlement in the Middle East. During your visit here in November, we explained to you our position on the West Bank and Jerusalem. We have not changed that position. As Ambassador Jarring makes progress, we hope and expect that there will be opportunities for us to support his efforts in more specific ways. Your Majesty, we are both passing through a critical period in the history of our two countries. With patience, wisdom and mutual trust, I am sure that we can solve our problems and obtain the objective we both so fervently desire-a peaceful Middle East in which a united Jordan can play its historic role. With all good wishes, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson.” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton, cleared by Atherton and Walt Rostow and in substance by Sisco and Davies, and approved by Richard W. Finch (S/S-O). In a February 10 memorandum to the President, Rostow also cleared the telegram with the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Jordan—8/1/67-7/31/68) 78. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 78. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, February 12, 1968. SUBJECT Getting Israel to Accept UN Resolution Here is the scenario for our next campaign to bring the Israelis around to accepting the November 22 resolution: 1. Rodger Davies laid the groundwork with Evron today at lunch by describing Egyptian frustration over Israeli evasiveness. Rodger cited primarily a conversation earlier today with the Egyptian Minister here who also quoted his recent telegrams from Cairo. 2. Joe Sisco is calling Eppie in this afternoon to go over with him in detail the Egyptian reactions as reported by Don Bergus. NEA rightly feels that IO and USUN should be the ones to do battle on the special considerations of the Israeli position. 3. Another Goldberg approach to the Israelis in New York would be the logical followup to Joe's talk with Eppie, but this is not specifically scheduled yet. 4. A message from Secretary Rusk to Eban has just cleared NEA on its way to the Secretary. It is cast in the general framework of the instructions the President gave the Secretary when Eshkol was here to follow up in finding peace initiatives. It comes down hard on the need for Israel to accept the UN resolution more straightforwardly. It also takes up the Jerusalem problem, starting with the Jordan threat a week ago to take this into the Security Council. 5. After the Sisco-Evron talk, we will have a clear formulation of the pitch we would like Goldberg to make in New York. State will ask you informally to make the same pitch to Eppie. I will give you something further on this as soon as we have a clear picture of the best line to take. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret. 79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 13, 1968, 0120Z. 114277. 1. Please deliver following message from Secretary to Foreign Minister Eban: “Dear Mr. Foreign Minister: During Prime Minister Eshkol's recent visit to the United States, he and President Johnson agreed that it would be useful if you and I consulted on specific steps which our governments might take to advance the cause of peace. In the spirit of this agreement, I would like to review with you at this time the status of the talks being conducted by Ambassador Jarring. I believe that the essential thing in this current stage is to begin actual negotiations on substantive issues, in a form acceptable to both sides, as promptly as possible. Our strenuous efforts throughout the summer and fall in the General Assembly and the Security Council had as a principal objective the creation of conditions that would make such negotiations possible. I therefore noted with much interest the position which you gave to Ambassador Jarring on February 1. 2 Although it seemed to me this represented some progress, I think it is only a partial step. I urge you to maintain the momentum of this move by going one step further. Israel, in my view, would risk nothing and would gain advantage by stating to Jarring unequivocally that it accepts the resolution as a whole in accordance with the interpretations put on it by its sponsor, and on the understanding that the resolution will be implemented through discussions under Jarring's auspices. I agree with your assessment that there are varying views among the Arabs themselves, and I think it is important through steps such as this to strengthen the position of those who advocate peaceful negotiations. As you know, there has in recent days been increasing talk among the Arabs to the effect that the dispute should be returned to the Security Council or at least that the question of Jerusalem should be raised in the Council. I fear that for the Council to take up any aspect of the problem at this stage would likely bring Jarring's mission to a close. This would have the most serious implications for peace in the Middle East. In addition, as I am sure you will agree, a Security Council session in such circumstances would hold great difficulty for both our governments. It would be particularly unfortunate if the question went to the Security Council in a situation in which the Arabs were depicted as accepting the resolution and being prepared to implement it, while Israel's position appeared to be ambiguous. The positive results achieved in the November Security Council resolution would be jeopardized as would the broad support and sympathy for Israel's position. The possibility that the Arabs might take this course of action makes it even more important that Ambassador Jarring be able to show progress in his efforts. Similarly, the possibility that the Arabs might return the issue to the Security Council strengthens our conviction that great restraint is needed in Israel's policies respecting Jerusalem. We have succeeded in persuading the Jordanians, at least for now, not to raise Jerusalem in the Council. I fear, however, that this possibility will continue to plague us so long as your Government pursues policies and actions which increasingly foreclose hopes that some meaningful accommodation on Jerusalem is possible in the context of a peaceful settlement-an accommodation not only to the interests of the international religious community, on which your Government has given clear assurances, but to the interests of the Government of Jordan as well. I must in all frankness say that without such accommodation we seriously doubt there can be a settlement. It was to underline our deep concern in this matter that I recently asked Ambassador Barbour to reiterate to you our views on the Jerusalem question. I would not want to leave the impression that our position is merely a formal one. I am firmly convinced that it goes to the heart of the problem of achieving a settlement and would appreciate an indication from you that your Government understands the depth of our concern. I raise these matters with you in the interest of our common goal of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and in the spirit of frank understanding which characterized Prime Minister Eshkol's recent talks with President Johnson. Those talks dealt with the closely related themes of peace and security. To assist Israel in its efforts to achieve a satisfactory degree of military security we have, as you know, recently agreed to increase the number of Skyhawk aircraft we are supplying Israel above the number agreed to during the Prime Minister's visit. Now I believe we must focus our attention on the search for peace, since it seems clear to me that it is in this direction that the only true security for Israel lies. This is my purpose in writing you today. I look forward to having your thoughts on these and other ways in which our two countries can contribute to the cause of peace.” 2. In delivering foregoing message, you should stress importance we attach to receiving truly substantive response to Secretary's letter. In this connection you should make point that, if Jerusalem despite our best efforts is again raised in the Security Council, it is by no means clear that USG will be able to stand with Israel on this issue as we have up to now. Moreover, this is also case in event Security Council considers ME question in circumstances where onus for failure of Jarring Mission was largely on Israeli shoulders due to their failure to put forward a forthcoming “acceptance” formula regarding Nov. 22 res. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and Day on February 12; cleared by Battle, Sisco, and Andrew L. Steigman in S; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to USUN, Amman, and Cairo. 2 See footnote 4, Document 68 . 80. Memorandum From Eugene R. Black to President Johnson 80. Memorandum From Eugene R. Black to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 14, 1968. SUBJECT Reconnaissance in the Middle East I have met with the Heads of State in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. I saw all Prime, Foreign and Finance Ministers. I met with leaders in public and private sectors plus officials of the USG and other US nationals residing in these countries. I emphasized that I was on a “private trip” through the area. However, I told the leaders that I would be seeing you upon my return to Washington and therefore would appreciate their candid expressions concerning: 1. The current stand of this government on the Arab-Israeli question. 2. The posture of the individual and/or his government towards the USG. My soundings may be summarized as follows: A. The prevailing mood in the Arab states is one of bitter frustration. It is at the moment a negative and destructive mood and therefore a dangerous one. B. I am personally deeply discouraged by the reactions I received on the trip and feel violence lurks just beneath the surface. 1. All the principals in the Arab states referred to the USG policy in the Middle East as the “No Policy.” (non-existent policy.) From the socio-economic-political points of view this region is in turmoil and the USG position is at a nadir. 2. Israel on the other hand is strong, resilient and enjoying the fruits of victory. Israel is far ahead of her neighbors on all fronts—especially the personal motivation quotient which has made this small state a remarkable example of “self help.” C. The Arab world is far from monolithic. A degree of political solidarity was achieved at Khartoum, however this was short-lived and the old divisions and some new ones are evident. This disarray is leading directly into the hands of the USSR. (See J.) D. The Arabs hold the USG as the scapegoat. Note: No one of importance any longer believes the USG intervened directly in the war but everyone —including the most pro-western (Feisal-Hussein) believes the USG does and can control Israel and Israeli policy. E. Nasser, Feisal, Hussein, Emir of Kuwait and Crown Prince Jaber of Kuwait (Jaber is real power in Kuwait) feel that there is a widespread revulsion among all classes against what seems to them a complete identification of the USG with Israel. Each have specific grievances. The grip of each of the above remains strong with their rule appearing to be highly personal. F. The “Refugee Problem” in Jordan is appalling. There is nothing that I have seen in any country on this globe which is as tragic as the destitute condition these hundreds of thousands of persons are living in and under. I visited a number of camps in the Valley and was shocked at the bitterness expressed by old and particularly young refugees against the USG. (See Recommendation Number 2.) G. Old Jerusalem is an “open sore” with all Arabs in all Arab states. GOI's posture on this is inflammatory. Mayor Kolleck seems an able administrator. However, there are numerous complaints from the Arabs re the Israeli occupation-both in Jerusalem as well as on the West Bank. The shut down of the commercial banks has caused hardship and is a festering problem. Border incidents are up markedly and the action by the GOI is directed at and into the refugee camps. GOI Chief of Staff Bar Lev admits this is ugly but a necessary measure in order to stop provocative acts by Arabs. H. The attitude throughout area towards the “Jarring Mission” is one of doom. Little hope is given for a meaningful solution that will provide the so-called “lasting peace.” Note: I met with Jarring in Cairo and he gave me impression he, too, was most discouraged. I fervently pray that this Mission will be successful because if it fails the reaction would/could be disastrous. I. Israel —I met with all the leaders. I will not report on this section as I feel you must be fully cognizant of the positions and posture of the GOI after the visit by Eshkol in January. In short, their attitudes represent the “other side of the coin.” J. Military —see “C”. 1. USSR has substantially rebuilt her position in Arab world by rearming Egypt, Syria and Iraq. 2. The USSR naval buildup in eastern Mediterranean is new factor and a dangerous one. 3. The strategic aim of USSR is to thrust south through the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The USSR is actively working at establishing and maintaining a “presence” in Yemen and South Arabia (Aden). The closing of the Canal is a major deterrent to this scheme. 4. The USSR buildup is patently political. It is designed to capitalize on the continued USG association with Israel in the eyes of the Arabs and the weakness of the UK. 5. All Arabs spoke of their concern about the increasing Russian “presence”. The flow of “technicians” and “advisors” into region is alarming even to Nasser. This is, of course, anathema to Kuwait, Feisal and Hussein. K. Suez Canal —Estimates vary from man to man. 1. M. Younes who is Minister in charge stated Canal could be open in 50-60 days to free the 15 ships. However, to be fully open for business it would require 4-6 months. General Dayan disagrees with this and believes Canal could be open much sooner. 2. Plans are being studied by Egypt to deepen/widen Canal to handle 200,000 ton tankers. Also authorities studying feasibility of constructing 42 inch pipeline from Suez to Port Said. 3. Shooting incident on January 30 was ugly and bad omen for early opening of Canal. I visited Ismailia and saw UAR boat which had been fired on. Also saw damage to city which is extensive. Conclusions: A. The Arab world is desperately in need of high level attention by the President and the USG. Time is of the essence in making some positive forward gesture. B. Israel is far ahead of her neighbors on all fronts. C. The UK withdrawal from the Gulf is alarming. The vacuum must be filled before the USSR gains the advantage. Recommendations: 1. You appoint a high level, experienced and internationally prominent US citizen to act as a “Personal Representative of the President of the USA” or a “Special Ambassador” to the Arab States. A. This person would not undercut the existing USG Ambassadors but would complement the USG team. B. The Representative should make periodic “hand holding” missions to the area and review with each Head of State their individual problems. This would be a manifest example of good faith and intentions of USG. 2. Dispatch at an early opportunity, if available, Ambassador Graham Martin (Secretary Rusk's Special Assistant for Refugee Affairs) to the area. Time is short on the “human bomb” with these hundreds of thousands of homeless, helpless people. Action is needed immediately on this problem—perhaps (hopefully) the action would be independent of UNRWA which is now a bureaucracy within a bureaucracy. If Martin not available then someone of his caliber. Brief Sketch 1. Economies A. Kuwait: Booming—in spite of heavy losses due to devaluation. B. Saudi Arabia: Continues to develop but a critical shortage of trained manpower has slowed the implementation of the development programs. These programs also being slowed due to large financial assistance being given to Egypt and Jordan. C. Egypt: Taking a nose-dive. USSR seems ready to provide assistance. However, situation appears hopeless. UAR is highly dependent on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya for financial assistance. D. Jordan: In a state of flux due to occupation of West Bank. USG's decision to give GOJ military assistance was very wise and timely. E. Israel: In relatively A-1 condition although naturally GOI suffered financially from war. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. No classification marking. Rostow sent copies of this memorandum to Rusk and Katzenbach on February 23 at the President's request. (Ibid.) 81. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 81. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 14, 1968, 1125Z. 2524. Jarring Mission. Ref: State's 114277. 2 Department pass Cairo. 1. At Israelis' invitation I met early last evening (Feb. 13) with Foreign Minister Eban and MFA DirGen Rafael to discuss latest Jarring Mission developments. During course hour talk with both and separate following conversation with Rafael: (A) I conveyed the Secretary's personal message (Eban read it, but said he would have to study it further before commenting). (B) Eban gave me copy modified GOI position he had provided Jarring February 12, explained rationale for modification and suggested what US could do to help. (C) Eban and Rafael speculated re Jarring next steps and discussed relation of Jordan to current moves. (D) At outset conversation Eban remonstrated about Department officer's remarks in recent conversations on Jarring state of play and I reminded him of some of our apprehensions at continued lack of progress in recent discussions of UAR and Israeli position. 2. Following is text describing Israeli position given Jarring February 12. GOI agreeable that full text be passed by Jarring to pass para (F). “(A) Israel has cooperated and will cooperate with you in your mission. We accept the Security Council's call, in its resolution of November 22, 1967, for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of peace with secure and recognized boundaries. (B) Once agreement is reached on a peace settlement it will be faithfully implemented by Israel. (C) As I indicated to you on 1 February 1968, Israel is prepared to negotiate on all matters included in the Security Council resolution which either side wished to raise. Our views on the problems of peace and our interpretation of the resolution were stated by me in the Security Council on November 22, 1967. (D) The Prime Minister of Israel, in a statement on January 8, indicated Israel's respect for the Security Council's resolution as an expression of the international interest in an agreed and final peace settlement. We now understand that the U.A.R. too is prepared to respect the Security Council's resolution and to establish a just and lasting peace, and for this purpose to discuss the resolution taken as a whole. (E) The next step should be to bring the parties together. I refer to the agreement which I expressed to you on 14 February for the special representative of the Secretary-General to convene the two governments. (F) We do not consider that accepted settlements of intricate problems can be reached by a procedure which avoids the establishment of contact. Apart from our views on the principle of negotiation, we cannot commit our most vital interests to an inefficient procedure.” 3. This, Eban said, was a statement Israel was ready to defend before world opinion. Israel had used words in this formulation it understood were necessary to get things moving: “accept,” “respect,” “implement.” The essential element was agreement. Israel could not return to 1957 type formulations. For Arabs the key seemed to be “implementation;” very well, this was mentioned in the Israeli statement. But we must always come back to idea of agreement. The SC Res mentioned it. The GOI speaks the same language as that resolution: we are ready to “reason together.” 4. The GOI, Eban continued, is hopeful that the USG will regard this as a forward movement. It represented quite an effort on the GOI's part in view of the fears of what others were trying to read into the UNSC res. He hoped that the US could consider using its influence on behalf of an efficient negotiating procedure. Jarring, he said, was afraid that Egypt would want to keep him running. 3 Jarring thinks this is technically impossible. (Later, separately, Rafael, “strictly off the record” said he gathered from his discussion with Jarring that latter felt he had enough substance on which to build a formula for convening the two parties; and that he close to point of inviting reps of parties to Nicosia; he could not go on with this game of ping pong with himself as the ball.) Eban noted that there was no mention of direct negotiations in the Israeli statement. In answer to my question as to whether the Israelis remained willing to have a meeting convened by Jarring have the appearance of the two parties talking to Jarring rather than to each other, Eban replied that they had reaffirmed their readiness to begin talks on the Bunche-Rhodes formula. 4 He said that during the first week of those talks the two parties had sat in the same room but had not addressed their remarks to each other. After about a week this all changed and there were direct talks with Bunche continuing in the chair. Rafael said the Israeli desideratum for talks was “same time, same space.” 5. At the beginning of our talk Eban said that recent conversations in Washington had given him cause for concern. According to their report Dep Asst Sec Davies had described to Evron Department's understanding of stiff and unyielding Egyptian position (no formal peace, no negotiation, no formal recognition of Israel, no Israeli canal navigation until refugee problem solved), without expressing any Department reservations and in terms seeming to advise acceptance of Egyptian formulations. If this was Department understanding of Egyptian position, it was all the more disturbing to have report of Asst Sec Sisco-Evron conversation 5 in which Sisco suggested that unless Israel accepted Egyptian formula there might be Security Council meeting in which Israel could not assume US support. This was surprising to Eban, he said; he was not aware that the US and Israel had departed from their common views. The tone was not a tone of partnership; it seemed to suggest that “we should all fall down and accept what the UAR wants.” As a matter of fact, Jarring had said that Egypt was doubtful about going back to the Security Council. “Our estimate is that if this were to happen the Council would not draft a new decalogue.” The point was that the US seemed to be trying to get Israel to accept Egyptian formulas. At the same time, Eban continued, the Israelis had reports that Egypt was telling third parties that Egypt had been given the understanding that the US was exercising pressure on Israel. This was very disturbing and might explain why the Egyptians had held out on the Israelis' February 1 formula. 6. Eban then went on to specific objections to the Sisco suggestions. Israel, he said, could not accept the November 22 Res “in accord with interpretations put on it by its principal sponsors.” One of the sponsors, the UK, was notably “wobbly” of late, though it seemed to be trying to get back on firmer ground. Israel had to interpret the resolution as it understood it and Egypt could accept or reject this interpretation as it wanted. Israel had had enough bad historical experience along this line. Besides, Jarring himself would not like this idea; with each side quoting its own interpretative authority, he could get caught in the middle of a dispute between the powers, which he clearly wanted to avoid. 7. I told the Foreign Minister that I thought there had been a misinterpretation of Asst Sec Sisco's views and I reviewed with him State 114278 (we have not yet received a report of the Davies-Evron conversation). We were concerned that the UAR and even Jordan was making hay in the world's capitals out of the continuing Israeli refusal to accept the SC res. The Arabs have told us that the Israelis were playing with words: right or wrong, their arguments were cogent to a degree. Our apprehensions re Jordan were heightened by the fact that the factual situation regarding Jerusalem, of such concern to them, was being eroded. We were concerned about a return of Middle East problems to the Security Council where, as Sisco put it, the Arabs would try to re-write history, where the pressure of shifting world opinion would make it difficult to achieve a resolution as favorable as that of November 22. Eban expressed the doubt, as he was to do again later in the conversation, that the Arabs would take affairs to the Security Council again. I assured the Minister that we were not buying the Arab line but I reiterated our concern about world opinion and our desire to avoid Israel's being in an indefensible posture if there is another SC session. 8. Later, with Rafael, I asked where Jordan stood in all of this. He said that Jarring reported that he was sure that if Egypt were to agree to attend a Jarring convened meeting, then Jordan would follow immediately. Jordan did not feel it could move first but it certainly did not want to be left behind. Rafael said that the GOI had authorized Jarring to convey the Israel February 12 formula. The Israelis had asked him also suggest that the Jordanians look a little more closely at the Israeli agenda for talks originally presented and rejected by Jordan. There [were listed items?], for the Jordanian interests in Jerusalem in addition to interests of religious authorities. Jarring, he said, was glad to have this. Rafael went on to ruminate that if the Jordanians thought this was a good time to take the Israelis to the Security Council under conditions favorable to Jordan, they were mistaken. There was great pressure in Israel, Rafael said, to take care of Israel's current security problems along the Jordan border on strictly military terms. He hoped Jordan would not try to seek a political advantage through Security Council action. Comment: I, of course, expressed pleasure at the new Israeli formulation and agreed with Eban in hope that some of the concern we have felt and which was evinced in the Department conversations he referred to will be alleviated by knowledge of the modifications that the Israelis have effected. It will be noted that the Israelis still have not simply accepted the resolution. However, especially from Rafael, I thought I detected a cautious but real optimism that these latest concessions from earlier Israeli positions will be enough to get talks going in Cyprus. He expressed the hope that we might be able to stimulate Jarring to decision to formulate proposal to parties but I, of course, noted that Jarring not directly in touch with us and consequently, there difficulty in our taking such steps. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 2 Document 79 . 3 Jarring met with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in Cairo on February 13 and conveyed the Israeli position as put forward by Eban on February 12. Riad responded that he saw no progress in the Israeli position. He stated that the UAR would have nothing to add until Israel indicated a willingness to implement Resolution 242 and reiterated that the UAR would not engage in direct negotiations with Israel. (Telegram 1636 from Cairo, February 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 4 See footnote 4, Document 61 . 5 This conversation, which took place on February 12, was summarized in telegram 114278 to Tel Aviv, February 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 82. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 82. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, February 14, 1968, 1650Z. 3417. Subject: Hussein's reaction to Jordan arms package. 1. Summary: King Hussein's reaction to our arms package is that as it stands it is insufficient in terms of quantities (particularly tanks), delivery dates, and financial terms. He requested we give urgent consideration to corresponding changes he wishes incorporated into our draft memorandum of understanding 2 to take care of these deficiencies. King also indicated he will reluctantly have to consider other sources if we cannot go further to meet his politico-military needs. 2. King Hussein asked I call late on the thirteenth. As I expected, he wanted to discuss the arms package which he had spent most of day discussing with General Khammash and various other GOJ officials. Crown Prince Hassan and General Khammash were present throughout our conversation. 3. King began by expressing warm thanks for President's letter (State 113645) 3 and said he would be responding in similar spirit. He also expressed thanks for time and attention given to General Khammash during his talks in Washington and for opportunities for Khammash to discuss Jordan's problems with key US officials. He then said he was quite disappointed that length of time and nature of discussions had not produced a more acceptable package in terms of his political and military needs. If package brought by General Khammash represented best we could do, he was still faced with question whether it was not in Jordan's best interest to seek arms from another source. He hoped that he would not have to go to that other source because he still did not consider it to be in Jordan's long-term interest, nor for that matter in the interest of the US. Nevertheless, fact remained that arms package that had been brought back by Khammash did not satisfactorily meet Jordan's political and military requirements. 4. The King then specified deficiencies in terms of quantities and delivery dates. He first laid great stress on insufficient number of tanks included in package. He referred to fact we had said we were in general replacing losses suffered by JAA in June hostilities. Jordan has lost 152 American tanks of which 124 were M48s and the remainder M47s. Yet we were offering Jordan only 88 M48 tanks to make up this loss. These 152 tanks were apart from the Centurion tanks that had been lost. The King noted bitterly that 142 of the American tanks lost by Jordan are now in service in Israeli Army. He then pointed out various other increased quantities of ground equipment needed by Jordan. He emphasized need for more anti-aircraft capability in terms of morale factors and deterrent effects, but it was clear tanks were his chief concern. 5. Hussein said that apart from failure of package to meet Jordan's “legitimate requirements” in terms of quantities, proposed delivery dates also greatly disturbed him because they failed to meet Jordan's political and military needs. He noted that other Arab countries have already made up their losses, whereas our proposed delivery dates, offered eight months after the June war, extend into US fiscal year 1970. He said memo of understanding provided no assurance that significant amounts of ground equipment would arrive in Jordan in 1968. He had no idea of when tanks, which were so important for morale, would begin to arrive. 6. Moving to aircraft, the King at first said that he did not want F104s under any conditions, and he asked to have 18 A4 Skyhawks substituted for 18 F104s. After some discussion, however, he said that he wanted to reconsider that part of the package for at least a further 24 hours to make up his mind as to what he should do about aircraft. His main complaint about the F104s was that they are no longer suitable for Jordan's needs. I pointed out the local and area political impact as well as the morale significance that deliveries of some F104s by June 1968 might have and the fact that his pilots are already well down the road in their training. I suggested that introduction of any other type of aircraft at this stage, whether US or non-US, would pose unknown delivery and training delays. It was after he had reflected on this that he said he wanted to reserve his position with regard to aircraft for another 24 hours. 4 7. Finally, the King had a number of editorial revisions that he wished made in the memorandum of understanding. Most of these, he emphasized, related to his concern in event of publicity, to appearing to have tied his hands. He said he particularly wanted to avoid being put in a position of potential embarrassment vis-a-vis other Arab states and with his own people if the memo of understanding should ever become public. In any case, he said, he probably would be forced to show the memo of understanding to some of the other Arab countries providing funds to Jordan-with obvious results. He then handed me his copy of the memo of understanding and requested I transfer his interlineations to my telegraphic copy (amended memo of understanding will be transmitted by septel). 5 8. Bearing in mind points in State 113632, 6 I responded to Hussein that while I could see package did not contain everything he wanted, I thought he might have overlooked how much it did contain. It seemed to me that it represented a very substantial meeting of his stated military requirements. Most important, it represented tangible and significant proof of US intention to support Jordan and to promote close and cordial relations we have had. I said we had hoped he would proceed immediately to sign the agreement and that I thought it would be important to move ahead now on the arms package in order to obtain the political benefits I saw coming from his acceptance of the package. For example, the morale of his army could be improved immediately. Moving ahead quickly with the package would enable him to ask now for the evacuation of Saudi and Iraqi troops and thereby to exert greater control over the terrorists who have been the primary cause of the recent incidents in the Valley. It would also improve the general psychological atmosphere necessary for him to proceed towards a Middle Eastern settlement. 9. Hussein interrupted to say that unfortunately the quantities and the delivery dates in the package would not be sufficient to enable him to hold up his head with the officers of his own army. He therefore needed to know as soon as possible whether we would meet his requirements as he had outlined them. When he had our final answer, he intended to send General Khammash to King Faisal to see what, if anything, Faisal is prepared to do in terms of further financial assistance before he considers other sources. 10. I told the King I believed that in constituting our package we had tried to go as far as possible to meet all of his requirements. I was not yet informed, of course, on details of Washington's views on various elements of the package, particularly with regard to detailed provisions of the memo of understanding. I said I would surmise that quantities therein represented the best mix possible, given presumed availability of the items involved and the funds that Jordan had available. I stressed that our capability to extend credit had been drastically modified by Congress. I noted also that we have always tried to exercise restraint with regard to arms deliveries to all states in the area and that no states had obtained everything they wanted when they had come to us for arms. Khammash had said Secretary McNamara told him he would take another look at helping Jordan to find some 155mm guns. With regard to delivery dates, I pointed out that the memo of understanding in para IV-C referred to US fiscal years and not calendar years, which would take six months off the 1970 date. On the other hand, I thought that it would be unrealistic to expect everything to be delivered in calendar year 1968 in view of funds available to Jordan, our own credit limitations, as well as perhaps the limited availability of some of the equipment. I referred to Secretary McNamara's mentioning to Khammash that he would look again at the possibility of shipping some items out by air. The important thing was that Jordan had a quite substantial military package. I would have hoped this in itself would be enough to take care of morale in his army and public opinion in Jordan and elsewhere, particularly once it became known publicly that items were coming in and that Jordan's “legitimate requirements” were being met by the US. 11. Specifically on tanks, I mentioned our understanding British might have up to 200 Centurions available which could easily be upgunned in Jordan with spares available well into 1970. Both King and Khammash said most emphatically they do not want any more Centurions. Khammash added that if he could get additional M48s they need to make up their US tank losses he would happily dump existing Centurions in Gulf of Aqaba—if that were a US condition. Principal argument against Centurions, he said, is Jordan's need to standardize. Now it had very complicated supply and maintenance as well a training problems. Given obsolescence of Centurions and Britain's position today, he thought it would be folly to standardize on British tanks and mixing simply is not feasible. 12. As I responded the King kept returning to his original statements with regard to the acceptability of the quantities and delivery dates of the package and his need to know as soon as possible what we are prepared to do to make up for the deficiencies that he sees in it. He wants to send Khammash to see Faisal as soon as possible. 13. With regard to credit and funds, I asked the King if he thought King Faisal would be willing to advance Jordan additional funds if necessary to speed up deliveries or, assuming the additional items might be available, to obtain our agreement to increase some quantities in the package. The King turned to Khammash, who said Faisal had told them to come back before they went to any other source and they had no clear idea of what he was prepared to do for them. Khammash said he would hope that at the very least, however, there might be some way to arrange for Saudi Arabia to put up an acceptable loan to Jordan or loan guarantee to us that would then enable the USG to provide financing or credit arrangements that would take care of the delivery and quantity problems they had just discussed with me. 14. Comment: Hussein was more relaxed and friendly today than he has ever been with me. It was clear he had been cheered up by our willingness to go as far as we had. He saw this as a real political plus, but there was no lack of determination in his statements with regard to the present deficiencies he sees in our package and his intention to go elsewhere if necessary. At this stage I feel unable to say whether he will be willing to compromise on less than his total asking price. My present estimate is that there must be some sweetening of the package to gain his acceptance. I believe that the critical sweetener would be some more tanks. Anti-aircraft is also a major concern. Beyond that I think we need to develop a set of options on the other items that he can present to his army as a global indication of what we are prepared to do-subject actually, of course, to his finding additional funds or credit either from us or from the Saudis. We will present our detailed ideas in a following message. 7 15. Suggest Dept repeat to Jidda FYI only. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 2 See Document 76 . 3 Document 77 . 4 Symmes reported in telegram 3420 from Amman, February 14, that the King reaffirmed his interest in obtaining Skyhawk aircraft rather than F-104s. Symmes noted that one of the reasons the Jordanians were interested in the Skyhawks was because it was the same aircraft recently supplied to Israel. Symmes proposed separating the ground and air elements in the arms package while the Embassy endeavored to find out how anxious the Jordanians were to receive aircraft in the near term. He asked for an estimate of how long it would take to meet Jordan's request for Skyhawks. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 5 Telegram 3418 from Amman, February 14. (Ibid.) 6 Telegram 113632 to Amman, February 11, provided guidance for Symmes' use in discussing the proposed arms package for Jordan. Symmes' report of his discussion with the King indicates that he incorporated all the Department's suggestions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 6 Telegram 113632 to Amman, February 11, provided guidance for Symmes' use in discussing the proposed arms package for Jordan. Symmes' report of his discussion with the King indicates that he incorporated all the Department's suggestions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 7 Symmes provided additional detail about Hussein's reaction in telegram 3440 from Amman, February 15. Hussein was pleased by President Johnson's letter and the uniform support for Jordan Khammash reported receiving in Washington, but he was disappointed with the terms of the U.S. offer. Hussein's reaction grew out of a concern over losing influence with and control over the army. Khammash urged that the U.S. offer be expanded even if it should prove ultimately impossible to deliver fully on the offer, in order to give Hussein and Khammash a package to which the army would respond favorably. (Ibid.) 83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 15, 1968, 6 p.m. SUBJECT Jordan Arms Package This is to refresh your memory as to the details of the proposed arms agreement with Jordan. There are three main parts to the package: (1) about $10 million worth of equipment we had agreed to send to Jordan before the war broke out last June; (2) about $38 million in new ground equipment including 88 Patton tanks; and (3) 18 F-104 jet fighters ($33 million). Just in case you want more details, I've attached a more complete list. 2 On a lot of the smaller items there are specifics which no one has yet tried to work out. King Hussein has expressed initial disappointment with the package and the draft memo of understanding we proposed. Our first response will be to help out with his problems in the wording of the memo and to urge him to accept the package as is and get on with delivery. However, we may have a little more bargaining to do yet. He is obviously relieved that we have come this far, and we should be able to bring him around. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/67-2/68. Secret. 2 Not printed. 84. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 84. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, February 16, 1968, 1355Z. 3461. Subj: Jordanian request for anti-infiltration equipment. Ref: Amman 3047, 2 State 104263. 3 1. After events of the past few days 4 it is clear we need to move forward in any way possible to help Jordanians to exercise better control of terrorist infiltrations. I consider it particularly important to respond quickly to request for anti-infiltration equipment reported in reftel. In addition to providing effective additional control measures, such equipment, if available, could provide Jordanian leadership a much needed encouragement to intensify their present efforts. This initiative by the Jordanians might also be used as evidence to Israel of Jordanian will to act on the matter. 2. We appreciate equipment discussed in our telegram of Jan 19 might not be available or that it may be too technical to lend itself to expeditious installation in the Jordan Valley terrain. If we have no suitable equipment available, or if for some reason we do not wish to make it available, I would like to be informed expeditiously. It is time we responded in some way to the Jordanians on this matter. Our continuing silence may be interpreted as indifference to Jordanian request or even an unwillingness to help. I am sure that Washington is well aware of nature of terrain we are talking about. It might be well to keep in mind, however, that we are talking about a limited number of fords across river and transit areas in Jordan. We would hope we could find some kind of equipment to monitor these major transit areas even though we could not expect completely to curtail terrorist crossings. 5 Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN. Secret; Nodis. 2 Document 54 . 3 Telegram 104263 to Amman, January 25, informed the Embassy that the Jordanian request for assistance in controlling terrorist activity was being studied in Washington. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN) 4 On February 8 an exploding mine killed three Israeli civilians and wounded two others. The incident triggered daily artillery exchanges across the Jordan River cease-fire line, and attacks by the Israeli Air Force which caused heavy Jordanian casualties in a refugee camp. (Memorandum from George C. Denny to Secretary Rusk, February 14; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 5 The Department responded on February 22 in telegram 119314 to Amman, a joint State/Defense message. The Jordanian request was receiving sympathetic and urgent consideration, but it was judged that a substantive response would have to depend on more specific information concerning the type of anti-infiltration system desired and the number and type of devices which would be most suitable. (Ibid., POL 23-8 JORDAN) 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, February 17, 1968, 0122Z. 117102. Ref: Amman 3373, 2 Tel Aviv 2481. 3 1. In light dangerous situation in Jordan Valley, Department strongly favors meeting between Israeli and Jordanian military at higher level than Colonel to establish more effective means of communication between two armies for use inter alia in arranging ceasefires and possibly for controlling terrorism. Along with stationing of UN observers in Jordan Valley, we feel such a meeting could make significant contribution to defusing of situation. Accordingly, we request following courses of action: 2. For Embassy Tel Aviv . You should inform GOI that we are urging Government of Jordan to accept meeting with Israelis between officers of General rank. As Israelis aware, such a meeting presents serious political risk for Jordan. We consequently urge Israeli acceptance of meeting with UN officer present. We cannot see how this could in any way jeopardize Israeli position and it presumably would make meeting which Israelis and Jordanians desire possible. 4 3. For Amman . You should urge Jordanians to appoint officer of General rank to meet with Israelis in presence UN officer. You may inform GOJ that we are urging Israelis to accept UN presence at meeting. 5 4. For USUN . Suggest Goldberg inform Bunche of our intended approaches to GOI and GOJ. He may wish to inform General Bull. Assume Bunche will appreciate sensitivity of efforts to establish such high-level talks, particularly from point of view of Jordan. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Houghton on February 16; cleared by Sisco, Battle, and Bahti; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv and to USUN. 2 In telegram 3373 from Amman, February 12, the Embassy reported that the Jordanian Government received an emissary from the Israeli Government who asked why Colonel Muhammad Daoud, who had previously handled liaison matters with the Israeli military, had not assumed the liaison function at the Allenby Bridge. The Embassy noted that Daoud was sick, but added that King Hussein was concerned about an adverse public reaction if he were to engage in the type of direct contact the Israelis were proposing. He did not feel that such talks could be kept secret for long. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 2481 from Tel Aviv, February 11, reported that the Israeli Government sent an emissary to Amman to propose direct discussions at the Chief of Staff level concerning the terrorism problem. (Ibid.) 4 Barbour made this suggestion in a conversation with Bitan of the Foreign Office. Bitan's response was that a UN presence at talks between Israeli and Jordanian military officers would cause them to speak for the record rather than seriously address problems. (Telegram 2559 from Tel Aviv, February 17; ibid., POL ARAB-ISR) 5 Symmes questioned whether the Department wanted him to suggest the appointment of a general officer to King Hussein. Unless the Israelis were prepared to accept a UN presence at the proposed talks, he did not think that Hussein would agree. He suggested that Colonel Daoud might prove to be the best the Israelis could expect as an effective point of contact with the King. (Telegram 3479 from Amman, February 17; ibid., POL ISR-JORDAN) 86. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 86. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, February 17, 1968, 1212Z. 1675. Subject: Jarring Mission. Ref: State 117236. 2 1. I saw Mohamed Riad at 12:30 today (Feb 17). Noted I was acting under instructions which had been sent me after Dept had had opportunity study report of last FonMin-Jarring conversation (Cairo's 1641). 3 2. Recalled efforts which USG was making, in accordance its pledge, lend fullest support to Jarring Mission. This connection, we had urged Israel inform Jarring that it “accepted” Nov 22 SC resolution. 3. Matters had now developed to point where USG had two questions to put to GUAR: (A) did GUAR accept Nov 22 resolution and (B) assuming that both UAR and Israel accepted resolution, how did UAR envisage next steps? 4. As to first question, I pointed out to Mohamed that resolution must be taken as a whole. He was more aware than was I of discussion and travail which had gone into drafting of resolution and its ultimate unanimous adoption by SC. Third para of resolution had two very important words: “agreement,” and “accepted solution.” 5. It followed there was direct and unbreakable link between two questions I had put to him. If UAR in fact accepted resolution, it should also be prepared to take practical steps required to reach agreement and an accepted solution. 6. In all frankness, nothing which had so far appeared in UAR's reports of FonMin-Jarring conversations indicated that GUAR had so far gone this required distance. FonMin had not been explicit as to next steps. Moreover, some of his comments to the effect that vague unilateral declarations or mere citations in a report that Jarring might write would take care of problem of belligerency fell far short of requirements of para 3 of SC resolution. 7. I noted that some UAR diplomats abroad had intimated that negotiations in Cyprus under so-called “Bunche formula” would be acceptable to GUAR. FonMin, however, did not appear yet to have crossed that bridge. 8. It was essential, if US were to be in position to make most effective use of its influence with parties, that we have clear answers to questions I had posed. 9. Mohamed took careful notes and said although he felt he was in position reply to my questions, he preferred not to do so until he could discuss them with FonMin and give an answer in latter's name. He promised get in touch with me before he departs with FonMin on North African trip Feb 20. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. 2 Telegram 117236, February 17, instructed Bergus to meet with Mohamed Riad to discuss the November 22 resolution. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 1641 from Cairo, February 15, Bergus referred to some new nuances in the UAR position he had gleaned from telegrams received from the Department and USUN. He noted that Jarring was expected back in Cairo and he planned to discuss the UAR position with Mohamed Riad after Jarring's meeting with the Foreign Minister. (Ibid.) 87. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 87. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, February 19, 1968, 1500Z. 1686. Ref: Cairo's 1675. 2 1. Mohamed Riad asked me call 12:30 today (Feb 19) receive answers to questions I had posed Feb 17. Riad opened conversation by repeating two questions I had put, viz.: (A) Did GUAR accept Nov 22 resolution and (B) assuming that both UAR and Israel accepted resolution, how did UAR envisage next steps? Riad then proceeded to read verbatim from lengthy statement which he had drafted and which he said he had that morning read to his FonMin who had approved it. I took full notes and will forward detailed memcon 3 in next pouch. Since most of statement was of historical nature, however, only necessary telegraph highlights. 2. In response to my first question, Mohamed gave lengthy historical excursus beginning from fact that since my return to Egypt GUAR had made it a point keep me fully informed of all its activities re Middle East crisis and to indicate that it was seeking peaceful solution. Mohamed then quoted excerpts from various conversations with Jarring indicate that GUAR “insisted” on implementation of SC resolution in its entirety. Riad then cited information received by GUAR from me and others to effect that USG felt Israel had not clearly stated its acceptance resolution and that USG urging Israel so to do. 3. Riad then specifically referred to third para of SC resolution and said USG should have no doubt as to UAR position. When GUAR said it accepted resolution as a whole and that it should be treated as an entity, UAR has made its position very clear. Riad cited US-UAR discussions in New York prior to passage resolution where UAR accepted concept of treating resolution as a whole. He said in light of all this Egyptians asked themselves why there was any doubt in mind USG re UAR position. 4. Mohamed then turned to second question re what UAR envisaged as next step in case Israel accepts SC resolution. Mohamed said GUAR believed this was hypothetical question. He said GUAR believed it within its right to know what was Israel's position vis-a-vis resolution. As for method of implementing resolution, this was something GUAR would state after it knew Israel's reply. 5. Notwithstanding this, continued Mohamed, Egyptians had told Jarring several times and specifically in their last meeting that re method of implementing resolution, UAR was ready discuss this with Jarring. Egyptians assumed Israel would also submit its suggestions. Mohamed reiterated portions of last conversation with Jarring to effect that GUAR ready terminate belligerency, assume obligations in SC resolution relating to navigation, etc. 6. Mohamed then said “Now we ask you, what do you want? We still remember that on the record you made a statement in SC in which Ambassador Goldberg declared that US would put all its weight behind resolution and that it would in due course request parties to implement it. When I speak about the resolution we mean the resolution as adopted by the Council taking into consideration all consultations that took place prior to the adoption. We also take into consideration that US accepted from the beginning that there would be no negotiations and no peace treaty. The question is what your position will be if Israel continues in its present position of refusing to accept the resolution. This will mean the stringing out of Jarring's mission. We believe that the big powers should, at some moment if Israel persists, convene the SC for the sake of putting pressure on Israel. We think that the situation should be clarified before long and certainly before the General Assembly resumes its session in April.” 7. I said I would report foregoing. I asked if Mohamed had used word “negotiations” in preceding paragraph advisedly. While it was true resolution had not referred to “direct negotiations,” seemed equally valid that resolution envisaged some kind of discussion among parties as only feasible means of implementation. Mohamed made no comment. 8. Comment: Mohamed's presentation, although bordering on the tendentious at times, was throughout couched in polite and dignified language. At the same time it was made abundantly clear that GUAR suspects that USG, having encountered resistance on part Israel to principle of acceptance of SC resolution, is casting about for ways and means welsh on its November commitments. For some reason Egyptians appear sublimely and genuinely confident that Jarring is on their side in present controversy. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2 Document 86 . 3 Not found. 88. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 88. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 20, 1968. SUBJECT NSC Discussion of the Near East—Noon, Wednesday, February 21 You have heard Gene Black's description of how our position in the Near East is eroding. Your ambassadors agree, and critics are playing up Soviet gains in the area. The purpose of this meeting is to review the situation and to discuss what more we can do to reverse the trend. We can take some steps like sending arms to Jordan or renewing relations with Cairo. But the Arabs will mainly measure us by our success in promoting an Arab-Israeli arrangement which would lead to Israeli withdrawal. In this quarter there are two main issues: 1. How to get the Jarring mission moving . Jarring is trying to persuade the Israelis and Egyptians to “accept” the November 22 UN resolution as a basis for talks. The Israelis are evasive because they fear Cairo will interpret their acceptance as agreement to withdraw before negotiating other issues like permanent boundaries. Israel wants to be sure talks will follow their acceptance. The Egyptians say they “accept” the whole resolution but won't commit themselves to talks until Israel “accepts” the resolution. Ambassadors Goldberg and Barbour and Joe Sisco are discussing the problem in detail with the Israelis, and Secretary Rusk has written Abba Eban. We don't think you need to weigh in yet, but the question is how much harder we press Israel to break this impasse. 2. How to stop Israeli incorporation of Jerusalem. The Arabs see Israeli acts in Jerusalem as proof that Israel doesn't intend to negotiate an honest settlement. The Jordanians threaten to bring the matter to the Security Council in the next few days. Secretary Rusk wrote to Abba Eban; a few days later President Shazar said publicly that Israel would never give up Jerusalem. Entirely apart from Israel's eventual negotiating position on Jerusalem, we want them to lie low on moves that further alienate the Arabs, upset Jarring and make it more difficult for us to play a constructive role. State may possibly ask you soon to weigh in with Eshkol asking him to lay aside plans for developing land in former Arab Jerusalem which Israel expropriated. There is no recommendation yet, but this discussion will give you the full picture of how these issues all fit together. W.W. Rostow 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 63, 2/17-21/68. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, February 20, 1968, 1639Z. 118025. Ref: Amman 3417, 3418, 2 3419 3 and 3420. 4 1. We are disappointed in Hussein's assessment of our arms package as being insufficient to meet his political and military requirements. We believe that further study on his part will reveal it as a substantial response to his request. With the exception of some of the tanks (and 155 mm guns which may not be available) we are offering to make up his June losses. The Russians have done no more for Syria and the UAR although admittedly they are doing it more quickly. We fully appreciate that the King has problems but he must remember that we also have problems about which he and Khammash should be fully conversant. Our offer should be viewed in this context. 2. As Khammash left Washington before we had a chance to explain our package, we believe the Jordanians perhaps do not fully appreciate all of the considerations which went into the determination of the size of the package. The arms offered to Jordan include almost every item in the spectrum of military hardware used by the Jordan Arab Army. Such a sweeping offer should be very useful to the King in explaining his policy to the army officers. It should also be noted that the illustrative items following those specifically listed in the memorandum of understanding provide for $2 million in small arms, $12.8 million in ammunition, $4 million worth of vehicles (1200), and miscellaneous communications and engineering equipment. 3. For reasons with which the King and Khammash should be familiar, it would be difficult for us to enlarge our arms package at this time. There are very real restraints in terms of quantities on what we can offer at any one time. We cannot ignore strong congressional and public feeling against (a) the supply of arms to countries where economic resources are so limited and (b) where we appear to be arming both sides of a conflict. These same restraints have influenced our response to Israeli requests as well. There is also genuine concern within the USG that Jordan's military establishment not be drastically disproportionate to its economic capacity to finance such an establishment. However irrelevant such considerations may seem to be to the King's immediate problem, these are facts of life with which we have to deal. Notwithstanding, we have offered him as an earnest of our support such politically sensitive items as tanks, planes, artillery and ammunition. 4. We should also bear in mind that our offer is the beginning of a renewed military supply relationship. It seeks to meet Jordan's legitimate military requirements as we see them at this juncture and as we are able to provide. We will be prepared to review Jordan's equipment requirements during the first annual review to be held within the next few months. In addition, he has been given strong assurances of support from the United States (State's 113645). 5 Such assurances should not be taken lightly. 5. In the circumstances, we believe that the King should accept our offer in the context and spirit in which it was made. To solve his immediate problem with his army, the important thing is for him to get on with the re-equipping of that army. You should make this clear in your talks with him. In addition to the above, you may wish to use the following points in your talks. 6. We understand why King is impatient and are aware of the urgency of his problems. He should realize, however, that senior levels of USG were faced with other serious problems concerning Vietnam and Korea during the period that General Khammash was in Washington. Our decisions in respect to Far East are serious matter not only for us but for entire international community. Since we are not a totalitarian government decisions on matters of wide political interest (such as supplying major combat items to Jordan) cannot be made overnight. In fact, in light of the other problems we were facing at the time, our decision to resume substantial arms shipments to Jordan, given the political problems created for us by Jordan's participation in the June hostilities, was reached relatively quickly. 7. In meeting our political problems, it is important to us that the total package be phased over 2-1/2 years and in establishing a delivery schedule we must take into consideration relative priorities for Vietnam where our troops are actively engaged in combat operations. The following is our initial assessment of delivery dates. We are now attempting to obtain higher priorities for some of these items. F-104 aircraft: FY 1968 M48A1 Tanks: 1st and 2nd half FY 1969 105 mm Howitzers: 2nd half FY 1969 M113 APC's: 2nd half FY 1970 106 mm Recoilless Rifles: 25 Units FY 1968, 113 units 2nd half FY 1969 40 mm AA SP: 2nd half FY 1969 50 cal. quad AA: 1st half FY 1969 2-1/2 ton trucks: 25 units FY 1968, 15 units 1st half FY 1970 Miscellaneous vehicles: 2nd half FY 1969 Ammunition: $8 million FY 1968, $4.8 million 1st half FY 1970 Miscellaneous Small Arms: $.8 million in FY 1968, $.8 million 1st half FY 1969, $.4 2nd half FY 1969 8. In discussing these delivery schedules you may wish to point out that the King, by accepting our offer, can initiate a steady flow in the months ahead of military equipment for Jordan. As a first step the undelivered MAP FY 1966-67 and the balance of ground force equipment sold to Jordan in 1965 can be ready for shipment in the next 60-90 days. Although these categories do not contain such glamour items as tanks or artillery they do contain important communications equipment, some vehicles, ammunition and vitally needed spares for tanks, vehicles and weapons. The memorandum of understanding listed only general categories for vehicles, small arms, ammunition, spare parts, communications and engineer equipment. You may wish to be more specific. For example, the package includes 7,105 calibre 30 rifles; 1802 carbines; 732 calibre 30 machine guns; 398 calibre 50 machine guns; 1240 vehicles of 1 to 3 tons, approximately $8 million for engineer equipment and various radios, telephones, switchboards, field wire, test sets, and $12 million worth of ammunition. 9. You may also wish to point out that the Jordanians have apparently given no consideration to the rate at which the equipment requested by Khammash can be effectively absorbed into their military establishment. 10. On the subject of aircraft, we find the Jordanian reaction difficult to understand. General Khammash told the negotiating team that he wanted a supersonic multi-purpose plane but also made clear that he wanted a type which could intercept high level MACH 2 intruders. FYI. He told General Wheeler he wanted F-104's. End FYI. With the negotiating teams he refused to specify the American aircraft he had in mind. When pressed he replied, “It is for you to choose which of your aircraft is most suitable for our needs.” The F-104, in addition to being an excellent high level interceptor, can be converted to carry out a tactical ground support mission. Conversion kits to add a bomb carrying capability were included in the original sales contract. The A-4 on the other hand has practically no air defense capability. It is a subsonic attack bomber. The F-5 is a possible substitute but Jordan would then lose a substantial part of the $10 million they have already paid on the F-104's. In addition, the delivery time would be much longer, perhaps 18 to 24 months. We were given clearly to understand by General Khammash that delivery time on aircraft was extremely important to him. We therefore designed a package that together with the 18 Hawker Hunters he anticipates receiving from the UK, would give him 36 good planes to fly, off Jordan's own airfields, before the end of this calendar year. If some other Arab state, such as Saudi Arabia, were willing to foot the bill, we would have no objection to Jordan purchasing Lightnings or Mirages, but they would cost two or three times as much as the F-104's with uncertain delivery times. 11. Given Jordan's present comfortable reserve position and relatively large balances of unused donations we do not believe that any credit should now be offered for arms purchases. We understand that Jordan's longer range economic future is a matter of concern to the GOJ and we are willing to discuss financing of the latter part of our package during the annual reviews. FYI. We also feel that insistence on cash injects a healthy note of self discipline into the Jordanian appetite for military equipment. End FYI. 6 12. Our comments on the King's suggested revisions for the memorandum of understanding follow in septel. 7 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wiley and Houghton on February 19; cleared by Battle, Davies, and Murray in DOD/ISA; and approved by Under Secretary Katzenbach. 2 See Document 82 and footnote 5 thereto. 3 In telegram 3419 from Amman, February 14, the Embassy suggested revisions to the proposed arms package for Jordan, including a larger package in line with Jordanian requests, but conditioned on Jordan finding other sources of cash or credit to pay for the package, presumably from Saudi Arabia. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 4 See footnote 4, Document 82 . 5 Document 77 . 6 Symmes responded on February 21 that he would use the arguments outlined in this telegram when he met with King Hussein and General Khammash on February 22. He asked, however, if he could introduce more flexibility into the U.S. offer. He noted that there had been no negotiations in Washington with Khammash, who had been given the U.S. offer and told to take it back to Jordan to discuss with the King. Symmes expressed concern that if he took the position he was instructed to take, the King might feel he was being confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it offer that did not take into account his difficult situation. Symmes suggested that the offer of an additional 12 tanks might make a critical difference. (Telegram 3527 from Amman; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) The Department replied that the negotiating position outlined in telegram 118025 was the preferred starting point in discussions with the Jordanian Government. If additional flexibility seemed indicated, the U.S. offer might include an additional 12 tanks as Symmes had suggested. (Telegram 119271 to Amman, February 22; ibid.) 7 In telegram 117988 to Amman, February 20, the Department assessed and accepted most of King Hussein's proposed changes to the draft memorandum of understanding. Some of the provisions in the memorandum, such as the requirement for prior U.S. approval before Jordan purchased major military equipment items from other sources and the provision for U.S. approval of the Jordanian defense budget were inserted to meet the stipulations of the Conte and Symington Amendments and could not be deleted without affecting the U.S. ability to continue economic assistance to Jordan. The Department suggested that a separate classified agreement covering these matters might meet Hussein's concern about showing the basic agreement to his army or other Arabs. (Ibid.) 90. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 90. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, February 21, 1968, 0131Z. 118628. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: Tel Aviv 2589; 2 Cairo 1675. 3 1. Dept believes that formula Eban gave Jarring (Tel Aviv reftel) and which we assume by now Jarring has put to UAR meets any legitimate concerns and doubts which UAR may have had. We therefore want you to see appropriate UAR officials immediately, once you have ascertained that Jarring has in fact conveyed formula to UAR, pressing Egyptians to accept latest Israeli formulation. We were deeply concerned about UAR attitude reflected in most recent Riad presentation to Bergus, particularly unwillingness to indicate clearly and categorically that negotiations would be undertaken (we do not mean direct negotiations here) to get at specifics of SC resolution in toto and to move towards “agreement” mentioned in para 3 of SC resolution. We believe Bergus should bore in strongly to this effect since UAR seems to hold view that all that is required is “respect and implementation” of SC resolution, apparently without any explicit recognition that negotiations (discussions) are required in order to achieve agreement on specific elements, i.e., withdrawal, secure and recognized boundaries, end of belligerency, freedom of passage, demilitarization, refugees, etc., all of which resolution mentions specifically. 2. Bergus should make clear to UAR that, while we agree that there has been unfortunate amount of semantical jockeying with various formulations, present lack of clarity in UAR responses casts doubt on Egyptian willingness to face fact that some form of negotiations is necessary in order to come to an understanding. As follow up to Goldberg talk with El Kony Feb 19, Bergus should press for Egyptian acceptance of Bunche-Rhodes formula. 3. As to possible SC action on any aspect of ME problem, we feel that this would represent a serious setback to efforts being made by Jarring, would not achieve constructive results, and would only produce futile repetition of long, drawn-out propaganda statements carrying all concerned further away from prospect of peace. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Davies, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and USUN. 2 In telegram 2589 from Tel Aviv, February 20, the Embassy transmitted the Foreign Office text of a statement of the Israeli position on the implementation of Resolution 242, as conveyed by Eban to Jarring during their February 19 conversation. The statement emphasized the importance of “meaningful” negotiations between Israel and the Arab states to move toward a lasting peace in the area, and indicated that Israel was willing to have such negotiations at a meeting convened by Jarring, suggesting a format for the negotiations similar to that used at Rhodes in 1949. (Ibid.) The text of the Israeli statement, as conveyed by Eban to Jarring on February 19, is printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations , Vol. VIII, U Thant, 1968-1971 , pp. 516-517. 3 Document 86 . 4 Bergus reported on February 22 that in a meeting with Mohamed Riad on February 21 he made the demarche as instructed. Riad responded that the UAR position was that it was prepared to discuss and negotiate through Jarring. (Telegram 1713 from Cairo; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 91. Memorandum for the Record 91. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, February 21, 1968. SUBJECT National Security Council Meeting on the Near East, February 21, 1968 PARTICIPANTS The President The Vice President Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler Director, U.S. Information Agency, Leonard Marks Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms Under Secretary of the Treasury, Joseph W. Barr Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Price Daniel Assistant Secretary of State, Lucius D. Battle President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Walt Rostow Executive Secretary, Mr. Bromley Smith Nathaniel Davis Harold H. Saunders This meeting evolved in three installments. Because the President was involved with UN Secretary General U Thant at the appointed hour, the meeting began in the Situation Room under the chairmanship of the Vice President. Then word came that the President would soon be available, and the Council adjourned to the Cabinet Room where further informal discussion took place before the President's arrival. Then the President came in and the discussion continued in a more formal way. I. Mr. Katzenbach summarized the US position in the Middle East by saying that there is no blinking the fact that US influence in the area has been deteriorating. Conversely, Soviet influence has been increasing. He suggested discussing this problem under two headings-our relations with the countries of the Near East and Soviet intentions toward the area. Speaking of our relations with the Arab world, he noted that we would have suffered some loss of influence had there been no Arab-Israeli war. He cited as the reason for this the natural growth of Arab nationalism and “the general changing face of the world.” This was complicated by the US-Israeli relationship and by the extent to which Congress had restricted the resources available for use in the area. In the face of these restrictions, we have “very little elbow room.” Turning to Soviet intentions, he noted that there is not total agreement on just what Moscow is up to. The Russians themselves may not have a clear picture of their strategy. Obviously, they want to see the US position deteriorate and theirs improve, yet without a US-USSR confrontation. Over the past year, they have played their hand in the Middle East in a more traditional diplomatic way. They have done certain things to capitalize on the upheaval last June, but they have also shown some hesitancy in involving themselves in inter-Arab quarrels. They have also sought to improve the military facilities available to them in the area. In short, they are not taking any losses, but they are not jumping in with both feet either. What can we do? Mr. Katzenbach felt there would not be a great problem if the Jarring mission succeeds. If that happened, some of the Congressional restraints would be relaxed, and we would be able to keep some influence in the Arab world. He would not put chances of Jarring's success particularly high, but because of the serious consequences for us if Jarring fails, we should put everything we have into making it succeed. He recognized the risk of backing a failing effort but he felt that if Jarring fails we will be left with a situation that is “absolutely intolerable.” He pointed out that this raises serious questions about what we should do if Jarring fails. These are not questions that need to be settled now, but they are serious. He concluded by pointing out that there are natural limitations on Soviet ability to increase influence in the area. He felt the normal situation in the Middle East would be for us both to be operating there. Mr. Battle added that we are, in addition to these problems, also faced with the British withdrawal from the area and the consequent decline of general Western influence in the Middle East. Mr. Rostow reported that he had just had a talk with Ralph Bunche. Bunche, as a veteran of Rhodes, thinks that Jarring is now in a position to declare that all parties accept the UN resolution and to invite them to a meeting on Cyprus. Bunche recognized from his own experience that tactically and in substance Jerusalem is the most explosive issue. If it came to the Security Council now, it could destroy Jarring's effort. Operationally, aside from nudging the UAR and Israel toward talks, the big question for us is when and at what level we lean on Israel on Jerusalem. Mr. Katzenbach opined that Jerusalem in the Security Council would be less likely to sabotage the Jarring mission if Jarring is conducting talks. Mr. Battle pointed out that the danger is that Jerusalem will come to the Security Council just at a point when the Jarring mission appears to be near a breakdown. He would like to see Israel stop all activities in Jerusalem which make it appear that Israel is steadily incorporating former Jordanian Jerusalem into the Israeli sector. Mr. Marks asked how hard we had leaned on Israel. Mr. Battle indicated that we had leaned quite hard for accepting the UN resolution. At that point word came that the group should move to the Cabinet Room, and Mr. Battle did not have a chance to answer the question as it related to Jerusalem. II. In the informal discussion which continued around the Cabinet table while the Council waited for the President, Mr. Battle and the Vice President discussed our relations with Nasser. The Vice President said that we had tried to get along with Nasser but he had finally concluded that “Nasser just did not like us.” Mr. Battle felt that the reason for the failure of our policy 1962-1965 was that we had mounted a policy that we could not sustain without Nasser's cooperation. As long as Nasser made speeches lambasting the US, we could not hope to win Congressional support for a policy of supporting him. The Vice President questioned whether we should resume relations and thereby tend to support Nasser's continuation in office. He felt there were people in the area who would know how to “bring Nasser down.” Mr. Battle suggested that we were not sure that leaders who followed would not be worse, although there were still pro-Western people around Nasser to whom we would still like to hold out a hand. The Vice President then noted the difficulty of explaining to the American Jewish community how much we had done over the past year in support of Israel. He felt that stories of our plane sales had not reached the average member of the Jewish community and that many members felt that we were pursuing a half-hearted policy toward Israel. III. At this point the President entered and Mr. Rostow summarized the discussion to this point. The President noted that Eugene Black had reported to him that our position in the Near East was deteriorating. Mr. Black had recommended more contact with Nasser. He had recommended, in reference to the false charges levied against us last June, that we accept the idea that Nasser had been misinformed. Unless we do, resumption of relations is hopeless. Mr. Katzenbach said that we were prepared to resume relations if we had an opportunity. We did not expect too much to follow from resumption of relations. He felt that perhaps the problem of the “big lie” would be taken care of by Mr. Attwood's interview with Nasser in Look magazine. 2 Mr. Battle pointed out that we still want Nasser to take the initiative in resuming relations, and the President did not disagree. The President asked whether we were any nearer to working out some arrangements with the USSR on arms limitation, or is that in limbo? Mr. Katzenbach said it was pretty much in limbo. Ambassador Thompson had talked with Kosygin, and Secretary Rusk had raised the matter with Ambassador Dobrynin the previous Thursday. The President said that he had “played for time” with the Israelis. He had hoped before Secretary McNamara left to have discussions on the ABM with the Soviet Union. He felt that Kosygin had agreed at Glassboro to have such discussions. A brief exchange followed on exactly what Kosygin had agreed to at Glassboro. The President felt that he had pressed over and over for a date to begin these discussions. He said that he had just talked to U Thant about achieving some sort of arms limitation and about registering with the UN arms shipments to the Middle East. He said all he had done at the Ranch with Prime Minister Eshkol was to postpone our decision in hopes that some of this could take place. Did anybody have any suggestions? Mr. Katzenbach felt that a good deal depends on Ambassador Jarring. If he succeeds, then arms limitation can be discussed. The President asked whether there was any chance that Jarring would succeed. Mr. Katzenbach felt that the chances were “less than even.” Secretary McNamara said he was “very pessimistic” and rated chances for his success as perhaps “one in four.” Mr. McNamara further noted the shortage of US resources for this area. He felt that the Middle East should be given very high priority for our resources. When the President asked whether this would be from existing funds or from a supplemental appropriation, Mr. McNamara said both, but felt that, as far as Defense was concerned, needs could be met largely from existing appropriations. Mr. McNamara and Mr. Barr noted that the Export-Import Bank had come out very well and that some arms could be sold on Ex-Im credits with support in both the Senate and the House. When Mr. McNamara said that we should not let a few dollars stand in our way, the President said he would “not object to a little more money.” The President concluded the meeting by suggesting that we do three things: 1. He asked that the Vice President and the Secretary of State be fully briefed on Eugene Black's report. 3 Then State should pursue the resumption of relations with Nasser. 2. State and Defense should get together an estimate of resources we should need if the worst happened-appropriations that we would need if Jarring's mission failed. 3. We should go back to Ambassador Thompson and instruct him to talk further with the Soviets about arms limitation and ABMs. We should also urge reporting arms shipments to the UN. We should make it clear to the USSR that if they act unilaterally, we would have no choice but to do the same. The meeting adjourned. Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab 64. Secret. Drafted on February 26. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 12:37 p.m. (Ibid.) 2 On March 19 Look published the text of an interview with Nasser in which William Attwood posed a question concerning the UAR accusation that U.S. planes had participated in the Israeli attack on the UAR during the June war. Nasser said that the UAR had merely repeated information he had received in a telephone call from King Hussein. In response to another question, Nasser agreed that the accusation resulted from suspicion and faulty information. 3 Document 80 . 92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 24, 1968, 1908Z. 120292. 1. During call Feb 23 on Under Secretary Rostow, Israeli Ambassador-Designate Rabin made presentation along following lines: A. USSR influence in Middle East had increased. Soviets wanted neither real settlement nor renewal of hostilities and were seeking to follow policy of step-by-step blackmail. Their tactic was to separate elements of Security Council resolution and deal with it in phases. Israel believed, however, that if it withdrew without settlement nothing would be achieved. B. Important thing was to bring Arabs to negotiations. Once that accomplished all could be settled. Recalling his experience during 1949 Rhodes negotiations, Rabin said it had not mattered that discussions began in separate rooms. Once under way, parties were soon sitting at same table. C. While UAR was playing its hand cleverly, seeking implementation by unilateral actions, Rabin believed Egyptians engaged in psychological warfare and did not really want to scuttle Jarring mission. Israel continued to hope that view would be accepted that all elements of resolution must be dealt with together. 2. Rostow commented that GOI and USG remained united on fundamental question of peace. Issues on which we had problems would come up and have to be dealt with in negotiations. UAR had torpedoed possibility of phased solution by linking Canal passage with refugee problem. Jarring mission had been delayed by unnecessary preoccupation with question of “acceptance” of resolution. We had thought a simple formula could be found which could protect Israeli position. This problem may now in any case have been overcome since according our latest information from Cairo, UAR seemed to be accepting idea of talks on Cyprus. If this true, Jarring would be reporting it to GOI and we did not want to get in middle. 3. Rabin asked whether this meant “direct negotiations.” Rostow said it did not mean meeting in the same room but thought that would come in time. What Jarring wanted now was to get parties to Cyprus. To Rostow's comment that we had done our best to make clear the importance of “accepting” resolution, Rabin replied that this problem now solved. Rostow said it was our understanding that Jarring would now try to produce piece of paper himself for parties to accept. 4. Rostow noted question had arisen whether Russians controlled situation in UAR. Rabin said he did not think so; Nasser had freedom of action to decide if he had will to do so. 5. Rostow noted we were concerned about situation in Jordan. Hussein was in trouble because of his statement on terrorism and, while he wanted to move toward settlement, did not dare do so alone. Rabin replied that hopefully Hussein had learned at last that, if he wanted to survive, he must control terrorism. Admitting that Hussein faced risk either way, Rabin thought on balance control of terrorism would increase Hussein chances of surviving since, if terrorists got upper hand, Hussein would eventually lose control of country. Hussein must make clear to Jordanian people that in the end they are the victims of terrorism. If Hussein exerted sufficient force, he could survive. 6. On Syria, Rabin said no one could be sure what was happening there. He speculated, however, that removal of Chief of Staff Sweidani, while not reflecting trend toward moderation, could represent attempt to check further leftward swing. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret, Exdis. Drafted by Atherton on February 23, cleared by Davies and H. Eugene Bovis, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, and USUN. 93. Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States 93. Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States 1 Moscow, February 27, 1968. In the oral message, conveyed through Ambassador Thompson on January 22, you touched upon the question, which has been already within our sight and on which the position of the USSR was laid down in the Soviet draft resolution of the Security Council of November 20, 1967, concerning the questions of political settlement in the Middle East. Had the Government of the United States wished to put the discussion of this matter on the practical plane then a proper opportunity would have been presented by the provisions of the Soviet draft, which stated, in particular, about taking measures for limitation of useless and wasteful arms race on the condition of withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories. The Soviet Government, as before, agrees under certain conditions to an exchange of views on the question of limiting the delivery of arms to the Middle East and would be ready to discuss this matter with the leaders of the friendly Arab states. However, we are deeply convinced that the main link of the whole complicated knot of the Middle East problems does not lie now in this. The clue to a settlement of the present crisis in the Middle East is in the speediest withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories, in the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression. You will agree, Mr. President, that it would be pointless to speak of ending arms race in the Middle East while Israel, using armed force, is retaining and even trying to secure the occupation of Arab territories seized by her. Certainly, if the United States also adopted the position answering the interests of peace in the Middle East and supported the legitimate demands for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops to the lines existed before June 5, 1967, Israel would—and there is no doubt about it—release the seized territories, the Suez canal would be opened and the unsolved problems would be settled. There can be neither peace nor political settlement in the Middle East without the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. This is the first and basic point regarding which there must be full clarity. Without it the wishes for the limitation of arms race in the Middle East have no real ground. So long as the Israeli leaders, enjoying the support from the outside, adhere to the position of annexation of the Arab territories the friends of the Arab countries and the partisans of lasting peace in the Middle East will help the victims of aggression, since in doing so they are fulfilling their duty in accordance with the U.N. Charter and the interests of maintaining peace. At the same time we would like to stress at this instance again that, as before, we are firmly standing for lessening tension in the Middle East, for turning this area into a zone of lasting peace, and no one should have any doubts about that. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 64, 2/22-29/68. No classification marking. A note on the message indicates that it is an unofficial translation. This message, conveyed by Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Rusk on February 27 as an oral message, was a reply to the message conveyed to the Soviet Government by Ambassador Thompson on January 22 (see Document 58 ). A memorandum of Rusk's subsequent conversation with Dobrynin concerning the prospects for a peace settlement in the Middle East is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 64, 2/22-29/68. 94. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 94. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 29, 1968, 2:40 p.m. SUBJECT The Israelis Say They Need More Aircraft You should know that the Israelis are claiming that a major change is taking place in Soviet-Egyptian military relations. They believe that 50 or more Soviet pilots are now flying with the Egyptians, that the Russians are in the process of taking over the air defense system, and that arrangements have been made for sending five more squadrons of MIG-21's to Egypt. From this information they conclude that Israel is losing its air superiority, and the Air Force commander is talking in terms of needing a hundred more planes. So far, they haven't made any formal request. The Israelis are making the strongest possible case out of the information, but if their facts are right, it isn't a bad case. Our intelligence people are unable to confirm what the Israelis are telling us, but they admit that Israeli sources could be better than ours. They are trying to get a clearer picture, but at this point they just don't know whether the Israelis are telling the truth. 2 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VIII, Cables and Memos, 12/67-2/68. Secret; Limdis. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:45 p.m. 2 A handwritten note by Rostow reads: “Tell Israel they better work out peace plan.” This comment apparently was the President's response to this memorandum. 95. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 95. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, March 1, 1968, 1510Z. 3648. Subject: Jordan arms. Ref: Amman 3570. 2 1. Summary: Gen Khammash has confirmed that they wish to leave F-104s in the package and are ready to sign, assuming the adjustments requested in the ground package will be granted. It appears that the arguments supplied by the Department and which we have been using in favor of F-104s have borne fruit. These have been reinforced by the apparent unwillingness of Faisal to help on aircraft and by favorable reports on the F-104 obtained from the Pakistanis. Khammash now asks only for reassurance that the $2.8 million ground control system included in our package will be adequate. (Khammash still does not wish to have the F-104's stationed in Jordan and superficially combat ready at too early a date.) Request therefore that F-104 aircraft portion be left in whatever rewrite of memo of understanding is being done. 2. Elaborating on the foregoing, Khammash explained that basic problem of Jordan's acceptance of F-104 aircraft has been negative feeling among Jordanian pilots towards this model. Crash of two 104s during College Run project last year, against background of German air force losses, confirmed their suspicions F-104 was unsafe aircraft. 3. Khammash said he had been doing some quiet propaganda on his own in favor of F-104 over past several weeks. He sent Jordanian Air Force Chief Colonel Kurdi to Pakistan last weekend to discuss F-104s with Paks. Kurdi, who had been dubious both about safety of this plane and whether it would serve Jordanian purposes, returned with considerably less negative outlook. He also brought news that Paks had said they would try to be helpful should Jordanians need any extra indoctrination and on the job training or maintenance. 4. Khammash said his trip earlier this week to Saudi Arabia (Amman 3570) had made him very dubious that Faisal would be willing to underwrite purchases of Mirage aircraft or turn Saudi Lightnings over to Jordan. Further argument Khammash had adduced for the F-104s, therefore, in session Feb 29 with King and Kurdi was economy. Lacking assurance from Faisal that Saudi Arabia would assist and in view probability Jordan stood to lose several million dollars already paid down on F-104 training and rehabilitation, he argued Kingdom could not afford to choose any other model. 5. In course of several hours meeting Feb 29 with King and Kurdi, foregoing points had been discussed as well as aircraft availabilities and costs. It was decided that it was essential Jordan should be able to state it was getting aircraft in relatively near future. Fact that delivery time for Mirages and Lightnings could be as much as three years away would seriously diminish credibility of King's posture that he doing utmost to re-equip Jordanian armed forces. (Khammash, however, made clear to Emboff that he continued to have some doubts as to advisability having F-104s stationed in Jordan as early as this summer both because he might be expected to use them and because the airfields and ground control equipment would not be ready and personnel fully qualified.) 6. Kurdi conceded that given all these arguments and his trip to Pakistan he felt with careful indoctrination of Jordanian pilots, which should include orientation visits to USA and Pakistan, the pilots could be brought around to accept this aircraft. He therefore would withdraw his objection to acquisition of F-104s. King said that this change in Kurdi's position removed his, Hussein's, only serious objection to the F-104. Hussein said he would not have forced an unacceptable aircraft on Jordan's air force: to do so would only create further problems. Khammash, Kurdi, and Hussein thereupon agreed to accept F-104s and carry out further pilot indoctrination to increase the pilots' confidence in the aircraft. Khammash said he hoped we would help out in this indoctrination because there could be a lingering problem if not resolved. 7. Khammash said he had only one outstanding question in connection with aircraft sale. In regard to $2.8 million ground control radar system for F-104 and Hawker Hunter aircraft which we had undertaken to supply, he said he would like insurance that this system would be adequate to do the job and not just a shoestring operation tailored to fit Jordan's budget. He said it was in neither Jordan's nor US interest to attempt to operate F-104s with deficient ground control system. 8. Recommendation: That aircraft not be deleted from whatever rewrite of memorandum of understanding may be in process. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 2 Telegram 3570 from Amman, February 24, reported on a February 23 meeting between Symmes and General Khammash during which Khammash made counterproposals to Symmes' presentation of the previous day. Symmes concluded that “we may be over the hump” if the United States could agree to limited increases in tanks and anti-aircraft artillery. Symmes felt it would also be necessary to help Jordan get additional financial assistance from Saudi Arabia to help meet the costs of Jordan's military requirements. (Ibid.) 96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 2, 1968, 0307Z. 123868. Ref: State 114277. 2 1. Ambassador Rabin February 29 delivered Eban's reply 3 to Secretary's letter of February 13. Summary follows. Text by pouch. 2. Jarring mission and modalities—Eban summarizes Israeli steps to advance Jarring mission, including agenda for peace, their most recent language on acceptance of UNSC Res and their willingness for Jarring to convene parties according to Rhodes formula of 1949. Eban agrees interruption of Jarring mission by UN debate would be unfortunate but adds Israel on basis its record would face world opinion in confident mood. 3. Eban emphasizes it would be counterproductive to pursue semantic wrangle any further on acceptance of UNSC Res. In his opinion UAR has either raised this issue as parliamentary or propaganda maneuver or as means of securing parallel, informal, and noncommittal implementation of Resolution without direct negotiations, agreement or recognition. Eban says Israel insists on (1) face-to-face negotiations, (2) contractual agreement, and (3) permanent peace, not mere suspension of belligerency. 4. In accepting Rhodes formula, Eban says Israel would not allow its representative to go to Cyprus hotel for purpose of being ostracized and shunned by Arabs but would expect to meet them together and constantly with Jarring. At Rhodes in 1949, Eban asserts, UN Representative firmly insisted on latter procedure. 5. Jerusalem—Eban reiterates Israeli position that Jerusalem should not again be divided but does not foreclose hopes of meaningful accommodation to any legitimate interest. “In conversation with Ambassador Barbour on 14 July 1967, 4 Prime Minister Eshkol indicated a possible opening.” (We cannot locate report of this conversation here and would appreciate transmission of identifying reference or Embassy's record.) Eban also refers to possible access agreement with Jordan. Criticizing GOJ behavior in former Jordanian sector of Jerusalem Eban rejects Jordan's search for veto on municipal development while refusing negotiations and agreement. Eban suggests Jordan would benefit with respect to Jerusalem and regional cooperation from direct talks with Israel. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Precht on March 1; cleared by Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Betty Jane Jones (IO/UNP), Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer, Atherton, Bovis, and Wiley; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 2 Document 79 . 3 The full text of Eban's reply was forwarded to Rusk on March 1 under cover of a joint memorandum from Handley and Sisco. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 4 This conversation was summarized in telegram 167 from Tel Aviv, July 14, 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII) 97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 2, 1968, 0319Z. 123872. Ref: State's 114277; 2 USUN 3926. 3 From Secretary for Ambassador. 1. I fully concur in Ambassador Goldberg's recommendations concerning Jerusalem. Please call on FonMin Eban and reiterate to him the conviction I expressed in my recent letter (State reftel) that great restraint is required in Israel's policies respecting Jerusalem. This conviction has been reinforced both by the somewhat improved prospects for meaningful negotiations under Jarring's aegis and by the increasing sense of frustration over Jerusalem on the part of the Arabs which continues to jeopardize this hopeful trend. According to our information, Israel has continued with expropriations of land and with the related new construction projects in the eastern part of Jerusalem. It is precisely these activities, however, which understandingly give rise to concerns that the character of this part of Jerusalem is being irrevocably changed and that the possibilities of negotiating about its future are being foreclosed. I believe, therefore, that a suspension of the expropriation proceedings and of the related construction is essential to preserve a situation in which negotiation about the Middle East problem as a whole can take place. I strongly urge that the Government of Israel take this important step, in addition to refraining from any new measures which prejudice the future of Jerusalem. 2. You should inform Eban that I have just received his reply 4 to my letter and will of course study it carefully. On first reading, however, although I welcome his indication that concerning Jerusalem Israel does not “foreclose hopes of a meaningful accommodation to any legitimate interests,” I continue to believe that without the steps we are asking Israel to take, chances for the settlement Israel is working to achieve will be seriously jeopardized. 5 3. In addition foregoing presentation, you should make points suggested by Ambassador Goldberg in para 2 USUN 3936. You may also wish to use legal analysis of Israel's action contained para 3 Deptel 116833. 6 4. Amman authorized to inform GOJ of this demarche. British Ambassador raised question of Jerusalem with me February 26 and we are also informing him. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Day and Precht; cleared by Sisco, Leonard C. Meeker, Davies, Houghton, Atherton, and Bovis; and approved by Secretary Rusk. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, and USUN. 2 Document 79 . 3 The reference is in error. The correct reference is telegram 3936 from USUN, February 28. With an eye to facilitating the success of the Jarring Mission and preventing an appeal by Jordan to the UN Security Council on the issue of Jerusalem, Goldberg recommended that the United States should “weigh in decisively and at a high level” with Israel to suspend all expropriation and construction activities in occupied Jerusalem. Goldberg suggested that the United States point out to Israel that these were unilateral acts that were undermining the Jarring Mission. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 4 See Document 96 . 5 In telegram 123937 to Tel Aviv for the Ambassador from the Secretary, Rusk put forward another argument, instructing Barbour to remind Eban of U.S. cooperation with Israel in seeking an equitable solution to Middle Eastern problems. It would, Rusk felt, be difficult to continue to do so if the United States continued to be subjected to surprise announcements concerning Jerusalem that adversely affected the hopes for peace. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 6 Not found. 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, March 2, 1968, 1546Z. 123889. Subj: Jarring Mission. Summary: Ambassador Dobrynin says USSR does not wish Arab-Israel crisis return to Security Council. Wants to work with US to find practical means implement resolution. Suggested it be done in stages. Rostow welcomed USSR willingness to work with US to help parties find solution but insisted resolution was package and negotiations of some kind necessary to work out details. 1. Dobrynin invited Rostow to lunch on Feb. 23. Dobrynin said he would first report what UAR had told Soviet Union about Jarring talks in Cairo Feb 21. Dobrynin said they are routinely supplied with verbatim report of meetings. Jarring said he had been unable get from Israelis clear acceptance of Security Council Resolution, and promise to respect and implement it. Egyptians said they told Jarring they accepted resolution as a whole, and would carry it out fully. In reply to Jarring's question about negotiating procedures, they said they were now negotiating with Israelis through Jarring, and refused answer categorically whether they would engage in indirect negotiations on Nicosia. While they did not quite exclude possibility, they would not answer question in absence of Israeli acceptance of resolution equivalent to one they had given Jarring. Jarring said he was near despair about mission, but would make one final try with Israelis before reporting to Security Council.UAR was talking about returning to Security Council and General Assembly. Soviet Union was concerned about these possibilities. Dobrynin thought we and they should work with parties to facilitate success of Jarring, both in present procedural impasse and on substantive issues at later point. Naturally, Israelis' refusal to undertake to respect and implement resolution gave rise to Arab suspicions both about Israel's attitude and US attitude. 2. Rostow welcomed Dobrynin's assurance Soviet Union did not want matter returned to Security Council and General Assembly, but wanted to work with us and parties to facilitate Jarring's effort. He agreed frank discussions between us on these subjects could clear away suspicions and misunderstandings, and therefore be helpful. Answering Dobrynin's question, Rostow said in our view whole exercise about “accepting” the resolution was metaphysical irrelevance, which had delayed process of peace dangerously. We assumed all parties had “accepted” resolution when it was passed, in sense of agreeing to work under it. But Arab insistence on words “respect and implement” had given rise to suspicions they were seeking settlement like that of 1957, without negotiations among parties and without engagement. After what had happened in 1967, this procedure was out of question. Resolution in our view was not self-implementing. It required agreement on part of parties—as to frontiers, security arrangements, and other matters. We did not see how it could be implemented unless there were negotiations-or, if that word was cabalistic to Arabs, discussions among parties looking to agreements called for by resolution. From our talks in Cairo, we had impression Egyptians have been stressing word “implement” rather than “accept” precisely in order to avoid negotiations. We did not insist on direct negotiations. We had relied on Nasser's public statement he would engage in negotiations like those in Rhodes, i.e., discussions with Israelis in presence of Jarring. UAR Ambassadors had made same point to us and to British. On basis of those statements, we had urged Israelis to agree to procedure, and they had done so, publicly and to Jarring. We and British thought some such procedure was indispensable. Present confusion illustrated its value. We were working in dark, on basis of ex parte reports of talks with Jarring, which might or might not be accurate. We all had great stake in Jarring's success. We were evidently agreed that nothing but trouble could come from return to Security Council. Why should we allow others to drag us into troubles we did not want? It was our appraisal of the situation that if it were clear UAR would engage in substantive negotiations, in Rhodes pattern, on real problems under resolution-borders, security arrangements, refugees-semantic difficulties about words used in “accepting” resolution could be overcome. 3. Dobrynin said he didn't see why so much stress was put on meetings in Nicosia, and he couldn't understand why Israelis, who were such clever people, made so much difficulty about accepting resolution. Egyptians had assured Soviets they would deal with every issue mentioned in resolution. That should be sufficient assurance to Israelis and to us that all issues would be taken up. Dobrynin clearly was not fighting hard on the Nicosia issue, but he did not undertake to press Egyptians on it, either. Dobrynin then asked for our views on how resolution could be implemented, as a practical matter. Could it be done in stages? For example, would we favor an Israeli withdrawal from “territories occupied in recent conflict,” as called for under Article I of resolution, accompanied by recognition on part of Arabs of Israel's right to live, to be followed by negotiations on use of waterways, refugees, security arrangements. 4. Rostow said he could not speak for Israel, but we had favored any approach on which parties could agree for moving towards peace, and certainly would not exclude implementing agreement in stages. But he did not think scenario Dobrynin laid out was feasible, or complied with resolution as whole. We had favored approach which would have linked withdrawals to end of belligerency, but UAR had said it would not open canal to Israeli shipping until refugee problem was solved. We were willing to go along with that approach, which was that of Security Council Resolution. If UAR preferred package deal, we had no objections. Dobrynin said the UAR did prefer package deal, but maybe practicable way could be found to get some change in situation soon. Rostow said we would favor progressive steps towards peace. But resolution required agreement on “secure and recognized” boundaries, which, as practical matter, and as matter of interpreting resolution, had to precede withdrawals. Two principles were basic to Article I of resolution. Paragraph from which Dobrynin quoted was linked to others, and he did not see how anyone could seriously argue, in light of history of resolution in Security Council, withdrawal to borders of June 4th was contemplated. These words had been pressed on Council by Indians and others, and had not been accepted. 5. Dobrynin asked whether we thought solution of refugee problem was possible. Rostow said we thought it should not be too difficult, in context of peace. As he knew, Secretary thought refugees ought to be given some real choices, and not used as political hostages. Dobrynin said he supposed some refugees should emigrate to other countries. Rostow agreed. He would not exclude some repatriation or compensation, in right political atmosphere. 6. At end, Dobrynin stressed again risks of return to Security Council and other trouble and importance of cooperation between US and USSR to facilitate Jarring's mission. He said several times he would appreciate on personal and off-record basis, being briefed on Israeli version of talks with Jarring. Rostow had impression Soviets were as puzzled as we sometimes are by each side's confidence in Jarring's support for their view of problem. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bovis; cleared by Johnstone, Atherton, Houghton, and Davis; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Tel Aviv and Amman. 99. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 99. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, March 2, 1968, 1725Z. 3672. Subj: Letter from King Hussein to President Johnson. Ref: State 113645. 2 1. Following is text of letter dated March 2, 1968, addressed to President Johnson by King Hussein: 3 2. “Dear Mr. President: I am grateful for your personal message which preceded the return of General Khammash from his visit to Washington. 3. Our two countries have indeed enjoyed a warm, close and mutually beneficial relationship for a long period of time, and I am pleased to receive your assurances that it is in the United States policy and interest to continue this relationship with us and that the strains and problems created by the June war have not altered the United States fundamental policy towards Jordan. 4. The arms package, which General Khammash brought us in answer to our request and which was aimed at meeting our legitimate arms requirements, did indeed manifest a strong reaffirmation of your support. We, and in the face of the enormity of the problems that confront us, have every hope that this package, with some slight modifications, can finally be agreed upon, to enable us to overcome the current problems. 5. As for your unaltered and firm resolve to extend full diplomatic and political support to Ambassador Jarring to reach a just and durable settlement in the Middle East, I can assure you, Mr. President, that we have extremely high hopes that this valuable support may enable Ambassador Jarring to make progress in the pursuit of his mission. However, I regret to inform you, Mr. President, that I have become extremely disheartened by what appears to be lack of genuine interest in a just and durable peace by the Israelis. It is unfortunate that their victory should direct them to follow a very narrow and short-sighted approach. For though the Israelis have won a battle they seem unable to appreciate the fact that they have not won a war. This is manifested in their lack of clarity over the acceptance of the Security Council's resolution under the mandate of which Ambassador Jarring is pursuing his mission; in their arbitrary actions in defiance of a semi-unanimous United Nations resolution on Jerusalem; in their continuing actions aiming at major alterations in the city which, as you well know, Mr. President, does not belong to us alone but to all Arabs and Muslims who have enjoyed the privilege of being the proud custodians of the holy places within it since the time of the Khalifa Omar, over thirteen centuries ago; in compelling thousands upon thousands of people to continue to leave the areas acquired by Israel through aggression and to flee in the face of terror and persecution, thus adding an unimaginable strain to the already heavy burdens which we shoulder; and finally in their most recent decision to alter the status and even the name of the occupied West Bank, thus dealing a severe blow to the Jarring Mission and any chance of its success. Such actions do not create an atmosphere conducive to the laying of foundations for a just and durable peace and are in defiance of the United Nations through which Israel was created, and which has repeatedly called upon Israel to respect the rights of the people she persecuted and to permit them to return to their homes and land. 6. Furthermore, Israel has persisted in the use of brutal force and has constantly attacked our people on the East Bank of Jordan, inflicting heavy losses of life and property. Her ridiculous and totally incomprehensible excuse for doing all this is that I am not fulfilling my so-called duty of ensuring the safety and security of her forces which occupy a good portion of my country. Israel seems unwilling to understand that so long as she remains in such occupation she will be met by mounting resistance by the people under occupation and who are victims of her aggression. The sum total of all this is a great tragedy for peace and for those who believe that a just, honourable and durable peace can and must exist in this area, and a growing realisation that the chance of achieving such a peace which, in my opinion, is the first and last such chance, may be lost to all forever. 7. I hope my readings are wrong, although what I live and see makes me tend to believe that I am right. I am confident that you, Mr. President, will spare no effort to ensure that such a chance is not lost. 8. I must confess, Mr. President, that patient and optimistic as I am, I am beginning to have some doubts about the wisdom of continuing to be so. 9. I wish you, sir, the very best in surmounting the many difficulties that you face as leader of one of the world's greatest powers throughout this critical period in the history of mankind. I wish to share with you, Mr. President, your confidence that we can solve our problems and obtain the objective we both so fervently desire: a peaceful Middle East in which a united Jordan can continue to play its historic role. 10. With my best regards. (Signed) Hussein.” Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2 Document 77 . 3 The signed original of this letter was transmitted to Washington as an enclosure to airgram A-235 from Amman, March 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 JORDAN) 100. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 100. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 4, 1968. SUBJECT Concessions on Israel's PL 480 Agreement? Negotiations on Israel's PL 480 agreement begin Tuesday. The Israelis have made one final low-key pitch for concessions. I report it because it was made on instruction but I would be inclined to stick to our present position, because I think we can do so without creating a problem and because we're already making a major concession in having any PL 480 program at all for Israel. You will recall that, in approving the $27 million Israeli food sale, you decided that Israel should move this year to 100% dollar sale. The alternative was 75% dollar and 25% local currency. All of your advisers recommended a 100% dollar sale, and I recall your agreeing strongly that Israel “shouldn't be begging.” A less significant element in the normal terms for this kind of agreement is a 5% downpayment (in this case $1.35 million). We do waive this in some cases (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Congo, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea) and reduce it in others (Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan). No one sees any economic reason not to require the full 5% from Israel. Saturday, Eppie Evron “on instructions” from his Finance Minister asked us to reconsider reducing the dollar requirements to 75% and waiving the downpayment. He admitted, in making this pitch to Hal Saunders, that they weren't going to make a federal case of this. He acted like someone dutifully carrying out orders, knowing that the decision had been made. The one reason for making any concession would be to give them the sense that we're not being completely uncompromising. Eppie points out that they're already making the $200 million shift in reserves Eshkol promised and buying $50 million in commodities here for cash. All of your advisers are inclined to resist this final effort. But if you want to give a little I would recommend sticking to 100% dollar sale—the important issue-but reducing the downpayment requirement from 5% to 2.5%. This would be purely a gesture since the amount involved would be only $675,000. 2 Stick to approved terms 3 Reduce downpayment to 2.5% Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Confidential. A handwritten notation indicates the memorandum was received at 12:46 p.m. 2 The details of the P.L. 480 agreement were agreed upon in negotiating sessions between Israeli Embassy and Department of State officials on March 5 and March 12. Records of these negotiations are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15-4 ISR. Rostow secured President Johnson's approval on March 12 of an agreement that included 50,000 additional tons of feedgrain, bringing the value of the agreement to $30.2 million. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68) 3 President Johnson checked this option. 101. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 101. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, March 4, 1968. SUBJECT Resuming Relations with Nasser—The Issue Attwood's interview with Nasser will appear in the Look that comes out tomorrow. 2 You'll recall the President's instruction at the NSC to try to use this as a handle for resuming relations; he also agreed with Nick Katzenbach that we should leave the final formal initiative in the UAR's hands. Attached for our clearance is State's instruction to Don Bergus. 3 We are well down this track and everybody in-house instinctively feels it's the right one. However, in my talks of the past few days, I have seen the issue it raises posed more sharply than ever, and I'd like to review for a moment the two schools of argument and give you my thoughts on what this move will and won't net us. 1. We are most familiar with the feeling that we ought to restore relations with Cairo because that's the key to resuming normal relations with the rest of the Arab world. Along with this argument goes the feeling that we're just generally better off present than absent. Part of our concern is the belief that a US presence will give Nasser some Westward anchor against mounting Soviet influence. Some followers of this school may even feel that a US presence would give Nasser enough added confidence to get on with peace negotiations. Underlying all this is the estimate that Nasser has improved his position, and will be around for some time as no replacement is in sight. 2. The other school starts with a different estimate—that Nasser's days are clearly numbered . Some (like Morroe Berger) even go so far as to say that Nasser had run out of steam before the war, and the defeat was only the latest in a series of blunders. Adherents of this school feel that the sub-political levels of the GUAR want Nasser to fall and would regret any US action which would give him a temporary reprieve. They believe that he's too weak to make peace and that Egypt's economy won't progress any further until he goes. Some (like Evron) believe that only Nasser's passing will permit the change of Arab heart that is the prime requisite for a lasting peace. This adds up to belief that we won't gain enough to compensate for putting off the day when Nasser goes —the day that must come before we can hope for reason and progress in the Mid-East. I must admit that, personally, I'm torn. I guess my position boils down to these: 1. If resuming relations will improve our official access or our reporting, then it's worth resuming . I can't get rid of the instinctive feeling that we should at least be present. Then I stop and think that we're already as “present” as we're likely to be. Don Bergus' official contacts can get him to see Nasser if need be, and his contact with the Foreign Office is as good as it's likely to be. He could get around more freely, and reporting might improve somewhat. Resumption of relations won't make non-official contacts and a sense of what Egyptians really feel any freer in that totalitarian society than they were before June. In short, resumption would bring a limited but not dramatic gain. 2. If resuming relations will help improve our position in the Arab world generally, then it's worth resuming . One can easily argue that resumption in Cairo will lead to resumption at least in Baghdad, Khartoum and maybe in Algiers and make it a little easier for the Kuwaitis to go on doing business with us. But, of course, the main obstacle to improved US-Arab relations is our failure so far (in Arab eyes) to get Israeli troops off Arab soil, and that will remain so. We have to remember that Nasser, the instinctive revolutionary, will not change his stripes: we'll still be the imperialist enemy for Nasser and all his followers. In short, we should probably recognize that resumption of relations is of limited symbolic value . 3 . If resuming relations will help improve chances for a peace settlement, then it's worth resuming . I must confess, I don't see much argument for this at all. I'm not so confident as some others that Nasser is too weak to negotiate a settlement. But I'm pretty sure we won't have much influence on that anyway. I do believe that, since Nasser will always be Nasser, he's nothing reliable to pin our peace arrangements on. The point here is that we don't have much choice; we have to work with whoever is in power. The only question is whether resumption of relations strengthens him appreciably. I think its effect would be marginal. What this adds up to is that we feel instinctively that resuming relations would marginally improve our position, practically and symbolically. It's hardly likely to net us much more. On the other hand, since we can't be confident that Nasser will fall soon, it might cost us too much to wait out his fall. Therefore, on balance, we're probably right in taking this limited step, but no one should expect it to produce a startling change in Arab attitudes, or even in Nasser's. Hal Saunders 4 To Hal. 5 Clear the attached Call me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. 2 The interview was published in March 19 issue of Look , which was released for sale on March 5; see footnote 2, Document 91 . 3 Document 102 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 5 Saunders added these options by hand. Rostow checked the first one and wrote: “but make sure Sect. Rusk (or Nick K) signs off personally.” 102. Telegram From the White House to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 102. Telegram From the White House to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, March 5, 1968, 6:50 p.m. 389. Ref: Cairo's 1413; 2 SecState 106083. 3 Subject: US-UAR Relations. 1. We are informed that Attwood article will appear in March 19 issue of Look which to be on newsstands March 5. We inclined to regard this as taking care of “big lie” as far as resumption of relations concerned. Accordingly, we suggest you tell your contact informally we willing release joint statement any time GUAR wishes after March 5 provided you have satisfactory undertaking on compensation (para. 6 Deptel 106083). You authorized work out date of resumption subject final check with Department. We hope you can do this tactically so that GUAR informed we regard Nasser statement to Attwood adequate but so that initiative on setting date still up to them and we not cast as running after them. 2. For your background, in conversation with Deptoff February 23 Ghorbal asked when US-UAR relations could be resumed. Deptoff replied we willing to discuss resumption at any time. Ghorbal then inquired whether upon appearance Attwood article “we can tell Mohammed Riad and Don Bergus to go ahead.” He also showed Deptoff text proposed joint statement worked out by you and Mohammed (para. 10c Cairo tel 1413) and asked whether it has been approved. Deptoff said suggested timing appeared all right and he would check on status proposed joint statement. Deptoff subsequently informed Ghorbal we thought proposed statement acceptable. You may confirm to Mohammed. 3. Ghorbal raised question about level representation once relations resumed. We told him that while we plan to resume at ambassadorial level, we do not now envisage immediate exchange of ambassadors but plan to keep our representation at charge level initially. 4. Needless to say, forward movement on Jarring mission will facilitate problem resumption relations. February 27 comments by al-Zayyat on Eban's statement that Israel willing enter into some sort negotiations with Arabs do not indicate much progress. We got more negative version of Riad-Jarring February 20 talks from Soviets here than that reported Cairo's 1714. 4 Summary Soviet version being forwarded septel. Additionally, Ghorbal's summary similarly more somber. Department continues rely on position stated in para 3 Cairo's 1713. 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret; Nodis. 2 See footnote 4, Document 55 . 3 Document 62 . 4 In telegram 1714 from Cairo, February 22, Bergus provided a summary of a report on Jarring's February 20 visit to Cairo, as given to him by Mohamed Riad. Jarring transmitted the Israeli position as he had received it from Eban but concluded that he did not feel the Israeli statement constituted acceptance of Resolution 242. According to Riad, Jarring was in a pessimistic mood and said he might ask to be relieved of his post. Riad indicated that the UAR was prepared to implement the resolution, but did not see the necessity of negotiations in Cyprus. The UAR would continue to negotiate with Israel through Jarring. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 5 Paragraph 3 of telegram 1713 from Cairo, February 22, reported Mohamed Riad's assurance that the UAR position was that it was prepared to discuss and negotiate everything through Jarring. (Ibid.) 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 7, 1968, 0043Z. 125925. Subj: Jarring Mission. Summary: Under Secretary Rostow and Assistant Secretary Battle called in Israeli Ambassador Rabin to urge that Israelis be flexible on steps needed for acceptance of November 22 SC Res and negotiating modalities and avoid actions likely prejudice Jarring mission. Noted Interior Ministry measures re West Bank had had bad effect. Rostow said US felt it should have opportunity to comment before Israel took measures affecting political atmosphere and chances for settlement. He requested Rabin convey to GOI importance we attached to approach Ambassador Barbour making re Jerusalem refugees, and other topics covered in his talk with Eban. 1. Under Secretary Rostow told Ambassador Rabin our talks with Jarring confirmed our impression he was not entirely happy with Israeli position re “acceptance” of SC resolution. We had impression that if things should blow up he would report critically on manner in which Israelis had expressed acceptance. Rostow said Jarring was trying to work out formula which hopefully would bring parties together. In dealing with acceptance question, Israel should be most careful to avoid being put in trap of having blame put on it if Jarring does not succeed. We agree Israel cannot accept thesis that resolution is self-implementing, Rostow said; we regard resolution as whole and as requiring negotiations. He emphasized however that present moment is critical in peace efforts. He said we could see no advantage in not being simple and definitive in accepting resolution and undertaking to implement it through agreement. 2. Rostow said Spanish had informed us March 4 that Riad during Madrid visit had said UAR did not insist on prior withdrawal and would accept resolution as package. At same time, Spanish reported UAR very reserved as to next step if Israel “accepts” resolution. We gave Spaniards message to convey back to UAR to effect that next step should be Rhodes-type meeting on Cyprus. We did not attach much importance to Spanish message. 3. Rostow then turned to recent Israeli orders re West Bank. Said they had caused commotion and turbulence affecting atmosphere of negotiations. Rostow said that, against background of talks between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol, US felt it should have opportunity make its views known in advance when events of this kind arise. He pointed out that, though we and Israel were agreed on the issue of peace, we had been caught by surprise in this way on number of occasions. He mentioned as earlier example regulations re Jerusalem. We headed off consequences of such acts with great effort. In present case, we could not be persuaded that measures affecting West Bank were needed to fill legal void; any such void had existed so far and could do so a while longer. 4. Rostow informed Rabin that US was supporting representations being made by UK re return of new refugees to West Bank and re Jerusalem. He said expropriation and building in Jerusalem create doubt concerning negotiability of Jerusalem question. When Rabin raised question whether Israel in fact considered Jerusalem negotiable, Rostow said we were not seeking define Jerusalem policy at this juncture. We recognized it was the most difficult item and would have to be last on the agenda. We had been relying on formal Israeli statements (including Eshkol statement in Knesset Feb 26) which seemed hold open possibility of negotiations concerning it. Meanwhile, it was important avoid precluding such negotiations. He recalled that Under Secretary Katzenbach had told Eban that we would support position that City should not be redivided but that we took very serious view of interests of others including Jordan. Current Israeli actions on the ground cause doubt re negotiability he continued. Ambassador Barbour had been instructed to request that expropriation and construction be suspended. Rostow requested Rabin convey to GOI great importance that we attached to this question. He said Barbour would also be bringing up subject of refugees from West Bank. Security Council session could result from Israeli actions in any of these respects, Rostow said, and it could happen that US and Israel would be in divided position in SC. US wants to avoid that, he concluded. 5. Turning to question of Rhodes formula, Rostow urged Israelis not to stick to particular modality. He said we saw no advantage for Israel in insisting on face to face meetings with Arabs on Cyprus instantly or exclusively. Rostow referred to President Johnson's statement June 19 that we were ready to see any method tried. President had appealed for adoption of no rigid views on these matters. Rostow said it would be disaster if this opportunity for peace—which might be the only one—foundered on an issue which not fully understood in the world and which not compatible with US position as stated on June 19. 6. Rabin replied that Israel interested in peace, but in real peace. He noted that in 1956 there had been no change in basic relationships. Israeli willingness to accept Rhodes formula represented withdrawal from earlier Israeli position on direct talks, but by Rhodes formula Israel meant that parties came to Rhodes for purpose of negotiating settlement between two sides. Israel prepared negotiate “practically everything” under Jarring's Chairmanship. He claimed US position re Rhodes was departure from Rhodes model which was matter of history. Rostow replied US had not attempted define Rhodes formula. We had same purpose; negotiations among or between parties. On Rhodes parties met in various ways. Main thing was initiate process which would result in negotiations. 7. Rabin gave usual Israeli argumentation re return of West Bank refugees. He then added as personal comment that it was important recall that Israel had not initiated the war. To have peace, he said, Arabs must be taught that once you start war you lose something. Starting war meant not only taking risk of not achieving goal but also of suffering loss. Re measures in occupied territory Rabin conceded they might be mistake from public relations point of view but he insisted that they not intended change status of those areas in present or future. Rostow said that while they might not be intended to effect change of status, political consequences could be very serious and must be dealt with. He reiterated that we had asked Israelis to take steps to remove widespread feeling that Israelis did not intend to withdraw from occupied territory. 8. Evron referred to Riad's statement reported by Spaniards and observed Riad had been talking through both sides of his mouth in last few weeks. Evron also noted Nasser's March 3 statement, from which he said it was clear UAR wanted prior withdrawal and that next steps thereafter were very uncertain. Assistant Secretary Battle agreed that one could not draw any conclusions re final UAR position. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Day (IO/UNP) on March 5, cleared by Battle and Atherton, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 104. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 104. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, March 8, 1968. SUBJECT More on Resuming Relations with the UAR As I mentioned yesterday on the phone, the GUAR is fudging the Look retraction of the “big lie.” 2 First, they altered the crucial admission to read-instead of “you could say that, yes”-“you could say that, but someone else may say something else.” Then their spokesman said that resumption of US-UAR relations is “not at present an issue that is being considered” and that the “extraordinary” support extended by the US to Israel does not signify that the US shows any interest in maintaining friendly relations with the Arabs. Don Bergus suggests several reasons for this hedging. One obviously is that Nasser doesn't like to admit to his people he's wrong. Another is the persistent UAR effort to hope it can use resumption to change our position. My own view is shared in NEA, is that this fudging need not destroy the usefulness of the Look article. I think we can go ahead and tell Bergus we consider this the best we're going to get, so we can drop this issue but still leave the initiative with Nasser. Most of us doubt he will rush into our arms. This isn't entirely throwing in the towel. The news of Nasser's retraction is getting through to the Arabs. The Egyptian press and radio have altered the interview some, but not enough to raise any doubts that Nasser now admits the original charge was untrue. In Cairo, Tunis, Khartoum, Benghazi and other places the Attwood interview has been the story, and even Sheikh Isa of Bahrain is aware of the retraction. We don't have reports from all the Arab countries, but Algeria is the only place we know of where the Look article is being ignored. Major play given to it in international broadcasts-particularly by BBC-is spreading the news no matter what Arab governments do. Therefore, I think we're over one hurdle, but we may not be much closer to actual resumption. We may disagree somewhat on the value of resumption (my view attached), 3 but even the President seemed to feel we shouldn't run after Nasser once we cleared all obstacles from the path. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. 2 See footnote 2, Document 91 . 3 Document 101 . 105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, March 9, 1968, 0234Z. 127656. For Ambassador. Pass following message urgently from Secretary to FonMin Gromyko: “The USG notes the statement in the oral message of Feb. 28 2 that the Soviet Union stands firmly for a lessening of tensions in the Middle East, and for turning this area into a zone of lasting peace. We are in full agreement with this goal. In our view, the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in the Middle East have now entered a critical phase, in which the full support of the United States and the Soviet Union could be of decisive importance. The United States welcomes the assurance in your message that the Soviet Government agrees under certain conditions to an exchange of views on limiting the delivery of arms to the Middle East. We are concerned, however, that the Soviet Government believes that such limitations need await settlement of certain other aspects of the conflict. Our message of January 22 3 emphasized the President's concern at the extensive supply of weapons from the Soviet Union and noted the pressures on the United States Government to take similar action. We consider it highly desirable to agree upon limitation of arms shipments to the area as soon as possible. We are therefore prepared promptly to discuss with the Soviet Union in a positive spirit the establishment of limitations on arms shipments. Any progress we can make in this regard would hardly fail to facilitate the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We are concerned that the Soviet Union still appears to adhere to the position that a peaceful settlement in the Middle East depends upon prior withdrawal of Israeli forces to the lines existing before June 5, 1967. We believe that your position, that such Israeli withdrawal must be the first and basic point, is not consistent with the Security Council Resolution of November 22. The Security Council Resolution clearly recognizes the interrelationship between Israeli withdrawal, agreement upon secure and recognized boundaries, the termination of belligerency, respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area, guarantees of freedom of innocent maritime passage, and progress in solving the refugee problem. There is nothing artificial about the interrelationship of these elements; it is in the nature of the situation and of the history of this conflict. The principles enunciated in the Security Council Resolution point the way from an uncertain armistice to a durable and stable peace. Taken together they form the basis for a lasting settlement. They reflect the policy publicly stated by President Johnson on June 19, 1967, explained personally to Chairman Kosygin at Glassboro, and more recently reaffirmed in detail by Ambassador Goldberg in his discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin on February 28. The essential aim of this policy is to replace the Armistice regime of 1949 with an agreed and accepted settlement assuring a just and durable peace. The history of the Palestine problem makes all too clear the necessity for such an agreed and accepted settlement by the parties. The US, as you well know, was primarily responsible for obtaining withdrawal of Israeli forces in 1957. The international understanding, on the basis of which Israeli forces were withdrawn, was that the Straits of Tiran would be and would remain open to ships of all nations including Israel. The UAR last May asserted that this international understanding was never formally accepted by it, and therefore was not binding. Its repudiation of this international understanding, which led directly to the recent conflict, demonstrates the necessity for engaging and committing the parties directly in a settlement of the issues currently in controversy. What is vital, in our view, is that the opportunities for peace opened up by the passage of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 and the appointment of Ambassador Jarring, should be constructively used. Ambassador Jarring has made limited progress, but the possibility now exists for advancing to a next stage in which the parties would carry on negotiations and discussions under his auspices on Cyprus. If the permanent members of the Security Council, and other states, give him unstinting support we believe the prospects for peace are good. For its part the United States Government is giving him such support. We have endeavored to persuade both sides in the dispute to move forward by negotiating, under his auspices, agreements on all the elements encompassed by the Security Council resolution. We would hope that you would use your influence with the UAR to accept the idea of the 1949 Rhodes-type negotiations. We are confident that, if this pattern of negotiations can be accepted again, it will be possible to surmount the difficulties which have been involved in Ambassador Jarring's conversations thus far, and permit the parties, at long last, to begin the substantive negotiations so essential for settlement. We strongly urge that the Soviet Union, which has indicated its support of Ambassador Jarring's Mission, use its diplomatic influence to persuade the Arab states to take this essential next step.” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sisco and Eugene Rostow, cleared by Battle, Walt Rostow, and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John M. Leddy; and approved by Rusk. 2 The message was conveyed to Secretary Rusk by Ambassador Dobrynin on February 27; see Document 93 . 3 See Document 57 . 106. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 106. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 10, 1968, 0212Z. 127776. Deliver to Ambassador Sunday Morning. FYI—Following is based on uncleared memcon subject to review and change. 1. In view present critical stage of Jarring Mission, we concluded it desirable have one more round with Israelis here prior GOI Cabinet session and Eban/Jarring meeting scheduled for Sunday, March 10. Goldberg therefore called Rabin to Department Saturday morning, March 9 (Sisco, Battle and Evron also present). 2. Stressing that following must be closely held and not revealed to Jarring, Goldberg said our information was that formula Jarring had submitted to UARG and would submit to GOI tomorrow runs generally as follows: UAR and GOI have accepted SC resolution as basis for resolving differences. Both Governments are therefore invited send representatives to Cyprus for discussions under his auspices to facilitate agreement and implementation. 3. Reports on UAR reaction were profoundly disturbing, Goldberg said. Considered USG view was that negative UAR response to Jarring leaned in direction of being final. Though we could not say this absolutely, we thought it likely. According our info, Riad had never addressed himself directly to Jarring's formulation. Since Jarring was merely consulting with UAR on formulation and not formally issuing invitation, if UAR wanted to keep door open Riad could have said he would accept Jarring invitation if Israel did so. Instead, Riad's response to Jarring had mixed a number of points. These had included renewed allegation that Israel had not accepted resolution and allusions to necessity of returning to Security Council to force Israeli acceptance, but had also included references to internal stresses in UAR and to possibility of major powers' intervening to straighten situation out. 4. In latter connection, Goldberg speculated that UAR might hope recent U.S.-Soviet exchange would improve its position. Israelis should know that, subsequent to last Riad-Jarring talk, we had sent message to Soviets firmly restating our commitment to durable and lasting peace and emphasizing that any settlement must directly engage and commit parties in order to avoid 1957 Tiran-type arrangements. 5. Goldberg said that, for both substantive and tactical reasons, USG felt strongly that Israel should give Jarring categorical acceptance of his formulation when he presents it tomorrow, asserting GOI accepts his statement and is prepared to send delegation to Cyprus for discussions under Jarring's auspices. To take care of its special concerns, GOI could add that it understands discussions will be held according to Rhodes-type precedent. We understood basic GOI concern was to avoid Lausanne situation, where Arabs refused meet Israelis face to face. We also did not see how agreement possible without discussions. 6. Substantively, Goldberg continued, it was important for Israel to accept Jarring statement in order miss no opportunity move toward agreed settlement if this still possible. Tactically, it was important in order for Israel to establish its record and preserve its political position. If, as we thought likely, UAR was backtracking in view of deteriorating internal situation, it should be made clear that onus was on UAR. We believed issue would shortly go to Security Council, where Jarring's report would carry weight. Jarring would publish his proposal and replies of parties, and it was important that GOI reply not permit onus to be shifted to Israel. According our info, Jarring completely discouraged and going to Israel tomorrow largely to complete record for his report. 7. Rabin commented that in recent discussions with Jarring there had been two points at issue: (a) acceptance or non-acceptance of resolution and (b) form of negotiations. Since UAR had stated it accepted resolution, question now was what position UAR taking on negotiations. Goldberg replied that our info indicated UAR now ruled out any Rhodes-type talks and even ruled out going to Cyprus. 8. Rabin said he continued doubt UAR wanted settlement. He was not persuaded, however, that UAR had given Jarring final reply. March 8 Haikal article had noted that Arabs maintained Embassies in Nicosia which could serve as continuing points of contact with Jarring. Such a ploy, which would represent no advance from GOI viewpoint, could not be ruled out, since UAR obviously wanted avoid being boxed in. In reply, Goldberg pointed out that (a) whatever Haikal may have said, UAR had not made this point to Jarring and (b) this was not Jarring's proposal, which was that parties should send delegations to Cyprus. Jarring would be guided by what Riad, not Haikal said. Riad had said there could be no discussions, direct or indirect, in Rhodes-type situation. Present UAR position was that Rhodes talks had dealt with Armistice Agreements whereas what Israel now wanted was peace treaty. This UAR viewed as surrender and therefore unacceptable unless Israel first withdrew its troops. 2 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Deputy Executive Secretary John P. Walsh, and approved by Samuel G. Wise (S/S-O). Repeated to USUN. 2 In telegram 2841 from Tel Aviv, March 12, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office indicated that Goldberg's advice to Rabin was welcome and timely. Using that advice Eban secured Cabinet support in responding to Jarring that Israel would be prepared to accept his proposed formula for discussions in Cyprus. (Ibid.) 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, March 12, 1968, 0007Z. 128960. Ref: Amman 3570, 2 3571, 3 and 3648. 4 1. We are pleased that the King now wishes to conclude negotiations as soon as possible. In order to conclude agreement, you are authorized inform GOJ as follows: (a) USG will increase number of M48A1 tanks in our package from 88 to 100. (b) We will increase number of 40 mm. self-propelled anti-aircraft from 4 to 24. (c) We will increase number of quad .50 caliber anti-aircraft guns from 9 to 100. 2. We have no objection to Khammash's proposal to scale down his undelivered ground force spare parts to a level of $2 million. JAA and DAO must decide what spares actually needed. Perhaps his purposes would be better served by cancelling out the undelivered spare parts in cases UBN, UBQ, UBS, UBU and reprogram these requirements within the ground force package now offered. Alternatively, if the JAA is in a good spare parts supply position, such requirements might be further delayed. In view heavy load of spares purchases (3 years level) under 1965 ground force agreement, we believe JAA may be “spare parts poor” and it would make good sense make new purchases of spares on the most minimum basis. By now JAA may have developed new usage factors which would enable Jordan make more economical use of funds available for military purchases. 3. In other respects package remains as previously described. With considerable difficulty we have increased the size of the package in an effort to reach prompt agreement. We cannot go further. We have also agreed to airlift some of the equipment on MAC weekly flights. We have not ruled out possibilities of additional airlifts but cost and transport would be a problem. We will also try to advance the delivery dates as much as possible. In this context, of course, we cannot even begin the process of procuring or rehabilitating the equipment until the Memorandum of Understanding and the Sales Agreement are signed and financial arrangements made. We are concerned that the longer the delay in concluding the agreement the greater risk of slippages in some of the items. 4. Instructions concerning the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding follow. 5. FYI. Although approval granted on political and psychological grounds for increased arms package itemized para 1, we are disturbed over high cost of 40 mm. SP AA's. Before conveying to the Jordanians our approval of the additional 40 mm. AA's, you should make strong effort persuade them to accept the 91 additional 50 cal. quad mount AA's as adequate meet their AA requirements. If Jordanians remain unconvinced you may then, in your discretion, offer the additional 20 40 mm. SP AA's. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wiley and Houghton; cleared by Davies, and Katzenbach in substance; Schwartz of DOD/ISA was informed of the substance of the telegram; and approved by Battle. 2 See footnote 2, Document 95 . 3 In telegram 3571 from Amman, February 24, the Embassy concluded that with some limited accommodation to Jordan's military requests it would be possible to reach an agreement that would preempt Soviet efforts to supplant the United States as the principal source of arms for Jordan. The Embassy recommended increasing the number of tanks offered to 100 and meeting Jordan's request for anti-aircraft guns. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 4 Document 95 . 108. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 108. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, March 12, 1968, 1345Z. 7344. Subject: Lebanese elections. 1. During my meeting with Minister of Interior Suleiman Frangieh March 7, he urged us to be prepared to intervene in Lebanese Parliamentary elections if UAR, Syrian or Soviet intervention becomes significant fact. To date, Frangieh admitted, external intervention is within manageable proportions. Stated UAR definitely intervening but at lower level than in past elections. 2. I reiterated US positions non-involvement to Frangieh, but emphasized our support GOL's efforts to hold free elections. USG watching developments very closely. I also told him we fully cognizant of difficulties GOL faces and said we would continue support his government's efforts within means available to us. Made clear we not providing funds or getting involved in selection candidates. 3. Frangieh agreed US policy wise and correct under present circumstances. He emphasized strongly that US should be prepared intervene if there is external intervention of any magnitude on part of others. Explained that under such circumstances there strong possibility composition of new Parliament would be weighted heavily on side of leftists and Nasserists and that such development would upset GOL's goal to have balance of forces in Parliament. Frangieh stressed that such development, in his opinion, would also be contrary to US self-interest and stated that if external intervention occurs “US has the obligation to intervene” and should be prepared to do so. Frangieh claimed GOL does not have sufficient means to combat external intervention on any significant scale. 4. Comment: Frangieh, a Maronite Christian, is a possible contender for the Lebanese Presidency in 1970 and a respected moderate with pro-Western leanings. He staunchly opposed to Nasserist and leftist political elements in Lebanon. He believes, and we agree, UAR does not need extensive funds to realize its political objectives in Lebanon because it can draw on the political base it has nurtured here for many years. Also (fortunately) he basically agrees with our assessment there is no significant financial involvement in elections at this time on part of UAR, Syrians or Soviets. His concern is that US should be prepared to stand by to help in case situation changes radically. 5. Comment: So far we have successfully staved off the myriad requests for US financial help in the elections which have come from the moderate and pro-Western politicians at all levels. The fact that the US is following a hands-off policy is slowly gaining credibility, even despite the corresponding anguish which it induces among would-be recipients. The Embassy fervently hopes that Minister Frangieh will not feel it necessary to ask us to re-enter the lists. The odds, we believe, are still with us. 2 Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 14 LEB. Secret; Limdis. 2 The Department approved the position taken by Porter. Telegram 130370 to Beirut, March 14, stated: “We hope that more Lebanese will get the message that U.S. nonintervention policy is firm and unequivocal and will not be altered by reports to Embassy from Lebanese politicians of actual or imagined external intervention from other parties, i.e.,USSR, UAR, Syria.” (Ibid.) 109. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 109. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, March 12, 1968, 1615Z. 3770. 1. It is now getting on to four months since the adoption of the Security Council resolution of Nov 22. Most recent reports from Cairo, Tel Aviv, and USUN indicate that we are further than ever away from implementation of that resolution and may soon be back in SC. 2. In late summer we decided at least temporarily to close down “Sandstorm” and began to pursue present policy of seeking a multilateral Arab-Israeli settlement. In making this shift we of course recognized the difficulty of getting individual Arab states which, after all, have quite different interests in a final settlement, to agree on a concerted approach to dealing with Israel. Indeed, the difficulty of obtaining such an Arab consensus has been one of the principal lessons of the past twenty years. 3. Over the years we have also been very much aware of another lesson—that it is impossible for a leader of one of the smaller Arab states, such as Lebanon or Jordan, to make a separate peace with Israel and survive. Particularly in Jordan, the fate of King Abdullah always comes to mind. We doubt that the situation has changed today. A separate peace would still entail extremely grave risks for the Arab leader who appeared to contemplate it. The most moderate and reasonable Jordanians we talk to see separate talks only as a last, desperate resort. 4. We know quite well that King Hussein and many Jordanian leaders want a peaceful settlement. From the very beginning of the Jarring Mission (even though they may have played with words during the first meeting with Jarring in order to save their honor and their reputations with fellow Arabs) we have known that the Jordanians accepted the resolution and wanted to move to practical next steps. 5. Meanwhile, the situation in presently truncated Jordan can only worsen, particularly because Israel continues to follow policies tending to consolidate, at least in Arab eyes, its occupation of the West Bank. Unfortunately, the manipulative strategy followed by Israel (that is retaliatory raids to “teach Jordan a lesson,” official and semi-official threats linked with retaliation, and public surfacing of contacts with Arabs or easing of Arab stands) tends to compound current difficulties faced by Jordan's leaders. In our view, although terrorism in future may not become any more effective in Israel or in the occupied territory, it seems bound to increase because of policies Israel itself is following. And the post-Feb 15 developments have shown that it is going to become more and more difficult for the Jordan regime to suppress it. Moreover, the terrorists pose a major threat to the Jordanian regime itself. We can only conclude from here that if present stalemate in the Jarring Mission continues, we will not only have failed to achieve a multilateral settlement under Jarring's aegis, but more important, we will also have substantially diminished the chances for moving successfully towards a bilateral Jordan-Israel settlement. The outlook for a stable and independent Jordan will become even more bleak. 6. Foregoing suggests the time may have come to consider again whether to encourage Israel and Jordan to seek a bilateral settlement. I recognize of course that this is not an either-or matter. It might well be possible and desirable, for example, to encourage Jordan-Israel contacts under a moribund Jarring effort. In other words, we could pay lip service to what might be an obviously dead Jarring Mission but still use latter as cloak for contacts. There would obviously be other possible variations. I am certain we will find considerable resistance to any kind of separate bilateral settlement from many prominent Jordanians. As time goes on I would expect such opposition to increase rather than to diminish, principally because Israel's position would have hardened. Recognizing there are possibilities for talks short of outright, secret contacts, I believe if as a last resort we were prepared to tell the King we saw no chance of forward motion by other means and that we were prepared to protect him if he moved towards a settlement with Israel, he might decide to take this step. I would be opposed to our making such an approach however, unless we had first obtained from the Israelis a clear and unequivocal statement in detailed terms of what they would be prepared initially to offer Hussein. By this I mean, for example, that we would have to get from Israel a clear minimum commitment as to what they were prepared to give Jordan with regard to Jerusalem. This minimum commitment would have to be specific in terms of lines on the ground, access, economic modalities, and aspects of sovereignty. It would have to be subject to some discussion. In other words, we would need to be able to say to the King that Israel was at least committed to do what it had said but that we would also hope in discussions Israel might have some add-ons to its minimum position. We would also need specifics with regard to where the Israelis expect to redraw West Bank borders, what they actually mean by demilitarization, and whether they would be prepared to consider something like the Joseph Johnson plan for refugees. 2 Unless we could obtain such specific statements from Israel, I would be opposed to our approaching the King on bilateral negotiations. In fact, I wonder if we should not now seek to elicit what Israel is prepared to offer against contingencies short of outright, secret contacts. 7. I wish to make clear I am not by any means suggesting we should align ourselves with Jordan to act as Jordan's agent in the negotiating process itself. I do believe, however, that the King and the officials who might go along with him have everything to lose by moving to anything smacking of separate peace and that they therefore deserve to have from us and from the Israelis through us a guaranteed floor for commencing the negotiations. The substance of such direct contacts that previously have taken place between Jordan and Israel (at least those of which we are aware) largely have been devoid of detail. We gather that the King has found Israeli generalizations brought over by emissaries such as Nuseibeh quite unattractive for this reason. 8. If we were to move towards bilateral negotiations, I think we should be prepared with contingency plans for helping to handle civil strife and efforts by other Arab states to interfere. I would suggest we give thought immediately to this kind of contingency planning in any case because King Hussein might well move towards bilateral negotiations without our encouragement. 9. Finally, we would have to have ironclad assurances from the Israelis with regard to (1) publicity (before, during, and after talks-particularly if the talks should be inconclusive the Israelis would have to avoid surfacing the contacts) and (2) cessation of manipulative activities (such as retaliation and threats) at least during the course of the talks. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. 2 The United States supported the 1961 appointment of a Special Representative of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) to conduct indirect negotiations between Israel and the Arab states toward a resolution of the Palestinian refugee question. After meeting with Arab and Israeli leaders, Special Representative Joseph E. Johnson submitted his proposals to the PCC on August 31, 1962. For an August 7, 1962, memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy summarizing the background of the initiative and Johnson's proposals, see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 15 . Additional documentation concerning the initiative is printed ibid., volumes XVII and XVIII . 110. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 110. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, March 13, 1968, 0238Z. 129216. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: USUN 4095. 2 1. For Cairo: Dept agrees you should see FonMin Riad at earliest opportunity to urge UARG to accept latest Jarring proposal. You should draw on reports of Nov 12 conversations with El Kony in NY 3 and Ghorbal in Wash 4 as well as Reftel and following. 2. We believe Israeli affirmative response to Jarring proposal should satisfy UAR position that Israel must “accept” Nov 22 SC resolution. Refusal of UAR to consider proposal therefore difficult understand and would place onus on UAR if Jarring now reports to SC failure of his efforts. 3. We continue believe Jarring mission offers best prospect for progress toward peaceful settlement in ME and that parties should continue cooperate fully with Jarring in his efforts carry out SC mandate. In adopting Nov 22 Res, SC members demonstrated their unanimous view that problem best approached through means of UN emissary. Consultations made clear that Council members not prepared at that time to try to impose terms of settlement on parties and in particular to call for withdrawal of Israeli forces as first step toward settlement. We have no reason believe members have altered views on either of these points and GUAR should recognize they no more likely obtain from SC now type of action Council unwilling to take earlier. If issue returned to SC in circumstances in which UAR negative reaction to Jarring proposal appears to have precipitated collapse his mission, Council members especially unlikely to view UAR position sympathetically. UAR should not expect support from US in such circumstances. 4. We continue believe SC Res cannot be implemented without discussion of substantive issues. We hope parties will accept Jarring's proposal so such discussion can begin without further delay. Proposal does not prejudice either side's position. We, of course, prepared continue use our influence in support Jarring's efforts. 5 5. For Amman: We do not know what approach Jarring will take with GOJ when he visits Amman Thursday. Specifically, we do not know whether he will raise with GOJ formulation he had prepared for last meetings with UARG and GOI, which was cast in terms of getting Egyptian and Israeli delegations to Cyprus and apparently not directed to Jordanians. While we thus would not wish attempt to foreshadow Jarring's forthcoming talks in Amman, we consider it desirable that Jordanians be fully aware that UAR is backtracking on Jarring mission in general and on earlier indications it might enter Rhodes-type discussions in particular. Unless you perceive objections, therefore, you should draw on reftel and other relevant messages as appropriate to make following points to GOJ prior to Jarring's arrival: A. Israel, according to our best information, has conveyed to Jarring a position which in effect accepts UK Resolution as basis for settlement and indicates willingness to discuss implementation of the resolution under Jarring's auspices. B. UAR has backtracked apparently to the extent of no longer viewing resolution including paragraph 3 as a package, reverting to position of demanding prior withdrawal and sterile course of implementation by SC fiat rather than negotiations. We are urging the UAR to reconsider its position to save structure of Jarring mission as the focal point for negotiations to attain objectives set forth in UK Resolution. We hope King Hussein will support this position and weigh in with Cairo to reconsider its negative response to Jarring's last proposal in light of information that Israel has indicated acceptance to Jarring. C. You should point out that Arabs would be in vulnerable position if recourse is had to SC since it will be evident that UAR unwillingness to enter into talks brought Jarring mission to deadend. D. Should Jarring put the proposal to GOJ on Thursday, US hopes King will be forthcoming, bearing in mind we recognize his reservations about getting out ahead of UAR. You should also express our appreciation for constructive and statesmanlike efforts which King and GOJ have made to achieve a settlement. 6 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, Davies, and Jones on March 12; cleared by Houghton, and in draft by Sisco and Battle; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Amman and repeated to USUN, London, Tel Aviv, and Moscow. 2 In telegram 4095 from USUN, March 12, Goldberg pointed to the possible collapse of the Jarring Mission and urged that efforts be made in Cairo and Amman to persuade the UAR and Jordan to reconsider and accept Jarring's latest proposal. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 4102 from USUN, March 13. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 129958 to Cairo, March 14. (Ibid.) 5 In acting on this instruction, Bergus found Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad at the point of leaving for a trip to Turkey. He therefore passed the substance to Mohamed Riad who indicated that he would bring it to the Foreign Minister's attention at the earliest possible moment. (Telegram 1872 from Cairo, March 13; ibid.) 6 In Amman, King Hussein was out of the country when Symmes sought an appointment in response to instructions. Consequently, Symmes met with Abdul Munim Rifai and told him that he would take up the matter with the King at the first opportunity. (Telegram 3782 from Amman, March 13; ibid.) 111. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 111. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, March 14, 1968, 0700Z. 3787. Subj: Jordan Arms. Ref: Amman 3781. 2 1. King Hussein received me yesterday evening immediately after returning from Aqaba. Zaid al-Rifai was also present. I reviewed with King earlier conversation with General Khammash (Amman 3781) and said I hoped he could now agree to memo of understanding as modified by add-ons. 3 I also suggested appropriate JAA officers be authorized go into details with our DATT and MAP. 2. Hussein expressed warm thanks and then telephoned to Khammash, said he had me with him, and that he would discuss matter with Khammash in morning. He turned to me and said he was glad “this matter is now behind us” and that he hoped details could be quickly settled. He emphasized that important thing for Jordan was early deliveries and that he would be counting on initial air shipment of as much as possible for psychological reasons. 3. Drawing on State 128960 4 I told King we would utilize weekly MAC flights where feasible. While we would not rule out additional airlifts, I must point out that cost and transport availability would be problems. King said he understood these factors but would still count on us to airlift as much as possible initially, as Khammash had discussed with Secretary McNamara. 4. Comment: King seemed greatly relieved and was most gracious in expressing appreciation for add-on. Obviously we probably have some tough nuts and bolts ahead, but it is good to be out of the woods. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 2 In telegram 3781 from Amman, March 13, Symmes reported that in the King's absence he had taken up with General Khammash the revised offer of arms for Jordan, as tendered in telegram 128960 ( Document 107 ). Khammash would not accept the proposed package without the 40-mm. anti-aircraft guns, but with the inclusion of 20 40-mm. guns he had agreed to recommend the package to the King. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 3 The revised text of the memorandum of understanding was transmitted to Amman on March 14 as an attachment to airgram A-34. (Ibid., DEF 19-4 JORDAN-US) 4 Document 107 . 112. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 112. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, March 14, 1968, 0820Z. 3793. Subject: Terrorism. 1. When I saw King Hussein on thirteenth on another matter, I mentioned I was worried about recrudescence of terrorist incidents in past few days. I said our information indicated that terrorists are still operating in strength in Jordan valley area. Given past patterns I feared another Israeli retaliation. Recognizing his policy against terrorism, I thought there might be other helpful step to take. For one thing he had told me he wanted Iraqi troops out. He had said as soon as he knew US arms were forthcoming he would be in strong position to get Iraqis out. I hoped he would start with 421 Palestine Battalion. Secondly, I hoped news that Col. Daoud is back in town meant Jordan would agree to Daoud's meeting with Israelis. This might not prevent all incidents, but it would be a helpful factor. 2. King responded that for everything he did to curtail terrorists Israelis seemed to do two things that resulted in strengthening them. Israeli unilateral actions and particularly their retaliatory actions greatly weaken Jordan argument that they do not need the Iraqis. The Iraqi Chief of Staff is expected in Jordan soon, however, and King would do what he could to start Iraqi troops on the way out. He hoped Israel meanwhile would not make this impossible. 3. On Daoud, the King said he would look into the matter as soon as the Jordan Cabinet has been reconstituted. Laughingly he said he would he happy to put Daoud in government house if the Israelis wished. 4. Hussein agreed that the terrorists are hurting the Arab cause far more than they help it. He said he could argue this proposition with other Arabs much more convincingly if he could point to some progress in achieving peaceful settlement under Jarring auspices and if Israelis would desist from their continuous unilateral actions to deprive Arabs of their rights on West Bank. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv,USUN, and Jerusalem. 113. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 113. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, March 14, 1968, 1400Z. 1877. Subj: Jarring Mission. 1. Spent nearly two hours with Mohamed Riad today (March 14) as follow up to demarche made as reported my 1872. 2 2. Mohamed opened by conveying FonMin's warm personal regards. FonMin regretted that pressure of time before his departure plus unexpected visit of Nigerian Foreign Minister had prevented his seeing me. FonMin had carefully studied my representations and wished convey his reply. At this point Mohamed read from document and I took notes. 3. FonMin referred to statement (para 3 State 129216) 3 “consultations made clear that Council members not prepared at that time try to impose terms of settlement on parties and in particular to call for withdrawal of Israeli forces as first step towards settlement.” FonMin believes this comment is not pertinent. What we have now is resolution adopted by Security Council stipulating certain provisions. Nobody argues that fact. Moreover, UAR position with regard to UAR acceptance of resolution has been conveyed time and again to Jarring and to Washington. Needless to say that with regard to acceptance UAR has on several occasions informed USG that it accepts resolution as a whole and in its entirety. Ambassador Goldberg spoke of what he called Jarring proposal. Moreover, Ambassador Goldberg reached conclusions and drew assumptions as he did once before with regard to those proposals. 4. Comment: At this point Mohamed read to me verbatim record of Foreign Minister-Jarring meeting of March 7. While it has several nuances which do not appear in other reports which have reached Dept, do not believe these important enough to justify telegraphic transmission entire text although will do so if Dept so requests. Will in any event air pouch text by courier leaving here March 20. One relevant point re UAR account of conversation is that FonMin carefully notes at end of his aide-memoire that Jarring did not leave paper at end of conversation but took it away with him. Moreover, UAR version of conversation raises some interesting possibilities re SC implementation of resolution if we come to that stage. 5. (Resume FonMin's remarks.) FonMin believes that account of conversation with Jarring is self-explanatory and should answer Goldberg's comments. It clearly sets forth the UAR position on the Security Council resolution, a position known to the US Government over an extended period. Therefore, it was with surprise and indeed dismay that UAR noted there seemed to be a deliberate attempt on the part of Ambassador Goldberg to confuse the issue and worse still to confuse the UAR position—a position which is clear and honest. It is to be noted that the adoption of the Security Council resolution took place after lengthy discussions between Ambassador Goldberg and FonMin. These discussions concluded on note that SC resolution should be implemented. 6. Should UAR thus take it that US is now changing its declared position re its support for implementation of the resolution? If this is case, UAR cannot but take note with dismay of such a position. UAR's definite aim, which is also aim of international community, is to reach peaceful settlement through honest implementation of resolution. This cannot be achieved except through an explicit and formal declaration by the parties. The UAR has made such a declaration and it is to be noted that it has done so not today, not yesterday, not last week, not last month, but since first visit of Jarring to Cairo. Meanwhile and through all this Israel has evaded doing the same. 7. UAR insists that to attain a true peaceful settlement the parties should take clear stands as regards implementation of the Security Council resolution. In all fairness and honesty, such a stand could not and should not be criticized. On the contrary, it should be welcomed. 8. The US in taking the position as conveyed by Goldberg is most certainly supporting Israel's approach and indeed agreeing to Israel's demand, namely holding negotiations. Goldberg must remember that since its aggression last June, Israel insisted on negotiations. Yet nevertheless the SC resolution when adopted, completely ignored this approach and requested the parties to implement its provisions through the Special Representative. Hence the issue of negotiations is neither relevant nor pertinent. 9. Goldberg furthermore said the US cannot support the UAR (cf. para 6 USUN 4102). 4 This does not surprise FonMin. 10. FonMin does however note that no pressure has been exerted by USG, along lines Goldberg public declaration, for implementation of resolution. In this respect Goldberg had referred to what he called a statement made to him by FonMin in New York. ( Comment: This has reference to: “Riad himself had said settlement cannot be imposed on sovereign governments: they would have to agree.” Cf. para 4 USUN 4102.) 11. At one time words had been put in FonMin's mouth. Now he was confronted with a new trend, namely taking words out of context. True story was following: during a discussion between Goldberg and FonMin Goldberg said he could not put pressure on Israel because it was a sovereign state. FonMin had replied that he did not ask Goldberg to do that but that all he asked was that Goldberg declare US position regarding aggression and withdrawal. Unfortunately, US refused to take such a stand. To refresh memories on this point and on the question of pressure, in conversation between FonMin and Secretary Rusk, Secretary had also refused idea of US declaration stating US is not Upper Volta and when US says something it should know it should be implemented. 12. One has a right in the light of such deliberate attempts aiming at confusing the UAR position to ask what goal, what aim Ambassador Goldberg has in mind. One could also ask whether true and honest cooperation could really be worked out between the UAR and US in solving this crisis. End of FonMin's comments. 13. I said I would of course convey the Foreign Minister's remarks to my government. I had some preliminary comments of my own however which I wished to make. First of all, I did not at all like the tone of this communication. If UAR has any interest in achieving a degree of cooperation with us, this was hardly the way to go about it. 14. Secondly, I said that just as consistently as UAR had stated its acceptance of resolution and readiness to implement it, USG had pointed out that resolution itself clearly implied some sort of discussion among the parties. 15. Finally, I noted that Jarring formula as presented to Riad carried as its point a statement that UAR and Israel have accepted the Security Council resolution. Subsequent to March 7 USG has informed UAR in Washington, New York and Cairo that Israelis have accepted Jarring formula. Does this not carry us past the point of acceptance which UAR has been stressing and to the stage of required discussions? Mohamed said that while USG had informed UAR of Israelis' acceptance, Jarring had not done so. I immediately asked that if Jarring did so, what would UAR's position be. Mohamed refused to answer this question but again noted that only word for Israel acceptance had come from USG and not from Jarring. 16. Mohamed said that FonMin will be back on the job March 18 but if prior that US has anything convey, he at my disposal any time. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. 2 See footnote 5, Document 110 . 3 Document 110 . 4 Telegram 4102 from USUN, March 13, reported on a March 12 conversation between Goldberg and UAR Permanent Representative El Kony. Paragraph 6 recorded Goldberg's assertion to El Kony that, since Israel had gone on record as supporting the latest proposal put forward by Jarring and the UAR had not, the UAR should reconsider its position or forfeit U.S. support. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 114. Memorandum From John W. Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 114. Memorandum From John W. Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, March 14, 1968. SUBJECT More on Hussein Just to make sure you don't miss it, the attached 2 from Harry Symmes deals with the other side of the question we wrote you about yesterday—what we might have to do to make it possible for Hussein to negotiate with Israel. Yesterday we considered whether it's possible for him to go it alone and leaned toward concluding that chances of his talking alone are a good bit less than even. Now Harry is writing about how to improve the chances. Harry feels that, to get Hussein to the negotiating table, we would have to get a specific statement from the Israelis on the minimum they are willing to offer and would have to agree to protect Hussein from the dangers of talking to Israel. He specifically mentions contingency plans for helping to handle civil strife and efforts by other Arab states to interfere. We'll have to think this through, but it's plain that Harry is not just talking about more barbed wire to use against infiltrators at the proper time. Hussein would probably want clear indication that we will do what is necessary to save him, not that we will make friendly gestures. Obviously, we're not going to be able to make him feel completely safe. The one thought I (HHS) have for bucking him up is based on an interesting comment to me the other day by an intelligent Lebanese. He says the Arab governments are increasingly reluctant to settle the broad Palestine question without the participation of the Palestinians. When I asked whether anybody really took seriously the thought that the Palestinians could organize a responsible representation in settlement negotiations, he said that the ouster of Shuquairy and the evolution of a collegial PLO leadership was designed to do just this. The thought that occurs to me is that if Hussein needs support for negotiating alone the Palestinians might provide it. Jordan and Israel-not the UAR-are sitting on most aspects of the Palestine problem. If Hussein could say he was negotiating with or on behalf of representative Palestinians who wanted peace, he might have some added backing. We're still better off pursuing our present course-trying to get the UAR back on the Jarring track both directly and via Hussein. But if that fails, we'll be looking for ideas like this. I've checked fairly widely in State and CIA and no one thinks this is a wild idea. In fact, Hussein himself is already trying to bring more Palestinians into his government. The problems are that: (a) Palestinian leadership is fragmented so he couldn't hope to have unanimous support; and (b) if Hussein gets too involved with PLO-type Palestinians, it could mean the end of Jordan via encouragement for a separate Palestine. But Hussein today is a man with no attractive alternatives, and this risk may be less than the risk of no movement at all. If we do get back into the area of Jordan-Israel negotiations, Jerusalem will be the main sticking point, and we will have to trot out again all the thoughts you had on Jordan-Israel economic cooperation. John Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret;Nodis. 2 Document 109 . 115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 16, 1968, 2216Z. 131734. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: Amman 3839 2 and USUN 4165. 3 1. Goldberg, Sisco and Davies called in Evron (Rabin not available) to urge Israeli acceptance of formula outlined in Amman reftel. 2. Goldberg observed that, as he had emphasized before, reports from each capital re Jarring Mission were somewhat colored. He did not mean this as criticism; it was quite natural and was due in part to Jarring's own presentations. Jarring himself said his role was not to place blame on any party. It seemed clear, Goldberg continued, that Jarring will not submit to SYG report saying Israel was in the right and UAR in the wrong. Sisco interjected that reports of last few days had made this increasingly clear. Goldberg pointed out Jarring was very precise and if Israel had not said in so many words that it accepted the resolution he would not report that it had done so. 3. Goldberg then reviewed highlights of Amman report re Jarring Mar 13 meeting in Amman, as he had done previous day for Tekoah. He noted in particular following points. Jarring, according to Jordanian report, had not characterized UAR response as negative (Jarring's conception of his role would not permit such characterization in any case). Jarring had said Cairo put strong emphasis on implementing resolution and putting it into action. Jarring had said he was pessimistic, not just because of Cairo's reaction but because of atmosphere in totality, implication being, Goldberg added, that his pessimism also based on Israeli position. According to Jordanians, Jarring said Eban had told him he thought Israeli cabinet could be persuaded to accept resolution. However, Jarring had said he could not get statement from Eban that Israel would implement it. Jarring had said he was not taking one side or other, but if deadlock continued he would have to report to SYG. Goldberg then described modification of formula proposed by Jordanians. 4. Goldberg told Evron Israel must be careful not to put itself in political box. Israel had enjoyed good political position for past few days because of its affirmative reaction to Jarring formula, but now we had new situation with introduction of Jordanian modification. Goldberg urged that Israel say “yes” to this formula but at same time protect itself by rephrasing second element concerning implementation. Israel could say it understood that Rhodes-type talks were intended and that implementation would come about pursuant to para 3 of SC resolution, meaning there would have to be an agreed settlement. Sisco noted this would amount to tying in acceptance and implementation with pursuing these through Rhodes-type negotiations and in accordance with para 3 of resolution. He said this would take teeth out of idea that implementation could come by fiat without negotiation. Goldberg said his proposal, in capsule, was that there must be agreed implementation-agreed between parties. Sisco commented Israel should build on Jordanian statement that Jordan has always accepted resolution as package. He said if our suggestion followed, there no way Israel could get hurt. 5. Evron said his off-hand reaction was that Israel would be taking very dangerous course to do this. UAR still said withdrawal came first. Sisco said Israel would reject that. Evron continued that if Jarring said he would not blame either side, Israel was then boxed in. If all Jarring did was report two views without saying which was in accord with resolution, Israeli position would be eroded. Sisco reiterated that formula we proposed would not hook Israel and Israel would not find U.S. taking position that it did. With respect to Jarring statement that it not his job to blame either side, Sisco noted that factual accounting by Jarring would show where balance lay. Goldberg pointed out Jarring no arbitrator; he would not interpret resolution for SC. Israel must see to it that its political position was protected and affirmative. He noted Israel had crossed a bridge when it said it could take first part of formula-acceptance; it should not let implementation trip it up now. Goldberg concluded with comment that there were many ways to write formula that would protect Israel and that with such formula he did not see how Israelis could be vulnerable. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Day, cleared in substance by Davies and Sisco, and approved by Day. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, and USUN. 2 On March 15 Abdul Munim Rifai told Symmes about a meeting on March 14 between Jarring and members of the Jordanian Government. In an attempt to try to break the impasse between Israel and the Arab states, Jordan proposed that Jarring's formula for agreement on Resolution 242 be revised to read that the parties would declare their “acceptance of the resolution and their readiness to implement it.” (Telegram 3839 from Amman, March 15; ibid.) 3 Telegram 4165 from USUN, March 16, reported on a conversation between Goldberg and Israeli UN Representative Tekoah in which Goldberg urged that Israel give serious thought to accepting the revised Jarring formula as reported from Amman. (Ibid.) 4 Barbour pressed the Israeli Government to accept the revised formula, but the Israeli response was that the word implementation had taken on a specific meaning in Arab pronouncements and that without language agreeing to negotiations as well, Israel could not endorse the proposed formula. (Telegram 2918 from Tel Aviv, March 17; ibid.) 116. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 116. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, March 19, 1968, 1915Z. 3887. Subject: Terrorism. Ref: Amman 3844; 2 3886. 3 Tel Aviv for Amb Barbour from Symmes. 1. Summary: King has followed up on suggestions made to him per Amman 3844 and previous and in course extended discussion with Emboff afternoon March 19 revealed decision made for staged withdrawal from Jordan of Palestinian battalion of Iraqi brigade to begin within week. Decision has also been made send Col Daoud to meet with Israeli counterpart under UN auspices in next few days. He reported GOJ intensive efforts apprehend those responsible for bus incident 4 and again requested any information which might aid the investigation. He also speculated at some length on Israeli intentions toward East Bank. 2. King prefaced discussion of terrorism with statement that his review of Arab military capabilities with own advisors, Iraqi Chief of Staff and Pakistani military team just arrived from Cairo have further convinced him of Arabs' total incapacity to win military solution of Arab-Israeli confrontation. Iraqi Chief of Staff Ansari had just advised him that Iraq could do no more to help Jordan militarily. According Pakistanis, UAR will need another ten years to modernize its air force and bring its training and maintenance up to Israeli standards. Syria, King described as completely impotent militarily and said Jordan's lack of military potential hardly bore discussion. 3. Since Israelis are fully aware of this, King said, he had come to doubt seriously that Israelis had any desire for peace and he speculated that the Israeli posture on terrorism owed something to this underlying attitude. He had concluded Israel wishes to hold on to land it now occupies for religious and cultural reasons and needs certain additional territory to consolidate its position. East Bank he feels is obvious remaining target. He questions whether Israelis would have any serious concern about adverse world opinion should they feel time had come to launch military attack. They would cite terrorism as pretext. With fall of East Bank, West Bank would quickly come to terms. In procession UAR and Syrian regimes would be exposed as impotent and likelihood their fall would sharply increase. 4. Hussein said he had “raised hell” with everybody concerning March 18 bus incident and has directed that, if perpetrators are caught in Jordan, they are to receive same punishment as if they had caused this accident to Jordanians. He said he had sent his top investigators, including trackers, to Aqaba area and stated they have discovered as yet absolutely no evidence of anyone having crossed over from Jordanian territory in that area or returned. King stated Jordanian intelligence apparatus through penetrations and otherwise has thus far been unable discover involvement on part of any known terrorist organizations with bus incident. Investigations continuing under King's personal direction. He reiterated his request for any information that might assist investigation. 4. King suggests possibility, recalling incident of oil storage tank sabotage at Eilat two months ago, that there may have been outside Egyptian involvement in yesterday's incident. 6. King said he wished tell us in confidence that decision made two days ago (Sunday, March 17) to start phased withdrawal of Palestine battalion of Iraqi brigade. Battalion would first be moved to H-4 (or H-5) and ultimately to Iraq. (Khammash subsequently stated that Iraqis strenuously resisted move on political grounds but that orders were issued today, March 19, for battalion to begin packing up.) 7. Re Col Daoud meeting with Israelis, King said he had delegated responsibility for meeting arrangements to Gen Khammash and we should follow up subject with him. King anticipated meeting under UN auspices could take place in next few days. (Arrangements have been cleared with PriMin also and further details are reported in Amman 3886.) 8. Hussein said he recognized that it would be desirable to inform Israelis of some of foregoing re terrorism and bus incident; the Palestinian battalion; and Daoud. He warned Emboff however, “If Israelis publicize exit of Palestinian battalion and claim it is result of Israeli pressure, I will not be able to let it leave, and my efforts in this regard will be seriously compromised.” Similar strictures apply to the decision to send Daoud. 9. Comment: I believe it imperative that you get undertaking from Israelis that foregoing will be kept in absolute confidence before relating any of it. We know how well the Israelis can keep a secret if they so choose. I believe that it is in fact legitimate for us to claim credit for some of these developments. For example, as reported Amman 3844, the Palestine battalion was discussed with King prior to the arrival of the Iraqi Chief of Staff with whom agreement to withdraw Palestinian battalion finally reached. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 2 Telegram 3844 from Amman, March 16, reported on a conversation between Symmes and King Hussein in which Symmes stressed the importance of breaking the mounting cycle of terrorism and retaliation, which was increasingly prejudicing the possibilities for peace. Symmes suggested that the withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Jordan would begin to defuse the situation, and he discussed with Hussein the importance of direct contacts with the Israelis to try to control the problem. (Ibid.) 3 The Embassy reported on March 19 that Colonel Daoud had been instructed to meet with an Israeli representative to consider the problem of terrorism. Daoud's instructions were to conduct the meeting in the presence of a UN representative. (Telegram 3886, March 19; ibid., POL ISR-JORDAN) 4 On March 18 a land mine exploded under a tour bus carrying Israeli school children on a road 13 miles north of Eilat. Two children were killed and 27 were injured. (Telegram 2937 from Tel Aviv, March 18; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 20, 1968, 1943Z. 133284. 1. Under Secretary calling in Ambassador Rabin at 1500 local time to make following points: A. USG deeply disturbed at reports from our mission in Jordan 2 and other indications that Israel calling up selected reservists and taking related actions which suggest military reprisal imminent. B. We understand sense of outrage in Israel at deplorable incident involving school bus near Eilat. Nevertheless, we cannot emphasize too strongly, as we have repeatedly in the past, that we consider military reprisals self-defeating and seriously prejudicial to hopes for peaceful solution to area problems. C. In particular, further reprisal against Jordan would be major and possibly fatal blow to Jarring mission and to US interests in Jordan and would seriously undermine our ability to influence Arab position in constructive directions which are as much in Israel's interest as ours. D. Such action would be particularly unfortunate at time when Jordan appears to be taking steps which Israel has been seeking for some time (Amman 3887). 3 2. Ambassador should seek immediate appointment with Prime Minister to make parallel approach. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Atherton and Houghton, cleared by Day and Battle, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 The Embassy in Amman reported on March 20 that Prime Minister Talhouni, acting on instructions from King Hussein, had requested the United States to take urgent measures to prevent imminent Israeli military action against Jordan. (Telegram 3914 from Amman; ibid.) 3 Not found. 118. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 118. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 20, 1968, 7:25 p.m. Mr. President: SUBJECT Urgent Message to Eshkol The Israelis are mobilizing on the Jordanian border. Wally Barbour has seen Eshkol, and Nick Katzenbach called in Rabin to make a strong pitch against an attack on Jordan. Barbour believes the final Israeli decision has not yet been made, and holds out the possibility they may decide to stop with a show of force. He gives us less than an even chance of holding them back. This quick Israeli action grows out of rapidly mounting concern over continuing Arab terrorism. They just don't believe Hussein has made a real effort to damp down on terrorists. We surmise that they have been debating whether to hit him again—even harder than on February 15—or to try to solve the problem some other way. We suspect the argument within the Israeli government has been pretty evenly matched. Then when an Israeli school bus hit a mine Monday and two Israeli soldiers were killed in similar sabotage incidents, the pressure for retaliation became all but irresistible. Hussein has asked for our help in holding the Israelis off. He fears a major Israeli attack could be the end of him and kill the Jarring mission. It would surely make our position miserable, especially if Israel decides to occupy additional territory on the East Bank. Nick Katzenbach recommends you approve the attached message 2 to be sent immediately from you to Eshkol. I wish there were something stronger we could do, but short of making specific threats I cannot think what it might be. I doubt it would add much to what we are already doing for you to talk with Rabin. I recommend you approve. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 3/1/68-7/3/68. Secret. 2 See Document 119 . 3 The President checked the approval line. 119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 21, 1968, 0511Z. 133886. Deliver following message urgently from President to Prime Minister Eshkol: “Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I want personally to emphasize the importance I attach to the messages Under Secretary Katzenbach2 and Ambassador Barbour have today delivered to you and your representatives. We deplore as much as you do the recent terrorist actions against Israeli lives and property. I am firmly convinced, however, that a military reprisal against Jordan would be a major miscalculation. Such action would have destructive consequences for our common hopes for peace and for the future of our own as well as your position in the Near East. In the interest of both our countries, I strongly urge that no action of this kind be taken. 3 I am making a strong approach at this time to King Hussein for a maximum effort to bring terrorism to a halt. 4 Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton and Houghton on March 20, cleared by Battle and Walt Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 3 President Johnson's message arrived in Tel Aviv 3 hours after Israel launched early morning military operations against Jordan on March 21. Units of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) moved across the Damiya and Allenby bridges at 5:30 a.m. to attack terrorist bases in the Karameh area north of the Dead Sea and the Safi area south of the Dead Sea. IDF aircraft supported the actions of the ground forces. Ambassador Barbour delivered the President's message even though military operations had begun in order to reinforce U.S. opposition to Israeli military reprisals. (Telegram 2983 from Tel Aviv, March 21; ibid) Prime Minister Eshkol telephoned Barbour later in the day to say that although the President's message had come after operations against Jordan had begun, he had responded to it by doing everything he could to localize and limit the operations and to ensure that civilians were not harmed. He justified the operations as a necessary reaction to terrorism and expressed the hope that they would help to stabilize the situation. Barbour reiterated the U.S. view that military retaliation to terrorism only exacerbated the problem. (Telegram 2991 from Tel Aviv, March 21; ibid.) 4 See Document 120 . 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, March 21, 1968, 0540Z. 133887. Deliver following message urgently from President to King Hussein. “Dear King Hussein: While I appreciate your problem in controlling terrorism incidents such as that which occurred on March 18th cannot but arouse passions most destructive for common hopes for peace in the Middle East. I found your public statement of February 15th courageous; but despite this statement and subsequent efforts incidents have continued. I appeal to you for a maximum effort to bring such incidents under firm control and to indicate by words and actions your determination to maintain an environment in which such violence cannot occur. I am making a strong appeal at this time to Prime Minister Eshkol to exercise restraint. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted at the White House and approved by W. E. Ledbetter (S/S-O). Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. The Embassy reported that the message was delivered to the King's private secretary at 9:40 a.m. (Telegram 3922 from Amman, March 21; ibid.) 121. Information Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 121. Information Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 21, 1968, 7:45 a.m. Mr. President: As you know from the press, the Israelis last night mounted a major raid on the Arab terrorist bases on the east bank of the Jordan River. Your message got to Eshkol 2 after the attack had been launched (8:45 p.m. EST last evening), and he responded by assuring you that this would be a limited raid and that Israeli forces would withdraw as soon as they had accomplished their mission of “preventing additional sabotage activities and disarming the terrorists.” Eshkol has just (5:50 a.m. EST) phoned Barbour to say that Israeli troops are now in the process of withdrawing. Eshkol says he will respond more fully to your message. Three action items face us today: 1. State will probably postpone signing the new Israeli PL480 agreement, scheduled for 10:30 a.m. today. We lay ourselves open to Israeli resentment for “applying pressure,” but I don't see how we could sign this today. State would say everybody is “too busy” today and avoid any implication our delay is punitive. 3 2. State is considering issuing early a statement built around the theme that “further violence cannot bring peace to the Middle East” and expressing our “concern and dismay” at Israeli military action. 4 We can hardly remain silent, and we would be as careful as possible about domestic Jewish opinion. The British have already publicly urged withdrawal behind the June cease-fire lines. 3. We have no indication yet that there will be a UN Security Council meeting, but this is a clear possibility. 5 Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret. 2 See Document 119 . 3 The Israeli Embassy was informed on March 21 that Assistant Secretary Battle was “preoccupied” with the events of the last 24 hours and that the scheduled signing of the P.L. 480 agreement would have to be postponed. (Telegram 134000 to Tel Aviv, March 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15-8 ISR) 4 A statement along these lines was released by the Department on March 21. The text was transmitted to posts in the Middle East and Europe in circular telegram 133989, March 21. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 5 The Security Council adopted a resolution on March 24 condemning the Israeli raid on Jordan. (UN doc. S/RES/248 (1968)) 122. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 122. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, March 21, 1968, 1030Z. 3928. Ref: State 133587. 2 1. We have just been asked by King's private secretary to send following message from King Hussein to President Johnson: 2. “Dear Mr. President: In response to your letter which I just received, I wish to point out the following: We are now fighting once again, defending-in the face of a blatant and premeditated Israeli aggression—our land, our homes, the shabby tents of the victims of civilization, and our honor. We are doing so with what has remained in our hands in the way of weapons since June 1967, facing overwhelming odds, unequipped as we are, not even by a finalized agreement between us for resupplying us with defensive equipment by the friendly United States. 3. “If the battle should go the way it well might do, then Jordan, its head of state, its leaders, its armed forces and its people would all become the victims of American weapons, and their own faith in the United States and its President, as well as the friendship which they valued to the point of refusing to accept any other option to bolster their defence in the face of a history of continued aggression. 4. “I am not, and shall never hold myself or my government and armed force, responsible for the safety and security of the Israeli forces of occupation in the West Bank of Jordan and the rest of the occupied Arab territories. Nor do I expect to be held responsible for this. 5. “As for the incident of March 18 to which you, Mr. President, referred, I wish to state, for your information, that after a most thorough investigation, this incident could not be traced in [planning?] or consequence, to Jordan. 6. “We have tried our best, honestly, faithfully and sincerely to lay the foundation for a just and lasting peace in this area. The blame for failure, if it occurs, must lie squarely on the Israeli side and on those who, knowingly or undeliberately, encourage Israel in her plan for the destruction of the first and last chance to achieve peace. 7. “With my regard. Sincerely, al-Hussein.” 8. Comment: As we have reported, President's message arrived after Israeli attacks had begun (and had been in progress for three hours). In delivering letter it was explained that it had originated prior to this morning's attacks and that a Presidential message had also been sent to Israeli Prime Minister. 9. We have been informed that President's message to Hussein evoked a very negative reaction. King was apparently particularly upset by what he considered imputation we were holding Jordan responsible for bus incident and that he had not been sincere in his efforts to try to control terrorists. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2 The reference is in error. The correct reference is telegram 133887, Document 120 . 123. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 123. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 22, 1968, 7:35 p.m. SUBJECT Reply from Eshkol Ambassador Rabin delivered the attached reply 2 this afternoon. It's mainly a statement of the familiar Israeli justification for their raid into Jordan. What emerges more sharply from this and from Rabin's oral commentary to Luke Battle, 3 however, is that the Israelis appear to have gathered extensive evidence that the Arab terrorist organization was planning a coordinated spring-summer offensive inside Israeli territory. They claim to have captured documents that prove it along with weapons such as Soviet-made heavy mortars. Eshkol and Eban saw Jarring today. The Israelis are trying to keep his mission alive and to involve him now in achieving better control over the border. Our effort in New York is designed to re-focus attention on Jarring, but the debate is still going on and we can't tell what success we'll have. Jarring's future will also depend on the outcome of the Arab summit which Hussein has asked for. On a related subject, Luke Battle has told the Israelis we will be in touch with them as soon as the UN meeting is over to reschedule the signing of the PL 480 agreement. Luke frankly told them we didn't think it would be helpful to sign while the debate continues, but he assured them that we are not backing out on the agreement. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 3/1/68-7/31/68. Secret. 2 Not found attached. The 3-page letter from Prime Minister Eshkol to President Johnson, dated March 22, was transmitted to the Department of State under a covering note from Ambassador Rabin on March 22. Eshkol's letter and the Ambassador's note were transmitted to the White House on March 23 under cover of a note from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read. (Ibid.) For a summary of the letter, see Document 124 . 3 A record of Rabin's conversation with Battle on March 22 was transmitted to Tel Aviv on March 23 in telegram 135537. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 3/1/68-7/31/68) 124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 23, 1968, 2001Z. 135561. 1. Ambassador Rabin delivered to Assistant Secretary Battle March 22 Prime Minister Eshkol's reply to March 21 letter from President. 2 Summary main points follows (full text by pouch); 2. Noting President's message received three hours after IDF commenced action against terrorists, Eshkol reviewed terrorist incidents since Hussein's February 16 statement, stressing “gruesome attack” on children March 18. 3. Fatah had developed from clandestine to “open, blatant, organized, and virtually legalized operations under King Hussein's eyes.” Awareness of Fatah's spring and summer plans made action imperative. 4. Leaders of Jordan tolerating and sometimes encouraging “second army” which violating GOI security, having no cease fire or international obligations, threatening Jordan's independence, and bringing Jordan and Israel into conflict. 5. Blow against Fatah should cause no regret to Israel, GOJ, or US, whose common interests advanced by Israeli action. It would be “destructive” if UN were to evade strong criticism of Fatah operations from Jordan. 6. IDF was ordered not harm civilians, and this restriction cost Israel heavy price. Hussein should understand JAA was not IDF target, even though JAA had sometimes surrendered to Fatah pressure. 7. King now better able consolidate cease-fire and move toward negotiated peace. Continuation Jarring mission necessary. Eban has told Jarring GOI still accepts his proposal for peace conference with Arab states at Nicosia and will work with him patiently despite “Nasser's irresponsible rejection this proposal.” Jarring has accepted GOI proposal come Jerusalem today to “contribute to relief immediate tensions between Israel and Jordan.” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Bahti; cleared by Atherton, Day, and Saunders in the White House; and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 2 See Document 119 . 125. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 125. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 26, 1968, 8:10 p.m. SUBJECT Signing Jordan Arms Package After weeks of negotiation, the Jordan Arms package is ready for signing. Nick Katzenbach would like to authorize Ambassador Symmes to sign tomorrow but does not want to go ahead without our OK. The plan is to do this without publicity for the moment. As you know, this negotiation has gone on for some weeks. It just happens that all the details are now wrapped up. It may not be the best time in view of continuing terrorist attacks and last week's Israeli raid. However, there may not be any good time, and the main purpose of this exercise is to bolster Hussein. The equipment involved in this deal will not arrive in Jordan for some time. For balance, Luke Battle has rescheduled the signing of the Israeli PL-480 agreement for this Friday morning. 2 That will get some publicity. My own feeling is that our public, especially the Jewish community, has accepted the resumption of military sales to Jordan. I doubt that the simple act of signing will cause much additional reaction, even if it leaks out. The press already writes as if the deal has long since been wrapped up. Therefore, I recommend that we tell State to go ahead. But I do not wish to do so without informing you. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret. 2 The P.L. 480 agreement with Israel was signed in Washington on March 29. (Telegram 138825 to Tel Aviv, March 29; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15-8 ISR) 3 The President checked the approval line. The memorandum of understanding and protocol were signed in Amman on March 28 by Prime Minister Talhouni and Ambassador Symmes. (Telegram 4060 from Amman, March 28; ibid., DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN) The texts of the memorandum of understanding and protocol were transmitted to the Department as enclosures to airgram A-266 from Amman, April 5. (Ibid., DEF 19-4 US-JORDAN) 126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, March 28, 1968, 0138Z. 137662. Ref: State 136930. 2 1. In your discretion you may draw on report of Rostow-Evron conversation reported reftel to give GOJ flavor of present Israeli attitudes and indication of our efforts forestall further Israeli attacks. We shall continue those efforts, as we oppose retaliatory raids just as we do terrorism, but we are not sanguine that these efforts will prevail with GOI for long in the absence of a serious and successful effort on the part of the Arabs to reduce sharply the incidence of terrorist activity. Although we appreciate Hussein's problem in controlling terrorism in the absence of progress towards a settlement, we at the same time believe that no Israeli Government can resist internal political pressures for military action if terrorism continues in Israeli territory. Underlining this assessment is British report that Eban told Foreign Secretary Stewart in London on March 25 that he realized March 21 raid conflicted with Israel's long-term aim of negotiated settlement, but, given growing intensity of terrorism, security considerations were overriding for GOI. 2. Just settlement acceptable to both sides is obviously only real solution to terrorist problem and we are actively studying ways we can assist Jarring's efforts towards settlement. However, if terrorism retaliatory raids cycle continues, situation will quickly degenerate to point of no return. We have and will continue to work for more flexibility in Israeli position, but it is imperative that Jordanians demonstrate significant measure of control over terrorist activity. Unfortunately, we have no blueprint to offer the Jordanians for controlling terrorism, but would suggest renewed offer of early secret talks between senior military officers, if necessary under UN auspices, might be a means of expressing GOJ's desire to control terrorism as far as its capabilities permit. We urge Jordan consider advantages of UN presence along cease-fire line. We most strongly hope if a Summit Conference is held that GOJ would make unmistakably clear need for curbing terrorism. In stressing the necessity of stopping terrorism, we are not unmindful of efforts GOJ has taken or of moderate and constructive course GOJ has followed. We have particularly in mind the King's press conference on March 23. We are concerned by present situation in which dangerous trend away from peace appears to be unfolding and are using what influence in concerned capitals we have to reverse trend. We hope conclusion arms negotiations will be considered an earnest of US interest in providing support for King in his effort chart course through these troubled waters to a just settlement so urgently needed by the peoples of the Near East. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton and Houghton on March 27, cleared by Davies, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 2 Under Secretary Rostow debated how best to respond to terrorism with Israeli Minister Evron on March 26. Rostow warned that another retaliatory raid such as the March 21 raid into Jordan would further weaken King Hussein, undermine the Jarring peace mission, and increase the chances of another regional war. (Telegram 136930 to Tel Aviv, March 27; ibid.) 3 The Embassy responded on March 30 that, while Embassy officials had been and would continue using these kind of arguments with the Jordanian Government, expectations were that Jordan would not be able to control guerrilla activities in Israeli-occupied territory. The only long-term solution to the terrorism problem, from the Embassy's perspective, would derive from Israeli implementation of the terms of UN Resolution 242. (Telegram 4119; ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) 127. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 127. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, March 29, 1968. SUBJECT Next Step with Israel-Jordan The problem in a nutshell is this: —We agree that terrorism is a threat Israel has to do something about . —We think Israel's effort to end terrorism by military attacks won't work . If they keep going down this track, we see only a rising spiral of attack and counter-attack ending in all Arabs at the summit rejecting a political solution and committing themselves to a guerrilla war against Israel. There's evidence now that the Israelis are beginning to think this way too, although they feel they must respond to terrorism somehow and don't yet see an alternative. —The only persons who can stop terrorism from Jordanian territory are the Jordanian government. The problem, therefore, is to convince Hussein to stop it or—if he's already convinced but unable—to create conditions which strengthen his hand enough to crack down. We disagree with the Israelis that their military attacks strengthen his hand. — The alternative we see is to get Jarring's peace talks on the road . If Hussein can show he's getting somewhere his way, maybe it's not too late for him to call the terrorists off, or stop them by force. —One of the main obstacles to getting Jarring's negotiations started is Israeli inflexibility. One of the main reasons for Israeli inflexibility is the fact that the Cabinet has not taken a formal position on the terms for a peace settlement; Eshkol fears breaking up his coalition but we have assurance that they'll make up their minds the moment there's a glimmer of Arab willingness to talk. —The difficulty with this is that the Arabs aren't likely to talk until somebody assures them there's a workable deal possible at the end of the track. This is what all the haggling over whether Israel accepts the UN resolution is about. What all this adds up to is the conclusion of some of us that we should now urge Eshkol to bite the bullet and make the limited move necessary to give the Arabs the assurance they're looking for . Eshkol would give away nothing of substance; he would risk a Cabinet crisis, possibly for limited gains. But the risk of doing nothing looks a lot worse to us. The alternative is to let force play itself out . The argument for is that only the Israelis will decide to bite the bullet when the pressure of terrorism builds up. The argument against is that we're in a worse position every time Israel strikes back and there's a real danger of the UN Security Council voting sanctions against Israel-with us having to decide whether to vote for, abstain or veto. More important, Israel is in a worse position if we don't stop the guerrilla spiral before the Arabs commit themselves to it. The debate was brought to a head today in State when Luke Battle tried to clear a response from the President to Eshkol's last message. Arthur Goldberg felt it was too tough for the President. Luke, while fully understanding the President's concerns, feels that any message we send ought to lay out what we see as the serious consequences of Israel's current course. My own feeling is that if we decide to do nothing to deter the Israelis from further retaliation it ought to be because we've decided consciously to let force play itself out a while longer. We shouldn't do nothing just because State can't work out line of action it feels the President can approve. I don't believe there's any point in just sending another Presidential message for Eshkol to disregard. If we approach the Israelis this time, it ought to be with the purpose of working out with them a way to get Jarring on the tracks . I think the only way to do this would be to send someone like Mac Bundy with the most serious words from the President for three or four days of talk in Jerusalem. This need not look like pressure at all. The main focus wouldn't be to restrain them. It's just the only way I can see at this time to decide where we and they are going, and the only place to do that is where Eshkol and his Cabinet are. State is considering this idea this afternoon. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President on March 30 under cover of a brief memorandum recommending that the President read it. Rostow noted a third possibility not mentioned by Saunders that could alter developments significantly in the Middle East: the fall of Nasser; but Rostow added: “I don't believe a U.S. policy can be based on that hope.” (Ibid.) 128. Memorandum for the Record 128. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, March 29, 1968. SUBJECT Conversation with Israeli Minister Evron Evron came in on March 29, at his request, to share his observations from his quick trip to Jerusalem. As usual, our conversation was tabbed as strictly personal and off-the-record. As can be imagined, it dealt mainly with the March 21 Israeli attack on Karameh and Israeli thinking in the aftermath. I began by asking him what the Israelis see at the end of their current course of gradually escalating terrorist raids and retaliatory attacks. Although the results of a military review of the Karameh attack have not been finished, Evron indicated that the Israelis were not necessarily satisfied with that sort of attack as the best means to counter terrorism. He said that they would experiment with other tactics, “such as today's” (at the moment the air and artillery attack south of Lake Tiberias was going on). He also indicated, “in the utmost confidence,” that the Israelis are building a “fence” from the Dead Sea to Lake Tiberias. (This is the reason for the Israeli request for a large number of anti-personnel mines which he hoped we might free quickly.) Concluding this line of discussion, he was quite ready to admit that these counter-attacks would not stop terrorism. When I said I did not see how the Israelis could expect to stop activities based on land which they do not consistently control, he agreed that the main problem is to convince Hussein to do the job. When I said I did not believe that Israel's counter attacks would do that either, he disagreed, but he did not argue as strongly as he usually does when he is convinced of what he is saying. I suggested that, if the military track did not promise a solution, it seemed to me this was all the more reason to get into negotiations. He suggested that more flexibility was needed before that could happen. Then telling him I wanted to ask a very indiscreet question, I asked whether Israel was denied the flexibility necessary to begin negotiations by the fact that the Israeli Government had not yet made up its mind what its position would be. I said it seemed clear to me that what the Arabs were seeking in all this haggling over whether Israel did or did not accept the UN resolution was some assurance that there was a deal at the end of the road. I realized that Foreign Minister Eban had, through us, passed the word that the Arabs would find Israel ready to negotiate generously, but it was clear that this was not convincing to the Arabs in the current atmosphere. Would an Israeli Government decision now on its negotiating terms enable some such assurance to be made? Evron answered quite readily, thoughtfully and not emotionally. He said, first, that the moment there was a “glimmer” of Arab willingness to come to the table, the Israeli Government would “make up its mind in a moment.” He said emphatically that the greatest single impression he had brought away from Jerusalem this time was the overriding desire for peace. Having felt this in his early talks there, he asked Eban whether he was right and Eban confirmed his view that everyone is “fed up with all this bloodshed.” Second, however, Evron said he had been considering for months the question of whether Israel should stake out its position before negotiations to encourage them. He said he did not believe this was the right procedure. But his main point was that, in international negotiations, one never lays his cards on the table before negotiations begin. He did not push the usual Eban line about willingness to negotiate being a necessary sign of an Arab change of heart, although this omission may have been simple oversight. At the end of our conversation, he confirmed that he had described to Eban that questioning of the US-Israeli relationship going on in Washington that he had heard from me before his departure as well as from Harry McPherson. We had both told him that an increasing number of people were more and more troubled over whether this relationship would ever become a two-way street. Secretary Rusk had asked the Israeli Government for certain actions in Jerusalem and on refugees, and his questions have been ignored. We have advised against retaliation, and our advice has been ignored. Evron said he had arrived in the Foreign Ministry the morning that Ave Harman was giving his final impressions of the US-Israeli relationship. On the basis of Evron's report and Harman's comments, Eban at the Cabinet meeting which made the final decision to go ahead with the Israeli raid on Karameh, described this change in the Washington mood to the Cabinet. Evron felt that this had made some impression since both Minister Begin and Allon had asked Evron later whether what Eban said was true. Evron at one point during this conversation said that one of the ideas that had occurred to him personally—and he said he had not heard this mentioned in Israel at all, so it was strictly personal-is whether now is not the time for Israel to begin thinking again seriously about a separate Palestinian entity. Hussein is so weak that perhaps only the Palestinians can take the lead. Already there are new economic relationships growing up between the towns of old Israel and the former West Bank of Jordan. Evron felt that the Palestinians were beginning to see the economic and other advantages of peace and, if they could be adequately organized, might be just the ones to stand up and take the lead in a settlement that Hussein might or might not join later. Evron did not seem to be suggesting a permanent separation of the West Bank from Jordan, but simply a settlement that could be worked out now as a first step in what might become a full settlement with Jordan later on when that was possible. Comment: Two reflections stand out in my mind after this conversation. First, although Eppie made clear that he had not had time for full talks with the Israeli military after the attack on Karameh, he seemed to confirm that there is some second thinking going on about the effectiveness of Israel's current force. Second, there is obviously a great deal of concern about the American relationship and I wonder whether we might not have more effect on Israel's course than we now feel possible. H.S. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 3/1/68-4/30/68. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders on April 1. 129. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 129. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 1, 1968. SUBJECT The President's Decision and the Near East 2 Our main problem, as you said this morning, is to see how we can use the President's new position to finish as much unfinished business as possible. In the Near East, the main job is how to make concrete progress toward the President's vision of last June 19. With the President's new freedom from politics, I'd suggest that we may be able to use the uncertainties of this period to good advantage in Israel. Two new factors are obvious: 1. The President is now more free of Israeli pressure. We shouldn't discount his strong personal determination not to let Israel down, so we have to exclude any dramatic shift in our position. But it's worth considering what we might do now that we couldn't have done last week. 2. The President has nothing to bargain with beyond next January. Whatever we do must not depend on committing the US beyond January 1969, except for military sales which a new Administration would be bound to honor or a financial commitment (like desalting) with Congress behind it. On balance, I believe the President's increased freedom may be more important than his loss of leverage. His ability to bargain with US support was neutralized by domestic politics. Now he can play on uncertainties about his successor. Two possible courses spring to mind: 1. Use the President's increased freedom of maneuver to bring pressure on Israel and begin re-balancing our position toward the Arabs. No successor will have such freedom to create public doubt that Israel can count on us in a Soviet-backed effort to get Arab territory back, curtail our support in the UN, tamper with tax exemption for Israel bonds or whatever else might occur to us. 2. Use the President's friendship to advantage—he may be the best friend Israel will have in the White House for some time. I favor the latter because (a) I don't think the President would want to pressure Israel and (b) because we've never fully and systematically put his friendship on the line in a tough effort to change an Israeli position. Now, if ever, is the time to try. The Israelis are already nervous about approaching the limits of our tolerance, and they might respond to the thought that they might get more support from us now than later. One other factor has to go in the hopper: There's not much the President can do on the Arab side. He is tabbed as too pro-Israeli, and our leverage there will increase only as we show we can move Israel. Putting these elements together, I think our best bet is to concentrate on changing Israel's position by persuasion-rather than pressure-enough to give Jarring a real chance. That's where the President's influence is greatest. If we take this course, we must be sure that doing something soon is better than letting Mid-East forces play themselves out. I must say I don't take much convincing on this point. It may already be too late for Hussein and Nasser to negotiate and the next Arab summit may commit the Arabs to guerrilla war instead of political solution. We want Israel to do two things: 1. Signal “ready.” One of the big obstacles to Jarring's getting started is the Israelis' position that the Arabs must come to them. In part, Eshkol is hiding behind this position to avoid the Cabinet crisis that forcing a decision on peace terms would precipitate. The question is whether an Israeli Cabinet decision now would inject enough new flexibility into the picture to get Jarring going—whether a hint to assure Hussein and Nasser that there is a deal at the end of the track would get negotiations going. The answer, of course, hinges on whether there's something at the end of the road for Israel. No one can guarantee that the Arabs will—or can—seriously negotiate anything beside withdrawal. But no one can argue that Israel has given them a fair try, and it's hard to see how Israel can lose while it sits on the Suez Canal and the Jordan River. 2. Show tactical flexibility . The time has come to try to move them a short step back from their absolute position on direct negotiations and from the notion of a package settlement all at once. The President last June 19 specifically did not endorse direct negotiations; nor did he rule out settlement in stages, and Secretary Rusk spoke to Eshkol on this point at the Ranch. What this adds up to is doing something concrete about what we've been talking about for weeks without result-increasing Israeli flexibility. Maybe we have a chance to cut the Gordian knot now. The point is that the Israelis are “shook” over the President's decision . Rabin told Ernie Goldstein, “We've had it.” So while the President doesn't seem to have much to bargain with, the urgency of getting Israel's security position in order (50 Phantoms) in the next few months may enhance what he does have. We can't expect to bargain with airplanes for Israeli withdrawal, but now may be the time to shoot our wad on a marginal Israeli shift that might be enough to get negotiations going. Now we come to an action proposal: 1. A special emissary to loosen up and pin down the Israeli position. Harry Symmes has proposed retired ambassadors like Holmes, Yost or Jernegan. But all of these are too “Arab” to cut any ice in Jerusalem. If we are to build on the advantages in the President's new status, we need someone who can go as the President's man and represent his pro-Israel side . (We've mentioned Mac Bundy as filling this bill.) 2. The line he would take would be to argue out the consequences of each possible course to persuade the Israelis that the consequences of retaliation and sitting tight are dead-ends. That being the case, pressures in the US are mounting to re-balance our position toward the Arabs before it's too late. That will also be an obvious task for the new President. With London, Paris and Moscow backing away from Israel, it will be dangerous for Israel if the US starts backing away too. Therefore, if Israel will shift its position enough to give negotiations a fair chance, we'll consider meeting Israel's aircraft needs now. This approach would combine a big carrot with a gentle stick urging only a marginal shift in Israel's position. All of us have a deep sense of foreboding that the Arabs will soon be locked into a guerrilla war that none of us will know how to stop. If the President wants to make one last effort for peace, now is the time. It may already be too late, but the effort won't cost him anything. If we're going to do it, let's do it now and let's send someone like Mac Bundy with the best possible credentials. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret;Nodis. 2 The reference is to President Johnson's decision not to seek re-election, which he announced in a nationally telecast address from the White House on March 31. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book I, p. 476. 130. Editorial Note 130. Editorial Note In a study of the Israeli nuclear program, Avner Cohen drew upon the recollections of physicist Edward Teller and the testimony of Carl Duckett, a former CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology, and explored the question of whether Israel had become a “nuclear-weapon state” in 1968. Teller told Duckett that his contacts in the Israeli scientific community led him to the “personal opinion” and “conjecture” that Israel was in possession of nuclear weapons. Teller was a consultant with the CIA and his views informed a National Intelligence Estimate, which Duckett said was drafted by the CIA, that drew the conclusion that Israel had nuclear weapons. ( Israel and the Bomb , New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, pages 297-298, 421) Duckett testified before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1978 that he took the estimate to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms and Helms told him not to publish it. He said Helms later told him that he had taken the matter up with President Johnson and Johnson had instructed him: “Don't tell anyone else, even Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara.” (Inquiry into the testimony of the Executive Director for Operations, Vol. 3, Interviews, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, National Security Archive Collection on Non-Proliferation, #26090) No such estimate has been found. 131. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson 131. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 4, 1968. SUBJECT Middle East Problem Recommendations: 1. That you sign the attached letters to Prime Minister Eshkol and King Hussein. 2 2. That you agree in principle, subject to a final recommendation regarding timing, to send a personal representative to Tel Aviv for intensive talks with Israeli representatives, and possibly to Amman and Cairo. Some suggested names of prominent private persons from which a representative might be chosen are included in the following memorandum. Background We are deeply concerned over recent developments in the Middle East which are affording the Soviets the opportunity to exploit the situation: the pattern of provocative terrorist activities countered by substantial Israeli military retaliation; the increased status which the Fedayeen seem to have achieved as a result of these developments; the inability of Hussein to deal with this matter and the apparent weakening of his regime; the decline in sympathy for Israel and growing doubts about its peaceful intentions; the inability of Jarring to get a dialogue going between Israel and the Arabs resulting from a rigid Israeli posture and the hardening of the UAR attitude. In light of the foregoing, we have concluded we must make a more direct effort to arrest and reverse these trends. Our efforts with the parties concerned to take measures to bring greater stability to the cease-fire areas and to begin talks under Jarring's auspices have not been successful. I believe it is now urgent that we raise these appeals to a higher level. We have indications that many Israelis are as concerned as we about the present course of events, and such an effort would strengthen those calling for a reappraisal of Israeli policies, particularly with respect to terrorism. We have therefore recommended to you the early despatch of the attached letters to Eshkol and Hussein. In addition, it would be highly desirable for you to send to Israel, perhaps some time next week (depending on the results of Jarring's continuing efforts), an individual who could speak frankly to the Israeli Government regarding recent trends and to explore with them possible steps which could be taken to reverse these trends. The principal short-range purpose of such a trip would be to try to indicate to Jarring a willingness to formulate acceptance and implementation of the Security Council resolution in such a way that it at least provides Jarring the opportunity to continue his efforts both in Amman and Cairo. While it is problematical that this would get talks started, it would at least help place the onus for failure on the UAR rather than Israel. More broadly and fundamentally, such an emissary could try to get across to the Israelis the immediate need for some gesture on their part, at least to Jordan, which will be an overt demonstration to the Arab world of a continuing Israeli interest in a political settlement. This would bolster Hussein. As a follow-up to your discussions with Eshkol, your emissary could also explore with the Israelis their concrete ideas about a settlement. The U.S. emissary would not take over the mediation effort of Jarring. He would support Jarring's efforts, and we would ask Ambassador Goldberg to explain this to the Secretary General so that there would be no misunderstanding. Our hope would be that such an emissary would also find it desirable and opportune to discuss matters in Amman and Cairo, though we would not wish to make any final recommendations to you in this regard until we know the results of discussions in Tel Aviv. Since it would be desirable to include Cairo on the itinerary, we believe the individual selected should be a private person in whom you have confidence rather than a government official. We have three possibilities in mind in the following order of preference: McGeorge Bundy, Robert Murphy, George Ball. Ambassador Goldberg feels, and we agree, that the emissary should have some ostensible reason for the visit other than the actual purpose. In this respect, McGeorge Bundy would be especially suitable since his foundation affairs could quite naturally take him to the Near East. 3 Ambassador Goldberg concurs. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret;Nodis. 2 There is no indication of the President's reaction to either of Katzenbach's recommendations. The draft letters are ibid. The proposed letter to Hussein was not sent. For the President's letter to Eshkol, see Document 134 . 3 In an April 5 memorandum to the President, Walt Rostow discussed the proposal to send a personal representative of the President to Israel. He proposed McGeorge Bundy, whom he cited as “everyone's top choice.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69) 132. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 132. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 5, 1968, 9:20 p.m. Mr. President: Recognizing that the approach to Eshkol in the letter previously submitted to you 2 was too general, Nick, Gene, and Luke Battle have produced a formulation which comes to bear much more precisely on an urgent operational question. The language which Eban said he could accept when Jarring gave it to him on March 10 if Hussein had accepted, is at Tab A. 3 The variation desired by Hussein to make it easier for him with Nasser involves the substitution for the bracketed passage (Tab A) of the phrase “their readiness to implement it.” The Jordanians indicate they would try to go with the Jarring text even if the Israelis do not accept the phrase. Goldberg suggests it as an additional phrase. Goldberg and State believe in any case that the provision in the next sentence of the phrase “promoting agreement in achieving such a settlement” covers the Israeli position. In any case, this draft merely urges Eshkol to “consider” this variation of language. The reasons your intervention at this point is regarded as critical are twofold: —there is an honest judgment that if we fail on this round-now that Hussein has indicated that he is prepared to accept the Jarring March 10 formulation—the Jarring mission will fail and we face a very bleak prospect; —the conviction that Eshkol simply will not move unless you personally take a position. He has ignored one intervention after another by Goldberg and the Secretary of State. I have read the critical passage to Abe Fortas, who now thinks that your intervention might make sense since it is sharply focused on a particular question. Walt Letter cleared 4 No Call me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 70, 4/1-5/68. Secret. 2 See footnote 2, Document 131 . 3 Not printed. The key passage in the formula passed by Jarring to Eban on March 10, which is bracketed for emphasis in Tab A, indicates that in order to achieve a settlement the contending parties “intend to devise arrangements under my auspices for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution.” 4 The President checked this option. 133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, April 6, 1968, 0229Z. 142978. 1. At luncheon April 2, Evron raised with Davies Israel's request for sizable quantities US anti-personnel mines (requests total 400,000). He said Defense had told General Geva request blocked by NEA. Evron said mines urgently needed in conjunction with security belt being constructed to inhibit infiltration along sensitive areas of cease-fire line. 2. Davies said he unfamiliar with case but gave personal reaction that since USG has taken strong public position critical of Israel's military reprisal policy, he favored cooperation in measures to provide alternates. Evron suggested if it would help that he would seek assurances mines would be used only in connection this project. Davies said it would be embarrassing if mines of U.S. origin were to be used in countermeasures on East Bank. 3. Davies later telephoned Evron to say suggested assurances would be helpful in expediting final decision. 4. FYI—Evron later complained to White House staff that Department exacting condition which implied lack of trust and which would be resented in Jerusalem. Davies telephoned to express surprise to which Evron responded he had had second thoughts relating solely to the form in which assurances conveyed. When Davies said he had in mind oral assurances, Evron replied that he authorized to state mines would be used solely in connection border-sealing project. End FYI. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Atherton and Battle, and approved by Davies. A copy was sent to the White House for Saunders' information. 134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, April 6, 1968, 0516Z. 142988. 1. Please convey following message from President to Prime Minister. Begin Message. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have considered your message of March 22 2 with two thoughts uppermost in my mind: deep sympathy for the serious problems which continuing terrorist acts pose for your country; and deep anxiety about the prospects for peace in the Middle East. 2. I appreciate, of course, the dilemma which the recent growth of terrorism presents. I believe, however, that military action across ceasefire lines does not deter the type of terrorism you face, but leads to greater insecurity, above all at this critical moment. 3. We both recognize, I am sure, that true security for Israel lies only in peace. 4. I believe we are now at a crossroads in this respect in the Near East: the sole peace-making process now available is the Jarring Mission. I am deeply concerned by the lack of tangible results from this mission and the cumulative deterioration of the situation resulting from a growing incidence of terrorism and counter military actions-especially at this delicate moment in the internal life of Jordan. 5. I feel, therefore, that there is an urgent need to reverse the present trend—a trend which carries the risk not only of greater and greater violence and insecurity, but indeed of another round of general hostilities, as well as irreparable damage to the Jarring Mission. We wish to see every possible step taken to minimize these risks. 6. There is very little time. There is still, however, an opportunity for an active strategy of peace. 7. I have just learned of Ambassador Goldberg's discussion with Ambassador Tekoah of April 5. 3 I believe that we must seize the opportunity presented by King Hussein's visit to Nasser, and the King's apparent willingness to urge acceptance of the formulation which Ambassador Jarring gave the Israeli Government on March 10. I understand that Foreign Minister Eban told Ambassador Jarring at that time that your Government could accept this formulation. I urge you most strongly to make your acceptance clear to Ambassador Jarring. The King believes it would greatly enhance the possibility of his success with Nasser if you could also agree to a variation in wording 4 which Ambassador Goldberg set forth to Ambassador Tekoah. I hope you will be able to consider such a variation in language, as necessary. 8. This may be the last chance for the Jarring Mission, and for peace. Lyndon B. Johnson End Message Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted at the White House, cleared in substance by Atherton, and approved by Walsh. Repeated to USUN, Amman, and Cairo. 2 See footnote 2, Document 123 . 3 Goldberg's meeting with Tekoah was reported in telegram 4488 from USUN, April 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 4 The language proposed by Jordan stipulated not only acceptance of Resolution 242 but also a readiness to implement it. 135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan and to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan and to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, April 7, 1968, 0131Z. 143077. 1. Cairo for Bergus. With Israeli acceptance formula presented by Ambassador Jarring in his discussion in Jerusalem March 10, and King Hussein's apparent readiness to accept this approach (Amman's 4238), 2 King's success in obtaining Nasser's acceptance now becomes of major importance in determining whether Jarring Mission is to succeed or fail. We have informed London of these developments through British Embassy and requested that Beeley consult with you soonest on what actions can be taken with the UARG in support of Hussein's position. You should apprise him of latest developments as soon as possible. In addition, suggest that you or Brommell see Hussein or, if not possible, pass word to him discreetly on results of our intervention with Israelis with view to having him make strongest efforts to obtain Nasser's acceptance. We have been reluctant to get out in front of Jarring, but issue is at such critical juncture every effort must now be made to move parties toward some form of negotiation leading to implementation Security Council resolution through agreement as required by para 3, SC Resolution. Clearly, if Nasser now reneges, responsibility for lack of progress will be on Egyptians. In light your 2055, you may wish to make this point apparent in further discussion with Muhammad Riad. 3 2. Amman for Ambassador Symmes. If in addition to action being taken in Cairo you deem it important pass Israeli reaction to senior GOJ officials, you authorized to do so. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on April 6, cleared by Popper, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN. 2 Telegram 4238 from Amman, April 5, reported that King Hussein was prepared to try to obtain Nasser's acceptance of the proposal presented by Jarring in early March. (Ibid.) 3 On April 6 Bergus and Mohamed Riad discussed the impending meeting between Nasser and Hussein. Bergus indicated that the United States was pressing Israel to accept a formula relating to Resolution 242 that would be acceptable to the Arab states, and urged that Nasser and Hussein should avoid any action detrimental to the Jarring Mission. (Telegram 2055 from Cairo, April 6; ibid.) 136. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 136. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, April 8, 1968, 1214Z. 4252. Dept pass Cairo. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: 143077, 2 3214. 3 1. Summary: King Hussein called me and Emboff to Palace evening 7th for briefing on Jarring talks with Nasser. Only after several hours of difficult discussion had he obtained Nasser's agreement even to consider accepting the Jarring proposal. Catch now is that Nasser insists Jarring must come up with some alternate phraseology to substitute for “I have invited the two govts to meet with me for conferences” on March 10 proposal. Jordan and UAR therefore will try to get Jarring to develop his own proposal along lines “I plan to meet with representatives or delegates of the parties in New York.” Nasser is adamant that meetings can be held only in New York and must be lowest key possible. Abdul Munim Rifai stayed behind in Cairo to join with UAR FonMin Riad in meeting with Jarring on 8th. 2. King said his April 6-7 meetings with Nasser had been longest and most arduous he had ever had with any leader. Jordanians had expected some difficulties in these discussions but were stunned by Nasser's opening position which was totally negative to concept of any peaceful solution. As far as Jordanians could see this position was shared by all of Nasser's advisers. Nasser had begun by saying flatly that Jarring Mission could not succeed, that only military solution was feasible and that UAR military was therefore preparing for that solution. Nasser repeatedly said Egyptian people would not stand for the humiliation of dealing with Israelis through Jarring in terms of latter's present proposal. Nasser in fact considered Jarring's present formula as “an American trick.” He indicated to the King a greater mistrust of US policy than ever and stressed he is unwilling to resume diplomatic relations with the US. According to Nasser he had just turned down opportunity to restore relations and would continue to do so. 3. Nasser told Hussein that six other Arab states have stated to him they have not accepted the SC resolution and oppose a political settlement. The six are Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Kuwait, South Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Nasser said Faisal through Omar Saqqaf had just urged him to agree to announce failure of the Jarring Mission. Hussein observed parenthetically to me “Your friend Faisal is more opposed than anyone to peaceful settlement.” 4. King probed Nasser for indication to when UAR would be ready to take Israel on militarily, if Nasser seriously meant that the military alternative was the only one available to the Arabs. Nasser said he would be ready “before eighteen months had lapsed.” King then countered with question how UAR proposed to help Jordan militarily since Israeli attacks on Jordan are occurring right now. Nasser replied unfortunately he was in no position to give any help. Jordanians thereupon reminded Nasser he had told them he felt personally responsible for loss of West Bank and was prepared to do anything possible to help King recover his lost territory. King pressed this point home with comment “Now you say no political solution and yet you cannot help us militarily.” King said he pointed out to Nasser that whether UAR liked it or not Jordan did not intend to continue to bear alone the brunt of Israeli military attacks and would call for assistance other Arab states, specifically UAR. Thus, King continued, UAR would become involved militarily against Israel but once again in circumstances where Israelis would be dictating the time and place. This would undoubtedly mean another disastrous defeat for the Arabs. King observed he thought this stage in discussion had been turning point in his efforts to get Nasser to consider accepting Jarring proposal. The two delegations thereupon settled down to review Jarring's formula. 5. To Jordanians' surprise Nasser passed over the “to devise arrangements” phrase without hesitation. This was point on which GOJ had expected most trouble. King said he had reserved as his fallback position insertion of phraseology “readiness to implement” but found this was unnecessary. Nasser balked only at the penultimate sentence of Jarring's formula and stated that call for meetings in way Jarring proposed was “impossible”. 6. Jordanians' first thought was that they must then begin all over again with their argumentation. They pointed out that the meeting with Israelis under Jarring's auspices was whole object of exercise. Nasser countered with statement if he accepted Jarring's “I have invited the two govts to meet with me for conferences,” there would be a “revolution in Egypt tomorrow.” Nasser stated that Cyprus as meeting place was out of the question. Jordanians then suggested possibility of New York as meeting place. Nasser was intrigued with this idea and, overriding the objections of some of his advisers, said he could accept this and added New York would be the only place where UAR could meet. 7. It was clear to the Jordanians that they had pushed Nasser as far as was possible. They felt at conclusion of discussions Nasser would stick to his position even though this put him in opposition to some of his advisers including Mahmoud Riad who throughout the meetings was particularly rigid and outspokenly anti-American. Nasser and Hussein agreed that Abdul Munim Rifai would remain in Cairo to meet with Jarring and Mahmoud Riad on Monday April 8. They would explain difficulty of “inviting the two govts” and would urge Jarring to develop a substitute phrasing of his own. Nasser indicated for example that he would not object to Jarring saying he had “arranged to meet with representatives (or delegates) of the parties in New York.” Nasser also agreed with Hussein that such meetings by no means need to be confined to permanent UN representatives of the countries involved. What he could not accept was a reference to “govts” or “conferences.” 8. Hussein said he was convinced Nasser both fully intends to proceed with “indirect talks” with Jarring and recognizes that talks are necessary “to devise arrangements for implementations.” Hussein said as far as he is concerned he will send Abdul Munim Rifai and or Dep PriMin Ahmad Touqan, together with other aides, to talk in New York and will be prepared to move as fast as possible. Jordan's al-Farra would not be GOJ representative. 9. After reviewing the foregoing, King Hussein said “This really is our last chance. You must persuade the Israelis to keep quiet and to go along with whatever Jarring proposes in place of the present invitation to the govts.” The King kept saying that “there will be talks and they can be broadened later if we can only get the meetings started.” He also said that although Nasser and he remain adamant against proceeding to a formal peace treaty, they had discussed various formulas through which permanent and secure guarantees of a peaceful settlement could be established. The King recognized the problem of proposing changes in the present proposal. For that reason, Rifai and Riad would not propose any specific language to Jarring but would explain the problem and try to stimulate him to come up with language of his own that would solve the problem for the Arabs and at the same time be acceptable to Israel as Jarring's own ideas. 10. Comment: We consider results of Hussein's talks to be encouraging. They were not conclusive in terms of getting final agreement from Nasser to Jarring's formula but we believe nonetheless we are within reach of getting talks started. We leave to other addressees whether there would be benefit in giving GOI run down on Hussein-Nasser talks until it is clear what Jarring intends to do next. He may need pushing from U Thant or Bunche if we are to have any quick action. Because of Jarring's less than activist approach to his mission we recognize that proposed revising of penultimate sentence in his formula may risk considerable delay and even Israeli rejection. 11. As far as Jordanians are concerned, it is clear to us they are ready to assume all risk involved in substantive negotiations and will take the lead in expanding the scope of the talks as quickly as possible. 12. We have increasingly deep reservations about Jarring's ability to carry through the job successfully and believe he will need careful monitoring and prodding. For this reason we see positive merit in meetings in New York which outweigh the objections USG has hitherto maintained to this venue. In any case, from what Hussein says there is no alternative to New York. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 2 Document 135 . 3 Telegram 3214 from Tel Aviv, April 6, reported Eban's request that Hussein be informed in Cairo that Israel had authorized Jarring to convey Israel's acceptance of the formula put forward by Jarring on March 10, and Israel's willingness to send representatives to a meeting between the parties under Jarring's auspices. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Bergus reported from Cairo on April 7 that Hussein left Cairo before an assurance relating to the Israeli acceptance of the March 10 formula could be conveyed to him. Bergus did convey such an assurance to Mohamed Riad. (Telegram 2060 from Cairo; ibid.) 137. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 137. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, April 8, 1968, 3:04 p.m. SUBJECT Israeli Settlements in Occupied Territories REF Tel Aviv 2722, A-716, Jerusalem A-176 2 CA-7122 We have noted press and posts' reporting that the GOI is under increasing pressure to authorize and facilitate the establishment of civilian settlements in the occupied areas. Existing settlements in the Golan Heights, Sinai, and at Etzion were justified by the GOI as para-military encampments serving security purposes. Recent reports (Tel Aviv A-716) indicate that these settlements are taking on aspects of permanent, civilian, kibbutz-like operations and some are, in fact, civilian kibbutzim with Nahal covers. Thus far, we have no information on the establishment of settlements by the 17 groups which Prime Minister Eshkol announced in the Knesset February 26 he had approved. While there was no suggestion in his statement that these groups would be associated with Nahal, we note that the groups filed applications with the GOI and it seems probable they are non-Nahal. Although we have expressed our views to the Foreign Ministry and are confident there can be little doubt among GOI leaders as to our continuing opposition to any Israeli settlements in the occupied areas, we believe it would be timely and useful for the Embassy to restate in strongest terms the US position on this question. You should refer to Prime Minister Eshkol's Knesset statement and our awareness of internal Israeli pressures for settling civilians in occupied areas. The GOI is aware of our continuing concern that nothing be done in the occupied areas which might prejudice the search for a peace settlement. By setting up civilian or quasi-civilian outposts in the occupied areas the GOI adds serious complications to the eventual task of drawing up a peace settlement. Further, the transfer of civilians to occupied areas, whether or not in settlements which are under military control, is contrary to Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, 3 which states “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” Finally, you should emphasize that no matter what rationale or explanation is put forward by the GOI, the establishment of civilian settlements in the occupied areas creates the strong appearance that Israel, contrary to the principle set forth in the UNSC Resolution and to US policy expressed in the President's speech of June 19, does not intend to reach a settlement involving withdrawal from those areas. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Precht; cleared by Wiley, Wehmeyer, and Day, and in draft by Bovis and Atherton; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, USUN, London, and Jerusalem. 2 Telegram 2722 from Tel Aviv, March 1, reported on a question-and-answer session in the Knesset on February 26 during which Eshkol answered questions dealing with Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, and discussed the negotiability of Jerusalem. (Ibid.) In airgram A-716 from Tel Aviv, March 29, the Embassy reported on the growth of six Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights area. (Ibid., REF ISR) Airgram A-176 from Jerusalem, March 6, reported on an Israeli settlement developing at a former Jordanian Army installation on the Dead Sea. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3 Reference is to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949. (6 UST 3516,TIAS 3365) 138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, April 8, 1968, 2348Z. 143620. Ref: Tel Aviv 3159; 2 Amman 4199. 3 1. We fully concur in Embassy Amman's 4199 and are becoming deeply disturbed by continuing evidence that elements in GOI seriously considering possibility of toppling Hussein as means of somehow improving current situation for Israel. We have particularly in mind statement made by chief of IDF naval intelligence reported Tel Aviv DAO 0626 4 (para 1A) and report in Tel Aviv 3146 5 that only one-third of opinion in Foreign Ministry is opposed to “solutions” involving the toppling of Hussein. We fail to see how the departure of Hussein could do anything other than put prospects for peace further in the background. We are further concerned that Israelis do not seem to have received message that regime's survival is important to US interests quite apart from interests of Israel. Given nature of our relationship with GOI, we believe that we are entitled to Israeli consideration of these interests. 2. You may inform Fonmin officials that we believe King Hussein is still in control of the situation in Jordan, but that recent Israeli reprisal actions have made his task of maintaining internal security much more difficult. You should also inform them that the US Government is becoming increasingly concerned over indications that Israel may be contemplating further military actions against Jordan as such actions will only weaken Hussein and further augment the prestige and support for the terrorists among the Arab population. 3. You should also emphasize that preservation of Jordanian regime is a major US interest. We believe he still represents the best prospect for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. In addition, Hussein is important to our overall position in the Arab world and his fall or further weakening would likely have most unfortunate repercussions for our interests throughout the area. We trust that the Government of Israel will realize that the relationship existing between our two countries justifies our expectation that Israel will respect our interests even when Israel may not think them identical with its own. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Wiley and Houghton on April 5; cleared by Atherton, Davies, and Battle; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman. 2 The Embassy reported on April 2 that it had responded to requests from the Foreign Ministry for an assessment of the internal situation in Jordan. Embassy officials had indicated that they had no information to confirm press reports that the collapse of the Jordanian Government was imminent. (Telegram 3159 from Tel Aviv; ibid.) 3 In telegram 4199 from Amman, April 4, the Embassy noted, in response to a request from the Embassy in Tel Aviv, that offering assurances to the Israelis that Hussein's government had reserves of strength might not have the desired effect in light of the fact that the Israelis had excellent sources of intelligence of their own to assess Jordan's internal situation. (Ibid.) 4 Not found. 5 In telegram 3146 from Tel Aviv, April 2, the Embassy reported that information obtained from the Foreign Ministry indicated that a debate was taking place within the Israeli Government as to how to deal with the terrorism problem and the Jordanian Government. The telegram indicated that the weight of opinion within the Foreign Ministry inclined toward doing whatever was necessary to keep Hussein on his throne as the best hope of containing the terrorists, but others in the Israeli Government advocated the overthrow of Hussein. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68) 139. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders and John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 139. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders and John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 9, 1968. SUBJECT Comment on Amman 4266 2 It's hard to know exactly what to make of the attached secret message from Eban to Hussein and Nasser. We can't even be sure that this third-hand account is completely accurate. The substance of the Israeli position as reported contains nothing new. The interesting aspect is the fact that they seem to be putting on some pressure now. Whatever else one reads into it, it's an ultimatum-direct negotiations now or we'll attack-softened somewhat by the line that the politicians may be losing control in Israel and this may be the Arabs' last chance for some time to get the kind of forthcoming deal Eban can offer. Why should Eban apply the pressure now? From other Israelis we have the impression that they'd rather sit until the Arabs come to them. Possible explanations: 1. There is a serious debate going on over how to stop terrorism, and Eban and other moderates may have bought enough time from the hard-liners to give negotiations one final try. Eban probably does feel it would be disastrous for Israel's hard-liners to gain the upper hand, but if he can't stop terrorism the peaceful way he may not be able to hold out against those who urge the military solution. While it sounds quite uncharacteristic for Eban to admit that terrorism is having an unsettling effect in Israel, he is still speaking from a position of strength since the alternative he poses is further use of force. 2. The situation may not be so neat as that described above, and this may be just one of several simultaneous attempts to explore a new tack. We know they are considering such things as seizing part of the East Bank, working directly against Nasser and Hussein, an $80 million fence on the Jordan, dealing directly with the Palestinians, and a wide variety of military answers to terrorism, three of which have been tried in the past month. It would not be surprising if they were to make diplomatic use of these to try to precipitate negotiations. They'd have nothing to lose, except that an ultimatum of this sort may do more harm than good if poorly presented. 3. Or they may be afraid of us and this may be their way of pressing the Arabs to talk on their terms before we push them to change their terms. They're alert enough to know by now that a lot of people here are beginning to talk about “partial solutions” and “last chance for peace.” They also know that American public opinion against our “pro-Israeli” policy is slowly coming to life. Except for the insight it provides if other evidence fills out the picture, there's no immediate operational aspect to this message. John Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. 2 Telegram 4266 from Amman, April 8, reported on a message the Jordanian Government had just received from Israel. A personal message from Eban to King Hussein, also intended for Nasser, it indicated that Israel was eager for a settlement with the Arab states, and felt that fedayeen activities made it imperative that the settlement be reached quickly. Eban stated that if a settlement was not reached during April, Israel would have to resort to force to resolve the Fedayeen problem. Eban added that the only way to achieve a settlement was through direct contact between Israel and the Arab states. He offered assurances that Israel was prepared to discuss border and security issues in a positive manner. Israel was prepared to be flexible on the issue of Jerusalem, but could not contemplate divided control of the city. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) 140. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 140. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, April 9, 1968, 1204Z. 3252. Israeli independence day parade. Ref: Amman's 4270. 2 1. While I am aware that the content and the route of the Israeli independence day parade will very likely arouse negative reactions among Arabs, I question whether the proposals set forth in reftel are best designed to protect our own interests in the matter. A USG public critical position is very likely, I believe, to contribute only to blow the whole matter up still further without positive return for us or anyone else. The fact is of course, as ConGen Jerusalem has been reporting for weeks, that Israeli plans and preparations are very far advanced indeed, and that any intervention on our part would stand no chance of effecting a major change in the spectacle. 3 I urge that we make no public statements on the parade and that if there are queries we limit ourselves to a reiteration of our position on Jerusalem. I wonder in any case on what grounds we could object to a military parade being held in occupied territory by the occupying forces. 2. I have not received an invitation to the parade yet and it is possible that the GOI, knowing well our views, will not tender one. Naturally, if I am invited, I do not intend to participate. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 8 ISR. Secret;Limdis. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, London, and USUN. 2 Telegram 4270 from Amman, April 9, reported Jordanian Government concerns that a proposed Israeli independence day parade scheduled for May 2 through Jerusalem would lead to serious repercussions in the Arab world if it went as planned through east Jerusalem. The Embassy suggested that an effort be made to persuade the Israelis to cancel or reroute the parade. To that end the Embassy proposed that UN Secretary-General U Thant be encouraged to issue a statement deploring the proposed parade as likely to increase tensions in the area and complicate the efforts being made to promote peace. The Embassy further suggested that the Department issue a statement expressing a similar position. (Ibid.) 3 The Consulate General in Jerusalem confirmed this judgment in telegram 1163 from Jerusalem, April 11. The Consulate General felt, however, that it was important for the United States to express its opposition to a parade it judged was inappropriate and unwise. (Ibid.) 141. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 141. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 9, 1968. SUBJECT Exploration with Evron As you suggested, I broached with Eppie the question of how the President might make a major effort for a Middle East settlement, explaining that this was a purely personal and private conversation. I started with the notion that some Israeli indication that a decent settlement is at the end of the track is necessary to get negotiations going. We talked about the validity of this premise and about how far the Israeli Government might go in sending such a signal. Our conversation was most revealing. I believe the answer, in short, is that the Israelis are waiting till Nasser falls and aren't anxious for any US initiative that hurries them toward peace before that happens. Eppie musters all sorts of reasons—some sensible, some marginal—but this is what I think it boils down to. To me, this means that we have to make our own judgment and then set out with all our energies to change the Israelis' minds (probably via an emissary). To do this, we have to have a convincing answer to their arguments that (a) Nasser can't or doesn't want to negotiate peace; (b) they can't negotiate a settlement with a schizophrenic; (c) Nasser must go before other Arab governments can be free to pursue their own interests in a settlement. The choice before us is between (a) letting forces play out as they are with an occasional tactical prod to keep Jarring in motion and (b) playing for a substantial shift in Israel's tactical position on the assumption that such a shift would get serious negotiations started. So far, while everyone is uneasy about our present course, no one has made the hard final judgment that would shift our approach to leaning hard on the Israelis. We came close last week but were diverted by the seeming break on the Jarring front. I will be doing a separate memo to you and Luke on this. For the moment, here's how my conversation with Eppie went: Eppie doubts—“with real regret”—that any kind of Presidential initiative or Israeli compromise now would get negotiations started. He believes the Arabs will choose to wait for President Johnson's successor. Any sign that we were urging compromise now would lead the Arabs to believe that pressures are building up on the US to push Israel into a more flexible position. Any sign of change in our position would encourage the Arabs to believe that the President's successor would have to start at least from that point and that greater compromise would be possible later. He pointed out how unanimously the Arabs view the President's Vietnam proposal as a sign of weakness and failure. He further believes that the Arabs have all the signals they need from Israel-that the main obstacle to negotiation is that the Arabs themselves aren't ready to negotiate. In the way of signals, he cited particularly Eban's 12 February interview with Haaretz . Having said that much, the Israelis believe any more signs of compromise would be signs of weakness in Arab eyes. Eppie is playing with a new idea. He believes that feelings of Palestinian separatism are growing stronger right under the surface on the West Bank. Since he doubts that King Hussein is a free (from Nasser) agent in negotiating a settlement, he wonders whether Israel shouldn't start with a settlement negotiated with the Palestinians and then let them determine their own relationship with Jordan. I suggested that, even to do this, Israel would have to make up its mind on the shape of a final settlement. He asked what we had in mind. I told him we had not drawn any lines on the map. I said that our main concern was that Hussein get back a big enough portion of the West Bank to call it a settlement and a significant role in Jerusalem. He hinted that the Israelis are thinking about a substantial modification in the old armistice line, pushing it eastward at least as far as the heights that run down through Nablus past Jerusalem and Hebron (looks like 15-25% of West Bank area). In Jerusalem he spoke of Jordanian administrative custodianship of the mosque area and, at most, a corridor of access to the old city. I said it sounded to me as if he advocates our standing back and letting events take their course. He denied this. He feels that there is already substantial Arab reason to believe that an eventual military solution would be possible because we have stood back. He harked back again to the idea that our greatest mistake in 1967 was to continue our suspension of arms shipments while the Soviets were rearming the Arabs. The Arabs do not believe we are firm in denying the area to the Soviets or in opposing the radical Arabs. In his view, we have never even made it clear that the Sixth Fleet will remain in the Mediterranean as long as it is needed. This American wishy-washy-ness is, in his eyes, the greatest encouragement the Arabs could find to believe that a military solution will become possible someday. It's the old line of making Israel so unbeatable that the Arabs will be forced to their knees. Far from advocating our simply letting events take their course, he proposed a policy of “active passivity.” He saw three things that could be done: —Nasser should be eliminated. “There are plenty of things you could do.” He claims that we continue to help keep him afloat by acquiescing in Western European and IMF programs to reschedule UAR debts. He believes we have dropped our conditions for resuming relations and are now encouraging Nasser to think that he can place conditions on resumption. —Aircraft for Israel. The Arabs must be certain that the military balance will continue to favor Israel. —We must make clear that we are going to stand firm against the USSR. “You should hear what even your friend, the Shah, says about your policy.” He deeply fears that the mood in this country is to pull out. I summed up by suggesting that the US could follow one of three courses: (1) We could sit back and let local forces play themselves out. (2) We could keep hands off the Jarring process but become more active in creating conditions that would be riper for bringing the Arabs around and convincing them that a military solution is impossible. (3) We could press for some sort of Israeli signal and try to get the Jarring negotiations started. He felt that the middle course was best. Comment: This illustrates to me, more sharply than anything I have heard, the limits of trying to deal with the Israelis on the basis of friendship. They deeply distrust our “softness” in dealing with the Arabs. They will cultivate closeness with us as long as it suits their purposes. They will not open up to us on basic strategy because they disagree with us fundamentally over the question of whose side time helps. If we disagree, we will have to make up our own minds and take them on. Eppie promised to come back with more refined thoughts after he'd had time to think this over, but I thought you'd be interested in his initial reaction because it's so revealing. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. 142. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 142. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, April 10, 1968, 0810Z. 4296. Subject: Jarring Mission. 1. King Hussein summoned me last night to meet with him urgently in the PriMin's office. He had with him Crown Prince Hassan, PriMin Talhouni, Abd al-Moneim al Rifai and Zayd al-Rifai. Abd al-Moneim had not long before returned from Cairo and they had been discussing his talks with Mahmoud Riad and Jarring. 2. The King with interjections from Abd al-Moneim explained a new snag that had developed in the Jarring exercise as a result of the talks in Cairo on the 8th. As a result of the talks Abd al-Moneim had with Riad and Jarring, Jordan was now requesting the USG to state to the GOI in writing that it is the USG understanding that Israel, in saying that it accepts the Nov 22, 1967 and Jarring's March 10 proposal, means that it also accepts the implementation of the resolution. If this could be done, then Jordanian and Egyptian representatives would be in New York in a matter of few days ready to talk under Jarring's auspices. After the talks started, Jordan would be ready “to move very far, very fast” regardless of what the UAR might do. But Jordan had to have the UAR with it in order to get started in talks. With the requested written assurance from the US, Jordan could get the UAR to talks in New York. The US statement would be considered as an assurance, not as a commitment, the King said. 3. I responded that we had already been assured Jarring had been informed officially by Israel that it accepted his March 10 proposal. Why should anything else be needed and why, in particular, should it be required of us? I did not see how Jarring's proposal could be modified without raising further questions and suspicions in everyone's mind. To us Jarring's proposal, like the Nov 22 resolution, meant what it said, nothing more and nothing less. Israel had provided us with the wording of its written telegram to Jarring reiterating acceptance of his proposal. 4. Abd al-Moneim then explained the genesis of the Jordanian request as follows: After a lot of jockeying around on the 8th about what would be said to Jarring and whether Jordan and the UAR would meet him separately or together, it was decided Riad would see him first alone. Riad was to say that Jordan had accepted his March 10 proposal and was ready to meet with him. Jarring had responded to Riad and later to Rifai “That's fine, but Israel has not accepted the implementation of the resolution.” 5. I expressed incredulity that Jarring had said this. In the course of further discussion, however, it came out that both Riad and Rifai had been told by Jarring that he did not consider that Israeli acceptance of his March 10 proposal or the Israeli telegram meant that they will implement the resolution. 6. I of course went over all of the old ground making especially the following points: (1) the resolution is not self-implementing (2) to accept the resolution is to accept the idea of its fulfillment (3) the resolution is a package (4) talks between the parties, but not necessarily direct talks, are understood to be required (5) some kind of secure and permanent arrangements, but not necessarily a formal peace treaty, are foreseen in implementing the resolution (6) the only true test of the intentions of the other side is to sit down and start trying “to devise arrangements for the implementation.” I said it was Jarring's job to get acceptance of different words if he and the parties felt that other words were necessary. I personally thought a great deal of time had already been wasted in debating the meaning of words about “acceptance.” If now we told Israel we were assuming the Arabs and Israel had agreed to implement the resolution, Israel would have every right to ask us what the Arabs meant by moving away from Jarring's March 10 proposal. We had heard enough about these forms of words to know each side seemed to find some special magic in them. If the Jordanian-UAR idea is to play legal or semantic tricks on Israel I saw no hope for a peaceful settlement. I did not see in any case why my govt should have to speak for Israel in this way. We very much wanted a peaceful settlement but we could not lend ourselves to deceiving either side. If we said “Israel agrees to implement the resolution” it would mean no more and no less than what the Jarring March 10 proposal says. 7. We went over and over this ground. The King emphasized there was no intention of misleading anyone. Jordan simply has to have the UAR with it to begin talks. The requested assurance (not a commitment, he stressed several times), from us would enable Jordan to get the UAR to New York. From then on there would be clear sailing. There would be no need for a report or statement or anything else from Jarring. 8. I pressed Abd al-Moneim on why Jarring's proposal was not sufficient. He reiterated that Jarring had said he cannot guarantee that Israel will implement the resolution and that he, Jarring, does not believe they will. Jarring had said this to Riad. When Jarring said the same thing to Rifai, the latter had said the U.S. Embassy assures us Israel accepts your proposal and will proceed to agree on its implementation. Jarring had said in effect: “I don't believe it. Get it from that Embassy in writing.” It was largely for this reason that Jordan now needed a statement from the USG in writing-a statement it could show to Riad. 9. Several variations of a possible USG written statement were put forward, but I did not get a clear statement of what would satisfy the Jordanians or the UAR. 10. Hussein assured me several times that Jordan is eager to meet in New York and to reach agreement. If this umbrella can be provided to get UAR to NYC, Jordan will move ahead rapidly. 11. Comment: Foregoing is preliminary report. I am seeing Rifai again in a few minutes and may ask to see Hussein later. Will make recommendations following these meetings. 12. Only explanation for this bizarre performance that occurs to us is that Jarring must have believed that Israel's retraction of its acceptance as reported in State 143647 and 143619 2 had again pulled the rug from under him. 3 Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, USUN and Cairo. 2 Telegram 143647 to Tel Aviv, April 9, repeated telegram 4494 from USUN, April 8, which was the basis of the information sent to Tel Aviv on April 8 in telegram 143619. Telegram 143619 to Tel Aviv, April 8, indicated that Ambassador Goldberg received a report from Jarring that the Israeli Ambassador in Nicosia had passed a message from Eban to the effect that Jarring should do nothing further to deliver the message to Hussein indicating Israeli acceptance of the March 10 formula. (Both ibid.) 3 The Department informed the Embassy in Amman on April 12 that, for all of the reasons advanced by Ambassador Symmes, the United States could not provide the written statement Jordan had requested. (Telegram 145661; ibid.) 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, April 11, 1968, 2330Z. 145603. Ref: Amman's 4266. 2 Subject: Arab-Israeli Eban Message. Should King Hussein seek our reaction to proposal carried by Hikmat Al-Masri, suggest you reply along following lines: 1. Notwithstanding strong U.S. desire seek progress toward settlement, because of considerable risk for Hussein we believe we must leave decision to him. 2. At the same time, we recognize pressures mounting within the status quo may prove a greater danger in the longer term. 3. While there are elements in Eban message we do not like, it does represent a significant Israeli initiative and a possible opening. 4. As made clear in November discussions with Hussein in the U.S., we cannot guarantee to deliver Israel on any specific issue but would use our influence to get the best deal possible for Jordan. We adhere to the views expressed then. 5. FYI. You will recall at that time we made clear we could not envisage a viable Jordan without return of the West Bank. We believe there must be withdrawal of Israeli forces to recognized and secure frontiers but not, necessarily, the old armistice lines. We believe there could be adjustments of these lines based on security and economic considerations but that there must be mutuality in adjustments. As Ambassador Goldberg noted, for example, “If Jordan makes an adjustment along the Latrun salient there ought to be some compensatory adjustment for it.” Jerusalem, we recognize, is probably the most difficult issue involved in any settlement, but even here we are prepared to be helpful. We are willing to use our influence to see what arrangements can be worked out for an appropriate Jordanian role in Jerusalem. End FYI. 6. If King should not raise this matter with you in next few days, we may wish to reassess the situation to determine whether we should take initiative. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Davies; cleared by Battle, Houghton, and Sisco; and approved by Katzenbach. 2 See footnote 2, Document 139 . 3 Symmes reported on April 12 that neither the King nor Zaid al-Rifai had raised the matter with the Embassy. Symmes concluded that “Jordanians will let this one ride at least until they see how the UAR reacts to latest Jarring developments.” (Telegram 4354 from Amman; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-JORDAN) 144. National Intelligence Estimate 144. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 11, 1968. NIE 35-68 ISRAEL Note This estimate assesses Israel's situation with particular reference to its central problem of security. In the radically altered situation arising from the June war, Israel's security problems have two major aspects: (a) its military capabilities compared to those of the Arabs; and (b) the political, psychological, diplomatic, and administrative questions involved in dealing with the occupied territories and with its Arab neighbors in circumstances short of war. Conclusions A. Despite its smashing victory in the June 1967 war, Israel finds that acceptance by its Arab neighbors continues to elude it. A formal peace settlement is out of the question, and the present stalemate, with Israel occupying large tracts of territory and controlling a million Arabs, will probably continue for a long time. B. Arab terrorist activity is likely to increase, though Israel will be able to keep it under control. Incidents along the cease-fire lines will also continue. Israel will retaliate on occasion, and this could develop into heavy fighting. In the longer run, continued Israeli occupation will almost certainly lead to a new round of major hostilities. C. In this condition of uneasy truce, Israel will maintain a military superiority over the Arabs, with a view to deterring them or, if war comes, defeating them quickly enough to prevent serious damage to itself. This means modern weapons. Israel probably sees France as a not very reliable source of such arms, at least as long as de Gaulle is in power, and will look increasingly to the US. But it will also try to produce as much as possible of its own military equipment. D. Six years ago, Israel contracted with a French supplier for a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 280 nautical miles. It could be deployed in Israel in 1969, if de Gaulle permits it. If he refuses to allow the French firm to deliver the missiles or to assist Israel in manufacturing them, the latter could go ahead on its own, but it would probably take at least five years to deploy a missile system. [ 1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified ] [Here follows the 9-page Discussion section of the estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 11. 145. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 145. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, April 15, 1968, 0815Z. 2136. 1. McCloy left Cairo this morning after 36 hour stay. 2 While here he saw Nasser, Fawzi, and FonMin. Following is prepared from rough notes dictated by McCloy before departure and is subject to revision by him. He asks that distribution be restricted to Secretary, Messrs. E. Rostow, Battle and Helms and White House. 2. Fawzi amenable but emphasized need for more significant US support for Nov 22 resolution. FonMin more critical of US and more despairing re any hope coming from US. FonMin said key to problem was limitation of Israel expansionism. He said Israel unwilling forego expansionism and US unwilling confront Israel on this issue. 3. McCloy talked very plainly to Nasser. Nasser said he willing make “package deal” with Israel including withdrawal, “agreed and secure boundaries,” demilitarization, non-belligerency. Documents to be prepared in advance and then go into effect simultaneously. 4. McCloy pointed up folly of linking Suez Canal to refugee problem. McCloy said refugee problem can never be “solved” to Arab satisfaction. Meanwhile one of Egypt's most precious assets wasting away. McCloy suggested reopening of Canal with IBRD assistance on terms of free passage for everybody. Nasser seemed to acknowledge the wisdom of such a course but indicated his internal situation would not permit it. 5. Nasser admitted he was the one standing in way of resumption US-UAR relations. He again indicated concern re public reaction to resumption so long as US did not balance its policy by doing something for Arabs. 6. Nasser recalled proposed US arms aid to Egypt in 1954 had foundered on his refusal accept US technicians. We had been right and he wrong. After June war he has been begging for Soviet technicians. He unable deny use his ports to Soviet fleet. 7. Nasser made sympathetic noises re Hussein but said if latter negotiated directly with Israel he wouldn't last very long. 8. Nasser said since President Johnson has announced he will not be a candidate might be time for US do something show its lack of bias for Israel. McCloy said no US administration would take action compel Israel withdraw without assurance for Israel's security and without convincing simultaneous action on part UAR. Nasser said this bitter pill but he accepted it. 9. McCloy got impression Nasser less vigorous, more subdued. He senses restrictions on his flexibility. Although worried, he is not distraught. 10. Nasser spoke in considerable admiration for President Johnson and what Nasser called “his statesmanship action” re Vietnam. Nasser added he completely convinced President's action not a maneuver. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Secret; Nodis. 2 John J. McCloy visited Egypt as part of a series of visits to Middle Eastern countries on behalf of the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development. He also visited Jordan April 10-11 and Lebanon April 11-13. Reports of his meetings with King Hussein and Prime Minister Talhouni are in telegrams 4316 and 4317 from Amman, both April 11. (Ibid.) For a record of McCloy's meeting with Lebanese President Helou, see Document 149 . 146. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 146. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 17, 1968. SUBJECT Airlift of Equipment to Jordan The attached memorandum from Dick Helms to the President reports another request [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] that we airlift some of the equipment included in our recent arms agreement. 2 We have already arranged two or three regular supply flights of non-lethal equipment down from Turkey. State and Defense are now arguing over whether to arrange 10-15 special flights to carry a few of the AA guns and other combat equipment to make a psychological impact such as we tried for after the Israeli raid on Samua in 1966. Luke is trying to push this to urgent decision. Therefore, we do not have a solid proposal yet, and I would recommend giving him another day or two to work one out with Defense. If he can, then we would probably want to tell the President since it would dramatize our arms shipments to Jordan at a time when military exchanges across the Jordan River continue. Until we have a recommendation, however, you may not want to distract him from other more important issues. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret. 2 Not printed. [ text not declassified ] Ambassador Symmes supported this appeal in telegram 4371 from Amman, April 16: “I cannot emphasize too strongly the need to be forthcoming to the GOJ with respect to airlift.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN) 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, April 18, 1968, 0101Z. 148769. Ref: Amman 4270, 2 Tel Aviv 3296, 3 USUN 4539, 4 Jerusalem 1163, 5 all refs Notal. 1. Israeli Twentieth Independence Day Parade, to be held in Jerusalem May 2, will originate in Shu'fat in former Jordanian-held sector, skirt Walled City and terminate in Israeli sector. Israeli press has reported foreign diplomats will not be asked to attend but that military attaches will be invited. USG has received no official Israeli communication regarding US attendance. 2. Department has determined that neither Ambassador nor any other Embassy officer should attend parade in Jerusalem. If it is deemed useful and desirable, a representative of USDAO may unofficially observe parade in civilian clothes. 6 At Ambassador's discretion he and members of his staff may attend other customary Independence Day ceremonies in Israeli sector of Jerusalem consistent with practice in past years. 3. We plan to inform Israeli Embassy here of our position on parade as follows: US could not authorize its representatives to attend parade in Jerusalem. This is consistent with our well known views on status of Jerusalem. As we have stated publicly and privately we believe future status of Jerusalem must be worked out in consultation with all parties having interest in special character of the city. Satisfactory solution for Jerusalem must take into consideration religious, economic, and political interests at stake including those of Israel and Jordan. This objective can best be achieved by dealing with future of Jerusalem as element in general political settlement. We have strongly and consistently expressed opposition to unilateral Israeli acts which appear to consolidate or symbolize de facto annexation of Jerusalem. We consider Israeli decision to route parade through the occupied, formerly Jordanian-held sector of the city a particularly provocative act which will understandably deepen Arab suspicions re true Israeli will to peace. We think Israelis will find little understanding for their action internationally and in UN. For Embassy Tel Aviv: Should question of Jerusalem Parade be raised by Foreign Ministry, you should make foregoing points in describing US position. 4. In formulating US position on parade Department has considered suggestions that USG attempt to dissuade GOI from staging parade in occupied East Jerusalem and that US encourage UNSYG to deplore Israeli planning for parade. We share views expressed by Embassy Tel Aviv and ConGen Jerusalem that there is no possibility GOI would make any change in its plans for Jerusalem parade. That parade would be held in Jerusalem has been foregone conclusion since June war, and elaborate preparations involving road work and construction of facilities have been made. GOI decision and actions have been taken in full knowledge US views on Jerusalem. Accordingly, we believe appropriate US response is dignified statement to press and to Israelis that emphatically and clearly sets forth consistent US position on Jerusalem while avoiding showdown over changing venue or route which we cannot win. By seeking involve UNSYG or otherwise forcing showdown, US would only provide additional fuel for Arab resentment. 5. Press guidance will be transmitted to addressees in subsequent message. 6. We plan also to inform British and other friendly governments who have expressed interest in our decision. We understand from informal consultations that British and Germans intend take similar decision. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 8 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Precht on April 17; cleared in draft by Sisco, Colonel Abba of DOD/Joint Staff, and by Colonel R. H. Jenkins of DOD/ISA; cleared in substance by Country Director for Northern Africa John F. Root and by Neuman, Battle, Atherton, and Houghton; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Aden, Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, USUN, Paris, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, and STRIKECOM. 2 See footnote 2, Document 140 . 3 In telegram 3296 from Tel Aviv, April 11, Barbour reiterated his objections to pressuring the Israeli Government to cancel or reroute the scheduled parade. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 8 ISR) 4 Telegram 4539 from USUN, April 11, transmitted Goldberg's recommendations concerning the scheduled May 2 parade. Goldberg recommended issuing a strong U.S. statement of non-attendance and criticism of the parade venue, and at the same time make a high-level demarche to the Israeli Government asking for a change of venue. (Ibid.) 5 See footnote 3, Document 140 . 6 The Department subsequently revised this instruction to prohibit any U.S. official from attending the parade. (Telegram 152893 to Tel Aviv, April 25; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 8 ISR) 148. Special National Intelligence Estimate 148. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 18, 1968. SNIE 30-1-68 TERRORISM AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN ISRAEL AND JORDAN Scope Note This estimate deals with the likely course of fedayeen 2 activity and its consequences in Israel and Jordan over the next 6-12 months. Conclusions A. Fedayeen activity is posing dilemmas for King Hussein of Jordan and for the Government of Israel. The interaction of events in the two countries is likely to lead to increased border conflict and to threaten Hussein's control of Jordan. B. Hussein would like to restrain the fedayeen, because they block his chances of an accommodation with Israel, bring reprisals, weaken his position on the throne, and infect the army and public with radical and subversive ideas. But he is finding restraint increasingly difficult since the fedayeen are popular symbols of defiance of Israel. The army is dissatisfied with the US arms supply program, and popular resentment toward the US is growing, based on a feeling that the US is partial to Israel. These circumstances may force Hussein to get arms from the USSR, through he fears the political implications of such a deal. If Hussein lost control, his regime would almost certainly be replaced by one more radical and aggressive, perhaps something on the Syrian pattern. C. Fedayeen activity is unlikely to drive the Israelis from the occupied areas or endanger the existence of Israel itself. Nevertheless, Israel's leaders and people are united in their determination to halt Arab terrorism. They are beginning to question their long-established policy of reprisals, and are likely to try counterterrorism and hot pursuit as alternatives. They might mount a major military invasion of the East Bank, but we think they will decide that the disadvantages would outweigh the gains. In the end, they are likely to try to seal off much of the present Jordanian border, though such a defensive posture runs against Israeli military tradition and instinct. Whatever their chosen tactic, they will be very tough in dealing with Arab terrorism and are unlikely to be deterred by the prospect that their efforts might topple Hussein. Discussion The Fedayeen 1. Arab terrorists—“fedayeen”—have become a critical factor in the internal affairs of Israel and Jordan, and in the relations of these states with one another. For a time after the June war, there was little fedayeen activity. Since the fall of 1967, however, such operations in Israel and in the Israeli-occupied West Bank have been of sizable proportions. 3 As of mid-March, the Israelis claimed to have killed over 90 terrorists and to have 1,500 under detention. Some of these figures represent unorganized resistance activity in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank, and many of those detained are probably suspects rather than proved fedayeen, but overall figures reflect a rising level of terrorist activity. 2. At least 20 organizations have the purpose of using terrorism against Israel. Most of them were formed before the June 1967 war and had as their objective the liberation of Palestine from Israeli domination. Since the June war, some of these organizations have represented themselves as movements of resistance against Israeli occupation of Arab territory. However, the line between these two goals is blurred, and fedayeen raids are carried out against Israel proper as well as against Israel-occupied Arab areas. The basic goal of the fedayeen probably is to undermine the state of Israel itself. The bulk of this activity is carried out by Fatah, which pre-dates the June war, and by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which was formed after it. The other major group, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), has trained irregular fighters, but does not appear to have engaged in raids against Israel. 3. Control of the fedayeen movement in Jordan is a subject of rivalry among Arab States and factions. The PLO for some time has been trying to unite such activity under its aegis, but Fatah has refused to cooperate and has itself sought to unify such groups under its control. The Ba'thist regime in Syria fears the influence of Nasser and of the Arab Nationalists' Movement in the fedayeen movement and has sought to establish its own predominance over it. The goal of each contestant is predominant influence over the Palestine Arabs as an element in the inter-Arab struggle for power. 4. Most fedayeen are trained and equipped in Syria, although Algeria, Iraq, and the UAR have done some training. Though some may have been trained in Communist China and North Vietnam, we do not believe that any non-Arab force controls any of the fedayeen. Heavy financial support for liberation activities comes from well-to-do Palestinians and other Arabs in the oil-rich states, and demands appear to be increasingly levied on Jordanians. Nasser has now come out publicly in support of the fedayeen. Once trained, the fedayeen cross into Jordan, where they get help and sympathy from the Iraqi forces in Jordan and from the large numbers of their fellow Palestinians there. Fedayeen usually operate in teams of 4 to 11 men. Their missions include crossing into Israel or Israeli-occupied territory to plant mines, ambush Israeli personnel, conduct sabotage, and collect intelligence. The fedayeen have a mixed collection of small arms, grenades, and mines; according to Israeli reports, they have now acquired 120 mm mortars. 5. While there were relatively few fedayeen before June 1967, there are now probably some 2,000 in Jordan alone. Many are of a new breed. They are younger, better educated Palestinians with a sense of mission. They are likely to pursue their goals with zeal and increasing skill, though they are still relatively inexperienced. Fedayeen activity is unlikely to drive the Israelis from the occupied areas or endanger the existence of Israel itself. 6. Harsh repressive measures by Israeli occupation forces have kept the West Bank Arabs from offering much assistance to the fedayeen. The Israelis have apparently penetrated many of the fedayeen organizations, and have been able to kill or capture a substantial number of infiltrators in the act of crossing into Israeli-held territory. But these countermeasures have not stifled the fedayeen. Indeed, each successful incident will probably further boost their determination to continue and enlarge their activities. Their methods, however, will probably remain much the same; they will try to take Israeli lives and inflict damage on property, will have some successes, and will remain objects of very serious concern to Israel. 7. The Israelis have also launched severe reprisal raids designed to make the Jordanians withhold support from the fedayeen. For example, on 15 February, the Israelis shelled and bombed a refugee camp which they said was harboring fedayeen. On 21 March, several thousand Israeli troops crossed the Jordan River, seized the town of Karamah, a terrorist base, killed and captured a number of alleged fedayeen, and killed at least 60 Jordanian soldiers as well. These reprisals in particular have, contrary to Israeli expectations, caused an upsurge of popular support for the fedayeen, who have achieved a new respectability as Arab patriots. Hussein's Position 8. King Hussein has been in a difficult situation since the June war. At that time he had earned almost universal approval at home by joining with the other Arabs in fighting Israel, but this did not entirely offset the shock of defeat and the great loss of territory. As Hussein has tenaciously held on to his connection with the US, which most Arabs believe strongly supports Israel, and as his diplomatic efforts to regain lost territory have not succeeded, frustration has become more open and pronounced in Jordan. 9. This situation makes it extremely difficult for King Hussein to arrive at an acceptable policy towards the fedayeen. He has endeavored to restrain their activities, for he recognizes that they result in Israeli reprisals which he can neither prevent nor protect against. These reprisals damage his country and his people; they also increase resentment against his regime by the Jordanian people and army. Hussein also believes that continued terrorism is destroying the chances of an accommodation with the Israelis which would return most of the West Bank to him. Moreover, the fedayeen owe allegiance to no government and constitute a subversive element which could provide a focus of antiregime sentiment. While the upper echelons of the Jordanian Government share Hussein's views, the bulk of the Jordanian people feel considerable sympathy for the anti-Israeli actions of the fedayeen. By and large, the Jordanian Army is not hostile to the infiltrators; some army units have provided covering fire for fedayeen crossing the Jordan River. They have probably, despite orders to the contrary, given them material support. Further, the Jordanian Army has not inhibited the open assistance given the fedayeen by Iraqi troops in Jordan. 10. Thanks to the rising popularity of the fedayeen, and to general anger in Jordan at Israeli reprisals, King Hussein now finds it increasingly difficult to restrict the anti-Israeli actions of the fedayeen who live in his territory. He is seeking accommodation with their leaders so as to curb criminal or antiregime activity which these groups might undertake. He probably is also trying to exploit differences among rival fedayeen groups and among the Arab regimes and factions that support them. There is little likelihood that this situation will change, and the fedayeen will probably operate from Jordan into Israel without fear of effective official opposition. As for Hussein, either permitting them to operate freely or trying to assert some degree of control over them is likely to adversely affect his position over a period of time. 11. In the past, Hussein's principal support has been the army, but the sympathy of some of its elements with terrorist activities may make it receptive to the general hostility of the fedayeen to the monarchy. This process is likely to be hastened by rising dissatisfaction with what the officer corps considers an unacceptably slow pace of arms resupply by the US. Military leaders have noted Hussein's lengthy, frustrating negotiations with the US—negotiations which have so far led to an agreement for arms supplies but have not yet resulted in the arrival of any weapons. They contrast this with the speedy Soviet resupply of the UAR and Syria and the standing Soviet offer to fully equip the Jordanian Armed Forces. 12. Though conservative Arab friends, particularly King Faisal, strongly oppose Jordan's receiving Soviet weapons, military officers are likely to press Hussein to do so. To help fend off this pressure, he is seeking to get Western arms from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and perhaps from Pakistan and Iran. Hussein has consistently refused to accept Soviet arms but would almost certainly accede if he felt it necessary to enable him to remain in power. A Soviet arms deal would be popular with the military and the public at large. Hussein might also consider that arms from the Soviets and better relations with the USSR would afford new protection from Israeli reprisal attacks. He might reason that Syria's close relations with the USSR have been a principal reason why Israel has left Syria alone. 13. Even if Hussein accepted Soviet arms, he would still try to maintain countervailing ties with the West and with the conservative Arab States. To limit adverse effects in his relationships with these countries, he might attempt to secure only specific categories of arms—e.g., tanks or artillery—from Moscow. Hussein would almost certainly take the line that he had turned to the USSR only as a last resort. His basic international policies would continue to take account of Western interests. He would continue to seek an accommodation with Israel. While he might benefit from increased domestic popularity, he would seek to rule through the same group of generally monarchist conservatives which has staffed Jordan's Government for years. 14. Though Hussein's hold on power has been weakened, it remains reasonably good. But the pressures against him-aggressive Israeli military reprisals, domestic discontent, lack of strong support from fellow Arabs and from the West—are substantial, and the initiatives open to him are not promising. Much will depend on the interaction of forces in the area; a continued high level of fedayeen activity accompanied by Israeli military countermeasures would seriously weaken him. Some progress by the Jarring mission, Egyptian or Iraqi moves to limit support for fedayeen, or receipt of arms would ease matters. Hussein has ridden out severe storms in the past and could do so again. But he is likely to be in substantial jeopardy through the next year at least. 15. A successor regime to the Jordanian monarchy would probably include numerous Palestinians and Arab nationalist army officers. It would be strongly anti-Israel. It would be more radical than Hussein's government and would be drawn toward cooperation with other revolutionary-minded Arab States. It would probably seek closer relations with the USSR and would be considerably less well disposed toward the US. But, in some aspects at least, its radical tendencies would be tempered by the continuing vital importance of subsidies from the conservative regimes of Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. Israeli Responses to Terrorism 16. Israel has had a long-standing policy of reprisal in force for terrorist incidents involving loss of Israeli lives. But this policy has come under domestic criticism as a result of the Karamah raid. Preparations for this raid were not concealed; most of the fedayeen had left Karamah before the Israelis arrived and have since returned. Although raids are planned so as to limit the loss of Israeli troops, 25 Israelis were killed and over 70 wounded in the Karamah operation. This was due in part to the fact that the Jordanian Army, much to the Israelis' surprise, chose to fight rather than stand by. Opponents of the reprisal policy point out that future raids like that on Karamah are likely to cause heavy Israeli casualties and will probably fail to achieve their purpose. Fedayeen operations since Karamah have taken several Israeli lives. Jerusalem's Mayor Kollek has said publicly that reprisals do not crush the spirits of the Arabs but, on the contrary, lead to increased support for terrorism and to more recruits for the fedayeen organizations. His position apparently has some support in the Israeli Cabinet. 17. Despite this opposition, the commitment to reprisal is deeply ingrained, especially in the Israeli military establishment. Though Israeli military leaders are probably aware that reprisals weaken Hussein's position, they are willing to take actions which risk his replacement by a new, more hostile regime in Jordan. Where the Israelis have previously seen advantages in Hussein's retention of power, they may now be indifferent to his survival and may even see benefits in his departure. Were he to disappear, the Israelis could tell the US that the situation in the Near East had so evolved that Israel was its only friend, could hope for greater US military supplies, and could argue that returning the West Bank to an anti-Western regime would not be in the interest of either the US or Israel. 18. The Israelis are adopting new antiterrorist measures to supplement or replace large-scale reprisal. They have recently engaged in hot pursuit with small forces into Jordanian territory. Other measures being considered include the dispatch of Israeli terrorists into Arab territory, with the object of inflicting greater property damage and loss of life than the fedayeen cause in Israel. Such activity will probably appear in the next few months. Such counterterrorism would probably have no more satisfactory results in stopping terrorism than the policy of massive reprisal has had. Such raids would probably lead to further loss of Israeli lives and would not prevent the fedayeen from operating in Israel. But the advantage, Israel may believe, would be that it would make Israel a less conspicuous target for international condemnation. 19. If the Israelis are not able to contain terrorism by such means as increased police action, reprisals, and counterterrorism, they would then be forced to choose other measures, none particularly palatable. One course would be to mount a major military assault against the East Bank, overrunning the populated area of Jordan. But such a move would risk a renewal of broader Arab-Israeli hostilities, and could bring on a new international crisis. World reaction would be extremely hostile. Though generally confident of US support—or of at least tacit acquiescence for the moves it makes—Israel might feel that an all-out invasion of Jordan would dangerously threaten American tolerance of Israeli militancy. Further, the Israelis probably recognize the great disadvantages of occupying the East Bank, with its million and a half Arabs and its unviable economy now being kept afloat by large subsidies from rich Arab countries. And once Israel withdrew from Jordan, the fedayeen would probably soon reemerge. On balance, we believe the chances are against a massive Israeli invasion of Jordan. 20. An alternative, which has received some attention in Israel, would be to seal off at least the most troublesome stretches of the present Jordanian cease-fire and armistice lines with such devices as barbed wire, sensors, electrified fences, and land mines. The French used such a barrier, on the whole successfully, to seal Algeria's Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers during the rebellion. Israel, with a shorter and more easily patrolled frontier with Jordan, could probably make such a barrier work fairly effectively. Some of these devices have already been installed in selected border areas. Though a major defensive barrier would not be able to stop the fedayeen completely, it would probably reduce their activities—and cut Israeli casualties—sharply. The million and a half Arabs now in Israel and Israeli-occupied territory have not helped the fedayeen much. If virtually cut off from contact with and supplies from their Arab brethren, they probably could not engage in significant, organized terrorist activity. 21. There almost certainly are strong voices raised against such a proposition in Israel. A heavily fortified 200-mile frontier barrier would be expensive to build; it would have to be patrolled by large numbers of Israeli soldiers. It would run counter to the established Israeli military doctrine that a defensive posture is anathema. And it would ease domestic pressure on Hussein, whose efforts to restrain the fedayeen would then be assumed by the Israelis themselves. 22. Nonetheless, the Israelis will, over a period of time, probably be forced to opt for more effective defensive measures to seal off Israel and Israeli-occupied territory from Jordanian-based fedayeen operations. Israel's traditional reluctance to adopt a posture of static defense stemmed in large part from the feeling that this would permanently commit it to unsatisfactory frontiers; it would feel little inhibition on that score about the present shorter and more defensible cease-fire line. At the same time, Israel would be prepared to use various forms of retaliation against Jordan—including very severe ones—if defensive measures are insufficient to prevent Israeli casualties. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 18. 2 In this estimate, we use the Arab word “fedayeen” in place of “terrorist” as often as possible. “Fedayeen” was originally used to describe emissaries of the medieval Assassins sent to kill their political opponents. It means one who sells his life in a sacred cause, thus redeeming himself in the hereafter. The English equivalent usually used by the Arabs is “commando.” [Footnote in the source text.] 3 In mid-March 1968, the Israeli Defense Minister said that 168 Israelis and 72 Arab citizens had been killed or wounded by the fedayeen since the war, in contrast with 58 killed or wounded in the preceding year. [Footnote in the source text.] 149. Airgram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 149. Airgram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, April 19, 1968. A-942 SUBJECT President Helou's Views on Bringing about Stability in the Middle East John J. McCloy paid a courtesy call April 13 on President Helou. The President availed himself of the occasion to summarize his present thinking on how the apparent impasse in Ambassador Jarring's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis might be broken. Emphasizing that he was speaking as a “Westernized Arab” the President stressed the need to understand basic Arab psychology. A fundamental prerequisite to achieving progress toward “peace” is a realization that no Arab leader could sign any agreement which would, in effect, give up what the Arabs hold to be their right to reclaim Palestine. As a direct consequence of this basic factor of life, real “peace” in the juridical sense of the word is not attainable; there can be no Versailles-type peace treaty. Therefore, it is unproductive to talk in such terms and, since the Israelis understand this aspect of Arab thinking, their persistent demands for direct negotiations leading to the signing of a peace treaty are considered only a pretext to retain the newly occupied territories. Though true peace cannot be obtained, there may be a peaceful way out of the current impasse. The November 22 Security Council Resolution contains the elements necessary to reach a modus vivendi. Full implementation of all of the practical measures contained in the resolution would bring about an effective condition of “stability.” Neither direct negotiations nor the signing of a peace treaty figure in the resolution and they are not essential to attaining this “effective stability.” In the President's view a prolonged period of such “effective peace” or “stability” would present opportunities to solve the many issues inextricably tied to a Middle East settlement. No progress could be made until the two sides were separated by demilitarized zones and a UN presence which could end the military confrontation and gradually reduce the emotions and hatreds which governed the actions of both sides. Since the key to a peaceful solution is implementation of the provisions of the November resolution, it is incumbent upon the US to use its influence to obtain Israeli acceptance. The President acknowledged the limited effectiveness of US efforts to pressure Israel into taking specific actions and commented that UAR Ambassador Ghaleb had himself acknowledged this fact in a recent conversation with the President. As far as withdrawal is concerned, President Helou said that the Arabs accept the fact that some modification of the pre-June war boundaries is essential in the interest of security and stability. Furthermore, the President believes establishment of a demilitarized zone along the new Arab frontiers with Israel, in which international forces would be stationed, would contribute to maintaining the “effective stability” he believes attainable. Mr. McCloy outlined current US public opinion on the Arab-Israel problem for the President. He stressed that many Americans consider justified Israel's determination not to withdraw from the territories occupied during the June war until it obtains firm guarantees of peace and security. In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez campaign, the US used its influence to pressure Israel into withdrawing from the Sinai and Gaza. In the absence of effective international guarantees, ten years later war again broke out between the Arabs and the Israelis. This time more is required than perfunctory verbal or paper guarantees before the US should pressure Israel into making concessions. Mr. McCloy told President Helou that, although he was not on an official mission in the Middle East, he hoped he would be able to pass the President's views on to appropriate policy-making officials of the US Government. Comment: Once again President Helou was speaking in his now familiar role of the moderate Western-oriented Arab leader interpreting Arab thoughts and feelings to a Western audience. He, of course, is indeed the “Arab friend of the West” which he terms himself to be. His analysis of the current situation and appeal for a “practical” solution in terms of a provisional modus vivendi is almost word for word the story he related to David Rockefeller in February. He is convinced continued efforts to seek the impossible can only frustrate progress toward a practical solution. Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Political Officer J. Thomas McAndrew and cleared in draft by Ambassador Porter. Repeated to Aden, Algiers, Ankara, Amman, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and USUN. 150. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 150. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 23, 1968. SUBJECT Status of Your Decision on Aircraft for Israel You will recall that, after your talk with Eshkol, you asked for three reports to determine how long you could keep open your decision on the 50 Phantoms. This is where we stand: 1. Secretary McNamara reviewed production schedules and determined that you can delay your decision until December 31, 1968, and still begin delivering Phantoms to Israel in January 1970 at the rate of about four per month (Tab A). 2 Defense might have to place orders this summer for long lead-time items, but they could be diverted to our own aircraft if you decided negatively. 2. General Wheeler, after reviewing training requirements with General Hod, also reports that you can delay your decision until December 31. He has told the Israelis they must have candidates with English and electronics fundamentals ready to begin advanced training in the US in January 1969 (Tab B). 3 The one hooker is in the training schedule. The Israelis agree with both of these judgments provided we plan only delivery at the rate of about four aircraft per month as they come off the production line. However, they haven't given up arguing that the situation might be serious enough to require delivering 30 or 40 planes in January 1970, or even before. We could meet that contingency by diverting the planes from our own inventory, but Israeli technicians and pilots would not be ready. 3. Dick Helms and the Defense Intelligence Agency still don't see that situation in the cards. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] Dick reports (Tab C) 4 that the facts available to us and to the Israelis are essentially the same, and the Israelis have surfaced no new evidence that causes our intelligence community to alter its estimate significantly. The reason the Israelis continue to press the gloomy picture despite our general agreement on facts is that they naturally take account of all possible enemy capabilities rather than relying on estimates of Arab and Soviet intentions. We're not likely to be able to prove our estimates that the threat will continue to be manageable. The problem in trying to resolve this difference is that their more pessimistic estimate reflects not only their understandable concern for the worst they might face but also an effort to influence our policy. Ambassador Rabin asked me some days ago “at Eshkol's request” what the state of our decision is. With your permission, I propose simply to give Evron a low-key informal progress report on our staff work. I would say that you are keeping the mater under the active review you promised. That you have received the recommendations you asked for from General Wheeler, from the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and that you have satisfied yourself that your option to begin delivering aircraft in early 1970 remains open. If we give Rabin a formal answer, he'll have to report it, and Eshkol will probably put it in the most pessimistic light. We are groping for some way to link this decision to specific progress toward a political settlement. I don't believe we can bargain 50 planes for Israeli withdrawal. But we might find a time to use them in bargaining for a marginal shift in Israel's tactical position that might give negotiations a boost, if we can ever get negotiations started. Therefore, I don't believe there is any reason to rush your decision, but we will stay on top of it as you promised Eshkol. Walt OK to tell Evron 5 Better not to answer at all Call me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:02 p.m. 2 See Document 71 . 3 Not attached. A copy of this February 14 memorandum from Wheeler to McNamara is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 353 Israel. 4 Reference is to an April 10 memorandum from Helms to Walt Rostow on the subject of U.S. and Israeli estimates on the Middle East. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68) 5 President Johnson checked this option. 151. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 151. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, April 24, 1968, 0107Z. 152002. Unsec 47. Subject: Arab-Israel Problem. 1. Ghorbal of UAR Interests Section called at Department April 19 for briefing on latest Jarring talks in Cairo. Deptoff showed him text of Cairo's 2179 2 and said we found statement of UAR position therein discouraging. We also found discouraging the remarks Mahmoud Riad had made to Jarring and various friendly diplomats regarding alleged deceitful role being played by US. Riad's mistrust of us appeared to be a major obstacle to progress on Jarring mission. It was true we had informed various governments that Israel had accepted Jarring's March 10 formula, which we and Israelis had considered positive step forward. That Jarring reportedly did not attach same significance to Israel acceptance was puzzling, but did not detract from fact that Israel had moved, and at our urging. 2. Deptoff said our efforts directed at convincing parties directly concerned that they should take positive steps to get over current procedural debate and move to substance. Apparent irreconciliability of UAR and Israel positions was heightened by communications problem which appeared exist between Jarring on one hand and Egyptians, Israelis and Jordanians on other. Before Egyptians accused us of deceit they should make sure they understood Jarring and vice versa. 3. Ghorbal said we should understand that problem was not one of Mahmoud Riad's personal mistrust but of convictions entire UARG. He had in fact been instructed inform us that statements made by various US representatives, plus lack of any tangible gesture on our part in support of Arabs, or in recognition their forward motion since last June, had persuaded Cairo that USG was engaged in deliberate campaign to support Israeli effort to dragoon Arabs to negotiating table. Whatever formula we devised, however it was camouflaged, Egyptians would not sit down with Israelis in New York or anywhere else and we might as well forget about it. Given this fact, real question was whether parties could move to substantive discussion without face-to-face meetings. Egyptians thought it possible and it was for this reason that Riad had made his three-point proposal to Jarring on April 8. If assured that Israel would implement the resolution, Egyptians were prepared to discuss substance and modalities of implementation through Jarring, but not directly with Israelis. If communications were the problem, this was an argument for moving to New York, where it would be possible to check quickly on what the parties had said and meant. Arabs could be in one room and Israelis in another, even in the same suite, and Jarring could move back and forth to work out details of agreement. This was not a negative position, this was a positive proposal for progress towards peace. Egyptians still wanted a peaceful settlement and were still prepared to cooperate with Jarring. But there would be an irreversible trend to extremism if progress did not begin soon. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Parker on April 22, cleared by Atherton and Day, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Tel Aviv, USUN, and London. 2 Telegram 2179, April 18, reported on a briefing Bergus received from the Foreign Ministry on the April 17 meeting between Jarring and Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad. In the course of explaining why the UAR could not accept Jarring's March 10 formula for the implementation of Resolution 242, as amended by Jordan, Riad alleged that the United States had launched a “vast campaign” to support Israel and persuade other Arab governments that Israel was prepared to implement the resolution. (Ibid.) 152. Memorandum of Conversation 152. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 26, 1968. PARTICIPANTS W. W. Rostow Ephraim Evron Harold H. Saunders Israeli Ambassador Rabin on March 20 had asked Mr. Rostow “at Prime Minister Eshkol's request” about the status of our decision on Phantoms as discussed at the Ranch. Mr. Rostow, on the basis of memos from Secretary McNamara, Mr. Nitze and General Wheeler, and Mr. Helms, reported to the President where staff work stands and asked permission to tell Evron informally. Not wishing to provoke a strong reaction in Jerusalem, Mr. Rostow with the President's approval passed the information informally in order to give Evron and Rabin a chance to decide how to handle it with their own Government. Mr. Evron came in at 5:00 p.m. yesterday to hear this report. Mr. Rostow, speaking very precisely, told him the following: 1. Secretary McNamara had determined that the President could decide as late as December 31, 1968, and still begin delivering Phantoms in January 1970 at the production-line rate of about 4 per month. 2. General Wheeler, after discussion with General Hod and his team, had determined that US training can be done beginning January 1969 provided the Israelis do preliminary training (English, electronics basics) in Israel. 3. Mr. Helms has reviewed the intelligence exchanges [ less than 1 line of text not declassified ]. There's no major disagreement on numbers. We interpret these numbers differently with Israel taking the gloomier view. However, Mr. Helms sees no new evidence that would change his estimates. Mr. Rostow also said that we had carried out our intention, discussed at the Ranch, to approach the Soviets with the following results: —We've made two serious approaches. —The Soviets say they're willing to discuss arms limitation after Israeli withdrawal. —We have never assumed that a direct Soviet answer was the only possible response. We have always assumed that the only Soviet response might be a de facto slowdown of shipments. We are watching this closely. Mr. Evron in response said he knew his government would be quite concerned. One of the things General Wheeler at the Ranch had said the US would specially watch was France's decision on the Mirages. Not only have the French still not delivered them, but they have signed a contract with Iraq. Iraq, from this deal alone, will end up with more Mirages than Israel now has in its inventory. Evron admitted that Soviet shipments to the Arab countries at the moment seemed to have leveled off and that absorptive capacity is a limiting factor. However, he said, noting that he could not be exact, that Israel has information that the training level of Egyptian pilots had increased to something like 50-100 a year. In sum, Evron felt there were elements in the situation which called for an earlier decision than waiting until the end of 1968. He conceded that it is technically accurate to say that the President's option will remain open until the end of 1968, but he noted that there are both “psychological and political” elements in the situation which make an earlier decision desirable. In fact, he felt that a public decision was called for, although he did not press that. He then spelled out his notion that the Arabs will only negotiate when they are thoroughly persuaded Israel is so strong that no military solution is possible. In conclusion, he said he could only tell us that the continued uncertainty would worry Jerusalem and urge a prompt decision. With that subject covered, Mr. Rostow turned to the broader subject of a political settlement, emphasizing that he was speaking entirely personally. He felt a tremendous sense of foreboding and saw the area teetering between the breakup of Jordan and the prospect some day of a bigger war. He felt that “what we and the Israelis owe to our grandchildren transcends hardware.” He felt it is absolutely essential that the Israelis give some encouragement to King Hussein to negotiate a settlement. He realized that Nasser seems unwilling at the moment to go that route, but Hussein is grasping for any straw that would permit him to negotiate a bilateral settlement. Mr. Rostow felt that what is necessary is for the Israelis to give Hussein some glimpse of the kind of settlement they might expect on the West Bank, but particularly in Jerusalem. Mr. Evron agreed that Hussein is desperately trying to persuade Nasser to give him the blessing for making his own settlement. Hussein—and here Evron cautioned the utmost sensitivity-is using the West Bank notables to try to persuade Nasser to give Hussein a free hand. He did not disagree with Mr. Rostow's line, although he did indicate that there already is communication through the notables with Hussein. In conclusion, Evron reiterated his argument that a decision on the Phantoms now would both increase Eshkol's maneuverability with his own government and would give Hussein further evidence with which to convince Nasser that the political solution was the only one possible. H. H. S. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President on April 26 with an attached note summarizing the conversation. (Ibid.) 153. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 153. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, April 27, 1968, 1130Z. 4555. Subj: Sandstorm. Ref: USUN 4785. 2 1. Reftel and other recent messages on Israeli thinking about Jarring Mission give more than hint that GOI may now concentrate on making separate arrangements with Jordan. I would not be surprised to find they will seek contacts with Hussein during his forthcoming visit to Europe. We have already reported signs that some members of the Jordanian “establishment” may be considering separate talks with Israel. 2. For all of reasons set forth in Amman 3770 3 and 4119, 4 I think we must be extremely careful in how we use (or acquiesce in Israelis using) this last asset for a peaceful settlement because if a separate peace effort should blow up, Hussein and Jordan will stand to lose everything. Israel will only have lost another move in its chess game with the Arabs. 3. I therefore think our own interests in the Middle East require: (A) That we obtain a clear and enforceable bilateral understanding with Israel on what we consider a minimum floor for Israel to offer Jordan for negotiations, with understanding Israel might have to give more in actual bargaining with Jordan. This will be essential in case of Jerusalem aspect of problem. (B) That we give careful and detailed consideration to politico-military contingencies that might arise and be prepared to move firmly and definitively (1) to underwrite any mutually acceptable arrangement Israel and Jordan might reach, or (2) to assist GOJ in maintaining public order and security particularly if efforts reach separate agreement should fail, and (3) to prevent any outside interference that might be threatened or undertaken by other states in the area. 4. Jordan and Israel may move to separate talks without our knowledge. Such talks could fail, and it would then be too late for us either to help influence the parties to final agreement or to protect Jordan and our Middle Eastern interest from the blowup that may ensue. 5. Foregoing ideas were developed in greater detail in Amman 3770 and 4119 which I hope will be reread in conjunction with this message. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis. 2 Telegram 4785 from USUN, April 26, reported on an Israeli appreciation of the situation in the Middle East, as conveyed by Permanent Representative Tekoah. Israel saw the UAR as intransigent and waiting for a more favorable opportunity to achieve a settlement on its terms. Israel viewed Jordan as potentially more flexible, and Tekoah indicated that Israel would continue to explore the possibility that Jordan might adopt an independent policy. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3 Document 109 . 4 See footnote 3, Document 126 . 154. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 154. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 27, 1968. SUBJECT Middle East Situation We are taking a fresh look at the present situation in the Middle East in light of the continuing differences between the Arabs and Israelis which have made it impossible for Jarring to get talks started and with a view to seeing whether we can recommend to you additional steps to give effect to the policy objectives of your June 19, 1967 speech. However, we have a more immediate short-range problem in the Security Council which begins Saturday to consider the problem of Jerusalem at the request of Jordan. Israel is holding an Independence Day parade which violates provisions of the Armistice Agreement 2 and previous UN resolutions by introducing military forces into Jerusalem beyond those permitted in the Agreement. The Jordanian objectives are threefold: (a) to get the Security Council to call on Israel to cancel the Independence Day parade of May 2; (b) to reinforce the Armistice Agreement framework, which is an anathema to the Israelis; and (c) to mobilize Security Council opinion against Israeli unilateral measures in Jerusalem which in the Jordanian view amounts to de facto annexation prejudicial to any ultimate settlement. Jordan has requested our support. (We persuaded Eban to say at the United Nations last summer that Israeli administration of Jerusalem is not an annexation, but municipal administration by the occupying power.) There are basically two approaches we can take in the Security Council. First , on the assumption we cannot develop sufficient common ground between the United States and Jordanian positions on Jerusalem, we could decide not to try to influence the Jordanians. In these circumstances, they would develop a resolution which would certainly go beyond what the United States could support. We would abstain in the vote, as we have on the two past General Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem, while restating in the Council the basic principles of our policy in essentially the same terms as in the past. Such a result would not disturb Israel too much since it attaches more importance to the United States vote than to the Security Council result. Israel would disregard such a resolution. It would go ahead with the parade and refuse to alter measures already taken in Jerusalem extending its control. Such a United States abstention would be exploited by the Soviets against our position in the area; it would further disillusion and weaken King Hussein; it would be played by the Arabs and his own people as another example that the King's friendship with the United States is not paying off for him; it would further aggravate the difficulties which have prevented Jarring from getting a dialogue started. We believe, and Ambassador Goldberg concurs, there is a second approach which should at least be tried even though its chances of succeeding are slim. Second , we would have Ambassador Goldberg meet with the Jordanians and probably the Pakistanis to see whether agreement can be achieved or a resolution based on the attached principles which are consistent with our present policy on Jerusalem. We would have to vote “yes” on the resolution if it stayed within the limits of these principles, and we would have to give the Jordanians this assurance at the outset of the Security Council discussions. Ambassador Goldberg wishes in the first instance to make a major effort to convince the Jordanians to limit the resolution to principle 1: A Call on Israel to cancel the parade because it would aggravate tension and make the Jarring Mission more difficult . This would be consistent with past policy. Ambassador Goldberg would also be given discretion to support principles 2 through 6 in a Security Council resolution if he thought it would be helpful. The reason we are being so gingerly about principles 2 through 6 is not because they are inconsistent with our policy but because an indication to the Jordanians of a willingness on our part to discuss them could lead to touchy and intricate political and legal issues being raised in the Security Council resolution. Israel is particularly anxious to avoid references to the Armistice Agreement in a resolution since their objective is to replace the unstable Armistice Agreement framework with a durable and stable peace by means of a negotiated settlement. We share this objective. We would leave it to Ambassador Goldberg's judgment as to whether and when to inject principles 2 through 6 in the discussions. We agree with him that we should not support a resolution that has the effect of bulwarking an Armistice Agreement system that has proved unworkable in the past. If we succeed along these lines we would avoid being isolated, it would be helpful to our position in the area, and it would help maintain an atmosphere in Jordan in which Jarring could continue his efforts. Both Eban and Jarring intend in the next ten days to concentrate in particular on the possibilities of Israeli-Jordan talks, since the recent hardening of the UAR position makes early progress in Cairo unlikely. As you know, Jordan and Israel are close together on Jarring's approach while the UAR has thus far been very negative. You should be aware there will be Israeli grumbling with this second approach. There will also be some domestic reaction in certain quarters, but it should be manageable since the recommended course does not involve any sharp change from past policy. We have long agreed to disagree with the Israelis on Jerusalem. We could balance this somewhat by reaffirming strongly the five principles you stated on June 19, 1967. The fact is that the Israelis have acted very badly on this Jerusalem matter and have put us in a position of near isolation in the United Nations which in turn is having adverse repercussions on our overall position in the area. Those favoring a settlement in Israel would be strengthened by our position. Recommendation: That you authorize Ambassador Goldberg (a) to proceed along the above lines in the knowledge we would vote “yes” if the resolution is consistent with the attached principles; (b) to include a frank discussion with the Israelis, as well as the Jordanians, so that they understand our position clearly. Dean Rusk Enclosure PRINCIPLES CONCERNING JERUSALEM 1. A call on Israel to cancel the parade because it would aggravate tension in an already inflamed situation and make the Jarring Mission more difficult. Other Principles if Desirable 2. Unilateral actions by any of the states in the area cannot be recognized as governing the international status of Jerusalem. 3. Issue of Jerusalem should be considered in the context of a settlement of all the problems arising out of the June conflict. 4. A satisfactory solution for Jerusalem must take into consideration the religious, economic, and political interests at stake, including those of Israel and Jordan. Its future status must be worked out in consultation with all parties having an interest in the special character of the city. 5. Israel is obligated to observe the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power in the newly-occupied sections of Jerusalem, as it is in the other occupied territories. 6. Pending a settlement, Israel should refrain from actions in the newly-occupied sections of Jerusalem which are prejudicial to the future status of the city or which impede progress toward a settlement. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret. 2 Reference is to the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Transjordan signed at Rhodes on April 3, 1949. 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, April 28, 1968, 1707Z. 154625. 1. Please deliver following message to Foreign Minister Eban from the Secretary. “Dear Mr. Minister: We have in the past discussed the dangers to mankind of a further spread of nuclear weapons. The current resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly will have the opportunity in this respect to take a major step by endorsing a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is the strong feeling of my government that the General Assembly should endorse the treaty and ask that it be opened immediately for signature by as many countries as possible so that it may enter into force at the earliest possible date. To assure prompt and widespread support for the treaty, parallel action will be necessary on the part of certain nations and groups of nations which have an understandable desire to assure themselves that their neighbors will also adhere to the treaty. The Middle East is clearly an area which stands greatly to benefit from the enhanced security which this treaty will provide. In this area, parallel action by Israel and the Arab states will be required for such a benefit to be realized. The Government of Israel, which, as the most technologically advanced state in the Middle East, has made clear its intention not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, is therefore in a position to assure that the treaty will effectively encompass the nations of the Middle East. That is why I urge, Mr. Minister, that your government as early as possible in the General Assembly make clear its readiness to join in supporting the treaty at the resumed United Nations General Assembly session. This, I trust, will shortly be followed by an announcement that Israel is prepared to sign the treaty. As you know, we are keenly aware of the many problems you face in assuring Israel's security. We recognize your concern over the buildup of conventional weapons in the states surrounding Israel. I can assure you again, as President Johnson told Prime Minister Eshkol in January, that we will press every opportunity to achieve satisfactory limitation of shipments from the Soviet Union. I can also repeat what the President said in January about our determination to keep Israel's needs under active and sympathetic review. In that context, I believe this treaty is crucial to the ultimate security of Israel. While we will work to limit the conventional arms race or keep it in appropriate balance, it is absolutely essential to prevent that race from leaping into weaponry against which Israel cannot be defended. The consequences of its use in your country would be catastrophic. Because we do not expect any Arab nuclear capability in the foreseeable future, Israel's objective must be to prevent, insofar as is possible by political arrangements, the transfer of such weapons to its neighbors. While the gains to Israel through adherence to the NPT would be vital, the only cost to Israel would be self-denial of the questionable deterrent of an unknown nuclear capability. However, I must also tell you that I consider this treaty to transcend even these crucial national issues. Its potential contribution to the safety and survival of all mankind—as well as to the survival of each nation large or small—is so great as to compel its separate consideration. I am confident that Israel will not ignore the worldwide significance of this act. I hope, therefore, that the United States can count on your government's initiative in supporting this treaty in the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk.” Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Priority. The text of a Presidential message was received from the White House for revision as a letter from Secretary Rusk. The telegram was approved by Rusk and Davies. Repeated to USUN and Geneva. 156. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 156. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 30, 1968, 6:40 p.m. SUBJECT Inspecting Israel's Nuclear Reactor Secretary Rusk has approved instructing Ambassador Barbour to ask Prime Minister Eshkol for another visit by US experts to the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona. Our last visit was in April 1967. Eshkol has acquiesced in periodic visits every 12-13 months, although he has never been enthusiastic. The visit this year is more important than ever. Up through last spring, we were reasonably confident that the Dimona reactor was being used only for research and that the Israelis were making no attempt to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The reactor used fuel elements from France which had to be returned to France when used. Late last year, however, there were indications that Israel was processing ore obtained without safeguards from Argentina. This could be to make their own fuel elements so they wouldn't have to depend either on France or on safeguarded material. We have no evidence that Israel has facilities for separating significant amounts of plutonium from irradiated fuel—the next step toward weapons production. But our experts say that last winter's activity could portend a decision to build such a plant. They estimate it would be only two years from that decision to Israel's first weapons test. Eshkol's response to our request could be an important clue to his intentions (though his political difficulties with the visit will also play a role). Secretary Rusk has already sent the message we showed you urging Israel to support the NPT. 2 Eban's staff says Israel won't make up its mind till toward the end of the year. This visit to Dimona will provide another avenue for reminding them that we're serious about opposing their going nuclear. Since Barbour will be making this request without reference to you, I should think this would carry minimum risk for the time being. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Exdis. A notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:45 p.m. 2 See Document 155 . 3 President Johnson approved Rostow's recommendation. 157. Letter From the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin) to Secretary of State Rusk 157. Letter From the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 30, 1968. The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit the following communication from His Excellency the Prime Minister of Israel Levi Eshkol to His Excellency the President of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson:— “Dear Mr. President: “On receiving your letter of April 6, 2 I gave Ambassador Barbour a full explanation of my views on both of the subjects you raised. The activities of terrorist organizations, openly encouraged by Arab Governments, present grave problems for our security. It is axiomatic that the solution does not and cannot lie in giving them free rein or impassively suffering their assaults on life, limb and property in Israel. No government could ever be expected to accept such a course. We are adopting various methods to cope with this terrorist campaign, bearing in mind the considerations which you have explained to me. We are also doing our best to secure international understanding of our dilemma and of the motives and necessities which govern our response. In the last resort our responsibility for the lives and security of our people must be overriding. “In response to your message of April 6, I acted promptly to reassure Jordan in connection with Ambassador Jarring's efforts. My impression is that King Hussein is aware of our attitude on this matter, but is inhibited by Nasser from moving ahead. The fact is that Ambassador Jarring's conference proposal for meetings with our government was accepted by Israel, rejected by the U.A.R. and has not been accepted by Jordan. “The critical state of the Jarring Mission is thus due to Cairo's attitude. We have made every reasonable attempt to promote a negotiated settlement. We offered a broad agenda for discussion. We agreed to negotiate on all the matters included in the Security Council Resolution within the framework of the establishment of a permanent peace. We stated that the boundaries are negotiable in peace talks. We accepted the procedure suggested by Ambassador Jarring in the hope that his presidency of a peace conference would give assurance to the U.A.R. and Jordan and ensure an equitable procedure as well as an agreed neutral venue. Nasser's response was to reject all these openings, to insist on our commitment to return to the June 4 situation, for which there is no international authority whatever, and to reiterate that he wished to ‘implement’ a Security Council resolution while rejecting its central principles—namely, peace, agreement and recognition. His public utterances as well as the views conveyed to Ambassador Jarring make it clear that he is not seeking an honorable and peaceful settlement with Israel. “On April 23, Ambassador Jarring told Foreign Minister Eban that by ‘implementation’ the U.A.R. means unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces in the first place to the June 4 lines. This is the very proposal which you, Mr. President, through your official spokesman, have described as a prescription for the renewal of hostilities. Nasser's attitude is dictated by the negative principles of the Khartoum Conference: no peace, no agreement, no recognition. His policy is thus to refuse all progress towards peace, to accumulate armed strength, and to bide his time until he is in a position to renew his aggression which he unsuccessfully organized in 1967. This policy is totally opposed to that which you, Mr. President, proposed on June 19, 1967. So long as the U.A.R. policy is so sharply contrary to yours and ours, I doubt if any formulation can bridge the gap. There has to be a will for peace, and the test for such a will is readiness to negotiate. “The question which we are now exploring is whether Jordan is willing, on its own account, to discuss a settlement with us. We are energetically seeking to clarify and promote this prospect. I do not know yet if it is a realistic one. I have myself had several talks with Palestine Arab leaders who wish Jordan to take a positive step. We are also trying every means including the good offices of Ambassador Jarring to bring about meaningful negotiations which, as Secretary Rusk wrote to Minister Eban on February 13, are the crux of our problem. Despite disappointment, it is important that Ambassador Jarring remain available in the coming weeks while efforts are under way to clarify the possibility of a Jordan-Israel negotiation. King Hussein seems to be oscillating between two pressures—that of Cairo and the terrorist movements which desire to escalate the present tension, and that of his own objective interests. He has not always acted in his own true interests, as we all learned last June. “The central cause of the deadlock created by Cairo is Nasser's intention to launch a successful war as soon as he is ready. So long as he believes this, he will not allow any peaceful process to mature. It follows that our principal aim should be to diminish his belief in the prospect of Israel becoming weak. We come back to the fact that the balance of strength in the coming months is the critical issue. Is it not a matter for further action and concern? This issue is immediate. It is Nasser's conviction that he is in the process of overtaking Israel's armed preparedness that leads him to refuse negotiation and to work for the frustration of the Jarring Mission. As we survey the Middle Eastern scene, we cannot forget for a moment the threat to Israel's very existence which developed overnight last May and June against all the prevailing estimates at the time that Nasser would not and could not raise the tension in the area for some years. “The matter which we discussed in your home in Texas last January has thus become very acute. When we spoke of the Phantom aircraft, you said that you would make a decision on the matter, one way or the other, during the course of 1968, in the light of developments, if necessary, even within the next few months. At the same time, you requested a review of the requirements for the training of personnel and information on the latest date on which you could make a decision to supply Israel with Phantoms and for Israel to be in a position to fly them in January 1970. “On the broad Middle Eastern level, you told me that you were investigating Nasser's posture and situation, the Soviet role, and the French policy on the supply of 50 Mirage aircraft ordered by us. “I hear that these three questions have now been clarified with disturbing results. Nasser has refused peace and opted for war preparations, with his eyes fixed on a growing decline in Israel's deterrent power. The Soviet Union has rejected all approaches designed to induce restraint in arms supplies to Arab states. The U.S.S.R. is certainly not promoting attitudes of peace. The French Government, to our deep regret, has made it clear that we have no reason to expect delivery of the Mirage aircraft. Moreover, they have lately decided to supply Iraq with 50 Mirage aircraft. In these circumstances, Nasser's policy of refusing peace and preparing for a new round of war derives a certain rationality from the concrete prospect of a changing balance in air strength. The postponement of a United States decision on the Phantoms now becomes very grave. The decision is vital on logistic grounds, but it is even more urgent for political and psychological reasons which affect the immediate prospect of a peaceful accommodation. “May I submit, Mr. President, that it is vital your decision be made now. May I urge that the 50 Phantoms be supplied from the middle of 1969, and not from the beginning of 1970, in batches of 8 to 10 a month and not of 4 to 5 a month. Training arrangements should be replanned accordingly. We wish to avoid another war just as ardently as we wanted and tried to avoid the last one. If we are to succeed, our deterrents must be credible, and if deterrence fails, our strength must be adequate. An American decision of this kind, far from disrupting any attempts at peacemaking, would by demonstrating the futility of further war, give the peace effort the stimulus which it is now objectively lacking. I do not believe that we shall get peace unless we move to foreclose the other alternatives. “Mr. President, I write to you on the eve of Israel's 20th anniversary. Israel came into being against the background of the destruction of a third of our people at the hands of the Nazis. In the twenty years of its existence, it had to fight three wars for its survival. Throughout this period only the maintenance of the minimum arms balance has saved it from destruction. I appeal to you on behalf of my people to grant us the weapons necessary to prevent further war and to encourage the process towards peace which though it tarries will-with God's help-surely come. “In conclusion, Mr. President, may I send you my fervent wishes for the success of your statesmanlike effort to bring an honorable peace to Southeast Asia and to the world. History will salute your efforts and bless your toil.” “Yours sincerely, Levi Eshkol Prime Minister” “Jerusalem 30 April 1968” The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity of renewing to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration. Y.R. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel 3/1/68-7/31/68. No classification marking. 2 See Document 134 . 158. Memorandum of Conversation 158. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 1, 1968. PARTICIPANTS Israeli Ambassador Rabin Mr. Ephraim Evron Mr. Walt Rostow Mr. John Foster Ambassador Rabin called on Mr. Rostow to deliver a copy of a letter from Prime Minister Eshkol to the President. 2 He had delivered the letter to the State Department earlier. The Ambassador stated that since the June War, the USSR has almost completely rearmed the Arabs, and in some cases they have more and better equipment than before the war. In addition, the French have agreed to deliver Mirages to Iraq. Not only have the French refused to deliver previously promised Mirages to Israel, but Israel has received nothing from other sources. Logic does not govern in the Near East—even in Israel—and war could break out at any time. Therefore, Israel needs an immediate decision on Phantoms. Mr. Rostow said that he had already read the letter. Because an agreement between Israel and Jordan appears to be one of the few hopes for peace, we are puzzled by Israeli activities, especially in Jerusalem. They can only make it harder for Hussein to conclude a separate peace. The President is very concerned about the long run prospects for Israel if peace proves impossible. Ambassador Rabin said that Israel must be in a position to defend itself. In January it was agreed that the Arabs would be able to resume hostilities in eighteen months, so even the proposed Phantom delivery schedule would have the first aircraft arriving six months too late. Mr. Rostow corrected the ambassador, saying that it was agreed that the Arabs might be in such a position in eighteen months. The Ambassador continued that Israel is doing its best to make it possible for Hussein to negotiate, but that he was unable to resist pressure from Nasser. He could say with assurance that Israel's Jerusalem parade had not affected Hussein's ability to negotiate. When Mr. Rostow said it affected the political atmosphere Rabin said that the strengthening of Prime Minister Talhouni in the recent cabinet shuffle was far more significant in limiting Hussein's freedom of action. The Ambassador returned to his main point: As the Arabs see Israel growing weaker, they become less inclined to make peace. Israel is weaker now-relative to the Arabs-than it was in June. The question, he said, is how finely a nation can cut its margin of security when its existence is at stake; “I'm sure your margin is far wider.” Mr. Rostow promised to send the letter to the President immediately. John W. Foster 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. 2 See Document 157 . 159. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 159. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, May 1, 1968, 1246Z. 2275. 1. Knowing full well Russians would be giving UAR their version Sisco/Dobrynin lunch (State 154986), 2 I telephoned Mohamed Riad of FonOff this morning offering to brief him. Offer was accepted with alacrity. Mohamed took extensive notes of conversation. 2. At conclusion of conversation I said I wanted to say a few words on my own and could assure Mohamed that I was entirely uninstructed in the premises. I viewed events of the last few weeks with increasing concern. UAR seemed to be walking trance-like down ever diminishing corridor of labyrinth from which there seemed no practical exit. I was frankly fed up with stale slogans, accusations that my government was practicing deceit and UAR tendency hide behind sterile phraseology. If this was true in case of myself, who was personally committed to improvement of US-UAR relations, Mohamed could imagine effect on others in USG who did not feel so personally involved. I would not be at all surprised, I continued, if Jarring were getting equally fed up with GUAR attitude and tactics. 3. I had been extensively briefed by McCloy on his conversation with President Nasser. I had noted with interest Nasser's statements which envisaged a process whereby various instruments respecting cessation of belligerency, withdrawal, etc., were arrived at and then put in escrow until whole package was ready for simultaneous implementation. Perhaps this did not represent any basic change in UAR position but it did have some refreshing nuances and implicit recognition that some kind of negotiating process was essential. Mohamed referred to FonMin's three proposals re implementation of resolution after Israel had agreed to implement. I said this was all very well but it was negative, stale and sterile. It seemed to me that if someone in GUAR could say to Jarring what Nasser had said to McCloy, it was just possible Jarring would have some new elements to work with. I recalled that in absence any real progress, it quite likely Swedish Government would be inclined ask UNSYG release Jarring return to his normal diplomatic duties. 4. Mohamed undertook to convey foregoing to his Minister. 5. Mohamed said Nasser had highest regard for McCloy and had thoroughly chewed out both FonOff and Fawzi's office for almost letting his visit to Cairo fall between stools. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 2 Telegram 154986 to Moscow, April 29, summarized a luncheon conversation that day between Ambassador Dobrynin and Assistant Secretary Sisco. The conversation ranged over a number of UN issues and focused on the Jarring Mission. Dobrynin indicated that the UAR continued to tell the Soviet Union that the principal difficulty in getting peace talks started was Israeli unwillingness to agree to implementation of Resolution 242. (Ibid.) 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, May 1, 1968, 2359Z. 156687. For Ambassador. In a private meeting, Ambassador Rabin told Under Secretary Rostow that he hoped to have something tangible to report about private talks with Hussein within a week. Thus far the contacts have been preliminary. FYI. Rostow had suggested to Evron several weeks ago that we thought the time might be approaching for Israel to make secret contact with Hussein. In view of reports from Amman of Jordanian interest in such talks, and indications that there was motion on that front, we had been carefully studying your telegrams on the subject, and considering various contingencies. We prefer to wait until asked before offering our good offices. End FYI. Rabin also gave Israeli evaluation of recent Cabinet changes in Jordan [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. In sum, Israelis believe King sought to dismiss Talhouni, who refused to resign. Cabinet changes stem from Hussein's backing down before Talhouni threat. GOI reads changes as replacement of key officials loyal to King by men primarily connected with Talhouni. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, and USUN. 161. Letter From President Nasser to President Johnson 161. Letter From President Nasser to President Johnson 1 Cairo, May 1, 1968. Dear Mr. President: I have the honour to convey to you my deep appreciation for the position you have taken by supporting the Resolution of the Security Council on April 27, 1968, 2 which called upon Israel to refrain from holding the Military Parade which it intended to hold on May 2, 1968. I have no doubt that your position was based on your disapproval of the actions taken by Israel in the City of Jerusalem and its refusal to comply with the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its special session on July 4, 1967 3 and upon your conviction that such an action by Israel is an illegal act. This illegal act on the part of Israel has its adverse effects on the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary General aiming at the realization of the peaceful settlement of the serious crisis in the Middle East which resulted from the Israeli aggression against Arab countries and the people of Palestine on June 5, 1967. Israel's defiance of this Resolution which you have supported and which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council, and Israel's declaration of its intention not to implement that Resolution is a grave matter which seriously affects the prestige of the United Nations and its effectiveness, and in fact its future as an international organization set up for the maintenance of peace and justice. Israel's persistence in its defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly underlines its insistence on pursuing the policy of force and the imposition of the fait accompli resulting from aggression to realize territorial expansion and perpetuate the disregard of the rights of the people of Palestine. I would urge you, Mr. President, to exert all efforts to compel Israel to respect the resolutions of the United Nations, the organization which we all strive to strengthen, and thus insure the preservation of its prestige and the increase of its effectiveness and at the same time contribute to checking any further deterioration of the situation in the Holy City and the Middle East. 4 Gamal Abdel Nasser 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic-Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. The letter was sent through the UAR Interests Section of the Indian Embassy in Washington. According to telegram 2280 from Cairo, May 2, the text of the letter was sent by Nasser to all chiefs of state represented on the UN Security Council. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US) 2 On April 27 the Security Council discussed a letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan protesting the proposed Israeli parade through East Jerusalem. A resolution proposed by the Delegations of India, Pakistan, and Senegal, which called upon Israel to refrain from holding the military parade scheduled for May 2, was adopted unanimously. (UN doc. S/PV.1417) 3 Reference is to Resolution 2253 (ES-V) in which the UN General Assembly registered its disapproval of measures taken by Israel affecting the status of Jerusalem. (UN doc. A/RES/2253 (ES-V)) 4 Rostow passed this letter to President Johnson on May 2 under cover of a note in which he observed: “It gives us an opening for a response at a critical moment.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic-Presidential Correspondence) May I take this opportunity to renew to you, Mr. President, the assurances of my very high consideration. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 162. Memorandum of Conversation 162. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 2, 1968. SUBJECT Letter from President Nasser on Jerusalem Problem PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Dr. Ashraf Abdel Latif Ghorbal, Minister, United Arab Republic Interests Section Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA Dr. Ghorbal said he had been instructed to deliver a letter from President Nasser to President Johnson either to the President or the Secretary as expeditiously as possible. (A copy of the letter dated May 1 is enclosed.) 2 In response to the Secretary's questions, Dr. Ghorbal said he was not certain whether the text would be published and that he had no instructions other than to deliver the letter. Mr. Davies said we understood from Mr. Bergus that letters from President Nasser to the heads of government represented on the Security Council would be published the following day. Dr. Ghorbal asked permission to make a few comments on the Arab-Israel situation. The ten months since the war and the five months during which Ambassador Jarring sought solution represented a long and agonizing period for peoples whose lands were under harsh occupation. The United States had a great interest in peace in the area and Arab governments looked to it to exert its influence to force Israel to accept and implement the U.K. resolution. The Secretary commented that invariably other governments felt we had greater influence in third capitals than we actually had. It puzzled him that when governments could discount U.S. influence in their own capitals they ascribed such power to the U.S. in other capitals. It would be refreshing if for a change a government would say “What should we do in the U.S. view?” Dr. Ghorbal said the Secretary was deeply mistaken if he felt the U.S. lacked influence in Cairo. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, words and actions of the U.S. were taken most seriously. He noted that in the days immediately following passage of the U.K. resolution his government had taken the position that Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories was a prerequisite to further action. The fact that his government changed its position to view the package as a whole could be attributed to U.S. efforts in Cairo and Washington. The Secretary asked whether the U.A.R. was cooperating fully with Ambassador Jarring and had accepted his proposals. Dr. Ghorbal said that he believed he could answer affirmatively. The U.A.R.G. had suggested three possible venues for discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices: the Security Council, discussions in New York with Ambassador Jarring, or specific proposals for implementation by Jarring with the various governments. The Secretary assured Dr. Ghorbal that President Nasser's letter would be transmitted immediately to the President and would be duly considered. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Davies on May 6 and approved in S on May 7. 2 Document 161 . 163. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 163. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 2, 1968. SUBJECT Letter from Eshkol 2 and Some Personal Thoughts Ambassador Rabin has just delivered to me the attached letter from Prime Minister Eshkol. He supplemented it with a strong pitch for making our decision on Phantoms now. State and Defense will have to staff this carefully since it reopens the whole Phantom decision. Secretary Rusk asked that he meet with you before a Phantom decision is made. However, I promised to pass this to you immediately and wish to add some purely personal views. Eshkol's letter replies to yours of April 6. 3 In brief, he argues that Israel has “made every reasonable attempt” to facilitate a political settlement (most of us would not agree) and that the UAR is the main obstacle (true). He says that Israel is investigating fully the chance for a bilateral settlement with Hussein, but he does not know yet whether this is realistic. (In fact, Rabin was pessimistic.) Finally, he argues that Nasser will turn to political settlement only when he is convinced that he has absolutely no hope of a military victory. He urges that we begin delivery of the Phantoms in mid-1969 at the rate of 8-10 a month. I agree with Eshkol and Rabin that Israel's security margin is thin. Our intelligence people are probably right in estimating that Israel could handle any Arab threat at least through 1969. But with the French refusing to deliver Mirages and literally no other suitable source of supply left but us, I can understand why Eshkol is worried about seeing our decision held up when delivery is still a year off at best. Moreover, he faces real political pressures in his Cabinet to exert maximum pressure on us—a point Eppie made yesterday when I called, at your instruction, and told him pressure on the President was most unwise. I also agree that Nasser no longer seems inclined to reach a political settlement. Hussein (and McCloy) say Nasser's internal base is too shaky to permit it. Some think he might have moved if the Israelis had been more forthcoming with Jarring in January; but we'll never know whether our not pushing them harder then lost a major opportunity. (I doubt this because I have come to the reluctant conclusion that Nasser is constitutionally incapable of settling down to peace.) This raises two questions: —whether we should now do all in our power to bring about an Israel-Jordan settlement—the next possibility; —and whether our aircraft decision could play a role. Although he asked not to have his name associated with it, Evron has hinted twice to Hal Saunders and me that if we strengthened Israel (with Phantoms) Eshkol might be able to stick his neck out farther in reaching toward a political settlement with Hussein. Theoretically, it might be possible to use the Phantoms to bargain for enough of a marginal shift in Israel's position to improve chances for a settlement with Hussein. We could not expect Israel to give up anything major, and we could not guarantee success. But it is at least worth considering whether any US move would help. Some of us believe that it would improve chances for a settlement with Hussein if Israel would: —commit itself via a Cabinet decision to withdraw from most of the West Bank in the context of a Jordanian settlement and permit Hussein a civil as well as religious role in Jerusalem (Eban unhelpfully told Jarring Jerusalem is not negotiable; although there is some reason to believe that Israel might, in the end, be more flexible); —let Hussein know of this decision; —back off from its insistence on direct open negotiations and a formal peace treaty, at least at the beginning of negotiation. I have been trying for several weeks to get State at least to judge whether these or any other such steps are worth our pressing on Israel. Nick Katzenbach is completing a review this Friday. So far, the State Department seems so divided that no concrete recommendation seems likely to emerge. Yet almost everyone agrees that positions are hardening and another round of fighting—perhaps with Soviet involvement—seems the most likely outcome. I must also report that some responsible people feel it would be a major mistake to decide now to sell Phantoms. They point out that the Arab-Israeli military balance is no less favorable for Israel than it was last June. They also point out that Soviet arms shipments have leveled off and that our Phantom decision would risk pushing the Soviets into additional shipments and ruin our best chance of getting a grip on the arms race. (You will have a paper from General Wheeler tomorrow and one from us.) It will take State and Defense some days to review again all elements in the Phantom decision. I feel strongly, however, that we are approaching-if we have not already passed-a critical period in realizing our hopes for a political settlement. You may wish, therefore, to consider a special meeting to go over this whole situation and, in particular, to hear argument on three points: —should we press Israel to make a maximum try for a settlement with Hussein? —should we relate the Phantoms to such an effort, as Evron suggests? —if so, should we send a special emissary to Eshkol to put the proposition? Walt Set up a meeting No Call me 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel 3/1/68-7/31/68. Secret; Nodis. 2 See Document 157 . 3 See Document 134 . 4 None of the options is checked. 164. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson 164. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 3, 1968. SUBJECT Israeli/Arab Military Balance CM-3275-68 1. In response to the query posed by Walt Rostow, I am providing you my assessment of the relative military balance between Israeli and Arab forces now and 12 to 18 months hence. 2. At Enclosure A 2 is a summary of present and projected Israeli and Arab equipment inventories. Except for aircraft, the Israelis probably have as much equipment now as at the beginning of the June war. The Soviets have not delivered fighter aircraft to the UAR since September or October of last year which places Egypt about 65 fighters short of the pre-war level. Deliveries to Syria and Iraq have increased those countries' inventories above the pre-war level. Soviet arms shipments to the area are now continuing at about the pre-war level and no new-type materiel is known to have been delivered. Including total deliveries to date, the Arabs are at about 75% of the pre-war level. Eighteen months from now, Israel will have an aircraft inventory 15% to 20% above pre-war levels while the Arab inventory will remain essentially at its pre-war strength; however, a greater disparity in high performance aircraft numbers to the detriment of Israel will develop. Ground equipment inventories on both sides will remain at approximately pre-war levels. Israel's relative naval capability will have improved due to the addition of guided missile patrol boats. 3. Our previous estimates on the Arab-Israeli balance have accounted for not only equipment levels, but the qualitative superiority of Israeli forces in such areas as training, intelligence, logistics, motivation and morale, and leadership. In these areas, the Israeli forces are still far superior to the Arabs and will remain so in the months ahead. In addition, the territory the Israelis control places them in better defensive position than they previously occupied, and they now have more combat-seasoned personnel. The Arabs do not currently possess the capability effectively to operate or maintain Soviet equipment. The Soviets, through their training and advisory efforts, (see Enclosure B) 3 are attempting to improve the situation but face many drawbacks such as educational deficiencies and poor morale. The Soviets believe that at the present rate of progress, it will take the UAR at least until the Spring of 1969 to achieve any significant degree of combat readiness. No major qualitative improvements in Syrian capabilities are expected over the next 18 months. 4. While we note increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, it is our conclusion that the Soviets wish to avoid any direct involvement which could lead to a widening of a resumed Arab-Israeli conflict or confrontation with the United States. In this connection, there is still no Soviet air in support of their Mediterranean naval forces. A miscalculation on their part cannot be discounted, but we believe that Soviet efforts would be limited to materiel and advisory assistance such as we have seen in the past. In February we exchanged information on the Middle East situation with the Israeli Director of Intelligence. While there were several differences, we were in general agreement on our assessments of Arab capabilities and Soviet activity in the area. We plan to continue this intelligence interchange and any significant new developments will serve as basis for a joint reassessment of the Israeli position. 5. A significant factor in Israel's growing imbalance of high performance aircraft, mentioned above, continues to be delivery of 50 French Mirage V's. Although France is continuing in effect an embargo on these aircraft, there are indications that there is a fair chance that Israel will eventually get delivery. The French have now agreed to sell 54 Mirages to Iraq; however, the delivery of these aircraft, not scheduled to begin until late 1969 or early 1970, would not affect the relative balance in the period under discussion. Non-delivery of Mirage aircraft to Israel handicaps Israel's air-to-air capability now and in the future as discussed below. 6. At Enclosure C 4 is a comparison of the current and projected high performance aircraft (MACH 2) capabilities of Israel and those Arab states likely to participate in a resumption of hostilities. This disparity in high performance aircraft inventories is the principal cause of Israel's concern. The comparison shows that the inventory of these aircraft for the contiguous Arab states will increase over the next 18 months by close to 70% (230 to 390) while the Israeli capability of 55 Mirage IIIs remains relatively constant. Thus, Israel would be handicapped in the battle for air superiority unless early bombing attacks on Arab airfields were exceptionally successful. Arab experience last June is not likely to allow the Israelis the degree of success in destroying aircraft on the ground that they enjoyed at that time. If Algeria's capability of 29 aircraft by the end of the estimate period is added to the Arab total, numerically, Israel would face a potentially unfavorable ratio of about 8 to 1. This raw ratio must be adjusted by the aircraft ready status, 50% to 70% for the Arabs versus 80% to 85% for the Israelis, and the qualitative factors such as skill, leadership, and command and control mentioned above. Delivery of the French Mirages to Israel would reduce the unfavorable raw ratio to 4 to 1 with further balance being approached through use of the same adjustment factors. 7. Considering all these factors, it is my judgment that Israel currently, and probably for the next 18 months, has the capability to defend itself effectively against the Arab forces. This judgment is based on an estimate that the outlook for significant overall improvement in Arab military capabilities, despite Soviet assistance, is only poor to fair. The most imprecise element in this judgment is the relative high performance air strength, hinging in part on actions by the French. Even here, the time at which an imbalance would become critical, in the event of a continued French embargo, allows us to continue to withhold a decision on additional aircraft sales to Israel until late this year. A decision can be made as late as 31 December 1968 and delivery of F-4E aircraft started in January 1970 at the rate of approximately 4 per month from production presently scheduled for the USAF. This would get the F-4E aircraft in the hands of the Israelis at approximately the same time Iraq would receive Mirage aircraft. Necessary training could be commenced as late as 1 January 1969 in order that Israel would have a capability to maintain and operate the aircraft upon delivery. 8. I consider that we should keep the matter of numbers of high performance aircraft in Arab inventories under continuing review. Should the USSR or other sources provide additional high performance combat aircraft to the radical Arab states during the next 6 to 12 months, should deliveries of such aircraft be expedited, or should the French definitely back out of their agreement to provide 50 Mirages to Israel, the relatively favorable forecast set forth above would be invalid. Earle G. Wheeler 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary McNamara. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President on May 3 under cover of a memorandum in which he noted that “the JCS remains relatively complacent about the balance even after taking into account the French decision on the Mirages for Israel.” (Ibid.) 2 Not printed. 3 Enclosure B, not printed, is a 1-page assessment of “Soviet Training Assistance to the Arab Bloc.” 4 Not printed. Harold Saunders also prepared an assessment of “The Arab-Israeli Air Balance” on May 3. His conclusions closely paralleled those put forward in Wheeler's memorandum, although he put the projected ratio between Arab and Israeli high performance aircraft by mid-1969 at 3 to 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68) 165. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 165. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, May 3, 1968, 1202Z. 3562. Ref: State 154625. 2 1. In meeting with FonMin Eban on May 2 I took occasion stress importance US attaches to NPT as indicated by Secretary's message to him of April 29, and urged that GOI give full support toward endorsement of treaty in GA and that Israel announce its preparedness to sign treaty. 2. Among others, I used argument that this problem transcends other issues that Israel has everything to gain in being forthright in supporting treaty and nothing to lose by doing so. Adverting to position advanced by some responsible Israelis that uncertainty as to Israel's intentions in a nuclear field constitute a deterrent to the Arabs and that consequently Israel's interests dictate that it be one of the last and not one of the first to sign, I said this seemed entirely fallacious argument to me. It inconceivable that Israel with its history would ever contemplate using a nuclear bomb and that consequently the deterrent of uncertainty was greatly diminished. On the contrary the risks of uncertainty are high and to achieve Arab renunciation of the nuclear threat the best tactic would be for Israel to be the first to endorse and sign the treaty. In any event if such tactic did not lead to Arab response the favorable political effect for Israel in the councils of the world would be very great. 3. Eban acknowledged importance of the matter and his appreciation that Secretary's message confirmed our determination to do everything we can to obtain support. He did not take issue with the US position. On contrary at end of somewhat lengthy conversation he expressed agreement that Israel should support the treaty and should make known that support at an early stage of the GA debate. Whether he can convince his Cabinet colleagues to approve such a course is more problematical. Barbour 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. Repeated to USUN and the Mission in Geneva. 2 Document 155 . 166. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 166. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 4, 1968, 1:30 p.m. Mr. President: The Jarring mission is running out of steam. We have two choices: (1) We can make a last-minute effort to get negotiations going under Jarring; or (2) we can wait and face the problem of what to do when he resigns after he has submitted his final report. Doing anything significant either now or later will require some sort of heart-to-heart talk with Israel. I believe that the situation has now reached a stage where no one but you should decide our course. Doing nothing now may well be a decision to let the Jarring mission die. Unless you are confident that we are on the right course, I recommend a special meeting soon to hear argument on what our course should be. Walt Set up a meeting No Call me 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Confidential. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:05 p.m. 2 None of the options is checked, but an attached note, dated May 7, indicates that the President instructed that a meeting be set up to consider the problem. 167. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 167. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, May 6, 1968, 0701Z. 2321. Following from Anderson: 2 1. I met this morning (May 5) with President Nasser for more than an hour and a half. He made the following points. 2. We must very clearly understand that he has a severe internal problem. He and his Cabinet are completely opposed to war. He does have elements in the armed forces who would welcome a return of fighting because of the humiliation of the June war and because they now have better training and “technical help.” He does not agree and has told his officers in a recent meeting that he would not be willing to risk war again and felt that we should make every effort to achieve peace. It is clear, however, that he must give some lip service to the attitude of his soldiers. 3. He also said that there were “other elements” in the country who would welcome a return of hostilities and that we must understand that he had to deal with these elements in his own way. 4. He said the restoration of diplomatic relations with the U.S. was, from his point, desirable but it ran contrary at this moment to public opinion until there was at least some signal from our side that we wanted to implement the Security Council resolution and would not continue to talk in such terms as “in the context of” or other terms which he described as vague and as supporting the Israeli view. He said “I am not asking arms nor aid. I am simply asking a clear unequivocal statement that the U.S. supports the resolution and the propositions in President Johnson's statement.” 5. He discussed the Jarring formula but was undoubtedly not entirely familiar with its wording because he asked me twice to lend him a copy and spent several minutes reading it carefully and finally said “There is nothing in this formula that I can object to.” He also stated, however, that he would not want to oppose amendments offered by Jordan if they were insisted upon. Again, he regards statements by the U.S. as being equivocal and of trying to unilaterally define the meaning of the November resolution of the Security Council in a manner consistent with Israeli ambitions. 6. He stated that he would “plan to see” Jarring on his return to Cairo on the 10th and that he would discuss tonight with his Cabinet the acceptance of the Jarring formula. Nasser said “I am not going to quibble about words in the Jarring formula if both sides will approach it in good faith. However, I must make it abundantly clear that neither I nor any other Arab leader could possibly have direct talks with the Israelis in New York, although they were perfectly willing to work through Jarring.” 7. He asked me if I thought my country was prepared to have a constant state of tension in the Near East simply because the Israelis demanded directed negotiations. 8. I replied by saying that it was not in my power to express my country's policy and certainly not to express an opinion about the position of the Israelis. 9. Nasser reiterated the same points made by Riad as to territory and stated his willingness to open the Canal to Israeli goods and finally to Israeli ships but by stages. 10. He spoke for several minutes on the unrest and frustrations of the youth of the country, not only here but elsewhere, and [stated?] that for the first time in his administration internal problems had to dictate a substantial part of his policies. 11. He also stated that he wanted me to make very clear that his country “was not going Communist.” He said “If I am gone, the probable result will be either a new war with Israel or a complete unwillingness to make peace on any terms.” Both the President and Riad emphasized their concern about their growing economic dependence on the Soviets and Riad stated “We have sold our cotton so far in the future that I don't know how we will meet all our obligations.” The President emphasized that he would welcome any attitude on our part that would give him an excuse to turn away from the Soviets, although he said “I am not asking you for military equipment.” He informed me that Ali Sabri had left his government and he knew that Ali Sabri had been regarded as a Communist but he said “For your information, even he deplores the involvements which are forced upon us by your attitude with the Eastern bloc because our natural friends are the West.” 12. We talked considerably about commercial activities and he stated he had told his Cabinet before and would mention it again that there must be much greater emphasis on private enterprise in this country. Our talks went to petroleum, fertilizer, land reclamation, the resumption of the tourist trade and a host of other similar subjects indicating his great concern with Egypt's economic condition. 13. He has gained weight since I saw him last, has restored his sense of humor and appears much more relaxed. 14. He urgently said that in the absence of any other more formal communications between our countries he hoped that I would come frequently and asked if I couldn't stay a few days to continue our talks. I told him I was leaving tomorrow for London. 3 Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2 Robert Anderson visited Cairo in the course of a private business trip to the Middle East. He was briefed in Washington on the progress of the Jarring Mission and was asked to stress to Nasser U.S. efforts to facilitate the success of the mission. (Telegram 157034 to Cairo, May 2; ibid., TRV ANDERSON ROBERT B) Anderson also met in Cairo on May 4 with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad; a report of that meeting was transmitted to the Department in telegram 2320 from Cairo, May 6. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3 Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on May 7 under a covering note in which he noted that it showed Nasser at his most conciliatory. He also sent the President a copy of the cable reporting Anderson's conversation with Riad ( Document 168 ) with a covering note in which he observed that the conversation represented “the first gleam of hope we've seen in the Middle East.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68) 168. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 168. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, May 8, 1968, 1325Z. 2353. 1. Mohamed Riad called me to FonOff today to make following presentation on behalf his Minister. 2. FonMin has received telegram from El Kony reporting conversation at social gathering in New York between Ambassador Battle and El Kony on or about May 6. 3. El Kony reported Battle had made eleven points: A. He recalled US commitment to Israel re Aqaba in 1957 which Egypt had accepted but later violated. This limited US role in Middle East crisis. B. There had been understanding since submission of SC Nov 22 Resolution that it implied sort of negots between Arabs and Israelis at some stage and in some form under Jarring auspices. Therefore Israel's insistence on direct negots was wrong and UAR's insistence on no negots also wrong. C. He does not understand UAR position exactly since it obscure. Israel position also obscure. D. SC Res is based on fact that it one entity but Arabs insist only on withdrawal. E. Solution Jerusalem problem very difficult. US recognizes neither Jordan sovereignty nor Israel annexation. It must have special status. F. Arabs accept many important concessions only after the opportune time which in fact affects those concessions. G. Question secure and recognized boundaries would be clarified when negots start between two parties. H. Battle showed interest and concern in demilitarized zones and rectification of frontiers between Jordan and Israel. I. Declarations by Arab leaders now do not show they desire a peaceful solution. J. US position is to support what Arabs and Israelis accept. K. If SC seized again of question it will confine itself to adoption of Res similar to that of Nov 22. 4. Mohamed said FonMin had read this account and wanted me be informed he very surprised at Battle's position. Reason for his surprise and astonishment was that he believed we had already crossed period of generalities and reached period of defined positions. FonMin had heard exactly what Battle was saying now six months ago when situation still fluid and before adoption SC resolution. 5. Battle said GUAR position obscure and he didn't understand it. If such was case, why didn't he ask Bergus ask FonOff for clarification? If there any obscurity, GUAR not responsible for it. 6. FonMin regretted even more what Battle said on point D above. Battle must know UAR position on that point. Does this mean Ass't Sec'y NEA does not read all records our conversations in Cairo in which we have consistently told Bergus that UAR accepts resolution as whole and as one entity? FonMin says this raises fundamental question as to how GUAR could cooperate with USG. FonMin would like ask Battle through Bergus if USG being fair or just? Would actions of this kind inspire confidence? 7. Mohamed then said that of course we have something in mind. At this point he read from lengthy memorandum submitted by Ashraf Ghorbal. 8. Memorandum states that Tekoah met Goldberg March 18. Tekoah reported that Eban met Jarring March 8. Jarring said Jordan refused his formula in its present form but might accept it if it indicated readiness parties accept and implement resolution. Eban said to Jarring that aim of UAR was withdrawal without peace, negots, agreement, or navigation. Eban quoted Jarring as saying that was exactly UAR position. Eban suggested two alternatives: A) acceptance of Jarring formula in its present form with indication Israel would accept if Egypt accepted; or B) “to seek agreement re its implementation and accordingly come to conference.” 9. Memorandum continues that Goldberg told Washington of foregoing and Washington sent report to “all of its Missions including Jordan.” On March 20 Symmes met Rifai and told him of Tekoah-Goldberg conversation. On same day Jarring arrived Jordan and spoke to Rifai who indicated Jordan did not accept his formula. Jarring did not refer to any alternative by Israel. 10. Memorandum continues that Symmes then informed Washington as Dept suspected that Jarring had not conveyed Eban's suggestions for one reason or another. Dept sought clarification through two channels: A) Bunche who stated Jarring had reported he had never heard this language; B) Israel which indicated Eban did not really submit any suggestions or alternatives but was thinking out loud. 11. Mohamed said FonMin's conclusion was that Tekoah gives info which USG distributes to all its missions. It is wrong information and US reps under false impressions. 12. Mohamed then returned to Ghorbal memorandum to report that Israelis told Barbour March 10 that Jarring had told them March 7 that Egyptians did not accept his formula and insisted on withdrawal as preceding anything else. Eban then met Barbour March 16 and said Egyptians trying by all means affect withdrawal without any conditions and then to open Canal for all ships except Israel. Eban said Washington had made Israelis believe UAR's position was more tolerant than reality. 13. Memorandum continues that in discussion March 15 Rifai told Symmes: A) Jarring had stated that he had not conveyed to Israel any negative position as set forth by UAR FonMin; B) “Cairo stressing not only implementation but also that Israel must accept putting resolution into action and want withdrawal start before anything else.” (End of memorandum.) 14. Mohamed said UAR had spoken to Amman re para 13. Rifai believes there contradiction between points A) and B). Rifai had asked Symmes about this. Symmes expressed belief there had been misunderstanding. 15. Mohamed said all these reports make FonMin very uneasy. He returned to what Battle had said. In point B he said both Egypt and Israel were wrong. What did this mean? 16. FonMin could not understand Battle's point F. He reiterated that UAR had accepted resolution. Before acceptance,UAR had insisted on unconditional withdrawal, it now accepted withdrawal under conditions. UAR had accepted SC Res which involved important concessions. 17. FonMin turned to point I. It is again regrettable because in every speech Nasser made he spoke of a peaceful solution, even in his speech to the military. Battle should be aware that whenever Nasser met important American personalities he insisted on a peaceful solution. Whenever FonMin met Jarring he spoke of peaceful solution. 18. As to Battle's point J, what does this mean when it is said at a time that the potentialities of both sides are not equal? Israel is occupying Arab land and has declared its annexation of Jerusalem and Gaza. US position as expressed by Battle can only mean supporting Israel's imposition of its demands. Arabs cannot accept cession of parts of their lands. 19. FonMin asks if in these circumstances he concludes US supporting Israel. Is he wrong? Such declarations and actions do not help in bringing peace to the area and do not help at all in establishing better relations between US and the Arabs. FonMin concluded that he reacted so strongly to this report because it quoted Battle for whom he has highest personal regard. If it had come from somebody else in USG, he would not have cared. 20. I said I greatly regretted being subjected to this confusing mass of detail. I detested arguments ad personam. They could only lead to difficulties in personal relationships which were essential to improving relations between states. I was at least glad that this time GUAR chose to complain directly to us. I was extremely tired of hearing complaints re US position and actions made to third countries. What bothered me most about foregoing was timing of this demarche. 21. At this point Mohamed said “Stop right there.” He said, “I know you are going to say Jarring is coming tomorrow. I say to you again stop right there. All I will say about Jarring is that I will give you a full briefing not later than Saturday morning.” 22. Comment: I think above tirade shows tendentious, neurotically suspicious, and basically pedestrian mentality of FonMin. I think we should respond to it briefly, and in general and high-flown terms, if at all. 2 It may be something like the present Vietcong offensive on the eve of the Paris talks. The only legitimate gripe Egyptians have is alleged remark that Arabs insist only on withdrawal, if such remark was really made. On March 21 I conveyed, under instruction, gratification USG that UAR no longer insisting on withdrawal as condition precedent. (State 133802 3 and Cairo 1949. 4 ) Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. 2 Battle instructed Bergus to convey to Mahmoud Riad Battle's surprise and regret that “what had seemed to me to be extremely useful and friendly conversation with al-Kony on May 6 has been intrepreted by him as evidence of US hostility to UAR.” Battle declined to address the questions raised by Riad. (Telegram 162710 to Cairo, May 11; ibid.) 3 Telegram 133802 to Cairo, March 21, instructed Bergus to tell Mohamed Riad that the United States was grateful that the UAR had not reverted to insistence on withdrawal as a condition precedent and welcomed reassurances that the UAR was prepared to work toward a settlement based on Resolution 242. (Ibid.) 4 Dated March 21. (Ibid.) 169. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 169. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 10, 1968, 11:55 a.m. Mr. President: Conceivably this could be a turning point in the Middle East. The UAR has accepted talks in New York with Jarring. 2 Beyond that fact, what gives us hope is in para. 5: Cairo now interprets “implementation” as a package deal to be implemented via a time table. We shall have a draft letter to Nasser up to you during the day. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 12:09 p.m. 2 Bergus reported this development in telegram 2370 from Cairo, May 10, which was attached to Rostow's memorandum. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 10, 1968, 12:45 p.m. SUBJECT Reply to Nasser's Letter You will recall Nasser's letter (Tab D) 2 thanking you for our Security Council vote against the Israeli parade in Jerusalem and urging you to compel Israel to respect UN resolutions. He sent the same letter to other members of the Security Council, and the British and Canadians have already sent substantive replies. Secretary Rusk recommends (Tab B) 3 you write back, urging that Arabs and Israelis not lose this chance for peace; reaffirming that you stand by your five principles; and offering to help if Jarring can start “serious discussion.” These points are deliberately general to avoid their being overtaken by Jarring's latest talk in Cairo, but they are basic. Nasser's most revealing comments to Bob Anderson were: —“I am not asking arms nor aid. I am simply asking a clear unequivocal statement that the US supports the UN resolution and the principles in President Johnson's statement.” —Nasser would welcome any attitude on our part that would give him an excuse to turn away from the Soviets. —Nasser asked if we will accept constant Near East tension simply because Israel demands direct negotiations. It looks now as if Jarring will move to New York and continue his talks there in hopes of getting substantive talks started. This letter encourages Egypt in a general way to participate. The main issue has been whether to reply at all since this was a circular letter (though delivered personally to Secretary Rusk). Most of us feel that this is a ready-made opportunity—not only for making the move toward Nasser we have long thought desirable but also for restating your commitment to your five principles of last June 19. (Most Arabs feel we've moved away from them to back Israel's insistence on direct negotiations, a peace treaty and territorial gain.) I have no illusions about winning Nasser over. However, if there is to be any hope of a political settlement, the Arabs must see some hope that we, at some point, will at least take a fair middle position between Arab and Israeli claims. This letter would not solve the problem but it would be a useful start. You will be interested in the attached intercept (Tab C) 4 which describes how Bob McNamara hopes to move into the Egyptian situation. He has a report from his staff saying that the Egyptians don't know how to make the most of the Aswan Dam's water and power and the Soviets aren't helping. Bob feels there may be a chance for him to move in there in the right political context, and he has obviously begun exploring. The letter at Tab A 5 is for your signature if you approve. It is pretty much as Secretary Rusk sent it over, except that I have added the personal touch in the final paragraph. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic-Presidential Correspondence. Top Secret. 2 Document 161 . 3 Not attached. A copy of this May 9 memorandum from Rusk to Johnson is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. 4 Not attached. 5 For text of this letter, see Document 171 . 171. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 171. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, May 13, 1968, 2341Z. 163325. The following message for President Nasser has been received from President Johnson at the Texas White House. You should deliver it to Foreign Minister Riad in the course of your call tomorrow: “May 13, 1968 Dear Mr. President: I have just received and read your letter of May 1. 2 For years we have regretted the failure of the parties to find a settlement to the Arab-Israel problem which would command general satisfaction. Now, for the first time since 1948, there is an opportunity to move toward peace. For the sake of all peoples concerned, that opportunity should be seized. For far too long, a tragic proportion of Egypt's and Israel's national resources have been devoted to armaments for use against each other. There has been far too much reliance on force to settle problems in the Middle East—a region which cries out for economic and social development and which could organize the resources for the task. It is time for a change, and the Security Council Resolution of November 22 states the purposes and principles which should govern it. As you know, we have strongly supported that resolution as consistent with the statement I made on June 19, 1967. That statement and the resolution embodying its essential principles have been, and will remain, the firm basis of our policy. We believe a settlement consistent with the principles set forth in my statement and the resolution can be reached if the parties concerned can arrive at an agreement on substantive details within the terms of the resolution. To this end we have encouraged all parties to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring and believe that his mission provides the best means for reaching an agreed solution. In this regard, I have been encouraged by the indications of your readiness to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring. When he is able to organize a serious discussion of substantive issues, it should be possible for the United States and other interested nations to use their influence in the interest of a just and durable peace in accordance with the resolution of November 22. Success will require our most energetic personal efforts. As you know, Mr. President, I recently made the decision not to seek another term as President of the United States because I believed I could do more in this way to advance the cause of peace—in the Middle East as well as in Vietnam. But you and I know that, important as the efforts of my country may be, peace with justice will not come unless the parties to this long conflict themselves want peace badly enough to struggle for it. With every good wish, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted at the White House; cleared by Battle, Goldberg, Sisco, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by John P. Walsh (S/S). Repeated to USUN, Amman, and Tel Aviv. 2 Document 161 . 172. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 172. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 13, 1968. SUBJECT UN Security Council Consideration of Jerusalem The UN Security Council for the past several days has been giving further consideration to the question of Jerusalem; Jordan has been pressing for a Security Council resolution that would call upon Israel to rescind measures which Israel has taken in Jerusalem over the past months which Jordan believes are prejudicial to an ultimate settlement. Ambassador Goldberg reports that, while he has worked hard in trying to convince Jordan and other Security Council members to avoid further formal action by the Council, it will be necessary for the United States to acquiesce in a resolution if we are not to be almost totally isolated in the Security Council. Both we and Ambassador Goldberg are agreed that a Security Council proposal calling on Israel to rescind past measures would be strongly objected to by Israel and would be totally disregarded. We therefore have taken a strong stand against such a proposition. However, with prospects better that there will be discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in New York on the question of an over-all settlement, we believe the Council's work should be directed towards a resolution consistent with our policy and past public pronouncements and one which would not prejudice either side's position on Jerusalem. Ambassador Goldberg made a strong statement in the Council to which the Israelis reacted favorably, stressing that the Council should not pronounce itself substantively on the Jerusalem issue in such a way as to prejudice an ultimate settlement or prejudge the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. He also stressed that the Jerusalem problem, like other aspects, should be part of the over-all agreement between the parties. The U.K. has drafted a resolution based on the approach taken by Ambassador Goldberg in this statement, which we believe the U.S. should support. 2 Caradon, the U.K. representative, believes it may be necessary to include references to previous General Assembly resolutions and to add some specificity, in particular references to exploitation of land and legislative and administrative actions, in order to achieve agreement in the Council. While we should continue major efforts to avoid such language, we believe we could agree, if necessary, to support an appropriate preambular reference to past General Assembly resolutions as well as more specific language regarding actions in the City. References to past Assembly resolutions would avoid an explicit obligation on the part of Israel to rescind earlier measures as called for in those resolutions. Israel would have preferred no formal Security Council action, and in particular would prefer to avoid reference to the previous Assembly resolutions. While we cannot be categoric, we are inclined to feel the Israelis would not make a major issue of a U.S. vote for such a resolution, however, particularly in light of the fact that we would be totally isolated if we did not do so. We note, for example, that their attitudes regarding the present proceedings in the Security Council have been largely in tactical terms in the context of Goldberg-Tekoah talks. No major demarches have been made here. Ambassador Goldberg concurs in this memorandum. Recommendation That you authorize giving discretion to Ambassador Goldberg to support a resolution along the lines described above. 3 Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. 2 This draft is attached but not printed. 3 President Johnson wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “OK L.” 173. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 173. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, May 14, 1968, 1335Z. 2421. 1. In meeting today with FonMin Riad, latter, after receiving President's May 13 to Nasser 2 and oral message from Battle, 3 made lengthy presentation re Jarring's next steps and UAR ideas re “time-table.” 2. Riad picked up language in both President's and Battle's messages re UAR communication to Jarring of May 9. 3. Riad said he did not attach too much substance to another piece of paper added to Jarring Mission. Jarring's own formula already subject to three interpretations: UAR's, Israel's and Jarring's. He had given note to Jarring because Jarring said it would be helpful and because he wanted to show that UAR could play with words just as adroitly as could Israel. “Eban gives an interview to Le Monde , I can give an interview to Le Monde .” If present situation continued, Jarring would move to New York and game of words would continue. El Kony would merely read Jarring telegrams from Cairo and Tekoah would doubtless pass on messages from Tel Aviv. 4. Something new must be added, said Riad. GUAR felt timetable was the answer. Riad made it clear that timetable proposal had no elements of “imposition” in it. He views it as a catalyst to get meaningful discussion going. He feels that if Jarring, or big powers, or single country, or group of countries could propose timetable for implementation of resolution, then UAR and Israel would be in position comment on it, state what is acceptable, what is not and in this way finally arrive at an agreed settlement. He thinks process of negotiating out timetable would probably take months. But end result would be “accepted settlement” and peace in the Middle East which GUAR strongly desired. While this process of establishing agreed timetable was being carried out, continued Riad, it would be natural for Jarring to advise and consult with SC members and UNSYG as well as parties. Riad made it clear that process would not succeed without fullest support from USG. 5. Riad said UAR continued maintain its position it would not negotiate in same room with Israel. “Separate rooms,” he said. Nor would it sign a piece of paper with Israel. “We have learned not to trust Israel signature.” 6. This is where ultimate role of SC or great power guarantee came in. Once timetable established by process of discussion and bargaining set forth above, either SC or great powers should guarantee the result. 7. I thanked FonMin for his lucid exposition which, I said, cleared up a number of questions in my mind. I would report thrust of his remarks as accurately as I could and I was certain USG would take considerable interest in them. 8. Comment: I find considerable movement in UAR position as set forth above. I think we should express interest in UAR ideas and seek clarification and enlargement. I believe this movement is emanating from Nasser and Riad personally. It is quite possible that neither Kony or Ghorbal are being kept fully up-to-date. For that reason, would hope that any further discussion of UAR “timetable” proposal be confined to Cairo for time being. Mohamed Riad leaving tomorrow for two weeks in Rome thence four weeks New York. He has made effective liaison arrangements for me at FonOff during period his absence. Moreover, I see no difficulty in my seeing FonMin again if Dept thinks would be useful. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 2 See Document 171 . 3 Not further identified. 174. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 174. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, May 15, 1968, 1647Z. 9257. Subject: Lebanese-Israeli border tension. Ref: State 163324. 2 Summary: President Helou deeply disturbed over implications for Lebanon's future of Israeli attack on Houle May 12. Given present tension in Lebanon connected with delicate internal political situation following Parliamentary election, pressures by Lebanese radicals in support of Arab commandos, and Syrian machinations for infiltration terrorists through Lebanese territory, Helou considers situation very serious and is contemplating request for formal UNSC action against “unprovoked” Israeli attack on Houle in order gain international support for Lebanon. Helou made clear he will do everything possible to prevent terrorist infiltration through Lebanese territory. He asked for US support Lebanese position. 1. During my meeting with President Helou May 14, Helou expressed deep concern over deteriorating situation on Lebanese-Israeli borders. Very existence of Lebanon as independent state was in jeopardy as result latest Israeli military reprisal against Lebanese village of Houle. Helou claimed Israeli attack was unprovoked and there was no infiltration of Arab commandos from Lebanese territory into Israel. 2. Helou fears Israelis bent on deliberate campaign to provoke incidents on Lebanese-Israeli border in order to alter border to their advantage and possibly gain control Litani River waters. He referred to Israeli public statements after June war by MinDef Dayan (Israel has ideal borders with Arab neighbors except for Lebanon), PriMin Eshkol (re unproductive use Litani River waters), and FonMin Eban (Lebanon declared war on Israel “in good old fashioned way”). Helou stated Houle incident proof that Israel not satisfied with present Lebanese-Israeli border. 3. Helou explained that delicate political balance exists in Lebanon in wake of Parliamentary elections, and he doing everything possible to maintain national unity on political and confessional planes. Border troubles with Israel aggravate current political tension in Lebanon and allow (in an obvious reference to Syria) interested foreign powers to intrude into Lebanese internal affairs. Helou dismayed by Israeli action which he said permits Syrian radical regime “pushed by its Russian sponsors” to promote political instability in Lebanon by encouraging Arab extremist groups to pressure GOL to adopt more militant stance against Israel. He convinced Syrians will attempt dispatch commandos through Lebanese territory to (A) open another commando front with Israel, (B) create instability in Lebanon, and (C) indirectly attack Lebanon's pro-Western orientation and attempt break Lebanon away from ties to US. 4. Helou commented that border incident has already caused serious political pressures on GOL, political leaders in South Lebanon demanding GOL arm villagers in South Lebanon and there are reported demands for unrestricted passage Arab commandos through Lebanese territory. At same time, leftists and progressives taking advantage of GOL's vulnerable position and urging badly needed social reforms in South Lebanon (Beirut 9218). 3 Helou admitted GOL's weakness in face such demands, since government does not have financial means to institute such reforms immediately; and of course he realized implication of providing arms to the population quite apart from financial aspects. 5. Given serious implications situation, Helou states he determined to do everything possible as chief of state to prevent infiltration Arab terrorists and commandos across Lebanese borders. 6. Helou asked me US position concerning Israeli raids against Lebanon, I told Helou US policy opposed to any military actions which increase tension in ME, and as example US doing everything possible to restrain Israelis from retaliation along Israel-Jordan cease-fire line. I stressed GOL should continue to do everything possible to prevent use Lebanese territory by Arab commandos, even though such government action unpopular with large segment public opinion. Informed Helou per reftel that our Embassy in Tel Aviv already instructed inform GOI of serious Lebanese concern over Lebanese-Israeli border, and Israeli intentions re integrity of border. Stated we will also make clear our view to GOI that despite politically motivated statements by some GOL leaders, GOL has no interest in allowing Lebanon be used as base for terrorism against Israel, and that GOL doing everything possible to limit such activities. I told Helou we would seek reassurances from GOI that it would not be in anyone's interest to create instability and conflict along only peaceful Arab-Israeli border since June war. I mentioned PriMin Yafi's public statement in support of Palestinian terrorist organizations and stressed Israeli sensitivities to such statements. Helou assured me Yafi was misquoted but reluctantly agreed that Yafi's statement reflected temper of times. 7. Helou urged US keep close watch on Lebanese-Israeli border developments and asked that US support Lebanese position, especially if situation arises where, despite all efforts by GOL to prevent infiltration, another border incident breaks out. He also specifically asked that USG make statement citing Houle incident and opposing policy of reprisal raids as it has done in past. I responded US would closely watch border situation. However, I made clear situation could change radically if there were a series of border incidents resulting from terrorist activities launched from Lebanon. We will try exercise element of control insofar as isolated incidents are concerned such as Houle, but if situation got out of hand, US policy against Israeli retaliatory raids would have to be considered in light of increased tempo of terrorist incidents. 8. Comment: Even though Helou's view may have been presented in exaggerated form, Embassy basically supports Helou's analysis of situation. Helou made clear that he can be placed in the same dilemma as that of King Hussein concerning efforts to prevent terrorist acts when, at same time, there is strong public pressure on GOL to permit infiltration. We must recognize that Arab radical states such as Syria are exploiting commando activity to create instability in moderate Arab states of Lebanon and Jordan. It would seem neither in our interest nor in Israel's to create internal instability in these countries. Israel should, therefore, be discouraged from taking action which would force Lebanon into a militant stand permitting use of Lebanese territory [garble—by?] commandos. We [garble—also?] recommend USG urge Israel to respond affirmatively to Lebanon's request of last October for reactivation of ILMAC. (See septel re possible Lebanese approach to UNSC.) 9. If pressures mentioned by Helous continue to mount, and Israel continues disregard complex implications for [ of ?] Israeli retaliatory raids, political situation in Lebanon will be undermined and we would see further erosion of US position in Lebanon. We also think that USG statement citing Houle incident and expressing US opposition to such retaliatory measures would facilitate Helou's efforts to handle situation. 4 Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, and DIA. 2 Telegram 163324 to Beirut, May 13, reported that Lebanese Charge Farah called at the Department to express Lebanese concern over recent incidents along the Israel-Lebanon border. Farah emphasized that Lebanon was doing everything possible to prevent illegal crossings into Israel and expressed his government's concern that Israel had designs on Lebanese territory. Acting under instructions, Farah requested the United States to take steps to show disapproval of Israeli actions along the border. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 9218 from Beirut, May 14, the Embassy reported on uneasiness in the Jewish community in Lebanon over mounting tension between Israel and Lebanon. Social reforms were viewed as a means of alleviating some of the tension. (Ibid.) 4 The Department instructed Porter to weigh in strongly with the Lebanese Government against a resort to the Security Council concerning the border incident. The Department noted that the facts of the incident did not establish that the Israeli action was unprovoked and stressed that an appeal to the Security Council would come at a very unfortunate time with respect to the Jarring Mission. Lebanon could be assured of U.S. interest in the border situation. (Telegram 165812 to Beirut, May 17; ibid.) 175. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 175. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, May 17, 1968, 1015Z. 2448. 1. With all due respect, I find our arguments against timetable concept as set forth para 3, State 165831 2 pretty thin and unconvincing. I am certain UAR will assume, once they hear of these conversations from British, Italians and others (as hear they will), that real reason for US opposition to timetable concept is US support for Israel insistence on direct negots and peace treaty. 2. Think we would be well advised withhold comment on timetable concept until at least we get Jarring's views on it. It may be that Jarring himself considers it non-starter. Another possibility would be further discussions with FonMin Riad in Cairo with aim of expanding timetable concept to something more to our liking. 3. I am also troubled by reference in para 6 reftel to “Our understanding with Israel as to how we were proceeding on whole question of talks.” This and other hints in other telegrams over past couple of months make me wonder if we have a secret agreement with, or have made secret commitments to, Israel which go beyond President's June 19 statement and our pledge of support for Nov 22 resolution. Would appreciate clarification on this point. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2 Telegram 165831 to USUN, May 17, reported on a conversation between British officials and Under Secretaries Katzenbach and Rostow on May 16. The conversation dealt with the Jarring Mission, and Katzenbach and Rostow persuaded the British that the timetable concept favored by the UAR should be opposed. The Department viewed the concept as a “mechanistic approach,” which deviated from the objective of promoting an agreed settlement between the parties, and saw the timetable concept as a device that could be exploited to substitute for negotiation and agreement. (Ibid.) 176. Memorandum of Conversation 176. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 17, 1968, 1-3:15 p.m. SUBJECT Middle East PARTICIPANTS For the United States: The Secretary G—Ambassador Bohlen EUR—John M. Leddy For the Soviet Union: Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Min. Couns. Yuri N. Tcherniakov Kuznetsov, referring to the latest statements by the UAR and Jordan, said that the Arabs had now made forward steps toward a political solution: (1) They had agreed with the essence of the resolution of the United Nations Security Council of November 22. (2) The UAR had indicated its readiness to continue consultations in New York. And, (3) the UAR had agreed to consider the entire scope of the November 22 resolution. Therefore, the other side should not miss this opportunity. But the position of the Israelis is not constructive. And the US has demonstrated no desire to take even a quarter of a step toward resolving the problem. The US should do more to take advantage of this favorable moment. Present tensions could lead to even greater tensions. The Secretary said that the agreement of the Israelis, the Jordanians and the UAR to have talks with Jarring was at least a step, even though small. President Johnson had reaffirmed American support for the Security Council resolution on the occasion of the recent visit of Tunisian President Bourguiba. The US will support Jarring in New York. We do not insist upon the Israeli position that Israeli-Arab talks at this point must be face-to-face. There was haggling going on between the two sides, each trying to gain. The Secretary said that the US was disappointed with Kosygin's reply to President Johnson's letter on the control of arms to the Middle East, 2 which Kosygin had tried to condition upon Israeli withdrawal. The US feels that the Arabs must show restraint. We know that countries other than the Soviet Union are supplying arms to the Middle East, but US/Soviet agreement on this subject is probably necessary to bring this traffic under control. The job now in the Middle East is to get both sides to agree to get down to talks on the substance if progress is to be made. Kuznetsov said that he had nothing to add to the Kosygin letter on the arms question. Regarding the Jarring Mission, the Soviets wished it success and would do their best to support it. The Secretary observed that we are somewhat disappointed that Jarring had proceeded so cautiously-so far he had not talked substance, only procedure. We hope for a better result from his activities in New York. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets had given careful thought to the Middle East. They believe that the Israelis must now take a step and that the US must do something to pressure the Israelis. Kuznetsov then referred to the proposal by the Security Council to establish a time-table for the achievement of a solution to the Middle East problem. The Secretary said that a time-table made sense only in relation to implementing a solution which had already been agreed upon. If a time-table is simply means for establishing pre-conditions, then all the same old difficulties would arise again. Therefore, it is important for Jarring to deal with the real issues. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy and approved in S/S. The memorandum is “Part II of V.” The meeting was held in the Secretary's dining room. 2 For President Johnson's January 20 letter, see Document 57 . For Kosygin's February 27 message, see Document 58 . 177. Memorandum of Conversation 177. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 17, 1968. PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Rabin Ephraim Evron W. W. Rostow Harold H. Saunders Mr. Rostow opened the meeting by giving Ambassador Rabin the President's letter to Prime Minister Eshkol, 2 saying that Mr. George Woods had agreed to take on the job as U.S. Coordinator on the Israeli desalting project. Both Rabin and Evron seemed pleased. Rabin opened the discussion by asking Mr. Rostow what he thought about the apparent shift in the Egyptian position toward talks in New York. Mr. Rostow replied that Israel should take it seriously, probe and make every effort to turn it into something useful. When Mr. Rostow said that is what we are doing in the Paris talks on Vietnam, Ambassador Rabin jumped right in by pointing out that we were at least probing in direct negotiations . Mr. Rostow admitted that but said that he felt strongly that “this is not the time” for the Israelis to insist on direct negotiations. He said that we had had contacts with the North Vietnamese through third parties in nineteen countries before we got to Paris. He warned the Israelis against being “too theological” in pressing for direct negotiations. Mr. Rostow went on to say that he fully understood Israel's requirement for a serious agreement between the parties at the end of the process. The President's position has been that we were not going to repeat the “Rube Goldberg chewing gum and tape” operation of 1957. We had been with the Israelis from the time of the hotline conversations on the point that, before Israel withdrew, there should be a serious political arrangement that could allow the parties to live together in peace. We had also felt that any such agreement at this time must come from the parties to the conflict themselves. At the same time, we had not been talking about what the Israelis seem to have in mind-something akin to the Congress in Vienna in 1815 “with striped pants, a big peace treaty, and all the trimmings.” Mr. Rostow returned to the question of why Nasser had made this change in course . He recounted some of the reasons suggested by Robert Anderson's conversation with Nasser—economic difficulties, political troubles, serious concern about Soviet influence in the UAR. Mr. Rostow said he had no evidence but could not exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union, recognizing the consequences for it of another round of fighting, had told the UAR to get on with the job of political settlement. Ambassador Rabin asked what we thought Nasser's purpose is. He said Israel must know what is at the end of the process on which they are now asked to embark. Israel insists that it lead to a contractual agreement—an agreement between the parties and signed by them. Mr. Rostow agreed that there must be an arrangement that binds the parties. But that can be achieved in any one of a number of different ways. The important thing is to get a process started that can lead to satisfactory arrangements. The Ambassador voiced his fear that all the UAR had in mind was for Jarring to establish some sort of “timetable” and substitute that for the contractual arrangement Israel wants. He repeated that Israel must know what is at the end of the process. Mr. Saunders said that the Arabs had a similar requirement-to be assured that there is a deal for them at the end of a negotiation. Ambassador Rabin finally agreed, as long as Mr. Saunders was not talking about specific peace terms but rather about the general principle that Israel would withdraw in the context of a peace settlement. Mr. Rostow cautioned against Israel's insisting on agreement on procedures at the outset. He could understand Israel's legitimate desire to know where it was headed, but he could not sympathize with any request from Israel to have the Arabs “like Huck Finn prick their fingers and sign in blood before talks could begin that they would sign a big peace treaty at the end of it.” The important thing is to get Nasser engaged in the process of making peace. That, in itself, could help change the political atmosphere. We have no idea where the Paris talks will take us. We are hoping that when each side engages in the process of working out a modus vivendi, the atmosphere will begin to improve. Mr. Rostow opined that Nasser himself probably doesn't know where all this is leading him. Israel has every right to be skeptical. Nasser has many different strands in his thinking, ranging from clear realism to the sort of thinking that took him to war last June. We have always known him to be this sort of schizophrenic individual, and, we can accept a healthy Israeli skepticism. What we cannot accept is the possibility that Israel might not even risk engaging in this process. More important, Mr. Rostow said, was to get talking with Hussein. The move to New York may be mainly designed to give Hussein a cover for talking. Both Ambassador Rabin and Mr. Evron indicated-more by what they obviously weren't saying-that Israel had every intention of pursuing this course with Hussein. Mr. Evron said he differed somewhat from Mr. Rostow as far as the Soviet Union's possible desire for peace talks was concerned. He felt the USSR's purpose is to spin out talks in New York until after the US election. Mr. Rostow cautioned against assuming that the Soviets are that well organized or that much in control of their Mid-Eastern clients. He said that we had had a number of contests with the USSR all around the globe. While we respect them as a capable adversary, we know they make their mistakes, and no one should overrate them. Mr. Evron replied that he saw his explanation as the only way to account for the seeming illogic and unexpectedness of the recent Egyptian move—a new way of showing movement where actually there was none. Mr. Rostow said he thought, to the contrary, that there was a certain amount of Egyptian logic in this move. Particularly, the Egyptians are nationalistic enough not to want to have to continue their heavy dependence on the USSR. In conclusion, Mr. Rostow said we don't expect Israel to jeopardize anything of its basic position. But we do expect Israel to try with all its ability-and that is a lot-to turn this Egyptian move into something worthwhile. Both Israelis agreed that this was the course they intended to follow. 3 H.S. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Exdis. 2 Dated May 10. (Ibid., Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 3/1/68-10/30/68) 3 Ambassador Barbour followed up on this conversation in a May 20 meeting with Foreign Minister Eban in which Barbour stressed the importance of moving beyond procedural discussions in New York into discussions of matters of substance. (Telegram 3782 from Tel Aviv, May 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 178. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 178. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, May 21, 1968, 1549Z. 167634. Ref.: Cairo 2448. 2 1. Since term “timetable” can mean many things to many people, it would perhaps be useful define in other terms what we consider unacceptable and why, as well as what would seem unobjectionable. 2. We are opposed to attempting to arrive at settlement by imposing terms or by applying terms in phases. Unwillingness to consider imposed solution has been central to our policy toward settlement from beginning and was enunciated in President's June 19 statement. Our view on phased settlement has also been basic to our position and is fundamental to November 22 res. 3. Re imposed solution, aside from probable unalterable Israeli opposition to procedure which ab initio requires surrender on what to Israel are matters of substance, concept of externally imposed settlement is incompatible with USG position that an active association of the parties in some form of agreement essential if peace is to endure. The USG is not “signed on” to Israeli objectives of a peace treaty arrived at through direct negotiations but in light of experience with 1957 expedients believes that to abandon principle that Arabs should accept responsibility of entering into some form of negotiation leading to agreement in favor of “imposed arrangement” would make later disavowal by Arabs of such arrangement that much easier. Although the word “negotiation” appears nowhere in the Resolution, it has seemed inherent in the situation that there must be a negotiating process of some sort. 4. Genesis of timetable idea makes clear that at least some of major proponents intend that it provide alternative to common understanding and agreement among parties. In Egyptian usage it seems to be outgrowth of “protocol of implementation,” which embodied whole concept expressed by slogan “implement the resolution.” Latter idea we considered to be reflective of desire avoid acceptance of responsibility for negotiation and settlement. Re relationship to phased settlement, timetable of course contains phasing idea inherently. Moreover, as it was expressed in early stages (e.g., by UAR Amb. in Moscow), it seemed explicitly to include some form of phasing. From background information previously provided, you are also aware of role of French and Soviets in pushing idea of an imposed timetable for implementation of resolution. 5. Word “timetable” itself need not mean mechanistic procedure and could represent mode of operation compatible with our position. We note Jarring has referred to “calendar” he is considering using in next phase; he may have in mind something other than imposed or phased settlement in unacceptable sense. As pointed out in State 165831, 3 timing of steps to be taken in implementing SC resolution must obviously be part of any agreement between parties. Emphasis here is on fact that timetable would be derived through discussions involving parties and would be result of common understanding. We have not given detailed consideration to precise manner in which negotiations could be carried on, but obviously one method could involve an initial outline of sequence in which elements of settlement would be dealt with. Drawing up of outline would, of course, have substantive impact and thus would have to be done by and with parties, whatever particular method might be chosen to initiate the process. To discuss timing of steps one must also discuss nature of steps, and in this sense also timing and substance are closely related. 6. We concerned that idea of timetable could become obstacle to progress if it actually constitutes new wrapping for old Arab position or if Israelis think it does—witness role of essentially harmless term “implement.” We hope therefore that there will be no attempt by parties or others to get agreement on its adoption, in abstract, as way of proceeding. This in part is reason for our determined efforts to discourage what appeared to be mushrooming support for it. In last analysis acceptability of particular “timetable” proposal can only be determined by examining proposal itself as it emerges, if it does, in process of Jarring talks. 7. Re your query about “secret agreement,” there is, of course, no such agreement with or commitment to Israel. We have made no secret of the fact that, as President said last June 19, we believe that “… the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace. Sooner or later it is they who must make a settlement in the area.” It is essentially this concept which underlies understanding as to how we are proceeding on question of talks. It is understanding we have made equally clear to both Arabs and Israelis. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Day and Davies on May 20, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN. 2 Document 175 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 175 . 179. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) 179. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) 1 Washington, May 21, 1968. SUBJECT An Updated Look at Phantoms In the last two months, there have been at least five new studies of the Arab-Israeli military balance and its relation to our Phantom decision. After going over these new papers, I did the attached summary to bring together their main conclusions. Since I intended this mainly as a summary that would not go beyond recent papers, I hesitated to add the last section on policy questions. But I succumbed to temptation and tried to wrap them up too. What this seems to add up to is the Israelis have some legitimate basis for concern. I don't see how, on the basis of our own studies, we can flatly dismiss their concerns. What we do is a big question, but it might help us as a start to be absolutely clear about the nature of their problem as our most recent round of studies presents it. You suggested a meeting soon to go over this, and I think that would be a good idea. Perhaps something like the attached could serve as a chopping block in sharpening our conclusions on where we stand. Harold H. Saunders 2 Attachment 3 THE ARAB-ISRAELI AIR BALANCE On the basis of several recent studies of the Arab-Israeli military balance, the following seems to be the USG's current view: I. Israel has no problem in 1968. A. Arab and Israeli inventories of combat aircraft are in just about the same balance as before the June war. B. Despite intensified training, the UAR forces will not complete their general reorganization until the spring of 1969. Even then, we judge it unlikely that overall combat-readiness will go beyond that of June 1967. C. Even Nasser and the USSR seem to be thinking in this time frame. D. The Israelis are quick to point out that their present boundaries provide far greater security than their pre-June 1967 borders. Their aircraft are closer to Arab targets, and they would have additional warning and defensive room to meet an Arab attack. II. While we estimate that the overall balance in mid-1969 will remain at least as favorable to Israel as it was in June 1967, elements of uncertainty begin to creep in: A. Will France deliver Mirages? Our estimates assume so. But the Israeli Ambassador in Paris, after talking with Pompidou, claims that there is no chance of French delivery, and lower level information we have suggests that a change in the embargo is possible but not envisaged. The point is crucial. If France does not deliver, JCS judges that an “unacceptable” ratio of high-performance aircraft (e.g. Mirages or Phantoms) would exist. By end of 1969 the Arab-Israel ratio in this category will have risen to 8:1. If either France or the US delivered 50 planes in this category, the ratio would remain 4:1. If both delivered, it would fall below 3:1. The ratio in June 1967 was about 4:1, and that remains the ratio today. It is impossible to say at what precise point the ratio becomes dangerous, but JCS judges that continuation of an 8:1 ratio over any period would be “unacceptable.” B. What will be the Soviet aid pattern? Our estimates of the future balance are based on the fact that there is no evidence that the USSR intends to go substantially beyond pre-June levels in building up Arab equipment inventories. Those estimates assume that, once war losses are replaced, the Soviet program in the UAR will return to a normal flow of deliveries for replacement and modernization within roughly the present force levels. However, that assumption is subject to change. Our intelligence studies point out that, given the cyclic nature of the Soviet arms aid program, new arms agreements are expected to be concluded this year as deliveries under existing agreements are completed. A new round of arms discussions began in March when Soviet Defense Minister Grechko visited Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo. Until results of these talks become known, we cannot be sure about the extent of modernization over the next 12-18 months . C. Will Arab forces expand in size? We have no evidence that the UAR is significantly expanding its pool of trained manpower. However, Ambassador Rabin says that the UAR is now increasing its total number of pilots at the rate of 50-60 per year. In addition, we know that the increase in the number of UAR airfields and hardened targets will spread any Israeli attacking force thinner. D. What is the offsetting effect of the sharp improvement in Israel's attack capability? In the field of medium performance attack aircraft (e.g. Skyhawks), the ratio will drop over the next 18 months from 3.1:1 today to 1.7:1, and this purely numerical ratio does not reflect the fact that the 88 Skyhawks will have increased Israel's bomb-carrying capacity and gained range and payload advantages. To what extent this would offset a possible increased Arab advantage in high performance aircraft is unclear. But it is clear that the Phantoms with their dual attack and interceptor capability would not only affect the ratio in high-performance aircraft but would further increase Israel's advantage in attack aircraft. III. This seems to add up to the conclusion that, if Mirages are not delivered, Israel beginning sometime in the last half of 1969 will at least face an unacceptable ratio of high-performance Arab aircraft. In addition, Israel will be unable to support and maintain US aircraft to reduce the ratio until about 18 months from the time of a US decision to provide them. A. As noted above, the ratio of high-performance aircraft by October-November 1969 would, by our estimates reach about 8:1. Despite expected deficiencies in Arab performance, JCS considers that high a ratio unacceptable. Thus, Israel would be handicapped to some degree—our papers don't examine the extent in detail-in the battle for air superiority unless early attacks on airfields were exceptionally successful. It seems unlikely that the Arabs would allow the same degree of success that Israel achieved in June 1967. B. Israelis would not be fully trained to support and maintain Phantoms until about 18 months from the date of decision to begin training. A cadre of Israeli personnel could be trained within 13 months, provided they already had English language and basic electronics training. However, that program would provide only a marginal capability since another 6 months would be needed to bring other personnel up to a level where they could function on their own. The six-month gap could be bridged by USAF or contract technicians if necessary. IV. These conclusions do not differ much from Israeli conclusions, and Israeli intelligence estimates do not differ greatly from ours. The main difference is in interpretation. The Israeli judgment comes from measuring these conclusions against three objectives: A. Not only to be militarily stronger than the Arabs but to be able to defeat quickly and without suffering much damage in return. The Israelis are convinced that if their own armed forces were badly defeated or if their small country suffered serious physical damage, it would mean the end of Israel as a state. Their objective seems to be to have enough strike aircraft available to incapacitate Arab air forces on the ground while minimizing Arab counterstrikes even from widely dispersed Arab bases. B. To modernize their air force. In maintaining clearcut military superiority, air power is crucial. Eshkol's request for Phantoms is not based on a desire just to increase the size of his air force. It is based on a projection of what kind of air force he believes Israel needs 2-5 years hence and assumes some modernization. This accounts for some difference in our judgments of Arab-Israeli ratios because we count all aircraft now in Israel's inventory; the Israelis assume that some older planes will have been retired (and that the French Mirages will not be delivered). C. To possess an absolute deterrent. The Israeli philosophy of peace is that Israel must be so strong that the Arabs will realize they have no prospect whatsoever of winning back their lands by force. V. The policy questions for us are how large a margin of security we want Israel to have and how Israel's strength affects other interests: A. Israel's security. Given Israel's objectives, they see their margin becoming too thin by mid-1969. They point out that their margin was uncomfortably thin in June 1967, yet they won a decisive victory with virtually no damage to Israel proper. Even if Arab aircraft are better dispersed in hardened revetments and on better alert, that only means by our estimates that Israel will need more time and perhaps suffer greater losses in gaining air superiority. What losses are too great? B. Political settlement. Given Israeli tactics, they believe they can only achieve peace when the Arabs recognize their unmistakable military superiority. We assume that most of the Arabs will refuse to make peace as long as it looks like abject surrender. It may also be true that Israel would be more willing to risk compromise if it were sure of its strength. But the reverse is possible-that greater strength could encourage the hawks who seem insensitive to Arab psychological and political needs. Now that the US appears to be Israel's only source of supply would assurance that our door is open be an important factor in increasing Eshkol's flexibility? C. Arms limitation. Given the longer range purpose of limiting the arms race, we are leery of improving Israeli capability too sharply, especially now that Soviet shipments have levelled off. However, it is possible to argue-and CIA estimates-that the USSR will go on modernizing Arab forces, even though there is now no indication it intends to go substantially beyond pre-June levels in building up Arab equipment inventories. If we provided Phantoms, could we justify our decision in terms of modernization (given, for instance, the unavailability of French aircraft) after having told everybody it would be escalation? D. NPT . We and the Russians both want Israel to sign the NPT. Israel's near-term security concern is not with the threat of nuclear weapons but with the possibility of an unacceptable imbalance in conventional arms. Meeting Israel's concerns on this point relates both to our guaranteeing Israeli access to needed conventional weapons and to limitation of Soviet shipments to the Arabs. It may also relate marginally to the atmosphere for peace talks and to Israel's desire for an absolute deterrent. Is there any sort of sophisticated trade-off in this area? 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, NSSM 81. Secret. Copies were sent to Davies, Atherton, Sober, Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Granville S. Austin, and Katzenbach's Executive Assistant Philip B. Heymann. Saunders also sent a copy to Walt Rostow under a May 21 covering memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 3 Top Secret; sensitive. 180. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 180. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 23, 1968. Mr. President: I am increasingly concerned, as I know you are, about the continuing delay in moving the Middle Eastern problem toward a more permanent solution. Israel seems to be saying that they will not discuss the substance of outstanding questions with Ambassador Jarring in the absence of face to face discussion with its Arab neighbors. Further, it has refused to act with restraint in Jerusalem and has not even made such a token gesture as withdrawal from the Saudi Arabian islands of Tiran and Senafir. Israel's Arab neighbors, for their part, seem unwilling to talk seriously about the substance of a permanent settlement and are resting upon periodic propaganda exercises aimed at both Israel and the United States in such forums as the Security Council. Meanwhile, the influence of the Soviet Union in such key countries as Egypt, Syria and Iraq continues to grow at the expense of our and other Western interests. You are familiar with the arms problem in the area and the refusal of the Soviet Union to discuss the matter seriously with us prior to Israeli withdrawal. I have been trying to think of some way in which we could get this problem off of dead center—a situation filled with danger. One possibility would be that we and the Soviet Union discuss this matter secretly and in complete detail-putting together a package which the two of us would then try to impose upon the countries of the area. I do not believe that this would work. I doubt that we and the Soviets could agree simply because their and our interests are in direct conflict. I doubt that the two of us could impose a result upon the countries of the area. We failed to restrain Israel last June and there is serious question as to how far the Russians could go with, say, Egypt and Syria. Another alternative, which appeals to me, is that we ourselves get into a more serious dialogue with both Israel and its Arab neighbors in an effort to find a basis for a settlement with which both sides could live. This would mean asking someone, very privately, to be in touch with both sides on your behalf on a more serious basis than we have yet attempted. There is some difficulty in having the same individual talk both to Israel and to the Arabs because such a person might be looked upon merely as a conduit to the other side and would not be treated with complete frankness. This suggests that we might ask two highly competent Americans to try to see what could be done-one talking with Israel and the other talking with the Arabs. It seems to me that Arthur Goldberg would be a good person to carry on serious talks with Israel after he leaves his present UN post. I have reason to think that he would be willing to do so. He is a tough-minded man and a superb negotiator and would be trusted by Israel even though points of real disagreement may come up. As for the Arabs, my mind turns to one of the following (in order of preference): David Rockefeller, Eugene Black, John McCloy and Robert Anderson. I would put Robert Anderson higher on the list except for his private interests in the area. You might wish to give this idea some thought in order that I may discuss it with you at your convenience. For your information I am attaching a summary which I asked Luke Battle to prepare of all of the suggestions which we have made to both sides in the Middle East. 2 In thumbing through this, you will note that we have been very active in our efforts but that our advice thus far has been largely ignored by both sides. We have had some limited response here and there but the record indicates that both sides have been very stubborn up to this point. 3 Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Confidential File, CO 1-6. Secret. 2 Dated May 21; not printed. 3 Rostow sent this memorandum to President Johnson on May 23 under a covering memorandum in which he indicated that he was inclined to agree with Rusk's suggestions. (Ibid.) 181. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 181. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, May 27, 1968. SUBJECT Anti-Infiltration Devices for Israel-Background Before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when terrorism was mounting, we launched a program with the Israelis to test a number of electronic anti-infiltration devices. Now the Israelis want to buy some. About three months ago, the Israelis submitted a purchase request for Munitions Control clearance to purchase 400,000 anti-personnel mines. They told us these were to be used in connection with a security “fence” along most of the Jordan River between Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea. Defense is now going ahead with the anti-infiltration devices, so Wally Barbour's concern in the attached telegram 2 is largely taken care of. However, the problem of the mines remains. Unfortunately, there is both a substantive and an emotional side of the problem. The substantive aspect is that Defense Department has vigorously resisted doing anything for Israel which makes the current cease-fire lines seem more permanent. While recognizing this point, State believes it is important enough to avert cross-border clashes that, on balance, it would go ahead and help build the Israeli “fence”. When State asked the Israelis for more information about the nature of the barrier they planned, Evron and his counterparts in Jerusalem flew off the handle because they feel we're questioning their good intentions or infringing on their sovereignty. They have refused us any more information and State is trying to figure out where to go from here. We do consider the mines to be in a different category from the devices because the devices are definitely a follow-on part of an earlier program agreement. However, State's position may soon prevail even on the mines. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret;Exdis. 2 Reference is to telegram 3810 from Tel Aviv, May 22, in which Ambassador Barbour urged approval of the Israeli request for anti-infiltration devices. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR) 182. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk 182. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 29, 1968. SUBJECT Israeli Actions and Motives with Respect to Tiran and Senafir In view of your interest in the Tiran/Senafir issue, you may find of interest the following comments which indicate both how Israeli actions have evolved over the past year and what may lie behind Israel's keen interest in this question. Israeli Actions Information from both the Saudis and Israelis suggests the following chain of events with respect to Tiran and Senafir since the June War: —During, or immediately after, the fighting the Israelis landed on Tiran. They either captured members of a small Egyptian contingent which had recently occupied the island or confirmed that the contingent had fled. We believe the Israelis then withdrew. When Ambassador Barbour toured the channel in a launch from Sharm al-Shaykh early in July, he saw no evidence of the occupation of Tiran by the Israelis or anyone else. —In late July or early August, 1967, the Israelis seem to have reoccupied Tiran. The Saudis so reported to us, expressing deep concern. We therefore approached Israel. On several occasions in our discussions of this subject during October, 1967, senior Israeli officials themselves confirmed that their troops were occupying Tiran. One top official used the term “garrison” (Tel Aviv's 1290, 1311 and 1370 of October, 1967). 2 —USG efforts to encourage the Israelis quietly to withdraw were countered by GOI attempts to extract maximum specific concessions, through us, from the Saudis. Ambassador Eilts was eventually successful in inducing King Faisal to assure us privately that he has no plans to militarize Tiran or to use it to impede freedom of navigation into Tiran Strait. You conveyed this information to Foreign Minister Eban by letter dated January 17, 1968. 3 —The Israelis responded negatively, seeking further binding written undertakings from SAG which would be underwritten by the USG. You expressed disappointment over the Israeli position to Ambassador Harman on February 8 and again pressed for Israeli withdrawal. 4 Harman promised to report your concern to Eban. —There has so far been no formal reply from Eban either to your letter of January 17 or your oral comments of February 8. —The Saudis complained to us in April about possible Israeli occupation of neighboring Senafir. We took this up in Tel Aviv on May 7. On May 17, our Embassy was told that regular patrolling has been carried out on Senafir island as a matter of routine since the six day war by small units as on Tiran island. Following publicity on this issue in Israel on May 19 (State 167501), 5 I called in the Israeli Charge on May 24 to express our continuing concern. He provided an identical response to that given us in Tel Aviv (State 170918). 6 I pressed the Charge as to whether the islands were in fact occupied, but he said he would have to request guidance from his government. Possible Explanations for Israeli Action Probably there is no single guaranteed explanation for the increasing interest which Israel has shown since last summer in these two fly-blown islands. But we may speculate with some precision as to what may lie behind their actions. Israel has for a decade attached even greater importance to free passage through Tiran than through the Canal. The Aqaba route is vital for Israeli trade with Africa and Asia. More importantly, it is Israel's lifeline to oil. This vulnerability was early recognized by Egypt. In 1955, Egyptian boycott regulations on Suez and Tiran traffic laid down that transit would be refused only to Israeli flag vessels and petroleum cargoes destined for Eilat . When the Egyptians reoccupied Sharm al-Shaykh in May, 1967, it was Nasser's suggestion that petroleum shipments would again be stopped that most threatened the Israeli economy. Some years ago Israel constructed a small 16” pipeline to move its crude imports (which originated in Iran) to the Haifa refinery. Little of this crude was re-exported. However, preliminary construction has now begun on a 42” transit line from Eilat to Asqalon. We believe that this decision, which seems to have been taken last summer, has greatly increased Israeli interest in the absolute security of the Tiran channel. The pipeline is to have an initial capacity of 20 million tons a year to be increased to 50 million a year (one million barrels/day) in a second stage which would provide additional pumping facilities. Such quantities could originate only in Iran. In fact, at present, they could originate only with the Consortium, but all major Consortium companies have extensive interests in the Arab world and have told us privately they would not use the Israeli line. They could sell some oil at the export terminals to independent companies who could use the Israeli line but such sales are only a small portion of total Consortium sales and they could not fill the line, unless, of course, additional markets west of Israel were to be developed. There remains only the National Iranian Oil Company. At present it has access to only a few thousand barrels of oil a day. Theoretically the NIOC could take royalty oil in lieu of payments but the net return to Iran would be much less than at present and this seems an unlikely development. However, Iran has a barter deal with Rumania (although no oil has yet been shipped) and the Shah has told Ambassador Meyer of his plans to embark on large scale trading with other Eastern European countries. Assuming Eastern Europe is willing to buy oil shipped through Israel (a not entirely warranted assumption), Iran would be able to make profitable sales only by getting oil from the Consortium for prices slightly above cost. And it was this point which all Consortium companies refused to concede to Iran during the negotiations this spring. If Iran intends to proceed with the project, the Consortium will face a very serious new problem with the GOI. Also, it could become difficult for Consortium owner companies to justify to some of their consumers any outright refusal to participate in what could be described as legitimate commercial transactions. There are, in short, many unanswered questions. But Israel is going ahead with the line. There would seem at least three good reasons why Israel would wish to develop such commerce: (a) hope of profit; (b) desire to replace Suez as an oil artery, thus reducing Egypt's regional and world importance and increasing Israel's; and (c) interest in developing closer relations with Eastern Europe and, hopefully, the USSR, insofar as the oil's destination might be Communist countries. On this latter point, the sole remaining substantial portion of the Diaspora is Russian Jewry. Those Israelis who oppose withdrawal from the present ceasefire lines no doubt see this group as the one sure source of population required to balance the increasing numbers of Arabs within Israel. While this would be a very long-term proposition and is speculative at best, the desire to introduce a note of Communist dependence on Israel could well be an additional factor in Israel's pipeline project—and hence in its attention to Tiran and Senafir. Whether or not the last point is valid, there may well be one further reason for Israel's interest in these islands. Jarring conceivably may work out a settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors which would include Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. But Israel has made public its intention to remain on Tiran and Senafir until a peace settlement is reached. This could well mean a peace settlement with Saudi Arabia. Since no such settlement is even under discussion, the Israelis may well calculate that their chances of a long stay on Tiran are better than at Sharm al-Shaykh. Conclusion To sum up, Israel's renewed interest in Tiran and Senafir seems gradually to have broadened since last summer. Basic security, economic and psychological motives are now involved. In the light of Faisal's assurance to us, and Saudi military impotence, we continue to believe that withdrawal would be in Israel's overall interest. Reference to “routine patrolling” rather than to a “garrison” may suggest that some rethinking along these lines is going on. Because of our important interests in, and past assurances to, Saudi Arabia we will continue to do everything we can to accelerate this trend. 7 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. Drafted by Brewer and cleared by Atherton, Deputy Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy James E. Atkins, and Davies. Saunders sent an advance copy of this memorandum to Walt Rostow on May 24 under cover of a note that reads in part: “Here's Bill Brewer's speculation on what the Israelis are up to on Tiran island.” (Ibid.) 2 Dated October 24, October 25, and October 28, 1967, respectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN) 3 See Document 47 . 4 See Document 75 . 5 Dated May 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN) 6 Dated May 24. (Ibid.) 7 Telegram 18695 to Jidda, June 19, reported Assistant Secretary Battle's discussion of Tiran Island with Ambassador Rabin that day. Battle acknowledged Israel's promise to evacuate Senafir Island and expressed U.S. belief that Israeli occupation of Tiran was unnecessary in view of King Faisal's assurances that Saudi Arabia would not militarize the island. Rabin responded that Israel was sensitive on the Tiran issue since a hostile presence on Tiran-“even three Fatah with machine guns”-could close the strait. Therefore the Israeli position was that the Tiran issue had to be part of a larger settlement package. (Ibid.) 183. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 183. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, May 31, 1968, 2300Z. CAP 81204. King Hussein is again worried by rumors of an imminent Israeli attempt to seize territory on the East Bank in northern Jordan from which some terrorists operate. He has asked Ambassador Symmes for a statement “from the highest authority in USG” of our present attitude toward the independence and territorial integrity of Jordan. 2 We do not believe Israel plans such a move, although we can never rule out an attack against terrorist bases. We don't know why Hussein is being fed these rumors, but it may be an effort to keep him uneasy about trying to deal with Israel. Or it may simply be normal operation of the Arab rumor mill. Although we do not believe these rumors, we do think it would be a good idea to restate assurances we have given him before as a background for possible negotiation with the Israelis. This, rather than current rumors, may be what is really on his mind in making this request, and we want him to know that our position remains as we described it to him last November. The one element in this message that would be new is our saying we would oppose any acquisition of territory beyond present cease fire lines. We have not had to face that, but I cannot believe even the Israelis would expect us to sit back quietly if they tried to take new territory across the Jordan River. Nick Katzenbach recommends that Ambassador Symmes be authorized to convey urgently the following oral message from you to Hussein: “Your apprehensions concerning future sanctity of Jordanian territory have been brought to my attention. I wish again to assure you, as I did in my letter of February 11, 3 that it is our policy and our interest to continue our close relationship and our support of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. As Ambassador Symmes has indicated to you, we have made abundantly clear to the Government of Israel our policy toward the continued independence and integrity of your country. From our talks last November, you know of our position on the ultimate disposition of the West Bank and Jerusalem. You should also know that we would strongly oppose any occupation of territory beyond the present cease fire lines. I recognize that Your Majesty has sought to prevent use of Jordanian territory to mount acts of violence across the cease fire line and urge that continued efforts be made to prevent these actions which promote instability and are an impediment to progress toward peace. I wish also to assure you that we are continuing our efforts to bring about a just settlement in the Near East which is, after all, the only solution to the problem about which we are both concerned.” Approve Disapprove 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis. 2 Symmes reported this request in telegram 5084 from Amman, May 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3 See Document 77 . 4 Neither option is checked. A handwritten note by Jim Jones apparently records the President's response: “Talk about this Tues [June 4] if it will wait.” Another note by Jones indicates that he passed this message to Bromley Smith. 184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 1 Washington, June 4, 1968, 0042Z. 175618. 1. Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros, accompanied by the Lebanese Charge Soleiman Farah and Lebanese Ambassador to London Nadim Dimeshkie, called on the Secretary on June 3. 2 The following summary of the talk is based on an uncleared memo of conversation, is FYI, Noforn, and subject to change on review. 2. The Foreign Minister explained that he had come to discuss two related problems: (a) that of the Lebanese-Israeli border, and (b) the general problem of an Arab-Israel settlement. (The conversation, however, was limited to the first problem.) The Foreign Minister explained that since June 1967 the Government of Lebanon had been concerned by a number of “threatening statements” by high ranking Israeli officials with respect to Lebanon's southern border. More recently, the Israelis attacked a Lebanese village on the pretext that commandoes from Lebanon had caused incidents in two Israeli villages. He wished to make clear that the Lebanese Government had taken a firm stand against the commandoes. Commando training was not permitted within Lebanese territory, and the Lebanese Army had done its best to control transit of commandoes from Syria. The Lebanese Government, however, could not completely insulate its borders to commandoes. The Israelis should be aware that the initiative and responsibility for commando activity belonged to the Ba'ath Party of Syria or those who support the Ba'ath and not the Lebanese Government. In any event, the GOL could not accept the principle that the Israeli Government had the right to attack Lebanon simply because one or two incidents within Israel may have resulted from commandoes slipping through Lebanese security arrangements. 3. The Foreign Minister could not believe that Israel considered Lebanon a threat to its security. He stressed that the Lebanese southern border was the only armistice line where practically no incidents had occurred since 1949. The border was recognized both as an international border, a cease-fire line, and an armistice line. In addition, Lebanon was not involved in the June 1967 fighting. 4. Despite all this the Israelis after the June war repudiated the Lebanese-Israeli armistice agreement. The Foreign Minister thought he could at least understand the rationale for the repudiation of the Jordanian and UAR armistice agreements. He could not see logic, however, in the repudiation of the Lebanese agreement. It was in this general framework, that Lebanon could only interpret Israeli actions and statements as indicating some Israeli design upon southern Lebanon. For a time the GOL thought of taking the matter to the Security Council but it finally decided that the Foreign Minister's trip was a better answer. Certainly an attack by Israelis on Lebanon would be in nobody's interest as it could easily result in the disintegration of Lebanon as now constituted, lead to the loss of that country to the Western world, and induce a radical political trend which could only cause trouble for Israel. In view of the importance of this matter, the Foreign Minister felt that Lebanon had the right to ask the United States as a friend and major power to take a position on this matter and to use its influence with the Israelis. 5. The Secretary addressed himself first to the policy question. He made clear that the United States supports the present southern border of Lebanon and attaches great importance to the preservation of the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon. Furthermore, we accepted without qualification GOL assurances of its non-involvement in terrorist activity across its southern border. However, as the Lebanese Foreign Minister had pointed out, others might well be operating from Lebanon territory. The Lebanese Government should make quite clear that it opposed as a matter of public policy terrorist activity. The Foreign Minister replied that the GOL did not recognize or deal with commando organizations as political entities, and it would continue to do everything to interdict and control terrorists. The GOL, however, could not publicly oppose the activities of commandoes because what the Israelis called terrorism the Arabs call resistance. Those involved were people who were trying to regain their homes and were acting in somewhat the same fashion as the resistance movement in Europe during the last war. He emphasized again that the GOL would not give the commandoes assistance and would continue to try to prevent them from using Lebanese territory. 6. The Secretary suggested that the strongest position the Lebanese Government could assume was to object to the abuse of its territory by any organization or state. The Secretary continued that we had had a good deal of experience in Vietnam with infiltrators and realized the problems which the Lebanese Government was experiencing. We were opposed not only to the raids but also against retaliation of those raids. We had made our position on retaliation clear in a number of UN resolutions. We had a special interest in Lebanon and would see if there were anything further we could do with respect to the problem the Minister raised. The Secretary went on to say that the fundamental problem was that terrorist activity inspired retaliation and that the two in tandem prevented the prospect of peace. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 LEB. Secret. Drafted by Houghton on June 3, cleared by Battle and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Harry W. Shlaudeman, and approved by John P. Walsh in S/S. Also sent to Jerusalem, Amman, Tel Aviv, London, and USUN. 2 While in Washington, Boutros also met with Eugene Rostow on June 3 and with Walt Rostow and Joseph Sisco on June 4. A memorandum of the conversation between Boutros and Eugene Rostow is ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Boutros' meeting with Sisco was reported to Beirut in telegram 176147, June 4. (Ibid.) A memorandum of the conversation between Boutros and Walt Rostow is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Lebanon, Vol. I, Memos, 2/65-1/69. 185. Memorandum of Conversation 185. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 4, 1968. SUBJECT Sandstorm: Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations PARTICIPANTS Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, IO Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Country Director-Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs Hon. Itzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel Ephraim Evron, Minister, Embassy of Israel Nissim Yaish, Counselor, Embassy of Israel During a discussion of other matters, Ambassador Rabin alluded to the question of Israel-Jordan peace talks. Rabin said that Nasser had given Hussein a green light to go further than the UAR. Nasser had said, however, that Hussein could make no agreement affecting Jerusalem without the approval of the Arab world since Jerusalem belonged not only to Jordan but to all Arabs. Rabin continued that the GOI had good information about the thinking of King Hussein and his entourage. Israel was committed not to discuss this matter in detail and he was therefore limited in what he could say. He could tell us, however, that Hussein was ready for a peace treaty through secret, direct negotiations under cover of the Jarring Mission. There was an argument in Israel as to whether Hussein could be relied upon. Government policy, however, was to maintain the Jarring Mission while trying to make progress secretly with Hussein. Elaborating on the foregoing, Rabin said that Israel's official public policy was as set forth in Eban's four points: (1) Face to face negotiations, (2) Agreement on the issues, (3) Conclusion of peace treaties, and (4) steps to carry out the agreements set forth in the treaties. All Israeli Government spokesmen would hew to this line but their purpose now was to advance secretly toward an agreement with Jordan. This cover was necessary in view of the basic differences between Hussein and Nasser. Israel knew what kind of settlement Hussein wanted and there was hope in Israel for a settlement with Jordan. There was no more talk of overthrowing Hussein. All key members of the Israel Cabinet agreed that “everything will be adjusted to this policy.” In response to Mr. Rostow's question whether Prime Minister Talhouni would support King Hussein on this course, Rabin said he thought so-providing Nasser concurred. Mr. Sisco asked how Israel planned to keep the Jarring Mission alive in the interim. Rabin said that Tekoah would seek to enlist Jarring's cooperation, explaining why negotiations with Jordan made this necessary. In this connection Rabin indicated that Israel was thinking in a time frame of about another six weeks. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret;Nodis. Drafted by Atherton. 2 Walt Rostow summarized the Israeli policy on negotiations with Jordan in a June 4 memorandum to President Johnson. In light of this information, which he noted was confirmed from sources in Jordan, “we have been standing down on any effort to become more active on the fringes of Jarring talks.” He added that Hussein might ask the United States to intervene with the Israelis on substance at some point. (Ibid.) 186. Editorial Note 186. Editorial Note By mid-1968, prospects for the UN-sponsored Jarring peace mission had clearly become very limited. The Johnson administration looked therefore to a renewal of secret contacts between Israel and Jordan as offering a more promising basis for a bilateral agreement, which might lead to a more general Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The United States encouraged and followed the progress of the contacts between May and November 1968. President Johnson's Special Assistant Walt Rostow kept him informed about the progress of the talks. In a June 27 memorandum to the President, Rostow stated, “Whether we take a Middle East initiative depends, in fact, on whether Israel-Jordan talks work out.” Thus far, he said, the situation was “not hopeful,” but the talks were “not yet broken off.” In a September 30 memorandum, Rostow described the secret contacts as “the best hope” for peace. In November the Israelis proposed an agreement based upon the “Allon plan,” which posited Israeli control over the West Bank, while returning political control of some two-thirds of a demilitarized West Bank to Jordan. However, it soon became apparent that King Hussein was increasingly skeptical that Israel would offer peace terms that he could accept, and he eventually broke off the talks. It was also clear to U.S. policymakers that only the United States could pressure Israel to accept a peace settlement premised upon its withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. 187. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson 187. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 4, 1968. SUBJECT Jordan-Israel Secret Negotiations 1. The secret Jordan-Israel talks in London covered the period between 4 May 1968 when Hussein had his first meetings with Eban and 16 May 1968 when Khammash had the final meeting with Israel Chief of Staff Barlev. Following these, Hussein stopped briefly in Paris for a meeting with General DeGaulle. By the last week in May, Hussein was back in Amman [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ]. 2. [ 7 lines of source text not declassified ]Hussein's preoccupation with the danger of a major Israeli military action which would destroy the moderate Jordan state has been reflected in Embassy reporting. 3. [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Eban agreed at the end of the London talks that he would report to Eshkol and the Cabinet Hussein's reaction to the Israel proposal for a settlement described by Eban in London and Hussein's own counter-proposal. [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 4. [ 11-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 5. General DeGaulle, after hearing Hussein's appraisal of the Middle East situation, told Hussein that if Hussein's statements reflected the realities, the prospects for an early political solution were dim and the threat of a major confrontation involving the Great Powers in the Middle East within the next two years was real. Hussein did not discuss his Israeli contacts with DeGaulle and DeGaulle's earlier offers to mediate were not renewed. Richard Helms 2 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Files, Chrono 1 Jan.-31 Jul. 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, June 4, 1968, 2027Z. 175876. Ref: Amman 5084; 2 5170. 3 1. Please pass to King Hussein following oral message from the President: Your apprehensions concerning future sanctity of Jordanian territory have been brought to my attention. I wish again to assure you, as I did in my letter of February 11, 4 that it is our policy and our interest to continue our close relationship and our support of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. As Ambassador Symmes has indicated to you, we have made abundantly clear to the Government of Israel our policy toward the continued independence and integrity of your country. You should also know that we would strongly oppose any occupation of territory beyond the present cease-fire lines. I recognize that Your Majesty has sought to prevent use of Jordanian territory to mount acts of violence across the cease-fire line and urge that continued efforts be made to prevent these actions which promote instability and are an impediment to progress toward peace. 2. I want also to assure you that we are continuing our efforts to bring about a just settlement in the Near East which is, after all, the only solution to the problem about which we are both concerned. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton and Davies on May 31; cleared by Atherton, Popper, Handley, Katzenbach, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to USUN. A record of a June 4 luncheon meeting with the President indicates that President Johnson also cleared the message. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968) 2 See footnote 2, Document 183 . 3 On June 4 General Khammash informed the Embassy that King Hussein was very concerned about the Israeli artillery and aerial attacks in the Irbid area that morning and wanted to know if there had been any response to his question concerning the U.S. attitude toward the integrity of Jordan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 4 See Document 77 . 189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, June 6, 1968, 1959Z. 177706. 1. During Rabin's June 4 call at Dept (septel), Under Secretary Rostow expressed pleasure with Israeli payment of Liberty 2 death claims and with GOI statement in UN on NPT. 3 2. Re NPT, Rabin said he wanted to convey central point of GOI thinking on this matter. Israel believed it would be a mistake in present situation to make clear to Arabs that they faced no Israeli nuclear threat. If Israel removed the question mark from this issue, it would remove a factor which Arabs must now consider in approaching a peace settlement. Problem was therefore a psychological one rather than question of whether or not Israel should have nuclear weapons. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Battle and Sisco, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN. 2 Documentation on the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967, will be printed in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume XIX . 3 On May 29 Israeli Permanent Representative Tekoah spoke in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on the draft non-proliferation treaty being considered by the General Assembly. Despite a number of unresolved Israeli concerns about the draft treaty, Tekoah indicated that in recognition of the importance of the treaty, Israel would vote in favor of it. (UN doc. A/C.1/PV.1576) 190. Message From Foreign Secretary Stewart to Secretary of State Rusk 190. Message From Foreign Secretary Stewart to Secretary of State Rusk 1 London, June 10, 1968. I have asked Pat Dean to deliver this message about the Arab/Israel situation because I am much concerned about the way events may move during the next few weeks both on the ground in the Middle East and also in New York. The very sharp exchange of fire on 4 June across the Jordan and the subsequent call for a Security Council meeting have underlined the ominous dangers which confront us all. I have in mind also that although the 21 May Security Council Resolution on Jerusalem 2 did not set a deadline for the Secretary-General to report back to the Council on its implementation, events could easily cause Arab pressure to build up, perhaps very suddenly, for a return to the Council on this issue, particularly as we can presumably rule out any hope of the Israelis doing anything which could even remotely be represented as compliance with the Resolution. All too soon, therefore, we may be confronted with a call for sanctions against Israel, which would involve difficult and dangerous decisions for both our countries. In the circumstances, I attach the greatest importance to our exchanging views with each other and to our trying as far as possible to keep our ideas on how to proceed closely in line. There is the further point that we can expect an approach from Mr. Malik to Lord Caradon following up my agreement to Mr. Gromyko's suggestion that the Russians and we should keep in touch on the Middle East. To avoid any possibility of these talks being exploited by the Russians adversely to our common interest, it seems highly desirable that we should make sure that we are working broadly on the same lines with you before matters of substance come up in any Anglo-Soviet meetings in New York. Another reason for our getting together soon is that Mr. Jarring indicated to Lord Caradon in a recent talk that he is now thinking in terms of consultation with the permanent members of the Security Council. In these circumstances, it seems to me that it would be timely for us to exchange views on the Arab/Israel situation at an early opportunity. Our presence together in Reykjavik on 23 June for the NATO meeting might, if you would agree, provide a suitable opportunity for us to do this. If you agree that this would be helpful, I think it would be desirable if senior officials on both sides could go over the ground first, so that the main problems likely to arise during the next phase can be identified and possible ways of handling them can be reviewed as a basis for our own discussion. I should propose to ask Sir Denis Allen to go to Washington to discuss these problems with your people in the State Department and with representatives of our two U.N. Delegations during the latter part of the week beginning 17 June. I should be grateful if you would let me know what you think about this. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Confidential. Transmitted to the Department by British Ambassador Patrick Dean. 2 On May 21 the UN Security Council considered a letter from the Jordanian Permanent Representative protesting actions by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem in contravention of UN resolutions. Pakistan and Senegal introduced a resolution deploring Israel's failure to abide by the resolutions relating to Jerusalem, and declaring that all legislative and administrative measures taken by Israel to change the legal status of Jerusalem were invalid. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 13-0, with the United States and Canada abstaining. (UN doc. S/PV. 1426) 3 A note attached to this message by Executive Secretary Benjamin Read indicates that Secretary Rusk told Ambassador Dean that he agreed to the proposal for U.S.-British talks on the Middle East. 191. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 191. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, June 14, 1968. SUBJECT Where We Are in the Middle East Basically we are standing down for the moment to give Israel-Jordan negotiations a chance. This was Arthur Goldberg's recommendation, and it is our instinct here. However, we are not putting all our eggs in that basket. We are quite aware that the Israelis may be painting a rosier picture than their own negotiating position warrants. Negotiations may come to naught, or at least come hard up against a substantive impasse which Hussein may ask us to break. Nick Katzenbach is slowly readying the basis for our moving in if we're needed. I'm bootlegging this to you for background, so we'll need to wait for State's formal recommendation. But the approach includes these elements: —Secretary Rusk's dual emissaries. Goldberg is top candidate for Jerusalem. Extensive staff work is now putting together a collection of what Israeli officials have told us about terms of a settlement, and what we now consider satisfactory terms. These would provide the basis for proposing our own terms as a means for provoking a definitive Israeli response if necessary. —Taking the line with the Israelis that we will not veto any Security Council effort to impose a settlement provided the terms seem fair and if Israel's main objection is absence of direct negotiations. We haven't refined this yet, but the purpose would be to put the Israelis on notice to make the most possible of whatever negotiating process is available. We will be meeting Monday to preview the position we'll take with Sir Denis Allen Thursday (preparation for Rusk-Stewart talk). It's possible this might come up at next Tuesday's lunch. On Phantoms, we have pushed staff studies to the next level, and Luke has called a meeting next Wednesday. Meanwhile, Paul Warnke will have to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee next week, and we are working on his line. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis. 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, June 15, 1968, 1755Z. 184194. Subject: June 15 Lebanese/Israeli Border Incident. Ref: Beirut 10174 and 10177, 10178. 2 1. We are disturbed by what appears on basis Beirut reports, to be unduly aggressive and somewhat “trigger happy” response of Israelis to alleged terrorist incidents near Lebanese-Israel border. We particularly concerned in context Ambassador Rabin's statement to Under Secretary Rostow and Assistant Secretaries Battle and Sisco on June 4 (State's 177707) 3 that as result direct contacts with Lebanese, “Israel knows GOL doing its best control terrorism.” Embassy should urgently approach GOL requesting full explanation of background of incident and stating our concern. In so doing, you may draw as appropriate on contents State's 182501 4 as well as on reftels. You should emphasize that while we fully appreciate Israel's problem with terrorism we feel their approach to terrorism on the Lebanese border will only make more difficult GOL's efforts to enforce controls and could lead to serious internal problems in Lebanon which in neither our or Israeli interest. We most strongly urge GOI that before taking military action it should avail itself of Lebanese continued offer to meet either in ILMAC or otherwise under UN auspices (Beirut's 9528). 5 2. You should also inform GOI that we are approaching Lebanese and once again underlining the importance of their continuing make utmost effort to interdict fedayeen within their territory. 3. For Beirut. You may inform GOL of our approach to Israelis but stress once again difficulties we face in restraining GOI as long as terrorist incidents occur. You may also reaffirm your statement to Michel Khoury (Beirut 10177) that USG following situation closely. Re Embtel 10178 we appreciate point you make regarding value of US public statement for Lebanese internal situation as well as our own position in Lebanon. Do not believe USG should commit itself publicly on incident however in absence of better information as to what might have provoked Israeli action. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-LEB. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Houghton; cleared by Day, Popper, and James H. Bahti; and approved by Handley. Also sent to Beirut, and repeated to London, Amman, Jerusalem, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Ambassador Porter reported, in telegram 10174 from Beirut, June 15, that Prime Minister Yafi was concerned about the Israeli shelling of a Lebanese border village near Houle on the morning of June 15. The Israelis claimed to be returning fire from the village but Yafi stated that his government had no knowledge of terrorist activity in the area. Yafi asked that the United States exert pressure on Israel to refrain from inflaming the border situation. Telegram 10177 from Beirut, June 15, reported that President Helou was convinced that the border incident was part of an Israeli effort to set the stage for further action against Lebanon. In telegram 10178 from Beirut, June 15, Porter recommended issuing a strong U.S. statement expressing concern about the apparently unprovoked Israeli attack on a Lebanese village. (All ibid.) 3 Dated June 6. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 4 Telegram 182501 to Tel Aviv, June 13, instructed the Embassy to emphasize U.S. belief that Lebanon was trying to interdict terrorist activity from Lebanese territory. The United States strongly urged Israeli restraint in response to isolated terrorist incidents along the border. (Ibid.) 5 Telegram 9528 from Beirut, May 24, reported on the efforts of the Lebanese Army to prevent infiltrators from crossing the border with Israel. (Ibid.) 193. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 193. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, June 16, 1968, 1421Z. CAP 81328. Herewith full text of Bergus' rationale for U.S. invitation to Riad to come to Washington. 2 1. Parker visit has given us opportunity re-canvass GUAR views re Jarring Mission, peaceful settlement, et al from Presidency, FonOff, Heykal and others. What we hear from Egyptians, what we hear from Jarring, and what we hear from Israelis adds up to a pretty depressing picture of stalemate. 2. Egyptians, feeling they have one-upped Israelis by May 9 exchange with Jarring, are now making fairly energetic efforts gain increased public support in world capitals, but even they realize that this is a long-term process of limited value. Whether or not they believe that time is on their side, they are certainly acting as if they thought so. 3. Israelis evidently remain convinced that Arabs will in time be forced by their own interests make peace on Israel's terms and in manner prescribed by Israel. 4. Russians have more than recovered from illusory “defeat” inflicted upon them by June war. Their politico-military position in Egypt is excellent, better than anything they ever enjoyed before, better than politico-military position of US vis-a-vis Israel or any Arab state. Russians can call the tune as to what military assistance will be furnished and manner in which it will be used. Russians probably have effective veto over any possible major UAR offensive action. Russians now have military and intelligence facilities in UAR greater than they ever dreamed of two years ago. 5. Wish re-emphasize point that Russians are now out of the arms race so far as need to compete with Western suppliers is concerned. Their position here so solid that they would no longer feel constrained respond in kind to increase in number or sophistication of Israel weapons by more deliveries to Israel of American hardware. In such eventuality our guess is that Russians would have little difficulty persuading UAR that Egyptian interests required even more Soviet presence and direct Soviet capability on Egyptian soil, in Egyptian airspace and in Egyptian waters, rather than more Russian weapons. 6. We believe that this trend of growing Russian influence is not irreversible. If we believed to the contrary, it would be our duty recommend direct confrontation with Soviets in Middle East before things get irreparably worse and contagion spreads. But we remain convinced that once UAR's rational and irrational fears of Israel began to be allayed, Egyptian nationalism would reassert itself to point of limiting Soviet military presence and influence here. 7. If this line of reasoning has any validity, it follows that an early and equitable settlement of Arab-Israel problem is a supreme national interest of the United States. It means US must play more vigorous role in promoting such a settlement for two reasons: A) Despite logic of our position that parties to dispute must play leading role in settlement, fact is that after one year it has become evident that they incapable of doing so. US is thus far unable to provide necessary catalyst. As Secretary Dulles put it on August 26, 1955: “Both sides suffer greatly from the present situation, and both are anxious for what they would regard as a just and equitable solution. But neither has been able to find that way. This may be a situation where mutual friends could serve the common good. This is particularly true since the area may not, of itself, possess all of the ingredients needed for the full and early building of security and well-being.” (underlining ours) 3 B) A settlement clearly promoted by the United States would be a historic diplomatic triumph with lasting benefits to US throughout the area and in many other underdeveloped regions. We would have produced something which the parties themselves, the Soviets, the British, the Western Europeans, the non-aligned states, the United Nations were incapable of providing. 8. We firmly believe that the US has the substantive ideas and the diplomatic gifts to promote such a settlement. As to substantive ideas, there are file cabinets of documents dating back from the “Operation Alpha” days of 1954-1955 to the summer of 1967 as to what could be done. We are either unduly modest or self-deceptive if we say USG doesn't have the capability of devising a just and equitable settlement. 9. As to tactical capabilities, we will confine our remarks to Egypt. Egyptians continue in touching, if exaggerated, belief that only US can produce settlement remotely acceptable to them. Our diffidence to make the effort is read by them as sinister intent. Their attitudes toward USG are now comprised of suspicion, distress and, paradoxically, considerable loneliness; we believe a tactical gesture from US would go far toward promoting some basic rethinking throughout GUAR and instill new readiness examine substantive problems involved in settlement (boundaries, refugees, Gaza, Suez, and Aqaba) ab initio. 10. We believe one useful tactical measure would be to invite UAR FonMin Riad to Washington for talks on nature and substance of equitable settlement. This has a great deal to commend it. For one thing we think Egyptians would leap at the opportunity. Privately they would be highly gratified. Publicly they could sell a Riad trip to Washington to their own public opinion and that of the other Arab states as a continuation of UAR efforts “explain” Arab position in foreign capitals. 11. From here, it would seem that U.S. domestic reaction would be positive to such a gesture. It could be stated that despite the absence of diplomatic relations, USG wishes leave no stone unturned in its support of UN and Jarring efforts achieve peaceful and equitable settlement. U.S. as permanent member of Security Council wishes consult with FonMin of one of principal parties to Arab-Israel dispute. Moreover, it could be intimated that USG intends consult in due course with Eban and Rifai as well, although for a variety of reasons, I would hope that Riad visit could come first. 12. Would appreciate Department's comments on this proposal. Bergus 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos, 6/68-1/69. Secret; Sensitive. 2 The telegram quoted is telegram 2679 from Cairo, June 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3 There is no underlined text in the quoted telegram. 194. Memorandum of Conversation 194. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 17, 1968. PARTICIPANTS Mr. Menachem Begin, Israeli Minister without Portfolio Ambassador Rabin Minister Ephraim Evron W. W. Rostow Harold H. Saunders Mr. Begin opened by affirming that there is widespread appreciation in Israel for President Johnson's support over the past year. Then he raised two specific requests: (1) that the US deliver the Phantom aircraft requested as soon as possible; (2) that the US speed up delivery of the Skyhawks. He felt the President's withdrawal from the election campaign gave him a unique opportunity to prove that US support for Israel had nothing to do with American elections and that even a President who is free from election pressures will aid Israel. He said both these requests were of the utmost importance to all members of the Israeli Cabinet. Israel could not accept the idea that Nasser's threatening statements were for domestic consumption alone. Moreover, Israel had to minimize its casualties in any war because “Israel has little blood to spill.” Finally, Mr. Begin said Ambassador Rabin had reported to the Cabinet that the USG sees a difference between a peace settlement and peace treaties. Mr. Begin said he would like to understand this difference. Mr. Rostow promised to convey the Minister's concerns to the President. He made clear that the President was as close to Israeli security needs as he was to any major international problem. The President had not yet made a decision on Phantoms, though he had put himself in a position to deliver aircraft to Israel quickly if he decided that were necessary. There were many factors involved, and the President alone would make this decision. Although it was impossible for Mr. Rostow to say when or how that decision might be made, he knew that, in the President's view, peace was the overriding objective. The President had told Foreign Minister Eban that he does not believe that last June's war was an unqualified Israeli success in the long run. He believes that Israel's survival depends on its acceptance as a nation in the Middle East. He does not believe peace can be achieved if one party simply arms to the teeth and expects his adversary to give in and come around asking for peace. Turning to Mr. Begin's question about peace treaties, Mr. Rostow said that we had never committed ourselves to one instrument over another. We felt there were numerous ways to record international commitments. The important thing was to engage in a process of peacemaking so that agreement could somehow be achieved among conflicting interests. He reaffirmed that we understand Israel's basic objective of achieving stable boundaries and acceptance by its neighbors, and we will continue to pursue those objectives. But we feel that the Israelis had an obligation to reach out to their neighbors and help them rise from humiliation to some sort of peace settlement. Mr. Begin made some general comments which showed little inclination to accept Mr. Rostow's general approach to peacemaking, but he picked up two of Mr. Rostow's points: He denied that Israel's right to live should be a central element in a peace settlement. He said a nation's right to live derives simply from its existence. There should be no question or discussion about it. Mr. Rostow had mentioned Jerusalem as one of the most difficult elements in a political settlement. Mr. Begin said he could not understand why Mr. Rostow had mentioned Jerusalem. Jerusalem was the capital of Israel, and Israel had guaranteed full access to worshippers of all faiths. He did not believe that Israel should deal with Hussein as a potential protector of Moslem interests in the city. In short, he did not see any alternative to full Israeli control. He wondered what solution Mr. Rostow had in mind. Mr. Rostow said quite informally that he envisioned a Jordanian role in keeping the Moslem holy places and a Jordanian role in the police, education and judicial systems of East Jerusalem. He saw the economies of Jordan and Israel meeting in Jerusalem, and an easily convertible relationship between the two currencies. While he held no special brief for these suggestions, he felt that without some sort of political recognition of Arab interests in Jerusalem, there was not much hope for a peace settlement. Mr. Rostow ended the conversation by saying that he was more pessimistic over the prospects for peace in the Middle East (as a result of his conversation) than he had been for some time. In closing he said that he would like some time to hear Mr. Begin speak about what he felt the Israelis' obligations were for reaching some sort of peace agreement. Comment: The discussion was amicable, but the gulf between the principals' viewpoints was obvious. H.S. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret;Nodis. 195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel and Jordan 195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel and Jordan 1 Washington, June 19, 1968, 2304Z. 186696. Subj: Attacks on Israeli Settlements. 1. Israeli Ambassador Rabin June 19 acting under instructions expressed to Assistant Secretary Battle grave GOI concern over new tactics being used in Jordan in connection cease-fire violations. 2. In past, exchanges fire began with small arms, then escalated. However, in last ten days there were two or three cases where Israeli settlements in Beisan area, e.g., Gesher, shelled by mortars or artillery. 3. GOI wants USG to know that if these tactics continue IDF will be forced to respond with artillery fire directed against Jordanian settlements and populated areas. Rabin asked USG convey GOI concern to GOJ and recommend GOJ exercise greater control activities this area. A similar message was being given to HMG in London. 4. In response questions, Rabin said perpetrators not small groups, since 60mm mortars and large amounts ammunition used. Declared JAA units might be involved. Noted that relatively small sector involved, i.e., Israeli territory opposite ADL. 5. Assistant Secretary said he strongly hoped GOI would not take threatened drastic action until USG had time discuss with GOJ. 6. For Tel Aviv. Embassy should assure GOI we conveying their and our concern to GOJ, and express hope IDF will not act precipitately. 7. For Amman. Embassy should (a) convey Israeli concern and seek GOJ comment, (b) advise GOJ we believe GOI serious in its threat respond in kind and (c) urge GOJ concentrate on greater control described sector. At your discretion you may wish point out once again usefulness of neutral observers in border area. 2 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Bahti, cleared by Houghton and Atherton, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Jerusalem, London, Beirut, and USUN. 2 Ambassador Symmes made a coordinated approach with the British Ambassador to King Hussein on June 22. Hussein professed ignorance about the mortar attacks the Israelis complained of, and he detailed his government's efforts to prevent terrorist attacks on Israeli-held territory. (Telegram 5456 from Amman, June 22; ibid.) 196. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk 196. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 20, 1968. SUBJECT Israel and the MD-620 Missile Discussion In the general consideration of Israel's request for F-4s, I recall that the Israelis have never really been forthright with us in discussing their own planning on the introduction of the MD-620 surface-to-surface missiles that are being built under contract in France. Despite several probes last fall (e.g. our questioning of Brig. Gen. Ezer Weizman, Chief of Operations, Israeli Defense Forces, and a subsequent approach to Prime Minister Eshkol), all we have been told is that an Israeli decision on moving from development to production of the MD-620s was not imminent and that Israel had not determined the role SSMs might play in its overall military posture. A senior Israeli Foreign Ministry official told our Charge that Prime Minister Eshkol believed we were carrying our inquiries in this field too far. We were advised to ask again in “18-24 months” (Weizman) or “two to three years” (Eshkol). The US intelligence community, however, indicates that an initial operational capability of the MD-620 system, political considerations aside, is technically possible as early as 1969. Up to now we have used our Ambassador in Tel Aviv as our main information channel out of respect for the wishes of Prime Minister Eshkol who, for his own reasons, did not want to involve the Israeli Embassy here in nuclear or missile questions. Ambassador Rabin, however, has a very special relationship with Eshkol, and as former IDF Chief of Staff, is familiar with the problem. I recently raised this question with Minister Evron who pleaded ignorance. It seems to me that an approach now by you to Rabin would emphasize the great weight we attach to the missile issue today in view of our pending decision on the F-4s. A personal approach by you might also reassure the Israelis about the security of information we are asking them to provide. They are particularly touchy on this score in view of recent leaks about the MD-620 program. In view of the implications for the US of this decision and the highly secret nature of the Franco-Israeli missile contract, it seems to me that we deserve more forthright answers than we have so far had from the Israelis. Should we decide to grant the Israeli request for F-4s and actually deliver them, only to find out afterwards that missile production and deployment were proceeding in a predetermined fashion, the effect upon the Middle East arms balance would be grave. [ 1 paragraph (12 lines of source text) not declassified ] Recommendation That you agree to talk to Ambassador Rabin in quite specific terms (we will furnish suggested talking points) about his government's intentions and projected capabilities in acquiring short and medium range surface-to-surface missiles. 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by George B. Lambrakis and Senior Research Officer Susan T. Tait in the Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia in INR; cleared by Atherton, and in draft by Austin. 2 There is no indication of Rusk's response to the recommendation. 197. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 197. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 21, 1968, 7 p.m. SUBJECT Present Thinking on the Middle East British Foreign Secretary Stewart has asked to discuss the Middle East with Secretary Rusk at the NATO meeting because he believes we're approaching another crunch point. To pave the way, he sent several officials from London and New York for talks with Nick Katzenbach this morning. 2 They believe pressures are mounting to throw the whole issue back into the UN Security Council. A big border incident could put it there any time. In addition, the Russians seem to be angling to get it back there, probably to isolate us. We would probably lose control if the issue goes into the Security Council now. There would be overwhelming support to amend the November 22 resolution and to spell out the terms of an imposed settlement. If Israel refused to accept, the next step would be sanctions. We'd face the demand to cast our first veto, thereby isolating ourselves from the Arabs. Our main difference with the British is that we think we may have a little more time. They see July as a watershed, after which we start going downhill if we let events and Jarring go on at their present pace. We're not sure the crunch will come quite that soon, but we're not complacent. Our other difference is that it's not as easy as they think to figure out how to become more active in helping achieve progress toward a settlement. We would have to persuade the Israelis to talk with us about the substance of a peace settlement. So far, they have held out for direct negotiations and refused to talk substance with anyone but the Arabs. Our purpose would be to get for the Arabs a solid Israeli commitment to terms that the Arabs would consider at least reasonable enough to talk about. The problem is how to appear to the Israelis to be making an honest effort to help and not to be selling them out. Secretary Rusk will only be exploring with Stewart the pros and cons and possible tactics. Obviously, he would wish full discussion with you if and when he has a precise recommendation to make. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis. 2 Notes on these talks are ibid. The talks were summarized in a June 21 memorandum from Battle and Sisco to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) An agreed minute drafted at the conclusion of the talks on June 21 was transmitted to London in telegram 188442, June 22. (Ibid.) 198. Memorandum of Conversation 198. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Reykjavik, June 23, 1968, 4:30 p.m. US/MC/4 PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State Assistant Secretary Leddy Mr. Getz, EUR/RPM United Kingdom The Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mr. Frank Brenchley, Under Secretary The Viscount Hood, Deputy Under Secretary Mr. D. J. D. Maitland, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State SUBJECT Part III—The Arab-Israeli Problem 2 Mr. Stewart noted that Jarring was not making significant progress in his mission and he feared that a serious border incident could throw the matter again into the Security Council. Sanctions might then be voted and this could wreck all chances of a settlement. The question now, said Stewart, is how to expedite Jarring's work. The British understand that the Arabs may have made some proposals. If we are to move to some sort of timetable, or a series of steps on the installment plan which would require something for each side at each step, there would have to be some assurance that the entire program would move on to its end. Secretary Rusk noted that Kosygin's position last fall had been that Israel should first withdraw and then discussions on further steps could begin. Both Israel and Washington were suspicious that Arab proposals might fall into Kosygin's pattern. Stewart said the Soviets had shown a little movement when he recently talked with Gromyko in Moscow. While Gromyko said that Israeli withdrawal was the main point, Stewart said that equally important were the end of belligerency and the right of passage through the straits and the Canal as well. Gromyko did commit himself to the idea that once a phased program had started, it must go through to its end. Stewart thought we must push on the two parties at issue; the Soviets would probably have to push the Arabs, while the US and UK should press Israel to come up with some program ideas. Otherwise we risk letting the situation get out of control. The Secretary said he shared this sense of danger and realized that time was not working in favor of a settlement. One serious incident could have disastrous consequences. The Secretary thought that there were several problems, including the fact that Jarring and the Secretary General were not bold enough in pressing for both substantive and procedural progress. Unfortunately, pushing on U Thant was like pushing on the end of a piece of spaghetti; nothing happens at the other end. U Thant has not made the parties realize how dangerous the situation is. Secondly, the internal situation in Israel is such that outside influence has little effect on the government, in which there is a contest for power. The US has tried often with no result. Eshkol is afraid to move with Dayan and others snapping at his heels. Mr. Stewart said Lord Caradon feels that July is the critical month. Secretary Rusk was skeptical about fixing a flash point, but said there is great inherent danger in the situation. Stewart said Caradon thinks that even without a major incident, the problem could come back to the Security Council in July. U Thant has led people to believe that there will be a report from Jarring in July. The Arabs are counting on this and they are trying to show that they have moved while the Israelis have not. Brenchley noted that the Arabs still have the Security Council seized with the Jerusalem question, and they could use this device to open up again in the Council. Stewart said that if it goes back to the Security Council, there will be pressure for the Council or the four permanent members to take charge away from Jarring. Brenchley thought the Soviets might aim at this development. Stewart noted that while Couve was still Foreign Minister he seemed to hold the same idea. Mr. Stewart then suggested that the US and UK hold further talks on how to pressure the Israelis to make substantive proposals to Jarring and also to try to analyze the elements of a settlement. Secretary Rusk doubted that the Israeli Cabinet could agree to any realistic proposals. On the other hand, if Jarring made the proposals, we could then push on the Israelis to accept them. Brenchley asked how we could get Jarring to move, and wondered if we should discuss this with him. Secretary Rusk noted that Jarring will be talking with the parties while he is on leave. For our part, the US has found Jarring extremely reserved and not disposed to reveal his hand. Brenchley stated the UK had a somewhat different line from Jarring. He had told them that he would welcome help from individual members of the Security Council, and that he needs assistance. Secretary Rusk thought that Jarring was inclined to accept suggestions, but then simply pass them along and blame the individual party (i.e., Israel) for rejection. Mr. Stewart asked if in about 2 weeks the US and UK could consult on what we would both say to Jarring and to Israel. He saw little chance of this matter working itself out, and said that the question is whether we work through Jarring or through Israel. Secretary Rusk hoped the British would give further thought to the problem, but reiterated his concern about the extreme nature of any proposals the Israelis might be able to agree on among themselves. Mr. Stewart thought that if this situation persisted, Jarring would have to be the path. Secretary Rusk said that Eshkol should be thinking over the longer range problem of how tiny Israel could live in a sea of Arabs, but he seems unable to do this. On the other hand, said Secretary Rusk, the Egyptians said last summer that the question of passage through the Canal and the straits could be resolved. But they did not say that on June 1, 1967. The Arabs had also blocked a cease-fire attempt on the first day of the war, which, if successful, would have averted the fighting with Jordan and Syria. There was some discussion about the duration of Jarring's mission, and Mr. Brenchley said he understood that Jarring would remain at least until the end of August. It was agreed that the UK and US would talk again in a week or 10 days. Secretary Rusk said that even if they agreed on pushing Jarring, there would also have to be work done with the Arabs and Israelis. With regard to the Canal, Secretary Rusk said that we think the World Bank could play a role. Mr. McNamara is thinking about this, along the lines of the Bank taking the Canal in escrow for a period of rehabilitation. Mr. McNamara would probably visit Egypt in August, and so far as we know, Nasser has not rejected the idea. Secretary Rusk and Mr. Stewart agreed that the continuing raids and artillery attacks on Israel risked a major Israeli reaction. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 300. Secret. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs John I. Getz, and approved in S on June 24. The meeting was held at the Embassy in Reykjavik, where Secretary Rusk headed the U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting June 24-25. 2 Separate memoranda on Rusk's conversation with Stewart dealing with Berlin, NPT, Vietnam and Laos, Gibraltar, Southern Rhodesia, the U.S. defense budget, and future problems are ibid. 199. Notes of Meeting 199. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, June 25, 1968, 1:20-2:35 p.m. NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH TUESDAY LUNCHEON GROUP THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE The President Under Secretary Katzenbach Secretary Clifford Ambassador Ball CIA Director Helms General Wheeler General Taylor Walt Rostow George Christian Tom Johnson [Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.] MIDDLE EAST The President: George Ball is our Middle East man. Ambassador Ball: We're getting in a trap in the Middle East. Jarring will come back with nothing. The Russians and the UAR will come back into the Security Council asking for sanction. If we veto, we're dead in the Middle East. I cannot today give you a proposal. An American position must be made. It will take intense diplomacy. Under Secretary Katzenbach: The British want us to take joint initiative. The President: Aren't they in a deep internal crisis? Under Secretary Katzenbach: Yes. To push them may create a crisis in their Cabinet. Under Secretary Katzenbach: You may want to send Arthur (Ambassador Goldberg) to Tel Aviv. The President: Would he go? Ambassador Ball: He would go. The President: I am against the trip. Can't you give Jarring some imaginative innovations? What about Battle or Sisco? Ambassador Ball: Battle was Ambassador to the UAR. Under Secretary Katzenbach: Sisco would be good. Ambassador Ball: Jarring is a poor guy to work with. He won't push anybody. The President: What about Vance? Under Secretary Katzenbach: He would be fine. Also McGeorge Bundy would be good. 2 [Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, June 25, 1968-1:20 p.m.-Tuesday luncheon. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. 2 In his notes on this meeting, Walt Rostow summed up the discussion on the Middle East as “some indecisive talk.” He added: “Will talk about it when Sec. Rusk gets back.” (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968) 200. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 200. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 27, 1968, 7:45 p.m. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret. 4 pages (including 3-page attachment) of source text not declassified.] 201. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 201. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 28, 1968, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Credit for Israeli Hawk Missile Purchase As the military credit sales revolving fund got set to close out on June 30, Defense found that it had a little money left. One place to use it would be to give Israel credit ($25 million, six years at 6%) for its already approved purchase of four Hawk missile batteries. Since this would involve Ex-Im money guaranteed by Defense ($6.5 million), a determination would be required, saying mainly that you believe the sale is in the national interest and that you have taken into account its effect on the local arms race. Both of these are true; this is a purely defensive weapon and we have a clear interest in Israel's ability to defend itself. The real question is whether we just toss off a $25 million credit for Israel with a flick of the pen without getting something for it. In view of the fact that we have to obligate this money by Sunday or lose it, I believe we should go ahead but make the most out of it by: (a) using it in the Congress to support our argument for the new credit sales bill (this was Nick Katzenbach's main reason for choosing to use this money on Israel); 2 (b) letting our Jewish friends here know about it; and (c) asking both Luke Battle and Wally Barbour to call special attention to it among the Israelis as evidence of our continuing desire to help meet Israel's defense needs. It would be hard to ask for anything more specific from the Israelis because they were prepared to pay cash, and they know why we're suddenly making this offer. Nevertheless they have a number of dollar repayments from previous purchases bunching up right now, and they will welcome the relief. If we eventually sell Phantoms and have to sell for cash, this would help them indirectly with that purchase. But this is more a matter of earning ourselves a little credit than of giving in on a vital issue. I think this is basically a good gesture. It permits us to cite the additional Skyhawks we sold after the Eshkol visit and now this as evidence that—even though we haven't sold the F-4's—we're right in there helping. It's a little easier to hold the line on Phantoms when we can show steady support in other fields. Attached determination for your signature if you approve. 3 We would need this before June 30 if we wish to go ahead. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. 2 Katzenbach's June 25 memorandum to the President recommending the military credit sale is ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 85, 6/29-30/68. 3 Not printed. President Johnson signed the Presidential Determination authorizing the credit sale on June 29. (Ibid.) 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, June 28, 1968, 2338Z. 193637. For Ambassador from Under Secretary. 1. As report of US-UK talks indicate (State 188982) 2 we will in days immediately ahead be looking at possibility of more active US role in support of Jarring Mission with view trying to move matters, even slightly, towards a settlement of Arab-Israeli dispute. It may be necessary to make direct efforts to break present Jarring Mission impasse if drift in area is to be stayed, opportunities for increased Soviet penetration minimized, and detrimental and retrogressive new Security Council round avoided. We assume Jarring not likely to make significant progress in his current trip. He is due to return to New York about July 15 and we will want to move promptly to help him before we are thrown into SC on basis UAR idea of timetable. 2. We envisage effort of this sort would involve carrying our substantive dialogue with GOI further than we have to date to ascertain more clearly Israeli ideas on a settlement to see whether we can convince them to make some substantive or procedural suggestions which would help break present impasse and to see whether through intensive consultations we can reach agreement on public or private approaches which we or they can take in the interest of peace-ways of achieving UAR agreement on Rhodes pattern; transmission of ideas of substance through Jarring or through us; etc. 3. Many factors would determine effectiveness of such effort and hence would be critical in deciding nature of any move on our part—e.g. situation in UN, Arab (especially UAR) and Soviet positions, and status of Jarring efforts. Central to any decision on approach to GOI and on manner of such approach, however, would be our assessment of Israeli domestic political situation and impact thereon of US initiative with GOI. 4. We recognize difficulties of making this assessment, particularly when so many relevant factors are unclear. We, nevertheless, need your best analysis of political forces now at work in Israel, especially as they would relate and react to such a US initiative with Israel in first instance to facilitate settlement with Arabs. Such initiative at outset would probably need to focus on problem of getting substantive negotiating process started and would most likely aim at getting GOI to present some substantive ideas on a settlement without first having obtained a categoric Arab commitment to face-to-face negotiations and eventual peace treaty. In taking such initiative with GOI we would take pains to reassure Israelis that any explorations with them are within framework of June 19, 1967 policy statement and November SC resolution and we would try to make clear depth and seriousness of US concern with present situation for reason stated para. 1 above. Despite such assurances and explanation, we assume that serious and forceful USG effort in this direction would increase tensions within GOI, perhaps to point of forcing Cabinet crisis. Among questions which occur to us are following: (a) What would such USG initiative with Israel do to present alignment of forces within GOI? (b) What should timing be—is present Eshkol-Dayan dispute likely to make GOI more or less receptive to USG initiative? (c) Would US initiative help resolve Cabinet divisions in favor of more flexible approach or in favor of greater rigidity? (d) How bound is Prime Minister by November 8, 1967 Cabinet position on direct negotiations and by subsequent Knesset pronouncements on this subject? (e) Would favorable decision on Israeli request for F-4 Phantoms have any effect one way or other on GOI position vis-a-vis negotiations and terms of settlement with Arabs? Conversely would further delay in decision have significant effect? 5. Other questions may occur to you and we do not want to predetermine or limit framework of your analysis and recommendations. Given timing considerations set out para. 1 above, we would appreciate prompt reply, in any event no later than July 1. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco and Atherton ; cleared by Battle, Day, Davies, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to USUN. 2 Telegram 188982 to London, June 22, summarized the talks in Washington on June 21 on the Middle East. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 203. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 203. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 28, 1968. SUBJECT Comments on Goldberg Paper Here are some specific comments on the Goldberg paper 2 which may be of use to you in your conversation with the President: 1. The principal recommendation is that we make a major effort with the Israelis to break the present impasse. We agree fully with this approach. 2. He suggests that we formulate terms for an overall settlement involving concessions from both sides and play an active role with both the Arabs and the Israelis to bring about the necessary compromises. Our present approach is more modest than this: while a US representative could seek to press the Israelis to give us their basic notions about a settlement, I doubt we ought go to them with our own blueprint at this stage. A more realistic goal is to press the Israelis to make some limited specific substantive suggestions which will give Jarring something more to work with. We should not preclude developing our own blueprint at a later stage if the Jarring Mission should fail. 3. He stresses the difficulties involved in a settlement imposed upon the parties for [ by ] a Security Council resolution. We basically agree with this analysis and consistent with the President's June 19th statement, we feel the parties in the area must be the parties to the peace. However, and Goldberg agrees, there should be greater Israeli flexibility as to modalities and the form in which the agreement should take. For example, a joint or parallel declaration would be every bit as binding as a peace treaty if it results from an agreement between the parties. 4. Goldberg stresses we should hold the Israelis to their past agreement to proceed on the basis of the Rhodes formula. We share fully this view. 5. Goldberg believes we should get a commitment from the Israelis that they do not intend a wholesale redrawing of the territorial map of the Middle East. I agree, and George Ball, if he goes to the area, should lay great stress on this point with the Israelis. In short, Goldberg's paper is an excellent one stressing the need for the United States to press the Israelis to adopt flexibility of means and moderation in territorial changes. 6. He recommends prompt delivery of the Phantoms. As you know, we have this under active consideration at the present time. Luke, Gene, and I all feel a prompt favorable decision in principle on the Phantoms is desirable. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to Katzenbach and Battle. Rusk initialed the memorandum to indicate that he had read it. 2 Reference is to a memorandum sent to the President and Secretary Rusk by Ambassador Goldberg on June 24 as he was preparing to leave his post at the United Nations. The memorandum put forward Goldberg's proposal for breaking the impasse in the Middle East. (Ibid.) 204. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 204. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 29, 1968, 1:10 p.m. Mr. President: Herewith a most sensitive document 2 indicating: —A 17 July meeting in London between Herzog and the Jordanian Foreign Minister; —Agreement in principle to a Hussein-Eshkol meeting in the Eilat-Aqaba area later, if Hussein concludes such a meeting could be conducted securely. Also attached is a conversation of Ball's with Bunche, 3 which indicates that: —Jarring received a much more forthcoming proposal from Cairo than he had expected; —The Soviets may be pushing the Jarring mission rather than trying to force a Security Council confrontation; —George Ball's conclusion is that we must now get a more forthcoming position from Israel with respect to direct negotiations, plus “an indication as to where Israel considers secure boundaries should be drawn.” A good deal hinges on Nasser's discussions in Moscow next week. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 9/68-1/69. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:20 p.m. 2 Reference is to a June 29 memorandum from Richard Helms to President Johnson updating information on the contacts in London between Israeli and Jordanian officials. (Ibid.) Another copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Files, Chrono 1 Jan-31 Jul 1968. 3 Telegram 5797 from USUN, June 28, reporting a June 28 conversation between Ball and Ralph Bunche, was attached. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. 205. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 205. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, July 2, 1968, 0921Z. 4354. 1. Following is reply (original being transmitted by pouch) of FonMin Eban to Secretary's message of April 29 re nuclear non-proliferation treaty: 2 A. “Jerusalem, 30 June, 1968. B. “Dear Mr. Secretary, C. “My colleagues and I have given earnest thought to your message to me of 29 April, regarding the proposed treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. I am sorry that my journeys to Europe have delayed my reply. D. “We fully grasp the implications of the proposed treaty for mankind as a whole, and, by speech and vote, have supported the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons during all the international discussions of the subject, including the recent debate and vote at the resumed session of the General Assembly. At the same time, your message has rightly and frankly placed the question of Israel adherence to the treaty in the context of our national security, which must obviously be Israel's first concern. E. “We are grateful for your government's awareness of Israel's special and unique security situation and for the assurances which you reaffirm. Unfortunately peace is not yet in sight. Our neighbors remain obdurate in their hostility and in their desire to destroy us. In this attitude they are encouraged by the automatic political support they receive from a number of states, chief among them the U.S.S.R.—one of the proposers of the non-proliferation treaty—which at the same time is supplying them, at nominal cost, with massive quantities of the most modern military equipment. As long as this situation remains unchanged, we cannot (with all our understanding of the international aspects of the problem) regard ourselves as in the same category as other states that are recognized by their neighbors, and have their peace and integrity assured by the major powers. F. “Moreover, we learnt last year with special incisiveness that Israel cannot realistically count on external military aid if she is attacked. It is in this situation that we are being asked to make commitments for at least twenty-five years. It is not surprising that we should devote profound thought to such an undertaking for the uncertain future, and that we are unable to divorce it entirely from the contemporary realities to which you refer. G. “The draft treaty cannot in itself give us a sense of assurance that nuclear weapons will never become available to our neighbours—particularly as not all the nuclear powers are associated with the treaty. While the three-power Security Council declaration is of political importance, it is a declaration of intention, and not a binding commitment. Its practical effect in a specific situation would depend on the three powers concerned taking a common position and joint action. One of the three powers is openly hostile to Israel, and has in the past threatened us with missile attack. The declaration does not appear to go beyond the provisions of the Charter concerning any act or threat of aggression; nor is the veto power affected. H. “These are some of the considerations which dictate our special sensitivity on the long-term issues involved in the discussion on the treaty. Moreover, although Israel is a non-nuclear power in the military sense, her technological capacity is a potent element in her regional and international position. You also know of our difficulty with the structure and bias of the I.A.E.A. and of the strong position of the U.A.R. and the Communist states in its direction. I. “In mentioning these considerations, I can assure you that my government is anxious to follow a course which takes into account the points you have raised in your letter. We shall continue to follow the progress of the draft treaty with close and constructive attention, having regard to all the factors I have outlined above. J. “Yours sincerely, K. “Abba Eban. L. “The Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.” Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 18-6. Secret; Limdis. 2 See Document 155 . 206. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 206. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 2, 1968, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Progress Report from George Woods George has completed his review of previous work on the proposed Israeli desalting plant. His brief letter to you enclosing a more detailed memorandum is attached. 2 He suggests two lines of action over the next three months: 1. He would like to lay on a couple of further studies because prices this spring in the nuclear desalting field have jumped sharply. At the same time, the price of fuel oil has gone down, making oil-fueled desalting more competitive. Our large planned plant in California is up in the air until we can reconcile problems created by these increased costs. Woods believes we should have the benefit of that analysis before we go any further. 2. He would like to go to Israel later in the summer. The Israelis have taken important new steps to meet their electric power needs with a large oil fuel plant. Woods feels this may change some of the ground rules for the desalting plant, and he would like to hear latest Israeli thinking first hand. This would not involve negotiations at this stage. 3 If this is satisfactory to you, he will press ahead with his proposed studies over the next 90 days and, in late August or early September, would go to Israel. I think this is a good idea. I might say that I have talked to George several times about this project and am happy to say he is fascinated with it and has a positive attitude toward desalting. He is realistic about the unresolved problems but thinks we ought to keep pushing ahead. I am also attaching a letter just in from Prime Minister Eshkol 4 expressing his appreciation for George's appointment. He would welcome George whenever George is ready. George had a chat last week with his old friend, Israeli Finance Minister Sapir, and asked him to let Eshkol know that he is hard at work. Walt Rostow Approve Woods' course of action 5 Call me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Confidential. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 3:15 p.m. 2 The letter is dated July 2; neither the letter nor the memorandum is printed. 3 Rostow added the last sentence by hand. 4 Dated June 14, not printed. 5 President Johnson checked this option. 207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, July 4, 1968, 0020Z. 196580. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: State 195670. 2 1. Under Secretary Rostow called in Dobrynin July 3 to convey certain US views on Jarring mission prior Nasser visit to Moscow (it had not proved possible for Ball to make approach to Malik in time). 2. Rostow told Dobrynin we wished to exchange views prior to Nasser's visit. He referred to Thompson talk with Gromyko June 5 (Moscow 4113) 3 saying we were struck by several aspects of it, but in particular by Gromyko's formulation of timetable idea which he described as Egyptian position. We were also of course glad to follow Gromyko's suggestion that we exchange views on ME, which could only be helpful. 3. Rostow then said that we saw three key issues in Jarring peacemaking process. First was question of agreement. He said that Riad's acceptance of resolution as a whole on May 9 had seemed to us important step forward. Question was, however, whether UAR in accepting resolution as package included paragraph 3, with its reference to agreement. We considered paragraph 3 required agreement of parties and issue of whether UAR accepted this concept was important. Timetable as described by Gromyko seemed to assume need for prior agreement of parties and confirmation of this could be critical. 4. Dobrynin said Gromyko description seemed to him quite clear on this point and he wondered what we wanted Soviets to do vis-a-vis Nasser. Rostow said Egyptian position was not at all clear to us; we sometimes had impression they wanted to have issue returned to SC for agreement on timetable which would then be imposed. It was pointed out to Dobrynin that we were not so much interested in confirmation of details of timetable as outlined by Gromyko but rather in confirmation that UAR accepts need for agreement among parties as stated in paragraph 3 of resolution. Rostow said that confirmation of this sort could help remove our doubts regarding Egyptian intentions. He also said we were not sure that Jarring understood Egyptian position as it had been stated by Gromyko. On this latter point Dobrynin said he believed Jarring was informed. 5. Dobrynin commented that US had been very cool to whole idea of timetable in past, and he wondered if our interest in Gromyko idea reflected change in this attitude. Rostow replied that there was no change in our position. Our impression from UAR had been that timetable was to be imposed by SC as substitute for agreement of parties. In this sense, timetable was not acceptable to us. We had never objected to a timetable of implementation flowing from agreement of parties. We are now questioning whether UAR had moved from this position to acceptance of principle of agreement. 6. Rostow then said that second important issue seemed to us to be how agreement was reached. President had said a year ago that no method should be excluded. Direct talks seemed to us to be normal way of seeking agreement, but we understood problem they pose for Arabs. At same time concept of direct talks is acute political symbol for Israel of Arab will for peace. It was our hope that clear confirmation by UAR that it accepted idea of agreement would make it easier to deal with question of modalities. Perhaps Rhodes formula would be way to proceed. Dobrynin observed there were many interpretations of Rhodes formula. Rostow said we meant by it that no form of discussion was excluded. We understood that at Rhodes there were formal meetings only at beginning and end. 7. Rostow continued, saying that third critical question was form agreement would take. He noted that while Israeli position insisted on peace treaty and UAR stood on Khartoum formula we had suggested Soviet-Japanese declaration 4 as example. We would be interested to know what Nasser and Sovs think of that. We had made clear to Israel, he said, that there was more than one way to frame agreement. 8. Dobrynin referred to Rostow statement that UAR at times seemed desirous of returning to SC, and said this was because Israel did not accept resolution. Rostow said this was not our view of Israeli position. Israelis had accepted Jarring March 10 formula. We were pressing Israel to be flexible, but this hard to do outside negotiating context. Problems of peace were acute political issues in Israel. They were not worth pressing in the abstract. Dobrynin said Sovs believed US supported Israel on direct talks, to which Rostow replied this was certainly not Israeli impression. Rostow said we wanted no means excluded. 9. Dobrynin said he would convey points to Moscow. He commented however that US had seemed very inactive for past months. Rostow said this not at all the case. We had worked hard to achieve March 10 and May 9 decisions, but were disappointed that thus far there had been no movement towards substance of settlement. 10. Dobrynin turned to question of NPT, asking why Israel had not signed when Syria and UAR had signed in Moscow. Rostow said we have impression Israeli position on NPT was related to progress on settlement. The matter was under discussion. He commented also that Israeli policy on security issue bound to be related to level of conventional armament in area. Dobrynin said he believed Israelis realized they could not achieve security through nuclear weapons. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Day, cleared by Acting Country Director for Soviet Union Affairs Adolph Dubs and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Malcolm Toon, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, London, Amman, and Cairo. 2 Telegram 195670 to USUN, July 3, instructed Ambassador Ball to explore with Soviet Permanent Representative Malik the details of a proposed solution to the Middle East problem outlined by Gromyko in Moscow on June 5, especially Gromyko's proposal for a timetable. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 4113 from Moscow, June 5, reported that Gromyko discussed with Thompson the problems experienced by the Jarring Mission. Gromyko endorsed the UAR proposal of May 9 for a timetable for the implementation of Resolution 242 and said that, as explained to him, the timetable would be agreed upon by the parties to the dispute and would be implemented gradually. (Ibid.) 4 Reference is to the joint declaration signed at Moscow on October 19, 1956, which marked an end to World War II hostilities between the Soviet Union and Japan. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956 , pp. 819-821. 208. Telegram From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas 208. Telegram From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, July 4, 1968, 1834Z. CAP 81447. Looking at the situation in Tel Aviv, Barbour concludes: 1) we should not be in a hurry to press the Israelis for their ideas on a settlement; 2) our prospects are not hopeless if the UN Security Council gets involved in another round of debate on the Arab-Israeli problem; 3) there is a good chance that Amb. Jarring's efforts can be kept alive on the present basis at least until fall when the Foreign Ministers meet; and 4) a US or US-UK initiative to stimulate proposals from Israel will not minimize increased Soviet penetration in the Middle East. Barbour suggests that if we feel something must be done, either alone or with the British, we should limit ourselves to a genuine exploration with the Israelis of the whole situation and solicit their ideas as to useful further steps. Barbour's reasoning is explained in his cable 2 which follows: 1. I have not commented on US-UK talks since in my view reports thereof have indicated a healthy skepticism on our part as to probability and desirability of our taking initiatives at this time with regard to the Jarring Mission. I am also skeptical whether we need be as apprehensive as the British about the consequences of a further SC round if it cannot be avoided, and, in addition, perhaps more importantly, whether if we decided on a joint US-UK effort to stimulate substantive proposals, we are in fact in a position to succeed in that endeavor. Furthermore, I wonder to what extent such a course will serve to minimize increased Soviet penetration in the area. 2. While obviously a further SC exercise could get intense and might be detrimental and retrogressive, it seems to me that although it could be better, the Israeli position, so far, is supportable on its merits. They have, at our urging, accepted the November resolution and have been endeavoring to get their defeated adversaries into some kind of substantive discussion which has been resisted by the latter on the ground that they wish an advance commitment that Israel will eventually withdraw to unrealistic (June 4) lines. There is also considerable supplementary public evidence at least that the Arab tactic only masks a real intention to do nothing politically toward a peaceful settlement. Eban tells me that Jarring in his latest conversation with Riad heard the latter give startlingly frank exposition why Nasser is too weak internally to do anything. In addition Jarring told Eban that he does not wish to submit the report at the end of July, promised on his behalf by the Secretary General, and if he does so he will not place blame for lack of progress on any party. 3. As to desirability, or more accurately feasibility, of our pressing Israelis for further indication substantive ideas on settlement, it seems to me unlikely in the extreme that any Israeli thoughts we might be able to evoke will not, as bargaining positions, fall far short of the goals set by the Arabs and therefore tend to harden Arab attitudes. Furthermore, while our total capabilities of exercising pressure and influence on the Israelis are theoretically limitless and overwhelming, I question whether as a practical matter we would or should exert such maximum measures as probably would be necessary to achieve a halfway step which might or might not move the parties toward an ultimate solution. 4. Soviet penetration into the Middle East is, of course, our major concern. However, I doubt that a unilateral or bilateral US-UK initiative could be expected to deter effectively Soviet current activities. I am inclined reluctantly to the theory that in the absence of a genuine US-Soviet detente affecting the area, which seems highly unlikely, there is not much room for maneuver on our part to influence a minimization of Soviet involvement. Rather this would seem likely to come about by the Soviets' own realization that they may be over-extending themselves, for example, in Egypt, or a longer range realization by the peoples experiencing Soviet tutelage that such tutelage has features they could better do without. 5. However, the foregoing is a prologue to the central question which you ask, that is, an assessment of the impact of such US initiative on the Israeli domestic political situation. 3 Most fundamental in Israeli thinking as I see it at the moment is the existence of a large body of the public which would be prepared to accept a compromise to the political solution involving major concessions to the Arabs. There is also a more vocal series of minority groups which would resist concessions to the end. But the whole spectrum of Israeli political public life is unanimously apprehensive of initial Israeli concessions in the absence of any indication that they would be matched by Arab willingness to conclude binding peace. This is based on the same security considerations which have been of paramount concern to all Israelis for twenty years and created a climate of fear and apprehension prior to June 5, 1967. Also fundamental is the fact that Israel is a democracy with a government headed at present by an individual who, although decisive enough on occasion, is not a world, or even Israeli, figure enjoying the charisma of Ben-Gurion, who in his long heyday could take personal decisions and subsequently maneuver the democratic process to a ratification thereof. Also the American relationship and support of Israel, not only that of the Jewish community in the US, but the broader understanding by the whole American body politic, is the one practical and sustaining psychological prop on which Israelis consciously or unconsciously lean. Despite any reassurances we could give them as to our motives therefore, US initiatives would at least arouse major apprehensions. 6. Therefore, assuming as I think you rightly do, that a serious and forceful US effort as outlined would increase tensions within the GOI, I offer the following specific comments on your specific questions: A. There would [be] no doubt a “Cabinet crisis” with the probable departure from the coalition government of the right wing Gahal members and less likely a revolt by the religious party. However, the Labor alignment, while shaky within itself, is now so close to a majority that Eshkol would probably weather the storm, more especially since there is no leadership alternative to him at the current time, including Dayan. B. As to present timing, Dayan has no public organizational base, despite his very widespread popular support. An American initiative might well provide the issue he may be looking for on which to challenge Eshkol, but whether this would or would not be the result, the dispute between the two would not necessarily affect the receptivity to US Government initiative. C. Given the widespread popular apprehensions I would only assume that any concessions made by Eshkol to resolve Cabinet divisions in the light of US initiatives would be in the direction of concessions by Labor towards greater rigidity rather than the contrary. D. Eshkol is currently bound firmly by the November 67 Cabinet position on direct negotiations and supplemental Knesset pronouncements. However, the government in this parliamentary system can theoretically reverse such decisions and by a narrow majority the Prime Minister might win if he sought an alteration in those directives. However, binding as these decisions are they do not specify direct negotiations in the first instance and in fact Eban has made clear in recent months that Rhodes procedure which the GOI advocates would include indirect talks at the outset. The controlling issue is rather that the ultimate settlement must be by agreement, i.e. contractual and not by some outside guarantees, acquiescence etc. E. As to the Israeli request for F-4 Phantoms, I am quite clear that a favorable decision on the Israeli request would have an effect on the fundamental US-Israeli relationship referred to above. It would certainly strengthen the confidence throughout Israel in US preparedness to assist in the vital field of security and would diminish the arguments of substantial sections of opinion who question whether our anxiety to improve our position among the Arabs will not dictate US policies prejudicing the Israeli estimate of their security capabilities. Conversely further delay can do nothing but adversely affect our relationship. Any concept that we could expect the Israelis to make political concessions affecting their security in return for military hardware, including Phantoms, is in my view erroneous. 7. The conclusion I draw from the above, unfortunately largely negative estimate, is that at this time we should not be in a hurry to endeavor to press the Israelis for specific delineation of substantive positions, our prospects if the SC gets involved in another round are not hopeless, and that we have a good chance Jarring's efforts can be continued and kept alive on the present basis until the Foreign Ministers presumably meet in New York in the fall. We should, therefore, resist British nervousness to the maximum extent possible. However, if your appraisal is that something must be done now, or the British are so determined on their course that there is no dissuading them, I strongly urge instead of our coming forth unilaterally or bilaterally with specific suggestions, we limit ourselves to a genuine exploration with the Israelis of the whole situation as we both now see it and solicit any ideas they may have as to useful further steps to be taken. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. Repeated to Walt Rostow at the LBJ Ranch. 2 Telegram 4329 from Tel Aviv, July 1, which is quoted below. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR) 3 See Document 202 . 209. Telegram From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas 209. Telegram From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, July 4, 1968, 1851Z. CAP 81450. McGeorge Bundy came away from a 90-minute meeting with Nasser yesterday with the impression that there is no prospect for early improvement in the Middle East situation. Following is a report of the Bundy conversation from our representative in Cairo: 2 Subject: Nasser-Bundy conversation July 3. 1. (N.B. Following drafted from notes taken in course debriefing Bundy after his talk with Nasser this morning and just before his departure for Beirut. Request Bundy make such changes or comment as he desires.) 2. Bundy saw Nasser for ninety minutes this morning. Bundy found Nasser relaxed and candid. Bundy came away from meeting with impression there no prospect for early improvement in the Middle East situation. 3. About 1/3 of conversation had to do with Ford Foundation business. Nasser very cordial toward Foundation. He admitted UAR birth control program had got bogged down in last couple of years because of higher priorities assigned to other activities. Bundy made point Ford wanted to help but could not do so if no budgetary support from UAR. Said program of this importance needed Presidential leadership. Nasser took note. 4. Political portion of discussion opened with fairly lengthy and fairly standard Nasser lecture on Middle East, attachment of people to their land, etc. Nasser evidently feels himself hemmed in by public opinion. Although Nasser referred to “extreme left” and “extreme right,” Bundy's impression was that his real concern is that Egyptians having suffered defeat are taking refuge in pride. 5. Nasser did not give impression he interested in any diplomatic initiatives. He seems believe present UAR diplomatic position is sound and is not disposed undertake any tricky initiatives for sake of movement. 6. On refugees, Nasser referred to previous Anderson conversations and stressed UAR prepared accept compensation and repatriation as solution. Nasser said this in way to indicate he believed this was movement forward in UAR position. Bundy pointed out repatriation not now practical alternative. Nasser did not react. 7. Nasser said his reason for linking Suez Canal and refugees was that until there is solution to Palestine problem, he could not allow Israel flags pass through heavily populated areas of Canal. He had already told Jarring he prepared allow Israel cargoes. Seemed to him this created no practical problem for Israel. Israel had plenty of other places to show her flag. But Israel flag in Suez Canal presented practical problem to Nasser. Bundy countered that refugee question presented practical problem to Israel requiring practical answer. Nasser said problem must be solved by Palestinian leaders. Bundy felt Nasser recognized that his was timid position but he wouldn't get off it. 8. Nasser felt that if great powers worked together there would be progress on Middle East. Bundy said he had heard that from Soviets. If great powers had an agreed solution in mind, this might be so. But neither Soviets nor ourselves had an acceptable solution. While both Soviets and U.S. had influence they alone could not produce progress. Bundy recalled that one year ago he had counseled President Johnson that distance between two sides so great there was no practical opportunity for U.S. expend political capital to produce a solution. 9. Bundy said Nasser's remarks had indicated an underlying belief that no political solution is in sight. Nasser said “Then there is only one other solution.” Bundy said: “How unfortunate.” 3 This closed political portion of conversation. 10. Miscellaneous gleanings: A. Nasser did not press view that U.S. one-sided but did say U.S. 100 percent pro-Israel. Bundy said we only 77 percent. Nasser rejoined 110 percent. (Mutual laughter.) B. Nasser said UAR would fight better next time, he had taken initiative obtain Soviet military advisers, etc. C. Bundy said he going Israel, asked Nasser if any message for Israelis. Nasser: “Tell them we are patient.” D. Of all Bundy's previous Egyptian interlocutors during this visit, Nasser mentioned only Heykal by name and with warmth. E. Nasser said he didn't think Hussein had much freedom of action. Said other Arab leaders did not give as much support to November 22 Res as did UAR. F. Nasser thinks Israelis realize there will never be bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt. 4 It follows that Israelis don't really want settlement. 11. In conclusion Bundy saw Nasser as a man heavily preoccupied with a problem without a solution. The existence of Israel occupation is a heavy weight on the morale of Egypt. But consequence is not Anglo-Saxon notion of need to negotiate out of this situation. Rather, Nasser's reaction is that this is time to show no weakness. 12. Bundy asked me make clear to Dept his belief that Nasser did not regard this conversation as a major encounter. At no time was there anything resembling a negotiating situation. Bergus 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos, 6/68-1/69. Secret. Repeated to Walt Rostow at the LBJ Ranch. 2 Telegram 2833 from Cairo, July 3, which is quoted below. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/BUNDY) 3 Bundy commented on Bergus' account of his meeting with Nasser in telegram 10757 from Beirut, July 5. He found it to be accurate but suggested an amendment at this point. “My response to Nasser's hint at renewal conflict was somewhat stronger than ‘how unfortunate’ and less convinced that he meant what he was suggesting. My own guess is that renewal hostilities are far from his personal intent, and my reaction was both stronger and less credulous, as perhaps, ‘that would be most unfortunate for all concerned, and surely there is a better way to be found.’” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Lebanon, Vol. I, Cables, 2/68-1/69) 4 Bundy qualified this in his comment on Bergus' summary to indicate that Nasser was referring to an agreement by direct negotiations. 210. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford 210. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford 1 Washington, July 6, 1968. SUBJECT Israeli F-4s Ambassador Ball is going out next week to discuss with Israel, certain of the Arabs, and others, the possibilities for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He will be going first to London and Paris, then to TelAviv, Amman, Beirut and Jidda (also, being very closely held, he may meet the UAR Foreign Minister in Beirut). We are told that State is preparing a Memorandum for the President in which they propose that Ball be armed with permission to reveal a “yes in principle” on the F-4s. We are not certain under what conditions this “yes” might be offered, but it seems to be related to the Israeli attitude on progress in the peace talks rather than, for example, Israeli signature on the NPT or their agreement to forego missile or nuclear acquisition. The advantages of going forward with the F-4 agreement in principle at this time are as follows: Israel must be able to defend itself—there is a gap in high-performance aircraft between the Arabs and Israelis—eventually Israel will need U.S. aircraft in any case-the duration of the French embargo is uncertain—we could reassure Israel of our support and perhaps make them less rigid—we would convince the Arabs and the Soviets of the firmness of U.S. support for Israel-the Arabs and Soviets may already presume we will deliver F-4s and have discounted this—it would ease Congressional and public concerns in this country-it would strengthen the Israeli Government vis-a-vis its domestic critics. The arguments against going ahead are: there is no real military need to do so now, and we are delivering A4s-there would be an adverse impact on the Jarring mission-it would be counter to the latest Soviet moves on Near East arms control—it would bring pressure on the Soviets to supply more and better aircraft—the Mirage deliveries may well go through and could be in operational Israeli units almost immediately after the decision is taken by de Gaulle. This would give the Israelis, at least temporarily, a sizeable “overkill”, particularly if the MD-620 missiles were also delivered by France-F-4s will not deter essentially irrational Arabs—it would deprive us of potential inducements to get the Israelis to be more flexible. We see certain advantages to giving Ambassador Ball authority to make a very conditional promise of a future agreement to sell F-4s on the following basis: a. We recognize Israel's need for F-4s if Arab inventories continue increasing; b. The need is not immediate; c. The diplomatic problems are at present overriding; and d. We must first see the results of the efforts to find a peaceful settlement (and the prospects for Near East arms limitation discussions with the Soviets). We suggest that Ambassador Ball's kit include only this conditional promise for F-4s which should for the present be kept secret but which could be made public at a later point (say, October) after the progress of the possible Near East arms discussions with the Soviets and the Jarring efforts are clearer and provided Israeli movement toward a settlement, in the coming months, is adequate. We suggest that you discuss the foregoing with Secretary Rusk or the President. Paul C. Warnke 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray in NESA. 211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, July 13, 1968, 1847Z. 202036. 1. Please prepare following letter from President for delivery to King and hold for Amb. Ball, who will deliver it personally in his call on King. Begin Text. Your Majesty: I have asked Ambassador George Ball, who has just assumed his new responsibilities at the UN, to discuss with you and certain other Arab statesmen, and with Israeli officials, current developments in the area. The trip to the area will give him the opportunity to become fully familiar with the Middle East problem. Ambassador Ball brings with him assurances of our continued firm support for Jordan and my sincere personal wishes for Your Majesty. It has been more than a year since the end of hostilities. In this time there has not been any progress toward the agreement called for in the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. I fully appreciate the difficulties you face in the continuing absence of a settlement, and the courage and moderation you have shown in meeting them. I assure you that the United States Government has given its full support to the efforts of Ambassador Jarring and that it will continue to do so. Ambassador Ball's visit to Jordan, and to other states in the area, is evidence of our concern and of our close interest in the efforts which are being made to find a way toward peace. I shall look forward to hearing from Ambassador Ball your thoughts on these matters. I hope that his discussions with you will help lead to the just and durable settlement which we all so fervently desire. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson. End Text. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Drafted by Day, cleared by Davies in substance and by Saunders at the White House, and approved by Popper. Repeated to Paris for Ball and Sisco. 212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, July 13, 1968, 1849Z. 202037. 1. Please prepare following letter from President for delivery to Prime Minister and hold for Amb. Ball, who will deliver it himself in his call on Eshkol. Begin Text. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have asked Ambassador George Ball, who has just assumed his new responsibilities at the United Nations, to discuss with you and your colleagues and with certain Arab statesmen current developments in the area. I know from our very useful exchange last January that you are fully familiar with our policy and that you share my concern over the lack of progress towards a peaceful settlement since the end of hostilities. We stand squarely on my statement of June 19, 1967, and we maintain our full support for the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. The trip to the area will give George Ball the opportunity to become fully familiar with the Middle East problem. I must frankly say that I fear the situation is deteriorating and that it will continue to do so in the area and in the Security Council unless some progress towards a settlement can be made. In particular, I am asking Ambassador Ball to explore with you steps which your Government might be prepared to take now to facilitate UN Representative Jarring's efforts to bring about agreement between Israel and its neighbors. I hope that you and Ambassador Ball may have a completely candid exchange of views which will advance our mutual interest in the prompt establishment of a durable and stable peace in the area. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson. End Text. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Jerusalem, USUN, and Moscow. 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, July 17, 1968, 0645Z. 4534. Summary: In two-hour Ball-Sisco exchange with Eban, 2 the following emerged: 1. Responsive to urgings of USG representatives, Eban indicated that GOI regarded direct bilateral negotiations not so much as a doctrinal pre-condition but primarily as an expression of belief that adequate contractual peace arrangements could not be achieved without direct dealing between the parties at some point. 2. Eban said GOI had decided probe UAR intentions and had therefore authorized Jarring put to UAR two questions concerning Egyptian concept of peace and nature of future UAR/Israeli relations. 3. Eban stressed that submission of Israeli questions through Jarring to UAR was an effort to sharpen issues and indicated willingness to proceed along this general line without waiting for prior Arab commitment to direct negotiations. 4. This represents effort shift Israeli strategy to concentrate on contractual nature of final settlement without insisting on formal bilateral negotiations as the first step in the road toward this objective. 5. In addition, for the first time Eban indicated that GOI would not necessarily insist on a peace treaty as the instrument at the end of road. He noted our suggestion of Japanese-Soviet declaration 3 as a possible pattern of agreement. Without in any way committing his government he indicated further that if this meant the difference between settlement and no settlement, they would not necessarily break on this point. 6. Eban said that by the end of July or early August GOI would make clear to Jarring whether or not their present unofficial flirtation with Jordan was paying any dividends. 7. In later evening discussions with Ball, Eban reiterated GOI determination not to stick on procedural insistence on direct negotiations but try to sharpen the issues through indirect means on the clear assumption that some form of direct negotiation would be needed before final contractual arrangements could be developed in a situation so complicated as that of Arab-Israeli relations. 8. In later conversation with Sisco, Raphael revealed Jarring has been asked to suggest on his own that secret Israeli-UAR contact be established at “any level which commands respect of UAR decision makers” and that such contact would not be characterized by Israelis as either “negotiations” or “prenegotiations.” End Summary . 1. Ball and Sisco, accompanied by Ambassador Barbour, had two-hour sessions July 15 with Foreign Minister Eban and senior Foreign Office officials. 2. Ball opened with presentation along following lines: A. USG concerned about Middle East problem in both long range and short range aspects. In longer run, USG desires satisfactory settlement of problems of Arab-Israel area. We recognize deep emotions on both sides and are sympathetic with Israeli desire for permanent settlement with recognized and secure boundaries. We agree there should be no further makeshift arrangements and understand Israel's desire that settlement should be recorded in agreement among parties at interest. USG will continue support this concept. As Israel knows, we do not however believe formal peace treaties only way to conclude agreement and will want to discuss precise form settlement might take. B. Immediate problem is how to get settlement process started. Long stalemate benefits no one: continued Israeli occupation of Arab territory is unnatural situation and new explosion in area could be highly dangerous. USG continues rely on Israeli assurances it desires reasonable settlement and is not interested in acquisition of territory. The more GOI can reaffirm this position the better standing it will enjoy in world public opinion and the easier its position will be to defend. C. Looking at the situation in short term we must consider what we face in the next few months. We understand Jarring intends to submit purely factual report and desires avoid termination of his mission for return to Security Council. It now seems less likely than previously that Soviets and UAR seek return to Security Council but that risk, with accompanying pressures for imposed implementation of resolution, cannot be discounted. D. Emphasizing that for talks to be useful they must be completely frank, Ball continued that immediate problem is to avoid Israel's becoming isolated. GOI must give world an impression of a reasonableness and a will to peace. Arabs have recently conveyed appearance that they are more flexible and reasonable than Israel. This has been noted in Washington, in US public opinion and in other capitals. We do not know whether apparent Arab reasonableness is a mere tactical ploy or reflects substantive change. In circumstances however the implication is that Arabs want peace and Israel does not. The result is that USG has difficulty supporting Israeli position. We are particularly concerned about Israel's dogged insistence on bilateral negotiations as only way to settlement. We understand need for contractual agreement but we are not persuaded that the insistence on direct bilateral negotiations is more than a procedural maneuver. If Israel continues to stick on this point, it will lose support of other countries. We do not think Israel will persuade Arabs to agree to bilateral negotiations at least at the beginning. We would have difficulty supporting this Israeli position in the Security Council. 3. Eban responded that GOI agreed on need for candid dialogue about appraisal of situation and how it can be influenced. There are some differences between US and Israeli appraisals. Israel has greater sense of confidence and tranquility than US appraisal would suggest. 4. “Atmosphere in Israel,” Eban said, “is dominated by memory of 1967 war and conviction Israel must not settle for less than peace within secure and recognized borders—i.e. liquidation of historic Arab-Israel conflict.” Recalling support of American people for Israel last year, Eban said that success of Arab design to destroy Israel would have had serious moral consequences for us and would have been enormous blow to USG credibility. Today, even USSR agrees that key to problem lies in Washington. 5. Eban continued that while there has been some Soviet penetration, particularly in Egypt, greater weight should be given to importance Arabs attach to US role and to existence of strains in Arab-Soviet relations. There have been several developments on credit side: doctrine of withdrawal without peace is discredited; Arab-Israel situation has had large impact in recent developments in Eastern Europe; and many Communist countries now regret having broken relations with Israel. In area itself, there is now intermingling of Israelis and Palestine Arabs which can never be reversed; logic of geographic proximity is beginning to prevail. Among governments concerned there is growing skepticism about efficacy of acrimonious public debate and GOI understands from Jarring that all parties including Soviets oppose return to Security Council. 6. Eban said foregoing are trends which should be permitted to ripen. Nothing radically dangerous has happened since November and we should not let delay plunge us into despair. Assumption that time not on Israel's side is true only if one assumes that war is likely if present situation continues or if one assumes active Soviet intervention. Of all Arab states only UAR might seek renewed hostilities but this unlikely in any case this year or next; we are not on brink of conflict. Re Soviets GOI hears from Jarring, from Rumanian and other governments and from public statements that USSR is taking long view and urging patience on Cairo. As for terrorism, it constituted “hit and run nuisance of severe proportions” but could not change basic GOI political facts. El Fatah is far from being Viet Cong or Algerian liberation movement and has not prevented development of normal relations in occupied areas. 7. Looking at short term problem, Eban said it all important to focus on and sustain Jarring Mission. Time will continue to work on Arab mind. While UAR now talking differently for tactical reasons, it may some day act differently as well. Jordan has expressed interest in talks at Ministerial level but remains inhibited by desire for greater clarification of Israeli position and need for signs of acquiescence from Cairo. 8. Eban said he has told Jarring Israel expects have clearer idea of whether it can move with Jordan by end of July or early August. Logical place to move is in area where human issues are largest-i.e., with Jordan. Problems of Sinai are less urgent and Syria has eliminated itself. 9. Jarring has been telling GOJ Foreign Minister Rifai that he does not favor renewed debate with Soviets and not optimistic about getting better SC res. He (Eban) does not understand why UAR not pressing for return to SC if this would be as bad for Israel as USG indicates. In Eban's view UAR does not have good case; in SC Cairo would have to say it wanted peace without negotiations, without signing anything, without explicit recognition of Israeli sovereignty-in brief, UAR wants to keep Palestine problem alive, liquidate results of last year's defeat and again take up cry of liberation of Palestine. 10. Eban continued that Arab tactical ingenuity is breaking down. It becoming clear despite Arab denial that peace has juridical meaning and requires negotiations. If SC were only a tribunal of opinion, Israel would win on points; fact is that SC is a “packed court” and renewed SC session would constitute set-back to modest gains with Jordan. 11. Eban then summarized Israel's assessment of UAR and Jordanian positions as follows: (A) UAR does not see peace as specific and formal but only as absence of war. It not only refuses to begin by direct negotiations but wishes avoid direct contact throughout. Instead of agreement between parties UAR wants greater part [ great power ?] guarantee; Israel learned in 1967 what guarantees mean and understands in any case that USG not enthusiastic about guaranteeing settlement which parties have not accepted. UAR willingness accept fact of Israel's existence is meaningless; what is needed is judicial acceptance. UAR position falls short of what Israel, USG and SC have asked. Nasser has admitted internal weaknesses prevent his going further and Eban sees nothing much to do except to hope UAR situation changes. While UAR has admittedly achieved certain semantic gains, it began again in week of July 9 to come under world criticism, inter alia as result of break following Riyad's reported Stockholm statement. Eban at this point surfaced fact that Israel feels UAR should be put to test and therefore two weeks ago authorized Jarring to put following questions to UAR: “(1) Is Egypt prepared to exchange the state of war that she has maintained for 20 years for a state of peace consecrated by a binding instrument which contractually engages both parties? (2) What will be the content, quality and status of relations between Israel and Egypt after the two parties will have reached agreement regarding all points mentioned in the Security Council resolution?” In presenting foregoing questions, Israel had told Jarring that for GOI peace means end of conflict analogous to settlements following World War II. This included, for example, Soviet-Japanese agreement. Israel also probing UAR through others (e.g., the Netherlands) and has sent letters which could be shown to UARG. (B) Re Jordan, Israel has better contact and therefore better idea of GOJ position. Jordan less obsessed by juridical and procedural inhibitions, but wants better idea of substance of Israel's terms, i.e., will Jordan get back enough to make peace worthwhile? Israel has given Jordan some ideas and some, unfortunately, have also become public knowledge. Allon plan 4 is example of effort devise arrangements to safeguard Israel's security, but Eban emphasized that none of plans which are being publicized represent Israeli Government position. Re Jerusalem, Israel prepared work out formula giving juridical status to Christian and Moslem interests but within framework of the reality that Jerusalem has been Israel's capital for 19 years and cannot be again divided. 12. Eban said Israel has seen some change in U.S. view of settlement with Jordan. Whereas U.S. supported idea of Israel-Jordanian agreement last fall, he (Eban) now senses U.S. skepticism re this idea. U.S. must take Israel's word that advanced discussions are going forward at high level in hopes of beginning Ministerial talks in New York-perhaps during fall session of General Assembly. Situation is in flux and not all symptoms are negative. 13. Re U.S. concern about SC resolution, Eban said there have been too many Soviet initiatives in support of Arab interests and too few U.S. initiatives in support not of Israel's but of American interests. Israel believes U.S. could again rally support against irresponsible efforts to upset “delicately and obscurely balanced” SC res. 14. Eban agreed need to refurbish appearance of Israeli position but saw no reason to move from basically good posture. Israel will not withdraw from cease-fire lines except in return for peace. Withdrawal must be justified to Israeli people. In some places peace and security have territorial implications, and Israel accepts U.S. view stated by Goldberg November 15 that permanent boundaries must be different from armistice lines. Israel cannot now say where boundaries would be; nature of peace settlement will influence nature of boundaries. As U.S. knows, there are tendencies in Israel to emphasize security in territorial terms. 15. Eban said Jarring agrees on usefulness of asking UAR how it interprets peace. UAR would probably answer by asking how Israel defines boundaries to which GOI would reply its aim is to devise agreement which will avoid military confrontation and assure free navigation. Re Tiran, no one has yet suggested way of assuring passage without Israeli presence at Sharm al-Sheikh. Re Suez, Israel must have full equality with all other nations. GOI doubts that UAR will develop dialogue further but has some hope with Jordanians. 16. Eban said GOI is flexible about form of peace settlement (e.g., Israel willing examine Soviet-Japanese formula) and sees territorial possibilities. 17. In Eban's view, charge of rigidity re direct negotiations is not justified. Israel cannot be ostracized and in any event issues are too complex to be negotiated indirectly. Israel does not exclude third party good offices leading to fruitful negotiations—e.g., Jarring's probing of UAR and its own contacts with Jordan. There could be a turning point if Israel had informal and disavowable channel with UAR as with Jordan and Lebanon, and GOI would be willing to state it would not consider this to be “negotiations”, or “pre-negotiations”. Rafael described this as a “clarification” approach. 18. Eban said there were number of things which could be done: U.S. could pursue active diplomacy, reasserting support for Israel as Soviets do for Arabs; U.S. could reaffirm that it wants a solution and not palliatives; U.S. and GOI could work in other capitals; U.S. could maintain balance of political and material strength in area—e.g., by providing aircraft. Even though aircraft would not arrive before 1970, decision would be important psychologically and politically to eradicate in 1968 the illusion of a military solution in 1969. 19. Ball said GOI decision to put questions to UAR and Jarring was useful step. Re description of Israeli negotiating posture as rigid, Ball said he wished to clarify this as follows: he inclined agree that no contractual agreement possible without parties sitting down together at some point, but much can be done to sharpen issues through intermediaries. 20. Sisco noted that it important to know what Jarring does with these questions, for them to be followed up by Israel. Israel now has moved down road towards substance as U.S. earlier suggested. It now important also to consider public relations aspect of this movement. Whatever UAR intentions are, fact remains that comparison of UAR and Israeli public statements gives impression of hardening Israeli position. 21. Ball said it desirable eliminate elements of ambiguity in order clear way for hard bargaining and latest Israeli questions to UAR represent progress. What is important is that a process be set in motion which Jarring can then guide as he thinks best. Israel seems to have made a start and we would urge that it press for continuing this process. So far as concerns negotiating procedures, our concern is that Israel not continue to insist that direct bilateral negotiations be prior condition for anything to happen. The insistence on direct negotiations should not be erected as a major principle; they should be viewed as something whose necessity becomes apparent to all as other processes are exhausted. This is point on which we differ with GOI. 22. Ball said there no change on US attitude towards negotiations with Jordan. Misunderstanding may have arisen from his statement to Argov in Washington that, so long as such negotiations must be kept secret that cannot help Israel's public position. Continuation of dialogue with Jordan is useful although there are limits on how far Hussein can go without nod from Cairo [garble], however, that most difficult questions lie with Jordan and that these also weigh most heavily in world opinion. One could make case for not treating opening of Suez Canal as urgent matter but issues with Jordan are pressing. To help get negotiating process started, Israel should reiterate as often as possible its willingness to withdraw and its will for peace. It is important to counteract cynics who tend discount Israeli statements and conclude that Israel has territorial ambitions. 23. Eban said Jordanian Minister Rifai had told Jarring in London that (A) Jordan wants Jarring Mission to continue; (B) Jordan does not want Security Council session (which only Iraqi PermRep is pressing for). Rifai did not say that Israel was holding back but considers further clarification of Israeli position necessary, a clarification which Israel cannot for “technical reasons” provide before late July or late August. 24. Ball then described impressions of talks in London and Paris as follows: A. UK is more impressed than USG with indications of Arab movement and has sense of urgency about opening Canal and releasing trapped ships. B. French reiterated view that bilateral negotiations are unrealistic goal and only way to progress is through Security Council action and great power guarantee-in effect an imposed settlement. Sisco noted that new element in French position was that France does not preclude introduction of four power UN forces in area as part of settlement. 25. Eban said he had received letter from Foreign Secretary Stewart which brings British and Israeli relations closer. Stewart agrees nothing can be implemented that is not negotiated and agreed and clearly wants to avoid any impression of UK-Soviet alliance. Eban said he suspects UK wishes demonstrate it not tied to US; he says no fissures between Israel and UK, however. Israel agrees it would be better for Suez Canal to be open, but if this done without clarification of Israel's rights a “May 22 casus belli situation” would be created. 26. Ball noted that UAR and Soviets are the most interested in opening the Canal. To extent that the Soviet insistence on opening Canal is not satisfied, it may be easier to influence Soviets to take positive attitude. 27. Eban said Jarring was in delicate position; he did not want too many mediators and Israel itself favors working through UN mechanism. In this process Israel should perhaps make clearer its willingness enter pre-negotiations. 28. In response to Sisco's comment that Jarring needed to submit as non-substantive a report as possible, Raphael reported Jarring had told him he (A) will not submit substantive report but will talk of “movement,” (B) will not make new suggestions unless both parties agree and (C) will not assess blame on either side. 29. Re tactical problem, Eban said it would be useful to play out situation until Foreign Ministers are in New York in September. It could then be possible to explore not only what to do in public but to use UN as diplomatic cover. To get away from “procedural acrobatics,” it would help to press idea of “UN conference procedure with Jarring in the chair.” Israel understands that Jordan does not need equal movement on UAR side but does require some token movement. 30. Sisco thought Jordan would be influenced by what they learn in advance of Israel's position on substantive issues. It would be dangerous for Jordan to engage in joint meetings without first having given Jordan some concrete indication on substance of settlement. Eban observed that in Palestinian community there was growing sense of nationhood and need for settlement. This is good in that it helps push Jordan toward settlement but is no substitute for interstate agreement. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Jerusalem, USUN, and Moscow. 2 Ball and Sisco visited Israel July 14-16 as part of an orientation trip for Ball as the new Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The trip began in London on July 10 and included a stop in Paris before Tel Aviv. After leaving Tel Aviv, Ball and Sisco went to Amman July 16-17, Beirut July 17-19, and Jidda July 19-20. Their conversations in London, which included consultations about the Middle East, were reported in telegrams 10747 and 10803 from London, both July 12. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) The stop in Paris, which also included talks on the Middle East, was reported in telegrams 17949 and 17950 from Paris, both July 13. (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 4, Document 207 . 4 The Allon plan, formulated by Yigal Allon, called for a line of fortified Israeli settlements along the Jordan River, with the remainder of the West Bank to be otherwise demilitarized. 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, July 17, 1968, 0930Z. 4535. Subject: Ball-Sisco Trip-Meeting with Eshkol. 1. After handing President's letter 2 to Prime Minister Eshkol, Ball said he had come to Jerusalem to get insight into Middle Eastern problems, to get Prime Minister's views first hand and to convey USG views. 3 Ball said he wished make clear that USG hopes to encourage movement toward contractual settlement of permanent nature and that we are not supporting makeshift solution. Ball said he and colleagues had just come from useful discussion with Foreign Minister Eban and now have better appreciation of GOI position and intentions. Particularly gratified and encouraged to learn both of GOI move to have Jarring probe UAR specifically on nature of peace and contractual arrangement and of Israeli action in testing possibility of agreement with Jordanians. Ball said he wished repeat what he had told FonMin that GOI should be alert to danger of appearing to take negative stance thus creating impression it not interested in reaching settlement while Arab governments gave appearance being ready to move forward. 2. In course of an hour long discursive and passionate exposition Prime Minister said he wanted us to know basic Israeli concerns. He said problem for him is that he has too complete confidence in what Nasser says. He was not referring to contradictory statements by Nasser and Hussein re their alleged desire for peace but to continuing and repeated statements of Arab intention to destroy Israel. This Eshkol said is Nasser's true aim and those who refuse to believe him are making same mistake as those in Europe before World War II who refused give credence to Hitler's statements re his intention destroy Jewish people. Eshkol cited Heykal article calling for gradual breaking up and destruction Israel regardless of cost in blood to Arabs. Over the years Israelis have come to know Nasser as an actor who tells all who speak to him what he knows they want to hear, though his basic intention always remains Israel's destruction. By contrast Eshkol said he did not think USSR wants Israel's destruction if only because it does not want to be identified in history with Nazi Germany. 3. Prime Minister stressed that question for Israel is one of survival. Israel had not wanted war. Eshkol recalled GOI had waited three weeks but finally it became clear there no other way out. PriMin noted that even then he had sent message to Hussein stating GOI desire avoid hostilities with Jordan. Israel won war but in process learned it cannot rely on international guarantees to protect its security. Now it cannot give away gains of victory for nothing. Government which did so could not survive. Eshkol pointed to 1957 guarantees re free navigation in Straits of Tiran and King Hussein's promise he would not allow tanks he received from US be deployed west of Jordan River. Prime Minister said day will come when he will have to bring Israeli Cabinet to a decision re steps to be taken toward a settlement. This could break up present coalition. He not afraid to work with a smaller cabinet, as before Six-Day War, but he cannot go before Cabinet and people empty handed. Eshkol asked USG sympathy and understanding of his problems in this regard. 4. Ball expressed appreciation for Prime Minister's exposition. The point he wished to emphasize was following: although USG and GOI were agreed on need for a settlement that will ensure lasting peace, he had emphasized to GOI that they were in his view putting too much weight on procedural requirements. 5. Ball said that USG shares Prime Minister's skepticism regarding Nasser. Problem GOI faces is to make sure of all possible processes for sharpening issues through instrumentality of Jarring Mission and otherwise so that no one can accuse GOI of lacking will to find final settlement. Ball said there are two issues that need discussion. First, the nature of the ultimate peace settlement and its expression in adequate structural terms. 4 On this, there is no difference in approach between the GOI and the USG. Second, the procedure by which peace could be achieved. On this there is some difference in approach. 6. Ball conceded that it was probable an ultimate peace settlement could be achieved only after a bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiation but this should not be a doctrinal sticking point.GOI should exhaust every pragmatic opportunity to sharpen issues through Jarring Mission and other means and should not rigidly insist that bilateral negotiations be a condition precedent to any progress. 7. Ball indicated USG did not much care how GOI publicly described its probings through Jarring Mission or other mechanisms. It need not say that those probings constituted negotiations; it could use the word clarification or any other word it preferred. The important point was that GOI should not appear as impaled on a procedural issue; it should stress its willingness to get on with a solution—while defining the requirements of the solution—but should not dig itself in on the negative point that no progress was possible without a direct bilateral negotiation. Otherwise it would be vulnerable to the accusation that it did not really want a settlement and would find itself increasingly isolated. 8. Ball stressed he making foregoing points because Israel and US fundamentally working for same objective of lasting peace. Ball said he knows Israelis are pragmatic people and is confident their ability move forward toward solution of area's problems. 9. Eshkol's response to Ball's statement was curious. He did not challenge Ball frontally but indicated a certain measure of private agreement while suggesting that his own problem was with the Knesset. 10. Discussion of Israeli request for Phantom aircraft which raised at Eshkol's initiative, and broke no new grounds will be reported on Ball's return to US. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to USUN and to Beirut and Amman for Ball and Sisco. 2 See Document 212 . 3 This meeting took place on the morning of July 15. Ball and Sisco also met with Defense Minister Dayan on July 16, who discussed Israeli concern about the danger of war with the Arabs. (Telegram 11105 from Beirut, July 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7) 4 Ambassador Ball subsequently revised this sentence to read: “First, the need for an agreed peace settlement and its expression in contractual terms.” (Telegram 11144 from Beirut, July 18; ibid.) 215. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 215. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, July 17, 1968, 0930Z. 4536. 1. During meeting with Prime Min Eshkol morning July 15, Ball raised issue of Israeli delay in signing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He referred to Eban's letter to Secretary Rusk 2 and made clear position expressed was unacceptable. All other states in area had signed treaty and GOI's intransigence called into question their basic good faith. The only result of GOI's footdragging would be to breed suspicion in Arab states and USSR. 2. Prime Minister said he knows USG view and stands on earlier position that Israel will not be first to introduce nuclear weapons in area. Eshkol pointed out, however, GOI is not only state which still thinking NPT over. Problem is that Israel surrounded by enemies on all sides. Eshkol said he not seeking to link NPT problem with Israeli request for Phantom aircraft but did wish to point out security consideration is a major one. Israel not interested in relieving Arabs of their suspicions re its nuclear intentions. Barbour recalled he had said earlier this was dangerous view. Ball stressed that anything Israel might do which would create shadow of a suspicion that it has nuclear arms aims would establish an even stronger UAR security claim on the Soviets. Ball drew attention to US-USSR assurances in Security Council to non-nuclear powers in case of nuclear attack. Prime Minister, noting he realized he on dangerous ground, asked whether this a real guarantee or rather a declaration of intention which powers may choose ignore if circumstances change. Israel faces “to be or not to be” situation. 3. GOI FonMin SecGeneral Gideon Rafael noted GOI participating in non-nuclear congress which scheduled convene August 29. Rafael said outcome of deliberations non-nuclear powers would be important to GOI's final decision with regard to NPT. 4. Prime Minister did not challenge Ball's view but gave impression of confusion suggesting that his government had been caught with fingers in the cookie jar. He referred rather plaintively to GOI's situation. The clear impression gained by Ball and Sisco was that this was a tactical move related to Phantoms and did not represent position GOI would hold over time. 5. Eshkol appeared very defensive on this point and stated three times that he “would take the USG's position into consideration.” Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to USUN and to Beirut and Amman for Ball and Sisco. 2 See Document 205 . 216. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 216. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, July 17, 1968, 0737Z. 5757. Subject: 155mm guns for Jordan. 1. Speaking “off-the-record” on 16th, Zaid Rifai read to me from a letter sent to King Hussein by “a British person.” The writer stated that his firm had been able to locate seventy 155-mm Long Tom guns which were immediately available. Shortly after finding these 70 guns, however, the “source of supply” had informed the writer of the letter that the guns had originally come from the U.S. Source alleged the American authorities had learned of Jordanian interest in them and had taken steps to insure that they could not be made available for sale to Jordan. The writer stated that he regretted that particular source was no longer available but that he was following up certain other sources (Zaid implied the other source was Turkey) and that he hoped to be able to find 20 or 25 guns for Jordan. 2. According to Zaid, King Hussein is furious about the indication that the USG has taken steps to cut off all possible sources of 155-mm guns for Jordan. The King has been making noises that he will accept Iraqi offers to supply new 122 (possibly 130) mm guns from the Soviet Union as a “gift.” Zaid said quite a “head of steam” has built up on this matter and that both King Hussein and General Khammash are determined that they must at least make up their losses in this category of weaponry. He said the King and Khammash are particularly upset that USG officials on the one hand have been implying that 155-mm guns are not available because they cannot be located, whereas, in fact, the USG seems to have taken steps to make them “unavailable.” 2 3. Zaid indicated the JAA currently has eight 155-mm guns operational. This agrees with indication given DATT July 16 by Commanding Gen 2nd Div. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Nodis. 2 Ambassador Symmes sent an official-informal letter to Rodger Davies on July 18 emphasizing the problem posed by the 155-mm guns. He noted that he had discussed the problem briefly with Ball and Sisco and had found them opposed to supplying such artillery to Jordan, “particularly in the period prior to November.” Symmes referred again to the King's angry reaction and concluded: “I think whatever we do we have got to come clean soon with the King. We cannot continue this masquerade of ‘unavailability.’ It is causing further disenchantment with us and is not a correct way to deal with a friend.” (Ibid.) Davies responded in a July 25 letter that the Departments of State and Defense were puzzled by the reference to 70 155-mm guns. “We know nothing of this and most certainly have not been requested to assent to provision of 155 mm guns by the British.” He added, however, that Ball and Sisco's reactions concerning the guns were generally shared in the Department. (Ibid.) 217. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 217. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, July 17, 1968, 1515Z. 5774. Subj: Ball/Sisco farewell talk with Eban. 1. During farewell call by Ball and Sisco, FonMin Eban said he had discussed with PriMin what it might be useful for Ball to say to King Hussein in Amman. Eban and PriMin agreed that if Hussein could overcome inhibitions about negotiations with Israel, Israel would make serious effort reach agreement. Eban had no idea how much leeway Hussein had from Cairo. As regards Hussein's desire have clearer idea of what Israel would offer, however, Eban said GOI agreed “it necessary give Hussein a push” in this respect. If we agreed, Eban said Ball could convey to Hussein impression that in “real peace settlement” he would get very much back-not all, but great deal of what he lost. 2. Eban said it would also help if Ball stressed that US wanted settlement among parties so that Hussein would realize he must turn to Israel to make progress. In addition to five points, President's emphasis on concept that “parties to conflict must be parties to peace” was important in this respect. 3. Eban said we could also convey on Israeli behalf that, while Israel does not envisage restoration of June 4 lines, it does envisage limited Kingdom on both sides of Jordan River, including Arab population and most of territory. In response Ball's comment that he understood security was controlling principle for Israel, Eban replied in affirmative, saying Israel only seeks changes in territory justified on security grounds. In addition, Hussein could obtain non-territorial gains such as free movement of goods and persons and access to natural Mediterranean outlet. Eban stressed he did not expect Hussein to commit himself, but Israel was urging that Jordan at least explore the ideas outlined above within context of overall settlement. 4. Sisco asked what could be said to Hussein about Jerusalem. Eban commented that there was no international pressure to redivide Jerusalem but, nevertheless, within limits set by fact that Jerusalem is Israel's capital and must remain united, Israel would stretch its imagination to find solution. Israel's thinking ran towards finding formula which would comprise expression and incarnation of Moslem interests. Coupled with concept of open frontiers, this should be helpful move. 5. Ball commented that with respect West Bank Hussein perhaps had some flexibility. Where Jerusalem was concerned, however, he was under pressure from other Arabs and non-Arab Moslems. Eban thought this was easiest aspect of problem since it was precisely Moslem interests for which Israel was prepared make special arrangements. Eban noted that neither US nor UK had said they favored redividing Jerusalem although some have been encouraged to think that US prepared return to June 4, 1967 status on basis its statements in UN following Israeli administrative unification of city last year. 6. Sisco asked what we could tell Hussein about two questions GOI had given Jarring for UAR. There was possibility, though no certainty, that Hussein would see this step as progress toward UAR-Israel negotiations and that this would help relieve his inhibitions about moving ahead of Nasser. 7. Eban suggested telling Hussein, if Israel-Jordan settlement endorsed by Palestine Arabs could be achieved, he would then have strong card since Nasser would have difficulty objecting to Palestinian settlement which Palestinians accepted. Eban also thought that degree of approval which USG would indicate for Israel-Jordan settlement would be important factor with Hussein. (Raphael, in response to Sisco's urging, later said Israel agreed we could inform Jordanians of two substantive questions they asked Jarring to put to UAR.) 8. Raphael expressed view that if Cairo allowed to “stew in own juice,” situation would evolve in which Cairo would eventually have to join. 9. In response Ball's query about Faisal's position, Eban said characterized by inconsistencies: on one hand Faisal was emotional about Israel and Jerusalem but, on other hand, he concerned about Nasser. 10. Returning to Jerusalem question, Raphael noted that there had never been Moslem endorsement of Jordan's unilateral annexation of Jerusalem. If Jordan had been strong enough to carry annexation off, it should be strong enough to make arrangements safeguarding Moslem interests. Eban commented that to pious Moslems it was intolerable for Jews to control second most holy place of Islam. Israel should accept this reality in seeking Jerusalem solution. 11. Re general problem of getting negotiations started, Raphael said that once Arabs realized no one would pull their irons out of fire and that they must choose between status quo and progress toward new situation, they would stop hoping for big power intervention. Jordan should, however, realize dangers in unstable border situation. Jordan should also know that, while Israel is cooperating in exploring issues, there must be discussions for Israel to go as far as Foreign Minister had indicated it would. 12. On question of territorial adjustments, Ball noted that he had been briefed earlier in day by Allon on so called “Allon plan.” 2 Eban stressed that this plan not endorsed by govt but should be viewed [as] possible model for way of achieving greater security without Israeli domination of Arab population. (Eban's answer, however, was given in such a manner as to convey impression he did not think Allon plan was ever going anywhere.) Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Moscow, Jidda, Beirut, Cairo, USUN, and London. 2 See footnote 4, Document 213 . 218. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 218. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, July 18, 1968, 1906Z. 11145. Dept pass Cairo. To Secretary from Ball. Subject: Audience with King Hussein. 1. Sisco, Amb Symmes and I were received by King, Wednesday, July 16. Zaid Rifai was only other Jordanian present at beginning of conversation, but during course of discussion Prince Hassan joined group. 2. We were received with warmth and a perceptible sense of expectation. Throughout our discussion, the King displayed philosophical detachment, suggesting substantial resignation to the unhappy situation of his country but indicating at the same time that he was not discouraged though eager to find a solution. 3. After handing King President's letter (Beirut 11146) 2 for which he expressed gratitude, I underlined continuing US support of November 22 resolution and Jarring Mission. I also referred to US assurances made to King during discussion of November 22 resolution in NY and stated that “we still bore them in mind.” 4. I then outlined presentation made earlier to PriMin, placing emphasis on two questions Israelis had requested Jarring to put to UAR. Significance of these questions, I explained, was not so much their content but their value as evidence that Israel tentatively seeking to begin process of clarifying issues through means other than bilateral negotiations at outset. I made clear that this provided opportunity for Arab nations to move the situation off dead center provided UAR gave sensible and not merely dialectical reply to the Israeli questions. I suggested also that if UAR really wanted negotiating process to begin, it should accompany its response with submission of question of its own, implying this was test of Arab good-faith determination to seek lasting solution. To avoid misunderstanding, however, I made clear that I had not recently talked with Jarring and did not know how he intended to handle Israeli questions. 5. Israel was, I stated, clearly more interested in attempting to settle its relations with Jordan than with the UAR. It wanted to find a modus operandi with its closest neighbor as soon as possible, while being prepared to wait for unlimited time for solution of Suez and Sinai problems. It was in this context that I reviewed with King details of message that FM Eban had asked me to convey to the GOJ. 3 In serving as an instrument of transmission, however, I made it clear that the USG was expressing no independent judgment as to merits or demerits of Israeli position. Moreover, the King should understand that we saw the Israeli proposals as representing merely an initial bargaining position. 6. The Israelis, I said, had retreated somewhat from their insistence on direct negotiations at the outset and were obviously prepared for some indirect exchanges with the GOJ in order to give the King some indication of Israeli thinking. At same time, the USG considered it imperative that the GOJ be prepared to utilize FonMin Rifai's visit to the GA in September as the occasion for serious talks with the Israelis. I told the King that I had strongly pressed on Israelis that the position of doctrinal insistence on direct negotiations to exclusion of all other diplomatic exchanges was totally unrealistic and self-defeating. At the same time, the Arab world should understand that in our view no secure peace could ever be arranged unless the Arabs were prepared at proper point for some form of direct discussions leading to contractual arrangement. I pointed out that as I saw it, the GOI had not formulated a governmental position as to precisely what kind of a settlement with Jordan they envisaged. The government was in some disarray with sharply conflicting opinions among the members of the Cabinet and I thought the GOI incapable of making any precise plans until forced to do so by the necessities of an ongoing negotiating process. Time was working on nobody's side and if any progress were to be made, the present excuses for inaction on both sides must be put aside. The only way to begin was to begin. 7. King Hussein responded with quite evident gratitude for President's letter and for information we had brought him. He made brief general review of efforts he and GOJ had made to bring sanity into situation following the war. At the Khartoum summit, he had tried vigorously, but without success, to avoid the adoption of the conditions of no peace treaty, no direct negotiations and no diplomatic recognition, which today were not only obstructing Jarring Mission but also enabling Israel to exploit alleged Arab intransigeance. Since Khartoum, he had tried hard to find out what the Israelis really wanted but, again, without success. 8. Israel, the King said, had three faces. There was the religious group, the hard-line expansionist and the moderate realistic element. As a result, there was no consistent Israeli policy to which the Arabs could address themselves. 9. Jordan had made clear to Jarring and to its friends, including the US, where it stood on all aspects of the Nov 22 resolution, and the King felt that Jordan must stay within the framework of the resolution since there was no other clear guide to settlement. The King then asked me what in our opinion he could and should do to move the problem forward. 10. I answered by referring again to the possible significance of questions that Israel has asked Jarring to transmit to the UAR and emphasized need for a constructive Arab response. I referred also to Eban's expressed hope that joint Israeli/GOJ meetings of some sort might be arranged in New York in September. The King appeared to agree with these ideas and both Sisco and I interpreted his reaction as a determination to do all that was possible along these lines. 11. In more general conversation in which Zaid Rifai participated, Sisco made point that the November 22 resolution is a package of principles, the details of which require discussion between the parties to reach a settlement. 12. At the conclusion of our long discussion, the other luncheon guests were brought in, including PriMin and FonMin. The conversation at luncheon was social in character, although toward the end of the meal, in replying to general question, the FonMin stated for the benefit of the whole table that he was not at all discouraged about the Middle Eastern situation and that “we have moved from first phase into second phase.” The FonMin then observed that “if we can move it to this second phase, we can start doing business.” 13. When we took our leave after lunch, King stated with great warmth: “I can't tell you what it has meant to me or how grateful I am for your coming here and for what you have told me.” 14. Impression given during entire meeting was that King was tired and very serious, by no means despairing and eager and determined to get on with settlement. In course of conversation, the King made two statements which seemed particularly significant. One was that information we had brought him from Israelis gave him “something he could get started with.” The second was that Jordan and UAR had “different interests,” implying his willingness to press for a settlement of Israel/Jordan problem alone, regardless of UAR foot dragging. 15. It seemed significant that audience with the King did not include any Ministers and that at no time did tone or content suggest any of the more formalized Arab position we had been given by Rifai and PriMin in earlier meeting. Nevertheless, Sisco tells me Rifai seemed more attuned to King's views than was case during detailed talks in NY last year. 4 16. The King made no comments that tended in any way to corroborate Israeli contention that there were secret direct contacts between Israel and Jordan. In fact, implications of his statements were quite to the contrary. 17. The King also did not react specifically to any of Eban's points, except to indicate that it would be most unfortunate if Jerusalem, as the city of peace, should be the single factor that obstructed a peaceful settlement. By what he did not say, he seemed to indicate that he personally has some flexibility on the question of Jerusalem and recognized there can be no return to the pre-June 1967 situation. Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, Moscow, Jidda, London, USUN, and Jerusalem. 2 Document 219 . The July 13 letter from President Johnson to King Hussein was transmitted in telegram 202036, Document 211 . 3 See Document 217 . 4 Documentation on King Hussein's U.S. visit in November 1967 will be printed in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume XIX . 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, July 18, 1968, 1906Z. 11146. Dept pass Cairo. Subject: Ball/Sisco trip—discussions with Talhouni and Rifai of Jordan. 1. Summary: In two-hour meeting July 17 with Jordanian PriMin Talhouni and FonMin Rifai, Ball gave them his overall impressions of present Israeli attitude towards Jarring Mission and a peace settlement. While obviously noncommittal and at the outset presenting Jordanian position along traditional lines, reaction of Ministers gave impression that specific substantive ideas which Eban asked Ball to transmit to the Jordanians regarding possible shape of an eventual settlement would not be dismissed out of hand particularly in light of fact Ball made clear our feeling that this Israeli opening bargaining position. Suspicion obviously remains in minds of Jordanian leaders that concrete propositions we conveyed to GOJ on behalf of Israel are largely tactical gambit to, in GOJ words, “escape responsibilities of SC resolution”; nevertheless we had impression matter would be weighed carefully. Atmosphere of talks was influenced in part by fact that word was trickling in regarding Iraqi coup. While conversation in opening round tended to be rather hard expression of Jordanian view, we were impressed with Rifai's very brief but objective summation of current state of play re Jarring Mission which he gave to King Hussein at lunch. For example, Rifai told the King in front of us that the situation was not unhopeful, that there was some movement, that Jarring Mission should be continued and that Jordan should continue to support him and respond constructively. We had distinct impression that Rifai has bought idea of Jarring continuing his probes between now and opening of GA and that GOJ has intention of sending Rifai to GA during opening days to help move things along. Ball had excellent opportunity to get across to GOJ our impression that there is a will toward peace in Israel though we doubted Israeli substantive position on settlement would crystallize until there were discussions between Arabs and Israelis which would tend to force GOI Cabinet to face issues and to make decisions of a substantive character.GOJ seemed impressed with Ball description that we had been categoric in conveying to Israelis our view that while we did not see how final settlement could be achieved without parties at some appropriate stage sitting down together, nevertheless insistence on acceptance of direct negotiations as condition precedent was untenable posture for GOI. GOJ leaders also showed interest in information Ball provided them regarding two specific substantive questions Israelis had asked Jarring to pass to UAR in hopes that this might help get “a process” started. Fact that Israelis were conveying specifics to UAR through Jarring and specifics to GOJ through us seemed to make some impression, though difficult to ascertain how much. We found that Talhouni and Rifai agreed with us that there is no value to going into the SC in the foreseeable future, though they obviously felt the need to leave open this possibility, particularly on the question of Jerusalem, should future developments require. Re Israeli desire for direct contacts with GOJ, they (A) voiced suspicion that GOI seeking evade obligations under SC resolutions; (B) asserted that overriding need was for plan to implement resolution which Jarring could work out; and (C) that GOJ “never had nor would enter separate direct contacts with Israel.” In connection with foregoing, Ball stressed that resolution was not a peace settlement, and that Jarring's activities could help prepare way, by clearing underbrush and sharpening issues, for agreement between parties. Biggest area of doubt which developed during course of conversation relates to Israeli intentions vis-a-vis Jarring in late July or early August on which we wish Barbour to follow up as he deems appropriate. Rifai was told by Jarring that GOI has promised Jarring map, or at least descriptive memorandum, giving its conception of secure and recognized boundaries. Neither Ball nor Sisco received any such impression from the Israelis. All Eban and Raphael indicated to us was that they intend to tell Jarring one way or another by the end of this month whether they see any real prospects for progress with the GOJ. They mentioned nothing about providing either Jarring or the GOJ with maps of boundaries and we were candid with the GOJ in questioning Israeli intention of going this far this soon, particularly in circumstances where there are obvious divisions in Israeli Cabinet and no consensus reached on elements of territorial settlement. We made headway in one other way in that Talhouni and Rifai both agree that Jarring should continue his probes between now and opening of the GA and that Rifai very much hopes that circumstances will be such that he and number other FonMins can engage in intensive consultations during opening days GA in order move things along. In fact the idea of intensive effort on the ME among the FonMins at the time of GA opening which we have been selling all along the circuit has taken hold. The only real question which unhappily is crucial, will be the UAR willingness to send Riad. Burgus ought to be working on this on a day by day basis so as to assure Riad's presence at that time. End summary. [Here follows the 12-page body of the telegram.] Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, USUN, and Jerusalem. 220. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 220. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, July 18, 1968, 2106Z. 11148. Department pass Cairo. Begin summary: Ball and Sisco, accompanied by Amb Porter, had frank exchange with Lebanese FonMin Boutros July 18. 2 Boutros stressed that Arab decision work for settlement on basis Security Council resolution, involving as it did willingness accept Israel as fact, was act of political courage. For Arabs this made it all the more essential to stay within UN context and work through Jarring. USG should therefore influence Israel to give up insistence on direct negotiations and to implement resolution. This Boutros saw as step by step process. Ball said step by step approach was unrealistic; Israel would not and could not be compelled to give up its only bargaining position, namely occupation of Arab territory, except in return for agreement on all issues. Ball said overriding need was to get negotiating process started. We had urged Israelis not to make direct negotiations a condition precedent. Similarly we urged Arabs to recognize it unrealistic expect that settlement reflecting agreement among parties, as called for in resolution, could be achieved without direct talks at some point down the road. Boutros acknowledged that progress toward implementation could make direct talks easier at later stage. Ball stated that while recognizing magnitude of difficulties, he was not discouraged; pressures of time would compel some movement on both sides. Israel had recently asked Jarring to pass two questions to UARG, in effect providing opportunity to get indirect negotiating process under way. Boutros showed interest but expressed suspicion that Israel laying trap for UAR and in general was pessimistic about chances for overall settlement. Stressing dangers to Arab governments of deep popular feeling on Palestine issue, Boutros argued that “all or nothing” approach to settlement unrealistic. There was need for Jarring or Security Council to devise accommodations that could begin “disarmament of minds” on both sides, without which any treaty would be meaningless. Ball and Sisco replied that process GOI trying to start was initiative by Israeli moderates; Arab response could foster or stifle initiative. They expressed hope Jarring would follow through and UAR would respond seriously. Re form of settlement, Ball said he had impression Israel would not stick on treaty and that alternative (e.g., like Soviet-Japanese arrangement after World War II) could be found. When Sisco noted that UNGA session in fall would offer opportunity for quiet consultations with Jarring and FonMins present, Boutros agreed but said question of whether Arab FonMins would go to NY would probably need to be considered first in Arab League FonMin meeting, which he expected occur prior GA. Boutros also raised GOL's concerns re Israeli intentions toward Lebanon. Ball said he had made clear to GOI how strongly US opposed any Israeli actions against Lebanon and had received categoric denial of hostile Israeli intentions. GOI had stressed, however, that it would have to respond to serious incidents against Israel across Lebanese frontier. End summary . [Here follows the 10-page body of the telegram.] Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 2 A memorandum of Ball and Sisco's conversation on July 18 with President Charles Helou and Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to airgram A-1198 from Beirut, July 22. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, July 20, 1968, 0650Z. 5810. Subj: Bundy's July 18 talk with King Hussein. Pass Ball/Sisco. Summary. 1. In his July 18 talks with Bundy, King Hussein sought Bundy's impressions of Israel, showing special interest in attitudes of Dayan. King stressed the importance of progress toward a settlement by the year's end, and the necessity of having something tangible in the form of expectation of a “just” solution before he could directly confront the Fedayeen. Hussein also indicated a willingness to consider some territorial “give and take” in any settlement. The King was worried by the Iraqi coup, and appeared concerned that sooner or later Iraq and Syria might move closer together. 2. Bundy stressed that he believed the Israelis genuinely want peace. He encouraged the King not to waste any opportunity for indirect examination of the issues with key Israeli leaders such as Dayan; and he underlined the theme that all avenues leading to an exchange of viewpoints should be explored carefully. Bundy also conveyed Dayan's warning that if Fedayeen forays into Israel continue, Israel might be forced again to strike at Jordan, causing further population displacement. Bundy advised the King that parties themselves have main responsibility for achieving settlement and should not expect USG or other outside govts to do it for them. Bundy said he sensed that the King has no currently active dialogue with Israelis but that he might, under some circumstances, undertake an initiative with the Israelis. Meanwhile King appears to hope someone else will do the job for him or at least get out in front. End of summary. 1. Bundy had audience July 18 with King Hussein. Crown Prince Hassan and King's private secretary, Zaid Rifa'i, also were present. Bundy did not have opportunity before departure to clear following report of his conversation, which he gave us orally. 2. Bundy said his general impression was similar to that which he had acquired during King's visit to Washington last summer. Hussein knows the problems that he faces, and he appears to realize that sooner or later he will have to make a stab at solving them. Bundy felt, however, that Hussein hoped someone else would achieve a settlement for him and that at least he, Hussein, would want someone else with him if not out in front. Bundy thought Hussein had regained some of the confidence he lacked during the summer of 1967, when Bundy found him “very shaky.” 3. Hussein asked Bundy to talk about his visit to Israel. Bundy said he thought the Israelis really meant it when they said they want peace but that of course they want it on a secure basis. Alluding to the fact that Amb Ball had conveyed to the Jordanians only the day before Eban's comments on the outline of settlement, and his desire for a Jordanian response, Bundy emphasized that any avenue directed at feeling out the respective positions was worth exploring. Hussein commented that the Arab Foreign Ministers might be able to do this later in the summer in New York. The King also volunteered he considered highly important there be some meaningful progress by the end of the year. (But Bundy again felt that by progress the King did not mean Jordanian initiatives.) 4. King was most interested in Dayan. Bundy told him he thought that Dayan, in the absence of peace, was the firmest of Israelis; yet he would be the most moderate of all and essentially the most helpful to the Arabs once peace and Israel's security was achieved. The King agreed with these comments. Bundy repeated to Hussein what Dayan had said to him about the cease-fire violations and Fedayeen raids. If Jordan were unsuccessful in controlling the Fedayeen situation in the Valley (implication being Beisan area), Israel would again have to take firm action and this might mean more Jordanians would be displaced. Bundy did not use Dayan's argument that deeds, not words, were what counted, but he repeated Dayan's comment that it would be in the King's own interest to control the Fedayeen. Hussein responded that he could now meet any direct Fedayeen challenge to his authority but that he thought it was better to deal with the situation with indirect tactics for the time being. Hussein felt strongly that he had to have something tangible, the expectation of a “just” solution, in order to justify a direct confrontation with the Fedayeen. 5. Bundy commented to us that Hussein used the word “just” frequently and in much the same manner the Israelis used the word “peace.” A settlement in which all parties had confidence was the only solution, said the King. He obviously considers that Israel has given the Arabs thin soup so far. Nevertheless, he said he was continuing to pressure Nasser to continue the dialogue with Jarring (which Bundy took as a reference to the Israeli “two questions” posed to the UAR through Jarring), and said that some progress has been made since the Khartoum conference. 6. Before the King arrived at the meeting, Bundy had been told by Rifa'i that Israeli terms proposed for Jerusalem were “impossible.” When Jerusalem came up with the King, the latter was not so flatly assertive. Bundy referred briefly to President Helou's idea of deliberately leaving the Jerusalem question “unsettled,” and obtaining agreement on all other issues first, but the King was unresponsive. Hussein repeated his frequently-used description of Israel as possessing three faces: the extremist one, which seeks the downfall of Jordan and Israeli occupation of the East Bank; the seemingly reasonable face, which wants a Palestinian entity; and the moderate face. The King said he has been trying to find the third face. He gave Bundy the impression that various territorial adjustments favorable to Israel could be considered, and that, for example, some territory could be given Israel in return for free Jordanian passage to the Mediterranean. 7. Bundy said he got no response from the King when he broached some of Eshkol's ideas about a refugee solution. (Bundy noted wryly to us that Eshkol had sought his, Bundy's, reaction to Ford financing of the settlement costs.) 8. Hussein pressed Bundy for information about political conditions in Washington. Bundy said that the US was heavily preoccupied with the war in Viet-Nam and with elections, and that there was little incentive to expend energy on a no-result exercise in the Arab-Israel contest. Bundy advised Hussein frankly not to depend on just the US and other outside states to find a way out, and he followed this up with the suggestion that Hussein should test the water with the Israelis, in any feasible, indirect way. Bundy mentioned that he thought Eban's proposals, as conveyed through Ball, constituted an asking price, a bargaining position, and suggested Hussein not be discouraged by them. In addition he proposed specifically that Hussein not lose any opportunity to send a trusted emissary to talk to Dayan, 2 for example, if the latter should travel to Europe. Bundy mentioned also that Teddy Kolleck, one of the most moderate men in Israel, was fortunately also Mayor of Jerusalem. This was another person with whom the Jordanians should get in touch. 9. Crown Prince Hassan, during the discussion of the possibilities of using US influence, proposed that the US apply pressure on Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, all friends of US, to discourage them for subsidizing the Fedayeen. But the King dismissed these remarks as “minor point.” 10. Hussein revealed considerable uneasiness about the Iraqi coup. He said he was discouraged and worried, indicating that he thought that the new Iraqi govt, some way or other, sooner or later, would get close to the Syrian regime. Hussein regretted the fall of the Arif govt because he had been entertaining hopes of being able to deal with it effectively. 11. Summing up, Bundy said he gained the impression that Hussein ought [ sought ?] take an initiative with the Israelis if he saw a discreet opportunity to do so, but we should not count it. If we had to depend on Hussein to take the initiative, Bundy told us he was sure there would be little progress toward a settlement. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Beirut, London, Jidda, Rome, Tel Aviv,USUN, and Cairo. 2 The Department reacted with concern to this suggestion. Telegram 207551 to Amman, July 23, warned that establishing a channel between the King and Dayan might pose risks for the King and could prejudice existing contacts between Israel and Jordan if Dayan was not aware of them. The Embassy was instructed to explain to the King that Bundy's suggestion was not made at the behest of the U.S. Government. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country Series, Jordan, Vol. V, Cables, 3/68-1/69) 222. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 222. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, July 22, 1968. SUBJECT Next Steps in the Mid-East Sisco confirms that the Israeli position described to Ball resulted from a Cabinet decision that Israel had to be more flexible to keep us with them. Our next job is how to capitalize on their shift. These are the follow-up steps now being taken: 1. Ball will brief Jarring in New York tonight. He will try to find out whether Jarring wants any further help right now. 2. Rifai is in Cairo urging the Egyptians not to react negatively to the questions Israel put to Jarring for the UAR. He will suggest that Cairo at least come back with questions of its own. 3. The British are also going to try to prime the Egyptians for a constructive answer to Israel's questions. While we shouldn't crow about this minimal shift in Israel's position, we can claim credit for it—for whatever it turns out to be worth. It was basically the result of our plugging away at them here, but apparently our decision to send Ball is what finally shook them into action. We still have plenty of work ahead of us, but maybe we should ponder the fact that even a small move by us can inject new flexibility into this molasses-like situation. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Exdis. 223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, July 24, 1968, 2247Z. 208286. Subject: El Al Aircraft Hijacking. 2 1. In somber presentation, Israeli Charge Argov appealed to Acting Assistant Secretary Davies for USG help to extent possible in regaining hijacked airplane and Israeli citizens. Israel approaching other governments also. Argov stressed they taking restrained public line in order leave Algerians maneuver room. Nonetheless Argov pessimistic about success. 2. Argov concerned that other Palestinian groups may seek to emulate this feat. He noted this was new dimension of trouble for Near East, in field which had not been affected for past 20 years. He expressed fear that this now about to occur, if Algerians [ Palestinians ?] get away with it. Foresaw prospect of adverse effect on tourism. 3. Davies replied USG, of course concerned about hijacking, which we have own interest in opposing. Principle of hijacking is profoundly troublesome. He willing consider what we could do. He thought direct USG approach to Algerians useless (Argov agreed), but perhaps approaches by third countries might help, especially France and Italy. 4. Action addressees accordingly requested approach their governments (Secretariat for USUN) make following points: USG concerned over serious blow to international civil air transport which likely arise if hijacking of El Al aircraft permitted to stand. Aside from dangerous stimulus hijacking might provide to mentally unbalanced individuals, this incident, if not quickly redressed, might stimulate competitive hijacking attempts which could have disastrous impact on international civil aviation in Near East. We think all principal civil air transport powers have major interest in trying to avert such a potential disruption of air traffic. We hope governments will make these points strongly on their own initiative to Algerian Government. 5. For Cairo: Hope you can impress on UARG how potentially dangerous this matter is. Hope UARG would see its way clear to urge Algerians to release plane and Israelis. We have ominous precedent of consequence of sinking of destroyer Eilat in mind. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by James K. Matter (NEA/IAI); cleared in draft by Williams Beal (E/OA), and in substance by Parker (NEA/UAR) and Peter Sebastian (AF/N); and approved by Davies. Also sent to Rome, Cairo, and USUN, and repeated to Algiers, Tel Aviv, London, and Montreal for USRep ICAO. 2 Israeli El Al flight 426, bound for Tel Aviv from Rome, was hijacked by three Palestinian commandos 25 minutes after it took off from Rome on July 22 at 10:30 p.m. On instructions from commandos, the plane made a forced landing at Algiers in the early morning of July 23. The plane carried 38 passengers and a crew of 10. Two of the passengers were U.S. citizens. On landing at Dar El Beida airport, the plane was surrounded by Algerian security forces. Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol publicly accused the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine for the hijacking, and warned the UAR, where the Palestinian group had its headquarters, that Israel would hold the UAR responsible for its acts. (Memorandum from Thomas Hughes to Secretary Rusk, July 24; ibid.) 224. Information Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 224. Information Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 26, 1968. SUBJECT Phantoms for Israel Reading Luke's pro-con memorandum (Tab A) 2 on the difficult problem of Phantoms for Israel, I come down on the side of acting now, perhaps in the form of the last sentence of the memorandum. 3 I should add that we should start the training part of the exercise at once, to eliminate factors of delay if actual deliveries in 1970 do prove to be necessary. Since Luke wrote, several things have happened. To me, they reinforce the argument for acting now. I'm afraid that the newspaper publicity about George Ball's trip, and some of our diplomatic conversations about it, may have given the Arabs (and the Russians) the sense that we are pushing the Israelis' hand, so that they can sit back and wait. Indeed, according to the last report we got from Amman (Amman 5865) (Tab B), 4 Nasser has raised the ante again. In that perspective, and taking into account the hijacking episode 5 and Soviet preoccupation in Czechoslovakia, the Phantoms should be a good signal to the UAR to proceed at once towards a settlement. It is indispensably important that the Arabs (and the Soviets) understand our firm intention to support a fair and evenhanded settlement, and a fair and evenhanded process of negotiation required to achieve it. Miscalculation on this point could in itself produce precisely the blow up we want to prevent. On the Israeli side, I think the Phantoms make sense as well. It is very likely that we shall have to commit the planes anyway in connection with the military assistance bill. It is better to make the decision without coercion, and as part of the process of our overall cooperation with Israel. If we lose Israeli confidence, or create unnecessary suspicions, we may find it increasingly difficult to influence Israel towards moderation in the months ahead. 6 The Phantoms should be a factor for moderation in another sense as well. When the arms balance is precarious, Israel feels easily threatened, and tempted by the idea of a preemptive strike. It is our interest to avoid another blowup. With confidence in our support derived from an early decision on Phantoms, the Israelis might be less trigger-happy when the next round of episodes occurs. The military situation is genuinely serious. The Arabs have too many planes, and too many modern planes. Their airfields are no longer easy targets. Too many of the Israeli planes are old and patched together. If a war does come, it will again be in our interest for Israel to win, and to win decisively. It might conceivably be worth another round with the Soviets on the subject, on a pretty blunt “Phantoms or talks-with-Jarring” basis. I doubt it myself, but I wouldn't object to telling the Russians once more that we're tired of UAR stalling and double talk. The time has come to move. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. 2 Attached is a 5 page unattributed memorandum with the handwritten date of July 6 and a subject line that reads: “F-4 Phantoms for Israel-The Pros and Cons.” 3 The last sentence reads: “That solution would be to tell Israel now we are prepared in principle to go ahead on F-4s while deferring a decision on timing and the signing of contracts and seeking to minimize and obfuscate publicity.” 4 A copy of telegram 5865 from Amman, July 24, is attached. The telegram transmitted a summary report from Foreign Minister Rifai on his recent trip to Cairo and his discussions with Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad. The basic point that emerged from the discussions was the UAR insistence that not a single inch of Arab territory could be conceded to Israel in a peace settlement. 5 See Document 223 . 6 On July 31 Harold Saunders sent a memorandum to President Johnson in which he drew on Ball's conversations in Israel with Eshkol to make the point that Eshkol was “upset” about the failure of any movement on the issue of the Phantoms. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68) 225. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 225. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, July 29, 1968, 0748Z. 3029. 1. Atherton and I spent over two hours with Mohamed Riad of FonOff evening 27th. 2. Atherton said he assumed from UAR discussions with other Arabs, particularly Jordanians, that Egyptians already had good feel of Ball talks in ME. Riad agreed. 3. Atherton emphasized that Ball talks within context pre-UNGA UN consultations and essentially fact-finding. He emphasized continuing USG desire assist Jarring in his efforts find areas agreement within framework Nov 22 resolution. 4. In course discussion, Atherton emphasized Ball's efforts move beyond present doctrinal impasse: viz. Arab commitment to Khartoum and Israel commitment to direct negots, in effort get pragmatic negotiating process started. This connection Atherton made points set forth Deptel 207803. 2 5. Commenting on short range problems, i.e. avoiding abortion of Jarring Mission and keeping problem out of SC, Riad indicated UAR's agreement. As to long range, he kept reiterating GUAR acceptance of Nov 22 resolution in its entirety, including concept of agreed settlement, with all its implications. He said this meant GUAR had no intention returning to pre-June 5 situation. 6. Stating that GUAR had received text Israel's “two questions” from Jordanians, he said he did not feel this anything new but said GUAR would not “be bashful” in responding and posing questions of its own. Riad said GUAR had given Jarring some substantive ideas of its position on free passage, borders and demilitarized zones without any response from GOI. Long before GOI, it had also taken initiative in posing question to GOI through Jarring—namely, what was Israeli concept of “secure and recognized boundaries.” GOI had not responded. Atherton commented that GOI and UARG had each posed hardest question for other side and neither should expect immediate full and direct answer. Important point was that this could provide beginning of substantive engagement of parties which offered best hope of breaking present impasse. 7. As to procedural impasse, Riad said Rifai had communicated to GUAR view of Ball that direct negots necessary at some point. Speaking very carefully, Riad said UAR at this stage could not take position other than opposition to direct negots. We said that at this stage important thing was to get process started. We did not see how direct negots at some stage could be avoided but that was not immediate issue and we had some hope Israelis now more flexible this point. When Jarring presented his formulation of “two questions” we hoped UAR would take opportunity engage Israelis in substantive dialog. 8. I then reiterated seriatim points in last sentence para 13 and remainder of State 20780 3 to Mohamed who took notes. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. 2 Telegram 207803 to Cairo, July 24, instructed Bergus to draw on Ball's exchanges with the Israelis to make the point that Israel had responded to the U.S. initiative and was willing to engage in an exchange of views without insisting on direct negotiations. Bergus was also instructed to note that there was deep skepticism in Israel that the UAR was sincerely interested in peace. (Ibid.) 3 The last sentence of paragraph 1 of telegram 207803 to Cairo instructed Bergus not to preempt Jarring by conveying the substance of the two questions the Israeli Government had asked Jarring to put to the UAR Government. 226. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 226. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 29, 1968. SUBJECT Supplementary PL 480 Sale for Israel In March you approved a $30 million PL 480 sale to Israel. We thought that would take care of them for this year. Now, however, their crop is coming in smaller than either of us estimated because of drought. They have asked for a supplement to the March agreement adding another 70,000 tons of wheat ($4.6 million). Secretary Freeman, Bill Gaud and Charlie Zwick recommend approval. 2 The main advantage in the broader US-Israel context is that going ahead shows a general willingness to help them out at a time when they're studying our every move for signs of how firm our support is. We have an interest in moving the grain, and this would be a 100% dollar credit. 3 Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Confidential. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 5:45 p.m. 2 Freeman and Gaud sent a joint recommendation to President Johnson on July 19. Zwick sent a supporting recommendation to the President on July 29. (Ibid.) 3 The President approved the sale. 227. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 227. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, August 3, 1968, 1505Z. 6014. Subj: Jarring Mission: Jordanian comments on Eban's points. Ref: State 212831; 2 Amman 5934. 3 1. On third I met with FonMin Rifa'i to urge that Jordan respond to Israeli overtures such as Eban points conveyed through Ball during his recent visit to Amman. Using general line in State 212831 I said we hoped Jordan would lose no opportunity to be responsive to any indirect Israeli overtures so that progress on substance could be achieved between now and the UNGA meetings in the autumn. I stressed our belief that Eban's use of Ball as indirect channel was further evidence that Israel is no longer insisting on direct negotiations as precondition for the discussion of substance. I referred also to Ball's impression of policy disarray in Israeli Govt and our view of importance of using all possible means to keep pushing the Israelis to adopt substantive positions. 2. Rifai responded that Jordan very much wants to see progress between now and the UNGA. In fact, as far as Jordan is concerned, progress must be made well before the UNGA meetings because of the Arab League Council meeting now set for Sept 3. Jordan and the UAR must have something tangible to present to the Arab FonMins at that time. Rifai said he could speak for the UAR also in stressing the “eagerness” of both the UAR and Jordan to get down to substantive issues. He again recounted his various discussions of the Jordanian substantive position with Jarring. He said he is not trying to be obstructive when he says that the questions put to the UAR and the points brought by Ball from Eban are too general and too vague to justify specific comment. We could not see what could be said in response except that Jordan still wants to know what actual boundaries Eban has in mind when he talks about “not all but a great deal” of territory. What specifically are the “certain territorial concessions” that Israel would give? He had put these questions to Jarring on several occasions and Jarring had promised to get specific substantive responsive from Eban. So far, these were not forthcoming. 3. In the course of reviewing Jordan's position, Rifai stated that Jordan remains ready to enter into joint meeting (with Jarring present) if it finds there are substantive matters that can profitably be discussed. These would have to be something more than generalities like the points that Eban gave to Ball. Moreover, Rifai said once again that he believes he would be able to show that progress in getting substantive details had been achieved before the UNGA meetings. 4. After further discussions along these lines, I finally asked Rifai if he would authorize me to report that in commenting on Eban points he had said something like the following which might be conveyed to Israel: The GOJ had appreciated Mr. Ball's helpfulness in conveying Mr. Eban's points and had been interested in them. The GOJ welcomed the implication in Mr. Eban's points that Israel agrees in principle to withdraw from the occupied territories. The GOJ has already requested Amb. Jarring to obtain from the Israeli Govt specific statements of what they would consider “secure and recognized boundaries.” Jordan is frank to say it would expect to go back to the June 4 boundaries. If, however, Israel has some specific rectifications to propose, Jordan would be prepared to consider these. It cannot consider them unless they are proposed. Jordan has already stated to Amb Jarring that it would not anticipate stationing its army on the West Bank after a peaceful settlement and would be prepared to limit itself to minimum forces needed for the preservation of public security. The GOJ, of course, found Mr. Eban's statement of the Israeli position on Jerusalem unacceptable. They would like the GOI to be more specific and forthcoming on Jerusalem and in particular would like to hear these ideas through Mr. Jarring. 5. Rifai said he would agree to my reporting the foregoing as a Jordanian response if I believed that this would help to bring about more specific Israeli substantive proposals to Jarring when Eban sees him in the next few days. He said also that I should tell King Hussein about our discussion when I saw Hussein later in the day. After reviewing “Jordan's response” once more, I told Rifai I intended to inform Washington and USUN that he had made these comments on the Eban proposals and that he had stressed Jordan's hope that Israel could give Jarring the specifics that had been promised in the last few meetings. Rifai said he had no objection. 6. With regard to the Israeli questions put to the UAR, Rifai told me he had now learned that Jarring had received the two questions brought by Ball in the form of three with the same substance. He said he did not believe the UAR would be responsive to these questions since they had already been forthcoming in much more detail to Jarring. As in previous discussions I again urged Rifai to recommend to the UAR that, notwithstanding their belief they have already given Jarring substantive details, they keep the ball rolling. If necessary let them restate what they have already said to Jarring as a response to the Israeli questions. Rifai seemed to buy this idea. 7. Comment: On the basis of this discussion, I believe we have enough to go back to the Israelis with a substantive reaction from Jordan. I think we could stress to the Israelis that we think it is now up to them to give Jordan through Jarring some specifics with regard to what they mean by “secure and recognized boundaries” and “certain non-territorial concessions.” If they could say to Jarring that they are ready to withdraw to such boundaries, this could be used as evidence of their acceptance of the principle of withdrawal and would give added stimulus to continuance of indirect discussions. I think it is especially significant that Rifai stated that Jordan is still willing to proceed to joint meetings if some substantive details can be developed before the UNGA meetings. 4 Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Policy; Exdis. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv,USUN, Jerusalem, and Cairo. 2 In telegram 212831, August 1, the Department commented on Foreign Minister Rifai's concerns about Eban's proposals that Ball conveyed to the Jordanian Government. The Department instructed Symmes to point out that Eban's proposals represented the starting point of an indirect process that Jordan could influence constructively or otherwise depending on how it reacted to Eban's overtures. Symmes was further instructed to warn that Jordan's failure to respond would halt the beginning of a constructive process. (Ibid., UN 7) 3 Telegram 5934 from Amman, July 30, reported on Foreign Minister Rifai's reaction to the Israeli proposals as conveyed by Ball. Rifai felt that the Israeli positions that had been transmitted through Jarring, while less specific, were more encouraging than those outlined by Ball. He pointed in particular to the Israeli concept of a role for Jordan in a united Jerusalem which would remain the capital of Israel. Rifai reminded Symmes that Jordan had recently reached an agreement with the UAR that stipulated that any Jerusalem arrangement would have to be part of an overall peace settlement. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 4 On August 5 the Department authorized Barbour to convey to the Israeli Government Rifai's position as outlined in this telegram. Barbour was instructed to urge Eban to make the most of the opportunity to help get the negotiations process going when he met with Jarring in London later in the week. (Telegram 215386 to Tel Aviv; ibid.) 228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, August 4, 1968, 1813Z. 214874. For Flott 2 from Root. Ref: Geneva's 4310. 3 Subject: Hijacked El Al Airliner. 4 1. Commend your effective response to Khelladi. 2. You may, at discretion, amplify remarks reported reftel as follows: a. USG not involved in hijacking in any way whatsoever and has no control over Israeli reaction to the event; assumption to contrary would be false and misleading. b. Washington read decision last Algerian Cabinet meeting to postpone determination re disposition plane, passengers and crew as indicative of GOA desire for time in which to employ resources of diplomacy. If this interpretation correct, GOA's decision constructive. However, we not sanguine much time likely be available for this purpose and we hope GOA will tailor its expectations of diplomatic possibilities to realities of situation. Signs of impatience following GOA's postponement decision already apparent. We unaware what Israel authorities likely do but disturbed lest they consider GOA's decision backward step. c. We note in any event that overwhelming international opinion opposes continued detention plane and occupants, that GOA's linkage political and juridical aspects in this context does not provide internationally acceptable grounds for further detention civil airliner and occupants seized while on “innocent passage”, and assume therefore that pressures will mount sharply once more if no agreement achieved. 3. We are repeating separately State tels 214832, 5 33 6 and 39 7 for your background only. 8 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 ISR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Peter Sebastian (AFN), cleared by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph Palmer II and Atherton, and approved by ARN Country Director John F. Root. Repeated to Algiers and Tel Aviv. 2 Frederick W. Flott, assigned to the U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva. 3 In telegram 4310 from Geneva, August 3, Flott reported that the Algerian Charge Khaled Khelladi called on him on August 2 to discuss the crisis over the hijacked Israeli airliner. Khelladi explained why Algeria had not yet released the Israeli plane, noting, among other things, that Israel and Algeria were formally at war. Flott responded that while international opinion applauded the release of some of the passengers, Algeria was becoming an accessory after the fact in a case of piracy by holding the aircraft an unreasonable length of time. In the course of the conversation, Khelladi said that if Israeli authorities were to liberate some Palestinian prisoners of war, not as a quid pro quo but as a humanitarian gesture, Algerian investigation of the case could be accelerated. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 ISR) 4 See Document 223 . 5 Telegram 214832 to Tel Aviv, August 3, responded to Israeli requests for a public U.S. statement designed to put pressure on Algeria to release the plane, and for a new round of U.S. diplomatic efforts to the same end. The Department felt that both would be counter-productive. (National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 ISR) 6 In telegram 214833 to Tel Aviv, August 3, the Department reported the continuing Israeli belief that the United States should use its influence through third countries to help resolve the impasse with Algeria. (Ibid.) 7 In telegram 214839 to Tel Aviv, August 3, the Department noted that the Italian Government had suggested a U.S. demarche to Israel urging a cessation of propaganda attacks and a “symbolic gesture” by Israel to help facilitate a settlement. The telegram reported that the United States had encouraged Israel to pursue a diplomatic solution but was reluctant to go beyond that in encouraging a settlement. (Ibid., AV 12 IT) 8 Flott made the points outlined in this telegram to Khelladi on August 5. Khelladi noted that his government was in touch with the Italian Government in search of a resolution of the crisis. (Telegram 19114 from Paris, August 6; ibid.) Assistant Secretary Battle met with Ambassador Rabin on August 5 to offer continuing support for Israeli efforts to free the plane. Rabin indicated that Israel had concluded that because the hijacking had occurred in Italian air space Italy was the logical country to help break the impasse. (Telegram 215913 to Tel Aviv, August 6; ibid.) On August 7 Battle spoke to the Italian Ambassador to encourage Italian efforts to find a solution. The Ambassador stated that Italy felt that a solution might depend on an Israeli gesture after the plane was released. Battle indicated that the United States could not suggest such a gesture and considered that Israel should decide the matter. (Telegram 216974 to Tel Aviv, August 7; ibid.) On September 1 an agreement arranged through the good offices of Italy led to the release by Algeria of the El Al plane and remaining passengers and crew. ( Washington Post , September 2, 1968) 229. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) 229. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) 1 Washington, August 5, 1968. SUBJECT Security Council Meetings Regarding Israeli Raid on Jordan We are faced with a difficult situation in the UN Security Council over the next week or so resulting from the recent Israeli air raids against Fatah bases near Salt, Jordan. 2 We expect, regardless of our efforts, that there will be near unanimity in the Security Council for condemning the Israeli counter military action, as was the case last March following Israeli attacks against Fatah bases in the Karameh area. Ambassador Barbour has already expressed our concern to Eshkol and Eban over the consequences of this raid which according to the latest Jordanian figures has resulted in the death of 37 people. As Ambassador Barbour pointed out, our concern is that this latest military action will discourage the Jordanians from responding positively to Jarring's efforts to get peace talks started; that early prospects for getting back the El Al airplane and the 12 Israelis from Algiers have been seriously undercut; and that Israel will find itself completely isolated in the Security Council for taking counter action universally viewed as disproportionate to the incidents which preceded it. 3 We have instructed Ambassador Ball: (a) to refrain from any United States lead which would be interpreted as an attempt on our part to condemn Israel; (b) to make a major effort to assure that any condemnation of Israel is balanced by explicit criticism of the Fatah raids which gave rise to the Israeli counter attack; (c) to call once again on both sides to accept a strengthened UN presence as a deterrent along the Jordan-Israel ceasefire line; and (d) to state publicly our support for an expected Israeli demand for release of the El Al airplane and its 12 personnel. We have also asked Ambassador Ball to exercise maximum influence in discouraging a call for sanctions against Israel which we expect the Jordanians to press at the outset. We are reasonably confident that, while every member of the Security Council will support condemnation of the Israeli air raids, a number will be unwilling to support sanctions. The Soviet strategy is to isolate the United States in the Security Council and to exploit this in the Arab world by portraying United States policy as one of total support for Israel. In practical terms, if our position of reasonable impartiality in the area is to be maintained and if our overall interests are to be protected, the United States will be required to vote affirmatively, as was the case last March (enclosed), 4 on a resolution condemning Israel and which includes reference to prior provocative Fatah incidents. Such a vote would help neutralize Soviet efforts to exploit the situation and help to maintain our influence with both sides. Since the prior incidents which gave rise to the raid are not well documented, our efforts to achieve balance in the resolution will be very difficult. We can assume the Israelis will press us to make an effort to avoid condemnation. We intend to assure them that we will make a substantial effort. However, we would intend to make clear at the same time that U.S. interests in the area require us to avoid being isolated in the Security Council on this issue. An affirmative vote on such a resolution would come as no great surprise to the Israelis, in light of our affirmative vote last March. We would expect that, as in the case of the Karameh raid, the Israelis will begin to discount in their own public opinion the significance of a second condemnatory Security Council resolution. This in turn leads us to believe, for the present at least, that there would be no serious adverse domestic flak if we voted affirmatively and thereby avoided being isolated. We request that this memorandum be sent to the President for his information. 5 We will keep the White House informed as Ambassador Ball's consultations proceed in New York. John P. Walsh 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. 2 Israel launched air and artillery attacks against two Fatah guerrilla bases in Jordan on August 4. Foreign Minister Rifai summoned the Ambassadors of UN Security Council member states on the evening of August 4 to describe the Israeli attacks and to inform them that Jordan planned to request a Security Council meeting and hoped to count on Security Council members to adopt coercive measures against Israel. (Telegram 6022 from Amman, August 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3 Barbour reported this in telegram 4774 from Tel Aviv, August 5. (Ibid.) Battle supported Barbour's initiative by registering a strong protest on August 5 with Rabin against the Israeli attacks. (Telegram 215559 to Tel Aviv, August 6; ibid.) [ text not declassified ]Helms stated that the Israeli attack, according to information from Amman, had created serious doubts [ text not declassified ] as to Israel's desire for peace. He also noted that the reported use of U.S.-supplied Skyhawk aircraft in the attack had sharply increased anti-American sentiment in Jordan. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Files, Chrono 1 Aug-3 Dec 1968) 4 Enclosed was a copy of the UN Security Council resolution of March 24; see footnote 5, Document 121 . 5 There is no indication that the memorandum was sent to the President. 230. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 230. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, August 5, 1968, 1015Z. 6029. Ref State 214812. 2 1. While I was waiting to see King Hussein on the third, his confidant, Zaid Rifai, invited me into his private office for what turned out to be a long conversation. After making his usual arguments for the need of US pressure on Israel to move more constructively toward a peace settlement, Zaid at one point commented the Israelis should know that Jordan would welcome secret and separate talks if Israel had something concrete to offer. He said that Israel would be surprised by how receptive Jordan would be to realistic, concrete proposals designed to bring about a package settlement with Israel. He then volunteered that there are not now and have not been in the past any contacts with Israel about specific matters of substance. Referring to messages that have been brought over by people like Hikmat al-Masri, Zaid said, “The trouble is the Israelis never get down to earth with us.” 2. Comment: Viewed in the gloomy aftermath of Israel's air strike on August fourth, Zaid Rifai's comments might not seem so significant as the day they were uttered. Nevertheless, I would judge they more than likely reflect the thinking of the King, and therefore should be treated seriously. Rifai's reference to the need for concrete proposals from Israel underlines what has been said frequently by the FonMin and Hussein to recent American visitors such as Ball and Sisco. It reveals that if concrete, specific proposals were advanced by Israel, Jordan or, rather, the King would attach relatively little importance to the channel through which they might be transmitted, whether from Jarring, or through something like the Ball/Sisco medium, or the “secret and separate talks” which Rifai mentioned. 3. I understand why Dept does not wish to probe either Israelis or Jordanians with regard to “disavowable” or other type contacts they may have. If any contacts, whatever their nature, are to do any good so far as Jordanians are concerned, they will have to get concrete. Dept may wish therefore to consider passing Zaid's comments to an appropriate Israeli official. 3 Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. 2 In telegram 214812 to Amman, August 3, the Department, in response to an Embassy suggestion, stated that while it had operated for some time on the assumption that secret contacts were underway between Jordan and Israel, it saw no reason to ask the Israeli Government about the contacts. The Department noted that the Israelis had indicated that they intended to offer a judgment as to the possibilities for progress with the Jordanians by early August. The Embassy was instructed to deny all knowledge or suspicion of such contacts. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 215397 to Tel Aviv, August 5, instructed the Embassy to pass along Zaid Rifai's comments, as reported in telegram 6029 from Amman. (Ibid.) When Barbour conveyed the comments to Eban on August 8, Eban said that his government did have concrete ideas about a settlement, but felt that they should be disclosed directly to the Jordanians, either privately or in Jarring's presence. He said he would speak to Jarring and offer Israeli cooperation, and added that the opening of the UN General Assembly offered the most propitious opportunity. (Telegram 4842 from Tel Aviv, August 9; ibid.) 231. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 231. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 6, 1968. SUBJECT Letter from Prime Minister Eshkol Ambassador Rabin today delivered the attached message from Prime Minister Eshkol. 2 It is mainly an answer to your note which Ambassador Ball carried to Eshkol. 3 However, it reiterates the familiar Israeli view that Nasser does not want a real peace and that one reason he refuses to face reality and settle with Israel is that he still thinks he can win the arms race. This leads Eshkol to hope there will soon be a favorable decision on Phantoms. Since Eshkol seems to pass over rather lightly the prospects for progress through Jarring in the near future, we may recommend a quick response to this letter. The danger we want to avoid is that the Israelis will feel they've placated us now in their talks with Ball and won't follow up seriously. If there is to be any progress the Israelis will have to begin talking substance with Jarring. Eshkol's jab in his final paragraph at our Jordan arms program 4 is hard to understand except as a general reminder that he's keeping his eye on us. Our program is just as we explained it to the Israelis after you approved it. We can't believe the Israelis really see it as a threat. New subject . Just for your information, Rabin in a separate note 5 has requested twelve more Skyhawks. These would be added to the end of the present production line before it is modified to put out a new model for our Navy. The Israelis want these mainly to cover normal attrition over the life of the planes. With the original 48 and the 40 more you released after Eshkol's visit, this would bring their total to 100. We will have a recommendation for you later. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch on August 8 at 10:15 a.m. 2 Attached was an August 5 letter from Ambassador Rabin to Secretary Rusk conveying a message from Prime Minister Eshkol to President Johnson. 3 See Document 212 . 4 Eshkol expressed concern that Jordan's rearmament would prove to be more formidable than anticipated and that King Hussein's interest in a final peace settlement would be correspondingly weakened. 5 Not found. 232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, August 7, 1968, 1844Z. 216436. 1. Ambassador Sharaf of Jordan called on Assistant Secretary Battle on August 6 and expressed his deep concern that the continuation of the present trend of events would make it increasingly difficult for King Hussein to justify his close relationship with the United States. He said that the recent Israeli air attacks had created a strong public reaction in Jordan. Almost all Jordanians believed United States could prevent such attacks if we wished to do so. In fact, the air raids had been carried out partially with US Skyhawk aircraft which had been delivered to Israel after Israel had occupied Arab territory in June 1967. 2. The Ambassador said that Jordan had accepted the November 22 resolution in toto even though the resolution had included almost all of Israel's objectives. Jordan had done so in light of US assurances that the USG would use its full weight to support the resolution. Unfortunately the Israelis had blocked the implementation of the resolution by arguing over modalities of agreement and the United States has not used its influence with Israel to bring about an agreement. The Arabs therefore concluded that the USG is retreating from its assurances, both in respect to our support of the UN resolution as well as our earlier assurances on territorial integrity for the nations of the Middle East. In addition to all this, the Ambassador continued, USG is now attempting to balance a few sporadic acts of resistance carried out by individual Arabs in the occupied territories with the calculated and destructive air raids carried out by the armed forces of Israel in the heartland of Jordan. The obvious disproportion between the provocation and the response has made the US posture appear insincere to the Arab world. United States actions are creating a situation in which it is increasingly difficult for King Hussein to justify his relations with the United States, and in fact, such ties are becoming more dangerous for the King in a “concrete sense”. 3. Mr. Battle said that he could dispute many of the specific points made by the Ambassador but this ground had been covered many times. He was now more interested in hearing any ideas the Ambassador might have on how the trend of events could be reversed. Ambassador Sharaf replied that despite our protestations the US could use its leverage on Israel. We had done so in 1957 and we could now withhold arms shipments. Both Dayan and Eshkol have said that they do not care about the rest of the world as long as the United States continued to back Israel. The US could also show more balance and understanding for the Arab position in the statements made by USG leaders. Even the Vice-President had recently made statements favoring the delivery of Phantom-jet aircraft to Israel. 4. Mr. Battle pointed out that the situation in 1967 was different from that in 1957. The rights and wrongs were clearer in 1957 and the failure of the arrangements negotiated at that time were a major reason for our present difficulties. It is also a fact that many observers could see a causal relationship between Arab terrorism and Israeli reprisals. Our position on both has been clearly stated and we still believed that the November 22 resolution and the Jarring mission offer the best opportunity to check the present unhappy course of events. Ambassador Sharaf said that he was afraid that the Israeli rigidity on negotiations and their policy of armed reprisals would soon make the November 22 resolution irrelevant. 5. Ambassador Battle pointed out that the USG found both the Arab and Israeli positions on modalities to be unrealistic and asked why Jordan resisted the stationing of UN observers along the ceasefire lines. Ambassador Sharaf replied that Jordan did not trust Israel and believed that the Israelis wished to convert the ceasefire line into a permanent boundary. In any case,UN observers would not answer the real problem. The real problem was how to implement the Security Council resolution. The three “noes” of the Khartoum conference were a necessary concession to Arab public opinion and provided the framework which made Arab acceptance of the November 22 resolution possible. 6. Ambassador Sharaf ended the conversation with a plea that USG at least make some gesture indicating a greater understanding of the Arab position as we have already gone far down the road towards severing meaningful contact with the Arab world. The United States' abstentions on the UN Jerusalem resolutions had probably hurt US prestige more in the Arab world than our arms sales to Israel. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Marshall W. Wiley, cleared by David L. Gamon (NEA/ARN), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Beirut, USUN, and London. 233. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 233. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 8, 1968. SUBJECT Ambassador Ball's Report on Middle East Trip We have already described for you the results of Ambassador Ball's Mid-East talks, so you do not need to read his long report (attached). 2 However, you may wish to read the main personal conclusions which are scattered through his report: 1. Some movement on the part of Israel is perceptible. However, without substantial and continuing pressure from the United States on both the Israelis and the Arabs, the Jarring Mission is not going to produce any significant movement toward settlement. 2. Unless compelled to move affirmatively either by events or external pressure the Israeli government is quite ready to live with the present situation of neither peace nor war for an indefinite time. 3. King Hussein desperately wants a settlement since he has lost half his country and is under terrible pressure; however, his freedom of action is severely limited not only by the Palestinian Arabs who constantly threaten him, but by the UAR. 4. Nasser is in a weak position and will almost certainly take no initiative toward a settlement. While the UAR economy is a shambles he continues to live off a dole from the Saudis, Libyans, and the Kuwaitis, which he can probably continue to exact so long as the Canal remains closed. 5. King Faisal is driven by religious passion, and deeply preoccupied with the protection of the Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem. Hussein must certainly consult Faisal on any Jerusalem settlement, and, if not satisfied, Faisal would try hard to persuade Hussein not to go ahead. Ambassador Eilts believes, however, that if Hussein were to accept a settlement, even though it fell short of what Faisal would like Faisal would grumble but do nothing about it. 6. Kosygin told Jarring recently that he wants a political settlement. While the prevailing “no-war, no-peace” situation is not unattractive to the Soviets, we should not take this for granted—particularly in view of their interest in opening the Suez Canal. It seems doubtful that we can deflect the Soviet Union from its one-sided support of the Arabs, but we should at least make an effort, if for no other reason than that 100 countries will expect us to do so. In addition, Ambassador Ball reports that the UAR and USSR are under great pressure to see the Suez Canal opened, as are the British, Italians and French to decreasing degrees. Regarding our interest, Ball concludes: “We should make a study in depth to determine our position with regard to the opening of the Canal. If that study should show—as it well might-that our interests are best served by keeping the Canal closed—thus frustrating Soviet strategic ambitions and raising the cost of Soviet supplies to North Vietnam—then we should be quite tough-minded in not joining in efforts to separate this issue from an overall settlement, in spite of the continuing expense to our British, German and Italian friends. Alternatively, if the study should show that these strategic considerations are only marginally important, we might make a real effort to trade our support for the reopening of the Canal for Soviet support of an acceptable final settlement of the Middle Eastern problem.” Jarring begins his next round of talks by meeting Eban in London August 9. We have urged Eban to show enough new flexibility so that Jarring will tell the Egyptians he is ready to start talking about substantive issues. Our objective is to pave the way for serious talk when the U.N. General Assembly meets in late September. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch on August 9 at 1:45 p.m. 2 A 12-page report on the trip from Ball and Sisco to President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, dated August 6, was attached. 234. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 234. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, August 9, 1968, 0900Z. 4847. Subj: Jarring Mission: Jordanian comments on Eban's points. Ref: State 215386. 2 1. I saw Eban Aug 8 at his office in Jerusalem and gave him full rundown on Rifai's comments as contained in Amman 6014, adding additional points made in reftel by Dept. Noted, of course, Amb Symmes conversation with Rifai was prior Aug 4 raid. 2. Eban said it was certainly helpful to have this report of Symmes talk with Rifai. Welcomed indication that Rifai remains of the same disposition as in May when he expressed desire to find way for Jordan and Israel to meet under Jarring's chairmanship. Thought this willingness on Jordan's part was most important thing that has come from Jarring Mission. Eban thought there should be no further American approach to Jordan until he, Eban, had seen Jarring. He would ask Jarring to tell Rifai that if the Jordanians find a way to meet with the Israelis under Jarring's chairmanship they would then not any longer hear generalities about Israel's position but specifics. Whether GOI could give them anything more specific before such a meeting, however, would depend. If a meeting such as Rifai envisaged with Jarring present could be arranged, then the speed of progress would increase by geometric proportions, so speedily as to bear no relation to the pace of progress up to now. He would ask Jarring to tell Jordanians, however, that if they want detailed GOI views it must be done in a situation in which Israel can also obtain Jordan views. 3. Eban went on to say that the current situation on the frontier might be said to offer great obstacles to negotiations. Certainly it was hard to try to make peace with a country which maintains anti-ceasefire organizations on its territory. Some members of GOI say that Jordan should be required to take strong action against El Fatah before Israel would be willing to negotiate, but the GOI is ready to proceed without this. Nevertheless, relationship of GOJ to El Fatah is an important element. One alternative would be to say that the local security situation is an obstacle which must prevent negotiations from the point of view of both sides, but another, which he thought more realistic, would be to disassociate the two. Noted Jordan had not yet said that security situation would influence peace moves. 4. His feeling, Eban said, was that if Israelis got around a table with Jordanians there would be a great deterrent on both sides against security situations which might adversely affect negotiations and both countries would take pains to avoid them. Said he would do everything to get Jarring to work for a meeting at UNGA because this would be the first time since Jarring's appointment for the Foreign Ministers to be together under one roof. The speed of liaison would be immensely improved, with Jarring able to go from room to room to make meeting arrangements rather than have to fly from country to country with attendant delays. Whatever Jarring does for next month to keep pot boiling will be fine, but his aim should be for a meeting at GA. 5. Re UAR, Eban said he understood Jarring had not officially transmitted his questions since he found El Kony frustrating to deal with and preferred to keep questions for direct talk with Riad. Eban said GOI estimates Egypt in state of ideological immobility. Result of GOI's questions would not be to make progress towards peace but to show who is responsible for lack of progress. If the primary goal cannot be attained at least the secondary one can. As long as the UAR-Jordan ideological gap remains, with one refusing all of the things to which the other agrees, he did not see how progress could be made. 6. I told Eban we certainly agreed that next step is between him and Jarring. Since he had mentioned question of El Fatah, I had to say again that we deplore both El Fatah and GOI moves, and regard GOI response as unfortunate. I added for myself that I was sorry to see that Israel found no response to infiltrators but offensive military force on a scale all out of proportion to the infiltration. Eban replied that it was important to meet infiltrators on the ground but also important to pursue them to their home bases. Failure is what influences them most, and they will be emboldened if they can maintain their bases with immunity on the acquiescence of GOJ. Even if it could not entirely prevent Fatah operations, GOJ could at least create conditions to make them hard. 7. I told Eban that GOI puts enormous efforts into offensive military tactics. I wondered if they were prepared to take the same sort of risks in the search for peace. Eban replied that the parallel was not valid because their efforts on the peace front get no reactions from the other side. 8. I believe conversation gave Eban a good understanding of how strongly we feel that opening towards substantive talks represented by Rifai's comments should not be lost. At same time, basic situation seems to remain that Jordan wants specific proposals before it will sit down with Jarring and Israelis, while Israelis say they cannot get down to specifics until they are actually sitting around a table with Jarring and GOJ. In spite of this difference, I think there is room for Jarring to maneuver and to seek to extract a little from each side to meet the needs of the other with the hope that, as Eban says, the final steps to bring them together can be taken when they are at the UN. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, London, Jidda, Jerusalem, Cairo, and USUN. 2 Telegram 215386 to Tel Aviv, August 5, instructed Barbour to convey to Eban Rifai's comments as reported in telegram 6014 from Amman, Document 227 . In doing so, Barbour was instructed to urge Eban to make the most of the opportunity presented by his impending meeting with Jarring in London to help Jarring get the negotiation process going. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 235. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant (Jones) in Texas 235. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant (Jones) in Texas 1 Washington, August 12, 1968, 1444Z. CAP 81937. Please hold this Hal Saunders memo for me, but show to the President if, in fact, Robert Anderson or any other private individual should seek to get in touch with the President on this sensitive issue. “I would not bother you with this except that the President may be approached on this subject. The American company involved has engaged Robert Anderson as a ‘consultant.’ The Israelis are trying to press Standard Oil of Indiana to cut back operations in UAR oil fields in the Gulf of Suez off the Sinai or to take Israel into partnership on any expansion of production. Production in this major field is increasing steadily, so the Israeli request amounts to pressure to deal Israel in or stop normal growth. The State Department Legal Adviser says Israeli occupation extends to the water's edge of the Sinai but not into the Gulf of Suez. He says there is little question about continued UAR sovereignty over the Gulf's underwater oil. More important, oil advisers are seriously concerned about the implications for our oil interests throughout the area-not to mention our political position-if Arab governments felt that we were now willing to stand aside and let Israel use an American company to consolidate its conquest of the Sinai. State believes the Israelis are just seeing now much they can get away with and intends to advise Israelis strongly to drop the idea. But we probably have not heard the last of this.” 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. 2 Telegram 218916 to Tel Aviv, August 10, instructed Ambassador Barbour to see the highest available official in the Foreign Ministry to convey the deep U.S. concern about proposed Israeli actions with respect to oil in the Gulf of Suez. (Ibid.) Under Secretary Rostow took up the issue with Ambassador Rabin on August 12, stressing the potentially explosive character of the issue raised by Israel with respect to the El-Morgan oil field being developed by Standard Oil of Indiana. Rostow noted that the United States did not accept the Israeli legal justifications for their position, and added that, at a delicate and crucial stage in the Jarring Mission, Israeli pressure on this issue could intensify doubts about its interest in a peaceful settlement and its long-term intentions with regard to the Sinai. (Memorandum of conversation, August 12; National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Rostow Files: Lot 69 D 196, EUR Chron, August 1968) Battle also discussed the issue with Rabin on August 15, in the company of the Department's Legal Adviser Leonard Meeker. Meeker outlined the U.S. legal position in opposing Israel's assertion of rights in the Gulf of Suez, and Battle stressed the adverse political consequences. (Telegram 222928 to Cairo, August 16; ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 33 GULF OF SUEZ) 236. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 236. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, August 14, 1968, 2334Z. CAP 81991. Secretary Rusk has had the following memorandum from Katzenbach, Ball, Battle and Sisco on the resolution pending in the Security Council on the recent Israeli retaliation raids on Jordan. The Secretary hopes to discuss this with the President by phone Thursday morning at the President's convenience. “1. The attached resolution is substantially the same as that adopted by the Security Council in March following the Israeli raid on Karameh. This is the case despite the fact that whereas there were general and well-documented prior incidents which provoked the Karameh raid, the same cannot be said for the present situation. The incidents that preceded the Israeli air raid on Salt were of a relatively minor character which could be expected in a situation where there is military occupation of territory. Tekoah (Israel) has made no real case in the Security Council concerning the prior provocations to this latest raid, and we nevertheless have succeeded in injecting balance in the resolution even though the Israelis have made a weak case. The fact of the matter is that this latest Israeli raid was a preventive raid rather than one that was sparked by any prior serious incident. Moreover, it is all the more embarrassing to us that evidence indicates that the Skyhawks we gave to Israel were involved. 2. We have worked very hard behind the scenes in order to make the text more balanced than in any of its earlier forms. We have succeeded in two principal ways: (A) the sponsors, pursuant to our pressure, have eliminated any language which might form the basis for future sanctions against Israel; and (B) while the text condemns the Israeli counter raid, it also makes explicit reference to the prior acts of terrorism. 3. Friendly members of the Security Council, after concerted and extensive efforts on our part (UK, Canada, Denmark, Brazil and Paraguay) have helped us achieve this result. They have concluded, as we have, that this is as well as we can do on any text. They are prepared to support the text, and we would be isolated if we were to stand out by abstaining. This would have adverse effects on our overall position in the area and give the Soviets an opportunity to exploit the situation to their advantage. 4. A U.S. abstention would encourage the Israelis to feel that there were no restraints regarding similar future raids and that it could disregard entirely the views of the Security Council. 5. Last March Israel put the best face on the Security Council resolution by stressing that both the prior terrorist raids and the Israeli counter action were criticized by the Security Council. They discounted its importance in Israeli public opinion, and we can expect the Israelis to play it essentially the same way this time. Our informal discussions with the Israelis indicate they expect condemnation and a resolution similar to the one adopted last March, and that this result they would not find greatly disturbing. 6. We do not expect the adoption of this resolution to have any appreciable effect here at home. We have had no expressions of concern from the Jewish community, and there has been little interest in our press in the SC proceedings. The editorials on the latest incident in our papers have been balanced and have linked the provocations with the counter action, so that I do not anticipate any major press problem. 7. Our affirmative vote would be coupled with a statement by George Ball in the Council which would stress that the SC resolution applies both to the prior terrorist raids as well as to Israeli counter action. George has already made such a speech in the Security Council, but it would be worth repeating. Draft Resolution The Security Council, Having heard the statements of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel, Having noted the contents of the letters of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8616, S/8617, S/8721, S/8724, 2 Recalling its previous Resolution 248 (1968) 3 condemning the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the ceasefire resolutions and deploring all violent incidents in violation of the ceasefire, Observing that all the massive air attacks by Israel on Jordanian territory were of a large scale and carefully planned nature in violation of Resolution 248 (1968), Considering that premeditated military attacks of this kind seriously prejudice the achievement of peace in the Middle East, and that all violent incidents and other violations of the ceasefire should be prevented, Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting therefrom, 1. Reaffirms its Resolution 248 (1968), in particular its paragraph 2 which condemns the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the ceasefire resolutions, and paragraph 3 which deplores all violent incidents in violation of the ceasefire and declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the ceasefire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts; 2. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property; 3. Condemns the further military attacks launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and Resolution 248 (1968); 4. Warns that if such actions were to be repeated the Council would duly take account of the failure to comply with the present resolution; 5. Calls for full cooperation with the Secretary General's Special Representative.” 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. 2 UN docs. S/8616 and S/8617 are both dated June 5. S/8616 is a letter from the Jordanian Permanent Representative calling on the Security Council to consider Israeli aggression against Jordan in the Israeli raid on Karameh, and S/8617 is a letter from the Israeli Permanent Representative rebutting the Jordanian charges and holding Jordan accountable for terrorist activity against Israel. UN docs. S/8721 and S/8724, dated August 5, were again letters to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and Israel with similar charges and counter-charges following the Israeli air raid on Salt. 3 Adopted on March 24. (UN doc. S/RES/248) 4 The Security Council unanimously adopted this resolution on August 16. (UN doc. S/RES/256 (1968)) 237. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 237. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, August 14, 1968. SUBJECT Ball Mission Down the Drain? I may be guilty of over-dramatizing, but the Barbour-Eban and Eban-Jarring meetings last Thursday-Friday seem to confirm that the flexibility we thought Ball found in Jerusalem was just a sop the Israelis threw us. I'm attaching the cables which describe the post-Ball Israeli position in detail. 2 Ball's understanding was that the Israelis would exchange real substance through Jarring. Eban now says the generalities he's passed are all the Jordanians are going to get, at least through Jarring, until they meet directly. Nor did Eban give Jarring anything encouraging to take to Cairo, as we suggested he do. Joe Sisco has already reacted, and State has instructed Ball and Barbour to react similarly. This is a fair start, but I think we ought to arrange a small explosion. If we let them get away with this without more than a passing comment, we can write off right now most of the progress Ball achieved. I am trying to stir State to sharpen and broaden its expression of dismay so the Israelis will get the point. Luke will do so with Rabin and will suggest Nick Katzenbach follow suit. He also agrees that we should include this theme in the President's reply to Eshkol, but that's still a few days off. If Eppie were here, I'd suggest you call him, but I guess we've lost that channel for the moment. Anyway, you can keep this theme in the back of your mind-the Israelis are slipping away from the position they took with Ball. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis. 2 The attached telegrams were telegrams 4842 and 4847 from Tel Aviv, both August 9, and telegram 220328 to Tel Aviv, August 13. For telegram 4842, see footnote 3, Document 230 . For telegram 4847, see Document 234 . Telegram 220328 transmitted to Tel Aviv an account of the August 9 meeting between Eban and Jarring in London, as conveyed to Sisco by the Israeli Embassy. In discussing the possibility of direct contacts between Israel and Jordan, Eban indicated that Jordan could not expect to receive any further clarification of Israeli territorial assurances without engaging in direct talks. Sisco noted that this was at variance with the impression he and Ball had received in Tel Aviv. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 238. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 238. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, August 16, 1968. SUBJECT The Situation in Syria You asked what is going on in Syria. Although much of our information comes from poor sources, we can see the general outlines. What we can't judge is the relative strength of the contending groups. The people in Damascus could be over-reacting to a largely imaginary threat, or they could be one step from defeat. The coup in Iraq a month ago, which brought a right-wing Baath government to power, encouraged the exiled Syrian Baathists in Beirut and frightened the radical Baath rulers in Damascus. Damascus is taking the reports of plotting in Baghdad and Beirut seriously. We know that there is plotting, but we don't know where it will lead or how much support the plotters will get from Iraq. To counter the threat, Damascus has cracked down—we aren't sure how much—on potential opponents in Syria. One result has been an increase in suspicion within the government and a decrease in domestic support. The crackdown—rather than coup plotting—was probably the reason the former Army Chief of Staff fled to Beirut, and this could also be the reason the Syrian pilots flew to Israel but it is more likely that they just got lost. Because most of the plotters are in Beirut, the Syrians have tried to put pressure on Lebanon. Their main effort was a transit tax which hurt the Lebanese, but also hurt the Jordanians, Saudis and Kuwaitis. The major result so far has been an increase in Syria's isolation in the Arab world. The Syrian rulers have never been popular, but most Syrians don't think the alternatives to the present regime are much better. If the exiles try to seize power, they will find neither popular support nor popular opposition. The only question is whether they are strong enough to seize key positions in the government. The answer to the question is in Baghdad and Damascus. Our sources are in Beirut and Amman. If the exiles win, Syria is likely to be less radical, but it would still be among the Arab extremists. Our main concern in all this is the effect on Jordan. There are indications that the plotters hope to overthrow Hussein as well as the Syrians. The Jordanians believe that Hussein is becoming increasingly vulnerable, and that our “pro-Israeli” policies contribute to radical strength. John 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Syria, Vol. I, Cables and Memos, 4/64-10/68. Secret. 239. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 239. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, August 17, 1968, 0124Z. 223116. You will have received London's 11823 2 as a supplement to State's 222134 3 as well as USUN's 6213 4 reporting Ball's luncheon session with Gohar, et al at which no new ground was broken. We suggest you draw on following in your discussion with Mohamed Riad: 1. We have been primarily responsible for getting some flexibility in GOI position; they now in process of exploring substance indirectly and we are continuing urge them to be as flexible and forthcoming as possible. We believe process of posing questions represents a good start, but it must be built upon, not only with additional questions but further and fuller explanations by all parties of their substantive positions. (In this connection, you should seek to ascertain just when UAR conveyed three questions reported in London 11823 and what UAR understanding is as to whether Jarring will put them to Israelis.) 2. We think time has long passed for any of the parties to stick to doctrinal rigidities. We hope that UAR will respond fully and constructively to questions Jarring has posed to them, and not limit themselves to countering with questions of their own. While we have no intention of blueprinting substantive replies to be made by respective parties, we believe it would promote progress if all parties, including UAR, could begin to clarify their positions in more specific terms re key elements of Security Council resolution. 3. For example, a positive reply by UAR to question of whether it prepared in context of a peace settlement to put a complete end to state of belligerency with State of Israel would be helpful. At best, we would like UAR to respond with a categoric “yes,” coupling such affirmative reply with indication of willingness to embody such an obligation in binding commitment with Israel not with some third party as SC. SC endorsement of any agreement would obviously be very useful, but it is not a feasible substitute for a binding undertaking between principal parties. UAR could be reminded that when they say they accept SC Res of Nov. 22 from A to Z as a package, para. 3 calls for “agreement.” 4. A further example can be cited re second question: recognition of political independence, territorial sovereignty and integrity of Israel. Again we feel that if in fact UAR is interested in a fundamental settlement then it must begin to indicate now that it is willing to consider a binding commitment between GOI and UAR. This would be clearest indication that UAR had in fact adopted a live-and-let-live policy, and is willing work out a modus vivendi with Israel. Is UAR ready for this? Statement on its part that “it accepts SC resolution of November 1967” are useful, but have become part of doctrinal rigidity which has contributed to impasse. What is required is indication of UAR willingness to enter into binding understanding with GOI on crucial point of this kind, as required by para. 3. 5. Similarly, distinction which UAR has been trying to make between freedom of passage of Israeli cargoes and Israeli flag ships strikes us as unrealistic and casts doubt on UAR willingness to achieve a fundamental settlement. 6. In short, we feel you ought to smoke out Riad on specifics. We suspect you will not get very far. We recognize UAR has been conveying piece-meal reactions to specific points in resolution which in our judgment have been designed largely to improve UAR position tactically and publicly. Answers or lack of answers or partial answers by UAR will help clarify whether their reaction is primarily tactical for public relations purposes or whether in fact they want to come to grips with the elements of a fundamental political settlement in accordance with SC Res. In this connection, we have had this week two New York Times articles by Eric Pace. 5 At the time of the Ball luncheon with Gohar (August 13), we inquired whether there was anything to August 12 article and got only quick denials from all three UAR representatives present at the luncheon. We feel you ought to get across to Riad our feeling that positions adopted by UAR to date have been primarily for public relations purposes rather than a serious attempt to face realities of a settlement. We say this not in sense of trying to make a judgment as to which of the parties is responsible because there has been plenty of rigidity on both sides. But we feel there is genuine opportunity to test real intentions of parties, and that it is a matter of high urgency to prepare the way for constructive exchanges among Fonmins in New York. 7. We note also that UAR has been very careful in avoiding any indication as to whether Foreign Minister Riad intends to be present in opening days of the General Assembly. This too, in our judgment, will be a test. Rifai of Jordan obviously wants to go there, but we detected caution on part of GOJ in absence of knowing what UAR is going to do. You might explore this point as well. 8. With reference to UAR statements of “acceptance of the SC resolution” and its insistence GOI has not, fact of matter is all three have accepted resolution, but each has expressed its acceptance with its own reservations. UAR, for example, has accepted SC resolution, but it does not draw attention to fact that acceptance is subject to reservation that it interprets SC resolution to mean withdrawal of Israeli forces to pre-June lines. Jordan has probably been most categoric in acceptance of resolution, though it too has expressed its reservations. And Israel is also on record as accepting resolution within context of its own reservations. (Tekoah's May 1 SC statement, reaffirmed publicly by GOI Cabinet on June 23.) 9. Finally, a simple statement to Jarring from UAR that it is willing to try to achieve a “binding agreement with Israel” in accordance with SC resolution of November 1967 would certainly move things forward. You may wish to explore this also on personal basis. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Stuart W. Rockwell and Eugene Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, London, Tel Aviv,USUN, and Moscow. 2 In telegram 11823 from London, August 14, the Embassy reported that it had received from the Foreign Office the text of three questions that the United Arab Republic had asked Jarring to pass to the Israelis. The questions, which were conveyed to the Foreign Office by the UAR Embassy, read as follows: “A) Is Israel ready to accept four-power or SC guarantee of overall area settlement along lines of November 1967 SC resolution? B) Would Israel withdraw its troops 30-40 kilometers from Suez Canal in return for unrestricted passage of Israeli cargoes through canal if this arrangement were regarded as one stage in putting entire settlement package into effect? C) If it were also regarded as simply one stage in an overall settlement package, would Israel be ready to withdraw from Gaza strip in favor of a UN administration?” (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 222134 to Tel Aviv, August 16, Barbour was instructed to try to find out if the three UAR questions had been conveyed to Israel and if Israel had answered them. If not, Barbour was instructed to ask the Israeli Government to consult with the United States before doing so. The Department explained the necessity for a more specific U.S. role in helping to influence the substantive exchanges between the parties in order to “encourage positive and constructive responses.” (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 6213 from USUN, August 16, reported on a luncheon meeting that Ball, Sisco, and Buffum had on August 12 with Ghorbal, El Kony, and Gohar of the UAR. Ball offered his impressions on the Jarring Mission, based on his recent trip to the Middle East, and tried to draw out the UAR officials on prospects for negotiations. The meeting was described by the Mission as “not particularly fruitful” with the UAR representatives cleaving to established positions. One point that emerged from the discussion was that the UAR representatives denied that there was anything to the article written in The New York Times on August 12 by Eric Pace purporting to describe new UAR proposals for a peace settlement. (Ibid.) 5 On August 12 Pace, citing “well-informed Arab diplomats,” reported that the UAR was prepared to accept a settlement that included internationalizing the Gaza strip, waiving past demands for the repatriation of Palestinian refugees, and demilitarizing the Sinai peninsula. In another article on August 15, Pace cited “highly placed Western diplomats” as revealing that the UAR was pressing for a peace settlement based on “declarations of peace” that would be endorsed by the UN Security Council, and separately by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. 240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, August 17, 1968, 0129Z. 223117. For Barbour. 1. You will be seeing Rafael on Aug 18th, and we hope he will be able to give you additional information regarding three UAR questions (State 222134 and London 11823). 2 You should feel free to discuss possible GOI reply along lines FYI section of State 222134. 2. In addition, we believe it is important that you get across to Eban upon his return our concern that flexible approach he described to Ball and Sisco in Israel be maintained. 3 You will recall that Eban made clear in those conversations a willingness to explore substance indirectly, and this was reflected in questions posed to UAR and Israeli ideas passed by Ball to GOJ re possible shape of a settlement. We understood clearly, though there was no time period put on it, that indirect process would be pursued seriously in hopes that it might set stage for serious explorations in the opening days of the General Assembly, including possibility of joint meetings, most likely in presence of Jarring. We have expressed concern to Israelis here and in New York that reports of Eban's Aug 9 conversation with Jarring indicate a less flexible posture than we were led to believe existed. We want to be specific in this regard. Reports are that Eban told Jarring that while Israel remained flexible, “Jordan cannot have specific clarification of Israel's intentions without some kind of direct contacts.” (This is precisely as Argov reported it to us here, see State 220328.) 4 This sounds to us like direct negotiations again becoming an end in itself. If this is a correct report, Eban statement is all more distressing in circumstances where he had available Jordanian response as contained in paras 3 and 4 of Amman 6014 5 in which GOJ invited specific GOI territorial rectification proposals and reaffirmed willingness to “enter into joint meetings (with Jarring present) if it finds there are substantive matters that can profitably be discussed.” 3. We feel it is untenable for GOI to take view it unwilling to be more specific unless there is direct contact. We therefore want you to press Eban to keep substantive dialogue going by being directly responsive to Jordanian request for more specificity. We realize this might entail difficult decisions on which Israeli Cabinet divided. But we are reaching watershed, and parties must begin to face up to realities. We felt ideas Ball and Sisco conveyed to GOJ on behalf of GOI were useful starting point. While Rifai's response has certainly a number of elements which are unacceptable to Israelis, nevertheless GOJ has said explicitly that it is willing to get together in joint meetings with Jarring present if it finds there are substantive matters that can be profitably discussed. We therefore urge that Eban respond more specifically to GOJ during his next discussion with Jarring. 4. While we have no intention to blueprint what GOI substantive reply ought to be, it should be possible to formulate answer in more specific territorial terms as it relates to West Bank, possibly coupling this with a renewed indication of a GOI willingness to discuss such new specifics at joint meetings under Jarring's auspices during opening days of the General Assembly. 5. You might tell Eban our judgment continues to be Hussein wants to make a settlement, but that he needs more specificity from Israelis and reassurance that a deal he can live with is possible if he is to make decision for joint meetings with them in New York. 6. We hope therefore you can have a full discussion with Eban and press him hard on this matter. 6 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco on August 16, cleared by Rockwell and Eugene Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, London, USUN, and Moscow. 2 See footnotes 3 and 2, Document 239 . 3 Under Secretary Rostow also stressed this point in an August 17 meeting with Ambassador Rabin. (Telegram 223182 to Tel Aviv, August 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 4 See footnote 2, Document 237 . 5 Document 227 . 6 Barbour was also instructed to remind Eban that he had said that by early August he would provide the United States with an assessment of the prospects for progress in the channel that Eban had referred to as the “Jordanian flirtation.” (Telegram 223140 to Tel Aviv, August 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) 241. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 241. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, August 19, 1968, 0915Z. 3193. 1. In Aug 17 conversation with Mohamed Riad, I waited until he had completed briefings on Jarring visit and Vinogradoff conversation (septels) before touching on some of the points in State 223116. 2 2. First of all Mohamed denied that three questions discussed between UAR Embassy London and UK FonOff had any status within GUAR. Only questions GUAR had put to Israel via Jarring were those raised by FonMin Riad on Aug 17. 3 3. As was to be expected, Mohamed expressed resentment at our tarring GUAR with brush of doctrinal rigidity. He said acceptance Nov 22 Res represented basic and fundamental UAR policy decision. He noted mention of “20 year state of war” in question put by Rafael to UAR through Jarring.UAR understood Israel's concern was that UAR only interested in “removing traces of aggression” i.e. returning to pre-June 5, 1967 situation. This definitely not case. GUAR had, and would continue respond with categoric “yes” to question as to whether UAR prepared in context peace settlement put complete end to state of belligerency with Israel. 4. Mohamed said Jarring was of opinion that “agreement” called for in Nov 22 Res did not have to be agreement between parties. Jarring felt, according Mohamed, that agreement between each party and SC coupled with pledge by each party before SC would fulfill requirements of para 3 of SC res. 5. As to live-and-let-live and modus vivendi with Israel, Mohamed said GUAR prepared give binding pledge, to be guaranteed by SC, on each and every element in Nov 22 SC res. 6. I said UAR position on Suez Canal, i.e. differentiation between Israel cargoes and flag not understandable. If UAR meant what it said re readiness terminate state belligerency with Israel, then there no basis for any kind of discrimination against Israel flag. Either you had belligerency or you didn't. It didn't come in packages of varying size. Mohamed said agreement which UAR envisaged would culminate in total implementation of SC res. Same agreement which opened Canal to Israel cargoes “as a first step” would also spell out circumstances in which state of belligerency would be terminated and Canal opened to Israel flag. 7. I mentioned denial of Kony, Gohar, and Ghorbal of Eric Pace NY Times story of Aug 12. Mohamed said GUAR stood on FonMin-Jarring Stockholm conversation which remained its firm position. (Mohamed also said Gohar had been greatly impressed by Ball.) 8. As to proposition that UAR, Israel, and Jordan acceptance of Nov 22 Res exists subject reservations each party, Mohamed said UAR content leave this to Jarring to determine. Jarring felt he had acceptance of all three to first two paragraphs of his March-May formula. 9. When I talked about possible UAR readiness tell Jarring that it willing to try to achieve a binding agreement with Israel, Mohamed said words “with Israel” were the ones that created the problem. This recalled Washington conversations in which Dept officials had talked about Egypt's having to “sign on the dotted line.” He reverted to proposition that UAR agreement with SC would fulfill terms of Nov 22 res. He kept saying, “Jarring not only accepts but advocates our viewpoint,” “Jarring volunteered agreement with us on this,” etc. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and USUN. 2 2 Document 239 . 3 According to a briefing given to Bergus by Mohamed Riad on August 17 of a meeting held that day in Cairo between Foreign Minister Riad and Jarring, Riad had asked Jarring to convey four questions to Israel: “A) Did Israel intend to implement resolution and withdraw to June lines? B) In light of many statements of Israeli leaders re annexation of Arab territory would it continue to be Israel policy to annex territories or would Israel renounce that policy? C) What, in opinion of Israel, are secure and recognized boundaries? D) Did Israel intend to implement UNGA resolution 1947?” (Telegram 3192 from Cairo, August 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, August 21, 1968, 0205Z. 224669. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: Tel Aviv 5004. 2 1. Israeli Min Argov called to convey to Asst Secty Battle following oral communication: Begin Text: The FonMin is surprised by the assumption expressed by US officers that there has been any change in the position which he and his colleagues outlined to Amb Ball and Asst Secty Sisco in Jerusalem. There is not the slightest justification or foundation for this assumption. In his conversation with Amb Jarring in London on Aug 9 Mr. Eban gave an account of Israel's views on the Jarring Mission in terms which were identical verbatim with those expressed to Amb Ball in Jerusalem. Indeed he read the relevant part of the Protocol of the Jerusalem talks. It is disturbing that a totally inaccurate view about a change of position should have been propagated within the US Administration, and even outside. Israel's position remains precisely as stated to Amb Ball and Asst Secty Sisco. We do not believe that binding engagements will be reached and signed on the basis of obstruction and refusal to meet. On the other hand our belief in the principle of normal negotiation does not exclude the preliminary exchange of views and clarifications through Jarring and otherwise of some of the main principles involved in the establishment of peace. Thus we have tried to initiate a dialogue with the UAR on the juridical and political implications of the term “just and lasting peace.” We shall try to maintain this dialogue and to avoid a diplomatic vacuum. This principle applied to Jordan as well. We have noted Jordan's reported willingness to hold joint meetings with Israel in Jarring's presence. On the other hand Jordan wishes to learn Israel's approach to the problem of “secure and recognized boundary.” As was said to Amb Jarring we are ready to clarify our conception of this point to Jordan through various channels and procedures well before the opening of the GA. FonMin Eban has very recently ascertained that these opportunities have not been affected by recent frontier clashes. It is however essential that the utmost discretion be maintained on Israel's efforts to diversify its methods of informal communication and that what was said to Amb Ball be taken on trust. Israel did not share the view expressed in April that the Jarring Mission was in danger of early liquidation and we do not now believe it impossible to carry the mission on to the UNGA when greater possibilities of meaningful communication may present themselves. End Text . 2. Battle said he would see that Amb Ball and Asst Secty Sisco were apprised of the message. He emphasized, however, that important thing was that Jarring have clear understanding GOI position. Argov asked if we believed Jarring had different view of GOI position than that given Ball and Sisco by Eban. Battle said this was our impression. From what we understood, Jarring seemed not to see degree of flexibility in GOI position that Ball and Sisco had believed existed following their talks with Eban. Battle urged that Israelis see that Jarring fully understands their position in this respect. 3. Argov asked whether matter now cleared up. Battle said he couldn't say that it was, as neither he nor Argov present at Ball-Sisco-Eban talks. We would be in touch after matter discussed with Ball and Sisco. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bahti (NEA/IAI), cleared by Day, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, London, Moscow, and USUN. 2 Telegram 5004 from Tel Aviv, August 20, reported on Foreign Minister Eban's reaction when Ambassador Barbour taxed him with following an inconsistent policy, as Barbour was instructed to do in telegram 223117 to Tel Aviv. Eban “responded vehemently expressing surprise and resentment” that the United States had concluded on the basis of insufficient facts and faulty understanding that Eban had gone back on the policy he had outlined to Ball and Sisco of Israeli willingness to deal indirectly on substance with both Jordan and the UAR. Eban insisted that Israeli policy had not changed and that he had outlined the policy precisely in his conversation with Jarring in London. (Both ibid.) 243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, August 30, 1968, 2131Z. 230885. Joint State/Defense/AID Message. Subj: Jordan's Internal Defense. Ref: Amman 6263. 2 1. Embassy authorized to respond to Jordanian overtures for more substantive discussions of problems of Jordan's internal defense. Begin FYI. Jordan's potential qualification for internal defense assistance will be subject to mid-September SIG meeting. Discussions should not be postponed on this account. End FYI. 2. Public Safety Assistance. Believe it important early in discussions with GOJ to make clear stringency of USG funding situation and hence likelihood that any acquisition of PSF equipment or commodities would be on purchase basis. In this connection you may wish to call attention to deep cuts in FAA authorizations and current high levels of Jordanian foreign exchange reserves. You may also wish to refer to substantial grant assistance previously provided under public safety program which has not yet been fully utilized by PSF. At this stage discussions should be limited to Jordanian requirements under various contingencies that may arise in coming months. 3. Other Internal Defense Assistance. Following represents our current thinking. We agree that most immediate threats to GOJ are popular rioting and fedayeen action. In controlling these threats additional equipment and manpower may be less important than improved training and deployment of personnel and equipment assets now available to regime. We also believe that it is not unreasonable to assume that in certain circumstances the regime may be required to reduce its static border defenses in order to deal with internal disturbances. The forces available for internal security cited in reftel, twelve battalions or equivalent totaling over 6,000 men, should represent an effective security force without additional increases. Should these not prove adequate in any given situation, redeployment of other forces would be normal and expected next step. We assume that some of equipment we now delivering (e.g. APCs) will be made available for internal security forces. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Robert P. Paganelli (NEA/ARN); cleared by Director of AID's Office of Near Eastern Affairs John Eddison, Assistant AID Administrator for Near East and South Asia Maurice J. Williams, Murray and Colonel Bradburn (DOD/ISA), Seelye, Senior Regional Adviser for Regional Affairs in NEA John Buckle, Battle, and Claus W. Ruser of the Senior Interdepartmental Group; and approved by John P. Walsh. 2 In telegram 6263 from Amman, August 22, the Embassy reported that King Hussein and his advisers had asked the United States to consult informally on measures to strengthen Jordan's internal security arrangements. The Embassy noted that the Fedayeen constituted a growing threat within the country. (Ibid.) 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, September 4, 1968, 1130Z. 6463. Subj: The Fedayeen problem and Jordan's internal security. Ref: State 230885 (Notal). 2 1. On third I told King Hussein the Embassy had been authorized to engage in working level substantive discussions of Jordan's internal security problem. I therefore wanted to have a general discussion with him before our working levels got into details. I wanted him to know we regard the Fedayeen problem as a primary cause of incidents between Jordan and Israel. These incidents place strains on US-Jordanian relations, and they create an impossible climate for progress toward a peaceful settlement. Perhaps even more important, the Fedayeen pose a real threat to the integrity of the Jordanian regime itself. Beyond that, the Fedayeen groups almost inevitably could be counted on to create disorder when and if some tangible progress toward a peaceful settlement was achieved and publicized. We therefore want to do all we can to help Jordan deal effectively with the Fedayeen problem both in the short and long term. Our discussions with his people would be for the primary purpose of determining Jordan's requirements. I had to make clear I was not promising grant aid. In principle, we would expect Jordan to purchase material it needed. We would determine how we could best assist Jordan's own internal defense efforts. I added that I assumed he would have no objection if I kept the British Ambassador generally informed of our efforts. I asked the King what general strategy he had in mind especially with regard to the timing of his efforts to deal with the Fedayeen problem. 2. Hussein proceeded to review the Fedayeen problem in general terms pointing to the differences between the present situation and the situation before the June war when he had been able generally to control Fedayeen activities in Jordan territory. In connection with more recent developments he went over the ground covered in NJA-7030, 3 Amman 6371, 6368, 6426, 4 and other recent Embassy reporting. He said he is now due to have another meeting with the Fedayeen groups. He is holding off on this meeting until he has assessed the results of FonMin Rifai's tactics in the Arab League Council meeting. (He mentioned parenthetically that the formation of the Eastern Arab Command, which has now been formalized, was from his standpoint important as a means of asserting a degree of control over Fedayeen activities in Syria and Iraq.) See NJA-7040. 5 3. The King said he is confident that the army is loyal to him and, if required, would be able to deal with the Fedayeen. He has issued new orders to insure that army units take even stricter measures to control Fedayeen irregular activities in the Beisan area. In his view the Israelis could not expect perfection from him and his forces any more than they were able to get it from their own in suppressing Fedayeen activities. (I stressed to him during this part of our conversation that we see Fedayeen activity against civilian settlements in the Beisan area as the chief irritant to the Israelis and that I could not emphasize too much our hope that the Jordan army would exert greater control over the Fedayeen in this region. I commented that the Israelis seemed able pretty well to defend themselves in other parts of the ceasefire line. The vicious circle could be broken if some means could be found to prevent or significantly to diminish the Fedayeen attacks on Israeli civilians across the old ADL. We do not question the need to improve public security capability for coping with the Fedayeen, but on the old ADL front the problem seemed to be the army's responsibility. The King acknowledged this point and said he had issued new orders to the JAA in this area.) 4. The King said he wanted to make it clear that his plans for improving the capability of dealing with the Fedayeen and internal disorder generally were based on public security forces rather than the army for specific reasons that he proceeded to explain. Psychologically speaking, it was impossible for him to give the army an internal security mission when troubles were taking place along the frontier, the Israelis remained in occupation of the West Bank, and generally hostile Israel-Arab confrontation existed. The presence of Iraqi troops in Jordan and the situation in Syria also made it important for him not to divert the army from its primary mission of defense from outside aggression. While he recognized that if Fedayeen incidents diminished there would be less threat from Israel, the psychological difficulties he had described would remain for some time to come. Therefore, he must rely on public security forces as distinguished from military forces in order to deal with the Fedayeen and other internal security problems. In the event of GOJ's moving toward a peaceful settlement with Israel, the Fedayeen would probably seek to promote internal disturbances in protest. Mobile Bedouin police forces had proved themselves over the years the best means of dealing with this kind of security problem. He said he would like for Embassy officials to discuss the requirements with General Ma'an Abu Nuwar and other officials under Abu Nuwar. He stressed, however, that the mobile Bedouin forces would be separate from the police although under Abu Nuwar's over-all control. 5. The King said he thought it would be important for me to stay in touch with the British Embassy on this matter and he thought coordination between the two Embassies would be helpful. 6. With regard to timing, the King says he does not anticipate an immediate confrontation with the Fedayeen. On the other hand, he must be prepared to move if his tactics at any moment should provoke outright confrontation. The optimum solution, in his eyes, would be agreement from the other Arabs to order all Fedayeen forces supported from the outside to place themselves under his control. This would enable him to clamp down on Fedayeen activities, assuming that there could be some progress toward a peaceful settlement. In the latter circumstance, he would be able to deal effectively with any Fedayeen confrontation with his control measures and would have the blessing of the other Arab countries. He regards it as unlikely, however, that the other Arabs will agree at this stage to this kind of control. Depending on how FonMin Rifai's tactics come out in the Arab League Council meeting, he intends to visit Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAR to persuade them to agree to his asserting control over the Fedayeen in Jordan. He anticipates a real problem with Saudi Arabia. He observed that the Saudis at present are subsidizing Fatah on condition they not coordinate with any Arab govt, including Jordan. 7. Comment: I did not take issue with the King on the somewhat contradictory elements in his thinking, primarily because I was encouraged by these further signs that he has been trying to get a grip on the Fedayeen situation. A good deal of what he said was, as will be obvious to the Department, in the thinking aloud category. I will of course keep in touch with his thinking as it crystallizes further, and adopt my tactics with him accordingly. Meanwhile, we will explore Jordanian requirements at the working level. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Document 243 . 3 Not found. 4 Symmes reported in telegram 6371, August 28, that Foreign Minister Rifai had been instructed by King Hussein to seek the approval of the Arab League Council for Jordanian efforts to control the Fedayeen. In telegram 6368, August 28, Symmes reported that Prince Mohammad, acting as Viceroy in his father's absence from the country, had told him that Jordan planned to seek the support of other Arab countries in its efforts to control the Fedayeen. Telegram 6426, August 31, reported on Symmes' meeting with Foreign Minister Rifai prior to Rifai's departure for the Arab League Council meeting in Cairo. Symmes, encouraged Rifai to pursue his stated intent to seek the Council's support for Jordanian efforts to deal with the Fedayeen problem. (All in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 5 Not found. 245. Memorandum of Conversation 245. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 4, 1968. SUBJECT The Middle East PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR The Secretary Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen Dobrynin said he had come in on the Middle East and read a statement from the Soviet Government, copy attached. He added that although not included in the document the Soviet Government would be prepared once Israeli troops had withdrawn to discuss arms limitation with the U.S. The Secretary said that this was an important communication and would have to be studied and he would refer to it later on. 2 Dobrynin confirmed that this was a confidential document not intended for publication. The Secretary asked if similar communications had been made to the British and the French. Dobrynin said he did not know about the British but the French had approached the Soviet Union two or three weeks ago on the Middle East. The Soviet reply to the French, of which he had a copy, expressed the same views as in the present document. There were in addition some answers to particular French points. The Secretary inquired if the Soviet Government had been encouraged in this by the Arab countries. Dobrynin said he had no instructions on this point but he was under the impression the Soviet Government had been by its contact with the Arabs. Attachment 3 The Soviet Government as heretofore considers its contribution to the achievement of a Middle East settlement to be one of its principal foreign policy tasks. This unchanging and consistent course of ours is well known to the Government of the USA. It finds its concrete expression in our active support of the just cause of the Arab states striving to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression by peaceful, political means. In Moscow there is a conviction that a Middle East settlement does not concern the countries of this region only. Undoubtedly the great powers are also interested in this settlement. The persistence of tension in the Middle East and the continued illegal occupation by Israel of indigenous Arab terrorists cannot fail to cause concern to the Soviet Government, since such a situation threatens the general peace. At the same time it is impossible to deny the obvious fact that while the Arab states recognize the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and are prepared to seek ways for a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of that resolution, Israel stubbornly refuses to recognize it, demanding direct negotiations with the Arab countries, which is clearly unrealistic under present circumstances. On the basis of contacts with the governments of the Arab states, above all that of the UAR, it appears to us that now it is already possible to speak of the presence of concrete considerations of the Arab states regarding the content of a possible plan and time-table for a Middle East settlement. If we were to summarize the thoughts about the content of such a plan and timetable which were expressed at different times by the various statesmen of the Arab countries, including President Nasser, then in our view they would appear to be approximately as follows: (a) Israel and the Arab countries declare that they recognize the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and that they are ready to implement it. In this connection they agree that through Jarring, or in some other form, dates would be established by means of consultations (within the framework of the Security Council or outside of it) for withdrawing the Israeli troops and, depending on this, a plan will be outlined for implementing the other provisions of the Security Council resolution. (b) The purpose of these consultations could be to co-ordinate the following concrete measures for implementing the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967: 1. Israel declares its readiness to begin the withdrawal of troops from the occupied Arab territories on the date set; 2. On the day of the beginning of Israeli troops withdrawal, carried out by stages under the observance of UN representatives, the Arab neighbor-countries of Israel who will agree to take part in such a plan, as well as Israel, will deposit with the UN a statement (declaration) on the cessation of the state of war, on respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in that region and their right to live in peace, within safe and recognized borders, i.e., in accordance with the aforementioned resolution of the Security Council. 3. During the course of one month (as agreed) the Israeli troops will withdraw from part of the Arab territories to definite lines on the Sinai Peninsula, on the western bank of the Jordan River (as well as from Syrian territory, from the El-Qunaytra area). On the territories evacuated Arab administration is reestablished and police forces of the Arab states are brought in. On the day when the Israeli troops will have reached the previously stipulated intermediate lines on the Sinai Peninsula (for example, 30-40 km. from the Suez Canal), the UAR Government brings its troops into the Canal zone and begins to clear the Canal for resumption of navigation. 4. During the course of the following month (as agreed) the Israeli troops are withdrawn to the positions which they occupied prior to June 5, 1967. On the first day of the second stage of Israeli troop withdrawal, the UAR and Israel (or only the UAR, in case its government agrees) declare their consent to the stationing of UN troops near the line prior to June 5, 1967, on the Sinai Peninsula, in Sharm Ash-Shaykh and in the Gaza sector, i.e., the situation existing prior to June 5, 1967, will be re-established. The Security Council adopts a decision to send UN troops in accordance with the UN Charter, and confirms the principle of freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba for the ships of all countries. 5. After completion of Israeli troop withdrawal to the lines of demarcation between the states, the previously deposited declarations of the Arab countries and Israel will finally become effective, either through the instrumentality of the Security Council or through the signing of a multilateral document. The Security Council, relying on provisions of the UN Charter, adopts a decision on guarantees of the Arab-Israeli borders (the possibility of another version—guarantees by the four powers who are permanent members of the Security Council—is not to be excluded). (c) With the participation of the interested parties the Security Council continues to seek a solution to the problems of Palestine refugees, of free passage of Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal, as well as of the status of Jerusalem. It is our deep conviction that such a plan and timetable is of important practical significance as a suitable basis for further steps in reaching a settlement. This plan and timetable is sufficiently realistic and specific; in the event of its implementation it would not in any way infringe upon the prestige or interests of any party drawn into the conflict. It is also very important that this plan completely corresponds to the provisions of the unanimously adopted Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and that the implementation of each of its stages inevitably leads to the implementation of the next one. This interrelationship and interdependence, it seems to us, stems from the meaning of the resolution of November 22. Finally, such a plan and timetable will to some degree apparently be able to facilitate the mission of the special representative of the UN Secretary General, Jarring, which is supported by the governments of our countries. In this connection we should like to note that against the background of concrete proposals and the sufficiently clear position of the Arabs on the problems of a Middle East settlement, the position of the Government of Israel does not indicate that it has any concrete proposals for reaching a Middle East settlement, but, on the contrary, being sure of the support of the Government of the USA, Israel persists in its negative and deliberately obstructionist position, actually ignores the decisions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council of the UN, tries to consolidate for itself the annexed Arab territories and does nothing to lessen the tensions in the Middle East. The time has come to put an end to this position of the ruling circles of Israel. The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the USA will carefully review the foregoing considerations and during the course of future consultations will express its opinions concerning steps, which, in its view, must be taken for the quickest possible settlement of the Middle East problem. The Soviet Government expresses its readiness to conduct on this question consultations between representatives of the great powers, including the USA and the USSR, as states primarily responsible for maintaining the peace throughout the world. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen. 2 In a September 4 meeting with President Johnson, Secretary Clifford, Walt Rostow, and Generals Wheeler and Taylor, Rusk described the Soviet proposal as a very important communication and a significant move in Soviet policy toward the Middle East. He noted that some parts of the proposal appeared to be constructive, and added that it provided evidence that the Arabs were not pressing for a solution to the Jerusalem problem. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Meeting Notes File, 7/68-12/68) On September 9 Rusk discussed the Soviet proposal in a telephone conversation with Ball. Ball said that his staff at the United Nations viewed the proposal as largely Egyptian in derivation with little new in it, but he felt that it offered an opportunity to use it as a basis for bargaining. Ball suggested that the United States respond with a proposal of its own. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Rusk Telcons) 3 The note is a translation from the Russian prepared at the time by the Division of Language Services. 246. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 246. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, September 4, 1968. SUBJECT Phantoms—What Do We Get for Them? No one is prepared to recommend that the President release the Phantoms to Israel now. Israel's need is not significantly more urgent than it was in January, and the Israelis have shown little flexibility in moving toward a political settlement despite our steady low-key urging. Nevertheless there's general recognition that Israel will need some supersonics in the next year. There is sharp disagreement over how much we could expect to get for the Phantoms if we did go ahead now. Those who most vigorously oppose releasing the planes feel we should ask the highest price—signing the NPT and renouncing surface-to-surface missiles—and hold out for it. Others believe the best we can try for are some marginal tactical shifts in Israel's position on negotiations with the Arabs. They remember how in 1965 we had to give up our efforts to trade the Skyhawks for a promise not to go nuclear and feel that Israel is just as unlikely today to trade for Phantoms any part of the position it won in the Six Day War. In fact, the prevailing view in State is not to bargain directly with the planes at all. You'll recall that this was Eppie Evron's advice too—assure Israel's basic security and then tell them what we'd like them to do. The formula that has been put to Secretary Rusk reflects this two stage approach to Eshkol: 1. We understand Israel's need for security and therefore approve in principle release of the Phantoms. 2. Our interests require that this become known publicly only in the context of progress toward peace. Therefore, we ask the Israeli government to: —State publicly without qualification its readiness to end 20 years of war and to withdraw to agreed and secure boundaries as part of a peace agreement. —Declare publicly its readiness to participate wholeheartedly in a refugee settlement. —Give Jordan a specific position on borders and make a concrete proposal on Jerusalem. If we do go ahead soon, the choice will be between keeping these two as separate as possible and bargaining one for the other. If we hold off, another range of options could open up if the President felt able to throw his own weight behind a more active U.S. role in getting negotiations started and in narrowing gaps. Several proposals have been made: —Secretary Rusk's suggestion of dual emissaries to Cairo and Jerusalem to get a real exchange going. —Arthur Goldberg's recommendation for an emissary to Jerusalem to pin down the Israeli position on peace arrangements. —The idea of proposing a fair compromise to King Hussein and then trying to sell it to Eshkol. —The possibility of some sort of joint Soviet-US diplomatic pressure. If we were to make a major effort along any of these lines, the Phantoms could figure at any one of several points. I have asked State for a memo detailing these options for the President's review, but it will not be ready for lunch today. With Jarring returning to New York at the end of the month for a final crack at negotiations during the UN General Assembly, September will offer just about the last chance the President will have to lay the foundation for a big push behind Jarring in October and November. I believe we should assure him a systematic review of these options as well as the shorter-term possibilities. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis. 247. Memorandum of Conversation 247. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 9, 1968, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Middle East Situation; Phantoms for Israel PARTICIPANTS The President Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon of Israel His Excellency Lt. Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel Mr. Shlomo Argov, Israeli Minister Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President Harold Saunders, National Security Council Staff Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA The President received Deputy Prime Minister Allon for an off-the-record meeting on Monday, September 9 at 5:00 p.m. 2 The President expressed pleasure at the opportunity to meet with Deputy Prime Minister Allon. Mr. Allon said that he was very grateful for an opportunity to call upon the President and to bring him the very warm regards of Prime Minister Eshkol. Mr. Eshkol had enjoyed greatly his visit to the LBJ ranch in January, and he “still carried hope that something would come from that meeting.” The President said that he, too, had found the talks useful. He said that he had great faith in the people of Israel, and he had little doubt that the Israelis would be able to survive their current difficulties and with flying colors. The President asked Mr. Rostow to summarize the talks that had gone on prior to the time the President was able to receive us. Mr. Rostow said that the group had been discussing various problems in the few minutes before coming into the President's office. Mr. Rostow said that it had been agreed that Jerusalem was perhaps the key problem. Mr. Allon had said that some role for the Arabs in Jerusalem could be negotiated with access guaranteed. There could be no change, however, in the civil and sovereign status for Jerusalem. No government in Israel could survive such a change. In fact, Mr. Allon had said that if any government attempted to, it might even bring civil war in Israel. There had been a brief discussion of the Allon plan for defensive enclaves and a consideration of the security problems the Israelis faced. Mr. Allon had stressed the need now for Phantoms. Mr. Allon considered that the Phantoms were necessary to show the Arabs that they could not win in the event of another round. Mr. Allon then remarked that Mr. Rostow's summary was a fair one, but he would like to add a few points. The problem today is not how to secure victory. It is how to prevent another war. The supply of U.S. Phantoms to Israel would be a stabilizing factor with both the Arabs and with the Russians whose presence in the area is increasing. The trouble along the Suez is serious, 3 but Mr. Allon did not believe the Arabs would go to war unless they thought they could win. After the Czechoslovakia affair where the West had been incapable of responding, agreement to supply Phantoms might be a helpful reply to the Soviets. Once the Arabs realize that they cannot win a war, Mr. Allon believes that they will reconcile themselves to the existence of Israel. The President told Mr. Rostow to talk to Secretary Clifford and to get his comments on the current situation. The President said that he would make the decision on Phantoms, but he was not sure whether that decision would be made before or after elections. He had already taken action to put the U.S. in a position to act without any loss of time in excess of the time that would have been required if the decision had been made in January. However, the U.S. wants to try to find a road to peace. We do not want to be charged with inciting another war. The U.S. will be cooperative in any efforts the Israelis are able to make toward peace. Mr. Allon recalled that Ambassador Ball was told that the Israelis would work with Jarring or, for that matter, with others. Mr. Allon believes, however, that the UAR considers that it can risk more than before-not full war perhaps but greater risks without bringing about full war. The Arabs frequently do not act logically, and it was sometimes difficult to anticipate what their illogical acts would be. The Russians must get tired of getting their supplies smashed and will one day perhaps want to slow down the flow of arms to the area. The Government of Israel is an important factor in the Middle East, and Mr. Allon hopes that the U.S. is aware of its importance. When Mr. Eshkol left the U.S., he had the feeling that his request for Phantoms would be favorably considered. The Czechoslovakia situation and UAR actions on the Canal are both factors to be considered carefully. That the UAR acted on the Canal after the Czech incident is a very important fact. The UAR might well consider that it has a greater freedom of action. Its actions indicate a threat of continued terrorism. Mr. Allon continued that he had read many statements and heard many speeches in the U.S. campaign. A statement by the President on the F-4's would, Mr. Allon thought, be better than an argument between candidates. Arabs respect firm policies. France's position in the area is weaker than it used to be, for example. The world should know that the U.S. is on the side of Israel, and an announcement on Phantoms would be great news for Israel and for many other countries all over the world. After an exchange of pleasantries, the Deputy Prime Minister and his party departed. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle on September 10. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the White House from 5:24 to 5:40 p.m. (Ibid.) 2 Allon was in the United States on a speaking and fund-raising tour. His meeting with President Johnson was at Allon's request. A summary of Allon's discussion with Rostow prior to his meeting with the President, prepared by Saunders, is ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 113, 1/1-15/69. In that memorandum of conversation, Saunders briefly summarized the meeting between Allon and Johnson. 3 An incident that began on September 8 when an Israeli Army unit detonated an anti-vehicle mine discovered on the east bank of the Suez Canal 10 kilometers north of Port Tawfiq escalated quickly into an exchange of small arms fire across the Canal, followed by an exchange of artillery fire that spread across a front from Port Tawfiq to El Kantara. (USDAO telegram 1599 from Tel Aviv, September 8; ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68) 248. Notes on President Johnson's Meeting With Congressional Leaders 248. Notes on President Johnson's Meeting With Congressional Leaders 1 Washington, September 9, 1968, 5:45-7:24 p.m. [Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.] Secretary Clifford noted that both of these presidential candidates have been talking about the request of Israel for military equipment. He wanted to know if we have in the recent weeks a request for standard equipment from Israel. He said both candidates talked about it yesterday and what's the status of the situation? Secretary Rusk said the President might want to comment on that. The President said: “Yes. In the last five minutes—there is a constant request from Israel. Vice President NIXON said day before yesterday he was going to give them jet planes. Well, we're giving them jet planes, a good many of them now. And they said, what kind of jet planes. He didn't specify what kind. I don't know—he may have spoken later on the facts. What they want is the Phantom plane. We have put ourselves in the position to sell them Phantom planes with a decision not later than January of this year by some adjustment in our production schedules if we conclude that by that time the military parity is such and the requirements of their security are such that it is desirable. We don't want to be in a position of just being arms merchants and starting an arms race with the Russians there, and we're also trying very hard to use this to try to bring about the success of the Jarring mission, to get both of them to do something themselves to find an area of agreement in that part of the world. “The Russians have stepped up their supplies to the Arabs substantially and they have replaced a good deal of what was lost in the June conflict. I might say that the encouragement the candidates have given some folks in this campaign year is not unanticipated and unexpected. For that reason, we have put ourselves—they have really—are for giving them whatever is necessary to insure the favorable consideration at their hands. March 31st I took a step that didn't require that of me and we are going to look at it very carefully and be sure that we think that it is not only their interest and our interest but in the world interest before we act. “And the Congress I think, the House indicated its approval of supplying the Phantom when it passed the Foreign Aid Bill. The Senate has also indicated its feelings to a somewhat more modified extent. The measure is still in conference. I'm not saying that we are going to supply them or not going to supply them, but that decision hasn't been reached now and our Joint Chiefs haven't passed on it. They think they have adequate security at the present time. The Israelis I think really demonstrated that they had it. Since then we have made available some very fine jet aircraft to them, but it is not the ultimate in the world and it's the ultimate they seek.” President Johnson observed that the Israeli Deputy Minister had been here and it was an off the record meeting. The Ambassador was with him and they took the position in the light of the events in Czechoslovakia that the reaction to the Middle East the last day or two with the skirmishes they have had to require very prompt action on the part of the United States. The President asked Walt Rostow to comment. Mr. Rostow reported that Deputy Prime Minister Allon was making a strong plea to the President for the 60 Phantoms. He said the arguments taken were—that after the Czech experience it had (a) made the Russians anxious to have us or somebody else take the light of the world publicity off them, and (b) possibly encourage the Egyptians to start probing across to the Canal because of the passivity of the Western reaction to the Russian entrance into Czechoslovakia, and he therefore urged, along with the conventional arguments that we advanced, not to be delivered until they announce them. Mr. Rostow reported that in private conversation before the President came in, Luke Battle and Rostow probed them a bit on their position in Jerusalem which is critical to the possibility of a deal with Hussein, and he indicated considerable give on the press issue, our position with respect to religious monuments, but nothing on the sovereignty of the city as a whole. Rostow said that he and Battle had pressed them on the Jarring mission, and they said they were forthcoming with Jarring. Allon's main pitch was that the Arabs will not begin to make peace until they are convinced that Israel is unattackable, and that the Phantom delivery is the key to that. [Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, September 9, 1968, 5:45 p.m. to 7:24 p.m. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The Congressional leaders including Speaker of the House John McCormack and Congressmen Carl Albert, Gerald Ford, Leslie Arends, and Melvin Ford. Also present were Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Walt Rostow, Budget Director Charles Zwick, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Arthur Okun, and Legislative Counsel to the President Harold Barefoot Sanders. A heading describes the notes as President Johnson's notes, but they were prepared from a tape recording by either President Johnson's secretarial staff or by his staff in Austin after the President left office and began his research for his memoirs. The tape recording on which the notes are based is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings. The notes have been corrected to accord with the tape recording. 249. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 249. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 10, 1968. Mr. President: Pursuant to my memorandum to you of yesterday (attached), 2 Ambassador Dobrynin came to my home at 8:30 yesterday evening. We had a very long private conversation. [Here follows a summary of a portion of the conversation unrelated to the Middle East.] 3. Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East and raised this question: In the wake of their paper to us on the Middle East, 3 is there any way that a Summit meeting might push us towards peace in the Middle East? I then pointed out to him that the paper they had given us was interesting in structure, but it did not come to grips with the Israeli judgment that only direct negotiations could lead to a settlement which would be politically and psychologically stable. I told him we were taking the Soviet paper seriously, but there were problems with it, including the relationship of any views that might be developed between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the Jarring mission on the other. 4. Dobrynin then made a long reply with the following points: —After the Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet Union could have exploited the situation to set up bases and greatly to strengthen its military and political position in the Middle East. They had decided not to do so. This paper reflected an authentic desire for a stable settlement. —We should be conscious of one particular point in the Soviet proposal; namely, the idea of a Four-Power guarantee of Middle Eastern borders. The idea had come to him through Dr. Nahum Goldman, an old Zionist. He, Dobrynin, and the Soviet Government had concluded that a Four-Power guarantee of the Middle Eastern frontiers was the most solid basis the Israelis could acquire for the continuity of their national existence—more solid than a peace treaty with the Arab states. He suggested that, perhaps, an agreement on this particular point might be a constructive item for a Summit meeting. —As for the rest of the substance of the paper, he thought that Jarring might submit some such paper against the background of prior U.S.-Soviet agreement. Jarring had been running around the Middle East, but not making much progress. If he could put in a proposal backed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, then his mission might move forward more rapidly. He returned several times in the course of the conversation to a Four-Power guarantee as the critical element for Israel in the Soviet paper. [Here follows a summary of a portion of the conversation unrelated to the Middle East.] Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Chlodnik, Box 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the Eyes of the President and Secretary of State Only. 2 In the attached memorandum to the President, Rostow reviewed his guidance from the President for his meeting with Dobrynin. 3 See Document 245 . 250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, September 11, 1968, 2148Z. 236515. Subject: Allon Visit. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. Summary: Deputy Prime Minister Allon called on Secretary September 10 and urged USG decision soonest sell F-4 Phantoms to Israel as means deterring possible Soviet-inspired Arab aggression. Military deterrent only way to force Arabs talk peace. Asked about Israeli nuclear intentions Allon said Israel did not have nuclear weapons and he was authorized reiterate PriMin Eshkol's assurances that Israel would not be first to introduce new weapons into Middle East. Declared GOI had not yet signed NPT in order keep Egyptians uncertain as to Israel's capability. Allon said Israeli hopes for an SSM had vanished, declared MD-620 program dead and denied Israel currently making an SSM. Secretary suggested Israelis settle USS Liberty claims soonest and evacuate Tiran Island. According Allon, Liberty matter should be resolved in a few days. End of summary . 1. During September 10 call on the Secretary Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, accompanied by Ambassador Rabin and Minister Argov, urged USG decision soonest sell F-4 Phantoms to Israel. Presentation emphasized theme that while Israel currently strong enough defeat Arabs (particularly in present geographical posture) the Phantoms would serve as a deterrent to war and encouragement to peace. Arabs would only give serious consideration to peace if the possibility of their military superiority removed. Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia has convinced Egyptians that Soviets are no longer cautious and this, together with Egyptian postwar rearmament, has prompted Egyptians to initiate recent serious incidents along Suez Canal. USG decision now sell Israel Phantoms would convince Arabs of futility of seeking military solution to Arab-Israel dispute. 2. Secretary asked Allon about status of Israeli missile program. Allon replied that as far as a Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) was concerned, “Israeli dreams had vanished.” Declared that if the proposed deal with the French for Mirage aircraft was “dead,” the MD-620 program was “doubly-dead.” Asked if Israel was not itself making an SSM, Allon replied: “No, not yet.” Both Allon and Rabin declared they did not attach much importance to Israeli acquisition of an SSM since in discussing SSM's they were talking about missiles with “conventional warheads” and such missiles require extremely high degree of accuracy. On other hand, Egyptian possession of SSM's could prove dangerous threat to Israel's mobilization system. 3. Secretary asked what assurances GOI could give that Phantoms would not be used to deliver nuclear weapons and why GOI had not signed NPT. Allon replied: “I can assure you on behalf of the Prime Minister that what he has said about Israel not going to be the first to introduce new weapons into the Middle East still stands.” He pointed to American inspection of Dimona reactor as giving additional assurances. When Secretary commented that these inspections applied only to Dimona Allon replied that Israel was a small country and was open to Americans. 4. In pursuing NPT matter Secretary described as unsatisfactory FonMin Eban's June 30 letter this subject. 2 Stated that letter was vague and failed to answer question. Both Allon and Rabin declared that GOI hoped leave question mark in Egyptian minds as to Israel's nuclear capability as a form of deterrent in current state of semi-war. Secretary stated that by leaving question mark in Egyptian minds GOI similarly placed doubts in mind USG as to its nuclear intentions. Allon commented that he felt sure that sooner or later GOI would sign and that Eban would be prepared discuss matter further with Secretary in October at UNGA. 5. Secretary asked Allon's reaction to a possible multi-power guarantee of negotiated Arab-Israel frontiers. Allon saw such a guarantee, even if given by the four permanent members of UNSC, as no substitute for a peace settlement. 6. Pointing out that security which rests on military means alone is a very fragile thing Secretary asked on what basis Allon sees a possible Israel-Arab peace. Allon replied that increased Jewish immigration to Israel plus a plausible military deterrent would eventually bring about a settlement. Opined that King Hussein seemed truly desirous of peace, but unable to move because of Egyptian objections. Added that GOI does not miss a single opportunity to communicate its peaceful intentions to all levels of the Jordanian Government. Stated that the plan he had proposed to Cabinet for disposition of West Bank takes into account Israel's security and demographic requirements while at the same time offering honorable conditions to Jordan. Israel was prepared make territorial concessions consonant with its security requirements. 7. In concluding conversation Secretary said Israel should expeditiously settle Liberty claims so as to remove unnecessary obstacle US-Israel relations. Allon indicated his complete personal agreement and said he hoped matter would be settled within few days. Secretary's suggestion that IDF should evacuate Tiran Island was countered by Rabin's argument that Israeli occupation was dictated by necessity ensure free passage Tiran Straits pending Israel-Arab peace settlement. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by John D. Leonard (NEA/IAI), cleared by Battle and Atherton, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, Jidda, and USUN. 2 Transmitted in telegram 4354 from Tel Aviv, July 2; see Document 205 . 251. Memorandum of Conversation 251. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 12, 1968. PARTICIPANTS Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal, Minister,UAR Interests Section Harold H. Saunders Ghorbal had asked on September 9 to see me, presumably to find out what the President had said to Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon. However, when he opened yesterday's conversation by asking what was new, I gave him a copy of the President's speech to B'nai B'rith 2 to read and we spent most of our time talking about that. We covered the following ground: 1. Ghorbal's reaction to the President's speech was quite positive. 3 He said he hoped that this was a first step toward a more active Presidential role in attempting to move the Arab-Israeli impasse toward a settlement. He singled out the following points for initial comment: —He “saluted” the President's call for the parties to get substance on the table and begin talking specifics of a settlement. He thought that was extremely important coming from the President and hoped Israel would take note and put an end to the sterile semantic exercises that Eban has been engaging in. —He regretted that the President had not mentioned “withdrawal.” When I said I thought that was implicit in the paragraph on territorial integrity, he said an issue as important as this should be explicitly handled. —He started to object to the fact that the President had said we cannot return to the situation of June 4 in a paragraph having to do with territorial integrity. He felt this confused “boundaries” and “situation.” However, when I marched him through a sentence-by-sentence reading of the paragraph pointing out that we had always said there could be border rectifications in the context of an agreed settlement and that the President had also explicitly ruled out drawing boundaries on the right of conquest alone, he backed away. In the course of the discussion, he said that the GUAR accepted the concept that we could not return to the “situation” of June 4—that we should end the state of war, draw permanent boundaries and settle the other outstanding issues mentioned in the Security Council Resolution. —He started to say that the Jerusalem paragraph was weak, and I pointed out that we had elevated it to the status of a separate principle. He immediately said it might be serious that we had removed Jerusalem from under the concept of territorial integrity. I said that was not our concept at all; in fact, we had never thought of it. 2. He asked whether I had drafted the speech. I said, “We consider this the President's speech.” 3. When he asked about Allon's talk with the President , I said it was a short 15-20 minute call scheduled so that Allon could pay his respects. When Ghorbal tried to find out exactly who had said what, I said it was a short conversation in which there was no detailed substantive exchange. The Deputy Prime Minister had briefly outlined Israel's view of the current situation in the Middle East, and the President had stressed the importance of moving forward to peace. When Ghorbal asked whether Allon had raised the Phantoms, I simply smiled and said that it wouldn't be surprising if he had. Ghorbal said he certainly would have, had he been in Allon's place. 4. When he chided us for our role in helping Israel to bring the current Suez Canal incidents 4 to the Security Council , I countered by asking him—since he had raised the issue—what inferences we should draw from the sudden increase in mining incidents on the Israeli-occupied side of the Canal. He made the following two semi-contradictory points: —The Israelis are throwing up a smoke screen and manufacturing these incidents. According to his information from Cairo, the Egyptians had no knowledge of anyone crossing from the Egyptian side. He said the Israelis themselves were engaged in a “ridiculous little cops and robbers business” to draw attention away from their own failure to move toward peace. —People in the Arab world are becoming generally frustrated and an increase in incidents like this is exactly what we must expect from now on. When I said this sounded as if he were suggesting that there might indeed be a connection between an increase in the number of incidents and a conscious policy decision, he simply said that there were Arabs on the Israeli side of the cease-fire line who were frustrated too. H. S. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, UAR, 1/1/68-1/20/69. Confidential. Copies were sent to Walt Rostow, Walsh, Battle, and Parker. 2 Reference is to the speech President Johnson made on September 10 at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington on the occasion of the 125th anniversary meeting of B'nai B'rith. Among those in attendance was Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book II, pp. 944-950. 3 In a summary of Middle East reactions to the speech prepared for the President on September 16, Rostow noted that Ghorbal viewed it as a positive step. He added that the Jordanian Ambassador had called to congratulate the President on a “balanced” speech, and that Ambassador Rabin had said, “We are very satisfied.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69) 4 See footnote 3, Document 247 . The exchange of fire across the Canal growing out of the original incident continued, and the United States called on both Israel and the UAR to exercise restraint. (Telegram 236892 to Tel Aviv, September 12, and telegram 237145 to Cairo, September 12; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, September 14, 1968, 1913Z. 238798. Subj: Jarring Mission; Suez. 1. Summary. At his request Israeli Amb Rabin, accompanied by Argov and Raviv, called on Asst Secy's Battle and Sisco Sept 13 to discuss Sov ME approach to US and Jarring Mission. Rabin said description of Sov approach given him Sept 11, 2 although lacking details, sounded like imposed settlement. It appeared US could have had two purposes in telling GOI of approach: to alarm and warn GOI in order erode Israeli policy, or to indicate USG considering change in its ME policy. Battle and Sisco emphasized they informed GOI of Soviet ideas in belief it should know of approach even though USG position on it not yet determined and could not, therefore, be given Rabin. Had also considered it important pass on our view that, regardless USG position, Sov ideas would have considerable appeal among 124 UN members. Soviet ideas would be evaluated within framework of US policy as stated by President in June 1967 and this week. 2. In response Rabin's repetition of query what US thought GOI should do to help move matters ahead, Sisco pointed out in absence Israeli peace plan ideas of other side pre-empted situation and had considerable appeal to many countries. Battle said GOI international support eroding and reiterated past urgings that GOI keep before world its willingness to withdraw in context peace settlement, since world increasingly believes Israel has no intention of withdrawing and is insisting on direct negotiations as cover to avoid withdrawal. Rabin replied Israel stood firmly for achievement real peace. Until Arabs ready for peace, nothing more to say. 3. USReps reiterated US deep concern over worsening situation along Suez and fact actions of both sides could exacerbate it. Rabin responded that there no doubt of new UAR military policy but that GOI not worried. He said Israel had found Arabs always see Israeli move to SC as sign of weakness. End summary . 4. Rabin first asked about US-UK talks of Sept 12-13.3 Battle said they had gone well and briefly indicated subjects discussed. He said we had reported Sov approach to UK in about same terms as to Israel. There had been review of status Jarring Mission and agreement to do all possible in its support. 5. Referring to Sept 11 meeting, Rabin said Israelis had given careful consideration to what had been said. He noted first that US had emphasized that time running out and there must be movement toward settlement. However, he had received no reply to request for specific advice or suggestions on what Israel should do. 6. Re Sov proposals, description given had been in general terms with no specific info on contents. Appeared US might be trying alarm and warn GOI with purpose of eroding policy. He wished make abundantly clear this would lead nowhere. Other possibility was US considering change in its ME policy as stated by Pres June 19, 1967 and reaffirmed by him Sept 10. It seemed strange conversation had come within 24 hours of President's restatement of US policy. He emphasized, however, even if there change in US policy, there would be no change in basic GOI policy. 7. Rabin expressed view Soviets by changes in “scenery,” atmosphere and appearances trying make possible return to status quo ante the June war. Increased tensions along Suez, Sov approach to US, and UAR last message given Jarring supported this thesis and indicated effort to alarm USG and GOI. Israel, he said, was not at all alarmed. He saw no alternative to sticking to policy of no half measures or half solutions but real peace. This would call Soviet bluff. GOI had taken Ball/Sisco advice in Jerusalem and started indirect substantive exchanges; if this process stopped, it not Israel's fault. He realized there might be tactical problem in UN, and he prepared discuss this, but basically he was optimistic. He thought we should not worry about Sovs. 8. Sisco agreed Rabin had not been given specific advice he requested Sept 11. This was in part because we wished avoid making specific comments on one point or another contained in detailed substantive exchanges parties conducting through Jarring. Reason we had stressed that time running out was importance we attach to what attention GOI giving to moving Jarring Mission along at time GA convenes and FonMins in NY. This consistent with our view of importance supporting Jarring. We had emphasized that to extent no real progress made through Jarring by parties, initiatives-not necessarily helpful-will come from others. We thus remain very interested in getting progress through Jarring, and we continue to urge GOI to examine carefully what steps it can take to help Jarring make progress toward agreement called for in SC resolution. 9. We had tried give Israel some idea of Sov approach, Sisco continued, and repeated four principal elements around which Sov proposals revolved. We had explained we had made no value judgment and were studying proposals. He and Battle not authorized say more. Battle emphasized his view, shared by Sisco, had been that, in light US-Israel relationship, it desirable inform GOI of Sov approach even before able report definitive US judgment. Sisco added had tried do this while pointing out Sov ideas would have considerable attraction among 124 UN members. If UAR gives Jarring its peace plan and it bad from Israeli point of view, it nevertheless will have good deal of attraction to others if it not possible point to alternative Israeli peace plan. Even if not acceptable, UAR ideas would preempt situation. As for possible change in US policy, Sisco noted he had told Argov, and we reaffirming this again, that we, of course, studying Sov proposals in framework of President's policy, and Battle pointed out Sov proposals known to USG prior to President's Sept 10 speech. 10. Battle considered question about what Israel specifically should do a very legitimate one. In reply he said he would repeat what he had said many times before over past weeks and months, totally without regard to Sov move. He had warned Israel to look ahead and not underestimate degree to which international support eroding. He had pointed out that, quite apart from facts of matter, Arabs were doing better in world propaganda battle. GOI was failing to keep before world its willingness to withdraw in context of a settlement. World increasingly believed Israel had no intention of withdrawing and insisted on direct negotiations in order avoid withdrawal. If there was one single factor that had given Arabs propaganda advantage, it was this. Sisco noted Rabin had referred, as in past, to tactical problem in UN. We viewed matter in much more fundamental way, as basic to whole question of achieving progress toward settlement, not just question of UN tactics. 11. In reply to Battle's point, Rabin said perhaps Israel had nothing new to say and Arabs more capable of keeping headlines. But Israel had firm policy. It wanted peace settlement, and once this said there nothing more to add. He thought many understood need for achieving real peace. At urging of Ball and Sisco during ME trip, Israel had agreed try process of clarification through indirect exchanges but got no answer from UAR to question whether it ready for peace. If clarification process stopped, it not Israel's fault. Key problem not what newspapers and other media said but that US believe real peace is what should be achieved. Sisco pointed out there no doubt of US view on this. President had just reiterated this; we want real not illusory peace in area. 12. Rabin continued as long as other side did not cross this line, other points such as boundaries, not important. Israel had tried through Jarring and other means to get answer on basic question of peace, but had gotten nothing. If UAR had said it was ready for peace, meaning a, b, and c, on assumption there would be agreement on boundaries, refugees, etc. he would have understood, but there was no use avoiding fact main issue between Israel and UAR was still peace. 13. Sisco informed Israelis on confidential basis that he and Ball, en route Brussels to brief NATO on UN problems, would stop in Paris to get Jarring's latest assessment. He would find Rabin's assessment of where things stand helpful for this talk. Rabin said he did not yet have details of latest UAR message through Jarring though Eban had said it no reply and couched in vulgar terms. Rabin thought it pertinent UAR had tried to deny publicly that there had been exchanges through Jarring and at Arab FonMins meeting had described Jarring Mission as instrument to gain a little time. 14. Reverting to question of four-power guarantees, Sisco noted UK position known to Israel. UK concerned re Suez and much more disposed than we to have it handled as separate problem. French have long favored 4-power approach. Sov position on its role as major power also known. Therefore, 3 powers were already well-disposed to 4-power approach. Linking this to what he had said earlier, he suggested that to extent there no progress by parties, there will be growing stimulation of 4-power approach. 15. Rabin referred to question of withdrawal and direct negotiations, stating even if newspapers took position Battle had suggested, US and other govts and Jarring knew from GOI it not question of willingness to withdraw but of where lines should be. He saw no problem, therefore, with govts and their policies. Battle, however, said he had repeatedly made point to reps of many govts that Israel ready act on various issues in context of settlement. However, despite what GOI and USG said, many suspected GOI using modalities to cover up lack of will to achieve peace. If Israel wished to keep international support it had to take account of this. 16. Battle said he about to make trip to Cairo for Abu Simbel ceremony. Though we doubted much would come of it, he would like idea of what he could say to Nasser that would be constructive and helpful. Rabin replied Battle should ask two questions Israel put to UAR through Jarring: what is Nasser's interpretation of peace with Israel, and what sort of relations would Israel and UAR have when peace achieved. Heikal said UAR would ignore Israel, but GOI said they could not ignore Israel. Some said peace treaty just piece of paper but for Israel recognition, peace, open borders were only hope. Absence of war between neighbors not enough. There must at least be start to crossing Rubicon of recognition and open borders, otherwise war would come again after few years. 17. Argov said in US statements re Sov proposals one ingredient missing-that proposals unacceptable. He wondered if four categories mentioned weren't per se in sharp contrast to President's policy enunciated few days ago. Repeating we had no USG position to convey at this time, Sisco said question Argov raised was judgment USG had to make. Yardstick to be used to evaluate Soviet or other ideas would be President's policy. Rabin thought 4-power guarantees sounded like substitute for one element of US policy—need for contractual agreement between parties. Sisco explained it not clear whether Soviets have in mind that 4-power guarantees would be supplement or bulwark to agreement achieved in accordance with SC Nov 22 Res or substitute for it. This was one point being studied. Battle emphasized again Israelis should not read into what was said things that were not said. When he gave Israeli reps USG position, they could be confident he not free-wheeling. In present case he unable give them USG position; ideas are being studied. Matter has been discussed with Secy, who will be happy talk to Rabin, probably early next week. There would be further consultations with Israelis when it possible provide clearer info. Rabin explained Israel simply wished make clear from very beginning where it stood and not be late in doing so. 18. Turning to Suez situation, Battle noted US had spoken earlier to Israel, as well as UAR, about dangers. We very concerned and wondered if Rabin had any new info. Rabin expressed view there could be no doubt UAR following new policy along Suez. This clear from quick reaction to slightest incident and declaration that Egyptian Army ready not only to defend but to conduct active offense. This was policy statement even if UAR preferred say it in newspaper rather than officially. Moreover, he thought Israel would face similar situation on other borders. Rabin analyzed reasons for change in UAR policy as effort gain confidence of army and public, to help Jordan and show participation against Israel, to regain prestige and position as defender of other members Arab world, and to create atmosphere of urgency for solution of basic question. 19. Battle emphasized US deeply concerned actions of both sides could exacerbate already bad situation. Both he and Sisco said US very worried. Rabin said Israel was not. In October 1966 it had made mistake of taking case of incident with Syria to SC instead of “doing something”. Israeli move to SC always seen by Arabs as sign of weakness. Sisco admitted Israel not getting satisfaction from SC. Rabin said he had personally never expected it would. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Betty Jane Jones, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Battle. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Amman, Moscow, Cairo, and Paris for Ball and Sisco. 2 In a September 11 conversation with Rabin, Battle and Sisco outlined some of the ideas put forward in the Soviet proposal conveyed by Dobrynin to Rusk on September 4. They noted that there was an indication that the Soviet Union was thinking in terms of four-power guarantees. (Telegram 236989 to Tel Aviv, September 12; ibid.) 253. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 253. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, September 17, 1968, 1624Z. 6654. Subj: Phantoms for Israel. Ref: Amman 6653. 2 1. After the King raised the possible sale of Phantoms to Israel (Amman 6653), I commented that as of yesterday the White House Press Secty had stated no decision has been made to supply them. The Israeli request is still “under consideration,” as stated last Jan. Nine months have gone by since the President met with PriMin Eshkol. During this time some Arab leaders have been making statements that fall just short of calling for “another round.” Some of them were boasting about the degree to which they had been able to obtain new arms from the SovUnion. The presence of thousands of Soviet instructors in the UAR and Syria has become well known to the general public. I wondered sometimes if the Arab public remembered the bellicose statements of Arab officials when they reacted to statements about Phantoms for Israel. In any case, it seemed to me personally that the administration has shown great restraint in so far avoiding steps that could be interpreted as upsetting arms relationships in the Middle East. 2. The King then asked me if Washington had given any thought to what might be provided to Jordan as an offset in the event that Phantoms were sold to Israel. I replied I was not aware that this hypothetical possibility had been considered. I jokingly commented that our thinking generally revolved around avoiding sales of arms. The King then said he had thought about having Gen Khammash go to Washington to request earlier delivery of eighteen additional F104s and other essential equipment, including 155s. I commented that I thought such a visit would be inappropriate at the present time. With regard to the outstanding request for 155s, I thought that the climate for its consideration might be improved if there were a cessation of artillery exchanges in the Beisan area. 3. At one point the King interjected that the Soviets have indicated they are prepared to supply a “much more sophisticated aircraft with offensive capability" to the UAR if the US supplies Phantoms to Israel. He obviously thought that he had made a slip and asked me not to report what he had said about the Soviets. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Cairo, and USUN. 2 In telegram 6653 from Amman, September 17, Symmes reported on a conversation that day with King Hussein in which Hussein described the upcoming UN General Assembly session as perhaps the last chance to achieve a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. He stressed that he had authorized Foreign Minister Rifai to take advantage of all opportunities to promote a settlement, including meeting privately with the Israelis if given an incentive to do so. The King complained that the United States had not taken an active enough role in promoting a settlement. He also said that possible U.S. supply of Phantom aircraft to Israel made it difficult for him and others in the area to defend their relationship with the United States. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 254. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 254. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 17, 1968, 18 p.m. Mr. President: I put to Sect. Rusk the five questions you raised with me on the telephone when I had a meeting in my office. [Here follow two paragraphs unrelated to the Middle East.] 3. On the other hand, Sect. Rusk is taking personally in hand Dobrynin's urging that we make a reply on the Middle East. He will have a long personal talk with Rabin tomorrow. 2 W. W. Rostow 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Middle East and Vietnam Negotiations, Sept. 1968. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. 2 The nub of the problem is the fear of our Middle East experts that if we get into a negotiating posture with the Soviet Union, the Arabs will draw back from Jarring and leave the task for the U.S. and the USSR, which is just what they want in the first place. The art of working out something to give to the Russians is to do it in a way which would strengthen, not weaken, Jarring. In my initial judgment, that, in turn, requires building into our scenario direct Arab-Israeli contacts at a relatively early stage on certain specific issues. Like the Russians, we, too, could give our paper to Jarring and make it clear both to him and the Russians that we are counting on him to move forward and that we and, we hope, the Russians will be trying to be helpful from the rear. This is the message we would also get across to the Arabs. [Footnote in the source text added by Rostow.] 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 255. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 255. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 18, 1968. Mr. President: Herewith George Ball's account of his meeting with Jarring in Paris Monday. Paragraph 5 on page 3 describes what many of your advisors feel is the nub of the current Arab-Israeli impasse. 2 In Jarring's view—which many of your advisors share—the main roadblock is Israel's inability to state its view of where boundaries should be. Israel cannot do this until the Cabinet makes a decision. Eshkol has delayed forcing that decision until the Arabs enter direct negotiations. The Arabs will not surrender that trump card-symbolizing recognition of Israel-until they believe the Israeli government has committed itself to withdrawal. Many of your advisors feel that we can't hope for progress on any front until we tackle Israel on this issue. For instance, they feel that any response to the Soviet initiative—desirable as a response may be—will be academic until we can bring Israel along behind a counterproposal. This is why we recommended as the centerpiece of your B'nai B'rith speech: ”… put their views on the table—begin talking the substance of peace.” The Israelis would argue vigorously that they are ready to put their views on the table only when they are convinced Nasser is ready to talk real peace. And they don't think he is. While no one has any illusions about Nasser, Jarring believes the UAR is ready to end belligerency. We're not sure, but we think there's enough in the UAR position to be worth probing. Where we disagree with Israel is that they're holding out for a complete Arab cave-in right from the start—open borders, full recognition, reconciliation. We see the road to that goal made up of a series of stepping stones, and we see a settlement not as “instant peace" but as a framework within which attitudes can change. We think Israel is holding out for too much and losing sight of substantial gains within its grasp—permanent boundaries and passage through the Canal. Therefore, many of your advisors—while agreeing we must treat the Soviet proposal seriously—would hate to see us pin too much hope on it by itself. They believe we must concentrate primarily on moving the Israelis to make their commitment to withdraw clear by stating their position on boundaries. If you were to go ahead with Phantoms, they would consider this a fair return. W. W. Rostow 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 94, 9/12-18/68. Secret; Exdis. 2 Telegram 20891 from Paris, September 16, was attached. The telegram reported on a conversation that Ball and Sisco had with Jarring in Paris that day. They found Jarring somber over the prospects for a Middle East settlement, but determined to make a major effort with the Foreign Ministers at the UN General Assembly. He emphasized the need for Israel to define what it meant by secure and recognized borders or to publicly accept and agree to implement Resolution 242. Paragraph 5 of the telegram detailed Jarring's conviction that the crux of the problem lay in promoting an agreement between Israel and the UAR, not between Israel and Jordan as the Israelis seemed to believe. Jarring did not feel that Jordan was strong enough to reach an agreement with Israel that could stand unless there was a prior agreement between Israel and the UAR. In his view, agreement between Israel and the UAR was dependent on Israeli willingness to define what the Israelis meant by secure and recognized boundaries. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 256. Memorandum of Conversation 256. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 18, 1968. SUBJECT A Near East Peace Settlement PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA H.E. Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel Mr. Shlomo Argov, Minister of Israel The Secretary said that we would shortly enter on intensive discussion with other powers in New York on the Near East problems and he hoped that we could keep closely in touch with Israel. It was important that we know what the Israeli position is on the Security Council resolution and on such questions as boundaries, Jerusalem, procedures, etc. It was important also that we know whether Israel considers the problem as one to be solved in its entirety as a package or whether it might be broken down into parts which might then be negotiated. The Palestine problem made a large and complex package but it might be possible or desirable to break it up and deal with the components in different contexts. The Secretary thought we also ought to consider whether the best approach to settlement was to aim for an Egyptian settlement first leaving the more difficult Jordanian problem aside. Ambassador Rabin said it was important to distinguish between the parliamentary situation in the United Nations and the real life situation on the ground. The Government of Israel is convinced that in the course of Nasser's stay in the Soviet Union an agreement was reached on a UAR-Soviet strategy. Both governments are interested primarily in restoring the status quo ante June 5, 1967 with only minor modifications. Neither power was interested in a real peace. The Egyptian position of rejecting reconciliation and of a termination of state of belligerency with continued isolation of Israel in the Near East could provide the seeds for the next war. Ambassador Rabin said the present Soviet strategy is to gain time to strengthen the UAR militarily and to seek a settlement which would leave the Arab-Israel problem extant. During Nasser's second visit to Russia an agreement had been reached to provide 100 additional new aircraft, 550 new tanks and an additional 100 Soviet pilots for the Egyptian Air Force. The UAR has agreed to tailor its policy to Soviet objectives. The UAR now supports guerrilla warfare as a means of supporting Soviet-UAR political aims in the area. The Soviet strategy to return the situation to pre-June 1967 includes, first, bringing all parties to accept the UK resolution and, second, through Jarring or through international consultation to fix a date for withdrawal of Israeli forces to the June 4 lines. As next phase, the states involved would deposit documents recognizing such things as the right of nations to national existence and a termination of the state of belligerency. Makeshift measures for transit through the Straits of Tiran, a UNEF force in Sinai and at Sharm ash-Shaykh, a phased withdrawal to permit Egyptian forces to take over and clear the Suez Canal would also be included. The Soviets also proposed that the Security Council issue a guarantee for the boundaries. As the Israelis understand it, such problems as refugees, Jerusalem and Israeli use of Suez Canal would be put aside for later Security Council action. The Secretary said this was a Soviet presentation of an Arab plan. Ambassador Rabin replied this is not an Arab plan but rather a Soviet plan which has been coordinated with Nasser. There is “no peace in it.” It is significant that the Soviets propose to leave the refugee problem for consideration after Israel withdraws completely from occupied territories. The refugee problem is the Palestine problem and the Soviets and the UAR desire to keep the refugees as such in order to continue to threaten the existence of Israel. There is no question, said the Ambassador, of the background of hate that exists against Israel, nor is there a question that this will be eliminated by an agreement, but it cannot start to be eroded without a peace agreement and “open boundaries.” Peace must involve recognition and contacts to reduce hatreds. The Secretary said that he was struck by the Soviet reference to “multilateral documents" as a means of registering agreement. Would this be acceptable if the document were signed by all the parties to the recent conflict. Ambassador Rabin replied that Israel was not dealing with a coalition but with neighbors, with each of which it had distinct and special problems. The Soviet plan, he said, avoids a contractual arrangement between the parties. The Secretary asked whether Israel is prepared to make a public and categoric declaration that it is prepared to withdraw from occupied territories to secure and recognized boundaries in a context of peace. Ambassador Rabin said that Mr. Eban is in a much better position to answer this question, but that personally he did not find difficulty with such a statement. The problem was that of the line of withdrawal. Dayan had told Ball and Sisco that the Security Council Resolution could be interpreted as calling for withdrawal to the June 4 line. Ball and Sisco had argued that this was not so but Dayan was not convinced. The Secretary said that the U.S.G. is not in favor of substantial changes from the former armistice lines but feels that discussions between the parties should lead to a definition of boundaries that each side would find acceptable. Ambassador Rabin stressed that to Israel there was a major difference between “elimination of war" (termination of belligerency) and peace. Peace did not equate with an end to the state of war. The Soviets have agreed to help the UAR regain its territory without entering into a state of peace. The Secretary said that Arab concern that Israel would not budge from occupied territories might lead them to seek solutions other than that provided by the Jarring Mission. He said the U.S.G. has no reason whatsoever to believe the USSR wants to see the destruction of Israel. Ambassador Rabin agreed but said that a condition less than peace would permit the Soviets to continue to exploit Arab-Israel tensions. The Secretary replied that the Soviets would find that the Arabs are not easy to control. Ambassador Rabin said that, nevertheless, by exploiting Arab animosity, the Soviets were deriving more and more concessions from them. The Secretary said it was very important that the Israelis get into the territorial questions. Wasn't it possible for Israel to indicate to the UAR that its territory could be returned almost completely? The Ambassador replied that Sharm ash-Shaykh was a critical issue. Twice it had brought war. In addition, Israel must avoid the situation where one side by moving troops and making threats could force Israel into war. The Secretary asked whether a four-power force at Sharm ash-Shaykh might be reasonable assurance for Israel. Ambassador Rabin replied that great powers have their own global interests which could lead them to compromise on matters of vital interest to Israel. He said Israel had too long relied on vague assurances, assurances on territorial integrity, and even more specific ones. When the chips were down, Israel discovered it could only rely on itself. It is better to rely on specific capabilities than on guarantees that might be interpreted differently in critical periods. The Secretary replied that Israel had been told that if it went it alone, it would be alone and Israel had attacked without consultation. Israel had not relied on the guarantees and it is unfair now to charge that they were worthless. In addition, Israel had told us it would not resort to war. Ambassador Rabin asked whether the Strait would be open now if there had been no war. The Secretary replied that Israel had not given the time necessary to test other solutions. If Israel had waited through Wednesday, the answer might well have been “yes.” However, Israel had made its own judgment on what it would do. Israel was in a strange position, Ambassador Rabin said. It was the only country not part of an alliance system which was surrounded by enemies daily threatening it with destruction. At the same time, however, Israel was asked continually to demonstrate that it wanted peace. Ambassador Rabin said Israel was concerned with Soviet-Arab reaction to the lack of U.S. response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the delay in providing the Phantom aircraft, and the delay in rejecting the Soviet proposal for a Near East settlement. These developments were interpreted as signs of U.S. weakness and tend to stiffen the UAR position and erode U.S. policy as expressed to Israel and generally understood. Sisco and Battle had told him that the U.S.G. was considering proposals which are clearly incompatible with stated U.S. policy. The Secretary replied that the Soviet proposal was a “mixed bag" with some good elements among the bad. We could not reject out of hand an approach by a major power which avowed an attempt to cooperate in bringing peace to the area. The President's position on the Phantom was as given in January. The Ambassador replied that the approach was a stratagem designed to bring about a break between U.S. and Israeli policy. Reverting to the Secretary's question as to seeking agreement first with the UAR, the Ambassador said that the basic difference between Jordan and Egypt was that Hussein is now ready even for a peace treaty; the UAR seeks to avoid peace. The extent to which the King is capable of entering a separate peace is doubtful as is the question of his authority within Jordan. Peace, therefore, is the principal point of difference between the UAR and Jordan. The Secretary asked whether there would not be considerable advantage to King Hussein if the UAR could move first toward settlement. The Ambassador replied that neither the UAR nor the Soviets are interested in the kind of peace that Israel wants. The Secretary replied that if this were indeed the case, then it is up to Israel to expose their positions. One way to do this would be for Israel to come forward with a reasonable plan for peace. The Ambassador said that Israel had tried this in contacts with both states, and it had not worked. The Secretary questioned whether the “nuts and bolts" of a settlement had indeed been tackled. The Secretary said it was going to be necessary for the U.S.G. to become more specific in interpreting the President's Five Points and the Security Council Resolution. It would be of value to us to know what Israel's views are with respect to these matters. He hoped that when Eban met with him he would be prepared to be more specific on Israel's views. This would be extremely important before we talk to other governments, as we must. Ambassador Rabin said that the first purpose of any effort must be to demonstrate that peace is attainable. The Secretary asked what this meant. Doesn't peace rest on a multitude of things that must be spelled out in detail? Ambassador Rabin replied that it was useless to spell these out in detail when the other side did not want peace. The Secretary thought that this was the whole purpose of the exercise in which we had been engaged over the past months: to move the situation in the direction of peace. Israel had not been specific on the underpinnings of peace either in talks with Jarring or in what was imparted to the Arabs. It was not enough to chant “Peace.” Both in Hanoi and in Washington peace was the cry. Yet peace would not be attainable until we got down to the specifics of what must underlie it. Ambassador Rabin questioned whether any UAR leader had stated that Egypt desires peace. The Secretary responded that this was a difficult thing for a leader to do publicly when the enemy sat on a considerable piece of his territory. For over seven years he had been assuring Arab governments that Israel had no territorial ambitions. What could he say now? Ambassador Rabin replied that before the war Israel sought peace on the basis of the ADL's. Israel had not wanted war; it had been forced on her. Now, the situation had changed. Israel's security must be uppermost, and peace was the only alternative to measures necessary to insure Israel's security. The Secretary asked that Mr. Eban be informed that he would desire to resume with him the discussion on the NPT and on Israel's missile program which, apparently, Deputy Prime Minister Allon had not wished to get into. The Ambassador left the enclosed Aide-Memoire reflecting the Foreign Minister's views on the Soviet proposals with the Secretary. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Davies on September 19. 2 The Israeli aide-memoire, dated September 18, is ibid.; it is summarized in Document 257 . 257. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 257. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 19, 1968, 13:40 p.m. SUBJECT Secretary Rusk's Talk with Ambassador Rabin The Secretary had a vigorous talk with Rabin last night. He said it's up to Israel to make its position clear—to move beyond generalities and get into specifics. When Rabin said this is impossible until Israel knows whether the Arabs want peace, the Secretary replied that this must be possible because it is the whole purpose of the exercise. The only way to find out what the Arabs want is to test them with specific proposals. Rabin left the attached Aide-Memoire. 2 It says, in essence, that Israel wants real peace—not just the end of belligerency. To Rabin “real peace" means open boundaries and full recognition. But the Aide-Memoire does not go that far; it speaks of permanent boundaries, agreed security arrangements, and the other issues in the UN Resolution. The Aide-Memoire argues that the Soviet proposal is “totally and drastically opposed" to Israel's policy and ours, because it aims only at withdrawal and not at permanent peace. The Israelis somehow know the full details of the Soviet proposition. They urge us to reject it out of hand. Rabin argued that the US response to the Czech crisis, failure to make the decision on Phantoms, and indication that it might even consider the Soviet plan have all created a Soviet and Arab impression that the US is weak and is about to back down. The Secretary did not say how we planned to respond to the Soviet plan. He told Rabin only that the Soviet proposition was a mixed bag—one that we could not reject 100% out of hand. This was a fairly tough conversation and highlights our main problem in moving toward peace. We don't really disagree with the Israelis that the Soviet proposal is generally unacceptable. We do disagree with their definition of “peace.” They seem to be holding out for a complete Arab “change of heart" whereas we have thought more of the step-by-step evolution of peace through a series of practical arrangements. We've thought of a settlement as a framework within which peace could evolve. The Israelis seem unwilling to launch that process until they are assured that the Arabs have caved, but the Secretary is right in saying there will be no progress until they do. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:50 p.m. 2 See footnote 2, Document 256 . 258. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 258. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, September 19, 1968, 1121Z. 3424. From Battle. 2 1. Accompanied by Bergus I called today on Foreign Minister Riad for one hour frank, very warm exchange views. After lengthy pleasantries, I said that I felt my visit should be one in which we looked not to past but to the future. I was concerned at increased tension in area which underlined need for getting on with an inevitable job before us. All of us had important roles to play. These roles vary. If there is no progress, we cannot forgive ourselves nor will history forgive any of us who might have contributed to progress. So far, no one had done as much as he could. The upcoming General Assembly with the key Foreign Ministers in New York was an opportunity which we must not lose. I asked what the Minister saw ahead of us. 2. Riad agreed we must make special effort next few weeks. A critical stage has been reached and something must be done. Jarring is doing his best but what can be expected? The UAR has refused him nothing and the Israelis have insisted on direct negotiations and a peace treaty which no one in the Arab world can accept. This means Israelis don't want settlement. Everyone talks about peace and a settlement but the meaning of these words, plus particularly the phrase “secure boundaries,” [is?] remote with everyone giving his own interpretation. While all express approval Jarring Mission, what it needs is “fuel.” Implementation of the resolution has been refused by Israelis and only Washington can tell Israel what to do. More and more arms are going to Israel from US. More and more planes are promised them. Both candidates are committed. How can there be movement if US insists Israelis must have air superiority. They can occupy and destroy and are in a happy position from which they can threaten others. They get all the money they need. Why should they withdraw? They hope to destroy the regime in UAR and in Syria. Riad hopes they can be convinced to find a just solution but he is not expecting much at UN. He had made suggestions at Stockholm which called for a timetable, a program, or call it what you will. The result in the Arab world has been critical and there had been suggestions for Arab summit to review position he had taken which underlines political problem in UAR and in Arab countries. 3. I replied that we had both heard all arguments perhaps too many times about the past. I must underline that neither side had done as much as it could or as much as was necessary. There had been moments when it seemed to us the sides were close to a situation in which movement was possible but each side had passed the other in the night. Riad referred to US leverage; I must refer to Egyptian leverage. He said the world looked to the US; I said that the world looked to UAR and to Israel. There had been too much talk of modalities and inadequate testing by either party of the real substance of the position of the other party. I must point out that the Israelis now talked a great deal less about direct negotiations and peace treaty, indicating more flexibility on a key issue. In my opinion, for the UAR to continue to insist on no negotiations was as unrealistic as for Israelis to insist negotiations could only take one form. We had repeatedly stated our position on this matter, most recently in a very important speech by President Johnson which I wished to leave with him and which I hoped he would read with great care. Riad's statement that he expected nothing in New York unless the US moved is in effect to dodge the issue and shatter hopes of mankind. Basic issue is whether Arabs and Israelis are willing to live with each other. What the Israelis want is acceptance of their existence and a contractual arrangement in a form the world can understand and support resolving the issue once and for all. This does not necessarily mean exchange of Ambassadors or diplomatic acceptance but it did mean willingness to live and let live. 4. With respect to arms the US had over many years avoided being major supplier arms to area. We continued to follow this policy. We had both before and after the present war supplied arms but in much smaller quantities than requested. When UAR rearms itself in great quantities and increases personnel other countries this had resulting effect on US and on imbalance in area. We had shown great restraint and continued to do so. While I regretted such issues found their ways into domestic campaigns, I must point out that no statements by political parties confined themselves to issue of arms. In each statement there was strong expression need for settlement and peace and statements must be read in totality. 5. US interests clearly dictated need to find road to peace and stability. There was essential requirement for parties find means accommodation. US has a role to play but, as in past, UAR tended believe our leverage greater in any situation than it was in fact. We wished find way to help and we want and need peace in area but such leverage as we had in situation not being utilized when both parties focused on modalities and when issues substance not dealt with in manner in which we could press parties effectively toward middle and common ground between their two extreme positions. Both sides, in absence negotiations, permitted their own public opinion to drift and positions harden and cheated themselves of leverage international community might exert towards settlement. Neither the Arabs nor Israelis could afford another round of military action. That Israelis must withdraw in context settlement had always been US position but we cannot say what boundaries would be agreeable. There are many forms negotiations and many forms of peace, as President Johnson's speech so clearly recognized. Riad had referred to fact Israel “happy.” No one could find happiness in present situation and certainly not US. 6. Riad replied there was no end to the arguments each side made. He agreed that there was need for boundaries although doubted term “secure boundaries" capable clear definition. When territorial claims Israel public and maps published by them reflected Sinai part Israel, difficult to believe Israelis had good intention. One had to only read public statements Dayan and others to be convinced Israeli intentions. 7. I replied Israelis had repeatedly informed us they had no territorial ambitions for UAR territory, at which point Riad said “we don't believe them.” I replied that it was impossible for me to believe all public statements made either in Cairo or Tel Aviv and that what was told to us privately often was at variance with public statements both sides. I urged UAR find a means test intentions. 8. Riad agreed too much had been said. He pointed to Jordan as country which had attempted test intentions without success. Riad spoke in some detail with equanimity and indeed sympathy re contacts that had been going on between Israelis and Jordanians. He referred specifically to Israeli contacts Palestinian leaders. In response Israel had declined to discuss substance. At present Jordanians feared another Israeli attack. This could mean complete deterioration. 9. I replied that some means must be found break circle of El Fatah activity and response by Israelis. UAR largest and most influential country in area and must find way help. 10. Riad repeated that he had refused Jarring nothing. I knew emotions and feelings of people from my own residence in area. US had public opinion problems which led leaders to have to write letters or make statements to Zionists every day. UAR also had its problems. Only UAR and Jordan had accepted November 22 resolution. Algeria and Syria had refused and Algeria had abstained in Security Council vote yesterday because of reference to resolution which it had not accepted. UAR has accepted resolution but cannot go too far too fast or its voice in area would be of no value and would help nobody. In New York perhaps there will be more time. There must be more talk in New York and Riad hopes for concrete ideas from the US on how to deal with problem. We must not move in wrong direction. 11. I replied that we had refrained thus far from offering plan and that we had no blueprint for settlement. I was not sure what lead Jarring would take in New York but we wished to help in any way possible in supporting him and anticipated he would take very active role. 12. Riad said he was not asking for concrete plan but hoped that we would go beyond generalities to specifics. We need more frank discussions and must “dot the i's.” The meeting ended with expressions some hope for New York. On way to car Mohamed Riad, who had been present, remarked that Foreign Minister had pointed some new directions, apparently referring desire concrete thoughts from USG. 13. Comment : Both Bergus and I considered talk very useful although not changing course history. Excellent rapport existed and there was obvious pleasure that Riad had opportunity for such talk. There was also clear indication he wished continue explorations with us in New York and prepared make effort facilitate consultations Ambassador Ball. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and London. 2 Battle was in Egypt to represent the United States in ceremonies winding up the project to keep Abu Simbel and other monuments from being covered by the water rising behind the Aswan Dam. 259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, September 19, 1968, 2208Z. 241705. Subj: Ceasefire Violations in ME. Ref: USUN 6562. 2 1. Dept shares USUN's view that situation along Israel/Jordan and Israel/UAR ceasefire lines is ominous and may encourage additional violent acts by parties leading to further deterioration of situation in immediate future. Accordingly, ME addressees should approach host govts soonest to urge utmost possible restraint and rigorous observance of ceasefire, pointing out (inter alia) irreparable harm that additional strife in coming weeks could do to Jarring's ability continue his peacemaking efforts in what could be decisive phase. 2. For Tel Aviv : In approaching GOI along lines para 1, Embassy should say we impressed by evidence of recent Israeli restraint and we intend to remind other parties of this important fact in urging similar restraint on them. We would hope that recent warnings delivered by Prime Minister and other GOI spokesmen do not presage lessening of Israeli forbearance in days to come, particularly in any manner that would tend to undercut our approaches to other parties. 3. For Amman and Cairo : In addition to making points outlined para 1 above, you should state our belief that recent Israeli actions along ceasefire lines have been relatively restrained and our desire see this continue, although we clearly unable give any assurances this will be the case. We hope GUAR and GOJ would see fit to respond helpfully, rather than by undertaking or allowing acts calculated to try Israeli patience to its uncertain limits. 4. For London : Embassy requested inform HMG of our approaches to parties and urge UK undertake similar representations, especially in Cairo. 5. Dept will make parallel approaches here. 6. Reuters report just received re death six Israelis in ambush on Israel/Jordan cease-fire line adds urgency to above. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Thomas J. Carolan, Jr. (IO/UNP); cleared by William H. Gleysteen (IO/UNP), Atherton, Popper, and in draft by Parker and Seelye; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv and Cairo and repeated to USUN and London. 2 In telegram 6562 from USUN, September 19, Buffum followed up a telephone conversation with Department officials the previous day to warn that Israel's circulation at the UN of a compendium of cease-fire complaints against Jordan should be seen as presaging major military operations against Jordan in light of past experience with similar Israeli diplomatic initiatives. Buffum recommended a high-level U.S. approach to Israel urging restraint. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 260. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 260. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 24, 1968, 17:25 p.m. Mr. President: Abe Feinberg is just back from seeing Eshkol. His message is as follows: 1. The reason the Israelis took the UAR incidents to the Security Council was so as not to complicate your life while the Czech crisis was on. 2. The Israelis say that Nasser has already made an arms deal with Moscow involving some: —150 MIGs; —450 tanks; —the training of 200 pilots in the USSR; —the sending of an additional 200 pilots to Egypt in mid-1969. 3. While Abe was here, I checked with our intelligence people and found: —we have no independent confirmation of the alleged Soviet-UAR deal; —the Israelis have reported the deal to us but not shared the source or quality of the intelligence. 4. In the light of the arms deal, Eshkol is worried about the Soviet proposal to confer with us about a Middle Eastern settlement. I explained to Abe that there was a good deal of nonsense in the Soviet proposal, but two points that deserved serious consideration: —the Arabs signing a “multilateral document;” —the notion of a 4-power guarantee which might be the best security Israel could ever get if the Senate would buy it, since the Senate does not appear about to buy a bilateral security treaty with Israel. 5. Abe said he would advise the Israelis to share with us fully their intelligence on the Moscow-Cairo deal. He said he was relieved that we were not “buying" the whole Soviet document. 6. I was in the midst of talking about the importance of the Israeli's clarifying their border position when I decided I ought to get this memo up to you. W. W. Rostow 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Confidential. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 261. Summary Notes of the 591st Meeting of the National Security Council 261. Summary Notes of the 591st Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, September 25, 1968, 12:05-13:40 p.m. The 23rd UN General Assembly The President: The purpose of the meeting of the Council is to review the issues before the current United Nations General Assembly and to discuss our position on these questions. Secretary Rusk will comment in general on the General Assembly meeting and Ambassador Ball will deal with the specific problems. Secretary Rusk: Suggested that Ambassador Ball lead off and he would comment later. Ambassador Ball: The session of the General Assembly meeting in New York will probably be the most routine in UN history, barring some unforeseen event. (See copy of State Summary of UNGA issues attached.) 2 The following major issues will be raised: [Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.] 2. The Middle East a. We have the last clear chance for an Arab-Israeli settlement in the next few months. b. Ambassador Jarring will be in New York and will be meeting with Arab foreign ministers and the Israeli foreign minister. The work on the Middle East will be done in hotel rooms, not in the United Nations Assembly. c. Currently, the Arabs appear to the public to be readier to settle than the Israelis. d. There is very small chance for settlement unless we push on the Israelis and the Russians push on the Arabs. Even if this were done, a settlement is doubtful because the two sides are so far apart. This is a sad prognosis. e. Unless action comes within the next few weeks, Jarring will be ending a year of activity without results. If he cannot advance toward accomplishing the objectives of the November 22 resolution, he may quit. The problem then becomes even more difficult for us because it will be returned to the UN Security Council. The subject is complicated by the U.S. election. [Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.] Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5, Tab 13, the 23rd UNGA. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. An attached list indicates that among those attending, in addition to the President, were Rusk, Ball, Sisco, Clifford, Nitze, Fowler, Helms, Wheeler, Walt Rostow, and USIA Director Marks. 2 Not found attached. 262. Memorandum of Conversation 262. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 25, 1968. PARTICIPANTS Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel Shlomo Argov, Minister of Israel W. W. Rostow Harold H. Saunders Ambassador Rabin came in this afternoon to discuss Israel's concerns about the Soviet memo to the US on the Middle East. 2 Rabin began by presenting the Israeli view, for which he says there is evidence from a “very reliable" intelligence source, that Nasser and the Soviet leaders had made the following deal when Nasser was recently in the USSR: 1. The USSR would build Nasser's armed forces into an effective military machine. This would involve the shipment of additional military equipment (Rabin mentioned 100 new aircraft, 550 new tanks, 100 more Soviet pilots-the same numbers he had used with Secretary Rusk reported in State 241839 3 and then rattled off a number of additional items and quantities). Rabin admitted that he could not say how long the delivery period would be—"it might be a year and a half, it might be four years.” He acknowledged that Egyptian absorptive capacity would control the timing of these shipments, but he maintained that the Soviets were committed to this arrangement and were working hard at training. 2. In return, Nasser agreed to follow the USSR's political strategy. The Soviets will try for a political solution-not peace, but a political settlement which involves return to June 4 boundaries, and leaving unsettled the issues of passage through the Canal, the refugees, and Jerusalem. All these are issues designed to perpetuate tension between Arabs and Israelis which the USSR can exploit. The Soviets have agreed to back the Arab guerilla movements and to a limited Egyptian increase of tension along the Suez Canal. They have done this to heat up the area and to worry the US. At the same time they have come to the US with their notion of a political settlement, which Rabin said bore no relationship to either the Israeli or the US concept of a lasting peace. Rabin said, “There is no peace in it.” This is the Soviet design and Nasser has subscribed to it. Mr. Rostow said he wasn't at all sure the Egyptians were in any position to follow a coherent strategy, but he agreed that the Ambassador had outlined a serious hypothesis which we would look at carefully. However, he had two outstanding reservations: 1. We have no collateral evidence to confirm that this deal was made. We have received the Israeli information but Israel had not shared its evidence with us so that we could make our own judgment. It is a serious matter for the US to accept as a working hypothesis one for which it has no independent evidence whatsoever. In response, Rabin said it is very difficult to share intelligence sources, but indicated that this information came from a highly reliable source. (Comment: From his hedging, it appeared that he might be referring both to intercept and to an agent in Cairo.) At another point, however, he admitted that there was some Israeli deduction involved too. 2. The Israeli hypothesis seemed internally consistent until it came to one point in the Soviet memo-the suggestion of a four-power guarantee. If the Soviet aim is to perpetuate tension in the Middle East, it seems highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would invite the US to guarantee whatever settlement develops. The Soviet Union is fully aware that the US keeps constitutionally accepted commitments. Vietnam has proved that. If the Soviets were not serious about a final settlement, the last thing they would want would be a US commitment to make the details of a settlement stick. Moving to a related point, Mr. Rostow as much as said that it is preposterous for the Israelis to think that we have bought the Soviet proposal lock, stock and barrel. He acknowledged that the Soviet document proposed return to the situation of June 4, 1967. He recalled that the US had fought that position in New York and everywhere else since the second day of the June war. The President had reiterated our position just two weeks ago, and there was no question of our moving away from that policy. However, that was not to say that a Soviet document contained nothing worth looking at. There was one item in the Soviet proposal which especially interested the Israelis—the Soviet suggestion of a four-power guarantee. Mr. Rostow said that if he were an Israeli, he would think very seriously about the advantages of a guarantee backed by the Congress of the US. From the Israeli point of view, this would be infinitely better than some treaty signed by an Arab leader. Nobody can guarantee that the Congress would go along with such a proposal, but it is worth thinking about. Mr. Rostow added that there are other points of flexibility in the Soviet document, though he reiterated that, of course, the basic proposal was a non-starter. The discussion then turned to the process of peace-making. Rabin said that Israel wants the Egyptians to define what it means by peace. By Israeli definition, peace is “reconciliation, open borders, and recognition.” Mr. Rostow said that the problem is for each side to define its objectives in a negotiating process of some sort. For instance, rather than complaining about the fact that the US was looking at a document the USSR had given it, he would like to see the Israelis produce a document of their own. They had not. As far as Mr. Rostow could tell, there were no serious boundary problems between Israel and the UAR, although we could not say so with any confidence because the Israelis had not told us what their position is. Rabin indicated that Israel would have boundary problems with the UAR, but he did not elaborate. The conversation turned to Jordan, and Mr. Rostow said that any settlement with Jordan would involve much more than a peace treaty because Jordan and Israel would have to live in economic intimacy if there were peace. Jerusalem is the sticking point. Mr. Rostow reminded the Ambassador that General Tzur had defined the problem this way: “We can't give Hussein enough in Jerusalem for him to live with.” Rabin said that Israel would give Hussein a role in the Moslem Holy Places. He said that they had even considered building an overpass or a tunnel to give the Jordanians unhampered access to Jerusalem. Mr. Rostow said that wasn't good enough. If there was going to be a peace settlement, they would have to show more imagination than that. H. H. S. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. 2 See Document 245 . 3 Not printed. 263. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable 263. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable 1 Washington, September 25, 1968. [ document number not declassified ] COUNTRY UAR/USSR/ISRAEL DOI Late August 1968 SUBJECT Possible Provision of Advanced Aircraft to UAR by the USSR ACQ [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] SOURCE [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] 1. Lieutenant General Amir Khammash, Jordan Arab Army Chief of Staff, was informed during a visit to Cairo in late August 1968 by both War Minister Muhammad Fawzi and UAR Army Chief of Staff Major General Abd-al-Munim Riyad that the Soviet Union had promised to provide the UAR with advanced aircraft to offset any sale of U.S. Phantom aircraft to Israel. (Field Comment. Source did not have any details as to type or number of aircraft.) 2. Field Dissem. CINCMEAFSA (also sent Cairo.) 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos, 6/68-1/69. Secret; Routine; No Foreign Dissem. 264. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 264. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 27, 1968, 16 p.m. SUBJECT Twelve More Skyhawks for Israel Secretaries Rusk and Clifford recommend that we accede to an Israeli request for 12 more Skyhawks. You will recall that our 1966 agreement sold 48 and that you added another 40 after Prime Minister Eshkol's visit last January. Now the Israelis have asked for 12 more, since the production line is going to close down by April 1970 and they would like to have a few extras to cover possible losses over the next few years. Secretaries Rusk and Clifford recommend you go ahead. The Arab world is still unaware of the total number of Skyhawks going to Israel, and a few more added to the end of the delivery line would make little difference on the diplomatic front. While this wouldn't reduce pressure for the Phantoms, it would give us additional evidence for proving that we are not totally insensitive to their security requirements. That plus our general interest in Israel's defense are the main reasons for going ahead; I don't think there's much room for a bargain here. The only reason this comes up for decision now is that we must notify Douglas Aircraft by September 30 to avoid a break in the production line which would add to the price. If we're going to do it, we might as well keep the line going. Walt Approve 2 Disapprove Call me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that the memorandum was received at 4:03 p.m. 2 President Johnson checked this option. 265. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 265. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 27, 1968, 18:10 p.m. Mr. President: You may wish to know that Dobrynin came in at 5 p.m. to see Sect. Rusk on one question: Is the U.S. likely to respond to their note on the Middle East? He wanted to know if newspaper accounts of a complete brush-off by the Israelis of the Soviet proposal was shared by the U.S. Sect. Rusk told him that it was likely that we would be getting a response to him in the next several days. The Soviet paper gave us certain problems, but our response was not a complete brush-off. W. W. Rostow 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 96, 9/26-30/68. Secret; Sensitive. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 266. Memorandum of Conversation 266. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 29, 1968. SUBJECT Views of the United States Government Regarding the Communication Presented by the Government of the USSR PARTICIPANTS The Under Secretary His Excellency Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA The Soviet Ambassador called on Mr. Katzenbach, at the latter's request, at his residence on Sunday, September 29, at approximately 8:15 p.m. Mr. Katzenbach handed to the Soviet Ambassador the attached paper which the Under Secretary described as the views of the United States with respect to the recent communication presented by the Government of the USSR to the United States. 2 Mr. Katzenbach emphasized that the paper contained the views of the United States and did not represent the views of the Government of Israel or any other country in the area. Mr. Katzenbach pointed out that Ambassador Jarring has worked long and hard and that he has a chance in the weeks ahead with the Foreign Ministers present to make progress under the resolution of November 22, 1967. The United States expects to exercise all influence possible on the situation and hopes to get substantive discussions underway in what will be an important period. It is particularly important, Mr. Katzenbach emphasized, for all pressure possible to be placed upon the countries concerned and in particular the UAR, Jordan, and Israel. The longer there is no move toward peace, the greater the difficulty, and the United States hopes very much that progress will be possible during the New York meeting. The Soviet Ambassador asked what the main point was of the communication. Is it merely to assist Ambassador Jarring? The Under Secretary replied that this was the main point and that the United States was making every effort to support him in his efforts. The Ambassador asked what was new in the paper. The USSR considers that there must be concrete proposals if there is to be progress. Mr. Katzenbach replied that we considered proposals for a solution should be advanced by Jarring in an effort to promote agreement of the parties. One of the most difficult points would be to arrive at a definition, for example, of agreed and secure boundaries. Ambassador Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union agrees that adjustments in these lines are the business of the parties and not the business of the Soviet Union. However, he felt that it was necessary to make concrete proposals and that the Soviet Union, while wishing to help Jarring, considered that its more detailed suggestions had been a move in that direction. The USSR did not wish to press its paper. If the United States does not like the Russian proposal, the Russians would welcome steps by the United States to offer its own plan. France has a practical approach, and other countries must be equally practical. Mr. Katzenbach replied that the question of timing was an important element. We consider it important to get the parties down to discussion of issues and substance. We believe that we have a common purpose with the Soviet Union of getting a settlement and ending a dangerous situation. We are reluctant, however, to tell Ambassador Jarring what to do. He must make that decision. Dobrynin replied that Jordan was, he understood, depressed and may give up. What can be done that is practical and will help? The USSR is not trying to impose a settlement because of the Czech situation. It, too, wished to help Ambassador Jarring. Mr. Katzenbach said that he had not brought up the Czech matter, that the Ambassador had mentioned it first. There was general talk of the problems of the area with Mr. Katzenbach emphasizing that the Arabs primarily wanted withdrawal while the Israelis primarily want peace arrangements based on recognition of their existence and a permanent arrangement. The United States, of course, is aware that a peace treaty would be difficult, but there were other forms of settlement that could accomplish the same goal. The Ambassador agreed to present to the Government of the USSR the views contained in the memorandum. Attachment September 29, 1968 1. The United States Government has noted the views of the Soviet Government concerning a Middle East settlement presented by Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Rusk on September 4, 1968. 3 2. The United States takes the view that peace in the Middle East is not the concern only of the countries of the region and that the persistence of tension in that area, and the absence of peace, threatens the general peace. 3. While sharing Soviet concern over the situation in the Middle East, the United States cannot accept the description contained in the Soviet document of the causes of that situation and the positions and actions taken by the parties since the cessation of hostilities. Moreover, it must reject as totally unfounded the allegation that the United States Government has supported a negative and deliberately obstructionist policy on the part of the Government of Israel. This statement is unwarranted and untrue. On the contrary, it is the view of the United States Government that the level of the flow of arms from the Soviet Union into the area has been a major factor in obstructing meaningful peace negotiations between the parties. 4. The views of the United States have been set forth by the President and other senior U.S. Government representatives on a number of occasions and are well known to the Government of the Soviet Union. The five principles enunciated by the President in his address of June 19, 1967, as reiterated by him on September 10, 1968, remain the basis for United States policy concerning a Middle East settlement. 5. Since the adoption of the Security Council resolution, the United States has given its full support to the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring to fulfill his mandate “to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles" in the Council resolution. The United States Government believes that its primary effort, along with that of the Soviet Union and other governments, should be directed at supporting Ambassador Jarring and in doing nothing that would in any way detract from or interfere in his activities. This attitude is reflected in the Security Council's resolution of September 18, 1968, 4 to which both the United States and the Soviet Union gave their support. 6. The United States, on its part, will make a renewed effort to encourage the parties to engage in the fullest and freest exchange of substantive proposals under his auspices and to accept such procedures as he may suggest to promote agreement as required by the resolution. It is hoped the USSR will do likewise. Just as we have felt that insistence upon direct negotiations as a pre-condition to serious substantive exchanges is unrealistic, so we believe the view that no joint talks can take place under Jarring's auspices is equally unrealistic. We hope the USSR will give this critical point the serious attention it deserves; for it is most difficult for us to conceive that stable peace can be achieved in this area without negotiations involving the parties at some stage, given the complexity of the issues. 7. The Soviet document requests the views of the United States Government concerning steps which in its view must be taken for a prompt settlement of the Middle East problem. In response to that request, the United States Government would like to seek certain clarifications and present the following observations, which inter alia could be explored in future consultations: (a) The Soviet document refers in paragraph (a) to the readiness of the parties to implement the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. The United States wishes to point out that an essential part of the obligation to implement the resolution is the obligation to cooperate fully with Ambassador Jarring in the carrying out of his mandate as set forth in paragraph three of the resolution to promote agreement among the states concerned. It does not regard the Security Council resolution as self-implementing. It believes, on the contrary, that under the resolution the parties must take responsibility for an agreed settlement and that a settlement cannot be imposed upon the parties by others. The United States would welcome further clarification of the Soviet views on this point. (b) The United States notes with interest that the Soviet document refers in paragraph (a) to the possibility of consultations “through Jarring or in some other form.” The United States believes that consultations involving the parties will be essential to the development of agreement on a peaceful settlement envisaged by the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution. Does the Soviet Union share this view? (c) The United States agrees that it may be desirable for United Nations forces to be employed to assist in the carrying out of the terms of a settlement agreed by the parties and notes in this connection that the Soviet document makes a number of suggestions in this regard. While not being able to accept some of the concepts reflected in these suggestions, the United States would be prepared to discuss with the Soviet Government the idea of use of United Nations forces in connection with an agreed settlement. (d) The United States further notes that paragraph (b) 5 of the Soviet document provides that the declarations of the Arab countries and Israel on the cessation of the state of war and the establishment of peace would become effective “either through the instrumentality of the Security Council or through the signing of a multilateral document.” The United States believes that the peace must be based upon arrangements which directly bind the parties. Is this what is intended by the reference to a “multilateral document"? The United States believes that a document signed jointly by the parties is the most desirable, if not the only, means of obligating the parties to carry out the agreement worked out in accordance with the resolution of November 22, 1967. It believes, also, that Security Council endorsement of the terms of a settlement agreed by the parties could serve a useful purpose. The United States is not clear what a Four Power guarantee would add to such a Security Council endorsement of the agreement of the parties, but it is willing to examine the possibility at the appropriate time. (e) Concerning the above point on the cessation of the state of war, does the USSR share the view of the United States that a termination of the state of belligerency would mean that there would be complete freedom of passage through international waterways, including the Suez Canal, for all vessels? 8. The Soviet document comments at some length on the desirability of a plan or timetable for implementation of the Security Council resolution. The United States has no objection to the concept of a plan under which the steps required for carrying out the peace settlement agreed to by the parties, and the timing of those steps, would be spelled out. It may be that the parties would find such a detailed plan necessary since, as the Soviet document also notes, the actions to be taken by the parties in carrying out their agreed settlement would inevitably be interrelated and in some degree interdependent. It is in light of this interrelationship that the United States firmly adheres to the view that all elements of a settlement must be dealt with in arriving at the terms of a settlement. It is the understanding of the United States, moreover, that the parties, including the UAR, all recognize that the Security Council resolution requires a “package" which would settle all the problems left open for negotiations by the resolution, whatever the chronology for implementation on which they might agree. In our view this position represents a proper interpretation of the resolution. 9. There is one specific aspect of the program outlined in the Soviet document which in particular merits comment: the idea of Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5 line. The essence of the United States policy since June 5, 1967, has been and remains that the state of armistice among the parties must be replaced, as the resolution of November 22, 1967, states, by a condition of peace. The armistice agreements of 1949 called for a transition to peace and specifically contemplated the possibility of agreed changes in the armistice lines of 1949 as part of that transition. The Security Council resolution calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force, but does not specify that those boundaries should be precisely the lines held prior to June 5, 1967, or on any other date. In view of the complexity of this question, the United States believes that this is a matter which requires the priority attention of both the parties and Ambassador Jarring. 10. The United States believes it important that the Soviet and United States Government continue to consult on all possibilities for a settlement of the Middle East situation. It expects to be in contact with Ambassador Jarring in the days immediately ahead and, of course, there will be further opportunity for the two governments to exchange views during Minister Gromyko's forthcoming visit to New York during the General Assembly session. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle on September 30 and approved in U on October 9. 2 The attached paper was summarized in telegram 254018 to Tel Aviv, October 11. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3 See Document 245 . 4 On September 18 the Security Council adopted a resolution reaffirming the principles of Resolution 242, urging the fullest cooperation with the Jarring Mission, and stipulating that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in several resolutions be respected. (UN doc. S/RES/258 (1968)) 267. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 267. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 30, 1968, 11:35 a.m. Mr. President: [ 1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified ] Jerusalem Jerusalem is the major sticking point. I see no agreement if the Israelis limit Jordan to access to Moslem Holy Places and no agreement if Jordan tries to apply principle of “no territorial acquisitions" to Jerusalem. The best suggestion I know is from an Israeli junior minister: rebuild every church, synagogue, and mosque there ever was in Jerusalem and gradually put 60,000 or so Arabs on West Bank, making old city a tri-religion monument. Secure borders It is very difficult to think of Jordan accepting Israeli outposts permanently on its territory along the Jordan. The other alternatives are: —joint patrols; —joint patrols plus UN presence; —UN presence, about which Israel would be very skeptical. Israel might well give on Gaza, as the outlet for a transit road across Israel, leaving the Gaza refugees with Jordan. To make anything constructive out of these initial positions will take a very great effort in the weeks ahead by Jarring—but, in fact, by us. It's the best hope, despite the gap. 2 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 11:45 a.m. Attached is a September 30 memorandum to the President from CIA Director Helms with a subject heading that reads: “Israel-Jordan Secret Talks.” See also Document 186 . 2 Rostow added a handwritten postscript that reads: “Helms tells me a supplementary report will be along shortly.” The supplementary report, in the form of another September 30 memorandum from Helms to the President, [ text not declassified ]. (Ibid.) Rostow commented on this supplementary report in a note he sent to the President on September 30. [text not declassified] Rostow concluded that “there may be some play for negotiation on the two really critical issues (Jerusalem and secure borders) in the weeks ahead.” (Ibid.) 268. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 268. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 New York, October 1, 1968, 1915Z. 6764. Secto 05. Subject: Secretary-Eban Mtg (I)—Arab-Israeli settlement. 2 Following based on uncleared memcon, noforn and FYI subject to revision upon review. Begin summary . In meeting with Secretary September 30 Israeli Foreign Minister Eban: (a) sought to discredit recent Soviet Middle East initiative, expressing concern re differing US and Israeli interpretations; (b) welcomed President's September 10 speech, expressing view that reports on US-Israeli differences on approach to settlement were exaggerated; and (c) made clear Israel continues adhere to position that it will withdraw from ceasefire lines only following signature of contractual agreements negotiated face to face at some stage, either under Jarring's auspices or otherwise. Eban discounted possibility of early progress toward settlement with UAR due UAR determination not make peace. Eban said Israel therefore now gives priority to agreement with Jordan. He outlined in more specific terms than heretofore concepts which Israel believes should govern settlement with Jordan, which he said have been conveyed authoritatively to GOJ outside Jarring context. Concepts as described by Eban suggest some variation of an Allon plan, though he did not so categorize them. Eban expressed hope for progress with Jordan while in New York, looking ultimately Jordanian-Israeli meetings under Jarring's auspices. At the same time, Eban said Israel will continue for tactical reasons to probe UAR position. Eban indicated that effort will also be made to improve Israel's public image. To this end, while not surfacing any concrete “peace plan,” he will seek make clear before General Assembly Israel's concept of peace with respect to such issues as boundaries, recognition and security. Secretary made clear that US not buying “imposed solution" approach but did not think Soviet positions necessarily frozen, and stressed importance of maintaining contact with USSR on Middle East and other major problems. Eban seemed reassured by Secretary's comments including US response to Soviet approach as outlined by Secretary. Secretary urged Israel to pursue both direct and indirect routes as feasible, to continue utilize Jarring and not to give up on UAR. Failure find early solution could have serious consequences and provide further opportunity for Soviets in Middle East. End summary . 1. FonMin Eban, accompanied by Ambassadors Tekoah and Rabin and Minister Argov, had one and one-half hour meeting with Secretary afternoon September 30. Ambassador Buffum, Assistant Secretary Sisco and Atherton (NEA) also present. 2. Eban said he had clear picture of USG views from President's September 10 speech and accounts of Secretary's meetings with Allon and Rabin. Israeli Cabinet had met several times to consider what Eban could say to give others, including world opinion through General Assembly, clear idea of Israel's position. 3. To begin with, however, Eban said he wished to focus on ways of keeping US and Israel together. Israel found President's speech clear reiteration of June 19 principles with some welcome additions, particularly emphasis on concept that Security Council resolution not self-executing but only a basis for parties to reach agreement. This went to heart of diplomatic deadlock, given UAR position that resolution could be carried out by declamation. Behind diplomatic deadlock, however, lay political deadlock arising from UAR determination not to make peace. 4. Eban continued that, while there was broad area of agreement between Israel and USG on approach to Arab-Israel settlement, he was not sure we shared common view of international setting which was inseparable from area problems. Specifically Eban thought US and Israel had differing views of Soviet policy. Soviet action in Czechoslovakia had caused wide concern in much of world and some friends of United States were troubled by our reaction. Israel believed Soviets had seriously prejudiced their position in world and that it was a mistake to act as though normal relations with USSR could be maintained. Israel believed Soviet intentions should be exposed, including their increasingly truculent position in Middle East and new Arab arms buildup. Czech invasion should be on GA agenda. Israel found incongruous and demoralizing the idea that US would welcome Soviet signature on ME settlement. USSR should not be invited into ME. In Israel's view, USG should not continue contacts with Soviets on ME. 5. Re specifics of Soviet proposal which Israel knew in detail, Eban saw no merit in proposal for some kind of multilateral document. Such document wld merely be substitute for Arab-Israeli agreement and provide Soviets basis for later intervention. Israel also viewed negatively proposal for four-power guarantee, especially in absence of agreement among parties. We should not afford USSR statutory basis to intervene in ME. 6. In summary, Eban said Soviet approach did not constitute peace proposal but merely proposal for return to situation of June 4, 1967, with better basis than previously for Soviet penetration. In Israel's view, role for great powers should be to insist that responsibility rested with the parties. Once agreement reached, it would be natural for there to be international endorsement on pattern of 1949 armistice agreements, of which SC took note after they had been negotiated by parties under UN auspices. 7. Turning to status of Israel's exchange of views with the parties, Eban reviewed past efforts to initiate negotiations with Cairo. UAR had backed away from every effort, beginning with period before Jarring Mission and continuing through Jarring's efforts to organize joint meetings last March and latest Israeli effort to begin indirect negotiating process in July through Sept this year. Latter exercise, Eban said, represented change of Israeli policy. Israel had begun by asking UAR to define its concept of peace and had hinted that it would not be dogmatic about form of peace settlement. UAR had replied with conventional abuse when Israel had asked what Cairo meant by proposal to record agreement in declaration to SC. 8. Eban said Israel had concluded that UAR was in state of ideological rigidity, unable to negotiate in any form. Eban disagreed with argument of some USG officials that UAR was unaware Israel would withdraw from occupied territories. UAR knew that it would recover its territories in context of peace. Israel's concern in Sinai was security and free navigation, and UAR has already made clear that it did not want Gaza. Problem, Eban said, was that UAR wanted return of territories without peace and may believe this is possible, either through 1957-type political solution or military solution based on buildup of UAR air force in absence replacement of Israeli air losses. Israel had concluded that it not feasible to begin with Cairo, though for tactical reasons it should continue to probe UAR in order to expose Egyptian responsibility. 9. Eban said that logical approach therefore was to give priority to settlement with Jordan. Palestine Arabs and Jordanian Government in any case more involved since Palestine was heart of problem. Exchanges with GOJ, which began in April through Palestinian leaders, had recently become more intensive, concrete and authoritative. Israeli-Jordanian dialogue existed with respect to peace, population and boundaries. While Israel had drawn no lines on map, Jordan had detailed conceptual picture of what Israel wanted. Israel sought maximum security with minimum change of territory and population. Those responsible for Israel's security believed changes were needed in uninhabited areas of Jordan Valley. This could be accomplished without breaking territorial link between East and West Banks. Essential conditions, however, were that there be no Arab army West of Jordan River and that boundary be a “community boundary" mutually open as at present, with Mediterranean port facilities for Jordan through Israel and access for Israel to places of religious and historical interest to Israelis in Jordan. On Jerusalem, Israel envisaged Jordan as custodian of Moslem holy places with access agreements to be negotiated. 10. Eban said most of world would consider this Israeli position magnanimous, given Jordanian responsibility for hostilities last year. Israel awaited with interest Jordanian reaction and looked for progress in October. In response to Secretary's question whether Israeli-Jordanian negotiations would be outside Jarring Mission context, Eban said Israel thought Jordan wanted to pursue informal contacts but also wanted to see if it could get in position to have direct contacts. Major question was whether Hussein had green light from Cairo. Meanwhile, Eban said he had not yet considered what to say to Jarring about contacts with Jordan. He thought Jarring understood why Israel preferred deal with specifics in private channels in order avoid either side's becoming locked into fixed positions. 11. Re negotiations with UAR, Eban said Jarring had suggested two possible ways to break deadlock: (a) Israel could define its views on secure and recognized borders; or (b) parties could make declarations in SC on carrying out principles of resolution while reserving territorial questions for separate negotiations. Eban had told Jarring Israel had no objection to latter procedure but doubted Arabs would agree. Israel also suspected that UAR would want to formulate any declaration in general terms, avoiding specific recognition of Israeli sovereignty, Israeli rights, etc. 12. Secretary noted information we had received from London to effect that King Hussein had told British Jordan would enter negotiations with Israel under Jarring's auspices if Israel would indicate acceptance of November Security Council resolution with qualification. Hussein had also said he had UAR green light to do this. (Eban noted that British had also passed this information to him.) In response to Secretary's query whether it possible to get into specifics with UAR through Jarring as Israel said it was doing directly with Jordan, Eban expressed skepticism. Ambassador Rabin added that the basic difference was that Jordan was ready for peace and UAR was not; it was thus logical to move to second phase with Jordan. 13. Turning to US-Israeli relations, Eban said he believed reports of US-Israeli differences in Israeli press and elsewhere were exaggerated. Some alleged that US saw no need for negotiations—an interpretation which Eban did not accept. It was clear that peace could not be achieved without parties setting eyes on each other. Historically, transitions from war to peace always involved contacts. Opinion in Israel did not favor perpetuating ceasefire lines, but Israel could live with those lines if it could not have peace. Sacrifices of recent war had sharpened Israeli awareness of need for negotiated peace. Israel would multiply and diversify its contacts, however, putting concrete ideas on table. Israel also understood US argument that it must improve its public image. Eban said he had no “peace plan" to present to General Assembly but would use GA to clarify Israel's concept of peace with respect to boundaries, acceptance of its right to exist and security. Re territorial questions, Eban noted that Goldberg's formulation of November 15 and President's statement on September 10 were close to Israel's ideas. 14. Eban emphasized that all of foregoing still in tentative stage. He planned to devote October and, if necessary, some of November to these efforts and hoped for more detailed discussions with USG. He also hoped public polemics could be avoided. 15. Referring to Eban's comments about Soviet policy, Secretary recalled that he had told NATO Ministers in Iceland that we faced dangerous summer. Even then USSR appeared moving away from peaceful coexistence. Given threat of Czech developments to maintenance of Soviet position in Eastern Europe, strong Soviet reaction was predictable. Soviets must have anticipated adverse world reaction although extent of condemnation of Soviet invasion was surprising. Secretary said USG not impressed by demands from others that US do something about Czechoslovakia while they continued business as usual. 16. With respect to situation in Mediterranean and Middle East area, Secretary said Soviets could be expected to attempt improve their position at expense of both Israel and moderate Arab states. Best way to contain Soviets in the Middle East was to find solution to Arab-Israel conflict. 17. Secretary continued that Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had interrupted aspects of US-USSR dialogue. Other problems such as Middle East and Viet-Nam had not disappeared, however, and it important to maintain contact on these issues. Secretary then summarized US reaction to Soviet Middle East approach as conveyed by US to USSR (septel) 3 and undertook to have Israeli representatives more fully briefed later. In general, Secretary said, we believed parties must find their own answer; solution could not be imposed. We would welcome it if progress with Jordan could be made through direct contacts. Jarring had role to play, however, and we would also welcome it if he could help with UAR. If solution not found, consequences could be serious and we therefore hoped there would be progress while Foreign Ministers were in New York. 18. Eban said US reply to Soviets as described by Secretary seemed close to Israeli views. Noting recent New York Times story on Soviet approach, Eban asked whether we intended to comment publicly. Secretary said we would limit public comment and were waiting to hear Soviet answers to our request for clarification of some points in their approach. He thought many issues were being re-examined in Moscow and, while not overly optimistic about the outcome, did not have impression that Soviet positions were fixed and frozen. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Sandstorm. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, and Tel Aviv. 2 Eban and Rusk also discussed the Israeli request for F-4 Phantom aircraft and the Israeli position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty during this conversation. Eban renewed the Israeli request for action on the request for Phantoms, pointing to the danger that the UAR might act assuming that it had achieved air superiority. On the question of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Eban said that Israel had not “gone nuclear" and had not decided not to sign the treaty. He stated that for the present Israel wanted “to swim in the international current" and work with those states seeking greater security assurances. (Telegram 6760 from USUN, October 1; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR) 3 See footnote 2, Document 266 . 269. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 269. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 New York, October 2, 1968, 1258Z. 6786. Secto 12. Following based on uncleared memcon, 2 Noforn and FYI, subject to revision upon review. 1. Begin summary . Secretary and UAR Foreign Minister Riad met for hour and fifteen minutes October 1. Both agreed next two weeks at UN critical and expressed hope Jarring could begin to make progress. Secretary tried to elicit from Riad clear statement what Egyptians were prepared to accept with regard signing peace document, terminating state of war, Israeli transit of Canal, refugees and form of negotiations. Riad's responses did not add anything new to what we know of Egyptian position with possible exception his remarks on refugees and willingness sign document. He seemed accept idea refugees be allowed express privately their desires re resettlement and indicated procedural question of signing peace document not as important as details therein and guarantee of implementation. Secretary asked whether Egypt could accept Rhodes formula for negotiations and Riad dodged question. End summary . 2. Secretary received UAR Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in his suite at Waldorf Astoria afternoon October 1. Riad accompanied by Mohammed Riad, Hassan Sabry al-Khouly and Ashraf Ghorbal. Sisco, Buffum, Pedersen and Parker (NEA) also present. Secretary opened substantive discussion by asking for UAR view of situation and where it thought progress could be made. Riad said there had been no significant progress since their previous meeting a year ago. He gave review of developments since then, noting that King Hussein had understood from our assurances that passage of November 22 resolution would mean Israeli withdrawal. Egyptians had doubted this at time and events have proved them right. UAR had cooperated fully with Jarring, but Israel had not. Jarring had said that he had a beautiful car but had no fuel for it. We had to decide how to give him a push. If Jarring failed he would issue a report and the matter would revert to the Security Council. This question had to be faced in the next two weeks. 3. The Secretary agreed that next two weeks would be critical. Jarring and the Foreign Ministers concerned were in New York and we needed intensive work by everyone to get some genuine motion. US would do everything to encourage them. We fully supported November 22 resolution. Secretary sometimes wondered, however, whether there were not several resolutions, given differing interpretations of parties. These differences were important because resolution was not self-implementing. We had hoped parties would avoid a procedural impasse and had not believed that Israel should insist on bilateral negotiations, nor that the Arab side should exclude them for doctrinaire reasons. We thought there should be talks at some stage. We ourselves did not attach tragic importance to procedure and the Secretary himself had engaged in negotiations with representatives of Peking and Hanoi, two governments we did not recognize. We had exercised flexibility and hoped the parties in the Middle East would do the same. 4. Secretary said November 22 resolution was a package, but it was made up of many parts. This was classical problem of diplomacy. The whole may be too big to deal with, but pieces could not be separated from it. We had hoped that by this time Jarring would begin to put pieces together to find out where problems are. Secretary then asked what Egypt's main problems were from a national point of view, leaving aside the interests of Jordan and Syria. We had the impression problems between Israel and Egypt were not all that formidable. Where were the real difficulties for Egypt? Were they bilateral or did they involve Jordan and Syria? 5. Riad said greatest problems were between Israel and Egypt because Israel had manifested territorial claims to Sinai since 1956. Egyptians could not take at face value declarations by Israeli leaders that they wanted peace. Problem was one of security, not of procedures. He then reviewed familiar Egyptian version of Israeli perfidy regarding the Rhodes and Lausanne Agreements. 3 Given this history, problem for Egypt was how to guarantee a solution. 6. Secretary said he gathered part of problem not so much procedure but of insured implementation. Egyptians were not rejecting procedures in themselves, but saying results of any agreed procedure must be carried out. Riad said after two experiments it clear a piece of paper signed by the Israelis was worthless. Secretary said he could understand UAR concern that agreement be carried out, but could not understand why it not prepared sign agreement either multilateral or bilateral. Riad said UAR not refusing to sign document. UAR said it had obligations and must honor them. 7. Secretary said he did not wish to be critical but with regard importance of signature he recalled that President Eisenhower had undertaken commitments regarding navigation in the Straits of Tiran. Egypt had not objected but in 1967 had pointed out that it had not signed the commitment and was not bound by it. We were thus left high and dry by an action we took on behalf of Egypt. Signatures were important. Secretary then asked if there were text of agreement worked out by Jarring and it were nailed to the wall for those who wished to sign and Egypt signed it one day and Israel signed the next, would the UAR accept? 8. Riad said question of wall or table irrelevant. UAR was ready to sign in accordance with its obligations. Whether on same page or a different copy was not real question. He had not thought it through, but the UAR was ready to sign a document which constituted a full plan for settlement. 4 9. Secretary said leaving question of signature aside for a moment and assuming withdrawal taken care of, what were the other problems? Was the UAR ready for the elimination of state of war? Riad said it was in the resolution. The Secretary said that was not his question. Riad said insofar as non-belligerency is in resolution UAR was ready to give statement, as he had told Jarring, to end state of belligerency. It would be effective when Israelis withdrew. 10. Secretary said assuming it was agreed to end the state of belligerency simultaneously with withdrawal, how could Egypt deny Israel passage through Suez once belligerency ended? Riad said if state of war ended, UAR would have to fulfill obligations regarding international traffic through Canal, but Israeli use of the Canal had been linked to refugees since 1951. Israelis must respect rights of others if they want their own rights respected. Secretary said he could understand organic connection between state of war and use of Canal, but not between use of Canal and some third question. As maritime nation interested in free transit we were concerned that such transit might be denied solely for political reasons. Egyptians might deny use of Canal to us some day because of Viet-Nam problem or some other political issue. Riad said this not problem because Americans had not killed people of Canal, as Israel had. There were two aspects of the Arab-Israel problem, one of refugees and one of expansion. Refugees were humanitarian problem which Israel had refused to consider to date. Canal was unimportant to Israel in material terms, but refugee issue was of great importance to Arabs. Secretary remarked that elimination of state of war had no substance without free passage. Riad said he had told Jarring that once there was agreement on refugee settlement Israeli cargo could transit Canal. Once that settlement was implemented the Egyptians would permit Israeli flag to use it. 11. Secretary said we very concerned about refugees. Why not let some reliable person go to each refugee privately and individually and ask him where he wanted to live? Would that work? Riad said this was in the UN resolution and could be done through a referendum or a plebiscite. Secretary said he was not thinking of a referendum where everyone would be told to vote one way or have his throat cut. Riad said that if the refugees had free choice, very few of them would go back to Israel and said that if money could be invested in, for instance, the West Bank for economic development projects this would attract many of them. He did not know why we had not tried this approach in past. Secretary said he would agree, of course, that new refugees, i.e. those who had fled since June 1967, must be allowed to return. Riad said this would come about naturally once Israel withdrew. Secretary noted that he did not think money would be a problem if there was a serious solution in sight. 12. Secretary said we had no problem with agreement on a sequence of events which might be called a timetable. We were concerned, however, with original idea put forth by Kosygin last year that withdrawal must precede everything else. We did not know if the Soviet view had changed, but we were wary of withdrawal first. This was, frankly, our problem in Paris. We had no objection to stopping the bombing, but Hanoi insisted that everything else must be held in abeyance until that happened. 13. Riad asked who was to set forth the timetable. Secretary thought it would take care of itself once there was agreement on substance. Riad said UAR had made its position clear on substance, but Israelis refused to discuss details. Secretary said he thought this might be because of procedural points. If Arabs did not exclude direct talks and Israelis did not exclude indirect talks as matter of doctrine, progress could start. Riad said he did not understand. Talks could either be direct or indirect. Secretary remarked that they could also be a combination of the two. Riad said Israelis insisted on direct negotiations, which Egypt could not accept. Rhodes talks had been indirect until the end, but the Israelis were refusing this combination now. The Jordanians had told the Israelis they were ready for such negotiations but Israel must first accept resolution unequivocably. Israel had refused. 14. Secretary asked if UAR was ready to accept Rhodes formula. Riad said Egyptians had tried it twice and it didn't work. Jarring was now engaged in indirect negotiations in effect. He was going from one party to the other, in same way Bunche did. All this talk of negotiations was rhetorical. Israelis simply did not want to reach agreement. 5 15. Buffum said perhaps there was some confusion arising from Khartoum formula. We understood it to mean that there could be no formal peace treaty. Did we understand correctly that UAR did not exclude eventual face-to-face encounter and signature of a document if it could be assured that Israel would keep its part of the bargain? Riad said at Khartoum it was agreed there would be no direct negotiations, no peace treaties, and no diplomatic recognition. It did not mean UAR could not sign piece of paper stating it would honor obligations and send it to SYG or SC.UAR's responsibility was not only to Israel but also to UN. It also wanted Israel to be responsible to UN. It wanted a better guarantee of Israeli performance than it had in the past. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and London. 2 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 320. 3 On February 24, 1949, Egypt and Israel signed an armistice agreement at Rhodes. For text, see UN doc. S/1264/Corr.1 and Add.1. On May 12, 1949, representatives of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the Governments of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria signed a protocol at Lausanne which provided that talks on a peace settlement should commence based upon a map showing the 1947 partition lines. For text, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. VI, p. 998. 4 Mohamed Riad, on instructions from the Foreign Minister, subsequently clarified the UAR position on this issue to stipulate that the UAR was not prepared to sign the same document with the Israelis, but was prepared to sign identical, separate documents that would have a binding effect. (Telegram 6802 from USUN, October 2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) 5 Mohamed Riad subsequently clarified this position to establish that the UAR was not prepared to accept the Rhodes formula. (Ibid.) 270. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 270. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 New York, October 2, 1968, 2333Z. 6805. Secto 17. Subject: Middle East: Phantoms. 1. At conclusion of lengthy discussion on Middle East with Sisco and Buffum Oct 2, 2 Amb Jarring raised what was obvious purpose in his asking for such quick follow-up discussion to his mtg with Secretary Oct 1. 3 2. Jarring said he feared he had gained impression from one comment made by Secretary that announcement to sell Phantom aircraft to Israel might be made soon. He also recalled Secretary had asked what we cld do to help him. Jarring said he was most disturbed about effect such an announcement would have on his mission. While it wld obviously not be proper for him to take position on substance of matter, he indicated strong hope US wld find it at least possible to delay any such announcement during immediate future, which he considers is critical period in determining fate of his mission. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 319. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted at USUN by Buffum. 2 See Document 271 . 3 Rusk's October 1 meeting with Jarring was reported in telegram 6767 from USUN, October 1. The meeting was devoted to a review of the current status of Jarring's efforts. Jarring indicated that no new decisive elements had emerged from his initial round of discussions with Foreign Ministers. Rusk encouraged Jarring to intensify his efforts and not to give up on his mission. (Ibid.) 4 Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on October 3 with a covering note stating that he wanted to make the President aware of Jarring's position on the Phantom aircraft. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 97, Oct. 1-4 1968) 271. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 271. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, October 3, 1968, 1552Z. 6819. Subj: Middle East. 1. In lengthy conversation held by Buffum and Sisco with Jarring at latter's request Oct 2, Jarring advanced new and interesting concept of approach to settlement for US informal consideration, indicating he not yet prepared to advance this to parties and requesting we discuss these ideas with no one, particularly Israelis. 2. Jarring said he now inclined believe most productive approach wld be to separate out key elements of problem which are susceptible to early agreement, putting others like Jerusalem and refugees aside for further study and agreement at later stage. (He noted Sovs have similar idea re Jerusalem and said he has not yet raised it specifically with Jordan because he regards it as most intractable of all elements in problem.) He envisaged possibility of breaking out following elements; withdrawal of troops; secure and recognized boundaries; free passage through international waterways. He thought there might be some hope in such combination since so many nations, particularly UAR and Asians, keenly interested in reopening Suez Canal. Moreover, he felt territorial issues between UAR and Israel were minimal. Therefore, he conceived of approach which would include Israeli withdrawal from UAR, with Sinai demilitarized (possibly with UN presence) with UAR undertaking binding commitment (not clear whether between parties) to terminate belligerency and permitting Israeli free passage through Suez and Gulf of Aqaba. 3. Jarring seemed more sure than before that he could get UAR signature on some kind of a document that would in effect legally bind them to carry out their obligations under the agreement. He also felt that UAR might be able to swallow agreement to let Israeli ships through Suez provided Israelis would not make an ostentatious display when their first ship goes through. As part of above arrangement, Israelis would be expected as first step to withdraw about 30-40 kilometers from Suez. As for Gaza, he adheres to earlier thought that this might be put under UN supervision for lengthy period, possibly going later to Jordan. Latter could capitalize on acquisition of Gaza to prove that even if some of their territory goes to Israel they wld not suffer a net loss of land in process. He did not consider Israelis would have legitimate claim in saying Gaza constitutes security problem if Sinai demilitarized. Gaza of course consists primarily of refugees, and solution of Gaza cld be considered largely as refugee problem rather than territorial or security problem. He considered that such approach would give Israelis most of what they want vis-a-vis UAR. 4. Jarring recognized that at moment Israelis not disposed to seek separate agreement with Cairo since they consider UAR does not sincerely want peace and that they are giving priority to efforts at an accommodation with Jordan. Re latter, he complained that whereas Israelis say Jordanians have clear picture of what they mean by secure boundaries with Jordan, they have refused to tell him what they mean by it, which continues to preclude him from playing significant role in advancing that aspect of problem. 5. Sisco recalled Israelis had authorized us to tell Jordanians they cld expect to get back most of West Bank, although he pointed out statements by Allon and others may well have left Jordanians confused as to what Israelis' real intentions are. 6. Jarring indicated he keeps pressing Eban for info on this, saying he cannot face Rifai again, who is in increasingly pessimistic mood unless he has clearer notion of Israeli intentions. He said Eban yesterday asked to be given “two more days.” 7. Dept should be aware that Jarring is in the beginning of an intense round of consultations. He is really in high gear; yesterday delegates poured in and out of his office. He sees next few weeks as critical and made plain he will probably want our specific help on specific points with Israelis in next few days. 8. He feels strongly that now that he is so deeply in middle of substantive exploration, that to revert back to a formula such as Caradon's 2 would be to return to the previous procedural impasse. For example, he does not see the Caradon formula really different from his own March 10 proposal. He also in last day has looked to see whether the May 1 Tekoah acceptance formula could be reworked and reused and has concluded it would be hopeless to move back this way. 3 Buffum 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and Cairo. 2 On October 2 British Permanent Representative Lord Caradon told Secretary Rusk that, based on soundings taken by the British Embassy in Jordan with King Hussein, he felt certain that Jordan was prepared to negotiate with Israel if Israel would make a simple declaration that it was prepared to implement the November 22 resolution. (Telegram 6804 from USUN, October 2; ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) Foreign Secretary Stewart subsequently revised this formula, proposing a joint U.S.-British effort to press Israel not only to make a statement declaring its intention to implement Resolution 242 but also to declare a willingness to discuss with Jarring a timetable for implementation. (Telegram 6949 from USUN, October 8; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3 The Department applauded the proposed initiative by Jarring. In telegram 251458 to USUN, October 8, the Department expressed the hope that Jarring's vigorous initiative would lead to a breakthrough and proposed an extensive list of suggestions and revisions to the approach Jarring had outlined. There is no evidence that Jarring adopted the suggestions. (Ibid.) 272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 1 Washington, October 4, 1968, 2218Z. 250484. Subj: Lebanese View on Imposed Solution. Ref: Beirut 13089 (Notal). 2 1. In call on Department Officers October 4, Simon Boulos, 3 President Helou's unofficial emissary, stated that Helou (as well as other Arab leaders) firmly convinced that only possible ME settlement is one imposed on Arabs and Israelis by US and USSR (but not Big Four or UN). Leaders could not justify to Arab people anything other than imposed settlement. Boulos added that although danger of later repudiation exists, imposed settlement is only way of getting issue off dead center at this time. 2. Boulos also stated Helou has hard intelligence indicating Syrian Government planning sharply increased infiltration of fedayeen through Lebanon into Israel. Purpose is to provoke Israeli reprisals which would in turn cause serious internal difficulties in Lebanon. Boulos expressed hope Israelis will not retaliate in case occasional terrorist slips through Lebanon, since Lebanese forces doing everything possible to interdict fedayeen. Memcon follows. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Bryan H. Baas (NEA/ARN), cleared by Michael Sterner (NEA/IAI), and approved by Talcott W. Seelye. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 2 Telegram 13089 from Beirut, October 1, reported that President Helou had designated Simon Boulos as a member of the Lebanese Delegation to the UN General Assembly and charged him with responsibility for discussing with U.S. officials Lebanon's fears about an Israeli attack against Lebanese territory in response to real or imagined infiltrations across Lebanon into Israel. Boulos was also instructed to try to promote an Arab-Israeli settlement at the United Nations. (Ibid.) 3 Boulos called on Seelye and Baas. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., AID(US)LEB. 273. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 273. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 5, 1968, 14 p.m. Mr. President: The attached letter from Eshkol to you 2 says, in effect: —the UAR doesn't want peace; please don't get in bed with the Soviet Union on the Middle East; —the Israelis are trying to do something with Jordan; —please give us the Phantoms; —may I come and see you in December in the course of my trip to Latin America? In the course of this, he has praise for your speech of September 10 (as he interprets it). You may wish to know that Joe Sisco will be in touch with both the Jordanian and Israeli Foreign Ministers to establish whether the right words spoken by Eban on the November Resolution in his speech scheduled for next Tuesday 3 would, in fact, open up negotiations between the two countries under Jarring. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:40 p.m. 2 This letter, dated September 29, was delivered by the Israeli Embassy to the Department of State on October 5 and forwarded to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Executive Secretary Read to Rostow, also dated October 5. (Ibid., Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68) 3 October 8. 274. Memorandum of Conversation 274. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 6, 1968, 19:30-22:45 p.m. SecDel/MC/16 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-THIRD SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September-October 1968 SUBJECT Middle East (Part VIII of VIII) PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen Ambassador J. R. Wiggins Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko Ambassador Ya. Malik Ambassador A. Dobrynin V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter The Secretary referred to a proposal that a multilateral document settling the Arab-Israeli dispute in the Middle East be signed by all the parties, including Israel, Egypt and Jordan. He did not care what such a document might be called, a Treaty or any other designation would do, as long as it was signed at a minimum by Israel, Jordan and the UAR. If substantive questions were resolved, the parties could sign the same document, not necessarily at one and the same time; thereby they would assume certain obligations which they would undertake to carry out. Mr. Gromyko inquired whether the Secretary had discussed this possibility with Riad. The Secretary indicated he had, although at the time Riad was accompanied by some other Arabs. He said that if an Arab has an Arab for an audience things have a tendency to become difficult. Riad had thought, however, that perhaps the various parties could sign different copies of the same document. Mr. Gromyko proposed that such a document be signed first by one side, and then Mr. Jarring could take it to the other side, so as to get it signed by all parties. Then, after all had signed it, suppose the members of the Security Council also signed, at least the permanent members. The Secretary thought such a procedure might be possible. In any case, said Mr. Gromyko, we should not let a comma stand in the way of peace if there is agreement on substantive issues. The Secretary said that he was interested to see a reference to a multilateral document in Mr. Gromyko's statement and suggested we see what could be done in this respect. A second problem had to do with passage through international waterways. Our understanding of the Soviet position was that the USSR had no objection to international waterways being open. We take the same view; both our countries are maritime powers. If the Arabs said that they were prepared to end the state of war with Israel, it would seem that the obstacle to the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal would also have been removed; for over the years the only justification for barring the Canal to Israeli shipping had been the state of war. It follows then, that if the UAR now says that it is prepared to end the state of war, but would postpone consideration of the question of opening the Suez Canal, then these are merely words without any real substance. Riad had said that Suez would be dealt with in connection with the refugee question. The Secretary had suggested to him that each refugee be asked where he wanted to live, whether he wanted to return to Israel or live in other countries, and that this be done in a most confidential manner so that he would not get his throat cut for having chosen one option over another. He was interested in the fact that Riad did not turn down this idea. Perhaps we could make progress on this basis, with the help of the Swiss or someone else. Mr. Gromyko asked for the Secretary's estimate of the number of refugees who would elect to return to their former territory. The Secretary guessed that number to be no more that 10 per cent of all the refugees. If this were really so, Israel would be prepared to receive them; it could not, however, commit itself to receive unlimited numbers. Mr. Gromyko then inquired as to the possible sequence of steps concerning the Canal and the refugees, once such a poll among the refugees had been taken and Israel had agreed to accept those who wanted to return. The Secretary thought that one possibility was to have UNRWA or the Swiss or some other neutral carry out the job of polling the refugees, possibly Jarring or some such person. If we could get this arrangement made and on the basis of that unlock the problem of opening the Suez Canal, that in turn would unlock the problem of the state of war; then we could take up territorial matters and troop withdrawal. The Israeli cabinet had not as yet reached any firm conclusion on the subject; but it was the Secretary's impression that there were no territorial problems that could not be solved between Israel and Egypt; there were none between Israel and Lebanon: the territorial problems between Israel and Jordan, he was sure, could be solved by quiet, behind the scenes negotiations. There was also not much of a problem in this respect between Israel and Syria. Jerusalem, however, did indeed present a very thorny problem. Replying to Mr. Gromyko's inquiry, the Secretary said that while he would not object to the Gaza Strip being classified as Arab territory, it was not Egyptian territory. He did not know what solution could be found for the Gaza Strip, possibly a UN solution; of course, he knew that Jordan wanted Gaza; but this problem would perhaps be eased once the refugee problem was out of the way. Thus he took the view that the solution of each point at dispute made the solution of other points easier. Mr. Gromyko said that it would be good for each of our two sides to try to work with the appropriate sides for the purpose of influencing them toward a solution. But, could we be sure that this work would not be in vain, that Israel perhaps would then come out with a statement saying it did not agree with the US position? The Secretary emphasized that he was presenting the US view of these problems; he did not, however, have any way of guaranteeing that Israel would see things the same way as we. In this connection he also said that in June 1967 we had received Israeli assurances that they would not be the first to take military action, yet they had done so. On the other hand, the Arabs were exaggerating; he was convinced that Israel was not engaged in a major campaign of territorial expansion. Mr. Gromyko asked if we had any good grounds to believe in a successful settlement of the various disputes if we worked in this direction. The Secretary suggested that we keep in close touch during the next three or four weeks as Jarring explores all of these possibilities first hand. Mr. Gromyko asked if the Secretary was suggesting that we keep hands off during that period of time. The Secretary replied that Jarring needed the support of the US and the USSR to be successful in his efforts. To Mr. Gromyko's question whether the Secretary was in touch with Israel directly, the Secretary replied that he was. Mr. Gromyko then said that we should work in parallel to get all possibilities considered while Jarring was proceeding with the matters he was working on. The Secretary called attention to a statement by Eban, in which he had strongly commended and supported Jarring's efforts. We would also support Jarring's work by talking with Israel and the Arabs, although he was sure Mr. Gromyko knew that our influence with the Arabs was not very great. Ambassador Malik remarked that it seemed to him our influence was not very great with Israel either. Secretary Rusk repeated that Jarring was working and said “let us work behind the scenes.” Mr. Gromyko asked that we keep in touch through the respective ambassadors; everything should be done to find a solution—such was the view of the Soviet Union. The Secretary added that we seemed to have common views on the points mentioned although we disagreed on the most important point of view of arms limitation in the Middle East. Mr. Gromyko reminded the Secretary of the assurances the USSR had given several times to the effect that when the problem of Israeli troop withdrawal was resolved, the USSR would be willing to consider the question of arms limitation. The Secretary said he hoped it would not be too late for that by then. Mr. Gromyko said we should be realistic; who would be causing trouble, surely not Nasser or Syria. The Secretary thought both sides sometimes acted as if they were crazy. Ambassador Malik objected that the Arabs were victims of aggression. To that the Secretary said that in the same vein we could then proceed to mention the Straits of Tiran, the Arab Holy War and so on; we could argue all the way back to 1945. The fact is that we have to start where we are and try to make some sense. Mr. Gromyko said that in the meantime it would be good if both sides could be prevailed upon to refrain from any acts which could inflame the situation. He thought that the US could strongly advise Israel not to stir up trouble. The Secretary said frankly that we had been doing so almost every week; we get back reports of terrorist acts by El Fatah, etc. As concerns Lebanon and Jordan, these two countries have been trying to restrain the terrorists and Israel knows that. We would like to see a situation where there were no incidents in any direction. He agreed that at times Israeli reaction to terrorist acts was too violent. Mr. Gromyko said that he was glad to know the Secretary would talk to the Israelis. For his part, he was sure the Secretary knew that he had made many private as well as public statements counselling restraint. The Secretary said it would be good if Syria could be prevailed upon to cooperate with her Arab neighbors, Lebanon and Jordan. Mr. Gromyko said that Syria's position, with part of her territory occupied, had to be understood. To that the Secretary replied that the Syrians had been engaging in hostile acts long before June 1967. Syria had even then been a center for El Fatah. He asked the Foreign Minister to keep in touch. The meeting ended with a brief discussion of what to say to press inquiries. It was agreed to mention the subjects and areas which had been discussed but also to state that no definite conclusions had been reached. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 321. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer and approved in S on October 17. The meeting took place over dinner in Suite 42A at the Waldorf Towers. The conversation was summarized in telegram 6889 from USUN, October 7. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB/ISR) 275. Telegram From the Department of State to Selected Posts 275. Telegram From the Department of State to Selected Posts 1 Washington, October 9, 1968, 1008Z. 252286. 1. At about 1:00 p.m. EDT today the White House put out the following statement by the President made in connection with his signing of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968: 2 “I have taken note of Section 651 concerning the sale of planes to Israel. In the light of this expression of the sense of the Congress, I am asking the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with the Government of Israel and to report back to me.” 2. FYI. Section 651 of the Aid Authorization Act reads as follows: “Section 651. Sale of Supersonic Planes to Israel-It is the sense of the Congress that the President should take such steps as may be necessary, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression by offsetting sophisticated weapons received by the Arab States and to replace losses suffered by Israel in the 1967 conflict.” End FYI. 3. At their discretion addressee posts may wish to point out to local contacts that President's statement was made in context of clear expression Congressional views on subject and in light continuing Soviet deliveries of arms to certain Arab countries. While we recognize Arabs will be prone to jump to unjustified conclusions, simple fact is that arms limitation in current volatile Near Eastern situation cannot be onesided. You should emphasize fact that USG/GOI discussions may take some time and agreement will have to be reached on a range of points before there will be any actual aircraft dispatched to the area. 4. Although you should avoid discussing comparison of aircraft, you may wish to note that since June 1967 war Soviets have delivered many supersonic jet military aircraft to Arab countries on or near Israel's borders … several times the number of Phantom aircraft Israel has requested. Furthermore, with French embargo on Mirages, Israel has had no source of supply for aircraft in this category to replace its wartime losses. Supply of supersonic jets to Israel by USG thus fully consistent with our long-standing policy of assuring Israel has adequate defense capability and represents no change in our basic approach to political problems of area. 5. We will continue work for resolution complex Arab/Israel issues in peaceful atmosphere which would render provision additional arms to either side no longer necessary. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Country Director for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden William D. Brewer and Atherton; cleared by Davies and Country Director for Ethiopia, Somali Republic, and Sudan Affairs John F. Root; and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to Aden, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Dhahran, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and USUN. 2 P.L. 90-554, 82 Stat. 960, enacted October 8 and signed by the President on October 9. 3 On October 9 Rusk called Ambassador Wiggins at USUN to instruct him to do what he could to reassure Jarring that a decision on the planes was not imminent. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, Box 930) Ashraf Ghorbal called on Richard Parker at the Department of State on October 9 in response to the White House announcement and stated that “he was at a loss for words to describe how catastrophic this action of ours was.” (Memorandum of conversation, October 9; ibid., Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR) The Jordanian Charge called at the Department on October 10 and expressed similar dismay. (Telegram 253602 to Amman, October 10; ibid.) Prime Minister Eshkol sent a letter to President Johnson on October 10 to indicate his “deep appreciation" for the decision to initiate negotiations for the sale of Phantom aircraft. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 ISR) 276. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 276. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, October 11, 1968. SUBJECT SIG Meeting Yesterday 2 [Here follow two paragraphs unrelated to the Middle East.] The meeting then turned to the Arab-Israel problem with Joe Sisco outlining the positions of the parties as follows: — Israel believes that the UAR is not interested in peace but that Britain [ Jordan ] is. Eban realizes there is a relationship between the UAR and Jordan in that the UAR must be brought along if Jordan is to make a deal with Israel. Eban's speech 3 had two purposes—to improve Israel's image by creating an impression of greater flexibility and willingness to withdraw and its commitment to keeping the Jarring mission live. Eban intends to follow up his speech with a written statement on specific proposals for peace terms to be given to Jarring in the next 24 hours. Israel apparently feels that the failure of the Jarring mission would make life more difficult for Israel. — Jordan is serious about peace and sees an opening in Eban's speech-the willingness to explore substance without insisting on direct negotiations at the outset. —The UAR's position has hardened. The UAR appears to believe that the only answer is to get the problem back into the Security Council. [There's debate in State about Joe's conclusion.] 4 Nick Katzenbach said he felt that, if the issue goes back to the Security Council, the best we can hope for would be to have the issue referred back to Jarring or somebody like him, perhaps with a slightly revised mandate. The worst would be a reasonable solution proposed by a majority of the members of the Security Council which would face us with a choice of going along against Israel's wishes or abstaining. It was generally agreed that the US should prepare itself quickly to inject its views on the substance of peace terms, though there was no decision that the time had actually come for us to do this. There was also general agreement that perhaps we had worried too much in the past about urging Hussein into direct negotiations. Harry Symmes shared Nick's view that Hussein was probably in a lot better position to go it alone if he had to than we had often given him credit for, though he unquestionably would like to have a UAR umbrella. The meeting concluded with agreement that we should bring out all past solutions on Jerusalem and West Bank demilitarization and put them in the best shape possible. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, Vol. 8, 45th Meeting, 10/10/68. Secret. 2 A record of the discussions and decisions taken at the 45th meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group on October 10 is ibid. 3 Reference is to Eban's October 8 speech to the UN General Assembly. (UN doc. A/PV.1686) 4 Brackets in the source text. 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, October 11, 1968, 1610Z. 253744. Ref: Amman 6999 (Notal). 2 1. Appropriate Senior Embassy Officer should deliver following oral message from the President to King Hussein soonest: “Your Majesty, as you are aware, I have instructed the Secretary of State to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. I trust that you will understand the circumstances that led me to take this action, which in no way diminishes our full and unequivocal support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel crisis. Please be assured that it continues to be our policy to facilitate in every possible way Ambassador Jarring's important mission. I have been gratified by your cooperation with Ambassador Jarring and remain hopeful that our joint search for peace in the Middle East will come to a successful conclusion. 2. I would also like to assure you that our commitment to and support for your wise leadership, as affirmed in my messages to you of February 11 and June 4, 3 remain undiminished. I highly value our close relations as being in the joint interests of our two countries. You can rest assured that my government desires to maintain-and strengthen-this relationship and that we are prepared to give full support to Your Majesty's efforts to find an honorable and equitable solution to the problems that beset you. Please accept my most cordial regards.” 3. In delivering this message you may wish to elaborate, drawing upon guidance contained in State 252286. 4 4. For Amman: Charge should inform Prime Minister of gist of message after London confirms delivery to King Hussein. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Seelye and Paganelli (NEA/ARN); cleared by Davies, Atherton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper, Symmes, Parker T. Hart, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 2 In telegram 6999 from Amman, October 10, the Embassy suggested providing as much information as possible to the Jordanian Government concerning the possible sale of Phantom aircraft to Israel in order to prevent a rash Jordanian response. (Ibid.) 3 See Documents 77 and 188. 4 Document 275 . 278. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 278. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, October 12, 1968, 1325Z. 7024. Subj: President's message to King Hussein. Ref: State 253744 2 and London 13455. 3 1. Summary —Gist of President's message to Hussein given to PriMin Talhouni Oct 12 along with further explanations based on Dept's guidance. PriMin expressed appreciation but reviewed US actions on aid, arms, and Near East issues at the UN as demonstrating lack of balance in US position toward Jordan as compared with Israel. Asserted these actions embarrassed friends of US and stimulated heavy pressures from the public against those friends. These pressures had been withstood but it was becoming increasingly difficult. 2. I acknowledged some delays and problems inherent in our system and the complexity of the situation but stressed the great strength of our fundamental policies and determination to carry through on them. I also suggested as a personal observation that clearing away the Phantom issue might make our dialogue with the Israelis on more fundamental problems easier. Meeting was cordial and overall effect of President's message, particularly reaffirmation of intentions continue work for a solution, seemed useful. End Summary . 3. I informed PriMin Talhouni morning Oct 12 of gist message from President to King Hussein as delivered in London, drawing extensively on copy which I excused myself from giving to him. DepPriMin Touqan present. I also drew on State 252286 4 making particularly points (a) clear expression Congressional views; (b) negotiations may take some time and agreement necessary on range of points before any aircraft would actually be sent to area; (c) Soviet deliveries to Israel's neighbors and fact that so long as source for replacement of high performance aircraft in doubt, this in itself destabilizing; and (d) our reaffirmed intention work for solution basic problem. 4. Touqan commented that they had thought of calling me in yesterday and both he and PriMin expressed appreciation for information and background. Talhouni said that while he did not know what King's reaction message would be, of course, he would give the present views of the King's govt. Talhouni then gave a long and closely reasoned account of events of the past year, culminating in the announcement of the Phantom decision, which he said led him to feel there was a basic and disturbing lack of balance in the relationships of the US with Israel and with Jordan. He cited the suspension of budget support, the protracted ban on arms shipments to Jordan, and various stands taken by the US at the UN as examples of the kind of moves which the Jordan public could not understand and which were an embarrassment and a source of mounting criticism of the King and govt by all walks of life in Jordan. He emphasized he was not asking for a resumption of budget support but was illustrating the kind of things which had been piled one on another and made it hard for Arab friends of the US. During the arms ban Jordan had been under tremendous pressure to accept Soviet arms and the Soviets had indicated willingness to supply. The Jordan Govt, however, had decided that the wisest course was to maintain its ties with the US. He mentioned too the delivery of Skyhawks to Israel while Jordan was still under the ban. Also Jordan had expected a major effort by the US to help clear the way for real progress after last November's SC resolution. 5. With respect to the supersonic aircraft, Talhouni said this opened the way to the Soviets to supply more aircraft which would tend nullify whatever additional security these planes were expected to give Israel. Also there was the fact these would be viewed by the Arabs in the light of the use of the Skyhawks supplied with modern rockets (sic) in the attack on Salt in which innocent civilians had been killed. He said he was distressed by the timing of the announcement and deeply concerned for the cumulative effect of such actions on the US image in the area and the position of the people who continue close ties with the US. Certainly up until now King Hussein had been able to stand off all pressures and attacks on his policy, but this was becoming increasingly difficult. 6. Talhouni said that while it was not for him to suggest what US policy should be he could not escape the conclusion that US interests had suffered from various actions in the past year, mentioning in this connection the entry of additional Soviet ships into the Mediterranean. He also expressed concern for implications of the delay in ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as symptomatic of US problems today. 7. Talhouni said the press had asked him to comment on the aircraft negotiations announcement and he had refused just as he had refused be drawn out on the Eban speech. Touqan said that they had just received a telegram from Farra in New York reporting a decision of the Arab delegates at the UN to ask their governments to express to respective American Ambassadors their concern and displeasure for the Phantoms announcement and to urge trade unions and other institutions in the country to telegraph their protests to the US and the UN. Talhouni said that Jordan obviously was not going to stir up the local organizations and the street against the US in such a way, but this was an example of the kind of pressures they were under. Talhouni also described the latest meeting with Nasser in which Nasser had said that it was only on account of Hussein that he had been persuaded to make a public acceptance of the SC resolution. This decision had, Nasser said, given him countless headaches with his own people and he maintained it because of Hussein. 8. After hearing Talhouni out, as he had me, I said I would report fully his comments. I said I also wish to reaffirm that I knew that the highest levels in the USG admired and appreciated the wisdom and course he as well as the King had followed in this long difficult period. We knew that delays and sometimes our actions resulted in problems for them. These elements were inevitable in our system and the complex situation with which we were dealing. With respect to budget support, the facts of the fiscal situation had made the action inevitable but we had tried to show our support for Jordan in other ways. He should not overlook, however, the great strength of our fundamental policies and our determination to carry through on these. One of these policies was to work for a basic solution which would establish conditions of real peace in the area. This required cooperation of all. I noted the reaffirmation of our intentions in the message to the King and the statements of Amb Wiggins in New York. 9. With respect to the aircraft negotiations decision, I said that speaking apart from instructions and as an observer, I saw real value in having cleared away an issue which had served only to confuse more basic problems in our relations with the Israelis. Again stressing it was my personal view I said that entry into negotiations should make it easier for us to talk with the Israelis about a solution of the broader problems. So long as Israel had no indication of source for replacement of its losses while Soviet planes were being supplied to its neighbors, Israel's preoccupation with its ultimate security prompted it to hang on to every tactical advantage it had and made it unresponsive to our suggestions for moves which it claimed might undermine that security. I stressed I did not know the extent to which this might play a part but said I thought it could be important. 10. I closed with a renewed request for understanding of the complex factors that had entered into the President's decision. I said I believed they should see in our genuine efforts in New York and elsewhere evidences of the real and fundamental support which we had again reaffirmed to Jordan. I again referred to appreciation of the wisdom and understanding Talhouni and his colleagues had shown in their handling of such matters. 11. Comment: The President's message was obviously appreciated. Although Talhouni expressed concern for the effect of the announcement, the meeting was very cordial and Talhouni's and Touqan's presentations relaxed and thoughtful. Comments as to Talhouni's own wise handling of affairs produced a pleased smile. Duncan 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to London and USUN. 2 Document 277 . 3 Telegram 13455 from London, October 11, reported King Hussein's appreciation for the message from President Johnson and noted that he had been giving the subject a great deal of thought and would respond to the President. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR) 4 Document 275 . 279. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 279. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, October 14, 1968. SUBJECT Negotiations on Phantoms After a long meeting with State and Defense Saturday, I believe the staffs will recommend to Secretaries Rusk and Clifford that we should set the following as conditions for the sale of Phantoms: Israeli agreement to sign and ratify the NPT, reaffirmation of past assurances that they will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East and agreement that they will not go further with the manufacture of surface-to-surface missiles. 2 The last point is the tough one, but there's strong feeling in the Bureaus that we have to tackle the Israeli missile program now or give up on it. There is serious doubt, however, that the President would be willing to refuse delivery of the Phantoms if the Israelis refused to give all these assurances. In fact, one can even argue persuasively that we have an interest in getting the Phantoms there so Israel can defend itself. At the same time, there's great peril in standing back while Israel goes nuclear. Even the NPT just puts them 90 days away if they are otherwise prepared and give notice of pulling out. I do not know how the Secretary feels about going this far-though it is clear that he'd like a signature on the NPT. Even if we decide that these should be our conditions, there is still a debate over how to satisfy them. Most of the Bureau officers feel we must have assurance on all points in writing specifically linked to the sale of aircraft. Wally Barbour on the other hand believes it is satisfactory to get Eshkol's oral assurances. He could do this or the President could do it when he sees Eshkol at the end of the year, though this does not cover the probability of Eshkol's eventual replacement. While I share everyone's uneasiness about Israel's going down the missile road, I personally don't believe we can expect 50 airplanes to buy us this kind of say in Israel's strategy of survival. I do think we might make a case for signature of the NPT and even reaffirmation of Israel's nuclear assurances, but I don't see how we could begin to expect Israel to close the path to missiles. I'm afraid we'll just have to be content with making our opposition known. No action required. I just thought you'd want this feel for the issue that will have to be discussed with the President before Secretary Rusk begins talking with Rabin. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A copy was sent to Spurgeon Keeny. 2 Memoranda with recommendations to this effect were addressed on October 15 by Parker Hart to Rusk and by Paul Warnke to Clifford. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel 452 (Sen), respectively) 280. Letter From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 280. Letter From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, October 15, 1968. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01284A, Box 26, Folder 12. Top Secret; Sensitive. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 1 Washington, October 17, 1968, 2343Z. 257386. Subj: Tiran. 1. During conversation October 17 with Israeli Minister Argov, Davies of NEA said we wished once again to raise problem of continued Israeli occupation of Tiran, particularly as this affected US-Saudi relations. We had noted that in Ambassador Rabin's last conversation with Battle in June, 2 and again when Allon saw Secretary September 10, 3 Rabin had justified continued Israeli presence on Tiran as military necessity, saying “even three Fatah with machine guns” on Tiran could close straits to shipping. Secretary had told Allon and Rabin he did not find this argument convincing. Davies said we wished once again to take up this point. Citing distances involved, Davies said it was difficult to see how light weapons could in any way interdict or otherwise harm shipping passing through the main Enterprise Passage which four-and-one-half miles away from Tiran. Only weapon that could do this would be long-range flat-trajectory guns such as Soviet 122 mm. rifle, and we were in position to know Saudis had nothing of this type. Moreover, such weapons obviously could not be installed on island without Israelis knowing about it through air surveillance. Davies said in addition to these factors he wished remind GOI we had King Faisal's assurance that Tiran would not be militarized if Israelis left island. We had no reason believe this was not firm and reliable undertaking on King's part. Argov made no comment except to ask if Israeli withdrawal from Senafir had had beneficial impact in Saudi Arabia. Davies said we had not heard that King had declared public holiday but we believed Israeli action had nevertheless been helpful. 2. Davies urged all measures be taken to keep this matter out of press. Argov said there had been leaks in past and he could give no assurances so far as Israeli press concerned. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN. Secret. Drafted by Michael Sterner, cleared by Atherton and Brewer, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 2 See footnote 7, Document 182 . 3 See Document 250 . 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, October 18, 1968, 0020Z. 257501. 1. Rostow 2 had informal conversation with Hassan Sabry al-Khouli at lunch given by Ghorbal Oct. 16. Hart, Davies, Parker and Atherton also present. Khouli reiterated UAR's interest in peaceful settlement and desire to finish Palestine problem once and for all but was unwilling to be drawn into discussion of details of settlement, or to confirm that UAR was ready to make agreement required by para. 3 of Resolution. Took line that substance of settlement more important than modalities and that meeting requirement of “agreement” could be met in various ways, i.e., accepting Security Council Resolution. 2. Ghorbal said we should be in no doubt, however, that Mahmoud Riad in New York was anxious to proceed with settlement and would be prepared respond positively to any real gestures made by Israelis. In this connection, luncheon started off with report that Riad had just received from Jarring 12 page document from Israelis. 3 Riad had not had time to read it and Egyptians did not know contents. Davies and Atherton stressed that Egyptians should look not at what was wrong with document but at what was right about it and should remember that Eban was having trouble with the cabinet at home. Khouli replied that Riad was having trouble with his cabinet too. 3. Rostow said that although he did not know contents of Israeli document, delivery was significant in itself and represented fruit of extensive US efforts to get Israelis adopt more accommodating position vis-a-vis Egypt. Egyptians now had historical opportunity and they should respond in the most favorable possible way to Israelis. We understood political problems which Egypt faced but Israel faced parallel problems. We had not supported the Israeli view that negotiations had to be direct, even though that position had seemed logical to us. At same time we did not think it was practical to rule out eventual direct confrontation between Israelis and Egyptians in signing of document which could be called something other than peace treaty but which would in fact establish peace not armistice, as required by Resolution of Nov. 22. If present opportunity was not seized, results would be tragic for all of us. It was not time to rake over past grievances but look to future. We would support any settlement on which parties agreed and President's phrase in his Sept. 10 speech regarding the real possibility of just and dignified peace had been carefully considered and meant what it said in the light of our knowledge of the parties' positions. But the parties themselves would have to take responsibility. They could not simply listen and ask US to do the job for them. We often heard charge that US policy was influenced by domestic political considerations. This was not the case. The need for peace in ME was one of factors in President's mind in making his decision of March 31. US policy was based on US national interests. We had been using all our energy and imagination to fulfill it throughout this period. But we had had many disappointments. 4. Khouli said Egyptians were prepared for peace but past experience made them extremely suspicious. Israelis also had right to be suspicious of Egypt. This highlighted necessity for international role and guarantees particularly from US regarding any settlement reached. Rostow said he would not entirely rule out possibility of US guarantee to support agreement of the parties under Resolution. The question raised far reaching issues which required study. In any event, he could say at this point that we would certainly support Security Council endorsement of agreement reached by the parties to implement the principles of the Resolution. 5. Khouli made frequent reference to Phantoms and to unfortunate effect recent While House statement in this regard had had on Jarring Mission and Arab/American relations in general. Rostow said question of Phantoms had been carefully considered and Egyptians should realize statement represented USG judgment of the best way to deal with tensions surrounding process of reaching peace including the bargaining positions of parties and Soviet policy. Overwhelming preponderance of Soviet aircraft in area was cause of real concern. It could be argued that supplying Israel with more aircraft at this time would make them more flexible in dealing with Arabs. If their security was established through airpower they might be willing to take more risks on the ground. In this connection Rostow mentioned demilitarization of Sinai. Khouli unwilling discuss UAR position but noted that if UAR demilitarized Sinai, Israelis might seize it again, as they had occupied al-Auja. 6. Throughout conversation Khouli kept reverting to question US-UAR relations which he said were essential to both countries. He called attention to statement by Riad in October 10 news conference that UAR was very interested in resumption relations but US would first have to establish its impartiality by agreeing that Israel had committed aggression and by supporting withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories. Khouli said that in his recent election campaign for ASU he had been struck by fact that fellaheen in all Egyptian villages kept asking why US was enemy of Egypt. He had not been back to Egypt since the White House announcement regarding the Phantoms but he expected an increase in the feeling of the Egyptian populace that the US was against them. Rostow pointed out that Nasser had told McCloy he fully realized responsibility for absence of relations was his, not ours. We believed in having diplomatic relations with UAR and wished to have good relations with that country. Our policy was not pro-Israel, or pro-Arab, but pro-US. We had pursued it steadily, agreeing with Arabs on some points, with Israel on others. On certain issues, like Jerusalem, nobody agreed with us. The problem now was to make peace under the Resolution, which we supported. We understood the UAR position to be that the Resolution required a package deal, linking withdrawal to all other issues. We agreed with that position. 7. Hart commented that he knew many Americans who were unable understand Egyptian actions against US, such as burning of libraries, speeches about drinking sea, etc. If Egyptians interested in good relations, a new leaf would have to be turned over. Khouli took it in good spirit. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker and revised by Eugene Rostow, cleared by Davies, and approved by Eugene Rostow. 2 Eugene Rostow. 3 On October 15 Eban gave Jarring a document to be conveyed to the UAR. The text of the document, which expounded on Israel's determination to “explore further the possibility of promoting agreement between the UAR and Israel on the establishment of a just and lasting peace,” was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7165 from USUN, October 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR) In an October 19 memorandum to the Secretary, Parker Hart of NEA and David Popper of IO summarized the Israeli document as containing little of substance beyond what Eban had outlined as the principles for a settlement in his October 8 speech to the UN General Assembly. They noted that the tone of the document was moderate and reasonable and at several points invited UAR comments or proposals, but it focused on the Israeli thesis that peace must rest on agreement between the parties involved, which should be in treaty form. Israel took the position that unilateral declarations or assurances by others would not substitute for a direct contractual agreement. (Ibid.) 4 At USUN on October 18 Al-Khouli gave Buffum assurances that Nasser was personally very eager to have a peace settlement. Khouli said that his mission in New York was to ensure that no opportunity was lost to move toward settlement. (Telegram 7206 from USUN, October 18; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 283. Memorandum of Conversation 283. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 21, 1968, noon. SUBJECT Arab-Israeli Dispute PARTICIPANTS Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Alan Urwick, First Secretary, British Embassy The Secretary Irving Cheslaw, EUR/BMI The British Ambassador said that he had instructions to talk to the Secretary at this time, particularly as the Secretary was scheduled to receive the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban tomorrow. The Foreign Office believed that the UAR's reply to the Israeli document, 2 received through Jarring, was rather discouraging. The British understood that the UAR has asked two questions of the Israelis: (a) would they accept the November Resolution and state their willingness to implement it; (b) what exactly did they mean by “secure boundaries”. When conveying this to Lord Caradon (UKUN) on October 20, Jarring said the Israelis would not like the reply and he wondered “where do we go from here.” Sir Patrick went on to say that the Foreign Office did not know if the Israelis have passed a similar document through Jarring for the Jordanians. The Jordanian Foreign Minister Rifai did not appear to have any new instructions following his visit to London to see King Hussein. Since his return, Rifai told the British in New York that the Jordanians were waiting for acceptance by the Israelis of the Resolution and agreement to implement it, together with a precise definition of what the Israelis meant by “secure boundaries”. Rifai had added that, if by these boundaries the Israelis meant acquisition of territory from Jordan, all bets were off. He also had said that Jordan would wish to have the population of the West Bank free and available for consultation before they could take decisions on an overall settlement with Israel. The Foreign Office believed the Jarring mission was now in considerable danger. Unless the Israelis were prepared soon to be considerably more forthcoming and to take what they would regard as risks in pursuit of a settlement, the brighter prospects of a fortnight ago would fade. Prime Minister Wilson had sent a message to Mr. Eshkol to this effect. Sir Patrick said several things were required from the Israelis in the near future: (a) a public commitment, either directly or through Jarring, of their willingness to implement the Security Council Resolution and to use the good offices of Jarring to reach agreement on why this should be done; (b) to give Jarring an indication of their ideas for a settlement with Jordan. In light of Eban's visit, the Foreign Office suggested that the US apply pressures along the foregoing lines. Perhaps the President could send a message to Eshkol. The Ambassador said there was a division in the Israeli Cabinet on these questions. They should be warned of the dangers if the present opportunities were allowed to lapse because of their unwillingness to take any risk. The Secretary replied that this presented two problems as far as the USG was concerned. (1) We understood that the Egyptian response to what the Israelis gave Jarring was inadequate. However the Secretary said there was no good in pressing the Israelis if they received a rejection from the Arabs. Who would put pressure on the Arabs or the Egyptians? We could not. It seemed that now the Arabs might even be opposed to indirect talks; this left us in a difficult position as we had something to do with Israel's willingness to talk substantively to Jarring. Our leverage on the Israelis was diminished by the lack of an Arab response to recent Israeli moves. (2) Regarding implementation, we did not see how any government could agree to implementation as interpreted by another. Any government had a right to say it would implement any particular proposal but that there would be clarification in the course of discussions. This Resolution was not self-executing; every word needed to be clarified. The Arabs were not only trying to define the words, but they were trying to deny to the Israelis the opportunity of clarification. Sir Patrick said he understood the Secretary's view, but the British wanted the Israelis to say publicly that they were prepared to implement the Resolution and to use the good offices of Jarring to see how it could be done. He believed this was a step forward. Sir Patrick reiterated that it was in the interests of the Israelis not to lose Jarring. The Secretary said the Israelis were interested in the need to keep Jarring in business. In fact, this was a lever which the US had used on the Israelis. The Secretary said that, in his talks with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad, the latter was noncommittal on all points other than withdrawal. He asked Sir Patrick if there was any possibility of anybody applying any influence in Cairo. Sir Patrick replied that they would see what could be done in that regard. The Secretary reiterated that he would keep all this in mind when talking to Eban tomorrow. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cheslaw and approved in S on October 22. The meeting was held in Rusk's office. 2 See footnote 3, Document 282 . 284. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and Foreign Minister Eban 284. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and Foreign Minister Eban 1 Washington, October 22, 1968, 10:30 a.m. The President reported that he had made his decision on Phantoms in principle last January. He planned to move ahead if the Russians kept on supplying arms to the Arabs; if the Russians proved unwilling to talk with us about regional arms control; if Israel were helpful in seeking peace; and if Israel accepted the NPT. The President said that he was not making the question of the NPT a formal condition, but Eban should know the very strong feelings in the American government on this matter. He then read to Eban Sec. Clifford's view (Tab A), 2 transmitted to the President by telephone, and the attached passage from Sec. Rusk's memorandum (Tab B). 3 Eban said that the U.S. Government appeared to have an “exaggerated idea” of Israel's nuclear capability. The President said he should talk about this matter with Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford. Eban held forth to the President for half an hour, emphasizing: —Israel is cooperating with Jarring; —Its bilateral efforts with King Hussein; —UAR intransigence; and —The ruthlessness of the Soviet Union, as revealed in Czechoslovakia with its implications for the Middle East. 4 WR 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; No Distribution. Prepared by Walt Rostow. 2 Not printed. Clifford expressed the view that the President should show concern over the Israeli program to develop surface-to-surface missiles with the capability of carrying nuclear warheads. Clifford felt that the President's concern could lay the foundation for the Department of State to insist that the missile development be stopped as a condition for Israel receiving 50 Phantom aircraft. 3 Tab B, not printed, was a quotation from an October 21 memorandum from Rusk to the President, expressing Rusk's concern about the Israeli missile program and the importance of Israeli adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A copy of the memorandum is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. 4 Eban provided another version of this conversation in his memoirs. According to Eban, Johnson began by affirming his intention to supply Phantoms to Israel and asked Eban to tell Eshkol that Lyndon Johnson had kept his word. According to Eban, the President said that he had discussed the issue of providing Phantoms with Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey and both candidates had agreed to honor his commitment. He also said that both NIXON and Humphrey could be counted on to keep faith with the commitment to Israel's security and independence. (Abba Eban, An Autobiography , pp. 458-459) 285. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol 285. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol 1 Washington, October 23, 1968. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have appreciated your recent letters, and I had a good talk with Foreign Minister Eban yesterday. He will be reporting in detail our strong feelings on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but I wish to write you this personal note to be sure our emphasis on that issue does not obscure a larger point. I know you face a difficult series of meetings this week and wish to send you this word of encouragement. I am deeply concerned, as you know, Mr. Prime Minister, about Israel's future, and I understand how strongly some of your colleagues feel that Israel's future can best be guaranteed by military means and expanded borders alone. It is so much easier to argue in terms of military balance and lines on a map than it is to argue the case for political compromise. But our own experience has proved that real peace is not found alone on the walls of a fortress—or under the umbrella of air power—or behind a nuclear shield. Every American President knows that our most secure borders are the open borders with Mexico and Canada. That day may not be close for Israel with the UAR, but it could be close with Jordan. I feel so strongly about the irrationality of trying to make peace by force alone that I must urge you to resist those who find it easier to risk Israel's future on today's expanded boundaries than to reach out for real peace. From my own difficult personal decision last March, I can say with feeling that it is not easy to lead a nation toward a necessary peace without jeopardizing hard-won gains and the future those gains have earned. But I can also say that it is worth reasonable risks, measured compromise, and personal pain. I do not presume to say what your Government should do. But I pray that you and your colleagues will find the courage to seize this moment of opportunity so that peace may be “within thy walls.” I look forward to seeing you later this year. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68. No classification marking. The text of this letter was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 261396, October 24, for delivery to Prime Minister Eshkol. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR) 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, October 23, 1968, 0049Z. 259996. Subj: Secretary's Message to PM Talhouni. 1. Following message from Secretary to PM Talhouni should be held for Ambassador to deliver following his return. “Excellency: Ambassador Symmes' visit to Washington has given me an opportunity to review with him in detail the current situation in Jordan. While we remain very concerned about the many complex problems facing your country today, we are impressed by the measures you have taken to deal with them. At the same time we are gratified by the diligent efforts of your government to make a constructive contribution to the search for a lasting and peaceful settlement to the crisis that has been a matter of deep concern to all of us. I have asked Ambassador Symmes to convey to you upon his return to Amman my warmest personal regards and to reiterate our continuing interest in the well-being of your nation. With my sincere best wishes.” 2. Following on heels of President's special message of October 11 to King Hussein (State 253744), 2 this letter is designed to reassure Jordanians of our full support at this delicate juncture in Jarring mediation effort. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL JORDAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Seelye, Baas, and Paganelli; cleared by Hart and Davies; and approved by Rusk. 2 Document 277 . 287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, October 23, 1968 , 2123Z. 260399. 1. In course of Eban call on Secretary October 22 (Hart, Atherton, Rabin and Argov also present), Eban summarized present position with respect to negotiations with Jordan and UAR as follows: (a) Jordan had indicated to Jarring that it would favor joint meetings with Israel under his auspices but first wanted to receive informally more specific idea of how Israel sees future boundaries. There was “mutual feeling” that it desirable to wait week or so in effort come closer on substance before moving forward on procedural problems. Eban said he would see what could be done during forthcoming trip to Israel to overcome obstacles Jordan still faces before entering joint meetings. 2 He expected return New York after one week. (b) UAR, on other hand had never indicated willingness to have joint meetings with Israel or desire for peace as Jordan had, which made it possible to give GOJ idea of Israeli terms. In response to Israeli memorandum spelling out GOI interpretation of Security Council Resolution and making clear Israel wants formal end to conflict, not absence of war, UAR has provided provocative and propagandistic reply, inter alia demanding Israeli withdrawal from all territories. UAR had not said what it means by peace and wanted Israel to renounce concept of settlement through “agreement.” This Israel would not do. “Agreement” was Israel's “safety catch.” Other countries agreed with GOI that this represented responsible position. 2. Secretary said he saw merit in this position and had so told Arabs with whom he had spoken. Secretary continued that we had found Israeli memorandum to Jarring constructive so far as it went. It had failed, however, to get into territorial question. It would help if Israel could inject this point into dialogue in ways which made clear it had no designs on UAR territory, while making clear, for example, Israeli view that special arrangements needed for Sharm al Shaykh. Unless there was movement in discussions with UAR, chances for success with Jordan would be slim. 3. Eban agreed on importance of maintaining dialogue with UAR. Israel had considered providing Jarring with map for UAR but preferred deal in concepts—e.g., need for Israeli presence at Sharm al Shaykh. Israel wanted to talk to UAR but it would not provide channel. UAR would have to face this issue at some time, however. If Israel gave its territorial terms to Jarring, Riad would simply reject them. If parties were at same table, Riad would have to explain his objections. Israel would reply to latest UAR memorandum in constructive spirit but, if UAR wanted to discuss lines on maps, it must overcome inhibitions about meeting with Israel. 4. Re Sharm al Shaykh, Secretary asked if Israel had considered idea of four power presence there, including Soviets. Eban said this would “globalize” problem; we should give careful thought to whether it was wise to provide Soviets statutory position in area, particularly in light of their record and their actions in Czechoslovakia. Secretary said Soviets were already in Middle East and would stay there whether we liked it or not; perhaps small Soviet contingent at Sharm al Shaykh with equal US, French and British contingents would not pose serious problem. 5. Re Soviet position in general, Secretary said while he could not speak for USSR, he had impression Soviets considered arguments about procedure “silly,” had no objections to use of Suez Canal by Israeli flag vessels and did not care about refugees. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Hart and Rusk's Staff Assistant Jay P. Moffat, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 2 In a separate conversation on October 22 with Eugene Rostow, Sisco, and Hart, Eban said that Israel hoped to reach more substantive agreement with Jordan through informal contacts. He described the informal contacts with the Jordanians as serious and pragmatic, but requiring additional time to achieve agreement. (Telegram 259849 to Tel Aviv, October 22; ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) 288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, October 24, 1968, 2205Z. 261146. For the Ambassador. Following based on uncleared memcon FYI and Noforn, subject to revision upon review. Begin summary: During meeting with Foreign Minister Eban October 22, Secretary pressed Eban hard about Israel's nuclear weapons and missile plans, stressing that this was matter affecting our fundamental relationship. Eban repeated standard Israeli position, emphasizing that Israel had not made decision to become nuclear power and that deployment of strategic missiles by Israel was not imminent. Secretary said USG needed more concrete assurances re GOI nuclear intentions-i.e., Israeli participation in NPT. Eban and Ambassador Rabin pressed for early start on technical negotiations for the sale of F-4 Phantoms. Secretary said we felt initial discussions should be held on political side, that Asst. Sec. Hart would be his representative for those discussions and that he hoped Eban would bring back new word on Israeli position re NPT when he returned from Israel next week. Initial session between Ambassador Rabin and Assistant Secretary has been scheduled for Wednesday, October 30. End summary . 1. Secretary opened meeting with Eban afternoon October 22 by referring to their discussion of NPT question in New York September 30 and asking whether GOI cabinet had completed its review of this matter. (Hart, Atherton, Rabin and Argov also present). 2. Eban replied that he had not been back in Israel since previous conversation. Position in principle which he had stated in UN remained valid, however, as did various bilateral Israeli statements to us (e.g., Israel will not be a first to introduce nuclear weapons in area and Israel is not a military nuclear state). GOI now studying question in light of Geneva Non-Nuclear Conference. This connection Eban noted that other countries in better security position than Israel were also taking time to study problem. Furthermore Israel had additional problem of its lack of position in IAEA. 3. Secretary said we had reason to believe Israel involved in nuclear weapons and missile programs. Such missiles were for use with nuclear weapons not high explosives. These were matters of utmost seriousness affecting our fundamental relationship, and we must have clarification with respect to them. For Israel to develop nuclear weapons would (a) confront us with question of whether we were serious about NPT, which we are and (b) raise questions of what Soviets would do in nuclear field in Arab countries. 4. Secretary said that we could not see how nuclear weapons would solve Israeli strategic problems. Israel's problems with IAEA inspections were something that could be discussed. We wanted something more concrete, however, about Israel's nuclear intentions and could not be reassured unless Israel participated in NPT as matter of fundamental policy. 5. In response Eban's assertion that Israel had not decided to become nuclear power and had not decided not to sign NPT, Secretary said we were concerned about absence of decision to sign. This connection Secretary noted UAR was signatory. If country was part way down road to producing nuclear weapons, we took little comfort from statement that it was not nuclear power. 6. Re missile development, Eban said Secretary exaggerated Israeli position which was as stated to us in 1967—i.e., Israel was far from being in situation of having operative missiles ready for deployment. Given slow down due strains in French-Israeli relations, that stage could not be reached before 1970. Stating that missile development in Middle East arose in non-nuclear context, Eban said Israel could not ignore what was happening in UAR which continued to try even though progress not swift. Israeli missile activity was function of what UAR was doing. It would be difficult for Israel to terminate its program in absence similar action by UAR. 7. Eban continued that in foreseeable future Israel's central preoccupation would be defense and security. For Israel, very existence depended on a few hundred airplanes. GOI has thus welcomed President's October nine statement re Phantom negotiations which had important psychological effect. Given view of some in UAR military that UAR could seek military solution or at least peace through intimidation in 1969-70, President's announcement on Phantoms would not only help Israel's security position but further prospects for peace. 8. Secretary said he remained concerned about arms spiral. Would not Soviets respond by providing additional aircraft to Arabs? Eban said he believed UAR already receiving all military equipment it could absorb. Furthermore no one could say USG responsible for escalating arms spiral since (a) Soviets had been probed without success re arms limitation and (b) President's announcement had come after Soviet re-supply of UAR. This connection, Eban noted that Arab reaction had not been violent. Secretary replied that form of announcement—i.e., President had instructed Secretary to initiate negotiations and report back to him—had helped soften Arab reaction. 9. Eban said he understood President's announcement constituted decision in principle and that it was assumed in area that negotiations would be concerned with technical details. Would it be possible to open negotiations today? If so who would represent Secretary? 10. Secretary replied that negotiations would be handled for USG by Assistant Secretary Hart. Meanwhile he hoped Eban would bring new word on Israeli position re NPT when he returned from Israel next week. In response Eban's comment that it would be bad to link these two questions, Secretary asked how we would assure that Phantoms would not carry nuclear weapons. Amb. Rabin suggested handling this problem as we had in A-4 Skyhawk sale. Secretary said this question could be discussed further with Hart. 11. Secretary asked what time frame Israelis were thinking of for F-4 deliveries. Rabin noted that Israel had preferred mid-1969, but that discussions last January had been in terms of beginning of 1970. Eban said Israel would be pleased if deliveries could be expedited, noting Israel had originally requested Phantoms in addition to Mirages now embargoed by France and that, in January, USG had still thought Mirages might be delivered. 12. Secretary replied affirmatively to Eban query whether he could report negotiations had begun. 13. Rabin noted that in past GOI had conducted technical negotiations with DOD once agreement in principle reached. Secretary said we felt it necessary to have preliminary talks on political side-perhaps by end of week. If GOI felt it needed bring experts to Washington to discuss price, availability, delivery schedule, training and other details, this question could be taken up with Mr. Hart. Eban suggested as first step we should review A-4 Skyhawk agreement. 14. Following meeting with Secretary, Rabin asked Deptoff whether preliminary meeting with Hart could be held Wednesday, October 23 since he was returning to Israel that night and could then begin to make necessary arrangements while there. Hart subsequently called Rabin to say it would be difficult for us to prepare for initial session on such short notice. We would, however, be happy to put Rabin in touch with our disarmament experts in Dept in order discuss Israeli concerns about IAEA problems if Rabin would find this useful before leaving Washington. Rabin declined, asking if NPT and related questions were not separate from F-4 negotiations. Could not preparation for talks with DOD be started now? Noting that Secretary had said political discussions should occur first, Hart said he was at Rabin's disposal but could not see that there was much to say before Eban returned in view Secretary's interest in hearing latest on Israeli NPT position. It was then agreed that first Hart-Rabin session would be held three p.m. Wednesday, October 30 following Rabin's return from Israel. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Hart, and approved by Walsh. 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, October 24, 1968, 2156Z. 261141. For Ambassador. 1. As you will have seen from our cables reporting conversations with Eban in Washington, we have urged Israelis to be specific as possible, particularly on withdrawal-territorial question, in their next response to UAR document. Our urging is based on several considerations: (a) Jarring believes next Israeli response will be critical and decisive; (b) It may well determine whether Jarring continues or whether matter will revert to Security Council at early date; (c) GOI response will have an important effect and interaction on Jordanian aspect of settlement. If prospects for substantive dialogue with UAR under Jarring's auspices are extinguished, it most unlikely Jordanians would feel free to proceed in their exchanges with Israelis, by whatever means. This latter point particularly important and is one which Israelis seemed to appreciate in our discussions here. 2. As previously reported, Eban has expressed some ideas regarding two questions posed in UAR document (1) acceptance and implementation of SC res; and (2) withdrawal-territorial question. We feel we have reached such critical point in Jarring Mission exercise that we must, unless you see overriding objection, convey to Eban some ideas regarding kind of GOI reply we would consider minimum required by present circumstances. We realize that last UAR reply was very inadequate and that in light strongly held Israeli view UAR not ready to make peace, we may be rebuffed. On other hand, we are sure you appreciate that while present juncture not particularly favorable, atmosphere likely to be even less so in climate of another SC round and its aftermath. 3. Statement below should be given to Eban personally. Eban should be told that these are informal and illustrative thoughts, in large measure based on statements which he and other Israeli officials have made to us in past. It would fully protect Israel since it includes “safety catch” of agreement and “peace.” It would turn tables on UAR and not give Nasser opportunity to knife Hussein. This is no blue-print, for we have none. But if Eban finds it helpful with his Cabinet colleagues to identify them as American thoughts, he may do so. We know he understands fully that if GOI response to UAR is inadequate not only could it cripple Jarring Mission, but more important it likely to weaken Hussein's resolve and capacity to pursue discussions with Israelis. We agree with Eban's desire to try to firm up as specific a deal as possible with Jordanians through informal contacts before discussions of substance revert to Rifai and Jarring. Our thoughts therefore deal exclusively with GOI response to UAR through Jarring, though we also agree with Eban's intention to deal at subsequent stage with Jordanian aspect as well. 4. Following would be included in any Israeli response, which we believe should also invite UAR to address itself specifically to substantive points in Israeli document of October 15. “Israel accepts SC resolution 242 of Nov. 22, 1967 and is prepared to implement it in accordance with paragraph 3. Israel wishes to make clear that its attitude toward secure and recognized boundaries is governed by considerations of security and a permanent political settlement which binds both sides to peace rather than by considerations of acquisition of territory by war. Within the context of an agreement implementing SC resolution 242 which would set forth mutually acceptable terms, including establishment of secure and recognized boundaries, guarantee of freedom of navigation for all vessels through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal, and demilitarization of the Sinai, Israel would be prepared to withdraw its forces to the international boundary between Israel and the UAR. An agreement embracing the above must also include special arrangements for Gaza and for the Sharm El Sheik area to assure that Israeli security interests will be fully protected and right of passage through the Strait of Tiran guaranteed. Our purpose is achievement of the just and lasting peace called for in Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. We are prepared to enter into immediate discussions under Jarring's auspices to achieve agreement on ways to implement all of the provisions and principles contained in that Resolution.” Eban should be told we have not discussed the above with Jarring or any foreign government. 2 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Hart, Eugene Rostow, Katzenbach, and Harold Saunders; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to USUN and Amman. 2 In an October 24 memorandum to Walt Rostow, Saunders wrote of this telegram: “I think it makes all kinds of sense. It is the first time we have injected ourselves substantively in any concrete way so it is something of a departure from past practice. However, if we don't do it now, we won't have a chance later.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68) Acting on instructions, Ambassador Barbour saw Eban on October 26 and reported that his reaction was neither sharp nor adverse. Eban was somewhat concerned not to reveal Israel's entire negotiating position to the UAR before the UAR had revealed any of its own, but he accepted the argument that the Israeli response should be substantive rather than polemical. Eban noted that he did not anticipate returning to New York until after a scheduled Cabinet meeting on October 30. He observed that if Riad was interested in negotiating a settlement, he should be willing to delay his departure from New York until after Eban had returned. (Telegram 5842 from Tel Aviv, October 27; ibid.) The Department informed the Embassy on October 29 that it was attempting to persuade Foreign Ministers Riad and Rifai to remain in New York until Eban returned and instructed Barbour to urge Eban again to be as explicit as possible in outlining a negotiating position with the UAR. (Telegram 263488 to Tel Aviv; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) 290. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 290. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 25, 1968, 2:20 p.m. SUBJECT Strong Israeli Reaction to Eban Talks Here Abe Feinberg called last night to say the Israelis are up in arms because Parker Hart had apparently linked the Phantoms and the NPT after you and the Secretary had stopped just short of linking them. I called Secretary Rusk who told me the following: The Secretary had not linked the NPT and the Phantoms but had told Eban that he wished Hart to discuss certain political questions with Rabin before technical discussions on the planes began. Rabin was leaving for Israel the following afternoon. Hart told him the one thing we were prepared to go into with Rabin on that short notice was International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which Eban had said he had reservations about. Rabin said he wasn't prepared to discuss that; he just wanted to discuss planes. So he and Hart made a date for 3:00 p.m., October 30, the day after Rabin and Eban come back. Rabin's line is: The NPT and the planes are two separate issues; let's get on with the planes. I told Feinberg that neither you nor the Secretary had made the NPT a condition for the Phantoms but you considered the NPT of great importance. Feinberg apparently told this to Argov who cabled Rabin that there was “no condition precedent” to the sale of Phantoms. (Argov is Rabin's deputy.) This morning, Argov called me to ask whether he could today supplement his last night's message with another saying that a date has now been set for actual consultations on the Phantoms. He says that the Israeli press is now saying we have linked the NPT and Phantoms and that this will put Eshkol on the spot in the Cabinet. He'd like to put Eban in a position to knock these critics by saying (a) there's no condition and (b) what's more Rabin is taking technical consultants back with him to begin detailed negotiations. If we want to wind up the Phantom negotiations promptly, as you indicated, that would make sense. But it would mean working the NPT on a separate track. The Israelis are mounting this reaction deliberately to press us to separate the Phantoms and the NPT. Giving them the kind of answer Argov wants would de-couple the two and take off the heat on the NPT that you and the Secretary generated. I can respond to Argov in one of two ways, depending on how you and the Secretary wish to play this: 1. We could give Argov a date for the beginning of technical talks—a date several days after Rabin's return so that we can at least hear what he has to say on the NPT before the technical talks even though we'd be committed to begin them. 2. I could tell Argov: We have set no conditions. However, the Israelis themselves have told us the Phantoms would make it easier for them to sign the NPT. Moreover, others in the area have already related the two. This is a problem we have to cope with, so we asked Eban to tell us where the issue stands. Rabin can make all the practical arrangements he needs to while he is in Israel and then Hart will discuss dates with him next Wednesday. You may wish to discuss this with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford before you reply, or you may wish me to. Walt I prefer giving Argov a date Hold the line, using the line in para. 2 above Work out with Secretary Rusk 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Nodis. 2 None of the options is checked. A handwritten note at the top of the memorandum, in Jim Jones' hand, apparently conveyed the President's response: “Discuss with Rusk & give me his recommendation.” 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, October 25, 1968, 1909Z. 261568. Subject: Arab-Israel. 1. Ghorbal called on Davies at former's request October 24 to discuss three questions: demilitarization, linkage of refugee and Canal issues, and status UAR talks with Jarring. Regarding demilitarization, he said on instructions FonMin Riad he wished to clarify UAR position which had come up for discussion during Rostow-Khouly lunch October 16. UAR had agreed to demilitarization on understanding it would be reciprocal. UAR not prepared demilitarize “all of Sinai” but would be prepared demilitarize area along border providing Israel demilitarized same size area on its side. Depth of DZ must be same on each side of border. UAR view was that history showed its security more in danger than Israel's and it could not afford abandon Sinai militarily. 2. With regard linkage of refugees, Cairo had been perplexed by demarche this subject made by Bergus to Sidqi, which raised question whether USG abandoning its position that Nov 22 resolution was package. He handed in piece of paper setting forth UAR position that it accepts resolution as whole and asking whether US adheres to its former position and still considers refugee question an integral part of implementation of resolution. 2 3. Finally, he pointed out that in his October 19 memorandum to Jarring, FonMin Riad had said Israeli declaration of readiness to implement resolution and withdraw its forces “would lead to achievement of peace in Middle East”. He said this was response to our urgings that UAR give indication it ready for “peace” and not just “political solution”. He could assure us Riad meant what he said and that UAR was sincerely anxious for peace. There had been no progress to date, however. UAR had shown its hand and made specific proposals to Jarring, which Israelis had ignored. He did not know whether Riad could remain in New York under these conditions. He had been there a month, largely as result urgings Ambassador Ball. There had been no progress, and now Eban had gone off to Israel. Were Arabs supposed to sit cooling their heels forever? In separate conversation he said Riad considering leaving for home permanently on October 29. He indicated timing of US-Israeli negotiations on Phantoms was major factor in Riad's current unhappiness. 4. Davies noted clarification regarding demilitarization but did not comment beyond saying hoped settlement would ensure security both Israel and Arab states. Regarding linkage of Canal and refugees, Davies said we hoped Egyptians would not react in such serious fashion each time we made suggestion to them. Bergus had merely been drawing to their attention legal aspects of problem which they should not overlook. We had been just as frank in calling to attention of Israelis certain flaws in their legal position. In so doing we trying to help parties move towards settlement, which all of us wanted. We were not trying separate refugee issue from package. It was Egyptians who seemed to be separating it and Canal issue from rest of package, particularly in Fonmin's Oct 1 conversation with Secretary. We thought that was mistake and that there should be no special linkage of this sort between any of the separate components of resolution. 5. Davies said we pleased to note Riad had spoken of peace in his memorandum to Jarring. He would call this positive note to attention of others. He hoped at same time that Egyptians would concentrate on positive aspects of Israeli position, and would realize that Israelis had domestic political problem which necessitated extreme caution on Eban's part. Eban had gone home for consultations. Hopefully he would return with more flexibility. We hoped Israelis would respond to Egyptian position in positive fashion and that Egyptians would re-ciprocate. All of us should put our shoulders to wheel and push. 6. Regarding Mahmoud Riad's travel plans, Parker told Ghorbal it would be serious tactical error for him to leave on 29th. He should at least wait until Eban returned and find out what latter had to say. Riad had waited 18 months, it would be mistake not to wait few days longer. If Egyptians so convinced we had made blunder on Phantoms, 3 they should not compound it with one of their own. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 2 Not found. 3 Ghorbal also called on Harold Saunders on October 24 to emphasize the strong UAR reaction to the announcement concerning the Phantom aircraft. In the memorandum he prepared of the conversation, Saunders stated that Ghorbal made “as emotional a statement as I have ever heard him make” and that he was “really quite angry” and not disposed to listen to reason. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US) 292. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 292. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, October 28, 1968, 1905Z. 5862. NPT-Phantoms. 1. Moshe Bitan, Asst DirGen MFA, called on Amb this evening and gave him oral message from Eshkol as follows: “After having received a report from Foreign Minister Eban on his conversation with the Secretary of State, the Prime Minister wishes to state that it is his understanding that the negotiations between our two governments about the sale of Phantom aircraft are to commence forthwith without being linked to the question of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Prime Minister assumes and hopes that our negotiating team led by Ambassador Rabin will be enabled to start immediately with practical discussions relating to the sale of the aircraft.” 2. At same time, Bitan handed Amb paper (text septel) 2 responding to US request for clarification Israel's position on NPT. Paper notes Eban return US delayed by PM's indisposition and requests PM's views therefore be conveyed to USG by Amb. Paper repeats familiar Israeli position on NPT and offers no firm assurance on signing. 3. Bitan expressed regret US had linked NPT with Phantoms and said strong Israel was in free world and US interest. Amb noted NPT paper was no advance beyond previous GOI positions and cautioned Bitan not to underestimate depth of feeling on NPT at all levels USG. Reviewed importance of NPT to world peace and noted anomaly of Israel sharing distinction of non-signature with Germany. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2 The text of the Israeli paper was transmitted to the Department in telegram 5863 from Tel Aviv, October 28. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68) Walt Rostow called telegrams 5862 and 5863 to the President's attention in an October 29 memorandum. Rostow summarized the Israeli paper on the Non-Proliferation Treaty by calling Eban's statement that his government was studying the issue “a completely non-committal answer.” (Ibid.) 293. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 293. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, October 28, 1968. SUBJECT The Situation in Syria You asked what is going on in Syria. This morning we have a spate of reports 2 on a showdown that seems to have taken place about October 23-24. On the basis of this third-hand information from Damascus, the intelligence community's best guess is that: Prime Minister Zuayyin's policy of cooperation with the USSR and local Communists went too far for Defense Minister Asad who decided to oust Zuayyin. Baath Party leader Jadid—the most important figure in Damascus—thought that if Asad succeeded he would be too powerful a rival and decided to stop him. An equally good explanation is that Asad moved against Zuayyin to be in a position to oust Jadid. In any case, Asad and Jadid had a showdown, and our sources in Beirut are reporting that Asad—backed by the army—won. So far there has been nothing official from Damascus to indicate a struggle, much less the winner. 3 If Asad won, Syria might move away from the USSR slightly, but it would still be the most radical Arab nation. They might heat up the border with Israel, but they're more likely to continue showing restraint in view of their obvious shortcomings. If Jadid won, the pro-Soviets would be likely to move Syria even farther left. Another possibility is that fighting among the Baath radicals will give the exiled Baath moderates and their Iraqi friends an opening, but the moderates are moderate only by comparison. John 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Syria, Vol. I, Cables and Memos, 4/64-10/68. Secret. 2 A list at the end of the memorandum indicates that the following reports were attached: telegram 13810 from Beirut, October 28; [ 5 document numbers not declassified ]. 3 On October 29 the Syrian Baath Party announced the formation of a new Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Nur al Din al Atasi who replaced Prime Minister Yusuf Zuayyin. The Embassy in Beirut assessed the change in government as “the most fundamental change in the character of the present Syrian regime since it came to power February 1966.” The Embassy noted that the Syrian military had emerged as prominent and that Defense Minister General Hafiz al Asad was the second most important member of the Cabinet. (Telegram 13880 from Beirut, October 29; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 SYR) In a later analysis of the governmental change in Syria, the Embassy concluded that Baath Party Secretary-General Salah al Jadid had been forced to accommodate Asad's expanded power and role, but that there had not necessarily been a split between the two long-time political allies. (Airgram A-1446 from Beirut, November 18; ibid.) 294. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson 294. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 28, 1968. SUBJECT Secret Israel-Jordan Negotiations 1. Since the last hours of the June war of 1967 senior Israeli officials, including Eshkol and Dayan, have demonstrated a willingness to meet directly with King Hussein. A secret meeting in Switzerland planned in July 1967 was cancelled at a late moment [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] when the U.S. terminated an emergency communications channel between the two parties that had been established during hostilities and used by both parties after the war in making arrangements for a clandestine Switzerland meeting. A second top level meeting arranged through direct Israel-Jordan contacts developed in early 1968 and scheduled for 8 August 1968 in the Gulf of Aqaba was cancelled [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] following Israel air attacks on Salt, Jordan on 4 August. The series of preliminary secret meetings in London have once again produced agreement for a top level secret meeting in the Gulf of Aqaba. The date of 7 November 1968 has been set; the arrangements will be checked out in a trial run [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] on 31 October. Both dates fall on a Thursday, the eve of the Jordanian weekend which provides some cover for a visit to Aqaba. 2. [ 6 lines of source text not declassified ] 3. [ 8 lines of source text not declassified ] 4. While there has been some increase in press and public speculation about contacts between Amman and Tel Aviv outside of the Jarring effort and Israeli officials have with a wide circle of American officials flatly asserted that direct Jordan-Israel talks are taking place, we are at this time unaware of any actual compromise of detailed and accurate information on the recent and planned contacts. Dick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. 295. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford 295. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford 1 Washington, October 29, 1968. SUBJECT F-4 Negotiations with Israel As you know, the first negotiating session on the sale of F-4s to Israel is tomorrow, 30 October. Assistant Secretary Hart has been delegated Mr. Rusk's responsibility for carrying out these negotiations with Ambassador Rabin of Israel. The threshold issue is whether our negotiators have authority to impose any political conditions on the sale of the F-4s or whether all that is to be negotiated are the technical details. The second is, assuming that conditions can be imposed, what these should be. Preliminary discussions between the President and Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Secretary Rusk with Eban have focused on Israeli adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As to the first issue we feel that the President's direction to open negotiations does not mean that we must agree to provide the Phantoms unconditionally. The oral messages conveyed from Prime Minister Eshkol and other Israeli officials are to the effect that they understand the sale of Phantoms to be unconnected to the issue of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any other political question. In our view, we should not accept this position and should instead make clear at the outset of negotiations that the sale of the Phantoms will be contingent upon our satisfaction with Israeli assurances on matters affecting our own national security. Authority for our negotiators to take this position should be obtained from the President. Reports we have as to the President's discussions with Prime Minister Eshkol the first of this year show that the President agreed only to keep the sale of Phantoms to Israel under review and to put ourselves in a position where, if an affirmative decision were to be made by the end of the year, we could begin to supply Phantoms in quantities of two or three per month beginning January of 1970. The announcement of October 9th that we would begin to negotiate with Israel on this sale did not constitute an undertaking to consummate the transaction unconditionally. Even more important, any agreement with a foreign government is subject to modification in accordance with developments affecting the security of the United States. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] This possession of a nuclear missile by Israel would be of no value to that country unless the fact were known to its Arab neighbors. If this fact were to become known, there is every likelihood that the UAR and possibly other Arab countries would request and receive Soviet nuclear missiles stationed on their soil under Soviet control. At a minimum, this development would lead to increased Soviet penetration and influence among the Arab countries and the complete polarization of the area. The responsibility for Israel's nuclear weapons would generally be charged to us, particularly after the sale of Phantoms has made us virtually Israel's only major source of arms supply. For the future, the consequences of nuclear weapons in the Middle East could be calamitous. There can be no assurance that Israel's possession of strategic missiles would deter the Arab states, particularly if they have Soviet nuclear missiles as an offset. We must at least contemplate the possibility that, faced with a massive Arab attack, Israel might launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike. A retaliatory attack, however limited, would destroy Israel and face us with totally unacceptable alternatives. The first of these, a nuclear strike by the United States, is almost unthinkable. If directed against the Soviet Union, it would lead inexorably to all-out nuclear war. If directed against an Arab state, it would virtually compel Soviet retaliation against U.S. territory, particularly in view of the fact that Israel would have been the first to resort to nuclear arms. On the other hand, the inability of the United States to respond to the destruction of Israel by Soviet missiles would damage incalculably our world position and our foreign policy objectives. We would have shown ourselves powerless to protect or even avenge a country for which we have been the principal sponsor and champion. I doubt that the West Germans could retain any confidence in our nuclear deterrent. Their most likely recourse would be an accommodation with the Soviet Union. NATO would cease to exist as an effective body. In the light of these possibilities, I believe that we must use every available means to get assurances from Israel well beyond their signature on the NPT. These assurances, upon which sale of the F-4s should be expressly conditioned, would include their written agreement: 1. Not to test or deploy those strategic missiles now in Israel without our advance knowledge or consent; 2. Not to manufacture or otherwise acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons without our advance knowledge or consent; 3. To permit semi-annual inspection of specified sites in Israel and to provide full information on any program designed to achieve a nuclear weapon capability; and 4. To sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 2 For illustrative purposes, a proposed exchange of correspondence between the President and the Prime Minister is attached. 3 Paul C. Warnke 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel 452 (Sen). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A stamped notation with a November 4 date reads, “Sec Def has seen.” 2 Harold Saunders sent a memorandum on October 29 to Walt Rostow warning him that Israeli Air Force Commander General Hod was about to arrive in Washington expecting to discuss the purchase of Phantom aircraft with Defense officials and Defense was taking the position that it was not prepared to discuss the aircraft until the United States received assurances from Israel concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Saunders noted the unlikelihood of such assurances. “So we may have a situation where General Hod is here but can't talk to anyone.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68) 3 Not printed. 296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, October 30, 1968, 2120Z. 263978. Subj: Jarring Mission. 1. You should convey urgently to Eban our growing conviction that if he does not bring to New York more specific position for UAR on withdrawal, Jarring mission doomed. You should follow line taken by Sisco with Tekoah in New York on October 29 (USUN 7434). 2 Suggest you also draw on Hart's talk with Riad on same day (USUN 7435) 3 in which Riad made clear his deep skepticism re Israeli intentions and his unwillingness to remain in New York unless Israelis began to make specific proposals. You should again stress need for GOI to give most serious consideration to kind of reply we have suggested. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Day (IO), cleared by Hart, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 2 Israeli Permanent Representative Tekoah told Sisco on October 29 that Eban was expected to return to New York on November 3. Sisco urged Israel to rise above the military incidents occurring along the Suez Canal and offer the UAR specific proposals relating to Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory. Sisco argued that if Eban returned to New York without such proposals, the end of the Jarring Mission was in sight. (Telegram 7434 from USUN, October 30; ibid.) 3 Dated October 30. (Ibid.) 297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, October 31, 1968, 0255Z. 264289. Subject: F-4 Negotiations. 1. Ambassador Rabin, accompanied by General Hod, Argov and Raviv called on Assistant Secretary Hart afternoon October 30 for next round in F-4 Phantom negotiations which were formally opened by Secretary and Eban October 22. Davies and Atherton also present. 2. Hart opened conversation by asking Israelis to prepare draft proposal setting forth what they believed agreement on F-4s should contain. 3. Rabin asked for clarification of this procedure. Noting that Israelis had only A-4 Skyhawk agreement to go by, he asked if this should serve as pattern. Israel could indicate its ideas on number of aircraft requested, which it had already set at fifty, on time of delivery and on credit arrangements. Were there other matters that should be covered? 4. Hart said he would leave it to Ambassador to follow whatever model he thought most appropriate. Rabin said he would have draft proposal ready tomorrow morning, October 31, and asked what next stage would be. Hart said Israeli proposal would be studied at high level as expeditiously as possible. 5. Pressing for further clarification Rabin noted that in previous such negotiations, once political decision had been taken detailed technical discussions had followed. General Hod was here for this purpose and undoubtedly additional experts would be needed. Rabin said he had hoped that U.S. would inform him in today's discussion that political decision had been taken to supply fifty F-4s and that immediate detailed technical discussions would follow. What stage of negotiations were we now in? Hart said we were at the stage of having asked the Israelis for a draft proposal which we would then study. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Davies, and approved by Hart. 298. Action/Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 298. Action/Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 31, 1968, 11:30 a.m. Mr. President: Herewith the state of the Phantom deal. 1. Sec. Rusk instructed Hart to ask Rabin to come in with a draft agreement. 2. The Israelis are coming back this morning with their draft. 2 3. The Pentagon is determined, unless instructed to the contrary by the President, to link the Phantom deal to hard nuclear assurances to the U.S. Sec. Rusk told me that what he had in mind is not forcing [ is forcing ?] the Israeli hand on the NPT by getting them to sign on to the U.S. that they will not produce or accept nuclear weapons. The Pentagon will not even discuss technical details with the Israelis until they get the nuclear assurances. Therefore, I suggest that you: —Talk with Sec. Rusk and get his recommendation as to how we proceed in the light of what Rabin brings to Hart this morning; and —After that conversation, talk with Clark Clifford and give him an instruction as to how to proceed with the technical talks with respect to timing and to prior conditions, if any. Abe Feinberg called me about this, underlining the Pentagon problem in broad terms. 3 W. W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 102, 10/29-31/68. Secret. 2 The Israeli-proposed memorandum of agreement was conveyed to Hart on October 31 under cover of an October 30 letter from Rabin to Hart. A copy is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1. In an October 31 memorandum to Rostow, Saunders summarized the Israeli draft as follows: “places the order for 50 planes and requests that we try to deliver some in early 1969; refers to Eban's paper of October 28 reaffirming Israel's ‘intention not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area’ and agrees, accordingly, that the Phantoms won't carry these weapons.” Saunders found the Israeli proposal disappointing: “This is much less than we have been talking about. It doesn't get to Israel's not producing nuclear weapons. It doesn't touch missile production.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68) In a similar assessment of the Israeli draft, Hart concluded that the Israeli draft posed the question of whether to try to get, in the context of the F-4 negotiations, assurances from Israel concerning the NPT, nuclear weapons production, and missile development. (Memorandum from Hart to Rusk, October 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR) 3 Rostow added a handwritten postscript that reads: “P.S. Amb Rabin also called to ask if the President had made a ‘policy decision.’ I told him I was reporting the situation to the President.” 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 299. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clifford 299. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clifford 1 Washington, November 1, 1968, 10:15 a.m. TELEPHONE CALL TO SEC CLIFFORD C congratulated the Secretary. Sec said he didn't know C was planning on recording a statement—left him in the position of being the old hawk who must have proposed it. C said he had done it in accordance with what the Pres had said. A one-minute statement on TV and given to the reporters which is fair and is absolutely the rule. He and Wheeler had had a backgrounder. Sec said he had had two or three talks with the Pres on Phantoms. He is strongly opposed to twisting arms on the nuclear thing in connection with Phantoms. Doesn't want them linked. When Sec brought up A-4's and tanks, Pres said they had already gotten this from us. Sec said Pres doesn't buy it at all. C said the problem falls in our area more than theirs. C said we know they have gotten an operational missile from the French. [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] This is the road to disaster. The Soviets will never let them have this in the Middle East. Sovs must know it now. They will send in Sov contingents and set up atomic weapons in Arab nations. It will be the most dangerous area in the world. Sec says he has a directive and C may want to raise it with the Pres. Sec asked about delivery on the Phantoms. C said he thought it was 1970. Sec said they (Israelis) say early 1969. C said Nitze and Warnke were with him and their clear understanding is 1970. C said he would talk to the Pres again. Sec suggested sending word to Rabin that there was agreement in principle and they should send someone to the Pentagon to work out things and go on from there. C said they wouldn't want to do that. Sec said the Air Force man who was at the Ranch is in town and is prepared to do it. C said to send him over. 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, Box 930. No classification marking. Prepared by Mildred Asbjornson of the Secretary's office. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, “No Dist.” 2 In a November 1 memorandum to Parker Hart, Rodger Davies stated that Rusk had instructed him to contact Nitze at Defense to arrange for technical discussions with the Israelis preparatory to the conclusion of an agreement for the sale of the Phantom aircraft. After discussing the matter with Nitze, Davies called Rabin and informed him that General Hod could get in touch with Warnke to set up technical discussions. Davies noted that Rabin was “overjoyed at this development.” (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR) 300. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford 300. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford 1 Washington, November 2, 1968. SUBJECT Negotiations with Ambassador Rabin on F-4s Yesterday, November 1, 1968, the Secretary of State, instead of negotiating anything with the Israelis, instructed Mr. Rodger P. Davies to inform Ambassador Rabin that the American Government was prepared in principle to accede to the Israeli request for Phantoms and that they should get in touch with Defense “to set up technical discussions.” In the attached memorandum of Mr. Davies, 2 General Hod's name is used as the one to contact us, but Mr. Davies admits that Hod's name was not included in Mr. Rusk's instructions to him. Davies also tells us that Mr. Rusk said that we should get from the Israelis no less than we have gotten in the past. I therefore seek your authorization to negotiate with the Israelis on the basis that an agreement in principle leaves ample room for us to require assurances from the Israelis with respect to matters which are vital to the national security of the United States, and specifically much harder assurances with respect to strategic missiles and nuclear weapons than we have received in the past. These were only: (1) that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, and (b) they would not use the A-4 aircraft to carry nuclear weapons. I would propose to tell Ambassador Rabin that: (a) I am acting on the instructions of the Secretary of Defense; (b) [ 3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]; (c) [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]; (d) Israel may consider such weapons to be a deterrent to hostile action by Arab states. The United States Government, having had considerably more experience with nuclear weapons and the concept of deterrence than any other nation on earth, does not believe that these weapons will have the effect on which Israel presumably is counting. Instead, we believe it will compel the U.S.S.R. to station nuclear missiles in the U.A.R. and perhaps in other Arab countries. Such a concept leaves out entirely possible actions by the Soviet Union with respect to the Arab states or with respect to Israel. It also ignores the unstable and irrational nature of the Arabs. Our belief, based on experience, is that deterrence of this kind can work only if the other side is not only capable of rational analysis, but of sustained rational action, particularly in times of great stress. We know, and Israel knows, that neither the Egyptians nor the Syrians nor the Iraqis have been known to exhibit such rational thought and behavior and we cannot be sure that they will be for decades to come. Furthermore, the United States, by selling Phantom aircraft to Israel, is entering into a new relationship not only as the principal arms supplier to Israel—when only a short time before we publicly refused to be a major arms supplier—but also, and partly by virtue of that fact, will put ourselves in a more vulnerable position with respect to any future hostilities. For these reasons, we must ask of Israel certain assurances prior to entering this new relationship; (e) Specifically, we would include in any written agreement for the sale of the aircraft, the following assurances: (1) Not to test or deploy strategic missiles without our advance knowledge and consent; (2) Not to manufacture or otherwise acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons without our advance knowledge and consent; (3) To permit semi-annual inspection of specified sites in Israel and to provide full information on any program designed to achieve a nuclear weapon capability; (4) To sign and ratify the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. I have set my meeting with Ambassador Rabin for Monday afternoon, November 4. He can be expected to react strongly to my approach and immediately to notify both his government and others in order to elicit the maximum pressure on us to change our position. The meeting, however, should be a long one and the repercussions should not be felt until Tuesday. If you approve this approach, I will of course report immediately to you after my session with Ambassador Rabin for further instructions. One happenstance that may work out well is that I am leaving for Europe on Wednesday, the 6th, and I therefore recommend that Ambassador Rabin's next session be with Paul Nitze. If Paul Nitze then takes the same line with the Ambassador on the 6th of November that I have taken on the 4th, the Israeli Government might become accustomed shortly thereafter to the thought that we are serious in this matter. In the meantime, I recommend that you report to the President how we intend to negotiate with Ambassador Rabin, and why. I am also attaching a proposed exchange of letters between the President and Prime Minister Eshkol with respect to the assurances that we require. 3 I consider this method of receiving the assurances the most binding and therefore the most suitable. A cross-reference to these letters could be made in the actual contract. My second preference for receiving written assurances would be in a government-to-government Memorandum of Understanding. In this memorandum there should be a clause which connects Israel's assurances with paragraph 6 of the Standard Sales Contract, which reads: “6. Under unusual and compelling circumstances when the best interest of the United States requires it, reserves the right to cancel all or part of this offer at any time prior to the delivery of defense articles or performance of services. It shall be responsible for all costs resulting from cancellations under this paragraph.” I would also recommend as additional sweeteners to obtain the assurances we desire, that we be prepared to offer a number of other items; for example: (a) As is already inserted in the draft proposed letter from the President to the Prime Minister: “The United States undertakes to provide Israel with sufficient conventional military equipment to meet its legitimate security needs.” (b) We would also be prepared to offer something like the following: —Reconnaissance F-4s. —As many as 50 more F-4s if desired. —J-79 engines for which they have already asked for their Mirage IIIc. —Non-nuclear weapons systems for the F-4s of a kind which have previously been withheld, and a number of other items which they have requested which we have withheld for various reasons up to now. Finally, I recommend that in the event you are unable to see the President on this subject between now and 2:00 o'clock on Monday afternoon, November 4, that I nevertheless be authorized to talk to Ambassador Rabin along the lines set forth above. Paul C. Warnke 4 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 See footnote 2, Document 299 . 3 Not printed. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates that Warnke signed the original. 301. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 301. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 3, 1968, 0653Z. 7544. Middle East: Jarring Mission. Following summary based on uncleared memcon Noforn and FYI. Subject to revision upon review. Summary: In lengthy review with Secy of ME settlement issues, Riad emphasized primacy of territorial question and impossibility of UAR considering Israeli withdrawal from UAR territory apart from question of withdrawal from other Arab territories. Secy focused on UAR-Israel aspects of settlement problem, outlining seven point summary of how US views meaning of Nov 22 SC Res vis-a-vis UAR. Secy suggested that Hussein could take care of Jordan aspects of settlement problem. Riad said Nasser had “freed” Hussein to make own settlement, but that UAR could not itself consider settlement apart from Jordan and Syria. Riad said UAR had accepted Res and had later also given answers to Jarring and US on specifics. On refugees and Canal, Riad said he not officially connecting anything, but Res is package. Israel, however, had not accepted Res or indicated readiness to implement it, which is matter of principle and leaves main question of territorial expansion unanswered. After Riad said US interpretation of Res not clear, Secy outlined US views on UAR aspect of settlement re withdrawal, termination of state of war, Suez Canal, refugees, Tiran Straits, arms levels, and signing of doc. End Summary . 1. Secy met for nearly two hours with UAR FonMin Riad Nov 2 for discussion of problems of ME settlement. Wiggins, Al-Khouly, and Mohamed Riad also present. 2. Secy said he had personal and official reason for coming to NY to see Riad: he personally would like next secy of state to find peace rather than war in ME and officially USG desired same. Secy said matters reaching point where important decisions have to be made, since if there is no peace there apparently is war. He therefore wanted to get Riad's estimate of situation with regard to components of peace, GOI views as UAR sees them, and particularly UAR's views. Secy said peace surely must be object; no one in right mind wants war. 3. Riad said UAR hopes something can be done; hopes US can do something. Observed that Secy and USG had not left Vietnam situation for new administration, but had taken big step of halting bombing which it could be hoped would together with other steps lead to peace. Secy said it takes two to make peace in VN as in ME. Riad said it will be very difficult in VN and ME since no one has magic wand to bring peaceful situation in 24 hours. In ME UAR hopes there will be peace, but does not call alternative “war.” Alternative is rather “destruction” and after more destruction settlement would eventually be found. As he and Secy had agreed a year ago, time not in favor of peace but running against peace. If anything this more true today and it necessary to work hard to achieve peace. With opposing forces confronting each other there bound to be incidents, exchanges of fire, resistance. Secy observed these have tendency to build into chain reaction with momentum which leads to larger incidents and full scale hostilities. Riad agreed, referring to last incident in which Israeli “plane” bombed bridges, dam, and power plant inside UAR. Riad said this destroys little in itself, but causes disaster for agricultural food production which must depend on irrigation. Thus Israel initiating dangerous new stage of warfare and if retaliation being considered in Cairo it would have to be something equivalent in importance to what Israel doing to UAR, i.e., not a bridge. 4. Riad said even after further rounds of destruction on both sides there would have to be settlement, so why not do it now? But if peace must be achieved, how can it be done? This subject of discussion in UAR since June 5, 1967. UAR does not like Nov 22 SC Res but whether UAR likes it or not it is a solution and UAR has accepted it because of need to be realistic. Israel and UAR might not like Res but they have to accept it. Main question is whether Israel gives up desire for expansion as Res requires. Independence and security of all countries—not just Israel-must be guaranteed. Other questions of refugees and navigation part of Res and must also be settled but main problem is territorial question and security for both sides. Anyone who wants to be fair would agree. Up to now UAR has felt implementation of Res will lead to peace. If situation drags on unresolved, however, Arabs will continue to try to strengthen their position in face of occupation, there will be more incidents, and prospects for peace will dwindle since who would talk peace with Israel in wake of further Israeli aggression? This is why time very precious and it necessary to work hard and very quickly so Res respected. History of Jewish state, support from Zionist movement and big powers (US,UK, USSR, and France), and past and current statements of Israeli leaders about expanded state long story which known to Secy. Thus important question not how UAR can please Eban or Eshkol by fulfilling certain procedures, but matter of security of Arab countries, territorial intentions of Israel, and extent to which ambitions of Jewish state receive support from big powers. 5. Secy said he speaking only for US, not anyone else. US had supported and continues to support the territorial integrity and political independence of states in ME. This not one-sided policy; it had been applied to Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAR, Kuwait, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco in past. Had UAR Pres not closed Straits of Tiran in May 1967 not one inch of territory would have been jeopardized; had he said on June 1 what he said in September 1967 about Tiran none of problems he and Riad discussing today would be confronting them. Secty said it not USG policy to support Israeli territorial expansion. Except for events of May-June 1967 there would not have been danger of territorial expansion. Secy asked Riad to look at question from US point of view. US pressed Israel to withdraw from Sinai in 1957 and with inter alia closing of Straits in 1967 US kicked in shin. Likewise, US would have supported original Palestine Res of 1948, but it had been resisted by arms and slipped out of window. 6. Riad accepted Secy's points; said he not talking about attitude of US but attitude of Israel. UAR could do nothing with historical factors and support of big powers for establishment of Jewish state; problem is whether Israel is going to stick with pre-June 5 territory, which already well beyond “legal” boundaries of partition res. Territorial question very important to them-more important than procedure to Israelis. 7. Secy said for US to give expression of our attitude, we need help from Arab side. At critical times this had not been forthcoming. He proposed breaking settlement problem into its component parts. Jordan could take care of its own interests. Re UAR, he did not see any reason why Israel would levy territorial claims. Riad interjected that it very difficult for him to talk about UAR as UAR. It too late for Egypt to discuss settlement problem in isolation from other Arab states directly involved. If problem concerned Egypt only, Egypt would never have become involved in 1948. Egypt was attacked in 1956 because she was involved. Israel could not withdraw from Sinai and stay in other Arab areas. Secy said he had not said that: Hussein had responsibility for Jordan, UAR for UAR, etc. He wished to look at pieces so as to get settlement. Riad reiterated that major question territorial one and that it could not be solved in pieces because it matter of principle. UAR could not have Israel withdraw from Sinai leaving territorial questions for Jordan and Syria to be solved subsequently. Feelings of people and policy of government would not permit this. UAR was member of Arab League and party to defense pacts; Jordan and Syria had moved to assist UAR on June 5; it would be immoral for UAR to agree leaving behind Jordan, with half of country occupied, and Syria. 8. Riad said Nasser had told Hussein to find agreement if he wanted and could save his territories, that UAR could not help him so he could try to find settlement himself. Riad said “We freed him, but we cannot free ourselves” because UAR cannot betray others due to pride and honor of country. On territorial question if others like Jordan make settlement UAR would “never object.” 9. Secy said if UAR had told Jordan territorial question for Jordan to determine, why couldn't he and Riad talk about territorial question between Israel and UAR. Riad reverted to reasons already adduced. UAR did not want to put obstacle in front of Hussein by saying don't do anything unless Israel also leaves Sinai. Sinai was desert and UAR could wait, but West Bank contained a million people, for its part, however,UAR could not go ahead alone, since Jordan and Syria would know that if UAR did so, they would be in very difficult position. Secy said he had no reason to think Hussein would or could object if with Jarring's help or otherwise UAR-Israel issues sorted out in some fashion. Asked Riad what interest Hussein would have in standing in way? Re trying to look at problem by pieces then bring them together, Riad said matter of principle re acquisition of territory as result of war had to be agreed on first and on this answer was either yes or no. Discussion of navigation, Holy Places in Jerusalem, demilitarization and security for both sides in Syrian heights sector etc could be discussed for Israel and each party, but not territorial question which only one question and is matter of principle. If territorial question between Israel and each party taken separately SC Res loses meaning. So UAR hopes stick to main question, having previously answered matters of detail on navigation and how to sign doc or paper to fulfill obligations at previous mtg with Secy. Riad emphasized UAR answers on details all on assumption that Israel accepts and implements SC Res and ready to withdraw. Up to present moment, Riad had not heard that Israel ready to implement res; this was really serious problem now. 10. Secy said UAR had prescribed its own words which Israel must use—“accept and implement”—and that what UAR means is that Israel should accept and implement Res as UAR interprets it. Suggested that UAR would reject requirement that UAR accept and implement Res as Israel interprets it. Secy said he could not see why any government should accept words of another government subject to that other government's interpretation. Res should be accepted for implementation by each as each interprets it with details to be worked out in negotiations. 11. Riad said maybe this would be correct approach if only details at issue. Difference, however, revolves around matter of principle, so far there is no difference between UAR and Israel because UAR has given its interpretation but UAR has not heard Israel's interpretation. All UAR had heard was that Israel accepted Res as agenda. Riad asked if Secy knows what Israel's interpretation of Res is. Secy said Res not self-executing and details have to be negotiated. Riad asked if this view of US or of Israel? He asking for Israel's view. Secy said he not speaking for Israel, but that US could not go to either side and say you must implement Res as interpreted by other side. Riad asked but what does Israel say? UAR had told Jarring UAR aim is peace and peace can be achieved by implementing solution in res. Riad said we should forget all words and see how we can implement res. UAR accepted Res and for first several months of Jarring Mission he had refused to give answers to specific questions pending Israel's acceptance of res. Then he gave answers to Jarring, but perhaps this was mistake since Israel still not forthcoming on this matter of principle. Secy said he had not seen Eban since latter's return to NY, but if Israel agrees implement Res on basis of details worked out through negotiations would Riad object to that? Riad said if Israel says that he will have no objection. Secy said beyond withdrawal from UAR territory, he not really clear on UAR answers on other parts of res. Riad, for example, had linked refugees to Canal, but Res does not so link them. Riad said he not officially connecting anything, but accepted Res as package at urging of US. Riad reiterated that it impossible to split main question of territory into segments. Secy said it not possible to insist on withdrawal until it known withdrawal to what. Withdrawal must be to peace, but he unable as yet to see pieces of the pattern of peace. US would not press anybody on withdrawal as first step leaving everything else up in air to be discussed. US is trying to find way to put pieces of puzzle together to get peace. 12. Riad said UAR up to present moment does not know what policy of US is on res. US says there are different interpretations of res, but so far UAR has not heard specific interpretations of others including Israel and US. Secy said interpretation of UAR not known. Riad said UAR can answer on Res point by point and had done so several times. Secy said he would briefly give US interpretation of Res as far as UAR concerned. Riad said UAR could not be considered separately. Secy observed he talking to FonMin of UAR. Riad said he and Secy discussing res. France and USSR had told UAR clearly that Israel would have to withdraw, but UAR had not heard this to date from US. This big problem for UAR and UAR hoped one day US would make its interpretation known. Secy said he could be specific re what US thinks Res means for UAR; he could not accept Riad as spokesman of Arab world since others did not accept him as such any more than de Gaulle accepted as spokesman for Europe by other Europeans. Riad said he never said he spokesman for all Arabs. Secy said this implicit in Riad statements. Riad said he could not be spokesman for all Arabs; he had said repeatedly he could not speak for Palestinians and could only speak about UAR. UAR ready to implement whole Res as is. US interpretation would no doubt help in solving question of withdrawal one way or another. 13. Secy said he would summarize his views on what Res means vis-a-vis UAR as fol: 2 1) Israeli withdrawal from territory of UAR 2) a formal termination of the state of war 3) following from (2) above, Suez Canal open to all flagships 4) answer on refugees be found on basis of personal and secret choice of refugees on where to live (Secy later clarified that this included choice to return to Israel as one of possible places, but that this means Israel not Palestine since latter does not exist having been replaced by Israel and Jordan.) 5) international presence at Sharm el Sheikh which could not be removed without consent of SC or GA 6) general understanding about level of arms in area so as to avoid arms race (though this point would not be required “in first instance”) 7) UAR should sign something in writing to which Israel also a signatory. 14. Riad asked if he could pass these points on to other Arab countries. Secy asked that Riad let him talk with Rifai, recalling for Riad USG's solicitude for Jordan and interest in her welfare even sometimes at expense of our relations with UAR. Secy noted that he left Gaza question dangling; he had referred to “UAR territory.” He supposed there could be agreement about Gaza. Riad asked agreement with whom-Israel? Secy suggested with Jordan. To Riad's query on why Jordan, Secy said some say they want this and UAR has no desire surely for Gaza “slum”; perhaps could be handled as part of refugee problem. Riad said Secy knew that Gaza was UAR responsibility; that UAR had been there when Israel attacked.UAR must see Gaza free of Israeli occupation; after that it an Arab question. UAR had never tried to annex it to Egypt. UAR had supported about half of Gaza citizens since UNRWA refused to give assistance to those who had not lost their homes but only their lands across the line in what became Israel. 15. Riad said that from what Secy had said US policy concerning Res is that there should be no territorial gains. Riad said Israel must withdraw from all Arab territories, not just Sinai. This would help achieve peace. On refugees, did US have in mind UN reses? Secy said he not talking about plebiscite, but about giving each refugee fifteen countries to chose from (including Israel) and then trying to accommodate their wishes. Mohamed Riad noted UN reses not against this: they required repatriation/compensation but specified no methods or devices. Secy said on basis he suggested he thought there could be a solution. Riad did not demur; observed that many refugees had already gone elsewhere, including to Cairo. 16. Riad said aspirin not enough for man with cancer and main question still whether there enough support for peace in area. This main question still to be answered by Israel. If clear answer given that there will be no expansion, then all problems can be solved. If they reject expansion and try to improve relations with Arabs there will be no problem. 17. Secy asked Riad if maximum effort could be made in next ten days. Riad asked what Secy thinks can be done, what UAR should do? Riad said he in NY for six weeks and had not seen any movement, only generalities. He had told Jarring he would have to leave for Cairo soon. If Eban returned with same nine points and no answers to Riad's two questions—as press reports seemed to indicate—then he would leave at once for Cairo. This would not mean end of discussion; he could return to NY at any time. Movement would depend on whether Eban ready to move on question of implementation of res. UAR wanted to see peace, but could not make concessions on territories. 18. Secy asked whether Riad could give reaction on purely bilateral basis to his seven points. Riad said his reaction could be given now and that main question is territorial. He welcomed Secy's attitude on Sinai, which he still hoped could be extended to other territories. UAR could not move to settlement unless assured Israel would withdraw from all Arab territories. Secy suggested that in commenting on his seven points, Riad might add additional point that UAR could not itself agree on settlement unless something worked out for other Arab states and that if something worked out for others, UAR could agree to settle. Secy suggested that El-Kony and Wiggins might get together re seven points. Riad reiterated that territorial question uppermost. Re UAR Secy asked if in view of his first point other six points acceptable? (Said no need for answer on this at present mtg.) Riad said everything is in res, that UAR accepts Res and prepared to fulfill all its obligations under res. He had told Jarring UAR looking for final settlement in which all questions settled. He had responded to Jarring's questions by saying UAR would accept UNEF in Sharm El-Sheik and Gaza and Sinai; free navigation in Straits of Tiran not a problem, etc. On signing paper, this depends on paper and how it looks and how other questions are solved. UAR has no objection as matter of principle to pledge or paper which it would sign and which would be sent to all members of SC so that it signed not only “to Israel but to all the world.” UAR ready to do this and if Israel comes and signs on “that” afterwards, this would depend on paper itself, and if it “my doc.” Secy said this would be then a contractual obligation between UAR and Israel. Riad said UAR signature would be on doc, but details would have to be worked out. Riad said UAR had signed four agreements with Israel; that this not the question; that UAR ready to sign. But it must be a paper on which all our obligations are written and stated. 19. Re arms, Riad said UAR would be most happy to be released from arms spending since high levels of arms expenditure inhibit economic growth. If UAR sure Israel not bent on expansion, UAR would need no arms since no threats to UAR from elsewhere. Secy said two psychological issues are involved: 1) Arabs fear Israeli expansion; 2) Israelis fear Arab desire to destroy Israel. What could be done? Riad said anyone could see that to destroy Israel not possible practically speaking, but that for Israel to expand all that is needed is for her to annex territory on which she sits by having defeated Arabs. 20. Riad again asked if Secy could advise him on what could be done in next few days, as he would have to be returning to Cairo. He might also need to return home for consultation, and could have done so during Eban's delay. Secy remarked that Eban had returned to Israel with strong recommendations from US but that Cabinet Oct 27 had been fully preoccupied with artillery battle across Canal which, together with Eshkol's illness, brought delay. Riad said Eban now returning and question is whether he brings anything hopeful. Secy said he did not know; he would be seeing Eban following day. Secy said it reasonable for Arabs press territorial question and reasonable for Israel to press other questions. Riad recalled that Eban reportedly had once talked of maximum security for Israel and minimum border corrections. What was Israel's position on this? Secy reiterated that on UAR border he did not think there would be any change. Riad said he talking about res. Secy said Hussein could speak for Jordan. Riad recalled that Secy had spoken of US support for Arabs at times of need; UAR could do no less. 21. In closing comment, Secy said he hoped Riad would understand that US could not exert 100 percent influence in Israel when UAR did not give US any influence in UAR. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, and Tel Aviv. 2 This is apparently the proposal Rusk was referring to when he indicated in his memoirs that “I tried my hand at peacemaking when I proposed an eight point program to the Egyptian foreign minister.” He mistakenly remembered making the proposal during the UN meeting that preceded the June 1967 war. ( As I Saw It , p. 383) Richard Parker, who was present at the November 2 meeting between Rusk and Riad, described the moment in the meeting when “much to everyone's surprise, Rusk fished out of his pocket a piece of paper which contained what has come to be known as Rusk's seven points.” Parker noted that Rusk's proposal came as a complete surprise to the NEA Bureau and he subsequently discussed the initiative with Rusk in 1980. Rusk said that he had thought up the points himself and had not discussed them with anyone in the White House or in the State Department. (Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East , pp. 131-133) 302. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 302. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 3, 1968, 2245Z. 7545. Middle East: Jarring Mission. Fol summary based on uncleared memcon, Noforn and FYI, subject to revision upon review. Summary: Eban reviewed with Secy Israel's current approach to Jarring Mission and ME settlement following GOI Cabinet deliberations. Israel feels it important to continue process of clarification vis-a-vis Jordan while continuing correspondence through Jarring vis-a-vis UAR. Re UAR Israel prepared to continue substantive exchange through Jarring and to make declaration along lines put to Eban by Barbour, but with “agreement” emphasized and “functional” rather then geographical definition of Israel's position on border question. Israel also working on declaration on Res vis-a-vis Jordan. Israel committed to continuation of Jarring Mission and believes Jarring should get more into specifics and reconsider March 1968 proposal for parties to meet under his auspices. Israel hopes us will continue to encourage UAR and Jarring. End Summary. 1. Secretary met with GOI FonMin Eban Nov 3 re ME settlement and Jarring Mission. Wiggins, Rabin, Tekoah, and Argov also present. 2. Secy asked Eban how he had done with GOI Cabinet. Eban said Suez Canal bombardment weekend after his arrival in Israel had created unfavorable atmosphere and first idea had been not to reply at all to Riad paper since it only invective and propaganda containing nothing specific and concrete to continue dialogue. Eban said he pointed out clear relation of any prospect for progress with Jordan to keeping process alive with UAR and Cabinet decision then taken to pursue dialogue further. Eban said he wished touch on three points: 1) process of clarification with Jordan on which there had been further progress; 2) Cabinet study of what position would be taken if negotiations forthcoming with UAR; and 3) tactical considerations relating to Jarring mission. 3. Eban said process of clarification with Jordan advancing and expected to culminate mid-November. (Septel) In meantime, it absolutely essential to keep Jarring available. Secy asked how Eban anticipated giving Jarring Mission enough nourishment keep it alive during this period. Eban said it is fact that there are possibilities and impossibilities with Israel as with UAR: it would be impossible for GOI to commit “whole destiny” to text without safety catch of “agreement.” Eban said Israel would be able to say something about having accepted Res and willing discuss ways reach full agreement on implementing its provisions as Amb Barbour had proposed. Problem is that UAR keeps wanting imposed settlement whereas Israel wants agreed settlement. Eban said Jarring had asked for anything to keep Riad in picture, and this all right with Israel. Problem is that Jordan does not want to go it alone so UAR must be at least indirectly in picture: it must be triangular not bilateral process. Eban said GOI position of placing implementation of Res in context of peace valid in terms both of international law and Res itself,UAR and Jordan should be persuaded that there would not be changes in SC opinion on this. Riad had left unanswered question in GOI paper as to whether he accepted UK FonMin Stewart's definition of res. 4. In response to Wiggins question as to what Eban would say to Jarring, Eban said he would refer to his previous statement (paper) to Jarring and ask Jarring to move mission out of declaratory rut and into specifics. Eban said he would tell Jarring frankly that GOI had decided to go on with mission and with clarification process with Jordan, especially over next two weeks, and that it most important that Jarring not remove himself at this stage. 5. Re UAR, Eban said he had enough to draft something for Jarring today or tomorrow which he thought would satisfy third parties that Riad would be justified in not breaking up mission. Nothing suggests that UAR prepared for peace. Either whatever USSR telling them UAR not listening to, or USSR not telling them to make peace. Intoxicated speeches of two weeks ago and on throwing Israel into sea reminiscent of May-June 1967. Fact that 20 Israelis killed in last barrage and little damage done to UAR must have had enormous influence on hawks in Cairo who wish to gain time for either partial or complete military victory against Israel. Despite GOI pessimistic view of UAR intentions, Israel would like to secure limited tactical objective of making it difficult for Cairo to break off on Jarring Mission without loss in world opinion. Israel would address itself in this phase with Jarring to get enough acquiescence on UAR part to let process of clarification with Jordan proceed. Secy observed that return by Riad to Cairo would not necessarily mean breaking off Jarring Mission. Eban said gist of GOI approach would be to: 1) reaffirm willingness to exchange views on certain matters of substance through Jarring; 2) press for precise definition by parties of positions including answers to questions Israel had already put so that positions could be compared and scope of difficulties of settlement estimated; and 3) make declaration with text almost identical to that suggested by US but (a) without accepting view that Res invalidated because it contains “agreement,” and (b) giving “functional” rather than geographical formula on boundary question which should make clear that Israel's purpose is not expansionism and that once boundaries and security arrangements agreed troops would be disposed accordingly. More specific position would be made known when Israel-UAR effort moved from tactical to substantive stage (septel), but it would be counterproductive to discuss specifics while UAR not talking peace. Jarring had never said Israel should give map or lines. If UAR says something on paper which is concrete and conciliatory Israel could say something more specific on boundary and res. Eban said Israel prepared to discuss further all three aspects of approach he had outlined. 6. Re tactics, Eban said Israel giving first priority to Jarring Mission; whoever breaks off mission, whether UAR or Jarring himself, would assume heavy international responsibility. Eban said he would be seeing Jarring sometime tonight or tomorrow. Secondly, GOI thinks Jarring should consider again proposal he made in March 1968 about meetings of parties under his auspices. This at least useful as operative proposal on table and Israel would say in advance that GOI would accept proposal if made now. Thirdly, Israel would follow up on Eban speech to GA and on Israel's seven questions to UAR to see if perhaps agreement could be reached on one or more points in contingent initial discussion. With these procedural proposals, together with willingness work out declarations both vis-a-vis UAR and Jordan (septel), Israel prepared stand before public opinion if Riad leaves and Jarring Mission collapses. In answer to Secy question, Eban said he would have to return to Israel sometime after Nov 15, but could in interim continue correspondence in NY if other side wants. 2 7. After Secy withdrew, Eban suggested to Wiggins that US might go to Riad indicating Israel has moved forward with further clarification to Jarring, declaration on res, and principles on border settlement which do not include or exclude anything. UAR would therefore be well advised to stay with Jarring Mission and make reassuring response so as not to take responsibility for breaking up mission. Eban said this crucial and he would say this to Jarring as well. If US were to say to UAR that US thinks that Israel's position on “agreement” sensible, maybe UAR would play ball if recognizes Israel has support. While Jarring would not embrace Israel's response he should recognize that it serious enough to have serious response on his part at least to insure time for Israel to make progress in clarification with Jordan. 8. Wiggins said this would be awkward in that what will be apparent re Israel's forward movement will not be as much as that movement actually is. Eban said he would give some friends in SC enough info to enable them on diplomatic level to recognize serious and substantive nature of progress so as to encourage Riad to stay. Wiggins and Eban agreed that Riad might well want to return to Cairo. But that where he might be located for a short period of time not as important as whether UAR remaining on board with Jarring Mission. Wiggins asked how far Eban would go in telling Jarring of disavowal by Israel of territory aims and advised him to be as specific and substantive on this as possible. Wiggins said he felt Rifai wants peace and that Riad has seemed better on this score now than he was previously. Re Jarring, Wiggins said he had moved off demand for total and complete specificity of a week ago and reverted to earlier position that what required is something with which he can work. Wiggins said he had talked with Swedish FonMin, who had said he happy to have Jarring continue his mission. Eban said this important so that Jarring would not be worried that his own career might be jeopardized by remaining with ME mission. Wiggins 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv and Cairo. 2 On November 5 Wiggins, on instructions from the Department, told Tekoah that the U.S. view of the approach outlined by Eban to Rusk on November 3 was that it would not keep the Jarring Mission going. Wiggins emphasized that the Jarring Mission was hanging in the balance and asked on behalf of his government to review the Israeli position paper before Eban submitted it to Jarring. (Telegram 7554 from USUN, November 5; ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR) 303. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 303. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, November 4, 1968, 1902Z. CAP 82679. Herewith Eban's meeting yesterday with Secretary Rusk. 1. In mtg with Secretary Nov 3, Eban said Government of Israel defining its position on territorial question vis-a-vis UAR in “functional” rather than geographical terms. GOI position would be governed by security including shipping through Straits of Tiran. While dealing through Jarring with UAR in tactical phase, Israel would make clear expansion not its purpose and that troops would be disposed according to secure and recognized boundaries and security arrangements. 2. Eban said substantive position Israel would take if UAR willing to talk peace. He wanted US and US alone to know re Sinai, it all comes back strongly and sharply to Sharm el-Sheikh, the focal point of two wars. Israel could not accept something which might mean Israel would once again have to send men out to open Straits. Israel would want arrangement enabling Israel to be in Sharm el-Sheikh in order to protect Israeli shipping, with direct communication between Eilat and Sharm el-Sheikh. Rabin added: “Direct land communication.” Eban said he had not discussed this in juridical terms; control of territory without sovereignty had been factor in Japan-USSR and Japan-US agreements and in Cyprus settlement. Eban said especially if UAR asked for enclave positions for one reason for another, Israel would want to be there and in direct land communication with Eilat. 3. Eban said what UAR might propose would be another matter, but Israel would not want to prejudice matters before negotiations begin. Therefore, Israel will give functional not territorial definition. Israel does not think UAR has right to stop Israel from asking for this; they can say no and then talk. This all Eban could say on Sinai. It was functional statement relating to security and navigation (in Tiran), but functional requirements could have territorial implications. Eban said UAR doesn't raise question of Gaza, but he thinks they understand they not coming back to Gaza. 4. Secretary said he thought what Eban outlined on Sinai non-starter. Alternative was in direction of improved international arrangements which were workable. Eban said UAR hadn't suggested that or anything else. Israel's experience with UN and any arrangement with veto unsatisfactory. Secretary said it important that there not be veto. He could understand Israeli dissatisfaction with arrangements to date, but Israeli presence would be point of infection such that there would be tension thereafter and hard to see how there could be peace. Wiggins said international presence would have to be such as to be terminated only by action of Security Council. Eban said he didn't see if local sovereignty said international presence should terminate what country, including US, would stand against it. Secy referred to arrangements in Panama Canal and Okinawa where local sovereignty modified. Eban and Rabin said Israel ready to have such treaties. 5. Eban said no point in going into this in detail now since not in negotiating situation. It necessary to hear what UAR would propose. Secy reiterated that as far as US attitude concerned, he had to put in reservation about Sharm el-Sheikh idea: US does not feel it could support that under present circumstances. 6. Israelis asked that foregoing be very tightly held. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 103, 11/1-4/68. Secret. 304. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 304. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, November 4, 1968, 0720Z. 7323. Subject: King's request. Sitrep No. 5. 1. King Hussein telephoned Emb officer who at home owing curfew to state following: (a) he is trying hard to “clean up the mess”; 2 (b) requested that US promptly inform Israelis that Fedayeen organizations may try diversionary moves by causing incidents on ceasefire line; advise Israelis be patient because he, Hussein, cannot have too many things on his plate at this critical time. (c) King also urged that all parties move forward as promptly as possible today in New York to secure Israeli acceptance of Nov resolution. 2. Fact that King personally made these requests can of course be cited. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN. Confidential; Flash. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Beirut, London, Cairo, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 2 The domestic crisis began on November 2 when a crowd of demonstrators attacked the U.S. Embassy in Amman on the anniversary of the signing of the Balfour Declaration. A number of windows in the Embassy were broken, one vehicle was damaged, and the U.S. flag was torn down. Police and security units dispersed the crowd. (Telegram 7315 from Amman, November 2; ibid.) On November 3 the Jordanian Army arrested 70 members of the Tahir Dadlan Fedayeen group and held them responsible for instigating the attack on the Embassy. (Telegram 7321 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) Heavy fighting between Fedayeen units and the Jordanian Army broke out following the arrests. (Telegram 7322 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) The Embassy reported that, in addition to the arrests, the government informed al-Fatah leaders that no uniformed Fedayeen would be permitted in Jordanian towns, that all Fedayeen organizations would be interdicted from firing across cease-fire lines, and that any infiltration operations into Israel or occupied territory would have to be coordinated with the Jordanian Army. (Telegram 7328 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) On the afternoon of November 4 the Embassy reported that most Fatah leaders and PLO leader Yasir Arafat were cooperating with the army in an attempt to defuse the situation. (Telegram 7333 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) 305. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 305. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 4, 1968, 5 p.m. Mr. President: Herewith an account of latest secret Israeli-Jordan exchange: 2 —top level meeting postponed until Nov. 19; —strong Jordanian arguments for simple Israeli acceptance of November Resolution 3 —which they should do. I do believe it is not impossible we can move the Middle East around the corner in the weeks ahead—if we try very hard. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Literally Eyes Only. 2 [ text not declassified ](Ibid.) 3 King Hussein asked that President Johnson be informed that he was doing everything he could to bring about peace. He felt that Israel's public acceptance of Resolution 242 was critical to the peace process, and he asked that President Johnson use whatever influence he had to get Israeli Foreign Minister Eban to convey Israel's acceptance of the resolution to Jarring during the current discussions at the United Nations. (Ibid.) 306. Memorandum of Conversation 306. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 4, 1968, 2-2:45 p.m. SUBJECT Negotiations with Israel-F-4 and Advanced Weapons PARTICIPANTS Israeli Side Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy Brigadier General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forced Attache Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York United States Side Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray Ambassador Rabin opened the conversation by referring to his meeting on 30 October with Ambassador Hart, in which Hart had asked Rabin to write a proposed Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the provisions Israel considered necessary to the F-4 sale. This was written and delivered to Ambassador Hart. 2 “We put in it what we thought was necessary, following the precedent of the prior agreement (A-4 aircraft).” Last Friday, 1 November, Rabin said he received a call from Department of State to the effect that “in principle, the answer is yes” with regard to Israel's request for F-4s and that he was to get in touch with Mr. Warnke. Ambassador Rabin said that today he would like to get agreement on how we proceed but not go into details. Mr. Warnke said that he would like at the outset to set forth the United States' position. The President agrees in principle to the sale. It is a difficult decision, not because we are not interested in Israel's security, but precisely because we are interested. Heretofore, we have avoided becoming the principal arms supplier to Israel. Wherever possible we have urged that Israel acquire its arms from other Western countries. We felt that this was to our mutual benefit for it lessened the risk of US-USSR confrontation in the Middle East and therefore lessened the dangers to the security of the United States and Israel. We would prefer to continue that policy; however, the Europeans apparently have opted out, and the French particularly seem reluctant to supply the Mirage aircraft Israel has purchased. Mr. Warnke stressed that with a decision to go ahead on the sale of F-4 aircraft we will have a different set of circumstances concerning our supply relationship to Israel. We will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel's security situation and involving more directly the security of the United States. Mr. Warnke reminded Ambassador Rabin that Secretary Rusk had talked with Foreign Minister Eban about the problems and the dangers of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. Mr. Warnke referred specifically to the paragraph in the standard sales contract which permitted cancellation “under unusual and compelling circumstances”; he suggested that Israeli acquisition of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons would comprise such circumstances. Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that because the security of the United States was clearly involved we must seek from the Government of Israel certain assurances: (1) that Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles, (2) that Israel will not develop, manufacture, or otherwise acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons, (3) that Israel will sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At a subsequent point in the conversation, Mr. Warnke mentioned the inspection arrangement at Dimona as a precedent that might be required here. Mr. Warnke noted that we had not sought such specific assurances in our prior agreements because, based on the information we had at that time, these developments were not imminent. Our present information, however, indicates that Israel is on the verge of nuclear weapons and missiles capability. This development would seriously and adversely affect the security interests of the United States; it involves the Soviet Union and risks a US-USSR confrontation; it dramatically changes the situation in the area. (Ambassador Rabin did not dispute in any way our information on Israel's nuclear or missile capability, nor did he comment directly on the assurances we requested. He did not seem particularly surprised or upset at Mr. Warnke's presentation. He referred to the fact that the Israeli position on the question of Israeli nuclear and missile programs had been conveyed to Ambassador Barbour.) Ambassador Rabin observed that this question (of missiles and nuclear weapons) had been raised two weeks ago, and that an answer was given by the Israeli Government to the United States Embassy in Israel. “I don't have anything to add to my Government's position.” Rabin said he was asked to draft a Memorandum of Understanding which he had done and which we have. Rabin said that “if you wish to suggest changes or additions to that memorandum you of course may do so.” Rabin remarked that, when he saw Secretary Rusk on Sunday, the Secretary said that the American acceptance in principle “did not mean that we accept your draft Memorandum of Understanding.” Commenting more generally, Ambassador Rabin said that Israel did not come to the United States for military equipment when it could go elsewhere; with other governments Israel did not have the problem of “conditions” that it has with the United States. In any case, we do not see, said Rabin, that your selling us 50 Phantoms changes things appreciably. Mr. Warnke said that it is not just 50 Phantoms, but 50 Phantoms plus 100 Skyhawks plus the great variety of other equipment that Israel is requesting that makes the policy we are entering upon a distinct change from our prior policy. Nevertheless, the United States is interested in doing what is necessary to assist Israel. Opinions vary on how best to do this but our goal is the same. It is for this reason that we are so concerned with Israel's missile and nuclear plans and intentions and this is why we need to “up-date” your assurances to us on these matters. Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that we would prepare by tomorrow for his review a revised Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the kinds of assurances we require. Mr. Warnke asked if there were other questions that Ambassador Rabin would like to speak about today. Ambassador Rabin said that he would like to call to our attention the current Israeli intelligence appreciation of the build-up of Soviet aircraft in Egypt and Syria. He said that the figures General Weizman had presented us in September 1967 had proven to be entirely too low. The inventories that Weizman had projected for those two countries by 1970 had in fact already been exceeded on 1 November 1968. The Ambassador undertook to provide details separately. 3 Rabin went on to say that a number of technical terms needed going into, for example, Israel would like a certain number—the more the better—of F-4s delivered in the first half of 1969 (he later put the number at 25 aircraft). He attributed the urgency to “what was happening on the other side.” Rabin said that they would like credit arrangements if possible, preferably on the same terms as the first Skyhawk sale (10 per cent down, 3-1/2 per cent interest, 10 years repayment). Rabin said they would like the F-4E configuration generally, but wish to include in the 50 aircraft 6 RF-4Es. Ambassador Rabin and General Hod asked if they could begin discussions on the F-4E with the Air Force. Mr. Warnke said he would inform them when this was possible. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office at the Pentagon. 2 See footnote 2, Document 298 . 3 Rabin subsequently provided a comparative chart of Arab air forces, under cover of a November 4 letter to Warnke. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel Arms, 10/1/68-1/20/69) 307. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 307. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 5, 1968, 1650Z. 7571. Jarring Mission. Summary: In meeting with Wiggins last night Jarring said he expects written Israeli reply today and in addition piece of paper for Jordan. Thought Israeli reply would not go far enough, said Arabs would continue to insist on Israeli statement of willingness to withdraw from “all” Arab territories; said Riad intended to reply very promptly; thought Riad and Rifai both then likely to return home for consultations, would not break talks off but was doubtful if they would come back; feared protracted period of diplomatic stalemate (several months) would result during which military engagements likely to increase in area; said new factor of Syrian participation in settlement had been introduced (presumably by UAR); and expressed concern at greater rigidities in situation he had experienced with all parties yesterday. While expressing above views he also indicated he did not believe situation had come to an end, and gave no indication he intended to throw in towel himself. Jarring listened carefully but made no commitments to our suggestions (a) that key effort now was to assure UAR reply contained some substantive comments on UAR position, and (b) that he might consider putting forward questions to parties himself, possibly with suggested answers, as next round of negotiating process if this one comes to an end. Did say he would speak to Sovs again today (with view to their help in keeping Fon Mins here if possible and in encouraging constructive UAR response). 1. Jarring asked to see Wiggins yesterday afternoon after talking to Eban, Riad and Rifai because things were “not very good.” Arrangements made to meet late last night after respective dinners. Sisco and Pedersen accompanied Wiggins. 2. Jarring had talked to all three Fon Mins yesterday and was concerned with rigidities he had detected and probability early departure Arab Fon Mins accompanied by extended diplomatic stalemate and danger increasing military incidents in area. 3. He said his conversation with Eban had been cordial, and he believed Eban was doing his best. Eban had promised written reply today 2 and also to deliver paper for Jordan as well. Nevertheless, Jarring knew Israeli reply would not be satisfactory to Arabs. Eban had not talked of “functional” approach to Jarring but had said Israel would express its interests in Sinai as being security and “guarantees” of freedom of navigation in Straits. He had left it to Jarring to “guess” what guarantee they might require, which he did not intend to do. From conversation with Riad he was clear UAR would oppose any “guarantees,” while saying UAR would be willing to commit itself to freedom of navigation. Eban had also spoken of connection between withdrawal and secure and recognized boundaries. When queried whether Eban had used word “withdrawal” Jarring said yes, but when he had told Tekoah at elevators they must use it in written reply, Tekoah said they would have to speak of “disposition of forces.” At our urging Jarring said he would make another effort on this directly with Eban. Jarring said Arabs had clearly shifted emphasis from implementation to withdrawal, and from “all” Arab territories. He felt though that they might accept Israeli statement of willingness to withdraw “in principle.” 4. Jarring said Rifai was particularly discouraged and in a difficult situation. He did not want to return to Amman to have to make a public report of no progress. On other hand he had been sitting here with little to do. If Riad returned Rifai would be in even more difficult situation. Jarring thought he could then stay here only if King told him to do so. 5. Jarring said he had urged Riad to hold any reply to Israeli note until after his consultations in Cairo (in context Riad insistence on returning) with hope this would produce more considered reply. Riad made clear he would reply to Israeli note promptly and before he returned. 3 6. Jarring also said it was clear in last few days that Syria again being brought into picture by Arabs as part of settlement. He did not speculate why but obviously regarded this as complicating factor. 7. Again expressed view Israeli Govt would not give him any details on their boundary ideas, though as victors it should be their obligation to make first move on this, because of Cabinet divisions and because any statement on UAR front would require shortly thereafter statement on Jordanian border. 8. Wiggins told Jarring we had been making major effort with Israelis. We did not know any more than he did about Israeli position at this point. We would have liked to see them more forthcoming on boundaries and on res. UAR military operation on Canal on 26th had been highly unfortunate complicating factor which had interfered with Cabinet discussions and Eban's effort to get more negotiating room. Sisco added that Arabs should of course understand that Israel would not put forward its final position at outset. Jarring replied that Arabs accepted that US was making serious effort with Israelis and felt this was change from earlier US attitude. Question was whether results would be enough. 9. Pedersen commented that we now seemed to be faced with situation where whatever influences could be used on Israeli reply had been expended. While Eban written document would not meet Arab views it was likely to go some distance beyond last document, and the two together would contain considerable amount of substantive statements of Israeli views. To keep issue moving it was now critical to influence UAR reply to include not just a new demand for Israeli views on withdrawal but as much substance as possible. Otherwise it would be most difficult to make any further progress in Israel. Suggested Rifai, who had been helpful to get final para in last UAR reply, might be helpful. Jarring indicated this was general intention behind his effort to get Riad not to reply right away. Said he expected Israeli reply to “accept” Res along lines March 10 formula and to include something on implementation and agreement, with emphasis on latter. Still felt Arabs would insist on Israeli commitment to withdrawal. 10. Sisco raised question of next steps if current round of written exchanges came to end through deficiencies of Israeli reply and another unsatisfactory UAR reply like last one. For example, had Jarring thought about possibility posing questions himself to both UAR and Israel, possibly also with suggested answers. Key issue to Israel was nature of permanent peace; this might be put to UAR. Key issue to UAR was boundary and withdrawal; this might be put to Israel. Jarring said he had of course thought about this possibility a lot. In fact he had put number of questions in past but not formally. Indicated he would think about matter, though did not commit himself. 11. Wiggins asked whether Jarring had seen Sovs recently, indicating they might be helpful in encouraging Riad to remain in New York and/or responding constructively to Israeli paper. Jarring said he had not talked to them in last few days but agreed they might be helpful at this point and indicated he would ask to see Semenov. 12. At conclusion of meeting Wiggins expressed continued concern about critical nature of present situation and about Jarring's assessment of current state of mind on both sides. Jarring then assured Wiggins he had asked for early meeting in order to share his concern. Stressed he did not believe Riad would “break off” talks with him, but repeated his concern rather was that situation could go into protracted diplomatic stalemate for several months, which would be hard to break, and that consequences in area would be increased violence and military clashes. He felt, for instance, that UAR reaction to Israeli success in recent retaliation more likely to be to hit back itself than to make more determined effort for settlement. He did not refer at all to possibility he might himself throw sponge in. Wiggins 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo, and Amman. 2 The text of the Israeli paper handed to Jarring on November 5 was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7582 from USUN, November 5. The Israeli position outlined in the paper was in essence as presented by Eban to Rusk on November 3; see Document 302 . 3 On November 6 Wiggins, Sisco, Buffum, and Pedersen met with Foreign Minister Riad to urge that the UAR view the Israeli paper in the most positive light and respond accordingly. They pointed to the specific Israeli reference to withdrawal to secure and recognized boundaries and also noted the Israeli emphasis upon security as the governing principle relating to the question of withdrawal. Riad was inclined to dismiss the Israeli paper as another “Israeli maneuver,” but agreed to consider returning a substantive reply. Riad indicated that he was planning to return to Cairo on November 7, but that did not mean that the UAR was breaking off the talks in New York. He said that the UAR wanted the Jarring Mission to continue and would cooperate with Jarring to that end. (Telegram 7604 from USUN, November 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) A UAR paper, addressed to Jarring and handed to him on November 7, indicated that the UAR found nothing in the Israeli paper to move the search for a peace settlement forward. The UAR took the position that Israel still refused to implement Resolution 242 and was actively attempting to integrate captured Arab territory into Israel. Until Israel was prepared to withdraw from all captured Arab territory, the UAR did not see that peace was possible. The text of the paper was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7628 from USUN, November 7. (Ibid.) 308. Memorandum of Conversation 308. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 5, 1968, 2:10-2:40 p.m. SUBJECT Negotiations with Israel—F-4 and Advanced Weapons PARTICIPANTS Israeli Side Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York United States Side Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that what he had done was to set out in a Memorandum of Agreement the points discussed yesterday. 2 Mr. Warnke then passed the memorandum to Ambassador Rabin to read. Ambassador Rabin, having finished reading the memorandum said: “As I understand it you put three basic conditions to the sale of F-4s.” Mr. Warnke said that the word “understandings” would perhaps be more appropriate. Ambassador Rabin said “I prefer to put it in my words: First, Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles; second, we will not acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons; and third we would sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. You also ask to make inspections, making a fourth condition.” Ambassador Rabin asked: “Is this the official United States position, that without these conditions we do not get Phantoms?” Mr. Warnke: “That would be my recommendation.” Ambassador Rabin said he was not in a position to give his Government's answer. Mr. Warnke said we understood that. He would like to say that the words of the memorandum were his. It is the assurances we seek, not the form. Ambassador Rabin restated that he could not give his Government's position, but that his reaction was: “I don't believe Israel is going to accept conditions within a Memorandum of Understanding about selling the Phantoms. We were told more than once that there would be no conditions—at least not these kinds of conditions.” The Ambassador then added, haltingly: “It would be a pity—all these conditions on paper—just for 50 Phantoms.” Mr. Warnke said that he did not consider what was being discussed was “just 50 Phantom aircraft.” He said that if we sold these 50 Phantom aircraft to Israel, our position would have changed markedly to one of the principal supplier of arms to Israel and he thought that the significance of this change is something that should be thought about very carefully by the Israeli Government as well as by our own. It is of great importance to Israel on the one hand and it is of significance to the United States on the other because it means that the security of the United States is more closely involved in the area. It is this larger matter which should be considered concurrently with the assurances for which we have asked. Ambassador Rabin said that it would be possible to have discussions on each of the items. But he again said, as his personal reaction, that “to have these conditions just for selling of 50 Phantoms, I don't think it is right.” Mr. Warnke repeated that the Department of Defense would consider any other form which would give us similar assurances that Israel would care to propose. Ambassador Rabin asked for time to study the memorandum more carefully. He asked also whether, in the meantime, it would be possible for Major General Hod to talk with the U.S. Air Force. Mr. Warnke said that he had spoken with Mr. Hoopes, Under Secretary of the Air Force, who agreed to arrange for a F-4E briefing for General Hod and would expect a call from Hod tomorrow. Mr. Warnke said that we had drafted the Memorandum of Agreement so that Israel could see clearly the things that trouble us. Whether the assurances we receive are contained in separate documents or whether we come to separate understandings is, to our way of thinking, irrelevant. We feel we must know what missile and nuclear developments are going on in the Middle East. These vitally affect the national security interests of the United States. There has been a long and strong relationship between our two countries. We must have mutual trust and confidence. [ 8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Mr. Warnke said that he would be gone for the next several days, but if it was necessary to have further discussions in this period that the Ambassador should contact Mr. Nitze or Mr. Schwartz. 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked “Second Session.” 2 A copy of this undated draft is ibid. 3 Warnke sent a memorandum following this meeting to Secretary Clifford in which he described Rabin's reaction to their conversation as “disturbed.” Warnke recommended that Clifford inform President Johnson and Secretary Rusk about the nature of his two exchanges with Rabin. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1) 309. Memorandum of Conversation 309. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 8, 1968, 6:10-6:40 p.m. SUBJECT Negotiations with Israel—F-4 and Advanced Weapons PARTICIPANTS Israeli Side Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache United States Side Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray Ambassador Rabin began the conversation by asking whether Mr. Warnke had changed his mind with respect to the assurances we had requested of the Israeli Government. Mr. Warnke replied in the negative. Ambassador Rabin, saying his words might not be diplomatic, read from a prepared talking paper 2 as follows: “I wish to address myself first to Article 3 of your proposed Memorandum of Agreement. I am now in a position to confirm that my original personal reaction upon first reading this paragraph—namely, that it is completely unacceptable to us—is indeed my Government's official position. We have come here for the purpose of purchasing 50 Phantoms. We have not come here in order to mortgage the sovereignty of the State of Israel, not even for 50 Phantoms. Furthermore, I wish to state that we consider Article 3 to be in the nature of a very major condition precedent to the sale of aircraft and it is therefore not acceptable to us also as a matter of principle. My Government's position is that the matters raised in Article 3 are extraneous to the question before us, namely, the terms for the sale of 50 F-4 aircraft. These matters have been the subject of separate discussions between our two Governments. Most recently, 28 October 1968, we submitted through the U.S. Ambassador to Israel a comprehensive statement concerning these issues, the contents of which I can make available to you now. “Accordingly, I should like to propose that Israel's assurances in connection with the theoretical question of the use of the planes for the delivery of nuclear weapons remains as submitted to you in our original proposal, namely, that the Government of Israel agrees not to use any aircrafts supplied by the U.S. as a nuclear weapons carrier. I am also authorized to reaffirm, in this connection, that it is Israel's long-standing policy not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Assurances to that effect can be incorporated into the agreement. “May I also comment on the Preamble to Article 3 and state that the Government of Israel does not consider itself qualified to express an opinion on what constitutes an endangerment of the security interests of the U.S. This is the exclusive prerogative of the Government of the U.S. Similarly, with reference to subsection 2 of Article 2, the Government of Israel does not feel that it is qualified to comment on what is or is not a major tenet of U.S. policy. Again, this is the exclusive prerogative of the U.S. Government. “This is my Government's position and the only basis on which we consider it possible to conduct negotiations for the purchase of military equipment—in this case, 50 Phantoms.” Ambassador Rabin, having finished reading from his prepared text, observed that paragraph 1 of the American draft Memorandum of Agreement is an exact wording of the 1965 Memorandum of Understanding, 3 and therefore adds nothing new. He reiterated that Israel did not believe that they were qualified to comment or to make judgments concerning the points covered in Article 2. Ambassador Rabin also thought that Article 5 on secrecy was not even as favorable as the paragraph on secrecy in the A-4 Agreement, which he thought was “more mutual.” Rabin said, however, that this was not a major point. (At this point, Ambassador Rabin passed to Mr. Warnke a copy of the Government of Israel's statement which had been given to Ambassador Barbour on 28 October 1968. 4 Mr. Warnke glanced at it, confirmed that we already had a copy, and returned it to Ambassador Rabin.) Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met with the Air Force. General Hod said that, while he had one briefing, nothing more was being done, the Air Force was waiting for Mr. Hoopes. Mr. Schwartz explained that Mr. Hoopes had forwarded the Israeli requests to Mr. Warnke, but, because Mr. Warnke had just returned from Europe, he had not yet seen Mr. Hoopes' memorandum. 5 Ambassador Rabin said: “So there we are.” Mr. Warnke said: “Yes, Mr. Ambassador. We have managed to isolate a major difference.” Mr. Warnke said he would like to take issue with two points raised by the Ambassador: first, that our request for assurances in connection with the sale of the F-4 aircraft is extraneous. What Israel does with strategic missiles and nuclear weapons affects the national security of the United States. “It is the national security of the United States that I am charged with protecting. By law I am required to consider the impact of the sale on the United States. You, from your vantage point, do not have to accept my judgments, but I am required to make them.” Second, the assurances we have requested are not, and are not intended to be, an invasion of sovereignty. All international agreements impinge on absolute sovereignty. Our request is no different than other international agreements. Mr. Warnke said that however these negotiations come out he has felt that this dialogue has been useful. “I have felt it was important to get across to you how we feel about Israel's acquisition of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. As you know, there is a provision in our sales contract that permits cancellation of the contract by the United States for ‘unusual and compelling circumstances.’ To me, if Israel goes ahead with its missile and nuclear programs this would involve that paragraph; and while I can not speak for the next administration, I feel sure they will feel the same way too. Therefore, to a considerable extent, the arguments we are having about the wording of assurances are mere words and not substance. The substance remains the same.” Ambassador Rabin said: “I can understand you would like to have assurances about the way your hardware is going to be used—not as a nuclear weapons carrier.” But in Article 3 you ask for all the rights to know and for us to give agreement for you to inspect in our country. We were very careful not to use the word “inspect” with respect to Dimona. We see in the two words quite a difference. The word “visit” means you are a guest in our country—not an inspector. Mr. Warnke said: “I would be prepared to accept an amendment to our memorandum substituting ‘visit’ for inspection.” Ambassador Rabin said: “We have an agreement today.” Mr. Warnke said: “Yes, but that applies only to Dimona, not to the sites where missiles are being produced” (nervous laughter from Israelis). Ambassador Rabin asked: “What do you call strategic missiles in the Arab-Israeli context?” Mr. Warnke replied: “Those capable of reaching the Arab capitals.” Rabin agreed, saying: “At least we have the same definition.” He also commented that the missiles “would not reach all the Arab capitals.” Mr. Warnke observed that the F-4 aircraft would be part of Israel's total defense environment; that they would be used, as the General well knew, to protect strategic missile sites as well as other possible targets. It is the totality of Israel's defense that we are involved in; it is not just a question of aircraft. Ambassador Rabin said: “You are only selling arms. How do you feel you have the right to ask all these things?” Mr. Warnke said: “I think I do. Otherwise I wouldn't bring it up.” Ambassador Rabin said: “We have promised not to carry nuclear weapons and that we would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.” Mr. Warnke replied: “We will think about what you have said and talk with Secretary Clifford and Secretary Nitze. I will talk with you again tomorrow.” 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked “Third Session.” 2 Rabin left a copy of his talking paper with Warnke. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1) 3 For text of this memorandum of understanding, dated March 11, 1965, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 185 . 4 See footnote 2, Document 292 . 5 Not found. 310. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 310. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 8, 1968, 11:10 a.m. Mr. President: You will be interested in this Soviet approach in the wake of Eban's memorandum. 2 Despite contrary noises in the press, I do believe that, if we put our shoulder to the wheel, we have a chance of turning the corner in the Middle East in the next several months. Quiet collaboration with the Soviet Union in getting behind the next phase of the Jarring mission could be important and useful. Interestingly enough, our people have been discussing in the last few days how to weave U.S.-Soviet consultation into the next stage of the Middle East peace effort. W. W. Rostow 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 104, 11/5-8/68. Secret. 2 A note on the memorandum indicates that telegram 7630 from USUN, November 8, was attached. Telegram 7630 reported on a November 7 conversation between Ambassador Buffum of USUN and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov. In his analysis of the prospects for a peace settlement in the Middle East, Semenov put a positive reading on the latest Israeli position (see Document 302 ). Semenov agreed with Buffum that the next step was to persuade all parties to the conflict to give Jarring more to work with while seeking to maintain an atmosphere in the Middle East that was conducive to negotiations. Semenov also suggested that in approaching the next phase of the Jarring Mission, the United States and the Soviet Union should begin a systematic exchange of views on the key problems involved in a settlement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR) A more extensive record of this meeting was transmitted to the Department in airgram A-2600 from USUN, November 8. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Under Secretary Rostow took up Semenov's suggestion in a luncheon meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on November 8 when they discussed prospects for the Jarring Mission at length. (Telegram 269827 to Tel Aviv, November 9; ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 311. Draft Memorandum for the Record 311. Draft Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, November 9, 1968. SUBJECT F-4 Negotiations with the Israelis Ambassador Rabin came to see Mr. Warnke last night and flatly and rather brutally rejected our request for assurances with respect to strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. He read from a talking paper, 2 a copy of which he left with us. This is attached. The Memorandum of Conversation is attached. 3 The background for the Israeli performance, as I understand it, is as follows: On November 7, Secretary Clifford and Secretary Rusk met with the President on this subject. 4 As recounted by Mr. Clifford to Mr. Warnke, both Secretaries argued with the President in favor of insisting on additional assurances from the Israelis on the grounds [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] that nuclear weapons in the Middle East were extremely dangerous for the national security of the United States. The President apparently said that he had promised the F-4s without any conditions, and that was his position. He did not even wish to accept Mr. Rusk's position that we had at least to obtain the same assurances that we had previously received from the Israelis in connection with the A-4 negotiations. Mr. Warnke was in Germany at this time, returned to the Pentagon at 5:00 p.m. on November 8, and was told of the President's position by Mr. Clifford just before the Israelis arrived. When Ambassador Rabin and his colleagues walked into Mr. Warnke's office just after 6:00 p.m., it was abundantly clear that they had been told of the President's position and of his instructions to the Secretaries of Defense and State. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Harry Schwartz. 2 See footnote 2, Document 309 . 3 Document 309 . 4 According to the President's Daily Diary, this was a luncheon meeting with the President which also included Generals Maxwell Taylor and Earle Wheeler, CIA Director Helms, and Walt Rostow. (Johnson Library) 312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, November 9, 1968, 0111Z. 269779. Subject: Your Audience With King Hussein. Ref: Amman 7393. 2 Following may be used by Ambassador in audience with King Hussein: 1. Next steps in Jarring Mission. Re Jarring Mission, you may draw as appropriate on telegrams reporting developments in New York. Suggest you state that, while there has not been as much progress as we had hoped for, we think indirect exchanges between parties and various bilateral conversations have been very useful. Most important thing at this stage is to maintain and accelerate what momentum has developed and keep Jarring exercise going. In this connection we pleased that, although Rifai and Riad leaving New York both have indicated they and govts intend continue cooperate with Jarring. Jarring seems determined make no move that would jeopardize continuation his mission. We plan continue maintain closest contact with Jarring and parties. You may also repeat assurances given King in New York Nov. 1967 concerning territorial aspects of settlement, including point that U.S. prepared support return of West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications. In discussing foregoing, you requested ascertain from King his views re ways in which Jordan might justify Israel's security requirements on West Bank. What formula would GOJ be prepared to accept? For example, would GOJ accept proposition of joint GOJ-GOI patrols perhaps made up of security police rather than military? Assure King that you are only making informal probes on this subject and that you are only seeking his preliminary views. 3 2. Internal Defense. You may reassure King of our desire be as helpful as possible re strengthening GOJ's internal defense capability. In this connection you may wish mention inter alia our intention dispatch on TDY specialist in riot control, our continued willingness assist in training, and our readiness sell and expedite shipment of equipment which GOJ may wish purchase from U.S. King might be advised to order needed equipment promptly view lapse of shipping time. FYI. Appears to us that the ball is now in GOJ's court. AMC's message No. 38135 and DA message No. 884553 4 gave Embassy information on price and availability of various items of equipment for use by security forces. We await GOJ response in wake your further consultations. We note parenthetically that the GOJ has not yet responded to price and availability quotations which UK provided expeditiously in August (London 13887). 5 End FYI. 3. Possible interest of Hussein in visiting U.S. for talks with President-elect. You should not raise subject but if Hussein expresses interest in visiting U.S., you should indicate that you will seek advice from Department on question of visits to President and President-elect in period prior to inauguration. FYI. Mr. NIXON's wishes on receiving foreign dignitaries prior to inauguration not yet known. End FYI. 4. Possible Arab Summit Conference in November. If King seeks your advice re convening of Arab Summit, suggest you seek discourage such a move at this time. You might note tendency of most past Arab summits to adopt extreme Arab positions and point to risk that Summit decision in context Arab-Israeli problem likely reduce Arab negotiating flexibility in connection Jarring effort. FYI. We propose you not make too strong a case against convening Arab Summit since this, after all, is King's business, not ours. He may have his own strong views and, if so, we would not wish make an issue out of this. We recall Hussein's desire over past several months to convene another Arab Summit conference for purpose of renewing mandate for Arabs to seek political solution to Middle East crisis. We also recollect that Hussein hoped to use such a conference to achieve Arab intergovernmental coordination on bringing fedayeen under control. We seriously doubt that an Arab Summit would achieve these laudable goals. We fear that another summit at this time is more likely to harden Arab public positions on an approach to a settlement with Israel, thereby further reducing Hussein's and perhaps Nasser's negotiating flexibility at this particularly critical juncture in Jarring mission. Hussein, of course, must make his own decision on pros and cons of calling for the convening another Arab Summit. We note that other Arab leaders, particularly King Faysal, have consistently opposed convening of another Arab Summit. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Seelye, Paganelli, and Jones; cleared by Sisco, Atherton, Davies, and Harold Saunders; and approved by Katzenbach. 2 In telegram 7393 from Amman, November 8, Symmes cabled that he intended to seek an audience with King Hussein at the earliest opportunity. He asked whether the Department had any guidance for him with regard to the following issues: “1. Next steps for the Jarring mission? 2. Internal defense. 3. Possible interest of Hussein in visiting U.S. for talks with President-elect. 4. Possible Arab summit conference in November.” (Ibid.) 3 Ambassador Symmes met with King Hussein on November 9 and made the points and offered the assurances authorized in paragraph 1 of this telegram. Hussein expressed gratitude for the reassurances, and said that with respect to exchanges with Israel, there was not much that Jordan could do unless Israel came forward with enough substance to justify proceeding to the next steps. (Telegram 7409 from Amman, November 11; ibid.) 4 Neither found. 5 In telegram 13887 from London, October 29, the Embassy reported that it had received from the Foreign Office a list of the items that made up the final element of the arms procurement package that Saudi Arabia was prepared to finance for Jordan. The arms were to be purchased from British sources. Major items included 100 Centurion tanks and 100 105-mm “up-gunning” kits. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 313. Memorandum for the Record 313. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, November 9, 1968. At about noon Walt Rostow told me that Abe Feinberg had told him that the morning meeting with Paul Warnke on F-4s had gone well. 2 He believed the discussions would be concluded on or by next Tuesday. Although there are now no preconditions to the sale, the Israelis are prepared to reaffirm their pledge not to be the first in introducing nuclear weapons into the Middle East and to pledge not to use the F-4s to carry nuclear weapons. Rostow told Feinberg that the Israelis should realize that Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and he have a deep sense of foreboding that Israeli policies could lead to a nuclear tragedy. Feinberg, in response, said he agreed that Israel should not go further down the nuclear road. He urged Walt to recommend to the President that he heavily emphasize the gravity of this issue when Prime Minister Eshkol visits Washington. John P. Walsh 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. 2 No other record of this meeting between Warnke and Rabin has been found. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 314. Memorandum of Conversation 314. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 10, 1968. SUBJECT US-UAR Relations; Phantoms; Jarring Mission PARTICIPANTS Muhammad Riad, UAR Foreign Ministry Ashraf Ghorbal, U.A.R. Interests Section, Embassy of India Richard B. Parker, Country Director for NEA/UAR Mr. Parker asked if he could interpret President Nasser's congratulatory message to President-elect Nixon 2 as a sign the UAR wanted to resume relations. Muhammad smiled and said he did not know. Ashraf said the ball was now in our court. Muhammad said he hoped that if there was progress towards resumption it would not be derailed again. He then confided that the UAR had been moving towards resumption last February but had changed its mind because of remarks and actions of Ambassador Goldberg, who had given complete credence to the Israelis but had refused to believe anything the Egyptians said. He referred specifically to Ambassador Goldberg's acceptance of the Israeli contention that the Egyptians were insisting on withdrawal first in spite of Egyptian assurances to us to the contrary. Mr. Parker said there had been a good deal of confusion as to the Egyptian position because of the elliptical statements issuing from the Egyptians themselves. He himself had gotten into trouble with the Egyptians for pointing out that Jarring apparently thought they were insisting on withdrawal first. He had only been trying to do a service by pointing out that there was a communications failure. All he had succeeded in doing was making people mad, but he had been vindicated when Jarring subsequently told Mahmoud Riad he understood the UAR was still insisting on withdrawal first. Ambassador Goldberg could certainly not be blamed if he reported what the Israelis told him. He also reported what the Egyptians and Jordanians told him. Phantoms Ashraf raised the Benjamin Welles story in the November 7 New York Times 3 again and asked for a fuller explanation. Mr. Parker said the Welles story was not accurate. The Department's spokesman on November 7 had said negotiations on the Phantoms were still continuing. This was correct. He would not try to mislead them; Israel would get the Phantoms sooner or later. But the terms of the deal were still under discussion and no agreement had been reached, nor had any decision been taken as alleged by Welles. Ashraf asked where Welles had gotten the story then. Mr. Parker said he believed it had come from someone in the aircraft industry. Ashraf asked whether the last sentence of the article, which referred to the possibility that delivery could be expedited if conditions in the area warranted, was not really the most important thought in it and the real reason for its appearance at that particular juncture. Mr. Parker explained that newspaper stories were usually written in discrete groups of paragraphs so that they could be cut down to fit available space without destroying the completeness of thought. The least important paragraphs were usually at the end of the story. Jarring Mission Muhammad said that he had told Mr. Sisco one should not exclude the possibility (laa yistaba'ad) that Foreign Minister Riad would reply to the seven points of the Secretary. Mr. Parker said he had understood that Muhammad had said categorically that the Foreign Minister would be replying. Muhammad said he hoped he would be, but could not be quite that categorical. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Parker. 2 The text of the congratulatory message sent by Nasser to NIXON on November 7 is ibid., POL 15-1 US/Nixon. 3 Citing “responsible American sources,” Welles reported on November 7 that the United States had agreed in principle to sell Israel 58 Phantom jet fighters. 315. Editorial Note 315. Editorial Note President Johnson met with President-elect Nixon at the White House on November 11, 1968, to provide him with a briefing on foreign policy issues. Included in the meeting were Secretaries Rusk and Clifford, General Wheeler, CIA Director Helms, and Walt Rostow. Rostow described the situation in the Middle East as “very delicate,” and Rusk noted that Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol was “fighting for his political life.” Rusk added that the crux of the problem was that the Arab states thought that Israel was interested in territorial expansion and Israel thought that the Arabs were interested in exterminating Israel. Rusk also told Nixon that he would have to face the problem of how to keep nuclear weapons out of the Middle East. If the Israelis developed nuclear weapons, Rusk felt the Soviet Union would respond by putting nuclear weapons into Egypt. President Johnson said that he had hoped to get the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Israel had not yet agreed to sign, approved before he authorized the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. (Meeting Notes, November 11; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Nixon and Transition) The issue of Israel's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty came up again in a November 24 telephone conversation between Walt Rostow and Robert D. Murphy, who was advising President-elect Nixon on foreign policy issues. Rostow told Murphy that he had a message for Nixon from President Johnson. The Johnson administration was negotiating the sale of the Phantom jets with Israel and was trying to factor into the sale as much “nuclear restraint” on Israel's part as Israel would agree to. The United States was pushing Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To that end, President Johnson was considering calling a special session of Congress at the beginning of December devoted to the issue of the treaty, which would have the effect of putting additional pressure on allies, such as Israel, which had not yet signed the treaty. Johnson felt that Nixon's endorsement of calling such a special session was important, and implied that he would only go forward with Nixon's endorsement. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, November 24; ibid., Murphy, Robert D) Murphy replied on Nixon's behalf in a telephone conversation with Rusk on November 29. Murphy said that Nixon felt that until he succeeded to the presidency the management of the effort to win approval of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was President Johnson's responsibility. Noting that Nixon had problems with members of his own party on the issue, Murphy said that Nixon would not take an active part in the debate over the treaty, nor would he express hope of ratification in a special session. (White House telegram CAP 82813 from Bromley Smith to President Johnson in Texas, November 29; ibid., Nixon and Transition) 316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, November 11, 1968, 1857Z. 269999. 1. You should deliver this as a personal message from the President to Prime Minister Eshkol: 2. “Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am writing to you, first, to welcome the prospect of your visit here later this month, 2 and secondly, to raise with you again a subject that has become of increasing importance to me as I enter the closing days of my Administration. As I look back over my five years in office, I find that one endeavor overshadows all those that have called upon my time and energy. This has been the search for peace. Central to it has been our effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has assumed a special responsibility for this endeavor. It is at the heart not only of my own nation's security interests but also of the security of every nation in the world. As you know I am personally deeply committed to this task. My deep concern on this subject was expressed to you personally as long ago as June 1964. Since then there has been no slackening of the arms race in the Near East, and the weapons introduced into the area have grown increasingly sophisticated. It would be a tragedy—an irreversible tragedy—if this arms race extended into the field of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons delivery systems. Secretary Rusk emphasized these points last month to Foreign Minister Eban when he stressed the United States' concern that Israel's continued delay in signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will have the effect of increasing, rather than reducing, pressures for other area states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. We have carefully studied your Government's paper handed to Ambassador Barbour on October 28. 3 We welcome the reaffirmation of your Government's assurances that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. It is our strong conviction, however, that with a Non-Proliferation Treaty now in existence, only Israel's adherence to that Treaty can give the world confidence that Israel does not intend to develop nuclear weapons. I therefore welcome the statement in your Government's paper that you are engaged in intensive study of the implications of signing the Treaty. It is my earnest hope that this study will result in a decision to sign the Treaty at an early date. Israel's failure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be a severe blow to my Government's global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States would also be deeply troubled if operational strategic missiles were to appear in the Near East. I hope you can give me an encouraging response on these matters when we talk later this month. It will be good to see you here. You are welcome not only as a distinguished and esteemed colleague but as a close personal friend. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson ” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Atherton, Davies, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Rostow also cleared the telegram with President Johnson. (Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, November 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 11/1/68-1/20/69) 2 On November 12 the Israeli Embassy informed the Department that Prime Minister Eshkol had been advised by his doctor to defer the U.S. trip scheduled for November 25. The Embassy indicated that Eshkol hoped to make a brief trip in December to meet with the President. (Telegram 271424 to Tel Aviv, November 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US) Walt Rostow sent a memorandum to President Johnson on November 13 informing him of Eshkol's change in plans and inquiring about a suitable date for an Eshkol visit in December. The President responded with a handwritten note on Rostow's memorandum that reads: “Let's Forget Visit.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68) 3 See footnote 2, Document 292 . 317. Memorandum of Conversation 317. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 12, 1968, 3:30-4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Negotiations with Israel-F-4 and Advanced Weapons PARTICIPANTS Israeli Side Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache United States Side Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray Mr. Warnke opened the meeting by saying that, as he had indicated in a previous discussion, we are interested in substance and not form in the matters we have been addressing. We believe it is your feeling that Israel will not and cannot accept our request for advance assurances concerning strategic missiles and nuclear weapons as preconditions to the contract. You propose alternative formulations to be included in the contract which are essentially reaffirmations of earlier agreements: not to use American aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, and not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. In our discussions I believe I have made clear to you our interpretation of “unusual and compelling circumstances” which would require that we cancel the F-4 contract. The contract would provide that action inconsistent with these assurances would constitute such circumstances. On these bases I believe we can draft an agreement that will be acceptable to you and which will meet your requirements—although not fully meeting mine. Mr. Warnke observed that he could not find in the record any understanding of what Israel means by the provision: “Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area.” Mr. Warnke asked the Ambassador what was meant by this term? Ambassador Rabin said that “it means what we have said, namely, that we would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons.” Mr. Warnke asked what specifically was meant by the word “introduce.” Ambassador Rabin said, “you are more familiar with these things than we are. What is your definition of nuclear weapons?” Mr. Warnke said that there are two aspects to the question: the definition of what is and what is not a nuclear weapon, and what is and what is not introduction into the area. Regarding the first, if there are components available that could be assembled to make a nuclear weapon—although part A may be in one room and part B in another room—then that is a nuclear weapon. As for introduction, that is your term and you will have to define it. Does it mean no physical presence? Ambassador Rabin said, “I suppose so.” Mr. Warnke said: “what if you have access to nuclear weapons that are in another country? Is that then ‘introduction’”? Ambassador Rabin asked if we believed that this was the situation. Mr. Warnke replied that he was just trying to find the Israeli definition. He noted that the same situation could apply the other way around: for example, what if another country in the area had access to nuclear weapons but had not brought them in? Ambassador Rabin said, continuing the example, that if China said they had nuclear weapons for Egypt stored in China, he didn't know what the Israeli reaction would be. He hasn't given the matter a great deal of thought. He believed that “introduction” would require their physical presence in the area. General Hod asked if the term “introduction” had an accepted usage in international law. Mr. Warnke replied that it had not. General Hod said that throughout the world the experience was that introduction of a weapon could only mean after testing. You could not introduce a weapon until after it actually became a weapon. Ambassador Rabin asked: “Do you consider a nuclear weapon one that has not been tested, and has been done by a country without previous experience”? Mr. Warnke: “Certainly. China with a strategic missile capability would be assumed to have nuclear weapons even had it not tested these weapons.” Ambassador Rabin said: “All nuclear powers-the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China—have tested nuclear weapons. Do you really believe introduction comes before testing”? Mr. Schwartz said that what the Ambassador was talking about is reliability. Ambassador Rabin disagreed saying that based on his experience with conventional weapons, he would not consider a weapon that had not been tested to be a weapon. Mr. Warnke asked whether, if the UAR had missiles with nuclear war heads but had not actually tested them, would Israel consider that the UAR had not introduced nuclear weapons? He said that testing by other nuclear powers is very relevant to a potential nuclear power if the latter is developing weapons based on existing technology. Ambassador Rabin said that, “weapons serve policy, not vice versa. Since the UAR's goal is to destroy us I would take it with very great concern. Our policy is not to destroy the UAR. You must combine the weapon with the policy.” General Hod observed that a very good example of introduction was when Egypt introduced missiles into the area in 1963, claiming they were capable of hitting anything south of Beirut. Ambassador Rabin said: “My concern with Egypt is with missiles with chemical rather than nuclear war heads. If Egypt were to hit our densely populated areas, even in a limited way, it could be disastrous.” Mr. Warnke said, as he understood it, Ambassador Rabin applied two prerequisites to the word “introduction”—notoriety and pretesting. Ambassador Rabin, saying that “I don't know what the Prime Minister said, but” there must be public acknowledgment. The purpose of nuclear weapons is not to use the weapon itself, but to use their deterrent power. “I don't believe any powers that have nuclear weapons plan to use them, although you cannot ever be sure.” Ninety-nine per cent of their value is deterrence. Mr. Schwartz said: “You mean deterrence against governments, to deter governments from specific actions.” Ambassador Rabin agreed: “The fact that you have got it must be known.” Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador also introduced the factor of intent: if the UAR has missiles, Israel would be concerned; if Israel has them, there is no cause for concern. The purpose of strategic missiles for Israel would be for deterrence. Ambassador Rabin said: “You are trying to combine strategic missiles and nuclear war heads. This is not necessary in the Middle East. To my mind, in the Middle East, missiles with war heads which are not nuclear weapons can play a role.” Mr. Warnke asked, “What sort of role”? Ambassador Rabin said: “It depends on the other side. What we are concerned about in Egypt is their chemical warfare capability. As I explained in 1963 when I was here, one of our thoughts was that Egyptian missiles, even with conventional war heads, might contribute to their success if they made a surprise attack on our cities. They could interfere with the mobilization system under such circumstances, and this might play a great role in determining the outcome. Seventy per cent more or less of Army capability, although less for the Air Force, is based on mobilization, not just on manpower but vehicles, transport, supplies, and so forth. During the six day war we had mobilized so much of the resource of our cities that we had to devote a portion of our military effort to resupplying the cities.” General Hod observed that Egypt has sea borne (Styx) missiles with 35 mile range and may have or may be receiving even more sophisticated missiles. Although these have a short range, they can be used sea-to-shore as well as sea-to-sea, and therefore can raise havoc with coastal cities such as Tel Aviv. Ambassador Rabin said that they had heard of a plan, although they could not know for certain, to sell to Egypt missile destroyers with missiles of about 100 miles range which, although normally sea-to-sea, could also be used sea-to-shore. Rabin said Israel was worried that Egypt might launch sea borne missiles during the six day war, “but they did not dare to do this.” Rabin said he also understands that there is a Cannon missile on the TU-16s now in Egypt that can hit the centers of our cities. “Therefore, we look at missiles somewhat differently than you. It is not necessary to have nuclear war heads on our missiles. There are war heads between high-explosive and nuclear.” Mr. Warnke said: “Then in your view, an unadvertised, untested nuclear device is not a nuclear weapon.” Ambassador Rabin said: “Yes, that is correct.” Mr. Warnke asked: “What about an advertised but untested nuclear device or weapon. Would that be introduction?” Ambassador Rabin said: “Yes, that would be introduction.” Mr. Warnke said he would interpret mere physical presence in the area as constituting, in itself, “introduction”. Mr. Warnke concluded the discussion by saying that he would talk with Mr. Hoopes, that we would have a Memorandum of Understanding prepared within a few days incorporating the provisions we have discussed, and that General Hod could in the meantime meet with the Air Force to continue the technical discussions that we are at this time prepared to go ahead with. Mr. Warnke said that we ought to continue these discussions so that we might try to arrive at some understanding between us as to the problems of missiles and nuclear weapons. At this time, with respect to “introduction,” Mr. Warnke said there was not much clarity and no agreement. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked “Fourth Session.” 318. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 318. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 12, 1968, 0246Z. 7729. Subject: Middle East. 1. Buffum called on Jarring Nov 11 and, in accordance with Sisco telecon, orally conveyed 7 points outlined by Secretary as describing our attitude toward Israeli settlement with UAR. 2 Buffum informed Jarring we had conveyed these points both to Riad and to USSR. 2. Jarring thought it was of great importance that US had taken stand in favor of Israeli withdrawal from UAR territory and said further that other 6 points in our position should be acceptable to UAR although it would be difficult get their agreement to an international presence at Sharm el-Sheikh which could not be removed without consent of SC or GA. Jarring commented that in view of this forthcoming attitude by US, he was surprised and disappointed Riad had not been more forthcoming with him during past week. 3. Jarring reported having spoken several times over week-end with Eban. In these talks he pressed Israelis further for unqualified statement on acceptance of Res 242 and on withdrawal of Israeli forces. He said he thought Eban had softened a little bit, at least to extent of indicating willingness to take fresh look at problem. 4. At same time, Jarring was distressed by news report just recd from Jerusalem to effect Eshkol delivered policy statement today indicating Israeli intent to maintain forces not only at Sharm el-Sheikh but in Sinai. He thought this would have most adverse repercussions in Cairo and predicted UAR would be asking us how this squares with our attitude toward Israeli withdrawal. 5. Jarring has clearly not yet decided how to proceed in next phase of his mission. While disappointed at the lack of movement on substance, he is heartened that all parties continue to wish his services. This desire is very strong on part USSR, said Jarring, who had lengthy conversation this A.M. with Semenov. Jarring was satisfied Sov Union will make efforts with Arabs to try and move his mission forward. 6. Buffum said Russians are talking to us in same vein and pointed out that concerted efforts on our side with Israelis, if coupled with Sov pressure on Arabs, could combine to give new impetus to his efforts. 7. Jarring seems disposed to stay on in NY at least for a while until he sorts out results of most recent exchanges with Fon Mins here. He is assuming he will have to make another trip to their respective capitals but does not want to do so until he thinks there is a chance it will produce movement. 8. Buffum pressed Jarring again to consider taking initiative in putting questions to both sides together with indication of kind of answer he expects from them. He remains somewhat skeptical he can get kind of answers he wants but is still open-minded about pursuing this route. Buffum said we would wish to resume discussion of such possibility with him in detail in near future and Jarring said he would be pleased to do so. Buffum 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and Cairo. 2 See Document 301 . 319. Letter From George D. Woods to President Johnson 319. Letter From George D. Woods to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 12, 1968. Dear Mr. President: In May, 1968, my terms of reference as your coordinator on the Israeli power and desalting project were approved, and you said in a letter to me dated May 6 2 that I was “to feel free to manage this in the way that makes the most sense.” I have attempted to be responsive to the terms of reference, although I have also proceeded in this complicated and highly sensitive problem as seemed to make the most sense to me in the present circumstances. My observations, conclusions and recommendations have been transmitted in the form of a memorandum to Mr. Walt W. Rostow, a copy of which is enclosed. 3 The principal recommendation is to concentrate on a 40-million-gallon-per-day (MGD) water desalting plant in Israel; and, in my judgment, work on this should proceed as a matter of priority if the goal of massive desalting-plant capability is to be achieved within the next ten to fifteen years. I applaud your desire to lay as much groundwork as possible for progress in desalting, to paraphrase your May 6 letter, and the above recommendation is put forward with this objective in mind. With the knowledge and experience which will accumulate with the construction and operation of a medium-sized desalting plant, it will be possible to see more clearly down the road toward the 100 MGD projects and, ultimately, toward the even larger plants of the future. Respectfully, George D. Woods 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 11/1/68-1/20/69. Confidential. 2 Not found. 3 Also dated November 12, not printed. 320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, November 13, 1968, 2218Z. 270935. Begin summary: Under Secretary Katzenbach called in Israeli Ambassador Rabin November 12 for review of recent US contacts, in context Jarring Mission, with UAR and Soviets. Under Secretary also expressed our concern at indications GOI thinking in terms of peace settlement involving territorial acquisitions by Israel in Sinai and West Bank—a position we could not support. Under Secretary said we have based our position on understanding that Israel seeks adequate security arrangements and recognition of boundaries but, leaving aside Jerusalem and Gaza as special problems, seeks no territory from UAR and only minor adjustments, with compensation, in pre-June 1967 lines with Jordan. At same time Under Secretary made clear we continue firmly support position that Israel should only withdraw in context of contractually binding peace settlement embodying clear guarantees for Israel's security and navigation rights, termination of belligerency and recognition of Israeli boundaries. Rabin argued that Israel's security requirements dictated some territorial changes and expressed view that position outlined by Under Secretary represented change in US stand; Israel was being asked make further concessions and its bargaining position was being undermined while UAR had given no indication it wanted peace. Under Secretary said our position was that settlement must be agreed among parties and we had therefore avoided expressing views on specifics. Nevertheless, we had consistently made clear we could not go along with Israeli efforts acquire Arab territory, given our long standing policy of support for territorial integrity of all states of area. End summary . 1. Under Secretary Katzenbach called in Israeli Ambassador Rabin November 12 to review recent US activities with respect to Jarring Mission and our views on where we go from here. Assistant Secretary Sisco, Davies (NEA) and Israeli Minister Argov also present. 2. Under Secretary reported that Soviets have been interested in continuing discussion with USG. We remain willing carry on dialogue with Soviets, making clear that it must be in Jarring Mission context. Dialogue so far had not gone far beyond our expressing concern re slow pace of Jarring Mission and inquiring of Soviets how they thought it might move forward. We had told Soviets we considered November 4 Israeli note to Jarring more responsive than UAR note which we had found disappointing. We had also had some discussion of arms control problems. In general we had not found Soviets pessimistic about Jarring's prospects. Sisco added that Soviets had reiterated desire see Jarring continue and had not interpreted latest Israeli and UAR notes as terminating Jarring Mission. 3. Under Secretary then summarized Secretary's November 2 conversation with UAR Foreign Minister Riad along following lines, noting that we did not consider it totally negative: Riad had said UAR wanted Jarring to continue but had expressed concern that Israel not prepared to withdraw from Egyptian territory to pre-June 5 lines. Secretary had stressed that withdrawal to international borders must be in context of state of peace and had noted that while UAR said it wanted peace, it had given no concrete ideas re kind of peace document it would accept. Riad had indicated UAR would sign some kind of document but had said neither that it would nor that it would not sign same document as Israel. Secretary had emphasized view that UAR should sign document to which Israel would also be signatory. He had also said that Resolution in our view was not self-executing and details would have to be negotiated. Re refugees, Secretary had stressed need for solution based on individual and secret refugee choice without results of that choice being binding in advance on any state. (Under Secretary noted in this connection Secretary's view that not many refugees would choose repatriation to Israel if choice were truly personal and secret.) Finally Secretary had stressed that there must be free passage through Straits of Tiran and Suez Canal with some kind of international peace keeping machinery at Sharm al-Shaykh. In stating these views to Riad, Secretary made clear he could not speak for Israel and was presenting US ideas. 4. Under Secretary continued that, as we saw it, most difficult questions related to territory on one hand and nature of peace on other. It was difficult for UAR and Jordan to say what they meant by peace without their having an idea of Israel's views on territorial question. On basis of our many discussions with GOI, USG assumed Israel's position was that, in context of peace, it would withdraw substantially to pre-June 5 lines, leaving aside Jerusalem and Gaza which were special problems. We had assumed there need be no changes with respect to UAR and with respect to Jordan only “really minor” changes on security grounds, with compensation for Jordan. Arabs had interpreted Israel's concept of changes for security reasons, however, as involving significant territorial acquisitions by Israel. This caused problems for USG, given our basic position on territorial integrity. We had held this position consistently without going into details of how a peace settlement could be arranged. Instead, in light of 1957 experience and origins of 1967 war, we had based our position on need for peace agreed to among parties. As President made clear in his September 10 speech, however, we had assumed territorial question would be resolved without transfer of significant areas to Israel. We recognized that it would be difficult to devise adequate security arrangements but believed this was possible without territorial transfers. 5. Rabin asked for clarification—was it the US position that leaving Jerusalem aside, Israel should withdraw to June 4 boundaries? Under Secretary said this was our position, allowing for adjustments of the kind contemplated in General Armistice Agreements, providing there were satisfactory security arrangements and a context of peace. In response to Rabin's comment that this was news to him, Under Secretary said this had been our position throughout. Ambassador Goldberg had said as much to King Hussein in November 1967 and had so informed Foreign Minister Eban at the time. 6. Rabin replied that Israel believed secure and recognized boundaries would require some territorial changes. Israel's guideline was security; it was not seeking real estate for its own sake. Eban had made clear to Secretary that Israel did not interpret “withdrawal” to mean withdrawal from all occupied territories. With respect to UAR, Israel needed to provide full protection for free passage through Straits of Tiran and would require land communications to Sharm al-Shaykh and Israeli presence there. Re Jordan, certain territorial changes would also be required but their precise nature had not yet been decided, although principles governing such changes had been agreed upon within GOI. To counter Arab arguments that Israel would not withdraw, Israel had been pressed to accept principle of secure and recognized boundaries to be agreed upon among parties. Now USG was asking Israel to accept principle of settlement practically to June 4 lines even though UAR had refused indicate that it wanted peaceful settlement or that it would sign document with Israel. UAR could now conclude that, having succeeded in getting US to accept position that withdrawal should be to pre-war lines without itself having given up anything, it should now see what more it could get. GOI had made concessions in latest note to Jarring whereas UAR had given up nothing since passage of November 1967 Security Council Resolution when it had dropped insistence on prior withdrawal. UAR was seeking to erode the meaning of peace. Furthermore, it was clear there was no US-Israeli understanding on what peace means. 7. Under Secretary replied that USG had avoided speaking of June 4 lines since this would be misleading with respect to Jerusalem and kind of adjustments we have in mind. To us the words “recognized and secure” meant “security arrangements” and “recognition” of new lines as international boundaries. We had never meant that Israel could extend its territory to West Bank or Suez if this was what it felt its security required. We had always thought new map would look very much like pre-war map but with Israel's security assured. We had assumed Israel had no territorial problems with UAR-only problems of security. If more than that was involved then US and Israel would be on divergent courses. Rabin read relevant portion of General Armistice Agreement to make point GAA placed no limitations whatever on territorial changes which could be made. Under Secretary said if it was Israel's position that all territories were negotiable, such position on Israel's part would confront USG with difficulties and we could not support it. Putting aside Jerusalem, Gaza and Syrian Heights for now, since they presented different kind of problem, we sought security for Israel not territory. 8. Under Secretary said he would put question another way: if Israel were satisfied with guarantees of demilitarization and navigation and obtained contractual agreements plus termination of belligerency plus recognition of boundaries, would Israel withdraw to the old lines? 9. Rabin said he did not believe Israel would be satisfied. In response to Under Secretary's question whether Israel sought permanent presence at Sharm al-Shaykh or simply absence of any presence plus the right to assure the latter, Rabin said the lesson of the early 1950s and of May 1967 was that there should be Israeli presence at Sharm al-Shaykh. Otherwise, as experience had shown, UAR could deploy troops and thereby change situation without firing a shot. This put onus on Israel to fire first which caused it problems with big powers. Israel wanted to be in position to prevent interference with its navigation without having to shoot. Israel could not rely on UAR and international forces were of no use. 10. Under Secretary said he thought clear cut arrangements for Israel's security could be made—e.g., terms of settlement could provide that presence of any country at Sharm al-Shaykh would be regarded as act of war justifying self defense under Article 51 of UN Charter. Rabin responded that 1957 arrangements were almost that precise but violation by UAR had only led to international debate. Lawyer could always find counter arguments to any legal device. In response to Sisco's comment that this line of Israeli reasoning undermined Israel's entire concept of peace based on treaties, Rabin said there was big difference between violation of boundaries, which would be clear to all and violation of security arrangements, which could be interpreted in various ways. To cite another example, Rabin said Jordan had promised USG not to deploy tanks on West Bank but this arrangement had been violated. Davies commented that there was important difference between Jordan's telling US Ambassador it would put no tanks on West Bank and Jordan's making formal commitment on demilitarization to Israel or Security Council. 11. Under Secretary said his main concern was that US and Israel not find themselves on divergent courses. Having taken position that Israel had no territorial demands if Arabs made peace, we would be in difficult position if it developed this was not the case. Time might come when Jarring would feel he should put forward proposals for settlement. Point had already been reached where USG, in pressing UAR to be more forthcoming, had said we did not anticipate territorial problems if UAR was prepared for peace. Sisco noted that Israel had told us many times there would be no territorial problems with UAR if latter agreed conclude binding contractual peace settlement. We were concerned that Israeli position had changed and that security needs were being linked with substantial territorial acquisitions. 12. Rabin asked what USG had received from UAR in return for giving UAR US position. Under Secretary replied that we had made clear to UAR that we were not speaking for Israel. Israel remained in occupation and this seemed to us a good bargaining position. Israel's bargaining position depended on fact of Israeli occupation, not on question of how much or how little it wanted to retain. 13. Argov said he thought USG and GOI had agreed, in context of our discussion of Soviet approach in September, that USG did not endorse Soviet proposal for total withdrawal “except for a few miles here and there.” He feared position taken by USG with UAR had undermined Israel's bargaining position. Under Secretary said this would be the case only if Israeli position was to seek territorial acquisitions. We had made clear to UAR where we thought responsibility for 1967 war lay and that our position as stated to UAR was premised on need for peace. Sisco added that Israeli bargaining position could not be undermined by US position based on binding peace and fulfillment of Security Council Resolution; Israeli leverage results from fact it is in occupied territories. US is not asking Israel to withdraw to international boundary in circumstances other than a satisfactory peace binding parties. Under Secretary expressed hope we could now proceed to useful discussion with Israelis of what the concept of peace means to Israel in specific terms. 14. Rabin concluded conversation by saying he had clearly understood Under Secretary's message and would report to his government. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Davies and Sisco, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Moscow, and USUN. 321. Memorandum of Conversation 321. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 14, 1968. PARTICIPANTS Shlomo Argov, Minister, Israeli Embassy Harold H. Saunders During lunch at his invitation—“to tell you my tale of woe”—Shlomo made a middle-sized speech covering the following points to make clear his (and, he said, Ambassador Rabin's) reaction to the November 12 Rabin-Argov talk with Under Secretary Katzenbach: 2 1. Either the Israelis have been “living in a fool's paradise” or the US has changed its position. He believes it's the latter. He and Rabin agree (once Shlomo “explained the term”) that we're practicing “salami tactics” on them. First we knocked them off direct negotiations. Then we got them to “accept the resolution.” Then made them use the word “withdraw” ( Comment: Joe Sisco will be pleased at his success!). Now we're pushing them to accept “June 4 lines.” 2. The Israelis aren't going to take this demarche seriously because we “speak out of both sides of our mouths” and the various positions we've stated are inconsistent with each other. For example: —One American says Jerusalem is “the key question.” Another says it can be set aside for the time being, “implying Israel has a case.” —One American says there's no such thing as “instant peace.” Another says Israel can withdraw when it gets a peace treaty because there will be peace then. 3. The US has undercut Israel's bargaining position without offering anything in return. The US has “made concessions” to the Arabs without getting anything in return. 4. The US is playing fast and loose with Israel's security without taking Israel into its confidence. Worst of all, the US “will not talk to us” about its view of what the Soviets are up to in the Middle East. Israel physically faces Russians across the Canal; they're “the real menace to Israel—physically breathing down our necks.” Yet the US won't even tell the Israelis exactly what we think Soviet objectives are. What's more, “we've watched how you worked this deal with Vietnam and we're inclined to think there's some sort of stratospheric deal with the Russians, maybe including the Middle East. That just won't work with us.” 5. Above all, if the US wants Israel to take it seriously, it will have to make clear what it means by peace. “To put it bluntly, we don't have any confidence that you've thought through the relationship that should exist after a settlement. Given your ‘salami tactics’, we think you'll ask us to compromise next—now that you've asked us to compromise on territories—on Israeli ships through the Canal (you'll say Israeli cargoes in foreign bottoms are OK); then you'll say we don't need a ‘peace treaty’; then you'll tell us we're unrealistic in the way we define peace.” Trying to respond in roughly parallel sequence to this extended oration, I made the following points: 1. Our policy has not changed. We've talked consistently about territorial integrity (May 23 and June 19, 1967); about withdrawal (June 19); about Jordan getting the West Bank back (November 1967 to Hussein and Eban); about the inadmissibility of the conquest of territory by force (November 22); about boundary changes only as they're agreed in “honest negotiation” as parts of a “just compromise” not dominated by “the weight of conquest” (September 10, 1968). I said we had heard Israelis describe the Dayan plan, the Allon plan, the corridor-to-Sharm-el-Sheikh plan and the keep-all-of-Jerusalem plan. Each time we have heard one of these, we have said repeatedly and at all levels that none of these is good enough to produce peace. As a matter of principle, our position has been clear. What we are doing now is not to tell anybody where to draw his boundaries; we are saying very simply that it is a fact that there will be no peace if Israel tries to hold onto large chunks of territory. I could not accept his charge of “salami tactics” for one very simple reason—our policy has not changed. If anything has changed, it has been a step-by-step Israeli perception of our position. We never agreed on direct negotiation (June 19: “exclude no method;” Shlomo acknowledged that.). We never agreed to their border schemes, but they never took us seriously; they just turned off their hearing aids. What has happened in the last 4-5 months is that the tactical situation has reached a crucial point where we could no longer afford to let the Israeli Government go on deluding itself that it had a blank check from the US. This is especially important if negotiations with Jordan are coming to a head. Everything Mr. Katzenbach had said about our territorial position on the Israel-UAR border applies in principle to the Israel-Jordan border, and if Israel plans to offer Jordan the Allon plan, we don't want anyone—especially the Israeli Government—to think the US will support that. We want Israel to know-as we told Allon here—that that's a non-starter. 2. On inconsistency, there's nothing inconsistent in saying that Jerusalem is the “key issue” and in saying it's so difficult that it may have to be negotiated apart from the rest of the territorial settlement. 3. We haven't undercut Israel's bargaining position. Israel's main bargaining counter is occupation. We haven't proposed to anyone that Israel withdraw except to a condition of peace. But when two parties are trying to start negotiating, their positions have to be somewhere in the same ballpark—close enough so that it at least seems remotely possible to bridge the gap between them. What we've urged Israel to do is to drop the absolutely impossible and untenable elements in its position to test whether the Egyptians will come to meet a half-reasonable position. If they don't then we'll at least know who stands where. But with Israel's position not even in the ball park, there was no way to put Egypt to the test. 4. We have taken Israel into our confidence. But frankly, we don't feel Israel has listened very attentively or taken our views seriously. 5. They were asking a fair question in asking us our definition of peace. I thought we had done this but felt it worthwhile to take another stab at doing it more precisely. HS 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 10/1/68-1/20/69. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Harold Saunders. Copies were sent to Walt Rostow, John Walsh, Philip Heymann, Rodger Davies, and Roy Atherton. 2 See Document 320 . 322. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 322. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 15, 1968, 1:05 p.m. SUBJECT Recent Steps in the Mid-East You should be aware of several recent steps Secretaries Rusk and Katzenbach have taken to clarify our position on a Mid-East settlement (Nick's memo attached). 2 In his last talk with UAR Foreign Minister Riad, Secretary Rusk summarized his interpretation of the UN resolution as it applies to a UAR-Israel settlement this way: —Israeli withdrawal from UAR territory. [We never thought Israel had territorial designs in the Sinai.] 3 —Formal termination of the state of war. —Suez Canal open to ships of all flags. —Refugee settlement on the basis of personal and secret choice of individual refugees on where to live (including return to Israel as one possible choice). —International presence at Sharm el-Sheikh which could not be removed without consent of UN Security Council or General Assembly. —UAR should sign something in writing to which Israel also is a signatory. —General understanding about level of arms in the area (though this not required in the first instance). Nick spelled these out for Rabin a couple of days ago. Rabin feels we've changed our position and undermined Israel's bargaining position. The fact is that this has been our consistent position for over a year, but the Israelis have turned off their hearing aids on us. As for undermining their position, we can't afford to go along with their bazaar haggling if we're going to have any chance of peace. What's more, we really would have undercut them if we had let them think we'd given them a blank check. It's especially important as negotiations with Jordan reach a climax that they know where we stand. Nevertheless, you may hear some strong protests. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret;Nodis. 2 Reference is to a November 15 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President with the subject heading: “Present Status of Middle East Peace Efforts.” 3 Brackets in the source text. 323. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 323. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, November 16, 1968, 1295Z. 3912. For Robert B. Murphy from Robert B. Anderson. “Have just had long meeting with Hassan Sabri al-Khouli at Presidency who informs me President Nasser seriously concerned by not receiving reply to his message to President-elect Nixon 2 which President Nasser purposefully intended be generous and friendly. 3 I am informed rumors are spreading in this part of world that President Nasser has been ignored by President-elect Nixon. Recommend you send urgent message from President-elect Nixon acknowledging Nasser telegram and responding in a manner as friendly as President-elect Nixon is agreeable. For your information I will be seeing President Nasser late this afternoon or tomorrow and I would hope to have some reply in hand when I see him if that feasible.” Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON. Secret; Flash; Exdis. 2 See footnote 2, Document 314 . 3 Bergus reported that Presidential adviser Hassan Sabri al-Khouli had placed the same emphasis on the importance of a reply from President-elect Nixon during a conversation on November 14. Khouli had returned from New York convinced of the good will toward Egypt of many important people in the United States, but when Bergus raised the question of the seven points that Rusk had outlined to Riad as the basis for a peace settlement in the Middle East, Khouli said that the UAR response would depend on Nixon's response to Nasser's congratulatory telegram. (Telegram 3900 Cairo, November 15; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) For text of Nixon's response, see Document 324 . 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, November 16, 1968, 2100Z. 273043. Please convey following message to President Nasser from President Elect Nixon in manner you deem most appropriate: “President Gamal Abdul Nasser Cairo Dear Mr. President: Your friendly message of congratulations on my election is much appreciated. 2 I too recall with pleasure our meeting in Cairo in 1963 and remember the very warm Egyptian hospitality shown us by your government and your people. With regard to your expression of hope that my election may create an opportunity for progress on some of the world's problems, let me assure you that the United States Government under my administration will continue to give a high priority to the search for a just peace and amicable relationships in the Middle East as well as elsewhere. With my best personal wishes for your good health and prosperity, and with best regards to your family. 3 Sincerely, Richard M. Nixon” Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John P. Walsh. 2 See footnote 2, Document 314 . 3 Bergus reported that he delivered the message on November 17 and that it was given front-page treatment by all of the Cairo newspapers on the following morning. Bergus described the text as “just right.” (Telegram 3915 from Cairo, November 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/NIXON) 325. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 325. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 18, 1968, 2:40 p.m. Mr. President: These two special CIA messages on Israel-Jordan negotiations have just arrived via Dick Helms. 2 As you will see: —The Israelis have agreed to proceed with the secret 19th November meeting, although they sought a week's postponement. The Jordanians believe the postponement was requested because of Israel's difficulty in obtaining a Cabinet consensus on their negotiating position. —[ 3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] —You will recall from earlier messages that, if the meeting with the Israelis were successful, Hussein envisaged that the positive results would be surfaced through Jarring and carried forward by Jarring from that point. If the result of the 19th November meeting were negative, Hussein envisaged surfacing his own position through Jarring and letting Jarring carry the matter from that point forward so that for the first time Jarring would be able to deal with both the UAR and Jordanian aspects of the problem. [ 4 paragraphs (16 lines of source text) not declassified ] Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. 2 Reference is to two memoranda sent by CIA Director Helms to President Johnson on November 18 reporting on secret negotiations between Israel and Jordan; neither printed. 326. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 326. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, November 19, 1968, 1400Z. 6153. Israel-Arab settlement. Begin summary: Eban told Ambassador Nov. 18 that Under Secretary Katzenbach-Amb Rabin Nov 12 conversation and other talks connected therewith were most remarkable episode in negative sense, in US-Israel relations. Absurd for Israel and US to get into a dispute which was not real, which concerned a third party which was not interested in reaching agreement. Fact that US had expressed views to UAR and USSR weakened Israel negotiating position. US formulation totally unacceptable to Israel and conflicts with President's Sept. 10 speech. Previous US statements had been broad and provided flexibility for interpretation, which Israel had thought intended. Proposal had been made in Israeli Cabinet to withdraw or at least not repeat GOI acceptance SC resolution. International presence at Sharm el-Sheikh would not be viable, and UN would have no power to keep it there. Private poll of refugees would place individual desires above national sovereignty and not acceptable to Israel. Contractual agreement which US talked of seriously with GOI was referred to contemptuously as mere piece of paper in talk with UAR. US alleged GOI policy had changed but this not so. It was US views which had changed. Eban hoped to hear US policy remained as previously delineated by President. Ambassador noted US policy remains as determined by President and recent conversations not in conflict therewith. Keystone remains agreement between parties and form of compact less important than substance. US involved because extremely concerned over future of Jarring Mission. If our moves did not achieve forward movement toward settlement, they might at least smoke out Arab views. US had talked only for itself and had not given away Israeli positions or made negotiations more difficult. US supported idea that some presence needed at Sharm el-Sheikh but not Israeli. Re refugees, US view was that not many would opt to return and it no derogation of Israeli position to agree to accept return of few. End summary . 1. Fon Min Eban asked Amb to call at Foreign Ministry late afternoon Nov. 18. DirGen Rafael, Asst Dir Gen Bitan and Elizur present. Amb accompanied by DCM. Eban began by saying Nov. 12 conversation between Under Secy Katzenbach and Amb Rabin, amplified by other conversations such as that between Buffum and Tekoah and others constituted a most remarkable episode in our relations in a negative sense. What the US had told Israel was not recognizable in terms of our previous relations. Eban was puzzled why whole exercise necessary. UAR was no closer to peace than US was to putting man on moon (immediately corrected himself and noted latter might be taking place soon). It was rather absurd for US and Israel to be in dispute about something which was not real while the other party concerned was not even interested. If Israel and the UAR had been close to negotiations, he might have understood US intervention. It was a serious matter that US views had been put to UAR and USSR since this had weakened the negotiating position of Israel. He could not understand reasons for our having done this. 2. Eban continued that US formulation was totally unacceptable to Israel. It appeared US had proposed or submitted to UAR certain principles which should apply to a settlement. One was that the SC resolution was not self-implementing. Israel agreed with this, and it had almost been accepted by UAR which has stopped calling for withdrawal as first step. 3. US proposal called for total Israel withdrawal from UAR territory. This certainly conflicts with President Johnson's speech of Sept 10 in which President said US was not the one to say where others should draw lines but that it was clear there should be no return to June 4. Israel had no difficulty in accepting President's two points, including idea that territory should not be gained simply by weight of conquest, but what Katzenbach said was completely different. In all other US statements, June 4 had been spoken of negatively as something to which we should not return, but Katzenbach had now said that this is what should be returned to, with minor adjustments. This was completely at variance with previous US pronouncements. 4. Gravity of situation, Eban continued, was that Israel had placed great faith in President's pronouncements and would like to be able to continue to do so. If they were broad statements which provided flexibility for interpretation in previous US pronouncements, Israel had assumed this had been intended by US. On this basis, Israel had announced its acceptance of SC resolution in US identical words. Israel had done this because it accepted the Nov. 15, 1967 statement by American UN representative that neither 1948 nor 1967 lines were boundaries and boundaries had to be agreed to by parties concerned. If US meant Israel had to return to June 4 line, this could not be accepted. There had been a proposal in Israeli Cabinet to withdraw acceptance of resolution or at least not to repeat they accept. If US position had remained a formula giving Israel room to maneuver this would have removed one element of Israel's consternation. 5. Eban said he was astonished by another matter. US had said to UAR Suez Canal should be opened to ships of all flags. This had no meaning unless Israel were specified by name. UAR always says Canal open to ships of all flags but nevertheless rejects Israeli ships. 6. US proposal for solution of refugee problem, Eban said, was a private poll. However, individual desires of refugees were the only criterion. Sovereignty of state was overriding. 7. US had proposed international presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, said Eban, which would not be removable except by UNSC or UNGA. Israel had said many times Sharm el-Sheikh was crux of problem with UAR. Israel could not have a war over Tiran Strait every few years. Had had experience with international presence. There was no ability in UN to remain at Sharm el-Sheikh 24 hours after Egypt asked for removal. U Thant said last year UNEF had no alternative but to leave since they could always be driven out by Egyptian military forces. What states would have their troops remain over objections of sovereignty? Next year UAR and USSR will gain majority in SC for their views. Of 15 SC members, only 4 with whom Israel can even talk. There will be authentic majority for Soviets and Arabs in GA and will certainly be majority for giving priority to national sovereignty. Israel had told US frankly Israeli presence at Sharm el-Sheikh only real guarantee that there would be no renewal of blockade. Israel knew of no assurance contrary to its belief that any international forces could be physically removed by the Egyptians or by a majority vote in the UN in favor of Egypt. 8. Eban continued that he was even more astonished by the extraordinary formulation of US views on the necessity for Egypt to sign “something in writing.” Never had the idea of a contractual agreement been more contemptuously expressed. Israel had given up on the idea of a formal peace treaty and had agreed that something like USSR-Japan agreement might be suitable. 9. UAR position was that they would sign a copy of UN resolution and so would Israel. Israel's position was that it is essential there must be a contract between the parties. While Israel had said it could accept something other than a classic treaty, US proposal was complete acceptance of Arab and Soviet view. 10. Eban said when Katzenbach statements compared with those of President Johnson and US Security Council representatives, there was a depletion of US position. He wanted to ask now the status of President's Sept. 10 pronouncement. In discussions in Washington it had been intimated that Israel's position had changed. Certainly US statements as compared with those previously made by President and in SC indicated a change on part US. Eban hoped Amb could assure him this not so and recent statements were only paraphrase of previous policy. 11. It was not true Israel's policy had changed, Eban said. Israel had not wanted to bind itself to territorial changes before negotiations. He could not understand why it was considered more moderate to formulate and transmit positions in advance of negotiations. He had thought Ambassador Ball agreed when he had said that one should not start negotiations with the most flexible position but with the hardest. Therefore Israel had told UAR through Jarring that security and navigation concerns would govern its positions. Israel had no encyclopedic interest in Sinai but was functionally concerned with security and navigation. Israel had not said anything about Suez (though it wanted freedom of transit of Canal) since this was not linked to territorial settlement. Nobody had showed Israel how anything other than Israeli presence at Sharm el-Sheikh would provide security. It was not true that Israel had now said this for the first time. Eban had made this position clear to the Secretary and to Ball and Sisco. Eban had told Secretary in Sept Israeli presence needed at Sharm el-Sheikh and this had been Eban's position in last talk with Secretary. It certainly undermined Israeli negotiating position for great power to tell UAR in advance they could wash out Israel. US should let Egypt try to persuade Israel or Israel to persuade Egypt how to dispose of this vital interest. GOI thought it had been approaching US views in its last document. It had hinted to UAR they would have to assure Israel on security and Sharm el-Sheikh. This not unprecedented. After war, countries try to maintain interest. This was true of USSR and US after WWII. US had also said it needed to maintain forces in and administration over certain places which it had occupied. 12. Eban then turned to Jordan. Said he did not know whether anyone had told Jordan Israel should return to the boundaries of June 4. If so, this would be even more difficult. Jordan seemed interested enough to continue talks through Jarring. Israeli position would be utterly undermined if someone intervened against it. If US wanted to do something, it should urge Jordan to be forthcoming. 2 13. Eban concluded his presentation by saying he could not remember many occasions which had been so disconcerting. In all frankness and friendship he had to say he regretted the whole exchange. He hoped the US would not talk with Israel's enemies before talking with Israel on matters of such vital concern. 14. Amb replied he not aware any US conversation with Jordan similar to that with UAR. He thought Eban read too much into US talk with Riad. US policy still remains as enunciated by President June 19 and Sept. 10. Keystone of our view is insistence on necessity for agreement between parties. Form of contract is minor compared with substantive content of agreement. On major points he did not think US position differed from that of Israel. US not asking Israel to go back to June 4. We had proposed some time ago that Israel offer to return to the former border with special regimes for Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza. Israel had not gone along with that proposal. Its statement to Jarring did not mention withdrawal but did hint that Israel would give up Sinai. 15. Amb continued that US had felt it must be involved because we were extremely concerned that Jarring negotiations were getting virtually nowhere. We had stayed out of the negotiations except for general statements of policy to which US still adhered. We had thought that if we talked with UAR and USSR we could smoke them out even if we did not achieve actual movement toward a settlement. He did not think US had given away Israel's position or had made negotiations more difficult. We were working for peace and peace was in Israel's interests. Our insistence on agreement meant insistence on negotiations. We do have a definite difference of opinion on Sharm el-Sheikh. We envisaged support for arrangements for Israel's freedom of navigation through Tiran Strait, but do not support these arrangements being made by Israel. If votes can be gotten in UN to put a force in it may be possible to make that force permanent and not subject to Egypt's veto. 16. Eban broke in that UAR could give a green light now to a UN force and then a red light later whenever it suited its fancy. Amb noted Secretary had made clear to Riad (and Amb thought Riad had accepted this point) that if UAR had agreed last year to what it now says it would agree to on Tiran Strait, there would have been no war last year. In any event, US had not repeated Israeli positions to UAR but its own, but he did not think these positions so different. Appreciate Eban's concern in tight negotiating position. On other hand, if Eban right that Egyptians are not interested in settlement at all, it would make no difference anyway. Safeguard for Israel's position was still necessity for agreement between parties. US was not introducing solution of its own. 17. On refugee question, Amb said there had never been agreement as to number of refugees who would want to come back to Israel. There were many reasons why refugees had left Israel, including unwillingness to live under Israeli state, and giving them choice would not erase reasons why they had left to begin with. Eban said there was difference between making this proposal to Israel and making it to Arabs. We were setting right of individual against right of sovereign state. Amb replied we did not think it disservice, but rather service to Israel to have some kind of census reflecting desires of refugees regarding return. 18. Amb went on to say important thing at this stage in Jarring Mission was that something had to be introduced into equation and this is what US had tried to do. Eban replied it meaningful that Riad packed up and went home few days after hearing US presentation. He continued that US had not talked with Israel about signing “some piece of paper” but about a permanent contractual arrangement binding on both parties for peace. Amb replied US had not talked to UAR either merely about piece of paper. Rafael interjected what affair was it of US to talk to other side about things which Israel and Egypt should talk about. Amb retorted US had sovereign right to talk with anyone about its position on matters of concern to it. 19. Eban continued that US formulation to Egypt made far less demands to UAR than on Israel. Amb said President's statements are policy and views expressed to UAR reflect that policy. 20. Bitan said Riad's reaction to proposal that Egypt sign a document of which Israel was signatory indicated Riad also had something else in mind other than a contractual undertaking between UAR and Israel. This showed Riad did not understand US proposal in same way Israel had done. Eban said what US ought to do was not protect UAR from proposals which Israel had made but to urge UAR to answer. What had actually happened was UAR had received impression from US that if they went on recalcitrantly long enough US position would get closer to that of UAR. 21. Rafael said he would review what had happened. US (in persons Ball and Sisco) had come to Israel and said throw out some bait to UAR on procedural matters. Israel had done so. Then US had come again to Israel and said throw out more bait. Fon Minister had done so. Then, instead of waiting for UAR to respond, US had proceeded to throw out more bait of its own, while other side had not moved an inch. On Nov 7 UAR had stated its position precisely: Israel must liquidate aggression and withdraw. In face of these concepts of enemy, US had carried Israel further along road with UAR and USSR. Eban said US spoke, on question of peace, only in terms of end of belligerency and said nothing about the just and lasting peace which Israel felt it required. 22. Amb replied there should be no misunderstanding on this point. We did not see a possibility in the first instance of full peace and diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab states. We felt condition of non-belligerency and stability necessary which could develop over time into real peace. Peace was in interest of both Israel and US and US was not undermining Israel's interest in trying to work for peace. 23. Eban said if US had come to Israel and consulted about proposed approach to UAR he thought he could have persuaded US differently. He would not have asked US to follow Israel's policy but would have asked that US stick to its previous policy statements. Amb noted we had also sought consultation in advance with Israel on paper to be given Riad through Jarring, but in spite of repeated requests had seen paper only one and one-half hours before delivery. Eban said he frankly had wondered if US had wanted to be in position of being involved with Israeli paper. Noted he had given Secretary full account in advance and had followed US suggested wording. 24. Eban noted Sisco and others had said it would be tragic if there were divergences between Israel and US. He thought this not necessarily so. It only natural Israel should have more strengthened positions than US. He found it not tragic but disconcerting when policies formulated at highest levels, with which Israel could live, were suddenly reformulated. He would like to be able to inform his government that US policy remained as enunciated by President Johnson and US representatives in highest international councils. 3 Noted he was disappointed by Riad's last reply. Riad could have replied to Israel's question on Suez Canal, nature of peace, etc. but had refused bilateral negotiations, negotiations under Jarring auspices, and now even refuses to negotiate by messages exchanged through Jarring. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 2 In a separate telegram, Barbour reported that Eban expanded on his concern about negotiations with Jordan. Eban said that Israel had put forward territorial terms to Jordan, which Eban felt would command international support. Israel's proposals included the demilitarization of the West Bank with only certain unpopulated areas to remain as Israeli territory while the remainder of the occupied territory and all of the affected population would revert to Jordan. Eban noted that his government was concerned that the progress made in negotiations with Jordan would be undermined if the United States were to state to Jordan, as it had to the UAR, that it supported the Arab demand for a return to the June 4 boundaries. (Telegram 6152 from Tel Aviv, November 19; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68) 3 Under Secretary Rostow called in Ambassador Rabin on November 19 to reassure Israel that there had been no change in the U.S. position concerning a peace settlement in the Middle East. Rostow reiterated that the United States would not support any settlement that fell short of a secure peace for which the Arab states took responsibility. He added that U.S. policy also remained as stated by President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol when he said that the further Israel went from the armistice lines the further it would be from peace. (Telegram 275224 to Tel Aviv, November 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 327. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 327. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, November 20, 1968, 1240Z. 7379. For the Secretary from Robert Anderson. 1. While I was in Cairo discussing with United Arab Airlines the acquisition of eight Boeing planes, President Nasser asked me to come to his house on Monday. We talked about three hours. Gist of what Nasser said was: A. Nasser was more anxious than ever to have some kind of peace because he thinks that if war should come again there would be vast destruction on both sides. He said he would not be alone in the next round. B. Nasser said he was not entirely free any longer to act as independently as before and as each day passed he probably would be less free. In order to emphasize his loss of freedom, he said, first, he had to listen to the Soviets and, second, if he was going to continue to get financial support from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya, he had been told that he had to abide by the Khartoum agreement which in effect said there would be no negotiation and no declaration of non-belligerency. (Donor countries would welcome pretext to discontinue their aid to UAR.) C. Nasser thinks King of Jordan is in a much weaker position after his confrontation with Fedayeen and he believes that in showdown Iraqi troops in Jordan would oppose King and favor King's younger officers. If this took place there would probably be a collapse of King's government with both Iraqis and Syrians trying to participate in the remains. D. Finally, Nasser said he now has “factions" in his country which make it more difficult to make independent decisions even inside his country. He stated that if for any reason he should be replaced in Cairo, any successor would be dictated to by the army and the army would be less inclined to any peaceful settlement than he is. 2. For foregoing reasons, Nasser feels that there is a sense of urgency about achieving peace. On other hand, he reiterated his old statements that under no circumstance can he have direct negotiation, either secretly or openly. He insists he has to have a timetable and some kind of a map that would show what boundary adjustments are being contemplated before he can “do a selling job" even to his own people. He believes that if any move of his is termed to be capitulation, he will lose support of the army and without the army he would lose his own control of the country. 3. I asked Nasser if he didn't think a major part of his trouble was a lack of communication both with Israelis and with countries like ours. He agreed but said he could not figure out a way to establish communication with Israelis, first, because he didn't trust them and, second, because if he made an agreement with some part of Israeli Government they would be undercut by other political segments in Israel who are competing in next spring election. 4. Nasser expressed great confidence in Jarring and stated he does not intend for Jarring Mission to end on his account. He feels, however, that something more is going to have to be done than Jarring's simply carrying messages between two parties. He did not make any specific suggestion as to how this could be done except to say that he needs more definition from Israelis so as not to agree in effect to a program of Israeli expansionism. 5. Nasser was obviously pleased to receive a reply from President-elect Nixon. He talked about possibility of this being some excuse to resume diplomatic relations with United States providing there was some statement from new administration which would offset statement during campaign of maintaining Israeli arms superiority. Nasser also has under consideration writing a letter expressing his views to President-elect Nixon. 6. I am going to be back in Cairo within next ten days in connection with financing of Boeing planes. Nasser stated he might ask me to bring a letter from him to President-elect Nixon. 7. There is considerable amount of details that took place in long discussion which I have not tried to incorporate here but which I will convey fully to appropriate people upon my return, which should be toward end of this month. In view of fact that I am going back to conduct discussions re airplane financing, if you have any suggestions I will be here in Tehran until late Saturday or Sunday and would be grateful to receive them. 8. One further thing of some significance. In a talk with Hasan Abbas Zaky he stated he wanted to tell me confidentially that Nasser was under pressure from two sides, one to secure immediate peace and other to continue arms development and training. He said that in view of Ali Sabri's heart attack and absence of some other people who are not so interested in peace, next two or three weeks are going to be crucial in decisions which Nasser makes. Abbas Zaky stated that he is among those who believe that peace is indispensable for Egypt and is urging President to go as far as he can to secure peace. 9. I was unable to see Don Bergus after receiving this information and have therefore not passed any of above on to him. Meyer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 107, 11/19-22/68. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Walt Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on November 20 under cover of a memorandum in which he concluded that Nasser appeared to be under conflicting political pressures and unable to decide or to lead. But, Rostow noted, there were some factors that seemed to be operating in the direction of a settlement in the Middle East. (Ibid.) 328. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 328. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, November 20, 1968. 7548. Ref Tel Aviv 6152, 2 Amman 7409. 3 1. Since I had assumed our position on territorial assurance for Hussein was already well known to Israel (I understood we had immediately informed Israel what we told Hussein in November 1967) and particularly in view of State 270935 4 and 272847, 5 Eban's statements on “unpopulated areas" reported in Tel Aviv 6152 are somewhat disconcerting. When I saw King Hussein on November 9 (Amman 7409), I read to him the following sentences from the memorandum on the “U.S. position as presented to Hussein on November 6, 1967.” “The United States, as a matter of policy, does not envisage a Jordan which consists only of the East Bank. The United States is prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications. However, the United States would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it is required to give up. For example, if Jordan is required to give up the Latroun salient, the USG will use its influence to obtain in compensation access for Jordan to a Mediterranean port in Israel. Finally, although as a matter of policy we do not agree with Jordan's position on Jerusalem, nor do we agree with the Israeli position on Jerusalem, we are prepared to use our influence to obtain for Jordan a role in Jerusalem. In short, we are prepared to make a maximum effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in terms of settlement with Israel.” 2. The territorial assurances that we have given Hussein are manifestly inconsistent with any proposal that would place “certain unpopulated areas of West Bank" under Israeli sovereignty or jurisdiction. The relevance of “unpopulated areas" to “minor border rectifications" is, of course, another moot point. (Incidentally, the Jordan Govt's 1961 maps on the “distribution of population" and “population density" show very graphically that the only “unpopulated areas" on the West Bank lie along the present ceasefire line between Israel and Jordan. These maps are in vol. 4 of the GOJ Dept of Statistics “First Census of Population and Housing" published in April 1965. A similar graphic representation of the population complexion of the West Bank is shown on “The Population of the West Bank by Settlements, November 1967,” published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in 1967.) As I read para 1 of Tel Aviv 6152, Eban seems to be saying that Israel has suggested to Hussein some kind of variation of the Allon plan, which we have already indicated is unacceptable in principle both to US and to Jordan. What Eban appears to be asking of Jordan is certainly “significantly" different even if not “violently" different from the territorial assurances we have given Jordan. 3. I do not know what the Israelis may have proposed to Jordan beyond the generalities occasionally passed on to us by Eban and others, nor do we know Hussein's reaction to any specific territorial proposals Israel may have made. The King and senior GOJ officials continue to take the line with me that the Israelis have never been specific with them about territory and I, of course, have not probed them regarding this matter. Nevertheless, because of the territorial assurances we have recently reiterated to Hussein, I would strongly doubt that he would feel he should entertain seriously any Israeli proposal that either specifically or in principle provided “certain unpopulated areas of West Bank to remain as Israeli territory.” I am convinced that anything like that is a non-starter with the King. Even if he accepted it, I do not believe he could bring along other Jordanians with him. 4. I am certain that the Dept is well aware of the foregoing. I review the matter primarily to underline my hope that we will be very firm in letting the Israelis know (1) we intend to stand by the territorial assurances we have given to Jordan and (2) our expectation that they will proceed as soon as possible to give the Jordanians acceptable territorial specifics as part of a peaceful settlement. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 12:26 p.m. 2 See footnote 2, Document 326 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 312 . 4 Document 320 . 5 Telegram 272847 to Tel Aviv, November 16, informed the Embassy about a telephone conversation on November 15 between Sisco and Argov of the Israeli Embassy. Minister Argov called “to unravel mystery" of the seven-point program for a peace settlement he had heard Secretary Rusk had put forward. In the course of explaining that there was no separate U.S. peace program and that the points made by Rusk in his conversation with Riad were merely restatements of long-established U.S. positions, Sisco noted U.S. concerns that Israel was defining its security concerns with respect to Jordan not in terms of minor rectifications of the pre-war border, but in terms of a significant acquisition of Jordanian territory. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 329. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 329. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 22, 1968, 1:45 p.m. Mr. President: If true, this report of Israeli position on Jordan and Allon plan is pretty grim news; and it is probably true. The following cables report parliamentary debate-indicating Israeli politics getting rough. 2 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2 p.m. 2 A list indicates that telegrams 6154, 6186, and 6191 from Tel Aviv were attached. Telegram 6154, November 19, described a debate in the Knesset on November 18 on a speech made by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan calling for the economic integration of the occupied territories into Israel. Telegram 6186, November 21, reported that Dayan and four other members of the Cabinet had taken the position that the Allon plan did not go far enough in incorporating the occupied territories and that its adoption by the Cabinet would lead to their resignations. Telegram 6191, November 21, reported on additional sentiment in the Cabinet in favor of economic integration of the occupied territories. Debate on the issue in the Knesset remained sharp. All of these telegrams are ibid. and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. 330. Memorandum of Conversation 330. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 22, 1968, 5:40-6:15 p.m. SUBJECT Negotiations with Israel—F-4 and Advanced Weapons PARTICIPANTS Israeli Side Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York United States Side Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray Ambassador Rabin said that he had received his Government's reaction to the US-proposed Memorandum of Understanding (referring to the draft Memorandum of Understanding sent to the Israeli Embassy on 19 November 1968). 2 He said that there is a paragraph in that memorandum which looks to the Government of Israel as “quite awkward.” Rabin said that the awkwardness was “not because of its practical implications" but because of the way it is worded. Ambassador Rabin read a portion of the paragraph in question: “It is understood by the Government of Israel that action contrary to any of the understandings specified in paragraph II of this memorandum shall constitute 'unusual and compelling circumstances' and shall permit the United States to recover any aircraft already delivered under this Agreement.” Rabin said that his Government could not accept that the United States could ask for such language. “There is no precedent. It creates something that I don't believe that exists anywhere.” Rabin said that the paragraph implied that the United States considered Israel “the bad guy" and that it did not believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel, and therefore this paragraph was worded as it is. Mr. Warnke took issue with Ambassador Rabin's statement. Mr. Warnke said that he had talked with Mr. Clifford, and Mr. Clifford in turn with Mr. Rusk, and the United States Government clearly did not put such a construction on this paragraph. The United States does believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel. “I believe you and what you have said.” It is quite natural, however, that Israel would look after its own national security requirements. It would be understandable for Israel to enter into an F-4 agreement now and later feel compelled to change its mind for reasons existing at that time. It would not be unusual in international agreements for undertakings previously made to prove improvident in the future. But the United States for its part must look after its own national security interests; if Israel were to decide at some point that it could not adhere to the provisions of the agreement, it would revert to status quo ante. That is the purpose of this paragraph. Ambassador Rabin said he couldn't understand why, for example, the United States could ask in ten years for these aircraft to be returned. Mr. Warnke said: “Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in these aircraft in ten years time?” Mr. Warnke said that what was put in the Memorandum of Understanding, after all, represents only the summation of our discussions. Ambassador Rabin said that he had not agreed to commitments in the contract; he said that Israel had agreed to reaffirm its previous understandings—that they would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or carry nuclear weapons on U.S. aircraft. “Why do you want us to do this?” Minister Argov said: “We feel we are on parole.” The Israeli Government is giving assurances, said Argov, but the paragraph presumes we will not live up to them. Ambassador Rabin said that it isn't the standard paragraph. Mr. Warnke disagreed that there was a “presumption" in the contract that Israel would not live up to its assurances. Mr. Warnke also disagreed with Ambassador Rabin's statement that this wasn't a standard paragraph. “There is no such thing as a standard contract.” Each one varies. A past contract is not a binding precedent for future contracts. Ambassador Rabin, somewhat apologetically, said that his instructions were to follow the former wording. He said also that, although he agreed with the form of the U.S. proposal (i.e., a memorandum of understanding), “my Government has had second thoughts" and prefers the same format as in the Skyhawk Agreement: “I send you a letter, you send me a letter.” Mr. Warnke observed that we had the form of a Memorandum of Understanding before, in the Skyhawk Agreement. Ambassador Rabin said he thought not. Minister Argov said that yes, at the time in 1965 of the visit of Mr. HARRIMAN and Mr. Komer, there was a Memorandum of Understanding: “You participated in its development Mr. Ambassador.” Ambassador Rabin agreed and said that that was the HARRIMAN Mission, which was a different matter. Mr. Warnke observed that that was the point he was trying to make: there are different matters and different circumstances that now exist. Mr. Warnke said that he understood that what Israel wanted now wasn't a Memorandum of Understanding but an exchange of letters; for this he had no instructions, and would have to discuss the matter with Secretary Clifford. Mr. Warnke also asked the Ambassador whether he had a letter to submit. The Ambassador passed him the Israeli letter (attached). 3 Mr. Schwartz suggested that Ambassador Rabin not press the A-4 analogy too far, that it consisted of a number of documents, not just an exchange of letters, and that it was negotiated under different circumstances. For example, it contained an agreement that Israel would not come back to the United States for planes for five years. General Hod observed that the President, when Prime Minister Eshkol was here, was willing to overlook the five year clause. Ambassador Rabin said that the United States didn't say anymore that it would not be a major supplier; the formulation of the communique issued at the Ranch in 1968 was different from that of 1965. In 1965 it said that the United States would not be a major supplier; it did not say that in 1968, but said instead that the United States would keep Israel's defense requirements under review in light of the situation in the area. Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador's remarks were not inconsistent with what Mr. Schwartz had just said. Mr. Schwartz said that the 1965 precedent (of the Skyhawk) didn't apply. Mr. Warnke said he would discuss the latest Israel proposal with Mr. Clifford. Mr. Warnke asked Ambassador Rabin if he wished to sign the letter. Rabin did. Ambassador Rabin said that there is a third problem. He laughingly said that he assumed we would overcome the “technical difficulties" of getting a satisfactory agreement in an acceptable form. Rabin said: “Everyone has his own superiors.” Rabin asked if we could proceed with the technical talks while waiting to sort out the basic agreement. Mr. Warnke said that the problem won't arise, for he expects to respond to Ambassador Rabin the first of next week. General Hod interjected that what he needs to know is what specific equipment can be included on the F-4 aircraft and its approximate cost, so that he can draw up a list of his specific requirements for the USAF, and they in turn may prepare a Letter of Offer. Mr. Murray said that he would review this and call General Hod on the telephone. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel, 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked “Fifth Session.” 2 A copy of this draft memorandum of understanding is ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that Secretary McNamara cleared it with the President. 3 Not printed. 331. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 331. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 23, 1968, 3:35 p.m. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 332. Memorandum of Conversation 332. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 26, 1968. SUBJECT F-4 Negotiations with the Government of Israel On November 26, Ambassador Rabin called me and reported that he had received my letter 2 in reply to his letter requesting that the United States Government sell 50 F-4 Phantoms to Israel. 3 Ambassador Rabin said that the letter posed no problems for him except for the reference to the interpretation of the United States Government as to what would constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons by a Middle East power. Ambassador Rabin said that he understood from our second conversation that we would not incorporate a definition of this term. I pointed out that this discussion had occurred in the context of an anticipated Memorandum of Understanding, to be subscribed by both parties. With a Memorandum of Understanding it would be necessary to arrive at an agreed upon interpretation and our conversation had made it clear that this was unlikely. I commented further that the existence of such differences of opinion had, as I understood it, been the reason for his proposal of an exchange of letters in lieu of a Memorandum of Understanding. I also commented that, as Ambassador Rabin had noted in our last conference on Friday, neither of us was responsible for the content of the other's letter. I pointed out further that the interpretation of the United States Government was not directed exclusively at the circumstances under which Israel would be deemed to have introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East but that it applied equally to the eventuality of such action by any other Middle Eastern power. In the event that another Middle Eastern power should acquire possession and control of nuclear weapons then this would relieve the Government of Israel from the restrictions of its announced policy. Ambassador Rabin said that he recognized that our position was equally applicable to other Middle Eastern powers and asked again if I thought this paragraph should remain in the letter. I said that I did and Ambassador Rabin said “all right.” In response to my question as to how the negotiations are proceeding, Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met yesterday with Mr. Schwartz and had presented a list of the items desired in order that an appropriate letter of offer could be prepared. He also commented that he might want to talk with me at the end of the week with regard to the delivery schedule. I said that I would be free to see him on Friday. Paul C. Warnke 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel, 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive. 2 Document 333 . 3 Rabin's November 22 letter to Warnke requested the sale of the aircraft, together with related armament, ammunition, training, spare parts, and other related services. The letter reaffirmed Israeli commitment not to be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons, and agreed not to use any U.S.-supplied aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel) 333. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin) 333. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin) 1 Washington, November 27, 1968. Dear Mr. Ambassador: This will acknowledge and respond to your letter of 22 November 1968, 2 requesting on behalf of the Government of Israel that the United States sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft and related equipment and training. The Government of the United States agrees to sell to the Government of Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft and related equipment and services in accordance with this exchange of letters and technical and financial annexes to be negotiated separately. This transaction is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act 3 and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952. 4 The United States Government, for its part, accepts the assurances given by the Government of Israel as stated in your letter: “On its part the Government of Israel reaffirms its longstanding policy as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding of March 10, 1965, 5 that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier.” In this connection, I have made clear the position of the United States Government that the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons. I wish also to confirm the understanding of the Government of Israel as set forth in the fifth paragraph of your letter of 22 November 1968. 6 Such unusual and compelling circumstances would exist in the event of action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter. The agreement contained in the last paragraph of your letter concerning the secrecy of this undertaking is satisfactory to us. It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details of this transaction. 7 Sincerely, Paul C. Warnke 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray. 2 See footnote 3, Document 332 . 3 Reference is to Part II, Chapter 3 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. (P.L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424) 4 TIAS 2675; 3 UST 4985. 5 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 185 . 6 The fifth paragraph of Rabin's letter stated that Israel understood that the United States reserved the right, under unusual and compelling circumstances, to cancel all or part of its commitment to provide F-4 aircraft and related equipment and services at any time prior to delivery. 7 As initially conveyed to Rabin, the last paragraph read: “It is understood that your letter of 22 November 1968 and this letter in reply together constitute an agreement between our two governments.” Rabin objected in a telephone conversation with Warnke on November 27 that the proposed last paragraph of Warnke's letter implied that Israel agreed with the U.S. interpretation of the circumstances that would constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons. Warnke agreed to substitute a “bland" concluding paragraph that did not carry such implications. (Memorandum of conversation, November 27; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, NESA Chron) 334. Memorandum for the Record 334. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, November 27, 1968. SUBJECT Near East South Asia IRG Meeting Wednesday, 27 November 1968 Arab-Israel Action Paper 1. The Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia met 27 November 1968 to discuss a draft paper on the Arab-Israel problem designed to highlight action matters with which the new national administration may be faced during its first 90 days in office. 2 2. The circulated draft stated there was little prospect that in the near future much progress would be made toward an Arab-Israel settlement. This conclusion was not challenged by anyone at the IRG meeting. 3. The draft went on to outline three alternative policies which the United States Government might follow given the impasse. Very briefly these were: (a) put real pressure on Israel to negotiate an agreement consistent with the reasonable meaning of the words of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution; (b) publicly support such a settlement in order to improve our position with the Arabs, but do not bring pressure on Israel to go along, thus virtually ensuring that no progress would in fact be made; and (c) continue as at present to back the Israeli position while urging Israel to be more flexible in both procedure and substance. 4. Assistant Secretary Hart expressed the opinion, which was generally supported by the IRG members, that a better format than presenting “alternatives" would be to explain our present posture and then outline progressive “steps" which might be taken to increase the prospects for an Arab-Israel settlement. He felt our present policy included many points of difference with Israel which should be mentioned, while admitting that in spite of these differences we are putting no meaningful pressure on Israel to change its stand where we disagree with it. The “steps" open to us all lead in the direction of withdrawing the blank check which Israel now holds from us, in order to move Israel toward a reasonable implementation of the Security Council resolution. An early one would be to advise Israel privately that if no progress is made toward implementation we would support some form of mediation or arbitration. Making a public statement to this effect would be a further step. An ultimate drastic step would be our actual active participation in an international effort to interpret and compel compliance with the Security Council resolution. 5. Procedurally, it was left to Assistant Secretary Hart to re-work the circulated draft along the lines he favored. This will go to Under Secretary Katzenbach and possibly be on a future SIG agenda. 6. The White House representative on the IRG/NEA, influenced by recent policy decisions in regard to aid to Biafra, favored a recommendation that the Arab refugee problem be cut loose from the rest of the Arab-Israel confrontation, and that we try to make progress on this issue as a separate matter. The general consensus was that the humanitarian aspect of the Arab refugee problem was completely subordinate to international political considerations, and that this was not a practical proposal. I expect, however, that the paper which eventually goes to the Under Secretary may contain some reference to this proposal, perhaps presenting it as a step which we might consider taking. David H. Blee 3 Chief, Near East and South Asia Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, DCI Executive Registry Files, Box 11, Folder 240, MFR. Secret. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency on December 2. 2 Not found. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Blee signed the original. 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, November 30, 1968, 0127Z. 280027. 1. Believe it would be desirable for you to have a chat with Eban prior to his December 2 meeting with Jarring, making clear you doing so on instructions. In view of the number and detailed discussions we have had with GOI in recent days, and fact that they are clear as to what our position is in relationship to Jarring Mission and our desire to make progress, we leave to your discretion how best to get across to the Israelis our continuing feeling that they should put forward positive posture in this next round. In the course of your conversation, you might make clear that for our part we have been pressing both USSR and UAR with a view to trying to get Nasser to be more explicit on concept of peace, which of course is of primary interest to GOI. 2. From Sisco's conversation with Tekoah in New York on Tuesday, 2 we have the impression Israelis very relaxed-much more relaxed than we are-regarding Jarring's willingness to serve for an indefinite period. We are pleased that he is having another round in the area and apparently plans further discussions after Christmas vacation in Moscow. While Jarring is no longer talking about wanting to sign off in the next weeks, our distinct impression is that he will not stay on indefinitely in circumstances where prospects for progress are very bleak. 3. Anything you can get of a specific character regarding where matters stand on Jordanian side of settlement would also be helpful to the Department. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Atherton, and approved by Davies and Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN. 2 November 26. 3 Telegram 280086 to Tel Aviv, November 30, amplified Barbour's instructions. Barbour was instructed to stress to Eban that if the UAR did not soon make a positive response to Jarring, Jarring would be under strong pressure to take an initiative himself. In those circumstances, the United States viewed it as important for Israel to make suggestions to Jarring about the initiative he might exercise. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 336. Notes on Meeting 336. Notes on Meeting 1 Washington, December 4, 1968, 12:30-1:30 p.m. PRESIDENT JOHNSON's NOTES ON MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM FOLLOWING WERE PRESENT Secy Rusk, Clifford, Smith, Fowler, Udall, Freeman, Cohen, Boyd, Atty Gen. Clark, Amb. Wiggins, The Vice President, PMG Watson, Under Secy Robert Wood sat in for Secy Weaver, Chairman Macy, Art Okun, Director Zwick, Bromley Smith, Charles Maguire, DeVier Pierson, George Reedy, Joe Califano, Harry McPherson, Ernie Goldstein, Harry Middleton, Bill Blackburn, George Christian, Tom Johnson, Jim Jones and Larry Temple, Charles Murphy and Amb. Averell Harriman Secretary Dean Rusk said: “It is an expression of an intention which is to a considerable extent understandable, and an attempt to emphasize to the Arabs that the continuation of these terrorist raids is not profitable and could lead to a buildup of hostilities. We will continue to do everything we can, and get others to bring their influence to bear to reduce these incidents, because it makes it more difficult to get an atmosphere in which a peaceful settlement will follow. “The possibilities of a peaceful settlement are being fully explored by Ambassador Jarring. I wish, Mr. President, I could report more progress on the part of his efforts. He is now in the Middle East talking currently with the Governments of the States directly concerned to see if he can get some sort of movement by both sides to move us closer to a peaceful settlement.” The Secretary added that for a long time there had been an obstacle on the procedural points. He said Israel has insisted upon talking directly with the Arab Governments in a direct negotiation face-to-face. He noted that the Arabs have indicated they would not do that and would only negotiate indirectly or discuss these matters indirectly in the Security Council or with Amb. Jarring. Secretary Rusk said that in recent weeks Israel had taken two important steps. On the one side they have actually taken up with Amb. Jarring various points of substance having to do with a peaceful settlement, opening the way for indirect talks which the Arabs apparently have been saying they want to see. Secretary Rusk continued: “We are disappointed that the Arab side has not been more responsive to this change in attitude on the part of Israel. It has not been willing to talk seriously with Ambassador Jarring about the particular points of substance more than you have heard thus far. “Secondly, Israel has now been talking about the need for a contractual settlement of the situation and has taken the emphasis off the term 'peace treaty.' This should open the way for a somewhat less formal arrangement, which would nevertheless bind all the parties but would be more congenial to Arab sensitivities. Again, that has not met very much response.” The Secretary said that along with this issue there was the deep feeling among many Arabs that Israel is bent upon territorial expansion and similarly a deep feeling on the part of the Israelis that the Arabs are bent upon the destruction of Israel. That deep emotional commitment on both sides obviously gets in the way of a peaceful settlement. The Secretary said: “I think it is fair to point out that there are internal political problems on both sides. Some of the Arab leaders may well feel that if they take a dramatic step toward peace, they will be subject to assassination, and it may well be true that they do face such a problem. And there are internal debates going on in Israel today which make the position of the Prime Minister very difficult if he should translate dramatic moves toward peace on his side. So we may have one of those situations where the parties feel internally too weak to be wise. Unless there's some unusual experience in diplomacy, that does complicate the situation.” Secretary Rusk commented that fortunately, Amb. Jarring was going to serve further and is going to continue his efforts but that we needed the help, however, of the other powers, including the help of the Soviet Union. He reported that just yesterday Pravda issued a statement which was highly polemical in content, which associated Israel with the imperialist forces, which are supposed to be the bugaboo in the communist world. He said it did, however, point to Soviet support for the November resolution in the Security Council and support for Amb. Jarring's mission. Secretary Rusk said we would hope that although outside powers cannot settle this situation among themselves in the positive form, we could hope that all outside powers, including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and others would bring [all?] their influence to bear that they could on the parties, to try to get the parties to be more cooperative in Ambassador Jarring's movement toward peace. He said: “So, Mr. President, we have the short-run model of trying to find ways to reduce these acts of terror and violence along the cease fire lines. “We must try to get additional muscle behind Ambassador Jarring's mission so we can draw a reluctant people on both sides more toward a serious peaceful solution because the Middle East not only is inflammatory in its own right in terms of its own territory, but because of many circumstances, including its geographical location, it is an area which could be inflamed depending upon whether the great powers could be engaged or highly involved with each other in a most dangerous fashion. We will continue to work for that just as hard as we can.” [Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, December 4, 1968, 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. No classification marking. Prepared from a tape recording by either President Johnson's secretarial staff or by his staff in Austin after the President had left office and begun research for his memoirs. The tape recording the notes are based on is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings. The notes have been corrected to accord with the tape recording. Secretary Rusk's comments were preceded by a discussion unrelated to the Middle East. The tape recording picks up Rusk's briefing at the point indicated. 337. Memorandum of Conversation 337. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 4, 1968, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Seven Points PARTICIPANTS Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal, U.A.R. Interests Section, Embassy of India Mr. Richard B. Parker, Country Director for NEA/UAR Mr. Parker said that the UAR Foreign Ministry had given Don Bergus the text of the UAR's comments on the Secretary's seven points on the morning of December 4. 2 He could tell Dr. Ghorbal on a personal basis that the Department, including the Secretary, had found the response most disappointing. Not only did the Egyptians insist on an irritating and counter-productive rehash of everything since Genesis, but they had not responded in a frank and open manner. In his presentation of November 2, the Secretary had made an important and far-reaching initiative. He had committed us to a position which our friends the Israelis had not liked and which would have entailed considerable difficulty for us in terms of implementation. The Israelis had recently assured us that the Egyptians would get us off the hook by responding negatively. Their forecast had been amply justified by the document we had received that morning. If the Egyptians wanted us to help them, they would have to learn something about dealing with the United States Government. The sort of foggy replies that the Egyptians specialized in only succeeded in irritating people. Dr. Ghorbal said we would have to understand in the first place that the prologue reciting Israeli misdeeds was an essential expression of deep and bitter feeling on the part of the Egyptians. Their territory was occupied. They had a long history of injustice at the hand of Israel and they could not disregard this or set it to one side. Mr. Parker said that on the previous day Dr. Ghorbal had been searching for a word to describe an action which produced a result contrary to that desire. That word was “counter-productive”. This was the term which should be applied to the prologue. Dr. Ghorbal went on to say that the Egyptian response was not really an answer to the seven points, but rather an amplification and a reaffirmation of what Mahmoud Riad had already said on November 2. As Dr. Ghorbal had said earlier, Mahmoud Riad had given his response on November 2. The Americans had chosen not to accept it as definitive. Riad had now reaffirmed it. The Americans kept getting the Egyptians to make concessions while the Israelis made none. Then they proceeded from the new position of the Egyptians and asked them to compromise further instead of asking the Israelis to move. There were some things the Egyptians could accept and others they could not. The US could not, in any event, expect the Egyptians to set forth in a document of this sort, which might fall into the hands of anyone, a position more forthcoming than that given by Riad. It would also have to understand the atmosphere in which this response was drafted. While, on the one hand, the Secretary had been very fair and forthcoming in his statements to Riad, he had also made much of the fact that American leverage with the Israelis was limited. Mr. Parker had subsequently informed Dr. Ghorbal that the seven points were not a peace plan but were rather a statement of the sort of position we could support. Mr. Parker had also said that we could not guarantee Israel's acceptance. Indeed, the Israelis did not like the seven points. All the while, Eshkol and Dayan were making bellicose statements about the retention of territory, the consolidation of the Golan Heights and other territories into Israel, on the inevitability of war, etc. We could not expect the Egyptians to put their hands in ours, given these uncertainties. Mr. Parker said that we had made what seemed to us a reasonable offer. We had delineated the position we could support, a position which was not unfavorable to Egypt. If the Egyptians had accepted it wholeheartedly, we would at that moment be working in an effort to get it accepted by the Israelis. The Egyptians were always asking us to put pressure on Israel, but they were not willing to make it possible for us to use what leverage we had. Dr. Ghorbal and Mr. Parker proceeded to examine the Egyptian reply point by point. With regard to the indivisibility of withdrawal, Mr. Parker noted that the Secretary had proposed as an eighth point an understanding that Egypt's acceptance would be with the understanding that the problems of the other Arab states and Israel would be regulated in a satisfactory manner. It was, of course, difficult to visualize any settlement which returned the Golan Heights to Syria given the fact that Syria refused to cooperate with Jarring or to accept the November 22 Resolution. In these circumstances, did the UAR response mean that if all other issues were taken care of and the sole remaining issue was Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and the Israelis refused to withdraw, the UAR would not go to settlement? Dr. Ghorbal said that was correct. Egypt could not settle with Israel as long as Arab territory beyond what Israel already had before June 1967 was occupied. Mr. Parker commented that Egypt was likely to forfeit a settlement over this issue. On termination of belligerency, Mr. Parker noted that the language of the Egyptian response seemed to mean that termination would come after withdrawal. Was this the intent? Dr. Ghorbal said he understood the response to mean that termination of belligerency and withdrawal would be simultaneous. As for the navigation issue, Mr. Parker noted that the response tied free navigation to the resolution as a whole and not just to the refugee issue. This was a better formulation than the earlier Egyptian position. On the question of refugees, Mr. Parker said the UAR response was unclear. The Secretary had made a specific proposal. The UAR had replied in general terms that it accepted the UN resolutions on the subject. This was not news, nor was it responsive. Given the fact that both Dr. Fawzi and Salah Gohar had commented to foreign ambassadors that the Secretary's proposal regarding refugees was unacceptable, we suspected this response was a rejection. Dr. Ghorbal said he did not think this was the case. He believed that the UAR was at the moment consulting with Palestinian leaders as to what they could accept. Until those consultations were finished, the Egyptians could not commit themselves to any detailed understanding on the issue. We should interpret the present response as keeping the door open and meaning that the UAR did not reject the Secretary's proposal, which after all, was not contrary to the UN resolutions. Mr. Parker noted that the UAR rejected a permanent UN presence at Sharm Ash-Shaikh. We could not expect the Israelis to settle for less, if indeed they would accept even that. The idea that the Israelis would accept a temporary UN presence which the Egyptians could recall when they felt like it, as they had done in 1967, was unrealistic. Both we and the Israelis had to have reassurances that the Straits would be kept open and neither of us trusted the Egyptian word in this regard, given past history. Dr. Ghorbal said that we should stretch our imaginations on this problem. What we wanted was freedom of navigation, not a UN presence. In a climate of peace, a satisfactory arrangement should be possible. Egypt, however, could not alienate for eternity a part of its territory, no matter how remote or how unimportant as real estate. We should stop talking about a permanent UN presence and start thinking about some arrangement which would give satisfactory assurances to both sides without derogating from Egyptian sovereignty. Mr. Parker suggested that if the Egyptians had any ideas in this regard they should bring them forward. Mr. Parker noted that the UAR also rejected the concept of signature of the same document. This presumably was because Egypt rejected sulh (reconciliation), in accordance with the Khartoum formula, although it was now talking of peace (silm), at our urging. Signature of the same document was a symbol of sulh, just as the handshake was a symbol of reconciliation in any ceremonial sulh. The Egyptians should realize that without sulh there would be no silm. If the Egyptians wanted to get the Israelis out of their territory, they had better start thinking about sulh. Dr. Ghorbal said that we should be ingenious enough to find a way to get around the question of signature. The Arabs simply could not sign the same document with Israel. They could, however, sign identical documents on the same day, both of which could be registered immediately with the UN and published simultaneously side by side, both committing the two parties to the same things and having the binding force of contracts. Signature on the same piece of paper should not be blown up into an obstacle to agreement. Mr. Parker commented that it was this very inability of the Arabs to sign that same piece of paper which convinced the Israelis that the Arabs were not prepared to offer meaningful peace. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker. 2 The text of the UAR's response to the Secretary's seven points was transmitted in telegram 4047 from Cairo, December 4. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) In his comments Bergus noted that UAR policy remained focused on the demand for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territory. (Telegram 4051 from Cairo, December 4; ibid.) 338. Information Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 338. Information Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 4, 1968, 4 p.m. SUBJECT (1) Israeli Raids on Jordan (2) Message from King Hussein 2 Before he left this morning, Walt asked me to send you our latest reading on the Israel-Jordan fighting today. The Israelis say their Sunday commando attack in southern Jordan was a direct response to terrorist shelling of Israel's Dead Sea phosphate works, but that may only have been the last straw following the Jerusalem bomb explosion last week. Today's attack, however, was directed mainly at the Iraqi troops who have been supporting the terrorists logistically and who themselves opened fire for the first time on Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley last night. The Israeli embassy here says Israel just couldn't sit still any longer without encouraging more such attacks. Eban has asked Wally Barbour to transmit a message from Eshkol to the Jordanian government, saying that the Iraqis were the target and that Israel had no intention of widening the action. 3 Rabin's deputy here called me to say the same. This will probably delay Jordan-Israel talks. Even the Israelis who are concerned about that argue that they have no choice if they're just not going to roll over in front of the terrorists. But with Jarring beginning another round in the area-he saw Eban Monday and goes next to Cairo-the Arabs can't help but assume the Israelis don't care. It's clear that they put short-term security above all. Hussein alludes to this Israeli attitude in his message (attached), 4 written to you before the attack on another subject-your wire explaining your go-ahead on negotiating the Phantom deal with Israel. He expresses sharply his disappointment with our policy, but given his feelings, the message is restrained. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 4:12 p.m. 2 See Document 341 . 3 This request was reported in telegram 6361 from Tel Aviv, December 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 4 Not attached. The text of King Hussein's letter to President Johnson, dated November 30, was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7684 from Amman, December 2. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 ISR) The signed original of the letter was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A-513 from Amman, December 5. (Ibid., POL 15-1 JORDAN) Ambassador Symmes provided his assessment of King Hussein's letter in telegram 7774 from Amman, December 6. (Ibid., POL JORDAN-US) 339. Memorandum of Conversation 339. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 4, 1968. SUBJECT Reports of Israeli Plans For Settlements on Golan Heights PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel Mr. Shlomo Argov, Minister, Embassy of Israel Mr. Moshe Raviv, Counselor, Embassy of Israel Assistant Secretary Parker T. Hart, NEA Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, IO Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies, NEA Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Country Director, NEA/IAI During a conversation primarily on other subjects, Mr. Hart referred to recent press reports that Israel planned to establish new settlements on the Syrian Golan Heights, allegedly to accommodate some 15,000 settlers. Such reports could only be interpreted as pre-judging the question of sovereignty over areas presently occupied by Israel, and we therefore trusted that these reports were erroneous. Ambassador Rabin said that, when Under Secretary Katzenbach had set forth the US position on Israeli withdrawal, he had not mentioned the Golan Heights. Mr. Hart replied that we were talking about the principle of the non-acquisition of territory wherever it might be. Ambassador Rabin noted that Israel had already established Nahals, which he described as military-agricultural settlements, on the Golan Heights and asked why we were raising this question now. Mr. Hart said that reports of new settlements carried implications of a permanent Israeli presence which was inconsistent with efforts to make progress toward peace. In response to Ambassador Rabin's comment that this issue could be tested in negotiations if the Syrians would negotiate, Mr. Hart said that he inferred from the Ambassador's comment that the future of the Golan Heights was negotiable. Rabin replied that the Government of Israel had made clear everything was negotiable except Jerusalem. He could not say, however, what Israel's position with respect to the Golan Heights would be. Meanwhile he saw no reason why Israel should not do what it wished to fulfill its responsibility for maintaining the territories under its control so long as Israel acted within the context of military occupation and abided by the Geneva Conventions. Mr. Hart said we saw a difference between Israel's utilizing the resources of occupied areas on the one hand and establishing permanent settlements on the other. Mr. Davies added that reports of permanent settlements tended to confirm Arab suspicions that Israel did not intend to withdraw; this could make the Arabs less willing to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring. Ambassador Rabin disagreed, saying that in his view the Arabs would be more eager to negotiate the more they saw a danger that they would not get their territories back. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved in S/S on December 10. 340. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 340. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 5, 1968, 0137Z. 282248. 1. Assistant Secretaries Hart and Sisco called in Ambassador Rabin afternoon December 4 to make following points re recent Israel-Jordan cease fire incidents: (a) We are asking both Israeli and Jordanian Ambassadors to convey urgently to their governments our concern over recent cease fire violations. 2 We see risk that escalating situation will get out of hand. (b) Without assessing blame, we look to both governments to observe cease fire. (c) We are aware of problems that terrorism and shelling of civilian centers cause for GOI. To avoid jeopardizing peacemaking efforts, however, we are urging parties to exercise utmost restraint. Latest Israeli air operation strikes us as dangerous over reaction. (d) At same time we recognize problem Iraqi operations from Jordanian territory cause for Israel and will stress to Jordanian Ambassador need for GOJ to assert control over Iraqis and Fedayeen. 2. Rabin said he would report foregoing promptly. At same time he wanted to explain how GOI views situation. Israel had accepted cease fire on assumption that it would be mutually respected. By entering agreement with Fedayeen organizations November 16, GOJ had assumed responsibility for Fedayeen activities. According Israeli information, GOJ understanding with Fedayeen groups provides inter alia that latters' operations against Israel would be coordinated with GOJ. 3. Rabin continued that Iraqis were in Jordan in division strength consisting of three brigades and had artillery units positioned in northern sector. Israel had evidence that Iraqis had initiated shelling of Israeli settlements December 2 along 25 mile front from Tel Qazir to Beisan Valley. This had been preceded by more limited shelling of settlements December 1, to which Israel had responded in limited fashion with 15 artillery rounds against Irbid plus shelling of known Fedayeen concentrations. Following further artillery bombardment of Israeli settlements December 2, Israel had used aircraft against Iraqi positions near Irbid and subsequently against Iraqi positions and other installations on larger scale December 4. Rabin stressed that IDF had sought to concentrate latest strike only on Iraqi military targets; neither town of Mafraq nor Jordanian airfield had been attacked and there were no overflights of Amman. Israeli Air Force had ignored two Jordanian Hawker Hunters which had been in area at time but had not attempted to engage Israeli planes. 4. Rabin added that as Israeli success in stopping terrorist infiltration had grown (he claimed 85-90 per cent of infiltrators now killed or captured), Fedayeen as well as Jordanian and Iraqi military had resorted increasingly to cross river shelling. As result latest Israeli action he thought Iraqis would think twice before provoking further incidents. Neither side wanted major hostilities and he did not believe situation would get out of hand as we feared. Israel could not tolerate shelling of civilian settlements, however, and unless cease fire was observed by Jordanians, Iraqis and Fedayeen there would be further incidents. Israel wanted to avoid “too much" escalation. Experience had shown, however, that use of “more than normal force" could calm situation for a time. 5. Rabin noted that, while Israel had never requested UN observers on cease fire line with Jordan, it was GOJ not Israel which had refused to accept them. In response to query whether Israel would accept observers if Jordan agreed, Rabin said GOI had never believed UN observers could bring tranquility. Nevertheless Israel had accepted observers on Syrian and Egyptian cease fire lines when UARG and SARG had done so. 6. Sisco informed Rabin that we expected press inquiries to which we would reply that (a) we had expressed our concern about cease fire violations to both Israeli and Jordanian Ambassadors and (b) we had asked GOI and GOJ to observe cease fire scrupulously. 7. For Tel Aviv : Ambassador should seek early opportunity to reenforce foregoing approach at appropriate level GOI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Hart. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Jerusalem, USUN, and Cairo. 2 Hart made a similar presentation to Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf on December 4. (Telegram 282251 to Amman, December 5; ibid.) 341. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 341. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 5, 1968. SUBJECT King Hussein's Reply to the President's Message Transmitted as an enclosure is King Hussein's reply 2 to the President's message of October 11. 3 As you will recall, the occasion for the President's message was our announcement to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. The message was designed to reassure the King that these negotiations in no way prejudiced USG support for the Jarring Mission or for Jordan. The King is obviously very upset with the proposed sale of Phantoms to Israel. His sharply worded reply to the President reflects the great strains placed upon him during the past months. A principal thrust of the King's reply is that alleged Israeli intransigence and alleged United States' passivity in the face of this intransigence impedes a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Other points made by the King include: (1) the proposed Phantom sale directly contradicts our profession of support for the Jarring Mission; (2) Jordan has suffered from Israeli military actions since the June 1967 war, particularly from aircraft supplied to Israel by the United States; (3) Jordan's marked military inferiority to Israel requires a military quid pro quo for Jordan to offset the Phantoms; (4) the United States' commitment to the territorial integrity of Jordan continues to be violated by Israeli occupation; (5) U.S. actions and positions on the Middle East problem are making it difficult for Hussein and other moderate Arabs to justify their close ties with the United States. Our Ambassador in Jordan has a continuing dialogue with the King and there is no need for a further response on the part of the President. A signed copy of the letter has been sent by pouch. Dirk Gleysteen 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Jordan, 8/1/68-1/20/69. Secret; Exdis. 2 See footnote 4, Document 338 . 3 See Document 277 . 4 Gleysteen signed for Read above Read's typed signature. 342. Memorandum of Conversation 342. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Beirut, December 5, 1968. SUBJECT The Prospects for a Peaceful Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict PARTICIPANTS Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi Governor William W. Scranton 2 Governor Scranton asked Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi for his views on the Middle East situation. Yafi went into a detailed expose of the history of the Arab-Israeli crisis from 1948. He characterized Israel as a racist, expansionist and aggressive state in the heart of the Arab homeland. Yafi emphasized that the Arabs were in a state of legitimate self defense. From 1948 on, he said, the Arabs have been the victims of aggression on three separate occasions. Governor Scranton inquired what form any future peaceful settlement might take. Would it be based, for example, on demarcation lines readily agreed to by both sides and Arab recognition of Israel? Prime Minister Yafi replied that the question of Arab recognition of the state of Israel was absolutely impossible for many reasons, to include the radical political pressures emanating from Arab youth today. Yafi characterized the views of the new Arab generation on the question of Palestine as being more fanatic than the views shared by the present Arab leadership. Insofar as demarcation lines were concerned, they could be agreed upon as long as Israel was not given any bonuses (in territorial terms) for her acts of aggression. Governor Scranton asked the Prime Minister for his views on the Jarring Mission and whether or not Yafi thought there was any better alternative for reaching a peaceful settlement. Governor Scranton commented that President-elect Richard Nixon was very much interested in the Middle East situation and he was fully aware of the expectations surrounding his advent to the American presidency. The Governor wondered whether or not the Arabs were waiting to see what the Nixon Administration would do before they went any further on the Jarring Mission. Yafi said the Arabs have placed much hope in the New American Administration. Concerning a settlement, he said he sees no other means than the Jarring Mission and the November 22, 1967 UN Resolution as the basis of a peaceful settlement. He strongly supported execution of the UN Resolution, and said the Arabs had accepted the resolution in full but that the Israelis had considered it as sort of a “battle order" which they treated in a routine manner. What was needed was to carry out the principles of the resolution and establish a timetable. Governor Scranton asked Prime Minister Yafi exactly what he meant by a timetable. Yafi said before any timetable could be established, Israel would have to accept the resolution as a whole. This would lead to specific stages of execution, to include, in part: Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories; freedom of navigation for Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal; arrangements for the return of the Palestinian refugees either to their former homes in Israel or to other parts of the Arab world, etc. Governor Scranton asked the Prime Minister exactly how any settlement, within the framework of the UN Resolution would be executed. Would it mean the establishment of demilitarized zones and the installation of an international police force, for example? Yafi said he did not agree with the establishment of an international police force along the Arab-Israeli border. He stated the presence of such an international force has not and would not, in the future, deter any further aggression, which, he claimed, would come only from the Israeli side. However, he stressed that the United Nations should be used as the instrument for enforcing any settlement, and that the UN must, with this objective in mind, be “reinforced" by the Great Powers in order that it may play an active and productive role in maintaining peace in the area. Governor Scranton commented that Prime Minister Yafi's frank remarks about the impossibility of the Arabs living with the State of Israel led him to ask whether the Arabs would ever accept the very existence of the state of Israel, and consequently, if there was any real hope for peace. Prime Minister Yafi replied that what the Arabs were opposed to was the racist, expansionist, zionist state of Israel which could not be tolerated. Governor Scranton said if this was the case, and the Arabs were not bent on the extinction of the state of Israel, then there would be some hope for a real settlement. He stated the United States had been opposed to Israeli expansionism and that this was also the position of President-elect Nixon. To limit Israeli expansion would, however, require some assurances from Arab states as well. Yafi stated that there could be no definitive peace between the Arabs and Israelis, and that, frankly speaking, only a comprehensive “truce" could be concluded between the two sides because the major issues dividing them were irreconcilable. Governor Scranton said most Americans support the existence of the state of Israel, but also that most Americans were opposed to Israeli expansionism at the expense of the Arab states. However, the Governor continued, most Americans also believe that the Arab position is the elimination of the state of Israel. Prime Minister Yafi explained that this was not the case and that what the Arabs were opposed to was Israel aggression and expansionism. In the long term, Yafi stated, the Israelis will not be able to maintain their present policies and remain in the Arab world. If history is any proof, Israel's destiny will not be unlike that of other foreign entities which implanted themselves on the Arab world like the Crusader Kingdoms and the French and British mandates. These entities, Yafi said, were unable to maintain their positions in the Middle East on any permanent basis. Yafi made it clear that in his opinion the US should not pressure the Arab states to go further than implementation of the November 22 UN Resolution. He said any pressures in this regard would be unproductive. Governor Scranton remarked that one thing which concerned him was the exaggerated expectations on the part of the Arabs that if the US exerts enough pressure over Israel, Israel will do whatever the US wants. Scranton said this is definitely not the case. However, he added, US pressure would seem to be necessary to contain Israeli expansionism. In any case, he emphasized, there are limits to US influence over Israel. Yafi said that he understood this very well but, unfortunately, the Arab masses believe otherwise. In conclusion, Prime Minister Yafi told Governor Scranton that what the Arabs were asking for is positive pressure from the US and not, what he termed, negative pressure. As examples of such “negative pressure”, he referred to the US-Israeli Phantom jet sale negotiations and US abstention on the UN Resolution on Jerusalem. Yafi said it was unfortunate that the US adopted these positions while Israel was defying international public opinion and UN resolutions by continuing her occupation of Arab territories. For these reasons, he repeated, the Arabs considered themselves to be in a state of legitimate self defense. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Edward P. Djerejian and approved by Ambassador Porter. The memorandum is Enclosure 1 to Airgram A-1505 from Beirut, December 13. 2 Former Governor of Pennsylvania Scranton visited Lebanon on December 5 as part of a six-nation fact-finding tour of the Middle East undertaken on behalf of President-elect Nixon. His other stops included Iran December 2-5, the UAR December 6-7, Saudi Arabia December 7-8, Jordan December 8, and Israel December 9-11. 343. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 343. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, December 7, 1968, 1036Z. 4082. 1. Governor Scranton met with Nasser for ninety minutes evening 6th. FonMin Riad present. 2 Scranton found Nasser completely relaxed. At no time did he become emotional. Following is brief sketch of highlights: 2. US-UAR Relations. Nasser said he had been thinking of writing letter to President-elect Nixon and sending it via former Treasury Secretary Anderson. Then Scranton visit had been proposed and Nasser thought it might be better convey views orally via Scranton. Governor said he believed it would still be good idea for Nasser to write President-elect. 3. Nasser several times said he would like see resumption diplomatic relations. He would like have a clear assertion of US policy on which he could hang it. He believed that if UAR resumed relations, other Arab states would follow. Nasser said he had been ready resume relations last February but US behavior in Security Council had caused him change his mind. 4. Governor suggested desirability of Nasser's making some kind of overture to US. This would help with American public opinion which still to large extent dwelt on false accusation that US had participated militarily in June war. Moreover, Nasser gesture towards US would strengthen hand of new administration in influencing Israelis to take steps towards peace. Nasser did not argue this point. 5. Sharm-al-Sheikh. Nasser said that during May-June 1967 crisis he discovered he did not have military power physically to close Straits Tiran. Governor pointed out that with subsequent rebuilding of UAR armed forces, they probably had acquired this capability. Governor said this emphasized need for UN presence at Sharm-al-Sheikh. No argument from Nasser. 6. Sinai. Nasser said Sinai, while important, was less important than problems of West Bank of Jordan and refugees. 7. Refugees. Nasser felt back of refugee problem could be broken if 500,000 refugees (both '48 and '67) could be settled on West Bank of Jordan. He wondered how water could be provided for such resettlement. 8. Gaza. While Nasser didn't want it ceded to Israel, he indicated no problem in finding workable solution. 9. Demilitarized Zones. Nasser reiterated Riad's dislike of idea of demilitarizing entire Sinai on grounds this would give undue military advantage to Israel. He also said UN forces in Sinai would not fight if Israel invaded. 10. Suez Canal. Nasser implied there no problem re opening of Canal to flags of all nations. 11. Peace. Governor gained impression Nasser had yearning for Arab-Israel settlement so he could concentrate on internal situation. 12. Internal Problems. Nasser said both Egyptian youth and military wanted revenge against Israel. He said his own children called for revenge. He stated that many Egyptian youth were volunteering to join Fedayeen. 13. USSR. Nasser made usual statements to effect USSR did not control UAR. 14. Syria. Nasser felt that if overall Arab-Israel settlement came in sight, he believed he could handle Syrians. He spoke specifically in terms of a settlement which would not necessarily involve return of Syrians to Golan Heights. 15. Iraq. Nasser said recent Israel raids on Iraq forces in Jordan had solidified Iraqis behind their government. He noted riots in Baghdad had ceased. 16. Communist China. Nasser said UAR did not have good relations with ChiComs. Bergus 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Exdis. 2 Scranton's meeting with Mahmoud Riad on the morning of December 6 was reported in telegram 4079 from Cairo, December 7. (Ibid.) 344. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 344. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, December 9, 1968, 1532Z. 7823. Subj: December 8 Hussein-Scranton talk. Pass other posts at Dept's discretion. 1. Following is Embassy-prepared summary of conversation between King Hussein and Governor Scranton evening of December 8. Zaid Rifai, Secretary General of Royal Diwan, was only other person present. Summary report approved by Governor Scranton. 2. Governor Scranton said that King presented his points calmly and dispassionately throughout talk. While revealing disappointment with US actions, or lack of actions, did not punctuate his criticism with sharp or bitter comments. He was “very pleasant.” (Zaid Rifai later at King's dinner told me that he thought the talk had gone very well and that the King had been impressed and pleased with the Governor.) 3. Much of conversation dealt with terms of possible settlement (Amman 7822). 2 Hussein agreed with Scranton's interpretation of Nasser's position as revealed in recent Cairo conversation: 3 i.e., (A) Nasser wanted Sinai back; (B) was willing to be accommodating re Canal, Tiran Straits; (C) could participate in contractual arrangement to Security Council under SC resolution; (D) could accept UN presence but not demilitarization; (E) would find no problem with UN or other kind of international presence at Sharm al-Shaykh; (F) did not believe Syria would present a major problem in settlement; and (G) did not necessarily want to keep Gaza, but did not want it to be given to Israel. 4. Hussein revealed a favorable estimate of Nasser now. Admitted having difficulties with him in past, but asserted he was utterly convinced that Nasser wanted a settlement. Said he and Nasser were working closely together. Zaid Rifai mentioned to Scranton that Hussein had occasionally “laid down the law to Nasser” and Nasser had complied. 5. Hussein seemed quite confident about his abilities to keep the country under control. Admitted he had problem with Iraqi forces but felt he had this situation under control as well. Admitted that King Faysal was giving money to Fedayeen, and that latter had ChiCom and Russian equipment. 6. Hussein did not raise Phantom issue as such, or his interest in sending General Khammash to Washington. Only Rifai referred to Hussein's Dec 2 message to President Johnson. 4 Hussein said he could not defend Jordan if Israel attacked. Mentioned that pressures to buy Russian arms were growing, but did not criticize US position on arms supplies. 7. Hussein said he was convinced that Soviets genuinely wanted peace. 8. Hussein also indicated his interest in an early visit to the US to see President-elect. 9. Scranton went into some depth with Hussein re Jordan's economic future, noting how well country had been doing prior to June war. (He also pursued subject during subsequent dinner with King, discussing water resources, desalination schemes, etc.) 10. Scranton also discussed refugee problem at length. King wanted some scheme which would bring refugees as a group under one authority. 5 Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. 2 Telegram 7822 from Amman, December 9, provided an account of Governor Scranton's discussion with King Hussein on the informal exchanges between Jordan and Israel. King Hussein indicated that as a result of the exchanges he had become convinced that Israel was not serious about negotiating a settlement with Jordan. His conclusion was that Israel was determined to annex significant portions of the West Bank and would refuse to leave East Jerusalem. Hussein felt that the United States was the only country capable of exerting sufficient pressure to change Israeli policy, but he did not anticipate such a dramatic change in U.S. policy. (Ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) 3 See Document 343 . 4 See 341 . 5 Scranton also met with Prime Minister Talhouni on December 8. A report on that meeting was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7831 from Amman, December 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON) 345. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 345. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, December 9, 1968, 2025Z. 8369. Subject: UARG reaction to USG reaction. 1. UAR PermRep El Kony called on Amb Wiggins Dec 9 to convey message from FonMin Riad. El-Erian, Mohammed Riad and Amb Buffum present. 2. Translating from statement drafted in third person, El Kony read four points: A. FonMin surprised at USG reaction of disappointment to his memo 2 replying to seven points Secretary raised with him. B. FonMin regrets he cannot agree with US that UAR memo will not help Jarring because latter has informed Egyptians to contrary. C. USG reaction will not be helpful to US-UAR dialogue. D. It has been hoped this dialogue would promote understanding but now it seems it might create misunderstanding. 3. El Kony added his own hope that after further study of memo US would have different reaction from our initial one. Wiggins said if memo helps Jarring, that is good. Certainly early sections of memo (which El Kony called historical expose) look backward rather than forward. Perhaps we were expecting too much in a tragic situation which moves so painfully slow. If memo does prove to be helpful element, we will gladly admit our reaction to it was wrong. 4. Buffum inquired whether UAR memo envisages no settlement without Syria being part of it. Mohammed Riad declared principle of withdrawal underlies everything. While issues of Canal and Tiran Strait can be separated out as UAR-Israel bilateral problems, principle of withdrawal is common problem for UAR, Jordan and Syria. Wiggins pointed out that this brings situation back to basic impasse. Buffum suggested Riad's explanation seems something like adding apples and pears because Syria has not accepted Res 242. El Kony expressed view that if principle of withdrawal is recognized fully, other issues would fall in place. Wiggins 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. 2 See footnote 2, Document 337 . 346. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 346. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, December 11, 1968, 0845Z. 6445. Scranton Visit. 1. This is report of meeting December 9 between Gov. Scranton and FonMin Eban cleared by Gov. Scranton. DirGen Rafael and Asst DirGen Bitan also present. 2. Eban began by presenting his whole theory of global conflict. 1967 Arab-Israel war had been a great free world victory and global context was clear setback for Soviet penetration of ME. It was Sov policy to get Sixth Fleet out or to denuclearize ME. Chief agent of Sovs is Nasser. Since Israel has achieved success and has stopped Sov takeover of ME, US and Israel should join together as espousers of freedom. 3. In Eban's opinion USSR understands that US and Israel hope for freedom in area. Because of Israel's successful policy, Sovs have instituted contacts recently and have realized that Israel is a large factor in ME and does not intend to be displaced. It is true that Sovs have strengthened their influence in ME, but only in those places where they were strong before, such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, UAR, Sudan. Sovs would like to make Mediterranean a Soviet lake. 4. Scranton asked whether Eban didn't agree position of Jordan and Saudi Arabia was weaker than before. Didn't they have more internal troubles on which Soviets could capitalize? 5. Eban said in his opinion US was dominant power in ME and all eyes were on Washington. Suez Canal was our big card and we should play it for peace and not wish for necessity to reopen Canal in absence of peace. US should depend on and help continue Israel's association with Iran and Ethiopia. If ever there was a clear exposition of Nasser's Sov ties and intentions, it was Dulles' written statement to Israel re UAR in 1957. 2 6. Eban's next theme was how to get peace. This should be done between Israel and Jordan first. Israel and Eban strongly anti-Nasser; Hussein more reasonable. Israel's two important principles were to “go forward" to secure and permanent boundaries that are recognized. There must be an agreed solution (“and US says this too”) and not one imposed from outside. In short, nature of peace most important. There must be an end to blockades, raids, etc. though not necessarily exchange of ambassadors. In short, settlement must be in terms of international law and order. 7. Eban continued Israel was opposed to external guarantees. These never worked. Israel had had deepest commitment from France but this had not worked. Agreement must come from countries themselves. In Eban's opinion, Nasser's objective was to get territory back without peace or if this was not possible, wait until he was in position to go to war again. 8. On territorial problem, Eban said, Nasser did not wish to allow Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterway. He had been completely unresponsive to Secretary Rusk's seven points. Scranton pointed out this somewhat exaggerated and response not completely negative. 9. Eban thought Egypt represented greatest rigidity. Sovs however not so rigid now. They had recently come to Israel, which is victory for Israel's stand on strength and determination not to withdraw without real peace. 10. Eban said Jordan was not thinking of another war. Hussein needs to settle soon or there will be an internal collapse because of Palestinian problems. He could make peace without Cairo's assent, Hussein tells Israel, but he needs a peace good enough from his point of view as not to cause internal problems with Palestinians. Israel's proposals re West Bank were that no Arab army should be west of Jordan River. Jordan would get back 90 percent of population and 85 percent of territory on West Bank. Only 17,000 Arabs would be left in the territory which Israel required. Re Jerusalem, it must remain united and capital of Israel. Good progress had been made with Vatican re Christian Holy Places and Israel would be glad to give sovereignty (sic) over Christian Holy Places to appropriate bodies. Any agreed sovereign (sic) for Moslem Holy Places would be agreeable to Israel but Jordan was nearest and second obvious choice. 11. Asked by Scranton about talks which had gone on with Palestinians about possible West Bank state, Eban said GOI not optimistic. Did not like idea of buffer state. Most Palestinians wish to be with whoever is in charge of East Bank. Inference was that any such separate state likely to be only a temporary problem child. 12. In response question about future of UAR and Nasser, Eban said anyone would be better than Nasser. If there were a change, at least whoever came after Nasser would be fresh and might do what Sukarno's successors have done. 13. Eban did not give clear picture of thinking on Gaza. Said UAR didn't want it, Israel didn't want it but also did not want Jordan to have it because did not desire to see Jordan-UAR border. Eban made vague references to Jordan's having opening to sea through Gaza but was not committed to that. 14. Eban noted he had made proposal for world conference on refugees but had been turned down. 15. Dept repeat other posts as desired. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2 An apparent reference to the August 1, 1958, letter from Secretary of State Dulles to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion. For text, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 77 - 79 . 347. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 347. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, December 11, 1968, 0850Z. 6446. Scranton Visit. 1. This is report of meeting Dec 9 between Gov Scranton and Prime Minister Eshkol, cleared by Gov Scranton. 2 Asst DirGen MFA Bitan and Yaakov Herzog, Director General of Prime Minister's office, were also present. 2. Eshkol said he extremely anxious US understand Israel wants peace. He somewhat concerned Israel beginning to give impression even to friends that it may really be expansionist non-peaceful nation. On other hand he was not going to make any kind of arrangement with anyone which he thinks not in best interests of Israel for real agreement. This is Israel's first and perhaps last opportunity for such settlement. 3. GOI thinks it essential for Israel to have arrangements militarily secure in area where so much trouble, so many years, day in and day out. This was reason for “arms" (i.e. projections from north and south from Israeli territory along Jordan River) in Israel proposal. Israel had been more than lenient in its suggestions re Jerusalem and if this whole proposal was not acceptable he (Eshkol) would only be able to throw up his hands. Three times he asked Scranton “What would you do?” 4. Eshkol's whole attitude on Nasser was completely different. He did not entirely rule out possibility that agreement might some day be reached with Nasser, but almost. Eshkol spent some time going over with Scranton maps of Israel-Jordan and Israel-UAR areas and discussing each in turn. Said Israel admitted territorial problems with UAR would be easier to settle. Israel knew UAR did not want Gaza. GOI had no objection to giving back all Sinai except for Sharm el Sheikh and access thereto. Israel had to have control over Tiran Strait and Eshkol dwelt on history of troubles at Tiran. 5. Eshkol continued that he particularly did not trust what UAR would say about Suez Canal. UAR knew it would take a long time before Canal could be cleared and reopened and they might make promises to get concessions now only to renege later on when Canal opened. Eshkol did not think that Hussein could make an agreement at this stage without approval of Nasser but did not rule out possibility his doing so at some later time. Eshkol inclined to think Hussein far more honest man than Nasser but “if he really is honest why does he tie himself to Nasser?” 6. Gov Scranton told Eshkol that in his own opinion the longer Israel continued to hold on to territory without peaceful settlement the more American public opinion would change away from overwhelming sympathy for Israel to a questioning of her motives. Scranton made this point in some depth. Fair to say Eshkol was somewhat impressed by this statement. 7. Continuing, Eshkol said openly he needed support America and American public opinion and, although to a lesser degree, support of Western Europe. Noted he had “lost" de Gaulle. 8. Eshkol made it clear from his heart that he had no confidence in any UN force or UN visibility and absolutely no confidence in any guarantee from anyone, “including US.” 9. Dept repeat other posts as desired. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2 Scranton met on December 10 with Allon and Dayan. A report on those meetings was transmitted to the Department in telegram 6447 from Tel Aviv, December 11. (Ibid.) 348. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 348. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 11, 1968, 8:55 a.m. Mr. President: I forward this working level information on the history of Phantom financing-about which you will no doubt be hearing from Abe Feinberg, etc. Abe Feinberg came in yesterday to complain again that Clifford is offering only $60 million in credit to the Israelis in a sale of fifty aircraft, whereas the Iranians received $100 million in credit in a sale of thirty-two. 2 I have reported Feinberg's view to Clifford; but it seems clear that only the President's intervention is likely to alter the Defense Department terms-if you wish to do so. I pointed out to Feinberg that Eshkol had told you he would be delighted to pay cash on the barrel-head. 3 Abe acknowledges this but says the Israeli foreign exchange position has deteriorated and Israel should not now be treated worse than rich Iran. 4 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2:25 p.m. 2 Feinberg sent a memorandum to Jim Jones on December 11 outlining the Israeli case for better credit terms. Feinberg asked Jones to show the memorandum to the President. (Ibid., Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel Arms, 10/1/68-1/20/69) 3 In a December 9 memorandum to Rostow, Saunders put the total cost of the purchase at $275-300 million. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 109, 12/1-9/68) 4 There are two handwritten notes by Jim Jones under Rostow's signature. One reads: “Jones told A.K.” A.K. was Arthur Krim, a lawyer and president of United Artists corporation, and a Democratic Party fundraiser and adviser to the President on politics and Middle East policy. The other note indicates what Jones told Krim, which apparently was President Johnson's reaction to Rostow's memorandum: “A.K.-Everybody mad-suppose to be cash. May blow whole deal.” 349. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 349. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 12, 1968, 12:30 p.m. Mr. President: You will wish to be aware of the attached letter from Eshkol on the NPT. 2 It tells us nothing new. Rabin, in the Phantom negotiations, reaffirmed Israel's assurance “not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area.” But it became clear in Warnke's discussion with him that the Israelis feel they could develop a nuclear device but would feel correct in claiming they had not “introduced" it so long as they had neither tested it nor made its existence public. Needless to say, that view leaves a lot to be desired from our viewpoint. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68. Secret; Nodis. 2 Not printed. Prime Minister Eshkol sent the letter to President Johnson on December 4 in response to Johnson's November 15 letter to him urging Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Eshkol wrote that Israel was still giving careful consideration to the long-term security implications of the treaty and would take into account the considerations advanced in Johnson's letter. 350. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 350. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, December 17, 1968, 1310Z. 6853. 1. Jarring said he assumed the UN Secretariat has informed Department of his reports of his recent round of consultations. He did give me in writing the following excerpt from the paper the Israelis had given him for Jordan which he said contained the gist of the document: “Having accepted Resolution 242 for the establishment of a just and lasting peace, we are ready to enter into discussions with Jordan under your auspices in an effort to achieve mutual agreement on ways to implement it. The resolution, being not self-executing, should be subject for discussion and agreement between the parties. This is a legitimate and affirmative formulation, fully consistent with international law and national rights. The essence of our position is that only things that are agreed can be implemented. This is the purpose and intention of Chapter 6 of the Charter as well as of the resolution itself as expressed in paragraph 3, para. on the boundary question. Israel's position is that within the framework of peace, the cease-fire lines will be replaced by agreed, secure and recognized boundaries and the adequate disposition of forces will be carried out in full accordance with what is agreed between the parties. These boundary and security questions are open for negotiation in the context of a transition to a permanent peace which should have treaty form.” 2. Jarring said the Arabs at first read the word “replaced" to mean that Israelis would keep all territory they now hold. He assured them this not the case which Israelis confirmed to him. He did not think the document had advanced matters at all. 3. He also said that the exchanges through him between UAR and Israel while very long had in effect merely said the same old things. 4. On Secretary's seven points Riad told Jarring that the leak in Paris had been unfortunate and had forced him to make his own position clear. Riad said he would reply in writing as requested but pointed out that in written document he would have to be more careful than he could be in an oral discussion. He cited Sharm el Shaikh as an example saying his reply would have to say that UAR could not accept a UN force there for an unlimited time. He would also demand similar arrangement for El Auja. In conversation with Jarring, however, Riad indicated that a fixed period of time for UN occupation of Sharm el Shaikh could be acceptable and under Jarring's prodding indicated this might be for as long as 15 years. For the present I gathered he was not willing that the Israelis be informed of this. 5. Jarring thinks both Arabs and Israel will wait advent of new American administration before making any further moves. He thought Governor Scranton's visit had been very useful. 6. Jarring was impressed with Sapir who he thought saw the problem realistically. Jarring is worried about the escalation between Israel and Jordan and the Israeli policy of four eyes for one. 7. Jarring met yesterday with Semenov and Kuznetsov who were interested in his report but appeared disinclined to discuss matters of substance. Jarring continues to think however that Soviets desire a solution and are pressing the Arabs. 8. Jarring did not think Soviets and Israelis were likely to reestablish relations soon. He said Israelis had repeatedly warned him that if he put forward his own plan his mission was finished. Jarring is thinking of sending a cable to the parties about January 10 proposing further talks but has not yet decided on where he would propose they be held. 9. My impression is that Jarring realizes patience is required and will give it another good try but will not go on indefinitely if no progress is made. Thompson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 351. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 351. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, December 17, 1968, 2204Z. 288486. Ref: Cairo's 4135. 2 1. FYI. President-elect's decision receive Amir of Kuwait and General Dayan was temporary suspension of rules. All previous requests for meetings were turned down, including Iranian request that Mr. Nixon receive Prime Minister Hoveyda. Exception was made in case of Amir and Dayan for various reasons, but we are informed that rule has now been re-imposed and there will be no further exceptions. If Egyptians wish to follow up Governor Scranton's recommendation that Nasser go ahead with his plans to send letter to Mr. Nixon, and if they wish to send it with an emissary, we believe Mr. Nixon would be glad to delegate appropriate representative to receive him. Simplest solution, of course, would be to have letter delivered by Ghorbal. End FYI. 2. You authorized tell Khouly that while exception was made for Amir of Kuwait and Dayan, firm policy of President-elect is not to receive any foreign representatives prior to his inauguration. If, as we understand from various sources, President Nasser wishes send special emissary carrying personal message to Mr. Nixon, latter would be prepared designate appropriate personal representative to receive him. 3. You may tell Heikal we regret he has erroneous impression we seeking humiliate him. No personal slight intended. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Parker, cleared by Ambassador Leonhart in S/NL, and approved by Davies. 2 In telegram 4135 from Cairo, December 14, Bergus noted that President-elect Nixon indicated that he was prepared to receive the Amir of Kuwait and Israeli Defense Minister Dayan prior to the inauguration. This was contrary to the earlier position taken by Nixon that he would receive no foreign dignitaries before the inauguration. Bergus suggested that Nixon should express a willingness to receive an emissary of the UAR as well. (Ibid.) 352. Action Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 352. Action Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 18, 1968. SUBJECT George Woods' Proposal on Israeli Desalting In short, George proposes (Tab A) 2 that we stop thinking for the moment in terms of a large 100-150 million-gallon-per-day (MGD) desalter and concentrate on a 40 MGD plant. He fully shares your goal of becoming able over the next 10-15 years to desalt seawater on a large scale, and he believes we should push ahead with this plant “as a matter of priority.” He has two main reasons for recommending a smaller plant than we initially considered: 1. He believes that the next logical step in developing the technology of large-scale desalting would be to build a 40 MGD plant. This would be enough larger (more than 5 times) than present plants to provide an important test of new technology at reasonable cost (about $58 million). We would gain almost as much in technological knowledge as we would from the $100 million plus that would be needed at a minimum from us to help build the $250 million larger plant. 2. Taking this smaller bite, he feels, is the only way to cut through the highly emotional argument we've had for several years between the crusaders and those who don't believe the time is ripe yet for a $100-250 million leap of faith. Everyone—except possibly AEC—believes this has been George's main contribution. To simplify our financial problem, George believes we should concentrate on desalting and get away from the idea of financing an Israeli electric power plant as part of a dual purpose water and power plant. The Israelis will be building new power plants right along to meet increasing demand for electricity. He doesn't see why they shouldn't provide the steam from one of these power plants as part of their contribution while we concentrate on the desalter to turn that steam into water. Therefore, George proposes we take the necessary steps to get Congressional authorization for Interior to spend up to $40 million on this plant. In addition to the steam from the power plant, Israel would provide $18 million using a loan from the World Bank or some other such loan agency. While the cost of water would still be very high, George believes the total Israeli contribution would not exceed the actual value of the water to Israel. Since the power plant would cost around $20 million, this would add up roughly to a 50-50 split between us. Walt asked Secretary Rusk to pull together the views of State,AID, Interior and AEC on George's proposal (Tab B). 3 With some variations, I think it is fair to say that each of them but AEC would go along with George's general proposal that we try to move ahead with a smaller plant and that you put it in your legislative program. AEC has no objection to going as far as George proposes but objects (especially Jim Ramey) strenuously to: —George's strong words about “abandoning" or “holding in abeyance" the plan for a big dual purpose plant. They believe it is important to preserve the idea that this is just the first step toward a later expansion into a larger plant. Secretary Udall goes along with presenting this to the Congress as Phase I of a larger project, but he would say that Israel must fund later expansion by itself. George says he didn't mean to close any doors—just to re-focus for a moment. —George's unwillingness to insist that the plant use nuclear fuel. His investigations persuade him that there's no economic advantage to nuclear over fossil fuel and that, if we ask the Israelis to provide the steam-producing plant, the choice of fuel ought to be theirs. AEC believes we have a strong interest in nuclear desalting. AEC further feels we should keep our strings on that Israeli decision to be sure they buy US nuclear equipment with safeguards. AEC believes it could justify a contribution of $10-15 million to the power (not desalting) plant if it were nuclear, and if our own California plant doesn't go ahead. Secretary Udall believes we should leave the choice of fuel open. (The Israelis, like the rest of us, would like to leave the choice of fuel open until they can decide what is most economical.) —George's judgment that it's “not possible at this time to obtain financing in the amount [$244 million] 4 on the terms which would be necessary.” AEC feels there would be “extensive Congressional support" for a big nuclear desalting plant because of the sympathetic attitude of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which would review the proposal along with the two Interior Committees. George's proposal for an Interior contribution would only go before the two Interior Committees which would be less cordial. On this last point, Secretary Udall thinks the Senate Interior Committee would be receptive but is less sure about the House. However, he points out that the FY 1970 expenditure would be only $5 million and remaining costs would be spread over five years. Only about $1 million of the FY 1970 figure would be needed for Israeli planning. The rest would go for testing some promising new technology which should go into the Israeli plant. Interior should proceed with this testing in any case, and that would cost about $4 million. AID feels Congress might see even $40 million as “just another aid spigot" and thinks Israel should foot even more of the bill than George recommends. State recommends that we pick up about $30 million of the $40 million, leaving the rest to Israel. In searching for a reasonable compromise, I would stand with George in saying that the fuel is an Israeli decision, but I would be a little less emphatic in “abandoning" the goal of a larger plant. I don't believe we are ready to commit ourselves yet, but I don't see why we shouldn't be quite honest in saying we're neither opening nor closing that door at this stage. We asked both Don Hornig and Charlie Zwick to look at this package: —Don feels that desalting technology has reached a stage where it's time to test a prototype of a large plant. He believes the 40 MGD size George proposes is reasonable. Given the apparently indefinite delay in building the large plant in California, he thinks it's sensible to try the experiment in Israel. He accepts George's recommendation that we concentrate on the desalter and let Israel provide the power plant to produce the necessary steam. He does not believe we should commit ourselves to future expansion of the Israeli project. —Charlie suggests that you let this decision ride. He questions the need to spend tight resources on a large experimental plant where the economic benefits are uncertain, especially when we are straining to keep your budget down. If a large desalting demonstration is to be undertaken, he would prefer that it be done in the US where technological access to the plant is assured over time. He specifically questions the Israeli site in view of the risk of building and operating the plant in a war zone. He feels that AEC funds should not be used to put AEC in the “foreign aid" business on the scale contemplated by AEC. For these reasons, Charlie feels that if we go ahead with the Israeli project the contribution be limited to $30 million, and like foreign aid, we should require that procurement, construction, and operation contracts be limited to US sources. Charlie agrees with Don that we should not commit ourselves to future expansion of the Israeli project. Charlie also agrees with Woods that we would get as much technology out of the 40 MGD plant as out of the big dual-purpose-plant-and at substantially less cost. Yesterday, I had a visit from Yaacov Herzog—Eshkol's chief assistant whom you met at the Ranch—and General Ben Artzi—George Woods' Israeli counterpart. George has shared his thinking with them informally to see whether he was being realistic. Yesterday, Herzog gave me the following message for you in Eshkol's name: Eshkol deeply appreciates your continued attention to this project, even in the closing days of your Administration. He thinks Woods' proposal is quite reasonable, and he would be prepared to discuss details of how to proceed. Herzog felt it would be helpful if you were to include this in your legislative program. The issues are: 1. Whether you wish to put George's proposal in your legislative program. The advantage in doing so would be to put yourself on record with a proposal for a feasible next step (a) in desalting and (b) in a program which you launched with Israel in 1964. The disadvantage is that the Congress may well disregard this proposal, leaving it in worse shape than if it had been left to a riper time. I personally feel that, after four years of pushing this, we should have a concrete proposal from President Johnson on the record. Put it in the program 5 No Call me 2. Whether, if you put it in your program, you would seek authorization for a US contribution of the full $40 million George suggests or press the Israelis to pay even part of the desalting research costs and go for only $30 million. In either case, only about $5 million would need to be appropriated in FY 1970. The argument for the full $40 million is that Israel would build the entire power plant (roughly $20 million plus more than $1.5 million yearly for fuel) and assume the $18 million loan in addition as its fair contribution. This would be about a 50-50 split between us. The argument for $30 million is that Israel too will profit in future plants from the results of the research and should contribute to the desalter too. $40 million $30 million Call me 3. Whether, if you go ahead, you make clear that nuclear fuel must be used. The only people pushing for this are the AEC. George and the rest of us think it makes sense just to leave the door open. Ben Artzi yesterday said he'd like the door left open until they can make studies to determine the most economical approach. Leave door open on fuel Nuclear Call me My own feeling is that, uncertain as our judgments are, we should go ahead with a plant like this soon. However, I recognize that there are still political questions to be considered and that we would probably not wish to begin construction if another war seemed likely. But these are questions for the next Administration. The main issue is whether you wish to propose this first step now or leave the issue entirely to the next team. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Confidential; Exdis. Saunders sent this memorandum to the President under a December 18 covering memorandum in which he indicated that Walt Rostow had asked him to forward it to the President in his absence. (Ibid.) The President wrote the following instruction to Jim Jones on the covering memorandum: “Hold until I'm back & Walt returns.” On December 23 Jones sent the memorandum to Rostow with the suggestion that Rostow take it up with the President after luncheon on December 24. (Ibid.) 2 Document 319 . 3 The reactions of the Departments of State and Interior,AID, and the AEC were summarized by Benjamin Read in a November 29 memorandum to Walt Rostow, attached at Tab B. 4 Brackets in the source text. 5 The first option under each of the three issues is checked. A marginal note in Rostow's hand reads: “approved by the President 24 Dec. 1968" On December 30 Rostow sent a memorandum to Rusk summarizing the President's decisions and asking Rusk to provide a recommendation on the organization best suited to coordinate and manage the project. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II) 353. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 353. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, December 19, 1968, 1415Z. 7992. Subject: Next Steps In Moving Toward Arab-Israel Settlement. Summary : The following report gives our views of the current situation and recommends tactics in the next stages. End summary . 1. Here in Amman we have a definite feeling of having arrived at an impasse in efforts to reach an Arab-Israel settlement. We have reported the gloomy attitudes of senior Jordanians caused by the hiatus in Jarring's activities and their increasing stress on the need for building up a stronger defensive military posture in order to deal effectively with Israel. Several of my diplomatic colleagues with good connections to the Palace and Prime Ministry share my own observations of the current purposeless drift in Jordanian policy—with its overtones of pessimism. The piece of paper handed to Governor Scranton by King Hussein (Amman 7822) 2 graphically summarized Hussein's own conclusion that Jordanian contacts with Israel, both direct and indirect, have failed to produce progress towards a peaceful settlement. The King emphasized he could do no more. In effect, the Jordanians are now leaving the initiative to others. 2. My own reading of the present situation is that the Jordanians (with strong behind-the-scenes support from the UAR and other Arabs) are also clearly putting a challenge to the US, and particularly to the new administration. In many ways it is an unrealistic challenge and their expectations for policy changes and new initiatives certainly exceed the possibilities. Nevertheless, the seeming impasse coupled with this Arab challenge and expectation require us in our own interest to develop revised tactics. 3. Aside from the fact that our present tactics are not producing progress, there are other reasons suggesting a change: A. Time is running out. In many respects, not just psychologically, we are farther removed from a settlement now than a year ago , in the first flush of enthusiasm for the Jarring Mission. B. Judged realistically, we are not going to get a nice tidy settlement that will provide perfect security and all of the usual trappings of international intercourse for Israel . After the wave of realism following June 1967 conflict, the Arabs in recent months have become less, rather than more, willing to compromise on the acceptance of Israel as a state with which they will entertain normal international relations. (In many ways the Arabs do not have normal diplomatic relations with each other.) I share the opinion of Amb Barbour, as conveyed to FonMin Eban (Tel Aviv 6153), 3 that there is no possibility in the first instance of full peace and diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arabs. In fact, while we have waited and watched Jarring wrestle with this problem, we may have missed opportunities to settle for less perfect arrangements. C. As seen from Amman, the Israeli Govt's continuing inability to develop a consensus not only makes it unlikely Jarring can succeed but is the major stumbling block in the path of a breakthrough in the purely Jordanian-Israeli context of a settlement. More and more Israeli spokesmen seem to define Israeli security concerns in terms of acquisition of territory. The Israelis seem unable to grasp that the Allon plan and its variations are not only unacceptable to Jordan but that it also represents the kind of arrangement that would perpetuate hostility. Similar arrangements elsewhere during the twentieth century have demonstrated they are more likely to breed subsequent trouble and irredentism than to guarantee security. D. The Israeli “clarification process" with Jordan thus has been singularly unrealistic, unspecific, and unproductive . I have been baffled (and indeed suspicious) all along about what the Israelis have told us but have assumed it was because I was not privy to closely held details. Yet, if we are to take Hussein's comments to Gov Scranton seriously, then I think we must conclude that even if the Israelis have not just been pulling wool over our eyes, they have definitely moved too slowly and have failed to come to grips with the realities as far as Jordan is concerned. E. Our assurances to Hussein (Amman 7548) 4 seem embarrassingly explicit when, together with the principles of the Nov 22 resolution, they are put up against the position Eban outlined to Jarring early this month (Tel Aviv 6401). 5 More ominously, however, the comments of Rafael (State 280109) 6 indicate that Israel still has expectations that Jordan could agree to more substantial concessions on the West Bank and in Jerusalem than we have predicted. These expectations are unrealistic. Even in the unlikely event that Hussein did agree to such Israeli territorial demands, however, I question whether from our standpoint such an arrangement could constitute a lasting peace . Our assurances to Jordan and Jordan's own internal situation place very decided constraints on the bargaining situation. At the least, Hussein sees our assurances as his final, fallback position. We must accept this fact ourselves and continue to make it clear to the Israelis. F. I finally come back to the point that in stressing that “the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace,” we may have sometimes been bemused into forgetting that we are a very interested party, with high stakes of our own. The past year has demonstrated that if we leave this peacemaking process to the Israelis and the Arabs, there is going to be virtually no forward movement . G. Unless we capitalize on the existing possibilities in the parties' stated attitudes towards the Nov 22 resolution, we may well drift further into the situation that Hussein foresees: an increase in incidents, tensions, and extremism (which Hussein was careful to explain would occur “on both sides”). Unfortunately, the fact that this tragedy has already played to a full house for twenty-one years does not mean it may not have an even longer run. 4. In proposing revised US tactics, I am not suggesting US intervention in the meaningless or negative sense often advocated by the Arabs (e.g., economic pressure on Israel). Another consideration is that Jarring might be finished with the Israelis if he put forth his own plans. This constitutes an added reason for us to move ahead in a more enterprising fashion—to communicate a muscular sense of urgency—but in a manner that would not undercut Jarring. This can be done as outlined below: A. During the past year we have not talked substance enough with the parties on a regular and continuing basis. We perhaps have been overly cautious about giving any impression of undercutting the Jarring Mission. At sporadic intervals in New York or Washington we have gotten down to the heart issues, as in the Secretary's Nov 2 meeting with Riad. But there has been virtually no movement in the interims. Amb Barbour's question whether to pass certain Israeli comments to the Jordanians (para 5 of Tel Aviv 6404) 7 suggests a need to decide whether the Ambassadors on the spot should become more actively involved in an exercise from which we heretofore have been relatively detached. I believe as far as Jordan is concerned we have missed several strategic opportunities for more intensive, substantive probing and that these need not have endangered Jarring's mission. Given the organization and conduct of the Jordan regime, inevitably we must deal with Hussein and one or two close advisers if we are to get anything done at all. I personally would like to discuss with Hussein, for example, whether he could seriously entertain the idea of Israeli security enclaves or security corridors on the West Bank, and where, and for how long. I would recommend ascertaining whether Hussein could accept some kind of phased withdrawal by which Israeli military enclaves, perhaps under UN aegis, might remain on the West Bank temporarily while a regime of peace and security was being established. Similarly, I think we need to elicit Hussein's views regarding the Israeli concept of “open borders" and “free access" to the Mediterranean. We stand to lose more time and opportunities if we leave entirely to the Israelis the probing of the Jordanian position (particularly in the light of the exercise of the last several months which Hussein categorically says has failed). B. I also recommend that we undertake more intensive discussions with the parties on the outlines of a pragmatic and honorable solution to the Jerusalem problem. This is a key. I think we should aim at a solution which, at a minimum, removes from unilateral Israeli jurisdiction the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem. C. I do not know whether there is a Washington task force on the Arab-Israel problem in being, but it seems to me the proposed shift in our policy and tactics would require a tightly controlled group in Washington to work full time on this problem in the same manner as has been done for Viet-Nam or Berlin. The mere formation of a task force would have substantive impact of some dimension. D. Finally, I recommend that consideration be given to publishing or “leaking" specific and detailed USG views on what we would consider would be a fair and reasonable implementation of the Nov 22 resolution. I would see the objective of this frankly to put public pressure on the more stubborn of the three parties—the UAR and Israel. 5. Dept please pass Tel Aviv. 8 Symmes 1 Source: National Records and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. 2 See footnote 2, Document 344 . 3 Document 326 . 4 Document 328 . 5 Eban met with Jarring in Nicosia on December 2 and told him that specific territorial proposals as a basis for an agreement between Israel and Jordan had been put to high-level Jordanian officials. Eban outlined the Israeli proposals, which closely paralleled the Allon plan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) 6 Not found. 7 The telegram citation is incorrect. The correct citation has not been further identified. 8 A note on the telegram indicates that it was not passed to Tel Aviv. 354. Note From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State 354. Note From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State 1 Washington, December 19, 1968. Note was taken in Moscow of some recent statements made by American officials in conversations with Soviet representatives in Washington and New York regarding the problems of a Middle East settlement, including observations made by Under Secretary Eugene Rostow, on behalf of the Secretary of State, in the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on November 8 last. We welcomed the statement by the American side of its interest in continuing Soviet-American contacts and a regular exchange of views on the problems of a Middle East settlement. We, for our part, consider these contacts to be useful and are ready to continue them. American representatives have put forward a number of considerations on the questions related to a settlement in the Middle East. These considerations are of definite interest, and we would like to express our opinion in connection with some of them. 1. The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the statement by the American side to the effect that Israel is now resting the whole territorial question on the Armistice Agreements of 1949, that is to say, in other words, that it has no territorial claims against the Arab States. It would be highly important that such a clear-cut and unequivocal statement be brought by the Israelis to the attention of Arab representatives as well (for instance, through Mr. Jarring). Such a statement, in our opinion, would undoubtedly facilitate progress in the cause of a settlement in the Middle East; it would lead to the development of a new and positive approach to this question. 2. The American side expressed the view that Israel's only territorial claim, so far as the UAR is concerned, concerns the question of guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran, since Israel raises the question of the necessity of stationing her forces at Sharm El Sheikh. Such a suggestion reveals once more the lack among the Israeli leaders of a realistic approach towards the problems of a settlement in the Middle East and their unwillingness to take the path of introducing reasonable and constructive proposals capable of advancing the whole question of settlement. 3. In the conversation of November 8 the American side drew our attention to the two points in Eban's document of November 4: 2 that it is essential for the UAR to clarify its attitude toward a number of aspects of a settlement in the Middle East; and that the question of boundaries between Israel and the UAR could be discussed after the Egyptians have stated their readiness to establish a lasting peace with Israel. As we see it, the UAR position is determined not only by the fact of its official recognition of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and by the statement of the UAR's readiness to implement the provisions of that resolution, but also by the constructive response of the UAR government to the known “seven points,” outlined by Mr. Rusk. In that answer it is stated: “As to the termination of the state of belligerency, it will come into force on the Arab side as soon as Israel's forces are withdrawn from the entire Arab territory occupied after June 5, 1967.” At the same time, the Arab States have reasons to be dissatisfied with the fact that Israel, so far, has not made a clear and precise statement concerning recognition of this resolution and the readiness to implement it, that is, a statement similar to the corresponding statement by the Arab side. Moreover, the UAR is known to have proposed drawing up a timetable for implementing the resolution, that is, for implementing all of its provisions, and has made specific suggestions in that connection. The Secretary of State has already had an opportunity to become acquainted with these suggestions. As for Israel, we know nothing about its attitude, not only toward these specific suggestions but even toward the very idea of drawing up a concrete program of measures to implement the resolution, which could lead to the establishment of peace and tranquillity in the Middle East. The American side, it seems to us, concurs in the necessity of a concrete approach to the questions of settlement. All the more valid, then, is the proposal of the Arab side regarding the necessity of working out a plan of concrete steps for the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. It would seem proper for the American and Soviet sides to make efforts to assist the sides in working out such a plan. We would like to point out, in this connection, that we had already conveyed to the Secretary of State, on September 4 last, our views on this score. 4. Moscow concurs in the idea of stepping up the mission of Mr. Jarring, who could, taking into account the positions of the sides known to him, himself make proposals that would help to bring these positions closer. 5. We believe that the so-called seven points, enumerated by the American side, contain some constructive views. In particular, we noted that the first place among them is given to the question of Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories seized after June 5, 1967. Naturally, the attitude of the Middle Eastern countries to these proposals is of crucial importance. As it is known, the UAR Government has already replied to these American views. On the whole, the UAR leadership regarded the US “seven points" favorably, stipulating that the question can be that of the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab territories, i.e., not only from the territory of the UAR but also from those of Jordan and Syria. 6. As for the proposal made by the American side regarding the demilitarization of the entire Sinai Peninsula, we do not believe that it will be acceptable to the UAR. In view of the incommensurability of the Sinai and the Negev, it would be feasible, in our opinion, to speak only about the possibility of creating separate demilitarized zones along the boundaries in this area. 7. Now, as never before, there is a need for clarity and unambiguity in the positions of the sides. One cannot but admit that up to now efforts to obtain such clarity from the Israelis have been unsuccessful. While the Arab side has made a number of concrete and realistic proposals, which largely contributed to the development of some positive changes in the matter of a Middle East settlement, one cannot say this about Israel. Its position continues to be the main obstacle in the way of achieving a settlement in the Middle East. Therefore, we hope that the US Government will exercise its influence upon the Israeli Government so that the latter may adopt a more realistic position. The Soviet Government expresses its readiness for a further exchange of views with the American side regarding the problems of a settlement in the Middle East. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Exdis. The text is a translation prepared in the Division of Language Services. The original of the note has not been found. A handwritten notation indicates that the note was handed to Secretary Rusk by Soviet Charge Tcherniakov on December 19. Telegram 290908 to Cairo, December 21, which transmitted the text of an unofficial translation of the note prepared by the Soviet Embassy, indicates that Tcherniakov gave the note to Eugene Rostow rather than Rusk. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) See also Document 355 . 2 See footnote 2, Document 307 . 355. Memorandum of Conversation 355. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 20, 1968, 5:10-5:30 p.m. SUBJECT F-4 Agreement PARTICIPANTS Israeli Side Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.—Ambassador Rabin Deputy Commander IAF—B/General Peled Defense and Armed Force Attache—B/General David Carmon United States Side Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Paul C. Warnke Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NESA)—Harry H. Schwartz Deputy Director, Near East & South Asia Region, ISA—Robert J. Murray Ambassador Rabin said he had called to review the status of the F-4 agreement. He said that the political side was finished with his exchange of letters with Mr. Warnke. 2 The negotiations with Mr. Schwartz are also finished. Ambassador Rabin asked if they may start tomorrow to develop a letter of offer. Mr. Schwartz said that they could. Ambassador Rabin said that the answer on financing had been given to Mr. Kuss; 3 Israel would only take government credit. Rabin said: “If someone asks why our reserves in the United States go down, this is it.” General Carmon said that the overall package would cost about $300 million. Some of this would be on credit with the remainder a “dependable undertaking.” Mr. Schwartz said he had just learned that Israel had decided to buy 6 RF4C aircraft now and, working with the company, have the engines changed to make it compatible with the F-4Es. General Peled confirmed that this was their decision. Ambassador Rabin said there was still one problem: early deliveries. Mr. Warnke said that we had done our work and sent the facts to the President. He said that the decision rests with the White House. Ambassador Rabin observed that there were two aspects: political and technical. He said the President would of course decide the political. He asked, however, whether Mr. Warnke could tell him whether early deliveries were possible on the technical side. Mr. Warnke said anything was possible; it was a question of whether it was desirable. General Peled said that he had talked with everyone he could in the Air Force about how the IAF would handle early deliveries. He complained that the USAF people would not engage him in a discussion—they just listened. Peled asked whether we thought he had been convincing. Mr. Warnke said he did not appear to have convinced the Air Force. He said that while General Peled's sincerity in pleading his case was not at all doubted, it was a difference of professional judgment. General Peled asked if he may talk further with the Air Force people. Mr. Warnke replied that he could and that General Larson was the man to talk to. Mr. Warnke said that it would be the President who made the decision, in any case. General Carmon suggested that a draft letter of offer be completed for General Peled to take back to Israel with him. Israel could then make decisions and these decisions could be communicated to the United States after the holidays. Mr. Warnke agreed. Ambassador Rabin raised the question of publicity and said, somewhat unhappily, that he presumed that we wanted to continue to say the same thing as before. Mr. Warnke said yes. We would say only that negotiations were continuing. Mr. Schwartz suggested this was a matter primarily for the Department of State. Ambassador Rabin asked Mr. Warnke if he would like to sign the agreement in Israel. Mr. Warnke said he would like to very much but was not sure he would be able to do so. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray on December 21 and approved by Schwartz. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. 2 See footnote 3, Document 332 , and Document 333 . 3 Henry J. Kuss, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations. 356. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 356. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, December 21, 1968, 0139Z. 290924. Subject: Arab-Israel Settlement. 1. Soviet Charge Tcherniakov called on Undersecretary Rostow December 19. Hart also present. Tcherniakov presented unofficial translation of Soviet document 2 responding to November 8 remarks by Rostow to Dobrynin and outlining positive nature of UAR position, including reply to Secretary's seven points. Text of document being transmitted separately. 2. Rostow read note quickly, said we welcomed it, and would be glad to continue exchanges on the subject. We would give document study and reply as soon as possible. In meantime, he had some preliminary comments 3. First comment was with regard to para. 1 of Soviet paper. Rostow wished there to be no misunderstanding between us on significance of reference to Armistice Agreements in Eban paper to Jarring. 3 The Armistice Agreements clearly specified that Armistice Demarcation Lines were not definitive political and international boundaries, but could be changed by agreement as part of transition from Armistice to peace. FYI. These provisions inserted in 1949 at Arab insistence. End FYI. We believe GOI position as stated in Eban paper to Jarring is that Israel has no territorial claims as such, except for minor rectifications of Armistice lines and arrangements to guarantee security and maritime rights. But we cannot speak for Israel. And we wish to avoid any misunderstanding with Soviets such as occurred in summer of 1967. 4. Rostow's second general preliminary comment was that Soviet paper made no reference to his questions to Dobrynin put on July 3 and on November 8 regarding UAR willingness to make peace and to enter into an agreement establishing peace, and equally to his suggestion of Nov. 8 for a practical negotiating procedure by UAR and Israel through Jarring to deal with issues of withdrawal, demilitarization of Sinai and guarantee of maritime rights. The prime interest of the US and USSR was in the establishment of peace, as set forth in the Resolution of November 22, 1967. This was the goal of the Resolution and of US policy from June 5, 1967. The UAR position in this respect was not clear and these questions must be answered before further progress could be made in implementing SC Resolution of Nov. 22, 1967. 5. Rostow said US recognized importance of problem of withdrawal. He cited with approval Dobrynin's remarks on Arab distrust of Israel's intentions in this regard, and on Israeli suspicions that Arabs do not intend peace, as the key to the problem. Eban had given a functional definition of Israeli policy towards withdrawal, and said that when the Arabs make clear their intent to make peace, Israel will go into more detail on withdrawal. The Secretary, in his November 2 conversation with Riad, had spoken of complete withdrawal from Sinai, putting the question of Gaza to one side for the moment, and saving the question of security arrangements and guarantees of maritime rights. Withdrawal would be subject to security arrangements, demilitarization and guarantees of maritime rights. Israel did not want to be put in a position of having to fight once more to regain those rights. Our position was that the Secretary had given Riad powerful assurances on withdrawal from Sinai. The guarantees on the other matters were not discussed by the UAR. We felt that we had taken a very big step in the Secretary's talk with Riad, and that UAR had not responded on the issues of crucial concern to us. 6. The Israelis took position they did not have territorial claims as such but had legitimate interests under the Nov. 22 Resolution in questions of security and maritime rights, which could have territorial implications. Armistice lines were not final borders, but Dobrynin himself had said minor rectifications possible (Tcherniakov interjected that Dobrynin had said this was not quite what he had said, his words had been misinterpreted by Rostow. Latter however read from Para. 5 of State 269827 4 reporting conversation in question and clarified his own recollection. FYI. We have also had report of conversation with Semenov in which he accepted idea of some border rectification. 5 End FYI). In any event US position was clear. We had thus taken big step and UAR should make use of Secretary's position and also come forward with progress on the other side of equation, namely peace and a procedure for reaching it. 7. Rostow said US could not take position with UAR that no agreement was possible until Syria came along. Syria had not even accepted Nov. 22 resolution. 8. We were unable to understand sentence in Soviet document to effect that Israel had not “accepted" Resolution. We thought debate on that topic was finished. Israel had said to Jarring that it accepted the Resolution. Rostow had given a copy of GOI statement in this respect to Dobrynin. As a matter of Soviet policy, was there anything wrong or insufficient in Israeli statement that it accepted the resolution and was ready to implement it by agreement? It was important that we clarify this question between US and USSR. For us, Resolution was not self-implementing. Under para. 3, implementation required agreement of parties. Did USSR agree? Did Arab position reported in para. 3 of Soviet paper mean that implementation required withdrawal first, negotiation later on other items in Resolution? Secretary had taken clear position on this with Riad. Tcherniakov replied that he was not aware of public Israeli statement in form of Rostow's formula. He did not directly challenge Rostow formulation, but said he knew of no public Israeli statement to that effect. Rostow undertook to provide him with series of texts. Tcherniakov said Arabs and Soviets worried by fact Israel had not accepted resolution while Arabs have. First step was for Israel to accept the resolution. The second was to implement it. The UAR had come forward with a timetable of implementation to which Israel had not responded. Rostow said the UAR timetable was not complete, and in any event could not be made a substitute for the agreement between the parties required by para. 3 of Resolution. We had never objected to a timetable as a way of carrying out agreement of parties. The first question was how the parties could reach agreement. 9. Tcherniakov asked why we doubted UAR willingness to implement the resolution. Rostow said it was because US had yet to get clear answers to its questions, either through Soviets or directly from UAR. From earlier Sov paper 6 it was clear that a multilateral document was acceptable to Sovs as a means of embodying the agreement among the parties called for by the resolution, but UAR had so far not given assurances it would sign such a document. After experience of 1957, when US negotiated on behalf of Egypt, and latter broke agreement when it closed Strait of Tiran, Riad simply says he will give a letter to the Security Council. This would not suffice. We have said there must be agreement if we are to support withdrawal. We had no objection to a timetable if it was part of an agreement, but UAR proposal had made no reference to para. 3 of the Resolution nor answered Secretary's 7th point. 10. Tcherniakov said that some form of “juridical document" could be worked out. Rostow said it would have to be signed by both parties. Tcherniakov said UAR in its timetable proposed that both Israel and Arabs deposit documents with the Security Council. Rostow said we had not insisted on a Treaty but suggested the Soviet-Japanese procedure as a model. Secretary, in his 7th point, had indicated that document establishing peace must be signed by both parties. 11. Tcherniakov said both US and Sovs agreed there must be legal, formal agreement, but there were several forms it could take. If UAR proposed a specific form, it did not mean it was rejecting concept of agreement. Rostow said this was a good point, but UAR had never proposed anything quite that clear to us. He cited the confusion regarding Riad's remarks on signing the same document in his Nov. 2 conversation with the Secretary. A document was needed, as with USSR and Japan. We have had no answer from UAR as yet on this point. Israelis had taken important initiative, next step was up to UAR, which must define what it had in mind with regard to (a) peace, (b) security and (c) maritime rights. This could be done in a private meeting with Jarring, at which issues of withdrawal and security arrangements could be settled. With all the ammunition given to Riad by Secretary, UAR had not yet moved. We had given Egyptians the US position. This was a major step. We had expected a major step in reply, but Riad kept saying the only important question is withdrawal. 12. Tcherniakov said UAR position unequivocally recognized Israeli right to exist whereas the Israelis had not made their first step towards the Arabs. The Arabs had made the first step and had been more forthcoming than Israelis. Rostow said we would study document and give a formal reply. He asked for Russian original and was promised it for Dec. 20. 13. For Moscow. Suggest Ambassador may find a convenient occasion to review ground with Dobrynin, either at this stage or when fuller reply is provided. We should also appreciate Ambassador's judgment of the significance of timing, tone, and content of Soviet reply in broader setting of Soviet policy. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Eugene Rostow, Hart, and Parker; cleared by Day (IO/UNP); and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 2 Document 354 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 307 . 4 Telegram 269827 to Tel Aviv, November 9, reported on a November 8 luncheon conversation during which Eugene Rostow and Dobrynin discussed the Israeli and UAR positions in the Middle East peace process. Paragraph 5 reported Dobrynin's understanding that Israel had no territorial claims on the UAR, but had raised territorial questions in connection with security problems and with the question of guaranteeing rights of passage through the Straits of Tiran. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 5 See footnote 2, Document 310 . 6 An apparent reference to the attachment to Document 245 . 357. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 357. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, December 21, 1968, 1827Z. 291067. Subject: Military Supply Program for Jordan. Ref: Amman 7941. 2 1. We have reviewed Country Team's timely and well-reasoned recommendations for US military supply relationships with Jordan over the next few years. 2. FMS Credit : FMS credit approved in principle for Jordan in FY 69 but exact figure will depend on worldwide and regional priorities as matched against total credit available. We note your recommendation for $14 million in FY 69 and $15-$20 million in FY 70. At moment we are using $14 million as a planning figure for FY 69 and for contingency use in FY 70. Technical requirements for release of FY 69 FMS credit for all countries not yet complete. In addition, credit amount for Jordan cannot be fixed until intra-USG discussion of country allocations, now underway, is finalized. You authorized inform GOJ that we have approved FMS credit for Jordan in principle for FY 69 but that exact amount as yet undetermined pending completion evaluation of worldwide priorities. You may state we hope to have clearer picture over coming weeks. 3. Grant Aid : Grant aid under MAP for FY 69 and 70 will be limited to CONUS training. After extending discussions at the highest levels of the Dept and DOD it has been decided that a materiel increment for FY 69 and FY 70 cannot be supported. Embassy views were given full consideration. Decision made in context future status of MAP programs on worldwide basis taking into consideration present programs, future availability of funds, Congressional attitudes, etc. Khammash may be informed of this at your discretion, possibly in context of your further arms supply discussions with him and after FMS credit picture clearer. 4. Internal Security : High priority assigned by CT to equipment for improvement and expansion of Jordan's internal security forces appears reasonable based on limited information available. We will give serious consideration to possibility proposed FMS credit be applied to procurement such equipment. Suggest GOJ in consultation with Embassy formalize proposed program in some detail. Assume this will be related to SIG-requested Foreign Internal Defense Plan, which Embassy preparing. 5. Additional Major Items of Military Equipment : Anticipated GOJ requests for major items of military equipment (as reported in reftel) appear to be appropriate subject for annual review discussions specified in March 1968 Memorandum of Understanding. 3 Embassy may consider suggesting this to Khammash in context of possible Khammash visit to Washington early next year, perhaps in March. 6. Agree generally with proposed plan outlined para 5 reftel. 4 Believe following general guidelines appropriate: (a) Internal security program should have highest priority, followed by items required to maintain existing forces (spares, etc.), and only then major new modernization items for army; (b) spare parts, uniforms, ammunition and other maintenance-type items should be purchased for cash. We can agree to annual open-end sales case for spares and minor items which will permit, after annual approval, direct and expeditious requisitioning by U.S. Military Departments. (c) We continue adhere to earlier agreement to consider additional aircraft of same type at some time in future. We are not prepared to go beyond this before: (1) we are convinced GOJ actually desires to have first 18 aircraft in Jordan and operational and (2) they are so located. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Murray (DOD/ISA) and Robert P. Pag-anelli (NEA/ARN); cleared by Hart in draft and by Sidney Sober, Murray, Seelye, and Lewis D. Junior (G/PM); and approved by Davies. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and London. 2 Telegram 7941 from Amman, December 16, presented the Country Team's recommendations for a 3-year military supply program for Jordan. One of the recommendations was a proposed credit sales program of up to $15-20 million per year. (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 3, Document 111 . 4 In paragraph 5 of telegram 7941, the Country Team proposed that the Embassy be authorized to inform the Jordanian Government that the United States was prepared to make available military sales credits for FY 1969. The Country Team proposed a breakdown for the program among the requirements of the army, the air force, and the public security program. 358. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 358. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, December 24, 1968, 2228Z. 292048. Subject: Seven Points. 2 1. In view all the circumstances, we do not believe it would now be useful to give formal reply to Egyptian response on seven points. We therefore do not plan to raise matter further for time being with UAR reps in Washington or New York. Should they wish to discuss, we would of course be prepared to do so. 2. At your discretion, however, you may seek clarification certain points in Egyptian response through informal discussion with your contacts in Cairo. Would be useful, for instance, to have clarification of UAR positions on Golan Heights issue and refugees. There apparent contradiction between what Riad said in November 2 conversation and December 4 memo and what he and Nasser said to Governor Scranton on UAR insistence Israel withdraw from all Arab territory as condition for settlement. 3 We would like to think harder line of November 2 and December 4 was bargaining position for the record and that UAR prepared be flexible on this issue. Long history of misunderstandings with Egyptians, however, indicates danger our believing Egyptians will actually be flexible when and if parties ever advance to negotiations on substance. 3. On question refugees, would be useful know nature Egyptians' reservations on proposal put forward by Secretary. Are they actually in process sounding out Palestinian opinion as Ghorbal says, or is it simply question of unwillingness commit themselves in writing at this stage? Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker; cleared by Hart, Sisco, Davies, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, and Amman. 2 Reference is to the seven points outlined by Secretary Rusk in his November 2 conversation with Foreign Minister Riad; see Document 301 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 337 , and Document 343 . 359. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 359. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, December 24, 1968, 2236Z. 292074. Amman's 6994. 2 1. We share your view that efforts to reach an Arab-Israel settlement are at an impasse and that some changes in tactics will be necessary if progress toward a settlement is to be made. These could be in the direction of (a) a more active U.S. role with the parties making more explicit to them and publicly what we are prepared to support and what we will not support; (b) an effort to concert with the Soviets in order to bring the UAR to acceptance of a contractual, agreed peace as the price of Israeli withdrawal; and, (c) more intensive U.S. efforts with Israelis to secure GOI commitment to principle of withdrawal (Jerusalem, Gaza and minor border adjustments aside) in context of peace. In any event, we plan to operate within the context of the November 22 Resolution keeping Jarring in play, if possible, and avoiding a direct U.S. involvement in the mediatory process. This, of course, will be subject to review by the new administration. 2. Covert Israeli-Jordanian negotiations seem also to be at impasse. Whether the Israelis sought to lull us into inactivity by assuring us repeatedly of progress being made in these talks or whether they simply unable to assess the limits of the possible insofar as Hussein's options are concerned, process seems moribund until such time as one or the other government tables alternative proposals. 3. Your recommendations are along lines of our thinking here. Trend has been toward making more specific U.S. ideas on issues involved in a settlement and clarifying what we are prepared to support. Thus, we agree that when you or Ambassador Barbour sees occasion to feed in ideas or opportunities for substantive probing, you should do so. A necessary caveat is that this must be in the context of an informal exchange of views unless subject is an established U.S. position and should be limited to the two or three decision makers on each side who count and whose discretion can be relied upon. 4. Reftel came as we were clearing letter suggesting you raise with Zaid Rifa'i or other the possibility of Jordan tabling counter proposals to the Allon Plan along lines of recognizing Israel's legitimate concern at security on the West Bank and exploring various interim arrangements which would obtain until Israel is assured of Jordan's capability and willingness to prevent hostile actions being mounted from area against Israel. 3 Joint patrols, UN force with Jordanian and Israeli liaison contingents, or Israeli military enclaves maintained for a limited period, until a regime of peace and security established were ideas that came to mind. These would provide reasonable security assurances for Israel and at the same time give regime stronger grounds for moving against any Palestinian irredentist movements as prolonging Israeli presence. You may wish to touch on these in your forthcoming discussion with King Hussein along with other thoughts in Paragraph 4A of reftel. You might stress to King that an articulated GOJ position on these questions would be useful in flushing out a possible Israeli fallback position to Allon Plan. 5. You should assure King that USG will be actively engaged in supporting moves toward a settlement in the context of the November 22 Resolution. 6. There has been a small working group (NEA-IO-L) which has been engaged in planning on an ad hoc basis for a settlement since August of 1967. Some of the “think pieces" are currently being revised and will be pouched to both posts for comment and background use in informal discussions. 7. We are considering ways of making public more detailed USG views on what we would consider a fair and reasonable settlement under the November 22 Resolution. Recommendations now being formulated for this or next administration. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted by Davies; cleared by Atherton, Seelye, Sisco, and Katzenbach; and approved by Hart. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 2 The reference is incorrect. The correct reference is telegram 7992 from Amman, Document 353 . 3 The letter was not found. 360. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 360. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 24, 1968. SUBJECT The Israeli Phantoms—Final Loose Ends Warnke and Rabin have exchanged letters on the general conditions of the F-4 sale (Tab B). 2 In short, the Israelis have agreed not to use the F-4s to carry nuclear weapons and “not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area.” Rabin told Warnke that as long as Israel had neither tested a device nor made its existence public, it would consider that it had not “introduced" nuclear weapons. Warnke in his letter says mere possession is “introduction,” and that is where the issue rests. Eshkol's last letter to you on the NPT was non-committal. 3 Two issues remain: 1. Delivery date . The Israelis have asked for April 1969. Bus Wheeler believes Israel will be at its greatest disadvantage between June 1969 and mid-1970. However, he does not believe the Israelis could be fully ready to maintain the planes much before January 1970. Also, delivering as early as April, 1969, would require “an unacceptable drawdown of spares" from USAF inventory. Therefore, Bus recommends we begin delivery in September 1969. This could be done without hurting the USAF, and if the Israelis need technical support for a few months they can hire US civilians from the manufacturer. Secretaries Clifford and Rusk endorse his recommendation (Tab A). 4 Approve 5 Disapprove See me 2. Credit . Defense has offered $60 million credit—$30 million each in FY 1969 and FY 1970. The Israelis have formally accepted, so there is really no issue. However, Abe Feinberg says an additional $15 million would help. I believe Defense could handle that much more this year, but the question is whether you wish to offer $75 million after the Israelis have already accepted $60 million. The only advantage to us of the higher figure would be a slightly better picture in Congress for the military sales bill. Stick to $60 million 6 Go to $75 million Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 See footnote 3, Document 332 , and Document 333 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 349 . 4 Attached at Tab A was a December 21 memorandum from Secretary Clifford to President Johnson dealing with the Israeli request for accelerated delivery of the Phantom aircraft. A December 20 memorandum from Warnke to Clifford indicates that Rusk approved Clifford's memorandum to the President. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel 452 (Sen)) 5 President Johnson checked this option. 6 The President checked this option. 361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 24, 1968, 2323Z. 292113. Following is full text of Israeli Aide-Memoire of December 23 2 commenting on Soviet communication delivered to Under Secretary Rostow by Soviet Charge on December 19: 3 Begin Text : Paragraph 1. The document presented by the Soviet diplomat confirms that serious damage to Israeli vital interests has been caused by a USA-Soviet dialogue of this kind. 4 In particular, it is shocking to find that the USSR could have misinterpreted the USA version of Israel's position as in paragraph 1. It is basic to Israel's position that peace requires secure and recognized boundaries and not return to the June 4 lines. Israel's refusal to restore the June 4, 1967 situation is absolute, basic and irrevocable. To avoid returning to the June 4 lines is of supreme national interest which Israel considers worthy of all tenacity and sacrifice. We have attached importance and confidence to USA statements on this point including that of President Johnson on September 10, 1968. But in any case, Israel has the absolute right to be sure that its own position is not misunderstood by the USSR as a result of conversations in Washington. Can we have assurance that the Soviet representative will be given an accurate description of the Israeli and USA positions as hitherto formulated? Paragraph 2. As against Israel's proposal on navigation in the Straits of Tiran, it should be recalled that the U.A.R. has not even acknowledged international character of the Tiran Straits and has specifically rejected any permanent arrangement for protecting navigation more effectively than hitherto. The Soviet paper, too, is completely silent on the freedom of passage through the Straits. This strengthens Israel's view that without Israel's presence there would be a repetition of aggressive U.A.R. action of May 22. Paragraph 3. U.A.R. reply to USA seven points is not “constructive" but destructive. Israel's statement on the resolution in the November 4 memorandum is affirmative and legitimate. Israel will not make any declaration on the resolution which excludes the concept of “agreement" as the governing factor. Israel's attitude on timetable is that after negotiations what is agreed would be implemented. There can only be a timetable after agreement is reached directly between the Arab States and Israel. At this time there can be no timetable since the Arab States have refused to negotiate any agreements. Furthermore, it should be clear that the establishment of peace is more than the “termination of the state of belligerency" and more than what is called a “political solution.” Paragraph 4. Confirms that the USA-USSR dialogue is in danger of interfering with the Jarring Mission. We should like to be assured that the “Idea" to which “Moscow agrees" is not shared by the USA. Paragraph 5. Falsely glosses over the UAR rejection of the USA seven points and confirms Israel's apprehensions that the seven points would encourage the illusion and discourage realism both in Cairo and in Moscow, in addition to causing serious danger to Israel's legitimate negotiating position. Paragraph 6. Marks a retreat from previous hints given through Jarring that the UAR would accept demilitarization arrangement in Sinai. Israel rejects the Soviet-Egyptian idea of separate demilitarized zones “along boundaries.” The UAR policy is to keep open the possibility of making Sinai a springboard and base for future assaults or intimidation. Paragraph 7. Israel is a sovereign state exclusively responsible for its own security and does not need to be “influenced" in the direction of realism. Its positions as stated on November 4 are realistic and legitimate and it is now for the UAR to show a genuine interest in the establishment of peace. The Soviet document does not even discuss the establishment of a permanent or serious peace between Israel and the UAR. End Text . Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Day and Hart, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Moscow, Cairo, and USUN. 2 The original of the aide-memoire is ibid., POL US-USSR. 3 Document 354 . 4 On December 20 Assistant Secretaries Sisco and Hart briefed Israeli Embassy officials on the contents of the Soviet note. (Telegram 291089 to Tel Aviv, December 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Minister Argov telephoned Atherton on December 20 to register his dismay over the U.S.-Soviet exchanges on the Middle East. Argov expressed concern that the Soviets would use the exchanges to further erode the Israeli position. (Memorandum from Atherton to Hart, December 20; ibid., NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Israel, July 1 through Dec 31, 1968) 362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 25, 1968, 0054Z. 292126. Ref: State 290908; 2 State 290924. 3 1. Summary : Israeli Amb. Rabin December 23 delivered Aide-Memoire to Under Secretary Rostow outlining Israeli reaction to latest Soviet approach to USG on Middle East. 4 Aide-Memoire and supplementary comments by Rabin reflect Israeli concern that U.S. policy is changing and that U.S. dialogue with Soviets and UAR is undermining Israeli position and harming Jarring Mission. Rostow reassured Rabin that fundamental U.S. policy unchanged, that U.S. reply to Soviet approach would protect vital U.S. and Israeli interests, and that our dialogue with Soviets is entirely within context and in support of Jarring Mission. End Summary . 2. Israeli Ambassador Rabin, accompanied by Minister Argov and Counsellor Raviv, called on Under Secretary Rostow December 23 to present Aide-Memoire from Foreign Minister Eban setting forth GOI reaction to latest Soviet communication on Middle East handed Rostow by Soviet Charge Tcherniakov December 19. Asst. Secretary Hart, Day (IO), and Atherton (NEA) also present. 3. Rostow commented as follows on Israeli Aide-Memoire (text by septel), which deals point by point with correspondingly numbered paragraphs of December 19 Soviet communication: (a) Paragraph one. First paragraph of Soviet Note dealing with General Armistice Agreements is tendentious misinterpretation of what U.S. had told Soviets. Rostow had made this clear to Tcherniakov and we would do so again in our formal reply to Soviet approach. Our position is that changes in 1949 Armistice lines are inevitable and desirable and are foreseen under terms of Armistice agreements. At same time we maintain that Armistice agreement provisions on this point should not be excuse for territorial expansion as such, that any changes in Armistice lines must be agreed and that extensive changes would be incompatible with our position and with GOI position as presented to us by Eban at earlier stage. (b) Paragraph two. Our position on Straits of Tiran is that any agreement would need to be clear with respect to navigation rights. We recognize that this problem has two aspects: (1) acknowledgment of international character of Straits and (2) method of guaranteeing free navigation. (c) Paragraph three. Our position on “timetable" concept is same as Israel's. Timetable would be acceptable if it derived from agreement but could not be substitute for agreement. Rostow said he had asked Tcherniakov what was wrong from Soviet point of view with Israeli statement on acceptance and implementation of SC Resolution. Tcherniakov had not responded to this challenge. (d) Paragraph four. Rostow asked Rabin for clarification of this paragraph of Israeli Aide-Memoire. Rabin said GOI thought that continuation of US-Soviet dialogue would interfere with Jarring Mission since, if Arabs believed other channels to settlement were available, they would be encouraged not to cooperate with Jarring. Rostow said our entire dialogue with Soviets was designed to help Jarring. We were urging Soviets to prevail upon UAR to be more forthcoming with Jarring and had made clear that we opposed idea of Four-Power approach as substitute for Jarring Mission. Fact remained that there was considerable support in world for idea that Jarring should take more active role. For this reason we had urged Israelis to take initiatives with Jarring as means of heading off pressures from other sources. Rostow emphasized that we would continue our dialogue with Soviets, which was within context of US responsibilities as world power. (e) Paragraph five. Rostow agreed that December 19 Soviet communication attempted to defend negative UAR reaction to Secretary's Seven Points. We would give due attention to Israeli comments in this respect in our reply to Soviets, making clear we will not support Israeli withdrawal except in context of peace. (f) Paragraph 6. Rostow agreed that this point in Soviet communication represented a backing away from earlier Soviet statements on demilitarization of Sinai. We suspected that this was bargaining position on part of Soviets and would deal with this question firmly in our reply. 4. In oral comments supplementing Aide-Memoire, Rabin recalled November 12 conversation with Under Secretary Katzenbach and quoted latter as stating that if Israel had changed its position on borders, USG would undermine that position. Hart corrected this interpretation, noting Katzenbach had said, in response to Argov's expression of concern that USG had in fact undermined Israel's bargaining position by giving seven points to UAR, that this could be considered to be the case only if Israel's position had changed and it now sought territorial acquisitions (State 270935). 5 5. Rabin said that until recently Israel had never understood it was US position that Israel should withdraw to June 4 lines “give or take a few miles.” Rabin said it now seemed that US had in fact decided to undermine Israeli position. By telling UAR that USG envisaged Israeli withdrawal to June 4 lines plus special arrangements for Gaza, USG had given away its own bargaining position with UAR and had demonstrated that it did not know how to deal with Arabs. UAR would proceed from this point and seek to erode US position on meaning of peace. Specifically, UAR was now seeking to make withdrawal from Syrian territory a condition for UAR-Israeli settlement and, in its reply to Secretary's Seven Points, had made no mention of peace and had said nothing about signing same document as Israel. 6. Rabin said problem as he saw it was that US (a) assumed others were as reasonable as it was and (b) could not live with unsolved problems. Israel had to live with people who were not reasonable and believed that solutions sometimes could be achieved in long run by leaving problems unsolved. Until recently US and Israel had created situation in which Soviets and UAR were at disadvantage. If we continued to show patience, their position would change. Rabin said he could not reconcile US policy of past two months with President's Five Principles for Middle East peace. In talking with UAR and Soviets, USG was on dangerous course unless it gave clear signal that it intended to stand by President's Five Principles. Rabin said that in his view current US position could reduce chances for separate Israeli settlement with Jordan. 7. Rostow replied that we welcomed this frank expression of Israeli views. Excess of frankness preferable in this relation to excess of discretion. See Rider A 6 not agree, however that we were on wrong course. Our policy had not changed; Secretary had stressed President's Five Principles in his talk with Riad, making clear there could be no withdrawal except to [ on ?]condition of peace established through agreement. We had relied on Foreign Minister Eban's statements to us in telling UAR we saw no need for territorial changes in Sinai, on condition that there was demilitarization and guaranteed free navigation. Rostow said he could not see how this had damaged Israel's negotiating position. As was case with our reply to September approach by Soviets, GOI would be reassured by our response to this latest Soviet communication. There would be no change in fundamental US policy. We did not see that any damage had been done to Israel's vital interests which, so far as UAR was concerned, consisted of a demilitarized Sinai and free navigation. With respect to Jordan, which remained key to solution of Palestine problem, we believed that chances of settlement with Jordan were better if dialogue was maintained with UAR. 8. Rostow concluded by assuring Rabin that we would take Israeli views into account in our reply to Soviets. We could understand Israeli anxieties but saw little substantive difference between us. GOI should recognize that it too could be wrong. Rostow reiterated that he could assure Rabin there was no change in US policy and no abandoning of vital US and Israeli interests in just and durable peace. We would nail this down firmly in terms of the President's stated policy in our reply to Soviets. Rostow said he regretted first sentence of Israeli aide-memoire, and hoped GOI would think better of its conclusion in the light of events. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Day in draft and by Hart, and approved by Eugne Rostow. Repeated to Amman, Moscow, Cairo, and USUN. 2 See footnote 1, Document 354 . 3 Document 356 . 4 See Document 361 . 5 Document 320 . 6 A note on an attached page fills in the text at this point: “Rider A as follows: US acknowledged it was capable of error. Rabin interjected that Israel too was capable of error. But Rostow could”. 363. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 363. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, December 25, 1968, 1827Z. 292142. Ref: Amman 7684. 2 1. Please deliver the following message to King Hussein from the President: “Your Majesty: I appreciate the frank exposition of your concerns and problems regarding the general area situation and that of Jordan in particular as contained in your letter of November 30. 3 I believe it is indicative of close and friendly US-Jordanian ties and of your personal confidence in me that you feel free to express your views in such a direct manner. 2. In the past difficult eighteen months we have played an active role in support of Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring a just peace in the framework of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. I feel certain that the new administration will give priority attention to attainment of peace in the Near East. 3. Since this will most probably be our last exchange of correspondence before I relinquish office as President, I reaffirm my great admiration for your wise leadership, gallantry and courage which have been so severely tried over the past months. I wish you success in your determination to bring peace, justice and prosperity to your people. Your constructive goals have my support and that of my country, and I feel confident that my successor will view your praiseworthy aspirations in a similar light. With warmest personal regards, Lyndon B. Johnson.” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Paganelli and Davies, cleared by Hart, Seelye, Atherton, Sisco, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. 2 See footnote 4, Document 338 . 3 See Document 341 . 364. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 364. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, December 26, 1968, 0900Z. 6600. Ref: State 290330. 2 1. I have studied with great interest Amman's thoughtful message 7992 3 assessing the current Arab-Israel situation and recommending tactics in the next stages of our search for a solution. If I read it correctly, it seems to me that that analysis concludes that there are courses essentially of a tactical nature by which the parties might be brought to accept an arrangement providing the elements of a measure of real stability, security, and tranquility in the area with some prospects of enduring. 2. Unfortunately, in my view, such an assessment must, at least by implication, be based on a fundamentally non-existent major premise which would be that the Arabs (read Egypt principally) desire or are capable of being made to accept a settlement providing real security for Israel, her recognition not only juridically but morally as having a right to permanent existence, and her genuine acceptance, again morally as well as juridically, as a Middle Eastern nation. 3. I do not believe that procedural tactics of whatever kind, which merely paper over the cracks of abysmal differences in these respects, can hope to achieve a settlement providing that degree of stability which will avoid the continuation of American involvement in the Arab political mire indefinitely. 4. Obviously, the present situation is not without dangers. However, I think it is possible to and, if I am not mistaken, US public information media do, exaggerate the present possibilities of renewal of large scale hostilities. Israel's security position is obviously better on all fronts than in May 1967; her casualties in the guerrilla clashes and from sabotage, while serious, are regarded by the public here as consistent with and not in excess of the price they are prepared to pay for existence; and except for an aberrationally inspired air attack on Tel Aviv there is little the Arabs could do to start a new configuration. 5. The Israelis are, of course, concerned with the Soviet role in the area. But if our assessment is that the Sovs are not prepared militarily to support with Sov forces a new Arab initiative, it seems to me that the threat of a US-Sov confrontation, which would be greatest in the event of renewed hostilities in circumstances where Israel would be likely to lose and we would be called upon to prevent her annihilation, is not immediate nor need it be over the longer time, even if no solution is found. 6. My apprehension is that the Sovs succeed by diplomatic maneuver to which we give verisimilitude in convincing the Arabs that us support for Israel is less than firm. I believe strongly that we have been correct to date in our refusal to be drawn into a negotiating posture with regard to a solution and (in declining) to participate in any moves toward an imposed settlement. Negative as it may sound, my view is that, while we can and should nudge the parties toward each other, so long as there is no fundamental change in the Arab inability to seek a genuine viable peace on borders clearly defensible against Arab attack, our best course is to make our basic sympathy toward Israel unmistakably clear, and to continue to avoid becoming a broker in a deal where one party refuses to trade. 7. Foregoing was drafted before receipt of State 292074, 4 with which it does not appear to conflict on major points. 8. Assume Dept will repeat Amman. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. 2 Not found. 3 Document 353 . 4 Document 359 . 365. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 365. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 26, 1968, 1:30 p.m. Mr. President: With respect to the Phantoms: —I have checked again with Sec. Clifford; —I made clear to him your view about credit and delivery dates; —He repeated what he said at lunch on the 24th; namely, the next move is up to the Israelis. They must make up their minds on three matters: weapons systems they want to go with the plane; the electronics systems they want; and the quantity of spares. The Israeli negotiating team is awaiting a response from Jerusalem. It is possible that Abe Feinberg and others interested in the matter are not aware that the next move is up to Jerusalem. Do you wish me to inform Abe of this fact? Yes 2 No Call me Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:45 p.m. 2 The President checked this option. A handwritten note in an unknown hand dated December 26 reads: “Mr. Rostow telephoned Mr. Feinberg.” 366. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 366. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 26, 1968, 6:30 p.m. SUBJECT Approval of PL 480 Credit Sale for Israel Bill Gaud, Orville Freeman and Charlie Zwick recommend you approve a $30.8 million PL 480 credit sale including 300,000 tons of feed grains and 200,000 tons of wheat for Israel. 2 The sale would be repayable in dollars. Israel continues to improve its agricultural performance, but still has to import over half its grain requirements. This credit sale would reemphasize self-help measures, and is a continuation of previous programs. The terms are identical to last year's $40 million sale except for an increase to 3 percent in the interest. In approving the 1968 PL 480 program, you concurred in a finding that Israeli military expenditures did not materially interfere with development. State/AID confirms that the basis for this finding is still valid. Walt Approve 3 Disapprove 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:45 p.m. 2 The recommendations came in a December 12 memorandum to the President signed by Gaud and John Schnittker, Freeman's Under Secretary, and a December 18 memorandum to the President from Zwick. (Both ibid.) 3 President Johnson checked this option. 367. Editorial Note 367. Editorial Note On December 26, 1968, two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine attacked an Israeli El Al aircraft in the airport in Athens, Greece, with automatic weapons and grenades. One passenger was killed and a crew member was injured in the attack; both were Israeli citizens. The plane caught fire and was severely damaged. The two men who launched the attack were captured and jailed by the Greek Government. The Popular Front issued a statement from its office in Beirut taking responsibility for the attack. Prime Minister Eshkol denounced the assault as a murderous attack on innocent civilians, and the Israeli press noted that the terrorists had come from Lebanon. (Telegram 6618 from Tel Aviv, December 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Israel held Lebanon responsible for the actions of a group based on Lebanese soil and retaliated with an attack on December 28 on Beirut International Airport. An estimated 45 Israeli commandos landed in 4 helicopters and attacked planes and facilities at the airport with grenades and machine guns for 20 minutes before withdrawing. Thirteen Lebanese-owned aircraft were destroyed. (Memorandum for the Record by Rear Admiral Robert Baughan, Deputy Director for Operations of the National Military Command Center, December 28; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69) 368. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 368. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, December 28, 1968, 0057Z. 293090. 1. Ghorbal at his request called on Davies December 27 after week's absence in New York catch up on current state of play in Middle East. Davies reviewed your conversation with Mohamed Riad on Gromyko visit (minus protected section). 2. Davies informed Ghorbal of noon announcement of agreement with GOI for sale of Phantoms. Noted that all concerned with agreement regretted decision which would not have been made had there been movement toward peace or restraint on delivery of Soviet supersonic aircraft to area. 3. Ghorbal became increasingly emotional as he reacted. Described decision as “abhorrent" and most damaging action by Johnson Administration since war. Forecast that meeting Israeli request would make it even more intransigent and that timing of announcement was most inappropriate in view of recent progress of resumption US-UAR relations. 4. Davies noted again that US action had been taken after study of developments over past year and in light ratio of holdings supersonic aircraft on both sides. Pointed out further that by meeting some of Israel's security concerns decision could contribute to more flexible position in Cabinet as regards settlement terms. 5. Ghorbal said decision could only be viewed with dismay. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by James Johnston (NEA/UAR) and approved by Davies. 369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 29, 1968, 0123Z. 293154. Subject: Israeli Attack on Khaldeh Airport. 1. On instructions Secretary Rusk Assistant Secretary Hart called in Moishe Raviv, senior Israeli Embassy officer present in Washington, evening December 28 to lodge immediate protest at Israeli action along following lines: (1) USG extremely disturbed by Israeli action. While attack against El Al aircraft at Athens cannot be condoned, this was carried out by individuals and we know of no indications that GOL was in any way involved. To contrary there are strong indications that GOL has been seeking to cope with terrorist problem. Lebanese basic intentions and concern are indicated by their regular participation in Mixed Armistice Commission meetings with Israel. (2) Certainly Khaldeh International Airport and the many people therein were not involved. This is a very busy international airport with people of all nationalities present. Our preliminary reports indicate extensive damage resulted and although we have no knowledge of casualties it seems likely that there will be some. (3) Assistant Secretary Hart stressed that he had been instructed by the Secretary to make protest in strongest terms and to make clear that we simply cannot have this kind of violence in the Near East. This incident is of particular concern when it involves international airport used by many nations. The people at the airport and the facilities thereon certainly in no way could be related to Athens incident. (4) The Israeli action is particularly unfortunate coming on the heels of the US announcement of agreement to sell Phantom aircraft to Israel. (5) GOI should know both President and Secretary are deeply concerned. If this case should be taken to the Security Council, the GOI will find the US strongly opposing this Israeli action. We will support condemnation. (6) As a personal observation, Ambassador Hart said that the Israeli action did not improve the capability of the Government of Lebanon to deal with terrorist organizations but will in fact impair it. This will not produce the result intended by Israel but will arouse a spirit of revenge among people who up to now have not been involved and who have wanted not to be involved. 2. Mr. Raviv responded that he would transmit our views to Jerusalem. Speaking from a paper he made the following points. (1) It is a fact that the individuals perpetrating the outrage in Athens came from Beirut. (2) It is a fact that the communique of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLOP) also came from Beirut. (3) Beirut is the center and headquarters for some organizations including PFLOP. Israel's view is that no government harboring such organizations can be immune from responsibility for actions of these organizations. The savage attack on Israeli aircraft on an international flight struck at Israel's vital life-line. No Government can permit this to happen. (4) If case comes to Security Council, GOI hopes that USG will view incident in context of what has been going on in past months in Beirut and elsewhere. 3. Ambassador Hart responded that we find a great difference between the action of two deranged or misguided individuals who happened to come from Beirut and the action of a government using its armed forces to violate the air space of a country and to attack its international airport. We believe this an inexcusable retaliatory act striking at innocent people and facilities and also greatly impairing US interests. We understand the deep feelings motivating the Israelis but noted that we have some provocation from Cuba in the form of hijacking aircraft and imprisoning American citizens. The quality and nature of US actions in handling these problems are in stark contrast to those of Israel. To hold the Government of Lebanon wholly responsible and then to express this by striking at innocent people and international facilities is incomprehensible. We consider this a dangerous escalation all out of proportion to the provocation. For Tel Aviv : Ambassador Barbour should seek to see immediately either Prime Minister Eshkol or Foreign Minister Eban to express USG concern making points made by Ambassador Hart. You should stress that USG deeply shocked by action for which we can find no justification. Holding Lebanese Government responsible for action of individuals will be most difficult to defend. More importantly, we believe this will change the whole nature of GOL-Israeli relationship in which Lebanese sought to limit use of Lebanese territory to the full extent of its capabilities in face of general public support for Palestine Liberation movements. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Root (AFN) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George S. Springsteen, and approved by Hart. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Aden, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, London, Paris, Athens, Ankara, Tehran, Jerusalem, Rome, Bonn, and Moscow. Walt Rostow repeated the text of the telegram to President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch in White House telegram CAP 82946, December 29. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69) 370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 1 Washington, December 29, 1968, 2123Z. 293184. 1. Lebanese Ambassador Kabbani saw DeptyAsstSec Davies (NEA) at noon Sunday to inform USG of Lebanese request for urgent convening of Security Council to hear complaint against Israeli attack on Beirut International Airport. 2. Ambassador sought USG support for a resolution embodying three points: a) a condemnation of the Israeli action, b) compensation for damages and attendant losses, and c) sanctions if Israel does not provide compensation. 3. Ambassador was informed USG extremely disturbed by Israeli action and would take Lebanese request into consideration in developing its position. 4. In ensuing discussion, Ambassador rebutted Israeli charges of GOL complicity in terrorist actions and noted: a) Lebanese press completely free and Government cannot prevent publication communiqués of Palestine Liberation Organizations; b) baggage of embarking passengers customarily not subject to customs inspections at Beirut Airport; c) there is absolutely no evidence that sabotage material used in Athens was in fact carried from Beirut by the two men involved in the attack against Israeli plane; d) Front for Liberation of Palestine states two terrorists involved only transited through Beirut from occupied Palestine; e) the GOL has done its utmost to prevent attacks against Israel from being launched from Lebanese territory; and f) it is not true that PFLOP headquarters are in Beirut as it is untrue that there are training camps for terrorists in Lebanon. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Hart, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv, Amman, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Aden,Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, London, Paris, Athens, Ankara, Tehran, Nicosia, Dhahran, Jerusalem, Khartoum, and USUN. 371. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 371. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, December 30, 1968, 1419Z. 8101. Subj: Meeting with Hussein on 28th. Summary : King Hussein told me on 28th that: (A) Phantom announcement could not fail to have a bad effect on Middle East situation: (B) he was keeping a watchful eye on the Iraqi troop presence in Jordan, whose total number, he said, was just over 10,000 (about half our present estimate); (C) the 14-point arrangement was working satisfactorily with Al-Fatah but the PFLP and similar Fedayeen groups were giving him trouble; (D) Gromyko apparently had used in Cairo a line similar to that recently asserted by the USSR Ambassador in Amman, i.e., USSR support for peace and for Arabs, and US could influence Israel; (E) he would take a special interest in problem of DP feeding; and (F) he expected to spend some three weeks in London in January. End summary . 1. I had a lengthy meeting with King Hussein on 28th: Phantom announcement. I opened the conversation by saying that I had not anticipated the Phantom announcement would have been made just before my audience. I commented that the President and others had already made clear that whatever we did on the Phantoms should not be taken as any diminution of our support for Jordan. Unfortunately other factors in the area had made the Phantom deal a foregone conclusion, citing as examples the absence of some dramatic improvement in the Arab-Israel confrontation or Soviet willingness to discuss practical arms control with US. Hussein shook his head and said emphatically that he considered the announcement most unfortunate and that he believed it could not fail to have a bad effect on situation in Middle East. He was very sorry to hear news of the conclusion of the deal. 2. Iraqi troops. I told Hussein that we remained concerned about the Iraqi troops in Jordan. When he was here, Governor Scranton had been quite interested in the implications of their presence. More recently we have received significantly different estimates from various sources of number of Iraqis in Jordan. We hear from some sources that there may be more than 20,000 and from other sources that there are just over 10,000. Hussein interjected that there were just over 10,000. I asked if there were not other supporting troops, in addition to the three brigades. Hussein said emphatically that there are just over 10,000 in all and that he intends to be very careful about allowing any more. King also said that recent removal of Chief of Staff Ansari and other Iraqis has further complicated the situation. He said that he believes Communists are determined to get rid of the Ba'athists and that the Communists have a good base in Iraq to do this. He mentioned that the Iraqis in Jordan are very upset about the most recent changes. In conclusion, he said he is well aware of and worried about the Iraqi troops in Jordan and is keeping a very careful eye on them. He said, “We are penetrating them instead of having them penetrate us.” 3. Fedayeen. The King said he believes the 14-point arrangement has been working all right with Fatah and some of the other groups but that the “Front" and groups like the “Front" are giving him considerable trouble. Just yesterday, the 27th, on the outskirts of Amman, he said, three rival groups in the “Front" had had a fire fight. (By Front, I presume King meant Popular Front—PFLP.) 4. Soviet Initiatives. I asked the King whether he had any comments on Gromyko's visit to Cairo. The King said a report from his Ambassadors in Cairo had not indicated anything startlingly new. It was consistent with what the Soviet Ambassador had said to him when he called before leaving for Moscow a few days ago: that is, the Soviets want peace, they want to prevent conflagration in the Middle East, they are supporting the Arabs as strongly as they can, and they think the United States should use its influence more effectively with Israel. The Soviet Ambassador had also informed him that the Soviets had had contacts with the United States about the situation but they had not reached any conclusive results. 5. Refugees and Displaced Persons. I outlined our efforts during current GA to induce Israel to allow more displaced persons to return to West Bank. I said we would continue these efforts. Meanwhile, as I had mentioned to him on several previous occasions, I hoped we could continue our discussions with GOJ on how the displaced persons on East Bank would be fed in coming months. I said our contacts with GOJ levels below the Prime Minister had not been fruitful so far, and that I believed some indication of interest and a green light were needed from higher levels. I had not had an opportunity so far to mention this to the PriMin. I hoped that the King could indicate his interest in our at least having detailed discussions without any commitment on either side. The King agreed that this was important and said that he would make clear his interest in it. 6. King's Forthcoming Visit to London. (Noforn) The King said he was not certain yet how long he expected to be gone but that he thought it would be about three weeks. His first operation (on his jaw) would be on January 9 and would require a general anesthetic. He had been told he would have to have another operation before he returned. (End Noforn) Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 JORDAN. Secret. Repeated to Beirut, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and USUN. 372. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 372. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, December 30, 1968, 1459Z. 8104. Subj: Discussion with King Hussein on military questions and internal security. 1. During my meeting with King Hussein on 28th, I said I was happy to report considerable progress in certain aspects in the military field. Most important, it appeared we might be able to get some credit for Jordan's purchases in the present fiscal year. I did not yet know how much this would be, but I believed it would be very helpful to Jordan. 2. I then noted that we were ready to schedule air transport delivery of the F-104's, with the first to arrive commencing February 3. A 25-day period would be required to assemble and test fly the aircraft. Assuming six aircraft would be delivered each month, the whole squadron could be ready by the end of May. In other words, our schedule had been advanced by 30 days. I noted that General Kurdi had explained to DATT that H-5 air base would not be operational before March 1st and he preferred that no deliveries take place before that date. The King acknowledged that he was aware of this and said he was happy that the 104's would be coming in. 3. I cited several examples of proposed accelerated deliveries of other items. I told the King I was mentioning these details because I hoped he could use them to show critics of his arms relationship with us that we not only were able to deliver on time but that we were making significant advances in delivery dates whenever we could. 4. I said we had been exploring with General Khammash and others Jordanian requests for additional materiel. I was confident that these new Jordanian requests could be examined under the annual review mechanism provided in the March 1968 Memorandum of Understanding. 2 Perhaps Khammash might visit Washington early next year for that purpose. In noting that there might be some personnel changes under the new administration with a consequent settling-down period, I suggested we might best aim for sometime in March for that visit. Meanwhile, we would strive to get as much done as possible in communications with Washington. I emphasized that we are still prepared to consider supplying additional aircraft of some type at some time in the future. I said it seemed to me important, however, that Jordan first get its 18 F-104's located in Jordan and operational. In principle, the option certainly remained open, I concluded. 5. The King expressed thanks at various points in my presentation and I gathered that he was pleased with the accelerated delivery dates and with the general indication of our willingness to consider Jordanian requests. 6. Internal Security. I told the King that we had had detailed discussions with Khammash and former security chief Abu Nuwar with regard to proposed equipping of the three-battalion Bedouin force, after which we had had further useful discussions with the British Embassy. I hoped that in a short time we might be able to get down to the specifics of financing (which might be a problem), as well as actual orders and deliveries of both US and UK equipment. The King laughed and commented that we would now have to talk to Mohammad Rasoul Kaylani (who has just replaced General Abu Nuwar). I said I assumed that, since General Khammash had had a “heavy hand" on the equipment aspects, we would not have any new problems with Kaylani. Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE. 2 See footnote 3, Document 111 . 373. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 373. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, December 30, 1968, 1440Z. 8105. Subj: My discussion with Hussein on 28th. Ref: State 292074. 2 Summary : With the authority given me in State 292074, I broached with the King the issue of secret Israeli-Jordanian contacts. I am convinced that the King welcomed this initiative. In addition to supplying considerable details about substance of these contacts, the King made clear that the channel with Israel was still open if the Israelis wanted to use it, but it was up to them, he emphasized. He said he could do nothing more unless or until the Israelis became more forthcoming. He stressed that secret talks with Israel could only be complementary to, not a substitute for, talks through Jarring. End Summary . 1. During my lengthy meeting with Hussein on 28th, I told him that I wanted to raise a very sensitive matter which I had wanted to discuss with him for a long time but for a number of reasons had been unable to do so. I said I was referring specifically to the paper he had given Governor Scranton regarding secret contacts Jordan had had with Israel. 3 I had known generally about these contacts but I had not been in a position to discuss them with him. I personally had detected indications that in the coming weeks there might be in some ways a more active U.S. participation in the peace-making process under Jarring's auspices. I wished to make clear that the U.S. continues to want to reinforce and complement the Jarring Mission in constructive ways. I also wanted to make clear that we stand firmly by the assurances that have been given to him. My present approach to him was a purely personal and informal one. I particularly wanted him to know that I could pass on in a secure way anything further he wished us to know about sensitive contacts he had had with the Israelis. It seemed to me there was mutual benefit in our being able to discuss this matter in detail in the coming weeks. I added that I had never discussed the subject with anyone in his government; for example, I had reason to believe that Abdul Mun'im Rifai probably was not privy to the sensitive contacts with Israel. (The King affirmed that this was true.) I then referred to the King's forthcoming visit to England and said I thought it would be useful to him to let me know if there is any Jordanian official now in the know with whom I might discuss this general subject if necessary during his absences from the country. I added that I personally believed there was “give" in most aspects of the Israeli position and it would be useful for him to try to flush out their attitudes particularly on how withdrawal from the West Bank would be organized. 2. The King responded that he indeed thought it would be useful for us to have such an informal relationship in the coming period because he very much hoped the United States would take a more active role, but still under the aegis of Jarring. He said he would think over the situation in the coming days before he departs and would get in touch with me to let me know with whom I might talk during his absences if that were necessary. Meanwhile he wanted to brief me on what had transpired so far. 3. Hussein said that talks with the Israelis have gone on “for some long time.” In spite of all the contacts, however, there had been no discernible give in any specific aspects of the Israeli position. “In effect, the Israelis keep giving us their general position and we keep giving them ours.” As far as Jordan is concerned, the Nov 22 resolution contains the principles under which a settlement is to be worked out. The principles do not allow for any bargaining. It is details under the principles that need to be discussed. In regards to principles, however, Jordan had to make perfectly clear that it must have the Jarring umbrella: that is, that while details might be discussed by secret contacts, such discussions were only an aid and could not be a substitute for reaching agreement under the aegis of Jarring. Anything discussed in secret with Israel would have to be made known to Jarring to be passed on officially. 4. Another essential principle for Jordan is that the UAR must be associated with the Jarring process. Jordan at this time was unable to go it alone. Hussein indicated that even if he were willing to go it alone he thought any separate settlement reached with Israel would not endure. Hussein referred parenthetically to recent US-UAR discussions of the seven points and emphasized that we should not consider that Syria presents a problem. Jordan and the UAR are not in a position completely to disregard Syria and could make no public statement to that effect. On the other hand, if arrangements could be made between Israel and Jordan and the UAR, Syria could be left aside. 5. A third essential principle for Jordan is that Israel must publicly accept the principle of withdrawal from territory occupied in June 1967. The resolution provides that there shall be no territorial aggression. It also provides that boundaries are to be discussed and that there may be some territorial modifications; but unless the principle of withdrawal is accepted by Israel, Jordan will be unable to move further toward a peaceful settlement. 6. A final principle is that any territorial changes must be made on a basis of “reciprocity.” Hussein used the word “reciprocity" several times during his conversation. I think he meant that if Jordan agrees to a territorial change in one place it will have to be compensated by some territory elsewhere on at least a face-saving basis. He used the word “reciprocity" in discussing security as well. He stressed, for example, that he had told the Israelis repeatedly that security must be worked out on a basis of reciprocity. He is fully prepared to accept the notion that Israel has security concerns, but he also expects Israel to recognize that Jordan has security concerns. 7. Hussein discussed some of the specifics that the Israelis have thrown out in the secret contacts. With regard to territory, the Israelis have said they want a 12-kilometer-wide strip running along the Jordan River from the north (Tiberias) to a point a few miles north of Jericho. Jordan would be allowed to have corridors across this strip. The Israelis have noted also that they expect boundary changes in the west. Hussein mentioned no specifics with regard to Latroun and Qalqiliya, but he said that in addition to the boundary changes the Israelis insist upon the new western frontier being completely opened for all Israelis. The Israelis also want a strip of territory running to the Hebron area (sic). They have indicated in a general way that they would consider giving Jordan access to Mediterranean port facilities. With regard to Gaza, their last word was that they want to keep it, but there were some indications they might be willing to discuss its future. 8. Far from giving anything on Jerusalem the Israelis have taken a very hard line, and Hussein said that he could see that all Jordan would get was “access to the Holy Places.” Hussein said that “sovereignty" over what it previously had in Jerusalem is important to Jordan and that the Israelis so far had given him no hope of an arrangement in Jerusalem as “a city of peace" which would no longer be the cause of division between Arabs and Israelis but would be the place where they would meet. He did not go into any details of what kind of practical administration this would entail in his view, and because there was so much else to discuss I decided not to probe him for details. 9. On refugees the King said the Israelis were proposing that Jordan and Israel form a sort of bilateral committee to discuss the status and disposition of the refugees. The King had responded that this was unacceptable to Jordan and Jordan's position is that the existing UN resolutions on refugees must be applied, at least in principle. He believed firmly that Jordan and Israel alone could not effectively settle the refugee problem and that the international community must be involved. 10. The King said the Israelis were still insisting upon signing some kind of “government-to-government" document. Jordan did not take the position that it would never sign any kind of document. On the other hand, the way the Israelis kept putting it, it appeared that they wanted a government-to-government peace treaty of the traditional sort. This was not acceptable. 11. I suggested that submitting counter-proposals to Allon plan concepts might help to flush out Israeli “give.” Drawing on State 292074 and Amman 7992, 4 I advanced several illustrative ideas. The King did not respond specifically but commented that Israeli insistence on a demilitarized West Bank gave him no problems. As he had already indicated to me, he was prepared to maintain only public security forces on the West Bank. On the other hand, things like the Allon plan would give him a problem, and he had stressed to the Israelis that Jordan also had security interests. Security was reciprocal, he reiterated, but, even more important, security would be a fruit of peace and would flow from an acceptable implementation of the resolution. 12. Hussein concluded this section of the conversation by saying that despite the negative summary he had given me he wanted to make clear that the channel is still open if the Israelis want to use it. It is up to them. The ball is in their court. “Unless they are willing to help me on the principles I have outlined, I can do nothing more.” When the King mentioned this to me another time, I emphasized to him that we would not be saying anything to the Israelis about this discussion and that I assumed that he already had told the Israelis that the ball was in their court. He indicated that this was the case. 13. As I was leaving the King said once again that he appreciated having had this conversation and that he would be in touch with me before he left to let me know if there were any late developments and also whom I might talk to in his absence. 14. Suggest Dept pass to Tel Aviv and USUN. 5 Symmes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. 2 Document 359 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 344 . 4 Document 353 . 5 A note on the telegram indicates that it was not passed to Tel Aviv or USUN. 374. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 374. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, December 31, 1968, 0118Z. CAP 82960. The Soviets brought in to Secretary Rusk this afternoon a general policy statement on the Middle East accompanied by a so-called “plan" for the solution of the Middle East situation. 2 Secretary Rusk's preliminary comments and the documents follow. His further comments, as well as mine, will follow tomorrow. For the President from Secretary Rusk. Mr. Tcherniakov, Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Union, came in to see me at 6:30 p.m. this evening to bring two documents from his government. The first was a general policy statement on the Middle East to accompany the second document which is a so-called “plan" for the solution of the Middle East situation. I emphasize that both of these documents now being transmitted are unofficial translations. We will get to you an official translation, taken directly from the Russian text, sometime tomorrow. Mr. Tcherniakov said that he did not believe that the Soviet Union was planning to make this communication public. I asked him to confirm this with Moscow and that we would assume that it is not being made public unless we hear to the contrary from him. He also said that the same communication is being given to the British and French Governments. Mr. Tcherniakov added that the USSR is of the opinion that the UAR is in agreement with the plan which they are now submitting. This undoubtedly reflects the outcome of Mr. Gromyko's visit to Cairo. You will recall that we had from Egyptian sources the Egyptian impression that Gromyko would be in touch with us following his visit to Cairo. I told Tcherniakov that I would not wish to reply off-the-cuff and that I would get this communication to you as soon as practicable. He knows that you are in Texas. I would like to study it very carefully before giving you my considered opinion. My first reaction is that it looks a bit toward what we could accept as a final settlement but is not yet good enough. I have in mind such matters as the handling of the passage of the Suez Canal and the continued insistence that the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the lines of June 4th is, in effect, a prerequisite to agreement on all other subjects. There is no flexibility in this present Russian plan for any modification of frontiers. On the other hand, the present Russian communication does seem to accept the idea of a package and that may give us some basis on which we can pursue the conversation. First Document (Unofficial Translation) 3 In continuation of the exchange of opinion with the American side with regard to the situation in the Middle East I am instructed to state the following to be transmitted to President Johnson. Moscow takes with serious concern the situation now developing in the Middle East in view of the absence there of any real movement towards achieving a stable political settlement. The pertinent facts are well known to the US Government and there is no need to dwell upon them. The Soviet Union in the course of the entire present Middle East conflict has consistently advocated its settlement by political means and consequently has maintained and continues to maintain contacts with the governments of Arab states which we believe has facilitated a constructive evolution in the approach on the part of those countries towards the problem of settlement with Israel. The Arab states, first of all the UAR, are known to have formally recognized the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and declared with all clarity their readiness to implement the provisions therein. Moreover, the UAR, as is known, has spoken in favor of working out a time-table for stage-by-stage implementation of the resolution, i.e. all its provisions and has put forward concrete considerations in that regard, which the American Government has already examined earlier. Finally, one cannot but note the constructive nature of the UAR Government's answer to the “7 points" introduced by the US Secretary of State last November. That answer, while confirming the already noted positive aspects in the UAR position, in addition specifies the Egyptian position on such questions of principle as termination of the state of belligerency, freedom of navigation, refugee problem, guaranteeing implementation of the commitments with regard to the settlement, UN participation in implementing the settlement. The UAR answer is in full accord with the November 22 Security Council resolution. Thus, there can hardly be doubt in anyone's mind as to the good will on the part of the Arab states and their readiness for a just political settlement of the conflict which would ensure stabilization of the situation in the Middle East. Now, what is the Israeli position? Are there any real positive changes in her position? One should state, that, in fact, there are no such changes. Moreover, the Israeli forces do not cease armed provocations in the areas of the Suez Canal and Jordan River; public statements by the leaders of Tel-Aviv testify to the fact that expansionist mood influences more and more the policy of Israel. The basic question of the Middle Eastern settlement is, undoubtedly, the necessity of complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories seized by them. As we understand the US Government also realizes the primary importance of the solution of this question. Notice was taken in Moscow of the statement by Under Secretary of State Mr. Eugene Rostow in the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on November 8 to the effect that Israel has no territorial claims against the Arab countries and is ready for settlement on the basis of the demarkation lines under the Armistice Agreement in 1949. However, subsequent statements by the Israelis themselves have in fact disavowed such an assertion. This clearly follows, for example, from the remarks made by Israeli UN Representative Mr. Tekaoh in the conversation with Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Mr. Semenov that took place in New York at Tekoah's initiative. Incidentally other remarks by Mr. Tekoah in this conversation do not show any reasonableness and soberness on the part of the Israelis either. Moscow would like to hope that the US Government understands to what dangerous consequences could lead in the long run such a defiant behavior of Israel. The Arab countries show their readiness for a peaceful settlement and for contributing constructively to its achievement. The conversation between the Foreign Minister of the USSR and the leaders of the UAR, which took place recently, fully confirms such a conclusion. At the same time one should keep in mind that in the circumstances of the continued aggression on the part of Israel the Arab countries, naturally, have taken and are taking maximum efforts to strengthen their military power. And nobody can blame them for doing so in the face of such a position of Israel. In Israel, and not only in Israel, one can hear arguments to the effect that time, perhaps, works for Israel and therefore they could be in no hurry with the settlement on the conflict. This is a dangerous delusion. And if Israel does not show prudence, one can not exclude any surprises, such a turn of events that would be not only contrary to the interests of the Middle Eastern countries, naturally including Israel, but also would create a situation of crisis extending beyond the limits of that area. Under these circumstances, it is the duty of all states, sincerely interested in stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, to take urgent and determined measures to prevent a new flare-up there through speediest achievement of a just, peaceful settlement on the basis of the resolution of the Security Council unanimously adopted on November 22, 1967. We proceed also from the assumption that Mr. Jarring's mission serves these purposes and in our opinion it should be supported in every possible way. The Soviet Union, in pursuing its policy of strengthening international peace and security, which was demonstrated anew by its contribution to the beginning of settlement of the Vietnam conflict, will continue to do everything depending on it to prevent a flare-up of a new crisis in the Middle East. Attainment of a real progress in the political settlement of the Middle East conflict as well as a further progress in peace settlement in Vietnam would undoubtedly affect in a most positive way the entire world situation and would create more favorable conditions for the development of Soviet-American relations. The main obstacle in the way of attaining a Middle East settlement continues to lie in the negative position of Israel. Therefore, hope is expressed in Moscow that the US Government will regard with all seriousness the considerations we set above and will take urgent measures to exert proper influence on Tel-Aviv so as to make them adopt, at last, a realistic position. To facilitate finding a solution to the Middle East crisis the Soviet Government has prepared a plan containing new proposals, which are fully based on the above mentioned resolution of the Security Council and take into account the recently emerged moments favorable to the achievement of agreement on a peace settlement in the Middle East. We are ready to continue further exchanges of views with the American side on the questions of a Middle Eastern settlement. Second Document (Unofficial Translation) Israel and the Arab countries-neighbours of Israel, that would be prepared to participate in the implementation of such a plan, reaffirm their adherence to the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and declare their readiness to implement all its provisions. They agree further that there will be worked out by way of contacts through Mr. Jarring a timetable and an order for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the territories occupied during the conflict of 1967 and that there will be outlined an agreed plan for the implementation by the sides of other provisions of the Security Council resolution, having in view the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, under which each state in that region will be able to live in security. The purpose of these contacts could be to agree upon specific arrangements to implement the above Security Council resolution. 1. An agreement be reached on simultaneous declaration by the Government of Israel and by the governments of the Arab states—neighbours of Israel which will participate in the implementation of the plan, of their readiness to terminate the state of belligerency between them and attain a peaceful settlement after the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. In this connection Israel states her readiness to begin, starting from a fixed date, the withdrawal of troops from the Arab territories occupied as a result of the conflict in summer of 1967. 2. On the day of the beginning of the withdrawal of the Israeli troops, to be carried out by stages under the supervision by the UN observers, the above mentioned Arab countries as well as Israel deposit with the U.N. appropriate documents on the cessation of the state of belligerency, on the respect for and the recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in this area and of their right to live in peace, in secured and recognized boundaries, i.e. in accord with the above mentioned resolution of the Security Council. In accordance with an agreement to be reached through Mr. Jarring provisions would also be agreed upon concerning secured and recognized boundaries (with appropriate maps attached), concerning the ensuring of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, a justful settlement of refugee problem, the ensuring of territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the area (possibly through measures, including establishment of demilitarized zone). It is understood that such an agreement will be viewed in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council as something of a whole, relating to all the aspects of a settlement throughout the Middle Eastern area, as a “package.” 3. The Israeli forces within the subsequent month (as an example) withdraw from a part of Arab territories to certain intermediate positions on the Sinai Peninsula, on the western bank of the Jordan River (as well as from the Syrian territory-from the area of El Quneitra). On the day when the Israeli forces reached predetermined lines on the Sinai Peninsula (for instance, 30-40 kilometers from the Suez Canal), the Government of the UAR brings its forces into the Suez Canal and begins clearing operations for the resumption of navigation. 4. Within the second month (conditionally) the Israeli forces are withdrawn to the lines which they occupied prior to June 5, 1967, upon which administration of the respective Arab countries is completely restored on the vacated territories, its troops and police forces are introduced. On the date of the beginning of the second stage of withdrawal of Israeli troops the UAR and Israel (or the UAR alone if her government agrees) declare their agreement to the deployment of UN troops near the line which existed before June 5, 1967, on the Sinai Peninsula, at Sharm al Sheikh and in Gaza sector, that is a situation which existed in this area in May 1967 is restored. The Security Council takes a decision to dispatch UN troops in accordance with the UN Charter and confirms the principle of freedom of navigation through the Tiran Straits and the Gulf of Akaba for vessels of all countries. 5. After the completion of withdrawal of Israeli troops to the lines of state demarkation through the Security Council, or through signing a multilateral document, the documents of the Arab countries and Israel, deposited earlier, are finally put into effect. The Security Council, on the basis of the UN Charter provisions, takes a decision to guarantee the Arab-Israeli boundaries (as a variant, guarantees by the four powers-permanent members of the Security Council, are not excluded). 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 112, 12/26-31/68. Secret; Sensitive. 2 A memorandum of Rusk's December 30 conversation with Yuri Tcherniakov, with a translation of the note given to Rusk by the Soviet Charge, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Tcherniakov also met on December 30 with Robert Ellsworth, an assistant to President-elect Nixon, and gave him two documents for Nixon that were virtually identical to the two given to Rusk. A memorandum of the conversation between Tcherniakov and Ellsworth and the two Soviet notes are ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administrative and Staff Files-Transition, Robert Ellsworth. 3 The translations of the two documents are as received from the Soviet Embassy. 375. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 375. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut,December 31, 1968, 1008Z. 15382. Subj: Israeli attack on Beirut Airport. 1. FonMin Hajj Hussein Oweini called me in afternoon Dec 30 to have a “completely frank discussion" of consequences of Israeli attack on Beirut International Airport. Speaking as “friend of US” (which he is), he wished me to know that, unfortunately, incident has created serious obstable in path traditional US-Lebanese friendship, one which can only be removed by subsequent US actions. Lebanon realizes Israel acted without prior knowledge of US but Lebanese are convinced Israelis would not have embarked on raid if they had not been confident repercussions would not be great and would not risk loss of US support. Therefore, it particularly important that Israel sustain more than just verbal condemnation which would soon gather dust with other UN resolutions. Lebanon calls upon US to use its influence in Tel Aviv to assure that Israel is made to understand that she must pay for her crime. 2. Arabs cannot accept that US has insufficient influence with Israelis since US is responsible for sustaining existence of Israel through constant material support. The US will be in most difficult position in Arab world if it does not now act to restrain Israelis and redress the wrong against Lebanon. Arab public opinion, both in Lebanon and outside, is turning more and more against the US and our friends in Arab governments are diminishing. 3. Hajj Hussein reiterated fervently that Government of Lebanon is in no way responsible for Fedayeen attack on El Al plane in Athens. Everyone, he pointed out, can enter and leave Lebanon freely. The two commandos were not Lebanese, were not trained in Lebanon, and were not recently residing in Lebanon. They merely transited Beirut on way to Athens, like hundreds of other travelers daily in Lebanon's open society. 4. Arabs cannot accept that Israeli raid was result of Athens incident; rather it came because Lebanon is weakest of Arab countries and has an open undefended airport. What hurts is fact that Israelis used “US arms and equipment,” provided them for use in self-defense, for opposite purpose of aggression against friend of US. Unfortunately, announcement US decision sell Phantom aircraft to Israel inextricably viewed by Arabs as giving Israelis added confidence attack her weak neighbor to north. Hajj Hussein implored US reconsider decision supply Israel with Phantoms which would only be used to attack weaker Arab neighbors and sustain her position in occupied lands. Arabs cannot accept view that Israeli possession Phantoms would impede extension Soviet influence in Middle East, he added. On contrary, Arabs will now have to turn to Soviets for comparable support. 5. Hajj Hussein noted that whole world called upon Israel withdraw from Arab territories in November 22 Security Council resolution. This action produced no results because Israel, feeling it has US support, defies UN. Therefore, mere Security Council resolution condemning Israel and calling for compensation not enough unless US willing oblige Israeli compliance. 6. Hajj Hussein expressed gratitude for quick US response following raid in protesting Israeli action, and promising support for Lebanon in Security Council. He also expressed GOL's gratitude for many US offers of material assistance to Lebanese airlines. 7. I assured Hajj Hussein I would convey fully his views to Washington. After reiterating US support for Lebanon in UN and points made to PM Yafi Dec 29 (Beirut's 15327), 2 I stressed fact that when Israel feels its security is at stake, it acts first in manner it considers in its own interests and only consults others later. I also expressed opinion that US public will be shocked by Israel action, as was USG. 8. Comment : Hajj Hussein, who is a genuine and loyal friend of the US, was making a heartfelt plea for the US to take action both in SC deliberations and with Israelis which will enable it to keep its remaining friends and influence in Arab countries. His parting remark was that he would never feel ashamed of his friendship for the United States, but he (and other like-thinking Arabs) would now have to be sustained by some more tangible manifestations of US interest in the Arab world than a slap on the Israeli wrist after the Khaldeh Airport attack. Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Tel Aviv, USUN, and DIA. 2 Telegram 15327 from Beirut, December 29, reported on a meeting between Ambassador Porter and Prime Minister Yafi in which Yafi protested the December 28 Israeli attack on the Beirut airport. (Ibid.) 376. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 376. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, December 31, 1968, 2142Z. CAP 82970. Following is a memorandum to me from Hal Saunders on responding to the Soviet Middle East initiative. Sec. Rusk will be formulating his view in the next day or so. “I believe the time has come to pick up where we left off on November 22, 1967. An intense period of negotiation with Russians, Arabs and Israelis produced the UN resolution. Then we stepped back to give Jarring a chance to arrange agreements that would carry out the resolution's intent. So far he has failed. Most of us, I believe, feel he will need more direct help from us and the Soviets if he's to get anywhere. Only the Israelis argue today that mounting tension will bring the Arabs closer to negotiation, and their eye-for-an-eye judgment is questionable. The issue today is whether we move toward another period of intense five-or-six-cornered negotiation to establish a scenario for working out agreement under the resolution. When Dobrynin delivered a similar memo 2 right after the Czech invasion, we answered by urging the Soviets to get behind Jarring. That was reasonable because Jarring was just starting his New York phase. But that produced little, and now he needs help. If we go down this course, these points are crucial: 1. Our first effort should be to impose a negotiation-not a solution. The Soviet note 3 speaks of contacts through Jarring to work out a timetable for withdrawal and resolution of other issues in the resolution. The purpose of this document, therefore, might be to arrive at an agreement to negotiate a timetable. Perhaps this could be an elaboration of the first page and a half of the Soviet memo. Then we would have a three-step process: A. Declaration of intent. B. Negotiation of details of elements of a settlement. C. Final agreement on a timetable, meshing those elements. 2. We must bring the Israelis with us as we did in October-November 1967. We have lost their confidence since November 1967. They're bitterly suspicious of our past exchanges with the Soviets. Yet our main contribution to imposing a negotiation would be to bring the Israelis along. Therefore, I would urge giving Rabin the Soviet memo today, telling him that we are going to prepare a counterdraft and asking him to study and return to discuss an appropriate counter. I think State will do this. 3. The Soviets must bring the Arabs along. Gromyko obviously has Cairo behind this memo. But the point is that Moscow must be willing to keep Cairo behind subsequent negotiations. These are just rough initial thoughts. The central point is my belief that we should now move back into intense involvement in the negotiation process. /S/Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 112, 12/26-31/68. Secret. 2 See Document 245 . 3 See Document 374 . Index Index Note: Numbers in this index refer to document numbers. Abba, Col., 147 Albert, Carl, 248 Algeria, 223 , 228 Allon, Yigal ( see also Allon plan), 247 , 250 Allon plan, 213 , 217 , 268 , 328 Anderson, Robert B., 4 , 28 , 167 , 323 , 327 Arab League, 244 Arab states ( see also specific countries; Border incidents; Settlement possibilities): Black mission report, 80 Military capabilities, 164 , 179 Soviet military aid ( see also Arms limitation), 179 Israeli position, 11 , 18 , 24 , 39 , 40 U.S. position, 11 , 19 , 28 , 38 , 80 , 164 Soviet relations with, 52 , 80 , 91 , 92 , 193 Arab summits, 5 , 36 , 123 , 312 Arafat, Yasir, 304 Arends, Leslie, 248 Argov, Shlomo, 247 Jarring mission, 242 , 321 , 362 Occupied territories, 339 Soviet settlement proposal, 252 , 256 , 262 Terrorism, 223 Tiran Island, 281 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 287 , 288,302 U.S. military aid, 290 , 297 , 306 , 317 , 330 Arms limitation ( see also Israeli nuclear weapons ; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ), 48 , 91 U.S.-Israeli communications, 40 , 41 , 155 U.S. military aid to Israel and, 179 U.S.-Soviet communications, 57 , 58 , 93 , 105 , 374 , 376 Asad, Gen. Hafiz al, 293 Asbjornson, Mildred, 299 Atasi, Nur al Din al, 293 Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., 2 , 6 , 11 , 16 , 44 , 56 , 75 , 77 , 79 , 92 , 96 , 97 , 98 , 103 , 106 , 110 , 117 , 119 , 124 , 126 , 133 , 134 , 137 , 138 , 147 , 151 , 179 , 188 , 189 , 195 , 196 , 202 , 228 , 250 , 259 , 277 , 281 , 297 , 312 , 316 , 320 , 335 , 359 , 361 , 362 , 363 Ball-Sisco mission, 225 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 185 Occupied territories, 339 Soviet settlement proposal, 268 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 282 , 287 , 288 Atherton, Roy, 321 Atomic Energy Commission, 32 , 352 Attwood, William, 91 , 101 , 102 , 104 Austin, Granville S., 179 , 196 Baas, Bryan H., 272 , 286 Bahti, James H., 75 , 124 , 192 , 195 , 242 Ball, George ( see also Ball-Sisco mission ), 204 , 236 , 239 , 261 Ball-Sisco mission: Failure of, 237 Introduction letters, 211 , 212 Israel, 213 , 214 , 215 , 217 , 231 Israeli reprisal raids and, 229 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations and, 213 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 227 , 234 , 237 Jordan, 218 , 219 , 227 Lebanon, 220 Planning, 199 , 222 Report, 233 United Arab Republic, 225 U.S. military aid to Israel and, 210 Barbour, Walworth: Arms limitation, 165 , 292 Ball-Sisco mission, 213 , 214 , 215 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 230 Jarring mission, 59 , 81 , 115 , 177 , 234 , 326 , 364 Jerusalem, 140 Scranton visit, 346 , 347 Terrorism, 85 , 119 , 229 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 289 U.S. emissary proposals, 208 U.S. military aid to Israel, 2 , 3 , 18 , 208 , 292 Barr, Joseph W., 91 Battle, Lucius D., 10 , 31 , 37 , 44 , 57 , 62 , 79 , 89 , 90 , 105 , 107 , 110 , 117 , 119 , 124 , 126 , 133 , 138 , 143 , 147 , 171 , 184 , 189 , 195 , 202 , 232 , 242 , 243 , 250 Allon U.S. visit, 247 Eshkol visit, 36 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 51 French military aid to Israel, 196 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 185 Jarring mission, 103 , 168 , 258 Jerusalem, 67 Nasser-Johnson correspondence, 4 , 21 , 23 National Security Council meeting, 91 Oil interests, 235 Refugees, 6 Soviet settlement proposal, 252 , 266 Suez Canal, 64 Terrorism, 123 , 228 , 232 , 236 Tiran Island, 47 , 182 U.S. economic aid to Israel, 125 U.S. military aid to Israel, 11 , 19 , 179 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 5 , 19 , 49 Baughan, Rear Adm. Robert, 367 Beal, Williams, 223 Begin, Menachem, 194 Bergus, Donald C.: Ball-Sisco mission, 225 Jarring mission, 86 , 87 , 135 Timetable proposal, 173 , 175 UAR position, 90 , 113 , 145 , 159 , 167 , 168 , 258 UAR three questions, 241 Nasser-Johnson correspondence, 34 Riad U.S. visit, 193 U.S.-UAR relations, 13 , 55 , 62 , 104 , 323 , 343 Birdsall, James, 12 , 13 , 14 , 21 , 23 , 31 , 34 Bitan, Moshe, 39 , 40 , 41 , 85 , 292 , 346 , 347 Black, Eugene R., 55 , 74 , 80 , 91 Blackburn, Bill, 336 Blee, David H., 334 Bohlen, Charles E., 176 , 245 , 274 Border incidents ( see also Terrorism ), 192 , 259 , 267 Israeli position, 17 , 195 Lebanese position, 174 , 184 Suez Canal incidents (Sept. 1968 ), 247 , 251 , 252 , 296 Boulos, Simon, 272 Boutros, Fuad, 184 , 220 Bovis, H. Eugene, 92 , 96 , 97 , 98 , 137 Bowie, Robert R., 37 Boyd, Alan S., 336 Bradburn, Col., 243 Brenchley, Frank, 198 Brewer, William D., 16 , 75 , 281 Britain. See Great Britain . Brown, Elizabeth Ann, 6 , 10 Buckle, John, 243 Buffum, William B., 259 , 268 , 271 , 282 , 307 , 310 , 318 , 345 Bunche, Ralph, 91 , 204 Bundy, McGeorge, 20 , 131 , 209 , 221 Califano, Joseph, 336 Campbell, John C., 67 Caradon, Lord, 271 Carmon, Brig. Gen. David, 306 , 308 , 309 , 317 , 330 , 357 Carolan, Thomas J., 259 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ( see also Helms, Richard M.) , 263 Cheslaw, Irving, 283 Christian, George, 199 , 336 Clark, Ramsay, 336 Clifford, Clark M.: Ball-Sisco mission, 199 , 210 Congressional leaders meeting, 248 Eshkol visit, 36 Jarring mission, 336 Nixon briefing, 315 U.S. military aid to Israel, 210 , 264 , 284 , 295 , 300 , 311 Cohen, Avner, 130 , 336 Comay, Michael S., 6 Congress, U.S., 248 Conte-Long Amendment, 49 , 72 , 89 Daniel, Price, 91 Daoud, Col. Muhammad, 85 Davies, Rodger P., 2 , 16 , 17 , 31 , 37 , 45 , 62 , 63 , 75 , 77 , 89 , 90 , 92 , 96 , 97 , 107 , 110 , 126 , 135 , 137 , 138 , 143 , 151 , 155 , 178 , 179 , 188 , 202 , 211 , 212 , 277 , 286 , 297 , 312 , 316 , 320 , 335 , 351 , 356 , 358 , 359 , 363 , 369 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 185 Jarring mission, 81 , 115 , 321 Jerusalem, 162 Occupied territories, 339 Soviet settlement proposal, 256 Terrorism, 223 , 370 Tiran Island, 281 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 282 , 291 UN Security Council resolution 242, 78 U.S. military aid to Israel, 133 , 299 , 368 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 1 Davis, Nathaniel, 91 , 98 Day, Arthur R., 10 , 17 , 63 , 79 , 97 , 103 , 117 , 124 , 137 , 151 , 178 , 192 , 202 , 207 , 211 , 212 , 242 , 296 , 355 , 361 , 362 Dayan, Moshe, 50 , 72 , 80 , 214 , 221 De Gaulle, Charles, 187 Dean, Patrick, 190 , 283 Denny, George C., 84 , 280 Desalinization, 32 , 33 , 46 , 177 , 206 , 319 , 352 Dimeshkie, Nadim, 184 Djerejian, Edward P., 342 Dobrynin, Anatoliy F.: Arms limitations, 91 , 93 Jarring mission, 98 , 159 , 176 , 207 , 310 , 355 Soviet settlement proposal, 245 , 249 , 265 , 266 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 274 Dubs, Adolph, 207 Duckett, Carl, 130 Dulles, John Foster, 193 Duncan, Enoch S., 278 Eban, Abba: Arms limitation, 155 , 165 , 268 Ball-Sisco mission, 213 , 217 , 227 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 187 , 230 , 268 Jarring mission, 59 , 81 , 134 , 177 , 234 , 326 Rusk-Eban initiative, 61 , 79 , 96 Jerusalem, 96 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 205 Nuclear weapons, 205 , 284 , 288 Scranton visit, 346 Soviet military aid to Arab states, 18 Soviet settlement proposal, 268 Suez Canal, 64 Terrorism, 123 , 338 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 287 , 289 , 302 , 303 , 307 , 318 UN Security Council resolution 242, 78 U.S. military aid, 268 , 284 , 288 Eddison, John, 243 Egypt. See United Arab Republic . Eilts, Hermann F., 47 El Al attack, Dec. 26, 1978, 367 , 369 El Al hijacking, 223 , 228 Eshkol, Levi: Arms limitation, 215 , 285 Ball-Sisco mission, 212 , 214 El Al hijacking, 223 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 157 , 163 Jarring mission, 157 Nasser State of the Union speech, Nov. 23, 1967, 7 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 349 Occupied territories, 137 Political situation, 315 Scranton visit, 347 Soviet settlement proposal, 260 Terrorism, 119 , 123 , 124 , 157 , 367 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 273 U.S. economic aid, 206 U.S. military aid, 3 , 157 , 163 , 275 , 285 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 231 U.S. visit, 33 , 35 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 51 Evron, Ephraim: Eshkol visit, 39 , 40 , 41 , 53 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 185 Jarring mission, 30 , 59 , 103 , 115 , 141 , 177 Suez Canal, 64 Terrorism, 128 UN Security Council resolution 242, 78 U.S. economic aid, 100 U.S. military aid, 133 , 152 , 158 , 194 , 246 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 20 , 24 Faisal ibn Abd ibn al-Aziz Al Saud (King of Saudi Arabia), 233 Farah, Soleiman, 174 , 184 Fatah. See Terrorism . Fawzi, Muhammad, 263 Fedayeen. See Terrorism . Feinberg, Abe, 290 , 313 , 348 Finch, Richard W., 77 Flott, Frederick W., 228 Ford, Gerald, 248 Ford, Melvin, 248 Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act ( 1968 ), Conte-Long Amendment, 49 , 72 , 89 Fortas, Abe, 132 Foster, John, 114 , 139 , 158 , 238 , 293 Fowler, Henry, 65 , 336 France ( see also French headings and subheadings ), 187 Frangieh, Suleiman, 108 Freeman, Orville, 43 , 65 , 336 , 366 Gamon, David L., 232 Gaud, William S., 43 , 366 Gaza Strip. See Occupied territories . Geneva Convention of 1959 , 17 Getz, John I., 198 Geva, Gen., 40 Ghorbal, Ashraf Abdel Latif: Allon U.S. visit, 251 Jarring mission, 45 , 151 , 239 Jerusalem, 162 Rusk seven-point formula, 337 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 282 , 291 U.S. military aid to Israel, 275 , 291 , 368 U.S.-UAR relations, 102 , 314 Gleysteen, William H., 259 , 341 Golan Heights. See Occupied territories . Goldberg, Arthur, 4 , 171 , 191 Jarring mission, 10 , 87 , 106 , 113 , 115 , 127 , 134 , 142 Jerusalem, 97 , 147 , 154 , 172 Goldstein, Ernest, 336 Great Britain, 172 , 190 Jarring mission, 175 , 198 , 283 U.S.-British discussions, 190 , 197 , 198 , 199 Gromyko, Andrei, 207 , 274 Hafiz, Elsie, 23 , 31 Handley, William J., 63 , 188 , 192 Harman, Avraham, 17 , 73 Eshkol visit, 39 , 40 , 41 , 51 Tiran Island, 16 , 47 , 75 U.S. military aid, 11 , 18 , 40 Harriman, W. Averell, 336 Hart, Parker T., 277 , 286 , 287 , 288 , 289 , 296 , 356 , 358 , 359 , 361 , 362 , 363 , 370 Interdepartmental Regional Group, 334 Jarring mission, 355 Occupied territories, 339 Terrorism, 340 , 369 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 282 U.S. military aid to Israel, 279 , 290 , 297 Hassan (Crown Prince of Jordan), 142 , 221 Helms, Richard M., 46 , 91 , 280 Ball-Sisco mission, 199 Border incidents, 174 Eshkol visit, 34 Israeli nuclear weapons, 130 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 187 , 204 , 294 , 325 Nixon briefing, 315 Suez Canal, 64 Terrorism, 148 , 229 U.S. military aid to Israel, 150 , 152 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 146 Helou, Charles, 149 , 192 Herzog, Yaacov, 7 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 347 Heymann, Philip B., 179 , 321 Hod, Brig. Gen. Mordechai, 40 , 41 , 51 , 70 , 297 , 306 , 308 , 309 , 317 , 330 Hood, Viscount, 198 Hornig, Donald C., 352 Houghton, Robert B., 1 , 5 , 17 , 37 , 44 , 55 , 63 , 77 , 89 , 97 , 98 , 107 , 110 , 117 , 119 , 126 , 138 , 143 , 147 , 184 , 188 , 192 , 195 Humphrey, Hubert, 91 , 284 , 336 Hussein I, ibn Talal (King of Jordan), 5 , 363 Ball-Sisco mission, 211 , 218 Bundy mission, 221 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 186 , 187 , 325 , 373 Jarring mission, 99 , 135 , 142 Scranton visit, 344 Soviet military aid, 9 , 29 Terrorism, 50 , 112 , 120 , 122 , 183 , 188 , 244 , 304 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 303 , 304 UN Security Council resolution 242, 1 U.S. military aid, 9 , 29 , 42 , 66 , 77 , 82 , 83 , 89 , 99 , 111 U.S. military aid to Israel, 253 , 278 , 338 , 341 , 371 Interdepartmental Regional Group, 334 Interior, U.S. Department of the, 32 Iraq, 371 Political situation, 219 , 238 Terrorism and, 338 , 340 Israel ( see also Border incidents; Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations; Israeli headings and subheadings ; Settlement possibilities): Ball-Sisco mission, 213 , 214 , 215 , 217 , 231 Eshkol U.S. visit, 33 , 35-36, 39 , 40 , 41 , 51 , 53 French military aid, 3 , 11 , 18 , 40 , 144 , 158 , 164 Surface-to-surface missiles (MD-620), 196 , 250 Military capabilities, 164 , 179 National Intelligence Estimate, 144 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 205 Political situation, 208 , 315 , 329 Scranton visit, 346 , 347 UAR three questions, 239 , 240 , 241 U.S. economic aid: Balance of payments, 33 , 39 Nuclear desalting plant, 32 , 33 , 46 , 177 , 206 , 319 , 352 P.L. 480, 33 , 65 , 100 , 125 , 226 , 366 Reprisal raids and, 121 U.S. military aid ( see also U.S. Phantoms, sale of below ): Anti-infiltration devices, 133 , 181 Eshkol visit, 33 , 35 , 36 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 51 , 53 Hawk missile credit, 201 Israeli requests, 3 , 11 , 18 , 94 , 133 , 231 Jordanian position, 29 Reprisal raids and, 229 , 232 U.S. position, 2 , 15 , 19 , 20 , 22 , 25 , 28 , 38 , 69 , 70 , 264 U.S. Phantoms, sale of: Arms limitation and, 179 Ball-Sisco mission, 210 , 224 Congressional leaders meeting, 248 Eshkol visit, 33 , 36 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 51 , 53 Israeli position, 157 , 158 , 268 Jarring mission and, 270 Jordanian position, 253 , 275 , 278 , 338 , 341 , 371 Nuclear weapons and, 284 , 285 , 290 , 292 , 295 , 298 , 299 , 300 , 306 , 308 , 309 , 313 , 315 , 316 , 317 Sale negotiations, 279 , 288 , 295 , 297 , 298 , 299 , 300 , 306 , 308 , 309 , 313 , 330 , 332 , 333 , 348 , 357 , 360 , 365 UAR position, 275 , 282 , 291 , 314 , 368 U.S.-Israeli discussions, 152 , 194 , 247 , 250 U.S. message to Jordan, 277 U.S. position, 38 , 150 , 163 , 179 , 208 , 224 , 246 , 275 U.S. relations with, 73 , 128 Allon visit, 247 , 250 , 251 Johnson B'nai B'rith speech, 251 , 268 , 273 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations: Ball-Sisco mission and, 213 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 227 , 234 , 237 Bundy mission and, 221 Israeli position, 152 , 153 , 157 , 163 , 185 , 213 , 242 , 268 , 287 , 325 Jordanian position, 186 , 219 , 230 , 268 , 325 , 373 U.S. position, 109 , 114 , 186 , 218 , 294 , 304 , 359 Israeli mobilization, 117 , 118 Israeli nuclear weapons, 130 Dimona reactor inspection, 156 Eshkol visit briefings, 33 Israeli position, 189 , 250 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, 205 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 288 U.S. military aid and, 284 , 285 , 290 , 292 , 295 , 298 , 299 , 300 , 306 , 308 , 309 , 313 , 315 , 316 , 317 Israeli withdrawal. See Occupied territories . Italy, 228 Jadid, Salah al, 293 Jarring mission ( see also Ball-Sisco mission ; Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations; UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting; U.S. emissary proposals): Arms limitation and, 57 Black mission report, 80 British position, 198 , 283 Circular telegrams, 10 Cyprus meeting proposals, 86 , 91 , 92 , 96 , 103 , 105 Interdepartmental Regional Group discussions, 334 Israeli position, 39 , 81 , 92 , 96 , 103 , 123 , 129 , 141 , 157 , 213 Israeli secret message, 139 , 143 Israeli two questions, 213 , 214 , 217 , 218 , 222 , 225 , 228 Jordanian position, 66 , 81 , 99 , 136 , 142 , 325 Lebanese position, 30 , 220 , 342 National Security Council meetings, 91 , 261 New York talk proposals, 169 , 170 , 171 , 177 Post-UNGA status, 336 , 350 , 353 , 359 , 364 Refugees and, 6 Rusk-Eban initiative, 61 , 79 , 96 Rusk seven-point formula, 301 , 314 , 318 , 328 , 337 , 345 , 354 , 358 , 361 Soviet position, 98 , 159 , 176 , 198 , 249 , 354 , 355 Status reports, 30 , 59 , 61 , 86 , 234 , 255 Syrian response, 30 Terrorism and, 127 , 134 , 139 Timetable proposal, 173 , 175 , 176 , 178 , 207 , 354 UAR position, 2 , 45 , 87 , 90 , 106 , 110 , 113 , 145 , 151 , 159 , 167 , 168 , 258 , 327 , 337 UAR three questions, 239 , 240 , 241 U.S.-Israeli discussions, 103 , 106 , 115 , 202 , 320 , 321 , 322 , 326 , 335 U.S. military aid to Israel and, 19 , 38 , 41 , 270 U.S. military aid to Jordan and, 68 U.S. position, 45 , 63 , 88 , 91 , 109 , 131 , 132 , 134 , 135 , 143 , 166 , 255 , 336 U.S.-Soviet communications, 180 , 274 , 310 , 354 , 355 , 361 , 362 , 371 , 374 , 376 U.S.-UAR relations and, 102 Jenkins, Col. R. H., 147 Jerusalem: Black mission report, 80 Israeli independence day parade, 140 , 147 , 161 , 162 Israeli measures, 44 Israeli position, 96 , 194 , 217 , 247 Jordanian position, 27 , 66 , 140 , 218 UAR position, 161 , 162 UN Security Council discussion, 172 U.S. position, 67 , 88 , 91 , 97 , 103 , 154 , 267 Johnson, Joseph E., 109 Johnson, Lyndon B., 46 , 60 , 200 , 331 Allon plan, 328 Allon U.S. visit, 247 Arms limitation, 40 , 41 , 48 , 57 , 58 , 374 , 376 Ball-Sisco mission, 199 , 211 , 212 , 233 Black mission, 80 B'nai B'rith speech, 251 , 268 , 273 Border incidents, 267 Congressional leaders meeting, 248 Eshkol visit, 33 , 35 , 36 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 51 Israeli/Arab military capabilities, 164 Israeli nuclear weapons, 130 , 156 , 315 , 349 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 163 , 186 , 187 , 204 , 294 , 304 , 325 Jarring mission: Jordanian position, 99 National Security Council meetings, 88 , 91 New York talk proposals, 169 , 170 , 171 U.S.-Israeli discussions, 322 U.S. position, 132 , 134 , 166 , 255 Jerusalem, 147 , 154 , 161 , 162 , 172 , 267 Nasser correspondence, 4 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 21 , 23 , 31 , 34 , 161 , 162 Nasser State of the Union speech, Nov. 23, 1977, 8 National Security Council meeting, 91 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 315 , 316 Re-election decision, 129 Riad U.S. visit, 193 Soviet settlement proposal, 249 , 254 , 255 , 257 , 260 , 265 Suez Canal, 64 Terrorism: Israeli reprisal raids, 118 , 119 , 120 , 121 , 123 , 338 Israeli territory seizure fears, 183 Jarring mission and, 127 , 134 Johnson-Hussein correspondence, 120 , 122 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 273 , 303 , 310 U.S.-British discussions, 197 U.S. economic aid to Israel: Nuclear desalting plant, 32 , 46 , 206 , 319 , 352 P.L. 480, 65 , 100 , 226 , 366 U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 43 U.S. emissary proposals, 131 , 180 , 208 U.S.-Israeli relations, 73 U.S.-Jordan relations, 363 U.S. military aid to Israel ( see also U.S. Phantoms, sale to Israel below ): Eshkol visit, 35 , 36 , 39 , 41 Hawk missile credit, 201 Israeli requests, 94 U.S. position, 15 , 19 , 20 , 25 , 28 , 38 , 69 , 70 , 264 , 275 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 15 , 19 , 20 , 26 , 29 , 68 Jordanian position, 83 , 99 Khammash negotiations, 71 , 72 , 77 , 125 U.S. Phantoms, sale to Israel, 150 , 163 , 248 , 277 Nuclear weapons and, 284 , 285 , 290 , 298 , 299 , 311 Sale negotiations, 298 , 348 , 360 , 365 U.S.-Soviet negotiation proposals, 180 U.S.-UAR relations, 28 , 62 , 74 Johnson, Tom, 199 , 336 Johnston, James, 98 , 368 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 2 , 22 Jones, Betty Jane, 96 , 110 , 252 Jones, Jim, 26 , 36 , 43 , 183 , 235 , 312 , 336 , 349 Jordan ( see also Border incidents; Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations; Jordanian headings and subheadings ; Refugees ): Ball-Sisco mission, 218 , 219 , 227 Bundy mission, 221 Political situation, 138 , 160 , 238 , 304 , 327 Scranton visit, 344 Soviet military aid, 1 , 9 , 29 , 42 , 52 , 66 UAR relations with, 3 U.S. economic aid, 43 , 63 U.S. military aid: Airlift, 146 Internal defense, 243 , 312 , 356 , 372 Israeli position, 11 , 20 , 24 , 35 , 231 Jarring mission and, 68 Jordanian position, 1 , 27 , 29 , 42 , 82 , 83 , 99 Khammash negotiations, 5 , 29 , 42 , 49 , 66 , 71 , 72 , 76 , 77 , 89 , 95 , 107 , 111 , 125 155 -mm guns, 216 , 252 Terrorism and, 84 , 243 U.S.-Jordanian discussions, 9 , 372 U.S. position, 15 , 19 , 20 , 36 , 37 , 356 U.S. relations with, 286 , 312 , 363 Junior, Lewis D., 356 Kabbani, Najati, 370 Karama refugee camp bombardment, Nov. 21, 1977 , 1 , 5 Katzenbach, Nicholas DeB., 63 , 89 , 107 , 117 , 119 , 143 , 147 , 188 , 202 , 239 , 240 , 277 , 289 , 312 , 320 , 335 , 358 , 359 , 363 Ball-Sisco mission, 199 Border violations, 17 Jarring mission, 45 , 91 , 131 , 135 , 175 , 320 Jerusalem, 44 Lebanese imposed settlement proposal, 272 National Security Council meeting, 91 Soviet settlement proposal, 266 Terrorism, 118 , 236 Tiran Island, 16 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 276 U.S. military aid to Israel, 15 , 19 , 20 , 22 , 133 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 1 , 15 , 26 , 49 U.S.-UAR relations, 91 , 324 Keeny, Spurgeon M., 279 Khammash, Gen. Amer: Soviet military aid to UAR, 263 Terrorism, 183 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 5 , 29 , 42 , 49 , 66 , 71 , 72 , 76 , 77 , 89 , 95 , 107 , 111 , 125 Khartoum Summit, 7 Khelladi, Khaled, 228 Khouli, Hassan Sabri al-, 4 , 31 , 34 , 282 , 323 Kony, Mohammed Awad El, 113 , 168 , 239 , 345 Kosygin, Aleksey N., 58 , 91 , 233 Krim, Arthur, 348 Krimer, William D., 274 Kurdi, Col., 95 Kuznetsov, Vasili V., 176 Lambrakis, George B., 16 , 17 , 196 Lebanon, 149 Ball-Sisco mission, 220 Border incidents, 174 , 184 Israeli reprisal raids, 367 , 369 , 370 , 375 Jarring mission, 342 Political situation, 108 Settlement proposals, 149 , 272 Syrian political situation and, 238 Ledbetter, W. E., 120 Leddy, John M., 57 , 105 , 176 , 198 Leonard, John D., 250 Leonhart, William, 351 Macy, John W., Jr., 336 Maguire, Charles, 336 Maitland, D. J. D., 198 Malik, Yacov, 274 Marks, Leonard, 91 Martin, Graham, 80 Matter, James K., 223 McAndrew, J. Thomas, 149 McCloy, John J., 145 , 149 , 159 McCormack, John, 248 McNamara, Robert S., 57 , 164 Eshkol visit, 36 , 40 , 41 Jarring mission, 91 Nasser-Johnson correspondence, 21 U.S. military aid to Israel, 19 , 22 , 36 , 38 , 41 , 51 , 69 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 49 , 71 , 72 , 76 U.S. Phantoms, sale to Israel, 150 , 152 McPherson, Harry, 336 Meeker, Leonard C., 97 , 235 Meyer, Armin, 327 Middleton, Harry, 336 Moffat, Jay P., 287 Murphy, Charles, 336 Murphy, Robert D., 315 , 323 Murray, Robert J., 89 , 210 , 243 , 333 , 356 U.S. military aid to Israel, 306 , 308 , 309 , 317 , 330 Nasser, Gamel Abdel: Jarring mission, 135 , 136 , 145 , 159 , 167 , 170 , 171 , 327 Political situation, 101 Settlement possibilities, 209 State of the Union speech (Nov. 23, 1967 ), 2 , 3 , 7 , 8 Suez Canal, 145 U.S.-UAR relations, 343 Johnson correspondence, 4 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 21 , 23 , 31 , 34 , 161 , 162 Nixon correspondence, 314 , 323 , 324 , 351 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 35-68, 144 National Security Council (NSC), 88 , 91 , 261 Neuman, Robert H., 17 , 44 , 147 Nitze, Paul H., 22 , 299 Nixon, Richard, 284 , 314 , 315 , 323 , 324 , 327 , 342 , 351 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ( see also Arms limitation), 155 , 166 , 215 Israeli position, 205 , 268 , 349 U.S. military aid to Israel and, 284 , 285 , 290 , 292 , 295 , 298 , 300 , 315 U.S. position, 316 Nuclear weapons. See Israeli nuclear weapons ; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . Occupied territories: Allon plan, 213 , 217 , 268 , 328 Israeli position, 39 , 157 , 256 , 339 Jarring mission discussions, 30 Jordanian position, 99 Soviet position, 58 , 93 UAR position, 115 U.S. position, 31 , 103 , 105 , 137 Oil interests, 235 Okun, Arthur, 248 , 336 Oweini, Hajj Hussein, 375 Pace, Eric, 239 , 241 Paganelli, Robert P., 243 , 277 , 286 , 312 , 356 , 363 Palestinians, 114 , 128 , 141 , 217 Palmer, Joseph, II, 228 Parker, Richard B., 2 , 31 , 45 , 62 , 151 , 223 , 259 , 291 , 351 , 355 , 358 Rusk seven-point formula, 337 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 282 U.S. military aid to Israel, 275 U.S.-UAR relations, 314 Pedersen, Richard F., 56 , 307 Peled, Gen., 357 Pierson, DeVier, 336 Poats, Rutherford M., 65 Popper, David H., 56 , 135 , 188 , 192 , 211 , 212 , 259 , 277 , 282 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. See El Al attack, Dec. 26, 1968 . Porter, Dwight J., 108 , 149 , 342 , 375 Ball-Sisco mission, 218 , 219 , 220 Border incidents, 174 , 192 Precht, Henry, 6 , 44 , 96 , 97 , 137 , 147 Rabin, Lt. Gen. Yitzak: Allon U.S. visit, 247 El Al hijacking, 228 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 160 , 185 Jarring mission, 92 , 103 , 106 , 177 , 320 , 362 Johnson re-election decision, 129 Nuclear weapons, 189 , 290 , 299 , 306 , 308 , 309 , 317 , 349 Occupied territories, 339 Soviet military aid to UAR, 256 Soviet settlement proposal, 252 , 256 , 257 , 262 Terrorism, 92 , 123 , 124 , 340 Tiran Island, 182 , 250 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 287 , 288 , 302 , 303 U.S. military aid to Israel, 231 U.S. Phantoms, sale to Israel, 150 , 158 , 194 , 297 Memorandum of Understanding, 330 , 332 , 333 Nuclear weapons and, 290 , 299 , 306 , 308 , 309 , 317 Sale negotiations, 357 , 360 Rafael, Gideon, 81 , 215 , 346 Rasoul Kilani, Muhammad, 54 Raviv, Moshe, 252 , 297 , 339 , 362 , 369 Read, Benjamin H., 21 , 190 Reedy, George, 336 Refugees: Black mission report, 80 Israeli position, 39 , 103 UAR position, 13 , 31 , 145 , 343 U.S. position, 6 , 27 , 63 , 103 , 269 , 371 Riad, Mahmoud, 345 Riad, Mohamed: Ball-Sisco mission, 225 Jarring mission, 86 , 87 , 90 , 103 , 106 , 113 , 135 , 151 , 168 , 258 Three questions, 241 Timetable proposal, 173 Rusk seven-point formula, 301 , 314 , 345 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 269 , 282 , 291 , 296 , 301 , 307 U.S.-UAR relations, 4 , 62 , 314 , 343 U.S. visit, 193 Rifai, Abdul Munim: Ball-Sisco mission, 219 , 227 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 230 Israeli reprisal raids, 229 Jarring mission, 110 , 142 , 213 , 234 Soviet military aid, 263 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 307 Rifai, Zaid, 66 , 142 , 216 , 218 , 221 , 344 Rockwell, Stuart W., 239 , 240 Root, John F., 147 , 228 , 369 Rostow, Eugene V., 62 , 63 , 92 , 103 , 105 , 110 , 135 , 138 , 171 , 178 , 189 , 202 , 207 , 239 , 240 , 289 , 358 , 361 , 362 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 160 , 185 Jarring mission, 98 Israeli position, 92 , 141 Timetable proposal, 175 , 207 U.S. position, 103 , 326 U.S.-Soviet communications, 310 , 355 , 362 Oil interests, 235 Terrorism, 17 Tiran Island, 16 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 282 U.S. military aid to Israel, 20 , 224 Rostow, Walt W., 60 , 62 , 77 , 105 , 119 , 188 , 200 , 277 , 316 , 331 , 363 Allon plan, 328 Allon U.S. visit, 247 Arms limitation, 48 , 57 , 58 , 374 , 376 Ball-Sisco mission, 222 , 237 Border incidents, 267 Congressional leaders meeting, 248 Eshkol visit, 33 , 35 , 36 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 51 , 53 Israeli nuclear weapons, 156 , 284 , 290 , 292 , 295 , 298 , 313 , 349 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiation, 114 , 163 , 185 , 186 , 191 , 204 , 304 , 325 Jarring mission, 88 , 131 , 132 Israeli secret message, 139 New York talk proposals, 169 , 170 , 177 Status reports, 30 , 61 U.S.-Israeli discussions, 321 , 322 U.S. position, 166 , 255 Jarring proposal, Oct. 3, 1978, 271 Jerusalem, 267 Johnson re-election decision, 129 Nasser-Johnson correspondence, 13 , 14 , 21 , 161 Nasser State of the Union speech, Nov. 23, 1967 , 7 , 8 National Security Council meeting, 91 Nixon briefing, 315 Oil interests, 235 Riad U.S. visit, 193 Soviet settlement proposal, 249 , 254 , 255 , 257 , 260 , 262 , 265 Suez Canal, 64 Syrian political situation, 238 , 293 Terrorism, 118 , 123 , 127 , 183 , 236 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 273 , 276 , 303 , 310 UN Security Council resolution 242, 78 U.S.-British discussions, 197 , 199 U.S. economic aid to Israel, 65 , 100 , 206 , 352 , 366 U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 43 U.S. emissary proposals, 191 U.S. military aid to Israel ( see also U.S. Phantoms, sale to Israel below ), 19 , 20 , 25 , 28 , 35 , 38 , 70 , 264 Anti-infiltration devices, 181 Eshkol visit, 35 , 36 , 51 Hawk missile credit, 201 Israeli requests, 94 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 19 , 20 , 24 , 26 Airlift, 146 Jarring mission and, 68 Jordanian position, 83 Khammash negotiations, 72 , 125 U.S. Phantoms, sale to Israel, 150 , 152 , 158 , 163 , 194 , 246 Nuclear weapons and, 284 , 290 , 292 , 295 , 298 , 313 Sale negotiations, 279 , 298 , 348 , 360 , 365 U.S.-UAR relations, 4 , 28 , 55 , 74 , 101 , 104 Ruser, Claus W., 243 Rusk, Dean: Allon U.S. visit, 250 Arms limitation, 48 , 57 , 93 , 105 , 155 , 284 , 299 Ball-Sisco mission, 211 , 212 Border incidents, 184 , 192 , 195 , 259 Congressional leaders meeting, 248 El Al hijacking, 223 , 228 Eshkol visit, 36 , 39 , 40 , 41 French military aid to Israel, 196 Goldberg proposals, 203 Israeli nuclear weapons, 189 , 205 , 284 , 299 , 311 Israeli political situation, 315 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 157 , 160 , 242 , 359 Jarring mission, 10 Israeli position, 92 , 157 , 361 Israeli secret message, 143 Jordanian position, 151 National Security Council meeting, 261 New York talk proposals, 171 Post-UNGA status, 336 , 359 Rusk-Eban initiative, 61 , 79 , 96 Soviet position, 98 , 176 , 355 , 361 Timetable proposal, 178 , 207 UAR position, 2 , 90 , 110 UAR three questions, 239 , 240 U.S.-Israeli discussions, 103 , 106 , 115 , 202 , 335 U.S. military aid to Israel and, 270 U.S.-Soviet communications, 180 , 274 , 361 , 362 , 374 Jerusalem, 67 , 97 , 147 , 154 , 162 , 172 Jordanian political situation, 138 Nixon briefing, 315 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 205 Occupied territories, 137 Refugees, 6 Seven-point formula, 301 , 314 , 318 , 328 , 337 , 345 , 358 Soviet settlement proposal, 245 , 252 , 256 , 257 , 265 , 268 Suez Canal incident, Sept. 1968 ), 252 Terrorism, 56 , 85 , 126 , 183 Israeli reprisal raids, 120 , 124 , 232 , 236 , 340 , 369 , 370 Tiran Island, 47 , 75 , 182 , 281 UAR military capabilities, 2 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 274 , 283 , 296 , 312 Israeli position, 287 , 289 , 302 , 303 UAR position, 269 , 282 , 291 , 301 UN Security Council resolution 242, 78 U.S.-British discussions, 190 , 198 U.S. emissary proposals, 180 U.S.-Jordan relations, 286 , 363 U.S. military aid to Israel ( see also U.S. Phantoms, sale to Israel below , 2 , 19 , 36 , 39 , 264 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 37 , 63 , 243 , 312 , 356 Khammash negotiations, 71 , 72 , 89 , 107 U.S. Phantoms, sale to Israel, 224 , 250 , 270 , 277 Nuclear weapons and, 299 , 311 Sale negotiations, 288 , 297 UAR position, 275 , 368 U.S.-Soviet negotiation proposals, 180 U.S.-UAR relations, 31 , 62 , 351 Salans, Carl F., 67 Sanders, Harold Barefoot, 248 Saudi Arabia, 233 Military aid to Jordan, 95 , 312 Terrorism and, 244 Tiran Island, 16 , 39 , 41 , 47 , 182 , 250 , 281 Saunders, Harold H., 53 , 124 , 211 , 212 , 312 Allon U.S. visit, 247 , 251 Ball-Sisco mission, 222 , 231 , 233 , 237 Israeli/Arab military capabilities, 164 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiation proposals, 114 , 191 Jarring mission, 30 , 61 , 139 , 141 , 177 , 321 , 376 Johnson re-election decision, 129 Nasser-Johnson correspondence, 14 Nasser State of the Union speech, Nov. 23, 1967 ), 7 , 8 National Security Council meeting, 91 Soviet settlement proposal, 262 Terrorism, 121 , 127 , 128 , 338 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 276 , 289 UN Security Council resolution 242, 78 U.S. economic aid to Israel, 226 , 352 U.S. emissary proposals, 191 U.S. military aid to Israel, 181 , 295 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 24 , 146 U.S. Phantoms, sale to Israel, 152 , 179 , 194 , 246 , 279 , 291 , 348 U.S.-UAR relations, 101 , 104 Schultze, Charles, 43 , 65 Schwartz, Harry H., 2 , 107 , 311 U.S. military aid to Israel, 306 , 308 , 309 , 317 , 330 , 357 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 76 Scranton, William W., 342 , 343 , 344 Seaborg, Glenn T., 32 Sebastian, Peter, 223 , 228 Seelye, Talcott, 243 , 259 , 272 , 277 , 286 , 312 , 356 , 359 , 363 Semenov, V. S., 310 Senafir, 182 Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), 276 Settlement possibilities ( see also Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations; Jarring mission ; UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting ; UN Security Council resolution 242 ): Eshkol U.S. visit, 33 , 40 Goldberg proposals, 203 Israeli position, 92 Lebanese position, 149 , 272 Scranton discussions, 342 , 343 , 344 Soviet position, 233 Soviet settlement proposal, 245 , 249 , 265 Israeli position, 252 , 255 , 257 , 260 , 262 , 268 U.S. position, 254 , 262 , 266 UAR position, 34 , 209 U.S. position, 109 U.S.-Soviet negotiation proposals, 180 Shapiro, J., 306 , 308 , 330 Sharaf, Abdul Hamid, 232 Sharm-el-Sheikh, 39 , 40 , 256 , 287 , 303 , 318 , 343 Shlaudeman, Harry W., 184 Sisco, Joseph J., 10 , 63 , 67 , 77 , 79 , 90 , 97 , 105 , 110 , 143 , 147 , 171 , 189 , 202 , 239 , 240 , 287 , 289 , 312 , 320 , 335 , 358 , 359 , 363 Goldberg proposals, 203 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 185 Israeli reprisal raids, 236 , 340 Jarring mission, 81 , 115 , 159 Occupied territories, 339 Refugees, 6 Rusk seven-point formula, 328 Soviet settlement proposal, 252 , 268 Suez Canal, 64 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 276 , 296 , 307 UN Security Council resolution 242, 78 Six-Day War, June 1967 : Reparations, 4 U.S. involvement, charges of, 4 , 34 , 55 , 62 , 91 , 101 , 102 , 104 Smith, Bromley, 31 , 57 , 315 Israeli reprisal raids, 229 Jarring mission, 208 , 336 National Security Council meetings, 91 , 261 Sober, Sidney, 67 , 179 , 356 Soviet Union. See Soviet and U.S.-Soviet headings and subheadings . Special National Intelligence Estimates: SNIE 11-9-68 , 52 SNIE 30-1-68 , 148 Springsteen, George S., 369 Steigman, Andrew L., 79 Sterner, Michael, 272 , 281 , 316 Stewart, Michael, 190 , 198 , 271 Suez Canal: Ball-Sisco mission, 233 Black mission report, 80 Border incidents, Sept. 1968 , 247 , 251 , 252 , 296 Israeli position, 39 , 40 , 64 , 347 Nasser State of the Union speech, Nov. 23, 1967 , 7 Tiran Island and, 182 UAR position, 145 , 209 Sukhodrev, V., 274 Symmes, Harrison M., 277 Allon plan, 328 Ball-Sisco mission, 217 Bundy mission, 221 Israel-Jordan bilateral negotiations, 153 , 230 , 373 Jarring mission, 99 , 136 , 142 , 353 Rusk seven-point formula, 328 Scranton visit, 344 Settlement possibilities, 109 Soviet military aid to Jordan, 9 , 66 Terrorism, 50 , 54 , 84 , 85 , 116 , 122 , 244 , 304 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 276 , 312 U.S. military aid to Israel, 253 , 371 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 1 , 9 , 27 , 82 , 99 , 372 Airlift, 146 Khammash negotiations, 5 , 29 , 42 , 66 , 89 , 95 , 111 155 -mm guns, 216 Syria, 92 , 238 , 272 , 293 Tait, Susan T., 196 Talhouni, Bahjat: Ball-Sisco mission, 219 Israeli mobilization, 117 Jarring mission, 142 Political situation, 160 U.S. military aid to Israel, 278 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 27 , 66 Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 199 Tcherniakov, Yuri N., 176 , 354 , 355 , 374 Tekoah, Yosef, 56 , 134 , 153 , 296 , 302,307 Teller, Edward, 130 Temple, Larry, 336 Territo, Dorothy, 72 Terrorism ( see also Border incidents), 17 , 228 Bus incident, Mar. 18, 1968 , 116 , 117 , 122 El Al attack/Israeli Beirut Airport attack, Dec. 1968 ), 367 , 369 , 370 , 375 Israeli-Jordanian military meeting proposal, 85 , 116 Israeli position, 39 , 92 , 128 , 148 , 157 Israeli reprisal raids, 1 , 5 , 117 , 118 , 119 , 120 , 121 , 123 , 124 , 229 , 367 Jordanian position, 232 , 236 Lebanese position, 370 , 375 Soviet position, 229 UN Security Council resolution, 236 U.S. position, 134 , 338 , 340 , 369 Israeli territory seizure fears, 183 , 188 Jarring mission and, 127 , 134 , 139 Johnson-Hussein correspondence, 120 , 122 Jordanian position, 50 , 54 , 112 , 116 , 122 , 148 , 183 , 244 , 304 Lebanese position, 272 National Intelligence Estimate, 144 Special National Intelligence Estimate, 148 U.S. military aid to Israel and, 133 , 181 U.S. military aid to Jordan and, 84 , 243 U.S. position, 56 , 84 , 126 , 127 Thompson, Llewellyn, 58 , 91 , 350 Tiran Island, 16 , 39 , 41 , 47 , 75 , 182 , 250 , 281 Toon, Malcolm, 57 , 207 Tuqan, Ahmad, 278 Udall, Stewart H., 32 , 336 UN General Assembly foreign ministers meeting, 246 British position, 283 Israeli position, 234 , 273 , 287 , 288 , 289 , 302 , 303 Jarring proposal, Oct. 3, 1968 , 271 Jarring reports, 307 Jordanian position, 227 Senior Interdepartmental Group discussion, 276 UAR position, 269 , 282 , 291 , 296 , 301 U.S. position, 252 , 256 , 258 , 261 , 289 , 296 , 312 U.S.-Soviet discussion, 274 , 310 United Arab Republic (UAR): Ball-Sisco mission, 225 Bundy mission, 209 Israeli two questions, 213 , 214 , 217 , 218 , 222 , 225 , 228 Jordanian relations with, 3 Lebanese relations with, 108 Military capabilities, 2 Nasser State of the Union speech (Nov. 23, 1967 ), 2 , 3 , 7 , 8 Political situation, 101 Soviet military aid, 3 , 11 , 263 Israeli position, 18 , 39 , 94 , 256 , 260 Soviet relations with, 13 , 33 , 52 U.S. relations with: Anderson reports, 4 , 28 Black mission report, 74 Nasser-Johnson correspondence, 4 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 21 , 23 , 31 , 34 Nasser-Nixon correspondence, 314 , 323 , 324 , 351 National Security Council meeting, 91 Political situation and, 101 Riad U.S. visit, 193 Scranton visit, 343 Six-Day War, charges of U.S. involvement, 4 , 34 , 55 , 62 , 91 , 101 , 102 , 104 UN Security Council ( see also UN Security Council resolution 242 ), 236 UN Security Council resolution 242 ( see also Jarring mission ), 61 Israeli position, 68 , 78 , 81 Jordanian position, 1 , 66 , 142 , 218 , 232 Lebanese position, 149 UAR position, 34 , 86 , 87 United Kingdom. See Great Britain . Urwick, Alan, 283 U.S. emissary proposals, 131 , 180 , 191 , 208 , 246 Vietnam war, 33 , 35 Walsh, John P., 31 , 57 , 106 , 134 , 171 , 184 , 229 , 243 , 321 , 324 Warnke, Paul C., 37 , 191 U.S. military aid to Israel, 210 , 279 , 295 , 300 , 306 , 308 , 309 , 311 , 313 , 317 , 357 , 360 Memorandum of Understanding, 330 , 332 , 333 U.S. military aid to Jordan, 49 , 76 Watson, Marvin, 336 Wehmeyer, Donald A., 96 , 137 Weizman, Brig. Gen. Ezer, 2 , 3 Welles, Benjamin, 314 West Bank. See Occupied territories . Wheeler, Gen. Earle G.: Ball-Sisco mission, 199 Eshkol visit, 40 , 41 , 51 Israeli/Arab military capabilities, 164 National Security Council meeting, 91 Nixon briefing, 315 U.S. military aid to Israel, 70 , 150 , 152 Wheeler, Joseph L., 63 Wiggins, J. R., 274 , 302 , 307 , 336 , 345 Wiley, Marshall W., 5 , 56 , 89 , 96 , 107 , 137 , 138 , 232 Williams, Maurice J., 243 Wise, Samuel G., 106 Wood, Robert, 336 Woods, George, 177 , 206 , 319 , 352 Yafi, Abdullah, 342 Yaish, Nissim, 185 Yemen, 11 , 18 , 24 , 52 Younes, Mahmoud, 80 Zaky, Abbas, 327 Zuayyin, Yusuf, 293 Zwick, Charles, 248 , 336 , 352 , 366