FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XVIII, ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, 1964–1967 Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967 United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII) Contents Preface Sources Abbreviations Persons Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967 (Documents 1-418) Index Sources Sources The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department’s indexed central files for these years have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Many of the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In preparing this volume, the editor made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. The bulk of the foreign policy records at the Johnson Library are in the country files and other component parts of the National Security File. The editor also consulted the Papers of George Ball and Robert Komer, two officials who were deeply involved in policymaking for the region in the first half of the Johnson administration. Thanks to the leadership of the Johnson Library, the Department of State historians had full access to the audiotapes of President Johnson’s telephone conversations. These audiotapes include substantial numbers of telephone conversations between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, and key members of Congress. The editor of this volume selected for publication seven audiotapes of President Johnson’s telephone conversations dealing with Arab-Israeli issues. The editor prepared transcripts of parts of these conversations, which were incorporated into footnotes or editorial notes. Although the transcripts give the substance of the conversations, readers are urged to consult the recordings for a full appreciation of those dimensions that cannot be captured fully in a transcription, such as the speakers’ inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning. Second in importance only to the White House records at the Johnson Library were the records of the Department of State. Because the Ambassadors in the countries of the region played a major role in the formulation of policy, the volume includes a large selection of telegraphic correspondence between the Embassies and the Department of State. The Department’s central files contain the cable traffic recording U.S. diplomatic relations with Israel, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, and other Arab countries; memoranda of diplomatic conversations; and memoranda proposing action or providing information. Some important documents are found only in the Department’s lot files. The Conference Files maintained by the Executive Secretariat contain briefing materials as well as records of conversations. Documentation on initiatives that were not approved is often found only in desk or bureau files. The Ball Papers include summaries of telephone conversations and other useful documentation. Files of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs include a selection of correspondence that provides insights into policy-making. Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Central Intelligence Agency provides the Department of State historians access to intelligence documents from records in its custody and at the Presidential libraries. This access is arranged and facilitated by the CIA’s History Staff, part of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding. This volume includes a number of intelligence records. Among the intelligence records reviewed for the volume were those in country and intelligence files at the Johnson Library, the files of the Directors of Central Intelligence, especially John McCone, CIA intelligence reports and summaries, retired files of the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing National Intelligence Estimates, and the INR Historical Files. Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the Department of State records is in process, and many of those records are already available for public review at the National Archives. The declassification review of other records is going forward in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12958, under which all records over 25 years old, except file series exemptions requested by agencies and approved by the President, should be reviewed for declassification by 2000. Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files . See National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files . These files may be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park Maryland, Record Group 59. INR/IL Historical Files: Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1970s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. NEA/IAI Files: Lot 69 D 492 Files on Arab-Israel affairs for 1963–1964 and 1966–1967, maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (later the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs). NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 304 Files on Arab-Israel affairs for 1953–1954, 1963–1966, 1967, maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (later the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs). NEA/IAI Files: Lot 73 D 438 Files on Arab-Israel affairs for 1964, maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (later the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs). NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102 Files on Arab-Israel affairs for 1960–1975, maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (later the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs). Central Intelligence Agency Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files Job 80–B01285A, DCI Files, DCI (Helms) Memos for the Record Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, DCI Memos for the Record Job 80–B01676R, DCI Executive Registry Files National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State Central Files Following are the principal files used for this volume: AE 6 ISR–US: peaceful uses of atomic energy, Israel-U.S. AE 11–2 ISR: atomic energy reactor development, Israel AE 13 IAEA: atomic energy safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency AE 13 ISR: atomic energy safeguards, Israel AID (US) LEB: general policy, U.S. aid to Lebanon AID (US) UAR: general policy, U.S. aid to the United Arab Republic AID (US) 9 UAR: U.S. loans for economic development, United Arab Republic AID (US) 15 UAR: P.L. 480, Food for Peace Programs, United Arab Republic AID (US) 15–4 UAR: P.L. 480 agreements, United Arab Republic AID (US) 15–8 UAR: Title I commodity sales for foreign currency, United Arab Republic AID (US) 15–11 LEB: U.S. dollar credit sales (Title IV) to Lebanon DEF ISR: defense affairs, Israel DEF 1 ISR: defense affairs policy, plans, readiness, Israel DEF 4 ARAB: collective defense pacts and alliances, Arab countries DEF 6–1 JORDAN: Jordanian Army DEF 6–8 JORDAN: mobilization, Jordan DEF 7 LEB–US: visits of U.S. military aircraft, vessels, personnel to Lebanon DEF 8 ISR: exhibitions, military parades, Israel DEF 12 ISR: armaments, Israel DEF 12 JORDAN: armaments, Jordan DEF 12 NEAR E: armaments, Near East DEF 12 UAR: armaments, United Arab Republic DEF 12–4 ISR: production, repair of armaments, Israel DEF 12–5 ISR: procurement, sale of armaments, Israel DEF 12–5 JORDAN: procurement, sale of armaments, Jordan DEF 12–5 LEB: procurement, sale of armaments, Lebanon DEF 12–5 NEAR E: procurement, sale of armaments, Near East DEF 12–5 UAR: procurement, sale of armaments, United Arab Republic DEF 12–5 US–LEB: procurement, sale of armaments, U.S.-Lebanon DEF 15–7 ISR–US: inspections, tours of military installations, Israel-U.S. DEF 17–1 US: military flight clearances, U.S. DEF 18 NEAR E: arms control and disarmament, Near East DEF 19 NEAR E: military assistance, Near East DEF 19–3 ISR: military assistance organizations and conferences, Israel DEF 19–3 US–ISR: military assistance organizations and conferences, U.S.-Israel DEF 19–3 US–JORDAN: military assistance organizations and conferences, U.S.-Jordan DEF 19–3 US–LEB: military assistance organizations and conferences, U.S.-Lebanon DEF 19–8 US–ISR: U.S. military equipment and supplies to Israel DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN: U.S. military equipment and supplies to Jordan DEF 19–8 US–LEB: U.S. military equipment and supplies to Lebanon E 11–3 ISR: question of desalination in Israel FN 6 LEB: banks and banking, Lebanon FT 11–2 ISR–ARAB: foreign trade boycotts, Israel-Arab ORG 7 NEA: organization and administration, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State ORG 7 OSD: organization and administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense ORG 7 S: organization and administration, Office of the Secretary of State POL ARAB–ISR: political affairs and relations, Arab-Israel POL ARAB–US: political affairs and relations, Arab-U.S. POL ISR–US: political affairs and relations, Israel-U.S. POL JORDAN–US: political affairs and relations, Jordan-US POL LEB: political affairs and relations, Lebanon POL SYR–US: political affairs and relations, Syria-U.S. POL UAR-US: political affairs and relations, United Arab Republic-U.S. POL 1 ISR–US: general policy, Israel-US POL 1 NEAR E–US: general policy, Near East-US POL 1 UAR-US: general policy, United Arab Republic-U.S. POL 2 NEAR E: general reports and statistics, Near East POL 3 PAL ENTITY: regional alignments and groupings, Palestinian Entity POL 7 ISR: visits, meetings with Israeli leaders POL 7 JORDAN: visits, meetings with Jordanian leaders POL 7 LEB: visits, meetings with Lebanese leaders POL 7 UAR: visits, meetings with United Arab Republic leaders POL 7 US/HARRIMAN: visits, meetings of W. Averell Harriman POL 7 US/KOMER: visits, meetings of Robert W. Komer POL 7 US/MACOMBER: visits, meetings of William B. Macomber POL 7 US/MCCLOY: visits, meetings of John J. McCloy POL 7 US/SHRIVER: visits, meetings of W. Sargent Shriver POL 7 US: visits, meetings of U.S. leaders POL 15 SYR: Syrian Government POL 15–1 ISR: head of state, executive branch, Israel POL 15–1 JORDAN: head of state, executive branch, Jordan POL 15–1 UAR: head of state, executive branch, United Arab Republic POL 15–1 US/JOHNSON: head of state, executive branch, U.S.-Johnson POL 15–2 ISR: Israeli legislature POL 16 SYR: recognition, Syria POL 17 UAR-US: diplomatic and consular representation, United Arab Republic-US POL 23 JORDAN: internal security, counter-insurgency, Jordan POL 23–8 ISR: demonstrations, riots, protests, Israel POL 23–8 JORDAN: demonstrations, riots, protests, Jordan POL 23–8 UAR: demonstrations, riots, protests, United Arab Republic POL 23–9 SYR: rebellion, coups, Syria POL 23–9 UAR: rebellion, coups, United Arab Republic POL 27 ARAB–ISR: military operations, Israel POL 27–14 ISR–JORDAN: truce, cease-fire, Israel-Jordan POL 27–14 PAL/UN: truce, cease-fire, Palestinians/UN POL 29 UAR: political prisoners, United Arab Republic POL 31–1 ISR–UAR: air disputes and violations, Israel-United Arab Republic POL 31–1 UAR-US: air disputes and violations, United Arab Republic-US POL 32–1 ARAB–ISR: territory and boundary disputes, Arab-Israel POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN/UN: territory and boundary disputes, Israel-Jordan and the UN POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN: territory and boundary disputes, Israel-Jordan POL 32–1 ISR–LEB: territory and boundary disputes, Israel-Lebanon POL 32–1 ISR–SYR/UN: territory and boundary disputes, Israel-Syria and the UN POL 32–1 ISR–SYR: territory and boundary disputes, Israel-Syria POL 32–1 ISR–UAR: territory and boundary disputes, Israel-United Arab Republic POL 32–1 PAL: territory and boundary disputes, Palestine POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER: international rivers & seaways, Jordan River REF PAL: refugees and migration, Palestinians REF 3 UNRWA: organizations and conferences, UNRWA SCI 11 UAR: science and technology research, United Arab Republicy TRV ANDERSON, ROBERT B.: travel and transportation, Robert B. Anderson Lot Files Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110 Records of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and international conferences attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, 1961–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347 Records of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States, and international conferences attended by the President, Vice President, or Secretary of State for 1965, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438 Top Secret records on the Middle East arms limitation probe (CANE) for 1963–1965, and miscellaneous documents on Arab-Israeli matters, for 1953–1961, as maintained by the Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192 Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961–1969, including texts of speeches and statements, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversations. S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199 Subject and chronological files of the Policy Planning Council, 1963–1964, and Policy Planning Staff meeting minutes, 1957–1961. S/S Files: Lot 70 D 209 Country files, including copies of memoranda and briefing memoranda for the period 1963–1966, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, administrative documents, but not minutes of the meetings themselves, for 1961–1966, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master file of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs), 1961–1968, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense OASD/ISA Files:FRC 68 A 306 Secret and lower-classified general files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1964. OASD/ISA Files:FRC 70 A 6648 Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1966. OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425 Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1964. OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1965. OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1966. OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistants, 1967. OSD Files: FRC 77–0075 Top Secret files maintained in Secretary McNamara’s office, 1961–1968, including records relating to Vietnam, draft presidential memoranda, and memoranda of conversations. Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson National Security File Files of McGeorge Bundy Country File Files of Robert W. Komer Memos to the President Name File National Security Action Memorandums National Security Council Meetings File Files of Walt W. Rostow Files of Harold Saunders Special Head of State Correspondence File Special Files President’s Daily Diary Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings White House Central Files Subject File Other Personal Papers George Ball Papers Published Sources U.S. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin , 1964–1968 (Volumes LI–LIX). Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964–1968. ———. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967 . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967–1969. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. ———. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966–67 . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965–1968. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series) , Volume XVII, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, 1965. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. Abbreviations Abbreviations ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ADL, Armistice Demarcation Line AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AID, Agency for International Development AIDTO, series indicator for telegrams from AID in Washington to the field AJC, American Jewish Committee Amb, Ambassador APC, armored personnel carrier ARAMCO, Arabian-American Oil Company BG, initials of former Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion BOB, Bureau of the Budget CA, circular airgram CAB/FAA, Civil Aeronautics Board/Federal Aviation Administration CANE, distribution indicator for telegrams pertaining to arms limitation probe CAS, Controlled American Source CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation CENTO, Central Treaty Organization ChiCom(s), Chinese Communist(s) CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CINCMEAFSA, Commander in Chief, Middle East/South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command CINCUSAFE, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe CINCUSAREUR, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy, Europe COMSIXTHFLT, Commander, Sixth Fleet CONUS, Continental United States C/S, Chief of Staff DAC, Development Assistance Committee DATT, Defense Attache DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DDI, Deputy Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram Dept, Department of State Deptel, outgoing Department of State telegram DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DL, development loan DMZ, Demilitarized Zone DOD, Department of Defense DOD/ISA, Department of Defense, International Security Affairs E, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State Emb, Embassy Emboff, Embassy officer Embtel, Embassy telegram ENDC, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Geneva) Exdis, Exclusive Distribution (extremely limited distribution or dissemination) EXIM, Export-Import Bank FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation FM, Foreign Minister FonMin, Foreign Minister FonOff, Foreign Office FRC, Federal Records Center FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information GA, General Assembly (United Nations) GAA, General Armistice Agreement GNP, Gross National Product GOC, Government of Canada GOF, Government of France GOI, Government of Israel; Government of Iran GOJ, Government of Jordan GOL, Government of Lebanon GUAR, Government of the United Arab Republic GVN, Government of Vietnam H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State HKJ, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) IDF, Israel Defense Forces IJMAC, Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission ILMAC, Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission IMF, International Monetary Fund INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs ISMAC, Israel/Syria Military Armistice Commission JAA, Jordan Arab Army JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State LBJ, initials of President Lyndon B. Johnson Limdis, Limited distribution Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group MAC, Mixed Armistice Commission MAP, Military Assistance Program MATS, Military Air Transport Service ME, Middle East memcon, memorandum of conversation MIG, A.I. Mikoyan i M.I. Gurevich (Soviet fighter aircraft named for designers Mikoyan and Gurevich) MOD, Minister of Defense NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NE, Near East NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/IAI, Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/NR, Office of Near Eastern, South Asian Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NFZ, Nuclear Free Zone Niact, night action, immediate reply NIE, National Intelligence Estimate Nodis, No distribution (other than to persons indicated) Noforn, No foreign dissemination NPT, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSA, National Security Agency NSC, National Security Council OAU, Organization of African Unity ODDI, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency ONE, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ORR, Office of Research and Reports, Central Intelligence Agency OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense PAO, Public Affairs officer P.L., Public Law PLA, Palestine Liberation Army PLF, Palestine Liberation Front PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization PM, Prime Minister POLAD, Political Adviser PriMin, Prime Minister R&D, research and development reftel, reference telegram Rep, Representative Res, Resolution (United Nations) RG, Record Group RJAF, Royal Jordanian Air Force S, Office of the Secretary of State SAG, Saudi Arabian Government SAM, surface to air missiles SARG, Syrian Arab Republic Government SC, Security Council (United Nations) SecDef, Secretary of Defense SecGen, Secretary-General of the United Nations septel, separate telegram SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State SSM, surface-to-surface missiles Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) in connection with international conferences U, Office of the Under Secretary of State UAC, United Arab Command UAR, United Arab Republic UARG, United Arab Republic Government UK, United Kingdom UN, United Nations UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNMOS, United Nations Military Observers UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNSYG, United Nations Secretary-General UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization USAIRA, U.S. Air Attache USDA, U.S. Department of Agriculture USDAO, U.S. Defense Attache Office USDel, U.S. Delegation USG, U.S. Government USIA, U.S. Information Agency USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UST, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements USUN, U.S. Mission at the United Nations YAR, Yemen Arab Republic Z, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time) Persons Persons Amer, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim, First Deputy Vice President of the United Arab Republic and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, from 1964 Atherton, Alfred L., Deputy Director, Office of Near East Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, November 1965–June 1966; Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq, July–December 1966; thereafter Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs Badeau, John S., Ambassador to the United Arab Republic until June 1964 Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State until September 1966; Representative to the United Nations, June–September 1968 Barbour, Walworth, Ambassador to Israel Barnes, N. Spencer, Deputy Chief of Mission in Israel until December 1964 Barnes, Robert G., Ambassador to Jordan, March 1964–April 1966 Battle, Lucius D., Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, September 1964–March 1967; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, April 1967–September 1968 Bergus, Donald C., Country Director for United Arab Republic Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, July 1966–July 1967; thereafter Principal Officer of the U.S. Interests Section in the United Arab Republic Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France until February 1968; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to Great Britain Buffum, William B., Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until August 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, September 1965–December 1966; thereafter Deputy Representative to the United Nations Bull, Lieutenant General Odd, Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Bunche, Ralph J., United Nations Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until February 1966 Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until March 1964; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (East Asian and Pacific Affairs after November 1, 1966) from March 1964 Burns, Findley, Jr., Ambassador to Jordan, July 1966–November 1967 Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall S., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until April 1965 Dale, William N., Counselor of Embassy, Consul General, and Deputy Chief of Mission in Israel, September 1964–August 1968 Davies, Rodger P., Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until October 1965; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Dayan, Moshe, Israeli Minister of Agriculture until 1964; Defense Minister from June 1967 De Gaulle, Charles, President of France Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States from April 1965 Dickman, Francois M., Desk Officer, United Arab Republic-Syrian Arab Republic Affairs, Department of State, until December 1964 Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States Duncan, Enoch S., Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until April 1964 Eban, Abba, Deputy Prime Minister of Israel, 1964–January 1966; thereafter Foreign Minister Eilts, Hermann F., Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from January 1966 Eshkol, Levi, Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Israel from December 1964; also President of the Israeli Atomic Energy Agency from 1966 Evron, Ephraim, Minister, Embassy of Israel, until December 1967 Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia Fawzi, Mahmoud, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, March 1964–January 1968; thereafter Defense Minister Feldman, Myer, Deputy Special Counsel to the President until January 1965 Fisher, Adrian S., Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Foster, William C., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Gaud, William S., Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development, until February 1964; Deputy Administrator, February 1964–August 1966; thereafter Administrator Gazit, Mordechai, Minister, Embassy of Israel Goldberg, Arthur J., Representative to the United Nations, July 1965–June 1968 Grant, James P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until September 1964 Handley, William J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from September 1964 Hare, Raymond A., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, September 1965–November 1966 Harman, Avraham, Israeli Ambassador to the United States until January 1968 Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, April 1965–June 1966; thereafter Director Helou, Charles, President of Lebanon from August 1964 Hoopes, Townsend W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1965–1968 Houghton, Robert B., Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from January 1967 Hughes, Thomas L., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States Hussein I ibn Talal, King of Jordan Jarring, Gunnar, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the establishment of peace in the Middle East Jenkins, Walter, Special Assistant to the President until October 1964 Jernegan, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until July 1965 Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until July 1964; Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam, July 1964–September 1965; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1965–October 1966 Johnson, W. Thomas, White House Deputy Press Secretary Johns, Curtis F., Officer in Charge of United Arab Republic Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until June 1965 Kaissouni, Abdel Moneim, United Arab Republic Minister of Finance until September 1965; thereafter Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Economic Affairs Kamel, Mustafa, Ambassador of the United Arab Republic until 1967 Karame, Rashid, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Lebanon, July 1965–April 1966; and again December 1966–February 1968 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Deputy Attorney General until February 1965; Attorney General, February 1965–October 1966; thereafter Under Secretary of State Khammash, General Amer, Director of Plans and Organization, Jordan Arab Army, until May 1965; thereafter Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Army Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Killgore, Andrew I., Officer in Charge of Iraq-Jordan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until May 1965 Kinsolving, Lucien L., Officer in Charge of Iraq-Jordan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, January–May 1966 Kitchen, Jeffery C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs until February 1967 Knight, Ridgway B., Ambassador to Syria until May 1965 Kohler, Foy D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1966–December 1967 Komer, Robert W., Member of the National Security Council Staff until September 1965; Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, October 1965–March 1966; Special Assistant to the President, March 1966–May 1967; after March 1966 also Special Assistant to the President for Peaceful Reconstruction in Vietnam; Ambassador to Turkey from December 1968 Leddy, John M., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 1965 Lee, Guy A., Director, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until August 1966 Macomber, William B., Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development, February 1964–March 1967; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations McCloy, John J., President’s Special Emissary for Near East Arms Limitation McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence until April 1965 McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense until February 1968 McNaughton, John T., General Counsel, Department of Defense, until July 1964; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 1964–July 1967 Meeker, Leonard C., Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, June 1964–May 1965; thereafter Legal Adviser Meir, Golda, Israeli Foreign Minister until January 1966 Meyer, Armin H., Ambassador to Lebanon until April 1965; thereafter Ambassador to Iran Moyers, Bill D., Special Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff at the White House, October 1964–January 1967; also White House Press Secretary, July 1965–January 1967 Muhieddin, Zakaria, Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic, October 1965–August 1966 Nasser, Gamel Abdel, President of the United Arab Republic Nes, David G., Charge d’Affaires ad interim to the United Arab Republic, March–June 6, 1967, when the UAR severed diplomatic relations with the United States Pearson, Lester B., Prime Minister of Canada Peres, Shimon, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister until May 1965 Porter, Dwight J., Ambassador to Lebanon from June 1965 Rabin, Lieutenant General Yitzhak, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, February 1964–December 1967; Ambassador of Israel from January 1968 Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department Riad, Mahmoud, United Arab Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs from March 1968 Rifai, Abdul Moneim El, Jordanian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, October 1967–April 1968; thereafter Minister of Foreign Affairs Rockwell, Stuart W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from September 1966 Rostow, Eugene V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 1966 Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council until March 1966; Special Assistant to the President from April 1966 Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Russell, H. Earle, Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Israel Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until June 1965; Officer in Charge of United Arab Republic-Syrian Arab Republic Affairs, July 1965–July 1966 Sabri, Ali, Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic until September 1965 Sapir, Pinhas, Israeli Minister of Finance Saunders, Harold H., Member of the National Security Council Staff Schultze, Charles L., Director, Bureau of the Budget Seelye, Talcott W., Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from July 1968 Shazar, Zalman, President of Israel Shukairy, Ahmed, President of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from September 1965 Sloan, Frank K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until 1965 Smith, Bromley K., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Smythe, Hugh H., Ambassador to Syria, October 1965–June 6, 1967, when Syria severed diplomatic relations with the United States Sober, Sidney, Deputy Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Department of State, from February 1966; Staff Director, Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asian Affairs, from March 1966; also Director, Office of Regional Affairs, from October 1966 Solbert, Peter O.A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until December 1965 Spain, James W., Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, March 1964–June 1966; thereafter Country Director for Pakistan-Afghanistan Stevenson, Adlai E., Representative to the United Nations until his death in July 1965 Stoddart, Jonathan D., Deputy Director, Near East and South Asia Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Symmes, Harrison M., Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until September 1965, Director, October 1965–June 1966; Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, July 1966–April 1967; thereafter Ambassador to Jordan Talbot, Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until September 1965 Talhouni, Bahjat, Prime Minister of Jordan and Minister of Justice, from April 1964; Prime Minister from July 1964 Taylor, General Maxwell D., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 1964; Ambassador to Vietnam, July 1964–July 1965 Tel, Wasfi El, Prime Minister of Jordan and Minister of Defense, February 1965–March 1967 Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large until December 1966; also Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Valenti, Jack, Special Assistant to the President until May 1966 Vance, Cyrus R., Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 1964–June 1967 Walsh, John P., Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until May 1965; Deputy Executive Secretary until September 1967; thereafter Acting Executive Secretary Warnke, Paul C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from August 1967 Wehmeyer, Donald A., Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, October 1964–August 1968 Wheeler, General Earle G., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, until July 1964; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wilson, Evan M., Consul General in Jerusalem, October 1964–September 1967 Wilson, Harold, Prime Minister of Great Britain Wolle, William D., Officer in Charge of Arab-Israel Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, August 1965–August 1967 Wriggins, W. Howard, Member of the National Security Council Staff, 1966–1967 Yamani, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki, Saudi Arabian Minister of Oil and Mineral Wealth; Secretary General, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) from 1968 Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967 Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967 1. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol Washington, January 2, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel—Presidential Correspondence. Secret. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 594 to Tel Aviv, January 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/SHRIVER) 2. Letter From President Johnson to King Hussein Washington, January 2, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Jordan—Presidential Correspondence. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 269 to Amman, January 3. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 JORDAN) 3. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 3, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Phillips Talbot on January 4 and approved in S on January 19. The memorandum is marked Part I of II. The other portion of the conversation is recorded in a memorandum of conversation, ibid., POL ISR–US. 4. Memorandum for Record Washington, January 3, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. 5. Summary Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I, Cables. Secret. Both the summary and the 9-page letter from Badeau are filed with a covering memorandum of January 14 from Rusk to the President; a covering memorandum of January 14 from Komer to Bill Moyers, which noted that the President might want to urge Badeau to stay on during the “ticklish period in US–UAR relations” expected to develop over the Jordan water issue; and an undated note from Moyers to NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith, stating that the President had seen the package and that Bundy should talk to him about asking Badeau to stay on. 6. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, January 7, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Amman, Jidda, Rabat, Algiers, Tripoli, Damascus, Khartoum, Beirut, Tunis, Kuwait, and Taiz. 7. Memorandum for Record Washington, January 10, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security (Tanks), Nov. 1963–June 1964. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that copies were sent to Talbot, Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Frank K. Sloan, and Bundy, and subsequently to USIA Director Carl T. Rowan and Deputy Special Counsel to the President Myer Feldman. 8. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Israeli Ambassador (Harman) and the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) Washington, January 15, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security (Tanks), Nov. 1963–June 1964. Secret. 9. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, January 16, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Talbot. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR) 10. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 18, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret. 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, January 25, 1964, 4:20 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Limdis; Immediate; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Crawford, cleared by Davies and Special Assistant for UN Planning Elmore Jackson, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Jerusalem, and USUN; and pouched to Aleppo, Algiers, Baghdad, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, and Tunis. 12. Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 11, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by H. Earle Russell, and cleared by Talbot, Jernegan, and Charles W. Thomas, Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs in the Office of International Scientific Affairs. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) 13. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, February 15, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a February 17 memorandum from McNamara to the Secretary of the Army. 14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 20, 1964, 8:23 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot, Russell, and Komer; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. An attached February 20 note from Komer to S/S states that the letter was approved by the President. 15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, February 22, 1964, 2:28 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 9 UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Enoch S. Duncan and approved by Jernegan. 16. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, February 22, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 17. Telegram From the Air Attache at the Embassy in Israel to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Tel Aviv, February 24, 1964, 1450Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Priority; Noforn; Limdis. Repeated to the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Air Force Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and 1127 USAF Field Arty Group at Fort Belvoir, VA. The Department of State copy is the source text. 18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, February 25, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Top Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Francois M. Dickman and Davies. The copy is filed with a memorandum of February 27 from Bundy to Rusk conveying the President’s approval. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 NEAR E) 19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, February 26, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Top Secret. 20. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser Washington, February 27, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Presidential Correspondence. Secret. The letter bears no indication of the drafter. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 3968 to Cairo, February 27, which indicates that the text was received from the White House. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US) A February 26 memorandum from Komer to Bundy notes that he had rewritten a draft sent with Rusk’s February 19 memorandum to Johnson (see footnote 2, Document 19). 21. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, February 28, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–ISR. Secret. Drafted by Russell and cleared by Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Kenneth L. Brown of INR, Davies, Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Counselor and Vice Chairman of Policy Planning Henry D. Owen, and Edward A. Padelford, Jr., of NR. The memorandum was received in Johnson’s office on March 2. 22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, February 29, 1964, 5:32 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dickman on February 28; cleared by Walt Rostow, Komer, U. Alexis Johnson, Adrian Fisher, and Sloan; and approved by Jernegan and Rusk. 23. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 4, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Russell on March 10 and approved in S on March 16. The memorandum text is marked Part I of IV. 24. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, March 4, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret; Exdis. Received at 5:04 p.m. 25. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, March 4, 1964, 10 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Received at 6:35 p.m. 26. Memorandum for Record Washington, March 5, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, Harriman, Bundy, Jernegan, Department of Defense General Counsel John T. McNaughton, and Myer Feldman at the White House. 27. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, March 8, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 290. Secret. 28. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, March 12, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret. A stamped note reads, “Mr. Vance has seen.” 29. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, March 13, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 290. No classification marking. An attached brief memorandum from Bundy to Feldman proposed combining their papers on the tank issue. Feldman agreed in a handwritten note on Bundy’s memorandum. 30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 14, 1964, 10:48 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 PAL. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Lucien L. Kinsolving; cleared by Davis, Jernegan, Stephen Campbell of IO/UNP, and Harriman’s Special Assistant Frederick Chapin; and approved by Harriman. Also sent to Jerusalem and repeated to Amman. 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 19, 1964, 3:10 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted at the White House; cleared by Davies, Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by McKesson. A March 14 memorandum from Komer to the President states that he had “greatly toned down State’s rather abrasive draft” of the letter to Eshkol. Bundy initialed the President’s approval on Komer’s memorandum and sent the revised draft to Benjamin Read with an attached note of March 19 stating that it was approved by the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, Presidential Correspondence) 32. National Security Action Memorandum No. 290 Washington, March 19, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 290. Secret. 33. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) Washington, March 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Secret. 34. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, March 25, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–US. Secret; Nodis. An attached note of March 25 from Read to Rusk suggested sending copies to the White House, U. Alexis Johnson, and Jernegan. Rusk initialed his approval. 35. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 2, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Box 6, Folder 7, DCI Meetings with the President, Jan.-Apr. 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. 36. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, April 4, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 37. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, April 7, 1964, 12:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Secret; Exdis. 38. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 8, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 8. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense,AEC, and NSA representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction. A table of contents is not printed. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. 39. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 14, 1964, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 4/14–15/64 (II). Secret. Drafted by Davies on April 15 and approved by U on April 27 and by the White House on May 4. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President met privately with King Hussein from 12:05 to 12:15 p.m. in the Oval Office followed by a 15-minute session with the press for photographs. The meeting recorded here took place in the Cabinet Room from 12:30 to 1:06 p.m. (Ibid.) An April 10 briefing memorandum from Ball to the President is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, (II). An April 13 briefing memorandum from Komer and Bundy to the President is ibid., 4/14–15/64 (I). Other records pertaining to the King’s visit are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 JORDAN and POL 7 JORDAN, and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2385–2386. 40. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 15, 1964, 3–3:40 p.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77 A 75, Memos of Conversation Between Sec. McNamara and Heads of State (other than NATO). Confidential. Copies were sent to Solbert, Director of Military Assistance General Wood, Sloan, Rowen, Henry J. Kuss, Jr., and Strickland. The meeting was held at Blair House. 41. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 15, 1964, 4:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 4/14–15/64 (II). Confidential. Drafted by Ambassador Barnes on April 22 and approved by U on April 29 and by White House on May 4. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the President’s office from 4:33 to 5:25 p.m. (Ibid.) 42. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 15, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem (Background Use Only). According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 15. The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. 43. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, April 16, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence. Secret. 44. Memorandum of Conversation New York, April 17, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 JORDAN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ambassador Barnes on April 22 and approved in S/S on April 29. The meeting was held in Ambassador Stevenson’s apartment. 45. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 20, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Talbot, Davies, Duncan, and Curtis F. Jones and concurred in by Rostow. Sent through Harriman, and Macomber (AID/NESA) was informed. 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, April 22, 1964, 6:51 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Heywood H. Stackhouse; cleared by Macomber, Donald A. Wehmeyer, and in draft by Davies; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Amman and Tel Aviv and repeated to USUN. 47. Memorandum for the Standing Group Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAM File, NSAM 290. Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum of April 27 from Read to McGeorge Bundy. Another copy shows that the memorandum was signed by Harriman for the Department of State and sent to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, who signed on April 25. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470) 48. Memorandum by the Board of National Estimates Washington, April 29, 1964. 49. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 30, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jernegan. 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, May 3, 1964, 4:41 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret. Drafted by Davies and Dickman; cleared by Walt Rostow, Harriman (by telephone), Foster, U. Alexis Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Talbot. 51. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 6, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 6. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. 52. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, May 8, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret; Exdis. 53. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Johnson Washington, May 11, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. No classification marking. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A handwritten note by Walter Jenkins reads: “Mac—President says pls talk to Feldman and LBJ about this.” In a May 13 telephone conversation, Bundy asked Johnson’s approval to have Senator Abraham Ribicoff and New York banker Abraham Feinberg tell Ambassador Harman and any Jewish leader they thought necessary that public discussion of the question of tanks for Israel would be counterproductive. It would “make life tough for our British friends,” Bundy commented, if it looked “as if we were passing the buck to them.” He told Johnson that he was with Ribicoff, who was willing “to try and keep things buttoned up” if Johnson wanted. Johnson approved, saying, “I want him to stop everybody that’s talking about it.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Bundy, May 13, 1964, 3:35 p.m., Tape F64.26, Side B, PNO 7) 54. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Acting Secretary of State Ball Washington, May 11, 1964. Source: Department of State,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 69 D 492, POL 3/2, Palestine Entity. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 55. Memorandum From President Johnson to His Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) Washington, May 15, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Secret. Drafts of this memorandum entitled “Feldman Talking Paper, “dated May 13 and 14, apparently drafted by Komer, are ibid. The memorandum was sent to Johnson with a May 15 covering memorandum from Komer, which states, “It tells Mike exactly what we want him to say, so he won’t stray off the reservation.” (Ibid.) A copy filed with a May 19 covering memorandum from Bromley Smith to Rusk, McNamara, and JCS Chairman Taylor states that the instruction, as amended by Rusk, was approved by the President on May 16. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470) See Document 57. 56. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, May 16, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470 Secret; Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the memorandum states that McNamara saw it on May 16. 57. Memorandum for Record Washington, May 16, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum of Meetings with the President, Vol. I. Secret. Drafted on May 18. Bundy wrote at the top: “No dis. McGB.” 58. Memorandum of Conversation Jerusalem, May 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Palmer on May 18. 59. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser Washington, May 20, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. Top Secret. A draft of this letter was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 5140, May 3, and given to Nasser by Badeau on May 7, as reported in telegram 2632, Document 52. The letter was sent to Johnson for signature with a May 19 memorandum from Komer, noting that Nasser had said he would give assurances as to UAR intentions to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Komer wrote that although Nasser had not indicated whether he would do so privately or publicly, his statement was sufficiently promising to fulfill Badeau’s request for an official copy of the letter “to smoke out Nasser.” A note in Bundy’s handwriting on Komer’s memorandum stated that he and Rusk strongly concurred. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I) 60. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 25, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Drafted by Davies. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held at the White House from 11:50 a.m. to 12:20 p.m., and Ambassador Kamel was accompanied by Jernegan. (Ibid.) 61. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, May 26, 1964, 2:42 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Henry J. Tasca, and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Amman, and Kuwait and repeated to Baida, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, Khartoum, Taiz, and Tel Aviv. 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, May 28, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dickman and Harrison M. Symmes; cleared by Wreatham E. Gathright of S/P, Deputy Assistant Director of ACDA’s International Relations Bureau Richard B. Freund, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan. 63. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, May 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 6/1–3/64. Secret. Sent to Johnson with a brief covering memorandum from Bundy calling it “absolutely first-class.” 64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, May 30, 1964, 1:09 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Davies and Symmes, cleared by Komer, and approved by Jernegan. 65. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 1, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. II. Top Secret. Drafted by Feldman. A handwritten note by Komer on a July 30 memorandum from Read to Bundy, returning the memorandum of conversation to the White House after its review by Talbot, states that it represented the work of Feldman, Harman, Talbot, Harriman, and himself. (Ibid.) According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the President’s office at the White House. The President and the Prime Minister met alone from 11:30 to 11:45 a.m., when they were joined by Feldman and Harman. The other participants joined them at 12:05 p.m., and the meeting concluded at 12:46. (Ibid.) 66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, June 2, 1964, 11:20 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Israel. No classification marking. Prepared in Ball’s office. 67. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 2, 1964, 11:15 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Russell on June 15 and approved in U and in M on June 22. Prior to Ball’s meeting with Eshkol, the Prime Minister met with Harriman and U. Alexis Johnson for a general discussion of the international scene. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., POL ISR–US) At 12:15 p.m., Eshkol and Peres met with Vance and received a briefing on U.S. military capabilities to defend Israel. Vance rejected their suggestion of joint contingency planning but indicated willingness to consider periodic discussions with Israel on military subjects. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., ARAB–ISR) 68. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, June 3, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 6/1–3/64. Secret. 69. Memorandum for Record Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. II. Top Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Vance, Harriman, Talbot, and Sloan. The attachment indicates that the conversation took place on June 5. 70. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, June 6, 1964, 1:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF PAL. Confidential. 71. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, June 8, 1964, 11 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret;Exdis. 72. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, June 8, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Corresponddence File, Syria, Presidential Correspondence. Secret. 73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 15, 1964. Source: Department of State,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 69 D 492, POL 22/1, Arab-Israel Dispute, May–June 1964. Secret. 74. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 29, 1964, 12:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. II. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot and Badeau and approved by the White House on July 23. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held at the White House from 1:02 to 1:16 p.m. (Ibid.) 75. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) Washington, June 30, 1964, 9:42 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Rusk Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Prepared by Rusk’s personal assistant Carolyn J. Proctor. 76. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) Washington, July 2, 1964, 2:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, United Arab Republic. No classification marking. Prepared in Ball’s office. 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, July 13, 1964, 7:38 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs in the Middle East Stephen Campbell of UNP, cleared by Paul W. Jones of UNP and Davies, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to USUN, Damascus, and Jerusalem. 78. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 22, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Symmes and Davies; concurred in by Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in NR Colonel Donald W. Bunte and Colonel William B. Robinson of G/PM; and sent through Harriman. 79. Information Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 24, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 18 NEAR E. Secret. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. Concurred in by Davies and sent through Harriman. A handwritten notation indicates that it was seen by Rusk on July 28. 80. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. 81. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 30, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 452.1 Jordan. Secret. 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, August 4, 1964, 8:37 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Stoddart and Colonel Donald W. Bunte; cleared by Solbert, John P. Walsh, Symmes, George L. Warren of G/PM, and Macomber; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to London. 83. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, August 7, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Arabia 091. Secret. 84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, August 8, 1964, 1:54 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Killgore, Symmes, and Duncan; cleared by Stoddart, Macomber, Warren, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Cairo and London. 85. Oral Message From President Johnson to King Hussein Washington, undated. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Confidential. Filed as an attachment to telegram 80 to Amman, August 8, which transmitted the text of the message and instructed the Ambassador to deliver it when he met with the King to discuss Jordan’s arms requests. A note on the message in Komer’s handwriting states that it was approved by the President at 2:20 p.m. on August 8. The original message, drafted in the Department of State and only slightly revised, is also attached to telegram 80. 86. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR-Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. Top Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum from Read to Bundy. The covering memorandum is also undated, but another copy is dated August 8 and indicates the memorandum was drafted by Dickman and Symmes and cleared by Gathright, Freund, James W. Spain, Talbot, and Harriman. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 US/JOHNSON) 87. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 10, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, United Arab Republic, Kamel Visit, 8/64. Secret. Prepared by Komer on August 12. Copies were sent to Harriman, Bundy, Bell, and Talbot. Marginal notations in Bundy’s handwriting read: “Approved con amore. McGB.” and “You make me so much smarter than I am. McGB.” 88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, August 12, 1964, 7:51 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3, US–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Killgore; cleared by Symmes, in draft by Bunte, and in substance by Komer and Stoddart; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Cairo, London, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 89. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, August 12, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. II. Top Secret;Exdis. The memorandum does not include drafting information, but another copy indicates it was cleared by Talbot and Gathright. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCLOY) An attached note in Komer’s handwriting states that the memorandum was not used since Johnson was not going to see McCloy, but Johnson did meet with McCloy for 5 minutes on August 14. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) An August 15 note from Dickman to Symmes states that McCloy said he had briefly outlined the high points of his proposed presentation to Nasser, and the President commented that this seemed to make sense and that he hoped Nasser would view McCloy’s presence as a symbolic link between the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. (Department of State,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438, Background Papers for 2nd McCloy Probe w/Nasser, 9/64) 90. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser Washington, August 13, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. No classification marking. Drafted by the President, the Department of State, and Komer. The text was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 914, August 17, which stated that the Embassy should not deliver it pending instructions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 US/JOHNSON) 91. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, August 13, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 13. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdictions. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. 92. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, August 20, 1964, 9:43 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 4 ARAB. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Killgore and Symmes; cleared by Stoddart, Bunte, Director for Operations in G/PM Howard Meyers, Newsom, and Komer; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs James P. Grant. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Taiz, Algiers, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, London, and CINCMEAFSA/CINCSTRIKE for Ramsey. 93. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, August 23, 1964, 6:21 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Killgore, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Grant. Repeated to London, Beirut, Damascus, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tunis, Khartoum, Baghdad, Tripoli, Jidda, Kuwait, and Cairo. 94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, August 24, 1964, 8:20 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Symmes, cleared in draft by Killgore and Curtis F. Jones, and approved by Grant. Repeated to Amman, London, and CINCMEAFSA/CINCSTRIKE for Ramsey, and pouched to Moscow, Algiers, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Beirut, Taiz, Kuwait, Khartuom, Jidda, Baghdad, Damascus, and Tel Aviv. 95. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 23, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Exdis; Tan. Drafted by Russell on September 28 and approved in S on October 8. 96. Memorandum of Conversation Cairo, September 28, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McCloy on September 30 at 11 a.m. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads, “Text prepared on cable forms but hand carried to Department.” 97. Memorandum by John J. McCloy Cairo, September 29, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret;Exdis. Drafted by McCloy at noon on September 29. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads, “Text prepared on cable forms but hand carried to Department.” 98. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 6, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 UAR. Top Secret. Drafted by Dickman on October 7 and approved in M on October 22. McCloy also met briefly with Rusk on October 6; a memorandum of the conversation is ibid., POL UAR-US. 99. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman), the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, October 19, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret. Filed as an attachment to an October 27 memorandum from Bundy to Rusk stating that the President had approved the recommendations in Rusk’s October 10 memorandum on FY 1965 help to Israel, with a Development Loan level of $20 million and a P.L. 480 Title I program for FY 1965 of at least $34 million, with any additional Title I or Title IV to be subject to negotiation between the United States and Israel. The October 10 memorandum is printed below. 100. Editorial Note 101. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret/Sensitive. 102. Letter From the Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (Battle) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) Cairo, October 27, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Secret; Limit Distribution; Official-Informal. Copies were sent to Ambassadors Knight, Barnes, Barbour, Meyer, and Strong, and to Davies and Consul General Wilson in Jerusalem. A handwritten note on the letter states that a reply was drafted on November 6. The reply has not been found. 103. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, October 28, 1964. 104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, October 30, 1964, 8:23 p.m. Source: Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCloy. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dickman; cleared by Davies, Harriman, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. 105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, November 14, 1964, 4:08 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 9 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Davies and Symmes; cleared by Officer in Charge of Near Eastern Economic Affairs George M. Bennsky, Jones, and AID Deputy Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia Walter G. Farr, Jr.; and approved by Talbot. 106. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, November 17, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Stackhouse, Jernegan, William B. Buffum, Louise McNutt of FE/RA, George N. Monsma of ARA/IPA, and in substance by Ross E. Freeman of EUR and Joseph J. Wagner of AF/AFI; and approved by Sisco. Sent to 37 Embassies and pouched to 61 Embassies and USUN. 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dhahran Washington, November 20, 1964, 5:11 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FT 11–2 ISR–ARAB. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Charles W. McCaskill of NE/E, cleared in draft by Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs George C. Moore, and approved by Davies. 108. National Security Action Memorandum No. 319 Washington, November 20, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 319. Secret. 109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, November 25, 1964, 7:40 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The text was received from the White House; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, Talbot, and Davies; and approved by Harriman. 110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, November 27, 1964, 6:08 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 UAR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Dickman, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. 111. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, November 30, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 UAR. Confidential; Priority. 112. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 4, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Killgore on December 15 and approved in M on December 22. 113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 14, 1964, 5:26 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Russell on December 11; cleared by Davies, Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs Charles W. Thomas, Kenneth L. Brown of INR, Kratzer and Reichard of the Atomic Energy Commission, Devlin and Cooney of CIA, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan. 114. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 19, 1964, 11 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Daniel O. Newberry of the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian Regional Affairs and approved in S on December 24. The memorandum is marked Part I of III; Parts II and III are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2449. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. 115. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 23, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Davies on December 28 and approved in M on December 31. 116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 24, 1964, 12:29 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Heywood H. Stackhouse; cleared by Davies, Buffum, and Sisco; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Damascus and repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, USUN, and Jerusalem. 117. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 31, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Davies. 118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, January 1, 1965, 5:57 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 ISR–US. Secret. Drafted by Russell; cleared by Davies, Komer, Talbot, Harriman, and Solbert; and approved by Rusk. 119. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, January 4, 1965, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, January 12, 1965, 4:53 pm Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential; Noforn. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, and Rusk’s Staff Assistant Edward J. Streator; and approved by Talbot. Pouched to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Taiz, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, USUN, and Leopoldville. 121. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 14, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on January 19 and approved in S/S on January 27. 122. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, January 18, 1965, 12:35 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus and pouched to Jerusalem, London, Paris, and USUN. 123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, January 18, 1965, 7:47 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Jerusalem and USUN. 124. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, January 21, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Near East. Secret. The memorandum bears the President’s handwritten note: “Have Bundy see me on this. L.” 125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, January 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Cables, Vol. II, 6/64–12/64. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Jones and Davies. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US) 126. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 25, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis/Tan. Drafted by Davies and approved in U on February 1. 127. Editorial Note 128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, January 28, 1965, 11:43 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on January 26; cleared by the President, Macomber, and Talbot; and approved by Rusk. 129. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, February 1, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that the covering memorandum was drafted by Killgore and the enclosure by Talbot and Davies on January 22. Attached to the copy is a January 22 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk forwarding the memorandum for his signature and a February 1 memorandum from Blaine Tueller of S/S-S to Rusk’s Staff Assistant Edward J. Streator stating that Ball had signed the memorandum and that Ball had talked to Rusk and had been to the White House to discuss the problem earlier that day. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 130. Summary Notes of the 544th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, February 1, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council Meetings File, Vol. 3, Tab 26. Top Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 6:27 to 7:30 p.m., and a total of 24 people were present. (Ibid.) A memorandum for the record by McCone is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 February–30 April 1965. 131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 1, 1965, 9:02 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Davies and Killgore on January 25; cleared by Meyers, Bunte, Solbert, and Talbot; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Amman, London, and Bonn. 132. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, February 1, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. A copy was sent to the President with a February 3 note from Bromley Smith stating that it was sent at Feldman’s request. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UAR, Vol. III) 133. Editorial Note 134. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, February 5, 1965, 5 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Passed to the White House. 135. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, February 5, 1965, 7 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Jordan. No classification marking. Prepared by Helen Hennessey in Ball’s office. 136. Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 5, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Filed with a brief covering memorandum from Komer to Bundy noting that the inspection was reassuring but that “we remain suspicious.” The memorandum bears no indication of the drafter, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Russell and cleared by Jernegan, Davies, Charles W. Thomas, and Scott George, Director for Atomic Energy and Aero-Space in G/PM. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) 137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 6, 1965, 7:58 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Amman for Talbot. 138. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, February 6, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. Komer’s handwritten note at the top of the memorandum states that Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti read it and agreed. 139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon Washington, February 6, 1965, 8:06 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Killgore and Macomber, cleared by Jernegan and Komer, and approved by Ball. Also sent to Amman. 140. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 7, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret. A note in Komer’s handwriting at the top of the memorandum reads, “Essence of Jordan arms problem.” 141. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, February 7, 1965, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Distribution. Repeated to Tel Aviv. Passed to the White House. The retyped text of the telegram was sent to the President on February 8 with a covering memorandum from Komer, noting that the talk with Hussein “didn’t go as badly as State feared, though this may be Arab courtesy.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I) 142. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in Jordan Washington, February 8, 1965, 5:36 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Jernegan and cleared by Ball. 143. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, February 9, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. 144. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) Washington, February 9, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Files, DCI (Helms) Memos for the Record, 1 Jan. 1965–31 Dec. 1972. Secret. Prepared on February 12. 145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, February 9, 1965, 9:50 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jernegan, cleared by Komer, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 146. Memorandum for Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, February 10, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. The memorandum, typed on White House stationery, bears no indication of the drafter. A handwritten notation states that it was approved on February 11. Bundy sent a copy to Ball that day, stating that he “did not like to show these things to the President without Ball’s seeing them.” (Ibid., Ball Papers, Jordan) Telegram 736 to Tel Aviv, February 11, from Bundy to Komer, states that his instructions had been approved by “highest authority.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/Komer) 147. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 13, 1965, 1 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/Komer. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to DOD and passed to the White House. 148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 13, 1965, 8:28 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/Komer. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Ball. 149. Briefing Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) Washington, February 13, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/Komer. Secret. Drafted by Killgore and Lee F. Dinsmore of NE on February 12 and cleared by Davies. Filed as an attachment to a February 15 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk. 150. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 15, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/KOMER. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, February 16, 1965, 12:27 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, Curtis C. Strong of the Congo Working Group, Komer, and Macomber; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Beirut. 152. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, February 16, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret. 153. Memorandum for the Files Washington, February 18, 1965. Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, Arms Deals with Israel, Background File. Secret. 154. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, February 19, 1965, 5 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. 155. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, February 19, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information. It was sent to the President with a covering memorandum of February 19 from Bundy noting that a meeting was scheduled for 6:15 p.m. that day. The President met with Ball, Bundy, and Komer between 6:45 and 7:39 p.m. on February 19. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found. Bundy attached a February 19 memorandum from Komer and stated that he shared Komer’s view that the Department of State proposal was “a little heavy on the Jordan side and light on the Israeli’s.” 156. Editorial Note 157. Memorandum From President Johnson to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, February 21, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel Security (Harriman/Komer Mission), Feb.–Mar. 1965. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy is filed with a covering memorandum from Komer to the President, which indicates that Komer drafted the memorandum and had cleared it with Rusk and Ball. Komer added, “With an eye to history (it might get published twenty years after), they toned down some of the flavor of your approach the other night, but I have it firmly in mind for oral use.” (Ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. IV) 158. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 25, 1965, 10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 3:35 p.m. and passed to the White House. 159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 25, 1965, 7:50 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot and approved by Ball. 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 26, 1965, 1:42 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66 DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot, Davies, and Ball; cleared by Bromley Smith for the President; and approved by Ball. 161. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 26, 1965, 9:45 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 3:48 p.m. and passed to the White House. 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 26, 1965, 10 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 163. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 27, 1965, midnight. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 5:26 p.m. 164. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 27, 1965, midnight. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 6:12 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 165. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 28, 1965, 4 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 9:58 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 28, 1965, 12:56 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jernegan and Talbot, cleared by Rusk with the President by telephone, and approved by Rusk. A message to Komer from Bromley Smith, February 28, states that the reply was cleared with the President after he read Harriman’s 3-part message and that the telegram was dictated by Rusk after discussion with the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) Rusk called the President to call Harriman’s message to his attention and cleared the two amendments with him. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversations Between Johnson and Rusk, February 28, 1965, 11:12 and 11:37 p.m., Tape F65.09, PNO 5–6) 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 28, 1965, 11 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 4:49 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 168. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, February 28, 1965, midnight. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 7:09 p.m. and passed to the White House. 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:02 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared in substance with the President by Rusk. 170. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, March 1, 1965, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 6:33 a.m. and passed to the White House. A typed copy was sent to the President. (Ibid., Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) 171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:16 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jernegan and approved by Rusk in draft. Repeated to Kabul. 172. Message From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Tel Aviv, March 1, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret. Received at the White House at 1728Z. 173. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, March 2, 1965, 2 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis/Tan. Received at 7:28 p.m. on March 1 and passed to the White House. 174. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, March 3, 1965, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 7:59 a.m. and passed to the White House. Repeated to New Delhi for Harriman. 175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 3, 1965, 10:48 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot and approved and initialed by Rusk. 176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 4, 1965, 10:43 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Lucien L. Kinsolving of NEA/NE, cleared by Davies and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Talbot. 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, March 5, 1965, 5 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Manila for Harriman and passed to the White House. Part Two of Komer’s report, consisting of highlights of his conversation with Eshkol, and Part Three, Comments, were transmitted in telegrams 1124 and 1125 from Tel Aviv, both March 5. (Ibid.) Bundy sent a retyped copy of the three telegrams to the President with a covering memorandum of the same date, noting that it was Komer’s latest report which Johnson would probably want to read, but that there was no need for action until Eshkol’s counter-proposal was received. Bundy added that he shared Komer’s evident conclusion that they had “pressed the Israelis far enough” and it was time to agree that “in the very nature of the situation we are bound to be their last resort for arms supply from here on out,” especially since the only immediate commitment required was for “tanks and ‘a few’ planes.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) 178. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Davies) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) Washington, March 5, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret. Talbot sent the memorandum to Rusk with a covering memorandum of March 8. Rusk’s initials on the covering memorandum indicate that he read it. 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 6, 1965, 9:19 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Russell and Talbot, cleared by Davies, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Manila for Harriman. 180. Message From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Tel Aviv, March 6, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret. Received at the White House at 2331Z. 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 7, 1965, 6:53 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The message was drafted at the White House and sent to the Department of State with a note from Bundy stating that it had been cleared in substance by Ball and should not be sent until Talbot saw it. The telegram indicates that it was cleared by Talbot. 182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 8, 1965, 8:57 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Text received from the White House, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Jernegan. The substance of the telegram was apparently decided at a meeting of the President, McNamara, Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy between 6:01 and 7 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found. Briefing memoranda and draft cables prepared for the meeting are ibid., National Security File, Country File, Harriman Israeli Mission (II), and in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. 183. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, March 10, 1965, 1 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received on March 9 at 6:58 p.m. and passed to the White House. 184. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, March 11, 1965, 2 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received on March 10 at 8:32 p.m. and passed to the White House. 185. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, March 11, 1965, 2 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received on March 10 at 8:38 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 186. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, March 10, 1965, 8:59 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies; cleared by Stoddart at DOD/ISA and Bunte and in substance by Rusk and by Bundy for the President; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 187. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, March 10, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on March 10. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, AEC, and NSA representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction. 188. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, March 12, 1965, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Received at 8:10 a.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 189. Letter From Prime Minister Eshkol to President Johnson Jerusalem, March 12, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Special Head of State Correspondence Fle, Israel, Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. 190. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, March 13, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). Secret. 191. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson Washington, March 15, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). Secret. Filed with a covering note from Bundy stating that the memorandum was Harriman’s report on his mission and that Bundy did not think it needed the President’s attention but had promised to forward it to him. A handwritten “L” and an “NR” on the covering note indicates that it was seen but not read by the President. 192. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser Washington, March 18, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic, Presidential Correspondence. Secret. Filed with a draft by Bundy, an earlier draft, and related memoranda. In a March 18 telephone conversation, Bundy told Ball that the President wanted a short letter, and Bundy had dictated one. (Ibid., Ball Papers, United Arab Republic) 193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, March 18, 1965, 9:56 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot, Symmes, and Komer; cleared by Davies and Komer; and approved by Talbot. 194. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, March 19, 1965, 7:13 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 NEAR E-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on March 18; cleared by Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs David D. Newsom, Davies, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, Beirut, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Khartoum and repeated to Damascus, Taiz, and Cairo. Circular telegram 1752 to the same Embassies, March 20, requested that they delay action on circular telegram 1750 until they were advised to proceed. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 ISR) Circular telegram 1842, March 31, instructed them to do so. (Ibid.) Reports of the Embassies’ presentations made in response to circular telegram 1750 are ibid. and ibid., POL NEAR E. 195. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol Washington, March 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. The letter bears no indication of the drafter. Another copy lists both Johnson and Bundy as drafters, but it is filed with a March 22 memorandum from Bundy to Johnson indicating that it was drafted by Bundy. (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 9) 196. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in France Washington, March 23, 1965, 12:18 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Russell and Richard G. Long in EUR/WE; cleared by Davies, Talbot, Brown in INR, Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Charles W. Thomas, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Robert C. Creel; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 197. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, March 25, 1965, 11 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 198. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, March 29, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Presidential Decisions (LBJ), 1965. Secret. 199. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, March 30, 1965, 7:10 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY. Confidential; Air Pouch. Drafted by Stackhouse on March 12; cleared by Davies and Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs Turner C. Cameron, Jr., and in draft by Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake and Stephen J. Campbell; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Aden, Aleppo, Alexandria, Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Baida, Basra, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Casablanca, Constantine, Damascus, Djakarta, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, New Delhi, Oran, Paris, Port Said, Rabat, Taiz, Tripoli, Tunis, USUN, and Karachi. 200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, April 2, 1965, 6:28 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret;Limdis; Noforn. Drafted by Jones, cleared by Davies, and approved by Rusk. 201. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, April 6, 1965, 9:01 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and to Geneva for Talbot. 202. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, April 7, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret. A note in Johnson’s handwriting reads as follows: “BOB—See that MacArthur, O’Brien, Ball & Company check with all appropriate chr [chairmen] & leaders before we move. Then give me results at once. L.” 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, April 8, 1965, 11 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL NEAR E. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Geneva for Talbot and to Rabat, Tripoli, London, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Tunis, Jidda, Kuwait, Baghdad, Algiers, Cairo, and Jerusalem. 204. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 8, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY. Confidential. Drafted by Jones. 205. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, April 15, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret; Exdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received on April 16 at 2:24 a.m. 206. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, April 16, 1965, 1118Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. A written notation in an unknown hand reads, “Good show!” 207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, April 17, 1965, 2:44 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jones and Symmes; cleared by Jernegan, Bennsky, and McGeorge Bundy and in draft by Deputy Director of AID’s Office of Near Eastern Affairs John Kean and in substance by Emmett B. Ford of GER; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Bonn. 208. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, April 18, 1965, 1805Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 209. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, April 22, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 6–1 JORDAN. Secret. The time of transmission is not indicated on the telegram, which was received at 8:46 p.m. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Baghdad. 210. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, April 23, 1965, 0945Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Bonn, Damascus, London, Paris,USUN, Jerusalem, POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Cairo, Rome, Algiers, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, Rabat, Taiz, Tripoli, and Tunis. 211. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, May 6, 1965. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “Sec Def has seen Brief.” 212. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, May 7, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 10:38 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, and Damascus. 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, May 8, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 7:37 a.m. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus. 214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, May 10, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. The memorandum has no drafting information, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Russell on April 30 and cleared by Talbot, Jernegan, SCI Acting Director Herman Pollack, Thomas, ACDA Assistant Director for International Relations Jacob D. Beam, ACDA Assistant Director for Science and Technology Herbert Scoville, Jr., and Davies, and in substance with Scott George of G/PM. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 ARAB–ISR) The memorandum was sent to the President with a May 19 memorandum from Komer commenting that he and Harriman had pressed the matter with Eshkol to no avail. It was Komer’s judgment that Israel was determined to keep the option open as a deterrent against the Arabs. Nonetheless, he thought the letter would be a useful reminder to the Israelis of the President’s personal interest in the matter. 215. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, May 15, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 10:36 a.m. Passed to the White House. 216. Memorandum for Record Washington, May 20, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. 217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, May 21, 1965, 12:43 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Jones on May 20; cleared by Davies, Blake, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan. Repeated by pouch to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Taiz, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli. 218. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol Washington, May 21, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence. Secret. No drafting information appears on the letter, but see Document 214. The letter was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 1188, May 21. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) Barbour reported in telegram 1510 from Tel Aviv, May 25, that he had delivered the letter on May 24. Eshkol’s preliminary comments were (1) that Israel was already among the countries that had agreed to IAEA inspection of part of its nuclear reactors, and (2) that the cost to Israel of relinquishing a psychological deterrent was in his view a matter of importance in the Israeli security picture. (Ibid.) A briefing paper prepared in NEA/IAI on September 19, 1966, noted that President Johnson never received a reply to this letter. (Ibid., POL ISR–US) 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, May 25, 1965, 1103Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Secret; Exdis. 220. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, May 28, 1965, 8:25 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Russell; cleared by Davies, Campbell, Staff Assistant in EUR George W. Jaeger, and Talbot; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, Jerusalem, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, USUN, Bonn, Rome, and Moscow. 221. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, May 31, 1965, 12:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10. No classification marking. 222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, June 5, 1965, 2:59 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Russell; cleared by Symmes, Talbot, Solbert, Bunte, Creel, and Komer; and approved by Rusk. A May 27 draft by Russell is attached with a note that the telegram was retyped with White House changes. Repeated to London, Bonn, and to Paris for the Embassy and DEFREPNAMA. 223. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 8, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle on June 9. 224. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, June 16, 1965, 9:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IV. Secret. A note on the source text states that the memorandum was received at 10 a.m. 225. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, June 17, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret. A note at the end of the memorandum in Bundy’s handwriting reads: “I am absolutely sure we should do this—because if we don’t the explosion will be our fault. We can haggle like Hell in the next phase. McGB.” 226. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, July 2, 1965, 3:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12. Confidential. 227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, July 19, 1965, 8:22 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle and Kinsolving, cleared by Symmes and in substance by Campbell, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, London, and Paris, and pouched to Jerusalem. 228. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, July 22, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The telegram does not indicate the time of transmission; it was received at 12:21 p.m. Passed to the White House. 229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, July 26, 1965, 3:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Talbot. 230. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, July 29, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer, Vol. I. Secret. 231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, July 30, 1965, 8:06 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Exdis/Tan. Drafted by Anton N. Nyerges; cleared by Talbot, Spain, Scoville, Komer, Symmes, Thomas, Colonel Haynes in DOD, and Wolle; and approved and initialed by Rusk. 232. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 3 and 10, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Davies. 233. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, August 18, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 8:20 a.m. 234. Memorandum for Record Washington, August 26, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Copies were sent to the Department of State and to Deputy Director for Central Intelligence Richard Helms. 235. Editorial Note 236. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 8, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Nyerges; cleared by Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in NR Lieutenant Colonel Billy W. Byrd, Davies, Evans in DOD/ISA, Meyers, and in substance by Townsend W. Hoopes in DOD/ISA. 237. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, September 24, 1965, 12:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, UAR Memos, Vol. IV. Secret. 238. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, September 30, 1965, 0103Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, October 5, 1965, 7:12 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by UNP Deputy Director Jonathan Dean and in substance by Wolle, and approved by William B. Buffum. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 240. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 6, 1965, a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2547. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Multilateral Organization Affairs in NR Daniel O. Newberry and approved in S on October 14. The meeting was held at USUN. The memorandum is marked Part V of V; the other four memoranda of conversation are ibid. 241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, October 8, 1965, 5:35 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle and Nyerges, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Raymond A. Hare. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Jerusalem and USUN and pouched to London. 242. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, October 9, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR. Confidential; Limdis. The telegram does not indicate the time of transmission; it was received at 10:23 a.m. 243. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, October 11, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, UAR Memos, Vol. IV. Secret. A handwritten date of 10/8/65(?) appears on the memorandum, but the Department of State copy is stamped October 11. A handwritten note on that copy states that Secretary Rusk took the memorandum to the President on October 11. That copy also indicates the memorandum was drafted by Sterner. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR) 244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, October 13, 1965, 11:42 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Handley. 245. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, October 20, 1965, 1302Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and USUN. 246. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, October 25, 1965, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. 247. Memorandum by Secretary of State Rusk LBJ Ranch, Texas, October 27, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk. 248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, October 30, 1965, 2:02 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–LEB. Secret. Drafted by Wolle, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, USUN, Jerusalem, and London. 249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, November 4, 1965, 10:35 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–4 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Wolle on October 29; cleared by George D. Monk of INR/RES, John P. Trevithick of SCI, Beam, Symmes, and Davies; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 250. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, November 8, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch on November 9 at 5 p.m. 251. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, November 10, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 5:55 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, and USUN. 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, November 17, 1965, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Russell and James H. Bahti of NE on November 16; cleared by Symmes, Davies, Hare, Macomber, and Komer; and approved by Ball. 253. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, November 24, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR. Secret; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 5:44 p.m. 254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, November 29, 1965, 1:36 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Iraq-Jordan Affairs Lee F. Dinsmore and J.D. Stoddart of DOD/ISA; cleared by Symmes, Meyers, Macomber, Hoopes, Davies, and Komer and in substance by B.W. Byrd of NEA/NR; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and POLAD CINCSTRIKE. 255. Special Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, December 3, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. 256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 9, 1965, 7:21 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Symmes and in draft by UNP Director Elizabeth Ann Brown and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and USUN. 257. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State Damascus, December 11, 1965, 1120Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL SYR–US. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Aleppo, Baghdad, Beirut, Bonn, Cairo, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. 258. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, December 28, 1965, 3:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 17. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 10:30 a.m. on December 29. 259. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, December 28, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 17. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch on December 31 at 11:45 p.m. 260. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 29, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret. Drafted by Gamon and approved in S on January 5, 1966. 261. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, January 12, 1966, 11 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret. Filed with a January 12 covering memorandum from Bundy to the President noting that it replaced a memorandum that he and Komer had sent earlier and expressing disappointment that the Israelis were “still trying to use the Feldman/Feinberg channel for serious business.” 262. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452. Secret; Limdis. Filed as an attachment to a January 18 memorandum from John T. McNaughton to McNamara, a notation on which indicates that McNamara signed the draft memorandum to the President on January 19. A February 10 memorandum from Hoopes to Vance states that Rusk allowed the draft memorandum to go forward to the White House without his express approval. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452) 263. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 21, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. 264. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 24, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a January 25 memorandum from Komer to Bundy that states, “Our side exercise to bring the Israelis in line seems to be going well.” 265. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 27, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. 266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, February 7, 1966, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Brown and Symmes, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Tel Aviv and pouched to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Ottawa, Paris, Ankara, and Jerusalem. 267. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, February 8, 1966, 11:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a February 10 memorandum from Komer to the President, which notes that it is a copy of a memorandum sent to him previously. Komer’s February 10 memorandum suggests three agenda items for a meeting the next day on Israel-Jordan: jets for Israel and Jordan, economic aid for Israel, and a desalting plant for Israel. A notation on it in Johnson’s handwriting reads, “Put on my desk. L.” 268. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 9, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 11:15 to 11:35 a.m. at the White House. Evron was also present. (Ibid.) 269. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 9, 1966, 4:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Gamon on February 12 and approved in S on February 15. The memorandum is Part II of IV. 270. Memorandum for Record Washington, February 11, 1966, 11:46 a.m.–1:12 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Daily Diary, which also lists McNaughton and Hoopes among those present. (Ibid.) The memorandum is dated February 12. 271. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 12, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hoopes on February 15. Copies were sent to, among others, Rusk, McNamara, General Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy, Komer, and McNaughton. Briefing material prepared for the meeting is filed with a February 12 memorandum from Hoopes to McNamara. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452) 272. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 17, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 UAR. Secret. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL on February 17. A February 14 memorandum from Komer to the President requested his approval for a low-key probe to see if the Soviets were interested in a freeze on arms shipments to the Middle East. The memorandum states that Rusk proposed this as part of the Israel-Jordan aircraft package and that none of the President’s advisers thought the Soviets would be receptive but thought it would be useful for the record. Johnson approved. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 20) 273. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, February 22, 1966, 6 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. 5. Secret. 274. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 23, 1966, 11:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Sterner on February 24 and approved in the White House on March 1. The meeting was held at the White House. 275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, February 23, 1966, 7:13 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 SYR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Marshall W. Wiley of NEA/NE; cleared by Symmes, Russell, and Davies; and approved by Hare. 276. Telegram From the Department State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, February 26, 1966, 3:57 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on February 24; cleared by Davies, Colonel Byrd, Meyers, and Komer, in draft by Stoddart, and in substance by Hoopes; and approved by Hare. 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, February 28, 1966, 8:33 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 NEAR E. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. 278. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, March 4, 1966, 10:08 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 16 SYR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., and John T. Wheelock of NE; cleared by Symms, Wehmeyer, and Morris J. Amitay of EUR; and approved by Hare. Sent for action to Damascus and repeated to Beirut, Amman, Jidda, Taiz, Baghdad, Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Kuwait. 279. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, March 9, 1966, 12:47 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Gamon; cleared by Symmes, Davies, Hare, Officer in Charge of Libyan Affairs Hugh Campbell, Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs Matthew J. Looram, and Trevithick, and in draft by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs Robert Chase and Meyers; and approved by Rusk. Sent to Amman, Algiers, Beirut, Baida, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Rabat, Tripoli, Kuwait, Tunis, Jidda, Taiz, and Khartoum. 280. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 16, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 NEAR E. Secret. Drafted by Thompson. 281. Editorial Note 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, March 24, 1966, 3:46 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Russell on March 23, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. 283. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, March 31, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Israel 452. Secret; Sensitive. 284. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, April 27, 1966, 1433Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JORDAN–US. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv. 285. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 29, 1966, 5:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. A copy was sent to Bill Moyers. 286. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, May 2, 1966, 1121Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, USUN, Jerusalem, and CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA POLAD. 287. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, May 2, 1966, 1748Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and Damascus and passed to the White House and USIA. 288. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 3, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret. Prepared by Walt Rostow. 289. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Carroll) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, May 4, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Israel 463.2. Secret; Limited Distribution; No Foreign Dissem. A copy was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 290. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 19, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Acting Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 19. 291. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 21, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3. Confidential. 292. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 23, 1966, 9:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, “Rec’d 11:10 a.” A handwritten “L” indicates that the memorandum was seen by the President. 293. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, May 24, 1966, 1137Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 UAR. Secret;Exdis. Repeated to Cairo, London, and Paris. 294. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 26, 1966, 5 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S on May 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. The memorandum is Part III of VI. 295. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, May 28, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Controlled Dissem/Background Use Only. A note in the source text states that the memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence and coordinated with ORR and ONE. 296. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, May 28, 1966, 1200Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. 297. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 31, 1966, 2 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Confidential. 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, June 11, 1966, 10:33 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Gamon on June 7; cleared by Symmes, James W. Spain of INR, Bromley Smith, Robert S. Rochlin of ACDA, and in substance by Robert H. Kranich of ACDA/IR and Stabler of AEC; and approved by Davies. 299. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 14, 1966, 3:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret. 300. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 16, 1966, 5:50 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. II. Secret. 301. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, June 17, 1966, 8:26 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 UAR. Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Wolle; cleared by Symmes, Brewer, Rochlin, Toumanoff, Garthoff, Sisco, DePalma, and Acting SCI Deputy Director J. Wallace Joyce; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to Paris and London. 302. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 18, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, UAR Memos, Vol. IV. Secret. 303. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, June 20, 1966, 6:40 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Wheelock, Atherton, and James H. Bahti of NE; cleared by Macomber, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon, Symmes, Davies, Mrs. Jacobson at the Department of Agriculture, Mrs. Bitterman of Food for Peace, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Handley. 304. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 21, 1966, 7:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. II. Secret. 305. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 25, 1966, 5:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret. The source text bears Johnson’s handwritten notation, “Walt, See me. L.” It bears no indication of his approval or disapproval. 306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, June 27, 1966, 7:09 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes and Officer in Charge of UK Affairs Thomas M. Judd, and approved by Handley. Repeated to London. 307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, July 13, 1966, 7:18 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Donald C. Bergus, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv. 308. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 13, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bergus and approved in S on July 25. The memorandum is Part III of III parts; Parts I and II are ibid. For the remainder of the conversation, see Document 307. 309. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, July 16, 1966, 1335Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 6–8 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House and USIA. 310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, July 28, 1966, 3:49 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF PAL. Confidential; Noforn Except Israeli officials. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Symmes and Sisco, and approved by Buffum. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and to Geneva for Goldberg. 311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, July 28, 1966, 6:42 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Hare. Also sent to Jidda and Taiz. 312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, July 28, 1966, 8:39 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Symmes and Sisco, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Geneva for Goldberg. 313. Letter From the Charge in the United Arab Republic (Nes) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) Cairo, July 28, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Official-Informal. 314. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 2, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on August 5. According to the President’s Daily Dairy, the meeting took place at 12:46 p.m. in the President’s office at the White House. (Johnson Library) President Shazar’s visit was informal. Briefing material for the visit is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Israel, Shazar Visit Briefing Book. 315. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 12, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved at the White House on August 18. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 1:48 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. (Johnson Library) 316. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hoopes) Washington, August 22, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Wolle on August 18 and cleared by Symmes, Padelford of NEA/RA, and Warren of G/PM. 317. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, August 22, 1966, 10:53 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–2 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle on August 17; cleared by Symmes and Hare and in substance by UK Country Director J. Harold Shullaw, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Spanish Sahara, and Tunisia Country Director John F. Root, Edward W. Schaefer of AFNE, and Kinsolving; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Bonn, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tripoli, and Tunis and pouched to Taiz. 318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, August 30, 1966, 12:06 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kinsolving and cleared in substance by Symmes and Davies. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Cairo, Jerusalem, and CINCSTRIKE. 319. Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, September 1, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the paper was prepared in cooperation with INR and DIA. A table of contents is not printed. 320. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, September 7, 1966, 1352Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, TRV ANDERSON, ROBERT B. Confidential; Limdis. 321. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, September 10, 1966, 0745Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, TRV ANDERSON, ROBERT B. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda. 322. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, September 14, 1966, 1115Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. 323. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, September 14, 1966, 1151Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF PAL. Confidential. 324. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 5, 1966, 3:45–5:10 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret. The meeting was held at USUN. The memorandum is Part IV of V Sections. Records of the other portions of the conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83. 325. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, October 7, 1966, 2345Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, and Baghdad. 326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria Washington, October 10, 1966, 4:31 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL SYR–US. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Atherton. 327. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, October 11, 1966, 7:19 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Priority All Addressees. Drafted by Atherton and Symmes; cleared by Campbell, Vladimir Toumanoff of the Soviet desk, and Sisco; and approved by Hare. Sent to Tel Aviv, USUN, Amman, and Cairo and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, Damascus, and Beirut. 328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, October 12, 1966, 7:27 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sterner, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. 329. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, October 17, 1966, 6:31 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Symmes, cleared by Campbell, and approved by Hare. Sent to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Cairo, Kuwait, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, October 31, 1966, 7:27 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Symmes, cleared by Campbell and Atherton, and approved by Hare. Repeated to USUN, Amman, Jerusalem, Paris, London, and CINCSTRIKE. 331. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, November 3, 1966, 0855Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Secret;Exdis. 332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, November 13, 1966, 3:25 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, Davies, Atherton, Sterner, and Symmes; cleared by Hare and Sisco, and in substance by Goldberg; and approved by Davies. Wriggins at the White House was informed. Also sent to Amman and repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, and CINCSTRIKE. 333. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 15, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. 334. Memorandum for the Record Washington, November 15, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, Israel, 4/1/66–12/31/66. No classification marking. Prepared by Howard Wriggins on November 16. 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, November 15, 1966, 8:39 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by UNP Deputy Director Stephen Campbell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, and Jerusalem. 336. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, November 16, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Rostow. 337. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 16, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos. Secret. 338. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, November 18, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. II. Secret. 339. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, November 20, 1966, 1820Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel. Secret. 340. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, November 21, 1966, 4:14 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN/UN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Tel Aviv and Amman. 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, November 21, 1966, 4:21 p.m. Source: Department of State,INR Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Cairo. Secret; Roger Channel; Special Handling. Approved by the Secretary. A draft of the telegram was sent to Rusk with a November 10 memorandum from Hare setting forth its background. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US) 342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, November 21, 1966, 8:44 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN/UN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Wolle and in substance by Brown, Sisco, and Davies; and approved and initialed by Atherton. Repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, London, Moscow, Cairo, Paris, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Kuwait, Jidda, Jerusalem, and UNCINCMEAFSA. 343. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, November 22, 1966, 10:24 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on November 21 and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 344. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, November 22, 1966, 6 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on November 21; cleared by Atherton, Handley, Colonel Jordan of DOD/ISA, Sisco, Kitchen, and Davies; and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to Amman, Tel Aviv, USUN, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Paris, and Moscow and pouched to POLAD CINCSTRIKE. 345. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, November 22, 1966, 2009Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Jerusalem and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA,USIA, and NSA. 346. Telegram From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas Washington, November 23, 1966, 2006Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 15. Secret. A handwritten note reads, “Sent 4:40 p.m.” 347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, November 24, 1966, 3:01 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and Handley and approved by Handley. 348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, November 25, 1966, 11:24 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) UAR. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Hare. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 349. Editorial Note 350. Memorandum for the Record Washington, November 28, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Prepared on November 29. 351. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, November 29, 1966, 1025Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Secret;Exdis. Received at 6:14 a.m. 352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, November 29, 1966, 9:58 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 353. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, November 30, 1966, 3:47 p.m. Source:National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 31–1 ISR–UAR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bergus, cleared in draft by Wolle, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo. 354. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 1, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. Filed with a brief covering memorandum of December 2 from Wriggins to Rostow, suggesting that he talk to Rusk and urge him to stop in Cairo on the way to Paris. Rusk was about to leave on a trip in which he visited several countries in Asia, concluding with a visit to Paris, where he attended a December 15–16 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. 355. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 2, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. 356. Intelligence Memorandum Washington, December 2, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the memorandum states that it was produced solely by CIA and was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence. 357. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, December 5, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Jordan 091.3 MAP. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that the memorandum was seen by the Secretary. 358. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 7, 1966, 3:47 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 15–7 ISR–US. Secret. Drafted and approved by Symmes. Repeated to DIA, OSD,USUN, Amman, Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, USCINCEUR/USDUCOM, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, CINCUSNAVEUR, CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, COMSIXTHFLT, and JCS. 359. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, December 9, 1966, 0013Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. The telegram was received at the LBJ Ranch at 6:52 p.m. on December 8. A handwritten “L” on the telegram indicates that it was seen by the President. A notation in an unknown handwriting reads as follows: “Walt: Let Komer tell Abe Feinberg do not want this—unless they want an enemy.” 360. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, December 9, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. 361. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 10, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret. The memorandum, filed as an attachment to Rostow’s December 12 memorandum to the President (Document 361) was apparently drafted by Wriggins, who sent it to Rostow with a December 10 covering memorandum. 362. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, December 11, 1966, 1320Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JORDAN–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Noforn. Repeated to London, CINCSTRIKE, OSD, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Kuwait, and Jidda and passed to the White House. Rostow sent a copy to the President with a covering memorandum stating that he would want to read “this rather ominous cable.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III) 363. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 12, 1966, 11:35 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret. 364. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 12, 1966, 2:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Top Secret; Sensitive. 365. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson Washington, December 12, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret. Filed with a December 12 covering memorandum from Rostow to the President, which also forwarded the draft letter to King Hussein cited in footnote 3, Document 363. 366. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 14, 1966, 7:29 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Davies on December 13, cleared by Handley, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Cairo,USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 367. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 13, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 70 A 6648, 333 Jordan. Secret. Drafted by Hoopes and approved by Secretary McNamara on December 17. Filed with a December 16 covering memorandum from Hoopes. 368. Editorial Note 369. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 13, 1966, 8:55 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential. 370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, December 13, 1966, 9:34 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and Marshall W. Wiley; cleared by Handley, Macomber, and in substance by Wriggins and Hoopes; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to London. 371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 15, 1966, 6:03 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Handley, and approved by Katzenbach. 372. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 20, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Confidential. 373. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State Amman, December 22, 1966, 0001Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/MACOMBER. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 374. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 22, 1966, 8:49 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Handley, and approved by Katzenbach. 375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 30, 1966, 8:14 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Michael Sterner of NEA/IAI; cleared by Wolle, Davies, and Saunders, and in substance by Trevithick and Rochlin; and approved by Handley. 376. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, January 9, 1967, 1437Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 377. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State Tel Aviv, January 11, 1967, 1321Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AE 13 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. 378. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 12, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved in S on January 17. The memorandum is Part VI of VI. The other five memoranda of conversation are ibid. 379. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon Washington, January 13, 1967, 6 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967– 69, POL 7 LEB. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gamon and John T Morgan of E/OMA and approved by Davies. 380. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 16, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President. 381. Memorandum of Conversation Between the UAR Ambassador (Kamel) and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff Washington, January 17, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. A copy was sent to the Department of State. 382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, January 17, 1967, 9:17 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner and Wolle; cleared by Davies, Atherton, Handley, Walt Rostow, and in draft by Buffum; and approved by Katzenbach. A note to Rostow from LN, dated January 17 at 7:35 p.m., attached to a draft of the telegram, states that Walsh had called to say that the telegram should go that evening and that Walsh had talked to Katzenbach who had not seen it but agreed that it should go; a handwritten note in the margin indicates that Rostow cleared with the President. The draft telegram and the note are attached to a January 18 memorandum from Wriggins to Rostow warning that the message might have given the Israelis an unintended signal because it was softer than the message Johnson sent to Eshkol after the Israeli raid into Jordan in November. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 10/1/66–6/30/67) 383. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, January 18,1967, 8:20 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–8 US–ISR. Secret. Drafted by Davies and approved by Walsh for Katzenbach. 384. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 26, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15–8 UAR. Secret: Exdis. Drafted by George Bennsky of NEA/UAR. A January 27 memorandum from Deputy Executive Secretary Herbert B. Thompson to Katzenbach states that he understood the memorandum had been revised according to instructions from Katzenbach’s office. A February 9 note, unsigned, attached to the action memorandum states: “Walt Rostow called to say that Eugene Black and Robert Anderson had called today to urge that we give another look at the food package for the UAR, despite Congressional problems, because of the urgency of the situation.” An attached April 25 note to CMS from Walsh states: “Both of these seem to have been OBEd.” 385. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, January 27, 1967, 10:28 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–8, US–JORDAN. Secret; Exdis; College Run. Drafted by Atherton on January 26, cleared by Robert B. Houghton and Hoopes, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman. 386. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, February 1, 1967, 1051Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv. 387. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, February 2, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Israel 091.3 MAP. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by McNamara. 388. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 8, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 ISR. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Atherton. 389. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 13, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. 390. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 14, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. 391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 23, 1967, 6:54 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Davies, Atherton, Handley, and Wriggins, and in substance by Trevithick and Rochlin; and approved and initialed by Rusk. 392. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, February 24, 1967, 0932Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 UAR-US. Confidential. 393. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, March 4, 1967, 1533Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Amman. 394. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, March 6, 1967, 1321Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret; Eyes Only. The message is dated March 4; it was received at the LBJ Ranch at 10:21 a.m. on March 6. A handwritten “L” on the telegram indicates that it was seen by the President. 395. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 15, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret. Johnson’s handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Put on my desk & get chart on our Israel aid by years. L.” 396. Memorandum From the Country Director for the United Arab Republic (Bergus) to Lucius D. Battle Washington, March 16, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bergus. Battle left Cairo on March 5 and assumed the duties of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on April 5. 397. Memorandum for the Record Washington, March 17, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential. Prepared by Rostow. Copies were sent to the State Department and to Wriggins. 398. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 19, 1967, 4:51 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Robert B. Houghton and cleared by Davies and Sterner. Also sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo,CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Damascus, and Jerusalem. 399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, March 24, 1967, 5:11 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Battle and cleared by Bergus. Also sent to Jidda. 400. Record of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia Washington, March 28, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, Israel-Arms. Secret. Prepared on March 29 by Sidney Sober, Staff Director. 401. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 7, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Sensitive. Received at 7:30 p.m. Rostow’s handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Howard &Hal: Hold—but for your guidance. Walt.” None of the approval or disapproval lines is checked, but handwritten numbers appear in the margin. A table dated April 18, attached to Document 406, shows the President’s initial decisions, which accord with the marginal notations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI) For his final decisions, see footnote 6, Document 416. 402. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, April 7, 1967, 9:14 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle; cleared by Houghton, Wheelock, and UNP Director Elizabeth Ann Brown; and approved by Davies. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, USUN, and London and repeated to Secretary Rusk at Punta del Este as Tosec 16. 403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, April 11, 1967, 8:41 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Atherton and Lambrakis; cleared by Houghton, Campbell, and in draft by Gabriel J. Paolozzi of IO/UNP; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Amman and repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, USUN, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and to Secretary Rusk at Punta del Este as Tosec 94. 404. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 13, 1967. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 13. The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in its preparation. The CIA, State, Defense, NSA, and AEC representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction. 405. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, April 17, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Exdis. Filed as an attachment to Document 406. 406. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 18, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Exdis. Filed with an April 18 covering memorandum from Rostow to the President recommending that he hold the APCs—and if politically feasible, the whole package—until April 28. The covering memorandum bears Johnson’s handwritten note: “Put on my desk &have available when Feinberg appt is ready. L.” 407. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 20, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret; Exdis. 408. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, April 20, 1967, 1625Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL LEB. Confidential. Received at 1:51 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, Moscow, and Tehran. 409. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, April 20, 1967, 1631Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 LEB–US. Confidential. Received at 2:49 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Moscow,CINCSTRIKE, Tel Aviv, CINCUSNAVEUR, CNO, COMSIXTHFLT, COMIDEASTFOR, CTG 60.2, and the Department of Defense. 410. Editorial Note 411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon Washington, April 21, 1967, 5:34 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL LEB. Confidential. Drafted by Gamon and approved by Davies. 412. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 26, 1967, 4:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus and approved in U on May 4. 413. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 29, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that it was received at 3:55 p.m. 414. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson New York, May 1, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret. Filed as an attachment to Document 416. 415. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson Washington, May 1, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Exdis. Filed as an attachment to Document 416. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Sterner and cleared in draft by Rochlin, Deputy Assistant Director of ACDA for International Relations Culver Gleysteen, Raymond L. Garthoff of G/PM, Vladimir Toumanoff of SOV, Director of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Donovan Q. Zook, Edward A. Padelford of NEA/RA, Director of INR/RNA Granville S. Austin, Bergus, Battle, and Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA Stuart W. Rockwell. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR) An undated memorandum from Battle, forwarding the memorandum for Katzenbach’s signature, states that it was prepared at the request of the White House staff. (Ibid.) 416. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 8, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President. 417. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 10, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum states that it was received at 5:20 p.m., and a handwritten “L” indicates that it was seen by President. 418. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, May 12, 1967, 6:02 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ARAB–ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle; cleared by Paolozzi, Davies, and in substance by Robert H. Flenner in EUR/SOV; and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, Jerusalem, and Moscow. 1. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol 1. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol 1 Washington, January 2, 1964. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: The visit to Israel of my good friend, Sargent Shriver, Director of the Peace Corps, provides an occasion for me to renew the frank and friendly exchange between our two governments. 2 I am of course familiar with the correspondence between President Kennedy and yourself as well as former Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. I too value greatly the close and candid relationship that exists between our two governments. This must continue, so I look forward to establishing the same high degree of mutual understanding as existed during the administrations of our predecessors. Among the major problems which we will have to consider in the near future is that of the Jordan waters, on which we stand behind you in your right of withdrawal in accordance with the Unified Plan. 3 Also high on our agenda is the assurance of Israel’s future security, in ways which will stabilize rather than upset the situation in the area. We are much concerned, too, with finding a satisfactory way to settle the refugee problem, as a prerequisite to Arab-Israeli peace. You may be sure that we are giving these questions our earnest attention and hope to exchange views fully and frankly with your government on the best means of handling them. I hope to write you again soon in response to your letter of November 4 4 on Israel’s security problems. Meanwhile, I want to assure you that I stand fully by President Kennedy’s public declaration on May 8, 1963, 5 that we are determined to defend the security of all states in the Near East, as well as our other public and private assurances of support for the safety of Israel. There will be no change in the policy of the United States Government on this issue. I hope I may look forward to the pleasure of meeting you sometime in the not too distant future to talk things over face to face. 6 Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel—Presidential Correspondence. Secret. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 594 to Tel Aviv, January 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/SHRIVER) 2 Shriver delivered the President’s letter to Prime Minister Eshkol on January 7. Their conversation is summarized in telegram 751 from Tel Aviv, January 8. (Ibid.) A January 29 memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff refers to an invitation conveyed by Shriver to Eshkol to visit Washington. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel) 3 The Unified Plan, or Johnston Plan, developed in 1953–1955 negotiations with the riparian states of the Jordan River Basin conducted by Presidential emissary Eric Johnston, had never received formal acceptance. For information about the Plan and U.S. policy concerning it, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVII, Document 8 , and vol. XVIII, Documents 352 and 355 . 4 For information concerning Eshkol’s November 4 letter to Kennedy, see ibid., Document 356 . 5 For text of the statement that President Kennedy made during a press conference on May 8, 1963, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , p. 373. 6 Eshkol replied in a letter of January 22 that he looked forward to meeting Johnson, that he valued Johnson’s statement on the U.S.-Israel relationship, that he hoped for an early reply to his November 4 letter, and that he was encouraged by Johnson’s assurance of U.S. support of Israel’s withdrawal of Jordan waters in accordance with the Unified Plan. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel) 2. Letter From President Johnson to King Hussein 2. Letter From President Johnson to King Hussein 1 Washington, January 2, 1964. Your Majesty: I am taking the occasion of the visit of my good friend and colleague Sargent Shriver to the Holy Land to have him convey to Your Majesty my sincere greetings and warm good wishes. Although I have never visited Jordan, I feel I know your country both because of my deep interest in the Bible and because of the very close and cordial relations this country has with Jordan. Our support of Jordan’s progress under Your Majesty’s wise leadership has been shown in many ways. We have followed with pride the advances in Jordan’s economic and political welfare. The United States is pleased to be associated with Your Majesty’s efforts to build your country and serve your people. I know the heavy burdens and serious obstacles faced by Your Majesty in leading Jordan forward. Only a few years ago it took great faith to believe Jordan could overcome the obstacles in its advance towards economic self-sufficiency. Your Majesty supplied that faith through your leadership. Your enduring confidence has now demonstrated that economic independence in the foreseeable future is no idle dream. Let me assure you most sincerely and categorically that the United States will continue to assist as it is able Jordan’s efforts toward achieving the goals you have so wisely set. 2 Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Jordan—Presidential Correspondence. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 269 to Amman, January 3. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 JORDAN) 2 Shriver delivered the President’s letter to King Hussein on January 6. Telegram 319 from Amman, January 7, summarized their conversation. Shriver asked the King if an informal visit with President Johnson in April would be agreeable if it could be arranged, and the King replied that he would be happy to accept an invitation for such a visit. (Ibid., POL 7 JORDAN) 3. Memorandum of Conversation 3. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 3, 1964. SUBJECT Israeli Request for Military Assistance PARTICIPANTS The Secretary His Excellency Avraham Harman, Israeli Ambassador Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Minister, Embassy of Israel Mr. Shaul Bar-Haim, Counselor, Embassy of Israel Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot, NEA The Ambassador said that on his recent consultation in Israel he had found the government preoccupied with the key issue of defense. Israel regarded the talks on November 12 and 13 between its representatives and U.S. Government officials 2 as very full and helpful, and subsequently had given further information especially on the tank situation. He believed that the United States now had a good picture of Israeli needs. In Jerusalem, the Ambassador said, the Prime Minister had asked him to put to the Secretary for consideration of the U.S. Government the entire security situation in Israel, and especially the position concerning tanks, which was very serious indeed. He appreciated the opportunity to do that now. There were two aspects, qualitative and quantitative. Qualitatively, there was no question that Israel was now completely out-classed by the UAR. Israel had Centurions, AMX’s and Shermans. By contrast, the UAR had obtained Soviet T–54’s, Stalin 3’s, and also had a declining number of T–34’s. The T–54’s, which were coming in larger numbers, out-classed anything in the Israeli tank inventory in all respects; fire power, armor, maneuverability, etc. Thus, it was vital for Israel to replace at least three hundred of its tanks with more effective tanks. It sought to obtain from the United States two hundred M–48–A–3’s within a year or so; and within two or three years one hundred M–60’s. These would all be replacements of old tanks. Israel also faced a quantitative problem, the Ambassador said. In the November talks the Israeli representatives had expressed the view, with which they understood the Americans agreed, that minimum safety lies in Israel maintaining a ratio of one to two, or at worst one to three, tanks facing the Arabs. To maintain such ratio in the next two or three years Israel would need to add two hundred more M–60’s. The Secretary asked where Israel had obtained its Shermans. The Ambassador responded that they had been bought mostly in Europe, and that Israel had obtained them because they were all that were available. The Ambassador stated that Israel believed its policy of deterrence had worked in the past fifteen years. Now Israel was faced with problems of maintaining the deterrent. It regarded these problems as finite. With the aid he was discussing Israel thought it could preserve its position for the next five years or so making it quite clear to the Arabs that attacks on Israel would not pay. The Ambassador said that while the UAR was the main threat to Israel, his country had to keep certain tank strength to face the Jordanian armed forces, whom Israel rated highly. It also kept a small number of tanks against the Syrians and Iraqis, because Israel was very vulnerable in the middle of the country, at places not more than ten miles wide and good tank country. The Secretary, stating that he was not implying anything by his question, asked whether Israel had looked into the race between tanks and anti-tank missiles. He had the impression that over time the tank was likely to be on the way out, like horse cavalry. As an old infantryman, he would be happier handling a modern anti-tank weapon than being inside a tank. The Ambassador said this question had come up briefly at the November talks, and that General Rabin had made the Israeli view clear. Israel was thinking of its immediate tank problem as a very short range issue during a period of extreme vulnerability. The one thing to do in the next few years was to meet tanks with tanks. The Ambassador continued that Israel hoped to get these tanks from the United States as military assistance. Its military burden had become very heavy. The Prime Minister was an old hand at defense problems, having been Secretary General of the Finance Ministry and Minister of Finance, and now being Minister of Defense as well as Prime Minister. Thus he was very alert to the financial aspects of the military burden, and had shown himself very sensitive to it, so he was not inflating the need. The Secretary said that military assistance funds were very stringent at the moment. Some of the recent cuts had been more damaging to our military assistance program than to the economic assistance program. We would, of course, study the request. The Secretary asked whether we have had from Israel information about its military expenses outside of any aid question. The Ambassador replied that Israel had not been asked to provide this. The Secretary pondered that it might be useful. The Ambassador said he wanted to speak a word about the naval side. The UAR had developed a capability of blockading, bombarding and landing, against which Israeli defenses were absolutely out-classed. Now Israel faced the problem of ship-to-shore missiles as well. This was another aspect in Israel’s enormous defense burden. In the budget for the coming year, starting April 1, the Israel defense establishment would get one billion Israeli pounds, 40 percent of the regular budget, and 11 percent of the GNP. The Secretary said that we were very sympathetic to the problem of defense, and would take a look at Israeli requests. Military assistance was a considerable problem for us, he noted, with reduced availabilities and very important needs. He said he thought it would be helpful if the Government of Israel would let us have information on defense expenses abroad, since this information could be highly relevant and was of the sort always expected of military aid recipients. The Secretary asked if the Israeli Government had made its request in writing. The Ambassador said not except in the letter that Prime Minister Eshkol had addressed to President Kennedy. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Phillips Talbot on January 4 and approved in S on January 19. The memorandum is marked Part I of II. The other portion of the conversation is recorded in a memorandum of conversation, ibid., POL ISR–US. 2 For a summary of the talks, see circular telegram 897, November 13, 1963, printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 359 . 3 Reference is to Eshkol’s November 4 letter to Kennedy; see footnote 4, Document 1 . 4. Memorandum for Record 4. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, January 3, 1964. UAR Press Attache Habib came in today at his request (the real power in the UAR Embassy, he is leaving for Cairo January 6th to handle press releases with Western correspondents during Arab summit). 2 He wanted any words of advice I had to offer. Pointing out the considerable improvement in US–UAR communication which had taken place under President Kennedy, a policy which President Johnson had already told Nasser he wanted to continue, 3 I stressed that 1964 was likely to prove a real test of our improving relationship. This was primarily because of the Jordan waters, one of those Arab-Israeli issues on which the US and UAR necessarily disagreed. We were impressed by Nasser’s handling of this problem so far (I cited Port Said speech 4 and Haikal commentary), and we emphatically hoped that Nasser as the No. 1 Arab leader could sustain a policy of restraint. I gently reminded Habib how circumstances over the last year—particularly Yemen—had led to the Gruening Amendment, 5 which seriously limited our freedom of maneuver. I feared that an outpouring of Arab hostility over the Jordan waters would lead to great Congressional pressure on the Administration. This (despite our own recognition that the Arabs intended no military action) might just force our hand. If we could only get through 1964 without a real setback in US relations with the Arabs, I felt sure that the obvious uptrend of the last few years would be continued and strengthened. Habib seemed most receptive, but asked what kind of an “out” we could provide for the Arabs. I replied that we had attempted to devise just such an out with the unified plan of 1955, calling for an equitable division of the Jordan waters among various users. We were insistent that Israel stick to this allocation, which left 60% of the waters for the Arabs. Habib asked what our attitude would be toward an Arab call for international observation and checking, both of water withdrawals and of nuclear developments. I parried that our response would obviously depend on the nature of the proposals but in principle I felt we would favor any such international arrangement that seemed acceptable to the parties. As Habib left he mentioned Abu Simbel and the UAR’s hope that President Johnson would send some personal message when the US contribution was made. I told him only half jocularly 6 that if he could manage in some way to keep the Israeli issue in the icebox (as Kamel keeps saying) during the Arab Summit, we could suitably memorialize US help for Abu Simbel. R. W. Komer 7 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. 2 The Arab Summit Conference was held January 13–17 in Cairo. Documentation relating to it is in the National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 UAR. 3 Reference is to an oral message from Johnson to Nasser which had not yet been delivered. For text of the message, see telegram 2860 to Cairo, December 23, 1963, in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 391 . 4 A memorandum by Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff commenting on the speech is ibid., Document 395 . 5 Reference is to an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, signed December 16, 1963 (P.L. 88–205; 77 Stat. 387), barring U.S. foreign aid, including assistance under P.L. 480, to any country that the President determined was engaging in or preparing for aggressive military action against the United States or any country receiving U.S. assistance. The amendment’s sponsors made it clear that it was aimed at the United Arab Republic. 6 The words “only half jocularly” were added in Komer’s handwriting. 7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 5. Summary Prepared in the Department of State 5. Summary Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. SUMMARY OF AMBASSADOR BADEAU’S LETTER OF JANUARY 3, 1964 TO THE PRESIDENT 1. Egypt is the paramount Eastern Arab state and the leader of the nationalist reform movement. Although the drive for Arab unity has slowed, Nasser remains the most widely respected Arab leader. This gives the UAR a significant independent capacity to affect American interests in the area. 2. Our interests are: to blunt Soviet penetration; to preserve Western access to sea and air routes and to Arab oil; and to promote peace and progress in the area. 3. Our policy has featured: extension of economic assistance; evenhandedness in area disputes; and readiness to commit our power and prestige to the defense of our interests. 4. The wisdom of these policies has been shown by an increase in American influence at the expense of Soviet influence since 1956. In addition, inter-Arab quarrels have been moderated; the public UAR position on Jordan waters has been moderate, as has their position on recent U.S. support for Israel; the UAR has kept the Israel question in the icebox, and is now considered to be likely to attack Israel only if it believes Israel has begun to produce nuclear weapons. Private U.S. claims are slowly being adjudicated; Western access to the Suez Canal seems assured (barring Arab-Israel hostilities); and the Egyptians have shown an increasing appreciation of the advantage of closer cooperation with the West. 5. The remaining problems between Cairo and Washington are manageable. Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen has been slow, but they recognize the disengagement principle. There is no present threat to the Saudi Government or to Aden, and there might be chaos in Yemen if the UAR moved out too fast. 6. The UAR remains heavily dependent on Soviet military aid, but Western aid—especially PL 480—has helped preserve nonalignment; the UAR is still hostile to Israel, but leans toward containment. Time may heal even this wound. 7. In conclusion, cessation of U.S. aid to the UAR would not moderate their policies, would nullify the gains since 1956 and jeopardize our interests. The guillotine can only be used once per subject. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I, Cables. Secret. Both the summary and the 9-page letter from Badeau are filed with a covering memorandum of January 14 from Rusk to the President; a covering memorandum of January 14 from Komer to Bill Moyers, which noted that the President might want to urge Badeau to stay on during the “ticklish period in US–UAR relations” expected to develop over the Jordan water issue; and an undated note from Moyers to NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith, stating that the President had seen the package and that Bundy should talk to him about asking Badeau to stay on. 6. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 6. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, January 7, 1964, 1 p.m. 1493. Depcirtel 1176. 2 In course of tour d’horizon with President Nasser on January 6, 3 I discussed Jordan waters problem along lines reftel. Earlier in conversation President stated Summit Conference had been under consideration since last mid-summer. So long as Baath regimes controlled both Syria and Iraq, UAR considered summit meeting impossible and therefore had waited until Baath collapse in Baghdad had isolated and weakened Baath in Syria, putting it in a position where it could not refuse to attend conference. This factor determined date of issuance call for summit. Re Jordan waters, I briefly presented US attitude based upon reftel, stating I had requested political counselor Bergus to meet with Presidential advisor Hassan Al Kholi on January 7 for full exposition of US position. US position put forward not in intent to influence summit deliberations but as factual statement of our well-known diagnosis of problem and attitude thereon. In making presentation I particularly stressed riparian rights, pointing out UAR as downstream user of Nile waters originating beyond its borders should be particularly sensitive to correct riparian position. President at once responded by saying withdrawal of Nile waters based upon agreement between countries concerned and no such agreement had been made between Arab states and Israel. While admitting this diplomatically true, I pointed out Johnston Plan had evoked a technical “meeting of minds” by all parties concerned and on this basis USG believed progress in utilizing potential of Jordan waters for benefit of all parties could be made. President did not argue point but passed on to ask what my “personal” opinion was—“not as Ambassador but as long-time student of Middle Eastern affairs.” I responded neither I personally nor my Government were in any position to put forward “our solution,” but it seemed to me any objective student of situation would identify following points: (A) Use of force—either overt or covert—would not solve Jordan water problem and therefore this solution must be put aside as neither in interests of Arabs nor of international community whose concern for tranquillity in Middle East was active and legitimate. (B) Plans to divert headwaters of Jordan, as speculated upon in Cairo press, equally unrealistic and dangerous. Whatever legal rights or wrongs of such a move, any riparian state whose chief water supply is thus cut off would have no recourse but to fight. If in course of an Ethiopian-UAR dispute, Ethiopia diverted Blue Nile, Egypt would certainly move to stop this. I opined Israel would do same and would win large measure of sympathy and support in international community. (C) Question appeared to be not whether Israel would or would not use more Jordan water, but if it would do this within context of Johnston Plan which had been technically recognized as possible and beneficial to all users. Therefore most protective and constructive action Arabs could take would be to develop their own use of water, both as benefit to themselves and as inhibition of Israelis using more water than allotted to them by Johnston scheme. (D) Machinery existing for consideration of international disputes is UN, of which both Israel and Arab states members. President’s only response was to ask, “Do you mean if we were to divert headwaters of Jordan, we would be subject to Israeli aggression?” I objected to use of word “aggression,” saying water was such vital interest any state would move to protect it, and this could scarcely be called “aggression.” President then said, “This means we must remain strong and prepared.” With this he dropped topic, being obviously unwilling to discuss any details of summit meeting. Badeau 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Amman, Jidda, Rabat, Algiers, Tripoli, Damascus, Khartoum, Beirut, Tunis, Kuwait, and Taiz. 2 Circular telegram 1176, January 2, sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Tunis and repeated to 13 other Missions, stated U.S. views on the Jordan water issue and instructed the addressees to state them to their host governments if an appropriate occasion arose, without taking the initiative or giving the impression the United States was using pressure to influence the outcome of the pending Arab Summit Conference. (Ibid.) 3 Badeau reported in telegram 1490 from Cairo, January 7, that during an 80-minute tour d’horizon with Nasser, he had delivered the oral message from Johnson cited in footnote 3, Document 4 . After noting that progress had been made in some areas in recent U.S.-UAR relations, he reviewed the Yemen problem and pointed out that Congressional amendments aimed at the UAR were “storm signals” as to the state of U.S. public opinion and its possible impact on U.S. economic assistance to the UAR. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US) 7. Memorandum for Record 7. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, January 10, 1964. SUBJECT Israeli Arms Needs PARTICIPANTS H. E. Avraham Harman, Israeli Ambassador Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Israeli Minister Col. Ram Ron, Israeli Military Attache Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Asst. to the President Mr. R. W. Komer Ambassador Harman explained briefly that he was calling, as he had on several others, to explain the basis for Israel’s increased security requirements, especially for tanks. As Prime Minister Eshkol had said in his 4 November 1963 letter, Israel’s needs fell into three categories: (1) surface-to-surface missiles to meet the growing UAR missile threat; (2) tanks to modernize Israeli armor; (3) some means of countering growing UAR naval strength. The Prime Minister had also stressed the great economic burden that Israel was carrying, which it had to take into account in seeking to meet its security needs. Of course Israel’s immediate and primary need was for tanks. Mr. Bundy commented that we could see how the growing imbalance between Israeli and Arab armor posed a “real” problem, and were actively looking into it. But why did Israel need missiles? We genuinely had trouble in following their reasoning here. To us, for Israel to spend a lot of money on missiles seemed wasteful and unnecessary. Harman responded that Israel had hoped escalation of the arms race in the Middle East could have been avoided, but the US itself had found that Nasser was uninterested in arms controls. The Israelis had presented to us their evidence about growing UAR missile stockpiles. These created a real psychological and military problem for Israel. In the absence of any effective arms controls, the Israeli Government felt it had to go ahead and develop a deterrent to Nasser’s missiles. Bundy said that he literally could not follow the Ambassador’s argument. He could see a psychological problem, but in practical military terms Nasser’s missiles were useless. So what would Israel get from matching them with an equally wasteful investment? It reminded him of the arguments of those people in the US who thought we ought to build blast shelters and anti-missile missiles just because the Soviets might have them rather than because we saw an actual need for them. Tanks, he granted again, were a “real issue.” We could talk about this, but when we got down to brass tacks there was a genuine question as to why we should give tanks as grant aid to Israel when it was, as we had heard, planning to buy surface-to-surface missiles from France. We simply didn’t see Nasser’s missiles as posing the kind of threat that would require a major Israeli investment in anyone’s missiles in return. Our intelligence people had looked at the problem again after the US-Israeli intelligence talks. Mr. Komer confirmed that we couldn’t believe the Israeli estimate that Nasser would build a 900–1000 missile force by 1969 or that even a force of this size with conventional warheads could interrupt Israeli mobilization. He and Col. Ron had a brief exchange about the differences in our estimates. Ambassador Harman then put the case of Israeli missiles on political grounds, saying that we must appreciate the Israeli situation—Israel, surrounded by the Arabs, hemmed in on every side, harassed by constant Arab hostility, had to show its own people that it was able to deter any level of Arab military attack. Mr. Bundy again expressed skepticism as to whether a substantial Israeli investment in SSMs was the answer. He noted that Israel did not seem to have told us very much about its missile plans. How far along were they? Harman replied that their plans had not yet jelled, as General Rabin had indicated when here. 2 Bundy thought it would be helpful if the Israelis would tell us about their plans. It would create a tough problem for the US to find that others were selling Israel missiles while we were giving tanks. Moreover, while not deprecating the seriousness with which Israel must look at every aspect of the UAR military build-up, we tended to credit the Israelis with greater qualitative superiority over the Arabs than the Israelis did themselves. Harman objected to what he called the general tendency in the US Government to “overexaggerate” Israel’s superior technology and manpower. He pointed out that 55% of the children entering primary school this year were of non-European descent. Israel was having a hard time absorbing so many immigrants. The quality of its armed forces vis-a-vis the Arabs wasn’t as high as many Americans seemed to think. He then returned to the problem of UAR missiles, saying that one of the difficulties was that these missiles might make the UAR cocky enough to try a fight with Israel, simply because the Egyptians wouldn’t realize how limited a capability they actually had. Possession of a missile force might encourage the UAR to be more aggressive than purely military calculations would justify. Bundy’s rejoinder was that we had no desire to look down our noses at the UAR missile force, but the simple fact was that such missiles without nuclear warheads would not be meaningful. However, if Israel went in for a substantial missile force along with its existing nuclear potential, it would create the real possibility of a whole new dimension in the Middle East arms race. If any Middle East country acquired a nuclear delivery capability, then we would have such a major change in the situation as to confront us with a grave policy problem. We would be forced to re-evaluate the whole basis of our Middle East policy. Ambassador Harman, who seemed a little harassed at this point, switched the subject by asking “how about tanks?” Bundy again said that this was a real question which we could look at in real terms, though grant aid would be difficult because MAP was so thin. We could see Israel’s need for tanks, but there were legitimate questions as to the numbers and types that Israel needed, and as to when and how these could be made available, either by us or by other friends. He was no expert on tanks so couldn’t discuss these, but his brother in the Defense Department was looking into them and could give some more authoritative reactions. Bundy was sure that we would have arguments over such questions as the number and type, but at least these were real questions with which we could come to grips. Harman explained the Israeli “two-bite request.” First of all, they wanted to replace some 300 of their Shermans with modern tanks—200 M48A3s and 100 M60s. The second bite would be to meet the continuing Soviet build-up of Arab armor. Here they hoped for some 200 M60s over the next 2–3 years. On the money, they hoped to get the tanks free. Harman explained the great security burden Israel was carrying. Defense now took 40% of the Israeli regular budget and 11% of GNP. The Israeli economy was really stretched. Israel had to lay out vast sums for the absorption of immigrants, and it was hard to see how it could buy tanks at full value. Bundy explained the tightness of our MAP program, given the recent Congressional cuts. These had fallen particularly heavily on MAP, so on this question we would have to be tough. We would expect to apply to the Israelis the same cost-effectiveness standards that we applied to our own military establishment. But at least these were questions we could lay on the table and discuss. At the same time, in the common interest, we ought to take another look at the missile problem. We should have a similarly real discussion of what the Israelis had in mind and whether it made sense. If Israel was asking us for grant aid, we had an interest in knowing how they were spending their own money. He emphasized that if we thought for a minute there was a real UAR missile threat, we wouldn’t talk this way. We were not saying that Israel couldn’t or shouldn’t buy a few missiles (5 or so) for psychological deterrent purposes if it felt it mandatory, but our impression was that Israel was going much further. These things were “silly” with conventional warheads. Yet, for just this reason if Israel bought missiles it would mean to Nasser that Israel was going nuclear. This was the risk we saw—and it wasn’t just Israel’s risk, it was our risk too. It was a matter of deep common interest to the US as well as to Israel to keep all of our commitments to Israeli security. This had been President Kennedy’s view, and it was equally that of President Johnson. Bundy then pointed out that 1964 was going to be a very sticky year anyway, because of the pro-Israeli stand we were going to take on the Jordan Waters. If on top of this we seemed to be subsidizing directly or indirectly a build-up of Israel military strength in so dangerous a field as missiles, especially against essentially frivolous UAR weapons, it would be hard for us to maintain our present position in the Middle East. Ambassador Harman fervently hoped that we would not get into a missile discussion with Israel. He expressed his strong conviction that Israel was under the gun, recounting how when he returned to Israel twice in 1963 he had explained to all concerned that the US commitment to support Israel was firm. However, he’d had a rough time at home. He had found a general feeling that Israel could not depend solely on unofficial US guarantees, but had to have its own deterrent power. The Israeli Government and Prime Minister Eshkol faced a difficult problem in convincing the Israeli people that Israel could cope with the missiles which Nasser was obviously building and which he kept flaunting publicly. The Ambassador, after pausing, commented that he greatly appreciated Mr. Bundy’s candor and would be frank in return. When we raised certain economic questions about Israel’s request for tanks, this was reasonable; we could talk about costs and whether Israel could afford purchase rather than grants. But he feared that if we entered into long negotiations about US availabilities and numbers and types, we would complicate matters. Quite frankly, there were many in Israel who said Israel should not spend desperately needed money on older model, reconditioned tanks which would soon be obsolete. It would be wiser to wait a while and buy a new model, which would give Israel a deterrent advantage for several years. Harman feared that if we were sticky, this school of thought would again come to the fore. Both Bundy and Komer responded that there might be something to the argument about waiting for something better. In any case, Bundy assured him we were fully prepared to lay our cards on the table and discuss this as well as other matters. However, Israel must recognize that there were legitimate questions as to what was needed for our own forces, what we could spare, what our new production plans were, etc. In closing, Bundy emphasized how we regarded both the missile and tank problems as matters of common interest, which we should explore jointly and freely with a full exchange of information on both sides. He also hoped that nothing he had said would indicate that we did not regard Israeli concerns as serious. However, among close friends there ought to be the kind of full and frank airing of respective viewpoints that would lead to those joint decisions which would best serve us both. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security (Tanks), Nov. 1963–June 1964. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that copies were sent to Talbot, Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Frank K. Sloan, and Bundy, and subsequently to USIA Director Carl T. Rowan and Deputy Special Counsel to the President Myer Feldman. 2 Komer’s memorandum of a conversation with Rabin, Ron, and Gazit, November 14, 1963, is printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 360 . 8. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Israeli Ambassador (Harman) and the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) 8. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Israeli Ambassador (Harman) and the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) 1 Washington, January 15, 1964. I had lunch with Ambassador Harman and he used the occasion to renew the plea for surface-to-surface missiles, tanks and naval weapons. He referred to the fact that he had discussed this with Mr. Bundy and that he had been disturbed by the reaction he had received. He said that Mr. Bundy kept directing the conversation to the missile question and strongly urged that Israel deny itself surface-to-surface missiles. Ambassador Harman said that if this was the position of the United States Government the conversations would probably be unproductive, for Israel must reserve the right to decide what weapons it needs to protect itself. I said that we were not attempting to structure Israeli defense forces, but the question presented to us fell into three categories: 1. What type of weapons should we make available to Israel? Our analysis indicated that neither missiles nor naval weapons were necessary, but we were actively considering a request for tanks. 2. Assuming we agreed to make tanks available, what kind of tank could be provided? Here there was some question as to whether or not we could export M–60s and whether or not anti-tank weapons would not also be useful. This determination was largely a Defense Department matter. 3. Assuming Israel accepted the tanks, we had the problem of payment terms. It was in this connection that Mr. Bundy made the valid comment that before we modified the terms on which military equipment was normally sold we had a right to know whether Israel could afford to pay regular prices at regular terms. The only way to make this determination was to examine the purposes for which the defense budget was being used. If Israel was expending money for useless equipment, we had a right to demand that such expenditures be curtailed and the funds diverted to tanks before offering special assistance in the purchase of tanks. Similarly, if Israel was using its defense budget in a manner that would heighten the arms race or increase the prospect of war, we had a right to request that these funds be diverted to the purchase of tanks before modifying the normal purchase terms for military equipment. Ambassador Harman found this difficult to understand. He pointed out that Egypt already had surface-to-surface missiles, and we had agreed that they would have at least 500 of these within 4 years (Israeli intelligence said they would have 900 to 1,000). Israel would be at a serious disadvantage, he said, if they could not have at least 100 missiles. I asked specifically whether Israel had an agreement to purchase missiles from France. He said he did not know. Ambassador Harman concluded the discussion by urging that we send Prime Minister Eshkol a prompt response. He said this was promised in the letter from the President delivered by Mr. Shriver and was eagerly awaited. Time was extremely important to him and to his Government. I said he would have to understand that the subject was complex and that it took some time to develop the United States position, but I assured him we were proceeding as expeditiously as possible. Myer Feldman 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security (Tanks), Nov. 1963–June 1964. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 9. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 9. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 16, 1964. SUBJECT Arab-Israel Problems—1964 We face a difficult and challenging year in the Near East. The Soviets are actively seeking to recoup their recent setbacks. Turmoil in the Arab States has sharpened tensions among themselves and vis-a-vis Israel. Israel is increasingly anxious about its future security. What is more, our own interests are steadily more caught up in the area, because of Europe’s growing dependence on reasonable access to Middle East oil, our needs for strategic transit and communications, the importance of blocking Soviet advances, and our other stakes in peace in the region. I foresee a series of issues in the coming months that could severely strain our position and our influence in the area. The most important of these are: — Arab reactions to Israeli diversion of Jordan waters (the toughest of all); — Israeli nuclear potential implied by completion of the Dimona reactor; — the future of Palestine refugees and of UNRWA; — threats of increased and sophisticated armaments; — conflicts between Arab governments and Western oil companies. We have learned over the years that the key to a constructive Near Eastern policy is maintaining a balance in our relationships with the Arabs and Israel. This has never been easy. In our interest, but also in Israel’s, we have been at pains during the past three years to build fruitful ties with the Arabs. In 1964, as never before, we will need our Arab relationships to weather the storms likely to be aroused by the issues I have listed. I believe we shall need to make a heavy investment of U.S. prestige in 1964 in support of Israel against Arab resentments on several of these issues. Actions we propose to take, with your approval, to limit adverse effects of the Jordan waters diversion, Dimona, refugees, and the arms race are discussed in Enclosure 1. As to Israel’s estimates of its military defense needs, which preoccupy its leaders and shape their current view of U.S.-Israel relations, we face decisions on what the U.S. should do and when. Israel has asked us to furnish it five hundred tanks under the Military Assistance Program. Prime Minister Eshkol also wrote to President Kennedy that Israel needs assistance in obtaining naval equipment and missiles. In fact, Israel seeks ever closer military and political identification with us. We are looking at ways to help it meet its most critical problems. However, we see its needs in a broader context. In the past, consistent with our policy of refusing to become a major supplier of offensive weapons to states likely to be involved in an Arab-Israel war, we have encouraged Israel to fill its requirements for such weapons in Europe. It has done so. Israel has both public and private assurances of our commitment to its integrity and security. In mid-1963, a JCS review of our military capability to respond to possible aggression against Israel 2 completely satisfied President Kennedy that we could deploy to meet any potential threat within 30 hours. He so informed Prime Minister Eshkol. What is more, the Arabs have shown they are well aware of both our intentions and our capabilities to deter and stop aggression. In our view, this reduces the need for Israel to press far and fast toward weapons escalation that would almost certainly throw the Arabs closer into the arms of the Soviets. While Israel’s increased vulnerability in the field of armor will not become critical for the next year or two, or perhaps longer, there may be an earlier psychological requirement to assure Israel that its armor needs will be met in time. Otherwise, we are likely to be subjected to a strong Israeli pressure campaign and renewed demands for a security guarantee. On the other hand, we may want to time any arms deal with Israel so as to avoid additional Arab antagonism just when we are taking a pro-Israeli stand on the Jordan Waters. It is also essential to use the steps we take to aid Israel as leverage to achieve greater Israeli cooperation in matters of importance to us. For example, we are greatly concerned lest in response to the UAR’s so-called missiles, which we see as of no military significance, Israel acquire much better missiles in quantity from France. Aside from the drain on Israeli funds (which could otherwise be used to buy tanks), this would enhance Arab fears of a nuclear arms race and might create dangerous repercussions. So we may want to use our help on Israel’s tank problem to get Israel to forego (or sharply limit) any missile buildup. The problems, our approach to them, and suggestions about what we might do for Israel are discussed in detail in the enclosures. 3 Dean Rusk Enclosure 1 DETAILS OF ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEMS—1964 Five major problems involve potential violence or threaten basic United States interests in the Near East in 1964. Fortunately, we begin 1964 with considerable prestige and good will built up during recent years. These assets give us positive leverage, which we shall need to maintain through and after 1964 if we hope to see an ultimate Arab-Israel accommodation and protection of our major interests in the Near East. Our policy problems in the Near East are almost always a matter of balance. To deal successfully with the issues ahead, we shall continue to need influence with both Arabs and Israelis. In practice the question of exclusive identification with any Arab state, or with the Arabs generally, does not arise. Israel, however, seeks a close military identification with us to serve as a deterrent to the Arabs. Such a relationship would not only destroy the influence we need to maintain with the Arabs but stimulate closer Arab-Soviet ties and reduce our ability to bring about an eventual peaceful solution to the Arab-Israel dispute. In the mid-1950s the Arabs thought we had identified ourselves completely and finally with Israel. The Soviets saw an opportunity to side with the Arabs and wreck the Free World position in the Near East. They largely succeeded so far as the French and British were concerned. It has taken several years to reverse Soviet successes, damp down the Cold War in the Near East, and regain the flexibility we need. A policy of balance permits us to protect our own interests in access to oil on reasonable terms, strategic transit and communications rights and facilities, as well as to help Israel achieve long-term security. Our ability to maintain meaningful relations with the Arab states is essential to attain these objectives. Against this background, the five predictable problems of 1964 come into focus: Jordan Waters : Israel will begin to divert water out of the Jordan basin, from Lake Tiberias, this spring. Test pumping is scheduled for about mid-February. Sustained pumping will begin two or three months later. For a decade this has been foreseen as the issue most likely to cause a new Arab-Israel war. Despite their determination to prevent diversion, the Arabs cannot successfully take on Israel. But there is always some danger they will talk themselves into disaster. In a major gesture of support, President Kennedy committed us to stand beside Israel, provided its water withdrawals are held within the limits of Eric Johnston’s comprehensive 1955 Plan. We have made extensive diplomatic preparation to fulfill this commitment. Our objective is to prevent Arab use of force or any Arab interference with Israel’s plans, but in such a way as not to exhaust the leverage we need with the Arabs in other divisive issues. Our best bet is reliance on: a) A strengthened United Nations peacekeeping machinery in the area, b) Vigorous behind-the-scenes diplomacy with the Arabs, and c) Recourse to the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly as necessary. If we get over this hump without war, we will have made a contribution to Israel almost as basic as our support for its creation in 1948. Dimona Reactor : Israel’s French-built 25 megawatt power reactor will be completed in January or February. Israel has assured us it will be limited to peaceful uses but with it Israel will have a small nuclear weapons potential. We anticipate strong Arab reactions and, at the least, renewed talk of acquiring comparable installations, perhaps with Soviet help. Fortunately, we have persuaded the Israelis to invite us to inspect Dimona periodically. We can use our findings to limit the fears of the Arab governments. We need to continue pressing the Israelis firmly to keep off the nuclear weapons path. But these steps will not be enough in the long run. Israel is thinking of a 125–150 megawatt power reactor, five times the size of Dimona. The UAR will try to keep abreast. We cannot prevent the two sides from moving ahead so long as both stick to peaceful uses. Therefore, safety will lie in: a) Involving responsible Free World states in reactor development on both sides so we can know what is going on and have maximum control through bilateral safeguards arrangements, b) Encouraging acceptance of IAEA controls to replace bilateral ones, c) Exploring possibilities for an Arab-Israel nuclear free zone or acceptance of such other international restraints as may be evolved, and d) Reassuring each side on the basis of our knowledge of the capability and intentions of the other side in the nuclear field. Israel’s Security and the Arms Race : Nuclear potentials apart, the “conventional” arms race has reached a dangerous new threshold just as we face the Jordan waters issue and the Dimona question. And Israel is pressing its case for new military gestures from us. Israel wants as close to 100% military identification with the United States as it can get. But its appetites exceed its needs. Neither President Kennedy’s May 8 statement 4 nor the assurances in his letter of October 30 to Prime Minister Eshkol 5 (which amounted to a written guarantee of Israel’s security by the President of the United States) fully satisfied the Israelis. We did not expect they would. Israel has presented a sizeable request for military assistance. On the list in 1963 were a public security guarantee, secret contingency planning, naval equipment, surface-to-surface missiles, grant-aid United States tanks (300 now, 200 later), etc. Our November exchanges with the Israelis indicated that these requests are out of line with Israel’s actual military needs. Israel needs gradual modernization of its tank and anti-tank defenses. In other respects it has a healthy margin of superiority for some years to come. The UAR’s showcase missiles are in fact only that, not a military threat, and will probably remain so unless Israel gets into serious missilery and the UAR then turns to the Soviets for help. The UAR missiles point up, however, the domestic psychological problem Israel’s leaders face. The Israelis and others have made efforts to downgrade our capability and commitment to defend Israel. Without going so far toward Israel that we break the bond of confidence we have developed with the Arabs and risk creating a vastly dangerous USSR/Arab versus United States/Israel lineup, we can lay more effective emphasis on what we have very generously done and are doing to help. And there are certain new moves we can make in 1964 that will please Israel and help meet its domestic political problem (and ours). Details of both are in the second enclosure. In addition, however, we need to work at measures to curb the arms race and enhance stability. To that end: a) We should continue active exploration of arms limitation and control. Secretary Rusk has spoken to Foreign Minister Gromyko about the possibility of mutual restraint in the disposition of obsolete weapons. Our Ambassador in Cairo has begun to probe his Soviet colleague on aspects of arms control in the area. We have talked to Nasser secretly about the United States becoming a kind of guarantor for working arrangements to control the escalation of arms. There is discussion of arms control, as well as nuclear free zone possibilities, in the United Nations context. From all of these not much has opened up so far, but the time might come when we could do something serious with the Russians about restraint. Our capability to deal with all parties in this field is enhanced by our traditional Near East arms policy. b) We should make clear on appropriate public occasions that we will defend the independence of all Near East states and will resist aggression in any form. c) If we facilitate solution of Israel’s tank problem, we should get assurance in return that Israel will not plunge the Near East into either the sophisticated missile or the nuclear weapons field. Arab Refugees : 1964 will be the year of turn-around on this problem. President Kennedy’s talk with Ben-Gurion in May 1961 6 and letters to Arab leaders launched a major initiative designed, if successful, to eliminate, over several years, this problem that bulks so large in the Arab-Israel dilemma. 7 Negotiations over the next several months will show whether this can proceed fruitfully. The chances, frankly, are not good. Neither the Arabs nor Israel accepted Dr. Joseph Johnson’s proposals, and Israel’s public rejection of any settlement based on existing United Nations resolutions has further compounded the problem. If we fail, we could probably buy time by continuing to support UNRWA indefinitely (an unpopular course in Congress), or perhaps could phase it out gradually over a period of years. We must expect, however, a storm in the United Nations should the Arabs read this as our goal. We have already tightened UNRWA’s belt. The climax will come next fall when the General Assembly must determine UNRWA’s future. Whatever the outcome, a heavy investment of United States influence will be required if area stability is to be preserved over this important issue. Oil : From the oil producing countries (organized through OPEC) we now face the most intensive pressures for major concession revisions that have ever been put forward. Our influence will be needed on all sides to help maintain the rapport and trust needed between the companies and governments to prevent changes that would entail either chaos or injury to United States private investment in this vital sector. The threat of Arab sanctions against Western oil interests in reaction to Israel’s diversion of Jordan waters may not materialize but is another aspect showing the context in which our interests in the Near East must be viewed. Intra-Arab Relations : Arab actions on these five problems will be shaped by the state of their own relations. Divided and quarreling as they are today, Arab politicians find a hard line against Israel inescapable. This increases the risk of irrational explosion on any of the big problems. Without the UAR, no Arab state or combination of states could really damage Israel. Knowing this, other states—most actively, Syria—seek to embroil the UAR with Israel on, for example, Jordan waters and Palestine refugees. A major object of our policy toward the UAR is to persuade Nasser that he is wise to keep Israeli issues “in the icebox,” as his Ambassador says. Similarly, our purpose in Yemen is to prevent a conflagration that might involve other Arab states and ultimately Israel. In intra-Arab tensions, as in other problems cited here, the key is balance and a careful husbanding of limited and hard-won U.S. influence. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Talbot. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR) 2 Text of JCSM–611–63, August 7, 1963, is printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 308 . 3 Enclosure 2, unsigned and undated, entitled “Actions To Reassure Israel: 1964,” is not printed. 4 Text of the statement, which President Kennedy made at a news conference on May 8, 1963, is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , p. 373. 5 Reference is to a letter from Kennedy given to Eshkol on October 3, 1963; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 332 . 6 For a memorandum of Kennedy’s meeting with Ben Gurion on May 30, 1961, see ibid., vol. XVII, Document 57 . 7 United States supported the 1961 appointment of a Special Representative of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) to conduct indirect negotiations between Israel and the Arab states toward a resolution of the Palestinian refugee question. After meeting with Arab and Israeli leaders, Special Representative Joseph E. Johnson submitted his proposals to the PCC on August 31, 1962. For an August 7, 1962, memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy summarizing the background of the initiative and Johnson’s proposals, see ibid., vol. XVIII, Document 15 . Extensive documentation concerning the initiative is ibid., volumes XVII and XVIII . 10. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 10. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 18, 1964. JCSM–40–64 SUBJECT Arms for Israel (U) 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–20042/64, dated 6 January 1964, subject as above, 2 which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Israel’s request for tanks and specifically asked: a. Are the numbers and types of tanks requested necessary and appropriate to Israeli needs? b. If the United States does approve the Israeli request in principle, is the equipment requested the most useful equipment to offer? c. Is it advisable to substitute anti-tank weapons (other than tanks) or other vehicles for a part of the total requirement in order to reduce costs? 2. In JCSM–953–63, dated 7 December 1963, 3 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their views on proposed changes to the “Near East Arms Policy,” including the assessment that “the substantial military equilibrium presently existing among Near Eastern states does not warrant immediate action to supply major quantities of arms to any of these countries. Rather, the highest priority effort should be directed toward achieving agreement among Middle East arms suppliers to restrict the flow of arms into the area. Pending the results of such efforts, however, the arms policy should provide the requisite flexibility without positively identifying the United States with either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict.” Appendix A hereto provides an assessment of the Arab-Israeli arms balance. 4 3. It is understood that a final decision to reaffirm or modify the “Near East Arms Policy” has not yet been made. In considering the questions posed in the referenced memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have therefore assumed that: a. US objectives in respect to the Near East include the maintenance of military equilibrium between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors, and the avoidance of actions likely to intensify the Arab-Israeli arms competition. b. Provision of tanks to Israel must be consistent with the US policy on supplying arms to Near Eastern countries. c. US military equipment would be made available to Israel only through the medium of sales. d. To minimize the diversion of Israeli foreign exchange resources from essential economic development programs, the most economical solution to Israel’s tank modernization problem is desirable. 4. With these assumptions in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the following criteria should be applied in responding to Israel’s request for tanks: a. Conformity with approved Israeli Army Force Guidelines, which are predicated on Israel’s orientation toward the West and her subjection to international peace-keeping supervision, which requires restraint on excessive arming. b. Consistency with requirements for strengthening Free World security forces and the protection of US political and economic interests. c. Necessity for internal security and legitimate self-defense requirements. d. To the extent possible, avoidance of contribution to and acceleration of regional arms competition. e. Assistance in offsetting the foreign exchange costs of maintaining the US military position abroad. 5. Applying these criteria to the Israeli tank request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the major Israeli Army combat units in being coincide with the approved Force Guidelines. Furthermore, a significant increase in Israeli Army units does not appear to be justified by the existing strength relationship between the Israeli and Arab Armies. However, replacement of obsolete armored equipment in the current Israeli inventory could be justified on the basis that the Arabs possess modern heavily armed and armored tanks. Because of the extremely sensitive political situation in the Near East, any US participation in a program to sell modern tanks to Israel would have to be managed discreetly. At a minimum this would entail phasing in small quantities over a time span of 2–3 years and insuring that there is no significant net increase in the number of weapons in Israeli hands. See Appendix C for discussion of additional factors bearing on the problem. 6. Israel currently utilizes French SS-10 anti-tank missiles. There is no comparable US weapon in production. Recoilless rifles, M–72s and the like, very probably would not meet the Israeli desires to enhance their tactical offensive capabilities, implicit in the tank request. Armored personnel carriers would be useful to Israel as a replacement for its US armored half tracks, but would not be responsive to the Israeli request. 7. In view of the above and the factors discussed in Appendices B and C hereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the sale of tanks to Israel cannot be predicated primarily on military considerations and that: a. Replacement of 300 of Israel’s present M–4 tanks is militarily sound on the basis of modernization, and the types requested are appropriate to Israeli needs. However, a net increase in Israel’s tank inventory is not presently justified. b. The types of tanks requested are the most useful equipment that could be offered Israel, but M–48 tanks would also meet Israeli needs. c. The United States can provide no substitute anti-tank weapons which would meet Israel’s needs and also be substantially lower in cost than M–48 tanks. 8. Should a decision be made to sell US tanks to Israel, it is recommended that: a. Israel be offered 300 M–48 tanks for phased delivery during the next 2–3 years. b. If Israel considers M–48s unacceptable, M–48A3s be offered only on the basis of converting present stocks of M–48A series tanks to M–48A3s (with the addition of 105MM gun, if Israel so desires). Such action would require that tanks so converted be replaced in the US Army inventory with M60A1s. c. If it is decided to offer Israel M–60A1 tanks, this be done only on the basis of expanding presently authorized production rates to provide the quantity agreed upon. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J. W. Davis Rear Admiral, USN Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret. 2 A copy is ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, Israel 470. 3 JCSM–953–63 commented on two undated draft memoranda to the President on the subject “Near East Arms Policy.” The first, prepared in the Department of State, recommended adhering to the traditional U.S. policy of restraint regarding arms sales to Near Eastern states. The second, prepared in the Department of Defense, recommended modifying the traditional policy by permitting sale of defensive armaments, abandoning the practice of deferring to European sources of arms for Israel or the Arab states, and permitting the sale of offensive weapons on a case-by-case basis if consistent with the objective of maintaining a sufficient equilibrium between the Arab states and Israel and among the Arab states to minimize the danger of hostilities. The text of JCSM–953–63 is printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 383 . The two draft memoranda are included ibid., Microfiche Supplement, Documents 15 and 16. 4 The appendices are attached but not printed. 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, January 25, 1964, 4:20 p.m. 679. Jordan Waters. Embtels 786, 2 817; 3 Deptel 658. 4 Israel Ambassador Harman had long talks in Department January 23 and 24 with, respectively, Under Secretary Harriman and Assistant Secretary Talbot. While Israel Embassy had led us expect final reply re Wiener-Criddle technical formula 5 that would enable us make constructive proposals to Jordan to help it over difficult period ahead, Harman said he could not reply until Jerusalem assessed January 23–24 meetings. In addition those points put to you by PriMin Eshkol January 15, Harman (1) sought agreement USG would desist from specific reference to Unified Plan allocations, particularly Yarmuk allocation for Adasiya, in talks with other governments; (2) pressed us reaffirm specifically that USG supports (a) downstream disposition of all saline waters that may be collected in and around Tiberias and (b) principle that no waters be wasted; and (3) urged USG not to press for final resolution of allocational differences since technical formula as far as Israel could possibly go. Both the January 23 and January 24 conversations tended become rather complex reiterations of respective positions and concerns. So much so that at conclusion January 24 meeting and to make absolutely clear where USG stands in response PriMin Eshkol demarche, we handed Harman following “piece of paper”: “1. We would strongly oppose Arab aggression if there should be an effort to frustrate Israel’s plans. “2. Cairo Conference made it unlikely Arabs will seek recourse to Security Council. We can discourage such recourse but not deny it. We do not share Israel’s fears of United Nations involvement and its possible consequences. If problem should get into Council one way or another: “a. We would oppose renegotiation of Unified Plan; “b. We would be against halting or otherwise interfering with completion and operation of Israel’s Tiberias pumping plan provided latter is kept within Unified Plan; “c. We would have to maintain flexibility as regards nature of verification and supervision over riparians’ Jordan water operations to ensure consistency with Unified Plan. We would not approve unilateral verification or supervision. In our understanding with Israel we have almost complete agreement as to nature of supervision called for in Unified Plan. We prefer leave matters at that for time being. “d. We would anticipate continued closest consultation with Israel, but we should not now try to spell out tactics. “3. We hope hear final confirmation of Israel’s assent to technical formula. 6 This is matter of immediate practical importance in terms of what we can recommend to Jordan. “4. Even with technical formula agreed to, we would like to be on firmer footing. So far, Israel has reserved its position and we have said what we must support. We will not take initiative but will continue present our view of specific allocations when questions of fact as to nature of Unified Plan arise. If there should be public airing of precise Unified Plan allocations, the difference between Israel’s position and what we support would appear. Arabs could drive a wedge between us. Therefore, we urge Israel’s formal acceptance of all Unified Plan allocations as United States is committed to these in its understanding with Arabs.” On Harman’s other points, insofar as these not answered by position paper, we said opposition to water wastage and question of saline water disposal, like other elements technical formula, are matters we can support with Jordanians with conviction they are consonant with US-Arab understanding of Unified Plan. Entire formula is ad referendum to Jordan. This is a highly sensitive matter for that country and we are far from sure it will be able accept our recommendations. You should convey foregoing position paper to PriMin Eshkol or other GOI official as our considered reply to Eshkol’s January 15 demarche. At your meeting you may wish add our strong feeling that absolute minimum of public statements remains as important in weeks ahead as it was during and before Cairo Conference. You may also say we preparing detailed analysis of conference and will be glad discuss it with GOI. FYI: At January 23 meeting Under Secretary also raised with Harman regrettable recent publicity given confidential exchanges between USG and GOI, pointing out these not consonant with relationship of trust and discretion on which we place so much value. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Limdis; Immediate; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Crawford, cleared by Davies and Special Assistant for UN Planning Elmore Jackson, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Jerusalem, and USUN; and pouched to Aleppo, Algiers, Baghdad, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, and Tunis. 2 Telegram 786 from Tel Aviv, January 16, reported a January 15 meeting between Ambassador Barbour and Eshkol, in which Eshkol urged that if the Arab states decided to take the Jordan waters issue to the United Nations, the United States should support Israel in opposing any Security Council discussion of this issue, which could “only bring complications.” (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 817 from Tel Aviv, January 22, urged a prompt response to Eshkol’s demarche. (Ibid.) 4 This telegram, sent to USUN as telegram 1870 and repeated to Tel Aviv as telegram 658, set forth points which the Department of State proposed to make in reply to Eshkol’s January 15 demarche. (Ibid.) 5 The technical formula was developed in talks held January 7–9 by Dr. Aharon Wiener, Director of the Israel National Water Planning Authority; U.S. consultant Wayne Criddle, who had been a hydrology consultant to Johnston in 1954–1955; and Department of State and Israeli Embassy officers. Records of the talks are ibid. The text of the technical formula reads as follows: “The 100 mcms delivered downstream by Israel shall be made up as follows: “15 mcms derived from saline springs around Lake Tiberias; 85 mcms to be released from Lake Tiberias. Of the 85 mcms from Lake Tiberias, about two-thirds will be released during the summer months at constant flow in accordance with procedures anticipated in 1955. All captured saline spring waters now draining into Lake Tiberias will be discharged by Israel at some point below Lake Tiberias. It is anticipated that the foregoing schedule of deliveries will be reviewed at such time as facilities for storage on the upper Yarmuk become operative. “Israel would receive an allocation of 25 mcms during the irrigation season at a maximum demand rate of 2.3 cubic meters per second from the Yarmuk River. “Jordan may use any Lake Tiberias spills, and Israel may use any uncaptured Yarmuk flood waters, to the extent either exists, rather than allowing them to waste to the Dead Sea.” (Telegram 281 to Amman, January 9; ibid.) 6 Telegram 319 to Amman, January 30, stated that the Israeli Embassy informed the Department on January 29 that the Israeli Government accepted the Wiener-Criddle technical formula. (Ibid.) 12. Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 12. Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 11, 1964. SUBJECT Need to Reassure President Nasser on the Peaceful Nature of the Dimona Reactor Mr. Komer has requested the following information. President Nasser had indicated that acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel would be cause for war no matter how suicidal for the Arabs. It is vital for the preservation of peace in the Near East, therefore, to reassure Nasser as to the peaceful nature of the 24-megawatt reactor Israel has just activated at Dimona. President Kennedy explained this problem to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in 1961 2 and obtained his agreement in principle to periodic inspections of the reactor by the United States technicians to establish its peaceful nature. Pursuant to this oral agreement, Israel did not object to our passing information on the first two Dimona visits to Nasser. During the last exchange of correspondence between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Eshkol in August 1963, 3 however, the latter told our Ambassador he was reluctant to agree to our passing information on the reactor to Nasser, but would give the matter further consideration later. Nasser was the only exception; Eshkol did not take issue with our passing the information to other nations. A United States inspection team visited Dimona last January 18. Its findings show the reactor was activated December 26, 1963, and has no immediate weapons making capability. The team agreed periodic semi-annual visits to the facility would be desirable to assure ourselves of its continuing peaceful purpose. A summary of the team’s preliminary report is enclosed. With the completion of the first inspection since activation, we should press Prime Minister Eshkol to agree to our discreetly passing our findings to President Nasser. We regard reassurance to Nasser about Israel’s nuclear intentions and capabilities as essential to offset the news of Dimona’s having gone critical. This is certain to reach Nasser soon. Coming at a time when Israel’s building up of a sophisticated missile capability that may also become public, we think passage of such reassurances as we can give is the minimum to prevent some drastic United Arab Republic move to acquire a new level of Soviet weaponry. Past experience has shown that direct intervention by the President is the most effective way to obtain Israel’s cooperation on the Dimona problem. We believe firm and persistent persuasion by the President will induce Prime Minister Eshkol’s compliance. We believe it desirable to continue treating the problem of reassuring Nasser orally. This permits greater flexibility and does not risk hardening either Israel’s position or ours. We recommend approval of the enclosed telegram, 4 a copy of which we have already sent you on February 1 for clearance. John McKesson 5 Enclosure 6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF DIMONA INSPECTION TEAM The inspection team spent over eleven hours at the Dimona reactor site on January 18 and inspected all significant facilities. It determined that The reactor went critical on December 26, 1963, but has operated only at low power. It was clearly designed as an experimental reactor, capable of operation at 15 to 20 per cent above design power of 26 megawatts. Operation at full power is not anticipated until late 1964. The reactor center, valued at $60 million, is the most diversified and well equipped nuclear installation in Africa or the Middle East. Present and projected facilities will provide a capability within 1–1/2–2 years to produce 50 to 60 tons of natural uranium metal per year. This is 5 to 6 times the production rate required to support the heavy water-moderated reactor, if operated according to stated plans. Reasons given for this excessive capacity are 1) the desire to conserve essentially the full uranium production potential from phosphate operations, 2) the desire to be self sufficient, 3) the equipment installed is the minimum size available commercially for a one-step production process, and 4) the belief that uranium will increase in value. The present fuel stockpile includes one full charge and about 10 tons in process. Discussions are underway to obtain a second core from France. It is hoped to produce the third core domestically. The fuel now on hand is subject to material control and committed to be returned to France. Upon completion of construction a year or so hence, the reactor plant may be declassified. The plant has no weapons making capability at present, but continuing periodic inspections are recommended. 7 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by H. Earle Russell, and cleared by Talbot, Jernegan, and Charles W. Thomas, Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs in the Office of International Scientific Affairs. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) 2 For a record of the conversation on May 30, 1961, between Kennedy and Ben Gurion in which they discussed this, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVII, Document 57 . 3 For text of Kennedy’s letter of July 4, 1963, to Eshkol and information concerning Eshkol’s reply, see ibid., vol. XVIII, Documents 289 and 317 . 4 The draft telegram is not attached, but a copy is attached to the copy of Read’s memorandum cited in footnote 1 above. 5 McKesson signed for Read above Read’s typed signature. 6 A copy of the inspection team’s report is filed with a February 6 letter from Arnold R. Fritsch, Technical Assistant to the AEC Chairman, to Charles E. Johnson of the NSC Staff. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Dimona 1964) 7 A talking paper prepared for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter states that there “appears to be little doubt that the center is now designed and intended for nuclear research” but that the reactor’s capacity and fuel supply and preparation facilities “would permit the Israelis to redirect the program in the future toward achievement of a small nuclear weapons capability, should they so decide.” It noted that “construction of complex and expensive plutonium recovery facilities would be needed for such a capability.” The talking paper is filed as an attachment to outgoing CIA telegram 98215, January 30, which states that on January 29, Carter briefed the President on several matters, including the background and status of Dimona. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01676R, DCI Executive Registry Files, Box 14, Folder 1, Memoranda Originated by General Carter (1 January 1964–29 February 1964)) 13. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 13. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, February 15, 1964. I–21448/64 SUBJECT Status Report on Israeli Tank Sale Problem: To determine whether a small DOD Team should visit Israel next week. Discussion: Your approval in principle of a tank sale to Israel was conveyed to State on 26 January. 2 While both State and White House staff seem prepared in principle to consider a sale, through non-US sources if possible, Mr. Komer tells us the President, while sympathetic, does not see the need to make a final decision now. He wants to wait until the election is closer, in any case, and feels if we give tanks to the Israelis now they will be back at us before November for something else. Several other factors also lead Messrs. McGeorge Bundy and Komer, State, and ourselves all to feel we had better make haste slowly here: (1) We are greatly concerned over the likelihood that the Israelis are about to invest some $45 million in a French Dassault missile (similar to the Pershing). We see this as another step toward putting themselves in a position to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. If the Arabs get the same idea, it could undermine our whole policy in the Middle East. It would force the Arabs to get more arms from Moscow at the least. (2) Considerable anti-U.S. sentiment has been stirred up in Arab States over the Cyprus situation, the Jordan waters problem, and the “anti-Arab” implications alleged to be contained in recent speeches by President Johnson and Alex Johnson; 3 all of which would make an accommodation move toward Israel impolitic at this time. (3) The general U.S. policy toward arms sales in the Middle East is now undergoing intensive review, and State would not like to make a final decision on the tank sale until this has been considered by the President. (4) Messrs. McGeorge Bundy, Komer, and Harriman are of the opinion that any decision to sell tanks should not be conveyed to the Israelis at least until Prime Minister Eshkol’s visit here in June, which would meet the President’s point about optimum political timing. (5) There is also the necessity to recognize that Israeli intelligence within the U.S. is so good that they will probably learn of our decision almost as soon as it is made and we will have no bargaining position with them once a decision is reached. (6) Your proposed approved sale is for 300 tanks, while Israel requested 500; and some further discussion of the tank requirement at the military level is desirable as underpinning for our ultimate position. Alternative Approaches: Because of the above considerations, State and the White House staff have determined to delay decision on the tank sale for the present, and to acquire as much additional information as possible on Israeli missile and nuclear plans. The following alternative decisions appear to be the most likely: (1) The Israelis will abandon or delay indefinitely plans to acquire an SSM capability, in which case the tank sale would probably be approved by the two governments at the time of Eshkol’s visit. (2) The Israelis will not commit themselves to abandonment of their missile acquisition plans, but will agree to consult with us on such planning to such a degree as to make the tank sale desirable as a quid pro quo. Whether or not the sale would be made under these conditions would depend upon the degree of Israeli cooperation and the degree of predicted Arab reaction at the time of the announcement. (3) The Israelis will refuse to abandon or delay missile acquisition. In this case the sale of tanks will probably not be approved. (4) A preferable solution involved in all of the above (which the Israelis have informally proposed) is that the U.S. might avoid political implications of the sale by arranging, or assisting in the financing of a sale by or through the FRG or the UK. This possibility is now being explored in the U.S. Government, but no mention has been made at any level elsewhere. The Israelis have made some inquiries on their own in FRG and UK. State in particular strongly endorses this procedure. Proposed Interim Step: In connection with the problems of nuclear proliferation and the Middle East arms policy, the ISA Policy Planning Staff has been accumulating information and preparing studies for some time on the nuclear and missile capabilities of Israel and the Arab States. This information makes it plain that the Israelis have progressed well along in initial arrangements with the French on missile development and production; and that the Egyptian missile development has no such degree of reliability as would justify the sort of missile planning which the Israelis are pursuing. We are also extremely concerned about the Israeli capacity to produce a nuclear warhead which might be mated with the missile. We see Mr. Rowen’s trip as a means of carrying to the Israeli Government our contentions that there is little military threat from the UAR’s so-called missiles, certainly not enough to justify Israel’s wasting money on a counter-deterrent with all the risks involved. We have little confidence that the Israeli Embassy here has fully clued its home office on our objections to potential nuclear proliferation by Israel, or the way in which Israeli missile acquisition might trigger UAR preemption or, at the least, push the UAR (and other Arabs) closer to Moscow again. Second, we see a need to get a better fix on why Israel wants a nice round number like 500 tanks, so as to buttress our case for offering only 300. So, the next appropriate step would appear to be to send a small party of DOD personnel, who are knowledgeable in the tank and missile fields, to continue the dialogue without publicity in Tel Aviv. Because Henry Rowen will be in Rome for discussions on Monday and Tuesday, and because of his special work in the missile and nuclear programs in recent weeks, it was thought appropriate to have him continue to Tel Aviv on Thursday and Friday, accompanied by an Army General Officer with expertise in tanks and missilry, to continue dialogue, in hope of obtaining further information and indications from the Israelis on these subjects. The party specifically would not discuss details of the proposed tank sale or indicate that any U.S. decision has been made, but would only further discuss the tank requirement. Recommendation: It is recommended that you approve the visit to Tel Aviv by Mr. Rowen, and request the Department of the Army to provide a qualified General Officer to join him in Tel Aviv (Memorandum for your signature attached). 4 Concurrences: State—Mr. Talbot White House—Mr. Komer (attached is White House Staff Memo from the President) 5 Both offices have reviewed this memorandum. 6 Peter Solbert 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a February 17 memorandum from McNamara to the Secretary of the Army. 2 A letter of January 30 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Frank K. Sloan to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson stated that McNamara had approved the extension of credit for the sale of 200 M48A3 tanks over the next 1–2 years and 100 M60 tanks over the next 2–3 years. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR) McNamara recorded his approval on January 28 on a January 27 memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William P. Bundy to him. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470) 3 In remarks on February 6 in New York at the dinner of the Weizmann Institute of Science, President Johnson stated that the United States had begun discussions with Israeli representatives on cooperative research in using nuclear energy for desalinization. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 , Book I, pp. 270–272. Reports on reactions to the speech in the Near East and North Africa are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 US/JOHNSON and E 11–3 US. The text of a speech made on January 20 by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson before the Citizens Committee on American Policy in the Near East in Washington is printed in Department of State Bulletin , February 10, 1964, pp. 208–211. 4 McNamara signed the memorandum on February 17; see footnote 1 above. 5 The undated paper by Komer, entitled “The UAR/Israeli Missile Problem,” is attached but not printed. 6 A handwritten note by McNamara on a February 17 covering memorandum from William Bundy to McNamara reads as follows: “Bill, Harry is to: (1) Try to persuade the Israelis not to buy missiles. (2) Assume that if the Israelis buy any tank we want them to buy our tank, but we are not yet ready to announce approval of a tank sale. (3) Recognize I favor the sale of 500 of our most expensive tanks. RMcN.” 14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 20, 1964, 8:23 p.m. 734. Verbatim Text . Please deliver following letter from President to Prime Minister Eshkol: “Dear Mr. Prime Minister: “I am delighted that you and I will soon have an opportunity to discuss our mutual interests and problems. The dates of June 1 and 2 would suit me well. “I also want to thank you for the warm welcome given Sargent Shriver during his recent visit to Israel. He has told me in glowing terms of the hospitality he received. He was much impressed with the technical assistance work your people have undertaken, and he particularly enjoyed his meeting with you. “As you know, we have been giving careful thought to your expressed concerns about Israel’s security needs. In particular we can understand your worries over the growing imbalance between Israeli and Arab armor, and can see the justification for your feeling that you must take steps to modernize Israel’s tank forces and anti-tank defenses. We are fully prepared to discuss this problem further with you. “At the same time we are disturbed lest other steps which Israel may contemplate taking may unnecessarily contribute to a heightened arms race in the region without in fact contributing to your security. Among other things, we seem to have quite different estimates with respect to the likely UAR missile threat, and the potential costs and risks of various ways of meeting it. Because of our own link to Israel’s security, I feel that these matters too are of legitimate mutual concern and merit frank discussion. “As you and I are both so well aware, we face a number of issues this year that will demand a heavy investment of United States effort in support of Israel. Among them are the Jordan waters off-take, the activation of the Dimona reactor, and the related problems of Israel’s security and the Near East arms race. We must work together to minimize undesirable repercussions and devise steps to avoid unnecessary increases in Arab antagonism, with the consequent weakening of the forces of moderation. At stake is United States influence with the Arabs, which we see as an essential component of our ability to help bring about any improvement in the relations between Israel and its neighbors. “I am sure we will want to discuss all these matters when we meet. Pending our meeting, I hope that your people and mine can air them frankly and freely so as to narrow down any points of difference. In the meantime let me assure you again that your genuine security concerns remain very much in our minds, and we of course wish to keep in closest touch about any significant developments that might affect Israel’s situation. “Sincerely, “Lyndon B. Johnson” In connection foregoing you should stress to Prime Minister importance Rowen mission discussions of military problems flowing from November 12–13, 1963 talks. 2 Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot, Russell, and Komer; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. An attached February 20 note from Komer to S/S states that the letter was approved by the President. 2 Ambassador Barbour delivered the letter to Prime Minister Eshkol on February 21; see Document 17 . 15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, February 22, 1964, 2:28 p.m. 3879. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. During call UAR Minister Treasury Kaissouni February 20/ 2 the Secretary affirmed President Johnson’s intention continue established policies toward UAR. Commended moderation of Arab summit and UAR handling difficult situation. Emphasized our interest UAR improvement relations Saudi Arabia. Kaissouni reviewed US aid relationships and noted AID Administrator’s indication earlier in day of possibility going ahead with $20 million loan in response UAR earlier request for $30 million commodity program financing. Kaissouni expected obtain memorandum understanding to date with IMF re stabilization program leaving some points for further discussion and agreement in Cairo. Since agreement with IMF a condition for possible US loan he hoped progress to date would permit US move ahead. Secretary confirmed we had decided in principle go ahead with loan and would have to look at situation with Fund. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 9 UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Enoch S. Duncan and approved by Jernegan. 2 A memorandum of the portion of Secretary Rusk’s conversation with Kaissouni concerning the UAR request for a $30 million commodity loan is ibid. A memorandum of their discussion of general U.S.-UAR relations is ibid., POL UAR-US. 16. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 16. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, February 22, 1964, 8 p.m. 403. Deptel 346 2 and Embtel 390. 3 Jordan Waters. Saw King afternoon February 22 after his return from Aqaba. Drawing on Deptel 346 and thorough briefings by Criddle and Symmes I sought first to reassure him that primary purpose US proposals was to assist Jordan obtain its rightful share of waters in quickest and least costly manner. Pointed out that due geography of area Jordan, as downstream user, was vulnerable to any Israeli cut off of water which might occur in retaliation for Arab actions whether taken by Jordan or by others. (At this point, King nodded assent.) I went on to explain reasons why US believes it essential retain Unified Plan as background control until or unless replaced by other agreements and why we can consider financial help only for measures that do not contravene plan. At same time, made clear we understand that Jordanian, or Arab, actions must be portrayed by them as part of “Arab plan” and as measures to take what rightfully belongs to Arabs. I then briefly described once more our suggested power plant pool pump and connecting pipe to East Ghor Canal which I had outlined in some detail during previous talk (Embtel 390) and went over in more detail than previously other projects in which USG disposed to be helpful (paragraph 5 Deptel 346). Emphasized that although all are within Unified Plan they not being proposed as alternative to any “Arab plan” which might emerge but could well be parts of that plan. (Especially stressed this point because of indication that Jordanian technicians, thanks to Criddle’s persuasive powers, now taking favorable view of US suggestions but feared political authorities would reject them as being substitute we were trying to talk Arabs into adopting in place of “Arab plan.”) In speaking of Maqarin Dam I said any USG assistance would have to be clearly related to construction of 300 MCM storage but this did not mean we would oppose the eventual erection with non-USG funds of storage or power facilities in excess this capacity. Reverting again to risks for Jordan involved in contravening terms of Unified Plan and consequent loss our leverage on Israelis to require them to continue to conform, I said US had succeeded in getting their firm agreement to a technical formula re use of Tiberias and Yarmouk waters provided we could assure them Arabs would tacitly abide by it. I then handed him copy of formula, pointing out that adherence to it would ensure sweet water enough to fulfill needs Jordanian farmers on lower Jordan via power plant pool and East Ghor Canal. Concluded by expressing hope we could continue to keep in close and frank consultation. King read formula carefully but made no comment other than that he would study it. Continued he thought we knew his general views which he had expressed in previous conversation and would not now repeat. Would have to press ahead with “Arab plan” but thought that its final provisions might not be very different from those of Unified Plan. Then asked if we had discussed our proposals with others. I said Criddle had fully explained them to Salim 4 but had not presented the technical formula as explicitly as I had just done. As we were walking to the door, King remarked he was worried by report Hafiz had stated yesterday that Syria would feel obliged to shell Israeli military installations when pumping from Tiberias commenced. I said this worried me also. Since Arabs making great point of being completely united on measures to combat Israeli pumping plans, Israelis might feel the more justified in retaliations against any Arab state—e.g. Jordan. Comment : King again calm and friendly. Difficult to predict how much he impressed by US proposals or how he will react to technical formula. 5 Will follow up by discussing proposals with Court Minister Hazem Nuseibeh and hopefully combined effects this plus direct presentation to King plus apparent favorable attitude of Salim and Jordanian technicians will serve persuade Arabs to back power plant pool and pipeline project and tacitly to abide by formula, at least for next year or two. As one other measure which would appeal to King and would give him opportunity to appear to be taking firm measures versus Israeli recommend I be authorized explicitly to suggest construction low diversion dam below entrance to Adasiya Tunnel, provided it so constructed as to allow flow contemplated in formula for Adasiya Triangle. Understand such dam necessary anyway for efficient regulation flow. Lewis 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 2 Telegram 346 to Amman, February 12, instructed Charge Geoffrey W. Lewis to arrange a meeting with King Hussein to present U.S. proposals concerning Jordan waters and laid out U.S. views on the subject. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 390 from Amman, February 14, reported that Lewis had met with the King but that his presentation was incomplete because part of telegram 346 had been delayed in transmission. (Ibid.) 4 UAR chief water expert Dr. Mohammad Salim. 5 Lewis reported in telegram 417 from Amman, March 5, that Hussein told him on March 3 that he could not accept the technical formula. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER) 17. Telegram From the Air Attache at the Embassy in Israel to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 17. Telegram From the Air Attache at the Embassy in Israel to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 1 Tel Aviv, February 24, 1964, 1450Z. C–40. Joint State-Defense message. Reference my C–36, C–38 and C–39. 2 This message in 5 parts. Part I. This is fifth in series. The US delegations followed consultations with GOI delegation at G.H.Q. with audience Prime Minister/Defense Minister Eshkol in one-hour plus talks on Friday 21 Feb 64, approx 1245–1400. Eshkol very impressive in this session which almost a monologue, but courteous, sincere and showing firm belief in this convictions/statements. Part II. Ambassador gave Prime Minister President Johnson’s letter which arrived that morning. Rowen made appropriate comments including: US viewing Israel’s need for armor favorably, but not yet decided. On missiles, US finding difficulty accepting Israeli need, views subject as dangerous and considers acquisition sophisticated missiles by Israelis would initiate missile race in ME. Questioned Peres when final decision to be made with answer of “one year possibly later.” Rowen continued that Israeli acquisition would cause escalation. Problem: adequate range missiles, effective only with nuclear warheads thus US interested in Israeli nuclear plans/intentions. Egyptian threat exaggerated and with improved armor IDF does not need missiles. Peres viewed Egyptian missiles could be effective, would cause panic and Israelis required retaliatory missiles. Rowen showed concern that US assistance re tanks would see Israeli use of tank money saved to purchase missiles. Rowen added towards end of audience that when decision on missiles is made, the US would like to be informed Israeli intentions in this field. Part III. Prime Minister’s comments: Missiles are dangerous, expensive and not sure decision possible in one year; probably 2 years more accurate. On security basis, price is no object. Israel is home of Jewish nation, last and only foothold requiring last-ditch stand even if must lower standard of living to lowest African level. Israel has tried talking peace with Nasser, but even in last two weeks Nasser has stated no alternative but crush Israel. Nasser/Arabs continually vocally insistent on destruction of Israel. US helps Egypt with far bigger sums which helps Nasser in arms build-up. What does UAR spending such large sums on missiles mean? Israel’s population—which from 60–70 nations, are here only 10–15 years—are afraid of even bad missiles. And Nasser’s missiles may become good missiles. Also may get further missile help from Russia which makes concern even heavier. There is no solution to concern over Nasser. On giving up missiles, if US provides tanks, Israel not prepared to give up missiles. On controlling arms race in ME, would welcome such possibility, but appears impossible. On Rowen’s question whether IDF can live without missiles if UAR doesn’t go ahead with missiles, Eshkol said Israelis would be happier and stop thinking about missiles. Part IV. Parts I and II above based on Strickland notes confirmed by Ambassador’s recall. Part V. Ambassador’s recall/comments, follow: Peres indicated Israelis did not have missile program currently and that decision to develop on own or procure is one-year off or more. Eshkol confirmed and believed two years probably more accurate. Eshkol suggested US instead of approaching Israelis go to Nasser with arguments to stop production missiles or Israelis would get good missiles from US; this would immediately stop race. To Rowen’s insistence that type of missile Israelis investigating only useful with nuclear warheads, Eshkol looked aghast, appeared to be new thought to him, and finally stated, “Don’t try to persuade us to put nuclear warheads on them.” To Rowen’s question on Israeli thinking re reactions to Arab threat, Eshkol pointed out formulae developed over years which showed Israelis prepared to accept a time-delay in reacting, prepared to be a little behind new Arab military developments. Eshkol sounds sincere, firm in convictions about political origins of state and status of Israel, last-ditch stand for Jewish nation, Jews all over world but only one Jewish nation, terrible expense for defense justified, and expects to give President Johnson this but in more detail. Major point: When Rowen attempting tie-in acquisition armor to missile problem, Eshkol strongly urged against US consideration of two problems simultaneously and asked urgent closure of gap through fulfillment Israeli armor requirements. Major premise: Israel not interested in taking over 30 million Arabs and Nasser not in right mind if he believed such was Israeli objective. Israel would cut own throat by conquering Egypt. (This is good argument for US approaches to Nasser to cease on missile developments.) Additional Eshkol comments: In view of absolute priority Israel security, even considering US assistance, primary responsibility of Prime Minister is to tell and show his people Israel doing all possible on independent basis to protect their existence. Now understands US looking favorably on armor and that President Johnson plans to discuss this, but Eshkol wonders when discussion will stop and decision materialize. Ambassador’s clarification of arms-control possibilities made point that Israel should clearly understand that US not interested in weakening Israeli security posture, and that Israel should put more stock in US commitments. Suggested that security could thus be assured equally adequately and not likely to cause repercussions. Eshkol mentioned Komars to Ambassador, but did not make pitch that they more effective than Egyptian missiles; merely added them to Egyptian missile capabilities. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Priority; Noforn; Limdis. Repeated to the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Air Force Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and 1127 USAF Field Arty Group at Fort Belvoir, VA. The Department of State copy is the source text. 2 Telegrams C–36 through C–39 reported talks held February 19–23 between Israeli officials and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Planning Henry Rowen and other Department of Defense representatives. Copies are filed, along with comments by Rowen and Brigadier General Eugene L. Strickland, USAF, Director for the Near East, South Asia and Africa Region in DOD/ISA, in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security, December 63–March 66. Other records of the talks are filed with a March 26 letter from Ambassador Barbour to Talbot in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–ISR. 18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 25, 1964. SUBJECT Resumption of Near East Arms Limitation Probe Discussion: The potential for missile and nuclear weapons development in the Near East led us last year to explore the possibilities for an unobtrusive arms limitation agreement between Israel and the UAR. A special Presidential emissary, Mr. John J. McCloy, met with President Nasser for this purpose in June 1963. 2 Nasser’s response was not entirely negative but it did not give us a peg for an approach to the Israelis. He indicated he might associate himself with some form of “collective” renunciation of nuclear weapons and might give us written public assurance not to acquire nuclear weapons or attack Israel. Ambassador Badeau in September left with President Nasser a draft letter from President Kennedy inviting written confirmation of assurances he had earlier given Mr. McCloy. President Kennedy’s death created a hiatus in this dialogue. Israel’s request for 500 new and advanced U.S. tanks and other offensive weapons again raises the question of arms limitation in the area and our ability to play a role. Before taking a decision on Israel’s request, there should be a further probe of Nasser’s willingness to consider general arms limitation. If some progress were made, it would have a bearing on the decision and give us a basis for an approach to Israel. If not, we would be in better position to justify to Nasser Israel’s obtaining new tanks while still leaving the door open for further efforts. Rather than appoint a special emissary, I propose that Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, carry out the probe during his forthcoming visit to the area. He is familiar with the McCloy visit and all aspects of the problem. His designation would give us good cover and serve to avoid drawing undue attention to this sensitive matter. Recommendations: 1) That you authorize me to ask Mr. Talbot to undertake this task. 2) That, subject to your approval and to prior Israeli concurrence, Mr. Talbot also impart assurances based on the latest inspection of the Dimona reactor. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Top Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Francois M. Dickman and Davies. The copy is filed with a memorandum of February 27 from Bundy to Rusk conveying the President’s approval. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 NEAR E) 2 Reports of McCloy’s meetings with Nasser on June 27 and 29 are printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Documents 283 - 285 . 19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 26, 1964. The good relations we’ve built up with the Arabs are in increasing jeopardy, primarily because in their frustration over their inability to stop Israel’s water diversion, they’re lashing out at all Israel’s friends. This is why they reacted adversely to your Weizmann speech; it will color their reaction to anything we say or do this year. 1. So Rusk proposes several friendly moves (Tab A), 2 designed to compensate for the pro-Israeli stand we’ll have to take this year. None should trigger much Zionist reaction except maybe the loan to the UAR, though this is covered by the fact we’re also giving Israel a loan. Rusk and Bell just told the UAR we re-approve this loan on certain conditions (but these offer enough loopholes for us to renege if the going gets too rough). 2. We also propose you pick up the Kennedy-Nasser correspondence, which the Egyptians themselves say Nasser set great store by. It’s been kept wholly private, which shows they want to continue it. A careful but friendly draft is at Tab B. 3. We want to ask Eshkol in your name to permit us to reassure Nasser that our recent inspection of Israel’s Dimona reactor shows Israel isn’t going nuclear. 3 This has been of real value in keeping Arabs from going off half-cocked, and especially important now when Arabs are already violent about Jordan Waters. 4. We want Phil Talbot to try out once more last year’s quiet effort to interest Nasser in tacit arms control (i.e. if Nasser will agree to stay out of nuclear and missile business we’ll ask Israelis to do the same). This won’t take, but is highly useful nonetheless in (1) both reassuring and warning Nasser; (2) putting him gently on notice that if he keeps getting arms from Moscow we may have to do the same for Israel. To show that the probe has the same high auspices as before, Talbot should have your blessing (Tab D). 4 All these moves were worked out with Bundy and myself; they entail minimum risk of adverse repercussions. We recommend you approve. 5 R. W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Top Secret. 2 The tabs are not attached but are listed on a copy of the memorandum in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Tab A was a memorandum of February 19 from Rusk to the President on the subject “Maintaining the Near East Balance—1964.” 3 Tab C was the draft telegram to Tel Aviv referred to in footnote 4, Document 12 . Telegram 747 to Tel Aviv, February 27, instructed the Embassy to seek Eshkol’s agreement to passing reassurance from the Dimona inspection to Nasser. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR) 4 Tab D was Rusk’s February 25 memorandum to the President, Document 18 . 5 A note in Komer’s handwriting states that the President approved all actions cited on February 26, according to Johnson’s Special Assistant Jack Valenti and a subsequent Johnson-Bundy telephone call. 20. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser 20. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser 1 Washington, February 27, 1964. Dear Mr. President: I have carefully read your extensive correspondence with President Kennedy and am struck by the degree of mutual respect and understanding it revealed. I sensed also a genuine will to move forward in areas where we could, while setting aside and working to limit the impact of those issues where we necessarily disagreed. For my part I would like this sense of growing confidence on both sides to continue, and to forestall the misconstruing of each other’s policies which has marred our relations in the past. In this vein I want to assure you personally that we are as determined as ever to carry forward policies of constructive cooperation, in the United Nations and out, with other governments of like intent. Thus I look forward to continued fruitful cooperation with your government and with the others of the Middle East and to exchanging views with you on our mutual interests. I believe the main concern of leaders in all nations today must be to keep the clouds of war from forming. The nuclear scientist has added new and terrible dimensions to war, and only deep and abiding international cooperation and understanding can make nuclear science a peaceful instead of a military pursuit. You may rest assured that we remain opposed to nuclear proliferation in any area of the world. Since it is inevitable that nations will disagree, we believe we must try diligently to make whatever progress is possible to settle issues in dispute. Meanwhile we must concentrate on expanding areas of agreement. I was heartened by the recent affirmation by Arab leaders meeting in Cairo of the doctrine that nations should compose their differences by peaceful means. We recognize the statesmanship that subordinated narrower grievances to the common good and engendered a climate of cooperation among the various Arab governments. We welcome the prospect of normalization in Yemen, of temperance in the Arab-Israel problem, and of increasing the Arab League’s potential for constructive cooperation. So I hope that in the coming months we can work together to enlarge the areas of mutual interest and narrow those where we may disagree. In fact, I look forward to the day when we can meet in person. Meanwhile I would like to continue the frank and friendly dialogue that has already contributed to understanding between our governments. The next few years will be a strain on both of us, but the US and the UAR have so much to gain through good relations that we must both strive to maintain and expand them rather than letting our two nations drift apart. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Presidential Correspondence. Secret. The letter bears no indication of the drafter. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 3968 to Cairo, February 27, which indicates that the text was received from the White House. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US) A February 26 memorandum from Komer to Bundy notes that he had rewritten a draft sent with Rusk’s February 19 memorandum to Johnson (see footnote 2, Document 19 ). 21. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 21. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, February 28, 1964. SUBJECT Tanks for Israel Discussion: Attached is a self-explanatory letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance indicating that the Department of State is not willing, at this time, to approve the sale of tanks to Israel. 2 Cairo Telegram 1896 (Tab D) 3 well summarizes the political imperatives for searching for more feasible alternatives to that earlier decision. Since the analysis in that telegram was prepared, Nasser has signalled in his speech of February 22 that the Arabs will react violently to any U.S. actions in 1964 that threaten their security interest. The Libyan Prime Minister has informed Ambassador Lightner of the badly deteriorating situation regarding the Libyan attitude toward Wheelus (Tripoli’s 331, Tab C). 4 In addition, the results of the Rowen mission show there are no grounds for thinking our supplying tanks could be used as a counter in dissuading Israel from proceeding in its missile program. The proposed letter also calls Mr. Vance’s attention to the fact that, judging from the reports we have seen, members of the mission appear to have indicated to Israel officials that the U.S. was giving favorable consideration to the tank request. This was directly contrary to the limitations in the terms of reference, paragraph 3, b. (Terms of reference attached at Tab B.) 5 Recommendation: That you sign the attached letter at Tab A. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–ISR. Secret. Drafted by Russell and cleared by Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Kenneth L. Brown of INR, Davies, Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Counselor and Vice Chairman of Policy Planning Henry D. Owen, and Edward A. Padelford, Jr., of NR. The memorandum was received in Johnson’s office on March 2. 2 The tabs are not attached; the letter has not been found. 3 Telegram 1896 from Cairo, February 21, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. 4 Telegram 331 from Tripoli, February 27, is ibid., DEF 15 LIBYA–US. 5 The political terms of reference were set forth in telegram 716 to Tel Aviv, February 13. (Ibid., ORG 7 OSD) 22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, February 29, 1964, 5:32 p.m. 4011. Cane for Talbot. 2 You authorized by President renew dialogue with Nasser on NE arms. Objectives are (1) demonstrate President shares predecessor’s concern spiraling arms race particularly field missiles and nuclears; (2) impart assurances re our understanding Israel’s current nuclear program; (3) impress Nasser with self-defeating character his missile program; (4) emphasize importance we place on mutual restraint in field sophisticated weapons and in gaining support for IAEA safeguards; and (5) obtain further insight Nasser views and suggestions on problem. Except for specific assurance re our examination Dimona reactor (see Deptel 748 to Tel Aviv) 3 and raising NFZ to which Defense interposed objections, you should follow Talking Points paper which pouched Feb 25 4 and summarized below: (1) Basic theme should be that accelerated NE arms race not in basic interest UAR or Israel. Whatever ultimate purpose UAR surface to surface missile program may be, has had unsettling effect and viewed as new stage in NE arms race. (2) For example, we and others continue be under constant Israeli pressure provide all sorts weapons correct imbalances resulting from continued acquisition Soviet arms by Arab countries and UAR weapons development. Our ability curb various Israeli initiatives made more difficult particularly where obvious imbalances occur. (3) We following very closely Israel’s progress in nuclear field. At this time, no evidence Israel engaged in production nuclear weapon. However, Israel may acquire capability make nuclear weapon at some future time. (4) Missile race picking up steam. We have not viewed UAR’s SSM effort as presenting great threat as long as levels low. However, Israelis fearful Nasser’s missile goals, and intelligence indicates they intend taking steps redress situation. If UAR develops large missile force and Israel follows suit, this would be self-defeating exercise for both countries. (5) USG has been through similar experience with Soviets. Though no major arms control agreements reached, Nasser must have noticed both Soviets and ourselves have sought limit further increases our military budgets. Similarly, have both supported UN resolution last November concerning nuclear weapons in orbit. This was direction which arms race could have been extended but neither side stood to gain. Control by “mutual example” can serve interests of both US and Soviets during period when formal agreements difficult to reach. We believe there is parallel for UAR and Israel. (6) What we seeking is means reduce possibility of chain reaction which would ultimately require outside involvement in struggle which either Arabs or Israelis might start but which neither could end. Must look other alternatives: (a) Tacit understanding on missiles: While believe some unobtrusive arrangement involving third party verification most desirable way, if this not possible, would like explore possibility mutual restraint in avoiding SSM forces and other sophisticated weapons. We find strong economic as well as other reasons for both UAR and Israel stop pursuing present course in developing highly expensive weaponry. FYI. Urge you try pin Nasser down more specifically re his vague comment to McCloy that UAR did not plan extensive missile force. End FYI. (b) Support IAEA safeguards: We heartened by UAR endorsement partial test ban. Practical additional step now would be for countries support IAEA safeguards. We look to India’s acceptance safeguards for Tarapur reactor as hopeful precedent.UAR support in principle for future yet unbuilt reactors would have profound effect and serve as lever move Israel accede similar safeguards for Dimona reactor. If UAR accepted principle and Israel refused, would have basis for questioning Israel’s nuclear policy. (c) Exchange of letters: Another possibility would be exchange of letters with President Johnson along lines suggested Deptel 1035. 5 (d) Collective Agreements: We continuing work on arms control on broader basis. Currently at Geneva, we discussing problem nonproliferation nuclear weapons. This discussion might provide Nasser with opportunity make position on UAR nonacquisition clear. If Nasser raises Nuclear Free Zone, you should indicate interest in UAR ideas and inquire how he thinks concept might apply in Arab-Israel context. (7) We do not believe end results present arms race can contribute Nasser objective strengthening independent role UAR in area. Rather, role can better be fulfilled through exercise restraint in ways suggested above. Would of course welcome any further thoughts Nasser might have. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dickman on February 28; cleared by Walt Rostow, Komer, U. Alexis Johnson, Adrian Fisher, and Sloan; and approved by Jernegan and Rusk. 2 Cane was the distribution indicator used for telegrams pertaining to the arms limitation probe described in Document 18 . Talbot visited Cairo in the course of a trip to several capitals in the Near East and South Asia during March. 3 Telegram 748 to Tel Aviv, February 27, instructed the Embassy to seek Eshkol’s agreement on passing reassurance from the Dimona inspection to Nasser, as requested in telegram 747 (see footnote 3, Document 19 ) as soon as possible. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR) 4 Not found. 5 Telegram 1035 to Cairo, September 12, 1963, is printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 324 . 23. Memorandum of Conversation 23. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 4, 1964, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Israel and the Near East PARTICIPANTS His Excellency, Abba Eban, Deputy Prime Minister of Israel His Excellency, Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Minister, Embassy of Israel The Secretary NEA—John D. Jernegan, Acting Assistant Secretary NE—H. Earle Russell, Jr. Mr. Eban said Israel now appeared to be low on the list of urgent world problems. An early conflict in the Near East seemed unlikely. The recent Cairo Summit Conference had opted for a course of caution. Tense tranquility characterized the climate of the Near East. The crisis remained since Nasser was giving increased public emphasis to the inevitability of an Arab-Israel war. The upward spiral of the Near East arms race seemed impossible to stop. Mr. Eban believed Israel had convinced the U.S. that it had fallen behind in the Arab-Israel military balance. Specifically, it was weak in armor. No agreement had been reached as yet on the importance of the U.A.R. missile threat but it was safer to overestimate than to underestimate. A general spirit of Nasserist adventurism pervaded the area. U.A.R. forces in Yemen had increased and Nasser had questioned the position of the West in Libya. Nevertheless, Israel should welcome the present comparative serenity in the Near East. Nothing was inevitable, even Nasser’s predictions of inevitable war. It was important, however, to preserve the arms balance. Prime Minister Eshkol urged prompt action on the Israeli request for tanks. He felt strongly that this issue should not be linked to other aspects of Israel’s military defense. The provision of tanks was important both substantively and psychologically. Israeli military officers believed the U.S. was sincere in its assurances to protect Israel against aggression but doubted that the U.S. would take prompt action in time of need. Response to Israel’s request for tanks had become a symbol of U.S. willingness to give concrete support to Israel against aggression. Israel’s view of the dangers of the U.A.R. military build up was such that even if it were possible to prove that a given number of missiles did not constitute a significant military threat, it would be impossible to convince the Israeli people. The problem was largely psychological and required more discussion. Israel was prepared to pursue the matter further but meanwhile hoped for prompt action on the matter of tanks. The Secretary inquired whether Israel desired to purchase the tanks or hoped for grant military assistance. Mr. Eban replied that outright purchase would impose an intolerable burden on Israel. The Israeli economy was intricate and its seeming strength belied the strain that such a financial burden would create. The Secretary stressed the relevancy of the use of available Israeli resources for acquisition of tanks. Grant assistance for tanks might conceivably permit diversion of sufficient resources for Israel to acquire missiles. Regarding the results of the Arab Summit Conference, Mr. Eban said Israel had noted a surprising consolidation of Hussein’s position. Jordan’s resumption of diplomatic relations with the U.A.R. had made Hussein a respectable Arab nationalist leader. Nasser had reached a less ambitious concept of what he could do in the Arab world. He was more prepared to live and let live. In Yemen, however, he was engaged more deeply than ever. There were no indications that Syria could be worked into a union with the U.A.R. Continuing instability there seemed likely. With respect to the proposed Arab diversion of Jordan headwaters, the major danger was from Syria. The positions of Jordan and Lebanon were ambivalent, and the U.A.R. was not immediately concerned. Israel wished to play down the Jordan waters off-take. Regarding the salinity problem, Mr. Eban noted that off-take above Lake Tiberias would have assured sweeter water. Israel, however, was accepting the criteria of the Unified Plan and water usage as provided thereunder. Israel greatly valued the U.S. support and agreed to the desirability of no publicity. In recent talks with the United Nations Secretary General, the latter had agreed that it would be undesirable to raise the Jordan waters issue in the UN. The Secretary expressed concern about the arms race in the Near East and the backbreaking financial burden it created. He noted a tendency on the part of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. voluntarily to cut nuclear and other arms production and wondered about a parallel desire on the part of the U.A.R. and Israel. Mr. Eban said disarmament interested Prime Minister Eshkol greatly. The U.A.R., however, had been the first on each occasion to introduce a new level of weaponry into the Near East arms race. Mr. Eban said the diffusion of power in the world in recent years had resulted in increased possibilities for small power conflicts. Large powers might wish to intervene but often felt unable to do so for fear of far-reaching consequences. These circumstances led Israeli military men to wonder about the ability of the U.S. to act promptly in support of Israel. They hoped for more clear-cut indications of U.S. intentions. The Secretary interjected that there was no automaticity in any of our agreements to support our allies. Mr. Eban said it was important, under the circumstances, to build up indigenous forces and not to depend upon big power intervention. This underlined the need for Israel’s tanks. The Secretary said that since the return of the Rowen mission from Israel he had had no opportunity to discuss the matter with the President. He would do so shortly and be in touch with the Israel Ambassador. We recognized Israel’s needs but had problems of our own to consider. On the position of the U.S. in the Arab world, Mr. Eban said it was safer for all concerned if U.S. influence in the area remained strong. The recent speeches of President Johnson and U. Alexis Johnson had created considerable uproar but the Arab states could not afford to ignore the strength of the U.S. It was salutary occasionally to stress the idea of U.S. opposition to aggression. The Secretary commented that the Arabs did not share Israel’s doubts as to our position on this score. The reaction to the speeches showed that they were convinced of U.S. intent to oppose aggression. Mr. Eban agreed that the military were never satisfied but said that Mr. Eshkol saw the matter in terms of survival of the Jewish people. It was not possible, therefore, to depend upon U.S. assurances without tangible evidence to back them up. The Secretary said President Johnson looked forward to the coming visit of Mr. Eshkol and to the opportunity to exchange views with him. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Russell on March 10 and approved in S on March 16. The memorandum text is marked Part I of IV. 24. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 24. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, March 4, 1964, 8 p.m. 1994. Cane from Talbot. Nearly half my two hour conversation with Nasser Tuesday evening 2 was devoted to arms questions. I told him President Johnson had carefully reviewed earlier communications between him and President Kennedy, along with reports of McCloy’s talks with him. McCloy had emphasized US concerned with area stability and diversion of resources into arms race. President Johnson was equally anxious that in any way possible US shall help nations in this area to curb arms race of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. McCloy and he had had candid talk on missiles and nuclear proliferation, and, expressing President Johnson’s deep concern, I hoped we could discuss in all seriousness problem as it now appeared. Nasser agreed and asked me to proceed. I said it seemed to us that accelerated Near East arms race was not in interests of either UAR or Israel. In particular, UAR development of surface-to-surface missiles was having clearly unsettling effect. It was seen by Israel and by other nations including US as new step in arms race. We assumed that in view their mutual distrust, UAR and Israel could not realistically agree now to reduce existing conventional arms. However, decisions made now about this new stage could influence course of arms race for years to come. We hoped he could consider this matter very seriously. I continued that we and other nations have been, and are, under constant Israeli pressure to obtain weapons which in Israel’s view needed to correct imbalances deriving from UAR acquisition of Soviet arms or development of its own weapons. Our ability to curb Israeli appetites particularly difficult where obvious imbalances occur. Any dangerous imbalance between two countries merely heightens the temptation for pre-emptive attacks. We have followed very closely, I said, Israel’s progress in nuclear field. I could say with full authority that at this time we have no evidence of Israeli production of nuclear weapons. However, it would be possible for Israel to acquire such capability in future. Nasser would recall how strongly President Kennedy had stood against nuclear proliferation and he could be certain that President Johnson just as firmly opposed to that dangerous course. Meanwhile, it apparent that missile race picking up steam. In our people’s judgment, UAR surface-to-surface missiles—of type described by Nasser to McCloy as improved V2’s—might be considerable psychological threat but would not have great military importance so long as numbers were kept low. This was London’s experience under V2 attack in World War II. However, Israel is uncertain and fearful of UAR missile plans and our intelligence indicates Israelis taking steps to redress situation. If numbers of missiles kept low on both sides, problem might be largely psychological. However, should UAR develop large missile force and Israel follow suit two forces would obviously be selfdefeating, as we assume Nasser would recognize. Problem particularly acute because missilery, as we have reason to know, excessively costly and yet we suppose that if competition really got going at this level both UAR and Israel would find means to build up missile force. I noted recent USG experiences with USSR. Although no major arms control agreements have been reached, US and USSR have quietly sought to limit further increases in military budget. In future they might find ways even to reduce military budgets. Obviously no formal agreement involved here, but mutual restraint brought this result. Also, Nasser would recall that US and USSR had concurred in prohibition of nuclear weapons in Outer Space. Both countries could have orbited these weapons but neither stood to gain by such action. These restraints by “mutual example” might, we felt, be useful guides for UAR and Israel. What we were seeking, I said, are ways of reducing chances of chain reaction which might be started by either Israel or UAR but could not be stopped by them and would be likely to draw in other countries including major powers, with consequences Nasser could readily perceive. Being much concerned at such possibilities, we would like to suggest to him, for his consideration and any response he might wish to make, several alternatives. One possibility would be a tacit understanding on limitation of missiles. Some unobtrusive understanding on verification would of course be better way to deal with possible development of surface-to-surface missiles and other sophisticated weapons. However, recalling what Nasser had said to McCloy on this subject, we hope he would at least be willing to explore possible mutual restraint. We see not only compelling military reasons but very strong economic reasons for this course in both countries. We would welcome an indication by Nasser of willingness to limit numbers of UAR missiles. Secondly, we hope Nasser has had opportunity to consider advantages to UAR of accepting IAEA safeguards for future reactors. We are not asking Nasser to change current UAR practice. Safeguards would apply only to any larger reactor it might build in future. Nasser knew that India has agreed to principle of IAEA inspection of Tarapur. It seems to us that for Nasser to take similar step would be no derogation of sovereignty, as he had suggested to McCloy, but rather a highly responsible use of sovereignty to reinforce system of safeguards which if generally adopted could benefit whole of mankind. Nasser’s agreement in principle would not only be powerful action in support of IAEA principles, but it would also give other nations, including U.S., sturdy leverage to apply to current Israeli reluctance to place its Dimona reactor under IAEA. Should Israel resist these safeguards after their acceptance by Nasser, U.S. would have basis for questioning Israeli nuclear policy. As another suggestion I recalled the draft letter that President Kennedy had promised [proposed] last October 3 and said President Johnson would welcome a letter from President Nasser stating UAR has no intention of developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. In our opinion public exchange of this sort would be statesmanlike advance. Finally, President Nasser had mentioned to McCloy possibility of collective agreements. We do not know exactly what he had in mind, but we have continued working at nuclear weapons problem on broader basis in Geneva. It has occurred to us that UAR might helpfully state its own position in that forum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If Nasser had any other ideas about how to proceed, I said we would be very glad to hear of them as well. In conclusion, I expressed hope I had successfully conveyed President Johnson’s deep concern over problems of missile escalation of possible nuclear weapons development. We found it difficult to see how entry into new and costly phases of arms race could serve UAR’s desire to strengthen its own independent role in world, for dangers of sophisticated weaponry so great that any hostilities involving them could very well draw in large powers seeking restrict any aggression. As one who understands these problems well, Nasser, we hope, can see how much better it would be if ways could be found to exercise positive restraints in field of missiles and other sophisticated weaponry. With apologies for length of my presentation, I invited Nasser comment as he might desire. He started by observing that once again heart of problem between US and UAR was Israel. It seemed always this way, he said. He thought his position had been made clear in his talks with McCloy and Ambassador Badeau. The UAR had to maintain its defenses. It did not trust Israel. It had been told before that Israel might agree to certain actions, but had been fooled. In 1955 the US had talked about getting some balance between Israel’s forces and all Arab forces, but Israel had moved into Sinai and suddenly fallen upon UAR units there. The first news he and his officers had heard of this was conveyed by an Israeli broadcast. None of them could forget those days of 1956. There was no point, therefore, in discussing limitation of arms, because UAR and all Arabs just cannot trust Israel. I pointed out we not talking about cutting back existing weapons. We understand lack of trust which prevents effective discussions directed toward limiting existing arms. Our central concern is for limitation of missiles and other sophisticated weapons yet to become operational. Nasser said UAR had gone into missile program in 1960 to develop deterrent against growing Israeli strength. He had also started building aircraft then. He felt UAR must develop its own aircraft and missiles because at that time Soviets, with whom UAR had some disputes, was refusing provide spare parts and otherwise making clear they not completely trustworthy source of arms. UAR had sought arms elsewhere, including US, without success; therefore he felt UAR had no choice but to develop its own planes and missiles. He could not tell me about numbers of missiles, Nasser said, because UAR has no plan yet. He is not thinking now in terms of numbers. His first job is to increase quality of their performance. So far they have not been very accurate, and inaccurate missiles aimed at Israel might hit Jerusalem or Amman. I observed that Israelis are disturbed because they seem to think UAR preparing to produce missiles in the hundreds. I said if it were matter of only small number, just possible Israelis also might limit themselves to small number. Could Nasser give me idea of range of UAR planning? He regretted that he could not, for reason just stated. He observed I had said missiles might have psychological impact but not much military effect in small numbers. As military man he agreed with this. With conventional warheads missiles could deliver only a ton or so of explosives. Aircraft might be more effective. But now of course Israel getting Hawks from US, so aircraft alone no longer much deterrent. I pointed out Hawk purely defensive and would not protect Israeli forces should they attack outside Israeli borders. He turned that aside by commenting that UAR has not also obtained SAM’s, from Soviets. These are extremely expensive, and UAR could not hope to cover whole country or even all important spots, as could Israel with US-purchased SAM’s. Indeed, UAR vulnerable because unlike US it does not have full radar coverage of frontiers. These deficiencies increase UAR need for deterrent. I argued SSM’s of type he described not really deterrent especially as their development would almost certainly cause Israelis to develop or acquire their own SSM’s, which could be quite sophisticated. Returning to question of numbers of SSM’s contemplated by UAR, I again got no answer. Nuclear weapons are another matter, Nasser said, as he had told McCloy and Ambassador Badeau. UAR has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. In any case UAR lacks necessary resources; for example, it has no source of plutonium, as does Israel. Nasser also observed that strategic nuclear weapons—“I know only of them, I don’t know about tactical nuclear weapons”—could probably not be used against Israel anyway because it is such small country. As it only 1520 kilometers wide at some points, strategic nuclear bomb might easily spread destruction partly in Arab lands outside Israel. He would consider what to say about not intending to develop or secure nuclear weapons. Perhaps he could state this in a letter to President Johnson, as we had suggested. They had looked at Kennedy draft letter and had found some difficulties in it, but they could consider matter again and see if such a letter could be sent. As to IAEA safeguards, he thought it might be possible for UAR to accept these at appropriate time. UAR is now seeking to construct large nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes. Ambassador Badeau asked whether arrangements for electrical power from Aswan Dam would not be adequate for some time to come. Nasser said point is UAR feels must get into nuclear age in good time. It was late getting into industrial revolution and into electrical age. It does not want to be late again even though nuclear power may cost more than other forms. Perhaps at time of arranging for new reactor UAR could announce its acceptance of IAEA safeguards. He thought this might be possible. I asked him about timing, explaining this was of interest since question of Israeli action on IAEA safeguards for its larger reactor was already at hand. He said he did not know when UAR would reach this stage. He left me with impression, however, that he got the point. I went after him again on numbers of missiles as a basis for some tacit understanding on limitation of numbers, with the same negative results as before. As conversation was beginning to get repetitive, I dropped it at that point. Comment: Ambassador and I believe there may be some significance in Nasser’s indication he may be prepared write letter to President stating UAR intention not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. This was clearest indication we got that he did not consider Cane exercise necessarily closed with President Kennedy’s death. We also feel his willingness talk about IAEA safeguards for future reactors may reflect recognition that Tarapur pattern may now be adopted by nations giving assistance for building reactors in developing countries. My failure to budge him on missiles does not necessarily signify UAR yet committed to produce large numbers, Ambassador and I feel. Assuming UAR is in fact still facing serious technical problems in missile development, Nasser may not wish expose his hand until situation clear. Alternatively, he may not wish to give up this bargaining counter at this stage in exercises. I would like to feel that net result is some give on IAEA safeguards and possible acceptance of idea of committing himself in letter to President on non-proliferation. However, his repeated references to Israel arms suggests his willingness proceed along these lines could be withheld if he comes to believe US changing its restraint on arms provided Israel. Badeau 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret; Exdis. Received at 5:04 p.m. 2 See Document 25 . 3 For text of Kennedy’s proposed draft letter, transmitted to Cairo on September 12, 1963, and given to Nasser by Badeau on October 5, and Nasser’s reaction, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Documents 324 and 325 . 25. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 25. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, March 4, 1964, 10 p.m. 1995. From Talbot. Accompanied by Ambassador Badeau I had two hour discussion with Nasser on Tuesday 2 evening. Throughout conversation he was cordial, quiet-voiced, and apparently relaxed. He repeatedly referred to Israel as the main irritant in U.S.-UAR relations, suggesting that U.S. policies in election year much on his mind. He clearly appreciated hearing directly from President. I opened by presenting letters from Mrs. Kennedy and from the President. 3 Nasser laid aside Mrs. Kennedy’s letter for later reading but opened President’s letter and read it through slowly and carefully. I then said I had come in expression President’s desire continue full and frank discussion that had characterized President Kennedy’s relations with Nasser. President Johnson, who had sat at his predecessor’s side as Kennedy administration policies shaped, had carefully reviewed our Near Eastern policy. Recognizing problems that necessarily affect our relationships, he was ready to pursue effective relations with UAR, seeking ways to resolve problems and where possible working to broaden areas of common interest. I said Ambassador Badeau had already spoken to Nasser about continuity of U.S. policies, and we hoped he understood our readiness to continue cooperation in economic and other fields. We were glad of contribution American cereals making to meeting Egypt’s consumption requirements and that proceeds from their sale also helping meet investment gap. As we had told Dr. Kaissouni during his very recent visit to Washington, we also were prepared as matter of practice carry on with development lending. There were, indeed, some problems to be overcome first, but Nasser would understand importance meeting these problems, such as International Monetary Fund terms for stabilization agreement. In fact friends of UAR, both governmental and non-governmental, had come believe IMF agreement to be central accomplishment necessary for further development assistance. However, our willingness in principle to negotiate loans remained as before. I commented on recent Cairo summit conference, saying we impressed by moderate and statesmanlike management of meeting, applaud Arab decision to use peaceful means to resolve disputes, commend reduction of tensions apparent between several Arab states and governments, and hope some improvement in UAR-SAG relations might also result. I said this opportunity discuss broad field of U.S.-UAR relations with Nasser emboldened me mention several issues which would probably face us in course this year. One, of course, was refugee problem. As he knew, for three years we had exerted strong efforts to deal with this difficult, seemingly intractable problem. As no overall solution found in past 15 years, we had hoped some step-by-step arrangement might help start process by which genuine progress could gradually be achieved. We now had impression Israel might take in some refugees, but in absence understanding of what Arab side would be willing to do, we found it difficult to press forward with this initiative. We had tried energetically to find path toward implementation of Paragraph 11 of UN Resolution 194. 4 In autumn we would be facing question of termination of UNRWA, with anticipated debate over future of Palestine refugees. If, by that time no progress made, situation would be difficult. He could understand we would find it hard continue status quo indefinitely. Nasser responded that, as he had said before, we have few problems in our direct relations. Troubles arise out of third party issues. First among difficulties in our relations has been, and continues to be, Israel. As he had said in recent speech, US had always supported Israel and had supported status quo. Arabs could not accept this. Arab-Israel problem could never be settled until Arabs got their rights. Refugees have right to return to Palestine homeland. Dr. Joseph Johnson 5 had come to talk about 20,000 refugees going back. If Arabs accepted this, life would be intolerable for them. At present Israel with more than 2,000,000 Jews has about 250,000 Arabs, who live under martial law restrictions as second class citizens. If all refugees returned, there would be more than 1,000,000 Arabs in country and balance between communities would be better. Returning to subject of refugees later, Nasser said it seems insoluble problem. It cannot be solved by war nor can it be solved by peaceful means because Israel will not give Arabs their rights. I noted Dr. Johnson had withdrawn illustrative figure of 20,000 refugees; what he really sought was a process that might progress so long as both sides were willing. In absence of agreement on final solution, step-by-step process seemed only path to progress. Nasser said Arabs could not accept this nibbling at problem. I said we all would need in coming months look carefully for ways to progress, else there could be great difficulties ahead. He assented with smile. Nasser returned to theme that US supporting status quo to protect Israel. I said I thought he underrated US efforts to work constructively with all nations in area. This was our policy with UAR, as he knew. Nasser said he agreed. President Kennedy had worked for peace, but then after latter’s death had come new policy statements by Alexis Johnson and President Johnson which troubled Arabs. Perhaps exact wordings used should not have caused anxiety; this had already been explained to him. But Arabs are sentimental people and had felt hurt at these speeches coming right after Arab summit, which praised Israel and had no warm words for Arabs. I commented that Alexis Johnson’s speech, scheduled before we knew of summit meeting, had been effort to state carefully the various considerations in American Near Eastern policy at beginning this important year. Careful reading of President Johnson’s speech would show that American assistance in study of desalting was explicitly extended to any interested country. Ambassador Badeau noted that American desalting specialist had in fact been working with UAR specialists in past year. [Here follows discussion concerning Yemen and Cyprus.] I noted that we had been disappointed to hear his reference to American base in Libya. We felt he knew US policy of support of freedom and independence of Near Eastern countries and we were surprised at his mention of a matter really peripheral to US–UAR relations since we had thought both countries seeking to broaden area of common effort. Nasser responded that as we well knew he doesn’t like system of bases anywhere in world. He had mentioned bases in this speech and had identified British bases, so he referred to American base also. He had been thinking primarily of our support of Israel, and this was a connected question. Comment: At several points in conversation Nasser found ways to reinforce impression he obviously sought to convey that what we are doing for Israel is on his mind in this election year. He gave appearance of willingness discuss any subject and suggested, as I did, that this sort of candid review helpful in our relations. In parting he asked me express his best wishes to President Johnson and said he would be replying to President’s letter. Badeau 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Received at 6:35 p.m. 2 March 3. See also Document 24 . 3 Document 20 . The letter from Mrs. Kennedy has not been found. 4 Resolution 194 (III), adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 11, 1948, established a Conciliation Commission for Palestine and instructed it on various subjects. Paragraph 11 resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes should be permitted to do so and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return. It also instructed the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation. 5 Joseph E. Johnson was appointed Special Representative of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine in 1961 to conduct indirect negotiations between Israel and the Arab states to seek a solution of the refugee question. Documentation pertaining to his efforts is in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, volumes XVII and XVIII . 26. Memorandum for Record 26. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, March 5, 1964. SUBJECT Israeli Arms Needs PARTICIPANTS H.E. Abba Eban, Deputy Prime Minister of Israel H.E. Avraham Harman, Israeli Ambassador McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President R.W. Komer In a most relaxed, low-key discussion Messrs. Eban and Bundy exchanged thoughts on Israel’s need to redress the imbalance between Israeli and Arab armor, and the pros and cons of further escalation of the arms race. Eban said that he was not here primarily on security business; nevertheless he hoped to contribute to narrowing any points of difference between us before the Eshkol visit, as the President had suggested in his letter to Eshkol. The latter was of course looking forward very much to the visit. Eban did not dwell on the tank problem, commenting that we seemed to be in agreement on the need. It was the Arabs who invariably started the parade by acquiring new weapons systems, and Israel which generally followed. He cited jets and submarines as cases in point. Moreover, Israel had seen in the Hawk sale US acceptance of the principle that we would not allow an arms imbalance to develop. Eban did stress, however, the importance of not linking the tank and missile questions. These were two quite different matters. If Mr. Eshkol could be given favorable word on tanks when he came, this would create the right atmosphere for further productive discussions on other matters. He and Harman both urged that we not attempt to deal simultaneously with an immediate and clear-cut question such as tanks, and a murky issue which was not immediate and on which the PM had explained to Mr. Rowen the Israeli views. As to missiles, Eban acknowledged the gap between Israeli and US estimates. But he emphasized that despite the limited military value of UAR missiles they presented a real psychological hazard, especially to a small, beleaguered nation like Israel. In response to Bundy’s query, he said that the purpose of Israeli missiles would be deterrence via threat of retaliation against Cairo. Israel needed a psychological counter which would both bolster popular morale and deter Nasser from thinking he could disrupt Israel with a bomber and missile attack while the US was making up its mind. Bundy rehearsed the arguments as to why we saw potentially great costs and risks to Israel’s moving ahead in this field. The UAR missiles of today seemed to be more for parades than a serious military weapon, though we saw force in the argument that Nasser might over-estimate his own strength. Quite candidly, however, what greatly concerned us were the implications of Israel, with an acknowledged nuclear potential, moving to acquire a delivery system which made real sense only with nuclear warheads. Whether or not Israel had any such intention, the Arabs could hardly be expected not to draw this conclusion. What they might do then was deeply disturbing. By now Israel should be fully reassured as to the firmness of US support; the one thing that might upset this increasingly close relationship would be US belief that Israel was moving in the direction of a nuclear deterrent. Yet Israel’s lack of candor in explaining its missile program generated suspicions which should be laid to rest. The most significant aspect of the discussion centered around the relationship of tanks and missiles. Bundy explained that we were not trying to link the two questions in any attempt at oriental bargaining. What we were trying to say was that we were deeply concerned over both these aspects of Israel’s security problem—precisely because both aspects could also deeply involve us. We felt a bit as though Israel was not confiding in us about its missile intentions because it feared our reaction; this in turn made us suspicious that Israel simply wanted to postpone the matter until after the tanks were settled, and then tell us that it proposed to go ahead on a course which could have a deeply unsettling effect on our relationship. The US should not say “it won’t do A without B”, nor Israel say “we won’t talk about B unless you do A.” All we could ask was a rational approach; they should not insist we separate the two issues or have no discussion, and we shouldn’t insist we link them or have no discussion. We should go ahead on both problems as a mark of mutual confidence. He couldn’t exaggerate the importance of coming to a harmonious view on these issues. Harman and Eban both saw tanks as the “test” of our commitment in Israeli eyes. If the US were unwilling to help meet an agreed need, it would powerfully reinforce the views of those skeptics who felt that Israel could not rely on the US commitment. Eban had again been impressed on this visit, as by past experience here and the Kennedy and Johnson letters, with the extent to which Washington stood firmly behind its words. But we had to reckon with the psychological problem—the fact that our assurances were so private and informal lessened their credibility. Moreover, Israelis closely followed such situations as Cyprus, Vietnam, Malaysia; when they saw the inhibitions on the use of US power, though everyone knew the US had an abundance of power, this raised doubts. Others feared that our tendency to push the UN to the fore in a crisis might lead us down this road at a time when Israel’s critical need dictated a quick response. Bundy made clear that we fully understood these concerns; we could well realize how a beleaguered Israel might worry over the US response. As one of the custodians of nuclear power (which some of us had grown increasingly to wish we hadn’t brought into the world), we were very cautious about the responsible use of such power. This of course was one reason why we were so opposed to nuclear proliferation, and felt that steps by Israel which might seem to be creating a new nuclear dimension in the Middle East could so affect US policy as to force us to rethink it. In short, the way to make certain our commitment was unreliable might be to act as if one couldn’t rely on it. Eban raised another question as to how to give credibility to our assurances that we could come quickly to Israel’s aid if necessary. When General Rabin, the new Israeli C/S, had been here, he was “impressed as a citizen” but concerned as a soldier with the vagueness of US protestations that we could come quickly and effectively to Israel’s support. To military men precision was essential. He realized the problems “joint planning” might give us, but hoped something could be done to facilitate clear, operational understandings. Bundy felt that “joint planning” didn’t prove very much. Our military were understandably reluctant to get pinned down to plans that rarely fitted the real case when it arose, yet robbed us of flexibility and often generated argument and mistrust. The problem of possible arms limitations was also discussed, with neither Bundy nor Eban very optimistic over this route. Eban stressed Eshkol’s deep desire to find some way to forestall the constant piling up of arms which cancelled each other out. This was a terrible waste, aside from the grave risks. Perhaps something might emerge from the Geneva talks. Did we see much chance of convincing the Arabs that some sort of a standstill would be mutually advantageous? Eshkol might want to raise this question when here. Bundy guardedly indicated that we didn’t see many signs to date of Arab interest, but all of us were undergoing a process of education along these lines, witness the US and USSR. If we felt that we had something to go on from the Israeli side, it would certainly enhance our desire to keep trying. Here Eshkol’s refusal to let us reassure Nasser that Israel wasn’t going nuclear tended to tie our hands. If the Arabs, already worried about Israel’s nuclear capacity, were to see missiles (which were not much use without nuclear warheads) added to the arsenal, this might create quite a problem. At Eban’s request Bundy gave some background on our Vietnam policy. There was also a brief allusion to Cyprus, Libya, and the repeated Arab statements of hostility toward Israel. All agreed that such words were generally a substitute for action, but they did serve to keep the pot boiling. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, Harriman, Bundy, Jernegan, Department of Defense General Counsel John T. McNaughton, and Myer Feldman at the White House. 27. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 27. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 8, 1964. Walter Jenkins has passed to me the attached memo from Mike Feldman 2 about tanks for Israel and told me that you would like to have a recommendation. It happens that I have been talking in recent days with both State and Defense on this matter so that I am able to give you a prompt answer. It has been our position, as you know, that we would not make a firm decision on tanks for Israel until later in the year. Mike Feldman feels strongly the other way, in part for reasons stated in his memorandum and in part because he quite naturally would like to be able to carry this decision with him on his visit to Israel later this month. Our current problem is simply that the Arabs are in an excited frame of mind and are likely to get more excited later this spring and summer as Israel begins to use the Jordan waters. Moreover, the Israelis have been very reluctant to deal frankly with us on their apparent desire to buy surface-to-surface missiles from the French, a move which we think full of danger for them and for us. The Israelis have a nuclear reactor which could make plutonium, and if they buy modern missiles from the French we may have a wholly new level of escalation in the Middle East arms race. Nasser’s missiles, by contrast, are both conventional and clumsy and are more for show than for use. Komer and I feel very strongly that it would be wrong to make a commitment on the tanks now, and that you should reserve decision until Prime Minister Eshkol comes. Harriman, who ought to know his New York vote, agrees with us. The State Department, below Rusk, feels strongly the same way, but Rusk himself is more of the view that the matter is already decided in principle and that you can make your own political choice as to when to tell the Israelis. McNamara is also quite pragmatic about it, as a tank merchant, and I do not think that he has concentrated on the politics of missiles or the politics of Arab reaction. I am not sure that either McNamara or Rusk has seen the very strongly worded cables from all our Ambassadors in the Arab countries warning of the violent reaction to any tank deal. On balance, I recommend that you continue to push this decision ahead of you, and that we indicate firmly to our Israeli friends the grave impropriety of turning any Republicans loose on this point while the missile matter is unsettled. My own guess is that if the Israeli missile issue were to get into the public domain, there would be a very serious backlash of criticism against the Israelis. I think we should deal with this by quiet diplomacy if possible, and much the best time for a full-scale review of it is your meeting with Eshkol in June. If you agree that we ought to wait, I suggest that you sign the enclosed NSAM, but before we support it, I would wish to talk with Mike Feldman and try to get him to agree why it is important to wait. Let me add, finally, that if we hastily give in on something as difficult as the tank deal in March, I hate to think what we will be asked for between now and November. The Israelis use all sources of pressure in an election year, and the heat is really quite low so far. At Tab A is Mike Feldman’s memorandum. At Tab B is a summary of U.S. Arab problems. 3 At Tab C is a detailed statement of the Arab-Israeli missile problem. 4 At Tab D is the memorandum that you may wish to sign. 5 McG. B. 6 Signed Not signed Speak to me 7 Call a meeting of those most concerned 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 290. Secret. 2 Not printed. The March 4 memorandum from Myer Feldman to the President stated that he had met with several Congressmen who expressed dissatisfaction with stories they had heard of U.S. reluctance to sell tanks to Israel. He stated that if the United States was going to supply tanks, it would be a mistake to wait too long before announcing it. 3 Tab B, Special Memorandum No. 6–64, February 25, prepared by the CIA Office of National Estimates, entitled “Storm Warnings Up for US Arab Relations,” is not printed. 4 Tab C, a paper by Komer entitled “The UAR/Israeli Missile Problem,” March 6, is not printed. 5 The President did not sign the draft National Security Action Memorandum at Tab D, but see Document 32 . 6 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 7 This option is checked. In a March 9 telephone conversation, Johnson told Bundy to tell Feldman that in the light of the Arab reaction to his Weizmann Institute speech (see footnote 3, Document 13 ), he wanted to “go a little slow.” He wanted to take action, but not until after Feldman’s trip to Israel. Bundy interjected that Feldman should not tell his Israeli friends this. Johnson agreed. He added, “And tell him we’ve got a lot we’ve got to expect of them between now and November anyway and I want to wait till they—if they’re so goddamned anxious to get me on the line, they’ve got to get on the line.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Bundy, March 9, 1964, 4:27 p.m., Tape F64.16, Side B, PNO 1) 28. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 28. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, March 12, 1964. JCSM–207–64 SUBJECT Military Assistance for Israel (U) 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 11 February 1964, on the above subject, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding certain questions posed in a letter by the Deputy Under Secretary of State, dated 8 February 1964. 2 These questions, concerning the desirability of selling tanks to Israel, are: a. Whether a significant imbalance exists in the relative strengths of the Arab-Israeli military forces; b. The need for Israel to augment its tank strength; c. The need for modernization of Israel’s tank force; and d. Possible substitution of antitank weapons that would meet Israel’s needs. 2. A significant imbalance in the relative strengths of Arab and Israeli military forces does not exist at this time. a. Though superior in total numbers and hardware, the Arabs trail Israel in quality and experience of leadership, in the level of general educational and technical background among the enlisted ranks, in mobilization capability, and in incentive to fight. The serious political differences and jealousies of the Arabs make effective combined military action against Israel highly unlikely. Israel will probably retain its over-all military superiority vis-a-vis the Arab States for the next several years. b. Apart from such estimates of over-all capabilities, Israel’s concern about tanks is justified. Israel cannot be complacent, for example, in knowing that Egypt has moved from a position of tank disadvantage to advantage in a period of five years. Egypt has moved far ahead in tank quality and has increased its tank inventory from 322 to 739, while Israel’s has increased from 626 to 798. 3. There is no need for Israel to augment its tank strength at this time. Current force levels and equipment levels are adequate for the defense of Israel in the light of announced US policies and Arab disunity and weaknesses. With the ability to mobilize to a strength of 250,000 in two d4ays, Israeli forces can continue to counter Arab threats as long as such forces are well led, trained, and equipped. 4. There is a military need for Israel to modernize its tank force because the bulk of its tank inventory is obsolescent. The Arabs (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iraq) have already gained a favorable modernization differential as well as a numerical advantage, and they are gradually improving their training and maintenance. Thus, Israel needs to replace obsolete M–4 tanks in order to counter Arab T–34s, T–54s, and JS–3s. 5. With reference to the question of substituting antitank weapons for tanks, it must be noted that these weapons are complementary to each other. Even though a nation may have adopted a defense strategy, there is a requirement for an offensive tactical capability to repel and, if necessary, eject enemy forces which have penetrated its territory. Thus, Israel has a need for an appropriate mix of tanks and antitank weapons in order to maintain a balanced military force. 6. The foregoing comments do not alter the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as furnished in JCSM–953–63, dated 7 December 1963, subject: “Near East Arms Policy (U),” and JCSM–40–64, dated 18 January 1964, subject: “Arms for Israel (U).” 3 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret. A stamped note reads, “Mr. Vance has seen.” 2 The memorandum from Vance to the JCS Chairman and the letter from U. Alexis Johnson to Vance are not printed. (Both ibid.) 3 See Document 10 and footnote 3 thereto. 29. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 29. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 13, 1964. SUBJECT Tanks for Israel Mike Feldman and I have talked further about tanks for Israel and we agree that the best way to put it up to you at this stage is by sending you two memoranda—Mike’s is at Tab A and mine is at B. Since Mike agrees with my Tab B, you can expedite this by giving a signal of approval—and keep Mike’s longer memo for leisure reading. The consequence of such approval would be that we would not decide on tanks before June. McG. B. Tab B Approved 2 Speak to me Tab A Washington, March 14, 1964. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Johnson SUBJECT Tanks for Israel I agree with the Bundy memorandum. However, I would urge that we make the decision as soon as possible as to whether or not we are going to supply tanks to Israel, leaving for a later determination the terms under which they will be acquired. If it is decided that we should supply the tanks, I should like to be able to convey this decision, in confidence, to the leaders of the Jewish community. They have shown in the past that they can keep a secret. Attached is an elaboration of my views on this problem. Myer Feldman 3 Attachment TANKS FOR ISRAEL In an earlier memorandum I set forth the political problems we might face if the decision was deferred too long. There are foreign policy aspects to the delay which are even more important. It seems to me that the logic in favor of providing tanks for the Israeli armed forces is inexorable. In view of the commitments expressed many times by many Presidents to come to the assistance of Israel if she is attacked, our basic policy must be directed toward the prevention of any aggression. Our policy must be such that American intervention will not be necessary. Basic to the prevention of war is the maintenance of a balance of forces between Israel and her neighbors. There is no doubt of the growing preponderance of Arab tank strength. Nor is there any question about the Israeli need for modern tanks if Israel is to be able to meet the military threat posed by Russian tanks in Arab hands. Israel feels she must have at least half as many tanks as Egypt. I believe that everyone who has considered this problem believes that the balance of forces needed to prevent conflict requires that a means be found to provide the Israeli Government with between 300 and 500 modern tanks. There are four problems: 1. It is said that any announcement indicating American military support for the Israeli army would disrupt our relationships with the Arab nations. I must confess that I am somewhat skeptical of this argument. I have heard it in connection with every American action designed to give comfort to Israel. We should remember that most of the nations depend upon us for large-scale aid. I notice that, even so, they more often support the Soviet Union than the United States in the United Nations. I read their constant denunciations of American imperialism; and I am more inclined to believe that firmness will attract respect than that concessions will win their favor. Anyhow, if carried too far, this argument will result in actions justifying and encouraging forces in Israel, which have had very little success thus far, that are much more militant. 2. It is said that a decision should be deferred as long as possible. We have already waited five months. These are long-lead time contracts. Unless the Israeli Government receives some indication that American tanks may be provided, it will be compelled to make its plans on the basis of other assumptions. Already, I understand, they have agreed to purchase 90 British tanks. Those who favor letting the Israeli Government purchase their tanks elsewhere overlook the shock to American-Israeli relationships which would result from our action, the balance of payments effects and, most important, the inability of the Israeli Government to purchase any substantial number of tanks if they are sold on the usual terms for military purchases. Besides, ours are the best tanks. To prevent war, these tanks are needed before the disparity between Egyptian and Israeli equipment becomes too great. 3. There is some feeling that we should not agree to the tank sale unless the Israeli Government gives up its intention to purchase ground-to-ground missiles. I find myself sympathetic with this position. However, it is difficult to tell a sovereign power what weapons it needs for its defense. The existence of Egyptian missiles and the fact that the Israeli Government has already contracted for 25 experimental missiles from France makes it impossible to condition the sale of tanks upon a renunciation of missiles. But there are two alternatives. First, Israel could give up its right to missiles of any kind, including Hawks, if Egypt would enter into a similar agreement. Israel would agree to this, but there is little chance that Egypt will. Second, we might be able to persuade Israel to refrain from any further purchases of missiles without prior consultation with us. In order to do this, however, it would be necessary for me to explore the question frankly and candidly with Prime Minister Eshkol, and I would have to know what we might be prepared to do in consideration for such an understanding. 4. Finally, and most important of all, there is the problem of terms of sale. Assuming it is decided that we supply Israel with the tanks, a 500 tank order would cost in the neighborhood of $75 million. This is a staggering sum for a country with a total budget of only $1 billion. The Israeli Government has asked for grant aid. We have explored various other kinds of assistance in the past; we have often increased the amount of development loans in order to free funds for the purchase of military equipment. But with the steadily decreasing foreign aid appropriations this is becoming increasingly difficult. Thus far I have seen no proposal looking toward the solution of this problem. Tab B Washington, March 13, 1964. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 4 SUBJECT Tanks for Israel I still think the best way to go ahead with this issue is to push any decision ahead of us. I think we should use Mike Feldman’s April visit to Israel as a reconnaissance in force, providing him with a detailed set of probing questions and comments, but carefully withholding any U.S. Government decision on the ground that such decision should await the meeting between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol. In this same spirit I would now send out a White House directive to State, Defense, and CIA to review all aspects of this problem—tanks, missiles, Arab reactions, actual levels of Israeli procurement elsewhere, etc. etc., with the object of presenting a coordinated interdepartmental recommendation, with dissents, not later than May 1. I would plan to review this recommendation here, with Feldman, Komer, and myself participating, and then bring it to you for decision safely ahead of the Eshkol meeting. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 290. No classification marking. An attached brief memorandum from Bundy to Feldman proposed combining their papers on the tank issue. Feldman agreed in a handwritten note on Bundy’s memorandum. 2 Johnson checked and initialed this option. A notation in Bundy’s handwriting requested Komer to draft a comprehensive NSAM to carry out the decision. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 4 Secret. 30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 14, 1964, 10:48 a.m. 793. Israel Embassy has been informed of Department’s approval of following: 1. We accept Israel Embassy’s proposal regarding Munn’s passport (Deptel 774 to Tel Aviv) 2 as most expedient way to resolve issue, i.e., proposal that we issue Munn second passport without designation Palestine which Israel Embassy will visa and return to Dept for disposition. GOI would then issue border-crossing permit against Israel Embassy visa number, but Munn would retain his present passport. 2. We will cease using “Palestine” in passports as place of assignment and cease issuing, renewing, or amending passports with seal bearing word “Palestine”. 3. If there are no adverse repercussions from foregoing, we will change listing of Jerusalem Consulate General in Foreign Service List so that it would be listed under Jerusalem rather than Palestine. Dept stressed that if there is any publicity over steps 1 and 2, it would be difficult for us to carry out additional steps now contemplated to accommodate Israelis on this issue. 3 Israel Emboff Gazit said he would immediately refer proposal to GOI. He again asked about plaque over front door of Congen office in Israel-held Jerusalem. Is our understanding correct that plaque does not contain word “Palestine”? 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 PAL. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Lucien L. Kinsolving; cleared by Davis, Jernegan, Stephen Campbell of IO/UNP, and Harriman’s Special Assistant Frederick Chapin; and approved by Harriman. Also sent to Jerusalem and repeated to Amman. 2 Telegram 774 to Tel Aviv, March 5, summarized an informal conversation between Davies and Israeli Minister Gazit concerning Israel’s efforts to obtain U.S. agreement to drop the use of “Jerusalem, Palestine” in passports issued or renewed in Jerusalem and issued to officers stationed in Jerusalem. Davies strongly protested Israel’s refusal to honor Consul Robert H. Munn’s passport, which contained this usage. (Ibid.) A chronology of discussions on this subject, dating back to February 1963, is attached to A–104 from Jerusalem, March 30. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 812 to Tel Aviv, March 19, stated that the Department was preparing an order for new seals for the Consulate General, all bearing the designation “Jerusalem” without the word “Palestine.” It instructed the Consulate General to begin using the new seals as soon as they arrived and at the same time to cease using the word “Palestine” on letterheads and in correspondence. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 316 from Jerusalem, March 15, replied that the word “Palestine” did not appear on any Consulate building. (Ibid.) 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 19, 1964, 3:10 p.m. 810. Please convey following message to Eshkol from President: “March 19, 1964 Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am distressed to learn from Ambassador Barbour that you feel unable to approve of our reassuring President Nasser about the peaceful character of the Dimona reactor. 2 We are far from confident that apprehension as to Israel’s atomic potential will, as you suggest, help deter Nasser from attacking Israel. Quite the contrary, we believe that Nasser’s fear of a developing Israeli nuclear power may drive him to a choice between accelerating the UAR military buildup or a desperate pre-emptive attack. Either of these choices would have the gravest effects on the security of Israel. We think it plain that any possible deterrent value that might come from keeping Nasser in the dark is trivial compared to these risks. It is also hard to see how Nasser could adversely exploit reassurance that Israel’s nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. We certainly do not intend to provide him with details. Nor did he misuse our reassurances when, with the agreement of your government, we last informed him along these lines. Indeed our doing so served to ease Arab-Israeli tensions. Therefore I hope you will reconsider your decision on this matter, on which I am sure you will agree that our ultimate interest—enhancement of Israel’s security—is the same as yours. With warm regards, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson.” You should make following points orally to Eshkol: 1. Nasser aware past US visits to Dimona and eventually will learn of January visit from other countries Israel has agreed we may take into our confidence. Preferable permit us give Nasser information directly to gain maximum favorable results. 2. Content February 22 Nasser speech not new. Every Arab politician must inveigh against Israel to survive politically. Realistic and moderate resolutions taken by Arab Summit Conference reflect Nasser’s position more clearly than his words. 3. Al-Ahram editorialist Hassanain Haikal, confidant of Nasser, has publicly voiced UAR recognition that war against Israel is not possible because of US support. 4. Israel’s security lies in US capability and preparedness to ward off aggression. Total security is not possible, however; even US lacks that. 5. Tank issue unrelated to Nasser reassurance. 3 FYI. Jewish Observer February 14 carried article entitled “Dimona Report Studies” that referred to “a top secret report from American experts who had studied the potentialities of Israel’s principal nuclear reactor at Dimona…” While word visit not used, idea is implicit especially to those aware already of our earlier inspection. Moreover, early in February Israeli newsman here specifically inquired about US interest in Dimona and rumored visit by US scientific team. End FYI. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted at the White House; cleared by Davies, Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by McKesson. A March 14 memorandum from Komer to the President states that he had “greatly toned down State’s rather abrasive draft” of the letter to Eshkol. Bundy initialed the President’s approval on Komer’s memorandum and sent the revised draft to Benjamin Read with an attached note of March 19 stating that it was approved by the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, Presidential Correspondence) 2 Telegrams 916 and 919 from Tel Aviv, March 3 and 4, reported a March 3 conversation between Barbour and Eshkol, in which Eshkol argued that a degree of apprehension as to Israel’s nuclear potential would serve as a useful deterrent to Nasser. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) 3 Telegram 976 from Tel Aviv, March 23, reported that in a meeting with Eshkol that morning, Barbour delivered Johnon’s message and made the five points in telegram 810. (Ibid.) 32. National Security Action Memorandum No. 290 32. National Security Action Memorandum No. 290 1 Washington, March 19, 1964. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT Meeting Israeli Arms Requests Before deciding on whether or how to meet Israel’s current request for tanks, the President desires a thorough review of all aspects of this problem, leading to a coordinated interdepartmental recommendation not later than 1 May 1964. Among the aspects he wishes reviewed are: (a) likely Arab reactions and their consequences; (b) various means of offsetting such reactions; (c) likely Israeli reaction if we refuse to meet their request or postpone the issue; (d) the likelihood that Israel could satisfy its needs elsewhere; and (e) the likely course and consequence of Israeli missile development, and the desirability of an effort to turn Israel aside from this course, including ways and means of doing so. The review should also assess various alternative ways of dealing with this matter, such as limiting the size of any sale, postponing such a sale to a more propitious time, or encouraging and perhaps helping Israel to meet its needs from other suppliers. Finally, it should include an analysis of what cooperative measures we might reasonably ask of Israel in return for our responsiveness in meeting its arms needs. I suggest that we prepare a paper in time for discussion of this matter in the Standing Group on 28 April, prior to final approval by the Secretaries of State and Defense and submission to the President. McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 290. Secret. 33. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) 33. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) 1 Washington, March 23, 1964. Here’s an extensive set of State talking, briefing, and background papers for your trip to Israel. 2 They seem to me quite in line with the President’s views, as put out to the town by Bundy. Here are a few additional thoughts. I. Missiles . Mac and I hope that you will make a real effort to turn Israelis aside from SSMs. In so urging we are motivated as much by Israeli as by US security interests. We simply do not seem to have gotten across to Israel that, whereas present UAR missiles (even if multiplied) are little if any threat, Israeli acquisition of good missiles will trigger the UAR to get good missiles in return (and the only place to get them is from the Soviets). This has in fact been the history of arms escalation in the Middle East—whenever one side draws ahead, the other must needs follow. We doubt that the Soviets would give Nasser nuclear warheads, but they might just put Soviet missile bases in the UAR. Either of these outcomes would magnify the threat to Israeli security (and incidentally increase the pressures on Israel to go nuclear). Finally, there’s the risk of UAR pre-emptive attack, which our Embassy in Cairo takes most seriously. Is it worth incurring such risks for the deterrent advantage of being able to lob a few conventional warheads into Cairo? If the above argument makes sense, then the corollary financial argument does too. Acquiring a missile capability is hellishly expensive. Why should Israel waste at least a few hundred million bucks on a deterrent of marginal value (without nuclear warheads), when a sum of this size could be far more efficiently used in other ways? Nor do the Israelis seem to pay much attention to our intelligence estimates, the gist of which we’ve passed quite freely to them. In fact, Eshkol told Rowen we should not question their intelligence, because knowing what the UAR is up to is a life and death matter to them. It so happens, however, that the Israelis themselves have no evidence that 900–1000 UAR missiles are in the cards. There is a sheer guess, and our guess as you know is only a “few hundred” by 1969–70 with probably fewer. And here is one field where we, with our own vast missile experience and intensive study of the Soviets, are a lot more competent than our Israeli friends. They have very little basis for evaluating program cost or the immense complexity of deploying, controlling and salvoing a 1000 missile force. Israel makes much, for example, of the psychological dislocation if several hundred missiles should land during the crucial 72 hours of mobilization. We flatly doubt that the UAR could achieve any such highly sophisticated salvo capability. We feel that the Israelis have simply closed their ears to our efforts to clue them. Bear in mind also that even the Israelis contend that the so-called UAR missile threat will not reach full bloom until 1969–70. This gives us room to maneuver. What the Israelis are apparently buying is the first French SSM. If our experience is any guide, it will be very expensive and may not be terribly good. Simple prudence would suggest that Israel could afford to wait a few years under any circumstances before committing itself to a major program. True, Eshkol himself says that it may be another two years before they decide how much of a capability they need, but this date could apply to the beginning of deployment or to a second tranche of purchases. The simple fact that the Israelis refuse to tell us what they have in mind in itself adds greatly to our suspicions. Indeed, I think you should make quite a point of saying that their evasiveness over Dimona, now repeated with respect to missiles, is precisely what creates uncertainty on our part. II. Security Assurances . Israelis are constantly, though I think largely for tactical reasons, stressing the tenuous nature of our security commitment. You are in a good position to say categorically, from three years in the White House, that there is absolutely no doubt as to US determination to prevent Israel’s destruction. This has been reiterated time and again, publicly and privately. The only real question at issue is whether we should give a formal security guarantee. We are unwilling to do so for reasons which serve Israel’s interests as much as ours, i.e. such a guarantee would simply trigger offsetting Arab moves toward Moscow which would actually increase the threat to Israel without at the same time adding an iota to our determination to act. III. Tanks . You are quite familiar with the tank arguments—pro and con. Since you will want to avoid getting out in front on this issue, why not emphasize that nothing Israel has told us suggests that the armor imbalance has become so immediate and urgent a problem as to deprive us of further time for reflection. The Israelis freely admit that the time when the imbalance will become potentially serious is 2–3 years hence. Why, therefore, are they pressing us so hard? The real answer, of course, is that it’s an election year. IV. US Aid to Israel and the Arabs . It seems to me that you have got to sustain the party line on this issue. Israel is doing magnificently (10% growth rate, estimated $640 million in reserves by end of this year, per capita GNP of $900 plus). We have given Israel through June 1963 approximately $1 billion in aid. True, we have given the UAR $880 million, but this is only $32 per capita (compared to $413 per capita for Israel); much more important, it has been mostly food which goes into the bellies of the fellaheen not the sinews of the state. The UAR has bought Soviet arms with cotton which it couldn’t sell to us. Moreover, the UAR bought as many arms in the late 50’s when we weren’t giving it much aid as it has during our three year PL–480 agreement. V. Finally, I do hope that you can get across to our Israeli friends that our relationship cannot be so much of a one-way street. Our underwriting of their security necessarily gives us a legitimate voice in their policy. All get and no give is unsatisfactory as a basis for our relationship. Any objective observer looking at the Middle East of the last 16 years would see US policy as being consistently pro-Israeli (aside from Suez, on which I personally think we flubbed). In my opinion the Israelis know this, they do count on us, and their frequent expressions of doubt are far more for bargaining purposes than because of any real question in their minds. In fact, Mike, Israel seems to have quite deliberately been seeking step-by-step to develop the kind of relationship with us (overt security guarantee, military aid, joint planning) which will compromise our relationship with the Arabs. No doubt the Israelis think that this will be a stronger deterrent to Arab pressures. But in my view it is a most short-sighted policy. The Arabs already regard us as so pro-Israeli that further steps will not add much. What they will do, however, is to force the Arabs to react, by squeezing our base and oil interests, and by moving ever closer to Moscow. This will increase the threat to Israel far more than the reassurance gained from making public what we already do privately. Thus Israeli policy harms rather than serves US-Israeli interests. It is no disservice to Israel to have this out with them, and I hope you will help do so. R. W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Secret. 2 Filed with a March 20 covering memorandum from Read to Bundy, they included unsigned and undated papers entitled: “Israeli Missile Acquisition” and “Israeli Tank Acquisition” and a suggested talking paper, as well as background papers. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 34. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 34. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, March 25, 1964, 5 p.m. 4713. For the Secretary only from Talbot. In meetings Monday night and yesterday in Beirut with Ambassadors Meyer, Knight, Hart, Barnes and Barbour I found several of them rather discouraged by what they consider loss in recent weeks of gains we had made with Arabs over past three years. Root cause, they agreed, is outside our control; we have now begun to absorb anticipated and inevitable Arab reactions to our support of Israeli diversion of Jordan waters outside Jordan Basin. They expect higher pitch of anti-Israeli talk and possibly actions in months ahead, with substantial fallout of anti-Americanism. They are especially concerned that sequence of recent official US speeches and actions has strongly accentuated Arab reactions. In euphoric aftermath of Cairo Conference Arabs, they said, had persuaded themselves that they could be masters in their own homes. Effect of Alexis Johnson and Weizmann Institute speeches was to suggest to Arabs that US asserting American intention of determining future pattern of area. This in Ambassadors’ opinion gave rise to so far unshakable Arab belief that “enlightened Kennedy policies have given way to Truman-like pro-Israeli policies.” It is obvious that accident of timing shortly after Cairo Conference plus superacute anxieties about policies of a new President reinforced Arab reactions. Ambassadors concurred that cumulative signals coming out of Washington now, including Eshkol visit and talk of possible arms sales to Israel, could generate runaway Arab reaction unless we can find ways to balance overall impression. Knight talked seriously of possible need to evacuate American dependents. Meyer felt US goodwill in Lebanon undergoing great strain, with our friends under pressure to deny us. Barnes thought Hussein would have to emphasize Palestine question in forthcoming Washington visit in order live with fellow Arabs afterward. Except for Barbour, whose concerns are different, only Hart reported that his clients not particularly affected so far by anti-Americanism mood. He doubted however that Saudis would resist participation in Arab programs against Israel. In earlier visit to Baghdad and Kuwait I had encountered similarly heightened sensitivity to Israel question in US-Arab relations. Ambassador Strong, who has found himself more deeply entangled in Israel question since Johnson [garble] two recent USG speeches than before, believes Iraqi posture will be determined in end by way Cairo decides to play Israel question and US-Arab relations. Ambassador Cottam finds Kuwaitis so anxious to be “good Arabs” they adopt rather strong line on Israel and US-Israeli relations. Ambassadors of course did not need my reassurances of continuity of policy and naturally they demonstrated understanding of and loyalty to US policy. They questioned however whether Washington understands erosion already evident in US-Arab relations or sensitivity of Arabs to campaign oratory and especially to any consignment of arms this year to Israel. Understandably, they pleaded for utmost restraint in US policy statements on Near East in coming months. Our Ambassadors acknowledged that Arabs had brought much on their own heads by heating up Israeli issue after Cairo Conference and coupling this with renewed campaign to eliminate Western bases from Eastern Mediterranean region. I would describe their mood not as critical of our policy but as disquieted by thought this is likely to be even more difficult year than they had anticipated. I believe they were encouraged after our meeting. If you wish we can discuss this matter further when I return home later this week. Jones 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–US. Secret; Nodis. An attached note of March 25 from Read to Rusk suggested sending copies to the White House, U. Alexis Johnson, and Jernegan. Rusk initialed his approval. 35. Memorandum for the Record 35. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 2, 1964. SUBJECT NSC Meeting [Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.] 6. Rusk then brought up the question of the UAR relationship. He said that the Department believed that no benefits had as yet been derived from our attempts to reach an understanding with Nasser. Nasser had failed in his commitments in the Yemen; there were now more troops in the Yemen than ever before and furthermore he had taken overt action against Aden. Furthermore Nasser had stimulated Libya’s efforts against the U.S. and British bases and was continuing to agitate this issue. Additionally Nasser had been uncooperative in our numerous efforts to bring the Middle East arms race under control. Rusk said he raised this question with, and informed the Council, that U.S. policies towards the UAR and Nasser were under penetrating study by the Department. Action: DDI should give this matter continuing consideration and should discuss the subject with appropriate people in the Department and also with me. [Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Box 6, Folder 7, DCI Meetings with the President, Jan.-Apr. 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. 36. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 36. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, April 4, 1964, 1 p.m. 1009. Feldman had substantive conversations with Meir and Eshkol on Friday. 2 Discussion with Meir was largely predictable. She emphasized the growing nature of the Arab threat, the recent speeches by Nasser, and especially the Israeli need for missiles and tanks if Israel was to meet the threats. She stated that in view of her understanding that the US Govt knew Israel would not be an aggressor, she could not understand any reluctance to supply missiles and tanks. She went on to say she was personally convinced of the friendship and good faith of the United States but there were other responsible elements in the Israeli Govt that felt their policy should not be predicated on this understanding. Feldman commented that the basis of Israeli policy had to be faith in the United States. He asked whether there really was any alternative and she agreed that from her point of view there was none. Feldman then pointed out that the acquisition of missiles by Israel in our view was not in the political, economic or military interest of Israel. Mrs. Meir urged very strongly that missiles were a needed deterrent to Nasser’s stated aggressive aims and claimed that his statements were already supported by a large number of UAR missiles, which even in their primitive state could create chaos in Israel. Feldman commented that this was probably not the view of the govt, but that of the Foreign Minister. Mrs. Meir said that she and Eshkol did not see things alike but that they both were vitally concerned with whatever defensive needs the current threats from Nasser made urgent. Feldman raised with Mrs. Meir the unfortunate leak in the Jerusalem Palestine story. 3 Mrs. Meir came as close to an apology as he has ever heard from her, although she disclaimed any responsibility. The meeting was attended by Mrs. Meir, Shimshon Arad and Feldman. It adjourned and Mrs. Meir expressed the wish to meet again on Monday. Discussions with Eshkol later in the day lasted approximately 2 hours and were attended by Kollek, Lubrani and Arad, as well as Eshkol and Feldman. The Prime Minister had asked that this be merely an informal chat. But it developed into substantive discussions. The Prime Minister exhibited considerable concern about the forthcoming visit to US. He pointed out that he had only been in office for six months and his party would soon have to stand for election. Relationship with the United States was always of prime importance. He was extremely anxious that the visit have constructive results. The following items were discussed during the conversation: 1. The Israeli request for missiles, tanks and naval weapons. Eshkol accepted the decision that neither missiles nor naval weapons would be supplied, but said the need for tanks was critical. He claimed they needed them fast and he was hopeful they could obtain them under a grant program. Feldman said a grant program was extremely unlikely and pointed out the merits of maintaining a flexibility as to the source of the weapons. Particularly if the tanks could be obtained at a substantial reduction in price it would be in the Israeli interest to get them from some other nation. (Although Eshkol continued to come back to the United States as a source of supply, Feldman is sure that if the investigation which has been initiated shows that it is possible for the West Germans to supply the M48A3 the Israeli Govt would be completely satisfied.) 2. Missiles. In connection with the tank discussions, Feldman urged that the Israelis restrain their efforts to obtain missiles from France. He said that it was his understanding that they had already purchased 25 such missiles for test purposes. He hoped that there would be no further acquisitions. Eshkol said he did not know how many they had thus far agreed to buy from France. After some discussion however, he agreed to consider not making any additional purchases without prior consultation with the United States. He said Israel did not have the resources anyhow to make any large-scale purchase at this time. In fact an agreement might be possible that Israel would not buy any missiles (Feldman believes he meant take delivery) in 1964 or 1965 and would limit themselves to the 25 test missiles for the time being. However, in view of the threat from the UAR he would have to have the right to keep pace with any missile program of the UAR. He suggested, for illustrative purposes only, that Israel might purchase one missile for every two the UAR acquired. This presupposed some effective method of determining how many missiles the UAR had. Feldman asked specifically whether the Israeli Govt would agree to acquire no missiles if Nasser would halt his missile program. The reply was an unqualified yes. (When this question was asked of Mrs. Meir she did not give the same answer. She felt Israel had to have missiles.) 3. The aid program. Eshkol recited the facts and figures showing the large deficit which he stated was running at the rate of $400,000,000 a year, which the Israeli economy had to overcome. He said that when Italy, with a population 20 times that of Israel, ran only a slightly larger deficit it created a major crisis. In view of the history of United States support for Israel he hoped the aid program would continue at the same level and that the rumors he had heard of a reduced level were not true. Feldman did not respond directly to question. He pointed out the difficulties the entire aid program was encountering in Congress and the need for phasing out all over the world. 4. Desalinization program. Eshkol exhibited considerable interest in American desalinization efforts. He asked when Israel could expect the initiation of the joint program announced by President Johnson. He asked also how much such a joint program would cost and what proportion the U.S. Govt would contribute. Feldman said that the first step would have to be discussions between American and Israeli scientists. These conversations would lead to a clearer picture of what is feasible and what cooperative steps could be taken. However, this raised the question of IAEA inspection of nuclear reactors. Feldman said he had intended to discuss this with Ernst Bergmann, whom he was seeing on Sunday. But it would certainly simplify American problems if Israel would agree to IAEA inspection. At this point Arad and Lubrani broke in with all of the objections to inspection listed Embtel 1008. 4 Not being equipped with satisfactory responses to these questions, Feldman again referred to the coming conversations with Bergmann and said he would see whether there wasn’t some solution to all these problems. (Feldman believes that if we can get satisfactory answers we may be able to substantially reduce the area of disagreement that presently exists. Urge a more complete response than that contained Deptel 855. 5 ) 5. Eshkol asked at the conclusion of the conversation whether it would be possible to prepare an agenda for his discussions with the President and with Secretary Rusk. Feldman suggested that it might be useful to have from him an indication of the subjects he proposes to raise at those discussions. Eshkol promised to prepare such a list and discuss them at a meeting scheduled for Monday. (Would appreciate any instructions on this point. Would also appreciate any thoughts regarding the meeting with Meir and Eshkol now scheduled for Monday. Feldman also expects to see Eban, Sapir, Dayan, Peres and Rabin course of visit.) He requests this tel be passed urgently White House for Komer. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 April 3. 3 See Document 30 . Telegram 969 from Tel Aviv, March 23, reported that the story of the U.S. decision to drop the “Palestine” designation from passports issued by the Consulate General in Jerusalem was in the local press. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US) Telegram 975 from Tel Aviv, March 23, reported that Barbour expressed keen disappointment at this to Arad. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 1008 from Tel Aviv, April 3, requested guidance for Feldman’s meeting on this subject with Israeli Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Ernst Bergmann; it listed several anticipated Israeli objections to IAEA inspections and requested guidance in responding to them. (Ibid., AE 6 ISR–US) 5 Telegram 855 to Tel Aviv, April 3, stated that the Department of State preferred to conduct negotiations on this question in Washington. (Ibid.) 37. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 37. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, April 7, 1964, 12:30 p.m. 1020. Feldman and I saw PriMin Eshkol for ninety minutes morning April 6. Eshkol attended by Mrs. Meir, Yahil, Kollek, Arad and Lubrani [garble—met?] with us. Major subjects were tanks, Israel’s overall defense policy, missiles, weapons financing, Eshkol’s June meeting with President Johnson, desalination and IAEA inspections. Last two topics being reported separately. 2 Following summary, topically rearranged in part, omits some familiar GOI argumentation employed in PriMin’s forcefully made presentation. 1. Tanks. Eshkol glad USG officials are acknowledging Israel’s need to modernize its tank force. Where does Israel’s request stand? Eshkol compared Israel’s inventories of various categories of conventional weapons with weapons held by UAR and Near East Arab countries. Threats by Nasser and others such as Ben Bella must be viewed against growing weaponry gap. Israel needs 500 modern tanks; “We’ll start with 300.” US is only possible provider. British Centurions not available in adequate number, AFG Israel wants better tanks, ones to last until early 1970s. French tanks, when available, much too expensive. Could Feldman give GOI some consolation now on tank request, which of utmost importance? Noting some variance between USG and GOI figures on weapons presently in area, Feldman said tanks would be appropriate subject for June meeting. He stressed non-partisan nature of US special commitment to Israel’s defense. Israel asks that we evidence this deep commitment more. Obviously we cannot have an alliance nor an inflexible defense guarantee. As last April’s crises showed, US is prepared intervene quickly. Other steps might be taken; perhaps there could be additional contacts between our military experts. US wishes avoid significant area arms imbalance in either direction; if Israel attained clear military superiority a dangerous escalation would surely ensue. Feldman said we recognize Israel’s need for modern tanks. After discussion of missiles (see 3 below), Eshkol again tried pin Feldman down on tanks. Feldman again acknowledged Israel’s need, but said no decision taken by USG as to source of supply. He asked if Israel’s objective is not so much that US supply tanks, as to get tanks; possibly other sources would be cheaper. Eshkol said he open to suggestion; maybe would be better for both of us if tanks came from non-US source. However, tanks from US would strengthen US commitment to Israel in Arab eyes. 2. Defense policy. Eshkol voiced appreciation of US public assurances (and on my reminder) of private Presidential assurances. But Israel’s “basic philosophy” is autoemancipation of surviving Jews; self-labor and self-defense. USG says its protective umbrella covers Israel but “we must stand on own feet and be able to touch the umbrella.” More bilateral military consultations would be good. However, PriMin expressed doubt that, if UAR attacked Israel and Soviets supported UAR, US would necessarily intervene with force on Israel’s behalf. Also, future US administrations might have different views on Near East. I reminded PriMin that (1) absolute security does not exist, (2) even US security relies significantly on our friends, (3) our commitment to Israel is fundamental no matter what US political changes occur. Feldman said we agree we want to keep balance of forces in Near East. 3. Missiles. Eshkol and Feldman had spirited exchange as to degree of threat posed by UAR missile program, and Israel’s reaction. PriMin said UAR would have 900 missiles in three or four years. Feldman replied this impossible. Eshkol: We know US is unhappy with us on missiles; cannot understand why. Feldman: Missiles Israel is buying from France will accelerate arms race; they are very much better than anything Nasser could have for years. Eshkol: UAR is first in jets including bombers, navy and tanks. How does US know Egyptian missiles will not be markedly improved soon? Feldman: PriMin can be sure if Israel gets superior missiles, UAR will get better ones. Eshkol: Why should we always step back? We will have merely “a few dozen” missiles in year or two. I noted PriMin still talking in terms of direct equations, overlooking striking power of Sixth Fleet. Eshkol: Therefore my stress on our defense philosophy. If Israel attacked, Washington’s natural tendency would be to take matter to UN, wait few days, ascertain Moscow’s reaction. Meantime, many Israelis killed. “We must be here to help you; we must absorb first shock.” I again observed timing of Sixth Fleet’s counterpunch not a crucial factor; knowledge that it would come will deter UAR. Eshkol said US means well but fails understand situation. “If I could believe you could persuade Nasser to stop on his missiles or else Israel will get better missiles…But US does not succeed in persuading Nasser.” Look at Yemen, where UAR troops gaining valuable experience. UAR has employed mortars in gas warfare. Is USG certain UAR will not put gas warheads on its missiles? Feldman reiterated USG has different appraisal UAR missile threat. Both our experts and Israel’s agree Egyptian missiles are now primitive. PriMin speculated Nasser building push-button weapons to compensate for Israelis’ man-for-man fighting superiority. He begged USG “not to exaggerate intelligence of our men.” Feldman said it impossibe for UAR to become serious push-button attacker for years. He warned that Eshkol will not be able to convince President’s military advisors that US appraisal of missile threat is wrong. After deliberating, Eshkol said “then we are in bad situation.” During further Eshkol-Feldman exchange on missiles, Feldman stressed dangers of Israel’s forcing pace of sophisticated missilery in Near East. PriMin said it “almost inhuman” to ask Israel to foreswear missiles. Feldman urged that before Israel acquired missiles on large scale it consult with us. Eshkol promised consult if “we go into hundreds.” Later he said consultation might be appropriate if Israeli acquisitions exceed range of “few dozens” already contracted. Re number of French missiles Israel has already ordered, Eshkol said “Maybe five more or ten less than 25; about one or two or three dozen.” PriMin made clear Israel would be glad to stop missile acquisition if UAR ceased its missile program. He asked USG to “keep going to Nasser” on missile problem not to concentrate wholly on dissuading Israel. 3 4. Weapons financing. Early in our talk Eshkol decried US “over optimistic” analyses of Israel’s capability to pay much for more weapons. Sure, Israel has 700–800 million dollar balance, but it owes vast sums in dollars. In 1965 foreign trade gap will be $400–450 million. If USG “denies, denies, denies, we will sell everything we have to gain security”, Eshkol said. Near meeting’s end PriMin said he hoped talk of USAID clear-out untrue. Israel must buy missiles; US can help financially on tanks. Dollar drain for (French) jets enormous. 60–70 Mirages cost Israel “much more” than $100 million, plus spare parts and cost of training “there”. Eshkol reminded us that as MinFinance he had opposed Hawk deal. I noted GOI nevertheless approved deal. PriMin promised provide Feldman with precise figures on Israel’s outstanding dollar obligations for military hardware. 5. June 1 meeting. Having set guidelines for consideration of tanks, missiles and desalination, Feldman said President may wish also discuss Jordan waters problem. Mrs. Meir said question of Maqarin Dam capacity would be worth focus. Eshkol said in view UAR missile threat and opposition and press realization thereof, when he returns from Washington he must have “something to tell the people”. (Deputy PriMin Eban and others are pushing this line too.) Feldman said another worthwhile topic could be general NE area relations. (Israelis did not comment on this point at this meeting, but later Assistant DirGen Herzog discussed long-range NE policies with Feldman.) Feldman said Palestine refugees also might be discussed, although he doubted if anyone had come up with workable new idea. I commented it difficult to discuss Israel’s relations with its neighbors without reference to important refugee problem. Eshkol said only solution is resettlement; Cyprus has taught GOI a lesson. Also, USG should give more money directly to host governments rather than a UNRWA. Mrs. Meir said she already drafting direct negotiations draft res for next GA. Feldman remarked she could spend her time more profitably otherwise. Feldman several times noted Eshkol’s time with President will be limited to about an hour, thus important to concentrate on most vital issues. Yahil suggested if USG wishes discuss refugees, PriMin might do so with Secretary Rusk rather than President. Feldman recommended Eshkol not be specific in publicly claiming any accomplishments, especially re tanks, as result visit to US. PriMin agreed. As meeting broke up it was agreed our call on Eshkol would be described to press as for general discussion his June visit. Recommend Department repeat most if not all of this message to recipients Depcirtel 1791. 4 Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Secret; Exdis. 2 Telegram 1022 from Tel Aviv, April 7. (Ibid., E 11–3 ISR) 3 Telegram 1021 from Tel Aviv, April 7, reported that in a meeting with Eban later on April 6, Feldman emphasized the danger to the Near East region if Israel were to put nuclear weapons on the missiles it was acquiring, noting that the United States felt very strongly about this, although he had been diverted from stressing it with Eshkol. (Ibid.) Telegram 1033 from Tel Aviv, April 9, reported that in a meeting on April 7, Deputy Defense Minister Peres reiterated Israeli willingness to abandon missile acquisition if Nasser halted his program, but that Feldman and Barbour had concluded there was virtually no hope of persuading the Israelis to eschew a missile program. (Ibid.) 4 Circular telegram 1791, March 26, sent to 14 posts in the Near East and North Africa and to London, informed the recipients that the Department was preparing a study on the question of Israeli arms requests and requested comments. (Ibid., DEF 19–3 US–ISR) 38. National Intelligence Estimate 38. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 8, 1964. NIE 36–64 MAIN TRENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD 2 The Problem To estimate general trends in the Arab world over the next several years. Conclusions A. Political turmoil in the Arab world appears likely to continue for many years to come. The military have come to play an increasing role, but—except in Egypt—they have not proved to be a stabilizing factor. Iraq and Syria in particular are likely to remain highly unstable. The monarchies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Libya will come under increasing revolutionary nationalist pressure, and one or more of them may be extinguished in the next several years. Nasser appears likely to remain the single most influential Arab leader. The noteworthy economic and social progress of the past ten years will continue, although as in the past, it will be uneven and varied. (Paras. 3, 5, 8–10, 16–19) B. The emotional appeal of Arab unity will remain very strong, but in general the pan-Arab movement is likely to be confined to the kind of cooperation among independent countries that occurred at the Cairo summit meeting in January 1964. (Paras. 20–22) C. Arab attitudes toward Israel remain basically hostile, but a fair proportion of Arabs have gradually come privately and reluctantly to accept the fact that Israel will exist for many years to come. The Arab-Israeli arms race will cause tensions and could lead to limited or selective hostile action. Other danger points are the Jordan waters problem and the possibility of Israeli military action in the event of a radical political change in Jordan. Nevertheless, the general inhibitions on open warfare would be strong, and a serious rise in tensions could probably be contained by great power pressures. (Paras. 23–26, 29, 30) D. Arab relations with the West remain heavily influenced by hatred of “imperialism” and by Western support of Israel. The possibility of a sudden deterioration of Western relations with the Arabs over Israel is always present. The Arab nationalists generally will press for termination of Western base rights in the area. While they will also press for a greater share of oil revenues and a greater degree of participation in production, nationalization appears unlikely. (Paras. 31–33, 35) E. The Soviets probably believe that the tide is running against the West in the Arab world and that they can capitalize on the unsettled political situation and upon various tensions between the Arabs and West. If US-Arab relations should deteriorate sharply, there would probably be a noticeable strengthening of Soviet influence. We do not believe, however, that this would result in one-sided reliance on the Soviets or a more accommodating attitude toward local Communist parties. (Paras. 36–38) [Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 8. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense,AEC, and NSA representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction. A table of contents is not printed. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. 2 This estimate does not cover Sudan and the Maghreb. [Footnote in the source text.] 39. Memorandum of Conversation 39. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 14, 1964, noon. SUBJECT The United States and Jordan PARTICIPANTS His Majesty King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan His Excellency Dr. Hazem Nuseibeh, Minister of Court of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan His Excellency Anton Atallah, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan His Excellency Saad Juma, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan The President Mr. George Ball, Acting Secretary of State Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State Robert G. Barnes, Ambassador to Jordan Mr. William Macomber, Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asian Affairs, AID Mr. Robert Komer, The White House Mr. Rodger Davies, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs The President and King Hussein had a private conversation before joining the larger group. The President said that he and King Hussein had discussed a variety of topics including foreign aid, military aid, problems with the Congress, the $3 billion odd dollars spent since 1946 by the U.S. in assistance to the Arabs, and the Jordan Waters problem. He had asked His Majesty to outline his views and his feelings on these subjects. He had also touched on his speech at the Friends of the Weizmann Institute banquet. He told the King that nothing he said in any way implied discrimination. The U.S. proposal on desalinization discriminated against none and favored none. The U.S. offer stood for any country. King Hussein said it was extremely important that we all speak frankly on the problems which face the Near East. Realizing the great responsibilities the U.S. Government carries in the Free World, he believed that there are very few differences between the U.S. and the Arabs and indeed few differences in what we believe in. One great difference was Palestine. He had been asked by the Arab League to bring the sincerest hopes of all Arab leaders that Palestine will not be permitted to become a major problem between us and that relations between the U.S. and the Arab world will continue to improve. The King said the President had been kind enough to refer to his surprise at Arab reaction to the President’s speech. In frankness, the general reaction among the Arabs was one of annoyance. This can be understood only when viewed against the background of the Palestine problem. There is Arab annoyance that so many sorely needed resources have to be utilized to counter what the Arabs consider the major threat of Israel, a hostile state which splits the Arab worlds of Asia and Africa, and complicates Arab problems of development. The Palestine problem has given Jordan a large refugee population, some two-thirds of its total people. Since the 1947 UN resolution, Israel has acquired a greater area than allotted. There have been many crises such as the 1956 push against the Egyptians. In the case of Jordan, Israel is encroaching on Jordanian territory in the south in developing its potash works. In the demilitarized zones, the Israelis continue to encroach. Perhaps most important at this juncture is the water problem, which boils down simply to a diversion of water required in the area to another area. Against this background the President’s remarks had been interpreted as a validation of Israel’s right to divert water and offer to provide means for even greater water resources. Those would permit increased immigration and enhance Israel’s threat to the Arabs. The King said that Arab policy now was one of containment of Israel. Stability in the area depended on establishment of a balance between Israel and the Arab states. Israel must be brought to realize that she cannot continue to maintain a position in the area based on force. At the present, there is no balance between the Arabs and Israel. This is what has caused the Arabs to look to the Soviets for military equipment. Israel’s diversion project raised two problems: The first and most immediate was the increased salinity of the lower Jordan river; the second, the question of increased immigration and the threat to the Arabs of Israeli expansionism. In the face of this acutely felt threat and in light of the fact that Arabs cannot get their requirements for arms from the West, Soviet offers are found acceptable. Arabs do not doubt the desire of the Soviet Union to acquire a foothold in the Near East through provision of arms. However, the Soviets have suffered serious setbacks in the area over the past years and Arab solidarity will be a further guarantee against Soviet penetration. Basically the Arabs seek good relations with all states, but feel that Israel is “the spoiled child at Arab expense and at the expense of the U.S.” What Arabs ask of the U.S. is that it look into the future and see both sides of this issue. The President said that the U.S. sees both sides quite clearly and, reverting to his speech at the Friends of the Weizmann Institute banquet, said that the offer on desalination was an example of U.S. evenhandedness: “We take salt out of his waters and yours; we give to you both.” Foreign Minister Atallah said that he thought the President’s reference had been misconstrued in the Arab world. The particular sentence which caused the difficulty was that saying “Water should not be a cause of war but of peace”. The Arabs interpreted this as U.S. official support of Israel’s right to divert water from the Jordan. Since the dawn of history water has flowed through the Jordan to Galilee and on to the Dead Sea. If Israel unilaterally states that it has the right to stop this historic flow and divert it to alien areas when there is need in the Jordan valley for water, in self defense the Arabs must take steps to secure their rights in this water. If Jordan’s needs for water from the Jordan were satisfied, there could be no objection to Israel’s diversion project. However, domestic and international law both give the riparians in a basin the primary right to water until their needs are satisfied. Israel’s project will result in stopping the flow of sweet water on which some 30,000 Arab farmers depend. It also prevents Jordan from developing lands on which refugees could be settled. The President said that nothing he had said by implication or connotation reflected anything but the U.S. desire to deal equally with all: for the Arabs, for Israel, for any other country. The U.S. position on Israel’s project rests on the plan worked out in 1955. As for the speech, he could not help what interpretations had been given to it, but he did not imply that he would do for one what he would not do for others. This he wished to make clear before other things were touched on. The Arabs complain about what the U.S. does for Israel. The Israelis protest about what the U.S. does for the Arabs and insist that more be done for them. The U.S. tries to do equally for both. The President said the only language he knows is that of candor. In extending $3 billion worth of assistance to the Arabs since 1946, the U.S. showed its interest in their development and their future. The U.S. did not spend money on people it hates. The U.S. did not extend more than $40 million to Jordan last year for any reason except to strengthen the country and speed its progress. The King responded that the Jordanians were grateful, but when aid to the two million Israelis was weighed against this, the equation was not balanced. However, the Arabs and the U.S. had many joint interests. Mr. Ball said that problems of this kind were laden with history. The U.S. is aware of the controversial nature of most issues in the area and its relations with the area. Certain principles, however, guide U.S. policies. U.S. policy starts from the point that Israel is a fact. In connection with water, the U.S. made considerable effort to seek a solution and the U.S. regrets that full agreement with the riparian states was not obtained. There must be guiding principles to formulate foreign policy: U.S. actions, we think, are consistent with these principles. The U.S. would regard use of water from the Jordan system as fair if within the standards set by the unified plan. The U.S. had hoped that Jordan would take actions to insure its full share of water under the allocations, as this was the key to full flowering of Jordan’s resources. Mr. Talbot said that His Majesty knows the U.S. too is concerned over the question of salinity of the waters of the Jordan and hoped that a solution to this problem could be found. Jordan’s East Ghor problem has contributed in large measure to this problem. He believed the recent visit by our water engineer was useful. His suggestion for pumping water from the power company reservoir into the canal offers a short-term solution for the problem of those farmers who face the problem of salinity in waters from the Jordan itself. In the longer range, there is hope for progress on the Maqarin Dam. Storage there would go a long way to preserve resources which are presently not usable. The Jordan valley plan was premised on meeting equitable Arab needs before any allocations to Israel were made; 6–8 years of effort had been devoted to work out a reasonable solution. The continuous concern of the U.S. is that the waters of the Jordan system be available to the appropriate users. We hope U.S. technicians and the Arab technicians can stay in touch with each other on actual and potential uses of the water. This will be of benefit to all and is far more desirable than measures which would serve to increase tensions. Ambassador Juma said that the basic flaw in the U.S. approach is equating of the Arab states and Israel. This flies in the face of the fact that the inhabitants of Palestine are refugees, their property was destroyed, and they are living in misery. In 1947 no Arab delegate would talk with the Soviet representatives at the UN. The strong ties were with the U.S. In one single decade the basic transformation in the entire alignment of the Near East took place because of the U.S. policy toward Israel. Arabs fear that a crisis situation can arise in their relations with the U.S. unless this basic problem is faced squarely. The Ambassador pointed out that the Arabs were not previously interested in large armies or acquisition of modern arms except for parade purposes. He fears that the trend is toward reactivation of the Palestine problem rather than settlement. The Arabs are not opposed to Jews as members of a great religion or as a people. However, the Zionist movement is behaving in a manner which faces the Arabs with dangers. The Zionists are seeking to acquire atomic weapons to further intimidate the Arabs. As a result the Arab world is squandering precious resources in maintaining a balance of armaments. He said he thought it was high time for a new look and a reappraisal of the 1948 policy of “might vs. right”. U.S. policy now is that Israel exists and must be accepted. The Ambassador believed that the U.S. with its principles of justice and morality must take another look at the Palestine problem. Foreign Minister Atallah said that tension was rising because of the arms problem and the expected diversion of the Jordan. Arabs know U.S. policy: Israel has been created to remain there. Arabs know the U.S. anxiety for Arab peace. For this latter, thanks are due. However, U.S. policy overlooks the price asked; the price is tantamount to Israel’s retaining Arab lands illegally and no enforcement of the UN resolutions and the right of Palestinians to return to their homes. Arabs do not expect the U.S. to pick up their chestnuts but do expect support on any additional forms of aggression. Zionism is aggressive—it has designs on the Arab world. Initially seeking only a national home, this proved not enough and a Jewish state was necessary. The Jewish state quickly overran borders allotted and lines emerging from the Armistice are now becoming sanctified as the status quo. The Zionists took lands, settled aliens thereon and now are bringing more. Although all persecuted Jews have long been settled, Zionists seek other Jews for Israel. They seek them from the U.S., the USSR and Britain. (The President was called out at this juncture for an urgent telephone call.) Clearly their aim is expansionism from the Zionist heartland. Arab refugees have no right to their home but Jews from abroad do. Israel wants more land, more water and more people. If Israel has its way with Jordan waters, Jordan will become a desert while the Negev blooms. Some people say that Palestine provides a military base for the West, the Foreign Minister said. However, he would not go that far. He noted that the President had said that water should be a cause of peace. Arabs interpreted this as saying “Let Israel take your water”. There are those that say that the Arabs for four generations let water waste in the Dead Sea. However, resources have not been available to fully utilize this water. This, said the Foreign Minister, is the mood of the Arab world. This is its spirit. Arabs respect you for your efforts to achieve peace, but feel you have different standards for Israelis. Mr. Atallah said that there is nothing sacrosanct in the Jordan [Johnston?] Plan. Arabs have refused it since it gives Israel control of Arab waters. Israel is an expansionist state and a threat to the Arabs. Mr. Talbot said that the foregoing reflected differences in our assessments of the Palestine problem. His Majesty’s visit enables us to explore areas in which to seek cooperation on a practical basis. It is impossible now to turn the clock back. The King here interjected his agreement. We are faced with a given situation. We should see how within this framework we can cooperate. Our differing estimates of Israel’s expansionism and capabilities must not prevent us from exploring those areas where we seek cooperation. The King said that a review of the background of current problems was useful. Now we could get on with discussions of mutual interests. Mr. Ball noted that we understood and regretted that both sides objected to the basic elements of the Eric Johnston Plan. The U.S. in its approach to the problem needed some standard and the Plan provided this standard. Notwithstanding the position of others we used the Plan as a yardstick on which to base our judgment of what was equitable and reasonable. The President rejoined the group and apologized for his absence. He reiterated the evenhanded nature of proposals made in his February 6 speech. The discussion ended and His Majesty departed for luncheon in the State Department. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 4/14–15/64 (II). Secret. Drafted by Davies on April 15 and approved by U on April 27 and by the White House on May 4. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President met privately with King Hussein from 12:05 to 12:15 p.m. in the Oval Office followed by a 15-minute session with the press for photographs. The meeting recorded here took place in the Cabinet Room from 12:30 to 1:06 p.m. (Ibid.) An April 10 briefing memorandum from Ball to the President is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, (II). An April 13 briefing memorandum from Komer and Bundy to the President is ibid., 4/14–15/64 (I). Other records pertaining to the King’s visit are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 JORDAN and POL 7 JORDAN, and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2385–2386. 40. Memorandum of Conversation 40. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 15, 1964, 3–3:40 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense King Hussein of Jordan Brigadier Khammash of Jordan Phillips Talbot, NEA, State John T. McNaughton, Acting ASD(ISA) Summary The important assurances by the Secretary were these: 1. US performance of undertakings incidental to military aid grant and military sales hereafter will be carried out promptly and the items will be in good condition, with adequate spares and appropriate ammunition. Hereafter fulfillment of commitments will be of highest priority—if necessary at the expense of US stocks. 2. He is prepared to talk to Jordanians (even to send representatives to Jordan) about possible purchases by Jordan of US arms using funds made available to Jordan-Syria-Lebanon by the new Arab group. The Secretary did not promise to sell but only to talk about selling. 3. Military aid to Jordan for FY 65 will be at the same level as for FY 64. This will be managed somehow out of whatever Congress authorizes and appropriates. (Note: The Secretary (4) did not discuss the C–47s and (5) did not discuss any $5 million loan to Jordan.) Chronological Account The conversation began by the King’s assertion that he thought that the new Arab cooperation would lead to increased stability in the area. There was some discussion of economic development in Jordan—the 7-year program with approximately 10% increase in the economy each year. The King used this point to shift to his concern that economic development, which could make Jordan independent of external aid, could be thwarted if military aid was reduced. He stated that Jordan was far behind militarily. Secretary McNamara, with respect to US past performance of military aid undertakings, stated that it had come to his attention that the US had been late in deliveries, had delivered equipment without spares, and had provided some defective equipment and ammunition. He assured the King that this would be handled more effectively in the future and asked the King to send him a personal cable if our performance in the future was otherwise. The King asked whether the Secretary was prepared to sell arms to Jordan, payment coming from funds made available to Jordan from the new Arab organization. The Secretary stated that he would be prepared to have his people talk about this with Jordanian representatives. He added that with respect to sales as well as grant, hereafter US performance would be prompt and items would be in good condition, with adequate spares, and with appropriate ammunition. Secretary McNamara said that Jordan could assume that military aid from the US for FY 65 would be at the same level as for 64—that this would be managed somehow out of whatever funds Congress authorized and appropriated. There was some discussion about the Jordanian economy (extension of irrigation, drilling for oil, etc.), education and health. The King referred to the Palestine problem—particularly the problem of refugees. He referred to Communist influence in the Near East and called the area a “bridge” between the Bloc and Africa. He stated that he saw the new Arab grouping as a stabilizing regional thing and hoped to see Iran and Turkey included. He mentioned that there were enticements—financial and ideological—to tie to the Soviets. He stated, for example, that the Soviets offer MIG-21s at two-thirds price. He hopes that the US looks at both sides of the problem and does nothing to make it difficult for US’s friends to continue the course they want to continue, as friends of the US. Secretary McNamara, stated that fulfillment of undertakings to deliver military items will hereafter have top priority, if necessary at the expense of US stocks. Mr. Talbot raised the question of the unfortunate introduction of “sophisticated” hardware into the Near East. The King stated that all Jordan wanted was to maintain a “balance” in the area. He stated that Israel could “clobber” Jordan in 48 hours. Mr. Talbot stated that Israel phrases the problem in almost exactly the same terms and urges increased armaments for themselves on the grounds that the Arabs could destroy them. He suggested that an increase of several million of arms on one side would almost certainly lead to an increase of an equivalent or a greater amount on the other. Brigadier Khammash stated that 15 million pounds a year for 10 years will be made available to Jordan-Syria-Lebanon by the Arab group. The King and he stated that perhaps 5 million pounds of this each year would go to equipment. The King stated that something had to be done to stop Israel—that Israel had set up a potash operation in Jordan territory (“formerly Trans-Jordan”), that Israel was occupying more and more of the demilitarized zones, and that Israel was misbehaving with respect to the Jordan river waters. He urged the United States not to do anything without considering “both sides.” Both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Talbot assured the King that the United States was doing exactly that. Secretary McNamara concluded by assuring the King again that DOD performance of undertakings hereafter would be as he had indicated earlier. John T. McNaughton 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77 A 75, Memos of Conversation Between Sec. McNamara and Heads of State (other than NATO). Confidential. Copies were sent to Solbert, Director of Military Assistance General Wood, Sloan, Rowen, Henry J. Kuss, Jr., and Strickland. The meeting was held at Blair House. 41. Memorandum of Conversation 41. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 15, 1964, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT The United States and Jordan PARTICIPANTS The President Acting Secretary of State Ball Assistant Secretary of State Talbot Ambassador Duke Ambassador Barnes Mr. Robert Komer H.M. King Hussein of Jordan H.E. The Minister of Court Hazem Nuseibeh H.E. The Foreign Minister Anton Atalla Ambassador Juma The President opened the conversation by presenting the King a volume of colored photographs taken during the King’s visit, commenting with a laugh that on the basis of the hospitality and good will reflected in the pictures it was going to be hard for the King to demonstrate to his Arab colleagues the diminishing interest of the U.S. in the Arab world, which he was quoted in the press as having mentioned in his address that noon. The King quickly denied that he had said any such thing and added that he was very upset that such a story could appear in the press. It was completely contrary to everything he felt. Exchanges such as those he had had in Washington could do much to erase doubts and establish a level of good will that would extend through future relations. The President said the truth of the matter was that the USG is interested in and concerned with the future of the Arab people and would continue to be in the future. Of course there would always be some people who would seek to misinterpret our position but he could assure His Majesty that there had been absolutely no change in policy by the present administration. We had no intention of being friends of one country at the expense of another but would always strive to deal with each one equally. The King said he was very pleased with the exchange of views which had taken place and if at any time in the future some misunderstanding should arise he would be glad to exchange personal messages in order to avoid having a serious problem develop. The President then said that it was important for the King to bear in mind that the amount of help which Jordan received from sources other than the U.S. would affect what we were able to do. Within the limit of the resources which Congress makes available he stood ready to help Jordan. The Secretary of Defense had already discussed military assistance. We were also ready to help with economic assistance. He hoped the King would assure the Arab world that this was our attitude. At the same time he should realize that Soviet aid to the Arabs did influence the Congress and could have a bearing on the level of resources made available to the Executive Branch and therefore on our ability to render assistance. The King said he was very grateful for this statement and he knew that President Nasser would be too. Nasser had asked the King to convey his greetings to the President and he personally wanted to express the hope that U.S.-Arab relations could in the future be close. The President said that he wanted to be able to do more than at present but the Congress wanted to do less. It was true that we had very heavy taxes and a very large national debt. The answer to our level of aid would be some agreement between the Executive and the Legislature, but the conduct and actions of foreign governments could do much to influence the range of this agreement. The King said that Jordan remained deeply grateful for everything which had been done and continued to do the best it could with the resources which it had. For instance, various reforms had been instituted in the budget and fiscal side of the government. A new 7-year development program was being initiated with the object of reducing Jordan’s need for external assistance. The rate of taxation in Jordan was the highest in the Arab world but even so they had just proposed a bill providing for reform of the income tax. Domestic expenses had been frozen for the past two years while government revenues had been pushed up about 10% per year. This was Jordan’s response to American aid. As for the Communist problem the King said he did not today consider this a threat to the area. It had been a problem in the past but there was now a relaxation of tension which had reduced the threat. Jordan had accordingly established relations with the USSR. There had been times in the past, he said, when he did not know whether Jordan could survive. Now he felt in a more secure position. He wanted to thank the President again for his kindness in inviting him on this visit. From time to time he welcomed the opportunity to tell the Arab side of the story and he believed this kind of frank exchange could assure friendly relations between their two states in the future. The President said he appreciated this comment and wanted the King to assure all the Arabs that Johnson is just as much their friend as Kennedy was. Our desire was for peace and good will. He referred again to his Weizmann Institute speech and said he had never meant to take sides. This had apparently been misunderstood but the real truth is that we want to help all. He would like to be able to see all the Arab leaders to make this clear but since that was impossible he was glad it had worked out so that the King could come and speak as a representative of all the Arabs. The President then referred to the constant Israeli pressure for more arms because of the increase in Arab arms. The King said no such increase applied in the case of Jordan which was still far behind in armaments. This was very worrisome to him and he hoped that some day a balance could be achieved. Secretary Ball spoke up to say that we had always sought to avoid an arms race. New weapons produced a demand for more new weapons which led to a spiral of ever increasing armaments. Ideally we should have complete disarmament but this was not possible. By the same token you could probably never achieve a perfect balance for one side or the other would forever be seeking more. Dr. Nuseibeh said he wanted to make it clear that Jordan was the victim of this increase in armaments. They were not increasing their armaments but they remained the most vulnerable country. Foreign Minister Atalla added that he had no doubt as to the sincerity of the U.S. position toward the Arabs. He knew we had tried to avoid an arms race in the area. We had sought to solve the refugee problem. But Jordan nevertheless remained the country in the exposed position and therefore the one which needed outside assistance. Mr. Talbot pointed out that it was this very situation which had given rise to the statement made by President Kennedy on last May 8. President Johnson added that the May 8 statement remained the policy of the U.S. Government. The King said the fundamental element in this picture had to be the long Jordan frontier with Israel. Presumably the arms which Saudi Arabia or Iraq possessed were considered part of the so-called balance but these arms would do Jordan little good. Israel had the capability of hitting hard and effectively and therefore Jordan felt very exposed. Secretary Ball said the presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet should provide a measure of security in the area. Our power was Jordan’s assurance of protection. Therefore we found it very hard to understand Nasser’s attack on the Libyan bases. These were useful to us and therefore were a part of the stability of this area of the world. The King said that if there could be a continual exchange of views in the future we could avoid this kind of misunderstanding. He had seen the statement that these bases were designed to help Israel. This is part of the Arab concern. He was glad to have this explanation and he would certainly report these views to the other Arab leaders. The President added that the matter of the bases was a real problem. If we were in effect to bring the bases home why should we send military assistance out the following week to help maintain stability in the area? Dr. Nuseibeh said the Arabs had a genuine fear that these bases were designed to assist Israel. They had not simply adopted a pro-Soviet position on the bases but were concerned about them as a threat to the Arabs. The President said the bases were definitely not a threat to the Arabs but were a part of the stability of the area. He hoped the King would convey this message to all the Arab leaders. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 4/14–15/64 (II). Confidential. Drafted by Ambassador Barnes on April 22 and approved by U on April 29 and by White House on May 4. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the President’s office from 4:33 to 5:25 p.m. (Ibid.) 42. Special National Intelligence Estimate 42. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 15, 1964. SNIE 36–2–64 IMPLICATIONS OF US MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL The Problem To assess the implications of a US decision to provide Israel with 500 modern medium tanks. Conclusions A. The atmosphere of US-Arab relations, which has been relatively good for the past few years, has recently become clouded by a resurgence of Arab suspicions that the US has a pro-Israel and anti-Arab bias. These suspicions would be greatly increased in scope and intensity were the US to furnish 500 tanks to Israel. (Paras. 4–7) B. Every Arab state would take at least some anti-US action, which might include harassment of US diplomatic establishments and of oil companies, revocation of some military transit rights, and increasingly anti-US positions in international forums. Termination of US base rights at Wheelus Field would be speeded up. Self-interest would, however, place some restraint on Arab reactions, and widespread nationalization of oil properties would be unlikely. (Paras. 8–10) C. The receipt of tanks from the US would gratify the Israelis and would strengthen their long-held hope that the US will eventually make a definite decision to take Israel’s side in its disputes with the Arabs. Israel’s own policies and attitudes towards the Arabs would not be softened, however, since they are dictated by considerations of national security. (Paras. 15–17) D. US ability to moderate area disputes would be seriously impaired for some time, especially with respect to the Middle East arms race, which would be intensified by the US action. The Soviets would be alert to exploit a variety of opportunities which the US action would give them to identify themselves more closely with the Arab cause. (Paras. 12–14) [Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem (Background Use Only). According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 15. The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. 43. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 43. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 16, 1964. Eshkol’s second negative reply (Tel Aviv 1054 attached) 2 to your renewed personal appeal that he let us reassure Nasser about Dimona is probably not final. Instead, I’d see it as a bargaining counter he wants to hold out for his meeting with you. So instead of going back again, I suggest we too hold off; meanwhile we’ll tell Israelis of your disappointment. 3 Eshkol’s negative and Mike Feldman’s inability to move him on missiles further strengthen our suspicions that Israel is heading for a nuclear deterrent, even though some years off. We thus face a tough decision as to how hard we want to hit Eshkol when here, given our flat opposition to nuclear proliferation. We’ll have this fully staffed out for you. Bob Komer 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence. Secret. 2 A copy of Eshkol’s April 15 letter is attached. Telegram 1054, April 15, which transmitted the text, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. 3 Bundy wrote “agree” in the margin next to this paragraph. 4 Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 44.Memorandum of Conversation 44.Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, April 17, 1964. PARTICIPANTS H.M. King Hussein of Jordan Ambassador Adlai Stevenson Ambassador Robert G. Barnes Following a dinner which he had given in honor of King Hussein, Ambassador Stevenson took the King aside for a private conversation. In the course of their discussion the Ambassador said that in his opinion the time had come for a serious effort at finding some solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. As the King had been told, the U.S. would not countenance any effort to exterminate Israel and equally we could not tolerate Israeli aggression against the Arabs. If both sides could accept this it should be possible to discuss possible ways and means of ending the present conflict. Otherwise we appeared to be on the edge of a new arms race which might have disastrous results for the whole area. There were two elements which appeared to give new hope. First, in the post-Cairo atmosphere, he assumed it would be possible to find a single Arab voice. Second, he gathered from what the King had said that he would be willing to give a private commitment of the territorial integrity of Israel. If these two suppositions were true, it should be possible to undertake some private talks, without any publicity, about ways and means of ending the present impasse. After it was pointed out that territorial integrity was a difficult concept because there were territorial aspects of the present controversy, Ambassador Stevenson suggested that what he really meant was mutual pledges of no aggressive intentions. This should create the basic condition necessary for some exploratory discussions. The King said that the Arab states were prepared to give such a pledge of no aggressive designs on Israel provided there was no publicity. He then went on to stress what he called the “inequality” of past actions with respect to Israel, the basic distrust which the Arabs had of Israeli intentions, plus the suspicion in many Arab quarters that the U.S. shared the Israeli aggressive designs on Arab land. Under the circumstances he thought that finding an amicable solution to some specific problem such as the salt pans dispute would greatly assist in establishing the bona fides of Israel and the U.S. Government and would thereby facilitate the steps which Ambassador Stevenson had in mind. The King then reverted to the point he had made both publicly and privately over the previous few days that he hoped the U.S. could look at the Arab-Israeli dispute “from both sides.” He implied that in his opinion an examination of the record over the past few years would indicate that we had not been impartial. The only example which he would offer was that Jordan invariably faced great resistance whenever it sought financing for something that competed with Israel, such as the proposed potash plant. Governor Stevenson continued with the comment that the Arabs were their own worst enemies. Statements about driving Israel into the sea merely built up Zionist determination to fight the Arabs and their ability to raise funds. The time had come to face this whole issue realistically and to work toward some solution. Otherwise we faced a new arms race with no one gaining and all losing. Hussein said he felt the Arab leaders were prepared to face the problem realistically. Further he had left Washington with a real feeling of the President’s sincerity and he therefore understood what Ambassador Stevenson was saying. In response to a specific query, he said that Jordan did need some increase in its military forces but that he had in mind only incorporating the national guard into the regular army which would increase overall security and also lead to better discipline and control over all Jordanian forces. He did not want sophisticated weapons but just the necessary small arms. He stressed the importance of receiving help on this in order to maintain at least some Arab states with western type equipment. In concluding the conversation Ambassador Stevenson commented on the relative lack of any attack on the King in the American press. He said it was very important to try to keep the public aspect of the trip balanced and he still hoped to see a headline before the King left quoting him to the effect that peace was possible in the Middle East. This would help more than anything else the King could do. He knew the King had a message to get across in the Arab world but he should also remember that he had a message to get across in America. The representative of the Arab League who had just joined the group expressed his agreement with this comment. The King said he still hoped to return some day in a private capacity with his family and perhaps really get to visit and understand America. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 JORDAN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ambassador Barnes on April 22 and approved in S/S on April 29. The meeting was held in Ambassador Stevenson’s apartment. 45. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk 45. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 20, 1964. SUBJECT United States Policy Toward U.A.R. 1. You asked me to take a hard look at our U.A.R. policy. Toward this end a good many man-months of effort have already gone into the National Policy Paper on the U.A.R., 2 the current draft of which substantially supports our policy approach. The attached summary and abstract (Tab A) 3 represent the latest version of the policy paper, which is now to be circulated to members of the U.A.R. Working Group for further refinement. Ambassador Badeau addressed himself to this same subject in a recent letter to the President (summary and text at Tab B). 4 2. I would like an early opportunity to give you a brief oral summary of our policy review. In view of S/P’s responsibility for the U.A.R. National Policy Paper, I have asked Mr. Rostow to accompany me. The Problem 3. Whether we can better protect and advance United States interests in the Near East (Tab C) 5 by continuing our present policy toward the U.A.R., including active dialoguing and substantial economic assistance, or by seeking to restrict Nasser’s freedom of action by, in effect, cutting off his rations. In-between measures would bring all the disadvantages of the present policy without any of its advantages. Discussion 4. Most U.A.R. policies that we and our friends find troublesome relate to Israel, Western bases in the Near East, or intervention in neighboring countries. All three are regional perennials, and the first two, at least, are widely shared by other Arabs. 5. On these and other issues the U.A.R. has the political and economic power, independent of United States assistance, to jeopardize United States and British interests in the region if it should determine to do so. With all its weaknesses, it remains the most populous, most powerful, and most influential of the Arab states, with a capability not only to move but also to lead other Arab states against Western interests. Cessation of United States aid would not adequately reduce this capability. (Tab D) 6 6. Constructively, benefits have been derived from our policy of recent years, when we have successfully moderated pressures against our major interests through our dialogue with the U.A.R. (Tab E) 7. Advocates of the “get tough with Nasser” policy fail to realize that we already appear to the U.A.R. to have embarked on this course. The relevant factors include the virtual freezing of new assistance since mid-1963, the Gruening-Farbstein amendments, the attendant personalized attacks on Nasser in Congress and the press, the assassination of the President, and the reactions to the two Johnson speeches. In the atmosphere of the Arab Summit and our support for Israel’s diversion of the Jordan, these developments have provoked anxiety as to constancy of United States policy and an Arab public posture of truculence toward the United States and the West. 8. During our effort in the mid-50’s to roll Nasser back by confrontation, the damage done Western interests, as then perceived, was enormous. It was then that Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, brought in a massive Soviet military and economic presence, pressed a hard anti-Western line throughout the Arab world, and accented a leftist neutralism that supported Castro, Lumumba, and extremist movements elsewhere. Since 1961 the balance has been substantially different. 9. The Near East is now being swept by the forces of revolutionary modernization. Since the Arab peoples viscerally identify the status quo with the West, the West is a natural target for their frustrations. In any confrontation between the two, the Arabs have the built-in strategic advantage of contesting on home ground, where Western military superiority is nullified by the nuclear stalemate and the force of neutral opinion. In a contest confined to political and economic action, the West could do serious damage to Arab interests (Tab G), but at the same time the Arabs could do unacceptable damage to Western interests (Tab F). In a struggle between the Arab states and the Western powers, the Soviets would be the only winners. 10. At the present juncture, a challenge to the U.A.R. will be a challenge to the entire Arab world. Our vulnerabilities in the area and the capabilities of U.A.R. propaganda are such as to facilitate conjunction of anti-United States and anti-Israel sentiments and to consolidate the Arabs against us, not only in the eastern area but also in North Africa. On the Israel issue, there is no possibility of emergence of a countervailing Arab grouping. 11. We have enjoyed influence and a degree of immunity from pressures throughout the region in recent years; the challenge of a policy change could reduce our position in the area to the confines of a “Fortress Israel” surrounded by a hostile and increasingly powerful Arab world. U.A.R. pressures could be mounted against civilian overflight rights (access to Africa, Middle East, South Asia), United States commerce (half a billion dollars a year), United States oil interests (a billion dollars a year in direct benefit to the balance of payments), United States presence generally, and against any trend toward eventual accommodation between the Arabs and Israel (Tab G). 12. A policy change would polarize the Near East, with the Arabs solidified into an anti-Israel, anti-American bloc cooperating with the Soviets facing a United States-supported Israel. 13. Nasser has not cast his lot with the Soviet bloc, nor has he turned implacably anti-West. On the contrary, there is evidence that the U.A.R. desires to straighten out the tangled lines of our relations. Propaganda on the Wheelus issue has tapered off, U.A.R. officials have told us that about March 27 anti-United States commentary in Egyptian media was enjoined, and Nasser volunteered to Robert Anderson on March 20 that the single most important question in his mind is improved relations with the West. Conclusion U.A.R. objectives include reduction of the military threat it perceives from Israel, and eventual elimination of western military bases from the area where the U.A.R. has paramount influence. We need to retain the Wheelus base through 1970, and our policies in the Near East are premised on an eventual accommodation between Israel and the U.A.R. Our assistance program provides the carrot which can restrain or contain action. Without it, we will not be able to maintain meaningful relations with the U.A.R. Without it, we stand to promote Arab militancy toward Israel and to expose our base rights to perhaps overwhelming pressure in the period of need. Aside from this element of U.A.R. economic need and our ability to satisfy it, we also have other interests in common: mutual opposition to Soviet expansionism, development of commercial and economic intercourse, and the strengthening of Arab independence and Arab will to resist foreign encroachment. We are not concerned merely with the U.A.R.’s capacity to do grave damage to our interests in 1964. To my mind, the most compelling objection to jettisoning our present policy is that it offers the best prospect for building a durable position for the United States in the Near East in the years to come. To facilitate cooperation, the United States should try to avoid involvement in area disputes not threatening its interests directly, accord Arab states access to United States markets, financing, and cereal surpluses, and provide positive support to development programs. We should seek to maintain constructive exchange with the U.A.R., reaffirming our area interests and our willingness to continue economic assistance provided the basic United States position in the area is not challenged. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Talbot, Davies, Duncan, and Curtis F. Jones and concurred in by Rostow. Sent through Harriman, and Macomber (AID/NESA) was informed. 2 The National Policy Paper on the UAR has not been found, but a summary in outline form and an abstract are attached to a copy of Talbot’s memorandum, ibid. 3 The tabs are not attached. Copies of Tabs A through C are attached to the copy of Talbot’s memorandum cited in footnote 2 above. 4 See Document 5 . 5 Tab C is an unsigned, undated paper entitled “U.S. Interests in the Near East (In Approximate Order of Importance.” 6 A copy of Talbot’s memorandum dated May 4, one of a set of copies of the memorandum made for wider distribution, is filed with a complete set of tabs, including Tab D, “U.A.R.’s Base of Independent Economic and Political Power;” Tab E, “Benefits Derived from U.S.-U.A.R. Cooperation, 1960–1963;” Tab F, “U.A.R. Intentions and Capabilities to Move Against American Interests;” and Tab G, “Western Capabilities of Political and Economic Reprisal Against the Arab States,” all unsigned and undated. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Egypt) 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, April 22, 1964, 6:51 p.m. 4953. Deptel 397 Amman, 809 Tel Aviv, 4343 Cairo. 2 In meeting with King Hussein April 15 Assistant AID Administrator Macomber urged King give favorable consideration Criddle proposals. Recognizing political difficulties acceptance could pose, Macomber suggested King depict his move pick up waters from power plant pool as unilateral assertion Jordanian rights. Noting Arab Summit Jordan diversion plan may never come to fruition he pointed out Criddle proposals could yield water within year—without King’s having declare himself against Summit plan. King said he had taken lead in trying keep Arab leaders standing by Summit decisions; acceptance Criddle proposals would mean he himself would be “going off the reservation.” Macomber suggested he could portray Criddle proposals as interim step to fellow Arab leaders. King wondered about US financing Mukheiba dam and heightening of East Ghor canal walls. He was told USG backing for Mukheiba not possible because it inconsistent with 1955 plan. Similarly we could not assist in raising East Ghor walls unless this project integral part measures carry out Unified Plan. Macomber assured King Maqarin dam would have strong behind the scenes support USG and expressed hope GOJ would move swiftly get engineering and financing for this project. King conceded Criddle proposals and Unified Plan would give Jordan more water than Arab plan and promised he would go back and take another hard look at proposals. Said he remained skeptical about Criddle proposals and would have to discuss with “other Arab leaders.” For Amman: Believe King has keener appreciation technical advantages Criddle proposals and has acquired idea of tack that might enable him to carry off politically his acceptance. It clear however in King’s conversation with Talbot April 16 (Depcirtel 1950) 3 he far from convinced Criddle proposals wise. You should not press King on this matter after his return though you should be ready discuss if he raises it. Would seem best continue assure his most influential technical and political advisors are fully conversant our views. You should continue give this high priority. For Cairo: If King actually consults other Arab leaders re Criddle proposals, Nasser will probably be among them. In view Salim’s hostility proposals and his apparent role in determining King’s earlier negative reaction prospects we could sweeten atmosphere in Cairo seem dim. Dept officers recently have taken line with Amb Kamel that Unified Plan represents only means insure Israel respects Arab rights and that Summit statesmanship has shown signs of turning into spite and menace. Kamel appeared taken with idea Unified Plan which safeguards Arab water rights should not be thrown away. He said he would report along these lines to Cairo. Does Embassy see any prospect mitigating UAR hostility at least to degree assuring silent UAR acquiescence GOJ acceptance proposals? For Tel Aviv: King told Macomber he convinced Israelis already dumping salt water into Jordan. Do you have any info to substantiate this charge? You may inform GOI that in spite negative tone King’s remarks on Jordan waters in public here, he did not completely bar possibility re-examining components technical formula. We still consider essentials Criddle proposals alive but believe further time necessary for maturing of ideas we have planted. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Heywood H. Stackhouse; cleared by Macomber, Donald A. Wehmeyer, and in draft by Davies; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Amman and Tel Aviv and repeated to USUN. 2 Telegram 397 to Amman, March 19, also sent to Cairo as telegram 4343 and to Tel Aviv as telegram 809, expressed regret that Jordan and the UAR rejected the technical formula on Jordan waters but indicated hope that it might still be possible to obtain acceptance of its components. The telegram instructed the Embassy in Amman to continue discussion with the Jordanians of the realities of the problem and of the course of action that would best advance immediate Jordanian interests. (Ibid.) For text of the technical formula, see footnote 5, Document 11 . 3 Circular telegram 1950, April 19, summarized the conversation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 JORDAN) 47. Memorandum for the Standing Group 47. Memorandum for the Standing Group 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Response to NSAM 290, “Meeting Israeli Arms Requests” The State and Defense Departments have thoroughly analyzed the questions raised in NSAM 290. Their tentative conclusions are that the U.S. is sympathetic to Israel’s growing need for modernization of its armor and would find it advantageous from a production and balance of payments point of view to sell 500 tanks to Israel but: (a) Israel’s need is not immediate; (b) the political cost to the U.S. of meeting this need directly would be too great; and (c) there are alternate possibilities for meeting Israeli needs via European suppliers which offer promise. The conclusion that the cost of U.S. interests in the area of providing the tanks from U.S. sources would be heavy is supported by SNIE 36–2–64 of 15 April 1964. Moreover, Israeli acquisition of surface-to-surface missiles is a matter of great concern to the U.S., because of the new arms spiral it would help stimulate in the area and the additional step toward an Israeli nuclear deterrent it might entail. These judgments are more fully discussed in a State Department paper (Tab A) 2 and one from the Department of Defense (Tab B). 3 Therefore, the agencies concerned tentatively recommend that the following be the basis for U.S. discussions with Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol: 1. The U.S. should tell Israel that, while recognizing Israel’s growing need for tanks, the U.S. cannot enter into direct supply at this time. 4 2. However, the U.S. believes that alternate sources of supply which meet Israeli needs can be made available, with U.S. help behind the scenes, and is willing to help Israel explore these. 5 3. The U.S. should tell Israel again of its strong opposition to Israeli missile acquisition and seek to dissuade Israel from going down this road; we are even more concerned about the development of nuclear weapons and insistent that there be no proliferation of such weapons in the Middle East. 4. The U.S. is intensifying its exploration of possible arms control measures to damp down the Middle East arms race, and enlists Israeli help in this effort. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAM File, NSAM 290. Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum of April 27 from Read to McGeorge Bundy. Another copy shows that the memorandum was signed by Harriman for the Department of State and sent to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, who signed on April 25. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470) 2 The Department of State recommendations, in a package headed “NSC Standing Group Meeting, April 28, 1964: Israeli Arms Requests,” were that the United States should (1) encourage Israel to acquire tanks and anti-tank weapons from its usual Western European suppliers, (2) explore means to facilitate this, (3) dissuade Israel, “by appropriate means,” from acquiring missiles or developing nuclear weapons, and (4) accelerate and intensify U.S. secret efforts to achieve practical arms control in the Near East. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 290) 3 A Department of Defense memorandum for Bundy, in a package headed “NSC Standing Group Meeting of April 28, 1964: Meeting Israeli Arms Requests, (NSAM—290),” set forth three alternatives: (A) U.S. supply of 300 tanks to Israel as a military assistance sale on liberal credit terms, (B) U.S. assistance to Israel in procuring tanks from Western Europe, and (C) treatment of the tank request as a part of the larger problem of controlling the arms race in the Middle East by seeking Western European and Soviet agreement to prohibit the provision of advanced weapons to the Middle East and seeking their support for an urgent effort to obtain agreement from Middle East countries for arms control measures. (Ibid.) 4 Bundy wrote “Yes” in the margin next to this paragraph. 5 >Bundy wrote “Yes, plus” in the margin next to this paragraph. 48. Memorandum by the Board of National Estimates 48. Memorandum by the Board of National Estimates Washington, April 29, 1964. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 49. Memorandum for the Record 49. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 30, 1964. SUBJECT Standing Group Meeting on Israeli Requests for U.S. Tanks 2 The Group met in the White House Situation Room on April 30. Those present were: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House, (in the Chair); Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman; Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance; Deputy Director of CIA Ray Cline; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Sloan; Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, JCS; Mr. Robert W. Komer, White House; Mr. Bromley Smith, White House; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John D. Jernegan. After discussion of the papers presented, it was decided: 1) The United States could not afford the losses in the Arab States which would be caused by its agreement to furnish the requested tanks to Israel; 2) nevertheless, Israel had a valid need for the tanks and failure to meet it in some way would generate unacceptable pressures against the Administration and in particular against the Foreign Aid Bill; 3) therefore, the United States should make a strong affirmative effort to assist Israel in obtaining tanks from other nations, the most promising sources being Great Britain, France, and West Germany; 4) it would be highly desirable to communicate the decision on this matter to the Israelis before the visit to Washington of Prime Minister Eshkol on June 1 and to be able to assure them that there were good prospects for purchases outside the United States; 5) knowledgeable, high level representatives of the Department of Defense should proceed promptly to London, Paris and Bonn to explore the question with top officials of the three governments; 6) since European tanks were likely to cost more and be less immediately available than American tanks, the United States should be prepared to offer additional economic aid to Israel to compensate for this extra cost and delay; the United States should also seek other means of showing its friendship and support for Israel at the time of Mr. Eshkol’s visit—in this connection there was discussion of the possibility of proposing a cooperative project in desalination with nuclear power. It was agreed that it was important to satisfy the Government of Israel that its needs would be fully met. It was further agreed that the initial investigation regarding tank availability in Europe should be kept very quiet. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jernegan. 2 A draft summary record of the meeting by NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith indicates that the meeting was at 5:15 p.m. It presents the conclusions set forth in this memorandum in summary form and adds that the Standing Group agreed on a further effort to persuade Nasser to refrain from a missile program. (Ibid., Files of Robert Komer, Israel Security (Tanks), Nov. 1963–June 1964) 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, May 3, 1964, 4:41 p.m. 5141. Eyes only Cane for Ambassador. Our previous two Cane probes with Nasser have accomplished little more than provide a basis for continued discussion. But risks of continued arms buildup in the Near East so serious that we believe it essential to continue dialogue and press for some tacit agreement on both types and quantities weapons before matter gets out of hand. We believe that in frank discussion we should put our cards on table and make clear we think missile-nuclear arms race one which Nasser cannot win given Israel’s financial resources, technical capabilities, and general availability armaments. In any case Nasser knows that US and other Western Powers simply cannot allow Arabs to knock Israel any more than (as proved at Suez) we intend to tolerate Israeli aggression against Arabs. We should also make clear that in our approach we are not seeking to do Israel’s work. Our bona fides has been established in 1956 and years following. Now armaments are threatening to get out of bounds with increasing risk to area stability and of possible great power involvement in any conflict which might inadvertently develop. Self-defeating nature missile race should now be more evident to Nasser. For example, IDF’s General Rabin stated April 15 that Israel has appropriate answer to UAR missile threat and Adzhubei implied in Paris April 8 that France supplying Israel with SSM’s. So did Foreign Secretary Butler’s backgrounder here, which undoubtedly got to Arabs. Recent Eshkol statement to Feldman that he would halt Israel’s efforts enter SSM race if Nasser could be persuaded exercise restraint is additional new element. Israel is particularly concerned about missiles just as Nasser worries about Israel’s nuclear potential. Therefore, what we aim for are tacit, private assurances from both sides re nuclear non-acquisition and missile restraint. If Nasser will come along, we can probably get Israel agreement as well. Accordingly, you should take early opportunity make following points to Nasser: 1) You may say President Johnson much appreciated Nasser’s recent letter, 2 and will be replying. President particularly noted Nasser’s assurances about UAR opposition to nuclear weapons races. President hopes will be possible to work out some practical means of dealing with risks of ME arms race, and has requested you to take matter up quietly with President Nasser once again. 2) USG gravely concerned over implications ever more-rapid acquisition destructive weapons by Near East states. We were pleased to learn from President’s talk with Talbot that UAR not now planning major deployment SSM’s but clearly, basic problem remains. UAR missile development is forcing pace leading to Israeli reaction. Nasser may now be aware from Adzhubei statement in Paris that Israel apparently obtaining small number SSM’s from France. UAR acquired missiles first. Israel is following suit. We tell Israelis UAR missiles do not represent significant military threat but they are nervous. With missiles, Israel will have added incentive seek develop nuclear capability. US determinedly opposes nuclear proliferation but recognizes Israel might be impelled try “go it alone” in response UAR missile build-up. However, missiles are expensive and we believe Israel would forego them if convinced that UAR would show similar restraint. 3) If UAR pressure continues build up, Israel has financial strength to match acquisitions. We doubt support from world Jewish communities likely taper off. 4) Accordingly, we think Nasser would be foolish not to consider seriously some kind of tacit arrangements of mutual restraint which would embarrass neither party. In fact, one could argue that Nasser would gain more than Israel. There is parallel here with variety of tacit arrangements we have arrived at with Soviets. In addition to Test Ban Treaty, we have understanding on bombs in outer space and matching decisions to curtail production of fissionable materials. These are not policed except through our intelligence capabilities. As UAR intelligence on Israel’s armed forces is good, so is Israeli intelligence on UAR forces. If Nasser could only assure us that he does not intend to proceed further with UAR missile development and will not acquire nuclear weapons (see separate message), 3 we believe we could also obtain quiet assurances from Israel not to deploy SSM’s or develop nuclear weapons. If Nasser not really intending waste lot of money on missiles, we see to his advantage not to spook Israel too much. 5) So far as nuclear weapons are concerned Nasser is aware we are pressing Israel to accept these safeguards; we shall continue to do so. We are puzzled by UAR statements on IAEA at Geneva Disarmament Conference where UAR representative objected to IAEA safeguards on transfer of fissionable materials or equipment as proposed by U.S. delegate March 5. We had impression from Talbot discussion that Nasser thought it possible for UAR to accept IAEA safeguards at an appropriate time. If UAR considers present IAEA arrangements too complex, we would like to know. 6) UAR support for principle of IAEA safeguards would help our worldwide effort extend these to increasing number of peaceful use facilities of all member states. Of these, Israel is clearly one of most significant where agreement most needed. We also recognize major nuclear powers must accept for increasing number peaceful nuclear activities same inspection they recommend to other states. USG therefore is offering major US reactor for IAEA inspection. We hope this offer, like Tarapur in case of India, will be helpful precedent. 7) In our approaches, we not seeking press Israel’s case and we hope our bona fides sufficiently established for Nasser to realize this is so. We are aware Arab conviction Israel inherently expansionist and poses continuing threat. We do not share this conviction, on basis our knowledge. We wish affirm categorically that US would vigorously oppose any effort by Israel to expand its borders. Similarly we would react within and without UN to threat of aggression against any area state. 8) Although we especially concerned over new rivalries in missile and nuclear field, we also hope to develop some means to slow down race in conventional arms. As UAR has acquired larger quantities modern tanks and aircraft, Israel has sought same. The more Nasser gets from Soviets, more Israelis will have to get from French, UK, FRG and US. Time to curb arms race is running out. With appreciation for Nasser’s understanding of area forces and trends, we would welcome his thoughts on how spiraling of arms stockpile might be slowed. 9) We hope Nasser will give these points careful thought. US remains determined pursue effective Near East arms limitation not because it favors either side but because, in its own interest, wishes avoid being drawn into conflict into which it will almost inevitably be drawn. We earnestly hope it will be possible for Nasser to see merit of our contention. We also hope he can make early response re foregoing ideas. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret. Drafted by Davies and Dickman; cleared by Walt Rostow, Harriman (by telephone), Foster, U. Alexis Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Talbot. 2 Nasser’s April 26 letter was transmitted in telegram 2508 from Cairo, April 27. It welcomed the continuation of correspondence between himself and Johnson and expressed agreement on the desirability of expanding areas of cooperation and seeking to reduce areas of disagreement, but it went on to review broad areas on which he implied there was disagreement: imperialism, Arab disunity, inequality between rich and poor nations, inequality within nations, and Israel. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) 3 Telegram 5140 to Cairo, May 3, instructed Badeau to note that Nasser had told Talbot he would reconsider a statement not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, although he had difficulties with the proposed draft letter that Badeau had given him in October 1963, and to make clear U.S. willingness to consider a new draft or some other technique. It transmitted the text of an alternate draft letter from Johnson to Nasser. (Ibid., POL 7 US/McCLOY) Except for minor revisions in the first paragraph, Johnson’s May 20 letter to Nasser ( Document 59 ) is identical to the draft letter. 51. Special National Intelligence Estimate 51. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, May 6, 1964. SNIE 36.1–64 NASSER’S POLICIES AND PROSPECTS The Problem This estimate is designed to assess the policies and prospects of the UAR’s President Nasser in his own country, in the Arab world, in the nonaligned camp, and in the world at large. It is aimed at providing judgments about where Nasser is heading, what he is likely to do along the way, and how his actions are likely to affect US interests. Conclusions A. Nasser’s fundamental objective is to create a new order in the Arab world—to build a prosperous Egypt, establish its independence and dignity and that of the Arab world generally, and bring about some measure of Arab solidarity under his aegis. He considers that the elimination of foreign influence is essential to the achievement of these goals, and he regards a strong military force as basic to his own retention of power. Since the influence of the Western powers is more extensive in the Near East than that of the Communist states, Nasser’s campaign against the status quo impinges more on US than on Soviet interests. (Paras. 1, 3, 4, 22) B. Nevertheless, Nasser’s policies are designed not primarily to favor or to injure the interests of the West or the Bloc, but to serve those of the UAR. Indeed, Nasser is well aware of his need to remain on tolerable terms with both the US and the USSR, since he presently relies on the former for food, on the latter for arms and for aid to build the Aswan dam, and on each for the political backing that keeps him from becoming unacceptably dependent on the other. His basic consideration is to remain nonaligned; in particular, he would not want to see Soviet military bases and special political positions in the Near East replace those of the West. (Paras. 21, 24–26) C. Nasser will continue to work for the establishment of governments favorable to him and for the removal of special Western political and military positions in the Near East. He will support Arab nationalists (except Baathists) with propaganda and material aid. A principal target in the near term will be Aden, where a dissident populace offers tempting opportunities. However, Nasser will exercise a good deal of caution to avoid a military confrontation with the UK. (Paras. 12–15) D. We foresee a continuation of Nasser’s personal rule in Egypt and of his efforts to develop an economy largely controlled or supervised by the state. He is likely to incur repeated foreign exchange stringencies, but these will probably not be so severe as to cause major cutbacks. (Paras. 5, 7–9) E. Nasser hopes that Israel will some day be eliminated as a state. He recognizes that for the foreseeable future he will not have the military strength to defeat Israel. He will bitterly resent any Western moves that seem to reinforce Israel’s political standing or military strength. (Paras. 17, 18) [Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 6. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. 52. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 52. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, May 8, 1964, 1 p.m. 2632. Reference Deptels 5140, 5141, 2 5168. 3 President Nasser received me 1930 hours May 7 for 45 minute interview. In light of Deptel 5168 I focused discussions principally on possibilities Middle East arms race alleviation along lines set forth in reference telegram. My presentation opened with transmittal written text of Presidential letter contained in Deptel 5140. After carefully reading this and requesting exact meanings of certain words, President recalled this subject had been discussed with John McCloy and Secretary Talbot. I reminded him that origin of discussion was President Kennedy’s earnest concern for practical steps in the reduction of armament and containment nuclear development which would further world peace. As President Johnson’s letter indicated he completely shares this interest and is desirous of carrying it forward. The presentation I was about to make was at President Johnson’s request and represented his thinking. I then put forward in slightly expanded form the views set forth in Department telegram 5141, emphasizing particularly the following: 1. The accelerating pace of sophisticated weapons acquisition between the UAR and Israel generated geometrically progressing danger so that any step, small in itself, greatly increased chances of final explosion. 2. Israeli financial and technical capability is such that they will match, and perhaps overmatch, every step taken by UAR as Adzhubei statement in Paris re SSM’s shows. Result is not only that UAR security can never be absolutely established but growing financial burden will make it increasingly difficult for UAR to support weapons and economic progress at same time. 3. As a great power US has embarked on course of self-disciplined restraint in aspects of weapon development vis-a-vis Soviets. Without formal agreement or special verification procedures, Soviets have taken similar steps. While admittedly these are limited they are not only a hopeful beginning in containment of arms development but indicate quiet process by which some advance can be made without formal bilateral negotiations. UAR as great power in Arab world should be willing to follow same path. 4. USG deeply concerned over all nuclear development and particularly over possibility of nuclear weapons in Middle East. In view of this we consider it essential to peace of area as well as to world interests that IAEA safeguards be accepted. As I had pointed out to President Nasser on earlier occasions, we consider this one of most effective and practical steps to meet Arab fears that Israel may be developing nuclear weapons. I therefore bespoke UAR support on IAEA safeguards, expressed concern at UAR criticisms of these at Geneva Disarmament Conference, and invited any constructive views President desired to put forward on this subject. 5. Although USA does not share Arab belief Israel inevitably expansionist, I stressed our vigorous opposition to any Israeli expansionism beyond its borders and our strong reaction to any aggressive threat against States in area. With this as background I dwelt at some length on USG commitment to general peace and tranquility in Middle East. This is sometimes interpreted by Arabs as being a pro-Israeli policy but I was sure President Nasser understood the falsity of this and recognized that howsoever strong Arab distaste for Israel might be its continued presence is a hard fact that had to be taken into account in seeking to prevent undue arms acceleration with ensuing danger of conflict. 6. In conclusion I reviewed plan whereby UAR would unilaterally and quietly give USG assurances that it was prepared not to go beyond its present level on either number or sophistication of advanced weapons, particularly rockets. On this basis chances are good that similar undertaking can be obtained from Israel both as to increase and deployment of SSM’s and most importantly the eschewing of nuclear weapon development. A first step would be President Nasser’s affirmative answer to the request made in President Johnson’s letter for written assurance re UAR intention to acquire nuclear weapons. President Nasser listened quietly to this presentation, asking several questions for clarification of English technical words and details of proposal. He then requested that I send him as soon as possible a written summary of the presentation I had made, 4 saying that this question was of such importance that he would have to study it carefully before giving any answers. He promised to see me for a “long session” after the Khrushchev visit. President Nasser then said that he would be replying to President Johnson’s letter and that he would give assurances on UAR’s purpose to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons as the President had requested. I probed to discover whether this assurance was a private one for President Johnson alone or would be in such a form that it could be made public, but without success. The President again assured me that he would answer President Johnson’s request affirmatively but could not be drawn into either the exact form or contents of the commitment. Comment : During McCloy conversations on above topic, the President put forward immediately objections to the plan. That he did not do so in this interview I consider somewhat hopeful; certainly a small gain will have been made if Nasser fulfills his intention to give President Johnson the assurances he seeks re UAR acquisition nuclear weapons. While Nasser will certainly give me one or more long sessions on above topic and other basic questions of UAR-USA relationships after Khrushchev visit, I believe it unlikely these will be completed before Eshkol arrival in USA June 1st. In my opinion it would be a mistake to press any timetable of talks that suggests this exercise is governed by Eshkol visit. Perhaps one reason for not prolonging the discussion was that President Nasser is obviously under the weather. He looked grey and drawn and told me that ever since his return from Yemen he had been ill and was still taking heavy doses of antibiotics. Badeau 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret; Exdis. 2 See Document 50 and footnote 3 thereto. 3 Telegram 5168 to Cairo, May 6, urged Badeau to find out from Nasser as soon as possible his reaction to the arms limitation probe before Eshkol arrived in Washington on June 1, so that the President could actively support a new approach to Israel. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCLOY) 4 Telegram 5503 to Cairo, May 14, stated that the Department wanted to review the draft of a written presentation of the points made by Badeau before giving it to Nasser. (Ibid.) Telegram 2709 from Cairo, May 15, reported that Badeau sent a memorandum of the conversation to Nasser on May 12. (Ibid.) 53. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Johnson 53. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 11, 1964. SUBJECT Tanks for Israel I have rarely been exposed to as much pressure as I have had recently on the question of tanks for Israel. It has been only after considerable effort that members of Congress have been restrained against making speeches on the question, the Anglo-Jewish press has killed several articles, and responsible leaders of the Jewish community have demonstrated their confidence in the Administration by keeping silent. I call this to your attention at this time because the pressure continues to mount and I believe we should prepare our position as soon as possible so that we may be able either to (1) take advantage of any favorable decision or (2) counter any adverse decision. I believe the various Government departments concerned are now ready with their recommendations, and I am ready with mine. Myer Feldman 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. No classification marking. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A handwritten note by Walter Jenkins reads: “Mac—President says pls talk to Feldman and LBJ about this.” In a May 13 telephone conversation, Bundy asked Johnson’s approval to have Senator Abraham Ribicoff and New York banker Abraham Feinberg tell Ambassador Harman and any Jewish leader they thought necessary that public discussion of the question of tanks for Israel would be counterproductive. It would “make life tough for our British friends,” Bundy commented, if it looked “as if we were passing the buck to them.” He told Johnson that he was with Ribicoff, who was willing “to try and keep things buttoned up” if Johnson wanted. Johnson approved, saying, “I want him to stop everybody that’s talking about it.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Bundy, May 13, 1964, 3:35 p.m., Tape F64.26, Side B, PNO 7) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 54. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 54. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 1 Washington, May 11, 1964. RNA–12 SUBJECT The Search for a “Palestine Entity” The projected conference of Palestinians now scheduled to take place in Jerusalem late in May 1964 focuses attention on various attempts of the Arabs to organize their Palestinian brethren into a group to represent the common interest. This paper has been produced in response to a request for a study of the past history and current status of the Palestine entity question. Abstract The Arab states once again are giving prominence to plans for the establishment of some form of body to represent all the Palestine Arabs. At the Arab Summit Conference in Cairo in January 1964, Ahmad al-Shuqayri, a Palestinian long prominent in Palestine Arab affairs, was designated to organize a so-called “Palestine entity.” Thus far, Shuqayri has announced a “National Charter for Palestine” and a “Constitution of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.” These documents will be laid before a conference of Palestinians scheduled to open in Jerusalem on May 28, 1964. He has announced also the formation of a “Palestine Liberation Front” to be composed of commando units to be kept combat ready. While Shuqayri has been attempting to gain support for this Charter and for the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestine Liberation Front, his rivals, notably Hajj Amin al-Husayni, have been organizing to oppose these schemes with the support of Arab states opposed to Nasser. The current endeavor to create a Palestine Entity, like previous attempts, seems destined to become a victim of the continuing struggle for power among Palestine Arab leaders and of the contest over the balance of power in the Arab world. [Here follows the Discussion portion of the paper, followed by copies of the proposed charter and constitution.] 1 Source: Department of State,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 69 D 492, POL 3/2, Palestine Entity. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 55. Memorandum From President Johnson to His Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) 55. Memorandum From President Johnson to His Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) 1 Washington, May 15, 1964. SUBJECT President’s Instruction for Feldman-Sloan Mission In view of the repeated Israeli pleas for a quick answer on their tank request, I am sending you to explain our position on the matter. You should explain to Prime Minister Eshkol that we are giving him our firm views through you so the tank matter won’t get in the way of a constructive visit, to which I am looking forward eagerly. You should then talk with him along the following lines: I. Context in Which We Considered Tank Request . We’ve taken a most exhaustive look at the tank matter, as the Israelis well know. Our JCS and intelligence community have assessed the present and prospective military balance. In arriving at our decision we also had to take into account whether the likely gain to Israel and the US outweighed the potential costs. I want you to assure Eshkol, however, that we did so on the basis of the underlying premise that Israel’s security must be preserved. A. In fact the US regards itself, and all the Arabs do too, as consistently the staunchest supporter of Israel. It is primarily the US which is expected by them to come to Israel’s defense if attacked. This, of course, is simple truth—since 1950 it has been a fixed tenet of our policy, reiterated by every President, to deter and if necessary cope with military aggression against Israel. We have also, through both public and private means, been Israel’s strongest financial backers. I want you to say again that I am as firmly behind this policy as my predecessors. B. But we have felt it necessary to maintain at least an appearance of balance between Israel and the Arabs, because of our wide interests in the area and desire not to thrust Arabs into arms of Moscow. This policy has always seemed to us as much in Israel’s interest as our own—not only does it give us leverage with Arabs but it helps limit Arab receptivity to such obvious Soviet meddling as Khrushchev is up to right now in Egypt. C. One facet of this policy has been to avoid providing clearly offensive weapons to Israel or to Arab states which could use them against her. Nor has this policy compromised Israel’s ability to maintain a substantial deterrent edge. Shrewd purchases from Europe, indirectly subsidized by US aid, have enabled Israel to stay well ahead of Arabs. In fact, our JCS and intelligence people all see Israel retaining a substantial margin of superiority for the next several years. D. This is also the year of the Jordan Waters crisis, on which the US is already carrying the main burden of backing Israel. To overload the circuit by such a dramatic shift in US policy as a big tank sale, especially at the very time when Moscow is bidding for Arab favor, could simply undermine our relations with the Arabs. We mean here not just the UAR but almost every Arab country: 1. It might jeopardize the position of Jordan, and at the least make it impossible for Hussein to maintain close relations with us. 2. Since Libya has become one of the most fanatical anti-Israel states, we would almost certainly lose our base. 3. Our restraining influence on issues like the Jordan diversion would be thrown away just when it is needed most. Arab frustration over their inability to do much about it could easily be catalyzed by a tank deal into a violent reaction against us. 4. In fact, we see a major risk of Arab counteraction against our oil, already likely to come under fire because of the Jordan Waters crisis. Khrushchev could end up the chief gainer, not Israel. II. Meeting Israel’s Need for Tanks . For all these reasons I do not believe that the US can afford a direct sale of tanks. Nonetheless we are as interested as ever in seeing Israeli deterrent capabilities maintained (though our JCS and intelligence people think Israel more pessimistic than it need be, and we believe Israel discounts far too heavily the added deterrent created by Arab belief the US will intervene). A. On tanks specifically, we recognize that Israel’s armor needs gradual modernization to keep a dangerous imbalance from developing, though here too our JCS see needs as more like 300 than 500 tanks over next 2–3 years. We also note heavy Israeli purchases of advanced AT weapons. B. We intend to see that Israel gets the tanks it needs, but without exposing the US to unacceptable political risks. We believe, based on recent inquiries, that it can buy enough modern tanks to meet its needs—in quantities, on terms, and with delivery schedules comparable to the best we could do ourselves—from the UK and possibly West Germany. Of course we can’t speak for them; Israel will have to talk directly. C. But we promise US help in paving the way. The one absolute imperative is to avoid publicity, especially surrounding the Eshkol visit here. If the finger is pointed at London or Bonn it would be politically impossible for them to fill such a large order. D. The US could not justify grant MAP to Israel in any case. Its financial position is such that it can afford to buy tanks. And Centurions from the UK or M–48s from Germany are probably available at similar prices to what we’d charge. Nor, as you told Eshkol before, could we justify giving tanks free while Israel uses its own foreign exchange to buy missiles from France. III. Israeli Missiles . I want you to assure Eshkol that our concerns over Israeli missile plans in no way influenced our decision. We also recognize we can’t make this decision for Israel. But I want Eshkol to know of my worry lest Israel get missiles on a scale which would actually serve to accelerate the arms race rather than damp it down. You needn’t argue this matter, but simply remind Eshkol that it is on our agenda. Tell him our experts are convinced UAR can’t develop enough missile capability to present much of a threat. Even advanced missiles are of questionable value without nuclear warheads, which are far beyond the UAR. So we wonder why Israel should spend so much on highly expensive missiles, which are wasteful without nuclear warheads and highly dangerous if the Arabs conclude, as we fear they will, that Israel has nuclear plans in mind. In sum I want you to make clear that, while we can’t sell Israel tanks directly, we intend to see that a comparable alternative is worked out, always provided the matter can be closely held. Thus we are confident that Israel’s security concern can be suitably met. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Secret. Drafts of this memorandum entitled “Feldman Talking Paper, “dated May 13 and 14, apparently drafted by Komer, are ibid. The memorandum was sent to Johnson with a May 15 covering memorandum from Komer, which states, “It tells Mike exactly what we want him to say, so he won’t stray off the reservation.” (Ibid.) A copy filed with a May 19 covering memorandum from Bromley Smith to Rusk, McNamara, and JCS Chairman Taylor states that the instruction, as amended by Rusk, was approved by the President on May 16. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470) See Document 57 . 56. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 56. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, May 16, 1964. I–24,361/64 SUBJECT Tanks for Israel There will be a meeting at the White House at 1130 today to discuss this subject. Problem . To determine whether to send a mission (Mike Feldman, of the President’s Staff and Sloan) to Tel Aviv to advise Prime Minister Eshkol of the U.S. decision on tanks; and to consider a proposed “talking paper” for the mission (Tab A). 2 Discussion . Upon return of Komer and Sloan from Europe, 3 and after your report of conversation with Minister Von Hassel, 4 a letter from the President to Mr. Eshkol was drafted, advising that the U.S. could not supply tanks but that European sources would. 5 The President indicated that he preferred to send a personal messenger since the answer was to be essentially negative, provided we had sufficiently firm British and German positions on the sale of tanks to inform Eshkol that his needs could be met. The British have decided they are willing to sell; both Centurions to be fitted with 105mm guns, and new Chieftains further on. Denis Greenhill advised Mac Bundy of this decision orally on Thursday 6 and promised a written message to confirm by today. The Germans are experiencing considerably more difficulty. Ambassador McGhee reported by telephone to Komer on Thursday that Erhard, Schroeder and Von Hassel all continue to remain negative. 7 Von Hassel continues to be concerned about problem of replacing M–48s sold to Israel by the FRG; and the Foreign Office is very concerned about Arab antagonisms and the question of Arab recognition of the East Germans. McGhee had a meeting with Schroeder scheduled for today, and a further cable was sent to him yesterday on the subject (Tab B). 8 His answer should be available by the time of the meeting this morning. We may then determine whether the mission should be sent to Tel Aviv. A negative answer from Bonn will throw a cloud on the British deal also, because they wish the U.S. and/or the FRG to share the political heat. Besides the Israelis least prefer the Centurion which has a range of only 120 miles. They want as many M–48A3s as possible. There is the further problem that no final decision has been made by the President that the U.S. will provide the retrofit kits (105mm guns and diesel engines) to convert the German M–48s to M–48A3s. Mac Bundy and Phil Talbot take the position that we must be responsive on this, but the supply would be through the FRG and not direct from U.S. to Israel. Recommendations 1. We should send the mission to Tel Aviv only if we have a reasonably affirmative answer from the Germans. Otherwise a Presidential letter is preferable. 2. We should agree to furnish retrofit kits for any M–48s which the FRG sells to Israel, provided the Germans will act as a channel for the sale of guns and engines also, and it is not a direct sale to Israel by the U.S. 3. Approve the proposed “talking paper” for the mission (Tab A). John T. McNaughton 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470 Secret; Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the memorandum states that McNamara saw it on May 16. 2 Tab A, entitled “Feldman Talking Paper,” dated May 13, is a draft of Document 55 ; see footnote 1 thereto. 3 Sloan and Komer conducted discussions May 3–8 with officials in London and Bonn concerning the possibility of Israel’s purchase of tanks. Reports on their mission are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I and in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. 4 Reports of McNamara’s discussion of tanks for Israel with German Defense Minister von Hassel and Chancellor Erhard on May 9 and 12 are ibid. 5 The draft letter is filed with a May 12 memorandum from Jernegan to Talbot. (Ibid.) 6 The conversation is recorded in a May 15 memorandum by Komer. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I) 7 The telephone conversation is recorded in a May 14 memorandum by Komer. (Ibid.) 8 Tab B is a copy of telegram 3242 to Bonn, May 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR) 57. Memorandum for Record 57. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, May 16, 1964. SUBJECT Israeli Tank Discussion with the President, May 16, 1964 PRESENT The President Secretary Rusk Asst. Secretary Talbot Mr. Jack Valenti Secretary McNamara General Maxwell Taylor Mr. Frank Sloan Mr. John McCone Mr. McG. Bundy Mr. Myer Feldman Mr. R. W. Komer When this item came up Mr. Bundy distributed the draft instructions from the President to Feldman and Sloan for their mission to Israel. Secretary Rusk queried whether we should say anything about possible economic aid at this time if this seemed necessary to pave the way for Israeli tank purchases in Europe. Feldman thought that this would really be desirable because as he pointed out the Israelis probably did not want secondhand tanks. Their main interest would be in the new British Chieftain. However, this was terribly expensive; hence to steer the Israelis in this direction, we ought to be willing to promise them some indirect help along the line Rusk suggested. Bundy felt this would create a difficult political problem. We had been telling everyone that Israel had done so well economically that it was on the list of those countries which no longer needed US economic aid. Could we say now that it should get more aid, and still carry credibility with the Congress? Rusk thought that the Congress would buy reasonable continued aid to Israel more easily than to any other country. McNamara suggested, as a way out, that we were selling many millions of dollars of equipment to the UK; we could easily knock down the price sufficiently to make up the difference. If the differential between secondhand M–48s or Centurions and new Chieftains was on the order of $150,000, then the total add-on needed might be on the order of $30–40 million. It was agreed on Bundy’s suggestion that this subject should be left for the Eshkol visit itself. However, Feldman could tell the Israelis that if price were a serious problem, we could consider how to help meet it. Feldman thought that if the purpose of his mission was to get tanks off the Eshkol agenda, we must be able to tell the Israelis more than currently seemed feasible. Harman had told him that the Israelis did not want Centurions. The German deal was better, but unfortunately he couldn’t tell them at this point that the Germans were signed on. Bundy’s view was that we couldn’t really take tanks off the Eshkol agenda. We’d have to talk tanks with Eshkol. But we could take them off the “public” agenda if we handled the matter properly. Feldman asked Secretary McNamara if we could tell the Israelis that we would provide the guns and engines for German M–48 tanks if these were available from Bonn. McNamara seemed to agree, and Rusk pointed out that this would be feasible if we could sell these items through the Germans. Bundy commented that this was the best we could do at the present juncture. Feldman thought that the best he could come back with under these circumstances was assurance that the Israelis would keep quiet till they could explore tank prospects with the Germans and the UK. Bundy agreed, and felt the Israelis should start on this right now. Feldman warned that the Israelis, if they did not get satisfactory responses, might come back to us about tanks. Again Bundy said we would [have?] to leave this to them. He asked whether the President approved the instructions. The President told Feldman to “get the job done and don’t come back without it.” Rusk raised a question about the points on Israeli missiles in the Presidential instruction. Missiles were missiles, even if the UAR variety didn’t seem very good; Rusk didn’t think the President should tell the Israelis they shouldn’t acquire missiles when the UAR had them. He recognized the limited military value of such missiles, but pointed out that they created a major psychological and political problem for Israel. Bundy said the difference was that the Israelis could make nuclear warheads to put on their missiles, while the UAR couldn’t. The real issue was whether Israel was going for a nuclear capability. Rusk felt in that case we should focus on the nuclear weapons. This was the risk. Feldman agreed. He mentioned that Eshkol had said he would gladly settle for a 1–2 ratio missiles vis-a-vis the Egyptians. Bundy pointed out that the number of missiles wasn’t the issue. The intelligence community thought that Israel’s covert program was aimed at a nuclear capability. McCone concurred. The issue, therefore, was one of nuclear proliferation, as Bundy put it. Feldman suggested he use as a cover story that he was going to Israel to arrange a sale of three million pounds of beef under PL–480, and that he actually sign the agreement while there. This would provide a perfectly legitimate cover. He had also been asked by the Kennedy Library to take BG’s recollections for the oral history. This might also provide good cover. The President agreed on the beef story, but felt it inappropriate for a Government official to be going to take oral history interviews. He told Feldman to leave this out. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum of Meetings with the President, Vol. I. Secret. Drafted on May 18. Bundy wrote at the top: “No dis. McGB.” 58. Memorandum of Conversation 58. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Jerusalem, May 17, 1964. SUBJECT Tanks PARTICIPANTS Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister Mrs. Golda Meir, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Deputy Minister of Defense Shimshon Arad, Director, US Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Uri Lubrani, Political Secretary to the Prime Minister Col. Itzhak Nesiahu, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister Myer Feldman, Deputy Special Counsel to the President Frank Sloan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Walworth Barbour, Ambassador Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy Note : The meeting took place at the Prime Minister’s residence in Jerusalem the evening of May 17. The Prime Minister could not receive us Monday morning, May 18, the regular weekly cabinet meeting having been deferred until then because May 17 was an Israeli national holiday. Mr. Feldman outlined the points in the President’s instructions, reiterating a number of observations for emphasis. Inter alia, he explained that the President had been thinking of replying to the Prime Minister’s last communication with another letter, but had decided it would be preferable to send Messrs. Feldman and Sloan to talk with Mr. Eshkol. The President sent warm greetings and asked Mr. Feldman to reaffirm the President’s firm adherence to the commitment of his predecessors to the security of Israel. The Israeli request for tanks had been very thoroughly considered at the highest level of the USG. An important factor in these considerations was how the US could best maintain and expand its influence in the Arab world. We realize there is some difference of view between the USG and the GOI regarding US relations with the Arab states. We feel it is in our mutual best interests that the US retain as much influence as possible with the Arabs. The President has concluded that if the US were to become a major supplier of arms to Israel, especially at this time of particular stress, the situation would polarize dangerously. For instance, such an act could have very negative effects on the Jordan waters situation. In this connection, the President wishes to reaffirm our support for Israel’s utilization of Jordan Basin waters within the Unified Plan. The supply of arms by the US to Israel would severely set back efforts to achieve better de facto relations with Jordan generally. The Arabs would undoubtedly turn to the Soviets for more military assistance. The USG has considered this matter and its ramifications in great depth. We simply could not come to any conclusion other than that we could not be a source of tanks for Israel. However, Mr. Feldman continued, we recognize Israel’s need for tanks and therefore we have looked into the matter much further. We sent a team, consisting of Mr. Sloan and another expert, to the UK and Germany in order to ascertain how those countries might help. Foremost in our minds were two considerations: (1) Israel’s need for tanks, and (2) the desirability of Israel’s obtaining these tanks at the best possible price. Mr. Eshkol wryly interjected that Israel would like to receive the tanks free of charge. Mr. Feldman recalled that when he was last here the Prime Minister and he had discussed the missile problem as well as tanks. He stressed there was no relationship between missiles and the decision we have made about tanks. The USG is prepared to assist in two important ways: (1) we shall assist in every way we can to help Israel get the tanks it needs from the UK and Germany, and (2) in this effort we are willing to supply to the Germans the engines and guns for converting M–48 tanks to M–48A3 models. Although we have no definite assurances either from the British or Germans, we feel almost certain that the UK will supply Centurions on a fairly quick delivery schedule, and that Israel probably can also obtain Chieftains from the British. Mr. Feldman urged the GOI to go to the Germans as soon as possible regarding M–48s. We are talking to the Germans and will continue to do so. They would have a number of problems in such a deal as we envisage. The need for absolute secrecy in this whole matter is paramount, Mr. Feldman emphasized. It is extremely important that it not appear that the British and Germans have been forced by the US to supply tanks to Israel. Therefore, all discussions about the possible arrangements should be held very closely. Noting that the implementation of this plan would result in meeting Israel’s tank requirements, Mr. Feldman said that we would like this present talk to serve as a substitution for Mr. Eshkol’s discussing tanks with President Johnson. Chancellor Erhard will be visiting Washington about a week after the Prime Minister leaves the US. If the German government has not responded to the Israeli request for tanks before Erhard arrives in the US, we will put this topic high on the agenda of our talks with him. Mr. Feldman stressed that the projected arrangement was the best possible, and that it would result in Israel’s securing tanks much more cheaply than it could from the US. The Prime Minister asked what would happen if the German answer were negative. Mr. Feldman said we would prefer not to speculate on that question now. He reiterated the importance of secrecy. He told the Prime Minister that Israel’s friends in the US are being requested not to ask questions about Israel’s arms requirements during the forthcoming delicate period. The Prime Minister should instruct his Embassy to do likewise. If this plan were to become public, its implementation would be rendered impossible. Mr. Feldman urged that the GOI immediately approach the British and the Germans. Mr. Eshkol asked about financing the purchase and conversion of the British and German tanks. Emphasizing that his figures were necessarily only estimates, Mr. Sloan said M–48s converted to M–48A3s might run somewhere between $120,000 and $135,000 per unit. In his discussions with the British, they indicated they could refit the Centurions for approximately the same figure, although they made no definite commitment on price. The British appeared to be very interested in the possibility of selling Chieftains to Israel, and therefore they will probably be inclined to offer to refit the Centurions for a reasonable price. Mr. Sloan said that the Chieftains would probably sell at about $300,000 per unit, about the same as the German Leopard. Stressing that what he was about to say should in no way be taken as any kind of a commitment, Mr. Feldman commented that the USG was aware of Israel’s limited resources. We expect Israel to talk more with us about the problem of financing its security needs. However, we cannot furnish the tanks under the military assistance program, on a grant basis. When the GOI has firm prices from the UK and Germany, it can come to the USG for a further discussion of cost. The feeling in Washington seems to be that Israel’s resources are adequate to cover the purchase of the 300 older tanks, but that when it comes to acquiring newer models, we shall be willing to take another look. Mr. Sloan discussed various technical aspects relating to the German part of the plan. If the Germans can be persuaded to provide M–48 chassis, the cost would probably be less than that which we would have to ask. We would furnish the guns and engines at our lowest book price. The retrofitting would be done in Israel, where labor costs are lower. Continuing, Mr. Sloan said that leaving aside the political questions, the picture appears to be as follows. The British seem ready to deliver Centurions almost immediately and at a more rapid pace than they indicated in their previous discussions with the Israelis. Further, UK probably would like to sell Chieftains to Israel. It is our hope that the Germans can be persuaded to make up the balance of approximately 300 with M–48s. In response to a question by the Prime Minister, Mr. Sloan commented further on the cost estimates on the components. In the ensuing discussion, in which Mr. Peres participated, it was noted that if the Germans supplied Israel with M–48s or M–48A1s, they would have to replace these with M–48A2s at greater cost. Mr. Sloan noted that entirely apart from the political problems involved, there simply are no M–48A3s available. In reply to a question by Mr. Peres, Mr. Sloan said the US had discussed tanks for Israel both with the Defense and the Foreign Ministry people in Germany. He too stressed that perhaps the primary problem is that of keeping this whole matter secure. The Germans and the British are extremely concerned about the possibility of leaks. Mr. Peres and Mr. Sloan discussed additional factors relating to cost and delivery schedules of components. Mr. Peres asked if Israel could not negotiate better prices on the US guns. Mr. Sloan said these prices cannot be reduced; they are our cost prices. If we were to assist Israel on financing, it would have to be done in some other way than changing the item prices. Mr. Peres asked about spares. Mr. Sloan said that both we and the Germans have spares; they present no problem. Mr. Peres noted that Germany’s problem would not be just a question of money. The Government would have to put it before a Parliamentary committee; maintaining secrecy would be very difficult. He suggested that the US give the Germans a tank for a tank at no extra expense; after all, the M–48 is a dying tank. Mr. Sloan said this would present problems for us. Preliminarily, the Germans seemed willing to exchange models even if this involved extra expense for them. Meanwhile, the US will be cooperative. In response to a further question from Mr. Peres, Mr. Sloan said we have indicated to both the British and the Germans that Israel’s immediate problem is acquiring a minimum of 300 tanks over the next two or three [years]. We also told them Israel has a total figure of 500 in mind. Both the British and Germans, each of whom is aware that the other was approached, understand that together the problem is to meet the 300 requirement. Mr. Peres said the provision of the conversion kits normally would take a year. Couldn’t we do better than that? Mr. Sloan thought probably we could not, but we would look into it. The Prime Minister observed there are many “ifs.” Moreover, as far as the Chieftains are concerned, they are extremely expensive. He said he would postpone consideration of the Chieftains for the later tranche of 200; Israel must find cheaper tanks to make up the first 300. Mr. Eshkol asked about the credit terms which the UK might offer. Mr. Peres said they would probably offer three to five years at five and one-quarter percent. The Prime Minister asked if the GOI should approach the Germans; what was the bridge? Mr. Sloan said that while we are quite sure Israel will get a positive response from the British, we are not as sure about the Germans. Israel should approach the Germans now. Mr. Feldman also urged that the GOI immediately approach the Germans. The Prime Minister said he would like to sum up. The USG has decided that it cannot give tanks to Israel. It is suggesting that Israel go to the UK and Germany. He thought the US part of this arrangement should be to come up with some assistance on financing. Mr. Feldman suggested that the GOI first find out what the prices will be, then ascertain what resources are available, then come to the USG and we will talk further. Mr. Sloan reiterated that in our judgement the provision of 300 units at approximately $125,000 per unit, on reasonable credit terms, is something with which Israel could cope out of its regular budget. The Prime Minister said it would be a mistake to assume that Israel could afford such a burden. A deal involving some $60 million, even if payments were stretched over ten-fifteen years, is not something Israel could easily bear. Israel’s deficit in foreign currency (sic) is running at $400 million; next year it will be $420 or even $450 million. Israel is having to pay dollars for the Mirages. Mr. Eshkol said he “confessed” that Israel would mortgage everything in order to ensure its security, “but this is a very heavy burden for you to impose on us.” Mr. Feldman suggested taking one step at a time. The first step is to secure the British and German commitments to provide tanks; the Germans will need a lot of persuasion. Mr. Peres said the IDF is not happy about Centurions. They are inferior to the Soviet tanks which the UAR has. This was the reason Israel did not press the British on the Centurions. The M–48s are far preferable. Mr. Peres suggested that the US supply the conversion packages at a greatly reduced cost, on a surplus basis. Mr. Sloan noted that this would run into serious statutory difficulties. The Prime Minister expressed appreciation that Messrs. Feldman and Sloan had come to Israel. Mr. Feldman again emphasized the need for keeping this whole matter completely confidential. The Prime Minister said, “I agree.” Mr. Feldman commented that Ambassador Harman has been cooperating in preventing speculation; it would be a good idea if the Prime Mininster requested his Embassy in Washington to continue these efforts, especially while negotiations are going on. If the German Government has taken no decision by the time Chancellor Erhard leaves the US, the USG and the GOI will reconsider the situation in Washington. Mr. Feldman said that he would like to review his instructions in order to be certain he had left nothing out. He read out the section on the missile problem and the following sentence re tanks: “We intend to see that a comparable alternative is worked out, provided the matter is closely held.” Mr. Peres suggested that we closely coordinate our efforts vis-a-vis the UK and Germany. He and Mr. Sloan made arrangements to meet May 18th. The Prime Minister said it was good to know where we stood. Mr. Peres commented that Israel was very much concerned about the Khrushchev visit to the UAR. Contrary to the USG estimate, Israel is convinced that the UAR missiles are being rapidly improved. Israel is really worried about missiles with conventional warheads, and has reason to fear that the Egyptians are working on chemical warheads. The difference in our respective judgements about UAR missiles is very great, Peres said. Furthermore, Israel would like to take up with the US the problem of its air strength. It needs “a few score” planes that are heavier than the Mirage. The Egyptians are building airfields further and further away from Cairo. If Israel could acquire some light attack bombers, like the Douglas Skyhawks and P–5’s, the Israeli missile program could be “correspondingly limited.” Mr. Feldman said he was not prepared to react on this point. Mr. Sloan said he hoped it would be possible for Secretary McNamara to give the Prime Minister a thorough briefing on our reaction time and capabilities to come to Israel’s assistance if it were attacked. Perhaps there could be an increased exchange of information of a nature which would help allay Israel’s concerns. The US is confident of its ability to respond to an emergency very quickly. Some quiet exchanges of pertinent information might be very helpful. Israel would find it impossible adequately to face all possible threats by itself. The Ambassador recalled that he and the Prime Minister had discussed this subject on several occasions. He noted that Secretary Rusk, in a recent speech in Brussels, had stressed the impossibility of any country’s being completely secure on its own. The Prime Minister remarked that this was all very good. Israel does not doubt US capabilities. What it does doubt is whether, due to world-wide political responsibilities borne by the US, Israel can count on timely US intervention in all contingencies. Mr. Eshkol said that even though the US is the most poweful country in the world, it feels that it cannot even sell Israel some tanks. There ensued a further general exchange on this question, with Mr. Eshkol contending that only after a country becomes militarily very strong does it take up the theme of the inter-dependence of security. As another group was waiting to see the Prime Minister, the meeting broke up after two hours. Mr. Eshkol again expressed gratification that Messrs. Feldman and Sloan had come to talk to him about this vital problem. At the meeting the following day between Messrs. Peres, Feldman and Sloan, Feldman stressed again the need for restraint in any public discussion of Israeli security needs in the United States. He said it was his understanding, and he asked that Mr. Peres confirm this with the Prime Minister, that every effort would be made to restrain persons following the Israeli security problems from discussing these problems. He referred specifically to public figures who might be unaware of the delicacy of the negotiations. Mr. Peres said he was sure the Israel Embassy would do its part in cautioning against any discussion during the negotiations. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Palmer on May 18. 59. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser 59. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser 1 Washington, May 20, 1964. Dear Mr. President: As Ambassador Badeau was asked to convey to you last year, the United States much appreciated your personal endorsement of the partial nuclear test ban and your Government’s prompt signature of the treaty. Your action contributed greatly toward near unanimity in world support for the treaty. As you know, this step has now been followed by a further effort on the part of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States to curb the increase of nuclear weapons. Thus we are embarked on an earnest effort to reduce tensions and curtail the arms race. Since assuming the Presidency, I have had an opportunity to review the statements made by you and your representatives on the need for disarmament and I have noted your mention of this subject to me in your letter of April 26. 2 I find in your statements assurance that the United Arab Republic views nuclear warfare as the greatest danger to mankind and that your Government regards itself as committed, in a broader sense, not to develop nuclear weapons or introduce them into your defense program. Your confirmation that this understanding is correct would represent a step which others might follow to ensure that the threat of nuclear warfare is further constrained. The ultimate goal we all seek is that of a peaceful world and we must work together in resolving these difficult problems. I know you share this hope and expectation and I would welcome a further expression of your views. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. Top Secret. A draft of this letter was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 5140, May 3, and given to Nasser by Badeau on May 7, as reported in telegram 2632, Document 52 . The letter was sent to Johnson for signature with a May 19 memorandum from Komer, noting that Nasser had said he would give assurances as to UAR intentions to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Komer wrote that although Nasser had not indicated whether he would do so privately or publicly, his statement was sufficiently promising to fulfill Badeau’s request for an official copy of the letter “to smoke out Nasser.” A note in Bundy’s handwriting on Komer’s memorandum stated that he and Rusk strongly concurred. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I) 2 See footnote 2, Document 50 . 60. Memorandum of Conversation 60. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 25, 1964. SUBJECT U.S.-U.A.R. Relations PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. Mustafa Kamel, Ambassador of the United Arab Republic The following account of his conversation with the President 2 was provided by Ambassador Kamel. The Ambassador said he had received a telegram from President Nasser conveying his very best wishes and high regards for the President and asking the Ambassador to convey his thanks to the President for his initiative in entering into correspondence with him. He was particularly touched by the President’s having done so during the sad days immediately after the death of President Kennedy. He instructed the Ambassador to stress his most earnest desire for good relations between the U.S. and the U.A.R. and his great hopes that these would be consolidated on solid bases during the President’s Administration. The Ambassador began his presentation with the following three points: 1. The Near East has great strategic and economic importance to the United States, ranking next to Western Europe in this respect. 2. Egypt, through the ages, has been the heart and mind of the Arab world. 3. The Middle East is passing through a deep and broad transitionary period, and its stresses and strains are not directly related to those of the cold war. The Ambassador said that American relations with the Arab states of the Near East could be divided into two periods. The first ranging from the close of World War II to 1958, and the second from 1958 to the present. Prior to July 1958, relations with the Arabs had deteriorated because of: 1. The creation of Israel in the Arab heartland; 2. The backward-looking policies of U.S. allies, France and Great Britain; 3. The “with me or against me” policies of Mr. Dulles; 4. The refusal of the United States to provide arms requested by Egypt; 5. The fact and manner of withdrawal of the High Dam offer; 6. The tripartite aggression of 1956; 7. The Eisenhower Doctrine with its premise of a power vacuum existing in the Near East. As a consequence of these factors: 1. The Soviet Union was provided an opportunity to expand its influence in the area. 2. Arab confidence in the United States was reduced to a new low. 3. The United States was identified with the alien intrusion of the Zionist state into the Arab World. However, after July 1958, a creative and positive aspect emerged in American policies. American policies, recognizing the forces and trends in the area and adapting to them, achieved the following: 1. Not one Communist government arose in the area, despite political instability and sizeable Soviet military and economic assistance. Iraq and Syria, threatened with internal Communist takeover, were purged of Communism primarily through actions and influence of the UAR. 2. Economic and cultural relations of the Arabs with the West have expanded. 3. U.S.-U.A.R. cooperation in matters such as Yemen has developed. a) There is hope of emergence of a modern intelligentsia in Yemen capable of managing Yemen affairs. b) The Royal House of Saud has been stabilized; Saudi relations with the UAR restored and improved. c) There has been no interference with Western oil interests. (The Ambassador noted that the British, following different policies, did not enjoy the position in the area which might have resulted from policies similar to those of the U.S.) 4. There is no broad anti-American sentiment in the area. 5. All major U.S. interests are intact. 6. The Arab-Israel conflict has been contained. The Ambassador said that this latter factor had been enhanced by the understanding shown by President Kennedy of the merits of a policy of “freezing the Israel issue”, avoiding public statements which might exacerbate Arab sensitivities, and excluding the issue from U.S. domestic politics. He warned that at the present juncture Israel and American Zionists were “seeking to defreeze” the issue in order to embarrass American-Arab relations. The visit of Prime Minister Eshkol came in the midst of a militant Israeli-Zionist campaign against U.S. policy. The New York Times recently noted that the Prime Minister was coming to seek arms, money, and a security guaranty. He actually, however, would seek to torpedo U.S.-Arab relations. The Ambassador said that here the President asked what he thought the U.S. should do. The Ambassador said he explained that in his opinion the Cuban confrontation of a year and a half ago had resulted in a detente in U.S.-Soviet relations. However, behind this facade the cold war continues. He had long thought the Soviets would concentrate their attack on American interests in the Near East. This was proving the case. To counter this attack, the following should guide U.S. actions: 1. Extreme caution in U.S. decisions involving relations with the Arab states. 2. Efforts to constrain Israel to adopt policies of restraint. 3. Positive efforts to continue the momentum of improved relations with Cairo. In the latter connection, the Ambassador felt that the U.S. might take action to: 1. Moderate Zionist inspired attacks against the UAR in the Congress. Threats of aid withdrawal only create negative reactions in the UAR. 2. Get the British to bring about a normalization of relations with the UAR and the YAR. 3. Bring the UAR to the periphery of the free world alliance, primarily through increasing economic ties. A Western consortium to provide for UAR economic needs was essential. The U.S. must encourage and support the UAR desire for closer economic relations with the West. The Ambassador summed up by saying evidence of U.S. desire to continue economic cooperation was even more important since yesterday’s announcement of massive USSR credits for the UAR. Continued cooperation plus efforts to preserve U.S.-Arab relations by freezing the Zionist question would ensure continually improving U.S.-U.A.R. relations. Only the Soviets will benefit if the Zionists succeed in disrupting relations between the Arabs and the U.S. The Ambassador stressed that direct correspondence between the President and President Nasser would be of great significance in ensuring good relations. The U.S. should use its good offices to improve U.A.R. relations with the British. The President need not worry about the Khrushchev-Nasser communique. 3 The facts of the situation, not words, were important in foreign relations. Egypt will not abandon its policy of non-alignment. It is, however, important to note that the USSR has the same goal as Israel and the Zionists: disruption of U.S.-Arab relations. The interests of the U.S. and the free world call for a green light from the President for the Secretary of State and his aides to launch a more active and positive program to improve U.S.-Arab relations. The President thanked Ambassador Kamel for his expose and affirmed his interest in promoting relations between the U.S. and the Arabs. He noted that some elements introduced in yesterday’s communique seemed completely unnecessary. These elements took some explaining and could not be wished away. The paragraphs relating to U.S.-Cuban relations were particularly galling. Ambassador Kamel suggested that words were unimportant and Americans should try rapidly to forget any unpleasant aspect of the communique. They should accept it calmly. The President said he was quite willing to be calm about elements of the communique, provided President Nasser would agree to be quiet and calm about Prime Minister Eshkol’s visit. The President asked the Ambassador to inform President Nasser that the United States would firmly oppose any aggression by Israel against the Arab states. The U.S. would oppose Israeli expansionism. By the same token, it would oppose any aggression against Israel. The President enjoined the Ambassador to inform President Nasser that Israel does not formulate American policy. At the same time, he would advise the Arabs not to “corner” Israel, for only the Communists could gain by this. The President expressed his concern at the escalation in arms. He noted that the more military equipment was provided by the USSR to the Arabs, the more France provided to Israel. This spiral was both dangerous and expensive to those involved. The President suggested that the UAR not concern itself too much with what Senator Gruening and others who were attacking U.S. policy toward the UAR were saying. He noted that these same men were attacking the President and his policy as well as the UAR. As he could not stop these attacks to protect himself, neither could he stop them in the interest of the UAR. The President noted the importance of the U.S. base in Libya to the global defense posture of the U.S. The President said that he agreed with most of the points made by Ambassador Kamel and would like very much to see him again. He suggested that the Ambassador telephone him when he felt it important to have an exchange of views. The conversation lasted almost an hour. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Drafted by Davies. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held at the White House from 11:50 a.m. to 12:20 p.m., and Ambassador Kamel was accompanied by Jernegan. (Ibid.) 2 Bundy had recommended that the President see Kamel before the Eshkol visit as “political insurance with Nasser.” Kamel had met privately with President Kennedy in 1961 and had told former Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson that he had Nasser’s authority to have a similar private interview with Johnson if he was invited. (Memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, May 6; ibid., National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I) 3 The communique was issued at the conclusion of Chairman Khrushchev’s May 9–25 visit to the United Arab Republic, where he took part in ceremonies marking the completion of the first stage of the Aswan High Dam. Telegram 2836 from Cairo transmitted highlights of the communique. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US) In an informal conversation with Kamel prior to his meeting with the President, Komer and Jernegan remonstrated with him about the communique, noting that it had touched on almost every issue that was or could be a source of U.S.-UAR friction. (Telegram 5538 to Cairo, May 27; ibid.) 61. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 61. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, May 26, 1964, 2:42 p.m. 2199. Following based on uncleared memcon. Representatives of UAR, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Sudan called on Secretary May 25 to express concern about possible effect of Eshkol visit on Arab-US relations.UAR Ambassador Kamel spokesman: reviewed Arab-US relations noting Arab-Israel problem only major obstacle to good relations. In recent years removal of Arab-Israel question from political arena and public discussions had resulted in Arab-US rapprochement. Arab states now concerned that Eshkol visit represented Zionist effort rekindle quiescent Arab-Israel problem, provoke Arabs and press aggressive expansionist aims. Israelis expected present large list requests including arms, financial assistance, and even security guarantee. Israelis had no need for arms since Arabs not contemplating aggression, did not require money and had guaranty in form UN Charter. Zionists desired rift in Arab-US relations. While not appropriate for Arabs question who should be guests of USG, Ambassadorial deputation urged exercise wisdom and farsightedness to protect US-Arab relations which prerequisite to peace in Near East. Representatives hoped US territory would not be used as stage for anti-Arab propaganda. Joint US-Arab interests at core of Arab concern. Secretary replied stressing reciprocal US interest in good US relations with Arab world, noting 1) historical tradition of cultural and economic ties, 2) absence of US territory ambitions and 3) interest in emergence of Arab states as strong independent entities in modern world. Differences however had existed and events of 1948 and creation of Israel were among most sensitive. We hoped find ways insulate such differences, otherwise impossible work steadily for peace all hoped to build. We concerned about peace in Near East and did not believe area should become battle field of great powers. We desired assist in development friendly relations throughout area. We were concerned by prospect sharply increased arms race in Near East. We had worked with patient determination at Geneva to seek ways to relieve countries of overwhelming burden of armaments. So far not possible make much progress. Our concern in disarmament field applied as much to Near East as to rest of world. Secretary continued representatives quite properly had not commented on propriety Eshkol visit. US has relations with Israel of which visits normal part. We would take all possible steps to contribute to peace in area and do nothing or say nothing to inflame situation in area or harm our relations with Arab world. We not responsible, however, for press speculation on details visit which might not be reported accurately. We would consider carefully anything we did and hoped visit would not result in any dismay in Arab world or create any untoward problems. Secretary undertook pass representatives’ views to President. Ambassador Kamel expressed appreciation on behalf Ambassadors, Charges and countries represented. Informal reaction to Secretary’s comments indicated representatives much pleased and considered call successful. Agreed representatives would inform press purpose visit and express nature their concerns. Department would express US views along lines Secretary’s comments. Action Addressees should convey foregoing to appropriate host government officials and express hope local news media will treat meeting in same restrained manner characterized by attitude Arab representatives. 2 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Henry J. Tasca, and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Amman, and Kuwait and repeated to Baida, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, Khartoum, Taiz, and Tel Aviv. 2 On June 1, the Arab Information Office in Washington issued a document entitled “Statement by the Arab Press Attaches and Information Officers in Washington, D.C.” which criticized the Eshkol visit. On June 2, Acting Secretary Ball called in the 13 Arab chiefs of mission to ask them to inform their governments that the U.S. Government found the statement objectionable. The meeting is summarized in circular telegram 2255, June 3. (Ibid.) 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, May 28, 1964, 7 p.m. 5567. Embtel 2758, 2 Deptel 5435. 3 Near East Arms Control. When you hand President’s letter to Nasser, mention to him that, as in the case of our letter, we count on opportunity see his proposed reply before it is in final form.FYI. We would hope thereby preclude his preparing response with conditions that would emasculate assurances we seek from him. End FYI. Judging by previous reactions we hopeful Nasser this time will have views on IAEA safeguards on which have pressed him last three approaches. In discussing this aspect you might wish suggest that best assurance Nasser could have that Israel will not develop nuclear weapons would be Israel’s acceptance IAEA safeguards for all of its reactors.UAR acceptance same safeguards would be small price to pay. FYI. If Nasser should say IAEA could only provide safeguards for Israeli manufacture and not against acquisition from other nuclear powers, you should point to February 6 Foster statement at Geneva that it declared US policy not transfer nuclear weapons into national control any state not now possessing them. We would do our best obtain similar assurances from other nuclear powers as regards UAR and Israel even before achieving a world-wide non-dissemination agreement. End FYI. In connection with Israeli intentions you should call his attention to Eshkol’s statement of May 20 (Tel Aviv 183 to Cairo). 4 You should cite in particular Eshkol’s point (C) that GOI prepared to join in any effort to rid the area completely of all arms at present in area under reciprocal control. We recognize UAR not willing to discuss this directly with Israel nor to enter into arrangement that would be susceptible of exploitation as direct dealing with Israel. We continue believe, however, there is ample scope for an arms control arrangement that would avoid points UAR finds objectionable. In any case, Eshkol statement encourages our belief now is time to work out something, and we hope UAR will not let slip opportunity to prevent further worsening of situation. You may say to Nasser that we have of course been seeking persuade Israel, too, not to pursue nuclear and missile development. If UAR continues missile development, we believe this will not only lead other side to obtain or develop matching or better missiles but may also lead them develop nuclear capability. Therefore we urge Nasser to think this problem through and hope he will consider carefully effects of closing door to our approaches. We strongly desire you probe Nasser’s missile intentions, perhaps citing UK newspaper report UAR preparing force of 1000 missiles by 1965–1966 as means of drawing Nasser out. You should also ask him whether report UAR planning on CW warheads accurate, in light UAR use of gas in Yemen. If Nasser’s general attitude negative and discussion proves unproductive, we would hope you nevertheless could keep door open and obtain his agreement reconsider various aspects at some later date. In so doing, suggest you say our concern over arms rivalry has received and will continue to receive attention highest levels of USG. We shall be exploring other means of reducing threat to peace and stability caused by Arab-Israel arms rivalry. Thus, Nasser should not be alarmed if he receives reports we have discussed NE arms rivalry with other states concerned. Our intentions will always be aimed at being helpful. We will of course discuss with UAR any avenues that appear promising. Since this may be your last meeting with Nasser on this subject, request you say we hope exchange of views will bear fruit both in terms of peace and security of his own country and region and in terms of peace we all seek on this planet. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dickman and Harrison M. Symmes; cleared by Wreatham E. Gathright of S/P, Deputy Assistant Director of ACDA’s International Relations Bureau Richard B. Freund, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan. 2 Dated May 19. (Ibid.) 3 Not found; it apparently transmitted the text of Johnson’s May 20 letter to Nasser, Document 59 . 4 Not found. 63. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 63. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 28, 1964. The Eshkol visit may be a strenuous one. Eshkol is being briefed to the nines on every issue which might arise. Also it is peculiar to US/Israeli relations that even secondary issues often can only be settled at the top level. Even so, we’re confident this exercise will be a success: (a) Eshkol needs to make it one even more than we do; (b) we have a very forthcoming menu planned. In fact, the only big risk is that we’ll look so friendly as to create extra Arab problems, following hard on Khrushchev’s all-out pandering to the Arabs in Cairo. 1. The sheer fact that Eshkol is the first Israeli PM ever to visit officially marks a big political plus for him. He’ll portray the visit as a success almost regardless of how much bacon he takes home. 2. The Israelis seem actually relieved that we’re helping them find tanks elsewhere (they apparently expected a flat turndown). They’ll keep pressure on us till another deal can be arranged (and we’re still far from it), but the heat won’t be too intense just now. 3. We can also offer more financial aid, if tank purchases elsewhere create an extra burden. 4. Most important, we can carry your February desalting offer a big step further by offering a prompt go-ahead on joint feasibility studies, and a promise of financial help if the studies pan out. This could easily be the biggest public plus of the visit. 5. We’ll also get some very good public noises in speeches and communique. For example, if Eshkol will publicly deny any expansionist ambitions (big Arab beef), perhaps we can reiterate our stand against Arab aggression too. Substance of the Visit . I’ve underlined and annotated State’s extensive briefing book 2 because you’ll want to be up to date on the issues Eshkol will raise (the Israelis will hang on everything you say, and repeat it later). Since we won’t be able to brief you this weekend, I’ll try to summarize everything in this memo. We can also lay on a briefing session Monday morning if you desire. 1. Reassurance to Israel . To get the meeting off on an ideal footing, and disarm Eshkol, why not tell him right off the bat that the US stands foursquare behind Israel’s security and well-being. This has in fact been the consistent policy of the US since 1947. We don’t intend to let Israel go under; to the contrary we have from the outset done more than any other country to help build it up (including over $1 billion in aid). While we have necessarily had to maintain an element of superficial balance in our public posture, and have at times disagreed with Israeli policy, the record of our support is crystal clear. This has cost us much with the Arabs, and given the Soviets a big opening to exploit, but we don’t intend to swerve from this policy. The one thing we ask of Israel is not to keep trying to force us to an all-out pro-Israeli policy. We ask this not just because a balanced policy is essential strategically to keep the Soviets out of the ME, and economically because of oil but because it is as much in Israel’s interest as ours. If we choose Israel’s side so openly that the Arabs form alliances with Moscow, Israel loses just as much as we. Our present policy gives the Arabs an incentive not to swing too far away from the West. This is simple common sense. 2. Our Jordan Waters stand is just the latest example of our support. We designed the Johnston Plan and stand fully by it, as the Arabs know. 3. Desalting . We recognize how vital water is to Israel’s future, and since readily available sources are about exhausted you have personally inaugurated a new joint enterprise to exploit desalting—the only great new hope for water. We will be as forthcoming here as the still uncertain state of the art will allow. We’ll work jointly with Israel to survey what kind of nuclear desalting plant would be technically and economically best, and would be prepared to help finance a plant if and when a mutually satisfactory scheme can be worked out (this could cost us as much as a $100 million loan). 4. Israel’s own deterrent posture . We’ve always kept a close eye on the Arab-Israeli military balance. Our JCS and intelligence people just reviewed it again, and see Israel as able to maintain quite a deterrent edge for the foreseeable future. 3 We also think Israelis tend to discount the US deterrent role , though we’re confident the Arabs know the score (McNamara will brief Eshkol on our capabilities). We’ve always regarded our economic aid as permitting Israel to buy enough modern arms in Europe to compensate for our inability to provide them directly. Even so, when nothing else was available we came through on Hawks. 5. Tanks . We appreciate Eshkol’s understanding as to why we simply can’t afford to sell Israel tanks directly. But we’ll do everything we can to help get them elsewhere. Eshkol will probably say he’s grateful for our proffered help, but is dubious over whether Israel can get what it needs elsewhere. He will probably make a strong pitch that only M–48A3s from Germany will do. Since a German deal (even through another intermediary) looks questionable so far, we must insist that the Israelis consider the UK Centurion, which is available. It hasn’t got the range of our M–48A3, but is otherwise just as good, and our military say it’s adequate to meet Israel’s defensive needs. My instinct is that Israel will make every effort to get M–48’s, but fall back on the UK if this fails. So we ought to make every effort to help them with the Germans, but not let them come back to us if this aborts. 6. Other arms requests . Eshkol may, in the course of describing Israeli security worries, mention other arms needs, such as the jet bombers he mentioned to Feldman, or some counter to the UAR’s Soviet-supplied missile boats. Our response is that our JCS and intelligence people see Israel as still able to maintain quite a deterrent edge. Nor should the Israelis forget our own deterrent support. 7. The UAR Missile Threat and Israel’s Own Missile Plans . We’ve been over this ground many times unsuccessfully, but Feldman put Eshkol on notice that you’d have a personal try. Attached (Tab A) 4 is a Defense study which counters the latest Israeli allegations (now it’s chemical warheads). Perhaps the best argument with Eshkol is that his military (like our own so often) may have sold him on a very expensive and dangerous counter to a threat they hadn’t really evaluated. We probably can’t get Israel to cancel its existing French contract (which may be only for R and D missiles, though we just don’t know). We can’t veto Israel’s missile plans, but as Israel’s security guarantors we’re entitled to ask it not to buy operational missiles until after it has consulted us. 8. Dimona Reactor . We appreciate Israel’s commitment to regular inspection but are disturbed at Eshkol’s refusal to let us reassure the Arabs in general terms (you sent Eshkol two messages on this). We’re firmly convinced that Israel’s apparent desire to keep the Arabs guessing is highly dangerous. To appear to be going nuclear without really doing so is to invite trouble. It might spark Nasser into a foolish pre-emptive move. Without in any way implying that Israel is going nuclear, one has to admit that a functioning secret breeder reactor plus an oncoming missile delivery system add up to an inescapable conclusion that Israel is at least putting itself in a position to go nuclear. This could have the gravest repercussions on US-Israeli relations, and the earlier we try to halt it the better chance we have. This is why your raising a to-do about missiles, even if unsuccessful, will at least put Israel firmly on notice that we may be back at it again. 9. IAEA Controls . Israel’s reluctance to accept IAEA controls also adds to our suspicions. We can’t make Israel an exception because we’re making sixty or so other clients of ours toe the IAEA line. The immediate issue is over renewal of a piddling 1–MW research reactor, but any new reactor on which we help Israel would have to be under IAEA. We hope you’ll personally tell Eshkol they should bite the bullet now. 10. Economic Aid . Israel’s economy is doing so well that Dave Bell sees no economic justification for new AID loans. Israel has had a fantastic 9–10% growth rate, has over $600 million reserves, per capita income of over $1,000 (better than Italy), etc. While Eshkol worries over Israel’s great foreign debt, fact is that Israel bonds are being paid off mostly in Israeli pounds for tourism et al. However, Eshkol is determined to show that Israel still needs help, and there may be a political requirement here. Bell hopes we can keep trend downward from $20 million DL this year, but could live with $10 million per annum in 1965 (our presentation was $0–10) and 1966. But we would want to make clear that this is help in financing indirectly Israel’s arms purchases, i.e. an additional incentive for them to go to European suppliers. 11. Our Arab Policy . No one can blame the Israelis, surrounded as they are, for repeatedly sniping at our Arab policy. The top people want to believe that we know what we’re doing (and many Israelis agree with our policy), but they’ve been conditioned by living under the gun for so long to a “fortress Israel” psychology which leads them to over-react. In turn, the constant Arab verbal attacks are in reality a reflection of Arab frustration at their own impotence. We want to avoid at all costs a situation in which we become lined up so overtly behind Israel that the Arabs choose the USSR as their champion. It is Soviet arms, not US wheat, which creates the real threat to Israel. The greater the Soviet presence in the Middle East, the greater the threat to Israel. If you will only drive home these facts of life politely but firmly to Eshkol, it will help mightily in toning down the kind of repeated pressure from Israel and its friends which poses such a dilemma for us in the Middle East. R. W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 6/1–3/64. Secret. Sent to Johnson with a brief covering memorandum from Bundy calling it “absolutely first-class.” 2 An undated briefing memorandum from Ball to Johnson on the Eshkol visit is ibid. Other briefing material is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2406–2407. 3 A June 1 memorandum from Bundy to Johnson suggested that he might want to have a brief private talk with Eshkol [text not declassified]. He noted that the United States and Israel had differing estimates of the strength of the Arab states and that it was in the U.S. interest to show the Israelis that U.S. information was more reliable. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5) 4 Not found. 64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, May 30, 1964, 1:09 p.m. 5592. Ref Deptel 5567. 2 We particularly want you to emphasize mischievous role of UAR missile program in pushing arms rivalry to new and dangerous levels, as covered in previous guidelines. We recognize of course thin line between insuring Nasser understands and appreciates nature of this escalation and on other hand giving him impression Israel about to go nuclear with our understanding and tacit support. We therefore leave to you best means of convincing Nasser this is game he cannot win because of Israel’s technological development and access to outside financial sources. Moreover, we think it important he be made to realize, in way he will not resent, fact that he must shoulder large share responsibility for arms race in general. His periodic opening of “icebox” door (cite cases) has let out blasts of cold air that put great psychological pressure on Israelis to obtain deterrent. We are not trying to justify Israeli actions to him; we are merely explaining them and his responsibility. Essential facts are: (1) UAR was first to opt for surface to surface missile force. (2) UAR is continuing to develop SSMs. (3) Reports are that Israel in response is also acquiring SSMs. (4) Once possessed of SSMs and confronted with a growing UAR missile force, Israel might well seek to develop more lethal warheads to provide deterrence against implacable Arab hostility it senses from Arab public statements. (5) We believe Israel can be persuaded not to proceed further with SSM development if UAR willing to demonstrate restraint. (6) Otherwise, we fear race will inexorably escalate. (7) But no good purpose served by such escalation. Situation is obviously self-defeating for both sides. Not only does it make for greater danger of war, it also diverts resources badly needed in development of more prosperous Arab nation. Moreover, US determined forestall aggression by either side, and has capability do so. So we wonder why either side should engage in wasteful expensive programs, which will not achieve any decisive military result. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Davies and Symmes, cleared by Komer, and approved by Jernegan. 2 Document 62 . 65. Memorandum of Conversation 65. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 1, 1964. SUBJECT Johnson/Eshkol Exchange of Views PARTICIPANTS The President Myer Feldman, Deputy Special Counsel His Excellency, Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel His Excellency, Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel Participants who entered mid-way in discussion U.S Mr. Komer Governor Harriman Mr. Talbot Israel Shimon Peres The President began by saying to the Prime Minister that the United States was and would continue to be interested in the security The President said that he appreciated very much the way Mr. Feldman had been received by the Prime Minister. The President said that as long as he remained in the White House, Mr. Feldman would continue to serve as his “Prime Minister” on the question of Israel. The President went on to say that he was foursquare behind Israel on all matters that affected their vital security interests. Just as the U.S. was in Southeast Asia, they would be wherever they were needed. The President took up the specific problems on the agenda. With regard to tanks, he said he appreciated the readiness of Israel to agree to the manner in which tanks could be provided. He pointed out that we could not provide tanks directly but we would be glad to help Israel in every way possible to get a sufficient quantity of tanks elsewhere. “We believe the Centurion is a good tank” he said, “and it will certainly be available. However, we will also do everything we can to help in the M–48.” The President then referred to the fact that Senator Ribicoff had discussed this matter with him and also that he appreciated the fact that the tank matter had not been made a public issue but had been kept discreet. On the question of water, the President pointed out that all the Arab capitals have been informed that the United States supports the Johnston Plan. There can be no doubt in anyone’s mind concerning U.S. commitment to this water project. The President said “We back Israel fully on the Jordan water. We want Israel to have more water. For that reason we are ready to undertake a study in connection with the desalting program which will also provide Israel with the water it needs. If the study proves that the desalting project is feasible, we will help in working it out. We will help Israel on this as much as possible. We have told the Arab Governments about this. Of course, we will get some backlash from the Arab countries as a result of your visit with me. However, I am not worried by that. It is important both to you and to the United States that everybody should know that we are friends. So that is no reason for us not to go forward with this desalting project.” The President asked Prime Minister Eshkol to make clear to his people that “if we turned our backs on the Arabs it would hurt Israel. We are deeply concerned with Israel’s security. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff keep a close watch on this. And we are more confident of the Israeli deterrent edge than the Israelis seem to be. We don’t blame them for running scared, but we hope they will listen to well meant advice. “Of course, we know that the Israeli Government is worried over the U.A.R. missile threat. But that threat is likely to remain feeble through 1970. Israel should not hasten to counter it and accelerate an arms race. It can always count on the United States in an emergency.” The President pointed out that the Arabs will inevitably tie Israeli missiles to Israel’s nuclear potential. He said that he should like to remind the Prime Minister that the U.S. is violently against nuclear proliferation. If Israel is not going to get into nuclear production, why not accept IAEA controls and let U.S. reassure Nasser about Dimona. It is U.S. firm policy to keep the U.A.R. from getting into nuclear production and it will do everything it can to restrain them. “I want to assure you,” the President said, “that we are not being naive about Nasser. What we want to do is to try and prevent him from leaning over too far towards the Russians.” The President summarized by listing the following six points: 1. On water, the U.S. will support the Johnston Plan. 2. On tanks, the U.S. will assist Israel in obtaining them. 3. On security, the U.S. will stand foursquare behind Israel. 4. On missiles, the U.S. Government feels that Israel is too worried about primitive U.A.R. weapons. 5. With regard to nuclear weapons, the U.S. is against their proliferation. 6. On the desalting program, the U.S. is ready to help as much as possible. The President expressed the view that the visit was good for both the United States and Israel, for both the Prime Minister and his nation. Following the visit, it will be possible for Prime Minister Eshkol to explain U.S. concerns and friendship to his people. The President said that he was glad that the issues had been kept out of the pressures of the election year and that the whole matter has been kept quiet. Because of this they can go to the Germans and be of help. The President said that he saw a bright future for Israel. The Prime Minister could leave knowing that the U.S. will help Israel in the future, both morally and financially as much as she can. Prime Minister Eshkol responded by first reciting the basis for the feeling of the Israelis that they needed additional strength. He said that after thousands of years of wandering, his people were now trying again to take their fate into their own hands and to do things for themselves. This was the meaning of going back home to Israel. In Turkish rule the area of Palestine had been 100,000 square k.m. but now Israel had been cut down to 20,000 sq. k.m. It was in this area that we tell our people that they must work out their destiny by depending on themselves and doing things for themselves. Of course, they always look for friends and they were immensely fortunate in having the U.S. as a friend. But what he told the people of Israel was to rely on their friends, but that the fundamental importance for Israel was “do it yourself”. They had to build their own agriculture and their own industry, their own army and all the other essentials of the nation. They had to be able to create their own future. The problem of security went back a long way. Even before Hitler there had been pogroms in Czarist Russia. Therefore, security was the most important and the first consideration. (At this point the President summoned into the room Governor Harriman, Mr. Talbot, and Mr. Komer who were accompanied by Mr. Shimon Peres, the Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense.) As they were sitting down, the President turned to the Prime Minister and said to him: “Harriman and Feldman are my Prime Ministers on Israeli questions.” The President then said that the Prime Minister has just begun his statement and that he wanted them to hear it. The Prime Minister thereupon continued: “When the independence of Israel was proclaimed in 1948 we thought we could live in peace, but we found that we were encircled by enemies. The recent visit by Khrushchev served to give Nasser additional prestige, additional armor and money. This makes him a dangerous enemy. Israel knows that the U.S. is a real friend. We believe this. We are told that there is a United States commitment to Israel. But I cannot ask my people to rely on this alone. When I discuss this matter with my people, the question they ask me is ‘do you have enough tanks?’ It may be true that the Egyptian missiles are not yet accurate, but the Tel Aviv area with a million people is an easy target. The man in the street wants to hear from me that we are on guard. What if one day Nasser, even against the advice of Khrushchev (the Prime Minister interpolated that he thought Khrushchev’s reference in his speeches in Egypt on Israel had been somewhat mild in language, and that he did not believe that Khrushchev wanted the destruction of Israel or war against Israel) and against the wishes of the U.S. were to attack Israel, he would do that if he felt that he could do it. Then, in one day or two or three days he could do a great deal of damage. What the man in the street in Israel wants to know is whether Israel would then be able to protect itself, whether it would be strong enough to protect itself. No one could forecast what other problems the U.S. would have at that time.” On tanks, the Prime Minister insisted that only the M–48 would meet Israel’s needs. He said it would be bad if Israel were compelled to take the Centurion. Israel had some Centurions and knew them. Israel cannot buy new tanks every day and therefore it is very important for us that we should get today the tanks we need, said the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Eshkol pointed out that the autonomy of the Centurion was four to five hours while that of the M–48 was 8 hours. This was very important to Israel. He said that if the Germans objected to doing it directly, it could be done through Italy. With regard to missiles, he said that if Nasser was willing to give up his missiles Israel would acquire none; but Nasser already has about 200. The Prime Minister added: “I think that Nasser is planning to build these missiles in the hundreds. We have some indications of this. For example, we know that he bought quantities of steel. It is impossible for me to believe that Nasser is not improving his missiles.” The Prime Minister went on to say that Israel would be prepared to wait a year or two; but Nasser is constantly improving his missiles, and in the next 2 to 3 years Nasser is likely to attack and to use them. Eshkol said he was always glad to hear complimentary things, for it implied that the Israeli armed forces could always overcome a 1 to 5 disadvantage. This might not always be true. At the present time, Nasser has 3 to 4 times as many planes and 3 to 4 times as much armor. At the present time the disparity between Nasser and Israel in respect to numbers is one against 10 or 15 or 20—depending on whether we take only Egypt into account or also the Arab countries. The same goes for tanks where the Arabs have 3 times as much as Israel. Nasser’s advantage is great. The Prime Minister observed that he was sure it would be possible to make peace with Lebanon; and though difficult, it would probably be possible to make peace with Hussein. But if Nasser attacks, all the other Arab states will join him. Mr. Eshkol said he did not see any way in which he could explain to his country, or even his own political party, a failure to do something about the missile threat. The Prime Minister said that he did not see any way as a citizen of his country or as a leader to explain to his people that he would just sit back and do nothing in relation to the missile threat. In any case, for a year or two there would be no missiles in Israel. How could he go and explain to the country or to his own political party or to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset, and when he is asked what he is doing to face the missile threat simply reply: “The Americans told me that the Egyptian missiles are no good.” Nasser has always been the first in introducing new weapons. He was the first in jets; he was the first in Komars and the first in missiles. “I am told,” he said, “that my boys in the army are very good. But it is too much for me to demand of my boys that they should face a situation like this without the proper materiel at their disposal.” The Prime Minister went on to say: “We cannot afford to lose. This may be our last stand in history. The Jewish people have something to give to the world. I believe that if you look at our history and at all the difficulties we have survived, it means that history wants us to continue. We cannot survive if we experience again what happened to us under Hitler. You may view the situation otherwise and it may be difficult to grasp how we feel. I believe you should understand us. It is important that you should understand us.” The Prime Minister suggested that his visit would be successful if it had helped the President and the American people to understand the situation of Israel. What Israel wants is peace. Nothing less makes sense. War made no sense for Israel. Israel could not possibly conquer Egypt. But Nasser did not have an equivalent attitude. What Nasser was calling for was for driving the Israelis into the sea. The Prime Minister said: “We want your help but we feel that we must do everything that is within the power of a small nation to do to protect itself. If you can persuade Nasser to give up his tanks and missiles, we will do the same.” The Prime Minister offered to destroy all of his arms if Nasser would do likewise. Then the Prime Minister went on to suggest that he would appreciate it if the President would tell Erhard when he came to visit that the U.S. had an interest in helping Israel and in Germany helping Israel. Historically, he felt the Germans had an obligation to do so. The reparations they paid were merely monetary compensation. The Prime Minister added: “The reason I think it would be very important to tell this to Erhard is that sometimes we hear from the Germans that they are not so sure that you are interested in them helping us.” On the question of the U.S. relationship to the Arab nations, the Prime Minister said it was not in the interest of Israel that the U.S. break off its relationships with any other nation. But he asked whether it would not be possible for the United States to tell Nasser to work out a development plan and to have assistance rendered Nasser go into the development of Egypt rather than into other areas. He said that Egypt had much to do. He said: “What I am saying is that you should be pushing Egypt into development and building and out of the field of spending their resources on armaments.” The Prime Minister suggested that in some instances it would be wise to help Israel publicly. Khrushchev had no reluctance in publicly promising Nasser everything he requested. But when it comes to assistance to Israel, their friends feel it must be done surreptitiously. It reminds the Prime Minister of the German expression: “Don’t greet me in public.” Perhaps a public greeting he said, would show that the friends of Israel mean to support that state and be conducive to world peace. In summary the Prime Minister said: 1. Tanks—the tanks we need are the M–48. I am glad over your decision of the tanks and I leave our meeting feeling that I am entitled to tell my Government that we will have these tanks. It would be better if we could get them direct for it would not be good if the Arabs were left in any uncertainty that Israel would be helped in matters such as tanks. However, if you do it indirectly, that is all right, for after all, the important thing is that we should get the tanks that we need. But please do not push us into the Centurions. 2. Missiles—there would be no missiles for 1 to 2 years. 3. Water—the support of the United States is appreciated very much. 4. Desalination—the statement of the President is good news. Israel is prepared to pay rather more for water for irrigation than would be considered possible in other countries. Therefore the project should be feasible. 5. Dimona—I cannot agree that Nasser should be told the real situation in Dimona because Nasser is an enemy. After 16 years they withhold peace from Israel. I notice that in your joint communique with King Hussein there was included a point of “just peace.” I don’t understand the meaning of this term. I know what peace means. What should have happened is that the armistice should have been following immediately by peace. It would be a great thing if you could induce our neighbors to change the armistice into peace instead of pursuing escalation in tanks and missiles. In the meantime, while the U.A.R. remains an enemy and is committed to the destruction of Israel, it would seem inadvisable to communicate such matters to them. Besides, Nasser has worked for years to become a nuclear power. He will continue to do so. A message that Dimona is not manufacturing nuclear weapons would have no effect. The Prime Minister then adverted to refugees by saying that Shukayri 2 says there are refugees; but they really are not people within the classic meaning of refugees. They are used by the Arab nations to develop enemies against Israel. He stated that Israel was not engaged in nuclear weapons production, but posed the question: “Why tell Nasser?” He asked: “Why should we tell Nasser when we don’t know from him what he is doing about missiles?” The Prime Minister concluded by saying that he thanked the President, for his decision was a grand thing and very imaginative. The President asked Mr. Feldman to comment and he made a brief statement on the need for cooperation on the tank question and said that Peres would hold various meetings while he was in this country in an effort to establish a procedure whereby Israel would receive them. In the meantime, there was a great need for secrecy. Under Secretary Harriman also made a brief statement dealing with the need to reassure the Israelis by having them inspect the 6th Fleet and other places where the military potential of the United States was evident. Under Secretary Harriman said that he agreed that it was necessary to add meaning and credibility to the U.S. commitment. He added that tanks were the major issue and that he hoped that could be worked out. The President said that it was important that there should be a feeling of security on Israel’s part. Under Secretary Harriman said that they were more hopeful about their strategy dealing with Nasser than the Prime Minister seemed to believe. Mr. Feldman said that it was important that the tank question be kept quiet. It is understood, he said, that only three people in Italy would have to know about it. The President then reviewed matters briefly, adding that there would be some mutual assistance in intelligence matters. We would help Israel with our knowledge of Arab intelligence and Israel would exchange information that they had with us. Prime Minister Eshkol suggested that it would be helpful to have semi-annual meetings at the political and military level where there could be mutual exchange of all matters of concern between the two nations. Under Secretary Harriman said this would be an excellent idea and that we would establish some method whereby this can be accomplished. The President closed the meeting by saying: “Well, this has been a good beginning.” 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. II. Top Secret. Drafted by Feldman. A handwritten note by Komer on a July 30 memorandum from Read to Bundy, returning the memorandum of conversation to the White House after its review by Talbot, states that it represented the work of Feldman, Harman, Talbot, Harriman, and himself. (Ibid.) According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the President’s office at the White House. The President and the Prime Minister met alone from 11:30 to 11:45 a.m., when they were joined by Feldman and Harman. The other participants joined them at 12:05 p.m., and the meeting concluded at 12:46. (Ibid.) 2 Ahmad Shuqayri, Palestinian representative to the Arab League, was named chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization executive committee at the Palestine National Congress held in Jerusalem May 28–June 2. Telegram 606 from Amman, June 3, commented on the Congress, and airgram A–586 from Amman, June 17, transmitted unofficial texts of the Palestinian National Charter and PLO Constitution, which the Congress approved. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY) 66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, June 2, 1964, 11:20 a.m. Ball asked Komer if he had been able to find out what the President said to Eshkol yesterday when they were alone. Komer said that Feldman had been with them except for the first 15 minutes. Feldman was to do a memcon which had not come up yet. Komer suggested that perhaps Ball and Rusk could impress on the President the difficulty these private discussions cause. The President assured Komer that he had followed the brief 2 (a quick and short version of the paper that the Dept. sent over). The President did raise the tank question and said we could not give them but we would help all we could. He went into our concern about the missiles briefly. He said he hoped they would bite the bullet on the IAEA. He said don’t force us to say publicly that we are behind you. He did not close any deals. He mentioned Dimona. Komer said he did not think Ball should talk about tanks or security although he might have to listen to Eshkol’s sales pitch. The important thing is the Dimona reassurances to the Arabs, the IAEA question and the details that we are prepared to do what we can on desalting which was mentioned only in general terms. 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Israel. No classification marking. Prepared in Ball’s office. 2 Reference is apparently to Document 63 . 3 In a telephone conversation that afternoon, Bundy asked the President if he had done “that intelligence talk” with Eshkol (see footnote 3, Document 63 ). Johnson replied that he had. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, June 2, 1964, 3:56 p.m., Tape 64.29, Side B, PNO 1) 67. Memorandum of Conversation 67. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 2, 1964, 11:15 a.m. SUBJECT Tanks for Israel PARTICIPANTS His Excellency, Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel His Excellency, Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel The Honorable Chaim Yahil, Director General, Israel Foreign Ministry The Honorable Theodore Kollek, Director General, PM’s Office Mr. Uri Lubrani, Director of PM’s Bureau and Political Secretary Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Minister, Embassy of Israel The Acting Secretary M—Mr. Harriman NEA—Phillips Talbot NE—H. Earle Russell Prime Minister Eshkol inquired about the status of Israel’s request for tanks. Mr. Talbot replied that the President expected to speak to Chancellor Erhard about West German capabilities to supply tanks. Between approaches by the U.S. and by Israel we would make a real try. There were also current conversations with the UK. Adequate tanks should be available. Prime Minister Eshkol said he did not wish to be pushed to Centurions. The M–48 was superior. There appeared to be a way to obtain M–48 tanks through an arrangement with Italy. He hoped we would accept the Israeli viewpoint. He commented that Centurions were expensive, but he did not wish to discuss pricing until prices were lower. Israel was willing to take a number of Centurions to complete existing tank units. Mr. Harriman said we would do everything to help, including exploration of the arrangement with Italy. There was, however, the Chieftain in the background. Cost was a problem since it amounted to nearly $300,000 per unit. Mr. Ball added that we foresaw problems with the transparent arrangement with Italy. Security in Italy was not good. The transaction was likely to become widely known. Mr. Peres said failure to obtain M–48 tanks would be a great disappointment both politically and popularly. The Centurion was not as good a tank, and lacked the range of the M–48. To buy Centurions would be to eat and remain hungry. The cost of 300 Chieftain tanks was excessive since they would cost $500,000 each including spares and ammunition. The total package would amount to $150,000,000. Mr. Talbot interjected that we were not thinking in terms of 300 Chieftain tanks. Mr. Peres continued that the Mark-8 Centurion was costly and lacked a suitable engine. The best solution economically and politically was the purchase of the M–48. Failure to achieve this would be a shocking popular experience in Israel. He hoped the U.S. would not retract its support for supply of tanks through Germany. Mr. Talbot suggested that the range of tanks was not important since no one wished to go 300 miles. Mr. Peres said that time of operation was more important than range. It reduced maintenance and decreased vulnerability. Prime Minister Eshkol noted that deliveries of M–48’s could begin in 8–12 months. Israel was already negotiating with Italy on the problem of conversion. As to Centurion availability, 48 would be available during 1964; 50–100 more in 1965; Chieftains might be available by the end of 1965. Israel proposed to buy 48 Centurions in 1964 and perhaps 50 in 1965, but no more. Mr. Ball noted that the M–48 tank suggested a more offensive weapon than the shorter range tanks. We understood, however, the advantages of tank “autonomy.” Prime Minister Eshkol said he hoped to be in a position upon his return to Israel to tell his government that the tank matter had been resolved. If the U.S. and West Germany were interested, the transaction could be kept secret for 2–3 years, by which time the M–48 would be in the same category as the Sherman tank today. In Italy only three people need be fully informed of the transaction. Mr. Ball said this was a subject for discussion with Chancellor Erhard. He could not speak for him. He believed the problem of tanks could be met. We would take into consideration the arguments made by the Israelis, particularly the need for tank “autonomy.” U.S. participants made brief reference to possible assistance to Israel in adjusting the cost of high-priced European tanks but declined to discuss details in the absence of more information on tank availabilities and other elements of Israel’s defense expenditures. Mr. Harriman said we would continue to press the Germans, but were not anxious to break away from our policy of avoiding the supply of offensive weapons to the Near East. We believed Israel could meet its needs elsewhere. In conclusion, the Prime Minister stressed that the proposed M–48 transaction could be kept secret for 2–3 years. He also said Israel was spending $450,000,000 every year for defense and could not afford not to follow up the West German transaction. He hoped it would be possible to obtain agreement in principle on the transaction from Chancellor Erhard. The discussion ended with the understanding that any further progress on M–48 tank procurement must rest upon the decision of Chancellor Erhard. Meanwhile, discussions on Centurions should continue. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Russell on June 15 and approved in U and in M on June 22. Prior to Ball’s meeting with Eshkol, the Prime Minister met with Harriman and U. Alexis Johnson for a general discussion of the international scene. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., POL ISR–US) At 12:15 p.m., Eshkol and Peres met with Vance and received a briefing on U.S. military capabilities to defend Israel. Vance rejected their suggestion of joint contingency planning but indicated willingness to consider periodic discussions with Israel on military subjects. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., ARAB–ISR) 68. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 68. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 3, 1964. Your soft sell to Eshkol connected a lot better than we realized yesterday. 2 Israelis came around this morning and: 1. Agreed to let us reassure Nasser on Dimona. 2. Agreed to IAEA observers in joint desalting study. 3. Agreed in principle to IAEA controls on any big desalting reactor. 4. In return for a nine month extension of present US bilateral on existing small reactor, agreed to ask for IAEA agreement within that time. 3 For what it’s worth, I gave Israelis a hard line after your meeting yesterday, saying I knew that while you didn’t want to press Israelis so hard as to spoil good atmosphere of visit, you as well as rest of us were disappointed at lack of Israeli response on any points. This may just have helped. While all returns aren’t in, this visit seems to have netted out a distinct plus. So far Arab reaction, especially from Cairo, is most restrained (your warning to Kamel took), while Israelis are highly pleased. We also managed to steer press successfully (so far) away from sensitive arms issue. Bob Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 6/1–3/64. Secret. 2 President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol met alone from 4:10 to 4:25 p.m. on June 2. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) No record of this meeting has been found. A June 2 briefing memorandum from Komer to the President stressed that he should urge Eshkol to agree to give Nasser reassurances about Dimona and to accept IAEA controls. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 6/1–3/64) 3 Memoranda of a June 3 conversation on these subjects between Peres and Talbot are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 6 ISR–US and AE 11–2 ISR. 69. Memorandum for Record 69. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Talk with Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres In a cordial talk with Peres Komer laid out certain views and concerns. Frank Sloan joined in. Minister Gazit and Col. Ron were interested observers. By prearrangement Komer mentioned the Shah’s interest in M–60 tanks. As suspected, Peres was already knowledgeable; he commented that the Shah seemed to want about 460. Komer suggested that the Israelis might wish to point out to the Shah that the M–48A3 was practically the same as the M–60 and could be bought for a great deal less. Deliveries wouldn’t take place for a few years, but when Iran had M–48A3s in quantity, this might be of help to Israel. Komer stressed that we did not want any Israeli approach to appear as being at US instance. Peres fully understood; he quickly grasped the implications of Iran playing a possible future role in the M–48A3 problem, and recognized that this wasn’t an immediate prospect but one a few years off. Komer then said that, like Governor Harriman, he felt Peres should get a clear picture of Arab-Israeli policy from his visit; we had heard that Peres was one of those who questioned our policy. The Middle East was an area where much more emotion than logic was at play; this made it all the more imperative to sort out what was really going on. There seemed to be three “myths” about US policy, which Komer wished to deal with candidly, on the understanding that he was talking completely unofficially and personally, and that he would not find such statements being bandied about. Peres fully agreed. First was the myth that the US pursued a strictly “even-Handed” or “impartial” policy, as between Israel and the Arabs. This was what we often said publicly. But if one looked at actions, not words, it was clear that from 1947 on our policy had basically favored Israel. We had been Israel’s strongest backer from the outset, financially and otherwise, and it was our deterrent power (not that of the British, French, or anyone else) which really provided Israel its insurance policy. What we did do was to seek an “appearance” of balance in our policy, which would permit us to exercise continued influence in the Arab world. This influence was imperative in Israel’s interest as well as ours, because it served not only to protect US assets (oil and bases) in the area but to limit Soviet penetration. The Aswan Dam fiasco had been a blunder in our policy. We had been the ones who in effect gave Khrushchev his golden opportunity to start peddling Soviet arms in the Middle East. It was Soviet arms, not Arab words, which created the real threat to Israel. So long as Arab words were only a reflection of their impotence, Israel could afford to live with them. But it was crucial that we not become so openly Israel’s champions as to force the Arabs to line up overtly with Moscow. In this event the real threat to Israel would be magnified. Second was the myth that the US had shifted to a pro-Nasser policy, and that he was our “chosen instrument” in the Middle East. We were making a deliberate and calculated effort to arrive at a basis for mutual cooperation with the man and country which we regarded (as did Israel) as the fulcrum of the Arab world. But no one who looked carefully at the facts could help but see the many places where we were still containing Nasser’s expansionist ambitions. How else could one interpret the fact that we were still providing substantial aid to Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan—in fact every country around the UAR. We were even willing to help Syria, except that the Syrians were unhelpable. One thing was certain—Nasser saw clearly that we had not gone overboard with him. We intended to do business with Nasser wherever mutual interests existed, in order to provide him an alternative to out-and-out reliance on the Soviet Union. So long as he had such an alternative he would take from both sides, but would be no more interested in serving as Khrushchev’s stalking horse in the Middle East than ours. The third myth was that the US could not be relied on to back Israel in a pinch. Harping on this theme from some Israelis was becoming annoying here; we didn’t like to be told our word couldn’t be relied upon, no matter how nicely this allegation was dressed up. Komer said he fully realized that no 100% guarantees were possible in this world. Indeed we recognized the theoretical force of De Gaulle’s argument that a nation could rely totally only on its own resources. What we objected to so vigorously was his feeling that an independent force of real practical meaning could be developed. De Gaulle thought he could tear off an arm, but in practice he might not be able to tear off even a little finger. Ergo, could we afford to risk letting him trigger World War III because of such a delusion? One could argue that Israel had a much more legitimate case for an absolute deterrent than De Gaulle—after all, it was facing the Arabs not the USSR. But in fact we saw no need for such a deterrent, given the US commitment. Even more important, for Israel to take this route would force the Arabs into Moscow’s arms. It might even lead to Soviet missile bases in the Nile delta. In any event, while neither Israel nor any other nation could have 100% assurance that the US would defend it, the all-important thing was what the potential aggressor thought. There was no doubt in our minds here. We had made sure that the Arabs knew we would intervene, and we thought unlikely any miscalculation on their part. We then got onto the tank matter. Peres explained how they proposed to handle the tank deal through Italy. Only three people—Defense Minister Andreotti, his intelligence chief, and the deputy intelligence chief would be witting of the ultimate tank destination. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]Since this would be an arms export from one NATO country to another, no licenses were required. The tanks would end up in Naples and be reexported from there. [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] The German MOD at least wanted to sell all of its 232 M–48A1s, so the Germans could say they were getting rid of these earlier models, in order to standardize on M–48A2 or 3s (which they would buy from us as replacements). The German Army would deliver the tanks to the Italian Army, which would send them to the company for refitting. The tanks would be refitted partly in Italy and partly in Israel. German Army engineers would handle quality control in the Italian plant. Andreotti had asked that 15–20 tanks be left for the Italian Army, which was again interested in the M–48A3. As Peres put it, when Israel bought a new weapon, all sorts of other countries became interested in it because of Israel’s reputation for being a wise purchaser. Komer said that the M–48 request proved the point, since the M–48A3 was unquestionably the best tank buy at the price in the world today. As to timing, it would take a year before the first tank got to Israel. There would be about four shipments. It would be at least another year before the Arabs found out. In response to Komer’s question, Peres said that Israel had kept its first Centurion purchases secret for 2–3 years. Komer asked for a written summary of these points for our use in talking with the Germans (an unsigned memo furnished later by Gazit is attached). 2 Peres said that Israel wanted to buy new engines, guns, etc. for the M–48s directly from the US. He thought this would avoid messy financial problems, and was just as secure. Israel had bought guns from us before. Sloan was dubious over whether DOD would want to do this. We’d have to reserve our position while looking into the matter. Peres also urged that we find some way to provide ammunition and if possible spare parts at reduced prices from US stocks. Sloan pointed out that US holdings of 105 mm. tank rounds were all of recent manufacture. It would be difficult to declare them surplus. In fact, we were still buying them for US use. We’d also look into this matter but he didn’t want to hold out false hopes. Komer mentioned to Peres in passing that he wasn’t going to belabor the missile question again, but wished to say that the secretive and evasive way in which Israel responded to our frequent inquiries on this and Dimona inevitably raised suspicions on our part. For the President of the US to have to intervene personally and repeatedly to get the necessary reassurances was frankly counter-productive; it only made us feel that Israel really did have something to hide. As for Israel’s missile program, why was it that they wouldn’t even answer our queries? Peres said that when one made an arrangement with a third country and that country laid down certain conditions, it tied Israel’s hands. Komer replied that this was the first cogent explanation we’d had, but wasn’t the US/Israel relationship such that we were entitled to greater candor? He said we’d want to talk with Israel further about missiles. As the meeting broke up Peres said that the Germans wanted to tell the French if they decided to provide tanks. He thought the best way would be for Eshkol to mention it casually to De Gaulle. Westrick had agreed that the Israelis could do so in this event. Komer demurred that we would not like to have our role in the arrangements revealed. Peres was sure this would be no problem, commenting smilingly that when great men get together they don’t get into details. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. II. Top Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Vance, Harriman, Talbot, and Sloan. The attachment indicates that the conversation took place on June 5. 2 Attached but not printed. 70. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 70. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, June 6, 1964, 1:30 p.m. 4390. Reference: Urtel 3171. 2 Subject: Arab refugees. At dinner last night, Stevenson discussed refugee question with PM Eshkol of Israel. After emphasizing seriousness of problem for both Israel and US in Near East and in UN, Stevenson asked what plans Israel has for dealing with problem. Eshkol replied that he fully appreciated difficulties question presented for us but that Israel had no new suggestions to advance. After expressing firm opposition to Johnson proposal he said that adding 100,000 Arabs to the 250,000 now in Israel, and assuming the present rate of Jewish immigration continued at about 30 to 35,000 per annum, the higher birth rate of Arabs would “create a Cyprus situation” within 25 years. On this assumption he estimated Arab population would become one quarter of total. Arabs will force refugees back into Palestine by various devices and he was not sure that any open-end formula could even restrict repatriation of 100,000. While extremely cordial and appreciative of US and UN problem, his position appeared inflexible and he advanced sundry arguments as to why any increase in Arab population was hazardous for Israel, including fact that Arabs do not serve in army. Eshkol referred repeatedly to integration of many of refugees into Arab countries and left no alternative but absorption of balance by Arabs. Following his departure, Jacob Blaustein asked Stevenson if he had discussed refugee problem, adding that if formula could be devised which would limit Arab repatriation to 100,000, he felt confident GOI could be persuaded to accept it in final settlement of problem. Stevenson concluded that Eshkol’s official position at least no more tractable than Ben Gurion’s. Plimpton also brought subject up with Peres (Deputy Defense Minister) saying that time pressures had prevented its being discussed in Washington, but that US Government regarded problem as very serious one for Israel and US in Near East and in UN. We realize that there is no overall solution in sight, but we do look to Israel for constructive suggestions that would lead to some partial progress. Peres entirely negative: he said only solution was to abolish UNRWA and turn over decreasing amounts of relief funds to host governments and let them handle refugees pending absorption into local economies. He rejected concept of admitting limited number of refugees on an experimental basis to see what could happen and shied away from compensation problem. Stevenson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF PAL. Confidential. 2 Not printed. 71. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 71. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, June 8, 1964, 11 a.m. 2974. Deptels 5566, 2 5567, 5592. 3 Near East Arms Control. In seventy-minute farewell interview with President Nasser on June 7, I made brief tour d’horizon of specific current issues between USA–UAR as reported Embtel 2975. 4 At close of this I turned to subject of Near East arms control, saying this was one of most fundamental and urgent USA interest in Middle East area. Progress in this field with UAR assistance would form strong bond of mutual interest and would help keep relationship of two countries in balance even when differences on specific matters generated some heat. President Kennedy had inaugurated discussion of this topic beginning with McCloy mission last summer. President Johnson equally concerned in and urgent for it. I opened presentation by handing President original copy of President Johnson’s letter of May 20 re this subject. I then recalled last discussion (Embtel 2632) 5 regarding UAR “declaration of intent” on non-acquisition nuclear arms and acceptance IAEA safeguards. President Nasser immediately responded by saying he was prepared to answer President Johnson’s letter with a statement that UAR had no intention of building or procuring atomic weapons. As to IAEA, he would be prepared to accept this international safeguard at time construction of nuclear power plant in UAR imminent. To accept safeguards before any possibility of plant existing would put him in difficult position since he had no reason to issue statement and he would be accused of doing so only under “great power pressure”. However, once UAR decided to build nuclear installation it would be appropriate to [accept?] IAEA safeguards and this he was prepared to do. He requested I personally and directly inform President Johnson of this. In response I suggested statement covering this might be included in same letter that disavowed intent acquire nuclear weapons. We would hope this letter could be discussed quietly and off the record while in draft form to be sure it met purposes both parties. President Nasser opined this would be possible although he did not give me a firm commitment. I then turned to larger topic of Arab-Israeli arms race, opening presentation with detailed recapitulation of reftel 5592. In connection with this I cited UK newspaper report re possible number of missiles in 1966 and development of CW warheads [garble—possibility] that made international community nervous and would certainly generate matching response from Israel. Nasser said he had not seen article in question but had read report in Bonn newspaper claiming UAR developing nuclear warheads for SSM’s. He said this was completely untrue, as letter assurance to President Johnson would make clear. Beyond this I could not draw him out [garble] number of missiles or type of warheads being developed. On basis above, I expressed deep concern that level of weapon sophistication was rising so rapidly that ultimate explosion in Middle East seemingly unavoidable. Since Israel and UAR now apparently in defensive positions sufficiently balanced to provide mutual security, this seemed logical and most favorable moment to consider how arms level might be frozen. While fully recognizing inhibitions to direct UAR-Israeli contact USG believed that quiet, unpublicized third part action could well bring arms growth to halt, without imperiling reasonable security interests of both parties. Nasser answered by saying UAR defensive position versus Israel was indeed much better than it had been five years ago. Israel had a certain advantage in ground to air missiles since the country was so small that a dozen Hawk installations would adequately protect its air fields. In contrast, UAR so large with air fields necessary in such scattered areas that protection by ground to air missiles not entirely practical. Hence his military people agreed SSM’s as necessary counterbalance to values Israel derives from Hawk installations. Nasser admitted arms escalation was under way, saying every time Israel acquired more sophisticated aircraft, he had been forced to do same or to seek some compensatory weapon. In the beginning Soviets had sold arms to UAR at 30% discount, but during past few years they had charged UAR full price. This applied specifically to last two purchases of Super MIGs. While recognizing this continuous matching and over-matching of armaments expensive and unending, he had real problem with his military men who kept urging increase of quantity and sophistication of arms. “All military men are alike—American, Russian, and Egyptian,” the President said. His problem is how to bring about halt in SSM increments without being open to accusation he has been bludgeoned into this by great power pressure. I immediately rejoined that it was not great power pressure which urged the move but inherent and inescapable danger of arms race in itself. Unless Israel and UAR could find some way to scale down or stop arms race the day of final conflict marched inexorably nearer. Should such a conflict come, it might be much more difficult to control than was Arab-Israeli clash of 1956. Then only two major powers were involved—USSR and USA. Now a third power has appeared on scene—Communist China. While USSR and USA had made some initial steps toward approaching problem of arms limitation and, I opined, shared mutual interests in avoiding world conflagration, same could not be said of Communist China. President agreed ChiComs a new and intransigent element on world scene. I then traversed again arguments for seeking unpublicized, basic steps towards arms limitation, saying we would welcome any specific ideas he could put forward. This requires broad and statesmanlike thinking and no other Arab leader either in position or with capability to do this but Nasser himself. We therefore would welcome his ideas. President could be sure we would continue to present this topic to him both by Ambassadorial representation and through direct communication between highest Government sources. If at this time he told me that door was closed and this matter was not to be raised again, I would of course report this to my Government. Nasser answered he took no such view and would look forward to further representations on matter. In course of above presentation I specifically reviewed matter of inspection of production of fissionable material re reftel 5566. At close of interview Nasser spent some moments discussing our personal relationship, expressed his gratitude for the 43 interviews we have had during the past 35 months, then accompanied me to my car for a final farewell. Comment : I believe we should now move to rivet down statement on non-acquisition of nuclear arms and IAEA commitment. Although no concrete progress made in general arms control, I believe Nasser is certainly open to further and more specific approaches in this field. I doubt if much will be gained by continuing to urge that he “put his ideas forward.” Here as elsewhere Nasser usually reacts rather than acts. Most productive next move would probably be a detailed proposal from USG, probably presented by special and high ranking Presidential emissary to which Nasser can give definite response. Badeau 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret;Exdis. 2 Telegram 5566 to Cairo, May 28, referred to a statement Badeau had made in a May 7 conversation with Nasser and warned that any implication that production of fissionable material could be monitored unilaterally not only was factually incorrect but also tended to undercut the U.S. position on IAEA safeguards for the UAR and Israel. The U.S. position at the Geneva Conference and elsewhere was that a complete cutoff of fissionable materials for weapons purposes by the United States and the Soviet Union required inspection. (Ibid., DEF 18–4) 3 Documents 62 and 64 , respectively. 4 Dated June 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US) 5 Document 52 . 72. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 72. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 8, 1964. When you see Ambassador Knight at 6 p.m., we recommend you give him a brief oral private message to take back to Syria’s President. The Syrians have been the loudest in denouncing our Arab-Israeli stand, and in claiming you have changed our Arab policy. Following doesn’t give him much, but would serve highly useful purpose of letting him know you care enough about Syria. “I wish to take the occasion of Ambassador Knight’s return to Syria to assure you of the unchanged and unchanging nature of our American policy in the Near East. I intend to continue to pursue it in the same spirit as President Kennedy. “While I realize that there are aspects of our policy that cannot fully satisfy any country in the area, I hope that you, Mr. President, your Government, and your people will appreciate the friendliness of our position and our desire for good relations between Syria and the US.” Approve 2 Disapprove R. W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Corresponddence File, Syria, Presidential Correspondence. Secret. 2 This option is checked. The message was transmitted in telegram 462 to Damascus, June 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 NEAR E-US) Telegram 896 from Damascus, June 22, reported that Ambassador Knight delivered the message to President Hafiz, who stated that he had no doubt about U.S. friendship and friendly intentions but that the Arabs continued to feel “grievance and injury” resulting from the events of 1947–1949. Knight noted that fundamental U.S. policy was unchanged by the Eshkol visit and remained opposed to aggression by either side. (Ibid.) 73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk 73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 15, 1964. SUBJECT The Palestine Problem, 1964–65 We have just concluded a “think-session” outside of Washington on possible new approaches to the Arab-Israel problem. Representatives of AID, IO, PPC, INR, AFN, and CIA, as well as NEA and NE, pooled their background knowledge and imagination in an effort to provide guidelines for future policy decisions. The consensus of the group is set forth in the attached “Possible U.S. Initiatives on Arab-Israel Issues in 1964–65”. The recommendations were concurred in by all present in their capacities as participants in the conference, although their concurrences do not represent formal clearances from their respective agencies or bureaus. You will see from the paper that we didn’t discover opportunities for dramatic new departures. I believe, however, the suggestions made therein will help inch the situation forward. Attachment 2 POSSIBLE U.S. INITIATIVES ON ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUES IN 1964–65 1. U.S. interests in the Near East have long been vulnerable to pressures arising out of indigenous social change, the outward thrust of Arab nationalism against the remaining points of Western privilege, Communist ambitions, and intra-area disputes, particularly the Arab-Israel conflict with attendant military escalation. Nevertheless, we have managed to maintain our basic interests in the area—access, transit, oil, and the integrity of Israel and other states—at relatively low costs. Our objective is to continue to do so. 2. Despite the bellicose statements we hear, neither Israel nor the Arab states are prepared to gamble on settling their differences by war. Neither side has confidence it could win or would be permitted to keep its gains, or even limit the course of hostilities or number of participants. Nonetheless, escalation to sophisticated weaponry and possibly (first on the Israeli side) to nuclears is intensifying the risk of accidental war and decreasing the certainty that we can deter or stop it. 3. Israeli and Arab positions on their principal disputes continue to be set in concrete. At best there is tacit acceptance of most elements of the stalemate. Our minimum objective is to prevent this stalemate from blowing up; if it persists, it might gradually take the shape of a modus vivendi. Our maximum present objective is to find ways to dissolve some of the most dangerous of its aspects. The problem is to encourage the modus vivendi without stimulating Arab-Israel tension by what we do or fail to do. 4. Israeli and Arab capabilities to resist unpalatable compromises continue high. Neither side is particularly responsive to initiatives by the U.N. or by individual nations, including the U.S. In 1964–65 the U.S. should be relatively well placed to use its limited leverage, however. Israeli confidence in U.S. security assurances has risen. Some Arab confidence in the U.S. has been demonstrated and Arab reactions to several difficult developments (e.g., Jordan waters diversion, Eshkol visit) have proved containable. The U.S. can expect to have an active administration with a strong mandate. 5. It follows that certain limited initiatives may be possible. On the Arms Race: 1. Our objectives are a. To concentrate above all else on preventing the proliferation of nuclears (which are within the capability of Israel in 2–4 years), and b. To resist further rocket programs and thus impede the spread of nuclear delivery systems and associated weaponry. 2. In working toward these objectives, we should a. Press on urgently with efforts to bring Nasser to self-denial of further rocketry and to IAEA inspection of any reactors. He would find this a good deal if it resulted in blocking rocketry and nuclears in Israel. This effort with Nasser should be the early business of our new Ambassador, and perhaps of a special Presidential emissary. After the election, it might call for a visit to Egypt by the Secretary of State or the Vice President, followed perhaps by a Nasser visit to the U.S. Hope of success in this effort would rest on maintenance of effective political and economic relations with Nasser. b. While working on Nasser, continue pressing against the Israeli rocket program and registering our unalterable opposition to any Israeli activity in the direction of nuclear weaponry. c. Exploit any breakthrough with Nasser to get categoric equivalent assurance from Israel. d. Consult with Britain, France, Germany and, as necessary, other Allies on cooperative actions to impede Israeli and Arab development of rocketry or nuclears. e. Consider a possible understanding with the Soviets on mutual denial of assistance in nuclears and rocketry to Israel and the Arabs. 3. There are also dangers in the conventional arms race. We should be alert to targets of opportunity to restrain and reduce this competition. Regarding Refugees: We see no prospect in 1964–65 for another major refugee initiative. Without some U.S. effort, however, the refugee issue could become more troublesome than it is. We can usefully pursue the following limited objectives: 1. Follow up the PCC property identification report by urging Israelis to take some initiative now to accept applications from individual Arabs for settlement of property claims and to enlarge possibilities for the reunion of families. A small office might be attached to the PCC to facilitate this process. 2. Set the stage for expansion of the PCC to five members, leaving the door open for ultimate U.S. withdrawal. 3. As proposed from the 1950’s onward, begin devolution of UNRWA to national units working under supervision of individual host states. As a two-year process, this might start with an agreement, to be sought by the UNSYG strongly supported by the U.S., with the U.A.R. to take over administration of relief and works in the Gaza strip. 4. Make some cut in the U.S. contribution to UNRWA for FY-1966, as a means of pressing the SYG and UNRWA to tackle rectification and reduction and look to national management of relief and works. 5. Accept a two-year extension of UNRWA on the understanding that efforts would be made by the SYG along the lines of (3) above. 6. Pre-empt the General Assembly situation by laying the groundwork for a middle-of-the-road resolution. Other Issues: 1. We should remain steady on our present course of supporting all works in consonance with the 1955 Unified Plan including leadership in finding finances for the Maqarin Dam. 2. We should continue to urge maximum utilization of UNTSO including participation by the parties in ISMAC and EIMAC. 3. We see no prospect of fresh initiatives in this period on such other questions as boundaries, boycott, and freedom of navigation. 1 Source: Department of State,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 69 D 492, POL 22/1, Arab-Israel Dispute, May–June 1964. Secret. 2 The attachment is unsigned and undated. A copy with the notation “Recommendations Adopted by Participants in Airlie House Discussions in Final Session, June 14,” is filed with a record of the discussions described in Talbot’s covering memorandum, which were held June 12–14 at Airlie House in Virginia. (Ibid., NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 304, Airlie House Discussions, June 1964) 74. Memorandum of Conversation 74. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 29, 1964, 12:45 p.m. SUBJECT U.S.-U.A.R. Relations PARTICIPANTS The President The Honorable John S. Badeau, Ambassador to the United Arab Republic NEA—Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs Ambassador Badeau was received by the President at 12:45 PM for his final call prior to his resignation from government service. The President opened the conversation by expressing warm appreciation for the Ambassador’s fine work in Cairo and regret that he was terminating his service. The Ambassador responded by expressing his own regret that unavoidable personal responsibilities had made his resignation necessary. He had found the post in Cairo challenging and stimulating, and felt that significant progress had been made in furthering American interests in the Arab world as these relate to the United Arab Republic. The Ambassador particularly noted the strong support accorded him by the Department of State and the Administration and said that, in whatever progress has been made, this was a chief factor. The President then inquired as to the current state of American-Egyptian relations. The Ambassador answered that basic relations continued to be good. Throughout his 35 months of service in Cairo, President Nasser had received him frequently, and the dialogue thus developed had proved highly useful, both in setting forth the American viewpoint and in avoiding incipient conflicts. In recent months, however, the Egyptian Government had been somewhat suspicious that the United States might be changing its policy. While no concrete evidence of such a change existed, the pressures of an election year and the fact of a new Administration made policy-making circles in Egypt unusually sensitive to American actions. The President then asked what course American policy could most profitably take in the future in relation to the United Arab Republic. The Ambassador replied with a brief summary of American relations with Egypt since the rise of the present Revolutionary Regime in 1952. During this time, the Ambassador pointed out, the United States had followed four distinct policies toward Egypt. The number and variety of these policies indicated something more than changing administrations in the United States, although such changes were naturally a factor in them. Basically it had been difficult for the United States to define and pursue steadily a single policy toward Egypt because there are certain mutual irritants which periodically push the two nations apart. Twice during the last 12 years Egypt and the United States had approached a major confrontation. The first occasion was in 1955, at the time of Egypt’s first arms purchases from the Soviet Bloc. The second resulted from the Suez Canal nationalization, and came to its climax in the landing of American Marines in Lebanon in 1958. On each occasion it seemed as though both countries were prepared to throw their weight into a major confrontation. However, just as this became imminent both parties stopped, being unwilling to take the final step. In effect, they said: “We cannot do this to each other; let us pick up the pieces and try again.” The Ambassador said that the reason for this lay in the mutual capacity to hurt each other’s interests, which both Egypt and the United States possessed. Were Egypt determined to do so it could cause considerable trouble for the United States in areas of the Near East where there are basic American interests—as witness the recent Libyan response to President Nasser’s call for the abolition of Wheelus Air Base. Equally the United States had the capacity to hurt Egypt in areas such as Yemen, Syria, and Jordan if she were determined to do so. Neither party possessed as great a capacity to hurt as it professed, but the capacity was sufficiently large to imperil certain basic national interests. It was this fact that had prevented a major confrontation in the past. The Ambassador believed that it would continue to make a major confrontation unlikely in the future unless the U.A.R. should threaten an American interest of so basic a character that the United States would be willing to risk imperiling its position in adjacent Arab lands. This was to say that American-Egyptian relations might well continue to fluctuate between cordiality and opposition, but always avoiding the final step of major confrontation. If this analysis was correct, the Ambassador said, it suggested that the two countries should strive to develop an on-going relation similar to that in existence between many countries. This relationship assumed a continuing bond based upon mutual interests but allowed room for direct opposition on specific issues. To illustrate this the Ambassador cited the American-French relationship. At the moment there were several aspects of French policy with which the United States strongly disagreed, i.e., the independent nuclear deterrent, certain attitudes toward NATO, opposition to British participation in the Common Market, and policy toward Communist China and Southeast Asia. It could be expected that America would oppose France on all these issues, but neither the United States nor France assumed that such opposition called into question the basic and longstanding Franco-American tie. The Ambassador suggested that this approach could be taken toward the U.A.R. It was inevitable that both the United States and the U.A.R. would find it necessary to oppose specific policies adopted by the other. Egypt had long opposed American policy toward Israel, while in recent months the United States had been in opposition to U.A.R. policy on foreign bases and the British position in South Arabia. But opposition on such specific issues need not continuously call into question the basic mutual and continuing interests on which a lasting American-Egyptian policy could be built. During the past three years a good beginning had been made in identifying and supporting these basic and mutual interests. If this support could be continued, the United States might be able to enjoy a reasonable and long-term relation with the U.A.R., yet retain freedom of movement on specific issues. The President inquired as to whether President Nasser would understand such a sophisticated policy. The Ambassador replied that he thought the chances were reasonably good for its acceptance. During a long and cordial farewell visit with President Nasser on June 7, 2 the Ambassador had advanced this view in detail. After discussing some aspects of it, President Nasser had replied that this was probably “the only possible policy between the two countries.” The Ambassador recognized that it would be difficult for some Americans to understand this approach—and even more difficult for some Egyptians. Nevertheless, it was the only alternative to the “off-again, on-again, gone-again” relation which had vexed the two countries during the past 12 years. In concluding the interview, President Johnson suggested that he might wish to communicate with President Nasser as a result of this talk with Ambassador Badeau. With this, interview closed. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. II. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot and Badeau and approved by the White House on July 23. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held at the White House from 1:02 to 1:16 p.m. (Ibid.) 2 See Document 71 and footnote 4 thereto. 75. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 75. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 1 Washington, June 30, 1964, 9:42 a.m. TELEPHONE CALL TO MR Talbot Sec asked if we would sell supersonic aircraft to Israel. T said no. Sec asked why we sell to the Lebanese. 2 T said basically because we are doing for the Lebanese, Saudis and possibly the Jordanians what we would not do for the three main Arab countries on the grounds that Lebanon is acknowledged by Israel to be no threat. Sec said he did not see our selling supersonic aircraft to any of the Arab neighbors if we are not prepared to sell to Israel. T said there was a paper which has been on its way to the Sec since April; last week we asked for the beginning of a study on the implications of the whole idea of military sales; there has been a great change in what is being offered without any policy considerations being given. Sec asked if we asked Israelis if they minded what they would say. T said they would rather we sell nothing to any Arab country but they have accepted tacitly our support of these three. Sec said he had an uneasy feeling that we do not have our policy lines straightened out on this issue; let’s give some thought to that; it would be possible for govts in these three to change or for united command to be set up. T agreed; T said he wanted to get whole question of military sales up to high level consideration. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Rusk Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Prepared by Rusk’s personal assistant Carolyn J. Proctor. 2 Talbot informed the Lebanese Ambassador on June 30 of U.S. willingness to enter into an agreement to sell 16 F–8A aircraft but not “Sidewinder” missiles. (Telegram 2 to Beirut, July 1; ibid., Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 LEB) A July 7 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk outlined the background of the sale. (Ibid., DEF 19–3 US–LEB) An agreement was signed July 15. (Telegram 68 to Beirut, July 16; ibid., DEF 12–5 LEB) 76. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 76. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 1 Washington, July 2, 1964, 2:35 p.m. Ball wanted to mention that Lord Harlech said he was sending down an economic study of the UAR which demonstrates the very great dependence of the UAR on the economic assistance we are giving them and the great value of our leverage. He wanted Talbot to know of this. Ball voiced concern at the wild statement of Nasser about war being unavoidable with Israel. Talbot mentioned the President called saying he would like to recheck the decision on the loan before it became final. Our present plan is to defer action on this for some time and take a good look at it when the American claims have moved farther along. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, United Arab Republic. No classification marking. Prepared in Ball’s office. 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, July 13, 1964, 7:38 p.m. 34. Ambassador should approach FonOff at highest appropriate level to make following points: 1) We again wish to counsel greatest restraint on GOI in matter of patrolling in and around DMZs. 2 At this juncture with tensions running high it idle to argue over what constitutes violation of GAA and what does not. Important thing is avoid incident which could get out of hand with unpredictable consequences and no benefit to anyone, including Israel. 2) However if Israel does feel that a show of its right to patrol was necessary, that right was reasserted on July 13, fortunately without Syrian reaction. Accordingly we strongly urge that patrolling again be suspended in order avoid senseless and perhaps dangerous incident. Such prudent course would cost Israel nothing. 3) In circumstances we would also urge GOI suspend any other extraordinary military activity which might be construed by SARG as provocative, especially since Arab dels to MACs reportedly meeting in Damascus. (We referring especially to paradrop reported by ACOS Marsh, but to protect him, you should not mention this specifically unless you have word of it from other sources.) 4) We hope GOI will renew its excellent relations with General Bull when he returns and believe Israelis should take up with him any reservations they may have regarding fairness or accuracy of UNMO’s reports. 5) GOI should realize, in event possible incidents are taken to SC, that it will be very difficult to defend any activity which contravenes GAA, whether both sides guilty or not, and if UNMO’s initial reports show they unable to establish which side first started shooting. 6) We again ask Israel to discuss recent incidents in ISMAC if ISMAC chairman can arrange that the only item on the agenda will be the recent incidents and not the question of Israeli sovereignty over the DMZs. You should inform GOI that Ambassador Knight has called on Syrian FonMin and urged restraint on part of SARG. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs in the Middle East Stephen Campbell of UNP, cleared by Paul W. Jones of UNP and Davies, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to USUN, Damascus, and Jerusalem. 2 A July 13 memorandum from Talbot to Harriman states that the Israeli Charge informed the Department of an Israeli decision to resume patrolling that morning in an area where from July 2 to 6 there had been three separate Israel-Syrian clashes. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 55 from Tel Aviv, July 14, reported that Barbour presented these points to Director General Yahil. (Ibid.) 78. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk 78. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 22, 1964. SUBJECT Jordanian Arms Requests: A Policy Problem Background The rapprochement between the UAR and Jordan and Jordan’s participation in the Unified Arab Command (UAC) set up as a result of decisions taken at the Arab Summit meeting in January, 1964 are beginning to pose some nettling problems for us. The attached [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] cable 2 conveys King Husayn’s comments on current pressures on Jordan from the UAR and the Soviet Union to expand its forces and to begin to “standardize” on Soviet military equipment. This graphically portrays the complexities of one of these problems. 1. The King and his military have been interested for some time in expanding and modernizing Jordan’s forces and the “confirmed requirement” for a squadron of twenty supersonic jet fighters, additional tanks, and other modern equipment to be provided at UAC expense is tempting. 2. At the same time, the King has been told by the Egyptians that the primary initiative for the introduction of Soviet equipment into Jordan came from Prime Minister Khrushchev who during his visit to the UAR this spring urged the UAR strongly to pressure the Jordanians to accept Soviet equipment in the interest of breaking the western monopoly on arms in Jordan. 3. The King tells us he insisted in his discussions with the UAC that Jordan could satisfy its need from the United States and was authorized to negotiate for the equipment decided on. If we are unwilling to provide the equipment, Soviet equipment will be delivered either through the UAR or directly from the Soviet Union. The King’s representative, Brigadier Amer Khammash is now in Washington with a shopping list. (He is responding to Secretary McNamara’s suggestion to King Husayn during the April visit that Jordan give the United States an opportunity to sell hardware when Jordan had funds from the UAC.) Jordan reportedly is to receive initially five million pounds sterling from the UAC to contract for its requirements. The UAR has “guaranteed” the Jordanians continuing funds and sources of supply even if the UAC should disappear. Jordan has agreed with the UAC to add the irregular 9,000-man National Guard to the regular army, to alter the army brigade organization to include greater firepower, supporting armor, and increase in the number of brigades and brigade strengths, and to add a squadron of 20 supersonic fighters to the RJAF. Counting on our concern at the prospect of Soviet aircraft in Jordan, they are requesting twenty F–104–G aircraft from us. Problems Posed Should we fail to hold the line on sale of supersonic aircraft and other sophisticated hardware to Jordan, we would be subject to pressures from the other Arab states and Israel, thus encouraging the Near Eastern arms rivalry. Israel’s reaction to creation of an air cover for Jordan’s army, be it made up of Soviet or Western aircraft, is another factor entering the equation. We must also recognize the inevitably adverse effect on the Jordan budget of an expanded and more costly military establishment if UAC/UAR commitments of support are not carried out. Actions We Are Taking In coordination with Defense we have developed a position designed to persuade the Jordanians to concentrate on modernization rather than expansion of their forces. We will make clear to Brigadier Khammash, and subsequently to King Husayn, that yielding to UAR/UAC pressure to accept Soviet equipment poses grave risks to Jordan’s integrity and to U.S.-Jordan relations. We will seek to persuade Jordan of the disadvantages of acquiring aircraft beyond its present inventory of Hawker Hunters until Jordan can maintain and operate these effectively. If we are unable to accomplish this, to preclude Jordan’s being forced to accept MIGs, we will indicate our interest in facilitating Jordan’s acquisition of a modern Western, preferably British, jet interceptor. With respect to ground equipment, we are proposing that we assist Jordan in the formulation of a long-range plan for equipping and modernizing its ground forces within Jordan’s capability to operate, maintain, and support. We have discussed this problem informally with the British and are awaiting London’s comments on our proposed position. The British apparently are aware that the UAC has advised Jordan not to acquire British military equipment. The decisions we must take with regard to the Jordanian requests are, of course, relevant to our overall Near Eastern arms policy. The accompanying memorandum 3 discusses the rationale for continuing our traditional policy. Your reaffirmation of the policy will be useful in setting forth guidelines for the entire Executive Branch. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Symmes and Davies; concurred in by Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in NR Colonel Donald W. Bunte and Colonel William B. Robinson of G/PM; and sent through Harriman. 2 Listed on the memorandum as [ text not declassified ]; not found. 3 Reference is to a memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, dated July 21, on the subject “Near East Arms Policy,” to which Talbot apparently attached the memorandum printed here. Both were forwarded to Rusk by Harriman as attachments to Document 79 . 79. Information Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to Secretary of State Rusk 79. Information Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 24, 1964. SUBJECT Near East Arms Policy Attached are three memoranda submitted by NEA which advocate continuation of our present Near East arms policy. These papers consist of: a) A summary memorandum (Tab 1) 2 which notes that our policy is under heavy pressure on three fronts: 1) US balance of payments considerations; 2) the desire of Israel and its supporters for modern US weaponry; and 3) rising Arab arms appetites generated by the formation of the United Arab Command. The particular immediate problem is the Jordanian arms request. The paper concludes that we must continue to hold the line and suggests firmness with Jordan in order to avert a major crisis in our overall relations with the Arabs and Israel. (At Tab 4 is an outgoing telegram to Amman setting forth the proposed US position.) 3 b) A contingent action memorandum (Tab 2) 4 which spells out the background and objectives of our present policy and discusses in detail the three pressures for relaxation of our curbs on arms sales. DOD representatives have not concurred, for balance of payments and other reasons, in the NEA viewpoint. NEA considers it essential to reiterate our policy to individual US Government agencies. The paper recommends: 1) that if necessary you seek Presidential approval for continuation of our established Near Eastern arms policy; and 2) in the absence of DOD concurrence in this recommendation, that you seek Presidential approval for his informing the Secretary of Defense of the decision to follow established Near East arms policy. However, NEA plans further consultation with McNaughton and Solbert and will inform you as to whether differences can be resolved. c) An information memorandum (Tab 3) 5 which reviews the background of and the problems posed by the Jordanian arms request and notes that in coordination with Defense we have developed a position designed to persuade the Jordanians to concentrate on modernization rather than expansion of their forces. It points out that the decisions we must take with regard to the Jordanian request are relevant to our overall Near East arms policy, and concludes that your re-affirmation of this policy will be useful in setting forth guidelines for the entire Executive Branch. H. Gordon 6 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 18 NEAR E. Secret. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. Concurred in by Davies and sent through Harriman. A handwritten notation indicates that it was seen by Rusk on July 28. 2 The tabs are not attached. The summary memorandum is cited in footnote 3, Document 78 . 3 The sentence in parentheses was added by hand. In a list of attachments at the end of the memorandum, Tab 4 is telegram 45 to Amman, July 25. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. 4 The action memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, dated July 15, on the subject “Near East Arms Policy,” is ibid., DEF 18 NEAR–E. 5 Document 78 . 6 Herbert Gordon signed for Read above Read’s typed signature. 80. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 80. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 28, 1964. Mac— Tuesday Lunch Items. [Here follows discussion of Cyprus.] Jordan Arms . We seem to be heading for a McNamara/Rusk clash. Brigadier Khammash 2 is here for an answer this week. He’s told us that either US must sell a squadron of F–104s and a lot of ground force equipment (to be paid for with United Arab Command fund) or Jordan will have to buy from the Soviets. DOD is inclined to bow with the wind and offer F–5As, contingent on the other Arabs actually making the money available to Jordan (which most of us doubt). State is willing to show some give on ground force items, but balks at planes: (1) It would be economic insanity for Jordan to take on a heavy new arms burden—even if the other Arabs paid for the hardware, maintenance alone would be a heavy additional burden on a Jordanian economy already subsidized to tune of $45 million this year by us; (2) if it gets out we’re offering planes to Jordan, Israelis may come in with a big pre-election plea for arms too; (3) in any case, these arms are for announced purpose of backing Arab scheme to divert Jordan headwaters—can we be in position of selling arms to support an action we oppose? Sloan says he’ll take issue to McNamara. Rusk personally opposed to selling planes. But issue hasn’t ripened to point where LBJ should decide it. Instead he should say that he’ll make final decision and wants opposing argument put to him. This is a genuinely tough decision, and best course probably is to show some give on ground force stuff but stall on planes, telling Hussein we have deep reservations so will check our bet till we see whether he can get ironclad Arab guarantees of all the dough involved. But we shouldn’t give him a flat turndown now (note our Ambassador’s appeal in Amman 55 attached). 3 FYI, Nasser is sending a letter to LBJ; our hunch is it may refer to arms limitations. At any rate, it will give us a peg for a lot of things I’ve been wanting to say to Gamal about Libya, Cyprus, Yemen, Jordan, etc. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. 2 Brigadier Amer Khammash, Director of Operations and Chief of Purchases, Jordan Arab Army, was in Washington on an arms purchasing mission. Documentation on his discussions is in the National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN, and DEF 19–3 US–JORDAN, and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 333 Jordan. 3 Komer added this sentence by hand. Reference is to telegram 55 from Amman, July 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 81. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 81. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, July 30, 1964. JCSM–648–64 SUBJECT Sale of Supersonic Fighter Aircraft to Jordan (C) 1. Jordan, as a member of the recently formed United Arab Command (UAC), has requested the United States to sell various types of military equipment, including twenty (20) supersonic fighter aircraft. It has been reported that Jordan will be forced to accept supersonic aircraft from the Soviets or the United Arab Republic (UAR), if the United States refuses to sell them. The State Department proposes to take the position that “The United States cannot provide supersonic aircraft to Jordan at this time.” 2. The basis for the State Department position is not known; however, it does not appear to be consistent with decisions of this type for other Arab countries. Lebanon, Libya, and Saudi Arabia have been authorized to purchase supersonic fighter aircraft from the United States, and it is to be expected that these authorizations are common knowledge among all Arab countries. 3. If the proposed US position is reversed and sale of supersonics to Jordan is authorized, certain complications can be anticipated. The reaction of Israel may prove to be a problem, although the US Ambassador to Israel doubts that the accretion in Jordan’s military strength would seriously worry Israel. On the other hand, he has information that Israel would be seriously concerned over the presence of UAR instructors, technicians, and other military personnel in Jordan, which can be expected if Jordan procures supersonics from other than Western sources. The UK Ambassador to Israel generally agrees to these views. The over-all effect on the Middle East arms balance would be an addition to the existing numerical superiority of supersonics available to the UAC in comparison with Israel. However, the Free World Air Intelligence Briefs indicate the UAC already possesses 475 supersonics as opposed to 179 in the Israeli Air Force. The addition of twenty (20) more supersonic aircraft to the UAC inventory will not appreciably contribute to the existent imbalance. 4. On the other hand, there are implications inherent in the refusal to sell supersonic aircraft to Jordan. The most significant of these appears to be the potential loss of the restraining influence which the United States can exert on Jordan. Furthermore, the US position of influence likely would be replaced by the Soviet or UAR Government, either of which would be detrimental to Israeli and Western interests. 5. The basic issue appears to be not the selection of a position most advantageous to the United States; instead it appears to be the problem of selecting a US position that is least detrimental to our national interests. If Jordan is sincere in the goal to obtain supersonic aircraft, and there is ample indication that this is true, then it appears that US interests would suffer more if they were provided from Soviet/UAR sources than would be the case if the United States were to provide them. If Jordan and the UAC are not sincere, or the proposal fails for financial or other reasons, then the United States might very well gain by making the offer in principle and not having to fulfill it in the final analysis. 6. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA recommends that the United States agree in principle to sell high performance fighters to Jordan, and further concludes that, with proper phasing and adequate supervision, Jordan could support a twelve (12) to sixteen (16) plane squadron both financially and operationally. Under any circumstances, it is obvious that the United States must eventually consider provision of supersonic aircraft to Jordan if the United States is to remain the source of fighter aircraft. The current Jordanian fighter aircraft is the Hawker Hunter, twelve of which the United States bought for Jordan. These aircraft will become unserviceable over the next few years and a replacement will be required in the supersonic category, since all currently produced fighters are supersonic. 7. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States agree in principle to sell supersonic fighter aircraft to Jordan. The type, phasing of delivery, and other details should be subject to negotiations involving finances, sincerity of UAC intentions, and aircraft availabilities. While the F–5 might be considered as a suitable aircraft for Jordan, the United States should be prepared to offer an appropriate model of the F–104 if necessary to preclude acceptance of UAR/Soviet aircraft. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: David A. Burchinal 2 Lt. General, USAF Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 452.1 Jordan. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature. 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, August 4, 1964, 8:37 p.m. 64. At conclusion August 6 talks, 2 US officers will provide Brigadier Khammash following resume of USG statements made to him. Resume will be marked “Secret” but carry no external indication of its source. A. General 1. Keeping in mind that there is no possibility of an increase in US budget support for Jordan, we are deeply disturbed that Jordan’s economy and prospects for economic self-reliance may be jeopardized by the threat of new defense burdens. 2. In this context, we think it is essential to consider the serious repercussions to Jordan’s economic development program should the UAC supporting contribution be insufficient to cover all military expansion and supporting costs, or should it suddenly be withdrawn or cut off. 3. The US has played a key role in enabling Jordan to develop economically and to contribute to the peace of the Near East. The stability of Jordan as well as the Near East area means a great deal to us. Jordan’s plans and what Jordan and the UAR are proposing now represents a change in strategy and a potential threat to the stability of the area. This gives us deep concern. B. Ground Equipment 1. With respect to Jordan’s ground forces, we appreciate the pressures which are being exerted on Jordan by the UAC. To the extent that funds for the modernization, expansion, and continued support are available from other sources, we can understand why Jordan wishes to proceed with the UAC program which Khammash has outlined. 2. Recognizing the basic threats to Jordan’s sovereignty and economic development inherent in the UAC proposals, we are prepared to assist Jordan in the formulation of long-range plans for equipping and modernizing Jordan’s ground forces within its capability to operate, maintain, and support. To this end, if Jordan can obtain adequate assurance that additional money would be guaranteed by the UAC over a long period for expansion and continued supporting costs and if future Jordanian defense expenditures are held to the current budgetary level, the US is willing to consider selling military ground equipment to Jordan along the general lines of Jordan’s shopping list against payments to be received by Jordan from the Unified Arab Command in accordance with the following program: a. We are prepared to proceed immediately to negotiate the sale of a $7 million first increment of your total ground force requirements with deliveries of equipment to follow within 12 months of a signed contract. This increment would be directed principally at modernizing or filling equipment requirements for existing forces. Subject to Jordan’s ability to secure adequate UAC funds for support and maintenance, we would also be prepared to provide in this increment for partial equipping of one National Guard unit converted to the regular force. b. We are also prepared after negotiating sale of the first increment of $7 million to develop plans for sales against cash payments by Jordan of the additional ground equipment contained in Jordan’s total ground force requirements. To facilitate planning and deliveries of purchases financed by the UAC, the US is prepared to consider extension of credit provided that the amount of credit would not exceed $7 million at any one time. c. The foregoing arrangements would be conditioned on Jordan holding defense expenditures at the current level of 18.6 million pounds ($51 million) and on Jordan providing through UAC contributions and/or from adjustments in its own defense budget, adequate funds for maintenance and support of new equipment and additional forces. d. To complement the first tranche of $7 million sales, we also are prepared to continue FY 1965 military assistance at the same level as FY 1964. As you know, this includes such major items as M–48 tanks and APC’s. e. The long-term program envisaged above should permit a gradual phased expansion of the JAA which the US would support on an incremental basis, provided UAC funds were forthcoming for materiel and maintenance support. In the event of default by the UAC in the provision of funds, this program would help minimize adverse effects on Jordan’s army and economy—particularly if the bulk of the materiel delivered initially went into Jordan’s existing forces. C. Aircraft We recognize that the Hawker-Hunter will become unsupportable at some point in the future and provision should be made by that time for the introduction of a replacement aircraft into the RJAF. Accordingly, we are prepared to consider the problem of replacement of the Hawker-Hunters by an appropriate aircraft. To ensure that our consideration of replacement aircraft is soundly based—militarily and economically—we propose that a study of Jordan’s air requirements, taking into account UAC recommendations, be undertaken in the near future. D. Our Embassy is prepared to discuss the foregoing matters at further length with you and King Hussein in Amman. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Stoddart and Colonel Donald W. Bunte; cleared by Solbert, John P. Walsh, Symmes, George L. Warren of G/PM, and Macomber; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to London. 2 Telegram 67 to Amman, August 6, stated that Talbot presented the U.S. reply to Khammash on August 6, using talking points transmitted to Amman in telegram 66, August 5, and telegram 71, August 6. (All ibid.) 83. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 83. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, August 7, 1964. JCSM–673–64 SUBJECT Formal Clearance of the National Policy Paper: United Arab Republic (U) 2 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–26001/64, dated 10 July 1964, 3 subject as above, which requested comments and reservations on Part I of the third draft of the National Policy Paper on the United Arab Republic (UAR). 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft policy paper provides a generally effective statement of US policy toward the UAR. However, Nasser’s recent opposition to the US base in Libya, his overt and subversive pressures against the UK in Aden, his continued intransigence vis-a-vis Israel, are clearly inimical to US interests and objectives. Therefore, provision should be made to permit a firm policy toward the UAR, as necessary, to protect US interests. At the same time, any “harder” line toward Nasser should be developed with recognition of the possibility that punitive action might place important US interests at risk. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft paper should give more emphasis to the possibility that war might break out in the Near East within the next several years. It outlines certain conditions under which Israel might attack; but it does not explain that relatively minor incidents could lead to Arab interference with Israeli activities (i.e., shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba or diversion of Jordan waters) and to Israeli military retaliation. It states that the UAR or Israel might pre-empt in the face of a nuclear threat; but it does not explain that the UAR could erroneously decide that such a threat exists. Such considerations lead to a dangerous possibility of overt hostilities—with related possibilities of escalation and US involvement. It follows that progress in the settlement of basic UAR-Israeli differences should be attempted with a greater sense of urgency than is reflected in the draft paper. 4. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the complexity of Arab-Israeli problems and the efforts of the United States and the United Nations to resolve such issues, they note that discussions with the UAR and Israel have usually focused on isolated problems. It is suggested that consideration be given to the initiation of appropriate international negotiations on the complete range of Near East political, economic, and security problems. Such negotiations should take into account the wide-range of US actions and inducements which might be used to encourage constructive solutions. 5. Subject to incorporating the views stated above and the specific changes recommended in the Appendix hereto, 4 the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft policy paper provides an effective statement of US policy toward the UAR. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J. W. Davis Rear Admiral, USN Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Arabia 091. Secret. 2 See Document 45 . 3 Not found. 4 Not printed. 84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, August 8, 1964, 1:54 p.m. 78. Amman’s 60 to Dept. 2 We expect send you by separate telegram oral message from President to King Hussein 3 to be used as opener for your meeting with him to explain our position. Following talking points are for use at that time. As we envisage it objective this meeting with Hussein is to remind him of fundamentals US-Jordan relationship, to explain to him forthcoming aspects our partial compliance with Jordanian request, and to encourage in him the will to take positive stance in future discussions with UAC. Unless King himself has will to preserve integrity of Jordan even full US compliance with Jordanian request would be insufficient safeguard Jordan. In your discussion with King you should concentrate on positive features our proposals to Khammash (as in resume for Khammash transmitted separately) 4 and avoid final confrontations on any aspect of package we have developed. Following talking points incorporating helpful suggestions contained in Amman’s 60: 1. USG has tried to be responsive to Jordan arms request. Despite our deep concern over box Jordan may be getting into, package we have developed shows we stand ready to be as helpful as feasible in meeting Jordan’s recognized problem. 2. US response must be viewed in context of proven long-standing US support of Jordan. Few countries are receiving as much in relation to size as Jordan is from us. USG support has helped Jordan, perhaps poorest Arab country, to outstrip almost every other in sound economic and social progress. Moreover, firm US position in opposition to aggression against Jordan has protected it against attack. We are sure King in no doubt as to our determination support Jordan’s integrity. 3. We are not mentioning the above in an effort to evoke gratitude, but to make clear our bona fides as Jordan’s largest, most consistent supporter, which in turn justifies us in asking King to listen most seriously to our counsel. 4. While Jordan fully entitled to legitimate self-defense, we fear UAC proposed military buildup going much too far too fast. UAC proposals, if fully carried out, will distort balance heretofore maintained between economic development and military strength. In first place, military strength cannot be built in vacuum. Rather, it flows as natural consequence from strengthening economic and social fabric of society. UAC buildup would mean additional continuing expenses of at least $30 million annually. If UAC funds fail after buildup has been accomplished, where would King get extra funds to support larger military establishment? 5. Jordan is even now considering its seven year development plan. This plan reflects our mutual agreement on the desirability and necessity of gradually reducing HKJ’s reliance on budget support as such. On the one hand we see no possibility of increasing our budget support to meet the ruinous recurring costs which the UAC plan may involve. On the other we stand fully ready to lend generous support for feasible economic development projects. We sincerely hope King and Jordan will proceed coolly in this situation and avoid being pressured into commitments which could wreck so much of what Jordan and her friends have worked so long and hard to achieve. 6. Given absence of UAC funds, plus lack of assurances of continuing maintenance costs, UAC cannot reasonably expect Jordan go further at this time than USG proposals for buildup. Otherwise,GOJ is abdicating sovereignty to UAC. King needs press this point at September 5 Cairo meetings. Package provided Khammash stands on its own feet. We are not forthcoming on aircraft because in our view these make no economic, political, or military sense for Jordan. Begin FYI. Even Brigadier Khammash admits Jordan does not need supersonic fighters. End FYI. We believe King can argue point at forthcoming Cairo sessions. King must realize USG has its own problems. If Jordanian military establishment becomes distorted out of proportion, Congress may not be willing continue support Jordan so generously as in past. Adverse Congressional reaction would predictably be increased if Jordan accepts Soviet military equipment. We wish HM to know there is no breath of threat contained in foregoing. As good friend we have to make sure he understands our genuine concerns over the threat to US-Jordanian relations bound up in exaggerated military appetites. 7. Jordan’s concurrence with Arab decision to divert headwaters of Jordan River is not in Jordan’s interests. Arab decision to spend vast sums of money on counter-diversion scheme of Jordan River headwaters makes no sense. Money could much better be spent on constructive projects in Arab countries. Jordan may end up with less water than under Unified Plan, to detriment of its development. (Employ points made in Sections 5 and 6 Reftel.) 8. We hope we can continue rely on HM’s assurance to Ambassador Macomber shortly before latter’s departure from Jordan that, in Jordan’s own interests fundamentals of Jordan’s relations with US could not be changed. 5 When Amman agreed exchange Ambassadors with Moscow, King made foregoing assurance. In our view old relationship is being threatened. Can King still assure us it is not? Hussein cannot believe Soviets have any real regard for him. For example, would he expect Soviet assistance if King were overthrown by internal coup or if Jordan attacked from outside? In our view Soviets are clearly engaged in wrecking expedition. We cannot understand HM’s failure perceive this. We do not wish discuss present sincerity of any Arab leaders. We merely hope King will remember the past. How much faith can he put in constancy of other Arab regimes if sudden shift seemed to dictate casting Jordan adrift? As King knows, we have always tried to maintain good relations with Nasser and have never opposed Arab unity freely achieved. In the past we jointly have considered Nasser’s control over Jordan would be bad for Jordan. We assume King still feels same way. 9. So we trust King will keep his head until present situation is clarified. We hope King will agree USG has been understanding and forthcoming in effort to meet his problems. We believe he has enough to seek clarification of overall situation at forthcoming Arab Summit Conference in September. If Hussein comes out of September meetings with cash funds for military equipment, and assurances of annual maintenance support for future, which we jointly consider convincing, we will then consult further with the King on steps that appear most likely to advance our mutual interests. FYI. As to best time for you approach King, we inclined believe you should not wait until Khammash has returned to Jordan and reported to King. In final session August 6 reported separately Khammash himself urged King be informed as soon as possible. Accordingly we favor your seeing King as soon as appointment can be arranged. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Killgore, Symmes, and Duncan; cleared by Stoddart, Macomber, Warren, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Cairo and London. 2 Telegram 60 from Amman, July 29, suggested that before Barnes left in mid-August for leave he should review with the King the situation on arms for Jordan. (Ibid.) 3 Document 85 . 4 Document 82 . 5 Reference is apparently to Macomber’s farewell conversation with King Hussein on December 23, 1963. Macomber reported in telegram 296 from Amman, December 24, 1963, that the King “spoke of his determination to continue this forward momentum [of Jordan’s economic development] and his appreciation for USG friendship and major contributions to progress which had been achieved.” (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JORDAN) 85. Oral Message From President Johnson to King Hussein 85. Oral Message From President Johnson to King Hussein 1 Washington, undated. ORAL PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN Your recent visit to Washington underlined the deep and cordial ties between Jordan and the U.S. For me personally, the visit was an occasion to take stock of the progress that has been achieved in Jordan under your wise leadership and to reaffirm the close relationships between our two countries. I felt your friendship for the US and sensed in turn your appreciation of the factors underlying our policies toward Jordan. I particularly appreciated the truth of your assurances to Ambassador Macomber several months ago that in Jordan’s own interest there could be no basic change in our relations growing out of the exchange of Ambassadors between Jordan and the Soviet Union. No one is in a better position than Your Majesty to understand the sincerity of US interest in a fully independent and progressive Jordan. Our support has been proven over time. It is because I know you understand our great stake in Jordan’s continued stability and progress that I want to raise with you may concern over recent developments that could adversely affect Jordan’s very integrity. We understand your present problem regarding arms for Jordan. We desire to help you face it—sensibly and realistically—in ways which will preserve our happy relationship and not jeopardize your interests or ours. So I have asked Ambassador Barnes to review with you my concerns in the fullest confidence and candor. He will speak frankly on my behalf and I shall welcome from Your Majesty a similarly frank and friendly response. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Confidential. Filed as an attachment to telegram 80 to Amman, August 8, which transmitted the text of the message and instructed the Ambassador to deliver it when he met with the King to discuss Jordan’s arms requests. A note on the message in Komer’s handwriting states that it was approved by the President at 2:20 p.m. on August 8. The original message, drafted in the Department of State and only slightly revised, is also attached to telegram 80. 86. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 86. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Nasser’s July 26 Letter to the President Recommendation: That the President express his gratification to Nasser for his letter of July 26 and affirm our understanding of the commitments Nasser has made in his response. A suggested letter is enclosed. 2 Discussion: Nasser’s letter carries out his promise to put in writing his oral assurances that the UAR will not develop nuclear weapons or introduce them into its defense program. We judge that his response meets our present requirements with respect to the UAR policy on nuclear weapons. The letter makes two important assertions concerning UAR intent and capability with regard to nuclear weapons: 1) Intent—Nasser personally assures the President that the UAR has no thought of bringing the “terrifying danger” of nuclear war into the region. 2) Capability—The letter states the Egyptian people and government “have neither the effort nor the resources to devote to weapons of total destruction.” 3 The latter clause suffers from the literal translation, which we understand was prepared by the Office of the Presidency in Cairo. As we and the UAR Embassy interpret the phrase from the Arabic text, which is governing, it says that the Egyptian people and their government are neither endeavoring to develop weapons of mass destruction nor do they have the resources to devote to this purpose. Whether the term “weapons of total destruction” might also cover radiological, bacteriological, and chemical weapons would require further clarification. “In this connection, I assure you that the United Arab Republic, as she resists the possibilities of nuclear war or the impositions of peace through nuclear terror in the entire world, does not think of bringing that terrifying danger to the region she lives in. I believe I hardly need explain the efforts deployed by the United Arab Republic for her development, or the strong and at the same time heroic efforts her people exert to rebuild their life on new bases while faced by the difficulties and obstacles of underdevelopment. “Through these aspirations and the great achievements to which the United Arab Republic people look forward, our people and their Government have neither the effort nor the resources to devote to the weapons of total destruction.” While Nasser does not suggest any abandonment of his hostility toward Israel, by implication the letter suggests that Nasser does not intend to resort to nuclear weapons to resolve the Palestine problem. The letter clearly rejects the balance of nuclear terror that exists between the West and the Soviet bloc or the imposition of peace by means of nuclear terror in the entire world. The tone and content on Arab rights in Palestine and the absence of any reference to UAR intentions toward its neighbors suggest that Nasser probably had in mind possible publication of this letter. He would of course have in mind the probable reaction of other Arab countries that have accused Nasser of being soft on Israel. Our favorable assessment of the letter is reinforced by a CAS report that at the recent OAU (Organization of African Unity) meeting in Cairo, the UAR introduced a resolution proposing a worldwide agreement by non-nuclear powers not to acquire nuclear weapons. The resolution was put forward to replace a proposed African denuclearization agreement which of course would not have included Israel. It is our understanding that this resolution received the endorsement of the OAU leaders and that they have expressed their willingness to enter into such an agreement. The resolution has not yet been publicly released. 4 In conclusion, we believe that Nasser’s private assurances, coupled with the proposed OAU resolution on nuclear non-acquisition, satisfy our requirements with respect to a written statement of UAR policy on nuclear weapons. The proposed letter from the President expresses appropriate gratification and affirms our understanding of Nasser’s assurances. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR-Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. Top Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum from Read to Bundy. The covering memorandum is also undated, but another copy is dated August 8 and indicates the memorandum was drafted by Dickman and Symmes and cleared by Gathright, Freund, James W. Spain, Talbot, and Harriman. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 US/JOHNSON) 2 Nasser’s letter of July 26 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR-Nasser Correspondence, Vol I. The draft letter is not printed, but see Document 90 . 3 The paragraphs under reference read as follows: 4 A copy of the proposed resolution is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR-Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. 87. Memorandum of Conversation 87. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 10, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting with UAR Ambassador, August 10, 1964 PARTICIPANTS UAR Ambassador Kamel Mr. McGeorge Bundy Asst. Secretary of State Phillips Talbot Mr. R. W. Komer Mr. Bundy welcomed the Ambassador and asked if he’d care to summarize his discussion with the President. 2 Ambassador Kamel did so at some length. Highlights were that: (1) Kamel stressed the value of good US/UAR relations, pointing out that US political and economic interests in the Middle East were quite adequately protected as a result of present US policy—not one Middle East country had gone Communist and none were likely to do so; (2) we were managing to keep the Israeli issue in the icebox; (3) the exchange of presidential correspondence was extremely valuable; and (4) Nasser’s latest letter made clear that the UAR did not intend to go nuclear. The Ambassador’s advice was that the US should now go back to the UAR with a specific program to build on the nuclear assurances received. Mr. Bundy assured Kamel that President Johnson, like President Kennedy, wanted effective communication with Nasser. Such communication had broken down before 1961, with adverse results to both countries. As a further indication, President Johnson took a direct personal interest in finding a suitable successor to Badeau. In Bundy’s opinion he couldn’t have found a better man. LUKe Battle’s appointment would help to keep up the tradition of effective communication which had been built up over the past few years. Bundy reiterated the President’s great appreciation of Nasser’s nuclear assurances; we would now consider “next steps” as Kamel had suggested. Kamel remarked that President Johnson had noted the upcoming Arab Summit and neutralist conferences in Cairo and expressed confidence that the UAR would play a constructive role in them. He hoped in turn that the US would be forthcoming in its attitude toward these conferences. Bundy’s rejoinder was that “conferences are as conferences do.” We had no bias whatsoever against conferences per se, but we naturally hoped they would avoid the pitfalls of bright words and excessive propagandizing. It was a little too much to expect us to be forthcoming in advance, when we didn’t know what the participants were going to say. However, Kamel could count on us not to bite unless we were bitten. Bundy went on to say that the new Administration had tried “ever since we have been here” to develop better relations with the UAR. Bundy himself was a determined “icebox” man. He felt that for the first 2–1/2 years we had made considerable progress in US/UAR relations. In the last year, however, there were some signs that the “icebox” policy wasn’t quite so cool. The Jordanians, under some pressure from other Arabs, were talking about a new arms buildup. This would inevitably create counter-demands from other quarters. As for the Yemen problem, it was simply not moving very fast. So we saw a number of issues that made it harder for the US and UAR to move closer together. Bundy stressed that what concerned us was giving even more concern in the country as a whole and to the Congress in particular, especially in an election year. Not everybody was as sophisticated in their view of US/UAR relations as those who dealt with them regularly. So Bundy asked the Ambassador to make sure that these dangers were understood in Cairo. When Kamel asked him to be more precise about what dangers, Bundy reiterated that they included Yemen, Arab arms, and apparent UAR support for that difficult man Makarios, who was complicating the UN’s task. Bundy assured Kamel that in dealing with UAR relations, our starting point was respect for Arab purposes and for the central role of the UAR in Arab policy. We too would like to see our relations closer and to avoid a drift away from the Kennedy/Johnson policy. In response, Kamel urged that we distinguish between long-range matters and those which were non-essential (by implication Yemen and similar problems); the latter should not be permitted to stand in the way of good US/UAR relations. The important things were that Communists were being kept out of the ME, that Israel was in the “icebox,” and that US oil wasn’t being disturbed. Kamel then explained at some length his personal role, ever since he had come to the US, in working for good relations. The question as he saw it was how to keep up the momentum achieved over the last few years. For eight months the US hadn’t done any real business with the UAR. He—Kamel—understood this matter but the “impatient young men” who ran the government in Cairo were beginning to wonder. The multi-year PL–480 agreement 3 had done great things for US/UAR relations. Kamel recommended that we begin negotiations on renewal to show our good intentions. He also stressed the importance of development loans. Cairo kept asking where the $20 million stabilization loan was. Third, Kamel felt it important to encourage US private capital to flow to the UAR. Bundy felt that the causes of delay on the $20 million loan were not on our side. We had made clear that it could only be given in the environment of three conditions, which would permit us to defend the loan before our own people. He did not believe that the three conditions had been fully met. Kamel granted this, but said that Cairo was taking the loan as proof of whether the US would continue its present policy. Kamel then said that the fourth thing he would like to discuss was a consortium to support UAR development. He described how Egyptian development was essential to stability. He had not been asked to raise the consortium question, but felt that such a device would help block extreme socialism or communism in the UAR. Bundy regarded the prospects for any consortium as affected by UAR dealings with the UK as a whipping boy. It was hard for the British to join in a consortium when the UAR was causing so much trouble over Aden, for example. The Ambassador described the UK problem as “a matter of confidence.” The UAR had no confidence in UK intentions. The issue now was Yemen. Why couldn’t the British accept the YAR? Then all UK/UAR difficulties would disappear. Bundy’s view was that nothing would do more for US/UAR relations than some withdrawals of UAR forces which would establish Nasser’s intent to carry out the disengagement agreement. Kamel made a lengthy rejoinder the gist of which was why couldn’t the US, after the next UK election, use its good offices to get British recognition of the YAR. Present British policy served no useful purpose. In Kamel’s view, US policy toward Yemen was far wiser than that of the UK. Bundy granted that it might be difficult to achieve a UK/UAR understanding before October. We had indeed tried several times to bring the UAR and UK together, but neither side seemed inclined to give. Summing up, Bundy said he was trying to explain that US/UAR relations must be regarded as a “two-way street.” It was just as important that the UAR not give disquieting signals to us as that the US make economic signals to Cairo. Kamel wondered whether the issue over Yemen was “troops or something else.” In Kamel’s view Nasser wanted to withdraw troops, but found it very difficult to do so because of British machinations against the YAR. Bundy thought that it was not just a matter of troop withdrawal per se, but of the damage to the UAR reputation from having agreed to disengagement and not performing. On Mr. Komer’s suggestion that we were not going to solve the Yemen matter that evening, the meeting broke up amicably. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, United Arab Republic, Kamel Visit, 8/64. Secret. Prepared by Komer on August 12. Copies were sent to Harriman, Bundy, Bell, and Talbot. Marginal notations in Bundy’s handwriting read: “Approved con amore. McGB.” and “You make me so much smarter than I am. McGB.” 2 Kamel met with the President on August 10 from 6:20 to 6:32 p.m. and delivered Nasser’s July 26 letter (see Document 86 ). (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) The meeting is recorded in a memorandum for the record by Komer, dated August 11. (Ibid., National Security File, United Arab Republic, Kamel Visit, 8/64) 3 Reference is to an agricultural commodities agreement signed at Washington October 8, 1962, covering fiscal years 1963, 1964, and 1965. For text, see 13 UST 2166. 88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, August 12, 1964, 7:51 p.m. 86. Amman’s 84 to Department; 2 Deptels 64, 76 and 78 to Amman. 3 Department commends your presentation to King Hussein of USG position on arms for Jordan which we had all foreseen would be unpleasant to King’s ears. While Hussein’s over-all reaction negative, we were encouraged by King’s apparent recognition of at least some of dangers and disadvantages to Jordan inherent in UAC arms buildup and by his stated intention postpone any final decisions until over-all situation has been clarified by September Summit Conference. In accordance his request, you should provide King with copy of resume of USG position on sale of military equipment as contained in Deptel 64 beginning with “A. General” and concluding at the end of paragraph “C. Aircraft.” Paragraph D should not be contained in summary handed to King. In oral presentation to King before handing him summary of USG position you should stress once again that USG has done more for Jordan in past and will unquestionably do more in future to preserve basic integrity of Jordan than any other country or group of countries. In light of problems posed for USG by Jordan’s arms request, our response to King cannot be viewed as other than generous. We are glad King apparently sees this with respect to ground equipment, as judged by his remark that our suggestions can probably be drawn up in such priority order as to satisfy UAC. We continue to maintain that a supersonic fighter squadron for Jordan makes no military, political or economic sense. In view total number of supersonic fighters at disposal various countries represented on UAC, we unable understand why supersonic squadron for Jordan could and should have assumed such apparently overriding importance. If UAC had been looking for issue most likely to render permanent damage to US-Jordanian relationship as well as threat to area stability no better could have been found than ordering Jordan to accept supersonic fighter squadron. King says key to present issue is F–104 squadron. This is very issue which faces USG with such impossible choices. Hussein’s argument that Israel might well not be upset if Jordan acquired supersonic US squadron may be well taken. However, apart from internal economic effects on Jordan, this misses main point, namely, if USG provides Jordan with supersonics that symbolize offensive modern military power, little will be left of its Near Eastern arms policy of avoiding becoming major supplier of offensive weapons to countries involved in Arab-Israel context. If we provide supersonics to Jordan, our arguments against providing similar and possibly larger quantities of material to other countries, including Israel and other Arab states, would lose validity. Once embarked on, end of this road would be clear—a polarized situation in Middle East with Arabs lined up with Soviet Union and US in such ill repute in area that King Hussein could no longer afford political liability of being associated with us. We ask the King to search his mind carefully. If he will do so we believe he will see validity of our position. In summary, we see Jordan’s acquisition of supersonic fighter planes at this time as beginning of process that may ultimately destroy relations with US. A MIG squadron for Jordan would be little if any better from our point of view. Congress will simply not understand how Jordan needs such extensive US support if it can afford an expensive supersonic squadron. We think King has good arguments that will make sense to most of other Arab leaders. We hope the King will make these arguments with full force and effect in coming meetings with his fellow Arab leaders. The King must know from past experience that we are with him. We would hope he would remain in close consultation with us and not close any doors at Summit. FYI. At very least we hope you will get assurances from King that in meetings with UAC next week he will avoid any commitments that will foreclose further discussions with us. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3, US–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Killgore; cleared by Symmes, in draft by Bunte, and in substance by Komer and Stoddart; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Cairo, London, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 2 Telegram 84 from Amman, August 11, reported that Barnes met with King Hussein on August 10, read the President’s message ( Document 85 ), and continued along the lines of telegram 78 to Amman ( Document 84 ). (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–JORDAN) 3 For telegram 64 to Amman, see Document 82 . Telegram 76 to Amman, August 7, stated that in a meeting with Talbot and Macomber before leaving Washington, Khammash said he found the U.S. package insufficient to withstand pressures from the United Arab Command. He handed back the resume, saying he would prefer not to have to give it to the King. The telegram instructed the Embassy not to give the King the resume until officials in Washington could consider possible revisions in the manner of presentation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–JORDAN) 89. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 89. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 12, 1964. SUBJECT Second McCloy Mission on Near East Arms Mr. John J. McCloy has agreed to make another probe of Nasser’s intentions regarding Near East arms limitation. Mr. McCloy’s first probe in June 1963 was followed up by others and eventually resulted in Nasser’s letter of July 26, 1964. In that letter Nasser assured you the UAR would not introduce or develop weapons of total destruction. The dialogue begun by Mr. McCloy probably also influenced the UAR to introduce the resolution on nuclear non-acquisition at the recent Cairo meeting of the Organization of African Unity. In our view Nasser’s letter together with the OAU resolution satisfy our requirements so far as UAR intentions toward nuclear weapons acquisition are concerned. The purpose of the present probe is to pursue the question of restraining the surface-to-surface missile rivalry between the UAR and Israel. Mr. McCloy’s objective is to let Nasser know we believe we can convince Israel to exercise nuclear and missile self-denial if Nasser will limit his acquisition of major offensive missiles either to the number he now has or to a low ceiling. He will present specific proposals for an arrangement by which this might be done. Mr. McCloy will see you on August 13 for a final briefing. The following are suggested points: 1. Thank Mr. McCloy for undertaking this new mission. 2. Request he emphasize to Nasser that you share President Kennedy’s strong desire for peace in the Near East. This is why you have asked him to see Nasser again. 3. Ask him to deliver your reply to Nasser’s letter of July 26 (proposed reply submitted separately) 2 and to express personally your gratification for Nasser’s response and your understanding of the commitments he has made. 4. Tell Mr. McCloy you recognize he has a difficult mission. We would be surprised if Nasser accepted immediately proposals that would freeze his missile effort. Your hope is that this new probe will lay the foundations for frank discussions of the missile question with Ambassador Battle. It will be the important opening session in a dialogue that we hope will convince Nasser to adopt as statesmanlike position on missiles as he has on acquisition of nuclear weapons. Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, will also attend the meeting. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. II. Top Secret;Exdis. The memorandum does not include drafting information, but another copy indicates it was cleared by Talbot and Gathright. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCLOY) An attached note in Komer’s handwriting states that the memorandum was not used since Johnson was not going to see McCloy, but Johnson did meet with McCloy for 5 minutes on August 14. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) An August 15 note from Dickman to Symmes states that McCloy said he had briefly outlined the high points of his proposed presentation to Nasser, and the President commented that this seemed to make sense and that he hoped Nasser would view McCloy’s presence as a symbolic link between the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. (Department of State,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438, Background Papers for 2nd McCloy Probe w/Nasser, 9/64) 2 Document 90 . 90. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser 90. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser 1 Washington, August 13, 1964. Dear Mr. President: I was most grateful for your letter of July 26, 1964, 2 which Ambassador Kamel delivered to me personally. I place high value on our correspondence and anticipate that it will continue to yield useful results in the future. It is most gratifying to have your personal assurance that the United Arab Republic does not intend to devote its efforts or resources to acquiring weapons of total destruction. Your interest in advancing the well-being of your people and the peace of the world is attested by your statement that the United Arab Republic has no thought of introducing the danger of nuclear conflict into the region of which it is a part. I believe this expression of your views constitutes another significant step in the continuing quest for means of curtailing the nuclear arms race and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy. I am also encouraged by your statements to Assistant Secretary Talbot and Ambassador Badeau that you are continuing to give thought to the value of international safeguards in looking ahead to the time when the United Arab Republic may build a nuclear power reactor. Again, let me thank you for your assurances. They give me increased hope that mankind is turning away from the ever-spiraling arms race and toward ever greater reliance on peaceful solutions. Sincerely, LBJ 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. No classification marking. Drafted by the President, the Department of State, and Komer. The text was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 914, August 17, which stated that the Embassy should not deliver it pending instructions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 US/JOHNSON) 2 See Document 86 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears these initials, not in the President’s handwriting. 91. Special National Intelligence Estimate 91. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, August 13, 1964. SNIE 36.3–64 IMPLICATIONS OF CERTAIN US MILITARY AID TO JORDAN The Problem Jordan has requested that the US sell it some $70–100 million worth of arms. This estimate assesses the consequences and implications of (a) an outright rejection of this request, (b) full compliance with it, and (c) partial compliance. It also examines briefly three related matters: the prospects for the Arab plan for diversion of the Jordan headwaters, the viability of the United Arab Command (UAC), and the anticipated Israeli reactions to this diversion and to the buildup of Arab forces under the UAC. Conclusions A. Rejection of Hussain’s request would cause him to turn to the Egyptians or the Soviets for arms. Although Hussain probably believes that he could take Soviet arms and still get some US economic aid, he would be concerned that US military assistance and budgetary support could well be cut off. If the Egyptians succeeded in sending training missions to Jordan with such materiel, Nasser’s influence in Jordan would be increased and Arab-Israeli tensions would be seriously heightened. (Paras. 7–9) B. US sale of all or most of the requested equipment, while it would lessen Arab resentments concerning alleged US favoritism toward Israel, would impair US ability to check the escalation of the Arab-Israeli arms race. Though Israel would find a large, US-equipped Jordanian army a lesser evil than one equipped with Soviet weapons and under strong Egyptian influence, the Israelis would renew and increase their pressures on the US for more weapons. Any large arms acquisition and expansion of the Jordanian forces would put serious strains on Jordan’s economy, since the UAC is unlikely to foot the entire bill. (Paras. 10–12) C. Partial compliance through a US package, of a size governed by UAC willingness to pay, which included some supersonic aircraft and some tanks would probably suffice to prevent the Jordanians from shopping elsewhere and from admitting UAR or Soviet training missions. Hussain would be able at the second round of the Arab Summit Conference to claim that Jordan was doing its share in the buildup against Israel. [ 2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Nevertheless, partial compliance would have, though to a lesser degree, some of the unfortunate consequences of full compliance. (Paras. 13–15) D. Arab plans to deny portions of the Jordan waters to Israel, even if only partially implemented, would heighten tensions. Israel has said that it would regard diversion by the Arabs of more water than was allotted them under the 1955 proposals as grounds for war. We believe that they would carry out this threat, and that the Arabs, believing it too, are unlikely to test the Israelis until they feel confident that they have become strong enough to provide an effective defense against Israeli attack. (Paras. 17–18) E. The UAC goes further than previous efforts to unify Arab military forces, and for the first time money is available to improve the common military effort. The Arabs estimate that it would take 24 months to create the military capability to repel an Israeli attack, but we believe that it would require three or four years at a minimum. It is too early to say whether the UAC will survive for more than a year or two the strains inherent in the Arab situation. (Paras. 19–22) [Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 13. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdictions. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. 92. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 92. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, August 20, 1964, 9:43 p.m. 333. Although recognizing desirability first determining if any change in Hussein’s attitude, Department does not wish delay much longer approach to Nasser on UAC and Jordan arms problem. In addition, we plan approaches to other Arab leaders counseling moderation at Summit Two and restraint on military buildup by UAC. 2 Accordingly hope you can obtain audience with Hussein immediately following his return. Request you elicit whatever he willing tell you about his talks with Nasser. Specifically you should inquire if after further reflection he is still intent on forcing supersonic issue prior September 5. If he maintains position reported Embtel 94 3 you should then make presentation along following lines: As result King’s message to President 4 USG willing to take another look at supersonic problem, but only if we are given sufficient time to do so. US refuses to be forced into hasty decision on matter with such obviously far-reaching implications for US interests in area and for very viability and integrity of Jordan. We feel that all-out US support of Jordan over the years and close US/Jordan relationship entitles us to ask for enough time to take another look. Moreover, this would be way of wisdom for Hussein as well as US. Therefore if Hussein willing to hold up a few months longer at most, US prepared to (1) send survey team shortly to review whole RJAF modernization problem, in light probable infrastructure and supporting costs; (2) based on this report USG prepared review whether supersonic jets can be made available, either as replacements or additional squadron. We would consider any and all types US or other Western aircraft although it must be made clear that no commitment of any kind involved; (3) we would promise to let Jordan know our decision as soon as possible, in any case before end of year; (4) we also ready discuss with Jordan advanced flight training limited number pilots. This program could start October. We well aware Summit Two conference will be held in heady atmosphere of new spirit of Arab solidarity and that King must not (and does not wish to) appear out of step with that spirit. Nevertheless, we believe we have been forthcoming in our response to King and that in addition he has good argumentation to support delay if he willing use it. We also believe there are other Arab leaders who can understand his position and who will be on side moderation and wisdom. Important point is that King will be able show he has acted on UAC plans and proposals and that we have been forthcoming. He can stress that based on available UAC funds he was able to obtain generous USG offer of equipment for Jordan ground forces and assurances of US willingness discuss further sales when UAC finances clearer. He can say that USG has undertaken begin immediate survey air needs of Jordan including problem of infrastructure and supporting costs. If King pressed by UAC or Summit leaders for details on type and nationality of plane, he should say that much depends on results of survey and on kinds of UAC fund guarantees he able obtain from Summit for both materiel items and maintenance support. (FYI. If queried by him you may say that US air survey would consider all types US and other Western aircraft. End FYI.) Hussein can also say that USG in conjunction with comprehensive survey of RJAF is prepared to initiate advanced flight training in October for limited number of pilots. We believe King should be prepared say to other Arab leaders that although he would have liked fuller and more final answers from US he is encouraged by forthcomingness of US response. We think he could also add that, as Summit leaders aware, he depends on US and other Western sources for nearly one-half Jordan budget. It therefore understandable USG, which has borne heavy burden support economic development and budget of Jordan for almost decade, would wish examine carefully new pattern of expenditures with widespread implications for Jordan economy. He could say regretfully that this fact of life and that he could not blame USG for wishing consider carefully what it should do. Finally we see no reason why King could not also say on basis longstanding and fruitful relationship that he is confident fuller and more definite US responses will be forthcoming in due course. King could then take initiative with other Arab leaders to say he would be greatly helped if better guarantees of funds from UAC could be assured. If necessary, he could say he recognized Soviet equipment might be easier obtain without requiring funds in hand. Nevertheless, problem not simply arms and could not be considered in vacuum. He had his whole economy to consider and very viability of Jordan. You should then tell King that USG convinced that King and other Arabs mistaken in believing, as they apparently do, that planned UAC arms buildup can quickly alter Arab-Israeli arms balance. Rather than improving Arab military stance relative to Israel, present UAC pressures will stimulate intensified arms race of self-defeating nature. Not only would Israel be likely continue obtain hardware it needs, but risks of preemptive actions would rise particularly if MIGs introduced into Jordan. Moreover, effects of arms buildup on Arab economics, particularly that of Jordan, could leave them weaker rather than stronger relative to Israel. Finally, acquisition by Jordan now of supersonic squadron bound to increase Israeli pressures for additional arms from UK, France, and especially US, particularly if issue should be forced during US national election period. Results could be contrary to Arab interests, preventing US from continuing its present restrained arms policy, and ultimately leading to polarization with US selling to Israel and Soviets selling to Arabs. This is neither in Arab interest nor ours. We therefore once more urge King not to force supersonics issue at this time, not to take final decisions at Summit Two, and to use the argumentation mentioned in order to show that as Arab leader he is responding to UAC spirit but in wise and statesmanlike manner. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 4 ARAB. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Killgore and Symmes; cleared by Stoddart, Bunte, Director for Operations in G/PM Howard Meyers, Newsom, and Komer; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs James P. Grant. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Taiz, Algiers, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, London, and CINCMEAFSA/CINCSTRIKE for Ramsey. 2 Instructions to this effect were sent in circular telegram 332 to Khartoum, Beida, Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat; telegram 103 to Jidda; and telegram 36 to Kuwait, all dated August 20. (All ibid.) 3 Telegram 94 from Amman, August 14, reported that on August 13 Barnes had sent King Hussein the resume of the U.S. position as instructed in telegram 86 to Amman ( Document 88 ), and that in a discussion of the U.S. package later that day, the King stated that the package was constructive, except that it ruled out the supersonic squadron that he considered essential to his position vis-a-vis other Arab leaders. Barnes concluded that without F104s, the King would accept a MIG squadron. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 4 An August 15 message from the King to President Johnson, transmitted in telegram 99 from Amman, August 15, argued the case for a squadron of supersonic fighter aircraft. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 93. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 93. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, August 23, 1964, 6:21 p.m. 352. Amman’s 114 to Dept. 2 Department commends your presentation to King Hussein of USG position on supersonic fighter squadron for Jordan. We relieved that King feels he will have sufficient argumentation at Summit II to delay decision on supersonics. We concur in your recommendation that approaches to other UAC-member governments on arms problem concentrate on general dangers inherent in arms build-up, rather than on problem of Jordan. Amended instructions being sent separately. 3 From Hussein’s response to your presentation, appears he may have mistakenly believed you were conveying President Johnson’s reply to his message of August 15. If this is case, would appreciate your recommendation whether further reply to King’s message is necessary. 4 Separate message forthcoming on timing and terms of reference air survey team. In continuing US/UK conversations in Washington on Jordan arms problem it has come to be accepted that British would participate. If you anticipate GOJ resistance to UK participation, would appreciate your recommendations how best make proposal. In our view, we cannot avoid making proposal. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Killgore, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Grant. Repeated to London, Beirut, Damascus, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tunis, Khartoum, Baghdad, Tripoli, Jidda, Kuwait, and Cairo. 2 Telegram 114 from Amman, August 23, reported a meeting the previous evening between Barnes and the King. (Ibid.) 3 Instructions were sent in circular telegram 356 to Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat and telegram 108 to Jidda, August 24 (ibid.), and telegram 39 to Kuwait, August 24 (ibid., DEF 4 ARAB). 4 Barnes replied in telegram 120 from Amman, August 24, that he thought the King had interpreted his remarks as the President’s reply and that he did not expect any further reply. (Ibid.) 94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, August 24, 1964, 8:20 p.m. 1063. Deptels 995 and 895, 2 Amman’s 114 rptd Cairo 44. 3 Developments reported Amman’s 114 to Department obviously require changes in rationale approach to UARG outlined in reftels. You should convey following to Nasser via Sami Sharaf 4 or other suitable channel: 1. Despite formidable obstacles there has been created in Near East a delicate political balance that reduces threat of governmental instability or provocative initiatives and permits states therein to move ahead on urgent business of economic development and social reform. 2. USG feels this balance has been reinforced by: a) Its impartial commitment to prevent aggression by any state in the area; b) Constructive relationship built up in recent years between US and UAR, a notable product of which was understanding so far as possible to freeze Palestine issue. 3. Prior convocation Second Arab Summit we wish express USG concerns that developments flowing from first Arab Summit meeting could affect profoundly balance of political and military forces in Near East if they should continue along present course. 4. At January Summit meeting, Arab leaders under leadership UAR had wisely decided against war and had made statesmanlike announcements to that effect. Nevertheless some measures decided on in January have developed in such manner as to appear to be leading to greater risk of war and instability in Near East. This seems true particularly with regard to Unified Arab Command. 5. Aside from UAC developments we have also noted various statements about diversion of Jordan waters, excitation of Palestinians through Palestine Entity, and other measures such as proposed Jerusalem radio project. Statements about war with Israel by Arab military spokesmen have been more bellicose since Summit. In addition, in recent days there seems danger in raising expectations of Palestine refugees by making unrealistic demands on UNRWA for increased expenditures at time when no further funds forthcoming, costs are rising, and UNRWA budget coming up for discussion at UNGA. USG, which has borne burden of refugee support over years, especially concerned that funds that might be used to support refugees and promote economic development of Arab countries are instead being diverted to acquisition extensive new armaments under aegis UAC. 6. USG has recently discussed with Jordan extensive UAC-sponsored military procurement requests that in our judgment are inconsistent with freeze on Palestine problem, would involve self-defeating drain on funds badly needed for Arab economic development, and could upset Near East political and military balance. 7. We have informed HKJ we wish to comply with request insofar as our arms policies and economic realities permit. We cannot, however, go so far as to upset stability we have done so much to establish. 8. Jordanians have suggested they might have to turn to Soviets if US sales not possible. Jordanian purchase of Bloc weapons would make if difficult if not impossible to convince US electorate of necessity to continue Jordanian “budgetary and other assistance at present level. Pressures to provide compensatory assistance to Israel might also be irresistible. We would see pressures on Jordan to arm too much too fast as upsetting prevailing pattern of military strength and political alignments in Near East. 9. We wish to emphasize that the closer the Arabs and Israel come to hostilities, the more remote becomes the prospect of a just solution. We have been gratified by UAR leaders’ recognition that Arab-Israel dispute is insoluble by force of arms. While we look confidently to the UARG to take the lead in dissuading Arab states from aggressive action, we are also deeply concerned that measures taken solely in the name of self-defense not be so precipitate or so extensive as to increase the risk of hostilities or result in a major acceleration of Near East arms race. 10. In our efforts to meet Jordanian requests, we have stretched our arms policy to limit. We believe expansion of Jordanian military establishment should be carefully phased over period of several years. We do not want to be forced into hasty decisions on matters with far-reaching implications for US interests in area and for very viability and integrity of Jordan. We hope UAR can understand that USG, which has borne heavy burden support economic development and budget of Jordan for almost decade, would wish examine carefully new pattern of expenditures with widespread implications for Jordan economy. 11. To sum up, USG hopes Second Arab Summit will not foreclose our efforts to preserve area calm and US-Arab cooperation. We are especially concerned lest UAC, by forcing disproportionate arms program of unprecedented character, might introduce into tense Near Eastern situation irrevocable new elements with dangerous and unpredictable implications for all governments concerned to say nothing of starting accelerated arms race in Near East. USG counts on UARG, as leader of Arab opinion, to guide proceedings of Second Arab Summit in statesmanlike and constructive paths. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Symmes, cleared in draft by Killgore and Curtis F. Jones, and approved by Grant. Repeated to Amman, London, and CINCMEAFSA/CINCSTRIKE for Ramsey, and pouched to Moscow, Algiers, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Beirut, Taiz, Kuwait, Khartuom, Jidda, Baghdad, Damascus, and Tel Aviv. 2 Telegram 895 to Cairo, August 15, instructed the Embassy to convey to Nasser the U.S. view that it was essential to maintain the political balance in the Near East, the U.S. concern that the United Arab Command “by forcing on HKJ a disproportionate arms program of unprecedented character” might introduce into the situation new elements “with dangerous and unpredictable implications for all governments concerned,” and the U.S. hope that the Second Arab Summit would not foreclose U.S. efforts “to preserve area calm and US-Arab cooperation.” Telegram 995 to Cairo, August 20, reiterated the instructions in telegram 895 with one revision but instructed the Embassy to wait until the Embassy in Amman could assess Hussein’s attitude following his visit to Cairo. (Both ibid.) 3 See footnote 2, Document 93 . 4 Director for Information for the UAR President’s Cabinet. 95. Memorandum of Conversation 95. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 23, 1964, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Supply of Tanks to Israel PARTICIPANTS His Excellency, Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Minister, Embassy of Israel Col. Ram Ron, Military Attache, Embassy of Israel The Secretary NEA—Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary NEA/NE—H. Earle Russell, Jr., Israel Desk Ambassador Harman summarized developments with respect to Israel’s acquisition of tanks: Prime Minister Eshkol had asked for the direct supply of M–48A3 and M–60 tanks and had been told we would consider it. Then the transaction through Germany had come up. Israel had needed 300 tanks quickly. The Germans had 232. Israel proposed to take up the slack with Centurions, which it regarded as inferior. By mid-June the German transaction was well underway. The first shock had come in July; Germany offered only 150 tanks that it proposed to send to Italy. Next, Mr. Sloan had said that the Israeli request for 80 trainees could not be approved on grounds of security and that only if there were no other possibility for training could a small number be considered. Israel had revised its request downward and hoped that it might receive sympathetic consideration. In a letter dated October [September?] 18, 2 Mr. Solbert had stated there was no possibility of supplying conversion kits and ammunition at excess prices. He had doubts about the wisdom of direct supply of these items to Israel. He indicated the need for a lead time of at least three months in procuring conversion kits. These factors jeopardized the feasibility of the whole project. Delays in procurement meant Israel would not be able to obtain the first tanks until 1966 and the last until 1968. Prime Minister Eshkol was deeply concerned and had proposed the following solution to keep the transaction from foundering: 1. Training : Israel had asked DOD for 26 training slots. This was the limit even of Israel’s capability of improvisation. Training courses normally last 12–14 weeks. Israel suggested two successive phases of 13 men each, scattered in three or four different courses. No single course was limited to the M–48A3 specifically, so pinpointing would be difficult. There was already an Israeli Lieutenant Colonel in training at Fort Knox, so that the arrival of additional Israeli trainees would create no new precedent. Moreover, Israel was fully cognizant of the need for secrecy and committed to it. 2. Delivery Schedule : The amount of lead time required by DOD threatened to disrupt Israel’s proposed schedule for conversion of tanks. Israel had suggested delivery of 50 conversion kits by March 1965, 50 more in September 1965 and the last 50 in March of 1966. This would permit delivery of the last tanks to Israel by the end of 1967. Only this or a similar schedule would assure timely deliveries. 3. Acquisition of Conversion Kits, Spare Parts, and Ammunition : When Deputy Defense Minister Peres was in Washington, he had indicated the need to do some work on the tanks in Italy, but the general idea was direct delivery to Israel. Cost would determine the proportion of conversion work to be performed in Italy and Israel. Direct delivery was indispensable to the success of the transaction because a) negotiations with the Italians did not cover purchasing or procurement, only work on the tanks; and b) direct delivery required that only three people in Italy be aware of the transaction, while, if Italy were to engage in procurement, knowledge of the transaction would spread to many others, including members of the Italian Embassy in Washington. The U.S. had already shipped 500 tank engines (for Sherman M–4’s) as well as a number of tank guns directly to Israel. These transactions had remained secret. To refuse direct delivery of conversion kits, spare parts and ammunition would be a retrogression. 4. Financial Arrangements : The cost of tanks would be high, amounting to $30,000 per unit plus large conversion expenses. Israel hoped to cushion the impact of these large expenditures by a) obtaining a mark-down on equipment purchases through classification as excess, b) indirect aid through increases in development loans and PL–480 sales, and c) agreement to provide conversion kits, spare parts and ammunition as non-reimbursable aid. On the basis of quoted prices, Israel estimated that conversion kits and spare parts would amount to $14 million; and ammunition for 300 tanks to about $14.75 million. Since Israel was already listed as a recipient of MAP aid, it would make little political difference whether this aid were in grants or loans. Israel would be unable to handle the tank transaction without such assistance. Despite Israel’s apparent prosperity, it had severe economic problems. Israel’s foreign debt amounted to about $1 billion, as against foreign exchange reserves of $430 million. Israel hoped last year’s level of development loans and PL–480 might be maintained, with increases in development loans to cushion foreign tank purchases. The cost of the whole transaction could be spread over three fiscal years. The Secretary replied: 1. DOD hoped to provide an answer to Israel’s request for training shortly.2. Delivery of conversion kits by March might be possible but at higher cost. Since the equipment must be manufactured, we could not provide surplus pricing. The need to work overtime to meet Israel’s proposed delivery would increase costs. We would try to meet this deadline if Israel considered it important. Meanwhile, we would undertake to obtain firm cost figures. 3. Regarding the manner of delivery and its relation to problems of security and use of a cut-out, further talks with DOD would be desirable. We did not know whether this would involve Munitions Control. There seemed some likelihood that MC licenses might be open to public inspection. 4. Did we have information on Israel’s external defense purchases? A program of Israel’s defense buying would be helpful. 5. We were considering the determination of the level of development loans, PL–480, and related matters. We hoped to have an answer soon, though certain problems continue to concern us. Ambassador Harman said he had not supplied material on Israel’s defense purchases, but could do so. He wished to convey the Prime Minister’s feeling of urgency about the supply of tanks and his worry that it was not moving rapidly. The Prime Minister had said everyone agreed that Israel needed tanks but it seemed impossible to obtain concrete results. Meanwhile, 46 tanks had been sent to Jordan. The need to arm in the wake of belligerent statements at the Second Arab Summit Conference increased the economic burden on Israel. The Prime Minister was desperately looking for some way to freeze arms escalation in the Near East and turn the tide of arms acquisition. He hoped there might be some possibility of broaching the subject with the Soviet Union. Also he had heard in the U.S. of a possible approach to Nasser. Jordan needed no additional arms; Hussein was merely responding to pressure from the UAC. Additional acquisition of arms by Jordan would force Israel to recalculate its arms needs. Finance Minister Saphir had given Mr. Bell a five-year forecast on economic development in Israel. This assumed no absolute increase in arms in the area, which, of course, was not a valid assumption. Ambassador Harman confirmed that acquisition of new tanks by Israel resulted in removal of old tanks from inventory. The first “bite” of 300 replacement tanks would mean the removal of 300 unreconstructed Shermans from Israel’s armed forces. Ambassador Harman confirmed that Israel had ordered 250 tanks from the U.K.; 150 by the end of 1966 and the remaining 100 by the end of 1967. Israel was not pleased with Centurions, however, and had hoped to obtain M–60’s as the “second bite.” Ambassador Harman suggested that, if desirable, one of Israel’s Deputy Defense Ministers, an expert on tank procurement, could come to Washington to confer with DOD. The visitor could, or course, come to the U.S. indirectly since he was scheduled to visit Canada in the near future. Mr. Talbot agreed to look into this matter with Defense. The Secretary commented on the needlessness of the Near East arms race. A regional approach on arms control at Geneva, however, had met with colossal indifference, despite the presence of a regional representative (Israel). Nasser’s position toward this problem was affected by the attitude of the other Arab states. Jordan was indeed under pressure to acquire arms but so far had not reacted. The Soviet track was not promising. It had not proved possible to limit arms control to one or two countries. Inevitably U.S. aid to countries such as Korea and Turkey became involved. We were prepared, however, to give the matter further thought and would discuss it with Mr. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Secretary inquired whether Israel was looking into the possibility of developing an anti-tank capability rather than proceeding on the tank vs. tank thesis. Col. Ram Ron noted that all large countries continued to develop new tanks. Moreover, south Israel was ideal tank country. The Secretary assured Ambassador Harman that he would follow up personally on Israel’s problems on tank acquisition. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Exdis; Tan. Drafted by Russell on September 28 and approved in S on October 8. 2 Not found. 96. Memorandum of Conversation 96. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Cairo, September 28, 1964. In company with Ambassador, called on President Nasser noon September 28. After presenting him with copy of Warren report 2 and talking a little about assassination, in course of which he said it was in his opinion impossible to provide full security and at same time have President perform necessary functions of his office, I told him object of my visit. I stated President Johnson had very strong desire to emphasize to him that he had same interest which President Kennedy had in cordial and well-understood relationship with Egypt as well as in welfare and progress of entire area in which UAR plays such large and vital part. Because of interest and importance President Johnson attaches to this area, he had asked me as same emissary President Kennedy had used, to call upon him in Cairo in order to express the continuity of his interest in the peace and stability of the area. I pointed out it had originally been intended I should call during hiatus between departure of Ambassador Badeau and coming of Ambassador Battle. He broke in to say he had become very tired during course of summer and what with the preoccupation he had in connection with visits of Chiefs of State and preparation for summit, it had been inconvenient for him to meet with me at that time and that he was glad that I had been able to adjust myself to his convenience. I then recalled to him my last visit which was on the same general subject as that of my present visit. We had the same object in view, namely, to relieve tensions and avoid expenses of unlimited arms race in this area. I pointed out that though he had not felt it was desirable or practical to enter into any agreement with Israel or indeed with US in connection with any disarmament measures that affected Israel and UAR, he had stated he had no intention of introducing nuclear weapons in area nor had he any aggressive designs on any of his neighbors. I stated he had also said if test ban treaty was agreed to between US and Soviet Union, he would endeavor to be among first to ratify it; that he had repeated the above statements and had been among first to ratify test ban treaty, for all of which President Kennedy had been deeply appreciative. Now President Johnson was replying to his letter of July 26, and had asked me to deliver it to him. I handed him letter 3 which he took and read without further comment. I told him he could see from contents and tone of letter that President was sincerely anxious to develop possibility of further action in this field of armament and that he continued to wish to find steps which would redound to benefit of all concerned. I dwelt on frustrating aspect of an arms race which no one could expect to win; that counter effort would inevitably be forthcoming from others if he attempted to build up his strength. I stated that we all knew that Israel with assistance of France had been building up missile strength as a counter to what they considered to be Egyptian threat. What President had in mind was, in view of increased expenses and increased dangers of missiles arms race, time had come to level off activities in missile field. What we had in mind involved no formal agreement between UAR and Israel or between UAR and US. On other hand we did contemplate and suggest independent action on his part, effect of which would be to level off at present state of missile strength. This independent action we suggested could be accompanied by a statement defining his position in this regard. Of course if any action inconsistent with spirit of such commitment on his part was engaged in by any other country in area, he would have full freedom of action restored to him and his commitments would not be binding. US would be prepared to bring its influence on Israel to respond in kind, again without formal agreement but with hoped-for result that badly needed resources could be deflected from purchase of arms to more beneficial purposes and dangers inherent in such arms race avoided. I emphasized he should accept my visit as indication of our own strong interest in area and not as any attempt to advance interests of any particular country. We had heavy investment in area and because of its general strategic importance, both political and military, it was one in whose stability United States as a world leader must be deeply concerned. This interest was in keeping with persistent and conscious effort on part of US to do all in its power to relieve tensions in sensitive areas in hope of avoiding what otherwise might be a far reaching catastrophe. He seemed to accept our good intentions in this respect and was apparently less suspicious of our motives than he had been at the time of my prior visit. I then gave him our proposals on missiles which were somewhat modified from those that were included in talking papers. 4 He read them as well as proposed statement which UAR could make. I then emphasized in reply to his question as to what form assurances would take that they could be either oral or written and that they were designed to avoid any form of inspection which might be invidious to him. I pointed out such information as he might be able to gather in regard to the carrying out of commitments of another country could be supplemented with information of our own. At this point I told him that I was prepared to advise him upon instructions that at present time, Israelis were not possessed of any nuclear weapons nor were they producing any material for such weapons. I stated that this was an indication of our cooperation. After reading proposals on missiles, whose new form follows in separate message, 5 he said we must understand that problem in Middle East is not problem of missiles but problem of Palestine. Arabs cannot accept present status in respect to Palestine. There must be solution of Palestine problem based upon justice. Nothing can stop the arms race or change the atmosphere in Middle East except solution of Israeli problem. This is fundamental to everything and it is fatuous to suppose that agreement in respect of missiles or any other incidental issue could solve this fundamental problem. He added that this was a profound political problem and he himself had no solution. Missiles were now very close to the heart of the army. It had no interest in nuclear weapons, but the missiles were a symbol of its renewed strength and confidence. They were a counter to deep reactions suffered in the 1956 invasion. All soldiers wanted all weapons they could get. Whereas our Pentagon might not be involved in political matters, army in Egypt was and it had deep political significance because of its fundamental position in domestic as well as international security of country. Missiles, therefore, carried strong political implications. He had to be frank about this and we had to understand it. Nasser said that he would give thought to proposals and talk them over with his advisors, but he would have to say he was not optimistic in regard to an understanding which involved limitations in regard to missiles. When I asked him how long it would take him to give us reaction to proposals, he said about one week. I told him under these circumstances it would be best to leave further discussions on this subject to Ambassador Battle. However, I wanted to point out that though Palestine might be a fundamental problem in the Middle East, a limitation of arms race was not inconsistent with a recognition of that fact. Indeed, limitation of arms might create an atmosphere in which a better solution might be effected. Because Palestine was difficult and fundamental problem was no reason why one should not attempt moderation of arms race in view of inherent dangers that were involved in such race, and great wastage of resources that could not benefit anyone. It was apparent both to Ambassador Battle and to me that he felt he would be faced with a very real political problem if now he attempted to limit production of missiles. It was this rather than any outright hostility on his own part to the proposals which he seemed to stress. Also involved, in our opinion, was his assumed role of leader of Arab world, whose sole binding element is antagonism to Israel. Only unity that existed in Arab world was Palestine issue, and his preoccupation to remain as the influential leader of Arab world precluded any action now which could be interpreted as softness toward Israel. Any weakening of his position toward Israel would impair that leadership and a suggestion that the missile program would be tapered off would be construed by his colleagues as weakening. When I suggested that we had found in our dealings with the Soviet Union that unilateral action of this sort was sometimes productive of improvement in our relationship, he insisted that the parallel between US and Soviet Union and between Israel and UAR was not a good one. Israelis were occupying Palestine, Arab soil. They had invaded and committed aggression against UAR. Only parallel would be if Soviet Union were occupying California. It was left that he would carry on discussions with Ambassador Battle for moment, that I would not stay to await his reaction, and that if it seemed desirable, I could return to carry on further discussions at a later date. But I think it was clear to both of us that he felt it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to accept proposals. Both of us had impression that he would indeed be involved in heavy political difficulties because of the symbolic character that missiles now occupied in minds of his soldiers and people if he suggested cut back. Moreover, he was fearful of any action that might expose him to charge he was being soft toward Israel in view of his position as leader of Arab world. He was most cordial throughout, recalling number of other occasions we had managed to deal with outstanding issues, and seemed in good health. As we left, he rather warmly, I felt, requested I pass on his good wishes to President Johnson. Comment : In appraising conversation, we found Nasser less flexible on missiles than we had hoped. While tone of conversation may have suggested he could see some advantage in proposals, it was obvious he felt his internal and external political problems were major hindering factors to any action he could take. At this point my view which Battle shares is that it is important keep the dialogue going and hopefully not to have direct turndown for fear ending what has thus far been useful discussion with possible side effects of bringing about exactly what we attempting avoid, acceleration rather than moderation of arms race this area. Our guess is that UAR will not give us early answer and may delay giving us any final response, which may be preferable to direct turndown if we press too hard at this point. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McCloy on September 30 at 11 a.m. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads, “Text prepared on cable forms but hand carried to Department.” 2 Reference is to the Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964). McCloy was a member of the commission. 3 Document 90 . 4 The talking papers have not been found. Background material relating to McCloy’s mission are in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438, Background Papers for 2nd McCloy Probe W/Nasser, 9/64. 5 See Document 97 . 97. Memorandum by John J. McCloy 97. Memorandum by John J. McCloy 1 Cairo, September 29, 1964. Following are verbatim texts of two papers given President Nasser September 28 during McCloy visit: Proposal for Missiles: 1. Private assurances, written or oral, would be provided that large land-based surface-to-surface missiles would not be deployed either through the use of mobile launchers or the construction of permanent launching facilities for this purpose. 2. Assurances would also be given that procurement or production of large surface-to-surface missiles for military purposes would be held to present levels. As it is understood that the number of missiles that are now available is limited, there would be no question of destroying any existing capacity. 3. Any space research programs would be conducted openly and in a manner consistent with furthering international scientific cooperation. Any production of rockets for use in such programs would be limited to the numbers required for planned launchings. 4. With respect to production or acquisition of missiles, the type of assurances that might be given to create confidence that the above commitments were being carried out would be left for further discussion. It is believed this could be done without the introduction of any type of inspection system which would be considered invidious to the countries concerned. 5. With respect to deployment, information which the countries accepting this arrangement would seek to obtain through their own resources could be supplemented by such information as may become available to a third country which would be aware of the arrangement. 6. If any country in the area should take any action inconsistent with the above, this commitment and related assurances would not be binding. Proposed written statement: The United Arab Republic wishes to provide assurances that its efforts to develop surface-to-surface missiles have been undertaken only for the purposes of self-defense. As a result of its missile development program, the UAR is now in a position to create a large missile force should it be necessary. It will be appreciated that the question whether the UAR should decide such a force is necessary for its national defense will be strongly affected by the course others in the area may follow. In the long run, the UAR hopes that the real value of the missiles it has developed will be for the role they can play in furthering man’s knowledge of outer space. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret;Exdis. Drafted by McCloy at noon on September 29. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads, “Text prepared on cable forms but hand carried to Department.” 98. Memorandum of Conversation 98. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 6, 1964. SUBJECT McCloy’s Impressions of His Meeting with President Nasser on September 28 PARTICIPANTS The Honorable John J. McCloy M—Governor Harriman NEA—Phillips Talbot NEA—John D. Jernegan M—Frederic Chapin NE—Francois Dickman After summarizing briefly the high points of his meeting with President Nasser on September 28, Mr. McCloy said he had found Nasser this time to be less suspicious and more willing to talk about the arms problem than when the subject had first been raised in June 1963. While Nasser gave no indication that he would be able to do anything about keeping his missile strength at present levels, he did not reject our proposal. He was frank in pointing out the political problems, both internal and external, which he faced if he should take any action which could be interpreted as softness toward Israel. Asked if he gave any hint on the number of missiles he had, Mr. McCloy said he had not asked the question. However, Nasser had reiterated that he had started missile development because he could not rely on the Soviet Union for his full arsenal. Mr. McCloy was not optimistic that Nasser could conform to the kind of proposal we had presented not to increase the present number of surface-to-surface missiles. We were asking him something that was very hard for him to do. Yet, there was a dividend for us in trying to maintain the arms dialogue with Nasser. If we kept working on Nasser, we might eventually get some results. He hoped Ambassador Battle would have an opportunity to review his meeting with Nasser whenever it was practical. Mr. McCloy then noted that when he conveyed our assurances on Dimona, Nasser made no comment. He assumed this meant that this information confirmed other UAR intelligence on the subject. He also thought it significant that Nasser did not mention pre-emptive war to him during this visit—as he did in the last—in the event Israel obtained nuclear capability. Also interesting was Nasser’s lack of reaction to information that Israel was going in for its own SSM’s. There seemed to be an almost casual acceptance of this development. Governor Harriman commented, in reading Mr. McCloy’s report, that Nasser had held out little encouragement for accepting the present status quo in the Near East. Mr. McCloy said Nasser had argued that a solution of the Palestine problem based on justice was fundamental. Nasser had volunteered that he himself had no solution. This seemed to imply that war was not a feasible way to resolve the problem. It also seemed to imply that Nasser did not feel he was strong enough with other Arabs to take any statesmanlike actions on this issue. Mr. McCloy mentioned that his visit had come to the attention of the Cairo press because his name had been listed on Nasser’s register of visitors. He asked how he should respond in case any questions were raised. He noted parenthetically that Joux (sic) in the Quai d’Orsay had noticed his visit with Nasser as had Eric Warburg at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. He had told them that he had gone to review several matters in connection with his business interests. Since the President knew of his friendship with Nasser, he had been asked to reiterate our interest in developments in the Near East and the need to tamp down tensions created by the arms race. Mr. Warburg had told Mr. McCloy that he thought this was a good development and hoped these efforts would continue. It was agreed that Mr. McCloy should respond along these lines in case questions were raised again by responsible private individuals. Governor Harriman suggested that Mr. McCloy might usefully point out at the same time why it was desirable for the U.S. to maintain a dialogue with Nasser. The Governor then expressed his concern over recent statements by Senator Keating and Congressman Taft urging the Administration to submit an ultimatum to Nasser or otherwise stop all assistance. He instructed NEA to prepare a telegram to Ambassador Barbour in which the Ambassador would convey to Premier Eshkol the general tenor, but without the specifics, of Mr. McCloy’s meeting with Nasser and point to the utility of maintaining a dialogue. Governor Harriman thought that after the elections, the Department would have a job to try to get the Israeli Government to get its supporters to think of the long-range aspects of our policy and understand why it was desirable for us to continue frank discussions with Nasser. He thought Mr. McCloy might play a useful role in this connection. At the close of the meeting, there was a brief discussion of the Chase boycott problem 2 and the Warren Commission Report. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 UAR. Top Secret. Drafted by Dickman on October 7 and approved in M on October 22. McCloy also met briefly with Rusk on October 6; a memorandum of the conversation is ibid., POL UAR-US. 2 The Arab Central Boycott Office in Damascus had announced the blacklisting of Chase Manhattan Bank on July 9 and had given the bank 6 months to liquidate its affairs in Arab countries. McCloy raised this with Nasser on September 28, noting it as an example of the desirability of avoiding any action that might irritate U.S.-UAR relations, and discussed it with Hassouna and Kaissouni on September 29. (Telegram 1078 from Cairo, September 29; ibid., FT 11–2 ISR–ARAB) 99. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman), the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 99. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman), the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 19, 1964. Aid to Israel . Attached are Secretary Rusk’s recommendations on FY 1965 aid and various aspects of the tank deal. By wrapping all these up in one package, we can use the plus items to offset those where we simply have to say no. Thanks to our help, the Israelis have done quite well on tanks. They will get not only 150 German M–48s, with an option on 82 more, but some 250 UK Centurions. The prices are better than we could have given. While the grand total may run over $70 million, it is now for many more tanks (482) than the 2–300 we were talking about earlier. We’ll help out on training and delivery, and give the same good terms as on Hawk (10 years, 10% down payment, 3–1/2% interest) for the modernization kits and ammunition we’ve agreed to sell directly for $24 million or so. Though pleased with the overall deal, the Israelis have hoped to shave this US price. They’ve suggested a number of ingenious ways, but DOD and State reject these as infeasible or highly risky. Nor, as Rusk says, do we have any commitment to go even further in helping out on tanks. If we want to help Israel on political and defense burden grounds, the sensible way to do so is via an indirect subsidy through PL 480 and economic aid (as we’ve done in past years). Dave Bell points out that Israel hardly qualifies for DL on any economic criteria, but this is still the safest way. So we recommend that you approve DL to Israel at the same $20 million level as last year (the high side of the range proposed by Rusk), and Title I PL 480 of at least $34 million , which Agriculture believes can be managed. There is pressure for moving Israel at least partly into Title IV this year, but we propose leaving this to negotiation with the Israelis. Together with the generous tank credit terms, this would add up in effect to a somewhat higher aid level than last year. While it naturally falls short of Israeli desires, we think they’ll be satisfied. We must also keep in mind that nuclear desalting may cost us a lot in future years. If you approve this general aid level, we’d like to put out the word quietly right now. 2 Mike Feldman McGeorge Bundy R. W. Komer 3 Attachment Washington, October 10, 1964. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 4 SUBJECT FY-1965 Help to Israel We have come under considerable Israeli pressure to button up various subsidiary aspects of the tank matter and to decide on our FY-1965 aid level —in the last analysis a political decision. I believe that we would do best by handling all these matters as a single package, so that the favorable items can offset those where we must be negative. Israel has done well on its German and U.K. tank purchases , largely owing to your intervention with Erhard. It is going to get 150 M–48A1 tanks from West Germany in an “as is” condition at a somewhat better price than we could have offered for the same tanks. We will sell kits to modernize the M–48’s and provide necessary training, ammunition and support spares. We also found to our surprise that after all Israel’s pleas that the U.K. Centurion was no good, it has now signed up for some 250. So Israel will get 400 tanks over the next few years, and the prices for the basic tanks will be fully comparable to what we could offer . Alleging both economic need and a need for indirect defense subsidy, Israel has requested $29.5 million in Development Loans and $38.5 million in Title I PL–480, (including $17 million already available for 1965). This is a total of $68 million for FY-1965 compared to $20 million Development Loans and $28 million PL–480 last year, or a total of $48 million. Given Israel’s continued remarkable economic growth and rising reserves, Dave Bell sees no economic justification whatsoever for any Development Loans (which AID in its presentation to Congress estimated as $0 to $10 million, as compared to $20 million FY-1964). Since the U.K. and German prices are most reasonable, we do not have a commitment to help out indirectly on the tank deal . Although Prime Minister Eshkol may have the impression from the conversations in Washington that we intended to be of financial as well as other assistance, the record shows that the only concrete suggestion we made was that we would consider such help if the European tanks turned out to be substantially more expensive than those from the United States. Recommendation: Balancing off the many factors involved, I recommend that you approve the following proposals: 1. PL–480: Meet the Israeli request with a program of approximately $21.5 million which, added to the amount of $17 million already available for 1965 in the current agreement, comes to a total of $38.5. This could be on the same terms as last year taking account of changes in PL–480 legislation and the need to maintain usual marketings, except that $7 to $10 million worth would be repayable in dollars rather than local currency, but this amount would not necessarily represent sales of beef. The dollar sales would be included in order to establish the principle that the time has come for Israel to move to a Title IV program. 2. Development Loans : Though Dave Bell sees no case based on economic aid criteria, there are valid reasons for Development Loans in the range of $10–$20 million on the same terms as last year. Request you indicate the amount you approve. 3. Helping Israel get Tanks : On top of our all-out efforts to date: (a) we have speeded up the flow of U.S. replacement tanks to Germany so the others can be released; (b) we have provided technical data requested by the Israelis; and (c) as an added concession, DOD proposes to give Israel favorable MAP credit terms similar to those on Hawks (10 years at 3–1/2% with only 10% down payment) for the modernization kits, spares and ammunition which must be purchased from us . As yet we do not have firm dates when the Italians need to have the overhaul and conversion kits on hand. Through the use of overtime, DOD can probably deliver the necessary overhaul and conversions kits to Italy on a schedule dovetailed with the arrival of M–48’s from West Germany . 4. Sale of Kits and Conversion : During Prime Minister Eshkol’s June visit we were given to understand that, in the interests of secrecy, M–48’s obtained from West Germany would be overhauled and fitted in Italy with diesel engines and large guns. It was also contemplated that the sale of the U.S. conversion kits would be through a third country. The Israelis are now urging that sale of the kits be made directly to Israel and that some or all of the conversion be undertaken in Israel. They contend that this procedure will be more secure. We should be openminded on this and hear them out, but accede to the Israeli suggestions only if we are satisfied that they do provide adequate security from the U.S. point of view. 5. Tank Training : The Israelis originally wanted to have almost 100 people trained in the U.S. For obvious security reasons, we got them to cut this to 26 plus visits by a few engineers to study conversion techniques. We think we can handle all of these visitors if properly spaced. 6. Surplus Prices : The Israelis have urged that we provide our tank kits and ammunition at “surplus” prices, to save them money. DOD says it simply cannot do so, because practically all is new output . The kits represent special orders; the ammunition is going currently to U.S. forces. 5 While the above does not meet all Israeli requests, it adds up to a generous package, which should relieve any pre-election pressure on us. If you approve, I propose to communicate these decisions to the Israelis shortly. 6 Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret. Filed as an attachment to an October 27 memorandum from Bundy to Rusk stating that the President had approved the recommendations in Rusk’s October 10 memorandum on FY 1965 help to Israel, with a Development Loan level of $20 million and a P.L. 480 Title I program for FY 1965 of at least $34 million, with any additional Title I or Title IV to be subject to negotiation between the United States and Israel. The October 10 memorandum is printed below. 2 The President initialed his approval. 3 Notations in Bundy’s handwriting appear next to the three signatures. One next to Komer’s signature reads: “He did it. McGB.” One next to Feldman’s signature reads: “He agreed.” And one next to Bundy’s signature reads: “This is a very good arrangement. McGB.” 4 Secret; Exdis-Tan. The source text is erroneously dated October 1. 5 There is no indication of the President’s approval or disapproval of the recommendations. 6 A November 15 exchange of letters between Solbert and Colonel Ron outlined the terms for procurement of articles and services relating to the conversion, overhaul, and support of M48 type tanks obtained from sources other than the United States. Solbert’s letter stated that if the nature of the transaction should become public knowledge before the U.S. Government determined that secrecy was no longer required, it might exercise its right of cancellation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert Komer, Israel Security, Tanks, July 1964–December 1964) 100. Editorial Note 100. Editorial Note National Intelligence Estimate 4–2–64, “Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade,” October 21, 1964, estimated the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons over the next decade and the consequences if they did so. [ text not declassified ] (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files) 101. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 101. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 23, 1964. The President has received a very private and informal approach from Prime Minister Eshkol 2 on delaying our next inspection of the Dimona reactor, for which we are currently pressing. Eshkol recognizes Israel has committed itself to periodic inspection of Dimona, though apparently on an annual rather than semi-annual basis. However, he has personally appealed for deferring this inspection until after his elections in November 1965. He is concerned about charges that he has opened Israel’s reactor to inspection by other powers, and contends that if he is compelled to honor his agreement it will jeopardize his political position. Eshkol further points out that there is no possibility that Dimona could be converted to military purposes in so short a period of time. The President would appreciate your recommendations. However, he would not want to decide so sensitive a matter until after our elections, which gives time for us to investigate the full implications of a delay en route. In the meantime I suggest that we postpone any further diplomatic approaches in Israel. May I also suggest that we ask John McCone for an evaluation of the possible risks in an inspection gap which might be as much as two years. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret/Sensitive. 2 The message was conveyed in a memorandum of October 19 from Feldman to the President. (Ibid.) 102. Letter From the Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (Battle) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 102. Letter From the Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (Battle) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 1 Cairo, October 27, 1964. Dear Phil: I did not want to let Ridge Knight’s letter and memorandum of October 16 2 go by without some comment. I think Ridge’s basic thesis is right. The United States is apparently a helpless witness to Israel’s inexorable drive not only to gain full sovereignty over the demilitarized zones but to “remilitarize” them. Therefore we get bogged down in details—“Black lines,” “Brown lines,” etc.—and end up assisting the Israelis in a process which is a clear violation of the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement and of the UN Charter. What should add to the Syrians’ apprehensions re Israel intentions and latent U.S. support for them is the fact that the Israelis in 1955 possessed themselves of the Nitzana demilitarized zone on the Egyptian-Israel armistice line and now operate that region in fee simple with none to protest the presence of Israel armed forces there. We are unable to persuade Israel to return to the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission so we get directly involved in the details of General Odd Bull’s informal negotiations with the parties. We have been unable to persuade the Israelis to withdraw their unilateral denunciation of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement so we involve ourselves in the details of financing and administering the United Nations Emergency Force. We are unable to formalize the international community’s very real interest in Jerusalem. Under Israeli pressure, we have now removed the designation “Jerusalem, Palestine” from our directories. Maybe this was the right thing to do. Maybe Jerusalem will just disappear. Maybe the next change in the Foreign Service List will be to call Israel-occupied Jerusalem “East Tel Aviv.” We are unable to obtain Israel compliance with UN resolutions calling for the repatriation and compensation of the refugees. Therefore we natter at UNRWA to prune its lists and cut expenses and keep reminding the Arab host governments that it is American bounty that keeps the unfortunate refugees alive. The above picture is not very pleasant. It is compounded by the fact that Israel and its friends in the United States have been able to establish widespread credence in an upside-down world where Syria is the trigger happy party in the demilitarized zones, Nasser is dedicated to the destruction of “peace-loving” Israel, and the plight of the Arab refugees is somehow the fault of the Arab host governments. All the above is said neither in sorrow nor in anger. I don’t think it is realistic to expect the United States suddenly after sixteen years to gain the capability to reverse any of these situations. To the contrary, I think we should probably take some pride in that despite these handicaps we have not only kept the peace in this area but have also managed to contain Soviet influence and to pump out nearly a billion dollars a year in petroleum revenues. I do, however, go along with Ridge’s thought that our preoccupation with trees often obscures the forest. The fact is that Israel’s interests (as determined by Israel) do not at all times and in all respects coincide with those of the United States. This is neither abnormal nor wicked. Perhaps we should strengthen our efforts to bring this fact to the attention of Americans. It was Thomas Jefferson, I believe, who in a little document proclaimed on July 4, 1776 said something like this: “Let facts be submitted to a candid world.” How do we do this? A number of suggestions come to mind. Perhaps some well-known journalists could be persuaded that there is a story behind some of the aspects of the Palestine problem and UN and other efforts to keep the peace. Rick Smith, the Cairo correspondent of The New York Times , tells us he has been commissioned to write a piece for the Sunday Magazine about the Palestine refugees to be run at about the time the UNRWA debate takes place in New York. We intend to give him every assistance. Perhaps other American correspondents in the area or in Washington would be interested in writing pieces about the demilitarized zones, the operations of UNTSO and the Mixed Armistice Commissions, etc. More importantly, however, it seems to me that it would be useful if some leading American legislators from states where there is little involvement in the Arab-Israel dispute were to take an interest in the Palestine situation and make speeches about the issues and their effect on the totality of U.S. interests in this area. Candidates for this type of exercise who come quickly to mind are Senators Fulbright, Church, and Monroney. The Arab-Israel area has been relatively free over the past few years of clashes and incidents of the magnitude which grab headlines on a continuing basis at home. This is, of course, a good thing as it demonstrates the effectiveness of our policies. At the same time it has meant that the field has been left fairly clear for special pleaders. This, I think, we should try to remedy. Sincerely yours, Luke 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Secret; Limit Distribution; Official-Informal. Copies were sent to Ambassadors Knight, Barnes, Barbour, Meyer, and Strong, and to Davies and Consul General Wilson in Jerusalem. A handwritten note on the letter states that a reply was drafted on November 6. The reply has not been found. 2 Knight’s October 16 memorandum on the subject “Syrian-Israeli Confrontation in the Demilitarized Zones,” attached to a letter to Talbot of the same date, argued that Israel was “seeking with unflinching persistence and tenacity to extend its sovereignty to the demilitarized zones” and that the United States was constantly trying to restrain Arab reactions against Israeli actions and was consequently too bogged down in details to do all that it could to restrain Israel. (Ibid.) 103. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 103. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, October 28, 1964. [Source, Department of State, INR Historical Files, NEA Area Files, policy Papers, 1964. No classification marking. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, October 30, 1964, 8:23 p.m. 362. Embtel 401. 2 We commend your presentation to Eshkol. We believe our ability to continue quiet, low-key approaches with Nasser not only useful but essential if any tacit restraint in arms field is to occur by both sides. Therefore, we hope PM can be convinced that continued efforts to develop more positive influence in Cairo is in our joint interests. You should stress once again necessity for absolute secrecy with regard our discussions. FYI—We recognize fragility US progress with Nasser on arms issue. It is this very fragility which underlines importance of Israel’s cooperation if USG is to further our mutual objectives. Believe dialogue has helped contain a situation which otherwise could be far more disadvantageous for US and Israeli interests. National defense concerns and psychological effect of new weapons just as important in Cairo as in Jerusalem. Our ability to move significantly in this field can only be within context permitting dialogue continue with both sides. Thus it plainly in Israel’s interest as well as ours that we develop maximum influence with UAR. Through continued quiet discussion we hope without going into any actual details to make clear to American Zionist leaders that significant progress towards arms restraint and other objectives in Near East is most difficult with Israel’s supporters mounting wide-ranging campaign stop all aid to UAR or otherwise discredit our entire Near East policy. 3 So long as we continue give aid to UAR, Nasser has some vested interest in reasonable behavior. Once that aid ceased, net effect would not be to make him more reasonable but to reduce inhibitions on him. Needless to say, would also make him far more dependent on USSR. We also hope impress on thoughtful Israeli observers relationship of our aid to our being able continue frank discussions with Nasser even on most sensitive issues. Were dialogue to break down with growing Arab uncertainty over Israel’s capabilities or our intentions, Nasser might well choose take more dangerous course of action and tie more closely with Soviet or Chicoms. At this very moment, we believe there important review UAR economic policies and hard decisions having be made how allocate existing resources. If Nasser convinced Israel going down dangerous road of sophisticated weapons or feels he being put under intolerable Western pressure likely decide give priority to military weaponry. End FYI. At this stage we consider it essential not to permit either UAR or Israel to develop position of monitoring or controlling this extremely fragile US initiative. We want to be frank with both sides and intend keep both properly informed. We do not want either at this stage to start trying to mastermind our explorations. You should discreetly make foregoing principle clear by saying we cannot provide further substantive details on UAR talks to PM at this time. Nothing we are doing commits either side. At proper time we will provide fuller details. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCloy. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dickman; cleared by Davies, Harriman, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. 2 In telegram 401 from Tel Aviv, October 14, Barbour stated that he would inform Eshkol at first opportunity of McCloy’s meeting with Nasser, as instructed in telegram 283 to Tel Aviv, October 12. He also commented on the “fragility” of U.S. progress with Nasser and noted that Eshkol had recently expressed the hope that reports of an economic crisis in the UAR would not lead to an increase of U.S. financial aid to Egypt. (Both ibid.) Telegram 438 from Tel Aviv, October 21, reported that Barbour conveyed the information to Eshkol about McCloy’s visit to Nasser. (Ibid.) 3 An October 9 memorandum from Talbot to Harriman reported indications of a concerted campaign by Israel’s supporters in the United States against U.S. efforts to maintain positive U.S.-UAR relations. (Ibid., POL ARAB–ISR) 105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, November 14, 1964, 4:08 p.m. 2794. For Ambassador from Talbot. Embtel 1637. 2 Appreciate fully your concern that presenting Egyptians with alternatives to commodity loan might be regarded as attempt to renege on an agreement whose requirements they feel have been met. Agreeing with Embassy position that continued inaction in field of economic cooperation could bring an end to our policy of seeking to broaden areas of common interest with the UAR and recognizing practical difficulty if not impossibility moving forward on commodity loan, we have sought to provide another basis for moving ahead. The State/AID proposals carried by Macomber supplemented by Aidto 198 3 we believe can be presented as an economically useful token of US intent to carry forward on current policies. Commodity loan is hamstrung by our inability to demonstrate to Congressional and other inquirers’ complete satisfaction second requirement or evidence that U.S. aid does not in fact pay part of foreign exchange costs of a UAR “occupation” of Yemen. We can hardly claim progress on third condition, given presence over 50,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen (latest intelligence community estimate) as against less than 30,000 when Yemen costs discussed with Kaissouni in October, 1963. While UAR-Saudi detente on Yemen hopeful, know from our experiences through 1963 the danger of claiming “major progress” on UAR performance until actual and substantial drawdown takes place. If the UAR should opt for the $20 million program loan, they must understand that we cannot proceed until Egyptian performance permits us to defend the loan against domestic criticism. This being the case, we propose moving forward by offering an alternative which we believe could be presented to Egyptians as more advantageous and more immediately available. We note that, since our agreement in principle supply $20 million to help meet chronic foreign currency shortage, Kuwaiti loan of over $90 million has been received. Any current balance of payments strains for which UARG had earmarked commodity loan can be covered to some extent by at least part of increases in the FY 65 Title I program requested by UARG over that remaining in the present multiyear agreement. The sector loan-project loan package added to this should serve as adequate symbol of US intent to restore aid momentum. Neither we nor the Egyptians should labor under illusion that program (i.e., commodity) or project loan for FY 65 is major benchmark passing of which will ensure smoothing of course of future assistance. PL 480 agreement which is core of our economic cooperation program remains to be negotiated for years subsequent to ’65. Our flexibility in this and working toward a future Western approach to counter Soviet influence will to a large degree be dependent on Egyptian action in meeting its commitments under present PL 480 agreement, in managing its economy, and on Egypt’s political posture in the area and on the world scene. We are gratified by recent reports that Nasser and his key lieutenants are giving UAR economic problems their personal attention. Strong argument can be made we should not come between them and their decision to face and reappraise unpleasant economic realities. They know from qualified foreign economists what needs to be done. Their willingness take bitter medicine necessarily will be one of principal determining factors in future US–UAR economic cooperation. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 9 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Davies and Symmes; cleared by Officer in Charge of Near Eastern Economic Affairs George M. Bennsky, Jones, and AID Deputy Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia Walter G. Farr, Jr.; and approved by Talbot. 2 Telegram 1637 from Cairo, November 11, conveyed Battle’s disappointment with the apparent unwillingness in Washington to proceed with a $20 million commodity loan to the UAR. He concluded: “New administration must give early sign of continuation cooperative effort or a new policy will exist here whether we intend it or not.” (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 106. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 106. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, November 17, 1964. 954. We do not expect to undertake any major initiative on Palestine refugee problem for time being, and hope to steer UNRWA item through GA with no change for worse in basic elements of overall Arab-Israel conflict over refugees. We intend maintain to maximum degree “even-handed” position which will resist all proposals designed to tip balance in favor of one side or other. This policy should give us maximum leverage to obtain our objectives, and produce middle-of-road res acceptable to all. With UNRWA up for extension this year, we have increased capability for keeping problem within tolerable limits. Some new elements have entered picture. Cairo non-aligned conf declaration included statement endorsing “rights of Palestinians to homeland” and Arab League has endorsed new and stronger refugee organization called “Palestine Liberation Organization.” We do not know that either of these factors will have any strong influence at UNGA, but we must be ready in event Arabs decide to press forward for additional UN backing for refugee cause in Palestine. On other hand, in keeping with even-handed position, we must be alert for Israeli efforts to ram through partisan resolution. As usual both sides are expected to open early campaign at UN and in capitals throughout world to gain adherents in this annual contest. Palestine Liberation Organization is making plans to send special missions to various govts to seek support for Arab objectives; Israelis are planning counter offensive. Many governments will look to US for lead. In your discussions this subject, you may be guided by following: 1. USG favors even-handed res along lines last year’s. It would extend UNRWA for perhaps two years. Exact length of time to be left open for time being. 2. We continue oppose Arab proposals for UN custodian for Arab properties in Israel. We will also strongly oppose any Arab attempt gain GA endorsement of non-aligned conf declaration on Palestinian rights, or to win GA recognition of Palestine Liberation Organization as official representatives of Arab refugees. This connection, if govt to which you accredited asks US attitude toward any special missions by PLO, you should state USG does not recognize it as official reps of refugees at UNGA, and we would be concerned at any effort by PLO to convert UNRWA item (essentially a humanitarian issue) into political problem (Arabs’ anti-Israel objectives). If PLO missions ask to see Emboffs we prefer Embassies decline. We do not, however, believe PLO missions likely be very effective. (We have informed Israeli officials we will brief our Embassies on USG substantive position on PLO and authorize them to give our position clearly and forthrightly to any government which asked our judgment on this matter. We declined however to take initiative since any approach by USG could raise allegations of “imperialist” pressure and befog substantive issue in manner which might help PLO. We also said we could not tell other govts how they should receive foreign visitors.) 2 3. Similarly, we continue oppose Israeli partisan res for direct negotiations, and regard as unrealistic Israelis’ objective of eroding at this time traditional UN affirmation of refugees’ right to repatriation or compensation (Para 11 of res 194 of 1948). Embs should report any developments this question. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Stackhouse, Jernegan, William B. Buffum, Louise McNutt of FE/RA, George N. Monsma of ARA/IPA, and in substance by Ross E. Freeman of EUR and Joseph J. Wagner of AF/AFI; and approved by Sisco. Sent to 37 Embassies and pouched to 61 Embassies and USUN. 2 Harman raised this with Talbot in a meeting on November 12, summarized in circular telegram 905 to Tel Aviv, November 12. (Ibid., POL ARAB–ISR) 3 The General Assembly did not discuss issues relating to UNRWA at its 19th session. On February 10, 1965, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2002 (XIX), in which it extended the mandate of UNRWA for one year, to June 30, 1966, “without prejudice to existing resolutions or to the positions of the interested parties.” 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dhahran 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dhahran 1 Washington, November 20, 1964, 5:11 p.m. 105. Chase Manhattan. Since ConGen will be responsible for reporting on forthcoming Bahrain Boycott Conference, and to ensure you informed, following background information transmitted: Arab Central Boycott Office Damascus announced July 9 blacklisting Chase Manhattan for “violation principles of boycott and for being agent Israeli bonds.” Bank given six months to liquidate affairs in Arab countries. Department’s assistance sought and matter has been receiving continuing attention in highest levels Department to ensure boycott recommendation rescinded in Bahrain Conference. Various Arab ambassadors called in and informed we view matter with great concern and fear consequences in Congress and elsewhere should boycott not be rescinded. Our own ambassadors in Arab countries have made representations to governments to which they accredited taking same line. Bank has only acted as fiscal agent for Israeli bonds held by investors in U.S., authenticating bonds and, together with other banks, disbursing principal and interest. Concerning Arab charges Chase extended loan to El Al, Chase discounted commercial paper arising out of sale of Boeing jets under Exim guaranties. Chase has endeavored satisfy Arab countries by furnishing affidavits and letters to individual Arab countries and by personal contacts. Chase received no formal notification from Boycott Office and has no communication with Central Boycott Office or boycott offices of any Arab country. Most Arab countries appear oppose implementation boycott but unable take lead for variety reasons. We recognize lead must come from Cairo and have made representations to UARG. Prime Minister Ali Sabri informed Ambassador Battle November 17 2 UAR will “do all it could.” In response specific question, PM indicated UARG willing assume leadership in December meeting. Meeting was friendly and Ambassador felt every evidence help forthcoming. However, we still fearful matter may become bogged down in boycott bureaucracy and will continue efforts ensure favorable action in Bahrain. We approaching British Mission Washington for suggestions help HMG might render Dhahran and Bahrain. Report of this will follow. In continuing effort ensure Congen kept informed, other Arab posts being requested repeat messages concerning Chase your office. 3 Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FT 11–2 ISR–ARAB. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Charles W. McCaskill of NE/E, cleared in draft by Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs George C. Moore, and approved by Davies. 2 Battle reported his discussion of the Chase boycott problem with Ali Sabri in telegram 1744 from Cairo, November 18. (Ibid.) 3 A memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, January 8, 1965, states that the boycott threat to the Chase Manhattan Bank had been withdrawn. Ambassador Kamal informed the Department on January 4 that he had received a cable stating that the Chase boycott had been officially suspended for 6 months but that in fact the case was closed. (Ibid.) 108. National Security Action Memorandum No. 319 108. National Security Action Memorandum No. 319 1 Washington, November 20, 1964. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Agriculture The Administrator, Agency for International Development SUBJECT US Aid to the UAR Given the Congressional and other criticism of aid to the UAR, I think it would be desirable to let the President review our policy on this matter before any new decisions are taken. I don’t mean to suggest that he is dissatisfied with existing policy, but merely that he should be fully apprised of the case for any new aid measures, particularly since they entail potential domestic reactions. So I suggest that you provide him in due course with your recommendations on proposed FY 1965–66 US aid, including PL 480, together with an analysis of what we expect to gain from such aid and what leverage it provides us. It might also be useful to discuss what other alternatives are open to us. Mid-December would be a good target date. McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 319. Secret. 109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, November 25, 1964, 7:40 p.m. 441. For Ambassador. Following instruction supersedes Deptel 434. 2 In response to PM Eshkol’s informal plea to President on Dimona, 3 you should make following points to Eshkol privately, indicating that you are speaking on Presidential authority: 1. President appreciates the frankness of Eshkol’s informal message outlining the problems posed for him by the timing of our next visit to the Dimona reactor. We can of course understand the ever present difficulty of reconciling conflicting domestic and foreign interests. 2. Nevertheless, President does feel bound to urge the importance of the semi-annual visits on which we have previously agreed. We are engaged in a continuing effort to prevent proliferation of sophisticated weapons, not least in the Near East. We believe Eshkol fully agrees that this effort is in the interests of Israel. A vital element in its success is our ability to assure all parties that none of them has attained or is seeking a nuclear capability, and to give this assurance we must be able to satisfy ourselves on this score. 3. The problem is made more acute by the recent explosion of a nuclear device by Communist China. It has alarmed many countries and made some of them—such as India—think again whether they should not attempt nuclear programs of their own. This is likely to focus Arab suspicion even more upon Israel. 4. Our interest in the security of Israel remains unchanged, but the grave responsibility which this puts upon us convinces us that we must leave no stone unturned in our efforts to maintain peace. President hopes, therefore, that Eshkol will see his way clear to arrange for a visit by our people to Dimona in late November or early December. FYI we regard early inspection of Dimona as imperative. End FYI. 5. In return, President has authorized following measures which we hope will ease Eshkol’s problem: a. We willing consider waiving Israel commitment to another six-monthly inspection until after November 1965 elections, contingent upon satisfactory findings next inspection and without prejudice to resumption schedule of six-monthly visits thereafter. b. We also willing postpone passing results inspection to Nasser until after November 1965, unless situation in Near East such that US and Israeli interests better served by informing him. We would, of course, consult GOI before such step. However, you should emphasize that the agreement on semi-annual visits to Dimona is particularly important to our efforts with Nasser, because he knows, as does the rest of the world, that Israel is probably the only country in the Near East which has the scientific capability to produce nuclear weapons and also has a facility in being which could be converted to such production. If we were unable to reassure Nasser periodically, for example, he might well be driven to greater dependence on the Soviet Union and even to irrational military action against Israel. He would, of course, be more resistant to our urgings that he limit his own arms development, particularly in the middle field. 6. If Eshkol avers that his problem is with “hard liners” in Cabinet, you can point out our difficulty in understanding this argument, since BG personally agreed to periodic inspections in May 1963, presumably with concurrence of Cabinet. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The text was received from the White House; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, Talbot, and Davies; and approved by Harriman. 2 Telegram 434 was similar in substance to telegram 441, except that points 1–4, which Barbour was to convey to Eshkol, were framed as an oral message from Johnson to Eshkol. (Ibid.) A November 18 memorandum from Komer to the President, enclosing a November 5 memorandum from Harriman to Bundy and a draft of telegram 434, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. 3 See footnote 2, Document 101 . 110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, November 27, 1964, 6:08 p.m. 3101. At our request, UAR Minister Eleish met November 27 with Jernegan discuss Thanksgiving day vandalism against Embassy (Ambassador Kamel in New York). Jernegan delivered copy of Embassy’s note protest (Embtel 1856), 2 emphasized that Department strongly supports statements contained therein, and expressed concern at recent trend of misunderstanding that had crept into US–UAR relations along lines Deptel 3092. 3 Jernegan said we took serious view of attack because felt could have been prevented if adequate action taken. Press reports had noted that Ambassador Battle who lives further away than fire or police stations able reach Embassy from his home through mob before police and firemen. Also noted that when police did arrive, concentrated on front of building leaving rear unprotected where burning occurred. Because we considered UAR had responsibility in this matter, Ambassador Battle had delivered note of protest to Acting Foreign Minister Abu Shadi. We understood from Ambassador’s report, 4 Abu Shadi expressed astonishment at protest and claimed UAR had done all that could be expected. Also, that Washington not taking as serious view as Embassy. We wished disabuse UARG of any such idea. Dept fully expected UAR compensate for damages and believed proper for UAR publicly express regret. Jernegan noted only regret so far had come from Chief of police and from Abu Shadi, but latter very matter of fact. Ordinarily, this handled by foreign government official visiting scene and government issuing public statement. After presenting substance Deptel 3092, Jernegan remarked that series of things had created impression in US of UAR hostility. It seemed there no policy followed by US which free UAR criticism. While we recognized that US–UAR relations cannot be based on what said in press, USG could not help but think UAR press treatment past two months symptomatic of UARG attitude. Added this had effect on Congress, American public and other US officials. Thus, attack on Embassy, while in itself not incident of grave severity, could have effect out of proportion to actual damage done. Eleish expressed his personal regret for mob attack, agreed report conversation, and expressed appreciation on learning neither Dept nor Embassy intended release text of note. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 UAR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Dickman, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. 2 Telegram 1856 from Cairo, November 26, transmitted the text of a note Battle planned to deliver protesting an attack on the Embassy that day by several hundred African students. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 3092 to Cairo, November 27, endorsed Battle’s protest note and stated that the Thanksgiving Day vandalism was particularly disturbing as a symptom of the “dissonance” that had recently entered U.S.-UAR relations. It noted increasing criticism by the Cairo press of U.S. policy in Vietnam, the Congo, India, Sudan, and elsewhere and a Foreign Ministry statement of November 25 condemning the U.S.-Belgian rescue of foreign nationals in the Congo. (Ibid.) 4 Battle reported his meeting with Acting Foreign Minister Abu Shadi in telegram 1068 from Cairo, November 27. (Ibid.) 111. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 111. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, November 30, 1964, 6 p.m. 1904. I called this morning on Prime Min Ali Sabri at his request. He began conversation by saying not necessary repeat all the things Fawzi had said to me. 2 Then stated interested in use of phrase “pre-arranged and premeditated” (Sabri’s words) in note and in conversation. He asked that I give him any evidence we had this point. I stated there could be no doubt of pre-arrangement if one examined nature of incident and its success from point of view those who wished it. I said that if he read carefully my statement and our note, he would see that I had never stated by whom incident arranged and had refrained carefully from any charge Egyptian involvement. I said I had done this and reported my govt no Egyptians involved even in light of numerous rumors and reports to contrary. I had avoided carefully overemphasizing these rumors for fear of exacerbating situation. I was now authorized to accept the UAR note expressing deep pain and the statement of willingness to negotiate compensation, 3 subject, or course, to successful working out matter. I said my prime purpose now was to overcome bad effects this incident but that it was impossible for me to do it alone. I must have their help. I said they had failed comply basic customs in matters of this kind and that throughout night of incident many of American and foreign press as well as others repeatedly asked me, “have you heard from Egyptian Govt?,” to which I of course had to reply in negative. I said I could only compare this with custom through centuries and for example recent example in Sudan, where half of Cabinet called to express regret for incidents, of which he aware since his govt involved in same circumstances. He said he had not been aware of custom and thought that sending Chief of Police with his expression adequate. I said his expression concern had reached me only in the note and had not been conveyed by Chief of Police. I told him that I had arrived two months ago with great hope and great expectation strengthening our relations. I still had them and wished to overcome problems surrounding this incident, but he must help and help more than he had done before and after incident. I said good relations two-way street, that I would do my part, but that I could do no more than that. He said, “What would you like me to do?” I said, prevent creation situations such as UAR press treatment issues involving US. I told him I would like to inform US press that he had called me in today to repeat expressions given me by Dr. Fawzi of GUAR regret and willingness to discuss compensation. He acceded. Sabri repeated desire as expressed by Pres Nasser in his recent speech to maintain good relations with US. I said this also our desire, repeating again it was a two-way street. We then sat for minutes in which neither of us spoke. I made no move terminate conversation. He then repeated strong desire good relations. I said that before leaving I wished to tell him that humanitarian mission conducted in Congo had been completed, that large number hostages had been evacuated, and that Belgian troops and US planes transporting them now out of area. I said I had noted UAR press treatment given Ball statement this morning and said I had sent off tel immediately asking for guidance. Response from Washington had indicated statement taken out of context and had referred to Congolese land movements. Conversation very firm, slightly tense, but ended reasonably pleasantly. I will talk with American press later today. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 UAR. Confidential; Priority. 2 Telegram 1885 from Cairo, November 28, reported Battle’s meeting that day with Foreign Minister Fawzi. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 1886 from Cairo, November 28, transmitted the text of the UAR note delivered that day. (Ibid.) 112. Memorandum of Conversation 112. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 4, 1964, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Jordan Arms Problem PARTICIPANTS State Department: M—Governor Harriman NEA—Phillips Talbot NE—Harrison M. Symmes G/PM—Howard Meyers M—Frederic Chapin NE—Andrew I. Killgore Defense Department: Peter Solbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA Charles Quinn, DOD, ISA White House: Robert Komer Governor Harriman said he had read and understood various briefing papers prepared for him by the Department in connection with the meeting. He therefore proposed a discussion of the issues, asking Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Solbert to begin. Mr. Solbert stated that we had to do the minimum necessary to keep Jordan on our side. He thought this would involve selling American supersonic aircraft, mentioning the F–104C as a likely prospect. To Governor Harriman’s question on why DOD wanted to sell the F–5, 2 Mr. Solbert replied that, in his view, the F–5 would entail a lesser political reaction, plus the fact it is easier to maintain. To a series of questions from the Governor, Mr. Solbert replied that the Jordanians say they now want to buy three squadrons of supersonics at 20 planes to the squadron, that Jordan has approximately 24 jet-trained pilots and that beginning delivery dates of any American supersonic fighters to Jordan would be at least three years into the future. Governor Harriman inquired if there was anything more to be said favoring the sale of American supersonic aircraft. Mr. Solbert stated we had also to consider a Jordanian request for a large amount of ground equipment for its Army. Governor Harriman asked a number of questions, drawing out replies from Mr. Solbert on the source of funds for Jordan’s military purchases, the relative importance of the ground and air buildup and types of tanks desired. Governor Harriman asked what the chances would be of diverting the Jordanians to a West European supersonic aircraft. Mr. Talbot responded that it comes down to what kind of arms policy we want to pursue over the years in the Near East. In his opinion, Jordan’s acquisition of either MIG’s or American supersonic aircraft would trigger irresistible pressures from Israel for reciprocal or better treatment. Governor Harriman’s question therefore came down to the nub of the issue. A short discussion then ensued on how strong Israeli pressure would be if American supersonics of any kind were sold to Jordan. Governor Harriman asked what attitude Jordan would have toward taking West European supersonics. Assistant Secretary Talbot replied he understood that King Hussein had expressed a desire for the French Mirage IIIC to President De Gaulle during the King’s recent visit to France. Mr. Talbot proposed we tell Hussein that if a West European aircraft were available he should obtain this type aircraft and that we could not, for political reasons, supply an American aircraft. If the King persisted that he must bend to UAC pressures to accept a MIG squadron, we should inform him that to do so would be at the cost of reduced American support to Jordan. Mr. Komer expressed the view that we probably had not worked hard enough initially to persuade King Hussein against early acquisition of any supersonic aircraft and that we should go back and inform him we could not supply American, nor could we acquiesce in his acquisition of Soviet aircraft. We should also go to Cairo in a further effort indirectly to dissuade Jordan from acquiring supersonics. However, we would leave enough opening in our position with Hussein to be able to fall back to a European supersonic if this appeared absolutely necessary. Governor Harriman asked if the group could agree on a European airplane. Mr. Talbot said that this would be his recommendation. Mr. Komer replied we should make every effort to dissuade the King from any early supersonics at all but he recognized that we might fail. There was general agreement that pre-Summit and other pressures of last summer, which had required our buying time rather than confronting Hussein head-on, had now eased. We could and should now take a harder line. To Governor Harriman’s question on the timing of our reply to King Hussein on supersonics, Mr. Talbot said he did not favor borrowing trouble by saying anything to the King at this point. We would like to leave the situation somewhat flexible and review what our reply should be as December 31, 1964 approached. Mr. Komer proposed letting the White House handle any disappointed American airplane manufacturers who might protest a European aircraft sale to Jordan. This proposal was immediately accepted without debate. Mr. Komer thought we should make crystal clear to King Hussein our opposition to his acquisition of MIG’s. Governor Harriman agreed, stating we would probably have to pull out of Jordan if Hussein did so. Mr. Talbot agreed that any appearance of hesitation on the aircraft issue might well be fatal to our aims. Mr. Talbot replied to Governor Harriman’s request for a summary of his recommendations by proposing (1) that an amended version of the Air Survey Report consistent with our political objectives be worked out for presentation to the Government of Jordan, (2) that when our position is ready we inform Hussein there are a whole range of priorities in Jordan’s drive for increased armaments, (3) that Jordan can well do without any supersonic aircraft, (4) that the acquisition of Soviet MIG’s would be a very critical matter from our point of view, and (5) (if Hussein were adamant) that acquisition of West European supersonics could be acquiesced in by us. The Governor said he was persuaded of the wisdom of Mr. Talbot’s recommendations. Governor Harriman asked how we would deal with Hussein in carrying out these tactics. In the discussion that followed, the consensus was: (1) Our future discussions will be at the Hussein level; (2) We would have either the Ambassador or a special emissary pursue the discussions with Hussein; (3) We would discuss a full package, ground and air, with Hussein, rather than proceeding piecemeal; (4) The question of who would pursue the discussions with Hussein would be decided after the details of our ground and air positions had been worked out in Washington. A further exchange took place involving Mr. Solbert, Governor Harriman, Mr. Meyers and Mr. Symmes concerning the F–5 aircraft. A discussion ensued of its characteristics and whether there would be any value in offering it to Jordan. Governor Harriman could not see the advantage to offering the F–5. Selling it to Jordan would have almost if not all of the adverse effects on our arms policy that we saw in the F–104. However, if it were desired to hold it deep in the background as a possibility ultimately to sell to Jordan, should everything else fail, he would not object. Governor Harriman said he hoped as a result of the foregoing words that the U.S. Air Force and the Pentagon would not try to sell the F–5 to the Jordanians while we were trying to induce the Jordanians either to forego supersonics or settle on a West European squadron. A short discussion followed on the desirability of better controlling American aircraft manufacturers in various parts of the world. Mr. Meyers said quite effective controls had been established over the activities of American aircraft salesmen in South America and he deemed it desirable that further efforts be made to assert this kind of control in the Middle East area. Others present emphatically agreed. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Killgore on December 15 and approved in M on December 22. 2 A December 5 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara (JCSM–1019–64) stated that the F–5 aircraft was preferred for sale to Jordan but recommended selling F–104H aircraft if the F–5 was unacceptable to the Jordanians. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 452.1 Jordan) 113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 14, 1964, 5:26 p.m. 492. Embtel 660. 2 At earliest opportunity you should inform Eshkol President gratified at GOI agreement schedule Dimona visit. USG naturally unhappy at Israeli postponement to January 30, but can accept this date so long as it thoroughly understood that inspection can be effectively comprehensive to meet our needs. Since Dimona now operating over 12 months inspection requirements more complex than last time. At minimum must include following: 1. Visiting team will require whatever time necessary (minimum estimate two days) complete observations at site with full access to reactor and all other facilities in order verify nature all such facilities, their production capacity and their present utilization. 2. Team should have opportunity review operating records reactor and any facilities either at site or elsewhere in which irradiated or unirradiated reactor fuel is stored, fabricated or processed, perform physical inventory and make independent measurements as may be necessary to verify production of reactor since previous visit. This more detailed inspection necessary to account for production. 3. Team also should have opportunity verify location and use any plutonium or other fissionable material produced in reactor. 4. Thorough inspection outlined above which corresponds to US bilateral and IAEA requirements minimum necessary permit President at later date reassure others on peaceful nature Israel’s nuclear activities. FYI: Visits to date have fallen considerably short normal safeguard requirements and at best accomplished only determination nature facilities at site and productive capacity at time of visit. AEC and intelligence community agree above more thorough inspection imperative. We regret earlier date for inspection not set. Embassy’s excellent reporting of developments on Israel’s domestic scene has helped explain Eshkol’s attitude. We appreciate difficulties and distractions he faces, but do not believe secret Dimona inspection would significantly affect his party’s election prospects. Decision permit six-monthly Dimona inspections originally taken by Ben-Gurion and reconfirmed by Eshkol, presumably after full Cabinet discussion. Deputy Defense Minister Peres also involved in decision. Thus, difficult believe “hard liners” in Cabinet could oppose Eshkol on decision in which they and Ben-Gurion participated. Embassy’s reporting suggests that with approach elections domestic pressures likely increase rather than lessen. Thus, inspection earlier than January 30 would appear decrease risk adverse domestic political repercussions. Our inability fathom Eshkol’s arguments for delay naturally heightens our security fears. Eshkol’s remark that “we cannot build nuclear weapon in two months” not reassuring in light estimate US experts that if Israel decided to produce weapon following January 1964 inspection, it could produce enough plutonium for one or two nuclear devices by the end of 1965. USG of course would not presume to suggest to Eshkol best timing of inspection politically. We hope however he will not invoke domestic political problems as pretext for further delays. Given other indications suggesting that Israel may be engaged in development weapon, further efforts delay inspection would bring into question Israel’s good faith. End FYI. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Russell on December 11; cleared by Davies, Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs Charles W. Thomas, Kenneth L. Brown of INR, Kratzer and Reichard of the Atomic Energy Commission, Devlin and Cooney of CIA, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan. 2 Telegram 660 from Tel Aviv, December 7, reported that after Barbour presented President Johnson’s position as set forth in telegram 441 to Tel Aviv ( Document 109 ), Eshkol agreed to a visit to Dimona on the weekend of January 30. Barbour reported that he had pressed for an earlier date, but that Eshkol resisted, finally saying, “we cannot build a nuclear weapon in two months.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) 114. Memorandum of Conversation 114. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 19, 1964, 11 a.m. SecDel/MC/43 SUBJECT Syria-Israel Conflict PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Yost Mr. Newberry Foreign Dr. Hassan Muraywid, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria Dr. Rafik Asha, Permanent Representative to U.N. Dr. Jawdat Mifti, Minister, Charge d’Affaires, Washington The Secretary opened the discussion by telling the Minister that the U.S. policy toward Syria was one of support for the independence, security and prosperity of Syria. The Minister reciprocated the Secretary’s comment. The Minister went on to express the pleasure of the Syrian Government and the Syrian people in the re-election of President Johnson. The Syrians, he said, felt that the Johnson Administration showed good understanding of the aspirations of national liberation movements. He also remarked on the great understanding shown by the U.S. in the current Security Council discussion of Syria’s complaint against Israel. 2 The Secretary said that it was unfortunate that Israel had moved the tractor into the zone in the first place; it was unfortunate that the Syrians had begun shooting; and it was unfortunate that the incident escalated as it did. The Minister noted that there was no precedent for an aerial attack of the sort mounted by Israel. The Security Council had not been able to deal with it and it was clear that the U.N. machinery in the area must be enabled to cope with such problems. The Syrian Govenment was insistent on remapping and marking the entire demarcation line as recommended in para. 45 of the report of the UNTSO Chief of Staff (August 23, 1963). The marking could, of course, be done step-by-step but unless the entire line is remapped, incidents might recur indefinitely. Dr. Mufti interjected that if the remapping were to be done only in the northern sector, Israel might later be unwilling to consider doing the same in other areas. Later in the conversation the Minister returned to the subject of Arab-Israel relations in general, stating that he would be derelict in his duty to his Government and to other Arabs unless he expressed to the Secretary the grave feelings of the Arabs in the face of Israel’s long-term expansionist and hostile aims. The Minister spoke at length of the inculcation in the minds of Israeli young people of hostile attitudes toward Arabs. This mentality, when associated with Israel’s projects in the field of nuclear research filled the Arabs with great foreboding. The Secretary responded by affirming that the U.S. was opposed to territorial expansion and the spread of nuclear weapons. The Secretary then asked the Minister what kind of situation might prevail if, hypothetically, the element of fear might be removed on both sides, noting that the Israelis also had occasion for their fear since they understood that many Arabs thought of Israel as a people marked for destruction. The Minister replied that it was not possible to conceive of such a situation given the present activities of the Israelis. The Secretary reminded the Minister of the U.S. efforts to restrict the spread of nuclear weaponry. When the Minister expressed a fear that Israel might be able to acquire nuclear weapons through the private sector, the Secretary expressed doubt that such a thing was possible and assured the Minister that the U.S. Government watches every aspect of nuclear production very closely. The Secretary told the Minister that the two of them would keep in touch on the matters they had been discussing. He remarked that Ambassador Ridgway Knight was an old friend of his and noted that Ambassador Knight had a direct channel of communication which the Minister could avail himself of whenever he had a personal message for the Secretary. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Daniel O. Newberry of the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian Regional Affairs and approved in S on December 24. The memorandum is marked Part I of III; Parts II and III are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2449. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. 2 Both Israel and Syria had requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council following an outbreak of fighting on the Israeli-Syrian border on November 13. The Security Council considered the complaints at nine meetings between November 16 and December 21. Documentation concerning the discussions at the United Nations is ibid., Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR/UN. 115. Memorandum of Conversation 115. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 23, 1964. SUBJECT U.S.-U.A.R. Relations PARTICIPANTS The Secretary M—Governor Harriman AF—Governor Williams NEA—Mr. Phillips Talbot AA/NESA—Ambassador William Macomber AA/AFR—Mr. Edmond Hutchinson AFN—Mr. David Newsom NE—Mr. Rodger Davies Mr. Talbot noted that the Secretary’s answer earlier in the day to a question on U.S.-U.A.R. aid negotiations 2 and President Nasser’s anti-American remarks, 3 first excerpts of which were received after the Secretary’s press conference, would be interpreted by the press as a direct confrontation between the U.S. and Nasser. He thought our broader interest would suffer if we reacted sharply to Nasser’s remarks. He thought we should “sit on our hands” for now. He proposed that we suspend all action on any new economic aid to the U.A.R., including the request for amounts of corn supplementary to the agreed amounts for the third year of the multi-year agreement, pending resolution of our policy differences. Existing programs, he thought, should be continued. Governor Harriman said he thought we should not take any new initiatives with the U.A.R. but carry out any standing commitments. These need not, he suggested, include further processing of the grain storage project which had been stalled for some time. Mr. Macomber said that there was approximately $15 million in the AID pipeline in non-PL 480 assistance. The Secretary asked about the safety of dependents in the hinterland of the U.A.R. in the event of demonstrations in the aftermath of Nasser’s speech. Mr. Macomber said that there were some Americans in Assiut, but he did not believe under present circumstances these would be endangered. Mr. Talbot and Mr. Davies felt it highly unlikely that possible demonstrations would endanger American lives. Mr. Talbot said he thought in considering future relations with Nasser, the last sentence of Marquis Childs’ article in Wednesday’s “Washington Post” was pertinent “… this (U.A.R.) is a new world and unless it is recognized as such, it will move wholly out of the orbit of the West.” The Soviets, he said, were standing by to pick up any advantage they could from deteriorating U.S.-U.A.R. relations. In addition, we had major interests such as Israel’s security, overflight rights, Hussein’s stability, facilities at Wheelus, Kagnew and other spots which could be damaged through U.A.R. influence or action. Nasser might, for instance, convince the Kuwaitis to draw down their security holdings in London. The question that faces us is whether we should seek confrontation with Nasser or continue our long-term effort to moderate his policies. Governor Harriman said we should look at the reverse of the coin, how much would we pay to dislodge the Soviets from an enhanced position in the Near East and Africa. For all the vast Soviet investment, so far they have received few dividends. Their fortunes would look up if U.S.-U.A.R. relations deteriorate. Mr. Talbot said at the same time we must recognize that Nasser’s policies and such recent incidents as the library burning, attack against the Mecom plane, 4 and the Port Said speech would raise tremendous pressure domestically for termination of aid. If we decide to continue economic assistance, it will perhaps be necessary for a full and frank briefing of the Foreign Relations Committee and key members of Congress. He thought continued assistance was in the best interest of the U.S. He noted that inside the U.A.R. the drift toward the East had alarmed pro-West elements. We had received several indications that these felt U.S. economic support was essential to prevent a rise in pro-Soviet influence within the regime. We heard recently through a friendly intelligence service from the Egyptian General Intelligence Agency, ostensibly on behalf of Nasser, that he would welcome U.S. assistance in ameliorating his precarious financial situation and in improving relations. Earlier in the day Henry Fowler had told him that the speaker of the U.A.R. Assembly a few days before had proposed to an associate of Robert Anderson that a U.A.R. Vice Presidential party be invited to come to Washington to discuss with the President the Salhia project and means of improving relations. To date no major U.S. interest has been hurt by Nasser. If we clash we are certain to incur some damage. We should now avoid any actions which would provide a basis for further deterioration of our relations. The Secretary suggested that we might assume a posture of taking no initiative whatsoever and waiting until the U.A.R. came to us for economic or other discussions. Mr. Macomber said that this would mean suspending action with respect to new projects contemplated in the $25 million FY ’65 level of A.I.D. loans. After recalling that no A.I.D. loans were made to the U.A.R. in FY ’64, Mr. Macomber noted that there were several projects still in the process of completion which had been funded in FY ’63. He indicated that there would be little difficulty in holding up on the new (FY ’65) projects but that, with the exception of the grain silo project, it would be a much more complicated task to suspend those FY ’63 funded projects which were presently underway. Mr. Talbot noted that since getting agreement in principle to the $20 million commodity loan for fiscal ’64, the U.A.R. had received $100 million in loans from Kuwait and $280 million from the Soviet Union. Our aid leverage, therefore, was limited except for PL 480. The Secretary decided PL 480 and aid in pipeline except for silo project will continue. We will not at this time proceed with processing supplementary PL 480 request or new aid agreements. The Secretary suggested that if the U.A.R.G. comes to us to discuss aid, we should indicate our desire to continue cooperation but also talk beyond to U.A.R. actions which make it difficult to justify additional aid to American people and Congress. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Davies on December 28 and approved in M on December 31. 2 Rusk was asked at his December 23 news conference if thought was being given to cutting off P.L. 480 aid to the United Arab Republic; he replied that this was not being discussed but that “relationships are reciprocal” and “if relations are to be good, both sides must make important investments in those relationships.” For text, see Department of State Bulletin , January 11, 1965, p. 39. 3 Reference is to Nasser’s December 23 speech at Port Said, summarized in a CIA Intelligence Memorandum of December 24, which called it “Nasir’s bitterest attack on the U.S. since 1956.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UAR, Vol. III) 4 Reference is to an airplane owned by U.S. citizen John W. Mecom, which was shot down while overflying Egyptian territory on December 19. Related documentation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 31–1 UAR-US. 116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 24, 1964, 12:29 p.m. 536. Israel-Syria. Even though SC consideration November 13 incident 2 was technically without issue Dept believes debate, behind-scenes negotiations and votes indicate abundantly broad SC consensus on major steps necessary to prevent recurrence such incidents. Without attempting set out guidelines for resolution specific issues behind Nov. 13 clash (UNTSO must continue exercise primary responsibility for this) Dept wishes convey to GOI and SARG its recognition this consensus exists, has force and merits Israel’s and Syria’s respect. For Tel Aviv . You should make following points to Acting Foreign Minister: 1. Although SC decision technically nullified by Soviet veto, believe resolution as amended constituted expression of majority opinion which should not be ignored. Comment by Israeli Foreign Minister after SC vote on Almagor incident September 4, 1963, 3 equally appropriate this instance: “Technical veto cannot detract in slightest from moral and political significance of stand formulated in Security Council.” 2. Differences between majority and minority in SC had essentially to do with SC’s interpretation of events November 13. On question of what should be done to prevent such incidents in future there was consensus that demarcation in disputed areas and participation in MAC meetings by Israel and Syria are necessary. 3. Israel would serve cause peace in area by acting in spirit this limited but very real consensus. 4. We think Israel should continue to exercise same restraint in response in UNTSO request it has exercised during last three weeks in Tel al-Qadi area both there and elsewhere along ADL. Specifically we would hope Israel would not resume patrolling in disputed Tel al-Qadi area but rather attempt again by working with UNTSO to remove causes of conflict in area or at least agree to such measures as UNTSO might suggest that would minimize danger of escalation such as occurred November 13. 5. We exerted considerable effort to see that unbalanced resolution did not emerge from SC. If controversial Israeli patrolling activities are a proximate cause of further violence in Tel al-Qadi area we would find it very difficult—if SC is again seized of matter—to achieve even limited influence on other members we succeeded in achieving this time. For Damascus . Appreciate fully our limited influence with SARG but believe expression our views could have some positive effect. You should inform Acting Foreign Minister (a) We deeply regret Sovs vetoed res which contained nothing of harm to Syria and so many elements favorable to its long-term wishes, viz., a strong request “that Israel as well as Syria participate fully in meetings” of MAC. (b) Our conviction that in spite veto SC majority opinion should be respected. (c) Whatever SC differences on interpretation November 13 incident there was limited unanimous agreement MAC should be fully utilized and demarcation Tel al-Qadi area should be matter first priority. (d) We hope Syria will make special effort cooperate with UNTSO to reduce tension in Tel al-Qadi area, specifically as regards efforts to demarcate line. To possible recriminations that we in service Israel during SC debate you should not fail note Israelis had objected strongly US–UK resolution, but that we tabled it nevertheless because we believed it most important SC throw itself behind measures to prevent recurrence such incidents. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Heywood H. Stackhouse; cleared by Davies, Buffum, and Sisco; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Damascus and repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, USUN, and Jerusalem. 2 On December 21, the Security Council failed to adopt a U.S.-British draft resolution (S/6113) deploring the renewal of military action on the Israel-Syrian Armistice Demarcation Line on November 13 and recommending that both parties cooperate with the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission for the purpose of maintaining peace in the area, that the parties cooperate in the continuation and completion of a survey begun in 1963 according to the recommendations of the UNTSO Chief of Staff, and that both parties participate fully in the meetings of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. The resolution received 8 votes in favor and 3 votes against but was rejected because of the Soviet Union’s negative vote. 3 On September 3, 1963, the Security Council failed to adopt a U.S.-British draft resolution (S/5407) concerning an August 19 incident on the Israel-Syrian border, with 8 votes in favor, 2 against, and 1 abstention, the Soviet Union voting in the negative. 117. Memorandum of Conversation 117. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 31, 1964. SUBJECT 1) U.S.-UAR Relations; 2) Jordan Arms Request; 3) NE Chiefs of Mission Conference PARTICIPANTS The Secretary NEA—Mr. Phillips Talbot NE—Mr. Rodger Davies 1. U.S.-U.A.R. Relations Mr. Talbot said the press wanted to know where we were going with the U.A.R. To give direction to the press we first had need for some policy guidance. We needed to decide our reaction to the U.A.R. approach through F.M.C. officials. The Secretary asked whether a message to Nasser or a reply from Nasser was due. Mr. Talbot replied that we had sent an oral message to Nasser on the Congo. 2 Since some Arabs, including Nasser, regard an oral message as being sent from a senior to a lesser official, it is problematic whether we get a letter in response to the President’s message. He noted that, meanwhile, Nasser had reactivated a long-unused [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]channel to express his desire to avoid further deterioration in our relations. 3 Mr. Talbot asked whether the Embassy and USIS should be authorized to accept the U.A.R. offer of a building for the library. The Secretary replied that it would be necessary to touch base with the President before an answer could be given on this. The President had been extremely upset by the signing of the purchase agreement for $17 million worth of wheat. In retrospect, the decision to continue all aid on the pipeline should have been checked out with the White House. The Secretary also said that the President is genuinely perturbed over the incivility manifested by Nasser and other radical leaders. He is inclined to consider such deportment unacceptable in international relations. The Secretary said Nasser’s speech was not the core of our immediate problem; U.A.R. assistance to insurgency in the Congo was. If Nasser continues support of “wars of liberation” in Africa, we are on a collision course. Mr. Talbot said that he thought yesterday’s Security Council resolution on the Congo may provide a platform for a dialogue with the U.A.R.G. on this problem. The Secretary pointed out there were unpalatable elements in the resolution. The Secretary asked about the merits of adopting a posture of not responding to U.A.R. overtures. Mr. Talbot said that this was difficult because there were day-to-day decisions that had to be made such as the one involved in meeting a U.A.R.G. request for 250,000 tons of wheat flour under the multi-year PL–480 agreement. Agriculture now thought that no more than 50,000 tons could be justified. We need to send a telegram to the Embassy to acquire additional information. Mr. Talbot recommended that we proceed to get the data and, depending on the course of events, apprise the U.A.R. Ambassador during his call on the Secretary that we would move ahead on this request. The Secretary agreed that the telegram could go provided the Embassy was in a position to provide the information without approaching U.A.R. officials. The Secretary said that Senator Hickenlooper had come to see him in great agitation over U.S.-U.A.R. relations. He had become somewhat calmer, however, when the Secretary pointed out that we had not proceeded on the $25 million commodity loan, that we had not met U.A.R. requests for additional aid, and that we were coasting along on past commitments. The Secretary said the CAB/FAA report on the Mecom aircraft should be surfaced normally through FAA channels. He thought Mr. Talbot should have a responsible officer carry the preliminary conclusions of the investigation to Mr. Mecom, along with FBI information on the background of the plane’s Captain. Mr. Talbot said that Mr. Davies would do so next Tuesday. The Secretary thought it quite clear that Nasser’s speech attacking Ambassador Battle and the U.S. had been sparked by the version given him of the discussion between Battle and the Minister of Supply on U.A.R. aid requests. 4 Mr. Talbot noted that this information had been imparted as Nasser was about to make what is characteristically the most emotion-laden speech of the year. The Secretary repeated that the Congo rather than the speech represented the core of our problem. He thought it likely that the Sudanese could be brought to cut off transit of arms to the rebels. That would make it easier for the U.A.R. to back away. Mr. Talbot said in briefing the press he planned to emphasize that while we could not have close relations with the U.A.R. given some basic differences, our national interests require reasonably good working relations. The Secretary said he thought that we should point out that it is in our interest that we maintain correct relations as well as a modest presence and influence. Without these we will have no capability of seeking to moderate U.A.R. policy. He thought we should not emphasize our vulnerabilities to U.A.R. pressures since that might give Nasser an exaggerated idea of his capabilities. The Secretary thought it would be useful to let the press know that there are people in the U.A.R. and Arab world who are extremely concerned about relations between the U.S. and U.A.R. 2. Jordan Arms Requests Mr. Talbot raised King Hussein’s eagerness to get American supersonics to fill his commitment to the Unified Arab Command. The Pentagon wanted to supply American aircraft, specifically the F–104’s. The Department felt that provision of American aircraft to Jordan would bring about the crumbling of our policy of arms restraint, particularly as regards Israel. The Secretary asked if it would not be possible for Jordan to get aircraft from France. Mr. Talbot replied we were pushing this but the French aircraft were twice as expensive as American aircraft. In response to the Secretary’s question whether we had filled the Israelis in on this problem, Mr. Talbot said that we were unable to do this until we had our internal lines straightened out. Some Israelis would fear MIG’s in Jordan. Some would prefer American to Soviet planes and might be willing to agree not to press for comparable treatment for Israel. Some others, however, would consider provision of U.S. aircraft as opportunity to press for U.S. supply of arms to Israel. We were making efforts to dissuade the Jordanians from the MIG’s and might in the end tell them that we could not accept MIG’s in Jordan. The Secretary asked whether, in fact, we would go that far. Mr. Talbot said that if the Jordanians accepted Soviet equipment the whole nature of our problem would change, prospects for arms control or restraint would be diminished and, possibly, the situation would then force the change in our relations. The Secretary said that obviously supersonics for Jordan in the Arab-Israel context did not make sense. However, the F5 might provide an acceptable compromise. Mr. Talbot responded that clearly we might have to negotiate on this, and he contemplated going to Amman in late January for this purpose. The Secretary agreed but again said that it was highly preferable that the Jordanians get their aircraft from either the British or the French. 3. NE Chiefs of Mission Conference Mr. Talbot raised the possibility of the Secretary spending one day at a Near East Chief of Mission’s Conference while travelling to or from the CENTO Conference. The Secretary said that he would if it could be worked out. His preference for locale was Beirut. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Davies. 2 Reference is to an oral message from Johnson to Nasser transmitted in telegrams 3429 and 3443 to Cairo, December 12 and 13. The message declared that U.S. policy was to support an independent unified Congo and assist in its development, and it urged against support of the rebel movement in the Congo, which would provide the Soviet Union and China with opportunities to extend their influence in Africa. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence,UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I) Ambassador Battle presented the message at his first meeting with Nasser on December 19, reported in telegram 2129 from Cairo, December 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 UAR) 3 A December 28 memorandum from Jernegan to Rusk reported several UAR feelers seeking improved relations. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) 4 A December 24 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk commenting on Nasser’s Port Said speech reported the UAR version of Battle’s December 22 meeting with Deputy Prime Minister for Supply Stino. (Ibid.) Battle reported the meeting in telegram 2162 from Cairo, December 23. (Ibid., POL 31–1 UAR-US) 118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, January 1, 1965, 5:57 p.m. 558. Embtel 661. 2 In approach parallel to your talk with Prime Minister Eshkol reported reftel, Deputy Prime Minister Eban recalled to Secretary December 5 3 that during Eshkol visit to Washington 4 it was agreed would be desirable keep in closer touch and there should be regular exchanges of views on political and military matters about every six months. Subsequently, this understanding extended to nine month periods. Eban stated rapid pace events in Middle East, some of which seriously affected Israel’s security led GOI contemplate two types of meetings: 1) general review involving Israel Foreign Minister that would occur with public knowledge, and 2) concurrent informal, military talks that would not become public knowledge. Secretary said he would discuss proposal with President and be in touch with Ambassador Harman. FYI: We fully recognize that informal consultations will have to be held now and then with Israel. However, Israel’s insistence upon periodic high-level meetings causes us concern. While consistent with Israel objective promote public identification with US, meetings not necessarily in interest either Israel or US. Moreover, there is no “agreement” on holding meetings. Israeli officials including Eshkol proposed them but President did not express specific agreement and consensus US officials was that occasional ad hoc meetings as needed might be desirable. We have noted repeated Israeli efforts parlay consensus into formal agreement. Since Eshkol visit, about ten such meetings have occurred. We also concerned about any proposal for formal, high-level meeting. This sort of publicized consultation was not suggested by anyone here last June, and in fact is contrary to spirit of informal quiet consultations proposed by Israelis themselves. Fanfare would inevitably attend formal, high-level meeting proposed March 1965 and inspire speculation and anticipation of portentous results facts do not warrant. This could well come at a time when US relations with Arabs over UAC and other matters in critical phase. Military meeting would seem unnecessary in view numerous recent discussions between high-level US and Israeli civilian and military officials over past months. Meetings would 1) reduce our ability help improve Israel’s position in Near East by moving us one more step toward joint consultations and contingency planning we oppose, 2) give Arabs evidence to support their contention we backing Israel against them, and 3) accomplish nothing that lower-level, informal, political discussion could not better achieve. End FYI. You should inform appropriate high-level GOI officials Department informing Israel Ambassador we believe formal meetings at foreign minister level unwise in general and not really envisaged by Israelis or us last June. If, however, GA still in session next March and Israeli Foreign Minister present, Secretary would of course be glad to meet with her again. As for other political talks we suggest that Talbot visit Israel when he is in area next spring. We also accept in principle that, if we have specific military topics which we agree should be discussed, then another round of quiet military talks could be arranged at an appropriate time after the political discussions envisaged above. 5 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 ISR–US. Secret. Drafted by Russell; cleared by Davies, Komer, Talbot, Harriman, and Solbert; and approved by Rusk. 2 Telegram 661 from Tel Aviv, December 8, reported that Eshkol had raised the matter of Israel-U.S. political talks with Barbour and had proposed a 2 or 3-day high-level meeting in March 1965. (Ibid.) 3 Rusk and Eban met in New York, where both were attending the U.N. General Assembly. Memoranda of their conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2448. 4 See Documents 65 - 70 . 5 Barbour informed Eshkol of the Department’s attitude toward the Israeli proposal on January 4, and Talbot spoke along the same lines to Harman on January 12. (Telegram 765 from Tel Aviv, January 5, and telegram 632 to Tel Aviv, January 26; both in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 ISR–US) 119. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 119. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, January 4, 1965, 8 p.m. 762. Subject: Dimona Visit. Ref: Embtel 738. 2 I approached Prime Minister Eshkol this morning making presentation along lines non FYI section Deptel 492 3 and left with Levavi of Foreign Office, who also present, copy of talking paper which consisted of close paraphrase all points enumerated therein. There followed lengthy discussion in which I emphasized that these were minimum requirements to enable visit to accomplish purpose envisaged by President and Prime Minister and that insofar as they are more complex than previous requirements, this added complexity arises from fact reactor has now been operating over twelve months since last observation. Prime Minister expressed concern that specificity these detailed requirements would seem to alter nature of visit to which he and his predecessor had agreed and he apprehensive that in circumstances he might feel necessary to consult Cabinet again, which if at all possible he anxious to avoid. He said it now appears what we desire is “inspection” as distinct from the visit by scientists as guests of Israel. Such inspection would raise familiar issue of prejudice to Israeli sovereignty and there no precedent in relationships between any two countries he could think of justify such procedure. I assured him there no intention our part to alter nature of visit and reiterated that specific requirements solely designed to enable observation by visitors to accomplish purposes originally set forth in line intervening developments since previous visits. While obviously not entirely reassured Prime Minister then said that he would send me his final comments within next day or two. Without discussing other specifics he declined agree to a full two days (nor to my alternative suggestion that might be possible arrange for team to visit on two successive Saturdays) but said he would be prepared for team to begin visit on Friday, the 29th, at noon and extend through Saturday evening, which corresponds to weekend when reactor personnel absent and is in effect almost two days. In conclusion he again stressed visit must be fundamentally on same basis as previous ones, that is team must be invited guests of Israel and not “inspectors.” If I succeeded in allaying his apprehensions, at least in part, I anticipate his confirmation will be forthcoming in day or so. Subsequently, Bitan of Foreign Office, who also present, told me in confidence that he does not anticipate great difficulty with most of requirements specifically probably no objection reviewing operating records reactor and fuel. However, Israelis had already feared team might want to bring scientific equipment of various sorts and our request that they be permitted “perform physical inventory and make independent measurements” tended confirm such fears. Israelis, Bitan said, prepared facilitate inventory and independent measurements with own instruments but would undoubtedly object to team bringing own equipment. 4 Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2 Dated December 29, 1964. (Ibid.) 3 Document 113 . 4 Telegram 568 to Tel Aviv, January 5, stated that the team was prepared to accept a January 29–30 visit and that it did not matter whether they were called “invited guests” or “inspectors” provided they were given access to all parts of the Dimona site and to all relevant reports. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, January 12, 1965, 4:53 pm 4008. Rusk-Kamel Meeting. UAR Ambassador called on Secretary January 8 to appeal to USG to step up aid. Talbot attended. Secretary opened by stating he hoped quiet talks could counteract effects of recent events on US–UAR relations. He would welcome Kamel’s personal and official appreciation of situation. Kamel expressed gratitude for opportunity, conveyed Nasser’s best wishes for New Year to Secretary and President, and expressed personal hope for year of constructive US–UAR and global cooperation. As for unfortunate events triggered by Congo situation, Kamel considered them minor, but they had been dramatized in effort destroy UAR-US relations. Help and wisdom of Secretary and President needed to overcome this tactic. Hence Kamel considered this meeting with Secretary equally as significant as his meetings with Secretary and President in 1961 when policy of US–UAR cooperation was laid down. Because of its troubled history, its sharp contradictions in creed and status, its current social upheaval, its proximity to Soviet Union, and its preoccupation with Israel, Kamel said Near East was a particularly complicated area in a complicated world. Hence Near East policy had to be formulated in expectation of such difficulties as those just experienced. Objective was not to rake over old problems but to seek solutions. Major US interests in area were preservation of Near East independence, protection of Western economic interests, protection of status quo, and control if not solution of Arab-Israel conflict. In 1958, with crisis of confidence between US and Egypt and Western troops in Jordan and Lebanon, all four US interests were in jeopardy. Kamel then arrived in US to hear on all sides Near East was lost to Communism. However, Kamel said, activation of US–UAR economic cooperation had kept Communism out of Near East (even though it had infiltrated to within 80 miles of US shores), had frozen Arab-Israel conflict, muted inter-Arab disagreements, and reduced area of Soviet opportunity; not one major US interest had been touched. Why then the agitation in Congress? To pursue protection of US–UAR cooperation, Kamel advocated that parties beware of defeatism, pressure tactics, over-dramatization, and excess of zeal—focussing instead on subtlety, restraint, and silence. If USG did not fully recognize Egypt’s need for economic assistance in its demographic problem, Egypt might fall to the Communists, and its loss to Free World might be as grave as loss of China. Economic cooperation was one arena in which US had advantage over Soviet Union. One hundred fifty million per year was modest investment in terms of results achieved and dangers averted. Oil company revenues alone far exceeded it. In late 1963, primarily as result of Yemen problem but possibly also as effect of US-Soviet detente, Kamel said Egyptians had sensed slow-down in US aid. Implementation of existing agreements continued, but no new areas of economic cooperation were penetrated. Growing stress on negative aspects of US–UAR relationship had left mark on his Government that Kamel now seeks to erase. Even at this,UARG had continued to fulfill its side of the understanding by playing constructive roles in Arab, African, and neutral summits and averting the war everyone had expected over Jordan diversion. But Kamel’s efforts secure reactivation of aid had failed. Recognizing limits on USG capabilities, he had also sought IBRD help and failed. In fact Woods’ remarks in Tokyo about UARG’s delinquency on foreign claims may have been contributing cause to recent incidents in UAR-US relations. As the senior partner in the relationship, Kamel said perhaps USG could muster more patience than UARG. It did not do for USG to play the schoolteacher, react to every line in foreign press, and follow policy of tit for tat. Such policy grated on proud Mediterraneans, as Soviets recognized. They exercise restraint even where Communist party banned. Recognizing Egypt as key to Near East, they would keep up their campaign to win it over. Turning to recent incidents, Kamel said he would not try to assess rights and wrongs and it did no good to cry over spilt milk, but he agreed with Secretary’s statements about need for respect for diplomatic conventions. He regretted burning of library and felling of plane; he did not feel harsh words necessary. But UARG had met diplomatic requirements on library, and in context of US global interest these incidents were tempest in tea-cup. He hoped US response would match its responsibilities. He proposed that USG and UARG put these incidents behind them, focus on fact that 99 percent of thirty million Egyptians were predisposed toward West, and open new chapter of cooperation by continuing PL–480 program after June 30, complying with request for increments to present agreement, and perhaps by granting the twenty million dollar commodity loan and enlisting help of IBRD and other states. If USG did not continue PL–480 program, Kamel could not conceive how we could keep the US and the West in the Near East. Communists were constantly at work in Egypt and were another cause of recent incidents. Kamel said France was making approaches to UARG, but he felt they were tactical. In any event he felt his country’s interest required that US influence predominate. To alleviate US–UAR friction over Congo, Kamel proposed this issue be left to OAU, with recognition that solution will be long-term process. Kamel was hopeful position his Government would evolve toward that of USG. Kamel pointed to dangers in conducting international relations in anger and in allowing annoyance over one issue affect over-all relationship. He knew this was not the diplomatic style of men at helm of USG; foreign diplomats in Washington were proud to know these men were leading world. He also paid tribute to Department staff. Finally, Kamel asked if USG could not take some action to mute annual attack on UARG in Congress. Repetition year after year had heightened Egyptian doubts about durability of US–UAR relationship. Within limits of US constitutional system, he felt President and Secretary could help guard relationship from this quarter. He doubted it could survive another attack like that of previous session. Whole UAR-US relationship was now jeopardized by trivia. Kamel believed in elemental need to preserve it. In this effort he had 100 percent support of his government. He knew able US Ambassador in Cairo was defending relationship with equal determination. In reply, Secretary said he was grateful for Kamel’s clear and eloquent statement of his concern for our relationship and ability with which he had pointed to its central elements. To avoid misunderstanding, Secretary wished make clear he would not comment definitively on all items Kamel had raised until another meeting. Some of these matters were of such importance as to require that Secretary confer with President before replying. Secretary agreed US–UAR relationship has had constructive elements. Certainly Kennedy and Johnson administration had sought to develop them. In narrow national sense, if UARG and USG were to draw up independently lists of their national interests, they would find some major elements in common. It was true that there were matters in background that were not easy to forget on one side or the other, such as High Dam/Suez experience. The record revealed complex elements which US and UAR must continue to try to wrestle with and circumscribe. As for the more superficial aspects of recent events, we regretted that more timely action had not been taken to prevent burning of library, but we could fairly say that, in light of all circumstances, steps taken by UARG in that matter would tend to indicate that norms of diplomatic usage had been sufficiently met to warrant considering case closed. Secretary could not however see incident’s early erasure from minds of Congress or American public. USG would have preferred that UARG confine its measures on the American cargo plane to pursuit over frontier and possible protest. Although we recognized complications from UARG point of view and did not condone flight pattern of plane, we felt UARG remedy had been a bit drastic. However, we felt this incident was also behind us. Speech of December 23 was kind that creates problems. Perhaps it reflected sensitivity, but it had aroused counter-sensitivity. Secretary did not know if speech had reflected misunderstanding of the talk between Stinu and our Ambassador. Presence of Shelepin did not help anyone who sought to explain the remarks. Secretary would not press exceptionally able ambassador like Kamel to defend another’s rhetoric, but Secretary was hearing of the speech several times a day. Perhaps most serious problem between US and UAR was Congo. USG had no special national interest there, no appetite for special presence. For several years we had supported Congo’s unity and integrity through UN and through bilateral aid approaching half a billion dollars. For most of period USG had worked in near unanimity with African states in effort to keep Cold War out of Africa and prevent fragmentation of Congo. While Adoula was Prime Minister, we had learned of illegal arms shipments into Congo from Tanzania and Burundi territory. Weapons of Communist Chinese origin had been captured. USG had no fore-knowledge of Tshombe appointment, but supports his Government under already existing policy to support GDRC. USG had been disappointed and a little surprised by UARG’s seeming association of itself with elements holding hostages in northeast Congo. We felt we had acted with great patience under extreme provocation during period August–November when rebels held incommunicado many hostages including five American consular officers and subjected them to barbaric indignity, brutality, and threat of torture, execution, and cannibalism. These elements with whom Cairo seemed to be associating self had in our eyes put themselves beyond the pale of a civilized world. Provision of arms to Congo rebels, particularly as an act of avowed national policy, was a grave issue. Most arms reaching rebels were of Soviet manufacture. We had good information on how they were reaching Congo. Their provision seemed to promote Cold War type of conflagration we had tried five years to avoid. If it could be stopped, we could concentrate our assistance on economic development. Continuation of arms shipments made that very difficult. Secretary would like to pursue this subject with Kamel further in some detail. Since rebels are poorly trained, large quantities of their weapons were falling into hands of Congo Government. There was now some indication deliveries to rebels slowing down. We hoped we could find answer through Security Council and OAU in order to prevent this issue from intruding on totality of our relationships. Secretary told Kamel his effort regarding existing US–UAR Food for Peace agreements was to ensure that nothing was done to interrupt them, but, as press showed, this effort was under very considerable attack. He viewed this program as an important channel of US–UAR communication; it contributed to welfare of Egyptian people, stood on its own feet, and lent itself to kind of relationship that need not be affected by every sensitive issue that arose. Objectively considered, there were important national interests on both sides that can be basis of cooperation. For the future, we hoped for steady improvement in UAR-US relations. If Egypt should be free and prosperous, that was extent of US national ambition for Egypt. On that basis we sought cooperation and friendship. Secretary said he had tried limit his own public statements, and he would hope by quiet discussion we would find better answers than we had found thus far. He took encouragement from Kamel’s able and diligent efforts to find a basis, and he paid those efforts full respect. The Ambassador should not consider that what Secretary had said in this one meeting constituted full reply to Ambassador’s important statement. Secretary would wish to confer with President. Kamel stressed once more urgency of situation and his personal concern and urged that both sides resist demagogy. Secretary suggested that in next meeting perhaps Kamel would comment on specifics of that urgency and, re his compilation of US interest in good relations with UAR, perhaps Kamel could also state how he sees Egyptian interest in good relations with US. Kamel said he could answer latter question at once. Only alternative to cooperation with US was cooperation with Soviet Union. Latter was greater danger to Egyptians. They counted on power, patience, and wisdom of US more than on wisdom of others. He adjured USG to continue economic cooperation and to be patient. Secretary responded that, for our part, we needed help in enabling a great democracy to be patient. Kamel closed discussion by contrasting superficial benefit to Soviets of arms sales with lasting benefit to US of food sales. By continuing economic cooperation, USG could promote relaxation of Near East political tensions, reduce Egyptian need for Soviet arms, and thus diminish Soviet leverage. If Congress were to force cut-off of aid, it would promote exactly opposite effect. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential; Noforn. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, and Rusk’s Staff Assistant Edward J. Streator; and approved by Talbot. Pouched to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Taiz, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, USUN, and Leopoldville. 121. Memorandum of Conversation 121. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 14, 1965. SUBJECT Jordan’s Request for Sale of U.S. Arms PARTICIPANTS The Secretary U—Mr. Ball NEA—Mr. Phillips Talbot NE—Rodger P. Davies Mr. Talbot said that decisions on how to meet Jordan’s arms request went far beyond our bilateral relations. These could force abandonment of our traditional policy of restraint on sale of arms to the Arab states and Israel. They could ultimately bring polarization of the area with the Arab states armed and backed by the Soviets united against a “Fortress Israel” armed and supported by the U.S. He was to impart our decisions to King Hussein by the end of January during visit to Amman. The Unified Arab Command, financed by the Arab states of North Africa and the Near East, has levied a requirement on Jordan to modernize and expand its army and air force as part of an Arab program to achieve parity with Israel. If the U.S. refuses to sell arms to Jordan, King Hussein tells us he will be forced to acquire Soviet equipment. He has withstood UAC pressure to standardize Arab military inventories on the basis of Soviet equipment only by assuring the other Arab states that the U.S. will provide essential equipment. If Jordan acquires Soviet aircraft and tanks which would require Egyptian training crews, Israel’s alarm would be intense. We would find it difficult to justify before Congress continued U.S. support of the Jordanian budget. If we meet Jordan’s request, thus violating our traditional Near East arms policy, Israel probably would tolerate or even welcome our sales to Jordan for she recognizes we could no longer fend off Israeli efforts to obtain offensive American weapons. We believe the bitter emotional response of the Arabs to the direct supply of offensive U.S. arms to Israel would be so great that it might force those Arab states now drawing on Western arms to turn to the Soviet Union. This would be a major step toward polarization which our policies over the years have been designed to prevent. The Secretary asked whether it would not be possible for the Jordanians to meet at least its aircraft requirements from European sources. Mr. Talbot said that we hoped to preserve the basic essentials of our arms policy by persuading King Hussein to acquire the French Mirage fighter which is comparable to the Soviet MIG 21 or our F–104. The British Lightning seems ruled out because it is excessively heavy and expensive. In addition the British have made clear that they will not consider credits in the sale of military equipment to Jordan. If we can persuade Hussein to acquire the French plane, we will have averted the worst of our potential problems with Congress and preserved a chance of maintaining continued American restraint on arms sales to the area. Mr. Davies noted that the French Mirage was expensive with a fly-away cost for twenty aircraft of approximately $28 million as compared to $12 million for the MIG 21 and $27 million for the F–104G. Other versions of the 104, the C and H, ran from $10 million to $20 million, however. Mr. Talbot said that while we would push for a European sale, we must be ready for the contingency that King Hussein will refuse to accept our views. Although the balance of disadvantages is close, he believed that to obviate Jordan’s acquiring Soviet supersonics, he should have stand-by authority to offer to consider selling American supersonic fighters. Mr. Talbot said the situation was also complicated by Jordan’s request for M–48–A–3 tanks with 105 mm cannons. Although we recognize Jordan’s need to modernize its armor, we have previously declined to sell this particular tank to Israel. If we sold the M–48–A–3 to Jordan it would arouse strenuous protest from Israel and its supporters in the United States. On the other hand, if we talk the Jordanians down to the M–48 or the M–48 with the diesel engine but not the 105 mm cannon, the Arabs will be incensed when Israel acquires this model from other sources. There is some possibility that the Arabs are aware that Israel is planning to acquire this particular tank. The Secretary said that the issues involved were so important as to require consultation with the President. He asked for a very short summary of the problem 2 to take with him to Texas the following day so that he might brief the President if opportunity arose. In any event, when the President returned, it would be necessary to discuss these decisions with him. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on January 19 and approved in S/S on January 27. 2 The memorandum indicates that a summary sent to the Secretary, dated January 15, was attached. The summary is not attached, but was apparently the memorandum from Talbot to Rusk summarizing the issues, drafted by Killgore and Davies on January 15, a copy of which is filed as an attachment to a memorandum from Jernegan to Rusk, March 27, 1964. (Ibid., NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316,NSAM 290) 122. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 122. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, January 18, 1965, 12:35 p.m. 833. PriMin Eshkol called me in evening January 17 to tell me he is greatly perturbed over recent developments concerning diversion Jordan headwaters and that, in view of reports that Lebanese parliament due to formulate GOL position this coming Thursday, 2 he thought it would be wise to ask USG tell GOL that diversion is serious matter and will be dealt with by GOI as serious matter. Eshkol pointed out that what is at stake is large portion (100 MCM’s or more) of sweet water which is necessary for Israel’s development. PriMin stated he would not want to use force protect this water but sooner or later he might have to do so. However, to avoid such development, GOI wished use USG channel to exert counter-pressure upon GOL which, while probably not wanting assume responsibility diverting waters, is subject to Egyptian threats. He referred, apropos such USG assistance, to “promises” and “assurances” he had received in his talks with President Johnson and others in Washington. I said that USG fully agrees that question Jordan headwaters a serious matter and also believes that GOL has some room free for maneuver. I pointed out, however, that our assessment differs from GOI’s in that we do not think Lebanese suffering from any misapprehension re Israeli attitude. Thus, while USG has had several talks with GOL re diversion, we would wish avoid any undue pressure which might provoke unfortunate Lebanese reaction, notably if Lebanese prestige directly involved by such tactics. Eshkol interrupted to say GOI certainly didn’t wish press too much but question was vital and that somewhere along the line there was a zero hour. He didn’t know of any halfway measures. I answered that I didn’t think that the critical point would be reached with the beginning of digging or the pouring of concrete, but only when water was actually diverted from Israeli use. If Israel forced employ drastic measure he feared, such measure would be just as effective against completed works as it would in earlier stages of construction and obviously consequences such intervention could be far reaching and unpredictable, possibly disastrous. Since there was always the possibility that Arabs would never be able get project off the ground I thought GOI had every reason play this hand out. Eshkol admitted that the construction of pumping stations and tunnels would take time and that it is a question of months rather than days. However, he is greatly perturbed and wishes USG know his concern and communicate it to GOL. Fundamentally, I believe he feels coming Lebanese parliamentary session important point in formulation Arab strategy and every effort should be made try to ensure best possible outcome. In assuring PriMin that I would bring his personal concern to attention USG I told him it would not be helpful if Israel started a big press campaign of intimidation against Lebanon. Eshkol said he did not envisage this and that GOI is trying to avoid public involvement Lebanese prestige. 3 Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus and pouched to Jerusalem, London, Paris, and USUN. 2 January 21. 3 Telegram 615 to Tel Aviv, January 19, also sent to Beirut, endorsed the line Barbour had taken with Eshkol and instructed the Embassy in Beirut to continue to pursue the line it had been taking with senior Lebanese officials on this subject. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER) Circular telegram 1317 to Tel Aviv, January 22, instructed the Embassy to suggest that Israel might bring the Jordan waters problem to the United Nations by means of a letter to the Security Council President describing the problem and warning of the possibility of an eventual clash of riparian interests. (Ibid.) 123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, January 18, 1965, 7:47 p.m. 378. Jerusalem’s 204 to Department. 2 Assistant Secretary Talbot conveyed to Israel and Jordan Ambassadors USG deep concern at reports received from UNTSO of build-up arms and troops on both sides Jerusalem, urged restraint and fullest cooperation with General Bull. Ambassador Harman said problem is continual resort by Arabs to firearms. IJMAC subcommittee provides forum for Jordan complaints; instead they shoot. Arabs creating intolerable situation in which they can create disputed areas by irresponsible shooting. If they have question of where line or track lies, be it in terms of one, ten or a hundred meters,MAC exists to adjudicate problem. Talbot noted situation potentially explosive and that we as matter of urgency requesting Israel’s cooperation with General Bull in relation to mounting Scopus patrol and in all other matters. In these situations, Israel should find judgment of UNTSO invaluable. It should be important to Israel not to find itself in violation of the GAA. Harman noted need to protect people in crowded urban area when, as UNTSO report confirms, Jordanians bringing up tanks. Hoped Department’s demarche to Jordanians would stress need to rely on machinery of MAC rather than on guns. Said he certain General Bull’s wish will receive immediate consideration in Jerusalem and that he would immediately notify his government of our request. Talbot noted to Ambassador Jumaa our deepest concern at UNTSO report of Jerusalem situation and hope that Jordan would exercise greatest restraint. He realized there were differences of fact between the two sides but stressed need for working these out with UNTSO rather than through shooting. Jumaa undertook to convey Department’s request for restraint immediately to Amman. Ambassador Harman subsequently telephoned to say that telegram crossing his reported Bull travelling Amman tomorrow to discuss situation with Jordan’s Defense Minister. At Bull’s request and to enhance prospects success his endeavors, Israel postponing January 19 patrol. Talbot informed Harman that in conversation with Jordan FonMin Kadri Tukan January 18 Ambassador Barnes informed that while Jordanian troops on Israel frontier nervous over recent incidents, had firm instructions not to start anything. Noted also FonMin’s statement that Jordan did not want any trouble and his hope we could make this clear on other side. Harman undertook to convey this latter immediately to his Government. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Jerusalem and USUN. 2 Telegram 204 from Jerusalem, January 18, reported a UNTSO request for a U.S. approach to Israeli and Jordanian representatives to urge restraint in the Jerusalem area. (Ibid.) 124. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 124. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 21, 1965. Jordan Arms . Rusk has asked for a meeting soon to lay before you our painful dilemma here. Our Jordanian friends have been pressing us for months to sell them arms and planes for the Arab buildup against Israel’s water diversion scheme, claiming that otherwise they’ll have to buy Soviet items being touted by the UAR. With Israel’s tacit consent, we’ve been subsidizing Jordan for years, in order to keep King Hussein—the most sober of the Arab leaders—out of Nasser’s clutches. We think Soviet arms in Jordan would be the beginning of the end, and to be forestalled at almost any cost. We’ve agreed in principle to some staggered arms sales to Jordan so long as the Arab kitty can finance them, but have stalled on the key item—supersonic aircraft. Our fear is that if we sell supersonics to Jordan for an announced Arab buildup against Israel’s diversion scheme, we’ll come under acute Israeli and US Zionist pressure to sell arms directly to Israel too. In fact, our whole aid program to Jordan might come under attack. If we get into overt arms sales to Israel, then all the Arabs may turn against us, and Jordan may have to accept Soviet and UAR arms anyway. We owe King Hussein an answer by the end of January. Our proposed strategy is to come through with some carefully phased ground equipment sales, but to tell Hussein he can’t have either US or Soviet fighters without jeopardizing US aid. If he feels absolutely compelled to get supersonic fighters he should buy them from the UK or France. We hope by this combined package to string out the whole program, in hopes the Arab buildup against Israel will fall apart in time (as it has before). But DOD and now State’s Arab experts fear that Hussein won’t play. So they propose as a fallback an offer of one US squadron by 1968–69 (which they think Hussein will buy) if he is adamant. Others of us oppose going this far now. We should try our hardest to turn Hussein aside before deciding on any fallback because of the acute risk of a violent Israeli reaction. Also we have promised to clue the Israelis on what we propose , and haven’t told them, pending your decision. A new complication is that the Israeli/German/US tank deal is now leaking (though our commitment to modernize the German M–48s is still not out). This could be played up by the Arabs to force Hussein to take Soviet arms. We told the Israelis we might have to call the deal off if it leaked prematurely, and may want to threaten this as pressure on them to keep their lips buttoned (they may have been the leakers). Another important part of this problem package is our policy toward the UAR. We face a growing crisis in 1965 on Jordan Waters, and if Nasser wants he can make it highly painful to us. The one issue on which he can always rally the Arab brethren is Israel. So you might want to send Luke Battle back with some quiet word that we’d rather talk than fight if only Nasser would show a little understanding of our problems too. State will have a long paper for you shortly but I wanted to provide an advance look tonight. R. W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Near East. Secret. The memorandum bears the President’s handwritten note: “Have Bundy see me on this. L.” 2 McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 22, 1965. SUBJECT Your Meeting with Ambassador Battle—Next Moves with the U.A.R. 2 Embassy Cairo indicates that President Nasser will wish to see Ambassador Battle on his return to Cairo. This follows on various indications that the U.A.R. would like to improve relations with us. The Department recommends that you explore the following with the Ambassador and authorize him to convey our views to Nasser as soon as possible after his return to Cairo Sunday. I. What We Want from the U.A.R. on the Congo We seek termination of Nasser’s support of dissident groups in the Congo and use of his influence in the Organization of African Unity in support of the Central Congo Government. The U.A.R. has indicated it will not buy a position of unconditional support for Tshombe but shares our objective of seeing a stable, independent Congolese Government emerge from the present chaos. We feel there is room for some bargaining with Nasser on this issue. II. What We Need in Way of Policy Implements Nasser faces an acute supply crisis coupled with a shortage of foreign exchange and credit facilities. Termination of PL–480 shipments would aggravate the crisis although Soviet assistance—granted at a price of further political concessions—would enable him to ride it out, we believe. Nasser’s reliance on PL–480 foodgrains is so great that the program poses the threat of unbalancing his economy unless he knows he can count on it. Two years of Congressional criticism coupled with the “running down” of our economic cooperation program have caused suspicion and frustration. What we need to draw the U.A.R. into a more cooperative posture is a “carrot” to hold before it—an assurance of continued support from the “Food-for-Peace” program in the years ahead. III. The Importance of “Normalizing” U.S.-U.A.R. Relations Getting back onto even keel with the U.A.R. is important for issues other than the Congo. If we let the situation lead to an open break, Egypt will use Arab solidarity and emotionalism to bring pressures to bear against British and American interests and against Israel. Only the Soviets will benefit from such a situation. We could lose military and civilian air rights (MATS, PanAm, TWA), oil concessions (a billion dollars a year to the U.S. balance of payments), unharassed passage of the Suez Canal, and much of our influence in the Arab world. Friendly regimes in Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia would be subject to intense nationalistic and possibly subversive pressures. Arab Communist parties would operate openly in the area as probable price for Soviet support to the U.A.R. and other Arab states. None of our major interests in the Near East have been damaged over the past six years. We must ensure that this situation continues. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Cables, Vol. II, 6/64–12/64. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Jones and Davies. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US) 2 The copy cited in footnote 1 above bears the typed notation: “White House (President) appointment Saturday, 1/25/65” and the handwritten notation: “Cancelled—Pres in hospital.” 126. Memorandum of Conversation 126. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 25, 1965. SUBJECT Jordan Arms Request PARTICIPANTS The Secretary U—Mr. Ball M—Governor Harriman NEA—Mr. Talbot NE—Rodger P. Davies The Secretary asked whether we could not arrange a tacit guarantee of Jordan’s security in lieu of selling it arms. The U.S. could say simply that it would not permit Jordan to be overrun by Israel. Mr. Talbot said the Arabs held that they would not attack Israel, but would react when Israel struck at the Arab diversion project. Jordan held it was part of a defensive arrangement with the other Arab states. Mr. Ball noted that circumstances pushed Hussein to cooperation with the UAC. His internal situation would be seriously endangered if he didn’t go along with the other Arabs. In addition, Jordan’s defensive position, like Israel’s, was “thin,” given the proximity of each other’s forces. Mr. Talbot doubted Jordan could be diverted from acquisition of additional arms. It sought, however, maximum freedom of action from the UAC by acquiring arms from the West. The Secretary said the U.S. had demonstrated its interest in Jordan’s independence through President Kennedy’s statement of May 8, 1963. 2 He thought Hussein knows his real enemy is Egypt, not Israel. By deeper involvement in the UAC, the U.A.R. threat to Jordan was enhanced. Hussein faced a bleak future of growing Egyptian influence to his country and of certainty that Jordan would take the brunt of any military engagement with Israel. Mr. Ball said Hussein could not draw back without excluding himself “from the Club.” Mr. Talbot agreed that this was the heart of the problem. Hussein, however, sought to retain membership while keeping his powder dry. He wanted to avoid closer military ties with Egypt which runs the UAC show, but psychic factors prevented him from disassociating himself from Arab solidarity. To the Secretary’s question as to Saudi participation in the UAC and whether Kuwait wouldn’t tire of making UAC contributions, Mr. Talbot noted that Saudi Arabia was a full participant and major financial contributor and that Kuwait’s $100 million per year increase in income assured continued support. Mr. Ball noted that Libya would soon be in a position to make larger contributions, and that these smaller states felt they must keep on trying to buy their independence. The Secretary asked whether we couldn’t tell Jordan that we would not object to its acquiring MIGs provided there were no Russians involved in training. To Mr. Talbot’s remark that this then would entail UAR trainers, the Secretary noted that the Jordanians could be trained abroad on the MIG. Mr. Talbot said that a preemptive U.S. sale seemed desirable if Soviet arms supply threatened. Had we moved to meet Egypt’s arms request in 1954, the Near East today might be quite different. The same was true in Afghanistan in 1955 and India in 1962. It would have served both Israeli and U.S. interests had we provided Egypt arms from the West. Although relations might have been just as bumpy, we would have had some control through Egypt’s need to purchase new equipment and spares. Assuming Hussein did not dare leave the Club, would it serve our interest to limit Jordan to procurement from the West. Mr. Ball said that Israel’s bargaining power would be infinitely multiplied if Jordan and the other Arab states went over to Soviet supply. We would have chosen up sides. Israel could point to the Communist danger in the Arab states to justify arms procurement from the U.S. Mr. Talbot said we had learned that the Arabs knew full details of Israel’s arrangements to acquire tanks. It was certain that they would insist on Jordan getting what Israel got. Significantly, Jordan’s request for M–48 tanks had escalated to the M–48A3 tank with 105 mm cannon—just what Israel is getting. The Secretary noted that we might suggest that Hussein get his tanks the same way that Israel does. Mr. Talbot said that there were 83 M–48s remaining in Germany and these might make up most of the 100 in our proposed package for Jordan (five-year). The Secretary said that both Israel and Jordan in acquiring tanks were behind the times. Anti-tank missiles provided a surer defense. Mr. Talbot noted that the Pentagon had disagreed with this thesis when we tried to apply it to Israel. Mr. Ball noted that the diesel engine gave the M–48 sufficient range to make it an offensive rather than a defensive weapon. Mr. Talbot said that given unpalatable alternatives, we believed that an effort to provide for a reasonably phased modernization of the JAA was the best for us. We would space deliveries of $55 million worth of equipment over the next four years. The minute division among the Arabs split the UAC, we could cut off the pipeline. However, if we forced a confrontation by refusing to sell, Jordan would be forced to a Soviet/UAR basis for her army; if we bought time by the sale there was some chance Arab solidarity might come asunder. Mr. Ball felt from the Israeli viewpoint, either course would be advantageous. If American equipment went to Jordan, Israel would press for American supply. If Communist equipment went, Israel would press even harder for American supply. Mr. Talbot said that we anticipated a negative Israeli reaction when they were informed of our decision. To reduce the heat, instructions to Tel Aviv must indicate that the President approved the decision. The Secretary queried whether more time couldn’t be given to consider alternatives. Mr. Talbot said that this was the fourth time we had been pressed for an answer. However, the President’s illness and the Churchill funeral could permit us to slip the schedule for a week. We had still to get the President’s clearance and to inform the Israelis before we could proceed to informing Hussein. The Secretary asked whether instead of informing Eshkol, we could not put the alternatives to him and ask his reaction as a loyal friend. Governor Harriman thought we would get a strong reaction with arguments that we should force Hussein to forego arms. We should be guided by our interest in preempting the situation and by the desirability of U.S. control through provision of spares and ammunition. Mr. Ball said that Israel would not object to a Soviet-U.S. polarization of the arms supply situation. Mr. Talbot assented and said that this would advance Israel’s objectives of a U.S. security guarantee and joint military planning. In the Secretary’s view the two principal questions were: should we buy into both sides of an arms race? Should we buy major items of equipment for the UAC given its objective of developing strength against Israel? He asked whether this was something we could work out with the Soviets. Mr. Talbot replied that he had discussed this possibility with Ambassador Thompson who agreed that the Soviets had nothing to gain from restraint. Arm sales provided the principal entree for Soviet influence into the Near East. Governor Harriman thought there was no harm in trying this out with the Soviets. Mr. Talbot said that we had learned that the details of Israel’s tank purchase arrangements were known to the press and they could hit headlines within two or three days. Our agreement with Israel was conditioned by a secrecy clause which could be invoked if the matter came to public knowledge. He felt that the strength of Arab reaction could be minimized if we cancelled that part of the arrangement which dealt with retrofit kits. We could then say that we had given approval to the shipment of M–48 tanks from Germany to Israel and apprise the Israelis that we could consider later a direct deal on diesel engines. Both Governor Harriman and Mr. Ball noted that Prime Minister Eshkol and those accompanying him in June had given categorical assurances that the transaction through the Germans and Italians could be kept secret for two or three years. Mr. Talbot said that in the event of cancellation, Secretary Vance was extremely worried about our public posture if the Israelis or the Germans leaked the fact that we had agreed to provide retrofit equipment. We could not very well deny the agreement even if we were able to say that we were not fulfilling it. The Secretary said that he felt the cancellation of our part of the arrangement would leave both the Germans and Italians out on a limb. We had pushed the Germans into the deal and we should stand by it. As a great power we cannot back away from an agreement freely entered into. If the Arabs protested, we could note the large flow of Soviet arms to the area and that no-one publicized Soviet deals with the Arabs. We could also tell them that we would welcome resort to the Geneva Conference to explore ways and means of limiting the flow of armaments to the area. We should accordingly not invoke our cancellation right. On the problem of Jordan arms, the Secretary decided action would be delayed until he could acquaint the President with the proposal. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis/Tan. Drafted by Davies and approved in U on February 1. 2 Reference is to a statement on U.S. policy in the Near East made by President Kennedy at a press conference on May 8, 1963, in the course of which he declared that the United States supported the security of both Israel and its neighbors. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , p. 373) 127. Editorial Note 127. Editorial Note On January 26, 1965, the House of Representatives adopted by a vote of 204 to 177 an amendment to an appropriation bill, H.J. Res. 234, that would have denied any further sale of agricultural products to the United Arab Republic under Title I of Public Law 480 during fiscal year 1965. On January 27, Rusk met with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other interested Senators in executive session to discuss administration policy toward the United Arab Republic and to urge that the Senate drop the provision or give the President discretion in dealing with the last portion of the 3-year program of P.L. 480 assistance to the United Arab Republic established under a U.S.-UAR agreement of October 1962. ( Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series) , Volume XVII, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, 1965 (Washington, 1990), pages 239–268) For the text of the agreement signed October 8, 1962, see 13 UST 2166. On February 3, the Senate adopted by a vote of 44 to 38 a version giving the President the discretion Rusk had requested. At a news conference on February 4, President Johnson urged Congress to adopt the Senate version, declaring it “of the highest importance” that final legislation should have the flexibility it provided. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, page 132) In conference, the House accepted the Senate version. The bill as enacted forbade the export of agricultural commodities to the United Arab Republic under Title I in fiscal year 1965 unless such exports were necessary to carry out the 1962 agreement and the President determined that the financing of such exports was in the national interest. (Public Law 89–2, signed February 11, 1965; 79 Stat. 4) 128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, January 28, 1965, 11:43 a.m. 4384. For the Ambassador. When you see Nasser you may draw on the following as appropriate: 1. You know that the President wants to maintain good relations with the UAR, if the US is given the opportunity to do so. He sees that we share major interests in the independence and strengthening of the Near East states. He will continue to work for constructive relations with all Near Eastern states and for impartiality in our policy and actions in this area. The President respects the dignity of other nations and insists that US policy reflect this as well as the dignity of our own nation. 2. The President recognizes that differences have arisen between us, particularly on the Congo. He hopes to resolve these through joint effort and mutual restraint. He believes a positive effort on the part of both governments is necessary to prevent our differences from overriding our interests. But under our form of government he must take popular and Congressional sentiment into full account. The extent to which developments in the Near East and Africa have stirred popular concern is clearly demonstrated in the recent effort in the House of Representatives to limit the President’s authority over foreign aid. The President is determined to oppose this limitation. Clearly the actions of the UAR and the statements of its leaders can be major factors in determining the outcome of the Administration’s efforts with the Congress. 3. The Congo is the most immediate issue now facing us. The President deplores the widespread misunderstanding of US motives there. He thinks that while the UAR and US may disagree on Congo, it would far better serve both our interests to help work out a political settlement than to let this problem escalate to a major confrontation in Africa. The President would welcome further discussions with the UARG on how to resolve this thorny problem which has become a major obstacle to our bilateral relations. 4. If Nasser raises the question of future aid, you may say that in your discussions in Washington you found hope that US/UAR relations would improve to permit the continuation of our cooperation. The President thinks that American actions of the last four years show the USG’s keen interest in helping the UAR grow and prosper. He is sincere in his hope that we can resolve the differences which have arisen over the Congo and other matters and turn our attention to better understanding of each other’s problems and further consolidation of our relationship. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on January 26; cleared by the President, Macomber, and Talbot; and approved by Rusk. 129. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 129. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 1, 1965. SUBJECT Jordan Arms Request—Impact on Near East Policy THE ISSUES Pressures, applied through the Unified Arab Command (UAC), for an arms buildup in Jordan as part of a larger Arab effort to attain military parity with Israel pose potential threats to very important American interests. At issue are: 1) How to meet King Hussein’s arms requests, levied by the UAC, without abandoning our traditional policy of restraint on arms sales in the Near East, which has so far served us well by preventing a polarization of the Arab-Israel dispute along Cold War lines; and 2) How to obtain Israel’s acquiescence in the sale of U.S. arms to Jordan. The enclosed paper sets forth The Problem, as we see it, proposes A Strategy For The Years Ahead, discusses The Situation in some detail, describes The Stakes at issue, sets out pertinent Policy Considerations and makes Recommendations. George W. Ball 2 Enclosure The Problem During 1964 we have been trying to maintain an even keel in our Near East relations in the backwash of Arab reaction to Israel’s completion of its Jordan River diversion project. The Arabs have equated the diversion with the establishment of the State of Israel in Arab territory and Nasser has used their emotional reaction to forge a solidarity, the duration of which will be central to our problems in the area in the years ahead. How the West meets the force of Arab Nationalist solidarity can be a factor in whether it is consolidated or diffused. How the United States meets its challenges will in part determine whether the trend will be to a polarization that would identify us wholly with Israel and unite the Arabs in alliance with the Soviets and Chicoms against us. A Strategy for the Years Ahead We need to engage in a series of complex operations to reduce the threat to our major interests and avert the danger of polarization in the area by: (a) Using our diplomatic, political, economic and military power to maintain the best possible bilateral relations with all area states and to avoid a confrontation with “radical” Arab states so long as they avoid damaging our major interests. (b) Encouraging social, economic and political reform and affording an alternative to Soviet economic support and military supply using, where necessary, highly selective military sales, to prevent a Soviet monopoly on arms supply to the Arabs. (c) Persuading the Israelis that controlled Western sales to the Arabs, though painful for Israel to watch, will enhance the prospects of peace in the area. (d) Renewing endeavors in the United Nations and directly with the parties to the dispute over Palestine to develop a trend toward eventual acceptance of Israel as a Near Eastern state. Detailed recommendations appear below. The Situation (a) Having sensibly eschewed war as an immediate riposte to the Israeli water works, the Arab states have for the time being come together to sponsor and finance (1) Arab diversion works in Syria and prospectively in Lebanon and Jordan to deny to Israel much of the flow from the sources of the Jordan River; (2) a Unified Arab Command, ostensibly to protect Arab soil from Israeli aggression (preemptive or punitive attacks) against Arab water works; (3) the Palestine Liberation Organization, to stir up Palestine refugee pressure to return to old homesteads now in Israel; and (4) unified Arab diplomatic and economic pressures against Israel, including the boycott of foreign firms doing business with Israel. (b) The united Arab front against Israel has so far survived for 12 months and shows signs of continuing, because of fear of Israel and because currently high—and still growing—oil revenues permit relatively easy financing of Arab schemes mainly by such states as Kuwait (which sees such payments as a way of buying into the club of independent Arab states), Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Libya, etc. How long this pattern of united action will remain dominant is a central question. Already there are signs that the usual divisions may re-emerge. Kuwait and some others have given indications of tiring of the heavy assessments, and some inter-Arab disputes (as in the Yemen) have reintensified. (c) All our estimates continue to show Israel as maintaining its military superiority over the Arab states for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the arms race goes on. Israel is increasing its conventional weaponry, probably is getting French SSM’s, and may be exploring nuclears. The U.A.R. is obtaining more and better Soviet conventional equipment and is experimenting (not so far very successfully) with home-made missiles. Iraq and Syria are getting Soviet-made conventional arms. Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and particularly Jordan are requesting new U.S. weaponry, including supersonic fighters, to be paid for in the latter cases by UAC funds. (d) Israel’s security anxieties are increasing rapidly because of the threats inherent in a united Arab front, the growing military strength of Arab countries, Arab diversion works which in time could cut off important water supplies to Israel, and more activist postures by Syria and Jordan along Israel’s borders and by political organizers among the Arab refugees. Israel has grown increasingly firm and even provocative in border patrolling, and the number of military incidents along its borders is rising. Responsible Israelis do not now rule out the possibility of preemptive or punitive strike against Arab targets. (e) The Soviet Union, apparently envisaging new opportunities in the strongly anti-Israeli stance of all Arabs and anti-“imperialist” stance of some Arabs, and possibly goaded by Chicom rivalry, is stepping up its activities in the Arab world. In the past year the U.A.R. has obtained new military hardware and a new pledge of $280 million economic loans from the Soviet Union, promise of a $60 million loan from Communist China, and a $100 million loan from Kuwait. In contrast, the U.S. has offered no military assistance, made no economic development loan since 1963, maintained a small ($2.3 million) technical assistance program, and remained committed to the third and final year of a 1962 PL–480 agreement. (f) The U.A.R. is involved not only with other Arab states vis-a-vis Israel, but also directly in the Congo problem and certain other “liberation movement” situations. In most if not all of these, our objectives are in conflict. In other situations, however (e.g., the Chase Manhattan boycott, certain issues in the non-aligned conference, etc.), U.A.R. efforts have helped us against other radical states. (g) By cutting off PL–480 commodities from the U.A.R., the U.S. could hurt Nasser but probably not topple him (and, in any case, no visible prospective successor looks better). It would also set in train an Aswan-like reaction by Nasser leading to such punitive actions as cancellation of our MATs and commercial airline rights, inspection of vessels transiting the Suez for radioactive hazards, stepped-up pressure against the Wheelus base agreement, removal of UNEF from Egyptian soil with the consequent threat to the Israeli port of Eilath and of a direct Israeli-U.A.R. military confrontation, further stirring up of other Arab states against Israel, etc. (h) Many of our friends and most of our opponents would like to force the U.S. into actions that would tend to polarize the Near East. So would some Americans. The Stakes Our major interests in the Near East are: (a) The maintenance of peace, to preserve the freedom and integrity of Israel and the other states in the region. (cf: JFK statement 5/8/63) (b) Ready access to and transit through the area by air, sea or land. (c) Continued availability of oil and its economic movement to Europe. (d) Denial of any part of the area to Communist-state control. (e) Economic growth and political stabilization to increase the prospects of independence and stability. The defense of these major interests (particularly the first four) is our central concern. Policy Considerations I believe the following are pertinent: (a) Over the past years, none of our major interests have been damaged. We have dealt with lesser problems within the framework of our flexible bilateral relations with all states in the area. We must continue this. (b) We cannot permit any state to challenge a basic interest without opposing it vigorously. If we cannot with dignity avoid a confrontation with the U.A.R., it has the power in the area to attack our special positions and to mobilize most if not all other Arabs into an anti-Israel front, thus effecting polarization since the Soviets would exploit the opportunity to give all-out support to the Arabs against Israel, “the beachhead of western imperialism in the Arab East.” Saudi Arabia might be in a position to maintain useful relations with us, but Jordan probably would have to follow the Arab Nationalist line or the regime would succumb to internal and external pressures that could be mounted from Cairo. (c) Assuming, however, that we can maintain tolerable relations with Cairo, there is the possibility of continuing the strengthening of the regimes and capabilities of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. In addition, we could and should continue to compete with the Soviets in the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq by offering alternatives to full dependence on the Soviets. This would involve continued “Food for Peace” programs and a willingness, in the case of Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, to sell military equipment up to the minimum levels being insisted upon and financed by the UAC. (d) Although Israel may in fact understand that U.S. military deliveries to Arab states participating in the UAC buildup is the least disadvantageous of alternatives at hand, vigorous high-level efforts will be required to persuade Israel’s friends in this country that such a course (1) gives us a restraining hand on the amounts and types of equipment made available to these states; (2) prevents the introduction of Soviet equipment and Soviet or Syrian/Egyptian/Iraq trainers and technicians along the long frontier with Jordan; (3) loosens the “radical” Arabs’ otherwise total grip on the UAC, thus strengthening and speeding the prospects of a splintering of the support for the UAC. Continuing strong high-level efforts will be required to resist pressures for compensating U.S. sales to Israel which would polarize the Near East to both Israel’s and our disadvantage. Recommendations A. That we actively and aggressively seek to resolve policy differences with the U.A.R. while carrying forward on our present PL–480 commitments and holding out the carrot of a new agreement for a further period. Should we be able to arrive at an acceptable political compromise on the Congo, limited economic development lending would be considered. B. That we proceed to discussions of the Jordanian military shopping list along the general lines of a 5-year, $55 million ground equipment program and a major effort to persuade Hussain to purchase the supersonic aircraft he insists he needs from some Western European supplier—with the fallback that we will consider the sale and delivery of one squadron of U.S. planes as early as 1968 (after pilot training and construction of airfield for jets) as a last resort to prevent his taking MIGs. C. That we inform Israel of the move we intend to make and seek to abort its strong adverse reaction with the argumentation developed above. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that the covering memorandum was drafted by Killgore and the enclosure by Talbot and Davies on January 22. Attached to the copy is a January 22 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk forwarding the memorandum for his signature and a February 1 memorandum from Blaine Tueller of S/S-S to Rusk’s Staff Assistant Edward J. Streator stating that Ball had signed the memorandum and that Ball had talked to Rusk and had been to the White House to discuss the problem earlier that day. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 2 Ball signed for Rusk above Rusk’s typed signature. 130. Summary Notes of the 544th Meeting of the National Security Council 130. Summary Notes of the 544th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, February 1, 1965. Vietnam—Arms Sales to Jordan [Here follows a brief discussion of Vietnam.] Under Secretary Ball: Reviewed the problem of military assistance to Jordan. The Arab States are jointly trying to purchase arms abroad. Kuwait is funding the purchases. The United Arab Command has set force goals for Jordan. These include M–48 tanks and supersonic aircraft. Jordan, as a member of the Arab club, must purchase additional equipment somewhere—if not from us, then from the USSR. The supersonic jets Jordan wants to buy are not defensive weapons—therefore it is difficult for us to provide them. There is no good solution to this problem and there are disadvantages from every course of action. If we say no to the supersonics, Jordan will ask Soviet aid. If we say yes, Israel will demand supersonics. Thus, no matter what we do, we will be contributing to the arms race in the Middle East which we have been trying to damp down. If necessary and as a last resort, we will have to give the supersonics, but we should first try to get Jordan to buy them from a European supplier. The decision in the Jordan case is a major one involving all the Middle East. Acting Defense Secretary Vance: The Jordan request is indeed thorny. The Jordanians ask for M–48A3 tanks because the Israelis are getting them. They ask for F–104Gs, an up-to-date jet, rather than the F–104C or the F–104D which are antiquated planes. General Wheeler: The United Arab Command already has superjets. If we add 20 supersonic planes to the Jordan force, the Arab-Israeli balance will not be upset. Libya and Saudi Arabia already have supersonics. The addition of these planes to the Jordanian force is not of great importance. CIA Director McCone: Jordan will get supersonics either from us, from the Europeans or from the Soviets. The price of our not supplying them is too high to pay. McGeorge Bundy: Either way the request is dealt with will end up being disagreeable for us. We should avoid giving Jordan supersonics if possible because the resulting Israeli pressure on us will be very great. However, we must make some arms deal with Jordan and do so before they decide to go to the Russians. We could agree not to give them supersonics now but review the decision again if they insist. Assistant Secretary Talbot: Our reply to Jordanian King Hussein has already been delayed. I will be leaving Wednesday from Washington and be talking with Hussein in Amman on Saturday. McGeorge Bundy: We have already informed Israel of the Jordanian request and we will discuss with them the decision we reach. Secretary Dillon: We should not feel badly about an arms race in the Middle East because it is going on and we cannot control it. Acting Secretary Ball: Secretary Rusk shares all our concerns about this request but he believes we should play out the negotiations until it is certain there is no alternative and then decide to give the supersonics. Assistant Secretary Talbot should press as hard as possible for some other solution but at the end of the road, he should refer back to Washington and at that time we would decide to go ahead. If we agreed to give the supersonics, deliveries could be scheduled for 1968–1970. The planes would thus be under our control for a period. The Jordanians would be dependent on us for replacements and spares. If the Jordanians do go to the Soviets and obtain supersonics, then the Israelis will be surrounded by countries having Soviet-supplied aircraft. The addition of a Soviet presence in Jordan would be serious, especially during difficulties which may arise from the diversion by Jordan of water flowing to Israel. Acting Secretary Vance: Secretary McNamara’s view is that we should provide A–3 planes, 20 supersonics—104C and 104D—if the Jordanians cannot buy their planes in Western Europe. The President: There is no problem in providing Jordan with the tanks they request. They should be told to buy their supersonic planes in Europe. If they do not wish to do so, then Mr. Talbot should cable us to this effect and await our reply. He should stay in Amman if it appears that the King is about to break off negotiations with us. Acting Secretary Ball: The King can’t resist the domestic pressure he is getting. There have been attempts on his life. Recently he moved toward closer relations with the Arab states in order to gain personal security and security for his country. He could not break with Nasser even if he wanted to. If he does not break with us, how can he get the armaments the other Arab states are demanding he obtain? Mr. Feldman: Jordan gets budgetary support of $46,000,000 annually from the United States. The purchase of arms by Jordan is considered a grant in aid by some people. This is not so but many will see our sale of arms to Jordan as giving a belligerent neighbor arms to attack Israel. Every effort should be made to persuade Jordan to buy planes from France. We should also put pressure on Nasser to stop pushing King Hussein so hard. We should threaten to withdraw our budgetary support of Jordan. This would have the effect of raising the cost of the planes to Jordan. No decision should be made until we have carried out these proposed actions. Robert Komer: We should try out the hard line on Hussein, not mentioning the supersonic planes in the beginning. Then if he insists, we should fall back and regroup, thus giving us more time before a final decision has to be made. King Hussein is not going to jump the reservation at once. In trying to save Hussein we may kill him. If we sell the planes to Hussein, then we will have to provide them to Israel. If this happens, Nasser could say that Hussein was a bad Arab. We should take this in two bites and only sell the planes if the Soviets make a firm offer to do so. McGeorge Bundy: If we warn Hussein that U.S. budgetary support may be in doubt if he makes a deal with the Russians, the King would not be in a great hurry to make a Soviet deal. Acting Secretary Ball: It is not necessary to reach a final decision tonight. When Assistant Secretary Talbot reports back on his talk with King Hussein, we will know much more and can then decide what to do. General Wheeler: It is not likely that France would sell Mirages to the Jordanians. McGeorge Bundy: We could try to overcome French opposition to a sale to Jordan. Vice President Humphrey: In the light of developments in the Congo and in Egypt, if Jordan breaks with us, there may be a very serious reaction on the Hill. The AID bill would be seriously affected. King Hussein is on the U.S. dole. If we sell him supersonic planes, we will have all hell to pay. The sale of modern tanks we could possibly get away with but the sale of supersonics would create an impossible situation. The President: We all agree that Jordan will get the planes from the Russians if they do not get them from us. USIA Director Rowan: Either way we move we face serious difficulties. In a showdown and as a last resort, we will have to go ahead with the sale of supersonics. The President: Mr. Talbot, before the MIGs arrive in Jordan, please call us. (A State Department paper discussing the Jordan arms request is attached.) 2 Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council Meetings File, Vol. 3, Tab 26. Top Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 6:27 to 7:30 p.m., and a total of 24 people were present. (Ibid.) A memorandum for the record by McCone is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 February–30 April 1965. 2 Document 129 . 131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 1, 1965, 9:02 p.m. 672. For the Ambassador. Subject to final review by the President, Talbot scheduled discuss our decisions on Jordan’s arms request in Amman end of January or early February. When you are notified of President’s approval, you should at earliest opportunity inform Prime Minister Eshkol of the decision 2 drawing on following presentation: As Prime Minister aware, USG over past six months has been pondering painful dilemmas posed by Jordan’s request to buy arms, using funds made available by Unified Arab Command. Jordan has resisted heavy pressure from the UAC to acquire Soviet equipment, against arguments stressing merits of standardization military equipment among Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, by assessing that it can and prefers to depend on Western sources of supply. Jordan has also refused agree to positioning of non-Jordanian UAC forces in Jordan except in time of war. If we refuse now to supply arms, particularly armor and aircraft, almost inevitably Jordan will acquire Soviet equipment with UAR military trainers with all the dangers that entails. Our assessment is that even if US-Jordan relations are put on the line to prevent arms acquisition, Hussein will feel he has no alternative but to accept UAC decision to modernize and expand his forces. Aside from his “image” in Arab World which would be impaired if he abandoned Arab ranks for Western subsidies, his own armed forces would not accept such an outcome. We believe that although Hussein recognizes that acceptance of the Soviet/UAR alternative could be beginning of end for his regime, he would do it rather than take immediate consequences of isolation from rest of Arab world. We have reached conclusion that some positive response to Jordan’s request is necessary to avoid disastrous confrontation with UAC which would be strengthened, not weakened, by our refusal sell equipment to Jordan. Prime Minister will realize that UAC objective of improving Arab military posture relative to Israel makes our dilemma especially painful. However, positive USG response less disadvantageous than other possible alternatives. Our strategy seeks to hold Jordan’s arms purchases to minimum necessary enable Hussein withstand UAC pressures, and to space deliveries so that there will be no unacceptable rapid arms build-up in Jordan. By avoiding confrontation with UAC, time may well permit divisive Arab forces to effect the weakening or destruction of UAC and policy of diverting sorely needed resources to arms. Jordan has requested USG sell GOJ approximately $90 million equipment including modern tanks and supersonic aircraft. Planned use ground equipment includes modernization JAA and creation five new brigades. Latter will be manned by approximately 8500 men in existing National Guard and 6000 to 7000 new recruits. On air side, King seeks to purchase one 20 plane squadron of F–104G fighters. After months of exhaustive study, we have decided inform King Hussein in next few days of our willingness sell for cash ground equipment to be delivered over calendar years 1965–1969 inclusive which prices out at about $50 million. We are prepared extend credit not to exceed $7 million at any time. We will seek to hold tanks to M–48s on grounds of cost and to phase deliveries through period. On supersonics we will seek to dissuade Hussein from acquisition any supersonics this juncture, but frankly we not likely succeed. We will inform Hussein that if he convinced no alternative to acquisition, we unwilling sell American aircraft and could not countenance Soviet MIG 21s. We will urge Jordan purchase supersonics in West Europe. Supersonic squadron cannot be operational until 1968 to 1969 at earliest. In reaching our decisions, we have had ever in mind requirements of Israeli security. Planned Arab buildup will not threaten existing Israeli over-all military superiority over Arabs for foreseeable future. We are confident Israel will agree USG decision is least unattractive alternative from viewpoint both American and Israeli interests. You should inform Eshkol we distressed that, contrary to Israel’s assurances about ability maintain secrecy M–48A3 tank transaction 2–3 years, entire transaction known to Arabs and to large segments general public. He will appreciate under circumstances and in order mitigate political repercussions in Arab world, we compelled either 1) invoke security clause to cancel conversion kit procurement agreement or 2) respond favorably to Jordanian request for similar tanks. We are disturbed at continued press campaign about alleged role Cubic Corporation in UAR rocket program and hiring of German technicians from Litton subsidiaries. Given the Secretary’s assurances that allegations about Cubic clearly distortion, we cannot escape conclusion continuing press campaign has tacit approval GOI and stimulated by Israeli leaks. We hope Israel can take effective steps end further sterile and misleading publicity. 3 In this connection, you should apprise Eshkol questions raised by Israel and press have stimulated interest in problem export sophisticated technological equipment and know-how abroad. View large amount electronic equipment and related information going to Near East, we fear such exports encouragement to escalation arms race. We looking into ways control flow. Of course, as Secretary noted in letter to Mrs. Meir, any controls necessarily applied regionally despite possible hardship to American business. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Davies and Killgore on January 25; cleared by Meyers, Bunte, Solbert, and Talbot; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Amman, London, and Bonn. 2 Telegram 675 to Tel Aviv, February 2, informed the Embassy of the President’s approval and authorized discussion with Eshkol. (Ibid.) Telegram 682 to Tel Aviv, February 3, authorized Barbour to discuss it with Foreign Minister Meir, omitting the reference to the M–48 tank transaction with Israel in the third to the last paragraph of telegram 672. (Ibid.) Telegram 919 from Tel Aviv, February 4, reported that Barbour presented U.S. views on Jordan arms to the Foreign Minister that morning. (Ibid.) Telegram 920 from Tel Aviv, February 4, and telegrams 921 and 922, both February 5, reported that Meir expressed unhappiness at the prospect of U.S. provision of tanks to Jordan. (Ibid.) 3 Foreign Minister Meir alleged in a letter to Secretary Rusk, not found, that the Cubic Corporation was involved in the supply of a missile telemetry system to the UAR. Telegram 490 to Tel Aviv, December 12, 1964, summarizes the letter and states that Gazit had been informed that the charges were unfounded. (Ibid., SCI 11 UAR) Rusk replied in a January 18 letter to Meir, not found. Telegram 627 to Tel Aviv, January 22, 1965, recounts a meeting between Jernegan and Harman in which Jernegan commented on Rusk’s letter and provided additional information on the subject. (Ibid.) Barbour reported in telegram 926 from Tel Aviv, February 5, that in a February 4 meeting with Meir, he stressed U.S. concern about “public campaigning” on this subject, and Meir referred to the Secretary’s “unsatisfactory” letter of January 18. (Ibid.) 132. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 132. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, February 1, 1965, 4 p.m. 2671. Department pass as necessary. I have just returned from approximately one hour meeting President Nasser. I thanked him warmly for receiving me on the night before the major holiday of the year and told him that I was grateful for an opportunity to have a talk since I had recently returned from Washington. I made small talk about the inauguration, snow, et cetera, mentioned that I had talked with a great many people both in the Executive Branch and the Congress including Secretary Rusk. I stated my principal meeting with President Johnson had unfortunately not developed due to his illness although it had been carefully scheduled for my last day in Washington. I stated that I had since received instructions and wanted to make several comments based on my talks and the instruction I had received from Washington. I then spoke as follows: Our President and indeed everyone I talked with are very hopeful of maintaining good relations with the United Arab Republic if possible. We have a deep interest in a strong, independent, and prosperous Egypt. We also share major interests in the independence and strengthening of the Near Eastern States. We will continue to work for constructive relations with all these States and for impartiality in our policy and actions in the Middle Eastern area. The President respects the dignity of other nations and insists that US policy reflect this as well as the dignity of our own country. At this point the President interrupted me and referred to the December 23 speech in a slightly embarrassed manner. He seemed to want to remove the speech from our relationship but without admission of error. He stated nothing personal was intended and that the report of the Stino conversation that he had received had indicated aid was conditioned on Egyptian manners and behavior. I said nothing of this sort was intended. I suggested we put the several incidents of the past behind us and look to the future hopefully. He stated we would do this but we must deal with the incident. He then spoke not about the speech but about aid, expressing gratitude for it and the hope that it would continue but with the expressed requirement that the UAR be independent in its actions. I then continued stating as follows: The President recognizes that differences have arisen between us particularly in the Congo. He hopes to resolve these differences by joint effort and mutual restraint. He believes that a positive effort on the part of both governments is necessary to prevent our differences from overriding our interests. The Congo is the most immediate issue now facing us. The President deplores the widespread misunderstanding of US motives there. He thinks that while the UAR and the US may disagree it would far better serve both our interests to help work out a political settlement than to let this problem escalate to a major confrontation in Africa. The President would welcome further discussions with the UAR on how to resolve this problem which has become a major obstacle in our bilateral relations. If Nasser agrees we would welcome any suggestions as to the form and place of any further talks. President Nasser nodded but made no comment. I continued, stating that under our form of government popular and Congressional sentiment must be taken into account. The extent to which developments in Africa and the Near East have stirred popular concern is clearly demonstrated in the recent effort in the House of Representatives to limit the President’s authority on foreign aid. The President is determined to oppose this limitation. I then stated I would like to be sure that President Nasser understood the situation within the Congress on this matter. I explained the nature of the amendment within the House. The fact that House action was not a final decision and that even as we spoke Mr. Ball was testifying in an effort to remove the limitation placed by the House. I stressed the delicacy of the situation and expressed the hope that the administration would succeed in its effort. At this point the President returned to a reference at the December 23 speech. He said he had feared for some time there would be a cutoff of aid and that his speech was really the consequence of a cumulative effect of many concerns and statements. He threw up his hands and said “those speeches every year by your Congress and your press”. I said we had had some of the same problem here with respect to the press in the UAR. He said, “it is much better now than it was five or six years ago but you may not believe it”. I said I had few complaints recently but that we had had difficulty during the first weeks of my stay here. He then said “and I read all these articles by the correspondents.” He referred to a Hedrick Smith article (although not mentioning him by name) which stated that “Nasser himself had called off the press in an effort to prevent interference with Congressional action at this sensitive time.” He said “this just isn’t true”. I then suggested that we talk for a moment about our major problem the Congo. Nasser said he had suggested to Gbenye that his Foreign Minister get in touch with the US, UK, and French Embassies in Cairo and meet with them. I said, “to what purpose?” He replied, “I believe that if you talk with him some of your concerns will be removed.” I stated that our policy was to support the Central Government of the Congo in accordance with the policy we had consistently followed and in accordance with various resolutions of the United Nations. He made no comment. I said I thought it important that we remove this problem from the military arena and seek a political solution. I pointed out that there were several steps coming up that gave flexibility to the situation—the Congo elections, the sub-committee’s travels, the Foreign Ministers meeting, etc., and hoped that there would be a new initiative which would offer hope. He made no comment. I asked him point blank whether he could see hope for an OAU initiative in the context of the present and forthcoming situation. He said, “if you could remove Tshombe it would help.” I referred to our last conversation and stated that we had not put Tshombe in; we could not take him out; and that we support the legitimate Government of the Congo where the problems are larger than any one personality. He then said we could tell Kasavubu to get rid of Tshombe. I said “we do not control the Central Government of the Congo any more than you control the rebels. It is a legitimate government and we must respect its status.” He said that someone other than Tshombe should be elected. I said this is up to the Congolese. They must decide. He waved his hands as though this could be taken care of with little difficulty. There was then a pause after which I asked him if I might ask him the significance of the closing of the GDRC Embassy which I had noted in the press and which had followed Gbenye’s press conference stating that the UAR gave him full support. He said that the answer is that he did not know it was still here. “I thought it was closed at the same time our Embassy was closed in Leopoldville and it was not until Gbenye mentioned that I was aware it still existed here.” We both laughed very heartily at this point and he said, “the analysts will have a good time with that one.” He stated that if Tshombe could be removed it would make it easier for UAR and others aiding the rebels to withdraw support. President Nasser alluded in a vague way to a Spaak-Gbenye meeting about two months ago in which Spaak had suggested some form of coalition government which Gbenye had rejected. He also referred to a meeting between Gbenye’s Foreign Minister Kanza and Attwood and to a proposal made by our Ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam. He made no comment on these proposals but referred to them as among the many things that had been suggested. I returned to the Congo and stated again that we were flexible as long as the legitimate Congo Government was respected and we hoped for a political solution in an OAU context and I hoped he had the same flexibility and would assist us in achieving some solution to the problem. He nodded but was most noncommittal. I expressed the hope for further talks either with members of the government or between the two of us. He nodded to both suggestions and made no specific response. The meeting ended most warmly. President Nasser stated he hoped I was enjoying Cairo. I stated I had been fairly busy and laughed. He also laughed and said he hoped things would quiet down for us. End of conversation. Comments: At no time did he directly mention aid except as noted. It is interesting that Nasser told the British Ambassador yesterday that the OAU had “failed.” He never got to this point with me although I led him into a discussion of the OAU several times. He seemed to want to dodge direct discussion of OAU activities and, when I mentioned the subcommittee visit to Leopoldville, Brazzaville and Burundi, he appeared to have no knowledge of the trip. I had the impression that Nasser has no sense of direction re Congo. He may be open to concrete suggestion provided there is a clear face saver for him, but he does not see his way out at this point. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. A copy was sent to the President with a February 3 note from Bromley Smith stating that it was sent at Feldman’s request. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UAR, Vol. III) 133. Editorial Note 133. Editorial Note Acting Secretary of State Ball called the President at 8:20 p.m. on February 3, 1965, to tell him that the Senate had voted 44 to 38 to give the President the discretion Rusk had requested for P.L. 480 sales to the United Arab Republic. (See Document 127 .) According to notes of the conversation prepared in Ball’s office, after some discussion of the vote in the Senate, the President told Ball “not to let Talbot go and make any deal.” He stressed that Talbot should not make any agreement, declaring, “This is a very explosive thing. We can never get anything in the Congress again unless we are careful. That foreign aid of forty to fifty million every year that runs to half a billion total, the King should think twice about.” He told Ball to be sure to tell Talbot to hold the line. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Jordan) At 5:05 p.m. on February 4, Ball talked on the telephone to Myer Feldman, who said he had discussed Jordanian arms with the President the day before and was left with the impression the President’s instructions at the NSC meeting had been modified so that Talbot was not authorized to make any agreement. Ball told Feldman that Talbot had authorization to make an offer on ground material including some tanks. Feldman said his understanding was that the President was concerned about even that and asked that when Ball saw the President he should tell him Feldman was writing a memorandum suggesting that Talbot should simply explore the situation and report back. Ball replied that he would tell the President about Feldman’s feelings and that a meeting in the morning might be in order. (Ibid.) 134. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 134. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, February 5, 1965, 5 p.m. 776. From Talbot. Reference Deptels 793 and 795. 2 In view indications in reftels that my instructions for talks with King Hussein may be under fresh review, I have focussed on Jordan arms question in morning discussion here today with Ambassadors Barbour, Barnes, Battle, Cottam, Hart, Knight, Meyer and Strong. Solbert and Bunte also present. Views expressed by all Ambassadors reflected sober concern that protection and promotion of U.S. interests in Near East becoming increasingly difficult as Arab-Israel conflict moves toward what some of them believe could be early climactic stage. All agreed that Jordan arms question can be approached effectively only in context of current Arab drive for unified political and military actions, symptoms of which are tensions over diversions of Jordan waters, Palestine refugee emotions, incidents on Israeli borders with Syria and Jordan, publicity on German-Israeli arms arrangements, etc. Each Ambassador present expressed belief our interests in Near East best served by proceeding with Jordan arms offer. Differences centered on such questions as speed with which transaction should be concluded, inclusion of U.S. supersonics in offer, and open sales policy to Israel and other countries in region. Hart, Strong, and Battle urged we should play for time in hope other and more moderating influences could be brought to bear on situation. Meyer also felt this a possible course. Hart argued arms race will continue whether or not we block entry of Soviet arms into Jordan and we might as well stay in the picture because when Arabs and Israelis fight, we will in any case have to move in to stop them. He thought if we sold F–5s to Saudi Arabia, this would encourage Jordan to look at F–5s instead of F–104s and thus slightly reduce sensitivity of supersonic issue. Barnes agreed. Strong was persuaded we could not look with equanimity on early clash between Arabs and Israelis. Impossible to see consequences of such a clash, he pointed out; our remaining friends in Arab world might well be undermined or destroyed in process. He urged that as monarchs are strong force for moderation, we should keep trying to bolster them. He saw other key in area as Nasser and UAR with whom he saw no alternative in interests of peace to trying to get back into a better relationship. If rapprochement with Nasser should fail, he felt, Near East bound to go into more difficult crises. If Nasser is interested in moving toward rapprochement with U.S. he may not wish press for early conclusion on supersonics for Jordan. Strong concluded we should play out our hand with Hussein by being forthcoming on ground equipment but difficult on question of supersonic aircraft. He would not like to see U.S. aircraft involved in deal because that would open up U.S. arsenals to Israelis who now have twice used air attacks against Arabs and may see air action as most economical and useful military instrument in future. Ambassador Battle, agreeing we should offer arms to Jordan to block Arab standardization on Soviet equipment, urged that we try to delay Hussein trip to Cairo, now tentatively scheduled for next week, until he was persuaded to make careful investigation of Western European sources of supersonic aircraft. Without much optimism, Battle hoped we could avoid a crunch with Jordan until several of our political Congressional difficulties with the UAR have become more manageable. In the end he would offer U.S. aircraft to Hussein to preempt Soviet-UAR entry there. Ambassador Meyer suggested that in view of difficulties of maintaining arms sales restraint in face of easy accessibility to other arms sources by both sides, we should permit military sales to any purchaser. He has found the Arabs talking much as they did in the 1950’s and has seen emotions and unrealism building up to dangerous levels. Therefore he questioned whether we need exhaust ourselves in efforts to postpone a confrontation. Perhaps an early bloodletting would not be too bad an alternative, especially as a clash several years hence could easily involve larger forces and more sophisticated equipment. In any case conflict now hopefully limited could precipitate on intervention to deal with root problem of Jordan waters which has taken Palestine issue out of icebox. To him the alternative would be to continue playing for time, mainly in the hope that Arab unity would break up once again. Ambassador Barbour agreed that the policy of general arms restraint makes little sense now because of relatively easy availability of arms elsewhere and breaches already made. He also doubted that “even-handedness” can be considered a viable policy, in part because we never had been as close to Arab states as to Israel and in part because he felt chances of maintaining peace might be improved by making certain all parties knew U.S. would not permit Arab attacks on Israel. On assumption Arabs would depend on Soviet backing in any military adventure, he believed Arab aggression would collapse if, as seemed most likely, Soviets should demonstrate they would not face confrontation with U.S. in Near East. As a tactic to meet the immediate situation, he would provide U.S. arms including supersonics as a fallback to Jordan on the basis of also making open arms sales including aircraft to Israel. Barbour also was inclined to believe that Foreign Minister Meir’s reaction to the Jordan arms proposal, although firm and serious, reflected less concern over this aspect than she had shown about Syrian and Lebanese programs to divert the headwaters of the Jordan. However, in view Harman’s immediate approach to USG it appears GOI position has hardened following subsequent talks with Eshkol. Ambassador Cottam believed that offering arms including supersonics to Jordan at present time represented an essential step up protection of our interests in Near East, but to make our relations with Arab states satisfactory we would need to go beyond this. We should find better ways to take account of and adjust to modernization and doctrines of liberation, unity, and socialism, fueled by anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism. Ambassadors Knight and Barnes questioned whether we still have latitude in area necessary to pursue tactics suggested by some of their colleagues. Ambassador Knight felt with passage of time we had lost several options open to us two or three years ago and our major failure in these years of relative quiet had been our inability to persuade Israel to give up its hard line “fortress Israel” concept and to seek accommodation with the eastern Arabs. He estimated that we have now moved so far to final confrontation between the Arabs and Israelis that “even-handedness” policies are probably no longer useful. He thought we might better restrain the forces leading toward an explosion by a policy of open military sales to all parties and of making fully clear where U.S. stands in case of conflict. While unfortunate, he thought we should deal with situation as it is shaping up and not as we would have preferred it. On Jordan, he felt strongly that we should go the whole way to save Hussein from going the Soviet arms route and to keep on our side only truly friendly state in area that adjoins Israel. In his opinion, we should bend over backwards to meet the problems caused by the provision of supersonic aircraft to Jordan because he is convinced our offer will get nowhere without supersonics. Ambassador Barnes expressed view that U.S. arms package as currently constituted could not meet King Hussein’s needs. On question of likelihood of Hussein and UAC accepting Western European supersonics for Jordan, Barnes believes Hussein not favorably inclined toward Mirages. Barnes further believes Western European supersonics will not in eyes of UAC match MIGs or F–104s both in terms of performance and his present understanding of French financial terms. There are some rumors in Beirut of a possible Saudi-Lebanese-Jordanian joint purchase of Mirages on very favorable terms. Barnes feels this would cause Hussein to look somewhat more favorably on Western European aircraft. Hart believes it would reduce USG influence in Saudi Arabia. Barnes reported that Hussein is scheduled to go to Cairo next week, probably about February 10, for talks with Nasser and the UAC. Barnes estimated that without promise of U.S. supersonics Hussein cannot sell the U.S. package in Cairo, and will not resist anticipated UAC decision that he should therefore accept the proffered MIGs. Difficulty arises over fact Hussein considers he committed himself last September to accept MIGs if he could not get U.S. supersonics. In the judgment of Barnes, should Hussein try to resist a UAC decision that he take MIGs, he could probably not stand 48 hours against a new UAR-UAC campaign labeling him still a tool of imperialism who was blocking Arab plans. Ambassador Hart asked that it not be construed that the U.S. has lost all its important assets in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, for example, has not been deeply inoculated with anti-Westernism. While ready to pay for Arab rearmament against Israel, Faisal is much more concerned over the intrusion into the peninsula of Soviet influence, Arab socialism, and the Egyptian military presence. He will himself avoid Soviet weaponry. An additional reason to play for time lies in Faisal’s future utility as a moderating influence. The above comments which reflect the diversity of views of our Ambassadors were made after I had laid out in detail our recent agonizing policy appraisals in Washington. I had described our efforts to balance the risks of Soviet-UAR military presence in Jordan against those of arms oscillation fueled by American sales to Israel as well as to several Arab countries, and had discussed the possible consequences of polarization between Soviet-Arab forces on one side and Israel and the U.S. on the other. I had also pointed out as clearly as possible the overlapping foreign policy and domestic political concerns which had been taken into account in the President’s instructions to me. Comment follows. 3 Meyer 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Telegram 793 to Beirut, February 4, stated that unforeseen developments might require Talbot to postpone his departure for Amman. (Ibid., ORG 7 NEA) Talbot was in Beirut attending the Chiefs of Mission Conference. Telegram 795 to Beirut, February 4, informed Talbot that Harman had requested a meeting with Ball the next morning to deliver a message from Eshkol to Johnson and conveyed a summary of Eshkol’s message as given to Jernegan on the telephone by Harman. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 3 Talbot commented in telegram 777 of February 5 that the assembled Ambassadors all felt Hussein was “on extremely difficult spot with other Arabs” and might well capitulate to the United Arab Command after hearing that the United States was unwilling to furnish U.S. supersonic planes. (Ibid.) 135. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 135. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, February 5, 1965, 7 p.m. GWB called to report that we had had a long meeting this afternoon with the President and are meeting again tomorrow. 2 The President has a natural reluctance but he is now fully appreciating the considerations involved. What GWB has recommended, with the support of his colleagues, is that Phil (Talbot) be authorized to offer the ground package which is the ground equipment, including only the basic M 48, A 1 tank which has the limited armament and the gasoline engine with the limited range. On supersonics he should encourage them to go to Western Europe. If this doesn’t wash he can come on back. This starts us down the road. It seems to us that there is a serious danger the King may go on to Cairo on the 10th and be persuaded to decide he is going down the other road with the other people. This is about as good a plan as we have to hold the line and see what develops. The general feeling is that this will not satisfy him and this deal will not be made on this basis and there will have to be further haggling. We have started talking with his neighbors who are very upset. GWB sure that part of their own rather vociferous anxiety is the desire to build up a case for some large demands on their part. It is an unattractive situation no matter how you slice it. GWB wanted to make sure the Secretary was in general accord with this line. The Secretary thought that was right. He didn’t think that by going as far as some of the papers indicated we ought to go to avoid the problems that we will be trying to avoid that it would cure the problem. On both sides of an arms race we will be building up the United Arab Command which is aimed at Israel. GWB said we had come to the kind of conclusion to offer something not acceptable in order to have an opportunity to talk further and see what comes out. If we offer nothing we can be certain we have sent him down the other road. Talk of losing the buffer state. Jernegan interrupted to mention the comparison with the UAR in 1955 when we refused a relatively modest request for arms and within two months he (Nasser) had turned around and accepted a much larger Russian offer and has had a close relationship with the Russians ever since. GWB mentioned the neighbors coming (Israelis) and saying don’t offer anything. Then the boss comes up to the realization they are pretty smart people but realizes they have their own domestic political problems. Secretary mentioned they were not very objective on the PL 480 business—at least not as objective as we thought they would be. General discussion of the weather and the state of the Secretary’s health. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Jordan. No classification marking. Prepared by Helen Hennessey in Ball’s office. 2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, he met with Ball, General Wheeler, Under Secretary Vance, Komer, and Feldman from 3:35 to 5:05 p.m. on February 5, and with Ball, Wheeler, Vance, Jack Valenti, Bill Moyers, and Komer about Jordan from 3:50 to 5:28 p.m. on February 6. (Ibid.) 136. Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 136. Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 5, 1965. SUBJECT Dimona Inspection and Need to Implement Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation in the Near East A United States inspection team visited the Dimona reactor site January 30, 1965. Although the ten hours spent at the site did not permit as detailed a visit as desirable, the team believes there was sufficient time to determine the status of activity at Dimona. Major findings (see enclosure) 2 included: 1. The future direction of atomic energy development in Israel appears uncertain because anticipated acquisition of a nuclear power and desalting plant has increased Israeli interest in slightly enriched uranium fueled reactors from abroad and reduced interest in developing natural uranium fueled reactors in Israel. 2. While nothing suggests an early weapons development program, the Dimona site has excellent development and production capability that warrants continued surveillance at intervals not to exceed one year. The team findings indicate that we can afford to accede to Prime Minister Eshkol’s request that we postpone the next agreed six-monthly inspection until after the parliamentary elections in November this year. We remain concerned that Israel may have succeeded in concealing a decision to develop nuclear weapons. The team findings must be weighed against the following facts: 1. Israel concealed the existence of the Dimona reactor from us for about two years. 2. Israeli officials did not allow adequate time for thorough inspection of the Dimona site and arranged no visits to sites of projected related facilities. 3. Israeli officials ruled questions about procurement of uranium from abroad “outside the scope of the visit” and suggested taking them up through normal diplomatic channels. 4. Israel is acquiring missiles from France designed to accommodate either high-explosive or nuclear warheads. 5. Public and private statements by Israeli officials suggest military planning that includes the use of nuclear weapons. Given these circumstances, we urge prompt approval of the request of the Acting Secretary to the President December 18, 1964, 3 for authority to initiate negotiations with Israel to extend IAEA safeguards to all Israeli nuclear facilities. 4 Ben H. Read 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Filed with a brief covering memorandum from Komer to Bundy noting that the inspection was reassuring but that “we remain suspicious.” The memorandum bears no indication of the drafter, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Russell and cleared by Jernegan, Davies, Charles W. Thomas, and Scott George, Director for Atomic Energy and Aero-Space in G/PM. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) 2 The enclosure, entitled “Preliminary Draft Report on Dimona Inspection Team,” unsigned and undated, is not printed. 3 Not found. 4 A marginal note in Komer’s handwriting next to this paragraph reads, “Not now, till we get Jordan arms sorted out.” 137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 6, 1965, 7:58 p.m. 701. Following is text of uncleared memcon. 2 FYI and Noforn. Ambassador Harman delivered to Under Secretary February 5 message from Prime Minister Eshkol 3 along lines predicted Tel Aviv’s tel 927. 4 Message urged President prevent provision military equipment to Jordan and use utmost influence persuade King Hussein abstain from creation new and aggressive Army. Stressed following points: (1) Increase in size Jordan Army from 7 to 12 brigades would transform it from defensive to offensive Army under aggressive directives of UAC. (2) Under circumstances impossible for King Hussein not embark on aggressive policy. (3) Supply of tanks and other material to Jordan would place large aggressive force only few kilometers from Tel Aviv. Israel would lose capacity defense in depth. Result would be fundamental change in balance strength unacceptable to Israel. Psychological blow to Israeli people no less significant than military blow. (4) GOI must and will do everything in its power to oppose development tension in Near East to all-time peak. (5) Arab countries openly preparing steal water to which Israel entitled and maintaining UAC for aggressive purpose and blackmail Western countries. Ambassador Harman supplemented message with oral presentation stressing: (1) Communication on US intentions supply arms to Jordan transmitted by Ambassador Barbour took GOI by surprise. Matter of gravest concern to Israel and Ambassador had been assured US officials would keep in touch as matter developed. (2) Urged initiation intimate and detailed consultation on highest level. Such consultation had not yet taken place, but vital to security Israel. (3) Supply US materiel to Jordan would change character Jordan Army from defense to offense. Whole basis GOI defensive planning based upon assumption Jordan Army defensive with role guard frontier until reinforcements from other countries arrived, i.e., permitting five day lag. With new offensive Jordan Army on frontier Israel defense concept invalid. (4) Increase in size Jordan Army with incorporation National Guard largely made up of Palestinians would result in Palestinianizing Jordan Army. Such development particularly dangerous view growing importance and effectiveness PLO. (5) US proposal constituted recognition UAC since Jordanian request for arms generated by it. UAC established to enable Arab diversion Jordan waters with resultant destruction years of Israeli planning. (6) Only economic development could assure survival Jordan. Enlarged Army would constitute severe economic drain that would threaten Jordan’s viability and independence. (7) Impact on public opinion in Israel would be severe. (8) Prime Minister requested (a) US not respond to Jordanian request for arms and (b) seek dissuade King Hussein from following suicidal path. Under Secretary said US aware Israel’s concern about any arms accretion in neighboring countries. We faced serious dilemma in Near East. Heart of matter is whether better for Israel’s security and peace of area for some arms to be given to Jordan on controlled basis by friend of Israel or on uncontrolled basis by Soviet Union. We remain interested in damping arms spiral but face problem maintaining control over Jordan. We presumed Israel regarded prospect of uncontrolled arming of Jordan by Soviets more ominous than situation we contemplated. We agreed necessary make Hussein understand stakes. Decision on Jordan arms of utmost importance to US and Israel. We would take careful account of Prime Minister’s message. US never understood we would consult Israel on Jordan arms decision but would undertake inform Israel before action taken. Decision had been made but no action yet taken. Under Secretary noted in all honesty action might be taken within next few hours. Ambassador Harman said he was much disturbed that action might be taken in a matter of hours since he had been assured US officials would be in touch with him on this matter. He said he felt considerable trepidation in taking his leave and appeared obviously dejected. End FYI. You should make following points to appropriate GOI officials. (1) Prime Minister’s message ignores fundamental problem facing us, i.e., question not whether Jordan gets arms but who supplies them and in what quantity. (2) Message grossly overstates magnitude threat to Israel of modernization Jordan Army. Entire projected sale includes electronic gear and ground equipment including M48 tanks at rate 25 per year for four years beginning 1966. (3) We not meeting Jordan’s full request for arms and proposed offer may not suffice to relieve UAC pressure on King to build up his military forces. (4) We look to GOI for suggestions on how to ease growing tensions in area. We see no advantage in premature reaction to plans such as Arab water diversion, extent of which unclear and which far from fruition. Counter-pressure at this time only encourages and speeds buildup we hope avoid. While we appreciate Israeli concern about growing Arab military strength GOI should remember US determination oppose aggression from whatever quarter. In last analysis Western power is and will be prime deterrent to hostilities. 5 Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Amman for Talbot. 2 Not found. 3 Eshkol’s message to Johnson was conveyed in a note of February 5 from Harman to Rusk. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel—Presidential Correspondence) 4 Dated February 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 5 Telegram 702 to Tel Aviv, February 6, instructed Barbour to inform Eshkol that an NSC meeting had been scheduled for February 8 to consider the matter raised in his message. After the meeting, a representative of the President would come to impart the President’s reply and explain the U.S. position. The visit of the emissary was to be kept strictly secret. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Barbour replied in telegram 938 from Tel Aviv, February 7, that he passed the message in telegram 702 to Eshkol via Bitan, stressing the need for secrecy. (Ibid.) Telegram 703 to Tel Aviv, February 6, instructed Barbour to take no action on the last paragraph of telegram 701. (Ibid.) Telegram 705 to Tel Aviv, February 7, stated that the Embassy could use the arguments in the last paragraph of telegram 701 but without reference to Eshkol’s message. (Ibid.) 138. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 138. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 6, 1965. Here is how the Jordan arms issue breaks down at this moment. State/DOD/JCS/CIA and our ambassadors all still favor going ahead now with a minimum package (basic M–48 tanks, and European jets) as essential to keep Hussein from jumping the reservation. McNamara and Rusk agree. In fact, most of them think even our minimum package won’t be enough to do more than buy us a little time. Only new wrinkle is that if Hussein won’t take M–48 tank we suggest we’ll help him get better German or UK models. The Israelis (and Mike Feldman) are still dug in hard. Their immediate objective is to buy time to bargain with us, so they’re taking a very stiff line. I believe that if we had the time (and were willing to pay the price) we could bring them around. But our dilemma is that if we stall any longer we may lose Hussein. It’s important to view the Jordan arms problem in full perspective, as part of the major new Arab-Israeli crisis (this time over the Jordan waters) which we face over the next year or two. We stand only to lose in this crisis because we favor the status quo. So does Israel, which has a special claim on us. So does Jordan, which joined Israel in sharing Palestine. The USSR, UAR and Syria are revisionist powers, with the other Arabs passively on their side on any issue involving Israel. Thus our real aim is simply to get through this new crisis without: (1) sacrificing Israel’s security or getting a domestic black eye for appearing to do so; (2) ruining our relations with the Arabs—along with all this would cost us; (3) letting the Soviets score another major gain in the Near East, as they did in 1954–57. Israeli aims are rather different from our own. They’ve consistently felt nervous about US support in a crunch, so have long favored tying us to them publicly (security guarantees, arms aid), regardless of whether this would throw the Arabs into Soviet hands or cost us our position in the Arab world. We’ve always felt that such a course would be disastrous to Israel as well as us. This is again a basic issue, as it is in every Arab-Israeli crisis. The second thing we want to avoid is another major Arab-Israeli clash, because we’d probably have to step in to stop it. We’d be caught in the middle again too. The best way to avoid such a clash is to maintain an adequate deterrent balance. I’d now argue that this will sooner or later require us to sell arms to Israel. The simple reason is that otherwise the growing Soviet arms sales to the Arabs will slowly tilt the balance against Israel (even after the latter gets missiles, though not necessarily if it goes nuclear). But if we want to prevent Israeli nuclear proliferation yet protect Israel and forestall another conflict, we’ll have to provide Israel with its own arms. A sale of arms to Jordan could give us the excuse for selling to Israel too. In fact, it would almost compel us to do so. We could justify this publicly as a response to Soviet moves. Moreover, to the extent that our arms sales to Jordan kept the Soviets and UAR out, this would minimize the threat to Israel too. Since this basic policy reversal on our part (from avoiding sales to making them) is probably inevitable, there’s a case for making it now! The Arabs may react violently, but they will also react violently when we have to back Israel in a Jordan waters crisis too. And Arab knowledge that they could not win an arms race against Israel should contribute over the long run to a damping down of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In sum, I see longer range policy reasons for taking the plunge now. Announcement of this new policy might largely blanket any Congressional reactions to our sales to Jordan. Returning to the immediate Jordan arms issue, we have three basic alternatives: A. Take Israeli line—offer nothing and rely on threats of withdrawal of US aid. We’ve tried this already and Hussein said he’d have to risk loss of US aid. Note his reaction last August (Tab A). 2 Experts think probabilities are that Hussein would have to go the Soviet route. So this course gravely risks the worst of all eventualities—Soviet/UAR arms in Jordan. B. Take State/DOD line. Offer minimum package designed to keep ball in play, while making crystal clear that if Hussein goes Soviet route he’ll sacrifice US aid (DOD and State think we might be able to get Hussein to go for UK, French, or German tanks and planes). Experts still think this won’t work unless package is rich enough. Also Israelis have urged at highest level we not take this road; if we do so without signing them on, we multiply our subsequent problems. C. Stall for a little more time. State, DOD, and our Ambassador all say we’ve stalled so long (nine months) that we must fish or cut bait. Hussein says so too, and he’s a gambler—capable of rash action. But there is a chance that we could shake him enough, without closing the door, to buy ourselves at least a few days and perhaps till 10 February, when he goes to Cairo. This would give a little time for us to pressure and cajole the Israelis. My scenario is at Tab B. 3 As to other possibilities, they seem to net out as follows: 1. Getting concerted Western pressure on Nasser to lay off Hussein is infeasible. De Gaulle would thumb his nose at us. Erhard is fighting desperately to solve his own problem, i.e. forestalling Arab recognition of East Germany. The UK favors a Jordan arms deal. 2. The oil companies are no help . They see the problem, but are so under Arab pressure now that they have no leverage with Arabs. 3. The Soviets won’t help us out , because they stand to be the biggest gainers from our woes. In fact, if we even broached the subject, they’d squeal to the Arabs. 4. I personally favor an approach to Nasser if only to tell him what we plan to do. But not before we get Hussein signed on. Then nothing will be lost from trying to convince Nasser not to scream. 5. A secret high level mission to Israel is indicated immediately to try and convince the Israelis we make sense. If it were authorized to offer arms sales, it could succeed. Harriman would be best, or Feldman or myself (but not Mike and I). Bob Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. Komer’s handwritten note at the top of the memorandum states that Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti read it and agreed. 2 Tab A is a copy of telegram 84 from Amman, August 11; see footnote 2, Document 88 . 3 Tab B, entitled “A Possible Stall for Time,” unsigned and undated, is not printed. 139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 1 Washington, February 6, 1965, 8:06 p.m. 808. Instructions to Talbot. We have reviewed the Jordanian arms requests at the highest level. That review has taken account of the strongly adverse reaction from the Government of Israel and the concern that would be aroused in many sectors of the Congress by a US sale of arms to the Unified Arab Command. On the basis of this careful rethinking of the problem we are instructing you to limit your offers to King Hussein in accordance with this telegram and to try to buy time during which Western European sources of supply for tanks and airplanes can be fully explored. Before making any explicit offer to the King, you should forcefully make the following points: 1. The United States friendship for, and support of, his regime in Jordan has been amply and repeatedly demonstrated over the years. This is a partnership we would like to continue. A partnership, however, requires mutual understanding of each other’s problems. We feel that we do understand the difficulties of the situation Hussein is facing with respect to his arms buildup under the United Arab Command. 2. Despite our serious misgivings about any large increases in armament in the area we have authorized Assistant Secretary Talbot to make as forthcoming an offer as feasible in the circumstances. At the same time, the President wishes the King—as an obligation under our mutual partnership—to understand United States’ concerns and inhibitions. 3. The ambitious arms buildup planned by the United Arab Command can lead only to a rising spiral of military capability between Israel and the Arab world. Sooner or later this will almost certainly result in an explosion since the Israelis will not sit by and see the Arab world outdistance them. Because of Jordan’s geographic location, it will inevitably bear a particularly heavy brunt from any Arab-Israeli holocaust. 4. The King’s request has put us in serious dilemma. While we are attempting to give the King as much support as possible, he must understand that a major USG contribution to the arms race in Arab-Israel area will be bitterly resented by Congress and American people. This would bring critical US domestic reaction that could adversely affect our future ability to continue our cooperation with, and support of, GOJ. 5. Our offer—which is as generous as is feasible—is necessarily contingent on GOJ not accepting any form of Soviet military equipment. If GOJ should elect to turn to Soviet equipment, we would be regretfully compelled to terminate our present military assistance program. More than that, we would necessarily have to reexamine the status and continuance of our entire partnership relation. 6. Finally, the King must keep in perspective the relative value to him of close and continuing friendship and support of USG as against a few tanks and airplanes. It is USG earnest hope that Hussein will not allow disappointment over present arms negotiations to jeopardize partnership which we deeply value and which we believe of critical importance to him. With the foregoing clearly in mind make following offer: (1) Military ground equipment valued at $55 million 2 over calendar years 1965–1969 inclusive. (2) M–48 tanks . Bear down heavily on advantages to Jordan of basic M–48 as outlined in supplementary talking points 1(Armor) (a). 3 If King insistently demands newer model, point out that we have no M–48A2s or M–48A3s for sale. We would, however, be willing to explore with him possibilities of procuring more advanced armor from Western Europe. 4 If Hussein cannot be convinced, consult Washington immediately for further instructions. (3) Supersonic Aircraft . Use every effort dissuade Jordan against early move into supersonics. If King proves adamant, however, acquiesce reluctantly in Jordanian purchase of a West European squadron. If King insists on purchasing Soviet MIGs in default of an American squadron, remind him of consequences. Urge that he make not hasty decision until you can return to the United States for further consultations. (4) King should understand that sales of arms Jordan may well force U.S. to make arms sales to Israel. We will count on Hussein in this event to help keep down Arab reaction. (5) In discussing the above, you should urge on King maximum secrecy about our discussions. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Killgore and Macomber, cleared by Jernegan and Komer, and approved by Ball. Also sent to Amman. 2 Telegram 782 from Beirut, February 7, queried this figure, noting that the proposed 5-year package with M48 tanks came to approximately $42 million. (Ibid.) Telegram 440 to Amman, February 7, confirmed that the figure should be $42 million. (Ibid.) 3 Talbot’s talking points have not been found. 4 Telegram 782 from Beirut (see footnote 2 above) stated that the only change in the offer to King Hussein was apparently to take a flat position against selling M48A2 or A3 tanks but to express willingness to explore possibilities of procuring Western European tanks. Telegram 440 to Amman confirmed that the only change in the offer related to tanks. 140. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 140. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 7, 1965. Mac— This is memo I sent LBJ yesterday, 2 which I believe had major impact on tentative decisions taken. Since he had Moyers sit in on meetings and Bill called me for lunch, I showed it to him and he asked me to tell LBJ he agreed. In the series of meetings we held it became crystal clear that the President’s chief reason for not accepting the repeated State/DOD/CIA recommendation was his concern over the US domestic reaction when it came out that the US was supplying arms to a UAC aimed at Israel. Of course this was the angle we kept cluing him on, since State/DOD tended to argue only in terms of keeping Jordan from going the Soviet route. The predictably violent Israeli reaction (see Eshkol letter) 3 and Feldman’s flank attacks added to his worries. It gradually dawned on me that we were three-quarters pregnant anyway. If Hussein accepted our package he’d have to tell UAC in Cairo; once it then came out that US selling to Jordan, we’d be trapped. In fact, Israelis themselves threatened they might have to reveal it (according to Mike). Moreover, US role in German tank deal is bound to leak soon; when this happened, we’d stand revealed as making arms sales to Israel too. So I kept pressing on State to face up to fact that if we agreed to sell Jordan, we’d have to sell Israel too—as the only way of protecting our domestic flank. Moreover, as I argued in attached, maintaining a decent Arab-Israeli deterrent balance was essential to forestall another Arab-Israeli clash, one piling up of Soviet arms to Arabs gave latter enough confidence. Moyers made a big contribution by arguing Friday 4 that we’d have to make a public statement justifying arms to Jordan in a way that would satisfy domestic critics. So at Saturday afternoon meeting 5 I expanded on this. My argument was that the only means of getting away with arms to Jordan was to say publicly we would help Israel too, in order to prevent piling up of Soviet arms from threatening peace. In addition to above arguments, I pointed out that we were inevitably being pushed in this direction anyway, citing 1962 Hawk deal and then 1964 covert tank deal. It was a fact of life that we were going to have to change our policy. German attempt to renege on tank deal, coming at same time, might be panicking the Israelis. But we needed their active support if we were to get away with Jordan arms sale—only way to get this was to tell them we’d sell to them too. So why not bite the bullet? Ball, Vance, Wheeler all agreed in principle, though expressing reservations as to how much we should say or do right off. I made clear that we’d get plenty of flak from the Arabs, but perhaps best to ride it out now. Only alternative was a flat US security guarantee and joint planning, which would spook the Arabs even more. Jernegan agreed, saying a security guarantee would force us into arms aid anyway, so was worse. There was no firm decision (I didn’t press for one because this is a major policy shift) but I do feel all top echelon are on notice that if we sell to Jordan, we have no other viable alternative. You should know that LBJ authorized modified offer to Jordan (only basic M–48s, no US jets) only on basis unanimous judgment Hussein wouldn’t accept. Ergo, in effect it was a tactical device designed to buy a little time (I was only one to say I thought some chance Hussein might buy). Am going on at this length, because this whole affair may come to a boil while I’m gone. I envisage a public statement (after news leaks) that US: (1) reiterates 8 May ’63 statement against aggression in ME; (2) has sought for years to avoid contributing to ME arms race; (3) but in view of constant Soviet effort to upset stability by cut-rate sales, US prepared sell to friendly countries which don’t wish to go Soviet route; (4) will sell arms only for defensive purposes when obvious cases of imbalance developing. If we go this route, I believe we should send a credible emissary secretly to Nasser pronto to clue him, saying that public spat will help no one and just result in US/UAR split; we still prefer arms control to arms race but he left us no choice (cluing him in advance on Hawk deal helped immensely). Bob Anderson would be admirable (LBJ mentioned sending him to persuade Nasser to lay off Hussein, but Ball and I countered this wouldn’t do any good just now). RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret. A note in Komer’s handwriting at the top of the memorandum reads, “Essence of Jordan arms problem.” 2 Reference is apparently to Document 138 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 137 . 4 February 5. 5 See footnote 2, Document 135 . 141. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 141. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, February 7, 1965, 7 p.m. 436. From Talbot. We have just seen King Hussein for two and a quarter hours. He had Khammash with him. Ambassador, Solbert and Bunte accompanied me. Barnes and I are to meet King alone for second session at luncheon Monday, 2 after Khammash, Solbert and Bunte have spent morning on details of USG proposal. King listened intently my 45 minute presentation based on talking paper as modified by Deptel 437. 3 He then expressed warm appreciation for amount and seriousness of attention given Jordan’s problems at highest levels USG. He hoped I would report views he was about to express so USG leaders could further consider his position. Otherwise “we may be in for some very grim times indeed.” King repeated many points we have heard before, including statement that whether Soviet equipment appears in Jordan now depends on our decisions rather than on him. He expressed disappointment at ground package as we presented it. Prompted by Khammash he said we appeared to be reopening understandings that he had thought long since achieved on ground equipment sales. King and Khammash both reacted visibly when told M48A3’s not available for sale. They did not, however, argue tank question this evening. King later said this request had been intended to balance the tanks being provided by Germany to Israel and converted to 105 mm guns. So far as we could tell Khammash’s main difficulty with ground force proposal, apart from tanks, was five-year delivery time. He appears still to want entire tranche within next year or so. On non-availability of US supersonic aircraft, King contented himself with quiet assertion that if Western European aircraft could have done the job he would not have troubled USG with request for American aircraft. Khammash stated that Mirage failed to meet requirements on both quality and price. King observed gloomily that one at least of great dangers he foresees ahead might have been avoided had we been able to provide US aircraft. We inferred he was referring to costs I had enumerated that would ensue if Jordanians took Soviet aircraft. Other comments by King related to general situation in area, Jordan’s exposed position, efforts of Arabs to act responsibly rather than discordantly and emotionally as so often in the past, need to build up Arab defensive forces to stabilize Arab-Israel situation since “our friends” apparently unable help bring solution and apprehension of great dangers likely in months ahead. Comment : Session was clearly one in which both sides laid out positions, with the Jordanian response being quite formal, contained and in somewhat general terms. We may hear more of theme that Israel getting better tanks than US willing to sell Jordan. At end of session we were shown newspaper cartoon displaying large Uncle Sam holding Germany who in turn holding an Israeli figure pointing a gun at a small Arab. Further sessions on Monday may reveal other specifics of Jordan position, and should give us chance to press detailed argumentation of our position. I believe decision on Presidential letter should await this next round. Detailed report of conversation will follow. 4 Barnes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Distribution. Repeated to Tel Aviv. Passed to the White House. The retyped text of the telegram was sent to the President on February 8 with a covering memorandum from Komer, noting that the talk with Hussein “didn’t go as badly as State feared, though this may be Arab courtesy.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I) 2 February 8. Telegram 443 from Amman, February 8, reported that Talbot’s luncheon conversation with the King ranged over a variety of Near Eastern issues. No decisions were reached in their discussion of the arms package. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 3 Telegram 808 to Beirut ( Document 139 ) was sent to Amman as telegram 437. 4 Telegram 437 from Amman, February 8, reported an extended discussion with King Hussein the previous evening concerning the U.S. arms proposals. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 142. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in Jordan 142. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, February 8, 1965, 5:36 p.m. 446. For Talbot. Acting Secretary has asked Jernegan to get in touch with you urgently by teletype. Understand however atmospheric condition unfavorable and this message contains what he had planned to put to you. Request immediate answer. Presidential decision 2 is that emissary to Israel should be Harriman accompanied by Feldman and Komer. 3 In effort to avoid too much focus on real purpose of trip, Harriman would plan to go on from Tel Aviv to Tehran, and Kabul and perhaps visit one or more African countries on way back. General line with public would be that he taking occasion of visit farther east to stop off briefly in Israel. This mission is felt to be necessary because of probability that Israelis would leak a Presidential letter as they have already done with the news of the proposed Jordanian arms deal (see Tel Aviv #945, rptd Amman 212). 4 President and Acting Secretary wish to do everything possible to forestall anticipated Israeli drive in US against foreign aid and other essential US policies. Such drive seems probable if GOI is not placated in face of Jordanian deal. Presumably a special emissary of Governor Harriman’s stature and ability could help soothe Israeli feelings and bring about some cooling off of high emotions. We would appreciate your views regarding this projected mission. Assuming arms deal with Jordan is in fact concluded, on terms you have offered or on anything more liberal, we very much fear repercussions in Congress affecting whole Middle East policies and perhaps other aspects foreign policy. As indicated above, President himself deeply concerned about this aspect. We are beginning to think that only step we could take which has chance of being really effective is to give Israel assurance that when and if necessary USG would be willing to consider direct arms sales on favorable terms. Following is some language illustrating what we have in mind: “1. Recognizing that continued Soviet arms sales to the Arabs can over time upset the deterrent balance (which US arms sales to Jordan are designed in fact to preserve), the US would consider selective sales of arms to compensate for any disproportionate buildup on the Arab side. “2. This, however, does not seem to us to be an immediate problem. We continue to prefer that Israel seek maximum help from European sources. But, if and when we agree that Israel has a demonstrable need which cannot be satisfactorily filled elsewhere, the US will consider direct sales on favorable credit terms. “3. In return to USG desires Israeli undertakings: a) actively to support US aid to Jordan and other Arabs and to assist in abating the stir over aid to the UAR; b) not to undertake premature preemptive action against Arab diversion works; c) not to go nuclear or deploy strategic missiles; d) accept full IAEA safeguards.” Would like to know how this strikes you and Barnes. Realize Israelis may well balk at agreeing to 4 considerations in para. 3 above. However, if we got even three of them, with or without commitment to abandon missiles, we would have achieved some pretty major objectives, possibly at the cost of nothing more than we will inevitably be forced to give over coming years without any quid pro quos. Do you and Barnes think there is any chance of getting Hussein to postpone his trip to Cairo for a week or two? This might give us more time for consideration here and further attempts to bring him around, while at same time it would give us breathing space in which to persuade Israelis to calm down. Do you think that a concession of 100 M–48A3s to be delivered in three years or thereabouts would enable you make deal with Hussein? Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Jernegan and cleared by Ball. 2 A draft attached to the telegram indicates that the decision had been reached that morning, presumably when the President met very briefly with Ball, Komer, and Jernegan on the subject of Jordan following an NSC meeting. Discussion of the question of arms sales to Jordan had been scheduled to follow discussion of Vietnam at the NSC meeting, but the meeting broke up after the Vietnam discussion. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meetings, 1965; Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) 3 The question of who the emissaries to Israel should be was discussed by the President and Ball in telephone conversations at 5:15 and 5:25 p.m. on February 7. Ball suggested sending Harriman. (Ibid., Ball Papers, Jordan) 4 Telegram 945 from Tel Aviv, February 8, reported a front-page story in Maariv that Israel had expressed concern to the U.S. Government over its decision to supply Jordan with arms worth $50 million. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5, JORDAN) Ball called in Harman on February 8 and expressed U.S. unhappiness with the leak. (Telegram 712 to Tel Aviv, February 8; ibid.) 143. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 143. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 9, 1965. Jordan Arms . Here are the key issues for 4:30 p.m. meeting. Of course the underlying decision to be made is whether we should now sell arms to Israel as well as Jordan, as the only way to buy off the Israelis and protect your domestic flank. This would raise hob with the Arabs, but is probably necessary sooner or later anyway. A. Should we sweeten the Jordan package? Talbot, Solbert and our Embassy recommend doing so pronto, to forestall Hussein going the Soviet route. 2 They doubt Hussein would take even sweetened package, but feel we could buy 10 days or so by saying we’d reconsider in Washington. 1. Supersonics are still the crux . Talbot again urges we offer 20 F–104C’s, since Hussein claims he’s committed to take MIGs otherwise. If not, he suggests we say we’ll reconsider and answer a week from now. He also suggests we tell King we’ll help him try to get European jets, but if this fails we’ll provide 104s. I’d prefer saying we’d “consider” 104s in that case. 2. Tanks . Talbot says we’re in a bind because Jordan knows Israel is getting better tanks. He proposes offering M48A1 with promise to “discuss” conversion to M48A3 “at early date” (it would take two years to deliver in any case). 3. Timing of Deliveries . King claims they must meet UAC timetable, so must have whole ground force package in one year instead of four (1966–69) we propose. Talbot urges two years with added stretchout on tanks. I’d prefer three years because early deliveries might spook Israelis into pre-empting. 4. Credit terms . Jordan wants full credit terms (we offered only $7 million revolving credit) so it can get whole package before other Arabs pay for it. King claims Soviets offer easy credit terms. Talbot and State favor increasing credit margin to $15 million and letting first year’s sales go on credit. I’d be much tougher, since our safety valve is to sell only what King can find money for. Ball will argue for sweetening package as Talbot wants to keep Hussein on the hook while we take 7–10 days to reconsider. But the higher we bid the more trouble we’ll have with Israelis (who now know our minimum). So I’d argue for just enough sweetening to show Hussein we’re serious and 10 days reconsideration in Washington (while we beat up Israelis). B. How do we calm down Israelis? Despite their leak, they’re still salvageable in my judgment. My hunch is they panicked because Germans reneged on them at very same time. So after a great show of indignation, we ought to go back at them hard, since we need their active help to protect your domestic flank. As I see it, more turns on what we’re prepared to offer them than on who carries the word . To really calm them we’ll have to say (once other arguments are exhausted), that we’ll sell to them too if and when we both agree that a need arises. This is a mighty big sweetener, and a mighty risky one, since it may get us in real dutch with the Arabs. We may even make it impossible for Hussein to take our arms. State is for this in principle, but afraid to bite the bullet. If we do go this route, we ought also to get some quid pro quos: (a) nuclear non-proliferation and acceptance of IAEA controls; (b) active Israeli lobbying in support of Jordan arms deal and aid to Nasser; (c) a commitment against pre-emption on Jordan waters. C. How do we negotiate this? A special emissary is the best bet, and the sooner the better before the whole business leaks. But the more public the exercise the more risks of leaks. Harriman has the clout (and I’ll gladly side him) but: (a) Israeli papers will have a field day speculating why Harriman is there; (b) Arabs may put two and two together and say he’s there to get Israeli permission to sell arms to Jordan. D. If we decide to sell to Israel, we must clue Nasser in advance . This may be a long shot, but it damped his reaction to Hawk deal. We’d have to tell Nasser face-to-face that if Arabs keep building up against Israel, we’ll have to maintain the balance. Ball has talked with Bob Anderson, who is going to Cairo in about four days. E. Getting the Germans to help . If they actually cancel their military aid to Israel, 3 Israelis will immediately be after us to replace this. Therefore, I see every merit in urging Germans at highest level not to cancel but to promise Arabs they’ll end program as soon as existing commitments are filled. They could claim this is a matter of honor. The above combination of moves seems the best way out of our painful dilemma, but one which was going to be on us sooner or later anyway. R. W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. 2 Talbot’s recommendations, summarized in this memorandum, were sent in telegram 444 from Amman, February 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 3 Telegram 2940 from Bonn, February 6, reported that the German Government had concluded that it could not continue shipments of arms to Israel, which had been conditioned on secrecy but had become public knowledge, and had proposed to Israel that it stop further shipments and pay Israel a sum of money as a “quid pro quo.” (Ibid., DEF 12–5 ISR) 144. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) 144. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) 1 Washington, February 9, 1965, 6 p.m. SUBJECT White House Meeting on Arms to Jordan PRESENT WERE The President and the Vice President Messrs. Ball, Harriman, and Jernegan for State Mr. Vance and Admiral MacDonald for the Department of Defense Messrs. Bundy, Komer, Feldman (part time were Messrs. Valenti and Reedy) for the White House Mr. Richard Helms for CIA 1. This meeting, scheduled for 4:30 on Tuesday, 9 February, convened in the Cabinet Room at 6:00 P.M. It adjourned at 6:30. The President was absent from the Room for about ten minutes, the Vice President came to the meeting ten minutes late. 2. Acting Secretary Ball opened the discussion with a detailed description of the recommendations made by Assistant Secretary Talbot in a cable from Amman (EmbTel-444). 2 He also outlined a recommendation for a compensating deal with the Israelis. There was general agreement on his recommendation except for Mr. Feldman who expressed his opposition on the grounds that the Israelis would not accept the United States “package.” It was clear that neither the President nor the Vice President liked Acting Secretary Ball’s proposal either, but their opposition appeared to stem from troubles which they anticipated having with the Congress. 3. The meeting ended inconclusively. The President did authorize the sending of an emissary to Tel Aviv. (It was later decided that Mr. Komer would be the President’s representative for this purpose.) 3 RH 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Files, DCI (Helms) Memos for the Record, 1 Jan. 1965–31 Dec. 1972. Secret. Prepared on February 12. 2 See footnote 2, Document 143 . 3 Notes of telephone conversations on February 10 between Ball and Jernegan and Ball and Harriman indicate that Komer was to go immediately to Israel and that Harriman was to follow a week or so later. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Jordan) 145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, February 9, 1965, 9:50 p.m. 454. For Talbot. Ref: Amman tels 444 2 and 445. 3 You are authorized offer increase amount of credit to fifteen million and to promise expedite delivery of ground equipment as much as possible. (Communications items in very tight supply and probably could not be delivered before end of 1966, while APC’s in great demand and also subject considerable probable delay. Conversion of tanks, if insisted upon and agreed upon, would take at least two years according Defense.) You should leave King under no illusion that we can promise that expedited delivery will mean delivery within one or two years even for all of equipment not specifically mentioned. FYI. This is for both technical and political reasons. End FYI. You are not authorized make new offers on tanks or supersonics at this time. Hope you can persuade King accept first 100 tanks as M–48’s with promise discuss A3’s later. If King still insists on either point, you should say you will return Washington and arrange further consideration, although you cannot promise what outcome will be. This does not mean that acceptable deal for King ultimately foreclosed but growing feeling here is that final agreement with Jordanians on any package will be extremely difficult sell in U.S. as well as in Israel if full discussions have not been held previously with Israelis. Plans not yet finalized, but hope to get Presidential Mission to Israel by weekend. You should of course do your best persuade King to postpone visit to Cairo. If invitation to Khammash to come to Washington in about ten days will make this possible you authorized to extend it and/or promise your own early return Amman if necessary. FYI. Discussion continuing here at highest level but doubt any further definite decisions will be made before your return. End FYI. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jernegan, cleared by Komer, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 2 See footnote 2, Document 143 . 3 Telegram 445 from Amman, February 9, commented on telegram 446 to Amman ( Document 142 ). In it, Talbot supported sending a special emissary of Harriman’s stature to Israel to try to persuade the Israelis that a U.S. arms sale to Jordan was the best available alternative. He agreed that the real choice was between selling arms to both Jordan and Israel or selling arms to Israel after Jordan obtained Soviet equipment, and he urged that he be given authority to tell Hussein the United States was prepared to make available a squadron of F–104s in 1968. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 146. Memorandum for Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 146. Memorandum for Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, February 10, 1965. Your mission is to explain to the Government of Israel in full and friendly candor the reasons why we believe that limited and carefully spaced out US arms sales to Jordan are far better than the alternative of uncontrollable Soviet or UAR supply. Since the Israelis seem to have focussed only on the added threat to them from US arms sales to Jordan, you should lay heavy emphasis on the far greater threat which would ensue from uncontrolled Soviet or UAR supply. You should point out that from our talks with King Hussein we are convinced that, unless he can get minimum satisfaction from us or Western European sources, he will be compelled to take the Soviet route. I want you to make clear that our effort from the outset has been primarily aimed at minimizing the threat to Israeli security and area stability, not the reverse. Indeed, we have no independent interest in Jordan. Our subsidies to it, now totalling almost a half billion dollars, have been primarily designed to maintain an independent Arab kingdom, not under hostile domination, along Israel’s longest and most vulnerable frontier. In our judgment this factor has contributed materially to Israel’s security. You should further stress our conviction, buttressed by the views of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the limited arms sales we envisage to Jordan will not significantly increase the overall threat to Israel. Even if this were the case, however, the increased threat would hardly be comparable to that created by Jordan’s acceptance of Soviet and UAR arms, and possibly UAC troops on Jordan’s soil, which in turn would risk ultimate UAR domination of Jordan. Thus I see US arms sales to Jordan as merely a further step in a longstanding US policy, which I understand to be tacitly acquiesced in by Israel, of forestalling this worst of all eventualities. If you are asked whether the US has already agreed on arms sales with King Hussein you should say that we have not yet done so, but are prepared to do so shortly if he meets our terms. I believe that these terms are so much in Israel’s interest that I wish to solicit not only Israel’s understanding but its active support of our policy. While you are not authorized to discuss the matter pending further instructions, I am aware that to secure Israel’s active support it will probably be necessary to indicate our willingness to sell arms to Israel sooner or later. The US recognizes that continued Soviet arms sales to the Arabs can over time upset the Arab-Israeli deterrent balance. The Israelis will be particularly eager for such sales if West Germany cancels the remainder of its program. We continue to prefer that Israel seek maximum help from European sources. However, if and when we and Israel jointly agree that Israel has a demonstrable need which cannot be satisfactorily filled elsewhere, we will consider direct sales on favorable credit terms. In return the US would expect to receive certain undertakings from Israel. These matters will be the subject of a further instruction to you. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. The memorandum, typed on White House stationery, bears no indication of the drafter. A handwritten notation states that it was approved on February 11. Bundy sent a copy to Ball that day, stating that he “did not like to show these things to the President without Ball’s seeing them.” (Ibid., Ball Papers, Jordan) Telegram 736 to Tel Aviv, February 11, from Bundy to Komer, states that his instructions had been approved by “highest authority.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/Komer) 147. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 147. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 13, 1965, 1 a.m. 969. From Komer. Friday 2 given over to practically uninterrupted series of meetings, including two with Prime Minister and long session with Foreign Minister, Eban, Peres, Rabin, etc. I made and remade all points in my brief, particularly stressing lack of any viable alternatives. Will not repeat these here since detailed report will follow. Highlights are: 1. Israelis, while immediately and deeply concerned over prospect US arms sales to Jordan, see it in larger context of unexpected cohesiveness of UAC, Bonn’s caving to Nasser, US catering to the UAR, and continued Soviet arms aid to the Arabs. In effect they see this combination of circumstances as creating (a) an increasingly grave threat to Israeli security; (b) a psychological fillip to the Arabs, which enhances their belief that Carthage can be destroyed; and (c) an incipient crisis of confidence among the Israeli public. By now they are far more exercised about Nasser (and his victory over Bonn) than over Jordan. 2. While Israelis have calmed down considerably on Jordan arms issue, little doubt that Israeli military in particular acutely disturbed by prospect of even a modest increase in strength of one of the two adjacent countries they have not regarded as a military threat. From briefing by Rabin with no punches pulled it clear Israelis were counting on not having to divert much first-line strength to screen piddling Jordanian forces. While they still talk about Jordan acquiring an offensive instead of defensive capability, long and short of matter is that they now feel they’ll have to deploy a fair proportion of their standing forces against a surprise Jordanian attack, instead of keeping them mostly in south against UAR and secondarily in north opposite Syrians. They made much of lack of warning time. 3. Beyond security threat is political problem faced by Eshkol as a practical politician heading unstable coalition and a split, plurality Mapai Party, going into a fall election, and with Ben-Gurion having in effect declared open war against him. While he himself didn’t stress this point, and is probably more convinced than he’s willing to concede as yet by our arguments, it is obvious that he is deeply concerned over how to explain to his Cabinet, and the public why it’s the least of all evils for Israel’s great friend the US to sell arms to the UAC. 4. With all due allowances for the replay of old records, it is quite apparent that the Israelis foresee a gathering storm over the Jordan waters issue, and as might be expected, are nervous over US support. 5. Also significant were repeated veiled and not veiled references to the need for pre-emption. Most of these were in connection with the need to scare off the Arabs from their counter-diversion scheme. While much of this talk was for our benefit, there seems little doubt that a pre-emptive psychology is building up in Israel and will become an increasing risk so long as the Israelis see no other way out of their dilemma. 6. Throughout eight hours of almost uninterrupted back and forth, we kept bringing them back to the fundamental dilemma—that however unpalatable the course we proposed to take, it seemed much less risky than the most likely alternative. Though Eshkol and others asked why we didn’t threaten to cut off our subsidies, etc., I believe that such plaints were for form’s sake and that they recognize that we are proposing the lesser of evils. 7. If nothing else, this exercise has been most useful in re-establishing intimate communication with GOI, which had felt genuinely bruised by our failure to give sufficient advance notification. Quite clearly, Bonn’s craven behavior had added to the shock. There were many harsh words about the Germans today. 8. More important, we believe we have gotten the top level of GOI (though not yet their military) over the hurdle of reacting primarily to Jordan arms and not to the larger issue. Pending instructions, I sedulously (and I must say disingenuously) refrained from even hinting at compensatory US measures. I did, however, seek to focus their attention on constructive responses by repeatedly posing the question of whether they had any better solution than the one we had come up with. 9. They didn’t do more than hint at this, but this was enough to make Barbour and me conclude that Eshkol, Eban, Meir, and probably Peres are already beginning to turn their minds to what Israel could do itself and get from the US to cope with their problems. For example, Eshkol and Meir both noted that we had not made any recent public statement of our support for Israel’s use of Jordan waters within Unified Plan. Eshkol mentioned the importance of dispelling any illusions the Arabs might have as to our continued determination to prevent Arab aggression against Israel. As Golda Meir put it, we should tell Nasser we would give Israel a tank for every tank Moscow gave him. All concerned carefully pointed out that any increase in Jordanian capabilities, plus Israel’s loss of further German arms, created an even greater increasing requirement for added Israeli deterrent strength. In the afternoon Rabin quite pointedly mentioned that Israel’s primary needs were tanks and planes. 10. We have another meeting scheduled for 5 P.M. Sunday local time. Taking advantage of the Sabbath, we suggested postponement till then to give Washington time to consider (in the midst of Vietnam) my report. Since we have tried our hardest to force the Israelis themselves to come up with alternatives, we may receive proposals at that time. However, Peres has asked to see me urgently tomorrow morning, which may provide some advance clues. 11. The recommendations of Ambassador Barbour and myself are already before you. But developments today reinforce our conviction that Israel can be brought to accept, and even to support quietly, limited arms aid to Jordan if we are prepared to do and say those things which would reinforce the deterrent balance and, equally important, give verbal evidence of this intention to both the Arab and Israeli audiences. 12. I feel duty bound to add that, so long as we do not close with Hussein and confront Israel with yet another presumed fait accompli it does not seem imperative to make either a general or specific tender to the GOI right now. However, the sooner we can do so, at least in general terms, the more rapidly we will be able to move on to the question of how to get demonstrable Israeli support of our Jordan arms program. Suffice it to say that if we do feel compelled to make Hussein a new offer, especially one any richer than the present bid, prior action here essential. Of course, aside from indicating that Hussein has not accepted our offer, we refrained from indicating that we might feel compelled to enrich it. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/Komer. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to DOD and passed to the White House. 2 February 12. 148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 13, 1965, 8:28 p.m. 748. For Komer. Tel Aviv’s 971. 2 At this juncture Hussein would be most reluctant enter into private understanding which if leaked could seriously endanger his position. Additionally, our capability to enforce such an understanding, even if one could be arrived at, would be limited. In Talbot’s discussions with Hussein and Khammash, it was made clear that Jordan will keep bulk of its modern tanks on East Bank on theory armored force has defensive role only. Believe you can reassure Peres that even with new arms, armored strength West Bank would be increased to small degree if at all. You may also inform him that Jordan intends remove from its inventory around 100 Charioteers and Centurions in 1965–66. FYI. We do not believe present situation and still doubtful status German deliveries require any decision on our part to make up possible short-fall of 90 tanks. Israel will receive 310 modern tanks in months ahead. Schroeder’s reported demarche to UAR Ambassador Bonn could indicate Germany may complete deliveries if Ulbricht received in Cairo. Until your supplementary instructions received suggest you avoid going beyond saying matter will be considered later in Washington. We agree it seems significant that at this stage Israelis are limiting their demands on us to the 90 tanks included in German deal. End FYI. 3 Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/Komer. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Ball. 2 In telegram 971 from Tel Aviv, February 12, Komer reported his meeting with Peres, who said Eshkol had authorized him to discuss the situation frankly and informally. Peres stressed Israeli concern about the need to preserve Israel’s “depth territorially and balance militarily.” He suggested a private understanding with King Hussein that Jordan would not increase its armored strength on the West Bank or would do so only to a very small degree, and he requested that the United States make up the shortfall of 90 tanks which were to have been provided by Germany. (Ibid.) 3 Komer replied in telegram 973 from Tel Aviv, February 14, that he would again reassure the Israelis along these lines. He commented that the Israelis would not limit their demands to 90 tanks; if the United States stated publicly that it would replace the German tanks, “we’re compromised and have in effect changed our whole arms policy. So let’s not kid ourselves.” (Ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 149. Briefing Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 149. Briefing Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 1 Washington, February 13, 1965. SUBJECT Latest Developments on Jordan Arms Problem I have been in Jordan February 7–10 negotiating with King Hussein on the arms problem. Simultaneously, several meetings with the President were held here as developments unfolded. In the initial presentation to King Hussein, I was authorized to offer: (1) The basic M–48 tanks, (2) A $42 million ground equipment package to be delivered over a five-year period and to include the tanks, (3) U.S. acquiescence in Jordanian acquisition of a West European supersonic fighter squadron, and (4) a $7 million revolving credit. This was not enough to satisfy King Hussein. The King revealed his knowledge of the supposedly secret tank deal between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel which, as the King pointed out, included the 105 mm gun. He argued that it was not fair to offer Jordan a tank inferior to that which Israel is getting. The King was also dissatisfied with the delivery schedules envisaged in our offer, the amount of credit, and the West European supersonic. He and the Jordanian side argued that the over-all American offer was not sufficient to enable Jordan to withstand Unified Arab Command pressures to accept Soviet equipment. After the second long meeting on February 8, I reported that the real issue had become whether to sell arms to both Jordan and Israel or to Israel alone, following Jordanian acquisition of Soviet materiel. I recommended increasing the credit to $15 million, offering the M–48A1 tank with a fall-back to the M–48A3 (with diesel engine), cooperating with Jordan to find a suitable Free World supersonic fighter (with American supersonics to be held eventually in the offing if a suitable non-American plane could not be found) and speeding up of deliveries to the extent feasible. After a February 9 White House meeting, the Department authorized me to offer (1) $15 million credit, (2) the basic M–48 tank for the first part of the Jordanian order with an agreement to reconsider the possibility of getting the M–48A3 for the second part, but (3) to offer nothing further on supersonics beyond our original offer. In a final meeting February 10 the King held firm to his request for the M–48A3, but did not insist on delivery before late 1967–1968. He did, however, ask for an agreement to supply 100 of the M–48’s in calendar years 1965–1966. Brigadier Khammash later specified 50 M–48 tanks in 1965 and 50 in 1966. The King is obviously convinced he cannot successfully resist the pressures of the UAC with anything less than the above assurances. I am persuaded he has soberly estimated his position and is staking his chances for continued close relations with the West on our supplying what he judges will be necessary to hold his membership in the Arab Club. Our offer to help Jordan find an acceptable aircraft from Free World sources remains. We are proposing to the President that he concur in our proposals to supply 100 M–48 tanks in 1965–66 and 100 M–48A3 tanks with the 105 mm gun in late 1967–68. Meanwhile, Robert Komer has gone to Israel as a special emissary of the President in order to convey our rationale for providing arms to Jordan and to reassure Israeli leaders of our continuing deep interest in Israel’s security and welfare. We anticipate agreement to sell arms to Jordan and cancellation of German military assistance to Israel will create pressure for direct sale of U.S. arms to Israel. To mitigate the severe political damage this would cause the U.S. in the Arab world,NEA has recommended that we compensate for any disproportionate Arab military buildup only in return for Israeli agreement 1) to support actively U.S. aid to Jordan and to assist in abetting the stir over aid to the U.A.R., 2) to forego nuclear weapons and accept full IAEA safeguards, 3) not to deploy offensive missiles, and 4) not to undertake premature preemptive action against Arab diversion works. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/Komer. Secret. Drafted by Killgore and Lee F. Dinsmore of NE on February 12 and cleared by Davies. Filed as an attachment to a February 15 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk. 150. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 150. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 15, 1965, 10 a.m. 975. From Komer. Third session with Eshkol went as expected. Eban, Meir, Peres again present. Prime Minister did not labor Jordan arms problem, but made strong plea that this plus German capitulation to Nasser confronted Israel with a critical dilemma. Who would replace the German tanks, much less provide the added tanks needed to meet those the US proposed to provide Hussein? The only way out of this dilemma would be direct US supply of arms. He, Eban, and Meir made much of the argument that the Israeli public would never understand why we could sell to UAC member for an openly anti-Israeli scheme, yet not sell to our Israeli friends. In effect, Eshkol’s pitch is that the only way in which Israel can justify acquiescing in US arms sales to Jordan is if we do the same for Israel too. I will hold until my return the remainder of his arguments, but there is no doubt that Israelis are building up quite a head of steam. To fend off further repetitious argument, I responded that I felt I now had a full understanding of their concerns and had succeeded in turn in clarifying our concerns to them. Therefore, best thing would be for me to return as soon as possible to Washington and lay their views before the President. 2 I felt compelled to say that I was confident we would not make any final decisions on aid to Jordan without fully considering both Israel’s worries and its requests. However, I warned them that the Jordan matter might have a very short fuse. Despite my disclaimers, the Israelis obviously expected that the President would not send out an emissary on such a mission without certain compensatory gestures toward them. To help fill the gap, I told them I had received new Presidential message asking me to assure them that the US remained fully committed to the security and well-being of Israel, would take their concerns (as reported by me) most carefully into account, and could be depended on to stand by Israel in difficult times ahead. In turn he hoped they would appreciate our motives in such matters as Jordan arms deal, where we had Israel’s own security interests very much in mind. 3 Once this painful episode was over, I raised (to ease the tension) the Cubic matter, UAR missiles, and Jordan waters. My debunking of the first two was quite reassuring to Eshkol while the last provided a useful opportunity to counsel restraint. We can expect plenty of trouble on this issue, too, however. In sum, Barbour and I believe that my mission was highly opportune in giving Israelis a much needed chance to blow off steam and then be brought tactfully back to earth. We have bought a little time and hopefully forestalled further such mishaps as the leak here on Jordan arms. But everything I’ve heard here tends to fortify my conviction that to sell arms to Jordan without at least doing the same for Israel will generate a major crisis in our relations. Moreover, their acute worry over the general deterioration of their security position (of which Jordan arms is only a part) is gradually generating a pre-emptive psychology. It could even lead at some point to a decision to go nuclear if this appeared to be the only way to maintain a deterrent edge. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/KOMER. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Komer reported in telegram 972 from Tel Aviv, February 14, that he told Eshkol he hoped to receive any Israeli suggestions at their February 14 meeting and would return to Washington the next day unless otherwise instructed. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN) Upon receiving this telegram, McGeorge Bundy called President Johnson and recommended accepting Komer’s suggestion and having him return to Washington where they could “have one more hard look” at the problem. He noted that Ball would like to give Rusk another chance to look at the issue, since Rusk was “very reluctant to get into this double arms selling, even though he doesn’t see any alternative.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Bundy, February 14, 1965, 1:02 p.m., Tape F65.06, Side A, PNO 8) Telegram 750 to Tel Aviv, February 14, instructed Komer to return to Washington on February 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/KOMER) 3 No such message has been found. Telegram 750 to Tel Aviv, cited in footnote 2 above, instructed Komer to assure the Israelis their views would be given fullest consideration at the highest level. 151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, February 16, 1965, 12:27 p.m. 4855. Our immediate problem is to drive home to UARG fact that modification of Michel amendment 2 is no open sesame to new PL–480 agreements. Increments under existing agreement are out of question in any event and negotiations for new agreement would be unacceptable to Congress and US public as US–UAR relations now stand. Trust Embassy will lose no opportunity to impress these realities on UARG with specific reference to following points: 1. As state with important interests in Near East and major responsibility for defense of free world, US determined bring its power to bear for stability and progress that area: a) by opposing aggression; b) by cooperating in area development. 2. This policy is area-wide. USG is party to no intra-area disputes, seeks with every like-minded state friendly bilateral relationship tailored to specific needs, whether for trade, aid, military backing, or PL–480. 3. Title 1 program in Egypt is not designed to buy off UAR. We recognize sovereign right to differ. However, growing body of American opinion feels UARG has gone beyond protection its own interests into area of unwarranted pressure on US interests in Near East and Africa. Only major Administration effort turned back Congressional initiative to terminate PL–480 sales to UAR. 4. In defending his need for flexibility in conduct of foreign policy, President also gave recognition to need for improvement in psychological climate of US–UAR relationship if economic cooperation is to resume. He is counting on UARG to meet its share of responsibility by according more attention to US interests in the several issues that divide us. 5. Administration could not justify to Congress or public continuation of aid to states supplying bloc arms to Congo insurgents. Since US and UAR both support Congolese unity and independence, they should be able to dispose very quickly of this obstacle to their cooperation by working for constructive cooperation between OAU and GDRC for a realistic solution. 6. Continuing drain on Egyptian resources to support expeditionary force in Yemen also makes US aid to Egypt hard to justify. While USG is not party to Yemen negotiations, it will continue support earliest possible reduction of Egyptian presence for common good of US and UAR. 7. Washington regrets hostile statements from Arab capitals about Israel, is somewhat heartened by indications of UAR success in channeling Arab hostility into defensive rather than offensive posture. UARG has intimated best hope of peaceful Arab-Israel accommodation lies in consolidation of US–UAR relations. Equally true that Arab-Israel hostilities could destroy all that US–UAR cooperation has achieved or could be expected to achieve in this decade. 8. Also germane to above discussion is Deptel 4760. 3 FYI: No decision yet taken here whether to recommend to President it in national interest to proceed issuance PA’s for remaining $37 million. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, Curtis C. Strong of the Congo Working Group, Komer, and Macomber; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Beirut. 2 See Document 127 . 3 Telegram 4760 to Cairo, February 11, stated that before any new purchase authority could be issued under the existing P.L. 480 agreement with the UAR, the UAR must first meet its normal marketing and other commitments and that the issuance of the purchase authority must then be cleared at a high level as being in the national interest. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR) 152. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 152. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 16, 1965. Mission to Israel . As your emissary, I explained why we would probably have to sell certain arms to Jordan and asked for Israeli understanding—it being as much in Israel’s interest as our own. I did not allude to what we might offer Israel as an offset, but the Israelis very quickly raised this issue with me. It is clearly the core of the problem. In three very cordial meetings with Eshkol and his key people I believe I got across why arms sales to Jordan were the least bad of the highly unpalatable choices with which we were both confronted. By probing for their ideas as to any other way out, I satisfied myself that they too see no better solution, much as they dislike ours. They trust Hussein’s motives less than we, and regard us as probably not having exerted enough pressure. Moreover, two specific aspects of our Jordan arms position greatly bother Israel. First is the geographic fact that the bulge of Arab Palestine on the West Bank of the Jordan almost cuts Israel in two. While Hussein up to this point has garrisoned it only thinly, Israelis fear that the UAC (and his own added confidence) might lead him to put substantial forces on the West Bank. This would require Israel to redeploy a substantial part of the forces it now has in the north and south against the main Arab threats. Second, Eshkol asks how he (especially as a politician running for re-election in November) can explain that he agrees the US should arm an Arab member of a new unified command aimed at Israel—and at a time when Germany has just reneged on arms. So the Israeli position is that they simply cannot go along with US arms sales to Jordan, much less quietly support them, unless certain other measures are taken to enhance their security position—which they regard as sharply deteriorating in recent months. To understand their violent initial reaction (though they’ve calmed down some now), one must see it in this larger context. Our proposed sale (which they took as a fait accompli) came as an added shock right on the heels of Bonn’s cancellation of arms aid. This had a double adverse psychological impact because it not only meant the loss of one of their three major sources of arms supply (France and the UK are left) but was a clear victory for Nasser. Then, just as they were losing a source of tanks, we told them we planned to provide some to their enemies. These two shocks also occurred at a time of rising Israeli concern over the unexpected vitality being shown by the Arab counter-diversion scheme and by the Unified Arab Command (they made a great point of taking me right up to the border to see the Syrians digging canals in plain sight). Israel clearly anticipates a developing crisis over the Jordan Waters (and is worrying over where we stand). Finally, the embattled Israelis regarded our Hill fight to continue aid to Nasser as a capitulation after he thumbed his nose at us, burned our library and shot down our plane. All the above will give you the current frustrated mood in Israel. With all due allowance for Israeli emotionalism and shrewd bargaining tactics, it is a reality with which we must deal. Indeed, Eshkol and the others kept coming back to the larger argument that continued Soviet arms aid to the Arabs, combined now with a surprisingly coordinated Arab approach, was creating a new order of threat to Israel. This, together with the partial drying up of Israel’s European arms sources, made the US policy of avoiding direct arms supply out of date. If the US was as firmly committed to Israel’s security as we kept saying, and if our policy was to maintain a deterrent balance to forestall another Arab-Israeli war, we must become direct arms suppliers to Israel. Only this way could we deprive Nasser of his psychological victory over Bonn in the short run, and convince the Arabs that they could not overpower Israel in the long run. Eshkol also made a strong plea for early public US support on the Jordan Water issue, as a means both of reassuring the Israeli electorate and deterring the Arabs from continuing their diversion scheme. He gave me a letter (Tab A), 2 asking you to receive his Foreign Minister Golda Meir in early March to put this case personally to you after we’d had time to digest my report. Conclusions . Israel’s worries over its deteriorating security position, and its resultant mood of frustration are likely to grow, since the prospect is one of rising Arab Israeli tension over the Jordan Waters issue. 1. Therefore, unless the Arab diversion scheme loses momentum or the German action is reversed, there will be increasing Israeli pressure on us for help, regardless of what we do about Jordan arms. 2. While Israel now more fully understands the rationale for US arms for Jordan, and Eshkol and Eban at least probably see it as the least bad way out of a painful dilemma, Israel will be compelled to oppose such sales in the absence of compensatory actions tending to reduce their adverse impact. Eshkol put me on notice that he would be compelled to denounce them, especially in an election year. 3. Moreover, such US action would (a) dangerously increase already noticeable pre-emptive tendencies, aimed at warning off the Arabs from their counter-diversion schemes by overt action; and (b) increase Israel’s tendency to go nuclear, as the best means of offsetting the decline in its conventional deterrent posture. 4. Because Israel’s leaders recognize that controlled US arms sales to Jordan are probably necessary, however, they would prefer to find some way of justifying them by being able to point to other US actions favoring Israel. Their first requirement is US acceptance of principle of direct arms supply. Second, they want US agreement to supply the 90 tanks Bonn cancelled. Third, they want some arrangement which would insure that Hussein keeps his new armor on the East Bank. Fourth, they want public US support of Israel’s position on the Jordan Waters and a reiteration of our pledges to resist aggression. 5. The Israelis were somewhat reassured that we intend carefully to control and space out any Jordan arms sales, especially that we contemplate selling only 100 M–48 tanks. To the extent that we enrich the Jordan arms package we will have to enrich what we do for them. Recommendations . I believe that we can get at least quiet Israeli support of US arms sales if we do at least the following: 1. Keep the Jordan arms package at the present level , i.e. no M–48A3 tanks and no US aircraft. If we have to tell Hussein we’ll consider these later, let’s face up to this problem when we come to it. 2. Tell the Israelis privately that we will consider direct arms sales if, as, and when we jointly agree they’re required, if they in turn will give certain undertakings to us. 3. Be prepared to sell 90 M–48A1 tanks, and to say so publicly, if the Germans finally cancel. 4. Agree in principle to appropriate public statements on Jordan Waters diversion and our opposition to aggression, if we can reach a meeting of minds on Israeli restraint and get them not to insist on the letter of the Johnston Plan. In sum, we can make a deal with the Israelis by doing certain things that we would probably have to do sooner or later anyway if Arab-Israeli tensions heat up. R.W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret. 2 Eshkol’s letter to Johnson , dated February 14, is attached but not printed. 3 McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature and added a handwritten note: “This seems to me almost right. It may be that we’ll need to give Hussein 50 cents more than BOB says—but he’s very near the target on what Eshkol needs. McG.B.” He also added a postscript praising the President’s recent speech to Congress. 153. Memorandum for the Files 153. Memorandum for the Files 1 Washington, February 18, 1965. SUBJECT Near East Arms Problems PARTICIPANTS The Secretary U—Mr. Ball NEA—Mr. Talbot NEA—Mr. Jernegan NE—Rodger P. Davies The Secretary reviewed the proposed memorandum to the President on Near East arms 2 and made the following comments: In the first paragraph, “compensatory assistance for Israel” should be “balanced assistance”. The former, he thought, implied we were “paying off” Israel. Our concern, in fact, is with Israel’s security. He thought that we should not agree at this juncture to tell Jordan we would sell U.S. supersonic aircraft if their needs would not be met from other free world sources. He suggested we should do no more than agree to consider the sale. Mr. Talbot replied he felt we would have to go beyond this. Since the Jordanis were in the process of checking with the French on the Mirage, we might be faced with the problem within two weeks. The Secretary said that we should not go beyond considering sympathetically the sale of aircraft. He noted that prior to 1967 we might for a variety of reasons have to cancel the sales agreement. Paragraph 2b, the Secretary thought, implied that we would condone an Israeli attack provided it had exhausted action in the UN. He said that we must never indicate that we would endorse a preemptive attack that would be support for an aggression. He suggested that we inform the Israelis that the diversion problem should be taken to the UN where the U.S. would be prepared to lend support on the basis of the principles of the Johnston Plan. Mr. Talbot hoped the U.S. could stick with this position. The Israelis already seemed to be preparing a case on the internal and external threat to Israel, and comparing their position to that of the U.S. in Southeast Asia. The Secretary asked that the reference to an Israeli undertaking not to deploy offensive missiles be eliminated. With the UAR developing missiles, the US could not ask Israel to forego them. The Secretary said that further action with Israel and the UAR should await Hussein’s reply to our proposed memorandum following his return from Cairo. The Secretary asked why the whole problem of the Near East arms race could not be given urgent consideration in the disarmament conference in Geneva. He thought the proposals to Jordan and Israel could go forward and still leave us room to undertake such a move. Mr. Talbot undertook to explore this possibility with Mr. Foster. 1 Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, Arms Deals with Israel, Background File. Secret. 2 Evidently a draft of Rusk’s February 19 memorandum, Document 155 . 154. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 154. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, February 19, 1965, 5 p.m. 486. Deptel 473—Jordan Arms. 2 King Hussein phoned residence late evening February 18 during farewell party for Eqs and requested EmbOff call on him that night. In subsequent conversation he said he had not been able avoid arms question in conversations with Nasser but had had lengthy discussions on subject and had finally told Nasser truth about where USG-GOJ negotiations stood as result of Talbot visit. He said discussions with Nasser had not been easy and had involved separate talks with Ali Amer and UAC. He felt his argument about dangers of polarization had little if any impact on Nasser and final resolution of conflicting positions had only been achieved with greatest difficulty. Factor which influenced discussions was UAR assessment of present German-Israeli arms package (septel), but key issue on Jordan arms build-up was supersonics. He and Nasser agreed they did not want to do anything which would contribute to Israeli pressure on USG to sell 104s to Israel. On other hand they understood such a sale already consummated through Germans. However if we could give assurances 104s would not be sold to Israel during period of present agreement, he would withdraw request for 104s and ask for our help on Mirage. Nasser concurred in this. Remaining problem would be finance since Nasser insisted there would be no more UAC money and Jordan must acquire its arms within funds currently pledged for this purpose. King then handed EmbOff letter to Ambassador 3 which in summary makes following points with request they be transmitted urgently to Washington: 1. Requests he be informed ASAP of accuracy of report he has received that recent German-Israeli arms agreement includes number of American Honest John surface-to-surface missiles. 2. Requests we confirm willingness to discuss, subsequent to concluding agreement covered by draft memorandum of understanding, supply of second increment of 100 tanks of M48A3 type with 105 mm gun. 3. States that if USG confirms that no aircraft of 104 series of US or free world manufacture has been sold to Israel, if we reaffirm our policy to deny such aircraft to both Israel and Arabs for at least duration of present agreement, then Jordan will limit its request to USG assistance in acquiring free world aircraft of type at last equal to Mirage III. 4. Reaffirms intention to fulfill arms requirements from free world sources so long as such equipment is made available to Jordan. 5. Reaffirms “commitments under agreement of joint Arab defense of Arab League through which UAC developed.” Letter closes with request for earliest possible reply. Text by pouch. Comment : In view of intelligence given Hussein re FRG-Israeli arms agreement, believe it would be useful supply as many facts as possible in addition to point (1) above. Barnes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. 2 Telegram 473 to Amman, February 18, requested information on King Hussein’s meetings with Nasser in Cairo. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 155. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 155. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 19, 1965. SUBJECT Near East Arms After further consideration of the Jordan Arms request, I see no alternative to improving the package we have offered to King Hussein and agreeing to consider balanced assistance for Israel. For the reasons discussed in the enclosed memorandum, 2 this will require coordinated actions in Amman, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. These actions will be necessary to insure that the major policy shift we are making adequately protects all of our interests in the area and minimizes domestic political reactions. I recommend you approve the following actions: Jordan (1) Agree to sell ground force equipment costing about $42 million, including 100 M–48 tanks to be delivered in 1965 to 1966 rather than 1965 to 1969 as originally authorized. (2) Agree to consider selling additional ground force equipment including M–48A3 tanks with the 105 mm gun with deliveries to be made from late 1967 through 1968. (3) Cooperate with Jordan in finding suitable supersonic aircraft from Free World sources on the understanding that, if Jordan is unsuccessful, we would then tell the Jordanians we would sympathetically consider selling them 20 F–104s with deliveries starting in 1968 or 1969. (4) Reach an understanding with the King that Jordan will not station tanks on the West Bank. Israel (1) Inform Israel that if there should develop any disproportionate buildup of arms on the Arab side, we will consider making selective, direct sales on credit terms, provided Israel had exhausted all other sources of supply. (2) In return, we would expect Israel: (a) to support quietly our Jordan program and to assist in abating opposition to our aid to other Arabs and (b) not to undertake preemptive action against Arab diversion works, but, rather, take this problem to the United Nations where the United States would be prepared to support the principles of the Johnston Plan. (3) Before making any sales, we would wish Israel to accept full IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to provide assurances they would not develop a nuclear weapons capability. (4) Agree to review with Israel dangers posed by Arab diversion plans. The U.A.R. To attempt to prevent severe Arab reactions, apprise Nasser by a letter from you, of the reasons leading to our decisions to sell arms to Jordan and to consider direct sale of arms to Israel (draft enclosure 2). 3 Domestic Pressures Assuming Israel’s acquiescence in sales to Jordan, give confidential briefings to selected American Jewish leaders and members of Congress. George W. Ball 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information. It was sent to the President with a covering memorandum of February 19 from Bundy noting that a meeting was scheduled for 6:15 p.m. that day. The President met with Ball, Bundy, and Komer between 6:45 and 7:39 p.m. on February 19. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found. Bundy attached a February 19 memorandum from Komer and stated that he shared Komer’s view that the Department of State proposal was “a little heavy on the Jordan side and light on the Israeli’s.” 2 The attachment entitled “Recommendations on Near East Arms,” unsigned and undated, is not printed. 3 The draft letter is not attached. A handwritten note by Komer states that the draft was detached for redrafting. 4 Ball signed for the Secretary above Rusk’s typed signature. 156. Editorial Note 156. Editorial Note In a 13-minute telephone conversation on February 20, 1965, President Johnson discussed the question of arms sales to Jordan with New York banker Abraham Feinberg, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Trust Company. Feinberg said that McGeorge Bundy had suggested he call because the President was on the horns of a dilemma with respect to the Jordan situation and felt he had not heard a clear expression of Israeli views. (Johnson indicated later in the conversation that he had received indirect reports that Ambassador Harman was expressing opposition to arms sales to Jordan.) Feinberg told Johnson that he had given Bundy a rundown of the Israeli point of view as he had received it in a conversation that morning. He said the way to get a clear expression of Israeli views was to let Prime Minister Eshkol send Foreign Minister Golda Meir to Washington and meet with her. Johnson said they had reviewed this proposal a couple of days earlier and he thought it would be “about the worst thing that could happen” because it would attract worldwide attention. He said he had asked Averell Harriman and Robert Komer to go to Israel to talk to Eshkol, tell him the importance that Johnson’s advisers attached to responding to King Hussein’s request for arms, and obtain his views. Johnson told Feinberg: “We can go one of two ways, and I’m willing to go either way. If the Israel friends in this country want to substitute their judgment about the consequences of Soviet planes and don’t think it makes much difference, kind of like Mike Feldman argued in the meetings up here, I’m prepared to tell my advisers that that is the course. I’d be perfectly willing. I don’t look with much approval on becoming a munitions maker.” He continued in this vein, telling Feinberg that he would leave the decision to Eshkol but making it clear that he thought failure to provide arms to Jordan would lead to disastrous results. He indicated that if the United States did not sell arms to Jordan, it would not sell arms to Israel. His judgment and that of his advisers, he told Feinberg, was that they should not let King Hussein “go down the river,” but “if you want to turn him over and have a complete Soviet bloc—well, we’ll just have to, and we’ll get out of the arms business.” He would let the Israelis make the decision, he told Feinberg, “but it’s got to be in or out. If we go in, of course we’ve got to be of some help to Israel. If we get out, then we’ve just got to say, well, we’re not taking part, we’re not going to supply arms to one side or the other, we’re just not going to be in here to sell a lot of munitions.” Feinberg said one of Israel’s major concerns was that the United States would reach an agreement with Jordan without further discussion with Israel. He again raised the question of a Meir visit. Johnson again rejected it. He repeated his view of the importance of selling arms to Jordan but said again that the decision was up to Israel: “What I want is, I want Eshkol to tell me what he wants to do. And I don’t want him to just tell me, I want him to tell the people over here what he wants to do.” He repeated that “we’ll furnish both of you” but if Israel did not want that, “we’ll furnish nobody.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Feinberg, February 20, 1965, 11 a.m., Tape F65.08, PNO 1–2) 157. Memorandum From President Johnson to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 157. Memorandum From President Johnson to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, February 21, 1965. Following on Mr. Komer’s earlier mission, I want you both to impress vigorously on Prime Minister Eshkol and others why they and we confront momentous decisions on aid to Jordan. We have postponed acting as long as possible and now believe that we can delay no longer. We must decide within the next few days. Therefore, I am sending you out to consult with the Government of Israel once again. Your job is to require the Israelis to face up to the hard choice involved. 2 I. You should explain fully again why we regard it as the lesser of evils to sell a limited amount of US arms to Jordan. You may describe how we are now within sight of an arrangement which will enable Hussein to withstand UAC pressures while still minimizing the threat to Israel. You should candidly outline all the built-in restrictions which we have devised to control the military threat to Israel posed by these sales: (a) present commitment limited to M–48 tanks; (b) no F–104 aircraft, provided that the US does not sell them to Israel either; (c) only a $42 million ground force package spaced out over two plus years; (d) a credit margin of not more than $15 million at any given time; (e) a clear understanding on Hussein’s part that he must obtain outside financing and that if not there will be no further deliveries; (f) no Soviet arms in Jordan. II. If, despite all your arguments, the Israelis insist that our Jordan proposals are totally unacceptable, you should use the following negotiating tactic. Remind them in no uncertain terms that we have made these proposals primarily because of our own deep concern over Israel’s security. We have no major interests of our own in Jordan. We have been supporting it, at a cost of roughly one-half billion dollars to date, primarily as a means of preserving stability in the area; among other things, this has been of obvious advantage to Israel. It is my own judgment, buttressed by those of all of my advisers, that if we do not help King Hussein out of his dilemma, Jordan will be compelled to accept much larger quantities of Soviet arms. If this occurs, we have told King Hussein we will have to cut off all aid. The almost certain result in our judgment will be Nasserite domination of Jordan. Then Israel will be hemmed in by a hostile Arab ring, with Soviet arms on the East Bank. I cannot quite understand why the Israeli Government should take such a totally different view from that of all my top advisers. Is Israel prepared to live with the likely result? The US can do so more easily than Israel. It is hard enough for me to get foreign aid through Congress without having also to defend aid to Nasser and aid to Hussein, which we regard as so much in Israel’s interest. At least we can save money and avoid controversy in the US. But Israel must realize the likely cost to us and to it if we lose much of our influence in the Arab world. Israel should be quite clear that it is faced with an even more grave judgment of policy than is the United States. The maintenance of some effective US presence and influence in the Arab world has proved of incalculable value to the security of Israel. Should the Arab world be unified and organized on the basis of Nasserite and Soviet influence and direction, the threat to Israel security would be fundamentally worsened. Israel should not rely upon the willingness of the American people to undertake unlimited commitments under circumstances where Israel’s own attitude has prevented the use of diplomacy to avoid a military confrontation between the tiny beachhead of Israel and the combined Arab-Soviet forces which could be mobilized in that part of the world. These are considerations which Israel must take into account against the background of the probable attitudes of the American people as a whole. You should also make clear that, regardless of Israel’s decision, the US cannot accept Israeli aggressive action against Jordan simply because the latter receives Soviet arms and adopts more pro-UAR policies. We opposed such pre-emptive action before, and we will be compelled to oppose it again—in accordance with the firm US policy last stated on 8 May 1963. III. On the other hand, if we and Israel can reach a firm mutual understanding on the wisdom of the course we propose, I am prepared to have you discuss the larger Israeli political and security concerns conveyed to me by Mr. Komer. First of all , I am well aware that however much the Israeli Government might itself be persuaded of our mutual interest in aid to Jordan, Prime Minister Eshkol would still have acute political difficulty in explaining to his electorate why US arms sales to an ostensibly hostile Arab state for an overtly anti-Israeli enterprise are actually the lesser of two evils. But he in turn must be brought to realize that I would have much the same problem here. Moreover, if we went too far in our explanations we would compromise King Hussein, thus defeating the very purpose we seek to advance. However, I am confident that, given mutual understanding and close coordination, we can work out this political problem. What I need is to be able to say privately that the Israeli Government supports what we do, even if it cannot publicly applaud, and to have that Government back up my words. In turn Prime Minister Eshkol needs to be enabled to say that Israel’s security needs can be adequately met and that Israel can face the future with confidence in the strong support of its friends. Second , I gather that Israel’s chief concern is over the possible growing threat from the continuing buildup of Soviet arms in hostile Arab hands. Our longstanding policy, which we believe to have been in Israel’s interest too, has been to avoid becoming a supplier of “offensive” arms to Israel or the key Arab states. We have preferred that Israel look to its traditional Western European sources. West Germany’s cancellation of its arms aid to Israel without consultation naturally was a deeply disturbing development. We still prefer that Israel seek maximum help from European sources. However, if there is a meeting of minds on other matters and if the US and Israel agree that a disproportionate arms buildup on the Arab side is developing which cannot be otherwise met, the US will make selective direct sales on favorable credit terms. Eshkol must understand that we do not make such a major change in US policy lightly, and that I personally have grave misgivings over the potentially disastrous effects on our relations with the Arab states. Under the circumstances, we must employ the utmost delicacy in making the shift and in controlling the attendant public disclosure. We would expect to meet any Israeli needs on a quiet case-by-case basis, with minimum attendant publicity. I would require a firm pledge from GOI to collaborate fully in this respect. Nor do I regard Israel as having any immediate arms needs from us. We still see hope that West Germany may deliver the remaining 90 M–48 tanks at issue. Even if not, Israel is getting 60 M–48s and 247 Centurions from the UK. Should it become necessary, however, we will later consider replacing the 90 M–48 tanks. Third , we recognize that Israel’s concerns over any expansion of Jordan’s forces relate largely to the geographic threat posed. King Hussein has assured us that he intends to keep his armor on the East Bank of the Jordan. We will ask him for a firm private undertaking to that effect, provided that Israel will promise to keep it secret. Fourth , Israel has raised the issue of the threat posed by the Arab counter-diversion scheme and the United Arab Command buildup. You may say that we are prepared to discuss this matter fully with Israel, though our view of the dangers posed is considerably less alarmist than theirs. However, we are prepared to reiterate at an appropriate time both our policy of opposition to aggression in the Near East and our support for the Unified Plan as an equitable standard by which to judge water usage by riparian states. IV. I regard the actions proposed by us as a major contribution to Israel’s security, and wish you to emphasize how they further demonstrate the firm support which we have always given Israel. However, such far-reaching steps must meet with a commensurate Israeli response. Therefore, in return we must have certain firm undertakings from the Israeli Government. These are an integral part of any program of mutual reassurances; they must be considered as a package, and accepted as such. I do not propose to have Israel take what it likes and then argue with us about the rest. A. As already indicated we want Israel’s quiet but unmistakable support of our Jordan arms program and its help in abating opposition to our efforts to maintain some sort of a presence in the other Arab states. B. We must have a pledge of full secrecy on all matters discussed by you and all subsequent actions taken until the US decides, in consultation with Israel, how and when to divulge them. C. Given the strengthening of Israeli security by the actions we contemplate, we wish a firm written reiteration of Israel’s intentions not to develop nuclear weapons, and that Israel certify this by accepting IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. So long as we receive the pledge, however, I do not insist on acceptance of IAEA controls now. D. The US cannot accept Israeli pre-emptive action against the Arab diversion works, but must instead have Israeli agreement to take this problem to the United Nations, where the US would be prepared to support the principle of the Johnston Plan. V. Finally, I want you to emphasize that in our judgment we have only a few days left before we must either sign a sales agreement with King Hussein or see him go the UAR/Soviet route. We have stalled him past the danger point. Therefore, we cannot and will not engage in extended bargaining with Israel. It must decide now on which course it prefers. Our choice is either to sell arms to both Israel and Jordan or to sell arms to neither. We could not have been more forthcoming in our response. In turn I expect Israel to display the spirit of statesmanlike understanding of US problems in the Middle East which has often been lacking in the past, but which can now open a new, hopeful road to the future. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel Security (Harriman/Komer Mission), Feb.–Mar. 1965. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy is filed with a covering memorandum from Komer to the President, which indicates that Komer drafted the memorandum and had cleared it with Rusk and Ball. Komer added, “With an eye to history (it might get published twenty years after), they toned down some of the flavor of your approach the other night, but I have it firmly in mind for oral use.” (Ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. IV) 2 Telegram 776 to Tel Aviv, February 20, informed Barbour that the President was sending Harriman and Komer to Tel Aviv for confidential discussions and instructed him to inform Eshkol. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Notes of telephone conversations between February 20 and 23 between Ball and the President and other officials concerning plans for Harriman’s trip are in the Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Israel. 158. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 158. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 25, 1965, 10 p.m. 1037. For Secretary from Harriman and Komer. First day’s talks with Eshkol went well. 2 We and Barbour believe across the board understanding can be reached along lines Presidential instruction with only minor modification. Israelis accept reaffirmation of nuclear self-denial but IAEA only if UAR does likewise and that there can be no pre-emption on Jordan waters till every peaceful recourse exhausted. However, they strongly doubt utility of taking water issue to UN. PriMin has asked that we agree to understanding in writing so that at proper time he can bring his Cabinet colleagues on board. He obviously must consult Cabinet on any matter of such gravity, but firmly promises there will be no leaks. Recommend that to tie down this sensitive and complex matter we be authorized to initial memorandum of agreement along lines appropriate portions Sections III and IV of Presidential instruction. Will submit proposed text tomorrow Friday but request authorization before next meeting with PriMin at 3 p.m. local time Friday to indicate to him that USG prepared in principle to initial a memorandum of agreement along above lines. Barbour 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 3:35 p.m. and passed to the White House. 2 Harriman, Komer, and Barbour met twice with Eshkol, Meir, and Bitan on February 25. First Secretary Stephen E. Palmer was present at both sessions; Russell was present at the first. Memoranda of these conversations and other conversations held during the Harriman/Komer visit are ibid., Israel, Vol. IV, and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. 159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 25, 1965, 7:50 p.m. 818. For Harriman and Komer. Ref: Your 1037. 2 We will endeavor to get a decision to you promptly on initialling memorandum of understanding along lines of Sections III and IV of Presidential instructions. Meanwhile, in further talks with Israelis you should point out that we regard IAEA safeguards as question between us and Israel, not dependent on UAR accession.FYI. You will recall Nasser has told us he will consider IAEA safeguards when he obtains nuclear reactor of sufficient size as to make question significant. End FYI. If and when we should obtain evidence UAR attempting to develop nuclear capability, we would press Cairo hard to accept IAEA safeguards. On question of pre-emption in Jordan waters dispute, you will recall strong objection here to asking Israel to hold its hand only “until every peaceful recourse exhausted.” Phrasing in Presidential instructions accurately reflects our firm view that U.S. cannot at any time accept Israeli pre-emptive action against Arab diversion works, but must instead have Israeli agreement to take this problem to the United Nations, where U.S. would be prepared to support principles of Johnston Plan. We are delighted at your encouraging progress. Further instructions will be forwarded as soon as possible, though cannot promise decisions in time for meeting with Eshkol Friday. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot and approved by Ball. 2 Document 158 . 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 26, 1965, 1:42 p.m. 823. For Harriman. Tel Aviv 1037, 2 1039. 3 Following telegram cleared at highest level. We can see virtue in reducing our understanding with GOI to an explicit statement. We believe that this understanding should be expressed in two simultaneous separate documents. The first would be a memorandum initialed by both parties along the following lines: 1. The Governments of the United States and of Israel agree that full secrecy shall be maintained on all matters referred to herein and all subsequent actions taken in this connection, until the two Governments agree on how and when to divulge them. 2. The United States agrees to review with Israel the dangers posed by the Arab counter-diversion scheme and the Unified Arab Command build-up. 3. The United States is prepared to reiterate at an appropriate time both its policy of opposition to aggression in the Near East and its support for the Unified Plan as an equitable standard by which to judge Jordan water usage by riparian states. 4. The United States will seek a firm private assurance from King Hussein that he intends to keep his armor on the East Bank of the Jordan. 5. The United States will undertake to make selective direct sales of military equipment to Israel, if the United States and Israel agree that a disproportionate arms build-up on the Arab side is developing which cannot be otherwise met. Any such sales would be arranged on a quiet case-by-case basis, with minimum attendant publicity, after Israel had made maximum efforts to obtain its requirements from Western European sources. 6. The Government of Israel pledges not to develop or obtain nuclear weapons and, before any direct sale of arms is initiated, will certify this by accepting IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. 7. Israel undertakes not to embark on preemptive action against the Arab Jordan diversion works, but to utilize all peaceful recourse including the United Nations. 4 FYI If Israelis insist you may add “where the United States would be prepared to support the principles of the Unified Plan.” End FYI. As a part of the over-all agreement you should insist upon a letter from Eshkol to the President which might read as follows: “Dear Mr. President: I greatly appreciate your consideration in sending Governor Harriman to discuss with us in depth the problems our two Governments face in connection with the developing situation in the Middle East. We have, I think, come to a full understanding. Governor Harriman has made clear the concern of your Government for the maintenance of the security of Israel. On my part, I want you to know that we shall be as understanding as possible in helping you to meet some of the heavy responsibilities that you bear. I am, therefore, prepared to assure you that the actions of my Government will consistently reflect the following considerations: (1) We believe that it is both necessary and useful for the US to maintain an effective influence and presence in the Arab world; (2) We accept the need for the US to provide certain military equipment to Jordan; (3) Should it prove necessary for the US to make direct sales of military equipment to Israel we will cooperate fully to minimize the resultant strains on US relations with other states in the area.” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66 DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot, Davies, and Ball; cleared by Bromley Smith for the President; and approved by Ball. 2 Document 158 . 3 The reference should be to telegram 1038 from Tel Aviv, February 26, which stated that Harriman had not been able to convince the Israelis to agree that rather than taking preemptive action they would take the water problem to the United Nations. It proposed alternative language for his instructions as follows: “Israel must agree not to embark on pre-emptive action but to undertake to exhaust all peaceful recourse including the United Nations.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Telegram 1039 from Tel Aviv, February 26, reported Harriman’s unsuccessful effort to assuage Israeli anger at the West German Government. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 ISR) 4 Talbot told Ball in a telephone conversation at 12:50 p.m. on February 26 that the President had read the outgoing telegram and approved the word “utilize” rather than “associate.” (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Israel) 161. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 161. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 26, 1965, 9:45 p.m. 1050. From Harriman. Embtel 1037. 2 I opened day long sessions February 25 saying the President is following closely current Israel-Arab situation. After summarizing critical world security situation, I outlined our analysis of current Middle East realities. I particularly stressed that it imperative Israel-Arab confrontation not become polarized on West-East lines. Noting we must make decision on Jordan arms within few days, I reviewed rationale this step at length. Then I reiterated President’s basic commitment to Israel’s security. In ensuing discussion: I emphasized significance of President’s willingness to consider direct sales of such military equipment as Israel needs and cannot obtain from traditional sources. I stressed essentiality there be no publicity about what we might agree re principle of arms supply to Israel. I requested GOI seek quietly to influence Jewish community in US to abide by such conclusions as we may reach on this and Jordan arms. Mrs. Meir asked if our arms aid to Jordan would continue if the Soviets gave Jordan economic aid. I stressed that a major purpose of our Jordan policy was to keep Soviet influence out. It came out eventually that what she had in mind was concern that Soviet financial assistance directly or indirectly enable Jordan to continue water diversion plan, i.e., Mukieba Dam. Eshkol said Jordan waters issue was fundamental “first test” for him. In lengthy back and forth, he urged we directly press Jordanians and Lebanese to desist from cooperating in diversion projects. Eshkol bore in on arms supply problem. He asked that simultaneously with our agreement to meet Jordanian arms requirements as outlined by us, we commit ourselves to add to Israel’s deterrent by announcing we would insure it maintain adequate arms balance. Eshkol called for active USG assistance re establishment Israeli full diplomatic relations with Iran, Turkey, India. PriMin called on us to move Embassy to Jerusalem. He even brought up Suez transit question. I rebutted that public declaration re our arms policy must be made at time and in manner considered most opportune. I insisted on Israel’s undertaking not to strike against Arab diversion projects; that she must take peaceful road, including UN, to resolve Jordan waters crisis. Subsequently I repeated this theme in clearest possible formulations several times. On nuclear question, I requested Israel’s continued undertaking that it would not build weapons, and would consent to IAEA observation. Eshkol agreed to reaffirm non-nuclear undertaking, but said Israel would accept IAEA controls “together with Nasser.” I reiterated our strong feeling that we should not now announce any change in our area arms policy, and in this connection, that we still have the problem of Israel’s acquiescence in Jordan arms deals. When there is actual US delivery of weapons to Israel, we could then consider public announcement. I stressed historic significance of President’s willingness to consider direct arms supply in context of other understandings we seek. We pointed out we have in mind Hawk-type credit terms, not grant supply. In answer to my question regarding undelivered equipment under German deal, Israelis seemed satisfied submarines would be delivered directly from Britain, but were particularly concerned over small naval craft (Schnellbooten) as well as tanks. Mrs. Meir characterized Lebanon’s and Jordan’s recent accommodations to Nasserist pressure as frightening. She contended King Hussein would at every step raise the ante by threatening to turn to Soviets. She professed to be upset about recent USG-GOI discussions of Jordan waters. Afternoon Session Talks almost entirely on Jordan waters, with Meir reaching for all possible ammunition to point out dangers to Johnston Plan in recourse to UN. Vigorous exchange followed predictable lines. I told them we are willing to discuss ways and means whereby our support in principle of Johnston Plan allocations could be effectuated in UN context. We emphasized that in event Soviet veto putting Jordan waters issue before world, public opinion could not help but improve Israel’s case. I was quite harsh in countering Mrs. Meir’s scornful appreciation of Security Council’s role. We stressed that when Israel undertook not to launch pre-emptive military action against Arab preserve, we would be willing, anytime, anywhere discuss any methods of peaceful approach. As meeting concluded, Eshkol asked for “something in writing” re arms supply to Israel. We stressed confidential nature of our discussions, and said we would consider this among other related subjects prior to 3:00 p.m. meeting Friday. Various members of PriMin’s suite have emphasized to our aides “necessity” for some very early public indication of USG willingness supply arms directly and openly to Israel. In side conversations we have stressed that if watershed in our policy is to be crossed, GOI may have to steel itself to endure considerable short range domestic political flak. Komer saw Peres morning Feb 26 in effort to persuade latter of full significance President’s package; that there no time for GOI to bargain over wrapping. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 3:48 p.m. and passed to the White House. 2 Document 158 . 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 26, 1965, 10 p.m. 1051. From Harriman. Our discussion with Israelis this afternoon took a negative turn. Eshkol was accompanied by Mrs. Meir, Peres, Levavi, and General Rabin. He read from a memo based, he maintained, on our previous discussions. In fact, however, he included about everything Israel would like to have us committed to, including arms to Israel to counter Soviet supply to Arabs. General Rabin then presented in graphic form present and future Arab-Israel air and tank relative capabilities. I countered by reading from memo outlining commitments we expect Israel to make in conjunction with US consideration of direct supply arms to Israel as based on my instructions. After emotional statements by Eshkol and Mrs. Meir and a cooler analysis by Peres, it was agreed that Peres and Levavi should meet with Komer and Barbour this evening, hopefully to arrive at meeting of minds. 2 I agreed to meet with Eshkol tomorrow to consider outcome tonight’s session. We will surely be asked to reaffirm assurances to Israel we have already given. In addition, Israelis will probably insist we make more definite commitment supply military equipment than my instructions cover, particularly make-up 90 German tank shortfall plus off-set to growing Arab strengthening of Jordan as well as improved Soviet equipment to UAR. Possibly we may also be asked for: (a) earlier public statement than we want of US agreement to direct arms supply with consideration of some grants if arms race goes beyond Israel’s means; (b) if peaceful effort fails to control spite diversion Jordan headwaters, our non-intervention with Israeli direct action. I may have message later tonight requiring reply soonest. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Harriman reported in telegram 1052 from Tel Aviv, February 26, that the evening discussion resulted in some agreement but that the participants failed to agree on a satisfactory Israeli assurance to use all peaceful recourse on the water issue or on the manner in which quiet Israeli acquiescence in the Jordan arms sale would be expressed. In addition, although the Israelis agreed to a restatement of nuclear self-denial, they were unwilling to accept IAEA controls. (Ibid.) 163. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 163. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 27, 1965, midnight. 1057. For the President, Rusk and McNamara. Personal from Harriman. Part I. Fourth meeting with Eshkol today moved up closer to broad meeting of minds, though it hard going. 2 While Israelis still hard keep bargaining till we concede as much as possible, they finally got down to brass tacks after emotional session yesterday when they first saw our terms in cold print. (Eshkol said no risk of their disclosing this draft since it much too damaging to Israel.) Komer later told Peres no agreement possible unless all our desiderata met. Then at fourth session I laid it on line about only alternative to US/Israeli agreement, precisely as outlined in Sections II and V of Presidential instruction. I made clear consequences to Israel and US if Jordan lost to West because US decided against arms deal in light Israeli opposition or because Israelis fiddled while Rome burned. Asked immediate answer. While Prime Minister was shaken, he said heart of matter was what US could provide Israel. He appreciated proposed major change US policy to direct sales to Israel as well as Arabs, but how could he convince his Cabinet? He couldn’t say that he agreed to actual US sales to Jordan, which would promptly be publicized by Arabs and then seized upon by his political foes, in return for generalized and secret promise US in principle agreed to unspecified direct sales to Israel at some future date—and this only in return for series of Israeli undertakings which could be political dynamite for him. He urged we forget about other US requests, and focus on central problem of precisely how US could concretely demonstrate this change in policy simultaneously with Jordan arms sale. Eshkol reviewed deterioration Israel’s deterrent posture since Washington intelligence talks almost year ago, citing new USSR/Egypt arms deal, new specter of coordinated Arab action through Unified Arab Command, and cancellation German/Israel arms agreement. This created two acute problems as how Israel’s increased security needs to be met and how he could bring his Cabinet and electorate along with him if he did what President Johnson requested. To meet security need, Israel must have hardware—planes and tanks. He couldn’t go to his Cabinet and get even their tacit support of US arms sales to Jordan (however friendly an enemy) without showing them Israel could get its hands on hardware too. Since a deterrent balance was essential, Israel’s first need was bombers to create counter-threat to Soviet Badgers and IL–28’s in UAR, Iraqi, Syrian hands. What Israel would really like was US Phantom, but he realized this impossible. Next he would buy Mirage IV, but with electronics it cost $5 million per copy. So Israel had decided best bet was old 1954 model B–66, which it understood US now phasing out. Since Israel’s resources were so limited, would we let Israel buy 75 of these at cheapest second hand price ? (Peres had told Komer in morning that reason for 75 was that US spare parts production had ceased; so Israelis would cannibalize some for spare parts.) Peres noted B–66 good for conventional payload. Second was Israel’s need for tanks, which had been fully agreed in previous Washington talks. Now Bonn had backed out. He must tell Cabinet that at least Israel’s previously accepted tanks needs would be met regardless, especially since threat of US tanks in Jordan must now be added to that from Soviet tanks in Arab hands. Even if he agreed that the US should sell $50 million in arms to Jordan, we must also see his political problem. He couldn’t say merely that the US sold tanks to Jordan because this was better than Soviet tanks in Jordan. So there must be some public “conjunction” between what US sold Israel and US sold Jordan. When it came out that we had made arms sale to Jordan, he must be able to tell his public we were going sell arms to Israel too. Once it became known that we were selling tanks to Jordan he must be able say we were doing same for Israel. Finally, because of new deterioration Israel’s security position he must at least be able to say US would sell surplus B–66 planes to Israel too. He couldn’t meet his acute political problem without some such coordinated disclosure. Part II follows. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 5:26 p.m. 2 A more detailed account of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 1091 from Tel Aviv, March 2, supplemented by a memorandum of conversation drafted on March 19. (Both ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) 164. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 164. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 27, 1965, midnight. 1058. For the President, Rusk and McNamara. Personal from Harriman. Part II. US Response. I gave Eshkol no encouragement. I said this first we’d heard of B–66 request, and could hardly express any opinion. Eshkol urged that I at least submit to Washington. I agreed, though saying could in no way predict early answer to wholly new proposal which would hit Washington cold on weekend. Meanwhile Jordan matter couldn’t wait. Komer took up cudgels, reminding Eshkol that at first meeting PriMin had said Israel’s security had priority over his own political problems. Washington insisted. But one thing he would say without hesitation was that, whatever US interim response,USG could not reach decision on such major request quickly nor in any way accept concept of simultaneous publicity. There no point even discussing this. President felt that in proposing basic shift in long-standing US arms policy he had made far-reaching new step toward helping meet Israel’s security needs. In effect, Israelis saying they could not accept US word but must see results too. Perhaps Washington might agree elaborate our offer to include promise consider tank and even plane requests. But one thing certain, US was not going to invite disaster like that Bonn just had with Cairo. Even if USG prepared entertain specific arms requests, Komer certain USG would insist adamantly that timing and nature of disclosure must be fully in US hands. No point in even referring Israeli requests to Washington if simultaneous disclosure with Jordan sales also mandatory. Eshkol granted security needs more important than political requirements. If USG prepared indicate it willing respond favorably on M–48’s and B–66’s US could decide how matter should be publicized. However Israel must be consulted. He thought he could assure compliance on secrecy. We believe that meeting of minds reached on absolute US requirement for secrecy insofar as possible. I then insisted only US package proposal could be considered. As President has instructed me, we could not agree even to direct arms sales in principle unless other US conditions met. Will report further on these, but highlights are: A. Eshkol only willing reiterate existing public commitment “not be first to introduce nuclear weapons into Near East.” He insisted this most he able get through Israeli Cabinet. It politically impossible agree on IAEA controls until all other major potential proliferators do so, not just UAR. B. Jordan waters problem consumed most time, as in other meetings. Mrs. Meir carried ball. Eshkol willing give secret promise end or “exhaust” all peaceful means solution but unwilling so far have any mention recourse to UN. Israelis also insist US agree to all-out support precise allocations Johnston Plan and “oppose” any Arab deviation. They propose we reserve both UN angle and degree US support of Johnston Plan for later full discussion. C. As to quiet Israeli support for US arms sales to Jordan, I stressed President Johnson’s political requirement, which he saw as in Israel’s own interest. I made clear Israeli acceptance our needs here indispensable to any agreement. I believe Israelis will accept our position provided other matters settled. I gave no ground on three issues above, but will submit recommendations later. My comments on key issue of US arms sales follow in Part III. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 6:12 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 165. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 165. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 28, 1965, 4 a.m. 1060. For the President, Rusk and McNamara. Personal from Harriman. Part III. Comments . We have stood foursquare on President’s instructions. I am also quite mindful of Secretary’s desire we stick it out until understanding reached. Increasingly clear that key to matter is fact Eshkol, with his relatively unstable coalition government, faces real difficulty in carrying his Cabinet even as far as tacit acceptance US arms sales to Jordan. Eshkol says he can only get Cabinet acceptance Jordan arms deal, and their collaboration on essential secrecy, if Cabinet can get feel of actual hardware, not merely of carefully hedged statement that US will eventually make some kind of direct sale. Frankly, I believe we must give Israelis some hope on hardware if we want a deal in time to give Hussein his answer. Minimum needed is a promise to consider favorably Israel’s tank and plane requests, subject of course to later agreement on type, number, price, delivery schedules and timing of each step in each specific sale. This seems relatively small added price for larger agreement we seek. It is essential to lend credibility to our commitment to direct sales. Nor do I see it as involving more than a spelling out of our general undertaking, under which it is implicit anyway. We can’t avoid selling tanks, or planes either, at some point. So the more specific we can make this undertaking the more quickly agreement can be reached, and the more leverage we have on other points we want. I believe that if we in position to satisfy Eshkol on provision hardware, we can reach prompt meeting of minds on our desiderata at least to extent that Israelis will 1) tolerate i.e. acquiesce in our Jordan arms supply and will so advise their Ambassador and their key friends, 2) maintain maximum secrecy re arms sales provided we agree coordinate public statements when matters become public knowledge, 3) understand that US will oppose use of force to preempt Arab water diversion and be prepared with our cooperation to have recourse to all peaceful means to prevent such diversion, which includes resort to UN in some manner without specific mention, 4) reaffirm what they have already stated as to their intention not to embark on nuclear weapons program, leaving question of IAEA to future. We have of course not in any way accepted the above, and will continue trying to improve on it. Believe some chance of doing so, but am not so sanguine even in event extended bargaining. Therefore, Komer, Barbour and I recommend adding some more specific wording to key para on direct arms sales in 21 February 1965 Presidential instruction. We suggest following addition after underlined portion at end of that para. 2 “USG recognizes that Israel’s highest priority arms needs are for (a) replacement of 90 M–48 tanks if West Germany fails to meet this commitment; and (b) certain aircraft such as the B–66.USG is willing to consider favorably sale of such items provided all above conditions are met.” Request further negotiating instructions. I realize weekend burden this places on you, but would be most grateful for earliest answer, if possible by noon local time 28 February. Also, if B–66 or comparable aircraft at all in cards, would appreciate such positive or negative info on general availability and possible timing of delivery as I could be authorized pass to Israelis. Am of course prepared stay as long as desired, but suggest that the longer we stay the more it will look as though we engaged in detailed negotiations. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 9:58 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 2 The underlined portion is italicized in Document 157 . 166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 28, 1965, 12:56 a.m. 843. For Harriman from the Secretary. Embtels 1057, 1058, 1059 and 1060. 2 The President has approved two amendments to instructions contained in Deptel 823. 3 (1) Add to numbered para 5 following language: “USG recognizes that Israel’s highest priority arms need is for the completion of the tank program which had been arranged with West Germany. It is prepared to consider sympathetically this need if West German deliveries are not completed.” (2) Substitute following language for numbered para 6: “Israel agrees to provide the USG with complete assurances with respect to the non-acquisition and non-manufacture of nuclear weapons and will give favorable consideration to the acceptance of IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable.” We cannot agree at this time to inject bombers into Near Eastern situation. General language of numbered para 5 of course leaves it open to Israelis to raise this question with us later. Regarding substitute language on IAEA, you should make it clear that we cannot accept that Israeli situation is tied to problems in other parts of the world rather than solely to the situation in the Arab states. We can conceive of no threat of any kind to Israel from any non-Arab state and in particular from such potential nuclear powers as India. Language used means that at minimum we would expect Israeli acceptance of IAEA whenever Nasser similarly accepted those controls. It may be useful for you to have in mind that IAEA controls on nuclear materials can be tailored by negotiation to meet specific circumstances and conditions. For example, agreements can be either for indefinite duration or a specified period. They can also include escape clauses which may provide that any party can terminate on a certain period of notice or that they may be terminated if a certain set of circumstances materializes. If negotiating situation makes it seem useful, you might put forward idea that Israeli acceptance of IAEA controls could contain escape clause to effect that agreement could be terminated by Israel if any Arab state acquired nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons and, within a given period, refused to accept IAEA or other controls satisfactory to GOI. You should, however, put forward any such thought as your own idea and strictly ad referendum. We hope these amendments will enable you conclude deal 28th. We deeply appreciate stout efforts and able presentation you have made during past three days. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jernegan and Talbot, cleared by Rusk with the President by telephone, and approved by Rusk. A message to Komer from Bromley Smith, February 28, states that the reply was cleared with the President after he read Harriman’s 3-part message and that the telegram was dictated by Rusk after discussion with the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) Rusk called the President to call Harriman’s message to his attention and cleared the two amendments with him. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversations Between Johnson and Rusk, February 28, 1965, 11:12 and 11:37 p.m., Tape F65.09, PNO 5–6) 2 For telegrams 1057, 1058, and 1060, see Documents 163 - 165 . Telegram 1059 from Tel Aviv, February 28, reported that Eshkol pressed for a U.S. commitment not only on tanks and planes but on timing and that Peres indicated Israel would not insist on the B–66 if a comparable aircraft was available. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR) 3 Document 160 . 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 28, 1965, 11 p.m. 1064. For the President, Rusk, McNamara—from Harriman. At Eshkol’s request I agreed to send him memorandum of understanding and letter to the President (Deptel 823 as amended by 843) 2 before our meeting this afternoon. As Komer had an engagement with Peres preceding the meeting, I gave him these papers to deliver. Peres took papers to Eshkol and returned after one hour, just before I arrived, to tell Komer Eshkol felt no agreement was possible on basis these drafts. Eshkol suggested brief meeting to conclude our talks gracefully and submitted draft communique (see septel). 3 Komer deduced from reference to continued talks that this meant Mrs. Meir projected visit this month. In effort to head this off Komer urged on Peres that Mrs. Meir visit counterproductive. Peres commented that I was only one who could say this to Eshkol. Under these circumstances I asked Barbour to arrange for me to see the PriMin alone instead of as large group. In this personal talk, Eshkol told me he had discussion with Cabinet and it was impossible for him to put through our proposed arrangements. He explained nothing was offered except indefinite assurances. When I referred to sentence on replacement German tanks he commented “sympathetic consideration” did not have the meaning to the Jews that I assumed. These words had been used for years, going back to the days of the Balfour Declaration, only to produce disappointments. After long but calm argument as to whether US Government intentions could be trusted he agreed but maintained something definite had to be settled now to reassure his colleagues. He underlined changes for the worse to Israel’s security since his visit to Washington last June and asked why could we not at least make some gesture which would justify him with his Cabinet in acquiescing to our Jordan arms deal. If planes are not available why not some more tanks. (He referred to the 232 M48A3s they had hoped to get, against the 150 finally agreed to.) The upshot was that he proposes Jordan deal be held up a week. Peres and General Rabin go to Washington quietly at once to review change in Israel’s military situation with the hope that a specific deal can be agreed to for a limited amount of hardware (a few tanks or planes). Eshkol would then expect to get his Cabinet to go along with Jordan sale, and agree to no publicity on our arms sales to Israel as we want. I had previously told him Mrs. Meir was not the one to send to Washington. I had to admit however that the matters relating to peaceful methods, including recourse to United Nations on the Jordan water problem, were in her field. Eshkol suggested we work together in any way we wanted to explore all peaceful means to deal with this problem. Israel wanted more than anyone a peaceful way to get its share of the water. Eshkol assured me I could state to the President that Israel had no military intentions at the present time and that certainly no action would be taken while they were working with us on every possible peaceful solution. Eshkol agreed to carry on discussions with us on this subject in any way or in any place we wanted. On nuclear problem Eshkol again gave assurance Israel had no plans for development nuclear weapons. He accepted my statement that the President felt one of his chief world responsibilities was to prevent nuclear proliferation, particularly since Red China’s detonation, and said he wanted to cooperate. However he explained he could not get his AE Commission to accept IAEA without some specific consideration such as Nasser agreeing as well. However he wanted to assure the President Israel wanted to help and would not make the President’s task more difficult. Taking the above and my previous talks into consideration, I recommend that (1) We divide up our package—I think we will do better with them separately. (2) Eshkol be permitted to send Peres and Rabin to Washington quietly, and Hussein be held off for a week. (3) Dept after consultation with Stevenson decide how to proceed with Israel on Jordan water problem. (4) We continue our pressure on IAEA inspection nuclear facilities in context of nuclear problem. Eshkol is not dominant in Israel. He is well meaning but does not control. I feel that in the long run we will do better with him if we try to understand his political problems and negotiate realistically on each matter. He knows tough trading, but is susceptible to friendly understanding. I have an engagement with Eshkol tomorrow afternoon to take my leave and hopefully to give him an answer. I urgently ask for a reply to this message, and approval of my departure for Kabul tomorrow, Monday midnight. Regret I haven’t been able to bring home the bacon but feel that much has been accomplished in calming Israeli emotions on our providing arms to Jordan and the ground has been prepared for reasonable future understandings on issues involved. Barbour and Komer concur. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 4:49 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 2 Documents 160 and 166 . 3 The text of the draft communique was transmitted in telegram 1065 from Tel Aviv, February 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) 168. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 168. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, February 28, 1965, midnight. 1068. For President and Secretary from Komer. Following supplemental to Harriman report in Embtel 1064. 2 For four days we have vigorously pressed Israelis to accept formal package deal covering all key aspects US/Israel relations except economic aid and desalting. Effort today, tabling our proposed memo of understanding and letter as reconfirmed by President, convinces us no quick agreement possible along these lines, even with sweetener that we’d now consider “sympathetically” replacement 90 tanks. Partly for bargaining purposes, but also because of domestic political reasons and Israel’s particular psychology, they refuse (1) deny themselves any later nuclear option by accepting IAEA controls; (2) utterly forswear residual right of pre-emption on water issue they consider vital; or (3) be required go UN. What they get in return is generalized promise we will in principle sell arms direct but only if there is agreed need, no other supplier, etc. Without minimizing great importance this commitment, it not sufficient enable US pressure Israelis into signing within three days such a broad series of undertakings affecting all their vital security concerns. But our failure get Israelis sign firm written contract in language we want should not blind us to degree of broad understanding achieved. We have (1) satisfactory contingent promise to support tacitly Jordan arms deal; (2) renewed undertaking not to go nuclear, which in itself highly important, despite fact Israelis flatly unwilling brave domestic political storm or deprive selves of nuclear option by accepting IAEA controls; (3) assurance they won’t use early force against Arab diversion scheme—in fact Israelis even willing have US take case to UN, though they won’t do so themselves; and (4) Israeli agreement to maintain secrecy about any US/Israel arms transactions, provided we willing consult with them about how to handle such matters when they become public sooner or later. Depending on how long Hussein will wait, and on how tough we willing be, further hard bargaining might even bring Israelis around a bit further on recourse to UN and accepting IAEA controls if UAR did. But to get these assurances more firmly tied down, and above all to get Israelis’ cooperation on handling Jordan arms deal, will require more give on our part, firmer promise to supply tanks and/or planes. In my judgment, this true whether we reach understanding now or later. We’ve all but accused Israelis of doubting USG’s pledged word and of grievously overbidding, but fact that Israel’s primary interest is in such security needs evident from PriMin’s wish send Peres and Rabin to Washington instead of Golda Meir (though our hints Meir visit would not be productive helped). Israelis want to prolong negotiations and shift to Washington, because they think they need, and can get, more than we willing give as yet. They willing take risk Jordan will go sour, or even that US will go ahead with Jordan arms sale in absence prior understanding here. In this tough impasse, we see three alternatives: A. Go ahead and sign with Jordan, depending on Israeli desire for proffered compensation to inhibit Israel from overreacting. Odds are Eshkol would keep still for time being, while negotiating with Washington. But Israelis would naturally threaten blowup unless we came through pronto on tanks and planes. Moreover, risk of leaks here would be substantial in absence prior Cabinet agreement. B. Try for quick deal covering only immediate Jordanian problem. We could tell Eshkol we’d provide 90 tanks before end 1965 if Germans finally cancelled, provided he in turn agreed to quiet support on Jordan deal pending negotiation of other issues. We strongly doubt this salable but could try. C. While Harriman must leave, we could still forestall new round negotiations Washington by having Barbour continue talks here. In many respects we close enough to acceptable formulation to offer hope. However, no point in continuing here unless we prepared say something more positive about tanks and/or planes. All here feel unavoidable implication our own formula on “direct sales” if necessary is that at the least we must sell tanks, since only other M–48 supplier now gone. Israelis keep harping on fact that we accepted Israeli need for at least 300 tanks as long ago as November 1963. Since then, Soviets have delivered many more tanks to Arabs, and we’ve delivered 48 to Jordan. Now we propose sell 100 more, besides delivering another 48 gratis under MAP. So we’re hooked for tanks, and for more than 90 too. As to planes, Israelis point out that Soviets have already “injected” literally hundreds of jet bombers into Near East. Why are we so reluctant? However, I sense that Israeli interest in B–66s less urgent than previously thought. General Weizmann today said B–66 marginal; he much preferred French Vautour if only US could help pay for it. When I replied De Gaulle unwilling do business with us, even for Israel, he suggested we help buy UK Spey engines for Vautour. 3 I’ve no idea whether this feasible, but it might be better than selling B–66s directly. Washington will have to decide whether quick agreement with Israelis essential enough to pay the price. All I urge is that we make this decision in full recognition we’ll sooner or later have to give Israelis some further indication our arms sales intentions. Pressures will become intense as Jordan waters crisis mounts. Also, sooner we do so the more we can get, particularly in way of firm Israeli secrecy pledges without which the policy shift forced on us by Jordan arms deal will be all the more risky. Am sure it possible cook up some formula which will satisfy Israelis while not materially reducing our leverage, since we can still stall on many related issues of price, delivery, publicity, etc. Will need such formula for Peres-Rabin visit, since this whole purpose of their coming. In sum, we seven months pregnant on arms sales to Israel as well as Jordan. If we sell to Jordan, we must sell to Israel too. If we don’t sell to Jordan, Soviets will. Then we’ll have to sell to Israel anyway. So we must compare risk of greater commitment to tanks and planes now against risk in having to make these later anyway with far less in way of return commitments than we can get today. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 7:09 p.m. and passed to the White House. 2 Document 167 . 3 This conversation was reported in telegram 1071 from Tel Aviv, March 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:02 a.m. 847. Eyes only for Harriman from the Secretary. I have had full discussion with President about your 1064 supplemented by 1068. 2 We do not believe that further delays are desirable or practicable. The issues have been fully explored in great detail. What is now required are some hard decisions by the Israeli and United States Governments on questions to which there are no easy answers. Time is an urgent factor because we cannot be certain that the movement of the Arab bloc into Nasser’s control and Soviet domination will not occur very fast if we are unable to proceed with Jordan. MIG aircraft could arrive in Jordan from Egypt within a week or two. Problem is now that of understanding of facts in the Arab world as they affect Israeli and U.S. interests. Therefore, if you are unable to obtain a final agreement on basis this telegram, Komer should remain behind to assist Barbour for further immediate discussions while you proceed on your schedule. We fully understand the domestic difficulties which Israeli Government faces in connection with decisions it must make. But these difficulties must be faced because of the decisions which are necessary to protect Israeli security and U.S. vital interests in the Near East, which include Israeli security. It seems to us that Israel is not so alarmed as we about the prospect of solidification of the Arab world under Nasser’s leadership with, in effect, a close working alliance with the Soviet Bloc. We had supposed that this would be the strongest imaginable threat to Israel security. Israel apparently has another view. If that is their considered judgment, we cannot force them to take another course but it would be necessary for us to consider most seriously whether we attempt to involve ourselves any longer in the problems of Near Eastern security. There should be no misunderstanding that the obligation of the United States Government is to act on the basis of the interests of 190 million Americans. And there should be no misunderstanding that Americans expect this of the United States Government. From your 1064 we gather that Eshkol’s principal problem is that he does not feel that he has a specific and firm commitment from us about military hardware. You should tell him that we have not been anxious to reduce these matters to specifics because (1) we do not yet know whether the West Germans will in fact complete their tank deliveries and (2) a flat commitment leaked to the press would make it extremely difficult for us to move diplomatically in support of U.S. and Israeli interests in our discussions with Arab governments. Nor do we wish to lose freedom of action in discussions with the Germans about their future course. However, if Eshkol feels he must have something specific, you can tell him, and include in the memorandum of understanding, that if West Germany does not complete its delivery of tanks under the original arrangement, the United States itself will provide those tanks. You can also tell him that we will give careful consideration to further tanks if the general security situation in the Near East requires it. We do not believe that we should make specific commitments at this time about further military hardware, such as planes, which Israel can always raise under the general language already proposed in the Memorandum of Understanding. You should not, however, encourage them to believe that they can get jet bombers merely by asking for them. You should again make it clear to Eshkol that the decision to sell arms to Israel, even on the proposed basis, creates major problems for the United States in supporting U.S. and Israeli interests in the Arab world and you should make it clear again that this decision has been a major development in U.S. policy. You should also make it clear that if Israel makes it difficult for us to support U.S. and Israeli interests in the Arab world, they force upon us a fundamental reexamination of our role in the Near East. Please be sure that Eshkol understands we cannot accept the idea that we should proceed to assist in the arming of Israel when we are on notice Israel plans to take preemptive military action with respect to Jordan waters. We will not support such preemptive action. We will continue to support in every way Israel’s right to a share of Jordan waters within the framework of the Unified Plan. But we cannot leave any implication that we will support an Israeli military initiative leading to war in the Near East over this problem. You should further attempt to put this question into the background by insisting that our best information is that there will be very considerable time before Arab diversion of such waters could possibly affect Israel’s share under the Unified Plan and that we shall do our best to support the Unified Plan by all other means. You should further underline that the United States cannot support any Israeli flirtation with nuclear weapons. On nuclear matters, the United States is as old as Methuselah and utterly cold-blooded in terms of U.S. vital interests. We shall resist with every resource at our command the dissemination of nuclear weapons into the Near East. We shall try to find ways to bring the UAR into IAEA safeguards but there should be no misunderstanding between us and Israel as to our view of Israeli acquisition of such weapons. If the above instruction about being specific about tanks does not open the way for the final agreement we seek, then Barbour and Komer should stay with it until we get such agreement. There is nothing that can be said in Washington that cannot be said in Jerusalem. (FYI. This means President does not want agree now to Peres-Rabin visit. End FYI.) We approve changes suggested in your 1066 3 for your departure statement but suggest insertion of following sentence at end of first paragraph: “these exchanges will be continued through diplomatic channels.” We have some reservation about issuance of agreed communique, which would stimulate rather than suppress speculation. You might point out to Eshkol that, in your new role as Ambassador-at-large, you do not wish to set precedent of formal communiques since you will be visiting many capitals informally from time to time, and communiques become a complicating factor. Let me conclude with point made at beginning, namely, that we are prepared to make extremely difficult decisions in support of Israel’s security in the Near East, decisions which will greatly complicate American interests in that part of the world. What is called for is equally difficult decisions by Israel. They should know that if we cannot make these decisions jointly, they cannot assume that their decisions can be supported by the U.S. The President has a deep commitment to the security and well being of Israel but he wants their help on matters involving both the vital interests of the U.S. and our ability to help Israel. Many thanks for your fine effort. We will keep trying to give Barbour and Komer quick answers to help them reach agreement, no matter how much midnight oil we burn. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared in substance with the President by Rusk. 2 Documents 167 and 168 . 3 Dated February 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) 170. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 170. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, March 1, 1965, 1 p.m. 1075. Personal for Secretary from Harriman. Your message confirms again the difficulty of communication by telegraph that I have known since my 1920 international banking days. I can assure you that all the points you make have been underscored with Eshkol et al to point of rudeness. Your telegram makes assumptions that should not be read into Eshkol’s words. We are not on notice that Israel intends military action. It wants to avoid such action but it will not give up its sovereign rights on the basis of a general assurance that we will help them get their share of water. Israelis want to know precisely what we are going to do in support of peaceful means. They certainly believe that the threat of military action is something to keep holding over Arabs as an essential in any negotiations. Eshkol assures me Israel is not flirting with nuclear weapons but they are not willing to commit themselves irrevocably at least until they know Egyptian intentions. Their suspicions are aroused and I could not allay them to point of forever giving up threat they might go nuclear, which they see as of value in deterring Nasser aggression. They believe Nasser’s threats that he intends to obliterate them if he can. Experience with Hilter’s threats is too recent to be forgotten. I have told Israelis unmistakably that proposed change in U.S. policy means we will give careful consideration to their residual arms needs “if the general security situation in the Near East requires it.” They have answered and firmly believe that the security situation in the Near East has already deteriorated since last June, even before our proposal to supply tanks and other material to increase Jordan’s military capacity. They ask that we face these facts together now in Jerusalem or in Washington. I am meeting with Eshkol again with Barbour and Komer in Jerusalem this afternoon and I can assure we all will do everything possible to achieve purposes outlined. We agree impolitic for me to remain longer, but that Komer should stay with Barbour to continue negotiations. As procedural matter, however, he cannot “assist Barbour” when he has just recently been here as private Presidential emissary. Barbour concurs. Their working relationship could not be better. Barbour 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 6:33 a.m. and passed to the White House. A typed copy was sent to the President. (Ibid., Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) 171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:16 p.m. 848. Eyes only for Harriman from Secretary. Tel Aviv’s 1075. 2 Please believe me my telegram 847 was not intended to reflect slightest doubt regarding clarity, vigor and force with which you have presented our views during these past four difficult days. On contrary, we can see from your reporting that you have stood very firm against powerful onslaught. Forceful reiteration in my telegram of points already essentially covered in your initial instructions was intended simply to give you renewed authority to press Israelis to utmost. It reflected continuing and growing feeling by the President that there are limits beyond which we cannot go in support of Israel. He wanted you to be sure that even the strong case which Eshkol has made on Israel’s behalf could not be allowed to override what he considers to be basic interest of US. If we cannot pursue a policy which enables us to further our overall interests in the Middle East, he would prefer to shift responsibility for that area’s stability to other hands. I think you have done splendid job, regardless of how your final session today comes out, and you have my warmest and most sincere thanks. Good luck and happy landings for the rest of your trip. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jernegan and approved by Rusk in draft. Repeated to Kabul. 2 Document 170 . 172. Message From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 172. Message From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Tel Aviv, March 1, 1965. For McGeorge Bundy from Komer. 1. Need your help in resolving apparent failure effective communications between Washington and here evident from Eyes Only Deptel 847. 2 2. Well realize Washington may think we need be bucked up, but we’ve already made and remade every point Deptel 847 in far stronger terms, especially on nuclear weapons. I’m surprised Israelis still speak to me. Also Harriman told them flatly that if they used force on Jordan waters US would be “spang up” against them. 3. Realize Washington worried about mounting Arab counterpressures, but as Harriman says even Soviets are less tough bargainers than Israelis. Harriman, Barbour and I convinced what set back talks was draft Eshkol letter to President we instructed propose. We can get credible assurances if we prepared pay price, but not in this form. 4. In line Deptel we’ll threaten again to turn against Israelis if they don’t play ball, but this not too credible. Also sure President doesn’t want us break too much crockery at time US aid to Arabs already under fire, we trying get new aid bill through Congress, and we face major Jordan water crisis. Nor can we say too loudly we’ll withdraw from Middle East and let chips fall where they may. 5. Crux of matter is that these people have received so many broken promises in their long history of dealings with great powers that they must get more than general statements we’ll help them out with arms. Though we’ve said till we’re blue in face that they can and must trust US word, no mistaking their determination keep negotiating, if possible in Washington, till they get more on arms. 6. Moreover, let’s put ourselves in their shoes and realize we’re asking for several specific pledges on matters they regard as essential their security, in return for very unspecific pledges on our part. True, they need us more than we need them, but we can’t high pressure them in a few days to settle matters we’ve been arguing about for several years. At any rate, we can’t do so without a little more flexibility. 7. As I tried indicate in Embtels 1060 and 1068, 3 there must be some way to be specific enough to meet Eshkol’s needs without really robbing us of much freedom of action. We’re buying so little by delaying the inevitable that I conclude State’s chief worry is leaks here which could grievously harm us with Arabs. I couldn’t agree more, but let’s carefully examine risk of general contingent commitments we have in effect already given without getting firm pledge of secrecy versus risks of leak slightly more specific commitments for which we can get strongest secrecy pledges. Frankly, we’re already compromised by leakage German deal, imperatives of selling to Israel once we sell to Jordan, and resultant offers we’ve already been authorized make here. So risk to us in going slightly farther seems to me far less than risks we already courting. 8. Any mileage in getting McNamara to look at possible Vautour deal mentioned Embtel 1068? 9. Finally, remember time pressure is requiring us use such strenuous tactics to force Israeli hand that they’ve probably concluded they can either bid up price now or get further delay while they keep bargaining. Though we’ve told them they must choose whether to lose Jordan, trouble is they know we are in a bind. 10. I’ll stay here pushing hard but urge you help get us minimum necessary to put across early deal, US itself needs as much as Israel at this point. Even so, across-the-board package deal so complex and involves so many gut issues, that breaking up package in favor of more limited understanding along lines alternative B in Embtel 1068 may be best we can get. We just can’t settle water issue here and now. My personal view is alternative A shouldn’t be ignored either, but this probably too risky. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret. Received at the White House at 1728Z. 2 Document 169 . 3 Documents 165 and 168 . 173. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 173. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, March 2, 1965, 2 a.m. 1082. For the Secretary from Harriman. In three hour talk with Eshkol, with Mrs. Meir participating, I believe I laid on the line all points covered in your message 849 2 with Komer by prearrangement filling in for double emphasis. We reviewed sentence by sentence memorandum of understanding, including authorized modification. I believe I am now in a position to advise what we can get in the way of an agreement with the GOI in time to deal with the Jordan arms arrangements. I hate to leave before completing job but under circumstances think my continued highly publicized presence any longer is counterproductive. Eshkol agreed it politic for me to leave tonight and appeared pleased that Komer would stay on with earnest desire of reaching some understanding. A. To cover the most vital subjects first: (1) Israel’s non-proliferation commitment: Eshkol has no intention of undertaking nuclear arms development under present circumstances and will restate whatever he has said before, including that Israel pledges it will not be the first to bring or develop nuclear arms into the Middle East. Constitutionally, he can not go much further without full Cabinet and Israel AEC Commission support with attendant public discussion, particularly as AEC Chairman is a political opponent of Eshkol. Net of this is that our earnest talks, plus my appeal to Eshkol to be the President’s first supporter of non-proliferation has done some good for long pull. But it is clear that it is not politically possible for Eshkol to do more than the above, without long and full analysis of this problem, including deterrent effect of keeping [garble]guessing plus IAEA technical problems. In sum I recommend that we not attempt to force Israelis beyond what Eshkol can do at this time. (2) The most pressing problem is Israel’s Jordan River water rights. I am sure the President understands, far better than I do, that water rights in our Western tradition are fundamental to land rights. Interference with water rights is to Israelis as fundamental as invasion of territory. Israelis will not agree in advance never to use force to protect the water to which we have agreed they entitled under Johnston Plan. They will agree to state affirmatively that they will use all peaceful means to protect their water rights as agreed to by us, and that they will explore with us and utilize every peaceful method to achieve these ends. However, they will not, and nothing will persuade them renounce ultimate use of force to protect their water any more than they would renounce use of force to protect their territory. We must recognize also that use of force has varying degrees. I saw yesterday area where Syrian bulldozers were clearing the ground for diversion canal within a few hundred yards of Israeli border. One heavy machine gun could knock them out. Considering that last night Jordanian terrorists invaded Israeli territory 5 miles to blow up inhabited house, Israelis do not believe warning to Arabs on water will produce full-scale war. However they will agree not to use force till all peaceful means exhausted or preferably affirmatively state that they earnestly seek peaceful means of protecting their water sources. They will agree explore with us and utilize any and all peaceful means to this end. A provision along these lines is negotiable, but we can not expect a renunciation under all circumstances of the use of force to protect Israel’s water. B. On the minutiae of memorandum of understanding. In paragraph 2 Israelis don’t understand phrase “counter-diversion.” They request “counter” be dropped and suggest paragraph read “Both governments agree to review the dangers posed by Arab diversion schemes and the Unified Arab Command buildup.” In paragraph 3 Israelis are highly suspicious of phrase Johnston Plan “an equitable standard by which to judge Jordan water usage by riparian states.” They fear this means a major change of U.S. policy. I urge we stop using fancy new language and tell Israelis we will support their right to water as provided in Johnston Plan. Greatest difficulty in wording is in paragraph 5. Israelis feel we have insured ourselves three times against any possibility of U.S. direct arms sales. I do hope draft will be reviewed and we recognize that we have to convince Israelis we mean to sell them something. So I urge we drop word “selective” (it means nothing anyway) and combine last phrase of first sentence with last phrase of second sentence so that we state only once our expectation all reasonable Israeli efforts to get arms from Western Europe. Also I urge that “maximum effort” be amended to read “every reasonable effort.” With these changes Komer can work out (acceptable) wording for this paragraph. C. Given changes along lines A and B above, Komer, Barbour and I believe we can make a deal promptly for Israeli acquiescence both here and in Washington in US arms sales to Jordan. It is of course for Washington to decide whether we wish to abandon Jordan deal or do it without Israeli acquiescence. Either of these has its domestic and international risks. For my part I earnestly recommend to you and the President that you accept our combined advice to get the best possible on the Jordan arms deal described above, and leave to future negotiations the other difficult problems we have to face with Israel. We always have the leverage of stopping arms delivery if Israelis misbehave. They know they must keep in our good graces, but we must understand in turn that we are dealing with a dedicated people who will not abdicate their right to survival. In leaving I want to express my deep gratitude for the unbelievably prompt responses you have given me at the most inconvenient hours and with I realize, other taxing pressures. Many thanks. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis/Tan. Received at 7:28 p.m. on March 1 and passed to the White House. 2 The reference is apparently to telegram 848 to Tel Aviv, Document 171 . Telegram 849 to Tel Aviv, sent to Amman as telegram 493, March 1, concerned arms for Jordan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 174. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 174. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, March 3, 1965, 1 p.m. 1098. From Komer. Deptel 854. 2 As we thought Governor Harriman’s reports made clear, almost half of difficult argument here has been over language our brief on Johnston Plan. Israeli alarm bells rang from moment we started speaking of US willingness express support of “the principles of the Unified Plan (Deptel 823, 3 para 7) or that US supported Johnston Plan” as equitable standard by which to judge water rights of riparian states (Deptel 823, para 3). Israelis kept asking what this fancy new language meant. Did we still support Johnston Plan or not? They said this reaffirmed all fears aroused recently by Talbot’s evasiveness, letter to Mrs. Sisto, etc., etc. Israelis regard us as committed to Johnston Plan as a whole. They keep coming up with new references to the record to sustain their stand. Clearly their tactics are going to be to hold us as much as possible to letter of plan. While this is obviously a bargaining position, they mean to play it to hilt as long as possible and beyond present round of discussions. As Eshkol keeps saying, “It is ok if Lebanon takes 35 MCM’s of water but not if it takes 36 or 40.” However, Eshkol in aside to me Monday said, “Don’t take away our whole basis for compromise. Don’t try to make us compromise at the beginning of a crisis rather than at the end.” He gets the issue clearly, and Harriman said in return that we obviously weren’t going to let Israel tie us down to last letter of Johnston Plan, which only agreed to by Israel, not Arabs. Our firm policy was to see that Israel got the water to which it was entitled. They then cited President Johnson’s 2 Jan. 1964 letter to the P.M., 4 delivered by Sargent Shriver, which said, “We stand behind you in your rights of withdrawal in accordance with the Unified Plan.” We said this still our policy, but not that Arab part of plan was inviolable. Stripped of all diplomatese, Israelis see US as slipping away from them on Jordan waters issue, in interests of promoting some other form of compromise. Relevant phrases in our memo of understanding, which I regret to say were not fully understood by me at White House nor properly flagged by me for President, have greatly heightened their suspicions. They think our next step will be to say they don’t really have to go to war if 320 MCM allocation is shaded slightly. After all, they’d still get most of the water they need. This in turn adds greatly to their reluctance give up their own right of pre-emption in exchange for wobbly promise of US support. Barbour and I fully agree US cannot let Israelis so tie us down to letter of Johnston Plan that we lose any flexibility in necessary effort work out some new form of peaceful compromise. But manner in which we have sought to evade this issue has inflamed Israeli suspicions and greatly complicated our negotiating task. Deptel 854 shows Dept. still evading issue, while we believe it must be squarely faced. We recommend (and know Harriman does) that we stand firmly on statement in President’s Jan. 1964 letter to Eshkol and on Harriman’s statement here, that we support Israel’s right to water allocated to it under Johnston Plan. This gives us half a loaf of freeing us on Arab portion of plan. It gives Israelis half a loaf by quieting their fears we’re beginning to renege on their allocation of Jordan waters too. Moreover, it gives us good public position in Israel and elsewhere against which Israelis will find it hard to make convincing arguments. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 7:59 a.m. and passed to the White House. Repeated to New Delhi for Harriman. 2 Telegram 854 to Tel Aviv, March 2, stated that the Israeli Embassy raised the question of whether the language used by Harriman and Komer about the Unified Plan and Jordan waters represented a falling back from the U.S. position taken in discussions with the Israelis in January and February 1964, especially in the memorandum given Ambassador Harman on January 24, 1964. (See Document 11 .) Telegram 854 asked how deeply Harriman’s and Komer’s talks had gone into questions such as allocations, transfers from Lebanon to Syria and Jordan, and the possibility of renegotiation and whether the Israelis seemed alarmed at the U.S. attitude on questions of this type as contrasted with the U.S. opposition to a pre-emptive strike. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR) 3 Document 160 . 4 Document 1 . 175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 3, 1965, 10:48 p.m. 865. For Ambassador and Komer. The President has decided that in view of Israeli difficulties with the proposal carried by Harriman, as subsequently modified at Israeli insistence, we might now take another track. You should inform Eshkol that while we cannot wait longer to go forward with our agreement with Jordan, which as Israelis aware we consider in mutual interest of Israel and USG, we recognize Israeli concerns. In view of Israeli hesitation in accepting proposal presented by Harriman with subsequent modifications we were able to make, we are now prepared to make following alternative offer. The USG is prepared to sell military equipment to Israel comparable in quantities and kinds to the equipment that the United States sells to Jordan to preclude the Soviet supply of arms through the UAC to Jordan. The United States regards such sales as an exception to its existing policy and not as creating any precedent for the future. Condition is that if GOI accepts above offer, it must make a commitment not to oppose our offer to Jordan and to keep all aspects entire agreement completely secret until both governments agree on appropriate publicity. We would expect a letter from Eshkol confirming this understanding along following lines: “Dear Mr. President: I greatly appreciate your consideration in sending Governor Harriman to discuss with us in depth the problems our two Governments face in connection with the developing situation in the Middle East. We have, I think, come to a full understanding. Governor Harriman has made clear the concern of your Government for the maintenance of the security of Israel. On my part, I want you to know that we shall be as understanding as possible in helping you to meet some of the heavy responsibilities that you bear. I am, therefore, pleased to assure you that Israel will utilize all peaceful means to ensure protection of its share of Jordan waters and that we are willing to indicate publicly that Israel will not be the first to acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability in the Arab-Israel area. For our part, (1) we understand that it is both necessary and useful for the US to seek to maintain an effective influence and presence in the Arab world; (2) we accept the need for the US to provide certain military equipment to Jordan; and (3) we welcome the willingness of the US Government to sell military equipment to Israel comparable in quantities and kinds to the equipment the US sells to Jordan to preclude the Soviet supply of arms through the UAC to Jordan. My government understands that the US regards such sales as an exception to its existing policy and not as creating any precedent for the future.” FYI. It is entirely possible that Prime Minister will find this less attractive than broader understanding on which we have been working. But there would be some advantage to us in having record show that, insofar as U.S. concerned, our only departure from longstanding policy (arms to Jordan) was balanced by corresponding offer to Israel. He may wish to return to more general discussion. You should report back any counter proposals he makes, specifically in having before him drafts of letter we think he should write President. What kind of letter does he think he can write President? You should know we feel this matter should be brought to conclusion now rather than ending up in any special emissary or delegation to Washington. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot and approved and initialed by Rusk. 176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 4, 1965, 10:43 a.m. 866. Tel Aviv’s 1098. 2 You may assure GOI that USG has not receded from commitment most recently stated in President’s letter to Prime Minister hand-carried by Shriver in January 1964 which stated “We stand behind you in your right of withdrawal in accordance with the Unified Plan.” It was, however, made absolutely clear to GOI in memoranda of conversation between Jernegan and Gazit of January 9, 10 and 14, 1964 3 that the USG considers the Unified Plan to be the version which was presented to the Arabs in October 1955 4 rather than the version embodied in our draft note of July 5, 1955 to the Israeli Government. 5 These January 1964 memoranda of conversation were reviewed with the Israeli Embassy and agreed-on copies given to Israelis so as to constitute joint record of discussions. In conversation January 10 Jernegan stated (bottom para page 2 of memcon) that re the two disputed allocations, “United States does not share Israel’s view on the allocations, and we would have to say that we support the 85/15 and 25 mcms allocations if the issue should arise.” Throughout memcon Jernegan is quoted as explaining our final version of Plan provided for UN involvement in supervisory mechanism. Subsequently in conversation with Ambassador Harman January 24 6 (memcon pouched Tel Aviv) Assistant Secretary Talbot in referring to July 5, 1955 note to Israelis specifically stated, “That was a draft” (page 3). As indicated in briefing memorandum, US continues to be committed to Unified Plan as an equitable standard. Israel, however, is not so committed and has never agreed to final version of plan. Agreed language of proposed “Summary and Technical Formula” worked out with Israelis in Department on January 9, 1964 7 makes this clear. While we stand by Israel’s rights to its allocations according to final version of Unified Plan, we are not bound unilaterally to ensure, nor do we have the capability to ensure, that the Arabs will abide by Johnston allocations, although we assume that when all is sorted out, the combined Arab off-takes may well be within the combined Arab allocations. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Lucien L. Kinsolving of NEA/NE, cleared by Davies and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Talbot. 2 Document 174 . 3 See Document 11 . 4 For documentation on Johnston’s October 1955 talks with representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in Cairo, see Foreign Relations , 1955–1957, vol. XIV, pp. 586 – 587 . 5 Regarding the “Draft Memorandum of Understanding” that U.S. and Israeli representatives accepted on July 5, 1955, see ibid., p. 278, footnote 2. 6 See Document 11 . 7 The technical formula is quoted in footnote 5, Document 11 . 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, March 5, 1965, 5 p.m. 1122. For President and Secretary. From Komer. Part One. Komer and Barbour laid proposal Deptel 865 2 before Eshkol and Meir in three hour meeting morning 5 March 3 (Eshkol unavailable previous day because attending maneuvers in Negev). Despite our best efforts, including stress on need for prompt understanding lest we both lose Jordan, Eshkol found it unacceptable. As suspected by Washington, he contended that in respect to arms offered Israel it worse than previous proposals. We refused accept such immediate answer and insisted on Israeli counterproposal. If he couldn’t accept our new offer, what was he prepared say? He agreed respond, and we think he shaken. In aside to Komer at end Eshkol pleaded we recognize Israel’s predicament. If President would only tell him privately—orally if necessary that we would meet Israel’s needs for tanks and “a few” planes in the next year or so, he could try meet our needs painful as they were. Komer replied that, speaking as Presidential emissary who knew our Middle East problems, he would urge PM not to press us too hard now. Israel would get farther in long run by not trying to force our hand. PM must see our problems too. If he trusted his US friends, he mustn’t try to settle everything on arms today. We wouldn’t let Israel down, but Israel must in turn comprehend our own deeply held concerns. Hightlights and Comments follow. 4 Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Manila for Harriman and passed to the White House. Part Two of Komer’s report, consisting of highlights of his conversation with Eshkol, and Part Three, Comments, were transmitted in telegrams 1124 and 1125 from Tel Aviv, both March 5. (Ibid.) Bundy sent a retyped copy of the three telegrams to the President with a covering memorandum of the same date, noting that it was Komer’s latest report which Johnson would probably want to read, but that there was no need for action until Eshkol’s counter-proposal was received. Bundy added that he shared Komer’s evident conclusion that they had “pressed the Israelis far enough” and it was time to agree that “in the very nature of the situation we are bound to be their last resort for arms supply from here on out,” especially since the only immediate commitment required was for “tanks and ‘a few’ planes.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) 2 Document 175 . 3 A memorandum of the conversation, enclosed with airgram A–696, March 17, is in the National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN, and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). 4 See footnote 1 above. 178. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Davies) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 178. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Davies) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 1 Washington, March 5, 1965. SUBJECT Observations of H. Earle Russell During His Recent Trip to Israel Based on Conversations with Embassy Officers Nuclear Developments All indications are toward Israeli acquisition of a nuclear capability. There is little realization in Israel of the intensity of U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation. U.S. hesitation and delays in pressing for the recent inspection of the Dimona reactor plus the failure to insist upon a two-day visit have led the Israelis to believe we are not serious. Some embassy officers believe we may run into difficulty in arranging the next visit. Israeli officials and public appear firmly to believe that the U.A.R. will have a nuclear capability within 5 to 7 years. Planning for Israeli acquisition of a comparable capability is moving forward on this assumption. The Science Attache has calculated that the target date for acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel is 1968–9. He has discovered information indicating that Israel has already acquired the know-how for Plutonium metal production. There is no need for sizeable domestic ore production facilities since Argentina has been a ready source. Ambassador Barbour is convinced Israel fears U.A.R. acquisition of a nuclear capability and believes it must prepare for the time this occurs. He also believes a psychological case can be made for U.A.R. development of a “radiological garbage bomb.” The GOI, of course, has exploited this issue publicly. Ambassador Barbour does not seem as convinced as his staff of Israeli determination to acquire nuclear weapons. He felt it inadvisable to press for more trips by Embassy staff to the South. The GOI is already sensitive on this issue and such trips could prejudice 1) the Dimona inspections, 2) [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and 3) the position of one or more Embassy officers—Ben-Horin/Marom in reverse. The Ambassador believed the Dimona inspections hung by only a thread. Prime Minister Eshkol has found it increasingly difficult politically to continue them, but realizes he has a firm commitment to the U.S. The argument that Ben-Gurion also agreed to the inspections does not solve the Prime Minister’s problems since he has other fractious political elements with which to deal. Ambassador Barbour said that cutting down the duration of the last Dimona visit had not been Prime Minister Eshkol’s doing. The Prime Minister had ordered the facility to be cleared for inspection beginning Friday night through Saturday night as late as necessary. The GOI was not monolithic and local officials did not always respond readily to instructions. Eshkol was disturbed that the President might think he had welched on his commitment. In this connection, the Science Attache believed he had convincing evidence that parts of the Dimona facility had been purposely moth-balled to mislead the visiting team. He and other Embassy officers believe Israeli scientists are preparing all necessary elements for production of a nuclear device, leaving undone only last-minute assembly. 2 Preemption Against Arab Water Diversion Works Embassy officers reflected a widespread Israeli philosophy calling for preemptive action to forestall Arab Jordan water diversion. Although the technical community and some members of the Foreign Ministry discounted Arab intentions to divert water, the IDF and Foreign Ministry “hard liners” played up the need for such action. The public, of course, was sold on the idea. IDF officers had indicated they believed the U.S. had been given ample warnings of Israeli intent to take preemptive action. A commonly expressed feeling was that preemptive action would be desirable soon while U.A.R. troops were still embroiled in Yemen. The Consulate General at Jerusalem reported concern in Jordan that aggressive Israeli pressures might result in hostilities. For the first time in their experience, old time American residents had approached the Consulate inquiring about plans for caring for American citizens in times of crisis. Both the Consulate General and the Embassy were reviewing their E and E plans. In fact, there is at the present time little against which to take preemptive action. Since November 1, 1964, only about 8 kilometers in Syrian territory have been cleared as a right of way for a possible canal. Rains had prevented rapid progress on this work which was supervised by Yugoslav engineers and surveyors. Preemptive action at the present time would be limited to destruction of up to ten bulldozers. Ambassador Barbour did not believe reference of the water issue to the UN was practical and the Israelis believed our suggestion to do so represented backtracking on our undertaking to support the Unified Plan. It had become necessary now to reaffirm this support openly. The verbiage attached to our recent statements of support had caused Israeli officials to feel they were “on the slippery slope.” Israeli Rocket Developments Israel’s capability for rocket production has increased. The Israel Aircraft Industries (Bedek) has built up its personnel considerably, beyond the needs for a normal aircraft corporation. Research on rocket propulsion and components is moving forward rapidly. Recent reports indicated Israel would soon be capable of producing ten tons of liquid oxygen or more per day. Other rocket production activities included operation of filament winding machines, heliarc tube welding apparati, operation of a $750,000 computer. Israel appeared to have decided to develop an indigenous capability in the production of rocket propellants and small rockets but to acquire large rockets abroad. Israeli Counter Boycott The Ministry of Commerce was not enthusiastic about the Israeli counter boycott because the Israeli economy was doing well without it and its imposition might create unforeseen problems. The Foreign Ministry, however, appeared to favor the boycott and the word had gone out to the American Jewish communities. Companies such as Union Carbide had already begun calculating the pressures that could be placed on its business activities by American Jews. Their preliminary conclusions were that they could not withstand these pressures. Ambassador Barbour’s Thoughts on the Jordan Arms Quid pro Quo Package Ambassador Barbour believed that we may have been well advised to append a large package of quid pro quo’s to the request for Israeli support on U.S. sales of arms to Jordan in return for selected direct sales to Israel. He was disturbed, however, that the Department thought it could obtain these desiderata. He believed their inclusion may have been useful in shaking up the Israelis but now it might be preferable to seek each objective separately. It was preferable to make a “grand gesture” on direct arms sales since we considered it inevitable anyway. Such an attitude would ensure greater Israeli receptivity to our other demands. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret. Talbot sent the memorandum to Rusk with a covering memorandum of March 8. Rusk’s initials on the covering memorandum indicate that he read it. 2 Airgram A–742 from Tel Aviv, April 9, discussed the status of the Dimona reactor in more detail. It concluded that the Israelis “have now created a flexible basis of choice regarding the possibility of producing nuclear weapons. Although the technical facilities are in an advanced state of preparation, we believe that weapons are not now being made, and there is no evidence that the Israelis have made a decision to move the rest of the way toward producing them.” (Ibid., AE 11–2 ISR) 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 6, 1965, 9:19 p.m. 887. Tel Aviv for Barbour and Komer. Ambassador Harman informed Talbot March 5 2 that he instructed to proceed Israel immediately for consultation and leaving that night. He believed that reason was GOI concerned and confused about course of current negotiations. He would be asked to explain Washington thinking. Could Talbot throw any light on negotiating problems? Talbot said feeling strong here we had to move forward. We have regarded proposals conveyed to GOI by Gov. Harriman as forthcoming and, as he had told PM Eshkol, signalling significant change of direction for future. We had been disappointed that GOI found itself unable accept that formulation. In view of GOI’s position, had concluded the alternative was to present a formula directed specifically at protecting Israel from adverse effects of arms sales made to Jordan for purpose of keeping Soviet arms and attendant dangers away from longest segment of Israeli frontier. Harman professed GOI’s astonishment that USG had put forward totally new proposal when GOI was awaiting US reactions to suggested changes in Harriman proposal. GOI had gathered impression these changes likely be acceptable. Talbot replied that negotiations had been followed with greatest care at the highest levels of USG who certainly had not concluded that positions put forward by Harriman had in fact been accepted. If this was wrong, we would like to know it. Ambassador Harman said he did not wish to duplicate negotiations being conducted in Israel, but would like to know more about US position. Recognizing para 5 of original proposal 3 as key policy statement, he probed for Talbot interpretation of its meaning. Talbot held closely to actual wording of para. Harman then asked at what point we believed Israel had not accepted US proposals? Talbot replied that record of talks in Israel showed these points in detail. Harman returned to theme that from report of Harriman’s last talk he had understood that certain changes were proposed and it was left that these could be considered. Komer then had come in with new restricted proposal, which as we now knew Prime Minister had found totally unacceptable. Talbot repeated rationale of new proposals: that since Israel had been unable to accept broader arrangements, we had accordingly moved to a position that what we did for Jordan we would do for Israel. This meant that we would hold to same policy of restraint in arms sales as in past 15 years, regarding these proposed new sales to Israel and Jordan as a balanced exception to policy. We had made exception in Hawk sales. We had moved to this position because rapid course of events in NE, which could place us in most difficult position, had led us to conclude that necessary actions could not be further delayed while Israel and US continued discussion of certain aspects of original broader proposal. Harman expressed inability to understand why narrower proposal should have included same request for Israeli assurances on questions of pre-emption and nuclear proliferation that had been in broader proposal. Talbot noted these now framed in somewhat different fashion and that no assurance was now asked for beyond what Eshkol had already said he was willing to give. Harman complained that US seemed to be prepared to give arms to Jordan without conditions, even though Jordan involved in water diversion plans and in UAC. USG, however, still insisting on full Israeli assurances its arms would not be used against Arabs. Talbot reviewed whole complex of reasons making it in interest of Israel and West to meet request of Jordan from non-bloc sources. In repetitive second telephone call of March 5 4 Harman requested additional clarification points of issue. Repeatedly sought to get from Talbot precise answers to question whether USG would oppose any alteration in Johnston Plan, specifically any off-take by Lebanon beyond 35 MCMs. Talbot replied Harman could assure Prime Minister US position same as expressed in January 1964 in Presidential letter carried by Shriver and Departmental-Embassy discussions on details of Johnston Plan. There had, of course, been some differences in Israeli and US interpretation of Plan at that time. However, in its desire to help protect Israel’s interests, US has made clear that it would oppose Arab disruption of Israel’s water supply. If Ambassador wished to get into details of interpretation of Johnston Plan again, we could do that on his return to Washington. In meantime, we hoped he would convey reassurances to Prime Minister. Talbot suggested Harman could also tell his Government we unable to understand why Israel seemingly taking position that prospective Sovietization of Jordan armed forces, with all significance that would have for Hussein’s efforts remain independent, would be more in Israel’s interest than our proposed line of action. Harman did not respond directly, but returned to observation that new narrow proposal unacceptable to Israel. Talbot gave no indication we proposed to return to broader proposal. He urged on Harman importance of completing our current discussions promptly. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Russell and Talbot, cleared by Davies, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Manila for Harriman. 2 A memorandum of the telephone conversation between Harman and Talbot, incorrectly dated March 4, is ibid., POL 17 ISR–US. 3 See Document 160 . 4 No record of this telephone conversation has been found. 180. Message From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 180. Message From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Tel Aviv, March 6, 1965. Eyes only for Bundy from Komer. Herewith my current appraisal our negotiating position. 1. Big problem is that it has probably lost good deal of its credibility in Israeli eyes. A. Barbour’s initial demarche telling Israelis we had to go ahead pronto on Jordan arms was 4 February over month ago. Since then we’ve repeatedly underlined urgency this matter. As instructed I just told them again we must go ahead. But by this time, Israelis must have concluded we unwilling actually do so without adequate assurances at least tacit Israeli support. B. Keeping Harriman and then me here so long further underscores our reluctance to move. Though Israelis also realize I being kept here so they can’t shift venue to Washington, even this adds to their bargaining leverage. C. Fact that each time we get new instructions we slightly enrich our offer probably also convinces them that we prepared pay pretty high price if they wait us out. Even latest proposal, though deliberately conditioned be unacceptable, at least dangled possibility some 40–50 million dollars in arms sales, which would buy quite a few tanks and planes. D. Inevitable publicity attendant on Harriman mission further eroded our bargaining position. I should have come out again covertly, but hesitated argue this too strongly a second time. Adding to publicity is what I suspect is deliberate Israeli press campaign put pressure on us sell arms to Israel. This too probably inevitable once speculation on Harriman mission mounted and Israelis also found out we willing in principle. 2. Thus chief remaining credible element our position is that we keep insisting Israel give us quite far-reaching reciprocal undertakings for what they want from us. At bottom, Israelis have probably already accepted our basic propositions insofar as they can. Biggest difficulty is how to get these recorded in manner politically tolerable to Eshkol yet sufficiently reassuring to us. 3. You may recall my prediction about six weeks of haggling needed get Israelis signed on to Jordan arms sale. However, I was wrong in assuring President that adding major concession of willingness make direct sales Israel too at long last would permit quick agreement. Perhaps this was possible if negotiation confined these two issues. But several factors—trying reach broad package understanding, necessarily high pressure tactics because of need go ahead with Jordan, some awkward phrasing, our brief, and Israeli inability shake hands on a deal without haggling, have stretched out bargaining process. Nor is this really surprising, given crucial importance to both Israel and US of series of matters we trying settle. 4. Next essential to be taken into account is that Israeli security position is in fact deteriorating, even if there were no prospective US arms sales to Jordan to add marginally to Arab threat. Crux of matter is continued Soviet arms supply to Arabs, but secondary factors are new degree of Arab unity of command under UAC, and German arms cancellation. Add to this Israeli nervousness over what they rightly see as mounting new Arab-Israeli crisis over Jordan waters, which will test their mettle and ours. 5. This is basic context in which Israelis (a) worry lest we tie their hands on preemption; (b) fear we falling away on Johnston Plan, where US their chief supporter; and (c) naturally seize on golden opportunity presented by our coming to them on Jordan matter to milk us for all they can get. 6. Important to recognize, however, that our coming to them merely precipitated these issues. They would have been at us shortly in any case with new arms requests and appeals for support on water. Remember they asked to send Golda Meir and military team for talks even before we hit them on Jordan arms. 7. If above analysis correct (Barbour, an old hand by now at Israeli game, believes it is), then we need reassess our negotiating position. Barbour comments that we trying buy new Cadillac for ten bucks. If our real position is that we unwilling go ahead on Jordan arms without satisfactory assurance at least tacit Israeli support, and if Israelis convinced of this by now and think they can afford to outwait us, then have we any alternative but to pay the necessary price? 8. Little doubt their basic demand is for credible fleshing out our carefully hedged promise to sell arms. This probably will take light bombers as well as tanks. Perhaps best means of sawing off matter promptly enough to enable us move on Jordan sales, would be private oral commitment by me, on President’s behalf, that will provide certain number tanks and see that they get certain number light bombers at decent price within specified period, if they keep matter completely secret. Sanction would be, as on earlier tank deal, that we’d cancel if matter came out. Reason for wording on bombers is that we may prefer subsidize a Vautour/Spey engine deal. 9. Another way to restore credibility our position would be to take calculated risk Israelis already sufficiently hooked, and go ahead with Hussein now. Odds are Israelis would still keep reasonably quiet, while redoubling their pressures on us. But need not spell out risks this course. 10. In sum, maintaining Israeli deterrent edge is so important to us as stabilizing factor in new Arab-Israeli crisis, other commitments we seek are so valuable, and it so important go ahead with Jordan that we ought either (a) make final offer good enough to sign up Israel; or (b) soften up Israelis by showing them they don’t have veto on Jordan arms. 11. Believe I aware as anyone in Washington of importance preserving US position in Arab world. Moreover, I fear we’ll lose Hussein if we don’t sign contract before Arabs conclude from all the publicity that we have to buy off Israelis first. Indeed unless some secrecy preserved on Israeli arms, we may lose Hussein anyway, because Nasser will accuse Hussein of forcing US arms sale to Israel by his insistence on taking US instead of Soviet arms. 12. But underlying reality is that developing situation in Middle East will compel us to sell tanks and probably planes to Israel sooner or later anyway, as only alternative to binding alliance. So it strikes me as much better to promise this quietly now, when we can get maximum in return, than to stall till public pressures plus area imperatives force us to do so later with less return for US. Afraid my NEA colleagues fail grasp this fundamental. 13. Unless next Israeli counterproposal proves above analysis wrong, will send gist shortly to Department. But want inform you in advance in hope you can weigh in on these unpleasant realities; if relayed too bluntly from here they may sound like self-seeking advice. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret. Received at the White House at 2331Z. 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 7, 1965, 6:53 p.m. 889. For Komer from McGeorge Bundy. 1. Have reviewed all your messages over this week end and have had long talks with highest authority. I detect a difference in temper between our sense of the problem and yours, which this message aims to bridge. Current clear preference here is for a prompt and clear-cut understanding limited as closely as possible to the immediate problem of Jordan arms sale. The general line in Deptel 685 2 is not a bargaining tactic but his genuine preference. 2. Highest authority does not now believe we should accept continuing general open-ended obligation to supply arms to Israel. The carefully hedged offer in Harriman’s initial instructions was matched by a requirement of strong Israeli undertakings on nuclear weapons and on avoidance of pre-emptive attack over Jordan waters. But Israelis resist flat undertakings which affect their ultimate sovereign power. (This Israeli reluctance has been reaffirmed forcibly through Feinberg today—protect source.) 3. In this situation White House view is we should leave these larger wider questions open for later discussion. We cannot now get a guarantee on the nuclear matter or even on Jordan waters. We have requested State-Defense coordination on concrete proposal which might meet Eshkol’s aside to you—taking account of your own recommendations to us. In addition we would want a gentlemen’s agreement that our deal with Hussein will not be undercut by Israel, but we do not currently think that Eshkol letter to President is essential means of registering this gentlemen’s agreement. This message is for guidance only and is not an instruction. Instruction should follow today or tomorrow, and present object is simply to insure that in any intervening discussion you focus attention sharply on the immediate problem of Jordan decision and a balancing arms offer to Israel. Highest authority wishes to take every possible step to turn talks away from open-ended arms commitment now. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The message was drafted at the White House and sent to the Department of State with a note from Bundy stating that it had been cleared in substance by Ball and should not be sent until Talbot saw it. The telegram indicates that it was cleared by Talbot. 2 The reference should be to telegram 865, Document 175 . 3 Komer replied in telegram 1131, March 8, which reads in part as follows: “Read Deptel 889 loud and clear. Our tempered reaction is that prompt and limited understanding along lines described possble if we prepared pay reasonable price.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 8, 1965, 8:57 p.m. 896. For Komer. 1. Since Israelis have delayed several days in making counter proposal, you should now approach Eshkol as soon as possible and seek his prompt agreement on carefully defined and limited agreement foreshadowed in Deptel 865. 2 2. Terms and conditions of proposal are as follows: (1) The US recognizes Israeli tank needs have increased because of prospective Jordan sale and possibility of non-delivery of 90 remaining German tanks. Accordingly, the US is now prepared to ensure sale on favorable credit terms of tanks to meet these changes as follows: (a) 100 tanks for later delivery to match new Jordan sales, and (b) 90 tanks for delivery in calendar year ’66 if German agreement is not completed. We can make these deliveries in form of M–48A1 or M–48A3 tanks, but you should point out that what we offer Israel we may have to offer Jordan. (2) The USG is prepared to ensure opportunity for Israel to buy “a few” planes for later delivery, if not from Western sources, then from the United States. The USG does not believe it is in the interest of either government to decide now on exact model of airplane. FYI. “A few” means less than 20, which is the upper limit of possible sales under proposed Jordan agreement, and you should make this number privately known to Eshkol. End FYI. (3) We wish to have a private agreement with Prime Minister Eshkol that Israel will not attack Jordan arms sale and that friends of Israel in the US will be given clear private guidance on this point. We ask this private agreement because we understand from Harriman/Komer mission that Government of Israel does plainly prefer US to USSR as Jordanian arms supplier. You should re-emphasize our understanding of this point and make it clear to Eshkol that if he takes a different view, now and not later is the time to say so. (4) US undertakings on tanks and aircraft for Israel, as stated above, must be kept wholly secret for as long as possible in interest of both governments, and there must be agreement to consult fully on means of handling public statements when they become necessary. 3. You and Ambassador are authorized to develop argumentation for this straightforward agreement in the light of your own understanding of thinking of GOI. The following arguments seem important to us: (1) Unless Israelis will tell us that they prefer Soviet arms to Jordan, we must move promptly with Hussein. But we greatly prefer not to make a deal with Hussein unless we have an understanding with Eshkol, and therefore such understanding is increasingly urgent unless Israelis wish to take responsibility for driving Hussein to the Soviets. (2) The offer to find necessary tanks up to a total of 190 should more than meet immediate Israeli concerns deriving from Jordan sale and possible German shortfall. (3) Similarly, offer to join in finding “a few” aircraft represents precisely what Eshkol asked for in his aside to you. First military analysis suggests that B–66 is not at all what Israelis really want, in either political or military terms. It would outrage Cairo but not offer best capabilities. There are a number of other planes, both US and European, which deserve careful study before a decision is made. In this situation it is much better not to decide on specific aircraft or means of ensuring sale. We have taken full note both of Eshkol’s aside to you and of his statement that Israelis can find the funds they need. We believe him on both counts. He in turn should believe us when we say that we will help. This offer in fact goes beyond any commitment we will now make to Jordan. (4) You should make it absolutely clear that broader agreement initially proposed by Harriman now seems to us wholly impracticable. Our offer to supply arms in the future was carefully hedged and made contingent upon Israeli acceptance of undertakings on Jordan waters and on nuclear development which are flatly unacceptable to the GOI. We recognize and accept that it is impossible for Eshkol to abandon final sovereign right of decision. But what is true for Prime Minister is just as true for the President. We therefore conclude that it is much better for both governments to reach a clear agreement now on the issues which need decision and to proceed as friends in the future, treating wider issues on their merits. We both will be free to press our view on these wide issues, always within the framework of recognition by both governments of their deep common interest in preserving the peace both by limiting the arms race and by avoiding a dangerous imbalance of power. FYI. If necessary to reach agreement, we could consider a reaffirmation of US policy in this sense, just as we are ready to reaffirm our policy on Jordan waters as stated in Shriver letter and our readiness to press Hussein for agreement to keep tanks east of the river. End FYI. 4. You should make it very clear to Eshkol that if this generous solution to the immediate problem is not acceptable, your mission will be at an end and it may become necessary for USG to make its own decision on Jordan even without Israeli support. You should make it clear as your own personal judgment that, without agreement, Washington would have to reach and publicize its own judgment that Israelis themselves prefer US supply to Jordan, as against Moscow. The US and Israel have now spent a month exploring alternatives and we are not prepared to allow the Government of Israel to bargain indefinitely in search of advantage from a US decision which in and of itself already serves true Israeli interest. 5. Finally, you should make it very clear indeed that we are not ready to accept a shift in the arena of discussion either by a special Israeli emissary to Washington or by an attempted end-run through friends of Israel in the United States. Such tactics are certain to react adversely to the interests of Israel. We have now made this point clear on about five occasions to friends of Israel in Washington and we are not pleased by continuing efforts to use these side channels. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Text received from the White House, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Jernegan. The substance of the telegram was apparently decided at a meeting of the President, McNamara, Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy between 6:01 and 7 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found. Briefing memoranda and draft cables prepared for the meeting are ibid., National Security File, Country File, Harriman Israeli Mission (II), and in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. 2 Document 175 . 183. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 183. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, March 10, 1965, 1 a.m. 1142. For Secretary and Bundy. Part One. Most grateful your 896 and 898. 2 We played to hilt. After talk with Peres, Levavi, Harman tonight we confident final closing tomorrow with Eshkol possible. Had arranged meeting with him tomorrow Wednesday 10 March 9 p.m. say goodbye, at which will now hopefully settle whole matter. Did not reveal our full position tonight. Instead passed word Peres and others earlier I had permission go home. US was tired with months’ haggling and would make its own decisions, since no gentlemen’s agreement seemed possible. Histrionics rejecting last night’s Harman performance useful too. This worked, and they came to us tonight. Their counterproposal follows in Part Two, 3 as amended by us to remove nonsense. Also our comments on what needed close deal, which will cause Washington no pain in our judgment. Komer will see Peres privately for lunch tomorrow convey gist our response. Will draw on Deptels 896 and 898 if you can’t respond by then. They bought our insistence secrecy and credible undertaking tacit acquiescence in Jordan arms sale. Promise give this to us as firm oral gentlemen’s agreement tomorrow, which Harman will execute Washington. Harman much subdued tonight. Part [Two] will follow. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received on March 9 at 6:58 p.m. and passed to the White House. 2 Telegram 896 is Document 182 . Telegram 898 to Tel Aviv, March 9, responded to telegram 1140 from Tel Aviv, also March 9, in which Komer proposed revisions and clarifications in his instructions in telegram 896. Telegram 898 stated that the United States should offer M48A1 tanks to Israel and M48 tanks to Jordan, that Komer could refer to “less than 24” planes rather than “less than 20” but should avoid specific comment on types of planes, and that he should make it clear that the United States might have to conclude arrangements with Hussein the next day. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR) 3 The proposed Israeli memorandum of understanding, with Komer’s comments, was transmitted in telegram 1143 from Tel Aviv, March 10, which constituted Part Two of Komer’s message. (Ibid.) Telegram 1144 from Tel Aviv, March 10, transmitted Part Three of his message, which reported additional details on the meeting. (Ibid.) 184. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 184. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, March 11, 1965, 2 a.m. 1151. For SecState, SecDef, Bundy. Ref: Embtel 1150. 2 Highlights final sessions with Israelis. Komer went over script with Peres at luncheon, saying had only tentative Washington OK since top echelon had not yet signed off. 3 But told Peres previous night’s session enabled him suggest way break logjam by urging some give on planes in lieu impossible idea $40–50 million compensatory sales. Gave Peres list suggested oral understandings plus draft memo. In evening Peres, Levavi insisted meeting first with us and attempted reintroduce concept sales to Israel of value comparable to Jordan. Komer flatly rejected, saying if so must go back to comparable kinds and quantities too. That was that. Then accepted minor addition of “direct” sales para 5. Also told Peres Washington willing consider so-called Peres gambit on Bonn/US/Israel tank drill. 4 Peres sent off cable Bonn that “unofficial US answer is they will consider if and when Germans approach US.” When met Eshkol he had word on preceding, so all went well. Expressed great appreciation President’s response Israel’s needs. Said ready to sign memo. On publicity we could tell President he would do everything possible. He wouldn’t brag US giving Israel tanks, if only so Jordan wouldn’t brag either. Said tell President Israel relations with Germany would now improve. Pleased at Nasser’s latest “folly.” Komer replied would assure President Israel would not undercut Jordan sales program. Komer regarded US as having gentlemen’s agreement (PM nodded assent). As agreed yesterday, we depended on Harman give clear private guidance friends in US why US compelled sell limited arms Jordan prevent Soviets/Nasser coming in. Hoped Eshkol wouldn’t mind if President told one or two mutual friends too. Assured Eshkol we would try hardest avoid press leaks our end too. On principle cui bono, US had no interest damaging Hussein by revealing Israel agreed US arms sales. We planned deliver basic M–48 to Jordan and M–48A1 to Israel, Israel could convert latter under contract with US. Remaining M–48’s we’d deliver if Germans didn’t were 90. On planes, should leave to military experts. Though planes either from US or other sources, we did not exclude B–66 or include it, latest word was our military people don’t think B–66 best type for Israel. In response Peres question, Komer said that, speaking entirely personally, he didn’t see why USG wouldn’t at least consider SP guns instead of tanks or engines instead of planes. Let’s leave to experts. PM agreed. Komer said must repeat this no change our long-standing arms policy—a balanced exception; not open-ended. Komer expressed appreciation PM’s agreement on secrecy. Said essential keep M–48A3 kit deal secret as long as possible too. This in Israel’s own interest to keep down Jordanian pressure for M–48A3’s. Next Komer said asked make clear genuine perturbation at highest levels USG at unofficial approaches purporting speak for Israel. Hoped government-to-government matters could be handled through same channels though couldn’t stop friends from talking about general attitudes. Stressed importance mutual understanding between heads of states as more important than anything else. PM got point. Had earlier told Peres to tell PM not send people Washington prematurely. Suggested at least 6–8 week interval let us recover from shock. PM himself mentioned this later. Believe point made. At this point Deptel 909 5 brought to us in meeting. Asked recess so could consider. Must say this almost blew up whole show again. We compelled make command decision, what to change in memo already being typed for signature and which to finesse. We take full responsibility. Got in clear reference to 90 tanks, i.e. remainder of the 150 not shipped. Peres wanted latter phrase to cover possibility Italians would hold back 20 in Italy. We said would argue later. Felt essential leave language re sources aircraft as change this sensitive matter could have re-opened whole package. Furthermore, present form says same thing as Deptel 909. Skipped altered secrecy provision; 6 can’t repudiate all previous words at last meeting. [Language?] on Hussein’s intention inserted, at cost raised eyebrows. Last sentence para 7 also altered per Deptel 910. In return we agreed new sentence in para IV that US told Hussein no sales if he got Soviet arms. To clear atmosphere, Komer then paraphrased Deptel 909 para on Peres gambit, 7 citing it as good news. This helped. Next we suggested agreed memcon to be initialed both sides. PM agreed and Barbour will follow through. 8 Finally, Komer asked PM if could give him some good word on non-preemption. PM said Israel wouldn’t move “for month, two months, three months.” While discussions going on. Agreed must be further talk about water, either here or in Washington. One comment PM was that between Komer and Harriman over last four weeks, they had managed much persuade him Jordan sale made sense. Harman urged, with PM’s consent, that we urge Hussein keep US sales to him secret as long as possible. This would greatly help Israel keep quiet too. Harman further proposed we consult on what Israel might say if and when matters began coming out. We agreed. And urge prompt follow-through on both items. In final private aside to Eshkol and Meir, Komer told them President had made every effort meet their needs. He asked reciprocal understanding. Planes from US or other sources was great last-minute concession Komer hadn’t really expected. In fact, in response PM’s plea for concreteness President had just told Komer tell PM privately “up to 24” planes in mind. After near blow-up result in arrival Deptel 910, Komer and Barbour felt had to state number positively instead of negatively. PM moved, expressed appreciation, said tell President we’ll collaborate fully. Komer ended by saying don’t press things too hard. Give us time to think matters through. Let’s work together, not argue with each other. Gently reminded PM that personal rapport with President worth more than any and all pieces of paper. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received on March 10 at 8:32 p.m. and passed to the White House. 2 Telegram 1150 from Tel Aviv, March 10, informed Johnson, Rusk, and Bundy that the memorandum of understanding had been signed. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 903 to Tel Aviv, sent at 12:59 a.m. on March 10, told Komer that he should press for a final understanding that evening but that his instructions would be confirmed in time for his talk with Eshkol. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 ISR) 4 Reference is to a proposal reported by Komer in telegram 1144 (see footnote 3, Document 183 ) that since the United States had been willing to sell 150 M48A2 tanks to Germany to replace the ones that Germany had intended to sell to Israel, the United States might ship 90 of them to Israel and charge the cost to the Germans. 5 Telegram 909 to Tel Aviv, March 10, authorized Komer to give U.S. agreement to a draft memorandum of understanding, the text of which was transmitted in telegram 910 to Tel Aviv, also March 10, and commented on some of the desired changes. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR) The draft transmitted in telegram 910 was similar in substance to the signed memorandum of understanding except as indicated in this telegram and in footnote 6 below. 6 The paragraph on publicity in the draft transmitted in telegram 910 to Tel Aviv consists of two sentences similar in substance to the second and third sentences in paragraph VII in telegram 1152 ( Document 185 ), but does not include the first sentence. Telegram 909 states that the change was made in view of the U.S. intention to disclose the general outline of the deal to the Jordanian and UAR Governments and to some Western Europe allies. 7 It expressed willingness to cooperate in the “Peres gambit” but commented that it would be best arranged through a private Israeli-German understanding. 8 Barbour sent the memorandum of conversation, initialed by Bitan and Barbour, to Komer with a covering letter of March 17, and Komer forwarded it to Read with a covering memorandum of March 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/KOMER) A copy of the memorandum of conversation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (IV). 185. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 185. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, March 11, 1965, 2 a.m. 1152. Embtels 1150 and 1151. 2 Text of signed memorandum of understanding follows: “I. The Government of the United States has reaffirmed its concern for the maintenance of Israel’s security and has renewed its assurance that the United States firmly opposes aggression in the Near East and remains committed to the independence and integrity of Israel. II. The Government of Israel has reaffirmed that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israel area. III. In view of the importance of an effective Israel deterrent capacity as a major factor in preventing aggression in the area, the United States will of course continue, as in the past, to be ready to discuss with Israel its needs and problems. IV. The United States has informed the Government of Israel that it may sell quantities of arms and military equipment to Jordan in order to preclude the Soviet supply of arms through the UAC to Jordan. King Hussein has assured the United States that if he purchases US tanks, he intends to keep his armor on the East Bank of the Jordan. The United States also has made clear to King Hussein that if he purchases Soviet arms there will be no sales from the United States. The United States will keep Israel informed of the completion of any deal with Jordan for the provision of US arms and equipment. V. It is understood that Israel is not interested in buying some of the particular items sold to Jordan. Instead the United States will sell Israel on favorable credit terms, or otherwise help Israel procure, certain arms and military equipment as follows: A. The United States will ensure the sale directly to Israel at her request of at least the same number and quality of tanks that it sells to Jordan. B. In the event of the Federal Government of Germany not supplying to Israel the remainder of the 150 M48 tanks outstanding under the German-Israel tank deal of 1964, the United States will ensure the completion of this program. C. The United States is further prepared to ensure an opportunity for Israel to purchase a certain number of combat aircraft, if not from Western sources, then from the United States. VI. The Government of Israel intends to provide the Government of the United States with a list of its requirements in the near future and requests that discussions on this list take place in Washington at a mutually convenient time. VII. The Governments of the United States and Israel agree that full secrecy shall be maintained on all matters referred to herein and all subsequent actions taken in this connection, until the two governments agree on how and when to divulge them. The Government of the United States has explained to the Government of Israel that premature publicity on the matters covered under this understanding could create serious complications for the United States in its relations with other states in the area. The Government of Israel has informed the Government of the United States that it understands this concern and will be guided accordingly.” Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received on March 10 at 8:38 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 2 See Document 184 and footnote 2 thereto. 186. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 186. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, March 10, 1965, 8:59 p.m. 521. Deptels 516 and 518; Embtel 527. 2 FYI After extended negotiations Barbour and Komer late Wednesday night reached agreement with Israelis that was prerequisite to our completing Memorandum of Understanding with King Hussein. Package includes Israeli assurances against being first in area to go nuclear, Israeli agreement to acquiesce in US arms sales to Jordan, renewed US assurances of opposition to aggression in the area, and US agreement to sell Israel on favorable credit terms military equipment in quantities and kinds comparable to US sales to Jordan, plus “less than twenty-four” aircraft after 1966 if Israel unable obtain them from Western European sources. US would also stand ready to complete unfinished portion of German-Israeli tank deal of 1964. End FYI. You are authorized to present approved draft of Memorandum of Understanding (Deptel 516) to King, explaining changes described Deptel 518. Although you would expect King to find draft acceptable in view of earlier careful negotiation of understanding, he should know that you instructed to refer to Washington any changes that may be proposed. You have authority to sign Memorandum of Understanding in present form. If, as foreshadowed in your recent talk, King asks what are USG intentions with respect to any military sales or assistance to Israel, you should remind him that he and Khammash had earlier told you and Talbot that Jordan could live with US military sales to Israel provided they not disproportionate. You should say that during Harriman mission and since then USG has been making strong efforts to restrain Israel through a most difficult period. Harriman was successful to some degree in reassuring Israelis as to continued US interest in their integrity and security and US determination to use its influence for peaceful resolution area problems. We believe that likelihood of a preemptive military strike by Israel has been substantially reduced. King knows well that US desires to give maximum support to Hussein’s regime, yet traditional US policy has been not to become a major supplier of armaments to either side of the Arab-Israel dispute. This latter position has been part and parcel of our policy of balance in the Arab-Israel context. This dilemma has been difficult for us to resolve. While we have not considered the US has a right to regulate the balance of arms in the Near East, we do have a legitimate concern in preventing development of a significant military imbalance that would be a major threat to peace because of overconfidence or desperation of one side or another. As we are prepared to make an exception to our policy in the case of Jordan, we want the King to know that this may involve comparable sales to Israel. Such sales would generally conform in quantity and type to what USG is prepared to sell to Jordan. We plan to inform certain other Arab governments of the purpose and substance of the Harriman talks in Israel and of the possibility US may make limited arms sales to Israel. Our purpose will be to allay concern and suspicion by explaining frankly reasons for decision. On aircraft, you may assure the King that we have encouraged Israel to look to traditional sources of supply. In conformity with our position on question of aircraft for Jordan, we would also tell Israel that if it is unable to meet its requirement in Europe we would consider direct sale of a few aircraft (about the same number as Jordan is asking). As King knows, we have not discussed possible sale of F–104 series aircraft with Israel and do not plan to do so. Unless Soviet bloc provides more and higher performance aircraft to Arabs sufficient to change strategic situation, we will not change our position during life of this agreement. In the course of your negotiations you should make clear that Israel would react sharply to positioning of Jordan armor on West Bank. Recalling previous discussions of this problem with Messrs. Talbot and Solbert, you should note our expectation that Hussein’s asserted policy of not exposing his armor by deployment on West Bank under normal peace-time conditions would be continued. We hope to minimize publicity on these arrangements. If the King should feel need for domestic purposes to note purchases of new equipment, we would like to coordinate approaches. You should also note continuing US interest in Jordan’s security as made explicit by both President Kennedy and President Johnson. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies; cleared by Stoddart at DOD/ISA and Bunte and in substance by Rusk and by Bundy for the President; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 2 Telegram 516 to Amman, March 10, transmitted an approved draft of a U.S.-Jordan memorandum of understanding. Telegram 518 to Amman, March 10, discussed the changes in the new draft memorandum of understanding from the draft given to the King and Khammash during the Talbot-Solbert visit. (Both ibid., DEF 19–3 US–JORDAN) Telegram 527 from Amman, March 10, reviewed potential problems in reaching agreement with the King and requested guidance on some points. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 187. National Intelligence Estimate 187. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, March 10, 1965. NIE 30–65 THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM The Problem To estimate present attitudes and future trends in the Arab-Israeli problem over the next two or three years. Conclusions A. The Arab-Israeli dispute is heating up. The initial success of Arab efforts to cooperate in a scheme for diverting Jordan waters at Israel’s expense and for achieving a degree of military unity has given the Arabs some confidence that they may be capable of hurting Israel. This Arab cooperation and the new willingness of richer Arab states to contribute funds to the program have led the Israelis to fear that a significant turning point in the dispute is occurring to Nasser’s advantage. In response, they are hardening their posture toward the Arabs. In this situation, tension will be higher in the next few years and the danger of armed clashes greater. B. In a year or so, if the Arab projects to divert the waters of the Jordan River basin materialize, the danger of Israeli strikes to put them out of commission will rise. However, we believe that Israel will first seek to deter the Arabs by a combination of political and psychological moves, directed particularly at detaching Jordan and Lebanon from effective participation in a common Arab military and water diversion effort. The chances are at least even that some development will come to pass by which the Arab diversion projects would satisfy Arab self-esteem without encroaching on Israel’s minimum requirements for Jordan water. In the absence of such developments, Israeli strikes against the diversion projects, especially in Syria, are probable. An Israeli strike would probably elicit some Arab military response, most likely by Syria, but would severely strain Arab cooperation. There is some chance of more general fighting in the tense circumstances prevailing, but we believe that both sides would try to avoid a general war during the period of this estimate. C. The accelerating arms race is involving both the Arabs and Israel in advanced weapons development, particularly in the missile field. The Israelis probably will be able to deploy a French-built surface-to-surface missile with a range of about 270 nautical miles by 1967–1968; the UAR may be able to deploy considerably less sophisticated missiles of slightly less range by 1968–1969. The UAR has virtually no prospect of acquiring nuclear weapons except from foreign sources—which we consider highly unlikely. By contrast, the Israelis could probably develop nuclear weapons by 1968–1969 and/or nuclear warheads by about 1971 without outside assistance, if a decision to go ahead were given at this time. We do not believe, however, that the Israelis have taken such a decision. D. Whether the Arab-Israeli controversy erupts into armed clashes or remains confined to political tensions, it will almost certainly be more difficult in the next few years for the US and other Western powers to maintain satisfactory relations with both Israel and the Arab states. The dispute will present the USSR with opportunities to increase its influence with the Arabs. Israel is likely to intensify its already strong pressure on the US both to limit arms supplies to the Arabs and to provide Israel with arms. Israel is also likely to press vigorously for a US security guarantee. Given the strong Arab resentment over US support for Israel in the past, developments of this sort might lead toward a more pronounced polarization of the Arab-Israeli dispute to include the Soviets and Arabs on one side, and Israel and the West on the other. In any event, Nasser’s strategy will include threats against Western interests in the area in order to pressure the Western powers to lessen their support to Israel. [Here follow the Discussion portion of the estimate, an annex, and 4 tables.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on March 10. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, AEC, and NSA representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction. 188. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 188. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, March 12, 1965, 1 p.m. 536. Deptel 521; Embtel 527. 2 Presented draft memorandum of understanding with explanation for changes to Brigadier Khammash March 10 and met with King, Prime Minister and Khammash afternoon March 11 for further discussion. Made careful presentation Deptel 521 to which King’s reaction milder than I had anticipated. On statement that we considered likelihood of preemptive military strike substantially reduced, he said he was glad to hear this but all of his intelligence contained ominous indications of build-up for aggressive action. On statement that we might have to make comparable sales to Israel, he said he quite recognized that Israel could not be denied access to arms though he hoped that in present mood of area we recognized that other Arabs might not react as moderately as he did. On stationing of tanks on West Bank, he said he obviously could not give assurances as to internal disposition of his forces. However, he could assure me that under continuation of what might be termed normal conditions he intended to keep tanks on East Bank, but obviously under wartime conditions this assurance would not apply. He would also continue make every effort avoid any action that might be considered provocative. On the memorandum of understanding, the King desired to add language along lines of paragraph 3 of his letter to me (Embtel 486) 3 but after some discussion and in light of remarks I had already made, agreed to delete this provided I would acknowledge receipt of his letter. This I agreed to do. He also sought to insert language in illustrative sales list stipulating that second 100 tanks would be M48A3 but when I said this unacceptable to Washington he agreed to remove language on understanding that DNF dealing with each other in good faith and that he was anxious to move forward on this much of package as soon as possible. He reiterated in this connection pressures he felt from UAC to demonstrate concrete results and fact that these results must ultimately in some form include supersonic aircraft. One open point in addition to changes covered below is that GOJ acceptance of our delivery schedule on M48s is still conditioned on our ability to deliver 48 MAP tanks in next few months (Embtel 525). 4 Otherwise King said he would have to insist on delivery of at least 50 tanks in 1965 in view of commitments which he had made to UAC subsequent to his discussions with Talbot and Solbert. [Here follow lists of changes proposed in the memorandum of understanding and the illustrative sales list.] Subject to satisfactory answer on delivery of M48 tanks and acceptance of textual changes outlined above, Prime Minister indicated he stood ready to sign agreement promptly. No reference was made to possible publicity and I did not raise subject. 5 Barnes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Received at 8:10 a.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 2 See Document 186 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 Document 154 . 4 Telegram 525 from Amman, March 9, reported a March 8 meeting with Khammash. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US/JORDAN) 5 The memorandum of understanding signed March 18 by Barnes and Tell provided for the sale to Jordan on a cash basis of defense articles and services along the lines of an attached illustrative list, with details to be negotiated subsequently. Implementation of the memorandum was conditioned on Jordan’s keeping the United States and other free world sources as the sole sources of supply to its armed forces, carrying out the modernization and expansion of its ground forces in a manner that would not adversely affect its economic development, obtaining from sources outside Jordan the funds required for the materiel covered by the memorandum and for the planned expansion of Jordan’s military establishment, and Jordan’s assurance of its intent to keep its military budget at no more than $52 million a year. The illustrative sales list included 100 M–48 tanks and 50 armored personnel carriers, as well as small arms, ammunition, and other items. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 400.3295 Jordan) 189. Letter From Prime Minister Eshkol to President Johnson 189. Letter From Prime Minister Eshkol to President Johnson 1 Jerusalem, March 12, 1965. Dear Mr. President, I wish to tell you how much I appreciate your having sent Governor Harriman and Mr. Komer here. As I told Bob Komer the night before he left, our discussions were at times outspoken, but they were discussions between friends. Happily they concluded in agreement in writing and orally. This was possible above all because of our confidence that we can always rely on your understanding, goodwill and friendship. This knowledge is far more important for me than words. I know the heavy burden of responsibility that rests upon you as you strive to preserve the peace and maintain freedom throughout the world, in a period of great danger. My prayers and good wishes go out to you. For myself, I am the custodian of a small estate and the representative of a small people. We are surrounded by enemies. I believe we will win our way to peace, but it will be a hard road. We have nowhere to retreat. You can be assured, Mr. President, that we will fulfil the agreement in complete good faith. My wife joins me in sending Mrs. Johnson and yourself our blessings for good health and peace. Sincerely yours, L. Eshkol 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Special Head of State Correspondence Fle, Israel, Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. 190. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 190. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 13, 1965. Mission to Israel . I hope I’m right in saying that we finally got from the Israelis the essentials of what you wanted—their agreement to sit still on Jordan arms in return for some tanks and planes. State almost fouled us up again by rewriting the contract at the eleventh hour, but we got over that hurdle too. My final cable (attached) 2 sums up the matter. What really broke the logjam was our shifting (Mac tells me on your judgment) from a broad package understanding, which was simply too much to negotiate quickly, to a much more limited deal. Once we called their hand this way, and were prepared to talk hardware, they tried to shift back. However, Eshkol quickly settled when I told him first that we were going ahead with Jordan and then showed him concretely just what we were prepared to do for him. On this last point, I was grateful that McNamara and Bundy accepted my recommendation we talk 24 planes instead of 20. This bit of give will cost us nothing in terms of any Arab reaction (24 is as bad as 20), yet it got us past the point of making Israel so strictly comparable to Jordan that the Israelis could cry foul. Nor will these necessarily have to be US planes. I also taped down that (a) we don’t want to see any Israelis here for six to eight weeks—this should buy us at least four; (b) attempted backdoor negotiating with the White House through unofficial emissaries hurts more than it helps; and (c) we will flatly oppose both premature jumping of the Arabs over water and Israel going nuclear. As a bonus, we got a written promise on the latter, for what promises are worth. While I may be prejudiced (and also too tired to see the matter in the round), I think we finally came out all right—and without giving more than we’d have to give sooner or later anyway to our Israeli friends. R. W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). Secret. 2 Telegram 1333 from Athens, March 11; attached but not printed. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/KOMER. 191. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson 191. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 15, 1965. Israel: I am glad that Bob Komer was able to work out arrangements with Israel satisfactory to you. I was sorry to leave in the middle, but as there was so much publicity about my presence, I felt it better to leave, particularly as I gained such confidence in Komer’s skill in handling the negotiations. Ambassador Barbour also was most helpful. My talks did some good in bringing Eshkol and his colleagues around to understanding the need for our continuing military assistance to Jordan. They also now clearly understand that we will oppose their use of force under any circumstances in connection with the Jordan water diversion. We must, however, make every effort to block Arab diversion, if in fact it ever comes off. The Israelis are very sensitive on the subject of their water rights, which I know you will understand. We will have, I believe, continuing difficulty in restraining them if peaceful means don’t produce results. I therefore stated bluntly that if the Israelis ever used force they would be up against United States opposition. This was somewhat of a shock, but I am satisfied it was useful. The Israelis feel that the military balance with the Arabs has deteriorated since Eshkol’s visit last June and they want to discuss this subject again. Eshkol asked me to convey to you his strong hope that we would move our Embassy to Jerusalem. I explained the difficulties but he persisted in his request. NEA believes it would be most inadvisable to make such a move at the present time. If you agree, I will write Mr. Eshkol informally that you feel this matter should be deferred under the present circumstances. 2 [Here follow brief reports on Harriman’s visits to Afghanistan, India, and the Philippines.] Averell 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). Secret. Filed with a covering note from Bundy stating that the memorandum was Harriman’s report on his mission and that Bundy did not think it needed the President’s attention but had promised to forward it to him. A handwritten “L” and an “NR” on the covering note indicates that it was seen but not read by the President. 2 No letter from Harriman to Eshkol on this subject has been found. 3 Secretary Rusk signed below Harriman’s signature. 192. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser 192. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser 1 Washington, March 18, 1965. Dear Mr. President: Since my message to you last December 12 2 I have looked forward to a further exchange of views between us. Now, unfortunately, new tensions have developed in the Near East. I have been deeply concerned by developments in the direct relations of the United States and the United Arab Republic which have put strains on the friendship I hope for between our two governments and peoples. As the proud leader of an important people, you will, I know, share my view that the best way to deal with difficulties of this kind is to discuss them man to man, with full respect for each other’s rights and responsibilities. I have therefore asked Ambassador Battle to seek an appointment with you to bring this personal message and to discuss with you the issues of current importance in the Near East that concern us both. The problem which needs this kind of discussion today is that of the best way of dealing temperately and responsibly with the growing arms race in the Middle East. As you know, the United States Government has consistently sought to find ways and means of turning that arms race downward. We are convinced that it does not serve the real interest of any people in the area. At the same time, we have obligations and interests which require us to take account of the pressures that are generated by very heavy arms supply from other countries. It is in this context that I have asked Ambassador Battle to discuss our present position with you. That position has been established within the framework of our traditional policy of restraint with regard to arms sales. The principles of that policy are two: First, we shall, to the greatest extent possible, continue to avoid selling arms to the principal parties to the Arab-Israel dispute. Second, in no case will we sell arms that will give one side a military advantage over the other. This is the policy we have followed and will continue to follow. You and I carry heavy responsibilities. I am convinced that by serious efforts on both sides, we can do much to improve understanding between our Governments. I can assure you that on my side I will do my full part to maintain and to increase relations of mutual respect between our two countries. The interests of our peoples will thrive in strength and understanding, not in weakness and frustration. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic, Presidential Correspondence. Secret. Filed with a draft by Bundy, an earlier draft, and related memoranda. In a March 18 telephone conversation, Bundy told Ball that the President wanted a short letter, and Bundy had dictated one. (Ibid., Ball Papers, United Arab Republic) 2 See footnote 2, Document 117 . 193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, March 18, 1965, 9:56 p.m. 5632. Talking Points for Presentation Letter From President to Nasser . FYI: We wish you to deliver in person Presidential letter to Nasser which will be sent separate message. 2 Primary purpose of letter and your meeting is to put limited and exceptional US arms sale to Israel in most acceptable light. Recognizing Nasser will be almost bound suspect hidden US commitment to arm Israel and abandon “evenhanded” policy, you should bear in mind following rationale: (1) Sale to Israel would be an exception to our arms sales policy made to prevent significant arms imbalance from posing a threat to peace resulting from overconfidence or from desperation. (2) Sale to Israel is limited commitment that we will strive to keep limited and exceptional assuming Arabs show restraint. (3) Sale is measure forced on us by complex of events including continued heavy Soviet arms supplies to area; threatening posture of Unified Arab Command and Arab spokesmen toward Israel, particularly in connection with Jordan Waters; and Bonn’s withdrawal as source arms supply for Israel. Secondary purpose this approach is to invite resumption of dialogue with Nasser, particularly on arms control but also on other matters of difference between us. You should make sure this point is not lost. Since we naturally wish avoid giving Nasser a stick with which to beat Husayn, we don’t want to highlight Jordan arms sale as reason we are selling to Israel too. Therefore, it mentioned only briefly in your talking points. If Nasser raises Jordan matter, we wish you to make clear distinction between US sales to Jordan and prospective sales to Israel. Sales to Israel have different justification, in that their rationale is to prevent significant imbalance in arms from posing threat to peace from overconfidence or from desperation. While it is obviously impossible prevent Nasser from assuming some linkage between US sales to Jordan and those to Israel, we count on you to make distinction and avoid direct linkage between two. Although we want over-all signal to be in nature of warning some US assistance to Israel will occur, we do not want this to appear as threat or ultimatum. Tone of presentation should be calm and reasonable without nuances of indignation or complaint. End FYI. Following are talking points: 1. President has been increasingly concerned by strains that have developed in relations of US and other Western states with Near East and particularly by recent divergence of US and UAR policies. Deterioration of Western relations with area has coincided with heightening of tensions growing out of Arab-Israel dispute. Threat of hostilities over Jordan Waters and activities of Unified Arab Command have brought to fore continuing arms rivalry in Middle East. Resulting tensions have perhaps inevitably increased doubts and suspicions about attitudes and policies of outside states toward states of Near East. President has asked you to discuss his concerns in detail, to clarify United States policies, and to invite Nasser to resume dialogue on arms control and on various matters of difference between US and UAR. 2. As Nasser must already know, Israelis have been reacting strongly to spite aspects Arab water diversion schemes, inflammatory and belligerent posture conveyed by Arab statements and UAC arms buildup, and then German arms cancellation. As part of continuing US effort to reduce tensions, President sent Harriman/Komer to Israel to calm Israelis down and talk out their worries. They discussed all aspects current Near Eastern situation and reviewed US policies with Israeli leaders. They explained that US opposition to aggression by any Near Eastern state against another applied to Israel as much as to Arabs. They stressed to Israelis our continued interest in peaceful resolution of area disputes. 3. Harriman/Komer talks have eased situation, but basic problems remain and are still a potential cause of war. Arabs appear concerned lest Israel make military strike outside its borders. But Israel in turn is disturbed by statements some Arab leaders they intend some day wipe out Israel. For our part, we are concerned by Israeli arguments that they might have to act to prevent continued influx of Soviet arms from eventually giving Arabs upper hand. Israelis have convincing case because of continued UAC buildup and stated Arab intentions on water diversion. Because of such pressures we also fear Israelis may someday feel forced shift from peaceful nuclear program to weaponry. 4. US effort has been to try insure Israeli restraint by (a) counselling peaceful solution to water issue; (b) reassuring Israelis on our opposition to aggression and use of force; and (c) warning them against any acts of desperation. To achieve those objectives, and to preserve atmosphere in which peaceful solutions possible, we reassured Israelis that to extent we agreed on existence of dangerous imbalance that cannot be corrected by arms from other sources, USG would make a direct but limited sale of arms as an exception to existing policy. 5. We want Nasser to see this in perspective. As he knows, we have been most reluctant to become direct supplier military equipment to any of principal parties to Arab-Israel dispute. We know each side has been able to obtain weaponry from other sources, and we are well aware each side considers itself best judge of what is required defend itself as sovereign state. In our relations with both Israel and Arabs we have taken all possible steps to arrest self-defeating military rivalry and resultant waste of funds needed for improving peoples’ welfare. But our restraint has not been matched by the Soviet Union. While making massive supplies of arms to states in area, it has pretended it is working for peace while using Arab-Israel dispute to foment discord in its interest. 6. We regard arms rivalry as self-defeating since each side ultimately can match armaments obtained by other, but always at risk provoking preemptive attack and at regrettable cost to progress and economic development. Thus there is danger that one side will get military advantage substantial enough to tempt it to launch preemptive attack—particularly if that advantage appears to be declining. Key to shaky peace in Near East therefore may lie only in preventing imbalances in categories of arms that might lead to preemptive strike. This does not mean outsiders have right to regulate armaments in absence of agreement among states concerned, tacitly or otherwise. It means only that it may be in international interest to accede to some arms requests in order to prevent conflicts. 7. Thus, if two sides are unwilling find peaceful accommodation or to arrange some kind of attenuation in arms race, international community has no alternative to selling arms to correct imbalances and thereby to preserve peace. In observance this principle, USG sold Hawks to alleviate Israeli apprehensions of UAR bombers. For same reason USG now would be prepared to sell Israel limited types and quantities of arms required for their defense if assured of Israeli restraint. This exception has not been lightly made. It has been made clear to Israel Government, as President has asked you to make clear to Nasser, that just as we have not lightly made this exception in past we do not intend to do so in future. FYI: If Nasser asks about specific US commitments, you may say: US has made no sales agreements with Israel but has agreed consider limited Israeli requests. If he asks about tanks, you may say: Limited number of older model US tanks are probably on horizon for obvious reasons. If he asks about supersonic aircraft, you may say: USG does not contemplate selling Israel supersonic aircraft in F–104 category. If he asks about less sophisticated aircraft, you may say: We continue prefer Israel use European suppliers unless significant imbalance develops in area. If Nasser asks about other weapons, you may say: No arrangements for any other equipment on horizon as yet. If he asks about price, you may say: US arms supplies will be sales at same price to all buyers. End FYI. 8. US need to sell arms to Israel of course will be governed by what Arabs do. Nasser should realize that if Arabs challenge US on any limited arms sales to Israel, they might provoke US public reaction that would jeopardize USG’s restrained and evenhanded approach to Arab-Israel problem.USG has always resisted going as far as Israel keeps pressing it to go. Should Arabs force a showdown, they would undercut US incentive to limit arms sales to Israel and force very polarization of Near East situation USG seeks to avoid. Arab restraint toward their own arms acquisitions and toward Israeli acquisitions from Western powers would facilitate Western efforts to exert similar restraint. Thus we want to assure Nasser that impartiality and restraint remain basis of US arms policy. Any US sales of weapons to Arab states or Israel will be minimum dictated by circumstances. 9. In this connection, President wants Nasser also to know we have agreed to sell certain arms to Jordan. We considered Jordan request carefully over period of several months. Although Arabs may not appreciate danger, alternative of Soviet arms in Jordan would mean Soviet presence and influence in unstable area from which they previously excluded. Resultant dangers to stability of entire Near East would threaten Arab as well as US interests. US therefore decided it would sell arms to Jordan to prevent Soviet exploitation of situation. 10. USG holds firmly to other tenets of its Arab/Israeli policy beneficial to both sides. USG will keep up pressure on Israel not to go nuclear. As Nasser undoubtedly aware fact of recent American visit to Dimona has been revealed by US press. 3 USG also determined to oppose aggression from any quarter and to continue effort to reduce risk of war. These are more important, in our view, than limited arms sales. 11. Indeed, given special relationship we have had with UAR, we hope our two governments may still find a way to reverse Near East arms spiral. We have been gratified by indications UAR leaders share our conviction that Arab-Israel dispute is insoluble by force of arms. In face of world opinion and US commitment to oppose aggression, neither side will ever achieve military capability to impose solution on other. Consequently, best hope of reducing arms drain is for Arabs to renounce development of certain categories of weapons in return for similar renunciation by Israel. 12. We should also work together to find some way of avoiding a Jordan Waters crisis. Most immediate threat to peace is prospective Lebanese action to begin to divert Jordan tributaries to Syria. Most critical element in this project is its representation by Arabs as device to deny water to Israel. We believe tension could be relieved and magnitude of Israeli counteraction reduced if Arabs would present their projects in more positive light, indicating that purpose is to guarantee Arab users’ access to water to which they entitled on basis internationally accepted riparian laws and usages. As Nasser knows, USG believes Johnston allocations meet these criteria. We recognize neither Arabs nor Israel refer to Johnston Plan publicly, but we wonder if some other formula could be devised that would encourage both sides to stay within their legitimate allocations. 13. We welcome ideas of Nasser and UARG as to how Arab-Israel situation may be defused; we are ready to cooperate in any way we can in mutual Arab-US interest. FYI: We have given some thought to consideration Arab-Israel arms race by Geneva Disarmament Conference. Do not however believe it advantageous surface this idea at this time. End FYI. 14. President recognizes sensitivity these issues and hopes his frank views will be considered in same spirit in which offered. We are seeking to reason together in effort to prevent conflagration which would spread far beyond confines of the Near East. FYI: If Nasser appears likely to react violently and publicly to news you deliver, you may add that if Nasser desires, President is prepared to send a special emissary to discuss whole complex of Near East matters more fully with him. President considering this as a device to provide a “cooling-off” period. End FYI. Contingency talking points on other subjects Nasser may raise will follow by separate message. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot, Symmes, and Komer; cleared by Davies and Komer; and approved by Talbot. 2 Telegram 5664 to Cairo, March 19, transmitted the text of the letter ( Document 192 ). (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR) 3 An article by John W. Finney, entitled “Israel Permits U.S. To Inspect Atomic Reactor,” appeared in The New York Times on March 14. The text was transmitted to Near Eastern Embassies in circular telegram 1692, March 14. (Ibid., AE 11–2 ISR) Telegram 922 to Tel Aviv, March 11, states that Finney was working on a story, beginning from a lead given by Foreign Minister Eban in a “Meet the Press” television interview. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 5686 to Tel Aviv, March 20. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) 194. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 194. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, March 19, 1965, 7:13 p.m. 1750. FYI: Developments in Near East since mid-1963 have caused significant strains in relations of US and other Western states with area. As of early 1965 USG is perforce reexamining its relationship with UAR. Prospect of military conflict over Jordan Waters looms larger. Renewal of Saudi-Egyptian confrontation in Yemen looms with possible reinvolvement of US. Arab nationalist drift toward Communist Bloc poses danger that, led by economically distressed UAR, Arab states could move toward closer relationship with Soviets than at any time in last ten years. Recent West German difficulties with Arab nationalists have accentuated deterioration of Western relations with Near East. While Israel’s loss of German arms source created new pressures in US, exceptions in US arms sales policy forced by Jordan arms request also faced us with probable serious repercussions from Israel and from domestic reaction. In last few weeks doubts and suspicions about US attitudes and policies have been voiced by Arab leaders throughout area. Some of deterioration in Western position is obviously beyond capability of USG to control or influence. On other hand, frank discussions US views and policies with host governments are needed to dispel some of doubts and suspicions that have arisen. This particularly true so far as moderate Arab leaders are concerned. Moderate Arab leaders are important asset to US. Although it would be mistake to try to use them as counterweights to Arab radicals, they may be able quietly and behind scenes to restrain extremists. We envisage unity spirit of Arabs as having certain built-in restraint. For sake of preserving unity spirit, radicals will be constrained to avoid moving counter to moderate sentiments, so long as moderates avoid forcing issue. Purpose of following presentation is to clarify US views on various aspects current situation—to avoid misunderstandings with radicals and to dispel doubts and suspicions of moderates. End FYI. You should seek early appointment at highest appropriate level stressing our hope confidential nature discussion will be respected to make following presentation which may also be used with other key officials of host government at your discretion: 1) President has been concerned by recent signs of deterioration in Arab relations with West. Tensions growing out of Arab-Israel dispute in particular have accentuated strains between West and Arabs. Doubts and suspicions have been expressed about attitude and policies of outside states toward states of Near East. You have been instructed to review situation in order to dispel any confusion about US policies and to promote better understanding of our views. 2) For many years US has sought to help find way to just and honorable peace in Near East. We are frank admit we see no prospect immediate solution to Arab-Israel problem. On the other hand, we believe most leaders privately agree with us that Arab-Israel dispute will not be solved by force of arms. Yet positions taken on Jordan Waters problem have caused widespread concern in international community. 3) Initial tone of moderation in First Arab Summit Conference in January 1964 encouraged us to think there would be peaceful and positive approach to Jordan Waters problem. But more recently it has seemed to us that constructive spirit of January 1964 has been forgotten. Arab spokesmen have described Arab water projects in terms of spite diversion designed to take water from Israel rather than to provide water for Arab peoples. Inflammatory statements have been made by both sides in connection with serious border incidents. Unified Arab Command has pressed individual Arab states to increase their armaments, thereby adding new pressures to existing arms rivalry. Arab statements of intent to liquidate Israel have tended give UAC belligerent and threatening posture. 4) US has been particularly concerned by worsened relations between West Germany and Arab states and is hopeful that moderate views will prevail so that productive German-Arab relations can be restored. We have noticed drift among some Arab states that has seemed to us solely to serve interests of Communists and has called into question policy of nonalignment. Some of policy confrontations with West, including Congo, Cyprus, and South Arabia, are difficult for us to understand if Arab states concerned desire mutually beneficial relationships. These repeated confrontations have forced USG to reexamine its relations with some Arab states. US continues to desire mutually beneficial relationship with all Arab states, but this is two-way street. As demonstrated by our reaction certain recent events, we do not intend to take any policy actions out of anger or indignation. On other hand, it is increasingly difficult for us to maintain close relations in atmosphere created by some states during past few months. 5) Jordan Waters problem and continuing arms rivalry cause particular concern because of prospect of conflict Israelis quite aroused. So as part of continuing US effort to reduce tensions in Near East, President recently sent Ambassador Harriman to Israel. While there Harriman discussed all aspects of current Near Eastern situation with Israel’s leaders and reviewed US policies with them. He assured Israel Govt of continued USG interest in peaceful resolution of area disputes. He reaffirmed our position with regard to Unified or Johnston Plan as equitable standard by which to measure use of Jordan Waters. But he emphasized that USG opposition to aggression and use of military force to solve disputes applies to Israel as well as to Arabs. He stressed our belief that peaceful solutions to area problems must and can be found. In our view Harriman’s talks have helped to ease situation. 6) On other hand, basic Arab-Israel hostility remains. Arms rivalry poses constant threat of conflict. Danger is that one side will get military advantage tempting it to launch preemptive attack, or other side seeing disadvantage may attack out of desperation. We ourselves for years have followed policy of not supplying arms to parties directly engaged in Arab-Israel dispute except for limited sales of defensive weapons. We have repeatedly declared our intention to prevent or stop aggression by either side. We have never argued we have right to regulate military balance. But recognizing weapons sales sources available to both sides—and particularly irresponsible way in which Soviets have sought to buy Arab friendship by weapons sales—we know our restraint is not enough. Thus, we consider we have legitimate interest in preventing imbalances in military hardware from posing threat to peace by leading to preemptive strikes. 7) In this connection, you wish to point out that we have recently agreed to sell certain arms to Jordan. We had considered Jordan request carefully over period of several months. Request had been made under sponsorship of Unified Arab Command, and it posed alternative of Soviet arms in Jordan if US did not agree to sales. Although some Arabs may not appreciate danger, alternative of Soviet arms in Jordan would mean Soviet presence and influence in unstable area from which they previously excluded. Resultant dangers to stability of entire Near East would threaten Arab as well as US interests. US therefore decided it would sell arms to Jordan to prevent Soviet exploitation of situation. FYI: Since we naturally wish avoid giving Nasser or other radical Arab leaders a stick with which to beat Hussein, we do not want to highlight Jordan arms sale as one of reasons for selling to Israel. If connection is raised, you should make clear distinction between US sales to Jordan and prospective sales to Israel. Sales to Jordan were made to prevent Soviets from entering Jordan. Sales to Israel were made under following rationale: (a) Sale to Israel would be an exception to our arms sales policy made to prevent significant arms imbalance from posing a threat to peace resulting from overconfidence or from desperation; (b) Sale to Israel is limited commitment that we will strive to keep limited and exceptional assuming Arabs show restraint; and (c) Sale is measure forced on us by complex of events including continued heavy Soviet arms supplies to area; threatening posture of Unified Arab Command and Arab spokesmen toward Israel, particularly in connection with Jordan Waters; and, last but not least, Bonn’s withdrawal as source arms supply for Israel. End FYI. 8) Insofar as possible US intends to continue its policy of restraint in arms sales to principal parties to Arab-Israel dispute. We do not intend to try to buy friends by irresponsibly selling weapons of destruction. At same time, we cannot overlook serious imbalances that would threaten peace. Nasser’s action forcing Germans to cancel arms sales to Israel put heat directly on us. We have told Israelis and also are informing Arabs that in such exceptional cases we would sell Israel limited types and quantities of arms required for their self-defense. However, we intend resist Israeli efforts purchase more than their minimum defensive needs. We have not lightly made such exceptions to our arms sales policy in past and would not make them lightly in future. It really up to people like Nasser and Syrians to decide by their own actions how much we forced sell to Israel. 9) Moreover, Arabs should try to see in perspective that limited US sales to meet Israel’s basic security needs essential element US efforts restrain Israel from dangerous military action. So US hopes there will be no public campaign or Arab attempt force showdown. Result could be adverse US public reaction jeopardizing our policy of restraint and evenhandedness. 10) US desires constructive and productive relationships with all Arab countries. We wish to make certain our views are understood at all times and will welcome continued policy consultations on matters of mutual interest. For Kuwait: Suggest this be discussed with Amir rather than FonMin. For info addressees: Leave entirely to your discretion whether, at what level, and how much foregoing approach you should make local officials. For Tripoli: Suggest you use in forthcoming audience with King and at Embassy’s discretion with Muntassir. For Tunis: Suggest Bourguiba, Jr. For Rabat: Suggest Benhima. For Algiers and Khartoum: Appreciate post’s recommendation re desirability use and official to whom this might be transmitted. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 NEAR E-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on March 18; cleared by Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs David D. Newsom, Davies, and Komer ; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, Beirut, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Khartoum and repeated to Damascus, Taiz, and Cairo. Circular telegram 1752 to the same Embassies, March 20, requested that they delay action on circular telegram 1750 until they were advised to proceed. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 ISR) Circular telegram 1842, March 31, instructed them to do so. (Ibid.) Reports of the Embassies’ presentations made in response to circular telegram 1750 are ibid. and ibid., POL NEAR E. 195. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol 195. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol 1 Washington, March 22, 1965. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I want to thank you for your thoughtful letter of March 12. I followed very closely your discussions with Governor Harriman and Mr. Komer, and I think your own summary is just right. And I agree with you entirely that our confidence in each other’s understanding, goodwill, and friendship is more important than words—though words are important, too. I also understand fully the responsibility which you carry for the safety of your land and people, and it helps me to have your generous recognition of the responsibilities that fall to me. I believe that in the future, as in the past, it will be possible for our two Governments to meet their responsibilities for peace and security in the Middle East by policies built on trust and respect for each other. In this task we are fortunate in our traditional friendship for each other—a friendship which is clear once more in your generous letter. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending our warmest good wishes to Mrs. Eshkol and to you. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. The letter bears no indication of the drafter. Another copy lists both Johnson and Bundy as drafters, but it is filed with a March 22 memorandum from Bundy to Johnson indicating that it was drafted by Bundy. (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 9) 196. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in France 196. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in France 1 Washington, March 23, 1965, 12:18 p.m. 4902. Paris for Ambassador. You should convey following oral message to FonMin from Secretary: I understand that during your recent visit to Washington you mentioned Israel’s Dimona reactor to Mr. Ball. In this connection, you may have seen the article in the March 14 issue of the NYTimes on nuclear developments in Israel. The article is generally accurate with the important exception, however, that visits by American scientists to Israel’s facilities have been at the invitation of the Government of Israel and were not in the nature of inspections. The visits to Dimona were part of regular exchanges of visits by scientific experts in connection with both U.S. installations and those of Israel. Our experts have seen enough to draw what appears to be a reasonable conclusion that the Dimona reactor is not being used to produce materials for nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, they also concluded that, should the Israeli Government decide to produce such materials and weapons from them, there is an increasing Israeli capability to do so. Under these circumstances, the United States believes it is highly desirable that Israel accept IAEA safeguards on all of its facilities. Since the U.A.R. has no nuclear weapons capability for the foreseeable future, we think Israeli acceptance of IAEA safeguards might induce President Nasser to accept similar controls. Extension of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the Near East would be a major step toward abating the area arms race. The United States continues to follow this situation with concern and would hope for close consultations between our two governments regarding any evidence of the introduction of nuclear weapons into that area. 2 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Russell and Richard G. Long in EUR/WE; cleared by Davies, Talbot, Brown in INR, Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Charles W. Thomas, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Robert C. Creel; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 2 Ambassador Bohlen reported in telegram 5448 from Paris, March 26, that he had that day conveyed the oral message to Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, who expressed doubt that Israel would accept the IAEA safeguards. He said that although according to French information, there was no evidence of any attempt by Israel to produce materials for nuclear weapons, he thought Israel would prefer to keep that possibility open. (Ibid.) 197. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 197. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, March 25, 1965, 11 a.m. 3351. Dept pass as necessary. I have just returned from a meeting lasting one hour fifteen minutes with President Nasser. 2 I began by congratulating him on his re-election 3 and on the great confidence that the people of the UAR have shown in him. He replied that he was pleased with the response of the people. He had had a brief rest out of town with the Vice Presidents who, under his instruction, had not been allowed to talk business. He remarked that the campaign had been unfortunate in one respect and that was that three people had been killed during a demonstration of support which had caused him great sadness. I then told the President that I was delighted to have a talk with him. I wanted to emphasize the great importance I attached and my govt attached to our continued conversations. I said that we were in a difficult period and that it was essential that we maintain regular, close and frank contacts with each other. He agreed. He then said that he had received the message I had sent him via Dr. Hatem (he obviously meant Sami Sharaf) which had reached him just as he was preparing his speech for Assiut 4 and that what I had told him had been very helpful and had been contrary to every other bit of info that he had. He also expressed his appreciation for my having kept him informed of my movements and intentions with respect to briefing him on the Harriman mission. He so strongly implied that if he had not received my message his speech might have been different that I said again that we must not, either of us, permit ourselves to act on any matter unless we were sure that we had talked it out together and had the best info available. He nodded pleasantly and agreed. I then said that I was happy to present to him a letter from the President. 5 He appeared pleased. He opened it and read it twice with great care. I had a slight feeling he was about to react to the contents of the letter and I stopped him from commenting, saying that as the President had requested I was there to brief him in detail on a great many matters of some complexity. I said that again in the interest of being sure that we had no misunderstanding I had written down the points that my govt had instructed me to make and would follow closely an outline and suggested that we have a frank talk thereafter. I then carefully went over the points contained in Deptel 5632 6 which I had paraphrased on paper (with a very few minor changes where I felt he might be offended or confused by one or another word). I went very slowly, watching him closely as I proceeded. He stopped me once or twice and I repeated phrases. He then said “This gives me a good opportunity to talk about a number of things.” I said I was glad to hear him say that. He again seemed on the verge of an emotional response but quickly got himself under control. He spoke strongly about the tanks that Germany had sold to Israel. He said that the UAR had known for some time that military equipment was being sent to Israel but that the UAR had believed it was entirely of German manufacture. He said that the info about the tank deal had reached him two or three months ago and had really caused “all the trouble.” He said it led to the Ulbricht visit which had been pressed upon him for three years. He said with great feeling there was no Soviet pressure at any time contrary to what newspaper reporters in the US had indicated. East Germany had never been mentioned by Mr. Khrushchev except insofar as the German problem itself was discussed. He repeated emphatically there was no Soviet pressure and appeared to irritate himself at the thought. He then launched into various statements with respect to the numbers of tanks going to Jordan. He said this would lead to more tanks going to Israel which would lead to more tanks needed here. I attempted to get him off the question of numbers and the inter-relationship of the Jordan-Israel-UAR problem by saying that the Jordanian and the Israeli deals were for different reasons and that I did not have info on the Jordanian matter which was somewhat separate from the general problem we were discussing and that I assumed that through the UAC he would know the details of the Jordanian armament. He then said (and came back to this point a couple of times) that he did not know how many tanks the Germans had sold or delivered to Israel. Estimates ranged from 60 to 300 or even more. He said “I suppose you are now going to match all the tanks they haven’t delivered. We don’t know how many were promised or delivered although our military consider that 80 percent have been received.” I replied that no sales contracts had been entered into but that the present possibility was for a limited number of older models although that this was not yet a firm deal. He then sought other details and I made the statement contained in my instructions with respect to supersonic aircraft, less sophisticated aircraft and to the absence of other weapons on the horizon. I stressed the fact that the supplies we made available would be sales and at the same price to all buyers. This seemed to relieve him. The President then made some general comments. He said that the US “counted all the Arabs together.” He said “The Arab world cannot be brought together quickly or easily. You must realize this from your own experience with NATO.” He said that what really had to be considered was Egypt. Egypt would be the country which must be knocked out in the event of a conflict. He said that no one could count upon the other Arabs, either individually or collectively and that Egypt was the mainstay as far as military power in the Arab world was concerned. He then reviewed the events of 1956 and the precarious position the UAR was in at that time drawing the moral that the UAR must always be able to defend itself against aggressors. If the UAR had not been able to hold out for nine days if would have made no difference what the UN or anyone else did. We talked for a few minutes of that period and I reminded him rather delicately, I thought, of the US role in 1956. He said that the UAR was appreciative of that role but repeated again that it had to be able to withstand attacks. At that point I reaffirmed our desire now as in ’56 for peace in the area and of our readiness to do what we could to assure it. By this time the President became quite reminiscent and reviewed the efforts of the past to solve the Israeli problem. The statement by Ben Gurion re earlier US efforts which recently appeared in the press seemed very much on his mind. He expressed some concern that this statement would hurt him in Egypt and the Arab world because it implied the possibility that he was willing to come to terms on the Israeli problem. He indicated that he had been willing during the Anderson Mission 7 to go along with a reasonable settlement but had been turned down by the Israelis. He said that he considered the Israelis a threat to him and that the Arab world was concerned about increase of population and immigration into Israel which would increase the threat. He said that earlier proposals which he had been willing to go along with at one time would perhaps have solved the problem but “you would have had something other than Israel as it is today.” In effect the plans amounted to a new kind of state based on Jews and the Arab refugees living together. Now he saw no solution to the Israeli problem for years—50 or 60, maybe more. During his comments he spoke of the Jordan waters; of the difficulty of getting agreement in the Arab world to a plan; of the minimal effect that the diversion plans would have on the actual supply of water available to Israel; and of the relation to immigration of additional water supplies that Israel might have. I repeated the arguments in my instruction with respect to “spite” aspects of the Arab plan which I said was a source of tension and that I thought we must all look to every source of strain and tension in this delicate situation and try to remove them. He nodded but made no comment. At about this time an air raid warning went off and we sat silently for a few minutes. I wondered what the realities of the Middle East had for us now. He then assured me this was only a practice and a local one. We immediately returned to the arms tension. He said “You have told me you are going to sell arms to Israel. The pressure from my military will be to equal its arms. The pressure from my military resulting from the German deliveries, even though the amount is uncertain, has already been forthcoming.” I said this was the point I had been making with respect to the need for some curtailment of the unfortunate arms race in the Middle East. This is the thing we must work toward. He made no comment and did not pursue the matter. As I started to leave I repeated the need for our govts to keep in close touch. I said that we were in difficult period and that we must not permit ourselves on either side to risk grave dangers because of misunderstanding or misinformation and that I hoped that he would talk with me again after thinking over what I had said. He asked me if I would give him a copy of the notes from which I had worked or alternatively to send him a memorandum. I said that the notes were informal with my pencil scribblings but that I would leave them—which I did. (Included paraphrase paras 1–14, not FYI paras, of Deptel 5632.) I said that after he had studied them perhaps a further talk would be in order. I said that all times if he felt uncertainty as to our intention or purpose or even curiosity as to what was going on I would welcome a call from him or one of his staff. I also said that if he had questions I could not answer I would say so and would attempt to get him my govt’s view in any situation by special emissaries here if he had any feeling that this would be useful. I said that the President stood ready to assure that he knew the details of our positions and would provide an emissary if he wished to go into depth on any issues. He said no, “I would prefer to continue as we are going.” He expressed approval of the President’s desire that talks continue and said that he would be happy to see me at any time I felt it desirable. Comment : The conversation, except for the one or two almost emotional moments, could not have been more cordial. His tone was friendly, warm, and more in sorrow than in anger (after he learned of our intentions). The only real emotion came with respect to the tank sale by the Germans. Neither the Yemen nor any of the other contingency subjects were raised and I made no effort to bring them up as I felt we had both had enough. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2 The meeting took place on March 24. 3 Nasser was elected to another 6-year term on March 16. 4 The message has not been further identified. The speech at Assiut was given by Nasser on March 8. Telegram 3117 from Cairo, March 9, reported that the speech contained no direct attack on the United States and that the “preponderance of venom” was reserved for UAR relations with West Germany, which had recently declared the intention of recognizing Israel. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 UAR) 5 Document 192 . 6 Document 193 . 7 Robert B. Anderson visited Egypt and Israel in early 1956 as President Eisenhower’s personal representative. For documentation concerning his mission, see Foreign Relations , 1955–1957, vol. XV, pp. 16 – 343 passim. 198. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 198. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 29, 1965. Small CCC Credit for the UAR. We’ve been keeping tight WH control over every facet of aid to Nasser. The UAR has requested CCC credit terms for 200,000 tons of corn (about $10 million worth). This would be a dollar sale on only slightly softer than normal commercial terms, and is not regarded as “aid.” Even so, we’d be chary were it not that Nasser reacted very mildly when we told him about limited US arms sales to Israel. While this may be only the lull before the storm, it would make life a lot easier for us if he kept quiet. Therefore, State and our Ambassador see the CCC offer as a small and low key signal that we’re still interested in doing business if he’s a good boy. In fact Luke Battle’s analysis (Cairo 3382 attached) 2 is hopeful on this score. Bundy and I agree with Rusk, but want to check it out with you. 3 R. W. Komer 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Presidential Decisions (LBJ), 1965. Secret. 2 Battle commented in telegram 3382 from Cairo, March 27, on his March 24 meeting with Nasser. He stated that it strengthened the Embassy’s impression that they were witnessing the beginning of the end of the current phase of Egyptian policy with its emphasis on Arab unity. He thought a number of Nasser’s comments to him made him sound like an “Egypt firster.” (Ibid., Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. III) 3 The “Disapprove” line is checked with the notation “See me. L.” in Johnson’s handwriting. 4 Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 199. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 199. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, March 30, 1965, 7:10 p.m. CA-10209 SUBJECT Guidance on U.S. Contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization Recent press accounts indicate that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) plans shortly to have offices in all Arab countries except Saudi Arabia. Offices are also to be opened in Great Britain, India, Indonesia and the United States. An office has been opened in Pakistan. As officers in these countries will probably be exposed increasingly to contacts with the PLO and its officials, the Department wishes to set forth guidelines for these contacts. There are of course fundamental differences between the PLO’s views of the Palestine problem and our own. We are as a matter of national policy committed to support the continued existence of Israel; PLO officials repeatedly have declared it is that organization’s aim to see the state of Israel destroyed. We are committed to a peaceful solution of the whole complex of Palestine issues; the PLO’s declared policies increasingly indicate it sees no alternative to solving these problems than by force of arms. Because of our role in Israel’s creation and our support of Israel,PLO statements are almost invariably hostile to the United States. We have made no public statements regarding the PLO. We do not recognize it as the sole or even as an official representative of the Palestine people. It is the USG’s view that it has no official status whatever. In spite of the chasm between the PLO and ourselves, we do not wish to cut ourselves off entirely and irrevocably from its members and officials as individuals. We believe that productive relations can be established between PLO members and USG officers. We do not believe that we should undertake any kind of broad-scale campaign to establish such relations, but neither should we ignore opportunities as might present themselves. Such relations we believe are another way of demonstrating to the Palestinians and other Arabs our continuing friendship for the Palestinian people. There is of course the possibility of acquiring useful intelligence. And finally the maintenance of these contacts would be a useful hedge against some unforeseen and fundamental change in the Palestine problem and our relation to it. Accordingly the Department wishes to caution the posts that they should take no action that might be construed as official recognition of the PLO. They may acknowledge mail from individuals in the PLO but should not enter into substantive correspondence with them as PLO officials. Officers should not call at PLO offices or encourage PLO calls at embassies or consulates. If PLO officials wish to call at USG offices they should be received at a subordinate level. Officers should not attend official PLO functions. There is no objection, however, to US officers’ attendance of small, informal functions given by PLO officers or ones at which the latter are present, even as guests of honor. Officers may where appropriate maintain unostentatious personal contact with PLO officials. They may attend official host country functions at which PLO officials are present, though not ones at which they are guests of honor. For its part, the Department intends to receive any PLO callers at the level of Office Director or below. It is intended that any contacts by Department officers with PLO officials outside the Department be kept at a subordinate level and be unostentatious and informal. The Department welcomes continuing reporting on the PLO and individuals connected with it. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY. Confidential; Air Pouch. Drafted by Stackhouse on March 12; cleared by Davies and Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs Turner C. Cameron, Jr., and in draft by Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake and Stephen J. Campbell; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Aden, Aleppo, Alexandria, Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Baida, Basra, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Casablanca, Constantine, Damascus, Djakarta, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, New Delhi, Oran, Paris, Port Said, Rabat, Taiz, Tripoli, Tunis, USUN, and Karachi. 200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, April 2, 1965, 6:28 p.m. 6049. Kamel called on the Secretary April 1 to appeal for immediate issuance of PA’s under current Title I agreement. Jernegan attended. No other memcon will be prepared. Secretary said he hoped for another meeting soon when he would be in position to discuss US–UAR relations across the board officially and formally. Meanwhile, present meeting gave him opportunity to consult Kamel informally on ways to reverse distressing trend in US–UAR relations. One area of possible improvement was that of arms that UARG had said publicly it was giving to Congo.USG sensed growing concern from neighboring states about their involvement with Congo rebels. Perhaps UARG concern was also growing. Problem of blocking arms infiltration into South Viet-Nam made USG particularly sensitive to arms infiltration into Congo. USG had told all parties of its hope GDRC would maintain active contact with other African states and with OAU in interest of resolving situation. USG wanted to be able to concentrate its aid to Congo in fields of economic and social development; it hoped Congo would not be drawn into intra-African strife or East-West cold war. It seemed to Secretary that provision of aid to rebels was not a very rewarding activity and created difficulties for USG efforts to rebuild relations with UAR. Kamel responded with his familiar case for freezing Arab-Israel dispute and reactivating UAR-US cooperation. He said he felt gravity of situation required him to make a frank, formal, and carefully studied presentation. He felt that UAR-US relationship required personal attention of Secretary and President. (Secretary assured Kamel he and President had given considerable time and thought to this subject.) Kamel said problem was, not to assess blame, but to devise workable formula for normalizing relations: 1) USG should frustrate Israeli efforts to take Palestine issue out of icebox. Israel did not need arms since UN Charter and US commitment against aggression were adequate protection. Diversion of Jordan headwaters would take years at best. Kamel detected that many Americans mistakenly viewed Arab-Israel conflict as central issue in Near East, whereas real issue was how to preserve Near Eastern neutrality and independence. As sincere friend of US, Kamel appealed to USG not to provide arms directly to Israel. 2) USG should resume full economic cooperation with Egypt. From his January meeting with Secretary, Kamel had understood PA’s for amounts remaining under current Title I agreement would be issued. So far no action had been taken. Kamel understood difficulties posed USG by Congo situation, but people of Egypt must eat. On their well-being hung stability of whole Near East. Kamel appealed to USG at least to provide urgent Egyptian needs under CCC or Title IV and begin negotiations for conclusion of new Title I agreement. Kamel questioned identification of Congo as critical issue in UAR relations. His reporting had given Nasser full understanding of US position. As far as Kamel knew, UARG was no longer providing arms to rebels. USG could hardly expect UARG to provide affidavit to this effect. Secretary replied that, out of respect for Kamel’s dedication to US–UAR cooperation, he wished to convey to Kamel, for his personal information only, full appreciation of problem that Congo posed USG. If Administration should issue Purchase Authorization before Secretary was in position to assure Congressional leaders that arms shipments from UAR to Congo had ceased, Congress would be likely to enact legislation disqualifying UAR from any aid whatsoever. Just today, Secretary had received perplexing report that Gbenye and rebel leaders were going to meet in Cairo. Until Congress obtained necessary assurances, it could not be convinced UARG truly nonaligned. In view of Ambassador’s important statement that arms flow had stopped, Secretary would review personally all information available to USG. Any information Kamel could provide on rebel meeting in Cairo would be helpful. Kamel feared that USG failure to resume aid would defeat the mutual objective of reviving cooperation. Citing his obligation to inform Nasser of any trend he discerned in Washington, he said reactivation of economic cooperation would strengthen his hand in Cairo, but insistence on unattainable guarantee would frustrate conditions in which Congo issue could be resolved. By withholding aid,USG was denying Nasser the power to maneuver within his own country. How could Kamel urge more concessions on UARG when USG had made no positive gesture in two years? It seemed that both his and Secretary’s hands were tied. Secretary said that, while he comprehended Kamel’s broad approach to US–UAR relations, Congo was issue that loomed largest in his talks with Congress and this was handiest lever by which to get US–UAR relationship back on tracks. He would investigate possibility of USG’s taking certain specific actions and talk with Kamel again. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret;Limdis; Noforn. Drafted by Jones, cleared by Davies, and approved by Rusk. 201. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 201. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, April 6, 1965, 9:01 p.m. 1893. Jordan Waters. Depcirtel 1854. 2 Assistant Secretary Jernegan opened fifth final session of current round talks on subject with Israeli Minister Gazit 3 by reiterating several points central to understanding U.S. position on subject: US supports Unified Plan fully as Plan or yardstick. No change in US position. It is not agreement and we do not believe parties involved should be expected abide by “every dot and comma” as if they were parties to agreed document. Projects now beginning take shape on upper tributaries do not seem to accord with UDP and we have argued thus with Lebanese. Must recognize argument that particular point does not agree with UDP is of limited usefulness with Arab riparians. US would not acquiesce in major divergences from UDP that would cause trouble. View held at highest level USG was that use force in this matter not advisable and USG could not acquiesce in it. We counting on GOI use peaceful means. Without attempting answer directly to these points Gazit said he had two or three of his own to make. GOI was interested in Lebanese reaction to our demarches. Jernegan said Lebanese did not accept all our arguments but they glad not to force issue. We could not say how this would come out but we confident Lebanese would do all they could to drag out matter. Gazit said GOI considering suggestion made that it take up Lebanese diversion projects in ILMAC. Would make decision in one or two days. Re use force Gazit said GOI not trigger-happy but could not be expected abjure force in matter of vital interest. For GOI use of force was “last rather than first thing.” Gazit said GOI attached considerable importance to knowing whether US agreed with Israel on out of country diversions (water transfer problem) and out of basin diversions. Re latter Jernegan said it clear from record Johnston negotiations out of basin diversion contemplated for Israel but not for Arabs. This was not helpful argument to use with Arabs, however. As for out of country diversion this apparently not contemplated by negotiators. It hard to say whether it considered and turned down. Gazit said GOI attached much importance to preventive diplomacy and wondered whether US felt it doing all it could. Jernegan said we were and assured him we would continue our efforts. Pointed out we had most influence in Beirut and after that, though considerably less, in Cairo. If we could increase our influence in Cairo could be more helpful because UAR key in this matter. Gazit urged US press undesirability Wadi Sreid canal in specific terms with Lebanese. We said we wished consult with Ambassador Meyer before pursuing this particular tactical line. Jernegan said he sure Talbot ready discuss in Israel aspects Jordan Waters we had covered in our discussions but be felt matter had been dealt with thoroughly during last week and he did not see what more there was to say at present time. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and to Geneva for Talbot. 2 Circular telegram 1854, April 1, summarized working level meetings with Gazit held March 29 and 31 and April 1 on the subject of Jordan waters. (Ibid.) The meetings are also recorded in memoranda of conversation dated March 29 and 31 and a memorandum of April 1 from Davies to Jernegan. (Ibid.) 3 A memorandum of the conversation is ibid. 202. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 202. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 7, 1965. The UAR’s request is for a CCC credit sale of 200,000 tons of corn, which would cost it an estimated $10–12 million depending on market prices. 1. This isn’t aid. It is a private dollar sale whereby a private US exporter can buy from CCC for resale to the UAR after he gets a US private bank guarantee (just in case the UAR doesn’t pay). The interest rate is 4–5% plus 1–1/2% for the guarantee. 2. The terms are near commercial. In fact, we allow only a year to pay on corn, in order to permit US exporters to compete with European sellers. France just sold the UAR wheat on 3-year terms. Agriculture regards CCC sales as meeting normal marketing requirements; i.e. as commercial sales not aid. 3. Nor is this much of a carrot for Nasser. We made two CCC credit offers last year which the UAR never took up. So one problem is that such a gesture might be too piddling to accomplish much. 4. There is no Agriculture press release, though Agriculture doesn’t hide these matters and they could be picked up. If there is a query we could put out the above legitimate story, which our AID and State people think ought to carry weight with the Congress. In fact Macomber tried the CCC gambit on L. H. Fountain yesterday and got a favorable reaction. We are living on pins and needles lest Nasser blow the whistle on US arms sales to Jordan and Israel. Even a minor gesture like the above could do a lot to keep alive Nasser’s hope that he can still do business with the US. Once he decides he can’t, we’re in for a blow. The real test will come over the remaining $37 million in Title I PL 480. R. W. Komer Note the attached. 2 If the UAR will keep quiet about US arms sales to Israel and Jordan, it is worth ten CCC sales to us. And it’s much more important than the Congo, where we’re winning despite the UAR. 3 RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret. A note in Johnson’s handwriting reads as follows: “BOB—See that MacArthur, O’Brien, Ball & Company check with all appropriate chr [chairmen] & leaders before we move. Then give me results at once. L.” 2 Telegram 3518 from Cairo, April 7, attached, reported a conversation between Presidency adviser Hassan Sabri Al-Khouli and an Embassy officer. Al-Khouli stated emotionally, “Don’t you realize that the Palestine question is more important to us than Vietnam, Yemen and Congo all put together is to you? You [are] having your way in Palestine. You have pressured us to accept your selling arms to Israel.” He also declared: “Now it looks as though you want to use your food to pressure us on the Congo in addition to Palestine.” Battle noted that this was the clearest indication yet of UAR acquiescence in U.S. arms sales to Israel. 3 Komer added this paragraph by hand. 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, April 8, 1965, 11 a.m. 589. Depcirtels 1750 and 1842. 2 Following drafted by Ambassador before departure. First opportunity see King Hussein since receipt second reftel came late afternoon April 7 following his return from Aqaba. Since most of same ground had been covered with him before, I couched presentation in terms of request from Washington that I review with him before departure for Geneva meeting current USG thinking on Middle East and his own earlier request that we be completely frank with him. I then made detailed statement based on first reftel. I added expression of appreciation for his recent comment to NY Times that he understood Harriman mission had been helpful, and in discussing drift of some Arab states toward Sovbloc said I could not refrain from noting his government planned sign agreement for use of Soviet radio programs whereas they had never been willing use ours. While admitting this different type of drift, said Washington could hardly refrain from speculating on such action. King listened attentively and then said he wished comment on some of points made. First he appreciated frankness of approach. He had always desired intimate and honest exchange of views with USG on area problems but in past had never felt this fully achieved. He hoped Washington would be willing make possible continuation of discussions this nature. He placed great value in relationship with Western powers which stood for things in which Jordan believed and above all else he desired preserve this relationship. Second, he was pleased American Ambassadors in Near East meeting together and he hoped we would take very hard look at US policy in area and particularly at possibilities of some rather drastic new ideas or initiatives. Admitted he did not have solution which he wanted to sell but felt that for too long USG had reacted to events rather than trying to influence them in proper direction. Only hope for peace and stability in area, he felt, lay with U.S. and other Western friends. As for behavior of Arab states, he admitted this had not been what it should have been not because of summit but despite summit. Summit decisions in his opinion had been essentially correct but some leaders were going back to pre-summit atmosphere. This was very dangerous and his policy, as he had shown in West German case, was based on determined effort to maintain Arab unity even when this involved minor concessions on items where Jordan would otherwise have disagreed. He recognized however that Arabs must do more than this; they must work together constructively and in particular begin to deal with internal problems of economic, political and social growth. This has been his effort in past few weeks in Jordan and would continue to be major point of his domestic policy. We could expect further changes, both in personnel and concepts within coming weeks. Hussein [garble] agreed there had been drift to left in some Arab states, particularly Syria and UAR, but he still adhered to belief Arabs would not become Communist. However this was problem which needed careful attention for Communists were only ones gaining from present tensions. As to report of agreement for Soviet radio programs, he knew nothing of this and would look into it. Did not think I should take matter seriously (report had come from Under Secretary Information) and in any case if GOJ reached such decision, they would make comparable agreement with USG. Jordan water question was without doubt at very critical state, though he considered this more symptom of underlying dispute than real cause of difficulty. Arab states would not and could not stop diversion works, though it remained to be seen whether these works would seriously hurt Israel. However, he felt Israel had embarked on determined effort to halt Arab works. Therefore he suggested that for planning purposes USG work on hypothesis that hostilities would ensue in 1965. He hoped these could be limited and under [no?] circumstances would Arabs attack, and perhaps out of it all some sensible agreements could be reached. But at moment he could not see entirely peaceful resolution of issue. On arms question he felt we were guilty of miscalculation. As USG well knew, he firmly believed Israel was expansionist power determined to acquire more territory. Balance of arms which was needed in area was one which would convince Israel it could not continue aggressive policies, push out its frontiers and constantly strive for more territory. Only when Israel recognized this could there be resolution of basic issue. There was no question of “driving Israel into sea” but equally Arabs would not sit back and accept further encroachments. His great concern was that US approach on arms to Israel was not designed to create kind of balance he had in mind but rather was one which constantly tempted Israel to flaunt its power in face of weaker neighbors. He was particularly conscious of this because Jordan was most exposed and stood to lose most if hostilities resulted. Finally, he said he wanted to enter plea that we so conduct ourselves as not to give Nasser another club with which to beat Arabs or West, since all Arab states and Western interests would inevitably suffer. Queried to his meaning, he said he felt that it important that we continue wheat shipments with minimum fanfare so that Nasser would really have to stand up and face horrible economic mess he has made of Egypt. If we stopped shipments, Nasser would charge Western imperialist conspiracy against Egypt and make political capital out of it, thus hiding what was real problem inside Egypt. Hussein implied without so stating that he anticipated that Nasser, if we stopped wheat shipments, would call for nationalization of oil so that greater profits could be made available to Arab world and hence to Egypt, but in process seriously damage position of oil producing states and of West. Calder 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL NEAR E. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Geneva for Talbot and to Rabat, Tripoli, London, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Tunis, Jidda, Kuwait, Baghdad, Algiers, Cairo, and Jerusalem. 2 See Document 194 and footnote 1 thereto. 204. Memorandum of Conversation 204. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 8, 1965. SUBJECT Conversation with PLO Representative PARTICIPANTS Jamal Saad, Washington Representative, Arab Information Office Usamah Naqib, Representative, Palestine Liberation Organization NE—Curtis F. Jones Mr. Saad hosted luncheon at the International Club to introduce Mr. Naqib. The following subjects arose during the conversation: Biographical Note on Naqib Born in Safad, Naqib went to Syria in 1948 and attended Washington State University from 1951 to 1956. He obtained a license as a medical laboratory technician in the United States and then returned to Syria where he established in partnership with a General Saba a medical laboratory which is still in operation. Naqib is married to a girl from Haifa. They expect a child in May. Naqib is a serious type in his late 30’s, bespectacled and balding, who speaks English quite well and conveys an impression of combined reasonableness and determination. Naqib’s Mission in the U.S. Saad said that, in accordance with what he understood to be the preference of the State Department, the PLO would not attempt to open an office in Washington. However, it was contemplated that he would assign office space and secretarial assistance to Naqib and the two would work closely together—the primary difference being that Saad represented the 13 members of the Arab League while Naqib represented the 14th unofficial member of the League, Palestine. Neither was a registered lobbyist and their purpose would be through press, radio, TV, and public speeches to get their message across to the American people. They were not here to cultivate officials or members of Congress. Mr. Jones stated that the Department of State was unable to maintain formal relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization. On the legal side, it did not represent a sovereign entity. On the practical side, it was widely regarded in the United States as an organization dedicated to terminating the existence of a state that we recognized. Naqib suggested that the Department view the PLO as an organization dedicated to promoting the rights of the Palestinians. Mr. Jones said that on that basis he would be pleased to provide any personal assistance to Mr. Naqib. 2 The Arab-Israel Dispute Mr. Jones stated the Department’s conviction that there is no military solution to the Palestine problem. We hope eventually that the military and political situation would evolve to the point of making war obsolete, but for the foreseeable future the possibility of a military solution was negated by the American commitment to oppose aggression from any quarter. Therefore, the resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute would have to come about gradually in accordance with basic political, economic and social forces which we hoped would eventually promote the acceptance of the people of Israel by the Near Eastern community. Saad and Naqib listened to this statement without comment. Arab Unity When this subject came up, Jones stated the Department’s position, adding his own personal belief that, since Arab disunity appeared to breed instability, any trend toward unification would appear to be in the American interest. He had no idea how such a trend might be established, whether collectively or by accretion, but in any event it was a matter to be dealt with by the people of the area themselves without any intervention from the United States or any other foreign country. Naqib remarked that history offered no examples of unity that had not been achieved by military action. In reply to a question about the background of the Unionist insurrection in Damascus in July 1963, Naqib said that it had been staged by Jasim ‘Ulwan and apparently was easily suppressed because it had been penetrated by the Baath. The regime had used this coup as a pretext to arrest several Unionist leaders who had had no connection with the plot whatsoever. Among those were Muhammad Jarrah, Ra’if Ma’arri, Muhammad Sufi, and Naqib himself, who spent nearly a year in Mezze. Jones commented that the failure of the regime to prosecute Jarrah had given rise to the story that he had been a double agent. Naqib denied this report categorically, saying that the report of early release was false, that Jarrah was with him in Mezze, and that in any event Jarrah could not have been a double agent since he had known nothing about the plot. “Let My People Go” During a discussion of the problem of getting the Arab message across to the American people, Jones attempted to make a distinction between defense of the rights of the Palestinian refugees and defense of the need of the Jewish people for a refuge from persecution. He cited the MetroMedia production “Let My People Go” as a very effective presentation of the latter thesis—a thesis to which the vast majority of Americans firmly subscribe. Those Arabs who advocated blacklisting Xerox for having sponsored this film would make the mistake of confusing these two issues, thereby doing disservice to their cause. In the absence of offers by other countries to accept the Jewish refugees in Germany during the war, it was difficult to blame the Jews for trying to reach Israel. In fact, perhaps the Arab states could blur Israel’s unique position as the Jewish national home if they should offer to hold their borders open in perpetuity to the Jewish refugees and their descendants. Naqib’s reaction to this observation was stony, but Saad noted that in past centuries the Arab world had played just such a role for Jewish refugees from European persecution and that as late as World War II the Sultan of Morocco had resisted Vichy directives to discriminate against his Jewish subjects. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY. Confidential. Drafted by Jones. 2 No record of any further contact with Naqib during the period covered by this volume has been found. 205. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 205. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, April 15, 1965. 3624. As culmination five hours of solid if occasionally rambling discussion of US–UAR relations by Fawzi, Kaissouni, Talbot and Ambassador, Talbot set out in candid terms why US finding constructive cooperation difficult. 2 This discussion occurred at end of luncheon with no note takers present. Although Fawzi’s response was suave and very general, we believe message got through. Talbot pointed out certain elements in American political life had consistently opposed US assistance programs to UAR but these—notably what Egyptians identified as Zionist groups—had never by themselves dictated US policy. Of late, however, much broader spectrum of American public life becoming troubled at indications UAR involved in “liberation” movements undermining governments of other free countries. This was what ChiComs and Soviets, latter in part spurred by aggressive stance of former, currently pursuing in less developed countries. Since World War II US had expended great treasure and effort to block various forms of aggression. There had been successes. We believed no nation could conceive at this stage in history of nuclear war as instrument of aggrandizement, in view of intolerable risks and consequences. Nor would any government today be likely to face consequences of world reactions to movements of massed troops across frontiers. US now deeply engaged in coping with third form of aggression, secret infiltration of trained soldiers and terrorists across frontiers, which being practiced by Communist nations. World had not yet found fully adequate answer to this type of attack. Its seriousness raised questions about policies not only of Communist countries but of others which seem to practice it. We had therefore been greatly concerned, as UARG knew, Talbot continued, by UAR support of Congo rebels. In addition, we were troubled when UAR fingers seen in difficult situations elsewhere, as in South Arabian Federation, Persian Gulf, North Africa, Cyprus, etc. Some thought these grounds for ending US efforts develop constructive relationship with UAR. At minimum, they clearly questions needing to be resolved as we examined how US–UAR relationship could be put back on constructive basis. Fawzi thanked Talbot for candor of his comments. Rather surprisingly, he said he was relieved that this was extent of our problems. In Cairo’s view, these matters should be discussed in full frankness between us whenever US had specific worry. Sometimes our views might differ. He did not wish to rebut points specifically, however, but rather to urge that our representatives discuss in detail any that might arise. Rest of conversation faded into generalities. Comment : Relatively mild response by Fawzi will presumably not be last we hear from this conversation which touched bone of our relationship with UAR. At worst it could bring a strong UAR response, probably from other officials and perhaps even from Nasser. More hopefully, it could have broken way open for Ambassador to pursue specific problems in this field. We expect to be able to make better judgment after meeting with Nasser Sunday. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret; Exdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received on April 16 at 2:24 a.m. 2 Talbot was visiting Cairo and other Near Eastern capitals. Telegram 3626 from Cairo, April 15, reported most of the conversation with Deputy Prime Ministers Fawzi and Kaissouni. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) The portion of the conversation reported in telegram 3624 is recorded in more detail in a memorandum of conversation ibid. 206. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 206. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, April 16, 1965, 1118Z. 1323. During conversation yesterday with Mrs. Meir, principally devoted to recent publicity re arms sales to M.E. reported separately, 2 I took occasion refer again to strength USG opposition to possible Israel 1) pre-emptive military action against Arab water diversion, and 2) entry into nuclear weapon field. I said I was speaking without instructions and I had no intention of making threats. However, although US position had been made entirely clear in recent Harriman-Komer talks and on other occasions, I told her I thought it in the interests of both countries that I pass on the brief but impressive comments the Secretary made to me privately last week in Geneva. The Secretary had remarked on his own initiative and not in response to any prompting or query on my part that in either event “the US Government would pull out.” I said that my quote might well be inaccurate and in any case the language was not preformulated with precision. To me the importance of this comment is that it emphasizes the seriousness with which the highest levels of the USG would view such Israeli action. Mrs. Meir thanked me and expressed understanding. She did not comment further but I think she was impressed. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. A written notation in an unknown hand reads, “Good show!” 2 Telegram 1319 from Tel Aviv, April 15, reported that Meir expressed great concern over news stories from Washington concerning U.S. provision of arms to various Near Eastern countries, including information that Israel had acquiesced and had been warned not to take any steps to prevent Arab water diversion. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 NEAR E) Circular telegram 1976, April 15, contains the text of a statement made by a Department of State spokesman that day stressing that there had been no change in U.S. arms sales policy in the Near East. (Ibid.) 207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, April 17, 1965, 2:44 p.m. 6406. Suggested Scenario for Talbot’s Meeting with Nasser. FYI: This meeting is important to both US and UAR. We hope it will produce confirmation that UARG intends carry out policy adjustments essential to resumption of US aid. Egyptians are looking for a signal that US declarations of desire to resume aid are sincere. With expiration of Title I agreement approaching and Egyptians in grim mood, we wish to accord them such a signal. We suggest following approach: End FYI. 1. Open on a candid note by remarking you have just come from chiefs of mission conference. Nasser might be interested in knowing how participants see present situation in Near East. After conveying your impressions, you could comment on our arms policy along lines of FYI section of Deptel 5632 2 and Depcirtel to Arab capitals on this subject. 3 You might also wish to draw on separate telegram on specific issues between US and UAR. 2. At this point, to promote atmosphere of give and take, you might solicit Nasser’s views on these matters. 3. Nasser may, as Kamel has advised, broach UARG desire for resumption of aid. If not, might be advisable for US side to broach it. Moving from area problems to Egyptian problems, you might note USG understanding of weighty economic problems UARG faces. You might go on to indicate USG regret that our support for efforts to find solutions these problems has lately been blocked by US–UAR policy differences. It might be well to review at some length the deterioration of the climate of opinion regarding the UAR in Congress as a reflection of wide-ranging sentiment throughout the country. While there are a number of major policy differences between the US and UAR, the Congo problem was the proximate cause of the latest difficulty. The Administration made a major effort to obtain authority for the President to continue useful economic relations with the UAR. It succeeded only by making it clear that a substantial improvement in relations must precede such further cooperation. Congressional reaction focused heavily on arms shipments to the Congo and the cessation of such shipments was clearly made a condition to the resumption of assistance. This is not to say that many Americans are not continuing to work toward the improvement of US–UAR relations. For example, Eugene Black’s reports of his conversations in Cairo have been helpful in clearing the air. 4. You might elicit Nasser’s views on prospects for reviving satisfactory climate. 5. If Nasser’s reply is encouraging, we suggest you convey following: a) USG willingness to consider now Egyptian request for CCC credit for corn. FYI: Terms on wheat (6 months) not likely be competitive with European offers but better on corn (12 months). End FYI. b) Your desire to bring about the assurance of further purchase authorizations to complete Title I agreement and your intention to work to this end provided that in the meantime the UARG can see its way clear to stop arms shipments to the Congo. (We leave it to you to develop a form of words that will make this point clear without sounding too much like an ultimatum.) c) You would hope a period of quiet and steady improvement would create favorable Congressional climate for negotiation new Title I agreement. 6. You might conclude with reaffirmation of genuine USG desire for cooperation. Our insistence on improvement in climate is not capricious but reflects political realities that cannot be ignored. USG has global interests and commitments to consider which we hope Nasser will recognize. FYI. As we see it, UARG believes it has made some difficult political concessions—notably tolerance of arms sales to Israel. Longer USG delays in reciprocating, greater is danger that Egyptian extremists will foreclose possibility of salvaging US–UARG cooperation. By reopening tap to allow thin stream of economic aid, we perceive better than even chance of confirming UARG on its present conciliatory course. This action would be consistent with ambassadors’ findings (Geneva’s 1599). 4 It would demonstrate that we are not stringing Egyptians along—that USG has will and capability to meet concession with concession. (We suspect FRG is thinking along similar lines in regard to its own problems with UARG. Embassy will have noted the several reports, of which German Foreign Office appears to be unaware, that Werner carried aid package to Cairo.) “Satisfactory climate” cannot be defined in terms of specific issues. It will obtain when sum total of UARG positions on major issues between us reflects conscious Egyptian effort to adapt to USG requirements. However, improvement in regard to Congo must be part of picture. End FYI. For Bonn: Above position is preliminary, not to be discussed with FRG. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jones and Symmes; cleared by Jernegan, Bennsky, and McGeorge Bundy and in draft by Deputy Director of AID’s Office of Near Eastern Affairs John Kean and in substance by Emmett B. Ford of GER; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Bonn. 2 Document 193 . 3 Document 194 . 4 Telegram 1599 from Geneva, April 12, reported that Talbot and U.S. Ambassadors to Near Eastern countries, who were meeting in Geneva, recommended completing the deliveries of surplus grain to the UAR committed under the current P.L. 480 agreement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) UAR) 208. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 208. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, April 18, 1965, 1805Z. 3652. From Talbot. Ambassador Battle and I had two and one-half hour talk with Nasser today ranging fully over US–UAR relations and many other issues in world affairs. He had obviously been briefed carefully on my earlier talks with his Ministers and officials and had done his homework sufficiently well so almost all points I had raised were skillfully woven into his comments and responses to my questions. Tone was personally cordial throughout. He was candid in comments about UAR policies, tactics and difficulties, and equally candid in complaining about certain aspects of US policy. For a time we concluded he had decided to pursue fairly stiff line. However, this turned out to be in part protective coloration for specific concessions to points we have been urging on UARG in recent weeks. Nugget he dropped in middle of fairly assertive discussion on Congo situation was flat statement UAR not now providing arms to Congolese rebels. In discussion of nuclear proliferation, he stated equally definitely that UAR will accept IAEA safeguards on reactors it builds, large as well as small. He gave us clear impression he has decided to swallow US arms sales to Israel, however unpalatable. He stated Arab water diversion works will not exceed, at least by much, Johnston Plan allocations. Also indicated current disinterest on Cyprus situation, though he helped Makarios last summer. On other hand, he raised signals of possible further difficulties with Saudi Arabia on Yemen and with British over SAF. He suggested prompt Amer-Sulatan talks to clear misunderstandings over his agreement with Faisal. He urged that US stop bombing attacks on North Vietnam to give NVN chance to respond to proposals for negotiations. It was clear our decision to sell arms to Israel was much on his mind. We discussed principal Arab-Israeli issues including Jordan waters and refugees as well as arms in detail. He repeatedly averred that Israel can influence US policy but Arabs cannot. At end of session I made offer, as authorized in my instructions, of US readiness to consider CCC sales of wheat and corn on credit terms of six and twelve months, respectively. I also said we hoped for prompt decision on remainder of current PL480 agreement. I expressed further hope that together we could achieve improvement of climate of relations necessary to enable us to enter negotiations for new PL480 agreement. Extensive telegraphic memcon being dictated rather hurriedly before my departure Jidda and will follow promptly. 2 Suggest Department may wish to divide it into sections by subject and repeat to other posts as appropriate. I have now had many hours of talk with UARG officials. It is apparent to Ambassador and me that Nasser’s decision to tell us no arms being sent to Congolese rebels represents firm UARG policy decision to attempt to meet conditions we have laid down for completion existing PL480 agreement. For variety of reasons well understood in Department, I believe it very important we now respond by prompt issuance of purchase authorities. You will not be surprised to learn that Ambassador Battle fully agrees. This leaves open for further discussion in coming weeks and perhaps months the question of a fresh PL480 agreement. That, rather than further dialogue on the existing agreement, seems to me the proper occasion for further examination of the many and real problems remaining between US and the UAR. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Telegram 3653 from Cairo, April 18. (Ibid.) 209. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 209. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, April 22, 1965. 629. Embtel 619 2 —JAA tanks. Saw King Hussein afternoon April 21 re redeployment JAA tanks. Reminded him of our earlier conversation and his assurance that under normal circumstances tanks would be kept on East Bank and that he would do everything possible to avoid provocative actions. Said I recognized that he and he alone could make decisions re legitimate self defense requirements of Jordan, but I had nevertheless been requested to raise question of tanks on West Bank since this seemed contrary to his own earlier assurances. Added that we had absolutely no evidence of any Israeli build-up or redeployment and under circumstances we were fearful that stationing of tanks on West Bank could trigger very reaction we all sought to avoid. Said that we recognized his concerns over dangers inherent in present state of tension and were doing everything in our power to prevent resort to arms as solution to present problems. His recent action in redeployment of tanks if known on other side could well work against objectives which I thought we both shared. King replied that it was quite correct he had earlier given assurances that under normal circumstances tanks would be retained on East Bank and he felt that he was still operating within framework of those assurances and his own responsibilities for providing all possible defense for Jordan. First, he could hardly describe present situation as being “normal circumstances” which he and I had previously discussed. He had no evidence of an Israeli build-up but he had to face stark reality that Israel had categorically threatened to stop Arab water works by force if necessary. This meant to him that conflict was inevitable and under circumstances he had to take such measures as he could to protect Jordan. Second, tanks that were moved were Charioteers which could hardly be considered a threat. They had been deployed in defensive positions as an anti-tank weapon and in fact they were only anti-tank weapons now available to him. Third, all other tanks including all U.S. models had been retained on East Bank and would continue to be kept there. It was true that he had ordered certain redeployments in last few weeks but in every case he had kept major installations way back from frontier and nothing that had been done could in the least be considered provocative. Fourth, he felt that in his own national interest it was essential that he maintain adequate defense of northwestern frontier against possibility of tank attack which he would under other circumstances be unable to halt. Putting his tanks into defensive positions today rather than after an Israeli build-up was detected seemed less provocative than if this were done at later date. In summary, he said he hoped that Washington would recognize fact that he had not undertaken a provocative action; that this redeployment was relatively minor and entirely defensive in nature. He said he would be glad to have me discuss other changes in military formations that caused us concern, but as he had told me before my departure for Geneva, he thought USG had to proceed on hypothesis that Arab states and Israel were now on collision course and that conflict appeared inevitable in course of year. Until situation basically altered he would have to take reasonable precautions but he could assure us once again Arab states would not initiate any hostilities. Barnes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 6–1 JORDAN. Secret. The time of transmission is not indicated on the telegram, which was received at 8:46 p.m. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Baghdad. 2 Telegram 619 from Amman, April 22, reported that some tanks had recently been stationed on the West Bank. Prime Minister Tell had stated that this was a purely defensive move and that the tanks would be withdrawn in the near future. Telegram 583 to Amman, April 17, instructed the Embassy that if further information confirmed the presence of a battalion of tanks on the West Bank, it should raise the subject with King Hussein. (Both ibid.) 210. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 210. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, April 23, 1965, 0945Z. 1358. From Talbot. Following are key points my meeting with PriMin Eshkol April 22. Noting FonMin Meir and I had already discussed Jordan waters issue (see following septel), 2 Eshkol professed to be flabbergasted by USG characterization of UDP as “yardstick” by which water usage should be measured. He asked that we ensure King Hussein know if Jordan accepted water diverted from Lebanon or Syria, Israel would reopen whole question of Jordanian utilization of Yarmuk. At Eshkol’s request I outlined my impressions of current situation in Arab Near East, particularly Nasser’s position. I said area trends during next six months should be watched closely to see whether Arab summit spirit would continue prevail or traditional inter-Arab rivalries again come to fore. I stressed persistence of apparently genuine Arab fear of geographic expansionism by Israel. PriMin strongly reiterated there no intention nor need for Israel’s territorial expansion. Eshkol made usual plea, without specifying precisely how it might be done, that we utilize aid to UAR so as to moderate Nasser’s policies. Next I stressed our interest in seeing area arms problem eased. Our approaches had undergone three phases. First on conventional arms, we had again re-examined US policy and again determined our best course was to continue exercise restraint in supplying arms to principal parties Arab-Israel dispute, with rare exceptions. Second, on missiles we had made thus far unrewarded efforts. We agreed with Israel that UAR missiles not now effective weapons. Third, re nuclear proliferation President Johnson, as was President Kennedy, is very seriously concerned. This was vital global problem, not one related merely to Arab-Israel confrontation. It most important that IAEA safeguards be applied to nuclear reactors in this area. Eshkol opined disarmament problem should be faced in above order, i.e., conventional arms first and nuclear last. I said we had indications UAR would accept IAEA safeguards. PriMin thought if Nasser accepted safeguards and got a large reactor, he might well then remove reactor from IAEA system. After review subjects reported separately, 3 PriMin stressed Israel not preparing for “war” in connection water issue. I took occasion reiterate our firm opposition to use of military force. Eshkol said he construed our position as opposing “preventive war,” not necessarily opposing “normal shooting” that goes on along borders expecially on Syria-Israel border. I stressed we opposed all shooting as means to solve area problems. Eshkol exclaimed, “It will be done (i.e., Israel would do some shooting). We will not sit quiet for a long time. Arabs can cut off 150 MCM’s of Israel’s water.” I said as GOI well aware from Harriman, Komer, Ambassador, and others, if Israel resorted to shooting “You would find US opposed to you.” To this PriMin said, “We’ll see. The President told me US would back Israel on the water.” I emphasized President was referring to Israel’s getting its share of Jordan waters, not about use of force to attain that end. Eshkol said “OK, you get the water without force, what do you advise?” I said it would be long time before Arabs could divert more water than that allocated them under UDP. Eshkol claimed this was mistaken estimate; Arabs could complete diversion projects in two years if allowed to work without interference. PriMin requested US move Embassy to Jerusalem. Everyone, with possible exception French, was waiting for this US lead. I said this was not simple bilateral issue; it had important international implications. I did not see our moving Embassy as being in the current picture. Eshkol complained same current picture had obtained almost 18 years. Failure Western powers move to Jerusalem added unnecessary element uncertainty. I pointed out no country outside area had devoted more effort than had US in attempting settle Near East uncertainties. We had worked hard on refugees, water, and other basic problems. At close of meeting, which was extended on PriMin’s initiative to over one hour, he said he would give much not to be compelled to use “a little force” on water issue, but water was Israel’s life-blood and if necessary Israel would have to fight for it. I stressed, as I had to Mrs. Meir, that if we are to give help on this issue, our views on how we can best help must be considered. We did not consider threat of use of force at all helpful, particularly vis-a-vis delicate political situation in Lebanon. Note: Of interest that after meeting Director US Dept Bitan told EmbOff PriMin had raised Jerusalem issue on his own because he bitterly disappointed at Bonn’s decision establish Embassy in Tel Aviv. Eshkol had in fact raised all but one item on his personal initiative. Memcon follows. 4 Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Bonn, Damascus, London, Paris,USUN, Jerusalem, POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Cairo, Rome, Algiers, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, Rabat, Taiz, Tripoli, and Tunis. 2 Telegram 1360 from Tel Aviv, April 23. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 1362 from Tel Aviv, April 23, reported that after their discussion of IAEA safeguards, Eshkol said he thought the Israeli Government could not foreswear nuclear weapon development in the absence of binding security guarantees, but that “we are so far (presumably from having a nuclear weapon)—it would take huge sums of money, then there would be problem of delivery vehicle. But we can’t afford not to think about it, not to try to know all about it,” because of the Israeli Government’s responsibility for the survival of the Jewish people in the face of Arab threats. The quotation marks and the parenthetical insertion are in the telegram. (Ibid., DEF 12–1 ISR) 4 A summary memorandum of conversation was enclosed with airgram A–808 from Tel Aviv, May 5. (Ibid., POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER) 211. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 211. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, May 6, 1965. JCSM–337–65 SUBJECT Impact on Area Arms Balance of Military Sales to Israel (S) 1. (U) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–22656/65, dated 26 April 1965, subject as above. 2 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their view (JCSM–953–63, dated 7 December 1963) 3 that our Middle East arms policy should not positively identify the United States with either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Every attempt should be made to avoid a polarization in the Middle East whereby the United States becomes increasingly identified with Israel and the USSR with the Arab World. Such polarization would have the undesirable consequence of promoting an anti-US Arab unity under United Arab Republic leadership. This process would tend to weaken the comparatively moderate, pro-Western Arab governments while strengthening Soviet influence among the Arab states. Sale to Israel of US offensive weapons, such as tanks and aircraft, can be expected to generate Arab reactions which would be detrimental to US political, military, and economic interests in the Middle East. The impact of US military sales to Israel is discussed in Appendices A and B hereto. 4 3. (S) Although the Israelis have requested 75 combat aircraft, presumably bomber aircraft, the Memorandum of Understanding, 5 as understood by the United States, provided for no more than 24 aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the addition of even 24 jet light bombers to the Israeli inventory would provide a significant relative increase in the Israeli military capability, and the addition of 75 bomber aircraft would create a drastic change in the present military balance which cannot be justified on military grounds. With the addition of Hawk missiles, scheduled to become operational about 15 May 1965, the Israeli air defense system will provide an acceptable defense against the numerically superior United Arab Command offensive air capability. 4. (S) Israel’s combat aircraft needs have been filled in the past from United Kingdom and French sources. The United States should avoid sale of any US combat aircraft to Israel, particularly bomber aircraft. Every effort should be made to persuade Israel to continue to satisfy its combat aircraft requirements from Western European sources. The British Canberra Mk II or the French Vautour II B (especially if it were equipped with the Spey engine) would give Israel a satisfactory bombing capability. Both aircraft are expected to be available. 5. (S) If a political decision is made to sell US aircraft, bomber aircraft should not be offered, since this would increase the severity of the Arab reaction. If US aircraft must be provided, the F–5 aircraft is the best available compromise on the basis of performance, cost, political considerations, and impact on US military posture. Although its performance does not meet the stated Israeli requirement, it is probable that Israel would accept the F–5 in order to obtain a US aircraft. Other US and Western aircraft which could be considered for sale to Israel are listed in Appendices C and D hereto. These aircraft are listed in the order of preference for sale to Israel if the F–5 is unacceptable. 6. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding commits the United States to provide tanks to Israel of at least the same number and quality as those sold to Jordan. In addition, it commits the United States to deliver the remaining 110 tanks from the German tank arrangement. In additional negotiations, Israel has asked the United States to furnish 100 M–48–A2C tanks to balance the initial commitment of 100 M–48s to Jordan and to furnish 100 M–48–A2Cs to fulfill the German contract. Consummation of the foregoing will significantly increase Israeli qualitative superiority. Therefore, in order to reduce Arab reaction, it is recommended that the M–48–A1 only be considered for sale to Israel in fulfillment of the Memorandum of Understanding to balance the tanks sold to Jordan. Moreover, any sale of current US Army M–48–A2 or newer model tanks would have an adverse impact on the armored capabilities of the US Army, whereas the sale of earlier model M–48–A1 or M–48 tanks would not. 7. (S) Since Israel has preferred in the past to consider self-propelled guns such as the USSR SU–100 in the category of armor and in view of the offensive capability of 155mm SP weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, if such equipment is requested, sales be approved only if the number of tanks sold is reduced by a corresponding amount. 8. (S) If the Israelis were to acquire, as postulated in the reference, 310 M–48 type tanks, 60 self-propelled 155mm weapons, and 250 Centurion tanks, the Arab-Israeli arms balance would be tipped in favor of Israel to a significant degree by the end of 1967. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “Sec Def has seen Brief.” 2 Not found. 3 Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 383 . 4 The appendices are not attached. 5 See Documents 182 - 185 . 212. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 212. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, May 7, 1965. 3898. Deptel 6651 2 raises interesting question which this Embassy has pondered for many months. Do actions and commitments arising from two Arab summit conferences constitute an integrated “plan?” We believe the answer, not surprisingly, is “yes and no.” Arab summit I was hastily called by Nasser to devise ways and means short of offensive military action to respond to Israel off-take of Tiberias water. Arab summit I succeeded in achieving this objective, but it set other policies and institutions in motion which, up to present, like Topsy have “just growed.” These can be fitted together in some fashion to make up a “plan” but such a “plan” contains several contradictory elements. Main aspects of Arab summit policies include: 1. Arab counter works on Jordan tributaries. This involves joint financing on Arab territories of engineering works calculated to use water from the Jordan system. Arabs tell us confidentially this will not involve off-take significantly greater than Johnston Plan allocations. Publicly they indicate this will harm Israel economy and Israel offensive action against Arab works on Arab territories must be expected. 2. UAC. To deal with this contingency armed forces of Arab states surrounding Israel must be strengthened and preparations made for back-up military support of other Arab states. Up to present we have no indications that UAC planning other than defensive. But imaginative and wishful-thinking Arabs must be discussing contingencies whereby UAC “defense” has been so effective that it can quickly move to offense. This wishful thinking having fairly wide impact on Arab public opinion. But we believe sober Arab leadership contemplates Arabs developing sufficient force to create a military stalemate with Israel. Then UN and/or great powers are expected to step into situation and force a settlement on terms favorable to Arabs. 3. Politico-economic preparation. To achieve UN/great power support at critical juncture postulated above, Arab summiteers decided on such steps as stepped up propaganda campaign, visits of Arab delegations to world capitals to “explain” Arab viewpoint, etc. They also made motions of progress toward policies whereby united Arab economic pressure (mostly oil) could be brought to bear on Western countries to bring them around to Arab viewpoint. 4. Palestine liberation. This is where most contradictions occur. Three elements above can be said to form reasonably comprehensive plan. But it became obvious between two Arab summits that Palestinians themselves should be given greater role. As result, “liberation of Palestine” became proclaimed goal, and PLO and PLA were established. Goal of “liberation” simply cannot be reconciled with defensive politico-military-economic strategy outlined above. Results confuse everybody. Ambitious but untrusted Palestine refugee leader Shukairy tries to equate PLO with bodies that liberated Algeria from France. But Arab leaders obviously refuse to go along. While PLO sits as member of Arab summit conference it has been made clear that (unlike PGRA) it is not a “government” and should not be recognized as such by other governments including Arabs. While Palestine “army” has been created, it has no independent life of its own but operates as part of the United Arab Command. Arabs generally seem apprehensive over Shukairy’s direct contacts with Red China, Jordan fears fruition of Shukairy’s ambition would curtail its own sovereignty, UAR miffed at Shukairy’s attempt dominate Arab League over Bourguiba issue. Foregoing is Arab “plan” as it appears to us after following Arab summitry for nearly eighteen months and many conversations with Egyptians and other Arab officials in Cairo. We do not believe there is more to “plan” than this. Our belief is that “plan’s” basic internal contradictions are in effect the seeds of its own destruction. But, as suggested in last sentence reftel, Embassy will pursue its inquiries in this matter as opportunities arise. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 10:38 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, and Damascus. 2 Telegram 6651 to Cairo, April 29, asked if the Arab summit conferences held in Cairo and Alexandria in 1964 had agreed on a “plan” or conditions for solution of the Palestine problem. Department officials had noted references to such a “plan” in a number of Arab responses to recent proposals by Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba for a Palestine settlement. (Ibid.) 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, May 8, 1965. 668. Deptel 607; 2 Cairo’s 3898 to Dept. 3 During course of conversation with King Hussein and Prime Minister Tell May 6 I had suitable opportunity to inquire specifically what they meant by Arab “plan” for dealing with Palestine. King replied immediately that Arab plan was simply (1) decision to proceed on divergence of Jordan waters coupled with (2) decision to build up Arab armies to point where they would be able to defend against any Israeli attack on diversion plan. This was full content of any plan on which Arab leaders had agreed. [garble—Bourguiba] had been attacked because he went beyond this framework without consulting other Arab leaders and in particular because timing of his public proposals had been most tragic in view of present emotional state of eastern Arabs. Prime Minister confirmed that this was all he had meant by his own reference to a collective plan. King went on to say that there was absolutely no intention of trying to destroy Israel. He appreciated our efforts over past few months to restrain Israel from any preemptive military move and our assurances that we were prepared to defend independence and territorial integrity of Jordan. In long run however, this not sufficient and Arabs obviously had to feel they were in position themselves to defend against any Israeli aggression. This required improvement in their military posture and “balance” in the military power of two sides which he was afraid was different from kind of balance which we had in mind. However, there was tremendous difference between being in a military position to defend against attack and being in a military position to destroy Israel; latter was totally beyond their intentions or even reasonable economic capabilities of Arab states. Comments: King did not make any further reference to PLO as he had during our previous conversation (Embtel 656) 4 but we agree with Cairo’s analysis that there is certain divergence between what Arab leaders have agreed on record and whole underlying concept behind PLO which is today becoming somewhat more important aspect of problem in eyes of Palestinians, and thorn in side King Hussein. Barnes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 7:37 a.m. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus. 2 Telegram 607 to Amman, April 29, was repeated as telegram 6651 to Cairo; see footnote 2, Document 212 . 3 Document 212 . 4 Telegram 656 from Amman, May 4, reported points made by King Hussein in several conversations during the previous weekend. It stated that concerning the PLO, Hussein had stated that Shuqairi was “throwing his weight around” contrary to summit decisions and would have to be curbed. He thought the basic problem was that “there could be no PLO as defined by Shuqairi alongside Jordan,” and he considered this definitely contrary to summit decisions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 JORDAN) 214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 10, 1965. SUBJECT Preventing Nuclear Proliferation in the Near East Recommendation That you authorize negotiations with Israel designed to extend IAEA safeguards to all Israeli nuclear facilities and that you approve the enclosed letter to Prime Minister Eshkol as the first step in this new approach to prevent Israel and the United Arab Republic from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. 2 Discussion 1. The Pressures on Israel: The arms rivalry in the Near East has reached a dangerous stage. As U.A.R. missile technology improves, Israel seeks to develop an unmatched, economical counterdeterrent. This seems destined to lead to development of nuclear warheads for Israeli missiles purchased from France. 2. The Israeli Strategy: Prime Minister Eshkol has told us orally that Israel’s nuclear activity is peaceful and that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israel area. He later said, however, that Israel could not forever foreswear nuclear weapon development in the absence of binding security guarantees. (In 1963 President Kennedy determined that we could not afford politically to guarantee Israel’s security and that, in any event, such a guarantee would not give Israel better protection than our present close association and commitment to oppose aggression in the Near East provide.) We must remember Israel deliberately misled us initially about the nature of the nuclear facility at Dimona. Therefore, we must assume Israel intends to make its decisions on whether to produce nuclear weapons without consulting us. Lower level Israeli officials speak frankly about Israel’s strategy toward the United Arab Republic: a) surface-to-surface missiles targeted on the Nile delta, and b) a capability to bomb and release the waters behind the Aswan High Dam. Destruction of the Aswan Dam would require a nuclear warhead; bombing with high explosives could not be counted on to do the job. 3. What We Can Do: Our efforts to slow down the U.A.R. sophisticated weapons program—as well as potential nuclear weapons programs in India and elsewhere—will be influenced by the example we set in dealing with Israel. We very much need a breakthrough on the problem of preventing proliferation by presently non-nuclear states. The world recognizes Israel’s nuclear capability and the fact we have compelling leverage on Israel because of our special relationships. So long as the Dimona reactor operates without publicly recognized safeguards, the credibility of our worldwide efforts to prevent proliferation is in doubt. Moreover, acceptance of safeguards in contrast to promises of peaceful intent would provide tangible evidence of Israel’s good faith. Israel has signed the partial Test Ban Treaty, is a member of IAEA, and has accepted IAEA safeguards on its small research reactor provided by the United States. It is, therefore, reasonable for us to ask Israel to accept IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. If Israel does not intend to produce a nuclear weapon, acceptance could lose only the questionable deterrent provided by fear of an unknown nuclear capability. Unilateral action by Israel to place all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards would place great international pressure on the U.A.R. and other states to follow suit . The U.A.R., which has consistently opposed safeguards since the establishment of IAEA, recently has demonstrated a new, more forthcoming attitude. President Nasser confirmed to Assistant Secretary Talbot on April 18, U.A.R. acceptance of the principle of international safeguards. This more flexible attitude encourages the hope the U.A.R. may agree to application of safeguards, not only to the large power reactor for which it is now shopping, but to all its nuclear facilities. The prospect of Israeli acceptance of safeguards could provide an added inducement. We should make clear to Israel we expect another U.S. team of scientists to visit Dimona after the parliamentary elections next November. At the same time, we should press Israel now for acceptance of IAEA safeguards immediately after the elections. To obtain maximum leverage, we should make our approach before the arrival in mid-May of an Israeli military team to discuss direct U.S. arms sales to Israel. I think that you alone carry the weight to persuade Eshkol to take this unilateral action. For this reason I am enclosing a draft letter that you might send to him. There is great urgency about this matter in view of the disturbing signals we have been getting from Israel. I think, therefore, that this is something we must come to grips with promptly. A letter along the lines of the enclosed would seem an essential initial step. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. The memorandum has no drafting information, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Russell on April 30 and cleared by Talbot, Jernegan, SCI Acting Director Herman Pollack, Thomas, ACDA Assistant Director for International Relations Jacob D. Beam, ACDA Assistant Director for Science and Technology Herbert Scoville, Jr., and Davies, and in substance with Scott George of G/PM. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 ARAB–ISR) The memorandum was sent to the President with a May 19 memorandum from Komer commenting that he and Harriman had pressed the matter with Eshkol to no avail. It was Komer’s judgment that Israel was determined to keep the option open as a deterrent against the Arabs. Nonetheless, he thought the letter would be a useful reminder to the Israelis of the President’s personal interest in the matter. 2 A copy of the draft is attached to the copy of the memorandum cited in footnote 1 above. Johnson sent a revised version to Eshkol on May 21; see Document 218 . 215. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 215. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, May 15, 1965. 4011. Verbatim text. Following is GUAR unofficial translation letter to President Johnson from President Nasser handed to me by Foreign Minister today. Letter dated May 12. Will pouch original and translation corrected as necessary. “Dear Mr. President: It was my intention to send to Washington, my colleague and friend Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Deputy Premier for Foreign Affairs in the United Arab Republic, with a request that you should meet him, so that he might brief you on mine and the government’s point of view on a number of important issues with events occurring in the Middle East or beyond it, and which directly or indirectly affect relations between our two countries. Yet, at the time, I noticed that you were reducing your foreign engagements to a minimum, and so I found fit to put off my intention of sending Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi to Washington. Fortunately enough, however, Mr. Phillips Talbot, American Assistant Secretary of State passed through Cairo at the time, and I found it appropriate that I should explain to him and to Ambassador Lucius Battle, who attended the meeting, our position in detail regarding the contents of your letter, dated 18th March 1965, 2 and with regard to a number of other issues which I thought best that each of us should be acquainted with the other’s position on them in all frankness and clarity. I have full confidence in the ability of Mr. Talbot and Ambassador Battle to convey to you a full and detailed picture of my long talk with him at my home on Sunday 18th April 1965. 3 If I may stress a few points, I wish to underline the following: 1. The United Arab Republic is very anxious to maintain Arab-American friendship and underlines the necessity of its permanent consolidation. While unfortunately, we find obstacles and difficulties impeding this objective, we have and still do exert all efforts to keep the door open before a free and responsible exchange of ideas and viewpoints. We sincerely maintain that this door should be kept open in the interest of the American and Arab peoples and for the sake of peace in a delicate and sensitive part of the world. 2. The United Arab Republic has not started or planned the arms race in the Middle East, but the United Arab Republic was compelled, following inadmissible armed provocations, to afford itself the ability of legitimate defence against a hostile and expansionist danger represented in the racist Zionism, to which imperialism has facilitated the usurpation of a parcel of the Arab land, to be used as a base to menace the will of the Arab nation for freedom and as a barrier against Arab aspiration to unity. The records—those of the United Nations included—bear witness to the fact that the United Arab Republic has used its armaments only in defence rights, while aggression always came from those who know they adopt a position hostile to nature itself and to history and which is incompatible with the principles of justice and law. Events of 1956 are fraught with proofs and meanings. 3. It is regrettable indeed, that a number of Western countries in general, undertook the responsibility of arming Israeli aggression through dangerous transactions mostly concluded secretly: these include what France offered Israel in early 1956, while the last of these transactions was the offer made by the Government of Federal Germany to Israel, the repercussions of which still remain in the area strong and violent. The Government of West Germany occupied an excellent position in the Arab world, and it is regrettable to the Bonn government and to the West as a whole, that this prominent position which formed a bridge between the Arabs and the West and was a vast path for positive and fruitful co-operation, should be destroyed. Yet, the United Arab Republic is still determined not to allow bitterness to be the centre of accumulation to Middle East forces. 4 The difference is basically between the Arab nation and Israeli aggression and its expansionist aims. Here, I wish to observe that efforts, often unbearable, are exerted to restrict the dispute to that framework. 4. The people of the United Arab Republic find and are convinced that the true challenge they face is for the achievement of progress and the development of their life socially, economically and culturally, so that they might lead a life in line with their age, and contribute, with other nations, to the honouring of human value. I wish to state that the constructive achievements of which the Egyptian people carry the burden, constitute a brilliant example of the determination of peoples, who found themselves bound by the chains of underdevelopment—to reshape their lives in spite of great difficulties that burden them and force themselves around them. The people of the United Arab Republic believe that the arms race is a temporary feature, put in motion by bitter experience and crises, and supported by suspicion every day. Yet, what will finally resist and last is life alone, built by the determination of men, their creative minds and their ability to exploit all resources afforded them in the fields of production and services. The outbursts of aggression can but destroy themselves, and the will of life, always remains stronger than all its enemies. Please accept, dear President, kindest respects and very best wishes. (sgd) (Gamal Abdel Nasser)” Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 10:36 a.m. Passed to the White House. 2 Document 192 . 3 See Document 208 . 4 Telegram 4013 from Cairo, May 17, reported that the correct translation of this sentence was as follows: “Nevertheless the UAR is still determined that bitterness should not result in the polarization of power in the Near East.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR) 216. Memorandum for Record 216. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, May 20, 1965. Abe Feinberg called on the President tonight, and the latter asked me right over. Subject was Israeli worries on arms, especially the planes. 2 Feinberg’s plaint was that the Israelis were concerned about: (a) our evasiveness on the matter—they couldn’t even get any information; (b) in wigging Harman on the recent unprovoked Israeli pre-emptive attack on Syrian bulldozers, Talbot had said we couldn’t even discuss arms if this sort of thing was going on. 3 Harman was most upset over this linking of Israeli behavior and our arms agreement (Rusk had personally told poor Phil to do this), so had poured out his woes to Feinberg. I explained the circumstances, and how unhappy we were over the Israeli use of strongarm tactics (the Syrians didn’t even fire back). The President backed me up, and asked Feinberg to tell Eshkol we couldn’t accept shooting and killing on the water issues. On the planes I explained how we frankly doubted that Israel had made much effort to explore European sources first. We had to insist that if Israel could get planes there it should do so. The President was good as gold on this too, telling Feinberg he knew the Israelis wanted “US” planes, but that we weren’t going to come through unless there was no other alternative. He then told me to give Feinberg all the fill-in he wanted, and to make sure we lived up to our agreement. We were going to be hard bargainers, but we didn’t welsh on any deals. He then explained to Feinberg his worries that he’d ruined Erhard’s chances for re-election. We had a little discussion of the BG/Eshkol squabble (Feinberg thought Eshkol sure to win) and that was that. I then took Feinberg off and mollified him, explaining some of the reasons for the delays and assuring him that everything was reasonably on the tracks, so long as the Israelis behaved. To give him a little something to say to Eshkol, I told him I thought we could deliver a few tanks before the Israeli election to back Eshkol’s hand. On the planes, however, we were sure there were adequate European types available—probably better than we could provide. If the Israelis were smart they’d stop wasting time trying to probe our availabilities and latch on to the best European deal they could. If they ran into roadblocks they could ask our help. We wouldn’t let State drag its heels too much—but Israel had to play ball too. Feinberg’s next worry was how he could reassure various groups in US Jewry who were hearing about arms to Jordan and wondered how Israel could be protected. He’d have a big problem here when the 1966 elections rolled around. I told him in spades that secrecy was still the order of the day, although by the time of the 1966 campaign we might be able to take off the wraps a bit. I taxed Feinberg gently for squawking to the President too quickly, but blamed it on Harman. Feinberg hastened to explain that he hadn’t sought an appointment for this purpose; he was going to Israel so had asked if the President would like to see him first. He’d been invited, and only when he came down today and saw Harman had the latter poured out his woes. Ergo, I shouldn’t tax Harman for having gone around end. Having made my point, I subsided. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. 2 On April 19, Gazit gave the Department of State a request for Israeli purchase of tanks, planes, and other military equipment. (Telegram 1075 to Tel Aviv, April 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR) 3 The reference is to a May 19 conversation between Talbot and Harman, in which Harman pressed for a response to Israel’s request for arms purchases. Talbot replied that the response was being formulated but raised the subject of the recent incidents on the Syrian border, noting that the United States opposed the use of force in the water issue and stating that if the evidence clearly showed Israel was involved with military initiatives, it would not be possible to proceed with military talks. (Telegram 1184 to Tel Aviv, May 19; ibid.) 217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, May 21, 1965, 12:43 p.m. 7149. US–UAR Relations. Begin FYI. We are accustomed to UARG’s taking one line with us and another with the Arabs, but lately we have sensed greater degree of ambivalence than usual. On one side we have noted a set of initiatives, restraints, and responses apparently calculated to requalify UAR for US aid. They include: 1. Unexpectedly warm reply to President Johnson’s message of congratulations on Nasser’s re-election. 2 2. Sharp improvement in relations between US Embassy and UARG since last winter’s crise. 3. Policy of restraint toward Saudi Arabia despite Saudi contribution to recent royalist successes. 4. Provision of high-quality temporary housing for John F. Kennedy Library. 5. Warm remarks of Deputy Prime Minister Sidqi in Nasser’s name at Bagasse dedication. 6. Offer to send Fawzi to Washington. 7. Intimation that Sadat will head parliamentary delegation to US. 8. Restrained treatment of US decision to sell arms to Israel in Nasser’s May 1 speech. 9. Positive tone of Nasser’s May 12 letter to the President. 3 However, Nasser’s May 1 speech also seems to have foreshadowed a hardening of Egyptian attitudes toward us on some issues. Aspects of that speech particularly unpalatable to USG were Nasser’s endorsement of the “liberate Palestine” theme and his blunt treatment of possible cessation Title I program. Since that time Cairo’s “Voice of Palestine” has attacked HKJ for frustrating PLO’s proposals, UARG has reportedly reinforced its troops in Yemen in apparent contradiction to its ostensible support for Numan’s conciliation campaign, Akhbar has criticized the three Arab hold-outs on the Germany/Israel issue, Ahram has launched a campaign against Libya and Wheelus Field, and Nasser has reportedly not only disclosed US disarmament initiatives but also misrepresented them. We can understand compulsion Egyptian regime must feel to present itself to public in best possible light, to placate Soviet Union, to throw up an anti-American smoke screen to camouflage fact of its pulling back on the Congo, and even to prod USG a bit. We suppose UARG’s problem of image-maintenance is painfully complicated by uncertainty of PL–480 program. If current agreement not renewed, UARG will have unenviable task of explaining to a people who suffered losses in Yemen why they must now go on half-rations in Egypt. We suppose allegations about US pressures that Nasser made in public May 1 and in parliament May 16 were made to justify regime’s position if US aid is cut off. However, at best these considerations are irrelevant to US interests and at worst conflict with them. End FYI. Department expressed to UAR Ambassador its concern at deleterious effects on US–UAR relations of capricious attacks on Libyan Government with which USG has excellent relations, of unilateral disclosures of informal talks between USG and UARG on highly sensitive subjects, and of generally unfriendly tone UAR press. Concur with your 4068 4 that you should delay any approach along lines Deptel 7098 5 (not repeated info addressees) at least until you return from Addis. In meantime may be useful for Embassy to convey our concern about anti-Libyan campaign to appropriate level UARG. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Jones on May 20; cleared by Davies, Blake, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan. Repeated by pouch to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Taiz, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli. 2 Johnson’s message of congratulations was sent in telegram 5660 to Cairo, March 19. Nasser’s reply was dated March 23. Both are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. 3 See Document 215 . 4 Dated May 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 UAR) 5 Telegram 7098 to Cairo, May 19, stated that a Department officer met with Ambassador Kamel that day and expressed concern at the unfriendly tone of a recent speech by Nasser. (Ibid.) 218. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol 218. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol 1 Washington, May 21, 1965. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have been thinking over our exchanges on visits to the Dimona reactor as well as recent unfortunate publicity on this subject. I can understand that secret visits pose problems for you. On the other hand, failure to make such visits on a regular basis poses a difficult problem for us and we feel compelled to continue them. Recognizing, however, that you face parliamentary elections and that a visit before they are held would cause you increased internal political problems, we have agreed to defer the next six-monthly visit until after the elections. A preferable alternative to these bilateral arrangements would be for Israel to place the Dimona reactor and all other nuclear facilities under IAEA controls, as you have already agreed to do for the Nahal Soreq reactor and for any U.S. materials or equipment transferred to Israel in connection with the U.S.-Israel desalting program. Because of our unalterable opposition to any further proliferation of nuclear weapons, our policy is to press for extension of IAEA or similar safeguards to all nuclear facilities in those countries not now possessing nuclear weapons. We have made substantial progress thus far, and nineteen countries including the United States have accepted IAEA controls over all or part of their nuclear facilities. Such action by Israel would help establish an effective ceiling beyond which the Near East arms race would not escalate. In order to protect Israel from any political injustices in the IAEA—which we by no means anticipate or even believe could occur—my government is prepared to support a statement by Israel with a withdrawal clause on the part of Israel that it would give up safeguards unless its own neighbors accepted them. We do not see any U.A.R. nuclear capability for the foreseeable future and are convinced the U.S.S.R. will not supply Nasser with nuclear weapons. Suspicion that Israel is developing nuclear weapons, however, might stimulate Nasser to make concessions to the U.S.S.R. that could result in a Soviet nuclear support program similar to the one that was attempted in Cuba. Voluntary adoption of IAEA safeguards would cost Israel only the questionable deterrent provided by fear of an unknown nuclear capability, would clearly demonstrate Israel’s peaceful intent to the whole world, would go far toward easing area tensions and abating the arms race, and would put pressure on other countries to do likewise. I make this proposal earnestly and strongly urge you give it your most serious consideration. For the next several years, Israel can rest secure in the knowledge of its military superiority over the Arabs and the steadfast assurances of U.S. support against aggression. Our military experts consider U.A.R. missiles only a psychological threat with negligible military potential. In my judgment an initiative by Israel to adopt IAEA safeguards would be in its own interest, since it would help assure Israel’s long-term security by removing the threatening shadow of nuclear war in the Near East. Israel’s example would also reinforce our efforts to persuade President Nasser to limit sophisticated weapons acquisition and encourage other countries to renounce the awesome decision that automatically would make them subject to possible preemptive attack. We have reason to believe the U.A.R. will accept IAEA safeguards if it acquires a large nuclear reactor. I realize that the delicate internal political situation in Israel might make acceptance of IAEA safeguards difficult at this time. I urge you, therefore, to consider agreeing now to accept these safeguards after your parliamentary elections this fall. You may be sure that our interest in the security of your country remains unchanged. The grave responsibility which this puts upon us is an important factor in my conviction that we must leave no stone unturned in our efforts to maintain peace. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence. Secret. No drafting information appears on the letter, but see Document 214 . The letter was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 1188, May 21. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) Barbour reported in telegram 1510 from Tel Aviv, May 25, that he had delivered the letter on May 24. Eshkol’s preliminary comments were (1) that Israel was already among the countries that had agreed to IAEA inspection of part of its nuclear reactors, and (2) that the cost to Israel of relinquishing a psychological deterrent was in his view a matter of importance in the Israeli security picture. (Ibid.) A briefing paper prepared in NEA/IAI on September 19, 1966, noted that President Johnson never received a reply to this letter. (Ibid., POL ISR–US) 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, May 25, 1965, 1103Z. 1511. Embtel 1485; 2 Deptels 1181 3 and 1184. 4 Israel-Syrian incidents. During conversation yesterday principally devoted to another subject Prime Minister raised question of developments on Syrian border with particular reference to the previous day’s Syrian firing on Israeli fishing boat on Lake Tiberias (Embtel 1507). 5 He noted this as further instance of Syrian attack on innocent Israeli individuals of which sporadic firing exchange involving Israeli territory the day before is part of pattern. He asked what the U.S. attitude is to such firing. I replied that we had never concealed our disapproval of Syrian attacks on Israeli fishermen and presumably would feel the same way in this instance. However, I went on that since he had raised the question of the Israeli-Syrian frontier I could not allow the opportunity to pass to reiterate my government’s previous expressions of strong disapproval over the Israeli attack on Syrian tractors on May 13. I referred to my conversation with Levavi reported Embtel 1485 which I said I hoped had been repeated to the Prime Minister. I also mentioned that Talbot had spoken in similar firm terms to Harman in Washington. I further said that I hoped there would be no Israeli misunderstanding of U.S. position in regard to such Israeli actions and repeated that if such actions lead to security council consideration the U.S. will not be able to support Israel. Prime Minister acknowledged his understanding of U.S. attitude. He continued with familiar line that Israelis would be in a worse position to counter Arab diversion after diversion projects completed than they are now in attempting persuade the Arabs of folly and dangers of carrying out their diversion plans. I endeavored again to rebut this reasoning along usual U.S. line emphasizing that it by no means certain Arabs will complete diversion and particularly that these Israeli attacks involve risk out of proportion to dangers to Israel from diversion schemes at present underway or in prospect. As expected, Prime Minister was not sold by these arguments although he obviously does not entirely dismiss them. He said he recognizes risks but aside from indicating to Arabs strength of Israeli determination in matter he believes May 13 incident may have served useful purpose of demonstrating Israeli capability of interdicting diversion works by measures short of full-scale war. He also thought it might be welcomed by Lebanese in that Syria instead of Lebanon was Israeli target. These points of course are not new, the Prime Minister having advanced them on various previous occasions. It is clear, however, that he still holds to his thinking tenaciously and will be dissuaded if at all only with difficulty. Subsequently Argov (acting head of U.S. Dept, FonOff) referred to Talbot’s conversation with Harman, reported Deptel 1184, particularly connection Talbot made between such Israeli initiatives and GOI-U.S. military talks. Argov sought to argue that these two separate matters. I responded that Talbot’s meaning seemed quite clearly to contrary and commented that in any event it obvious that relations between states must be considered as a whole and it impossible to treat issues in isolation without reference to generality of each state’s concerns. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Secret; Exdis. 2 Telegram 1485 from Tel Aviv, May 20, reported that in a conversation May 19 with Israeli Foreign Office Director General Levavi, Barbour indicated strong U.S. disapproval of Israeli actions in the May 13 incident on the Syrian border. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 1181 to Tel Aviv, May 18, instructed the Embassy to inform the Israeli Foreign Ministry the next day of strong U.S. disapproval of Israeli actions in the May 13 incident, to reiterate U.S. opposition to the use of force in the water diversion dispute, and to state that if incidents such as the May 13 incident were to be taken to the United Nations, the United States would not support Israel. (Ibid.) 4 See footnote 3, Document 216 . 5 Dated May 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR) 220. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 220. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, May 28, 1965, 8:25 p.m. 2380. Following is uncleared memcon FYI Noforn. 2 Secretary called in Israel Ambassador May 28 to express deep concern over Israeli military raids into Jordan territory May 27–28. He said USG took serious view such activities on peaceful frontier. Timing raids during meeting Arab Prime Ministers in Cairo made situation even more explosive. USG had hoped that in view its clearly expressed opposition to use of force such activities would not occur. Ambassador Harman explained attacks not on Jordan but on bases of Fatah organization which since January had been conducting raids against civilian targets in Israel. Ambassador reviewed number such incidents including 1) February 27 attack on Kfar Hess which gave rise to Israel’s letter to Security Council; 2) March 4 incident along Negev border which UNTSO investigation indicated was work of organized group for which Jordan responsible; and 3) Recent increase in sabotage during May culminating in Ramat Hakovesh and Afula attacks. Israeli attack aimed at three places: 1) Shuneh where training base and arms cache of Fatah destroyed, 2) Qalqiliya which jump-off point for attacks on Kfar Hess and Ramat Hakovesh, and 3) Jenin from which Afula attack mounted. Ambassador stressed need for Jordanian responsibility for activities within its borders and attacks emanating from within Jordan. Israel had exhibited patience when sabotage caused no casualties but attacks on inhabited areas intolerable. Ambassador hoped Jordan would derive lesson from raids and take more serious view regarding need control Fatah. Secretary noted: 1) incident at Qalqiliya involved not just pinpoint sabotage but sustained artillery fire; 2) some question regarding what occurred at Afula since GOI apparently blocking further investigation incident; facts available cast doubt upon Jordanian responsibility for incident; and 3) Jordan had said it would concert with Arab nations for joint action in retaliation to Israeli attacks. This could lead to serious situation. Secretary requested resume of Fatah incidents with indication those reported to UN. 3 He urged Israel do everything to restore calm and not permit escalation of military activity. While Israeli contention that Jordan responsible activities individuals within its territory valid as general proposition, sovereign governments cannot always guarantee behavior individuals. Ambassador said Israel anxious avoid military escalation but believed that interest area stability served by making Jordan aware of its responsibilities. Secretary concluded with reference to having instructed our Ambassador to make parallel approach in Tel Aviv. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Russell; cleared by Davies, Campbell , Staff Assistant in EUR George W. Jaeger, and Talbot; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, Jerusalem, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, USUN, Bonn, Rome, and Moscow. 2 A more detailed memorandum of the conversation is ibid., POL 27–14 ISR–JORDAN. 3 Telegram 1227 to Tel Aviv, May 29, transmitted a list of nine incidents provided by Ambassador Harman. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) 4 Instructions were sent in circular telegram 2367, May 28. (Ibid.) Barbour reported in telegram 1533 from Tel Aviv, May 28, that he had discussed with Foreign Ministry Director General Levavi the U.S. view of the raids. (Ibid.) He reported in telegram 1544 from Tel Aviv, May 29, that he had raised the subject with Foreign Minister Meir. (Ibid.) 221. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 221. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 31, 1965, 12:40 p.m. SUBJECT $37 Million PL 480 Wheat for Egypt Secretary Rusk has now asked formally for a determination on the completion of shipment under the existing PL 480 agreement. I attach his memorandum at Tab B 2 and a good one-page from Bob Komer at Tab A. The Secretary and Bob Komer are both ready to go ahead on this and I am sure they are right from every point of view but that of Congressional reaction. The Department (Rusk and McArthur especially) has done a comprehensive consultation with the top Leadership, but it is a fact that the Senate authorization on aid will be up in the next ten days. If you want to go ahead with the wheat sale, but keep it out of the Senate debate, we could probably make some money by telling Nasser informally that we expect to be able to go ahead in the next couple of weeks. 3 He keeps his mouth shut on this sort of thing because it is in his interest to do so. I will put this on the agenda for our next Tuesday lunch-type meeting with Rusk and McNamara. So this particular paper is for information and not for decision. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy , Vol. 10. No classification marking. 2 The tabs are attached but not printed. 3 The words “telling Nasser informally that we expect to” are circled with the following note in Johnson’s handwriting: “We tell Nasser—we hope to go $17 in 2 or 3 wks & perhaps can get Congress to go along shortly thereafter but ask him to bear with us with other 20. L.” Telegram 7401 to Cairo, June 2, instructed Battle to inform Nasser privately and in confidence that the U.S. Government hoped to be able to proceed with $17 million in purchase authorizations within the next 2 weeks and hoped Congressional acquiescence in issuance of the remaining $20 million could be obtained shortly thereafter. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UAR, Vol. III) Battle reported in telegram 4281 from Cairo, June 4, that he had given the message to Kaissouni for Nasser. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR) 222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, June 5, 1965, 2:59 p.m. 1254. Israel Arms Procurement. This message FYI throughout. High level discussions within USG May 22 on Israel arms procurement 2 resulted in following US position: I. Tanks: US prepared: 1. Offer 110 M–48A2c tanks to make up shortfall in German deliveries. Fifteen ready for delivery in US this summer; balance in three months beginning mid-June 1966. 2. Offer 100 M–48A1 tanks to offset sale similar number basic M–48 tanks to Jordan. In view of Israeli request that M–48A1’s be delivered before M–48A2c’s to permit early conversion, deliveries to Israel would be made over four months beginning in mid-January 1966. US could deliver M–48A2c’s ahead of M–48A1’s if Israelis change their minds. 3. Provide kits to install 105-mm guns on 110 M–48A2c tanks and 140 M–48A1 tanks (40 from Germany and 100 from the US) in Israel. 4. Provide 140 kits for conversion in Israel of Israel’s M–48A1 tanks to M–48A3 configuration. In view known Jordanian desires and comparability of Jordan and Israel tank sales (see Deptel 898 and US-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding), 3 implication clear US will in due course be under strong pressure to supply Jordan M–48A3 tanks with 105-mm guns. If Israel should press for delivery of 100 M–48A2c instead of M–48A1 tanks (as we think they will) to offset the Jordan sale, we could probably agree (unless it turns out that it seriously degrades US forces), provided we supplied neither kits for conversion of the 40 M–48A1’s in Israel to M–48A3 configuration, nor kits to up-gun any of Israel’s M–48 type tanks. Since these M–48A2c models could not be delivered before 1967 this concession would have advantage of broader phasing of deliveries and less political impact on Israel’s neighbors. Any up-gunning kits would have to come from the UK. II. Self-Propelled Guns: US prepared to supply only M–44A1 SP 155-mm howitzers and then only in lieu of tanks on one-for-one basis. III. Aircraft: 1. Clear consensus contrary US interests to sell military aircraft to Israel. 2. We are committed to sell Israel aircraft only if Israel cannot obtain suitable aircraft from Western European sources. In any event, we would not sell supersonic aircraft, the number would not exceed 24, and delivery would not be until 1967. We are also most reluctant to sell a bomber or even an attack aircraft, but to avoid charges of bad faith we propose to stick for this round with the precise language of Memorandum of Understanding (i.e. certain number of combat aircraft) and March 10 Agreed Minutes (i.e. certain number of mutually agreed type). 3. We propose tell Israel Embassy here we expect detailed evidence of GOI effort procure Western European aircraft. 4. If, after intensive effort, GOI unable find suitable aircraft, we intend canvass Western European sources ourselves. 5. Since we wish to steer Israel to Europe rather than whet its appetitite for US aircraft, we do not now intend furnish GOI information on availability, price, characteristics, or recommendations re potentially available US combat aircraft. Supply such information before conclusion investigation Western European possibilities could destroy credibility US insistence upon thorough search for Western European aircraft. However, we will provide certain information on costliness selected US aircraft we do not intend to sell, with a view to encouraging Israelis to search for suitable foreign aircraft. During forthcoming discussions with Israel here 4 we intend to reiterate statement made to Israel Ambassador May 19 (Deptel 1184) 5 and stress that Israel’s military attacks intended to solve water diversion issue could cause suspension of arms arrangements at any stage. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Russell; cleared by Symmes, Talbot, Solbert, Bunte, Creel, and Komer; and approved by Rusk. A May 27 draft by Russell is attached with a note that the telegram was retyped with White House changes. Repeated to London, Bonn, and to Paris for the Embassy and DEFREPNAMA. 2 No record of these discussions has been found. 3 See footnote 2, Document 183 and Document 185 . 4 Talbot and Solbert presented the U.S. response to the Israeli arms request to Harman on June 15. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR) 5 See footnote 3, Document 216 . 223. Memorandum of Conversation 223. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 8, 1965. SUBJECT Arab-Israel Border Situation; Palestine Liberation Army PARTICIPANTS Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Minister, Israeli Embassy Mr. Shimon Moratt, Counselor, Israeli Embassy NE—Mr. Rodger P. Davies NE—William D. Wolle Mr. Gazit said that the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem had reiterated June 7 to Ambassador Barbour that the Israeli Government seriously desires a return to tranquility in the border areas and that it wishes to cooperate with the Jordanian authorities to bring this about. Ambassador Barbour in recent days had also been given copies of messages sent by the GOI to the Jordanian and Lebanese governments via the MACs containing lists of individuals suspected of Fatah connections. There were 29 names on the list for Jordan and a single name on the list for Lebanon. Mr. Gazit said his government hoped the United States Government would go back to King Hussein in a follow-up to his initiative with Ambassador Barnes several days ago 2 and, in addition to stressing to the King the Israeli desire for a return to peace along the border, would raise a number of specific points relating to the recent border events. These points had been enumerated to Ambassador Barbour, but Mr. Gazit said he would mention some of them as examples. For one thing, the GOI does not understand why the official Jordanian letter to the Security Council concerning the May 31 Jerusalem incident 3 is at odds with what has been learned from the Jordanians themselves to be the real explanation. The GOI wonders what kind of punishment Jordan will impose on the army captain arrested because of that incident, which it considers to have been most serious. Israel fails to understand Jordan’s apparent inability to spot saboteurs moving toward the border, since groups of several persons rather than simply individuals have been involved in some cross-border incidents. The Israeli Government would continue to supply information concerning Fatah complicity in the sabotage incidents, said Mr. Gazit, though it could hardly supply such a quantity that it became in effect a branch of the Jordan security services. Mr. Gazit expressed gratitude on behalf of the Israeli Government for the USG’s readiness to transmit such information and more general messages to Jordan on its behalf. He went on to note that his government believed the onus was now on King Hussein to see that border tranquility was restored. Mr. Davies said that U.S. intelligence confirmed the serious desire and efforts of King Hussein to keep potential saboteurs in check. He noted that it was a little too much to assert that Jordan had absolute control of such activities. Nearly 200 Israeli soldiers had, after all, moved almost unnoticed well into Jordan territory during the May 27–28 raids, and even the Israeli security forces could not detect individuals or groups of infiltrators immediately on entry into Israel. He stressed that the USG was quite convinced that any further Israeli military raids would push the Jordanians into some sort of military reaction. Mr. Gazit referred to PLO efforts to raise a Palestine Liberation Army and stated his government was impressed by the serious steps in process, particularly in Gaza. He spoke of the seriousness with which the GOI viewed the question of keeping UNRWA ration cards from PLA conscriptees. Mr. Davies agreed this was a serious question, reiterated the steps the USG had taken with UNRWA officials regarding it, and expressed again the hope that this issue would be kept out of the press since the glare of publicity would render UNRWA action much more difficult. Regarding the PLO, Mr. Davies said it seemed clear that the Arab states principally concerned were holding the organization at arm’s length. There was a danger, however, in the extent to which the Chinese Communists could make good on Peking’s reported promises to Shuqairy of funds, arms and training. Mr. Gazit read brief passages from a GOI letter to the Security Council regarding the June 1 explosions at Yiftah and Beit Guvrin, 4 and spoke briefly of two more recent border incidents. At Beit Qama (about 13 miles north of Beersheba and 6 miles from the Jordan border) an Israeli watchman had come upon four intruders cutting the fence around a water tower and had thereby prevented damage to the installation. At Jisr Shaikh Hussein the Jordanians had fired across the border for 45 minutes with no apparent cause. Mr. Moratt commented that the Jordanians now claimed to have repulsed two Israeli attacks, neither of which in fact ever existed. Mr. Davies commented that the Jordanians undoubtedly were apprehensive about possible incursions. He emphasized that the USG is counseling restraint on all parties concerned although our leverage in one location (Damascus) is at an extremely low level. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle on June 9. 2 Telegram 732 from Amman, June 3, reported a discussion between Hussein and Barnes concerning the background of the recent incidents on the Jordan-Israel border. Hussein said concerning Fatah that Jordan was not sponsoring the group, was completely opposed to its alleged activities, and was making every effort to control the border against infiltrations. He expressed willingness to have his comments communicated to Israeli officials. (Ibid., POL 31–1 ISR–JORDAN) On June 4, Davies gave Gazit the substance of telegram 732, stressing that the information must be held very closely within the Israeli Government. (Ibid.) 3 The Jordanian letter, dated June 4, responded to a June 1 Israeli letter charging that Jordanian Army posts had opened fire the previous day across the armistice demarcation line into Israeli territory. (UN documents S/6415 and S/6397) 4 Dated June 4; not printed. (UN document S/6414) 224. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 224. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 16, 1965, 9:30 p.m. Planes for Israel . Our Israeli friends are typically pressing us to enrich the secret arms deal as much as possible. Since we’ve done even better than they originally expected on tanks, they’re now zeroing in on aircraft. When I was out there, they talked about an old light bomber like the B–66, which they thought they could buy for peanuts. We agreed to help them get up to 24 “combat” planes (not necessarily bombers) either in Europe or here. Since then we’ve convinced them that the B–66 is not available as surplus so now they’re asking for the F–4, our fanciest current operational model. 2 The F–4 is (a) simply outside the spirit of our understanding; (b) would cost them a mint; and (c) would raise hob with the Arabs. Rusk is very strongly opposed; he doesn’t even want to sell old planes. This memo is to (a) inform you so you’ll be ready for any backdoor approaches; and (b) ask you to let me say I’ve confirmed our negative position at the highest level—hopefully this will fob off further useless talk. We can always take another look later. The alternative is not to bring your name into this yet, but I fear the Israelis won’t look seriously in Europe unless I can do so. I already have Feldman on my neck. Approve Keep me out of this as yet 3 R. W. Komer 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IV. Secret. A note on the source text states that the memorandum was received at 10 a.m. 2 A June 10 letter from Harman to Talbot states that Israel had been unable to find suitable military aircraft in Europe and was looking to the United States for a plane such as the Phantom. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR) 3 This option is checked. 4 Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 225. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 225. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 17, 1965. Tab A is Rusk’s formal request for a green light on the remaining PL 480 for the UAR, and the draft Determination (cleared by BOB) for your signature. 2 Tab B is Rusk’s view on how seriously Egypt has violated the PL 480 agreement. 3 It did not bar sales to Communist states but did contain rice export quotas and other provisions which the UAR probably did violate at least in 1964. State argues that the UAR fell short of its export quota in 1963 almost as much as it exceeded in 1964, so these should be offset. We have this sort of problem with many PL 480 clients, and have had to work them out by agreement. Agriculture is willing to go ahead on this basis so long as we put the UAR on notice that this matter must be cleared up, especially before any new PL 480 agreement. To meet any adverse publicity, we have the UAR Ambassador’s authority to say that the UAR fully agrees to negotiate out any such issues to our mutual satisfaction. This is a messy problem, and will generate some flak, however we move. But the Secretary of State makes a powerful case for giving Nasser just enough rope to limit the risk of a difficult confrontation in the Near East. I can only add my sober judgment as your Middle East hand that he’s dead right. 4 R. W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret. A note at the end of the memorandum in Bundy’s handwriting reads: “I am absolutely sure we should do this—because if we don’t the explosion will be our fault. We can haggle like Hell in the next phase. McGB.” 2 The tabs are attached but not printed. Rusk’s memorandum for the President is dated June 16; the draft Determination is undated. 3 Tab B is a June 17 memorandum from Rusk to the President. 4 Talbot met with Kamel on June 21 to tell him that a few hours previously the President had approved issuance of purchase authorizations for the $37 million remaining under the existing P.L. 480 agreement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US) 226. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 226. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 2, 1965, 3:30 p.m. Despite the Javits speech, Congress and the press reacted with restraint on the whole to the $37 million food for the UAR. There was relatively little other adverse comment, though Gruening, Farbstein, Pelly, Michel and Horton said the expected. The returns aren’t all in, and we hear that Michaels may try to amend the appropriation to block all aid to the UAR. But the telling argument was willingness to honor a commitment, not sympathy for Nasser. We moved just in time to spoil partly a big Soviet propaganda coup. In desperation Nasser got Moscow to divert 300,000 tons of its own purchases from Canada and Australia, which he doubtless planned to announce with fanfare once he decided there was no hope from us. Nasser also apparently got some wheat on credit from Mexico and Argentina. All this, plus the UAR’s own crop, will fill Egyptian needs through the winter. So it relieves pressure on us, and gives us time to sort out our relations with Nasser. There’s a rumor that you feel we led you astray on the UAR by painting a grim picture of its inability to get food. I don’t believe this, because we put the case on straight political grounds of preventing a real bust-up between the US and UAR. Our chief hope was to forestall total UAR dependence on the Soviets for wheat as well as arms. We’re still in this ballgame if we choose. New Problem. Releasing the $37 million has led to growing pressure on Agriculture from the trade and its Hill friends to resume CCC credit sales. We’ve been sitting on about $30 million worth of applications for wheat, tobacco, barley, etc. Agriculture is pressing to release these because they earn dollars and help meet PL 480 usual marketings. It’s also odd that we would give wheat under Title I but not sell it for dollars. In fact, however, the UAR is so low on foreign exchange and its credit so poor that it cannot get the needed US bank guarantees to permit many (if any) dollar sales unless the EXIM Bank will reinsure these guarantees. Thus by authorizing CCC sales, but not allowing EXIM reinsurance, we can have our cake and eat it too—avoid trade and Hill criticism but still keep the UAR on a short rein. I’d add that these small dollar sales generate no adverse publicity. Is this OK? 2 R. W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12. Confidential. 2 Johnson wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “See me. L.” A note in Bundy’s handwritting follows: “BOB: I think you should do this.” 3 Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature. 227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, July 19, 1965, 8:22 p.m. 58. Assistant Secretary Talbot July 19 gave Israel Ambassador Harman reply to Israel Embassy’s formal demarche of July 7 on Lebanese diversion plans. 2 Talbot stated our estimate Lebanese work proceeding slowly, as GOL had informed us. Question of Lebanese deceiving us has not arisen since they never said they would stop, only that they would drag their feet. If we should now perceive any unusual activity, we would consider what extraordinary efforts we should make. Meanwhile we will continue express our concern to GOL. Israel should convey its concern through ILMAC which would be an appropriate and effective channel. Talbot noted recent public statement by Israel COS Rabin had reduced GOL flexibility and made it more difficult for us to exercise our influence. Harman specifically inquired at what level we would be making demarches to GOL. Talbot replied it might be at more than one level, normal contact with senior level of GOL being our Ambassador. Harman emphasized Israelis do not believe what GOL doing is foot-dragging. Israel Minister Gazit reviewed Israeli position stating GOI had refuted US deprecation of Lebanese project by indicating both Lebanese and Syrian sections of canal are on same contour and excavations near al-Meri are for larger enterprise than mere roadshifting. He reiterated now is right time from diplomatic point of view to push Lebanese into removing tractors, slow foot-dragging down to standstill and create right atmosphere for gradual shelving entire plan. Harman stated there had been predisposition in GOI to minimize Lebanese project while watching Syrians most closely. However GOL, even after Nasser speech of May 31 and for reasons Israel cannot fathom, continued at increased pace when it had excuse to stop. Now Jerusalem is no longer predisposed minimize it. Harman concluded that, while he would report Talbot’s suggestion of continued use of ILMAC channel for this purpose, GOI would still be appreciative of US demarche to Lebanese stressing new element in Israeli concern over situation. Talbot replied we would keep eye on situation and might have further conversation on it. You should seek meeting with Eshkol to speak along following lines: 1. We, as friends of Israel, are concerned at certain recent Israeli actions vis-a-vis Arabs. We would have expected, during recent months as high tide of Arab Summit solidarity receded and as Arab realists recognized once again Israel’s basic military preeminence, that GOI actions would be characterized more consistently by calm, confidence and restraint expected of nation whose security is essentially, if not absolutely, assured. However we have noted GOI on several occasions past six weeks has acted as if its existence was in immediate jeopardy. GOI reaction late May to alleged Fatah raids was out of proportion to damage those raids and appears to us ill-advised in that target nation was one that seemed to be working curb terrorist activities. Erection of large burlap screen on border by Israeli forces in Jerusalem early July aroused fears and suspicions unnecessarily. Finally GOI reaction to Lebanese canal digging has in our view gone beyond justifiable requirements. 2. Appears to us Israel may be losing opportunities inherent in present Arab disarray. In current phase through which Arab world passing there may be real opportunities make large strides toward peace and stability in Near East. We hope Israelis will look beyond immediate desiderata (e.g. desire achieve final collapse of presently feeble Arab water diversion efforts) to longer-range goals of finding necessary pre-conditions for peace or long-term modus vivendi in area. 3. GOI actions pointed to above also have disadvantages in our view of detracting from Israel’s image as country sincerely devoted to peace with its neighbors and of making USG efforts to help Israel more difficult and reducing their chances of success. 3 4. We will, of course, as indicated to Ambassador Harman, continue express our concern to Lebanese over pace of their diversion activities at this juncture. We will continue keep watchful eye on that situation and anticipate further conversations with GOI officials on it. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle and Kinsolving, cleared by Symmes and in substance by Campbell, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, London, and Paris, and pouched to Jerusalem. 2 Reference is to a conversation between Gazit and Rusk, during which Gazit raised the subject of Israeli concern about continuing Lebanese canal construction and stated that the Israelis thought the situation required an immediate high-level demarche urging the Lebanese to discontinue further construction. (Memorandum of conversation, July 7; ibid.) A memorandum of Talbot’s conversation with Harman is ibid. 3 Barbour reported in telegram 77 from Tel Aviv, July 26, that he discussed the subject with Eshkol that morning. (Ibid.) 4 The approaches to Eshkol and Helou were approved by Rusk. (Memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, July 14; ibid.) Telegram 64 to Beirut, July 17, instructed Porter to discuss Israel’s concern with President Helou. (Ibid.) Porter reported in telegram 69 from Beirut, July 20 that in a meeting with Helou the day before, the latter assured him that there was no cause for Israeli concern. (Ibid.) 228. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 228. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, July 22, 1965. 261. I was summoned today from a lunch at the Australian Embassy attended by the Ambassadors of France, Italy, UK to see the Foreign Min as soon as possible. I began by thanking the Foreign Min for a most pleasant dinner at his house the preceding night. He said he regretted having to disturb me but that he wished to bring on behalf of the President a matter to my attention that he assumed I had already been informed about—the arrest of Mostafa Amin in Alexandria yesterday. Reading from pencilled notes he then stated that an American Embassy official, Mr. Bruce Odell had been lunching with Mr. Amin in what was apparently a weekly lunch (I expressed great surprise at this point), but that immediately on ascertaining the identity of Mr. Odell he had been released although Mr. Amin was under arrest following a surveillance of many weeks. The Minister stated that Mr. Amin had apparently for some time given info to CIA, some of it, as was done yesterday, of a military and security nature. Mr. Amin had claimed to have a personal continuing relationship of confidence with President Nasser, a relationship which did not exist. I stated that I had in fact heard of the incident but that my knowledge of the facts was rather sketchy. I stated, however, that I was shocked at the implications that he had apparently read into a routine lunch with Mr. Amin who had a wide acquaintance among diplomats and Americans and had seen them off and on over the years as I understood it. I said I rejected any idea that there was anything improper in the lunch with Mr. Odell who happened to be vacationing in Alexandria in recent days. I said also that the treatment which had been accorded Mr. Odell had been considerably less than courteous and customary when a diplomat was involved. He appeared surprised and asked me to explain what I meant. I said that my conversation with Mr. Odell on his return this morning had been extremely brief and that I would not want to go into any detail on a matter with which I was not completely informed. I then stated I assumed that he had told me the foregoing for my info and that he would continue to investigate the matter as would I. I said that I would hope that any matter of this seriousness would not be permitted to become a major issue between the U.S. and the U.A.R. as I had worked for many months to improve our relations and viewed with alarm any threat to our friendship and cooperation. I said that the charges with respect to Mr. Odell were most serious and that I found them impossible to believe or accept. We paused for a moment and I then asked whether the fact he had seen me today would be a matter of public record and what he intended to say to the local press concerning our conversation. I said I was concerned because the American press knew of the incident and I might have to make some statement to them in the event he intended to make our conversation public. He then stated he had no intention and, in fact, had not even thought of making a statement. I said that in the event either he or I had to mention the matter publicly I would hope that we could confine our comments to the fact that he had informed me of the incident and that we were both looking into the facts with care. He readily agreed and then stated he did not know what President Nasser’s intentions were, but he implied rather strongly that the President would not be pursuing the issue. During the course of the conversation he remarked that if we wanted to know anything about the UAR I could always get a straight and sometimes colorful answer from the President and that he, the Minister, would always speak with me frankly and honestly. At this I replied that I was grateful for the frankness and sincerity of the President’s and his own conversations with me and, in fact, was increasingly pleased with the candor and warmth of the relationship between the Minister and me and I would not want any incident to interfere with either that relationship or the increasing friendship between our two countries. He readily agreed. In parting I again stated my great shock at the incident and my concern over the implications he had read into a routine lunch. Comment The conversation was very warm, very friendly and more in sorrow than in anger. I am convinced that to the best of the Min’s ability this matter will be dropped although he appears to have some uncertainty as to Nasser’s intentions which will probably be clear to us in his speeches in the next few days. I think it is vital that this matter not be permitted to get out of hand and that we be as restrained and relaxed as possible in dealing with the press. Our earlier recommendation that we refer to the fact that an Embassy officer was detained but that he was released when his identity was established is by far the best line I can think of. I cannot get through the day without having to take it with some of the press. If you have any different views, send them to me as quickly as possible. Addendum: PAO has just been informed by Reuters correspondent that Mena plans issue statement to effect Bruce Taylor Odell arrested along with Mostafa Amin and had been communicating with Amin re internal affairs in UAR; that there was list of questions from Odell to Amin in his handwriting at time of arrest; and that Odell had been released after claiming diplomatic immunity. In view this development and to dampen increasingly wild rumors I plan brief American correspondents this afternoon along lines proposal Embtel 255. 2 Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The telegram does not indicate the time of transmission; it was received at 12:21 p.m. Passed to the White House. 2 Telegram 255 from Cairo, July 22, recommended informing the press that Embassy Political Attache Bruce Odell was lunching with Amin at his house when the latter was arrested and that Odell was detained there for 1 hour and 45 minutes until his identity was established and then was released. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV) 229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, July 26, 1965, 3:30 p.m. 600. Following summary based on uncleared Memcon and subject to revision on review. FYI only and Noforn. Secretary July 26 gave UAR Ambassador Kamel initial reaction to UAR request for new PL–480 agreement. 2 He said: 1) Our problem still one of public atmosphere and timing. We judged present UAR procurement arrangements allowed some time. With aid bill before Congress we in difficult position these coming weeks. Until bill passed discussion proposed agreement sensitive. 2) Suggest quiet talks in Cairo to deal with unresolved technical aid matters. We cannot now engage in talks that might be interpreted as negotiations new PL–480 agreement, however. 3) Hope meanwhile conduct U.S.-U.A.R. relations in low key, get them off front pages and into diplomatic channels. Ambassador undertook convey Secretary’s views to Nasser. He stressed response to Nasser’s request for wheat vital since he going to Moscow next month. Important give Nasser impression US will seriously consider try make agreement. Secretary said he could not give such categoric answer. Reference in Nasser’s July 22 speech 3 tying US supply of food to US “pressures” not helpful. Actually PL–480 agreement and talks on Near East arms limitation unrelated. Apart from problems arising from reservations here that large UAR arms build up impaired effectiveness aid as stimulus to economic development, best avoid public debate. Kamel said he thought Nasser’s motive in citing US pressure was to underline vital Egyptian interest in wheat. Crux is if US does not supply food others will. Egypt has maintained non-aligned policy thus far, but failure obtain US wheat would expose it to Communist domination. Important that President understand that seriousness situation comparable to 1955 Aswan dam decision. UAR Ambassador at that time criticized for not having given adequate warning dangers involved; Kamel wished avoid similar mistake and clear his conscience toward Secretary, history and world. Question not of wheat, but US relations with Egypt, Near East and perhaps Africa. Secretary agreed consequences could be serious, but if UAR wished go to other side, little we could do to stop it. UAR should not underestimate US constitutional system and need to build coalitions of popular support behind each governmental policy. We committed consult with Congress on new agreement and impressions from Cairo important in shaping Congressional attitudes. Speech by Nasser thanking Soviet Union for wheat, but failing mention $400 million worth US wheat sales inevitably caused adverse domestic effect. Secretary hoped, if matters kept quiet, it would be possible work out another agreement. Important that both Cairo and Washington understand elements that make action possible. Later Ambassador Kamel expressed satisfaction to Dept officer about results meeting. He said, however: 1) Important remove fear of famine from Nasser’s mind. UAR must have food; would prefer US as supplier, but will go anywhere to get it. 2) Since suspension PL–480 sales last January, UAR officials puzzled and perplexed by US attitude conducting agonizing reappraisal US–UAR relations. 3) Important maintain and even accelerate tempo contacts with UAR officials during coming weeks to forestall rash acceptance possible Communist wheat arrangement. Detente might lead to discouragement. 4) Effort to improve climate US–UAR relations must be joint endeavor along broad front in both Cairo and Washington. Control of US secret activities not in best interests UAR important contribution. Many Egyptians feel UAR position in Arab World being undermined. 5) While Nasser aware of domestic problems USG faces in formulation foreign policy, he does not understand them and believes President capable fully controlling domestic pressures. He suspects US reluctance move on wheat may be plot to exploit vital UAR need as means embarrass and overthrow him. Should he become convinced validity his suspicions he would react violently and irrationally regardless of consequences. Foregoing given in strict confidence with injunction source remain undisclosed. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Talbot. 2 Kamel conveyed the official UAR request in a July 7 call on Secretary Rusk. (Memorandum of conversation, July 7; ibid., POL UAR-US) 3 Nasser’s July 22 speech is summarized in a memorandum of that date from Read to the Secretary. (Ibid., POL 15–1 UAR) Extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 619–620. 230. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 230. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 29, 1965, 4 p.m. Israeli Tanks. I have the honor to inform you that we finally closed the Israeli tank sale on the original basis approved by you. 2 After about five months of trying to enrich the deal, they finally conceded and are very happy to boot. They’ll get (a) 110 M48A2C medium tanks to replace the German ones; (b) 100 M48A1 tanks to match those sold to Jordan; (c) conversion kits to upgun these plus the 40 Bonn did deliver to 105 mm. guns; and (d) ammo and spares. Total sale would amount to around $42 million in dollars over two years or more. I might add that Israelis have been very good at keeping mum to date, and we have a cancellation clause in case they leak later. Now we’ll start arguing about the twenty-four combat planes we said we’d help get from US or European sources. Rusk is strong against any US sale so we’ll stall for a while and try to shift them to Europe. We can always concede in the end, but it’s good to have leverage on the Israelis because we don’t like their threats to attack the Arab water diversion works (now it’s Lebanon). We’re also still very suspicious they might go nuclear. R. W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer, Vol. I. Secret. 2 The agreement was embodied in a July 29 exchange of letters between Solbert and Zvi Dinstein, Special Assistant to the Israeli Defense Minister. (Ibid., Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security, Tanks (1965)) They amended the November 15, 1964, exchange of letters between Solbert and Colonel Ron; see footnote 6, Document 99 . 231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, July 30, 1965, 8:06 p.m. 91. Embtel 75. 2 President keenly disappointed in Primin’s reply to his letter on May 21 on IAEA safeguards. You should seek appointment with PriMin soonest after Thursday July 29 (date for signing supplementary tank agreement) to convey President’s disappointment. As stated in presidential letter, we are aware Primin’s problems with forthcoming parliamentary elections and are therefore willing refrain from insistence now on commitment. In our view special relationship between US and Israel and friendship between Primin and President provide basis for greater reassurance than appeared in letter. We are so confident Primin’s showing in elections we would be satisfied at this juncture with his assurance if he remains in office following November elections he will do all he can to advance acceptance by GOI of IAEA safeguards for all Israeli reactors. Without such assurance we fear shadow creeping over our relationships while we wait for GOI reply. He should understand USG and US people feel deeply about non-proliferation and this could become point of issue between us later if no progress made. 3 At same meeting but without overt linkage to foregoing you should tactfully inform Primin that while we are pleased at the successful conclusion of the tank arrangements, he should be aware, however, that we continue adhere to our position against use of force by Israel against its neighbors. Military strikes by Israel against its neighbors would force us reconsider proceeding with the deliveries. You should note Talbot has made similar point to Ambassador Harman and Mr. Dinstein at July 29 signing of supplement to the November 15, 1964, tank agreement. 4 FYI: Uncertainty over tank negotiations may have served as deterrent to Israel’s carrying out its threats to strike militarily at Lebanon’s water diversion activities. By threatening to make continued deliveries contingent on no preemptive strikes we hope continue keep Israel in line. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Exdis/Tan. Drafted by Anton N. Nyerges; cleared by Talbot, Spain, Scoville, Komer, Symmes, Thomas, Colonel Haynes in DOD, and Wolle; and approved and initialed by Rusk. 2 Telegram 75 from Tel Aviv, July 26, transmitted the text of Eshkol’s reply to Johnson’s May 21 letter. Eshkol’s letter stated that Israel’s position on any subject related to its security was necessarily influenced by the unabated hostility of its neighbors and suggested deferring discussion of the matter until after the Israeli election. The telegram reported that Barbour expressed regret at the reply and stressed the importance that President Johnson attached to the problem. Eshkol called attention to a recent statement by UAR Vice President Amer referring to plans for development of nonconventional weapons. (Ibid.) The letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel—Prime Minister Eshkol Correspondence. 3 Barbour reported in telegram 116 from Tel Aviv, August 10, that he told Eshkol of the President’s disappointment. (Ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. IV) 4 Barbour reported in telegram 127 from Tel Aviv, August 13, that he did not make this point on August 10 but sent word to Eshkol that Talbot’s July 29 remark was not an off-hand aside but represented a determined U.S. Government position. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–LEB) 232. Memorandum of Conversation 232. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 3 and 10, 1965. SUBJECT Luncheon Discussions on U.A.R.-U.S. Relations PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Mostafa Kamel, Embassy of the United Arab Republic NE—Rodger P. Davies The Ambassador “briefed” Mr. Davies on developments through July during the latter’s leave. He recounted details of his luncheon at the White House with Messrs. Valenti and Hand during which the President appeared, 2 and his two meetings with Secretary Rusk. 3 He was immensely pleased with the results of these meetings and said that he had sent details of his discussions to President Nasser. He thought a trend toward improvement in U.S.-U.A.R. relations was definitely observable. There were dangers, however, in such things as the frustration of the army with the stalemate in Yemen, the growing belief in U.A.R. circles that the U.S. was contributing to the difficulties in Yemen through Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the Odell case which tended to confirm suspicions that the U.S.G. or CIA was attempting to overturn Nasser’s regime. 4 Mr. Davies provided the Ambassador with that portion of the transcript of the Secretary’s press conference of August 2 which related to U.S.-U.A.R. relations. He noted that there was a genuine desire for improved relations with the U.A.R. within the United States government and that there was only one policy within the U.S.G. This was recommended by the Secretary of State, approved by the President, and was binding on all agencies and individual officials of the Government. The exaggerated accounts of CIA influence as pedalled in such books as “The Invisible Government” should not be taken at face value. The Ambassador in Cairo was the President’s personal representative and led a country team for whose actions he was directly responsible. If the UARG had any suspicions that an agency or an individual was not acting in accord with our stated policy, it should go to the Ambassador for reassurance. He would be pleased at any time to investigate and satisfy any question the UARG might have. Mr. Davies said he could state categorically that no element of the USG was attempting to subvert the Nasser regime. Mr. Davies said the arrest of Mustafa Amin and charges against him were cause for concern. Amin was known to favor close U.S.-Egyptian relations, knew and saw many Americans, and had conducted his contacts openly. It raised the problem touched on by Mr. Symmes earlier as to who spoke for the U.A.R. We thought Amin reflected President Nasser’s views just as we think Hassanein Haykal reflects them in his current talks with Ambassador Battle. Will U.A.R. intelligence pick up Haykal one day because of these contacts? Ambassador Battle has continually made clear to Haykal that he cannot consider him an official channel. If the UARG, however, wishes us to use an Amin, Haykal or Sharaf as a channel of communication, it should so indicate. However, we repose complete confidence in our Ambassador and in the integrity and accuracy of Ambassador Kamel. We would prefer to accelerate the dialogue between our governments through them to the Foreign Ministry and Presidency. Ambassador Kamel indicated his complete accord with these views and said he would convey them with his endorsement discreetly to President Nasser. Mr. Davies noted that in January he had expressed concern to the Ambassador over indications that the Soviets were planting false intelligence with the UARG. Almost intuitively he felt that this process was a fact and that the Soviets were poisoning the well of U.S.-U.A.R. relations. He had seen the Soviets in action in Iraq under Kassem and, although the UARG was far more sophisticated, he felt the Soviets were succeeding in creating suspicion. In January he had mentioned specifically the Sudan where the Soviets sought to involve the U.S. in the southern dissidents movements. He felt that allegations made both by the Yemeni and the U.A.R. officials in Yemen that the U.S. was in fact encouraging Saudi and Iranian help to the Royalists stemmed from Soviet activities. Similarly, the alleged feeling in Cairo that the U.S. was operating against the Nasser regime was stimulated by the Soviets. The U.S.G. was not in any way operating against the U.A.R. and the record would show that we had consistently sought to be helpful in facilitating a solution to the Yemen problem. The Ambassador said Nasser’s departure for Moscow August 28 could have dangerous consequences if Nasser at that time felt that there was “no hope for further U.S. PL 480 assistance.” He urged some kind of forward motion on negotiations. Mr. Davies replied that while the administration was anxious to improve relations he would be less than frank if he led the Ambassador to believe that the climate prevailing in the Congress would permit action leading to a new agreement. This did not mean that an agreement would not be possible in the future, provided some outstanding political differences could be resolved. Until this improvement could be demonstrated, however, he could not see any move toward new assistance. August 10, 1965 Ambassador Kamel praised highly the August 9 televised interview with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara on Viet-Nam. He had sent a summary of points made to his government, which was extremely anxious to have full information on the U.S. position. Ambassador Kamel said he sent a full report of his last conversation with Mr. Davies to the Presidency. He had made the points concerning the unity of U.S. policy and the need for the UARG to discuss frankly any suspicions it might have of U.S. intentions with Ambassador Battle, the desirability of defining more clearly the channels of communication between our governments, the U.S. concerns over possible U.A.R. pressure on Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.G. desire to see an improvement in relations. He had just received a reply on the question of U.A.R.-Saudi relations. He was instructed to assure his colleagues in the Department of the UARG desire to see peace restored in Yemen and for amicable relations with Saudi Arabia. President Nasser had dispatched Hassan Sabri al-Kholi to urge King Faisal to meet with President Nasser in order to determine conditions for peace in Yemen. As of the date of the telegram, Faisal had not responded. The UARG hoped that the U.S. would use its influence in Jidda to encourage Faisal to meet with the President. In the meantime, reports of alleged U.A.R. intentions of attacks on Saudi Arabia were false. The Ambassador again raised the possibility of closer Soviet-U.A.R. relations if Nasser is not assured of U.S. interest in the U.A.R.’s future. He said the PL 480 program had been the basis on which U.S.-U.A.R. relations were conducted. The provision of foodstuff in fact had enabled the U.A.R. to pursue a non-aligned policy. Its termination could completely change the orientation of U.A.R. policy to the disadvantage of the West. Mr. Davies said he could only repeat that the climate in Congress toward aid to the U.A.R. precluded any steps in this direction by the Administration. It was important first to clean up any irregularities in the carrying out of the past agreements. The U.S.G. position on this had been formulated and we would soon be discussing these matters in Cairo. Before the Administration could even discuss the possibility of a new agreement, it had to be protected from charges that it had failed to ensure compliance with provisions of the old agreement. He saw no possibility of assurances to Nasser of favorable consideration of a new agreement prior to August 28. He would recommend to his superiors, however, prior to Nasser’s departure, of an indication to him of our desire to have a full scale review of our relations either on his return from Moscow or on completion of the September Arab Summit Meeting. Hopefully, during the course of this period the situation would evolve so that the Yemen problem would be on its way to solution and the complex of Israeli problems could be put back on ice. One disturbing factor influencing Congressional attitudes was the U.A.R. press. Mr. Davies’ impression was that it was worse now than any time since November. He feared that the installation of Khalid Muhyi al Din in a position of influence had permitted him to staff most of the press with pro-Communists. The Ambassador interjected that he was certain that the situation was not as bad as described and he was certain that President Nasser was giving these people enough rope to hang themselves. He again lamented the practice of Embassies of sending summaries of unfavorable comment since the reporting itself distorted the picture. Mr. Davies noted that U.A.R. editorials and news stories were transmitted by the wire services and provided the ammunition used by the Congressional opponents of policy. If the UARG wished an improvement in climate, it would have to solve this problem. Mr. Davies said that a further black cloud might be the situation in the Sudan. He noted allegations by the pro-U.A.R. and pro-Communist press in Khartoum that the “imperialists—U.S.-U.K.-Belgium-Israel and Tshombe” had promoted the uprising in the south and had armed it. This was a canard. The U.S.G. supported the integrity of Sudan and did not believe that the secession of the south was in its or anyone else’s interest. The brutal fact was that the arms in the south were supplied by the courtesy of the U.A.R. and Algeria. Some were siphoned off during the airlift to the Congo rebels and others were taken from the Simba as they were forced out of the Congo by the Nationalist army. Quite obviously unfriendly sources, most probably the Soviets, were encouraging the Sudanese to use the U.S. as a scapegoat. The fact that Soviet and U.A.R. propaganda coincided on this issue was indeed disturbing. Ambassador Kamel said he had been following the news in al Ahram and had seen nothing of this and was certain that this allegation would not be supported by his government. The Ambassador said he had a long letter from Kaissouni on the urgency for the need of U.S. assistance. Although it was confidential, he would make available a copy for the Department. He closed the conversation with renewed appeal for action to assure continued U.S. economic support for the U.A.R. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Davies. 2 The luncheon took place on July 23. (Telegram 591 to Cairo, July 26; ibid.) No record of the discussion has been found. 3 See Document 229 . 4 Symmes wrote to Battle on July 27 that Department officials had been seeking a convincing explanation of what lay behind the UAR arrest of Amin and the linking of Odell and the CIA with it. They were trying to determine the policy implications of the affair and its lessons for future dealings [ text not declassified ]. Symmes stated that “we are quite concerned by evidence that the U.A.R. may believe (whether rightly or wrongly) that there has been a basic disagreement about U.A.R. policy within the U.S.G. [ 1 line of source text not declassified ].” He noted that officers in NEA “have never felt certain that we have had a full picture” of [ text not declassified ] activities and stated that if the basic assumptions underlying U.S. policies toward the UAR were valid, “we cannot afford in the coming months the risk of having misleading signals transmitted to the U.A.R. by witting or unwitting policy deviations [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ].” (Filed as an attachment to a July 31 letter from Charge David G. Nes in Cairo to Symmes; National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 29 UAR) 233. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 233. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, August 18, 1965. 517. As the UAR’s economic situation remains difficult as result its foreign exchange position, our staunchest friends here (such as Kaissouny) are urging us strongly give some early indication that new food agreement of some size will be possible by end of year, assuming no major additional irritants in our relations. They specifically urge that we do so before President Nasser departs for Moscow August 27. I assume this timing impossible in view current status aid legislation and climate Congressional opinion, but we must give UAR some fairly definite sign of our intentions by early October because it must begin then to plan for additional wheat supplies needed in January. An affirmative decision will not guarantee a new honeymoon in US–UAR relations. It would be an important step however in rebuilding our influence to the levels enjoyed in 1962–63 and in protecting our essential interests in the area. We would envisage a series of short term agreements for specific products beginning with tobacco. Wheat in particular I would limit to amounts to be augmented by later agreements in the light of prevailing relationships realistically appraised. If our decision is negative or we continue to be evasive for many more months, I am convinced we can expect progressive and fairly rapid decline in our position here and substantial harm to some of our interests elsewhere in area. I would expect the Embassy’s effectiveness to be reduced to roughly that of British at present, i.e., little useful contact with UAR authorities and little or no influence on such matters as UAR policies on Palestine, the Arabian Peninsula or Libya. We have much to lose here in terms of a position of influence. We should take hard look at realities of situation before permitting further decline in Western influence at a critical time in this area. In view importance decisions involved, believe I should return on consultation at a time when Dept thinks my presence in Washington would be most useful in reassessing and redefining US policy towards UAR. As noted above, decision should be reached by early October and as far as local factors concerned mid-September would appear most suitable time for consultation. 2 Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 8:20 a.m. 2 Telegram 1126 to Cairo, August 20, authorized Battle to plan to return for consultations in mid-September. It stated that the Department was not prepared to give the UAR Government a commitment on a new P.L. 480 agreement at that time and that it envisaged a meeting between Battle and Nasser after his consultations to explore areas of possible improvement in U.S.-UAR relations. (Ibid.) 234. Memorandum for Record 234. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, August 26, 1965. Messrs. Bundy and Komer saw UAR Ambassador Kamel briefly, as Bundy had promised during the Presidential party for Middle East ambassadors on the Sequoia the night before. 2 Bundy said that following Kamel’s appeal (and Kamel’s own talk with the President on board the Sequoia) he had discussed the UAR problem with the President. The President and the Secretary of State were going to undertake a “careful review” of our relations with the UAR. More than this we couldn’t say at the present time. As the President himself had mentioned the previous evening, we wanted good relations with key countries like the UAR. But these had to be founded solidly on mutual respect. Aside from saying how hopeful we were about developments in Yemen, Bundy did not go into any specifics. In return he got an abbreviated version of the now famous Kamel speech. The US had to provide food to the UAR to balance Soviet aid so that Nasser’s “stabilizing influence in the Middle East” would not disappear. Despite regrettable incidents, no basic US interests in the Middle East had been harmed; the Israeli problem was in the icebox, etc. But we were at a crucial crossroads. The diplomatic corps here was full of rumors that the US was switching to a tough policy of “tit for tat.” But this policy never worked. Great powers must be more magnanimous and less emotional than small ones if they were to preserve their vital interests, etc. For example, Nasser felt humiliated by the way we had turned off aid. Whether rightly or wrongly, Nasser also thought CIA was trying to cause trouble for him in Egypt. Mr. Bundy reminded Kamel that he had dismissed the CIA canard the previous evening and assured him that we too sought friendly understanding. He was sure the Ambassador realized, however, that this must be a two way street. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Copies were sent to the Department of State and to Deputy Director for Central Intelligence Richard Helms. 2 Kamel told Davies on August 27 that he had sat next to the President for an hour during the August 25 Sequoia cruise and presented the case for renewed aid to the UAR. He said the President displayed “keen interest” and finally asked him to continue the conversation with “his boss,” Bundy. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US) 235. Editorial Note 235. Editorial Note The Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 (P.L. 89–171) was approved September 6, 1965. Section 401 amended Section 107 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480) to provide that no sale should be made under Title I of P.L. 480 to the United Arab Republic unless the President determined that it was essential to U.S. national interest, that no sale should be based on UAR requirements for more than one fiscal year, and that the President should keep the Foreign Relations Committee and Appropriations Committee of the Senate and the Speaker of the House fully informed with respect to sales made to the United Arab Republic under Title I. The text of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 653) is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pages 1137–1145. 236. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk 236. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 8, 1965. SUBJECT The Israeli Aircraft Request: General Weizman’s Visit Israel has long sought access to U.S. supply of arms. Currently, the GOI is mounting a strong effort to acquire United States supersonic fighters and/or light bombers. Its objective is as much to identify the United States with support of a deterrent offensive air strike capability against UAR targets as the acquisition of the latest equipment at a cost substantially less than European supply. The acquisition of modern supersonic aircraft by the Israel defense forces is recognized as in our mutual interest of maintaining Israel’s defensive strength. This is evident from the fact that in the March 10, 1965 memorandum of understanding we agreed to “ensure an opportunity for Israel to purchase a certain number of combat aircraft, if not from Western [European] 2 sources, then from the United States.” (This was later understood to mean 24 aircraft, if provided by the United States, to be delivered after December 31, 1966.) The agreement emphasizes our policy need to avoid provision of offensive or sophisticated weapons when these are available in Western Europe even if it is ultimately necessary to provide a token quantity of United States aircraft. Israel is seeking, however, to interpret the agreement as a commitment for United States aircraft, regardless of European availabilities. We do not wish to sell high-performance aircraft either to Israel or Jordan because the provision of these highly sophisticated and clearly offensive weapons would spell an end to our arms policy. Though tattered and torn, this policy has been a major factor in keeping us out of the Near East arms race and protecting the United States from the political damage that would result from a policy of uncontrolled military sales. However, we have used our facilitative services with the French and British for both countries, and in the case of Israel we have also offered the French the use of a U.S.-designed engine. The next major Israeli push will take place during the visit by Air Force General Ezer Weizman, scheduled to arrive in Washington October 11 to request U.S. aircraft. Our basic position is that we have determined Israeli aircraft needs can clearly be met from French or British sources. Therefore, we will have discharged our commitment under the memorandum of understanding by locating and assisting toward acquisition of suitable non-U.S. military aircraft. We will continue to refuse to provide information on characteristics and performance, price and availability of United States aircraft inasmuch as we do not plan to provide such aircraft. Recommendation That you approve the basic position that: 1) in our judgment French or British aircraft should meet Israel’s needs, 2) we are prepared to discuss performance, suitability, and availability of European aircraft, and 3) we are not prepared to discuss suitability and availability of United States aircraft. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Nyerges; cleared by Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in NR Lieutenant Colonel Billy W. Byrd, Davies, Evans in DOD/ISA, Meyers, and in substance by Townsend W. Hoopes in DOD/ISA. 2 Brackets in the source text. 3 Rusk initialed his approval on September 20. 237. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 237. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 24, 1965, 12:30 p.m. With the aid bill over the hump, Rusk asks that you take another look at aid to Nasser. His long memo (attached) 2 is worth weekend reading. The issue is whether we now agree to start talking quietly about more PL 480 for the UAR. We’d come back at you in a month or so before signing anything but even to start talking does imply we’d go ahead. All agree we should be much less generous than in the past, and keep Nasser on a short rein. But State and our Ambassador argue cogently that some food is useful insurance to keep this key Arab country from taking a strongly anti-US course and becoming too dependent on the USSR and Red China. They’re right on straight foreign policy grounds—moreover, we’ve now faced Nasser down and shown we’re not to be trifled with. But if we flatly cut him off (and he halfway believes we have), he’ll have no incentive to think twice about shafting us. This leaves the domestic US reaction; how do we justify resumption of food? After Yemen and the Congo there’s a general impression now that Nasser is behaving more sensibly, and Battle’s recent Hill talks (he didn’t talk aid) lead him to believe that anti-Nasserism is far less acute. So if you’re agreeable in principle, I’d suggest the following scenario: 1. Battle see Nasser, and say you’d asked him to get Nasser’s views on the future of US/UAR relations. We get into a political dialogue. 2. If this goes well, then State take such Hill soundings as are feasible before Congress goes home. 3. Then we enter quiet negotiations in mid-October or so for only a six-month agreement (with a six-month renewable clause) for under $50 million worth of Title I wheat, etc. Anything beyond this he’d have to take in Title IV dollar sales (which are good business for us). Thus we’d be giving much less than in the last three-year $400 million plus Title I agreement, and Nasser would know he was on his good behavior. R. W. Komer Approve Disapprove Let’s have talk 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, UAR Memos, Vol. IV. Secret. 2 Rusk’s September 23 memorandum to the President recommended that he meet with Bell, Battle, and Rusk to review U.S.-UAR relations, including the recent UAR request for a new P.L. 480 agreement, and that he approve negotiation of a P.L. 480 agreement with the UAR. (Ibid.) Johnson approved the first recommendation and disapproved the second. 3 The option originally read, “Let’s have talk Rusk wants first.” Johnson crossed out the words “Rusk wants first” and checked the option. 238. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 238. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 New York, September 30, 1965, 0103Z. Secto 10. Secretary’s talk with Israeli Foreign Minister Meir. 2 Following salient points of conversation held at USUN Sept 29 are drawn from uncleared memcon FYI, Noforn, and subject to change to revision upon review. Bulk of seventy-minute conversation devoted to exchange of comments on position of President Nasser. FonMin Meir drew parallel current India-Pakistan crisis with Arab-Israel question, noting ominous lesson to be drawn from an adversary’s repetition year after year that “this country must be destroyed.” She noted that despite well-publicized plans and budget appropriations by Arab command for assault on Israel, nothing being done by world community to head it off. FonMin took little comfort from Nasser’s Arab summit announcement that assault on Israel would be delayed four years. She acknowledged that Nasser is having a number of troubles, particularly stemming from frustrations of Yemen adventure, but she warned that Egyptian Army, conscious of having suffered defeat in Yemen, may try to find someone else to fight. Without stressing point she posed question whether it was wise for us to facilitate food shipments to UAR. She asked that USG make Nasser appreciate that his preparations against Israel are something he cannot be allowed to execute. She noted that Israel was not the only interested party in this question; other Arab states were concerned lest Nasser find ways of strengthening his position. FonMin made repeated references to long-term dangerous effect, especially on young people in Arab world from Nasser’s belligerent public speeches about Palestine. Secretary noted that USG regards Nasser’s influence in Arab world as more moderate than GOI gives credit for. He suggested that UAR posture toward Israel more doctrinaire than activist. Secretary recalled that Nasser had exerted a calming influence on Syria and in Jordan waters question. Secretary remarked that in general we are not inclined to be optimistic about Nasser performance but there was some evidence restraint as, for example, in changed UAR behavior regarding supplies to Congo rebels, agitation about Wheelus Base, relations with Saudi Arabia, and some responsiveness to our representations on trade boycott. FonMin expressed thanks for USG willingness receive IAF General Weizman.GOI was highly satisfied, she said, at our agreement that (1) IAF suffering “disbalance” and (2) US willing consider supplying IAF needs if equipment not available elsewhere. Secretary replied that we would be glad to talk to General Weizman and review this problem thoroughly. He expressed frank hope that GOI aspirations re USG as supplier were based on differences in price and performance and not on political advantage to be gained by Israel having USG agree supply. FonMin assured Secretary that Israeli recourse to USG being resorted to only after thorough exploration other potential sources. FonMin gave Secretary list of “acts of sabotage” allegedly committed by infiltrators coming from Jordan during July, August and early Sept. FonMin said she knew King Hussein does not want trouble but GOI considered Fattah problem as very serious. Secretary told her we did not consider striking back at Jordan as best way to deal with problem. FonMin emphasized that Israel had struck only at Fattah centers. Furthermore,GOI provided Jordan Govt with information about Fattah activities but lower echelons GOJ were making trouble. She noted that Fattah saboteurs who had been arrested were subsequently sent home by Jordan officials without trial. FonMin raised question of Moqeiba Dam and said it is not clear whether Jordan intended to stick to allocations provided under Johnston Plan or whether some other diversion was intended. She said we ought to tell King Hussein that Jordan cannot have all sweet water of Yarmuk, Hasbani, and Banyas leaving only relatively brackish waters to Israel. She said it would be helpful if USG could also inform Jordan that if they intend to carry through Meifeidoun crossing of Litani River, Israel position was that this would be inadmissible. Secretary made no commitment to do so. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 2 Memoranda of the conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. 239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, October 5, 1965, 7:12 p.m. 759. Re USUN 1091, 2 we assume “memorandum of Permrep PLO” is opening move in effort to gain UN recognition of PLO. We realize we have little leverage with Arabs on this issue, but we think it might be useful to point out to more moderate Arab dels that procedure on this question in past several years has been satisfactory to Arabs and that we hope they will agree to its continuance at this session. If they insist upon specific recognition of PLO, they should realize this might lead to nasty floor fight which may not necessarily come out to their advantage. Mission might wish to tell Israelis we are, in response to Amb Harman’s request, (Deptel 371) 3 trying to head off Arab campaign for greater recognition of PLO. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by UNP Deputy Director Jonathan Dean and in substance by Wolle, and approved by William B. Buffum. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 2 Dated October 4. (Ibid., ARAB–ISR) 3 Telegram 371 to USUN, September 2, summarized a conversation between Harman and Sisco. (Ibid., REF 3 UNRWA) 240. Memorandum of Conversation 240. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 6, 1965, a.m. SecDel/MC/18 SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1965 SUBJECT Lebanon’s Water Development Plans PARTICIPANTS U.S. Secretary Mr. Daniel Newberry, NEA Foreign H.E. Georges Hakim, Minister of Foreign Affairs H.H. Ibrahim El Ahdab, Ambassador to the U.S. The Foreign Minister cited the agreements entered into by the Lebanese Government and by other Arab states. He stated that Lebanon stood by those agreements. He went on to emphasize that the agreements were directed largely to the use of waters arising in Lebanon. Syria, he said, was a riparian of the lower Hasbani for only a few miles of the river’s length. Referring to other aspects of Syrian plans for water diversion, the Foreign Minister explained that this part of the project had been stopped because the projected canals in Syria came too close to the frontier of Israel. Lebanon for its part, the Foreign Minister said, saw no use in going on with canal construction to link up with Syria because there would be no canal on the Syrian side for several years. The Minister recalled that the Johnston Plan had allocated very little water to Lebanon. He said that today Lebanon’s own needs are such as to require more accessible water within its borders. The Minister spoke of a 25-year plan for development of the southern half of the country which would require enormous quantities of water. He added that the city of Beirut would also need some of the Litani River waters. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister what time factors the Minister had in mind in contemplating the water development plans; he very much feared that a first-class crisis was in prospect when the take-off of water reached substantial quantities. The Foreign Minister, without answering specifically, alluded to a span of ten years. The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that the United States would agree with Lebanon’s view that a primary use of water should be enjoyed by the people of the area adjacent to the water sources. The Secretary responded that such would not be an altogether accurate interpretation of our position because the United States in general supports the Johnston scheme. The Secretary again emphasized that he saw the elements of a major crisis in the Arab approach to water utilization. The Secretary expressed the hope that the interested states would not rush ahead with their plans without allowing time for the development of other ways to solve the water problems. The Secretary noted that the quantities of water in question were small in relation to the overall requirements of the populations in the area. The Foreign Minister responded that the Arab plans would take some time to bring to realization, but he asked that we not lose sight of the fact that Israel had gone ahead. Indeed, the Minister remarked, Israel was not using water just for the basin in the area but was diverting important quantities to the Negev. The Foreign Minister stated that Lebanon would insist on its rights and was ready to take the risks involved. The Secretary reiterated that he could see only trouble ahead as matters were proceeding now. He emphasized the need for the United States and Lebanese Governments to keep in touch, and he expressed the hope that there would be an indefinite delay in any plan aimed at changing the basic structure of the Johnston scheme. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister to consider frankly the question of whether the true character of the problem was one of finding the most efficient way to get the water or whether the objective was to devise a method to keep Israel from getting it. The Foreign Minister replied that, even though the question had been at the beginning a political one, it had now become a real problem for Lebanon in the search for the water requirements of its own population. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2547. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Multilateral Organization Affairs in NR Daniel O. Newberry and approved in S on October 14. The meeting was held at USUN. The memorandum is marked Part V of V; the other four memoranda of conversation are ibid. 241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, October 8, 1965, 5:35 p.m. 151. Fatah raids from Jordan were major topic discussion in Ambassador Harman’s courtesy call on Assistant Secretary Hare October 7. Harman said Fatah raids are a pressing security matter in Israel where the situation is becoming increasingly difficult. Originally Israel had concentrated on the longer range danger posed by UAC but this attitude has changed since Fatah operations have acquired character of grave regularity, central planning and expertise reminiscent of 1955–56. Fatah striking deep into Israeli territory. People are unable sleep nights. Armed forces are being diverted from essential training to night patrol duties and wartime atmosphere created in border villages. GOI appreciates what US doing in Amman but worried and would not like to draw practical deductions from its analysis of situation. It is afraid King will not be able seize hold of situation. He should know Fatah his enemy as well as Israel’s. Important for him to take real action. Ambassador Hare responded we appreciate Israel’s concern over this type penetration. We have been in frequent touch with Jordanians, most recently with King on October 4 and 5 and Prime Minister on October 7. We convinced any doubts King may have had about seriousness matter are dispelled. He came out October 4 publicly about Fatah. Press conference by Prime Minister is to follow. Military are alerted. Jordanians have arrested individuals although guiding apparatus still intact. King has stated he is at wit’s end to know what more he can do. If Israel thinking in terms of retaliatory raid Israel should remember King is not responsible but is trying to contain situation. Retaliatory raid would hit Jordan not real offender and would favor those Arab elements who want to accelerate long term animosity toward Israel. Raid would be grist for Shuqairy’s mill. US understands Israel’s concern and is doing its best. Jordan is also trying. Restraint on Israel’s part necessary. Foregoing is distillation of our most careful thought and collective thinking. Ambassador Harman responded Israel has shown extraordinary patience due to desire give Hussein time. But now appears Israeli restraint and a less than active King have contributed to Fatah’s feeding on its own success. The King gives no sign of making all-out security push and Jordanians in lower echelons including IJMAC uncooperative. While Israel appreciates US efforts with Jordan GOI is in vulnerable position on this issue particularly in view of elections. Israel cannot take too much more risk. King should not miscalculate Israel can indefinitely ignore situation. Ambassador Hare said we prepared if Israel authorized convey to GOJ seriousness with which Israel regards situation. We would urge Israel take no action that does not fit with progress we have made. Ambassador Harman replied he assumed we thought US actions of October 4, 5 and 7 should be allowed time to have effect. Ambassador Hare agreed. Ambassador Harman said he thought would be helpful if US would reinforce its concern to Amman. Symmes (NE) noted that 1) we have information, already imparted to Israel Embassy, that word is getting down to lower Jordanian levels, 2) it is in Israeli and US interest King and other decision makers stay in power, and 3) these decision makers have been back in Jordan only one week and therefore need time to intensify control. In separate conversation Department passed Israel Embassy (Yinon) substance King’s and PriMin’s comments on Fatah reported Amman’s 198 and 201 2 (omitting King’s speculation GOI might be behind Fatah, also numbered paras 1 and 5 of Amman’s 201). Stated we appreciative intelligence given us by GOI in past on Fatah activities outside Jordan and would welcome receipt additional such info in future. Pointed out that greater our total store of knowledge, better able we were to pass GOJ key intelligence of possible value its anti-Fatah efforts. Re GOI accusation lower levels GOJ not cooperating King’s directives, suggested Israelis produce in IJMAC any evidence supporting this charge keeping us informed also. Yinon doubted utility MAC channel, claiming GOJ lacked confidence SJD Daoud, but opined might be feasible pass such evidence through UNTSO Chief of Staff for direct transmission King or PriMin. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle and Nyerges, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Raymond A. Hare. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Jerusalem and USUN and pouched to London. 2 Telegram 198 from Amman, October 6, reported a conversation with King Hussein the day before on the subject of Fatah. Telegram 201 from Amman, October 7, reported a conversation that day with the Prime Minister on the same subject. (Both ibid.) 242. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 242. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, October 9, 1965. 980. Embtel 940. 2 We are now at major watershed in US–UAR relations and actions next few days will have continuing and far-reaching effect those relations next few years. Since my return from consultation many of my diplomatic colleagues, including representatives states not particularly friendly toward Nasser, such as British and Ethiopians, have expressed to me hope we will be able resume substantial PL 480 assistance to UAR. Most of them predict serious economic difficulties, not to say chaos, if we do not do so. They feel this would be tragic not only for Egyptian people but for Western interests here and that best interest US and its allies served by our keeping our hand in and maintaining position influence. They also believe UAR has made real effort remove causes irritation and that installation new Muhieddin Cabinet, although done for reasons internal administration, should lead to substantial improvement our relations providing we can meet UAR half way with aid. Belief our relations now normalized also current among official Egyptians whom I have seen informally in recent days. Although not expressed in quite those terms by them, they indicate belief Muhieddin Cabinet signals new era US–UAR relations. This regard we are impressed with pragmatic attitude new govt taking on economic and administrative problems and its apparent intent concentrate on internal matters. This not to say Egyptians have abandoned adventure, but rather it looks to us as though Muhieddin will be considerably easier to live and cooperate with than Ali Sabri govt. In these circumstances, and in view progress we have made on all matters we have raised with Egyptians since last spring, I sincerely hope we can avoid disappointing UAR now. Specifically, I hope that when Secretary sees Kaissouni on October 12 he will be able give him definite offer PL 480 aid, preferably on terms suggested Embtel 940 and at least as favorable as those we have given such countries as Yugoslavia. I am fully aware difficulties this may pose, but we estimate Egyptians have only enough flour to last until January and no alternative source supply in sight. In order avoid human suffering as well as for sake Western position here, we should act now when we have unusual opportunity to establish US–UAR cooperation on new footing. Cannot emphasize too strongly my belief delay in decision inevitably will mean loss that opportunity. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR. Confidential; Limdis. The telegram does not indicate the time of transmission; it was received at 10:23 a.m. 2 Telegram 940 from Cairo, October 5, commented on the question of whether a new P.L. 480 agreement with the UAR should be based in whole or in part on Title IV of P.L. 480. Battle recommended a combination of Title I and Title IV, with Title IV not to exceed 25 percent in the first year. (Ibid.) 243. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 243. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 11, 1965. SUBJECT U.S. Aid to the U.A.R. Recommendation: That you authorize our Ambassador in Cairo to enter negotiations with the U.A.R. Government for a new short-term PL–480 agreement . Our willingness to enter into the new agreement could be conveyed when I meet with the U.A.R. Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs on October 12. 2 Discussion: For the past nine months we have used a suspension of our aid to press the U.A.R. toward policies and courses of action which conform more closely to U.S. interests. We have met with some success . Present U.A.R. attitudes toward the Congo, Yemen, Vietnam and the Palestine question indicate an increased respect on Nasser’s part for U.S. interests and a heightened sense of his need to get along with the United States. In addition, there has been encouraging recent progress on settling private U.S. claims (reduced from $15 million to less than $5 million), and the U.A.R. has promised to pay restitution for damages to U.S. property (our library reopened October 3). A newly-installed cabinet offers hope that more resources and energy will be directed toward economic development; the new Prime Minister (Muhyadin) is believed more pro-Western than his predecessor (Ali Sabri). We have derived all the benefits we can expect to get from a continued suspension of aid . There is now risk that further pressure, without a demonstration of willingness on our part to help with the U.A.R.’s pressing food problems, will damage rather than promote our policy objectives with the U.A.R. We estimate current food stocks will carry the U.A.R. through the end of the year, perhaps a little beyond. With this critical supply situation the time is fast approaching when Nasser will have to seek alternative sources of food if he concludes that the U.S. does not intend to resume its aid . In order to assure himself of such alternative sources, he may be forced to make far-reaching political decisions that will fundamentally alter U.S.-U.A.R. relations and throw him into an unwanted dependence on the Communist states. A resumption of PL–480 aid will not solve all our problems with the U.A.R. We will continue to have policy differences. But Nasser, unlike many other Afro-Asian leaders, has demonstrated some willingness and capability to adjust U.A.R. policies and actions to accommodate us. PL–480 sales, granted on a short-term basis and flexibly administered in terms of amounts, offer the best means to maintain the leverage we need to contain and reduce our differences. We therefore propose that we indicate to the U.A.R. that we are prepared to enter into negotiations for a new short-term PL–480 agreement. The conditions of the new agreement would be harder than our previous agreement with the U.A.R. Two possible proposals are outlined in the enclosure. 3 Both would be for an agreement of not more than one year duration. We believe any new agreement should reflect a shift toward Title IV sales which are repayable in dollars. We would also incorporate a provision for periodic review of the amounts being supplied so as to give us flexibility for upward or downward revision depending on the overall climate of U.S.-U.A.R. relations. There would also be a provision for termination by either party. A resumption of PL–480 sales on a short-term basis will satisfy our policy requirements for the time being. We would not recommend any lending activities over and above this for the present. We need to come to a decision in principle about a new PL–480 agreement soon. We will begin to lose advantages when Nasser gets the idea we are trying to back him up against his own supply deadline in order to squeeze further political concessions from him. I am seeing the U.A.R. Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs on October 12. He leaves for Cairo the next day. In my opinion the time is now right to proceed, and we will gain maximum impact if I am able to indicate our willingness to enter negotiations for a new agreement at this meeting. Detailed negotiating instructions can be sent to Ambassador Battle later. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, UAR Memos, Vol. IV. Secret. A handwritten date of 10/8/65(?) appears on the memorandum, but the Department of State copy is stamped October 11. A handwritten note on that copy states that Secretary Rusk took the memorandum to the President on October 11. That copy also indicates the memorandum was drafted by Sterner. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR) 2 The memorandum bears no indication of the President’s approval or disapproval. 3 The enclosure, unsigned and undated, is entitled “Range of Possible PL–480 Arrangements With the U.A.R.” Proposal A was for a Title I agreement and a Title IV agreement, each worth $70 million, both for 1 year but subject to review after 6 months. Proposal B was for a 1-year Title IV agreement for $98 million, also subject to review after 6 months. Rusk noted in the margin that he preferred Proposal A. 244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, October 13, 1965, 11:42 a.m. 2129. Eyes only for Ambassador from the Secretary. After full discussion with the President, I told Kaissouni that the President wished him to know that PL 480 question was before the President personally, that the President had asked for certain additional information relating not only to Egypt but to other countries where large PL 480 arrangements had existed and that the President would not be able to bring this matter to a conclusion while he is still in the hospital. I told Kaissouni that we would try to get word to him as quickly as possible. 2 FYI. Principal problem here is not the political issues with Egypt, which have improved in important ways, but certain policy questions regarding PL 480 as a whole on which President wishes to be clearer. For example, the policy of sending large quantities of PL 480 food on extraordinarily generous terms to countries who are themselves food exporters or to countries who use their own foreign exchange to buy food in other markets needs clarification. My talk with Kaissouni was friendly and, although he was disappointed at not having an immediate yes, he recognized that he was not getting a no. My suggestion to you is that you simply state that you are awaiting further word from Washington which you hope to have without undue delay under the circumstances. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Handley. 2 A memorandum of Rusk’s meeting with Kaissouni on October 12 is ibid., AID (US) 15–4 UAR. 3 Battle reported in telegram 1070 from Cairo, October 20, that Kaissouni told him that morning that he had conveyed Johnson’s message to Nasser, who asked him to convey to President Johnson his appreciation for the message, his pleasure that political problems had abated, and his hope that U.S.-UAR relations could proceed normally and build on the improvement already begun. (Ibid., AID (US) 15 UAR) 245. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 245. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, October 20, 1965, 1302Z. 223. Deptel 164 2 —Fatah. Conveyed Israeli points as outlined first para reftel and in Deptel 160 3 to PriMin Tell Oct 19 making clear I was simply transmitting message and not endorsing various points. Tell reacted with extreme irritation, saying he had about reached limit of his patience in having “those people” tell him how to do his job and not do anything themselves. Borders were joint responsibility with both sides responsible for taking reasonable security measures. He thought Jordan had commendable record of arrests and regardless of what was said about full moon, he felt record of past three weeks indicated considerable progress had been made. He had authorized us to pass factual information to GOI and this should convince them of GOJ sincerity. What was Israel doing on its side to clear up this activity? Tell said we could report that it would also be grave miscalculation to assume Jordan would not respond to another retaliatory raid. As for contact between local commanders this could serve no useful purpose and was obviously designed embarrass Jordan with other Arabs. To extent either army encountered Fatah he assumed they would take action. Problem arose in those areas where it was impossible fully to cover frontier. No direct contact would obviate this problem and he had no intention of getting into position where Israeli commander would try to control disposition of Jordanian forces. Curfew also not feasible unless they able fully patrol area in question and to extent they could do this curfew not necessary. Re approaches to other governments, these had been most disappointing and indicated no disposition to help. Trip of security officer to Kuwait postponed since he too busy rounding up suspects but would be made later. Contact with Syria so far only through local Embassy and indicated complete disinterest. However Queen Mother would raise subject during her visit to Damascus next week. This attitude on part of neighbors explained GOJ inability to penetrate main apparatus which was operating outside Jordan. He felt financial center probably Kuwait but operating center Syria. Comment: Asking us to pass message such as that in reftel embarrassing since it appears we are questioning factual information GOJ has given us. I think we need to remember GOI has no Mission here and all their information re GOJ activity obviously comes from spies. We on other hand have reasonably good direct contacts with local officials who have been most cooperative in providing facts and authorizing us to pass them to Israelis. We are satisfied GOJ is trying and is making progress and in face of evidence we have, it looks silly to constantly reiterate Tel Aviv line that “you are doing nothing” and “we are going to attack you for it.” Barnes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and USUN. 2 Telegram 164 to Amman, October 18, summarized a conversation that day between Hare and Harman, who reiterated Israeli concern about Fatah. He said the Israeli Government attributed the absence of incidents in the past fortnight to the cycle of the moon and was apprehensive about what would happen when the nights were dark again. The government believed the Jordanians were not taking Fatah seriously enough and should “crack down hard.” He asked that the U.S. Government convey this assessment to the Jordanians and reiterate that it would be a grave miscalculation to think Israel could take more terrorist raids. Telegram 164 instructed Barnes to convey these points to the Jordanians and at first opportunity urge upon the King the “most vigorous possible prosecution” of Fatah. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 160 to Amman, October 16, summarized points made to a Department officer that day by Israeli Minister Evron. He suggested direct contact between Israeli and Jordanian commanders in certain boundary areas and imposition of a night curfew in certain parts of the border. (Ibid.) 246. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 246. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 25, 1965, 6:30 p.m. Planes for Israel. Now that Israel has a good tank sale under its belt (which nets us dollars), it is predictably focussing on planes. You’ll recall that last March we promised that if Israel would lie low on Jordan arms, we’d sell some tanks and “up to 24 combat aircraft” if they couldn’t get them anywhere else. Again predictably, the Israelis have made a blue sky opening bid—not for just 24 but for 210 new fighter bombers. Their air chief of staff was just here proposing in effect that we take over the modernization of the whole Israeli air force, on the grounds that neither France nor the UK—the only other suppliers—can provide the planes. 2 State and DOD told him that he’d better go back to the French and British, and that selling 210 planes—even for dollars over several years—was out of the question. Nonetheless, it is true that we produce far better aircraft for the money, and that France and the UK probably can’t meet Israel’s total need (in fact the Israelis are already back in, claiming that a new approach in Paris produced nothing). We’ll keep stalling the Israelis along, making clear that we simply can’t talk about becoming their chief suppliers but not slamming the door on a small sale in 1966. State remains adamant against any combat aircraft, but some of us are coming to wonder whether State doesn’t overestimate the adverse Arab reaction (as it did on Hawks and then tanks). Moreover, the Israelis are eager enough that they’d even let us sell planes for dollars to Jordan too (if necessary to block a MIG deal). Israel is happy enough about tanks and is asking enough other things from us—a desalting plant, 1966 economic aid, PL 480—that we can play hard to get on planes for a few months yet. But we’d recommend keeping the option open if you approve. 3 R. W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. 2 Discussions held October 12–13 between an Israeli delegation chaired by Ambassador Harman, with Chief of the Israel Air Force General Ezer Weizman as the chief Israeli spokesman, and a joint State-Defense U.S. delegation chaired by Hare, with Hoopes as the chief U.S. spokesman, are summarized in an October 14 memorandum from Kitchen to Thompson. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US) 3 The memorandum bears no indication of Johnson’s approval or disapproval. 247. Memorandum by Secretary of State Rusk 247. Memorandum by Secretary of State Rusk 1 LBJ Ranch, Texas, October 27, 1965. The President agreed 2 that we should try to put together a food arrangement with Egypt combining four elements (1) the procurement of rice from Egypt which we ourselves need in Viet Nam (2) Egyptian purchases of agricultural products in the American market on the usual commercial basis (3) dollar repayable food shipments under Title IV of P.L. 480 and (4) food shipments under Title I repayable in local currency. The President was not asked to approve any particular mix of these four elements. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the total package should be one which is in our interest as well as in Egypt’s interest—beyond the mere proposition that what is good for Egypt is good for the United States. We should not approach this particular combination in terms of how best to put together a large subsidy to economic development in Egypt but rather a reasonable, mutually beneficial combined transaction which will be realistic in terms of our own abilities, Egyptian market operations in foodstuffs (both export and import) and other elements affecting trade and assistance in food itself. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk. 2 Rusk met with the President at the LBJ Ranch on October 27. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) A memorandum of that date from Komer to Bundy describes the proposal Rusk took to the Ranch, apparently his October 11 memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV) 248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, October 30, 1965, 2:02 p.m. 375. Tel Aviv’s 450. 2 1. Israel Ambassador Harman called at Department afternoon October 29 at request Assistant Secretary Hare to discuss GOI cross-border raid into Lebanon. Hare referred to Meir-Barbour conversation reftel and recalled GOI well aware from numerous past talks of strong USG opposition to raids across ADL. Said we see retaliatory raids as disturbing rather than positive factor. First, they disrupt armistice agreements. Hare noted that in MAC context there is difference between identifying transgression performed by Fatah or other thugs and official action for which one side takes full credit. Second, USG honestly and seriously believes such IDF actions contrary to Israel’s long-term interests. 2. Re specifics October 28–29 raid, Hare made following points: A. This amounts to triumph for Fatah. If irresponsibles by wrong doing can provoke acknowledged action by responsible government that is feather in their cap. B. We understand there only three incursions from Lebanon in past five months. After first one GOI expressed itself as quite satisfied with GOL cooperation in MAC and actions outside it to check saboteurs. Therefore present raid does not have aura of understandable action. C. Also Lebanon is, after all, somewhat different in position and attitude from other Israeli neighbors. Furthermore, present GOL having its internal troubles and this raid could make things difficult for it. D. Primin Eshkol in election speech only matter of hours before raid had mentioned Fatah and Lebanon in sense of warning them. Juxtaposition speech and raid just does not look good. E. Finally, and Hare termed this as marginal consideration but one we felt should be mentioned and in fact had been by Amb. Barbour to Mrs. Meir, there are other matters USG and GOI have talked about together. Things such as present raid can be bothersome to atmosphere such discussions and certainly don’t improve it. 3. Hare emphasized he hoped Harman and GOI understand degree of USG concern this situation directly related to our concern for Israel’s basic security and welfare. Was for this reason we felt it essential discuss situation with GOI without delay. 4. Responding, Harman outlined three elements in GOI view situation. First,GOI can acknowledge no difference at all between type incursions from Lebanon and Israeli action of October 28/29. Armistice agreement very explicit on this. It disapproves both irregular and official incursions. Arabs must understand border crossing is two way business. Said GOI hopes USG will not press this point with it. If it becomes point of public controversy Israeli border residents will endeavor take law into own hands, and this GOI will not allow. Second, Israel had noted October 27 incident took place despite GOL assurances after first two incursions that forceful measures being taken against violators and despite fact mukhtar of al-Huleh and other GOL officials could easily detect new Palestinian faces in village and draw conclusion they were up to no good (since Palestinians do not normally live and move close to border areas in Lebanon, unlike case in Jordan). Third and “most serious,” there no connection with Israeli elections. GOI reaction would be identical November 3 or any other post-election date. Main point this episode was that October 27 incursion was attack against occupied village. Israel cannot and will not live this way, and GOI considers its elementary duty is to enable its people go to sleep at night. IDF cannot be spread thin and pinned down to patrol every few yards along border. Either Arab Governments must take responsibility controlling border violators or GOI must act as it does to provide security. 5. Harman said IDF personnel were given strict orders guard against human casualties and to his knowledge no life had been lost nor a single shot fired. He painted sober picture of mood pervading Israel’s population. It had lived 17 long years under Arab threats and bombast of every type. Every family had some member in armed forces and constant cause worry about personal and national security. Emphasis on military content Israel’s Independence Day parades was essential GOI tactic to assure populace its defenses at the ready. He knew of no country anywhere whose citizens would take relaxed philosophical view of bombs exploding under their homes. Concluded by hoping we would take all this into account, and stressed that when GOI views these matters from standpoint its own long-term security is convinced it must act as it does. Present government has been as cautious as any government could possibly be. 6. Hare assured Ambassador we minimized neither these factors nor wanton character of Fatah incursions, but reiterated our strongly held belief that retaliatory raids not the answer. Further, we were not pronouncing USG conclusion present raid connected with forthcoming elections though wanted mention that facts of situation might lead some to such interpretation. 7. Israel Minister Evron sounded final notes. Said Eshkol in other recent speeches had promised exploit to limit all diplomatic and other peaceful means achieve border security, using force only as last resort. His speeches should be taken together, not separately. Urged we consider, on other hand, King Hussein’s October 28 speech, which GOI viewed as one of most belligerent it had ever read and was itself flagrant violation of armistice agreement. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–LEB. Secret. Drafted by Wolle, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, USUN, Jerusalem, and London. 2 Telegram 450 from Tel Aviv, October 29, reported that at the conclusion of a meeting that morning with Foreign Minister Meir, Barbour raised the subject of Israel’s raid into Lebanon the night before, reminding Meir of the long-standing U.S. opposition to such unilateral action. (Ibid.) 249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, November 4, 1965, 10:35 a.m. 197. Amman’s 241, 2 last paragraph. 1. FonMin Nuseibeh during October 6 talk with Secretary said GOJ convinced Israel had already attained capability producing nuclear bomb, also predicted Israel’s rocket program had advanced to point GOI by March 1966 would demonstrate capability firing rockets that could carry nuclear warheads. Copies relevant memcons being pouched. Embassy should convey following orally to Nuseibeh: 2. Secretary Rusk has asked me tell you USG continues watch very closely possible nuclear weapons capability and acquisition by Near Eastern countries. We are most strongly opposed to idea nuclear proliferation in Near East as elsewhere. We have no evidence that Israel or any other Near Eastern state is in position to develop nuclear weapons in near future or that they have decided develop or otherwise acquire them. USG vigilance this matter will continue as will our efforts secure effective worldwide nuclear non-proliferation agreement. Meanwhile Arab Governments particularly UAR could take very important step toward elimination danger nuclear spread in Near East by undertaking accept IAEA safeguards on existing and future nuclear facilities since this would clearly put pressure on Israel do likewise. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–4 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Wolle on October 29; cleared by George D. Monk of INR/RES, John P. Trevithick of SCI, Beam, Symmes, and Davies; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 2 Telegram 241 from Amman, October 25, reported a conversation with Foreign Minister Nuseibeh in which Nuseibeh referred to his meeting with Rusk at the UN General Assembly in New York and expressed the hope that in due course Barnes would have a message for him concerning this. (Ibid., REF 3 UNRWA) Memoranda of the conversation between Rusk and Nuseibeh are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. 250. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 250. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 8, 1965. Food for the UAR . Rusk’s new package 2 seems to meet the criteria you gave him at the ranch. 3 In fact, it is tough enough that Nasser may insist on arguing about it, even though our Embassy says he’s by now almost desperate enough to grasp at any straw. It is also tough enough (far less than the UAR asked, or than we’ve previously given) to be politically defensible here. If it works, we can point to the lower quantities, tougher terms, dollar returns, and rice for Vietnam. Since State/AID now seem to be talking the right tune, we recommend you go ahead. It’s possible to design an even tougher package (e.g. six months’ instead of a year) but doubt that we could hang on it such conditions as free rice for Vietnam. 4 R. W. Komer McGB. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch on November 9 at 5 p.m. 2 An attached memorandum of November 8 from Rusk to the President recommended a P.L. 480 package totaling $109.5 million for the UAR. 3 See Document 247 . 4 Johnson wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “I want to talk to Rusk & Bundy about this Thursday. L.” Thursday was November 11. 251. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 251. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, November 10, 1965. 498. Fatah. Embtel 485, 488, 493. 2 1. Saying she had reserved most important point for last of several she raised with me yesterday (reported separately), Mrs. Meir referred to U.S. public statement re Israeli Lebanon exchanges over Fatah incursions. 3 She described statement as “a plague on both your houses” and reiterated complaint that we had not singled out Fatah as cause of whole trouble. She said other govts had diplomatically expressed opposition to Israeli raids but U.S. only one to do so publicly. She went on to note two subsequent Jordanian Fatah incidents (house at Givtat Yeshayahu and mining of railway) in which by miracle no one had been hurt, and asked what we would suggest GOI do about them. She contended that evenhandedness of U.S. statement on Lebanon had encouraged Fatah to latter incursions and that, regardless whether Jordan and Lebanon trying to supress organization, U.S. equating incursions with Israeli countermeasures tended make Fatah believe U.S. sympathetic. 2. I said I had no suggestions other than increased police measures and use established international machinery. I added continued Jordanian incidents confirmed our view that GOI warning reprisals not effective. I said further that such reprisals removed Israel from status of injured party and made broad U.S. statements inevitable. She replied that she not interested in being injured party, she did not wish to be injured at all. She remarked that railway incident further instance of lack of Jordanian cooperation in that Jordanians declined follow investigation beyond border although detonator wires led forty yards into Jordan. 3. Finally, she said PM Eshkol before leaving for vacation today had asked her to call me in to make foregoing points. She described him as much disturbed by this further Fatah activity and by the potential consequences of blowing up a passenger train which this time averted by accidental discovery of explosives. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 5:55 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, and USUN. 2 Telegrams 485, 488, and 493 from Tel Aviv, November 7, 8, and 9, respectively, reported on a November 7 explosion near the Jordanian border and the discovery on November 8 of an explosive charge under the railway to Jerusalem near the Jordanian border. (All ibid.) 3 Reference is apparently to a November 1 statement by the Department of State, made in response to press inquiries about the Israeli retaliatory raid of October 28–29 against Lebanon, which reads in part: “We deplore the resort to force by any party whether by private groups or by governments.” (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–LEB) 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, November 17, 1965, 7 p.m. 2807. For Ambassador. 1. You should inform Kaissouni earliest that USG pleased accede to UAR request for new PL–480 agreement. FYI: In our view preferable you inform Kaissouni rather than Nasser of broad outlines new agreement we willing negotiate. Kaissouni not only in position better understand implications new agreement but less likely react emotionally about possible “strings” or penalties. Quid pro quo aspects of new agreement would be clearly outlined to Kaissouni and others and passed by them to Nasser. On assumption Kaissouni reaction to new proposals will be favorable, we anticipate you would seek early meeting with Nasser, not to discuss details of PL–480 agreement, but to review against background our willingness negotiate new agreement broad spectrum US–UAR relations and areas of possible cooperation including: a. Normalization UK-UAR relations and cessation terrorism in Aden. b. Birth control. c. Economic management and planning in UAR. d. IAEA and avoidance of nuclear proliferation. e. Near East arms race. End FYI. 2. Suggest your presentation include following points: a. US–UAR relations suffered unfortunate strains in past months, but we have noted indications lessened strain. b. President Johnson appreciated President Nasser’s recent message expressing his desire for good relations with US. c. We hope climate our relations will continue improve. Important, however, that UAR understand problems we face in marshalling domestic support essential for success our foreign policies, and fact that future of PL–480 program will be directly related to climate US–UAR relations. Believe continuing frank exchanges offer best chance keeping incipient problems manageable. d. Several weeks intensive discussion among interested USG agencies were required develop program responsive to UAR request. While certain technical details—including third country consultations on usual marketing requirements—must still be worked out, main features proposed program (same described Deptel 2751 2 ) as follows: 1) Duration six months. 2) “Mix” of 75% Title I and 25% Title IV. Title IV terms generous. Shift to increasing use Title IV part of worldwide trend. 3) Program will include wheat, vegetable oil, tobacco, and poultry (number of items requested by UAR no longer available for PL–480 programming) in amounts indicated Deptel 2751. 4) UAR will be expected substantially increase commercial food purchases from US. Program also provides for option US purchase rice for pounds. e. Negotiating instructions now being prepared and should be completed early December. We will not be able discuss specifics until that time. Begin FYI. We doubt that any of above desiderata can be significantly eased so we should not let Egyptians think that much bargaining is feasible. End FYI. 3. Department will make parallel presentation to UAR Ambassador Kamel upon receipt info re timing your meeting with Kaissouni. Please advise immediate. 4. There should be no public statements at this time. You should stress to Kaissouni that it is essential there be no publicity or speculation in UAR at this stage. 3 Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Russell and James H. Bahti of NE on November 16; cleared by Symmes, Davies, Hare, Macomber, and Komer; and approved by Ball. 2 Telegram 2751 to Cairo, November 12, requested comments on a package proposal discussed at the LBJ Ranch on November 11 for a P.L. 480 agreement with the UAR with a total commodity value of $54.75 million. (Ibid.) 3 Battle reported in telegram 1260 from Cairo, November 19, that he informed Kaissouni of the substance of telegram 2807. Kaissouni expressed great pleasure but also concern at the terms of the offer. (Ibid.) 253. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 253. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, November 24, 1965. 1311. Re Deptel 2807. 2 Have just completed 55 minute conversation President Nasser. I conveyed President Johnson’s pleasure at receipt Nasser’s message and assured him US desire reciprocate his hope for good relations. Made points in reftel re period of strain, our desire for even relations and hope continue frank exchange of views. I then stated, as he was aware, US had taken decision offer P.L. 480 agreement. While terms do not include all UAR wanted, agreement reflects requirements world food situation and US policies toward other recipients as well as UAR. Discussed in some detail general problem of food and then urged we look upon new agreement as major new beginning between us and make every effort build on new foundation in the future. I reviewed US problem of obtaining Congressional and public support for foreign policies and stated our ability proceed directly related climate US–UAR relations. I suggested three areas concern. First, we should try to solve existing problems. Second, we should anticipate new ones and try to prevent them from arising. And, third, we must look for new areas of cooperation. In latter category I mentioned population control and great problem we had in assuring our food did not indirectly encourage population increase. President nodded pleasantly but made no comment. I mentioned need for increasing food production and again he made no comment. I expressed pleasure economic planning and management under new government and noted with satisfaction new UAR attitude towards US business which led us anticipate increased US business activity with cooperative attitude and helpful approval UAR. President then expressed his very great gratitude to the President of the United States for the resumption of aid. He expressed great thanks to me for my objectivity and help over recent months and stated UAR wanted very much maintain good relations us. “We have nothing to gain from bad relations your country and we will do everything possible to improve them.” He stated he had wished include something in his speech tomorrow to National Assembly expressing appreciation for new aid but would take my advice and omit any reference even though he must deal with Russian aid and had hoped for balance in statement. I suggested he express gratitude for cooperation in past and pleasure at improved relations between our two countries. He nodded and appeared to agree do so. I then turned to more difficult problems mentioning first Aden and my hope that this area of contention could be diminished as source of concern to those of us who wanted peaceful Middle East. I expressed hope UAR could normalize its relations with UK and would use its great influence bring about cessation terrorism in Aden. I stated British committed to independence by 1968 and expressed doubt any other solution available before then that would serve anyone’s interest, including UAR’s. Chaos would result from a precipitate British withdrawal and doubtful urban elements who have UAR sympathies would emerge victorious in that situation. “What can we give the Front?” he asked. “They are not my agents.” I replied, “I never said they were your agents, but your influence over them and in area very great and your influence might be decisive in this delicate situation.” He ranted for a moment or two and I finally said, “What can you suggest that is constructive in this situation?” He said, “Next move is up to the British. We agreed to deal with Aden problem when Thomson came to Cairo and this was impossible.” He then stated British efforts bring about solution in London meetings totally unproductive but somewhere in this direction British must move again. Assuming the Yemen problem is settled the key moment will be toward end of Egyptian presence. As Egyptians withdraw leaders Liberation Front will become deeply concerned removal Egyptian strength from area. Key moment for British to make move is in three or four months assuming Yemen agreement to be implemented. I asked how President viewed chances Yemen agreement being implemented. He replied that three or four days ago he had been pessimistic but things looked somewhat better. Saudis wished proceed although were confusing things by asking for understandings not in basic agreement, such as requiring 4/5 majority on votes at Harad conference when Nasser had anticipated need for only a simple majority. Nevertheless Saudis wanted settlement and he wanted settlement. The only ones who did not were the Yemen Republicans. He said, “I am having as much trouble with them as with the Royalists. I don’t really care who is in charge there as long as the Hamid ad-Din family is not involved. One group is the same as the other to me except for the family. That was no real revolution in Yemen. It was only a plot. But I just found that out lately.” At this point I laughed uproariously and so did he. I stated US strongly hoped for settlement Yemen question as it had for some time. He stated he too wanted settlement and that issue had been most difficult one for him. “Do you know we have had over 70,000 troops there?” I replied that this was more than I had estimated. He stated military had wanted him expand conflict to Saudi Arabia and that just prior to talks in Alexandria (sic) troop strength had been increased to between 70,000 and 75,000 men in anticipation expanded war (although fewer there now). He stated he had held off military pressure and had attempted political settlement against advice some of his top advisers. Many of them had opposed his going Jidda (“but the world applauded,” I said) and he had in brief conversation been able to do what military could not have done through force—settled problem with King Feisal. President asked me to carry message to US that it must keep close touch Feisal during this delicate period. Although every evidence Feisal wanted agreement, we must do all possible keep anything from going wrong. I assured him of our continuing interest and of our intention assist where we could. I then brought up arms control problem in general, stating world must find solution arms race. I mentioned US hope UAR could accept IAEA safeguards, saying that we were not, as he had previously stated, singling UAR out for attention in this field but that we had in fact discussed question safeguards with a great many countries in hope of encouraging general acceptance this requirement. He said, “I told Talbot our position when you and he talked with me.” I said I was aware Egyptian endorsement safeguards system but what was needed was formal adherence IAEA safeguards for its own country. “Have the Israelis accepted?” he asked. “No, but someone has to begin and we are in consultation with them with hope safeguards can become area wide. Someone must begin this vital step.” I then brought up conventional armaments and expressed hope we could over coming months have searching exploration these problems. He said, “You contribute to it by selling arms to Israel.” I said, “You contribute to it in other ways but that is not for discussion this evening. The only things I want to register are our continuing concern for the problem, our hope that together we might find a solution, and our desire to continue discussions with you on this very difficult problem.” He said, “How many tanks have the Israelis obtained—300, 400, 500?” I said I did not know but I thought his figures highly exaggerated but suggested we deal with basic issues and not numbers any one specific armament. He said, “If you sell planes to Israel, we will buy planes. If you sell tanks to Israel, we will buy tanks.” I said this reinforced my argument we must find some way to call a halt to resources going into unproductive activity at time they are desperately needed for more important things involving human survival. I stopped him from extreme emotionalism which built up very readily on this issue, which I have not discussed with him for many months. (Perhaps a detailed presentation should be prepared for my use with him in the near future.) In conclusion, he repeated again his deep gratitude for US willingness enter into new agreement and his earnest desire to assist in improving relations between us. I remarked rather delicately I would look forward to his speech tomorrow night. Comment: The meeting was extremely cordial and embarrassingly friendly, with renewed apologies for speech of last December 23 which I told him now part of history. Obviously he wishes desperately get back in good graces with us and will I believe try in his own way to do his part. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR. Secret; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 5:44 p.m. 2 Document 252 . 254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, November 29, 1965, 1:36 p.m. 246. Joint State-Defense. London’s 2350 and 2358 to Department; Deptel 2598 to London. 2 If King or Khammash approach Embassy re supersonics, you should be guided by following: 1. French and British have made offers to sell supersonics to Jordan. From reports available seems clear costs are beyond current GOJ funding from UAC. 2. If Jordan has exhausted bargaining for lower cost and improved terms for aircraft with UK and France, it is our view that their next step should be to seek UAC concurrence to proposition that (a) either UAC provide more funds for Jordan’s purchase of Western European aircraft, or (b) UAC reduce its demands re number of planes (see Para F Deptel 219 to Amman). 3 3. USG believes UAR fully aware nature US-Jordanian relationship and recognizes difficulties posed by UAC’s strict alternative of MIG’s or Western aircraft at same price. (FYI: Foregoing points were made to UAR presidential advisor Hassan Sabri Al-Khouli recently during private visit Washington. Airgram CA 5637 pouched Amman. 4 End FYI.) Showdown this issue could force undesirable decisions on USG, effects of which could introduce unmanageable instability in area. 4. Finally, USG has no intention provide either direct or indirect funding Jordanian purchase French or British supersonics. Nor is sale US supersonics contemplated at present reading. 5 5. For London: In view favorable reports from Jidda to effect Saudis have opted for mixed package, what are prospects for pressing UK make Lightning offer to Jordan more attractive? Davies and Hoopes would like discuss this question with appropriate Embassy and UK officials next week. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Iraq-Jordan Affairs Lee F. Dinsmore and J.D. Stoddart of DOD/ISA; cleared by Symmes, Meyers, Macomber, Hoopes, Davies, and Komer and in substance by B.W. Byrd of NEA/NR; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and POLAD CINCSTRIKE. 2 Telegrams 2350 and 2358 from London, November 22 and 23 respectively. (Ibid.) Telegram 2598 to London, November 15, set forth the response that the Department of State planned to make to a British Embassy query concerning possible U.S. financial support or guaranty for the purchase of British aircraft by Jordan. The Department wanted to avoid any commitment of U.S. funds to enable Jordan to comply with UAC demands, especially on supersonics, and thought the British and Jordanians should continue to explore how Jordan might satisfy UAC demands within the available UAC funds. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 2598 to London, cited in footnote 2 above, was repeated to Amman as telegram 219. 4 Circular airgram CA-5637, November 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 UAR) 5 Telegram 322 from Amman, December 1, reported a conversation on November 30 with Prime Minister Tell and Court Minister Sa’d Juma in which Barnes set forth the U.S. position along the lines of telegram 246. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN) Telegram 355 from Amman, December 16, reported a December 15 conversation along the same lines with King Hussein, who declared there was no hope of obtaining French or British planes at an acceptable price and no hope of getting more money from the UAC. He thought the only alternative left was to buy MIGs. (Ibid.) 255. Special Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 255. Special Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, December 3, 1965. SC No. 00699/65A ISRAEL, THE ARAB STATES, AND PALESTINE “LIBERATION” ACTIVITIES The frustrations of more than a million Arab refugees from Israel are leading to new efforts, both peaceful and violent, dedicated to the “liberation” of Palestine. Formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization is the latest of several attempts to provide a political focus for the refugees, and it has the nominal backing of the Arab League. At the same time, however, two independent terrorist groups seem to be trying to trigger incidents which would bring the Arab states into military action against Israel. Jordanian King Husayn opposes either approach to eliminating Israeli rule because his country is the Arab state most exposed to any Israeli reprisal. Moreover, Jordan includes part of Palestine and is the haven for half of the refugees, and Husayn is wary of pro-Nasir subversion among Jordan’s Palestinians. Syria, on the other hand, whose support of the terrorism offers greater provocation to the Israelis, enjoys the advantage of being more difficult to retaliate against. Although Nasir, like Husayn, seems anxious to avoid any escalation of the sporadic border incidents, these Palestine-Arab activities could, with little advance notice, lead to the largest Arab-Israeli clashes since Suez. [Here follows detailed discussion of the refugee problem the Palestine Liberation Organization, Jordan and the PLO, and Fatah.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. 256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 9, 1965, 7:21 p.m. 494. UNRWA. In view of developments on UNRWA item in UNGA 2 and especially in light of GOI attitude toward them as expressed by Amb Comay (USUN 2590) 3 and Bitan (Embtel 608), 4 Ambassador should seek appointment with Mrs. Meir to convey message along following lines: 1. Dept regrets GOI is unable to go along with UNRWA res which we have worked out over past six weeks, especially GOI’s feeling that US failed to “stand pat” on our original resolution. This connection we believe we made clear from beginning that we considered our text non-negotiable as to substance, but as Amb Goldberg told Comay Nov 5 “this did not mean we would not consider any proposed changes in wording if they did not affect substance.” (USUN 1831) 5 We adhered loyally to our commitment to Israel to oppose all amendments as long as it tactically possible to do so and to keep Israel closely advised of our moves. Willingness to consult closely was not fully reciprocated by Israel and resulted in additional tactical disadvantage for us as we approached vote in Committee. 2. Every step of way we have kept Israel’s interest clearly in mind; this is borne out in strong effort to block PLO; in forthright statement in Committee; in effort we have made to assure that Committee approved res was cut back so much it bears little resemblance to original. We have worked long and hard to obtain this result. 3. Our judgment of tactical situation is different from that of GOI. It is composed following elements: (a) majority dels do not feel strongly about amendments; (b) there is among many dels real measure of humanitarian concern about refugees which influences their position; (c) many of Israel’s usual friends (notably Italy) were weak-kneed; (d) Arab amendments were approved in Committee; (e) even if two-thirds not available for all amendments, two-thirds was there for many of them, including some dangerous ones. Our vote count tended to bear this out clearly, and we had no evidence to support Israeli contention that there no need for compromise if we used our full influence (this connection you will recall Amb Comay declined invitation to compare vote counts). Clear choice was between accepting a few non-substantive changes or running risk of res with number of really troublesome amendments. 4. Given these tactical difficulties, we believe US del has conducted negotiations skillfully and emerged with very satisfactory result. In summary, del managed to (a) get Arabs to drop four or five references to para 11; (b) knock out para approving Nine Points with all its serious political implications; (c) eliminate call on PCC to report directly to GA; (d) change “without prejudice to refugee rights …” to vaguer “without prejudice to para 11.” Only additional element was acceptance of time limits on PCC report (which overdue anyway). 5. As for resolution’s effect on problem, we do not believe it makes any essential change in situation. No new element has been added; some real and potentially dangerous factors have been successfully beaten back: recognition of PLO 6 (Mrs. Meir expressed pleasure of outcome this question in Tel Aviv’s 453), 7 GA sponsorship of Nine Points, most of Arab amendments on para 11 and “rights,” and property custodian res, etc. 6. With or without this res, Arabs will continue to push refugee issue in GA and we must anticipate increasing difficulties. As Amb Goldberg said “UNRWA question must be taken at UN in light of situation developing here” and “many positions including some of our own being eroded and elements of support shifting.” 7. We fully understand Israel’s disappointment that it not possible to make some progress toward eroding para 11, and we regret some concessions (in language but not in substance) had to be made to Arab viewpoint. 8. But these tactical considerations aside, the main point is: we have over years given fullest possible support to Israeli position on refugee and other Arab-Israel issues. Our position remains the same. We will continue to try to find solution which fully protects Israel’s sovereignty and security, and we will oppose proposals which endanger its welfare and interests. 9. Finally as Ambassador Goldberg told Comay we will prepare statement for GA to effect we do not regard res as departure in substance or principle from our position. 8 Dept will make similar presentation to Israeli Embassy. 9 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Symmes and in draft by UNP Director Elizabeth Ann Brown and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and USUN. 2 A U.S. draft resolution introduced in the Special Political Committee on November 9 called on all governments to make the most generous effort possible to meet UNRWA’s anticipated needs, directed the Commissioner General to take necessary measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, to assure the most equitable distribution of relief based on need, called on the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine to continue its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194, and extended UNRWA’s mandate until June 30, 1969. (UN document A/SPC/L.113) On November 17, the Special Political Committee approved three amendments introduced by Pakistan and Somalia (UN document A/SPC/L.114) by a vote of 43 to 39, with 23 abstentions, and approved the draft resolution as amended by a vote of 47 to 31 with 17 abstentions. The United States and Israel voted against the amendments and against the draft resolution as amended. 3 Telegram 2590 from USUN, December 8, reported that U.S. and Arab representatives had agreed on the text of a draft resolution, which they would try to get Nigeria to sponsor, but that Israeli Representative Comay opposed it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA) Telegram 1403 to USUN, December 4, instructed the U.S. Delegation to try to reach agreement on the basis of the Committee-approved draft resolution with some modifications. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 608 from Tel Aviv, December 9, reported that Bitan said Israel would vote against the resolution. (Ibid.) 5 Dated November 5. (Ibid.) 6 The Special Political Committee on October 20 adopted a resolution proposed by Costa Rica and El Salvador authorizing the persons constituting the delegation of the “Palestine Liberation Organization” to speak in the Committee, without such authorization implying recognition of the PLO. (UN document A/SPC/L.112 and Rev. 1) 7 Dated October 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 3 GA) 8 On December 15, the General Assembly adopted a draft resolution proposed by Nigeria as Resolution 2052 (XX). The vote was 91, including the United States, to 1 (Israel) with 7 abstentions. The resolution included the main points of the original U.S. draft resolution, with some, but not all, of the modifications made by the Special Political Committee. A statement made at that time by a U.S. representative is summarized in U.S. Participation in the UN: A Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1965, p. 80. 9 Telegram 497 to Tel Aviv, December 10, summarized Davies’ conversation with Evron that day. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA) Telegram 612 from Tel Aviv, December 12, reported Barbour’s conversation with Meir. (Ibid.) 257. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State 257. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State 1 Damascus, December 11, 1965, 1120Z. 184. US-Syria. Deptel 115. 2 1) FonMin Makhus received Amb with Earle Russell (NEA/NE) Dec 9 for two and half hours discussion US-Syrian relations. Meeting had positive accent. Makhus seemed to want lengthy exchange to give latitude for mutual effort “to clear the air.” He obviously hopes US will ponder and understand SARG’s positions better; we hope Makhus will use his political influence to get others in leadership group thinking about better relations with US. 2) Amb commented on Baath’s distorted concepts of US aims and policies, laying special stress on regrettable fact that SARG/Baath media have nothing but vitriol for US and fawning praise for Commie camp. Referring to recent Baath theme that imperialism led by US is plotting SARG downfall, Amb declared allegations of US involvement in such activities completely false and requested Makhus to notify him if SARG ever had evidence it believed supported such suspicion. Amb also explained SARG very mistaken if it expects it can kick US and at same time get US sympathy re Palestine and economic cooperation. 3) Makhus made intense presentation of Baath’s broad criticisms of US Palestine policy and US use of its power vis-a-vis small countries. 4) He also kept probing lightly re US intentions toward Syria in economic field. According to some quarters, Makhus stated, US A) is putting economic pressure on Syria, B) will not make available to Syria significant assistance, C) is keeping West Germany from moving ahead on Euphrates Dam project. Main thrust of his comments was that SARG would favor moving ahead on economic cooperation (memcon by pouch). Comment: In sum Makhus position seemed to be that expanded Syro-US economic relations are possible and desirable within some rigid limitations of Baath principles. Makhus statements also suggest to us that even some “principles” might be pushed aside if inducement were great enough. We will continue explore opening which has been created. In another round with FonMin Amb plans to trace past and present US activities in econ and commercial field and what we prepared to do. Appreciate Dept’s consideration possible aid to Syrian hospitals. We envisage any new US “assistance” to Syria’s economic development as being on business basis. Smythe 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL SYR–US. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Aleppo, Baghdad, Beirut, Bonn, Cairo, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. 2 Telegram 115 to Damascus, December 8, noted that Embassy reports suggested high officials in the new Syrian Government might wish for better U.S.-Syrian working relations, which the Department of State would favor, and set forth points for discussion with the Syrian Foreign Minister. (Ibid.) 258. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas 258. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, December 28, 1965, 3:30 p.m. The PL 480 negotiations with the UAR have gone better than expected, and we’ve struck a pretty tough bargain. They’ve bought all the conditions you laid down—an option for us to buy rice for Vietnam, increased commercial purchases in the US and a 75–25 split between Titles I and IV. We also arranged to convert enough local currency to pay Suez Canal tolls for USG ships. Now the UAR is eager to sign as soon as possible. The political atmosphere has been relatively quiet. Nasser has made a couple of grateful comments about our aid. Ali Sabri, who has pushed the radical line in the past, is now out of the picture, and the new government looks as if it’s going to pay more attention to its economic problems. Egypt still seems sincere in trying to pull out of Yemen, although that’s going slowly because of bickering among the Yemenis themselves. The one sour note is the trial [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], 2 but that got started quietly and went into closed session. Since we’ve already taken our Congressional flack as a result of the decision to go ahead, and since the UAR has met our stiff terms, to hold any longer would tend to defeat the purpose of the exercise. It also makes sense to go ahead before Congress comes back. So we recommend you sign the attached determination. 3 R. W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 17. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 10:30 a.m. on December 29. 2 Mustafa Amin was indicted for espionage on November 30. (Telegram 3531 to Cairo, December 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 29 UAR) 3 On December 29, the President signed a memorandum to Rusk determining that it was essential to U.S. national interest to finance export sales of surplus agricultural commodities to the United Arab Republic under Title I of P.L. 480. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 622–623. Two agreements providing for the sale of agricultural commodities under Title I and Title IV of P.L. 480 were effected by an exchange of notes signed at Cairo on January 3; for text, see 17 UST 6 and 17. 259. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas 259. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, December 28, 1965, 4 p.m. I’ve held off as long as I could bothering you with this year’s Israeli aid package. We have Israeli requests for $39 million in development loans (nearly double the FY’64 and ’65 levels) and for two years of PL 480 Title I, starting with $34 million this year ($32m.FY’65, $23m. FY’63 and ’64). However, I see this as strictly a bargaining position. In economic terms there’s no justification for either AID loans or Title I food. Israel is doing far better than several other countries where we’ve already shifted from concessional AID and Title I terms to Ex-Im Bank and Title IV. Bell again recommends we make that shift in Israel this year, and Mann agrees. They argue that failure to do so soon in Israel undercuts the credibility of our worldwide effort to get out of the aid business once a country is really moving, and makes it tough to cut back in other places. Moreover, past Title I programs have banked us excess Israeli currency, so Title IV dollar sales would make more sense. In general, the harder the line we take the more favorable the balance of payments effects. Of course, State and AID recognize that the case for Israeli aid is basically political, so each year they buck the decision to the White House. The Israelis claim that economic need is not the real test; they have since 1959 regarded our aid, with some justice, as a defense subsidy in compensation for our reluctance to give them grant military aid or a public defense guarantee. Finally, there is the domestic political factor, especially at a time when we are resuming food to Nasser. Nonetheless, I think that our Israeli relationship is in good enough shape to sustain some cut in aid and stiffening of our loan terms. We are now selling Israel hardware on concessional loan terms, which weakens its argument for a defense subsidy. Moreover, on the horizon is our contribution to a nuclear desalting plant (though this is more likely an FY 67 or 68 matter) and possibly some jets. Our aid to Israel has averaged around $80 million per annum 1961–65. Last year we gave $83.6 million ($20 million in DL, $4m. Ex-Im, $32m. in Title I and $27.6 million in a MAP credit for tanks). This year we’d all favor cutting to about $65 million, but the big issue is over loan terms. I’d see three basic choices: A. The Bell/Mann hard line of shifting Israel to all Ex-Im loans ($20 million) and Title IV ($30 million), plus the $14.4 million in MAP credits already given. This would generate a strong Israeli beef. B. A soft line , essentially repeating last year’s performance of $20 million DL and $32 million in Title I. The Israelis would probably be quite happy with this. C. Splitting the difference by going for $10 million DL and $10 million Ex-Im, and insisting that Israel take one-fourth of the $32 million PL 480 under Title IV (the same proportion as for Nasser). This option makes a start toward shifting Israel on to harder terms, but cushions the transition. It would generate plenty of Israeli complaints, but not too much to live with so long as Israel sees hope for planes and desalting (State will probably recommend shortly that we sell jets to Israel and Jordan—a repeat of last winter’s tank deal). I’d favor this last as making the most political sense. I’ve also tried it out on Harriman, who agrees that it’s the least we can do. We ought to put it hard to the Israelis as our best offer, but could always retreat if they scream too loudly. Moving pronto on this will also soften Israeli complaints about food for Nasser. R. W. Komer 2 Approve Bell/Mann line Approve soft line Approve compromise 3 See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 17. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch on December 31 at 11:45 p.m. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Bundy initialed below the typed signature. 3 This option is checked. A memorandum of April 13, 1966, from Komer to the President requesting his authorization to inform the Israelis about the FY 1966 aid levels states that with Johnson’s approval, they had delayed informing them “in order to strengthen our hand during the aircraft negotiations.” Johnson approved, and a memorandum for the record by Komer indicates that he informed Harman on April 19. (Both in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V) 260. Memorandum of Conversation 260. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 29, 1965, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Israeli Concern over Near East Developments PARTICIPANTS The Secretary His Excellency Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel Mr. Ephraim Evron, Minister, Embassy of Israel NEA—Ambassador Hare NE—David L. Gamon Ambassador Harman said that during his recent visit to Israel Prime Minister Eshkol and other senior Israeli officials had discussed with him recent developments affecting the area that were causing the Government of Israel serious concern. In this connection the Prime Minister told him that he had to take exception to the following erroneous concepts that were current abroad: (1) Arab Summit meetings were becoming more moderate; (2) Israel is militarily superior to the Arab States; and (3) Israel’s Arab neighbors were rearming merely to catch up with Israel. As the Prime Minister saw things, the U.A.R. had been able to play on the common Arab desire to destroy Israel and had succeeded in rallying the Arab states behind the Unified Arab Command. Ambassador Harman then gave the Secretary the two attached documents (“Liabilities Imposed by Arab Summits” and “Arab Summit Budgets”) 2 and read from them to show how the Arabs were busily preparing themselves for the time when they would attack Israel. He dwelt at some length on the UAC plans for the rearmament of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon stating that their task would be to pin down Israeli forces in the north while the U.A.R. mounted the main attack. Once the refugees in the Gaza Strip were organized into an effective Palestine Liberation Army Nasser would have the option of letting them conduct Fedayeen-type operations or a “liberation war” as a cover for his own aggressive designs. The U.A.R. was giving top priority to its armament while cutting back on economic and social programs. It had acquired 60 new MIG-21’s, was getting 20–30 Sukhoi low-level attack planes, additional TU–16 bombers and helicopters, and the first of a large number of T–55 tanks had arrived. There was every indication that the U.A.R. was organizing a third armored division and that some of the Yemen veterans would be kept in the regular army rather than be placed on reserve status. In this context the resumption of a food program for the U.A.R. was causing Israel concern, particularly because the United States was apparently not taking up with Nasser the things he was doing to undermine Israel. Although the United States had assured Israel that the primary purpose of the Saudi armament deal was to provide that country with an adequate air defense package, Israel could not gloss over the fact that the Saudis had an airfield only 200 kilometers from Eilat and that the process of arming Saudi Arabia would breed a new class of military in that country. A second subject that was causing the Israelis concern was the status of U.S.-Israeli understandings on Israel’s defense needs. During the discussions in March 1965, it had been agreed that Jordan had no need for a military build-up but that it would be preferable for Jordan to have Western rather than Soviet arms. The United States had made good Israel’s tank deficiencies and had recognized that it would be in the interest of both countries for Israel to have modern aircraft. The Israelis were disappointed that, despite this commitment and Israel’s repeated unsuccessful efforts to find planes in France, the United States was unwilling to set a date for a resumption of aircraft talks. The Prime Minister was under the impression that the United States would never supply Israel with aircraft, even if it were demonstrated that there was no alternative source. Israel had welcomed American assurance that there would be no direct U.S. aid to Jordan for its aircraft acquisitions. However, Israel had learned that the United States was supplying Jordan with some 100 tanks beyond those about which the United States had informed Israel, although the United States had agreed to keep Israel informed of tank deliveries to Jordan. [On August 21, 1965, Mr. Rodger P. Davies informed Minister Evron that the U.S. had supplied Jordan with 96 M–48 tanks under MAP in 1964–65 and would be selling Jordan 100 M–48’s under a special arrangement in 1966.] 3 Finally, the Israelis were disappointed that the United States had not responded to their request for economic assistance. As far back as 1960 the U.S. had told Israel that economic assistance to Israel would take into consideration the latter’s defense burden. The Secretary said that he would have the Department study the assessment presented by the Ambassador as well as past U.S.-Israeli military discussions and would be in touch with him soon. With regard to economic aid, the Secretary said that the Israeli request was under study. This would have to take into account Israel’s whole economic position. 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret. Drafted by Gamon and approved in S on January 5, 1966. 2 The attachments are not printed. 3 Brackets in the source text. 4 Hare met with Harman on January 13 to respond to the points he had made. He stated that no decision had been made concerning the question of aircraft sales and that the Israeli request for economic assistance was under high-level consideration. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF ISR) 261. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 261. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 12, 1966, 11 a.m. Our Israeli Affairs . Mike Feldman says he hopes to see you in the next few days, probably to pass on a complaint about how poorly we’re treating Israel. In fact, I wouldn’t be surprised if you got a letter from Eshkol shortly. Such gambits are part of a standard Israeli effort to put pressure on us for more military and economic help. I’ve been through them before and, as I wrote you, 2 the best response is to play a little hard to get ourselves (and make clear we won’t be muscled) before coming through. We end up spending less this way. Thus we’ve held up informing Israel of your economic aid decision just yet; we’re also waiting till we can propose to you a solution on planes for Jordan and Israel. One development has infuriated the Israelis. To counter all the public criticism they generated about US aid to Nasser and arms to other Arabs, somebody in the Pentagon defensively leaked that the Israelis were secretly buying fancy missiles from France. We haven’t made them feel any better by pointing out that, while we deplore the leak, it serves them right. Although Israel will complain about a crisis of confidence, this is par for the course. So is sending Feldman and Feinberg in to harry you. Thus, I’d see merit in telling Feldman to pass back word that we naturally bridle when Israel tells us how to run our business and that, if Israel expects help from us, it must be a two-way street. We could well afford to hold the line for another few weeks before easing up. If you feel that we are trying to play too cozy a game, however, we can ease up. We can short-circuit most Zionist criticism by leaking the tank deal to Israel (even though this risks flak from Arabs, especially Nasser). We could also go ahead with the economic aid package, and then with the planes. In sum, we have more than enough goodies in hand to stem any tide of criticism. The only real issue is whether to play hard to get a bit longer as a lesson, or to begin caving now . R. W. Komer Keep holding back till February Start easing up now 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret. Filed with a January 12 covering memorandum from Bundy to the President noting that it replaced a memorandum that he and Komer had sent earlier and expressing disappointment that the Israelis were “still trying to use the Feldman/Feinberg channel for serious business.” 2 A January 5 memorandum from Komer to the President noted several items that Komer attributed to an Israeli effort to put public pressure on the United States for more aid. He recommended telling the Israelis that “we simply refuse to do business this way.” A note from Bundy on the memorandum endorsed Komer’s recommendation. Johnson wrote “See me” on the memorandum. (Ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. 5) Bundy stated in the January 12 memorandum cited in footnote 1 above that he had not done so because of the press of other business. 3 Neither option is checked. 262. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 262. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Proposed Sale of American Aircraft to Israel and Jordan Recommendation We recommend you authorize us to proceed with a sale of American military aircraft to Israel and Jordan along the lines of proposals in Enclosure 1: (a) up to 24 U.S. A4’s to Israel on MAP credit terms, with an option for Israel to buy 24 more at a later date, and (b) up to 36 F–5’s or F–104 A/B’s, or a mix of the two, to Jordan in increments of 12 for cash allocated to Jordan by other Arab states. 2 Discussion We have reviewed the options available to us in meeting Jordan’s requirement for supersonic military aircraft (Enclosure 2) and conclude we must agree to sell up to 36 American aircraft if we are going to preclude King Hussein’s accepting MIG’s under pressure from the United Arab Command (UAC). The UAC has offered Jordan Soviet MIG’s, but has allocated funds to Jordan to purchase 36 aircraft from Western sources in lieu thereof. Since the King feels he has already obtained the maximum numerical concessions at the last Arab Summit (from 60 to 36 aircraft), we believe an offer of less than 36 would not obviate the risk of his accepting MIG’s. In making our offer, however, we would not relate it to the UAC requirements as such. (Enclosure 3 is a chronology of developments leading up to the present situation.) This course is distasteful, but less so than the probable results of other courses of action. We agree with Ambassador Barnes’ assessment that Hussein cannot put off a decision much beyond mid-January. MIG’s in Jordan could precipitate a chain of events that would seriously damage our interests not only in Jordan but elsewhere in the Near East. A subsidy for the purchase of more expensive French or British aircraft would have balance of payments disadvantages and would put us in a position of indirectly fueling the Near East arms race without the compensating advantage of control we would gain from a U.S. sale. We have been under considerable pressure from Israel to sell U.S. aircraft regardless of what we may do for Jordan. If we sell to Jordan there would have to be a compensating sale to Israel. Without the sale to Jordan we might be able to stall the Israelis for a time. However, particularly if we believe that eventually we must provide some aircraft to Israel, a sale now to Jordan would have a number of advantages. It would protect the considerable U.S. investment in that country, would enable us to exert continued influence for stability in the area and, by preempting the Soviets in Jordan, would prevent a major step toward an East-West polarization of arms supply to the area. At the same time, an offer to sell to Israel would make a sale to Jordan more acceptable to circles in which criticism of such a sale could be expected. Our agreement to sell U.S. supersonics to Jordan, to which we are convinced there is no feasible alternative, could be incorporated in the same kind of Israel-Jordan package arrangement developed for the ground equipment sales last March. (Enclosure 4 is a summary of U.S. aircraft cost and availability data.) We recognize that the course of action recommended will not put an end for all time to either Jordanian or Israeli pressures on us for military sales of supersonic aircraft and other military equipment. The threat of Soviet equipment in Jordan will remain to be invoked in the future. Soviet supplies to the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq will create continued Israeli pressures for deterrent equipment. Some sort of agreement with the U.S.S.R. would therefore appear to offer the best hope of ultimately checking the arms race in the Near East. The Soviets have been probed a number of times on this subject, most recently by Secretary Rusk on October 1, 1965, but our efforts have not been fruitful (Enclosure 5). We are now studying possibilities for a further effort to explore Soviet attitudes in this regard. 3 Dean Rusk Robert S. McNamara 4 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452. Secret; Limdis. Filed as an attachment to a January 18 memorandum from John T. McNaughton to McNamara, a notation on which indicates that McNamara signed the draft memorandum to the President on January 19. A February 10 memorandum from Hoopes to Vance states that Rusk allowed the draft memorandum to go forward to the White House without his express approval. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452) 2 There is no indication of the President’s approval or disapproval. The enclosures are not attached. 3 Rusk raised this subject with Gromyko during an October 1 conversation in New York which covered a number of subjects. He stated that he thought it might be possible to reach an informal understanding to bring pressure on Israel and Egypt to limit their arms buildup and that some day it might be possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to jointly declare that they would not tolerate the use of force to resolve disputes in the Near East. Gromyko brought the conversation back to U.S.-Soviet efforts at arms control. The relevant portion of the memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XI, Document 97 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears Rusk’s typed signature and McNamara’s handwritten signature. 263. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 263. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 21, 1966. Mac: I am putting my talk today with Israeli Minister Evron in the form of a memo to you, because of the sensitivity of the matters discussed. He said that Harman will be leaving no later than July. Evron either didn’t know or wouldn’t say who would replace Harman. He also broached the question of an Eshkol visit this year. My first instinct was to counsel waiting till 1967 but then I reflected that it’s an election year and the President might be interested. So I was noncommittal, except for saying that a visit would be a lot easier if our other business had been satisfactorily settled beforehand so that no one felt that Eshkol would be coming with a shopping list. After I gently reproved Evron (who is the soft salesman of the Israeli Embassy) for the press and pressure campaign of recent vintage, we got down to cases. He thought that Golda Meir’s replacement by Eban would greatly decrease the decibel level of Israeli diplomacy and make things easier all around. On planes, I told him that Israel had made a grievous error in trying to take a whole arm when we extended a hand. When we grudgingly said last March that up to 24 planes might just be feasible as a bonus if none were available in Europe, the Israeli response was the Weizman approach asking us in effect to take over supply of the whole Israeli airforce—with an initial commitment of 210 planes. This had led us to draw right back into our shells. If they wanted to increase the chance of a helpful response, I would advise them to inform us officially as soon as possible (preferably before Eban got here) that, while they still thought the Weizman proposal was the most sensible, they now recognized our reluctance to become the prime Israeli airforce supplier. Therefore, they would continue to seek primarily European sources. However, they did have a much smaller requirement for low-level intruders which they hoped we would supply. They should also tell us that they recognized (as they had on tanks last year) the importance of forestalling Soviet supply of aircraft to Jordan by a sale of our own. I could make no promises as to whether an approach along these lines would unfreeze the aircraft matter, but in my view it was the only promising way to get us to take a second look. I also said that, were I an Israeli, I would not ask for more than the 24 aircraft mentioned last March, and simply express hope that we might later make a further sale of like magnitude. I think he got the drift. Then I pointed out that if Mr. Eban wanted to have a constructive visit, instead of being put on the defensive about Israel’s nuclear posture, it would be highly desirable to give us an affirmative answer on the next Dimona inspection before Eban arrived. Otherwise, as Barbour had told Eban, this would be No. 1 on the agenda of everyone to whom Eban spoke. 2 Evron and I agreed that another inspection was inevitable, and that it would be more sensible to agree on it now than to go through the usual series of acrimonious high-level exchanges. However, he pled Eshkol’s problem with the new faces in his cabinet, plus Eshkol’s worries about Peres. These problems might force a brief delay, until Eshkol could bring his cabinet around. I replied that Peres should be no problem since he and BG were the very ones who originally set up the inspection arrangements. Nor could I help but feel that renewed pleas about Eshkol’s political difficulties were largely evasions. After all, we had just given him a year’s grace on these grounds. If, however, Eshkol did have a short-term political problem, he would be wise to acquiesce right now in an inspection within a month or so, and candidly explain why he asked for this brief delay. Evron advised that we keep a close eye on Israel Galili, new Minister without portfolio from Mapai’s coalition partner Ahdut Avoda. Eshkol had wanted to make him Defense Minister, and in Evron’s opinion he might well be the next PM. Evron asked about economic aid. I indicated that this was a difficult decision for us, because of the President’s desire to cut back wherever possible in order to finance Vietnam and the Great Society at the same time. Many in the USG argued strongly that Israel could not justify any economic aid. But I hoped that, if the Israelis would relax, we might be able to come at least part way toward them. I deliberately took the above tack on planes and Dimona, because in my judgment circumstances will probably demand that we end up selling some aircraft to the Israelis. If so, it is far wiser for us to soften them up on certain conditions precedent (on proliferation, on not making us prime suppliers, and on not expecting too much economic aid) than to give way piecemeal and end up getting less than otherwise. If I’m wrong, no harm has been done. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. 2 Barbour told Eban on January 18 that the most important matter on the agenda was arranging the next U.S. visit to Dimona. (Telegram 716 from Tel Aviv, January 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) 264. Memorandum for the Record 264. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, January 24, 1966. Israeli Minister Evron came in briefly at his request today to say that Jerusalem was most responsive to my private suggestions of 21 January as to what ought to be done if Israel wanted to maximize its chances of purchasing aircraft from the US. However, they were worried about one particular point. What kind of planes would we supply Jordan, if we felt that we had to go ahead with Jordan too? I reminded him of Weizman’s view, later confirmed by Harman, that the Israelis would be most unhappy with the Mirage, somewhat less unhappy with the Lightning, and least unhappy with F–104’s. We had in fact been holding off the Jordanians for a long time, as he undoubtedly knew. If we decided that it was the way of wisdom (in Israel’s interest even more than ours) to meet Hussein’s minimum demands, we had in mind only a defensive interceptor-type aircraft. In fact, we were thinking of some old F–104’s which had a purely air defense configuration. Therefore, I doubted that Israel would have cause for concern on this score (I infer that Jerusalem was worried lest we sell Jordan the same kind of plane we might sell Israel). Jerusalem’s only other worry, he said, was that if Israel reduced its request to say 45 intruders (interestingly, the figure Feldman mentioned to the President), would the US then consider this just a bargaining figure and proceed to cut the number down even further. I replied that this would be in the lap of the gods. But if we made a decision to sell aircraft, a number like 45 did not seem to me unreasonable. I stressed, however, that we might prefer to meet initially only the conditional commitment I had been authorized to make last March, i.e. 24 aircraft on this sale; in this case I saw a possibility that we would agree to Israel’s coming back the following year for an additional tranche of the same size (in saying this I had in mind that State/Defense are recommending we sell 36 interceptors to Jordan, though I favor only 24. If we do sell 36 we will be totally unable to hold the Israelis to less than 48 or so). I again emphasized to Evron that I was discussing this matter with them privately and wholly ad referendum, in an effort to create the kind of climate in which a US sale might just become possible. As he knew, however, it would still be an uphill fight. So if Israel was eager for planes, an approach along the lines I suggested would at least increase the prospects of success. I also told him that the President had agreed to see Abba Eban. He was delighted. I urged that if the appointment was on the record Eban be most careful not to contribute to our difficulties, but say to the press afterwards that aid to Egypt or Israel’s arms need had not been discussed. The visit should be billed as purely a courtesy call at which no requests were made by him. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a January 25 memorandum from Komer to Bundy that states, “Our side exercise to bring the Israelis in line seems to be going well.” 2 Komer’s memorandum to Bundy cited in footnote 1 above states that if his approach to Evron on plane terms worked, “we’ll in effect have pre-negotiated the conditions of sale, a much better way to do business than the pain and strain of last year.” Bundy wrote in the margin, “Good work.” 265. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 265. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 27, 1966. SUBJECT Proposed Sale of U.S. Supersonic Aircraft to Jordan and Israel In connection with the memorandum to you and the Secretary of Defense on the scale of U.S. supersonic aircraft to Jordan and Israel, 2 I am in general in agreement with the views expressed in the AID dissenting memorandum, 3 particularly with respect to blackmail by Jordan. I understand that nearly all concerned within the Government are unhappy about the proposed course of action, even those who are supporting it. It is, of course, also unnecessary to point out the charge of inconsistency that could be levelled at the United States in the event of public disclosure of the aircraft sales in the light of the seventh point (regarding regional arms races) in the President’s message to the ENDC. My preference, and I am sure this view is shared by Bill Foster, would be for the United States to make further effort to hold the line on Near Eastern arms., for I do not believe a convincing case has been made by Israel or Jordan. Should, however, it not prove possible for us to forego the implementation of the recommendations in the memorandum, ACDA strongly supports the recommendation that we make a concurrent approach at the highest level to the Soviet Union, urging that a joint effort be made to halt the spiral in the Near East. I would also urge that, concurrent with approval of the memorandum, you direct the interested agencies and bureaus to develop on an urgent basis a proposed U.S. program of action with respect to arms limitation in the Near East. For various reasons past efforts to develop a program have languished and come to naught. If we must go ahead with the present sale, we should make sure that the time we buy is used to better effect in the future. Adrian S. Fisher 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. 2 Reference is apparently to a January 17 memorandum from Hare and Hoopes to Rusk and McNamara, enclosing the draft memorandum to the President ( Document 262 ) and recommending that they sign it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) 3 Attached to the January 17 memorandum cited in footnote 2 above, but not printed. 266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, February 7, 1966, 7 p.m. 1890. Eban-Sisco meeting. Following main points of discussion of refugee issue between Formin Eban and Asst Secty Sisco: 1. Sisco noted US concern over refugee debate, pointing out signs of diminishing support for US and Israeli positions, citing restiveness of contributors, and stating we foresee even more difficult problems this year than last. He expressed opinion ways must be found to firm up support for weakening positions. 2. Eban expressed appreciation for US effort last year and agreed experience should be warning to us. He suggested earlier planning and said GOI task force will meet in February, develop its ideas by March, and would wish to confer with Dept in spring. Early planning especially necessary, he said, to allow time for full diplomatic efforts with other governments. 3. Ideally in future, Eban said, GA should approach question on reasonable basis, disposing of budgetary and other technical matters without rehearsing over again in familiar terms whole political situation. Only way to achieve this is to make debate less attractive to Arabs. He cited Arab-Israel border situation and declared that since Arabs have learned they cannot have own way they have stopped making trouble. He implied that similar measures in UN could halt refugee debate. 4. Eban also suggested PCC should “intensify” its efforts, not by attempting any new initiatives, but simply by going through motions and reporting that views of two sides far apart. 5. Sisco agreed it useful try to de-politicize refugee item and if possible omit it entirely from proceedings, but doubted this feasible. He then went on to note issue at GA depends greatly on what goes on in area, and asked if there not something Israel could do which would not only help refugee problem, but also have favorable impact on debate. He cited various ideas: Israeli contributions to UNRWA; broader family reunion plan; and especially compensation plan. 6. Eban said Israeli efforts such as agreeing to separate refugee question from overall settlement and un-blocking bank accounts had drawn no response from Arabs, but admitted such gestures gave Israel tactical advantage and agreed GOI would have look at suggestion. 7. Sisco noted US concern over Rossides proposal. He expressed our understanding GOI opposition, but noted there not many negative noises against plan when introduced last GA. 8. Eban then insisted strongly that emphasis should not be on what Israel might do to improve position but “what we can all do together” to line up GA behind GOI position. What can US do to hold line or reinforce our position, he asked, and suggested time may have come for USG to state more explicitly its views on resettlement as solution to problem as he claimed US did in early 1950’s. You should get others to say it with you, he said, and added it will be shock, but we must confront Arabs with international opinion. 9. Sisco noted that UN in early 1950’s was very different and much less difficult organization. He agreed however on need for early planning and expressed gratification Israel recognized last GA debate as warning. 10. Eban also expressed gratitude for US position on Nine Points and rectification and Sisco pointed out our friends and Israel’s were very wobbly on this. 11. Eban concluded discussion refugee question by insisting that instead of making our position softer, we should make it harder—on rectification of rolls, on solving 3rd generation problem outside political context (i.e., without going into juridical status of refugees), etc. Sisco noted GOI should work on “all our friends—not just Africans.” Comment: We unable discern any indication Eban any more flexible on refugee issue than predecessor. Nor did we get impression GOI will take very sympathetic look at possible gestures it might make either to improve basic problem or its own image. But discussion served very useful function of making clear to new Formin that while we continue to be sympathetic to GOI problem and wish continue work with Israel USG influence at GA not unlimited on this issue and GOI must take lead own defense. We intend to continue to take this line as set by Amb Goldberg in NY. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Brown and Symmes, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Tel Aviv and pouched to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Ottawa, Paris, Ankara, and Jerusalem. 267. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 267. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 8, 1966, 11:30 a.m. Planes for Israel and Jordan . We’ve held off the meeting you wanted till the agencies could sort out this key matter first. As you know, we’ve stalled Jordan from buying cut-rate MIGs for almost two years now, and stalled the Israelis too for over a year. But King Hussein now pleads that he can’t hold off Arab pressures any longer; he may cave momentarily and buy MIGs. Israel is also getting hot under the collar. So we’ve finally reached the point where we have to fish or cut bait. There is no good solution, only another painful choice among evils. McNamara and most of the key State people, as well as Bundy and I, have come reluctantly to conclude that controlled sales best serve the US interest. However, Secretary Rusk quite rightly worries lest we’re accused of fuelling both sides of an arms race. He wants a discussion before you first. I. The Argument Against . At first glance, we’d all concede that the US should not get further enmeshed in another dilemma of selling arms to both sides. Much better to get the Soviets and other suppliers to agree that none of us will fuel an Arab/Israeli arms race. More to the point of US domestic criticism, how can the US keep selling arms to Arabs who are sworn to do in Israel? Given the way the United Arab Command is calling for a joint anti-Israeli buildup, it looks as though this is precisely what we’re doing. This is the gist of the heavy Congressional—73 Congressmen just wrote Rusk—mail we’ve been getting (though what they are really saying is that if we sell to Arabs why won’t we sell to Israel too?). II. The Facts of Life. In reality, do we have any better option than to back our friends—Arab as well as Israeli—if we are to prevent a blowup in the Near East? We have managed to prevent one ever since Suez by doing just that, however superficially foolish it may seem. A. We didn’t start the Near East competition —Soviets did. And they’ve been forcing the pace ever since. Since 1955, Moscow has shipped almost $2 billion in cut-rate arms to the UAR, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen . We and our European friends have been forced to respond by providing some deterrent capability to Israel and friendly Arabs, lest they become highly vulnerable. It is generally arms imbalances (not balances) which most directly lead to trouble. B. Isn’t arms control a better solution? Amen. The US/UK have tried for years to get a Soviet response. But the USSR sees much more advantage in using its arms surplus to gain influence with the Arab nationalists and to undermine the US/UK position. When Rusk again raised the question with Gromyko this October, we were again ignored. We’ve also been at Nasser and Israel, arguing against the senseless waste of resources, but haven’t gotten to first base. Over time we may be able to reach some at least tacit understandings, but this will depend largely on our first convincing the Soviets and UAR that they will not be allowed to create an arms imbalance in the Near East. C. So maintaining an arms balance may be the best way of moving toward arms controls, and of forestalling trouble in the meantime . The Saudis really want arms, not against Israel, but to protect themselves against Nasser over Yemen. Tiny Jordan knows that it would be suicide to attack Israel, but Hussein (2/3 of whose people are Palestinians) must appear to them as a good Arab and keep his army happy (it’s his base of power). We have no independent stake in Jordan; it has no oil or bases. The main reason why we’ve spent some $500 million to keep Jordan independent is to prevent the closing of a hostile Arab ring around Israel. The Israelis themselves recognize that our subsidizing King Hussein is worth its weight in gold to them, and play up US arms sales to Arabs mainly to get us to sell to Israel as well. III. Should the US now sell combat planes to Israel? We’ve come a long way over the past four years toward becoming one of Israel’s arms suppliers, and the net effect has been to help stabilize the area, without creating as much Arab backlash as we’d feared. Indeed, it is remarkable that we’ve managed all these years to be Israel’s chief backer, without it costing us our influence in the Arab world. This has been no mean trick, and is still feasible if we don’t get spooked by Arab, Israeli, or uninformed US Zionist criticism. From 1948–61 we managed to avoid becoming a major arms supplier by indirectly subsidizing Israeli purchases in Europe. But the drying up of Israel’s regular European sources (they just don’t produce the right items any more—and Bonn opted out entirely) forced us to become direct suppliers —first Hawks and then tanks. Since our own deep commitment to Israel’s security would almost force us to intervene if there were another major Arab-Israeli flareup, it is in our interest to help Israel maintain a sufficient deterrent edge to warn off Nasser and other eager beavers. And the more secure Israel feels, the less likely it is to strike first, as at Suez. So maintaining a reasonable Arab/Israeli arms balance helps limit the chances of our being drawn into a Near East crisis. A. But does Israel really need US planes? Not as much as it did tanks, but it has a good case. Soviet MIGs and bombers are still flowing to the UAR and Syria. We committed ourselves last year to help out with “up to 24 combat aircraft”, if they were not available in Europe. If we want to be legalistic, we can argue that French Mirage interceptors are unavailable, but the Israelis want and can best use an intruder-type. B. Will selling planes to Israel spook the Arabs? Our Arab experts so warned before we sold Hawks in 1962, then again before we sold tanks. But actual experience shows far less reaction than we feared. Unless revealing the tank deal creates unforeseen Arab troubles, it’s a good bet that quiet, limited aircraft supply to Israel will not upset our applecart in the Arab world. C. Can we use planes as a lever to keep Israel from going nuclear? Desperation is what would most likely drive Israel to this choice, should it come to feel that the conventional balance was turning against it. So judicious US arms supply, aimed at maintaining a deterrent balance, is as good an inhibitor as we’ve got. D. In the last analysis, can we avoid selling planes to Israel sooner or later? Given continued Soviet shipments to the UAR and Syria—which are Israel’s real worry—Hill and other pressure is growing to the point where we probably won’t have a defensible case much longer. We could argue that we won’t sell planes to either Israel or the Arabs, but does this stand up when (1) the Soviets keep shovelling arms to the wrong Arabs; (2) we’ve already sold Israel tanks and missiles so why not planes; and (3) it is our friends, not our enemies who will suffer if we refuse to sell arms. Moreover, the more Hill and Zionist criticism we get, the more it interferes with our ability to carry out a sensible Arab policy. So if we’re going to be badgered into selling planes anyway sooner or later, we can gain more and will risk less by doing so now when we can drive a hard bargain. IV. Should we sell to Jordan too? If we refuse planes to Israel, we can’t get away with Jordan sales without a storm of domestic US protest. But if we deny Hussein’s request he may feel compelled to risk our wrath by caving to UAC demands that he buy MIGs (in which case the Israelis would have an additional powerful argument for getting us to sell them planes). The only way to stop him would be to tell him flatly that if he bought Soviet planes we’d cut off his annual $50 million subsidy. Some of us think Hussein would back down. But should we take the risk? Hussein’s ability to stay on his uneasy throne depends critically on his not appearing to be a US or Israeli stooge (his grandfather was assassinated for this reason). We’ve already stalled Hussein to the point of no return—in his judgment and that of our Ambassador. Jordan’s independence is important enough to us, and to Israel, that we should not risk jeopardizing it short of over-riding reasons. Thus there is a compelling case for selling planes to Jordan as well as Israel. In fact, the basic rationale is to protect Israel itself. Entry of Soviet arms into Jordan would start a trend which could seriously upset the Arab-Israeli arms balance, and put us under great Israeli pressure. As with tanks last year, if we sell to one the same logic suggests we sell to both. Otherwise, it’s hard to avoid an even worse box. V. Conclusions . In sum, painful as it is, there seems no better option than minimum, carefully controlled plane sales to both. Selling to neither is not a real option if the facts of life will probably force us to sell to Israel sooner or later. So there’s advantage in doing so now when we can get Israel to acquiesce in our helping Jordan too. The one real issue is whether such sales would over-expose us to criticism for “fuelling both sides of an arms race”. But most of this heat (especially on the Hill) is from those who really object to our arming only Arabs and not Israelis. We might be able to cope with this problem by requiring the Israelis themselves quietly to warn off their Hill lobbyists. This wouldn’t be foolproof, but should reduce the flak to tolerable limits. To meet the argument that we ought to be promoting arms control instead of arms races, we could refer to our frequent efforts to do just this—and protect our flank by yet another Soviet probe (via Dobrynin). However, none of your Sovietologists believe the Soviets will bite. If we decide to sell Israel aircraft, we can only get what we want in return by providing a low-level intruder. There’s no point in offering an interceptor if Israel doesn’t want one (and could buy from France if it did). It wants the fancy A–6 (at least $62 million for 24 stripped down versions), but we could probably get it to settle for the smaller, cheaper A–4E (around $24 million for same number). VI. Recommendations . Offer Israel now (on the same MAP credit terms as tanks) up to 24 intruder-type aircraft, with an option to purchase 24 more next year, provided that Israel will in return: (1) continue buying most of its aircraft in Europe so we don’t become prime supplier—thus outraging the Arabs; (2) actively, if quietly, support controlled US arms sales to Jordan as being in Israel’s interest just as much as ours; (3) not use our aircraft as nuclear weapons carriers; (4) maintain full secrecy till we decide when and how to publicize all such arms deals. Offer Jordan up to 36 F–104 A/B’s (a secondhand interceptor) or F–5s in increments of 12 per year delivered beginning in 1968 for cash on the line, if Jordan will in return: (1) purchase no Soviet equipment of any kind; (2) keep the deal secret till we decide to publicize; (3) keep mum about US sales to Israel; (4) renew its undertaking not to increase its own arms budget at the expense of our own budget support program. Despite the length of this memo, it still doesn’t cover all the ins and outs of such a tricky and complex matter. So it is well worth a half hour’s discussion with your key advisers—hopefully as soon as feasible. We may have held off Hussein well past the zero hour from doing something foolish which could compromise our whole Arab/Israeli policy. R. W. Komer 2 Meet this week Talk with me 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a February 10 memorandum from Komer to the President, which notes that it is a copy of a memorandum sent to him previously. Komer’s February 10 memorandum suggests three agenda items for a meeting the next day on Israel-Jordan: jets for Israel and Jordan, economic aid for Israel, and a desalting plant for Israel. A notation on it in Johnson’s handwriting reads, “Put on my desk. L.” 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 3 Neither option is checked. 268. Memorandum for the Record 268. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, February 9, 1966. SUBJECT President’s Talk with Israeli Foreign Minister Eban PRESENT The President Foreign Minister Eban Ambassador Harman Mr. Komer The President warmly congratulated Eban on his assumption of the Foreign Ministry. He recalled their friendly association when Eban was Ambassador in Washington, and looked forward to a close future relationship. The President then discussed at length our current position on Vietnam in the light of the Honolulu meeting. He made clear that in helping the GVN we were showing how we would live up to our commitments to small countries as well as large. Israel would rightly be the first to be frightened if the U.S. were to “cut and run in Vietnam.” Eban strongly agreed, saying that small states like Israel had an obligation to stay strong and stable enough that they would not become Vietnams, and thus create special problems for the United States. He went on to say that if it were not for Israel’s security problem—created primarily by Soviet arms—Israel would no longer need U.S. aid. Because of its special situation, however, Israel still hoped it could rely on the United States. Eban then raised Israel’s current concerns over aircraft, 1966 economic and food assistance, and the desalting matter. He hoped that some of these matters would come to a head soon. He emphasized that Israel would still place the bulk of its arms orders in Europe. But sometimes it had needs which the Europeans could not meet, as in the case of intruder-type aircraft. Israel needed about 45 of these. In asking for them, Israel was not “changing gears” and trying to make the U.S. its chief arms or plane supplier. On economic aid, Eban cited Israel’s pride in its economic progress; it only needed aid because of its security burden. He noted that all this aid was on a loan basis. As to desalting, Eban reminded the President of the latter’s own great interest in the matter. However, all that Israel was suggesting for the moment was the procedural step of appointing one high-level official from each Government to look at the tricky financial problems of how to finance the nuclear desalting plant. The President assured Eban that we would try to evolve something satisfactory on these scores. He wanted to do everything he reasonably could for Israel. In fact we didn’t even want to subsidize Jordan, except that this helped Israel. We had no desire to be arms salesman to Israel either, but he didn’t want the Israelis to feel insecure. It might be that a balance of arms was after all the best way to avoid unrest in the area. We would also look at economic aid. The President added that he was as anxious as the Israelis on the desalting matter. However, he had been up to his ears on Vietnam and with the new Congress. He would try, nonetheless, to come up with specifics shortly. The President concluded by telling Eban that he looked forward to very close relations with him personally, and with Israel. He wanted to do everything he could, consistent with our national interest. “Let’s deal frankly and freely with each other on top of the table” and keep from batting issues around in the newspapers. He added that we always seemed to have a problem with well-meaning friends of Israel who attempted to help our relations along. He asked Eban to tell them “to stop coming in the back door, or writing, or sending telegrams, or talking to the newspapers.” We and the Israeli Government together could handle these matters. The President said he had great confidence in Prime Minister Eshkol and saw nothing that was going to disturb our relations. Eban replied that his Prime Minister had had complete trust in the President ever since their meeting in June 1964; he heartily reciprocated the President’s sentiments. The President then took the Foreign Minister out to be photographed by the press. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 11:15 to 11:35 a.m. at the White House. Evron was also present. (Ibid.) 269. Memorandum of Conversation 269. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 9, 1966, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Nuclear Proliferation PARTICIPANTS Foreign Minister Abba Eban of Israel Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel Minister Ephraim Evron of Israel The Secretary Under Secretary Ball NEA—Ambassador Raymond Hare NE—David L. Gamon After telling Foreign Minister Eban that the President wanted to reach an early decision on Israel’s aircraft and economic aid requests, the Secretary said that the only major question that could have a disastrous effect on U.S.-Israeli relations was Israel’s attitude on proliferation. Israel was apparently following a policy designed to create ambiguity in the Arab world. This also created ambiguity in Washington. Israel should expect the U.S. to be extremely clear and utterly harsh on the matter of non-proliferation. He urged the Foreign Minister not to underestimate the total involvement of U.S.-Israel relations in this matter. Mr. Eban said he understood the importance of this question and that the two countries need not fall apart on this. The Government of Israel stood by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s undertaking in 1961 for periodic visits. The subject had become much more difficult over the last year because of publicity and because Israel had undertaken to accept these visits without full consultation of Parliament. There were delicate but not insuperable internal domestic complications involved. Censorship with a questionable legal basis had been imposed to prevent discussion on the merits of U.S. visits. A full parliamentary debate on the matter had been asked by an opposition party. This could probably be avoided. The alternatives were to have a secret visit or one after the matter had been discussed with the various political parties. With regard to IAEA safeguards, Israel preferred a bilateral arrangement because of the increasingly weak position of Israel in the IAEA and the growing strength of the Arabs in that body. The Foreign Minister said that his Government attached full weight to the undertaking given to Governor Harriman that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israel area. The Secretary observed that this undertaking might not prevent the development of a precarious situation somewhat akin to eight months of pregnancy. He stressed that the U.S. could not be silent on its attitude toward proliferation. With regard to visits, he said that the request for secrecy assurances would have to be looked into. What he was interested in was something that would serve as a public assurance. Private assurances were of limited value. The Foreign Minister said that as soon as he got back to Israel he would help in lobbying for a U.S. visit and would also turn his attention to the matter of IAEA safeguards. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Gamon on February 12 and approved in S on February 15. The memorandum is Part II of IV. 270. Memorandum for Record 270. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, February 11, 1966, 11:46 a.m.–1:12 p.m. SUBJECT President’s Meeting on Israel/Jordan Matters PRESENT The President Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara Secretary Vance Director Bell Ambassador Hare Mr. Komer 1. Plane Sales to Israel/Jordan . Secretary Rusk described the proposal being recommended, i.e., sale of 48 aircraft to Israel. He saw dangers even in selling the A–4E, but much stronger political as well as military arguments against selling the A–6 which the Israelis now wanted. There was also the nuclear angle. At the same time, it was proposed that we offer Jordan 36 F–104s or F–5s. Secretary McNamara felt that we could not even consider the A–6. It was an extremely complicated aircraft, and the bugs hadn’t even been worked out yet. We had only one squadron. There were security problems with its electronics. Its price was four times as expensive as the A–4E. There was a shortage in our own supply for Vietnam. Selling the A–6 would also inflame the Middle East arms race, in particular scaring the Arabs about Israeli nuclear capabilities, since it was designed as a nuclear weapons carrier. The President asked Secretary McNamara to take on the job of dealing with the Israelis on this matter. He noted the pressure he was under from the Congress on Israeli matters. He had already had to talk with twelve Congressmen, plus Foreign Minister Eban. So McNamara should call Eban back here and tell him we couldn’t possibly sell A–6s, for the reasons McNamara had given. McNamara should find out if Israel was willing to have us sell to Jordan. He should tell the Israelis that we would sell them “X” aircraft and give them “X” dollars in aid if they would sew up everyone in Congress to keep quiet about our Jordan and Israeli sales. McNamara should say that our proposition was a final one; all the pressure in the world would not change it. 2. After a brief discussion of economic aid to Israel, the President agreed that perhaps it was better to hold off telling the Israelis how much economic aid we could give in 1966 until we settle the plane matter. 3. On desalting , Bell and McNamara suggested that we should not help the Israelis on any plant that was uneconomic. We should help out with loans at the normal rate for the investment required, but there should be no subsidies. As to the Israeli proposal for creating a two-man committee, the President agreed that we should work out first what we could do financially on the project before we agreed to set up such a committee. Here follows discussion of unrelated matters. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Daily Diary, which also lists McNaughton and Hoopes among those present. (Ibid.) The memorandum is dated February 12. 271. Memorandum of Conversation 271. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 12, 1966. I–35235/66 SUBJECT Meeting Between Secretary McNamara and Israeli Foreign Minister Eban on Saturday, February 12, 1966 ISRAELI PARTICIPANTS Foreign Minister Eban Ambassador Harman Colonel Ron U.S. PARTICIPANTS Secretary McNamara DASD/ISA Townsend Hoopes After the usual amenities, the Secretary opened the meeting by saying the US is operating in the Middle East “on very slender margins” and that there are accordingly several things we definitely cannot do: (1) we cannot be a major arms supplier to Israel or any Arab country; (2) we cannot sell to any country a sophisticated airplane like the A–6; and (3) we cannot sell supersonics of any kind to Jordan unless Israel concurs in the sale and effectively supports it among its friends in the United States, both in and outside of Congress. He stressed the point that, in the absence of Israeli concurrence and support, the US would not sell aircraft to Jordan. The Secretary said that, if Israel can meet that basic condition and certain others, the US is prepared to sell Israel 24 A–4Es and to give it an option to buy an additional 24, either now or later. The Secretary said the cost of such airplanes would be approximately $26 million for 24 and that credit terms would be the same as those which governed the Hawk purchase (10% down; 3–1/2% interest; and a 10-year repayment). He said that four additional conditions would attach to our willingness to make this sale: (1) that Israel agree to continue to look to Europe for the bulk of its aircraft requirements and not regard the US as a major arms supplier; (2) that Israel reiterate its undertaking not to be the first power in the Middle East to manufacture nuclear weapons, and its acceptance of periodic inspection of Dimona; (3) that Israel agree not to use any US-supplied aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier; and (4) that Israel agree to full secrecy on all matters until the USG decides when and how to publicize. Mr. Eban said he could respond immediately to certain of the conditions, but would have to consult his Government on others. He agreed fully that Israel should not ask the US to be a major supplier of arms; indeed he had encountered an “obverse problem” in Paris, where the French had expressed concern that Israel might be turning to the United States as its major supplier of aircraft. He said that Israel desires to maintain its French link. He said that Israel does not intend to build nuclear weapons, “so we will not use your aircraft to carry weapons we haven’t got and hope we will never have.” Regarding Israeli acquiescence in and support of the proposed US sale to Jordan, he asked what this would mean in terms of action by Israel. He said that public statements approving a Jordanian sale would be difficult; on the other hand, if either there were no publicity about either sale, or equal publicity about both, he was reasonably sanguine that Israel could accept and privately support a Jordan sale. Secretary McNamara said the US had received unwarranted pressure from Israeli supporters on the tank arrangements, and did not want a repetition of this. He said Israeli acquiescence is the crux of the US sale to Jordan, and we would have to have assurances that the Government of Israel would prevent its American friends, both in and outside of Congress, from making emotional charges. Mr. Eban turned to Ambassador Harman to ask what arrangements had governed the tank deal (March 1965). Ambassador Harman said that, at the conclusion of US-Israeli negotiations in Tel Aviv, he was instructed to inform “a limited number of Israeli friends in the US” of Israel’s acquiescence in the sale of US tanks to Jordan. He explained that the trouble came only when the sale of tanks to Jordan was inadvertently disclosed through an official American publication. Because the Israeli sale was not similarly disclosed, there resulted a disparity in public knowledge which made it difficult to restrain Israeli supporters in this country. Mr. Eban said once more that if the publicity or non-publicity were symmetrical, he would see no serious problems about Israeli acquiescence. He went on to say that, on technical and military grounds, Israel had concluded that the two tank deals produced a good net result for Israel. He could not say whether 48 A–4Es as against 36 F–104s would add up to a similar net benefit for Israel, but he would like to put that question to his Government. He continued that Israel had wanted the A–6 because of its far greater range, and he spoke of the vulnerability of the Israeli Air Force owing to its limited number of airfields. The Secretary said that in this age every air force is partly vulnerable, and that total security from surprise attack is not attainable. Colonel Ron said the Israeli Air Force desires the A–6 because it can carry three times the bomb load of the A–4. He added that the A–4 was, after all, an unsophisticated airplane and would be more so by 1970. Mr. Hoopes interjected that General Weizman last October argued at great length that he wanted the A–4 precisely because it was unsophisticated. The Secretary said he understood the A–4 had been the primary object of the Israeli efforts. The Secretary said that the United States needs a prompt answer to its offer. He said that Israel can, if it likes, defer a decision on the second 24 aircraft, or take all 48 at one time. Mr. Eban asked what the delivery dates would be if the original order were for 48. The Secretary said he would have to examine this question, but that the first 24 could be delivered in calendar 1968, with the balance perhaps in 1969 or 1970. Mr. Eban asked what the terms of the Jordan sale would be; the Secretary replied “cash on the barrelhead.” Ambassador Harman asked about proposed deliveries of the F–104s to Jordan. The Secretary said this would be slower, in the 1968–71 time frame, and would depend on the availability of UAC cash. Mr. Eban said he would have the details of the meeting cabled to his Government at once, and that he would see his Prime Minister on Thursday (17 February). Discussion was then concluded on the aircraft question, and there ensued a short informal discussion of the situation in Vietnam. The meeting was convened at approximately 4:40 p.m. and was terminated at 5:10 p.m. Townsend Hoopes Deputy Assistant Secretary 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hoopes on February 15. Copies were sent to, among others, Rusk, McNamara, General Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy, Komer, and McNaughton. Briefing material prepared for the meeting is filed with a February 12 memorandum from Hoopes to McNamara. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452) 272. Memorandum of Conversation 272. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 17, 1966. SUBJECT Arab/Israeli Arms Supply PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State I lunched with the Soviet Ambassador today at his invitation. In the course of the conversation, I said that as he probably knew, the United States had followed a policy of not becoming a major supplier of arms to Israel and the Arab countries. I said, however, that we were under constant pressure to furnish or sell arms to the countries of this area and I said that speaking quite frankly the Soviet supply of arms, particularly to the UAR, added to our problem. I said I supposed it was impossible to shut off the sale of arms completely to any area in the world, but we had been wondering, in our Government, whether or not it would be possible to at least hold down the arms race in the Middle East by some understanding between the arms supplying countries to limit the sale of arms on a qualitative basis. I suggested, for example, that it might be possible to agree not to sell supersonic planes or rockets to the countries of this area. I said I thought that the Secretary had raised this matter with Mr. Gromyko last autumn. Dobrynin said that he recalled this conversation but that not much had come of it. On the question of rockets, he said he understood that we had furnished some Hawk missiles to Israel or to some other country in the area. I said I was not sure, but thought this was possible. However, I pointed out that I was thinking of surface-to-surface missiles and not surface-to-air. Dobrynin asked if I had intended that he take this matter up with his Government. I said I did and that what I was saying was a very informal probe to see whether or not there was any interest on the part of the Soviet Union. Dobrynin asked what about other countries and inquired specifically if we had discussed this with the French or British. I said that I did not think there had been any specific discussion, although our general position on the sale of arms was well known. I said I thought that there was little point in pursuing it with other governments unless the Soviet Union was interested, but that if such an arrangement were worked out, it would have to cover the principal suppliers of arms. I thought that if the more important countries agreed, there would be little difficulty with smaller countries, such as Sweden or Switzerland. Dobrynin said that he would inform his Government. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 UAR. Secret. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL on February 17. A February 14 memorandum from Komer to the President requested his approval for a low-key probe to see if the Soviets were interested in a freeze on arms shipments to the Middle East. The memorandum states that Rusk proposed this as part of the Israel-Jordan aircraft package and that none of the President’s advisers thought the Soviets would be receptive but thought it would be useful for the record. Johnson approved. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 20) 273. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 273. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 22, 1966, 6 p.m. Our tactic of sicking McNamara on the Israelis seems to have worked. I got Eban down here on the 12th and McNamara dusted him off in twenty no-nonsense minutes. As predicted, the Israelis have come back essentially settling for our terms. 2 They’ve added enough oral caveats, however, that we think we’ll insist on the terms in writing. In short, we’ll sell Israel 48 A4Es (about $50 million), and they will undertake in return to: (1) quietly support our sale of 36 secondhand F–104s to Jordan; (2) reaffirm their promises not to go nuclear unless others do; (3) keep the whole matter quiet until we decide how to publicize it; and (4) not bother us any further on planes for the next several years. Meanwhile King Hussein has replied to your oral message 3 asking him to sit tight for a few more weeks. He again appeals for help, saying that otherwise when the Arab leaders meet on 14 March he’ll have to give in and take MIGs. King Feisal is also in, appealing that you help out Hussein. We are now able to get Hussein off the hook by offering him the secondhand F–104s in three increments of 12 a year beginning in 1968. We’ll charge cash (it should net us about $50 million too) because the oil-rich Arabs are footing the bill. Once we are satisfied with the Israeli commitments, may we go ahead with the Jordan sale? We’ll get some criticism, no matter what we do, but in my judgement, the risk is now less one of Zionist complaints (though we’ll get some) than of the Arabs doing something foolish. If we play our hand skillfully, however, we believe we can handle this. R. W. Komer Approve See me 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. 5. Secret. 2 A memorandum of the February 19 conversation between Harman and Hoopes is attached to a February 21 memorandum from Hoopes to Hare and Komer. (Ibid., Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security, Arms/Aircraft, 1966) 3 Johnson’s oral message was transmitted in telegram 379 to Amman, February 14. It assured the King that it remained U.S. policy to “support the integrity and progress of Jordan to the fullest extent” but that Jordan’s request for supersonic aircraft raised grave problems for the United States. It stated that Johnson had asked for an urgent and searching re-examination of how the problem could best be met. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN) The text of the King’s oral response was transmitted in telegram 496 from Amman, February 17. (Ibid.) 4 This option is checked. The President indicated his approval on a February 25 memorandum from Komer to the President, filed with this memorandum, which states that the Departments of State and Defense believed it urgent to move promptly on the sale to Jordan. 274. Memorandum of Conversation 274. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 23, 1966, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT U.S.-U.A.R. Relations; Yemen PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Anwar al-Sadat, President of the U.A.R. National Assembly His Excellency Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the U.A.R. His Excellency Ahmad Hassan al-Feqi, Under Secretary, U.A.R. Foreign Ministry The President Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary, NEA Michael Sterner, Escort Officer In reply to the President’s warm greeting, Sadat expressed his deep appreciation for the reception he had received from all quarters since his arrival. He said he had a message from President Nasser to President Johnson which he wished to read. (Text attached.) 2 The President thanked Mr. Sadat for President Nasser’s message and promised that he would send an appropriate reply. The President said he had been encouraged by indication of a more mature understanding of the problems between our two countries. A lot of these difficulties were public relations problems. The President said he knew some of the public relations problems that Mr. Sadat’s government faced. By the same token he hoped the leaders of the U.A.R. could occasionally put themselves in his shoes. He was in a goldfish bowl being watched by 200 million people. That was the character of American democracy. He was now asking Congress to provide him with the wherewithal for a foreign aid program which he considered very important. He hoped Mr. Sadat would appreciate that he wouldn’t stand much of a chance getting that money if he started calling Congressmen names at the very time he was urging them to pass the bill. The President thought the foreign aid bill would pass, but it would take a lot of trouble. By all rights the President thought U.S.-U.A.R. relations should be of the best. The U.S. has contributed more than $1 billion of aid to the U.A.R. over the years. We wouldn’t have given the U.A.R. that much money if we hadn’t been deeply interested in the welfare and security of that country. Yet in spite of this there were bad moments between us. Differences were perhaps inevitable in the affairs of two independent countries, but they didn’t have to be compounded by public relations problems. Whatever difficulties we faced the President hoped they could be discussed quietly among ourselves and not announced to the public over loudspeakers. The President said he faced many public relations problems within the U.S. itself. People were always saying hard things about him and always hoping he would react, but he rarely gave them that pleasure. The President expressed his admiration and personal liking for Ambassador Kamel. “When your government has something to say to us, you just tell Ambassador Kamel to put on his hat and come on down here. Let’s not talk about it in public.” The President said he wished to comment on a few specific aspects of U.S.-U.A.R. relations. He was most appreciative of the U.A.R.’s efforts to be helpful on Vietnam. He had had a first-hand report about this from Governor Harriman. 3 He wanted Mr. Sadat’s government to understand exactly what our position was there. We wanted peace, but we weren’t going to allow the other side to take over South Vietnam. We were not as alarmist as the Egyptians on the subject of possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel. We were watching the situation closely. The U.S. would be against such a development because of our firm policy against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We hoped there was still a chance for a settlement in Yemen. We had been sorry to see that recently there was some slowdown in the progress that was being made last summer. Couldn’t both the Egyptians and Saudis get together and talk about their difficulties? Ambassador Hare said we had been urging just this on both the Egyptians and Saudis for some time. The President asked Ambassador Hare to look into anything further the U.S.G. could do along these lines. President Johnson said that the U.S.G. was impressed by the self-help measures the U.A.R. Government had recently adopted. We hoped this trend would continue. In summary, the President said we thought there was a sound basis for excellent relations between the U.S. and the U.A.R. The U.A.R. could depend on the U.S. doing its part. He repeated that he personally was grateful for the U.A.R.’s good offices on Vietnam and asked that Mr. Sadat convey his very best regards to President Nasser. Mr. Sadat said, first of all, he wished to express the gratitude of his government and his nation for all the help the U.S. had given the U.A.R. More than this, Egyptians were grateful for the special attention President Johnson had personally given to U.S.-U.A.R. relations during periods when he had many other things on his mind. One problem seemed to be worrisome for the U.A.R.G. at the moment—Yemen. Following the Jidda Agreement last year, 4 Nasser had declared that the U.A.R. wanted nothing further out of Yemen and that it was ready to evacuate its forces. Unfortunately, the U.A.R. had been running into some misinterpretations of the Jidda Agreement on the Saudi side. Both before and after the Haradh Conference President Nasser had asked to meet with King Faisal to sort out these differing views. These offers had been evaded with polite rejections. In Mr. Sadat’s opinion, Faisal apparently thought the U.A.R. was desperate and “begging for peace” in Yemen. Mr. Sadat wished there to be no misunderstanding on this point. The U.A.R. was not begging for peace. But it was ready to make every reasonable effort to arrive at a peace that would be honorable for both sides. The U.A.R. could not get out of Yemen without leaving behind some form of viable government. This was what the U.A.R. wanted to talk about with Faisal but in view of his unwillingness to talk the U.A.R. frankly did not know what more it could do. The President asked whether another Nasser-Faisal meeting of the type they had last summer was out of the question. Mr. Sadat indicated this was exactly what his government was trying to bring about. President Johnson repeated his desire for good relations with the U.A.R. as well as his hopes that differences between the two countries could be kept out of the public forum. On the present meeting, he hoped they could just leave it that “mutual problems” had been discussed without any mention of specifics. Both Mr. Sadat and Ambassador Kamel indicated their agreement. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Sterner on February 24 and approved in the White House on March 1. The meeting was held at the White House. 2 The text of the message, undated, is attached but not printed. It introduced Sadat and observed that his visit came at a time of “marked improvement” in U.S.-UAR relations, of which the recent economic agreement was an example. 3 Harriman met with Nasser in Cairo on January 4 in the course of a trip to various capitals for discussions concerning Vietnam. He reported his conversation with Nasser in telegram 1677 from Cairo, January 5. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV) 4 Reference is to an agreement between the UAR and Saudi Arabia signed at Jidda, August 24, 1965. The text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents , 1965, pp. 623–624. 275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, February 23, 1966, 7:13 p.m. 393. Your 504. 2 Syrian Coup. 1. Please convey following at appropriate level: A. We have no evidence Communist involvement February 23 coup. Information available to us indicates coup result of inter-Baath party rivalries growing out of recent governmental changes. B. We would strongly advise against any intervention by Jordan, particularly intervention armed forces. C. We keeping situation under close scrutiny and endorse idea of full exchange of information on continuing basis. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 SYR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Marshall W. Wiley of NEA/NE; cleared by Symmes, Russell, and Davies; and approved by Hare. 2 Telegram 504 from Amman, February 23, reported Barnes’ meeting with King Hussein and Prime Minister Tell about the coup that had taken place that morning in Syria, which, according to Jordanian information, was Communist-oriented. The King told Barnes that either a Communist takeover or civil strife resulting in chaos in Syria would threaten Jordan’s security and might force him to consider limited intervention. (Ibid.) 276. Telegram From the Department State to the Embassy in Jordan 276. Telegram From the Department State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, February 26, 1966, 3:57 p.m. 404. Your 496. 2 1. Request you deliver following oral message to King from President: “After full and careful consideration of the problems you face, I have decided we should make a special effort on a one time basis to meet your request for supersonic defensive aircraft. You are already aware of the many reasons for our reluctance to make this decision. These reasons still exist. Our decision to proceed despite them takes into account the special relationship between our two countries and the extreme pressures that you have felt. The proposals that I have authorized Ambassador Barnes to deliver to you represent a maximum stretching of our policy, and I therefore earnestly hope that you will find them acceptable.” 2. You will receive by separate message further instructions regarding proposal you should present to King. 3 3. If King should remark on absence any reference in President’s oral messages to his complaints about aid program or other sections of his letter, you may state you informed full letter under study and that appropriate responses will be forthcoming. Dept would welcome any comments you have in that connection. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on February 24; cleared by Davies, Colonel Byrd, Meyers, and Komer, in draft by Stoddart, and in substance by Hoopes; and approved by Hare. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 405 to Amman, February 26, conveyed instructions for Barnes’ detailed presentation. It authorized him to offer up to 36 rehabilitated F–104 A/B series supersonic interceptors in three equal increments. If the first increment, for delivery in calendar year 1968, did not create “unmanageable problems,” Jordan would have the option of purchasing 24 additional F–104As or Bs. It also set forth U.S. requirements: Jordan should reconfirm its previous undertaking to make no arms purchases from the Soviet bloc, the delivery of the last 24 aircraft would be keyed to the phase out of Jordanian Hawker Hunters, and Jordan would continue to take all necessary steps to minimize budgetary costs of modernizing its armed forces. The offer was contingent on UAC provision of funds, and no credit would be extended. (Ibid.) 4 Barnes reported in telegram 525 from Amman, March 1, that he had made the presentation to the King. (Ibid.) 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, February 28, 1966, 8:33 p.m. 4851. 1. Following summary based on uncleared memcons FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision upon review. 2. Secretary discussed Near East arms race with President UAR National Assembly Sadat February 25. a. Said US deeply concerned and had tried not become directly or heavily involved. Believed, however, overall area security better served by absence fear resulting from arms imbalance. Wished make informal comments for UAR consideration. 1) Before Vietnam crisis became acute US and USSR were able by “mutual example” turn arms production curve downward. Vietnam, however, forced heavy additional arms expenditures. 2) Could reciprocal restraint serve flatten Near East arms spiral? If not, difficult foresee sane future for Near East. b. Sadat feared little could be done about Near East arms race. He reviewed history past ten years including 1) UAR arms acquisitions to guard against Israeli military attacks which repeatedly followed public professions of peaceful intent, 2) violation of 1950 Tripartite Declaration 2 by Franco-British invasion 1956, and 3) Ben-Gurion statement Sinai integral part Israel. Clearly Israel not to be trusted. Israel now stronger and backed by UK which also untrustworthy. Only assurance for UAR against attack was to be armed to teeth. Small size Israel plus policy encouraging Jewish immigration made expansion inevitable. UAR hated spend scarce foreign exchange on arms, but did not want become nation refugees like Palestine. c. Secretary asked whether fear Israeli expansion or existence Israel that governed UAR attitude. Sadat said both. Secretary observed if former something might be done, if latter not so sure. d. Secretary stressed unalterable US commitment oppose proliferation nuclear weapons. Applied world-wide to all countries. Injection nuclear weapons into Near East arms race would cause US react very harshly. Sadat replied UAR felt equal concern and would be forced launch preventive war if Israel acquired bomb. Secretary hoped for effective preventive measures short of war. e. Secretary confirmed US commitment applied equally to imported or indigenously produced weapons. f. Secretary assured Sadat Israel under no illusions about US stand on nuclear weapons proliferation. Desired widest possible acceptance IAEA safeguards. Sadat said UAR suspected Israel had turned down US try for safeguard for Dimona. While avoiding detailed reply Secretary said he would not take that as conclusion. Sadat said “very good.” g. UAR Under Secretary al-Feqi noted UAR had said at Vienna it would accept safeguards. On other hand French had acknowledged to UAR that Israel with France’s help probably could now produce plutonium on its own. Secretary suggested UAR recheck this since he understood Franco-Israeli agreement for nuclear cooperation provided for no leave-behind nuclear materials. h. Secretary said if USSR were to push idea nuclear free zone in Near East, excluding Turkey, we could see advantages to it. i. In response Secretary’s hope UAR would give intense thought to arms problem, Sadat assured him UAR would never act, only react. Secretary considered this important assurance, but problem was getting Israel to believe it. j. Secretary asked Sadat whether he believed US could ever support Israel in attempt expand its territory. Sadat replied yes, he could under possible future circumstances of poor US–UAR relations. Secretary said inconceivable US would ever support Israeli attempt territorial expansion, but appreciated Sadat’s frankness. k. Secretary described UAR economic reforms as best means achieve respect necessary for UAR play leading international role commensurate its potential. This objective posed no problems for US–UAR relations. Sadat interjected Israel only real problem. Might not be solved this generation, but time had also solved problem 80-year Crusader occupation Egypt. l. Secretary cautioned about US public sensitivity. President Johnson believed deeply leaders of states interested improving relations should not engage in polemics. Secretary assured Sadat President Johnson would not allow him make speeches attacking President Nasser. Sadat smiling said he understood. 3. UAR Ambassador Kamel reporting foregoing to Cairo as well as other Sadat conversations with senior US officials. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 NEAR E. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. 2 The text of the Tripartite Declaration, a statement issued by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on May 25, 1950, is printed in Department of State Bulletin , June 5, 1950, p. 886, and in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents , Vol. II, p. 2237. 278. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 278. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, March 4, 1966, 10:08 p.m. 1677. 1. As routine matter Department planning deliver two circular diplomatic notes to Syrian Charge d’Affaires here on March 7. 2. Such conduct of formal diplomatic business normally implies that sending Government recognizes Government of addressee. 3. Department on February 26, 1966, was handed note from Syrian Charge 2 stating in effect a) present Syrian government considers itself legitimate successor past Baath governments and b) therefore no further recognition necessary from friendly states. 4. Given origin, uncertain nature and cloudy future of present SARG, we see merit in avoiding situations which would require us either give special signal of support or indicate non-recognition of new government. Therefore seems in our best interest quietly accept Syrian government’s thesis that no new declaration of recognition required. Routine delivery of diplomatic notes in question is consistent with this approach in that it will signify without highlighting our continued recognition of SARG. 5. Embassy Damascus should not take initiative discuss recognition question with Syrian officials but if latter raise matter after delivery of notes, Embassy officers may in low key cite this action as indication we are continuing normal diplomatic relations. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 16 SYR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., and John T. Wheelock of NE; cleared by Symms, Wehmeyer, and Morris J. Amitay of EUR; and approved by Hare. Sent for action to Damascus and repeated to Beirut, Amman, Jidda, Taiz, Baghdad, Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Kuwait. 2 The note is ibid., POL 15 SYR. 279. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 279. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, March 9, 1966, 12:47 p.m. 1709. 1. Moroccan Ambassador called on Secretary March 7 and inquired about arms situation in Near East. Expressed particular interest in facts behind recent stories of US deliveries to Israel, explaining his Government wished exert traditional moderating influence during forthcoming Cairo FonMin meeting. 2. Secretary reviewed US Near East arms policy as set forth Department’s February 5 press statement 2 and correspondence to interested Congressmen (CFR No. 6 February 9). 3 In particular made following points: (1) USG did not wish become major arms supplier to area; (2) large-scale Soviet deliveries had created fears not only on part of Israel but also certain Arab States; (3) in line our interest help friendly states meet defense needs we had agreed supply limited number Patton tanks to Jordan and Israel and ground-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia and Israel; (4) while we did not propose discuss details of deliveries, tanks furnished Jordan and Israel were in very modest amounts when compared to armaments UAR had received; (5) Secretary had proposed at Geneva that efforts be made to slow down arms races not related to East-West issues; (6) maybe Morocco, exercising its moderating influence, could ease not only Israel-Arab difficulties but inter-Arab tensions as well. 3. Rabat. You may use above in addition to Deptel 465 4 in conversations with GOM officials, should you consider it appropriate and likely to be helpful. 4. Tripoli and Baida . You may draw from above in conversations with Bishti and his private secretary, noting additional guidance below. With further reference to Embtel 775, 5 you should avoid giving impression USG entering into field as supplier arms in major quantities but that it merely reacting, to minimum extent consistent with defensive and replacement needs our friends, to Soviet sales that have amounted to $2 billion over past ten years. 5. All addressees. You may use above as you see fit if appropriate occasion should arise to discuss Near East arms situation with host government, particularly if you believe you can count on receptive attitude. However, we do not seek to stimulate Arab reactions and any such approaches you deem advisable should be handled so as to avoid creating impression USG attempting mount campaign to influence Arab thinking. For this reason posts other than Rabat should not mention Moroccan approach. You should not bring up subject of Israel’s nuclear program. If subject should arise, you may say USG watching situation in area carefully and we have no indication GOI developing nuclear weapons. As we have made clear on number of occasions we are adamantly opposed to nuclear proliferation in Near East. We believe if all countries in area having nuclear potential were to accept IAEA safeguards, helpful step this direction would have been taken. Meanwhile, any USG cooperation in projects this area involving nuclear energy must be accompanied by such safeguards for those projects. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Gamon; cleared by Symmes, Davies, Hare, Officer in Charge of Libyan Affairs Hugh Campbell, Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs Matthew J. Looram, and Trevithick, and in draft by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs Robert Chase and Meyers; and approved by Rusk. Sent to Amman, Algiers, Beirut, Baida, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Rabat, Tripoli, Kuwait, Tunis, Jidda, Taiz, and Khartoum. 2 The text is in telegram 360 to Amman, February 5. (Ibid.) It is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , p. 512. 3 Reference is to Current Foreign Relations , a classified Department of State publication. 4 Telegram 465 to Rabat, March 2, provided guidance similar to that in circular telegram 1709. It also noted that inter-Arab tensions as well as the Israel-Arab dispute affected the arms situation in the Near East and that Arab public statements calling for the liquidation of Israel contributed to pressure for Israeli defensive arms. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 MOR) 5 Telegram 775 from Tripoli, March 5, requested guidance concerning U.S. arms sales to Israel. (Ibid., POL 7 UAR) 280. Memorandum of Conversation 280. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 16, 1966. SUBJECT Supply of Arms to Near Eastern Countries PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State Ambassador Dobrynin, after lunch at the Embassy today, referred to my earlier conversation with him some weeks ago on the supply of arms to Near Eastern countries. He remarked that while I was away on my Far Eastern trip, an article had appeared in the New York Times which contained a reference to a conversation which Secretary Rusk had had on this subject with Foreign Minister Gromyko last autumn. The Ambassador pointed out that this had been an informal, confidential conversation and it certainly did not help matters to have reference made to it in the public press. I said I had not been aware of this and was quite surprised to learn that there had been any publicity. The Ambassador said that the position of his Government remained as it had been. He said that with respect to atomic weapons in this area, if there was interest in making this area a nuclear-free zone, the Soviet Union would be prepared to support such a proposal. So far as other types of sophisticated weapons are concerned, he indicated that his Government considered this a very complex question and the tenor of his remarks was to the effect that they had little interest. He mentioned that some of these countries were concerned with their own security and, in this connection, they had to take account of United States Naval forces in the Mediterranean, as well as United States bases in the area. Our conversation was broken up before I had an opportunity to find out what countries they considered should be included in any atomic-free area and I would suggest that the Secretary may wish to pursue this when he sees the Ambassador before the end of the week. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 NEAR E. Secret. Drafted by Thompson. 281. Editorial Note 281. Editorial Note Telegram 5017 to Cairo, March 7, 1966, transmitted the text of a letter from President Johnson to President Nasser replying to the message from the latter delivered by President of the UAR National Assembly Anwar al-Sadat (see Document 274 ). Johnson’s letter expressed the hope that continued diplomatic talks between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia would make it possible to reach a solution to the Yemen problem and that Sadat’s visit would serve as the basis for continued improvement in relations between the United States and the United Arab Republic. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 UAR) Telegram 5030 to Cairo, March 8, instructed Ambassador Battle to seek an early meeting with Nasser to deliver the letter and provide d talking points for the meeting. It instructed him to reiterate President Johnson’s feeling that continuing quiet dialogue was the best way to do business and it laid out points he should make concerning Yemen and Aden. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) Telegram 2388 from Cairo, March 20, reported a conversation that day between Battle and Nasser, primarily concerning Yemen and Aden. Battle noted that Nasser had not raised the subjects of U.S. arms sales to Israel or Israel’s nuclear potential. (Ibid.) 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, March 24, 1966, 3:46 p.m. 5349. 1. Following summary uncleared, FYI,Noforn, and subject to revision upon review memcon. 2. UAR Ambassador Kamel met with Secretary March 22 prior to departure leave in UAR. Reviewed major issues affecting US–UAR relations. 3. Secretary said he wished raise troublesome issue that elicited Congressional interest, namely, activity UAR delegation at Tri-Continent Conference Havana and invitation next Conference convene Cairo. Conference statements on forcible subversion Latin American governments had irritated these governments and precipitated meeting OAS. US desired and compelled maintain solidarity with Latin American neighbors.UAR involvement this conference painful matter. 4. Kamel said while conference non-governmental he understood US sensitivity. He undertook raise matter with President Nasser and Prime Minister Muhyadin. Secretary suggested UARG might possibly dissociate itself from conference in press statement. 5. Kamel make lengthy presentation covering: a. Improved US–UAR relations justification for expanded economic cooperation. 1) Both Nasser and Sadat expressed desire improve relations [cl10]with US. 2) Over past months marked improvement tone UAR press. 3) Sadat visit outstandingly successful and offered opportunity that should be exploited. 4) Need to encourage flow of prominent visitors from business and economic fields to UAR. 5) Nasser welcomed US capital investment in fields land reclamation, fertilizer production, port development. 6) Deputy Prime Minister Kaissouni had said UAR willing permit 51 per cent US ownership in enterprises operating in UAR. 7) Nasser had indicated clear desire leave Yemen with honor (reported separate telegram). 8) UAR now requested US consider new PL–480 agreement, value $150 million, duration one year. Ambassador said conclusion such agreement would encourage pro-Western trend in UAR. He hoped agonizing efforts required conclude last agreement would not be repeated. 9) UAR hoped for US encouragement IBRD participate in UAR economic development. 10) UAR anxious for suggestions on how to attract US capital. 11) UAR wished facilitate visit by Congressional group and US businessman group to encourage private capital investment in UAR. b. Despite foregoing UAR had impression US procrastinating on economic cooperation. Nasser had gone far to meet US desires and would find himself exposed politically if US did not meet him part way. Failure US provide necessary encouragement pro-Western elements could precipitate involuntary reliance on USSR. c. Arab/Israel issue quiescent. No positive progress, but freezing of issue prevented deterioration. UAR public speeches for domestic consumption of minor significance. d. UAR willing accept US lead on controlling nuclear proliferation. UAR much concerned by intelligence reports that Israel working toward production nuclear weapons. Kamel referred to Shepilov proposal for NE nuclear control (circa 1959), refused by US. e. Re Near East arms race, Kamel said on instructions improved US–UAR relations would lessen urgency UAR arms acquisition. Whatever arms UAR acquired, purpose not militant, not for aggression. Arms needed solely for defense, as in case tripartite invasion 1956. 6. Secretary said he wished send greetings and picture President Johnson to President Nasser. Secretary sent personal greetings to Prime Minister Muhyadin, Speaker Sadat and Deputy Prime Minister Fawzi. In response subjects raised by Kamel, Secretary said: a. Unlikely Congressional group could visit UAR before adjournment Congress perhaps June or July. Meanwhile would be in touch with Congressional leaders. b. Hoped convey data proposed visit to UAR within few days. Possibility brief stop Cairo on way to or from CENTO Conference April 20–21. 2 c. Much interested and appreciative forthcoming statement by Nasser on area denuclearization. So far little cooperation from Soviet Union which tried draw in Turkey and Greece although part of NATO alliance. We would follow up. d. US anxious avoid involvement arms issues in Near East but sometimes drawn in, e.g., Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Such involvement complicated US relations but need meet legitimate defense requirements and maintain reasonable balance and security in area made involvement disagreeable necessity. Perhaps steady removal sources fear and suspicion offered means improve situation. US had no wish be major arms supplier. US unhappy at diversion economic resources to military ends. e. Economic cooperation: 1) US remains interested in UAR and its people. We pleased hear about additional steps taken by UAR to attract private investment. This channel permits bringing resources to bear without complication government budgeting. Channel effective and desirable politically. Possible we might help encourage business leaders visit Cairo as means developing momentum economic progress. Advantages participation international economic organizations also clear. 2) Food will be major issue in next decade. If all countries expanded food production to utmost, barely possible meet world food needs. US moving away from position surplus food producer. This last year US will have surplus resulting from domestic policy. In future planned production necessary meet domestic and foreign commercial needs. This situation requires new element discipline on all sides. Need for hard-headed decisions based on projection food production next decade. US itself could not meet world needs even if extra 60 million acres brought into production. 3) Bilateral aspect economic cooperation complicated by US political system. President needed help in dealing with turbulent US domestic politics. No official answer to UAR PL–480 request possible at this time. Politically two six-month agreements twice as easy to conclude as one one-year agreement. Kamel repeated desirability one-year program stressing need strengthen Nasser’s hand in resisting Soviet pressure. Kosygin may visit Cairo May or June. Also emphasized need avoid any gap after termination present agreement June 30. 7. In conclusion Kamel requested Secretary’s personal support for reactivation grain silo project and help in expansion UAR fertilizer production. Secretary responded with inquiry about estimates of losses to UAR from lack of grain storage facilities. Department officer estimated value losses might pay for cost silo project within three-four years. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Russell on March 23, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. 2 Sadat had invited Rusk to visit the United Arab Republic. (Memorandum from Hare to Rusk, March 18; ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN) Telegram 937 to Ankara, April 12, stated that due to the exigencies of Vietnam, Rusk planned to reduce the time incidental to his attendance at the CENTO conference to a minimum, precluding his acceptance of invitations to visit Istanbul, Tehran, Cairo, Tunis, and Rabat. (Ibid., ORG 7 S) 283. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 283. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, March 31, 1966. I–22216/66 SUBJECT Aircraft Sales to Israel and Jordan I am glad to report that we have now successfully completed negotiations for the sale of aircraft to Israel and Jordan. Tim Hoopes handled both negotiations for ISA, in close collaboration with State and the White House. The relevant papers for Israel are at Tab A, and for Jordan at Tab B. 2 Israel Israel accepted all of the conditions set forth in your conversation with Foreign Minister Eban, but for reasons of “sovereign dignity,” they desired to state certain of these as affirmations of Israeli policy, rather than as conditions tied strictly to an aircraft sale. Prime Minister Eshkol was said to be particularly adamant in refusing a formal written agreement which might indicate to future historians that he had bargained away Israel’s future nuclear policy and opened the Dimona facility to US inspection for the sake of “a mere 48 airplanes.” After debate with the Israelis on these points and after consultation with State and the White House, we accepted the Israeli formulations. These involved (a) an affirmation of Israeli policy not to be the first to develop nuclear weapons in the Middle East, in the body of the basic letter from Harman to Hoopes, 3 but not under the paragraph dealing with specific conditions; (b) a statement of their specific undertakings to avoid and prevent criticism of the US aircraft sale to Jordan, in a memcon separate from the basic letter; 4 and (c) a statement of their willingness to open the Dimona facility to US visits, in the form of a separate letter from Harman to Assistant Secretary of State Hare. 5 Notwithstanding these concessions aimed at assuaging the sensitivities of a small nation, we are satisfied that the conditions set forth by the President and yourself are fully incorporated in the agreements. Jordan The only notable problem in the Jordan negotiation also involved a question of formulation, rather than of substance. We wished to make clear that the USG, while prepared to consider in principle a sale of 36 aircraft, insisted on describing the sale as involving an initial increment of 12 aircraft, with a follow-on sale of 24 aircraft being dependent upon satisfactory completion of the first increment. Jordan’s problem, on the other hand, was to be able to show the United Arab Command a contract for 36 aircraft. We resolved this problem by insisting on our language in the Memorandum of Understanding 6 (the basic instrument of the transaction) while making some concessions to the Jordanian position in the technical annex. As a practical matter, we have conclusive strings on this deal—i.e., cash on delivery of each aircraft, and also a requirement that Jordan be able to assimilate the aircraft into its defense establishment (adequate training for pilots and ground crews, and adequate maintenance funds from the UAC). Public Disclosure Neither sale has been publicly disclosed as yet; and to the best of our knowledge, there have been no leaks. An agreed disclosure plan calls for informing 11 Congressional leaders immediately, and 10 additional members immediately after disclosure of the Jordanian sale. The plan calls for a low-key announcement by King Hussein from Amman within a few days, stating the basic facts of the sale, but without reference to the number of aircraft involved. This will place the State and Defense Departments in a position to respond to press questions; if asked, they will confirm the fact of the sale with minimal elaboration. 7 The Congressional briefing will concentrate on the Jordan sale, emphasizing the general pressures created by the inflow of Soviet arms to the area and the specific pressures created by the force requirements levied on Jordan by the United Arab Command. It will also indicate that we understand the implications for Israel and are acting to meet the basic Israeli requirements. The briefing will emphasize also our efforts over two years to find a solution to Jordan’s aircraft problem in Western European arms markets, and our reluctant conclusion that only US aircraft can avoid the introduction not only of Soviet MIGs, but also of Egyptian or Soviet technicians—developments which would create conditions incompatible with our economic and military aid to Jordan and which would create new and dangerous instabilities in the Arab-Israeli confrontation as a whole. The timing of an announcement of the Israeli sale remains under consideration. We are anxious to avoid simultaneous disclosure of the two deals, as this could open King Hussein to an Arab charge that his arrangement with the US had triggered a larger sale to Israel. In this regard, the Arab Prime Ministers, at their recent meeting in Cairo, specifically condemned previous US military sales to Israel and warned the US against the consequences of future sales. Within limits, the Israelis agree with our arguments against simultaneity; they do not wish their deal to be linked to Jordan, preferring to place it in the larger context of the Arab threat as a whole. On the other hand, Israel definitely desires a short time-lag between the two announcements—perhaps 10 to 14 days—whereas we are hoping for an interval of about two months. Our view may be optimistic, and events could force an earlier disclosure. Nevertheless, we intend to keep the pressure on Ambassador Harman and his colleagues to reassure their American friends that Israel’s interests are being met by actions of the United States, and thus to prevent or damp down domestic protests of the Jordan sale. As you know, this is a touchy business and must be played to some extent by ear. We will however be prepared to make an announcement of the Israeli sale from Washington at any time it is deemed necessary. The negotiations are, however, successfully behind us. John T. McNaughton 8 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Israel 452. Secret; Sensitive. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 The letter under reference is dated March 17. Hoopes’ March 23 reply to Harman and an additional letter of March 29 from Harman to Hoopes are also attached. 4 The agreed memorandum of conversation is dated March 17. 5 Harman’s letter to Hare, dated April 11, states that the Israeli Government was prepared to issue invitations “from time to time” for visits to the nuclear reactor at Dimona by U.S. representatives. Airgram A–242 to Tel Aviv, March 28, noted that although the letter referred to visits “from time to time” rather than “periodically” as stated by McNamara and by other U.S. officials in conversations with the Israelis, the Department of State intended to continue to seek Israel’s acquiescence in semi-annual visits. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US) 6 The memorandum of understanding was signed by Hoopes and Khammash on March 29. 7 For the text of a statement issued by the Department of State on April 2 on the sale of military jet aircraft to Jordan, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 541. 8 Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature and an indication that the original was signed. 284. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 284. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, April 27, 1966, 1433Z. 1055. Re Amman’s 651 to Department. 2 From Adams. 3 1. Following is summary of conversation had by Assistant Secretary Hare in Amman morning April 25 with King Hussein with Prime Minister Tell present, as approved by Hare in Beirut. 2. Tone of conversation much smoother, less abrasive than Hare’s conversation 25th with Prime Minister and Court Minister reported reftel, but nonetheless firm. King set tone early in talk by expressing appreciation both for US approval supersonics package, which he understood had been most difficult for USG, and for economic aid. On latter he also expressed understanding difficulties but sincerely hoped there could be appreciable step-up in rate of loan approvals by USG in order keep steam behind Jordan’s economic development. 3. Balance discussion devoted largely King’s appreciation Jordan’s external security position, the Communist threat in area, his dissatisfaction with US policy toward Nasser, and his desire achieve arrangement with USG for continuing evaluation developments in Middle East combined with some degree advance contingency planning. 4. Ambassador Hare employed discussion of aircraft, reported separately, convey to Hussein his feeling derived from discussion Eshkol and others 4 that Israelis more relaxed re Arab military threat than on previous occasions and his distinct impression Israelis in mood keep things quiet on border. There was, however, no direct reference during conversation to recent border incidents. 5. Discussing external threat Hussein expressed principal concern at possible Communist take-over in Syria saying Jordan could not tolerate such situation. He concerned by present trend that direction, thought Syrian situation would get worse before better but doubted Nasser had substantial assets there. Nasser, however, might try obtain US acquiescence to effort reestablish UAR with Syria. Listing friends on whom Jordan could count King mentioned Iran and SAG. He thought conditions Iraq somewhat improved and agreed Lebanon friendly. Kuwait and Gulf area were open to extremists. 6. Asked by Hare if they discerned any new pattern to Communist approach in Middle East Hussein and PriMin both agreed Communists had abandoned open, “united front” approach and were infiltrating poison directly into various groups, increasing number of which had adopted Marxist dogma and phraseology. Soviets according to Hussein are building a presence in Jordan and neighboring countries, largely through aid. 7. With Nasser Hussein said he expects deterioration in relations and he trying stabilize home base in anticipation Nasser storms. He thought Nasser would probably try get out of Arab Summit meetings, although he (Hussein) would try save them. Nasser, he said, must get out of Yemen. Replying to implied criticism US approach to Nasser Ambassador Hare asserted Nasser not a chosen US instrument, that USG had no illusion about Nasser and many decisions taken in face grave misgivings but in light USG interpretation its best interests. 8. In context threat of Syria and Nasser, Hussein said Jordan would do best resist through own strength but Jordan not an island and must work with friends. In obvious allusion US he asked whether Jordan’s friends have a policy or do they approach Jordan only in terms Arab-Israel dispute. 9. Pursuing this theme Hussein and PriMin urged USG consider collaborating with GOJ in continuing assessment situation in Middle East directed toward preventing Communist take-over through some degree advance contingency planning. Carefully avoiding any implication favorable USG response such proposal, Hare pointed to nebulous nature contingencies and difficulty being precise about circumstances which would involve commitment. Major danger, he said, would lie in taking action in situation which seemed within commitment but which in actual fact was not of type envisaged. Past instances when Syria “lost” was case in point. However,USG would be prepared keep in very close touch on problem. PriMin urged us consider problem “with certain sense of urgency” since situation in Syria or elsewhere in Middle East could blow up at any time. 11. Summary : King Hussein and Prime Minister obviously hope that as result this conversation and that reported reftel, US will: 1) step up approval development loan agreements, 2) re-examine what GOJ regards as US support of Nasser, and 3) seriously and urgently consider possibility continuing review with GOJ of Middle East developments directed toward some degree contingency planning. 5 Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JORDAN–US. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv. 2 Telegram 651 from Amman, April 25, reported a conversation on April 24 between Hare and Prime Minister Tell. The latter complained about delays in U.S. aid, criticized U.S. policy toward Nasser, and appealed for U.S.-Jordan cooperation for a joint assessment of the Middle East scene in order to anticipate and prevent unfavorable developments. (Ibid.) Hare visited Amman in the course of a trip to a number of Near East capitals, including Tel Aviv, Beirut, and Cairo. 3 J. Wesley Adams, Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Amman, was Charge in Amman after Barnes relinquished charge of the Embassy on April 23. 4 Memoranda of Hare’s April 24 conversation with Eshkol are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR, POL ARAB–US, and POL ISR–US. 5 Adams reported in telegram 695 from Amman, May 12, that he informed King Hussein the previous day that the U.S. Government had concluded this would not be in the interest of either government. (Ibid., POL JORDAN–US) 285. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 285. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 29, 1966, 5:45 p.m. We will soon announce our aircraft sale to Israel. 2 We have made every effort to stave off an explosive Arab reaction like the row over the German tank sales to Israel in 1964–65. But I want to forewarn you that, at worst, Arab reaction could endanger some of our embassies. We told Nasser through one of his advisers 3 in hopes that a little warning might keep him from exploding in public. This tactic worked well when we sold Israel their Hawk missiles in 1962. However, he will make his annual May Day speech Sunday. If he sounds off on the sale, State will issue a low-key confirmation. If we get over that hurdle, we will press the Israelis to delay announcement until about 13 May—after the Arab Defense Ministers’ meeting in Cairo. Before that announcement, we will brief other Arab leaders. Eshkol wants as early an announcement as possible, but will probably accept our timing. He has so far managed to contain his opposition reaction to the Jordan sale and can probably hang on a little longer. This announcement will win loud plaudits from Israelis and from their friends here. I am working on other new things you might do for Israel as you asked. 4 However, the $52 million in economic and food aid just announced, this sale of about $70 million worth of aircraft (though we will not publish the figure) and this year’s slice of last year’s tank sale ($21.2 million) are handsome evidence of your current support for Israel. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. A copy was sent to Bill Moyers. 2 It was announced on May 20. For text of replies made by Director of the Office of News Robert J. McCloskey to questions asked at a news conference that day, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 540. 3 Telegram 2701 from Cairo, April 20, reported that Battle had informed Presidential adviser Hassan Sabry al-Kholy of the pending aircraft sale. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR) 4 An April 23 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, recording decisions made by the President in the course of a review of foreign policy problems, noted that the President wanted development of new ideas in several areas, including, “Ideas for working constructively with Israelis and Arabs.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Non Vietnam, April–July 1966) A May 21 memorandum from Rostow to the President stated that he had been canvassing “new things we might do in Israel.” It noted that because Israel’s economic performance raised it far above the level where AID normally pulled out, any new programs “should capitalize more on imagination than on large sums of AID money.” It listed a number of possibilities. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3) 286. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 286. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, May 2, 1966, 1121Z. 1102. Depcirtel 2127. 2 1. I have conveyed to Bitan (FonOff) points made Depcirtel. After reiterating substance our concern as set forth by Davies to Evron, I noted especially U.S. position in event GOJ goes to UNSC. Also emphasized concern at increasing tension Syrian frontier urging restraint and disadvantages to all should Israelis have recourse military action. 2. Bitan said would immediately pass views to higher authority as he has already done with report Davies-Evron conversation. He took occasion reiterate Israeli motivation underlying recourse to this raid on Jordan. Emphasizing Israeli reluctance take such measure, he said single most important consideration from GOI standpoint is fact GOI must be able impress its border settlers with GOI ability protect them in face of attacks involving Israeli lives. He added that GOI experience in past has been that period of quiet and stability on borders has ensued following demonstration Israeli determination this manner although he admitted impossible be sure past pattern could be anticipated with confidence. He made major point that GOI unable devise effective alternative, only other recourse aside from diplomatic intervention being to UNTSO, which invariably takes position evidence insufficient convince it of Jordanian origin Fatah incursion. 3. Bitan said GOI disturbed by increasing tension Syria but he does not have impression action likely that connection in absence unforeseen variation in Syrian tactics. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, USUN, Jerusalem, and CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA POLAD. 2 Circular telegram 2127 to Tel Aviv and other posts, April 30, stated that in a meeting that day between Davies and Evron concerning three Israeli raids into Jordanian territory the previous night, Davies urged against any action that would further escalate the situation. The telegram instructed the Embassy in Tel Aviv to reiterate U.S. concern and to add that if Jordan took the incident to the UN Security Council, the U.S. Government would be obliged to base its position strictly on the facts as eventually reported by UNTSO. (Ibid.) 287. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 287. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, May 2, 1966, 1748Z. 668. Ref: Embtel 665. 2 1. In course conversation with King Hussein 6:00 p.m. May 2 on subject Israeli raids and GOJ reaction thereto, Hussein assured me that 1) GOJ doing all possible prevent incursions by infiltrators from Jordan territory into Israel and 2) although he under heavy pressure from domestic population and army to “do something” there would be no military retaliation by JAA at this time. However King added “Do not come to me on next occasion asking that I restrain army. We cannot continue take attacks this sort and retaliation apparently only language Israelis understand.” 2. Told Hussein I had sought audience first because of remarks by Sharif Nasser earlier in day first to DATT (reported DATT 0609 May 66) 3 and later [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that regime under heavy pressure both from civilian populace and army to take some sort retaliatory action for Israeli raids and his comment that next forty-eight hours would be critical in reaching decision on what course Jordan would follow. Referred also my talk PriMin May 1 reported reftel. Hussein’s assurances would seem preclude military retaliation in absence any further attacks from Israelis. 3. Asked what he thought were Israelis’ objective these raids Hussein replied he unable comprehend them. He thought surely they understood such action played directly into hands of extremists within Jordan making pursuit moderate course by GOJ more difficult. As possible reason he suggested Israeli desire provoke Jordanians and set stage for major Israeli attack. He reiterated extreme difficulty his position and stressed hope USG could make GOJ see light in order prevent repetition latest events. 4. I thanked Hussein for his assurances which I said would be most appreciated Washington. Said I had to add that even should repetition occur would hope he would not find it necessary retaliate with force. Promised convey to Washington his plea for understanding of extreme pressure to which his regime subjected by incidents this sort. 5. Incidentally, in conversation with British Ambassador, who preceded me in audience with King, Sir Roderick volunteered remark that these latest Israeli raids make position of moderates like King and Prime Minister impossible. Israelis knew this and accordingly he wondered if they wanted peace. Added he had sent strong message this effect London. 6. Comment : King outwardly calm but reflected mental anguish at dilemma having restrain army once again in face political and army pressures. I avoided inquiring whether GOJ intended take issue to UN, fearing this might be regarded as US suggestion this effect. Hussein did not mention subject. Adams 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and Damascus and passed to the White House and USIA. 2 Telegram 665 from Amman, May 1, reported a meeting between Barnes and Tell in which Barnes urged against Jordanian retaliation for the Israeli raids of April 29–30, urged full Jordanian cooperation with MAC and UNTSO, and urged renewed vigorous Jordanian efforts to frustrate Fatah operations. (Ibid.) Barnes’ instructions for the meeting were sent in circular telegram 2126 to Amman, April 30. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 288. Memorandum for the Record 288. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 3, 1966. Israeli Ambassador Harman spent most of his talk with me this morning outlining outstanding issues between our two governments. I chose to listen rather than engage him, except for Vietnam. (Evron and Saunders were present.) First, he described three major concerns in the current aircraft negotiations: 1. Because the Skyhawk will be up against superior opposition, the GOI wants it to have the best possible defensive equipment. Harman implied that, since the Skyhawk was Israel’s third choice, the US had some obligation to upgrade its capability as much as possible. The Israelis want the Sidewinder 1–C whereas we have offered only the 1–A (according to him). They also want a radar warning system in the plane. 2. To improve performance, they want the Bullpup missile because of its air-to-sea capacity. Israel’s answer to the threat of UAR naval bombardment is defense from the air—not a navy of its own. On the ground, Israel wants the Rockeye II anti-tank cluster bomb to combat armored concentrations. Harman said this would reduce the number of air sorties required. 3. Worrying about other evidence of our “lack of forthcomingness,” he cited our unwillingness to sell napalm bombs fitted to the Skyhawk. He hoped we could help save expensive adaptation of their own ordnance. He felt that with secrecy—which is in Israel’s interest as well as in ours—there would be no problem in our supplying this kind of equipment. Second, I preempted a lengthy exposition on desalting by saying I was thoroughly familiar and much interested. I told him the President was also personally interested, but we all knew certain ambiguities about the economics of the project remained. However, I was confident that we would be in touch with them “fairly soon.” Harman said he was fully aware of the complexities and felt that perhaps the best way to get at these was for each side to appoint one man to “bat these problems around without commitment on either side.” He felt that “the world is going to have this but without actual doing we cannot take the next step.” He felt this project would help open an entire new industry akin to the atomic and space industries. Israel, because of its great need for water and its sophisticated agricultural and industrial economy, would be a good guinea pig. Third, Harman outlined problems in the future of our economic aid. He accepted that the question had been resolved for this year, but was particularly concerned about the common glowing Washington appraisal of Israel’s economy. Despite good performance, Harman said defense costs were increasingly impairing economic progress. While Israel was very grateful for the ten-year credits on the tank and aircraft sales, nevertheless these would have to be paid back and would constitute a growing burden (defense costs now 11% of GNP). Not only would Israel have to pay its debts to the United States, but, since part of our aircraft deal required Israel to buy elsewhere as well, it would have debts in France where hardware is expensive. This all comes at a time when the flow of capital to Israel is diminishing. German reparations have ended and personal restitution to Israeli citizens will probably end during this decade. At the same time Israel’s debts are falling due—$1.2 billion this year alone. Israel has had to slacken the pace of its development program, and some unemployment is developing, though very unevenly. He cited the problem of increasing industrial exports to the Common Market, but came back to rising defense expenditures as the prime problem—a problem we could help with. Fourth, he mentioned the recrudescence of trouble along the Jordanian and Syrian borders. He feared that discipline had broken down within the Jordanian ranks because of the rapid expansion of the Jordanian armed forces. In addition to Fatah incidents, there had recently been several occasions of “trigger-happy” behavior by regular Jordanian troops. A similar situation was developing along the Syrian border, but he could not tell how that would evolve. Fifth, he hoped we would think twice before resuming food aid to Nasser. He felt that Nasser’s requests to us were admissions of weakness which gave us considerable leverage. Israel hoped we would not give him a boost while he was down. I asked him in conclusion why Israel found it so difficult to help us on Vietnam. Internally, he said Israel’s coalition government depends in part on one left-wing anti-Communist party (Mapam), which the Prime Minister must handle delicately. Externally, he cited relations with the USSR as Israel’s biggest problem outside the Middle East. The Soviets have left the Israelis in no doubt that they are watching very carefully Israel’s position on Vietnam. He denied the Israelis were “out to lunch” on this issue, but felt Eshkol must be allowed to handle it in his own way. He felt that if Israel had been allowed to begin a small scale training program in Israel for South Vietnamese agriculturalists early this year, perhaps we would not be at our current impasse. He also regretted public statements here by South Vietnamese ambassador Vu Van Thai which set us back for some time. W 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret. Prepared by Walt Rostow. 289. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Carroll) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 289. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Carroll) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, May 4, 1966. S–984/ST–2 SUBJECT Preliminary Report on Visit to Israeli Atomic Energy Sites (S/NFD) 1. (S/NFD) A three-man team of U.S. nuclear experts visited Israeli atomic energy sites during the period 31 March to 4 April 1966, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has submitted a preliminary report on the visit to the U.S. Intelligence Board. The team’s observations and conclusions, as stated in the report, are summarized in this memorandum. 2. (S/NFD) In view of Israeli sensitivities associated with the visit and report, the AEC has requested that distribution be limited to those who have specific requirements for the information and that recipients of the report be cautioned of the need to hold the information and even the fact of the visit very closely. 3. (S/NFD) It is the unanimous conclusion of the three-man team that there is no evidence that Israel is producing or intends to produce nuclear weapons material. The principal observations supporting this judgment are as follows: The Dimona reactor, Israel’s only potential source of plutonium for an indigenous nuclear weapons program during the next several years, is being utilized for nuclear research activities and the site has been opened to scientists from the Weizmann Institute at Rehovot and the nuclear research center at Nahal Soreq. Some of the research projects are supported by funds from U.S. Government agencies. The reactor has been operated at significantly reduced power, which is not consistent with a plutonium production effort, and the high irradiation levels at which fuel apparently is to be removed from the reactor would not result in plutonium well suited for use in nuclear weapons. In addition, there is no chemical processing facility at Dimona for the extraction of plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. Finally, there is no evidence that diversion of the uranium inventory at Dimona has occurred, which supports the judgment that the reactor has been operated at low power and that no unreported fuel has been irradiated and removed from the reactor between U.S. visits. 4. (S/NFD) There is a possibility that the team may have been deliberately deceived by the Israelis, but the members of the team believe that this is unlikely. They felt it would be prudent, however, to note the following reservations: The team could learn nothing about the 80 to 100 tons of uranium concentrate purchased from Argentina. Although the team members are convinced that this uranium has not been delivered to the Dimona site and that the personnel there know nothing about it, this material could have been (or could in the future be) run through the reactor between U.S. visits without being detected as long as the indicated reactor utilization is low. For this reason, there would be some basis for concern if the reactor continues for another year to have a lower operating efficiency. If this is the case next year, the survey team should demand very concrete evidence to explain the failure of the reactor to operate at design power. 5. (S/NFD) The report also points out that the members of the team are not in a position to determine whether a reactor or chemical separation plant exists elsewhere in Israel. With regard to this point, it is highly unlikely that a reactor capable of producing significant quantities of plutonium could be built without being detected. It is possible, however, that a chemical processing plant capable of separating a few kilograms of plutonium annually could escape detection if a serious effort were made to hide it; such a plant would be very similar to other chemical facilities. 6. (S/NFD) The report of the team of U.S. experts is the best source of information on the Israeli nuclear energy program and there is no convincing intelligence from other sources which is in disagreement with the team’s observations and conclusions. Joseph F. Carroll Lieutenant General, USAF 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Israel 463.2. Secret; Limited Distribution; No Foreign Dissem. A copy was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 290. National Intelligence Estimate 290. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, May 19, 1966. NIE 36.1–66 THE OUTLOOK FOR THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC The Problem To assess the situation of the United Arab Republic and to estimate developments in domestic and foreign affairs over the next few years. Conclusions A. Growing economic difficulties, the costly stalemate in Yemen, and other troubles have produced considerable discontent and even some active opposition in the UAR. The regime has responded by overhauling the security apparatus, by searching—unsuccessfully—for some solution in Yemen, by cutting civilian spending, and by stretching out its five year economic plan to seven years. B. The program of domestic retrenchment, particularly the cuts in civilian consumption, should help in dealing with economic problems, but it will have to be continued for several years to be effective. Foreign exchange earnings will probably be increased by recent important oil discoveries. To meet its economic goals, the UAR has some $1.1 billion in aid pledged by Communist countries and about $500 million promised from various Western sources; it will, however, still need about $2 billion during the Second Plan period (1962–1965), partly in foodstuffs and partly in other types of aid. US willingness to supply PL–480 food will greatly affect the willingness of other Western donors to contribute to Egypt. The UAR’s need for Western aid will be an important but not overriding consideration in its conduct of foreign affairs. C. We see no better than an even chance of a settlement in Yemen in the next two years or so. Nasser is highly unlikely to accept a humiliating withdrawal. We also believe that he will try to avoid the risks of escalation, though there is some danger of clashes involving UAR and Saudi forces. His most likely course is to retrench militarily, holding the more defensible areas and hoping for some kind of face-saving settlement. In the meantime, antagonism between Nasser and the Saudis is likely to exacerbate inter-Arab relations generally, undermining the detente of the last two years or so. D. Unless Nasser’s troubles get much more severe than at present, we doubt that his regime will be in serious danger of being replaced. A successful move to do so would require considerable backing from the armed forces; this appears unlikely in the near term. However, unless the government improves its economic performance and manages to revive greater political support, it will become more vulnerable in the long run. E. US–UAR relations have fluctuated considerably over the years, and present indications are for a downward turn. This results mainly from the reviving antagonism between Nasser and the more pro-Western Arab leaders—particularly Faisal. It is exacerbated by Nasser’s troubles with the British in the Arabian Peninsula, by his resentment at tightened US aid policies toward the UAR, and by his belief that the US is increasing support for his adversaries. It is also encouraged by Soviet gestures toward the UAR. [Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Acting Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 19. 291. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 291. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 21, 1966. Ambassador Goldberg has sent you a very imaginative proposal for tackling the Palestine refugee problem. 2 His idea is to persuade Israel to announce unilaterally that it will allow any refugees to return to Israel who want to, subject only to annual quotas and security screening. This would be a bow to the Arab claim that the refugees have a “right” to return. Israel would offer compensation to those who wanted to settle elsewhere. While this might not work, Israel would at least have made a move to break the current impasse. Our preliminary reaction is that, even though there are some good new ideas here, the Israelis would not buy this. They feel they have to put upper limits on the number of refugees coming back into Israel for security reasons. If they were sure the Arabs would reject the idea, they might consider it to make political points. However, they feel that the present situation is tolerable and time is gradually eroding the problem. There are clearly fresh winds blowing in the Israeli Government and greater willingness to think about a long-term Arab-Israeli accommodation. We do want to guard against pushing these new thinkers too far too fast because their hard line cohorts will be all too ready to jump them. So we would want to work out any such initiative very thoroughly before proposing it to them. I think we ought to give State the outlines of Goldberg’s plan to staff out in detail. If you approve, I will send it over without attribution. Walt Send it to State 3 See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3. Confidential. 2 Goldberg’s May 19 letter to the President is ibid. 3 This option is checked. Johnson’s handwritten notes on the memorandum indicate that the President wanted his staff to “Hurry it up” and to thank Goldberg. Another note in an unknown handwriting states that Rostow called Goldberg in New York later that day. 292. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 292. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 23, 1966, 9:30 a.m. SUBJECT Telephone Call Today to Feinberg We are committed to a telephone call to Abe Feinberg about three matters: 1. U.S. support for Israeli technical assistance in Africa . You have in your hands a memorandum describing the options. 2 My recommendation is: I tell Feinberg that the Israeli Government will be hearing about this matter shortly through regular [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]channels . 2. The Haifa loan . Dave Bell by noon today will be recommending that we use the “left over” money to support an additional Israeli project (the power plant at Tel Aviv, of which $10 million will in any case be financed by ExIm but we would put in $6 million of AID money). I recommend that I tell Feinberg on this item that we will shortly be suggesting to the Israeli Government a responsive way to meet their request . 3. Desalting . We now have in our hands memoranda from State and Hornig. 3 State suggests an approach which, while initially bilateral with Israel, would involve the strategy later to include the UAR in desalting enterprises. There are many unanswered questions which cannot and ought not be settled today. I recommend that I tell Feinberg that we have decided in principle to appoint a U.S. coordinator to explore with the Israelis the technical and economic aspects of the desalting project; and we shall be in touch with them shortly about the name of our man and terms of reference . You should note that State’s concept would involve at some appropriate time the U.S. coordinator on this project dealing not only with Israel but with the UAR. This is a concept you will wish to examine. There is no need to tell Feinberg about this today. One of the reasons for a bit of vagueness in reply to Feinberg today relates to the timing of an announcement of Harriman (or someone else) as the coordinator. We have just announced the Israeli aircraft. We may want to save the announcement of the coordinator for a later time this year. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, “Rec’d 11:10 a.” A handwritten “L” indicates that the memorandum was seen by the President. 2 A May 21 memorandum from Rostow to the President laid out options for meeting a request from Feinberg to increase [text not declassified]support for Israeli technical assistance programs in Africa. (Ibid.) 3 Rusk’s May 21 memorandum to the President is ibid., Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. A May 20 memorandum from Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Donald F. Hornig to Rostow is ibid., Files of Harold Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona. 293. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 293. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, May 24, 1966, 1137Z. 1229. Israeli strategic missiles. CA-11071, May 10, 66. 2 1. I had almost an hour with Eshkol morning 24th on missile question. I had given him prior knowledge of subject, and he was well prepared. Following is brief summary of highlights. 2. After I made pitch pursuant ref CA, and subsequent preliminary exchange, PM assured me a) there are no strategic missiles in Israel now; b) there will be no such missiles in Israel at least for two more years from now, perhaps three; c) he sincerely hopes within that period of time UAR will abandon its missile program, in which event Israel will do likewise. In any event Eshkol indicated that GOI not contemplating purchase of more than “two dozen, maybe one dozen more or less.” He implied they were having development problems, and finding costs nearly prohibitive. 3. In view importance today’s exchange and in order provide full flavor of Eshkol’s sensible attitude towards missile question we preparing detailed memcon to be sent priority airgram. 3 4. PM gave me paper and map summarizing current Israeli appraisal UAR missile program. Paper states, inter alia, guidance problems apparently still not overcome, but if gyro on which Egyptians now working proves successful,UAR might have about 60 operational SSM’s by middle or end of 1967. Israeli appraisal also being pouched. 5. Comment : Noteworthy that Eshkol did not take issue with my point that in present circumstances, presence of SSM’s in Israel would constitute Israeli introduction of new weapons into area. PM impressed us as fervently desirous avoiding further qualitative escalation in area arms. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 UAR. Secret;Exdis. Repeated to Cairo, London, and Paris. 2 Circular airgram CA-11071, May 10, instructed Barbour to renew the U.S.-Israeli missile discussions of April 1964 with Eshkol, in particular to try to halt any delivery to Israel of missiles falling under the initial French-Israel contract for 25 missiles mentioned to Feldman by Eshkol. (Ibid.) For Feldman’s reports of his discussions of this subject with Eshkol, see Documents 36 and 37 . 3 Barbour transmitted the memorandum of conversation with airgram A–1000, May 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 UAR) 294. Memorandum of Conversation 294. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 26, 1966, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Nuclear Weapons in the Near East PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR The Secretary Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State The Secretary asked the Ambassador if he had any reaction in Moscow to the discussion they had had with respect to nuclear weapons in the Near East. 2 Dobrynin said he had understood the Secretary was not talking about a possible treaty, but rather the policy of our two countries. The Secretary agreed that a formal treaty might not be practical since the Arabs would probably not sign a treaty with the Israelis. Dobrynin said that the Soviets were not going to furnish any nuclear weapons to these countries and he assumed that we were not and therefore he had not pursued the matter further in Moscow. The Secretary pointed out that if all these countries would accept IAEA safeguards, this could be a good first step. He went on to explain, however, that what he had had in mind was the possibility that both the Soviet Union and the United States might get these countries to give separately private assurances to us and we could then each tell the governments on the other side. The Secretary asked if there had been any discussion of this subject with Cairo. Dobrynin replied that there was not, to his knowledge, but it was possible that this had come up during the recent visit of Mr. Kosygin to Cairo. The Secretary said he could tell the Ambassador quite privately that we were convinced that the Israelis were not planning to make nuclear weapons. Ambassador Dobrynin expressed some skepticism and wondered how an arrangement could be made. The Secretary said he thought that if these countries assured us that they would not go nuclear, they would not do so. He asked if it was the policy of the Soviet Government that there should be no nuclear weapons in this area. The Ambassador replied that there should not be any anywhere! The Secretary asked if the Ambassador had had any discussion in Moscow with respect to keeping sophisticated weapons out of the Middle East, such as missiles. Dobrynin, without directly relating his reply to any conversations he had had in Moscow, said that he did not see much possibility in this area until the Big Powers took some steps toward disarmament and set an example. Otherwise, it was difficult to convince these countries not to acquire such weapons. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S on May 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. The memorandum is Part III of VI. 2 The subject was discussed briefly in the course of a wide-ranging discussion between Rusk and Dobrynin on March 18. According to a memorandum of the conversation, Rusk indicated the United States would be interested in a nuclear free zone in the Near East, provided that Turkey and Greece could be excluded. Dobrynin expressed skepticism as to whether Israel and the UAR would be interested in such an arrangement. Rusk expressed the opinion that both would be. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, 1966) 295. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 295. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, May 28, 1966. No. 0830/66 EGYPTIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS Summary Egypt and the USSR may be moving toward a period of closer cooperation in the pursuit of their common objectives in the Arab world. Nasir’s reviving antagonism toward conservative and moderate Arab leaders, his concurrent tendency to try to unify “progressive and revolutionary” Arab forces, and his renewed hostility toward US and British policy in the Middle East have almost certainly increased his readiness to collaborate with Moscow. Moscow’s present leadership will be cautiously receptive to opportunities Nasir may offer for extending Soviet influence in the area. They already appear to be preparing to work somewhat more closely with him than in the past in espousing his kind of Arab nationalism, socialism, and opposition to Western influence. There are, however, definite limitations on such cooperation well-recognized by both sides. [Here follow 17 paragraphs of more detailed discussion.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Controlled Dissem/Background Use Only. A note in the source text states that the memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence and coordinated with ORR and ONE. 296. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 296. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, May 28, 1966, 1200Z. 3091. Re Embtel 3050 and Deptel 6537. 2 1. Following general expression concern new US–UAR strains by Sadat, I made general statement US desires seek understanding and not confrontation which I suggested be theme of evening. I pointed out that we had all been delighted with Sadat visit and that it had in everyone’s judgment heralded new era good feeling between US and UAR. I then suggested that the main areas of their apparent concern today had existed prior Sadat visit. US guarantee territorial integrity Saudi Arabia which had been drug out publicly again as result bellicose statements here had, as the UAR knew, existed for some years. US arms sale to Israel had been known by UAR for over one year and I had informed UAR each step of way progress. Sale came as result great soul searching our part in framework US policy to refrain from becoming major supplier arms in area and represented very restrained step. Therefore elements particular UAR concern not new and resulted in part from UAR throwing into public arena matters that should be dealt with privately. Moreover, Al Ahram with full knowledge they were inaccurate had built up arms sales issue by charging US with much broader sales than actually the case. While visit King Feisal to Washington was new element visit had been scheduled some time ago for this year although date finally agreed to just before announcement. Difficult understand UAR actions in light their obvious past willingness work for improved relations when factors that now appeared of concern to them already existed. 2. Sadat then commented as follows with respect to subjects indicated: A. Arms for Israel. Made statement perfunctory objection not denying effect of Al Ahram story and admitting truth my statement that we had informed them at each stage development. Stated he wished express strong objection to sale but not to go into matter in depth. Little emphasis was placed on arms sale for remainder of evening. B. Islamic Pact. UAR is convinced British and Americans encouraging Islamic Pact. In fact, UAR has definite info US at CENTO meeting urged some countries join Pact. UAR convinced Pact anti-Nasser in design. I objected use word pact pointing out this nomenclature had, if not originated here, at least been repeated here with result general usage term around world when that not basic to idea as I understood it. C. Havana Conference. Nasser shocked Secretary Hare raised matter in recent meeting 3 since UAR attitude such conferences consistent throughout revolution and UAR presence these conferences essentially moderating force. Obviously UAR had no subversive plans Latin America in which its interests limited. I pointed out Latin American countries with which UAR maintained relations could not be expected look with favor on resolutions inviting their overthrow and this concern inevitably resulted in US being drawn into issue which could cause difficulty in US–UAR relations. Sadat stated impossible change UAR policy and indicated 1968 conference would proceed on schedule. I predicted UAR could expect Latin American countries to reflect concern when specific intentions proceed conference became known. Sadat believed Latin American countries would and could wait until they saw nature of conference before they became unduly upset. D. Yemen. Confrontation between Nasser and Feisal already in existence. Feisal could not act as belligerent or confident as he does without US support. US appears completely on his side. Nasser’s speeches to which US had objected so strongly came after months UAR effort resolve issue and he emphasised certain actions were threatened only in certain contingencies. Door still open and always open and basic desire for peace unchanged. Sadat told Secretary Rusk UAR would wait two months for solution and then shift to new policy which is exactly what has happened. However, desire for peace still exists and UAR open to help from third parties. Ambassador Kamel then suggested US mediate situation to which Sadat nodded pleasantly; for rest of evening Kamel kept referring to Sadat’s desire for US mediation although only Kamel really pressed point. I stated one mediation effort already underway for which Sadat indicated little hope. I expressed doubt any country would wish enter mediation efforts unless it considered there was willingness both sides seek solution and all efforts at mediation not helped by public threats. Sadat warned President had speech scheduled June 15 at which time he expected to go beyond anything thus far in attack on Feisal. Speeches on Yemen had been popular in country and were essential in view loss Egyptian life and requirement to forestall charge Yemen operation had not been successful. Kamel again pressed mediation idea pointing out we were only ones concerned and only country with leverage on Feisal, therefore problem ours. I stated most emphatically Yemen war not our war and those directly involved must seek solution and not wait for outside help which they were hardly encouraging. E. Aden. Emphasis in dealing with South Arabian peninsula was placed subsidiary problem which could be solved if Yemen issue resolved. Deep distrust British expressed vehemently and we received no encouragement our urging for constructive help toward government Aden area reflective people’s wishes. F. Aid. US aid always too little, too late, too tied with strings, etc. Level of aid going India and elsewhere makes UAR wonder why we will not help them as much as we help others. UAR desperately needs our food and economic situation very difficult but under no circumstances will UAR accept aid with strings. If UAR not assisted by US, great pressure will be exerted on them toward increasing reliance Eastern bloc. 3. Comment : Conversation was useful as means [garble—maintaining?] channels and exchanging points of view. While I spoke at great length on US attitudes along established lines, I do not believe we changed any minds and certainly we uncovered no flexibility on Yemen or Aden. Israeli arms sale seemed to be minimized and obviously far greater concern now for “US support” Feisal than support of Israel. I find it difficult understand extent their professed fear of Islamic Pact and of Feisal’s Saudi Arabia given NE realities and its relative political-military weakness compared UAR. Great emotion attended exposition on Havana Conference which dealt with at great length out of proportion its relative importance compared to other items. There was shocking unawareness of the external effect President Nasser’s speeches and repeated statements UAR reacts but does not act. I suggested that they not react to the wrong thing, pointing out UAR had over-reacted to unofficial AP story subsequently denied by US. While they occasionally showed signs of emotion, at all times conversation friendly. It was agreed meet again from time to time over next weeks. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. 2 Telegram 3050 from Cairo, May 25, reported that Battle had been invited to a working dinner on May 27 with Sadat and Kamel. (Ibid.) Telegram 6537 to Cairo, May 26, suggested that in Battle’s discussions with Sadat and Kamel, he should stress that the United States had made a sustained effort to seek good relations but that a number of disturbing developments had occurred recently, including the continued presence of UAR troops inYemen, attacks on U.S. policy in Vietnam, and distortion in the UAR press of U.S. arms sales to Israel. (Ibid.) 3 Hare met with Nasser on May 2 in Alexandria. Telegram 2820 from Cairo, May 3, reported that Nasser urged renewal of U.S. assistance; other subjects of discussion included Yemen and Vietnam. (Ibid.) 297. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 297. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 31, 1966, 2 p.m. Secretary Rusk recommends letting Ambassador Goldberg sound out the Israelis on the proposal he recently outlined to you (attached) 2 for setting the Arab refugee problem. He emphasizes that this should be a very informal and tentative probe. Since Eban took over, he has set up his own task force to study the whole Arab-Israeli problem. Eshkol is fully aboard. They are looking for ways to break down the “fortress Israel” idea and to build bridges to the Arabs. A lot of good ideas are forming. We do not want to break this fragile reed by overloading it at the start. The steps Eban’s people are considering—greater contact between Arabs and Isaelis—lay them open to the charge of letting down Israel’s defenses. To many sincere Israelis, repatriating Arab refugees would be their Trojan Horse. So asking Eban to accept Ambassador Goldberg’s plan right now might push him too far too fast. Frankly, State does not give this idea much chance of success. However, Ambassador Goldberg’s proposal does offer some new variations on the Johnson plan worth passing along to the Israelis as long as we do not push them. A hard sell would only backfire. So if you approve, I suggest you let me read back to State that you favor a carefully prepared low-key approach but want to be sure we do not appear at this stage to be pressuring the Israelis into something against their will. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Confidential. 2 See Document 291 . Rusk’s May 30 memorandum is attached but not printed. Another copy of Rusk’s memorandum is filed with a May 31 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow commenting, “Attached recommendation comes because no one wants to shoot Ambassador Goldberg down.” It continues, “NE doubts the Israelis will buy but doesn’t want to squelch Goldberg’s response to the President’s request for new initiatives on the Arab-Israeli deadlock.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 5) 3 The President checked the approval line and wrote: “Put on my desk. L.” A June 3 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk states that the President authorized Rusk to instruct Goldberg to explore with the Israeli delegation in a “tentative, informal, and low-key manner” Israeli willingness to consider a new initiative aimed at breaking the Arab-Israeli deadlock over the refugee problem. It noted that the President understood that the approach would “not appear to the Israelis as an attempt to push them into something they are not prepared to accept.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA) No record of Goldberg’s approach to the Israelis has been found. 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, June 11, 1966, 10:33 a.m. 1085. Deptel 1052. 2 1. As soon after Prime Minister Eshkol’s return from African trip as feasible you should see Foreign Minister Eban for review of arrangements under which USG has been invited visit Dimona. You should make following points: 2. USG appreciates considerable efforts to which GOI went to arrange for satisfactory visit in April 1966. We would like interpret success of that visit as good augury for future USG-GOI arrangements this field. 3. At same time we consider it most important there be no misunderstanding on part GOI of utter seriousness which USG, at highest level, attaches to prevention nuclear proliferation in Near East. As Secretary told Eban this is matter of fundamental significance to US-Israel relations. 4. As GOI aware, USG attaches considerable importance to periodicity of visits and trusts relevant details can be worked out satisfactorily. 5. For technical reasons USG considers that periodicity needs be semi-annual. Scientific reason (given to Embassy in Deptel 938, June 15, 1963, 3 but apparently not then relayed to GOI because of Ben Gurion resignation) which you may give Eban is as follows: As is widely known and accepted by knowledgeable international scientific community, a reactor size of Dimona could be operated so as to discharge single fuel load approximately every six months if intended for ultimate production of weapons-grade plutonium, whereas for peaceful purposes the burn-up period would be about two years. 6. As previously stated on several occasions, what we want is full access to Dimona’s facilities and records every six months. We believe this should be done as matter of course without need for complicated negotiations and protracted delays that have accompanied our visits so far. 7. You should use occasion to stress to Eban USG interest in substantive response to President’s letter to Eshkol on IAEA safeguards dated May 21, 1965 4 (Deptel 698, 1966, paragraph 5). 5 It will be recalled USG considers placing Israel’s nuclear facilities under IAEA controls a preferable alternative to bilateral arrangements under which US teams have been visiting Dimona. We have been impressed by Prime Minister’s recent statements on nuclear policy and believe it would be in Israel’s interests to give these statements added credibility that would result from IAEA safeguards. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Gamon on June 7; cleared by Symmes, James W. Spain of INR, Bromley Smith, Robert S. Rochlin of ACDA, and in substance by Robert H. Kranich of ACDA/IR and Stabler of AEC; and approved by Davies. 2 Telegram 1052 to Tel Aviv, June 2, instructed the Embassy to tell Eban that U.S. officials were generally satisfied with the March 31–April 1 visit of the U.S. team to Israeli atomic installations but were concerned that Israeli personnel could supply no information about Argentine-Israeli transactions of uranium concentrate, which they understood had occurred and for which there were no provisions for safeguards equivalent to the IAEA safeguards system. The Embassy was instructed to request clarification of the whereabouts in Israel of Argentine uranium concentrate and its use or intended use, noting that this type of problem added to apprehension in high levels of the U.S. Government and elsewhere and underscored the need for IAEA type safeguards to reassure the world of the peaceful orientation of Israel’s nuclear program. (Ibid.) 3 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 274 . 4 Document 218 . 5 Telegram 698 to Tel Aviv, March 1, instructed Barbour to stress to Eban the need to make arrangements for the long-pending Dimona visit. Paragraph 5 instructed him to remind Eban the President was looking forward to an answer to his May 21, 1965, proposal for IAEA safeguards. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR) 299. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 299. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 14, 1966, 3:10 p.m. The purpose of our meeting at 11:30 a.m. on Wednesday, June 15 on the Israeli and UAR desalting projects is to surface for you the wide range of opinion and controversy over them. I hope the discussion will give us a clearer sense of how to sort these out and move ahead. Basically, the argument is between the desalters and the disarmers, with varied views between: —The AEC and Interior want to push ahead with nuclear desalting. They admit money is a problem because a big nuclear desalting plant, while technologically feasible, is still not economic with normal commercial financing. —AID and Budget Bureau want to save us from building a white elephant which we would have to subsidize. —State hopes we can use these projects to bargain for IAEA safeguards on all Israeli and Egyptian reactors. They feel that subsidizing a plant might not be too big a price to pay. —The disarmament experts fear putting any new reactors in tense areas because they would increase ability to produce weapons. Some of them have little faith in safeguards or feel there may be better ways to buy nuclear controls. To make the most of this meeting, you might want to state your view of the problem and then follow up with the tough questions. Suggested talking points: The problem . We want to push ahead with nuclear desalting as rapidly as makes sense. We also want to keep Israel off the nuclear track. Can we do both? The questions. 1. If nuclear desalting still can’t pay its own way without subsidy, what about other sources of water? We’ve talked so much about desalting, have we overlooked other angles in Israel? 2. Is there a chance that new technology combined with Israel’s increased need for water will make desalted water economical in the 1970’s? 3. If there is no other way, how much is the Israeli project worth to us? 4. Since we are worried about nuclear proliferation, how about non-nuclear desalting? Have we closed our eyes to this angle? 5. Should we go ahead with desalting if Israel won’t accept safeguards on all its reactors? 6. How good are IAEA safeguards? Are they worth giving away a nuclear desalting plant for? How can we make them better? 7. Should we link the Israeli and Egyptian projects? Attached is a summary of Secretary Rusk’s recommendations and of the paper prepared by Dr. Hornig’s, Charles Schultze’s and my own staff. 2 At the close you might say the discussion was helpful in exploring the issues that will be faced by our coordinator on the U.S.-Israel project; and that the next step is for Rostow, in consultation with those represented around the table, to formulate terms of reference for the coordinator for submission to you. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret. 2 The summary is attached but not printed. 300. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 300. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 16, 1966, 5:50 p.m. Dave Bell, George Ball and Charles Schultze recommend we go ahead with this year’s budget support grant ($21.4 million) for Jordan. None of us likes budget support, but there is a clear political case for keeping Israel’s longest and most vulnerable flank out of Nasser’s hands. We have succeeded in getting out of straight budget support everywhere except in Vietnam ($500 million), Korea (steadily falling but still $50 million in FY 67 plans), Laos ($20 million) and Jordan. But in each case there’s important political justification. In Jordan, an 8% annual growth rate raises hopes that Jordan is moving toward ability to pay its own way. As you told Israeli Foreign Minister Eban in February, we would rather not subsidize Jordan, nor sell tanks and jets to Arabs. But after painful consideration, we see no other way to keep Soviet-backed radical Arabs off Israel’s softest flank. So far our policy has worked. Hussein resisted heavy Arab pressure to take MIG’s. He has privately agreed to keep his armor off the west bank of the Jordan where Israel would be hard-pressed to defend. He has squelched fanatical Arabs raiding across Israel’s borders. He has resisted heavy pressure from his military—whose support keeps him in power—to retaliate when Israel has attacked Jordanian villages harboring those raiders. Secretary Fowler does not approve this grant because of the balance of payments drain (50% is not tied to US procurement). I recommend you read Charlie Schultze’s excellent memo (attached), 2 which spells out the compromise he has negotiated with Bell. This is the best he feels we can do to meet Secretary Fowler’s legitimate concerns. I recommend you approve the Bell/Ball/Schultze program. We will continue reducing the payments drain, but cutting back too quickly would undermine Hussein. The kind of deal we have with him may be cheap at the price. Few other events would be as likely to tempt a pre-emptive Israeli attack and trigger a major Mid-East fracas as the threat of a Nasserist takeover in Jordan. We cannot afford to get caught in a mess like that, especially while we are pushing ahead in Vietnam. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. II. Secret. 2 A copy of Schultze’s June 14 memorandum, along with copies of Ball’s June 10 memorandum and Bell’s May 14 memorandum, are attached to a copy of Rostow’s memorandum, ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 6. 301. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 301. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, June 17, 1966, 8:26 p.m. CA-12335 SUBJECT Israeli and UAR Offensive Missiles REF Tel Aviv’s 1229 and A–1000 2 1. The Department agrees with Embassy Tel Aviv that Prime Minister Eshkol’s stand on the missile question is eminently reasonable and encouraging. We consider it provides a basis for further efforts to resolve this aspect of the UAR-Israel arms race. However, before considering how this question might best be handled further in both Tel Aviv and Cairo, we believe it would be helpful to clarify the kind of UAR undertakings which Israel would consider acceptable, and the kind Israel would be prepared to make in return. This is the more important in view of the Israeli estimate of the UAR missile program which implies that acquisition of gyros is the sole obstacle to activation of a 50–60 missile UAR stockpile. If Eshkol, whether or not he is firmly convinced of the accuracy of this estimate, feels his actions must be governed by it, the question of undertakings may involve verification and/or destruction. 2. What we have in mind would be some sort of private statement by each side, through the US or in some other manner, that each is prepared to abandon both indigenous offensive (meaning surface-to-surface ballistic) missile activities and acquisition of such missiles from abroad. To see how feasible this might be, Embassy Tel Aviv is requested to approach Eshkol along the following lines soon after his return from Africa: A. We are gratified at the Prime Minister’s statesmanlike position on the missile question evidenced in the May 24 conversation. B. We believe this may afford an opportunity to encourage the UAR to abandon its missile program if Israel were to do likewise. We would have in mind that neither nation would (1) import offensive missiles or parts or (2) make such missiles or parts. We would assume that private declarations, either through the US or in some other manner, would be acceptable. (FYI. It would be helpful to have as precise a statement from Eshkol as possible on these points. End FYI.) If Eshkol resists committing Israel on its indigenous program the Embassy may state that continuing research work in either Israel or the UAR would presumably not be precluded. However, missile production and testing would have to be foresworn. C. You should mention in low key that US information on the UAR missile program does not support the Israeli assessment handed to Ambassador Barbour on May 24. If discussion ensues on this question, you may say that, for example, our information indicates the UAR is having trouble with numerous aspects of its program, including structural problems, guidance difficulties, other design problems, and skyrocketing costs of research and development. D. If Eshkol raises questions about either verification or destruction, you should seek his reasons. You may suggest that he remain flexible on these questions for the moment, until UAR views can be ascertained. You may point out in this connection that we recognize these questions may become problems but that we think such factors as the rising costs and poor progress of the UAR missile program, as well as Cairo’s presumed desire for Israeli restraint, might make some mutually advantageous arrangement possible. 3. FYI. The Department is giving careful thought to possible modalities for enabling Israel and the UAR, should some private understanding be attained on non-introduction of missiles, to carry off the matter publicly without undue repercussions should the two countries so desire. End FYI. 4. For Cairo . The Department would appreciate the Embassy’s comments on possible modalities that might help enable Nasser to make a private self-denying declaration of some sort on missiles. On what basis might some public position be desirable and feasible? It occurs to the Department that the UAR leadership may already have given thought to this subject, what with the lagging progress of its current missile program, its growing economic headaches generally, and the prospect that as things now stand Israel will probably be in position to deploy offensive missiles long before the UAR can demonstrate a capability to do so. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 UAR. Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Wolle; cleared by Symmes, Brewer, Rochlin, Toumanoff, Garthoff, Sisco, DePalma, and Acting SCI Deputy Director J. Wallace Joyce; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to Paris and London. 2 See Document 293 and footnote 3 thereto. 302. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 302. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 18, 1966. The Egyptians asked us in March to negotiate a new one-year $150 million PL 480 agreement. Our present six-month deal runs out this month. Nasser badly needs this food—and on heavily concessional terms if he can get them. His supplies will run out in October. Allowing time to ship, he must buy somewhere by early August. His economy is in worse shape than ever—reserves are all but exhausted. Despite Nasser’s need, Secretary Rusk recommends we not sign a new Title I–IV agreement now. 2 Instead, he proposes we offer to sell (probably $50 million) on CCC credit terms slightly better than those the UAR can get commercially from our competitors. We do not want to refuse to supply desperately needed food (our wheat was 60–70% of the supply in the cities last year). Besides, we want our farmers to make the sale since it is on fairly hard terms. Congress will be a lot more tolerant of CCC than of PL 480. We do not want to give Nasser a flat “No.” This is not necessary, and his violent reaction could cause us a lot of trouble. Instead, the Secretary would like to leave the door open to Title I–IV later. He would also continue Title III ($8–9 million in school lunches), the AID technical assistance program ($2 million) and the projects we support with our excess local currency. We recommend this line with some regret. 3 We still think it is worth trying to get closer to Nasser and to avoid splitting the Middle East into US and Soviet camps. But Nasser has left us little choice. He has almost dared us publicly not to renew our agreement. He has lambasted us on Vietnam. He continues to stir things up in Yemen and South Arabia. In general, he has not picked you up on the suggestion you made to Sadat last winter to discuss our differences quietly and build a more constructive relationship. We are not quite sure what he is up to. Our guess is that he is worried about his political base. For the first time, he has discovered plots among his junior officers and a serious assassination plot among the educated young men he thought he could count on. His stalemate in Yemen has alienated the military. So he is caught between the moderates who know the UAR must retrench to move ahead economically and his old-timers who talk a good revolution but have no idea how to develop a modern economy. Taking the Secretary’s line is taking a calculated risk. Nasser may react violently, but we think he is expecting this kind of answer so should be braced for it. Our unreadiness to agree on PL 480 now could hurt the moderate prime minister, who is pushing a sensible economic program. If he fell, his successor would probably be pro-Soviet and less sensible economically. It is equally possible, however, that mounting economic pressures will force Nasser to lean more heavily than ever on his Prime Minister as the only hope of pulling the UAR out of its economic mess. I recommend you approve Secretary Rusk’s line. 4 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, UAR Memos, Vol. IV. Secret. 2 Rusk’s June 16 memorandum is attached but not printed. 3 A June 4 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow states that the mood at a May 25 meeting of the Interdepartmental Review Group for Near Eastern Affairs (IRG/NEA) was not angry but “just fed up.” He continued, “We’ve tried hard over the past five years to do business with Nasser. But his public comments in the past few weeks are almost the last straw. We’ve tried our best to avoid a showdown, but Nasser seems to be forcing one—for reasons we haven’t figured out.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV) IRG/NEA was one of several interdepartmental groups dealing with regional issues. Its records are in the Department of State, NEA/RA Files: Lot 70 D 503. 4 The approval line is checked. 303. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 303. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, June 20, 1966, 6:40 p.m. 6653. Deptels 6581, 6537. 2 Subject: PL–480. 1. You authorized explain to UARG, at levels you deem appropriate (Embtel 3144), 3 that we cannot at present time give favorable response new PL–480 request. 2. Likewise we do not want give negative response and sincerely hope overall climate US–UAR relations will improve enough in future to make favorable response possible. 3. Therefore we propose keep request under consideration and will so inform press, public, and foreign representatives when questioned. 4. Drawing on points made in reftels to extent you feel appropriate, you should emphasize our present inability move positively in no way represents change in US policy toward UAR, has no punitive intention, represents no attempt impose definite conditions, and was not result of representation from any third country. Rather it simply reflects what is possible for us given present overall state of US relations with UAR. 5. In keeping with sincere desire be as forthcoming to UAR as present conditions permit, you may advise UARG: a. According our calculations, May–June wheat crop, shipments under present PL–480 program, recent CCC purchases, and anticipated foreign deliveries will cover UARG wheat needs through September or October. We willing meet additional requirements by offering CCC export credits for wheat/wheat flour. While there no absolute limits on amounts other than those imposed by US supply situation and UAR needs and ability finance, we are thinking tentatively in terms of 600,000 tons. Tobacco, corn, vegetable oil also available. b. Anticipate three year credits for wheat/wheat flour, tobacco, corn; one-third repayable end first year, one-third end second year, one-third end third year. Vegetable oil credit maximum one year and dependent supply situation. c. CCC credits last year required 100% US bank guarantee. Under present regulations US bank guarantees only 10%. While this might present problem for total credits of perhaps $50 million, UARG has been able to secure US bank 10% guarantee for CCC credits now being utilized. Waiver US bank guarantee unlikely. FYI: View commercial arrearages and foreign exchange position there also practical limits on amounts that UAR banks can guarantee. We unable specify limits at this time, but suggest total guarantees significantly greater than $50 million might be considered excessive. End FYI. d. USG also willing continue technical assistance projects, local currency loans for economic development, and renewed Title III program (about $11 million) in FY 67. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Wheelock, Atherton, and James H. Bahti of NE; cleared by Macomber, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon, Symmes, Davies, Mrs. Jacobson at the Department of Agriculture, Mrs. Bitterman of Food for Peace, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Handley. 2 Telegram 6581 to Cairo, June 4, informed Battle of the consensus reached by the IRG/NEA at its May 25 meeting on aid programs to the UAR and requested his comments. (Ibid.) Regarding telegram 6537 to Cairo, see footnote 2, Document 296 . 3 Telegram 3144 from Cairo, June 7, conveyed Battle’s concurrence in the program laid out in telegram 6581 to Cairo and suggested that his initial talk should be with Kaissouni, who had submitted the request for aid. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR) 304. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 304. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 21, 1966, 7:40 p.m. I have checked with Secretary McNamara, as you requested, on the economic program loan for Jordan. I have just received word from him that he concurs in the recommendation of Secretary Rusk, David Bell, Charles Schultze, and myself. 2 In relation to this loan, you will be interested in a talk I had this morning with Shimon Peres, former Israeli Defense Minister, whom Abe Feinberg brought in. He spoke with great respect of Hussein and cited the unspoken “agreement” between Israel and Jordan to dampen border troubles. He made clear that Israel prizes Hussein’s independence of Cairo to which our aid to Jordan is decisive. I recommend you approve this loan. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. II. Secret. 2 Rostow’s June 17 memorandum to McNamara requesting his views, a June 21 message telling Rostow McNamara had called to give his concurrence, and a memorandum of June 27 from McNamara to Rostow giving his formal concurrence are ibid. 3 The approval line is checked. 305. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 305. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 25, 1966, 5:30 p.m. Following our meeting with you on desalting in the Middle East, 2 we have carefully studied our commitment and drawn up tentative terms of reference for the U.S. coordinator. On the commitment, I conclude (the full record is attached): 3 1. We are publicly and privately committed to help Israel with technical assistance to study and plan a desalting program. 2. We are committed to help “as much as possible” with construction costs if studies prove the project feasible. The engineering study concluded that the project is technologically feasible but that its long-term economic costs and benefits still need to be determined. 3. We are not committed to a nuclear desalting plant, and the option of an oil-fueled plant remains open. However, we have talked enthusiastically about using nuclear energy and now have a study saying it is technically feasible. But we still have room to maneuver if a nuclear plant turns out to be politically or economically undesirable. 4. We are committed to appoint a high-level U.S. representative to discuss with an Israeli counterpart financing and other practical aspects of how to move ahead on the project. Therefore, I recommend you approve the following steps: 4 (1) Appoint our representative as soon as we can arrange it, even though we are not yet ready to talk to the Israelis. Our own position is still not firm on important policy issues, including how we might help finance the project if we decided to go ahead. The coordinator can help pin down our position and should share in formulating his final instructions. Any first-rate man would wish to help shape the enterprise from an early stage. I recommend Douglas Dillion as the man best equipped to handle the difficult economic aspects of this project while still having the necessary diplomatic experience. The Israelis have mentioned Bob Anderson as combining the same qualifications. Averell Harriman and Mac Bundy are also on Secretary Rusk’s list. Approve now Wait until Disapprove Approve——as coordinator (2) Tell the Israelis privately now whom you have appointed, but ask them to agree to hold off joint announcement until later in the summer in order to give him time to do his homework. For both domestic and foreign political reasons, we want to space our Israeli gestures. We announced the aircraft sale 20 May. We now have this year’s AID loan almost ready for announcement but do not want to put it out while Faisal is here. We have $6 million left over from an old loan that you have delayed transferring to a new one. That could move any time. We have President Shazar coming the first week in August. We want to fit announcement of the coordinator into this schedule in order to reap maximum domestic advantage and minimum Arab reaction. Approve Announce sooner; give me an appropriate date (3) Give the coordinator the attached terms of reference. 5 Briefly, these instruct him to: —Take about two months to review all available economic data (perhaps with the help of a good economist or other specialist) to find out whether further study is needed. A clear picture of Israel’s water position in the 1970’s is needed to determine how much concessional or grant financing or continuing subsidy would be involved if we went ahead. Don Hornig argues rightly that we should not pile one study on another, and the Israelis will not stand still for that either. But my understanding is that we still do not have an economic picture of Israel in the 1970’s which gives us a clear picture of what water prices will be acceptable then. —Recommend what further study may be needed after he has completed these preliminary reviews. If he feels we need no more study, he should recommend a USG position. If he thinks we should go ahead with the project, he should recommend a way to finance it. He should also recommend the timing and content of his first approach to the Israelis. Approve terms of reference See me (4) Tell the coordinator to look especially closely at the problem of requiring the Israelis to accept IAEA safeguards on this, Dimona and all future reactors. Our current position is to make this our price for going ahead with a nuclear plant. We know the Israelis will not accept this condition readily, if at all. But we would stick with our position rather than prompting the bureaucracy to begin thinking about fall back positions already. However, our coordinator will have to know this problem inside out to argue our case with the Israelis. Moreover, we must be realistic about Israeli resistance on this point and will have to know whether there are other good ways to achieve our objective. Approve I do not want to press Israel too hard on safeguards (5) Attach the coordinator to the White House. The Israelis want to feel that he is your man and, from our point of view, that is not a bad idea. Only here will he find enough freedom from bureaucratic lobbying to sort this out. However, this might bring you more directly under fire, and it might be possible for a man of Dillon’s or Harriman’s stature to retain his independence if located in State. Attach him to White House Put him in State Don Hornig’s staff and Charlie Schultze’s have participated in working out this approach. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret. The source text bears Johnson’s handwritten notation, “Walt, See me. L.” It bears no indication of his approval or disapproval. 2 The President met with Rostow, Schultze, Hornig, and other members of his staff on June 15 to discuss the question of appointing a coordinator on desalting projects in Israel and the United Arab Republic. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) See Document 299 . A memorandum for the record by Saunders, dated August 10, records a 20-minute meeting of Johnson, Rostow, Schultze, Hornig, and other staff members on Israeli and UAR desalting, evidently the June 15 meeting, although Saunders, dates it on June 22. According to the memorandum, Rostow outlined key questions to be answered, Schultze and Hornig stated their views, and Johnson asked Rostow to find out the extent of the U.S. commitment to Israel on the project and then “tell me what I ought to do.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona, 4/1/66–12/31/66) 3 Not attached. 4 None of the options in this memorandum is checked. 5 The attached “Terms of Reference for U.S. Coodinator on Israeli and UAR Desalting Plants” is dated June 25. A virtually identical document dated August 12 was sent to the President with a memorandum of that date from Rostow outlining plans for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to begin his work as coordinator at the end of August and present his recommendations in November, recommending delaying announcement of Bunker’s appointment until mid-September, and recommending the President’s approval of the terms of reference. Johnson approved Rostow’s recommendations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V) 306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, June 27, 1966, 7:09 p.m. 6689. 1. UAR Ambassador Mostafa Kamel upon return to Washington from leave and consultation in UAR told Department officer June 24 he found in Cairo atmosphere suspicion and fear of US intentions. Yemen prime issue facing UARG and many Egyptian officials believed US supporting King Faisal’s intransigent stand in order bring down Nasser regime. President Nasser thought UAR had satisfied major US needs through moderate constructive policies, i.e., a) nonaligned UAR position and avoidance close association with USSR and communism, b) US oil interests intact, c) Israel in “ice box.” US reluctance cooperate with UAR strengthened hand leftist elements anxious discredit Muhyadin government. In order gain ascendancy, these elements seeking undermine US–UAR relations and create climate that would prevent US sale wheat to UAR. 2. After enormous effort and at great risk to personal career, Kamel said he had convinced Nasser and key UAR officials of need for UAR give US clear evidence its desire improve relations. 3. Kamel cited as examples of past UAR actions indicative of desire cooperate with West: a. Settlement of difficulties between UARG and Pan American Oil Company. b. Offer to compensate damages to USIS Library. c. UAR letter of intent to Westinghouse to arrange financing for construction nuclear power and desalting plant. (Apparently failure of International General Electric to arrange financing for this project has induced UARG to try its luck with Westinghouse.) d. UARG decision purchase three Boeing aircraft for United Arab Airlines. e. Submission of draft law to National Assembly to solve outstanding difficulties with Shell company. f. Invitations to Davies, head of Food Machinery Corporation, and other US businessmen to visit UAR and interest them in participation economic development projects. 4. As measure continuing UAR desire for closer relations with West, Kamel said he authorized state: a. UAR has no desire make UK position in NE difficult. UAR prepared help UK in orderly honorable withdrawal from South Arabia provided HMG complied with UN resolution. (Kamel feels UARG believes desirable resume diplomatic relations with UK, perhaps after discussion this issue at OAU conference Addis Ababa in September. Helpful UK attitude toward solution Yemen problem would do much facilitate resumption relations.) b. UAR does not believe in making axis. If Faisal wants Islamic pact UAR not inclined respond by creation “progressive” axis, e.g., UAR, Syria, Algeria. UAR desires close bilateral relations with other Arab states, but no axis. UAR meetings with one or more Arab states for purpose exchange views only. c. UAR unaware of and did not support Shuqairy announcement plan send PLA volunteers to help Viet Cong. In fact UARG arrested Syrian head of volunteer group in Cairo. d. Uncertain whether proposed Tricontinent Conference (AALAPSO) will take place in Cairo as scheduled 1968. If it should, UAR will be model of moderation and help US against ChiCom activities. e. Decision taken settle all outstanding US claims en bloc as was done with Belgian claims. f. Kamel carrying letter to Secretary from Sadat renewing invitation visit UAR. Also has gift photo of President Nasser for President Johnson. 5. Kamel stressed need for corresponding evidence US desire cooperate with UAR: a. He was instructed to ask for the sale of $50 million of wheat on CCC credit. USG help with 10% guarantee (i.e., $5 million) from US banks also sought. b. Foregoing arrangement would ease pressure on UAR to assure meeting immediate food needs. Kamel recognized problems posed by election year and said he clearly expected no public response to UAR PL–480 until late November. Desirable however reassure UARG by secret advance expression intent respond favorably. Kamel convinced if US does not signal intention conclude PL–480 agreement, Soviet Union will provide wheat. Ambassador said only his persuasion prevented UAR acceptance Soviet wheat offer at time Kosygin visit. c. Kamel said imperative US make Faisal understand wheat issue not plaything. Only then would Faisal abandon hope damaging US–UAR relations and follow path of reason that could permit Yemen settlement. 6. Department officer had impression UAR Ambassador may have been given last chance to bring home bacon, despite skepticism at home about probable success his efforts. Kamel made point of suggesting you inform Deputy PriMin Fawzi, FonMin Riad, and Presidential Adviser al-Kholi that he made detailed expose to Department officer upon arrival, hopes to see Assistant Secretary Hare and White House Special Assistant Rostow week June 27 and Secretary upon return from trip to Far East July 9. 7. Department officer conveyed gist Deptel 6653 2 to Kamel and summarized report your meeting with Kaissouni (Embtel 3267). 3 He also cautioned against expecting US officials be impressed by actions taken by UARG (e.g., Pan American and Shell) which dictated primarily by Egyptian economic imperatives. Constructive attitude toward Yemen and South Arabia and demonstrable progress toward improving area stability might brighten prospects future US–UAR cooperation. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes and Officer in Charge of UK Affairs Thomas M. Judd, and approved by Handley. Repeated to London. 2 Document 303 . 3 Battle reported in telegram 3267 from Cairo, June 23, that he met with Kaissouni and explained the U.S. response to his March request for a new $150 million P.L. 480 agreement. He observed that the session had gone quite smoothly and commented, “We, in fact, puzzled by low key reaction and lack of effort pressure US for immediate favorable decision.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR) 307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, July 13, 1966, 7:18 p.m. 7004. Following summary uncleared FYI/Noforn and subject to revision upon review memcon. 1. UAR Ambassador Kamel saw Secretary for nearly ninety minutes July 13. Kamel opened by saying Secretary had been missed in Cairo. Secretary expressed regret Vietnam matters had prevented his visit. 2. Kamel detailed number of officials and other leaders he had talked to during his sojourn Cairo, complimented Ambassador Battle, and said he had been in UAR during very critical period in US–UAR relations. He now in position convey officially that Nasser wants work with President and Secretary strengthen relations. As evidence UAR intentions, GUAR had taken following actions: 3. A. Yemen and South Arabia . Nasser had told Battle UAR did not wish complicate Yemen situation but to settle it. UAR welcomed Kuwaiti mediation, cooperating with Kuwaitis and hoped Saudis would do same. UAR had no intentions jeopardize US oil interests or take over South Arabia. UAR proposed USG exercise its “good offices” informally to help settle matters. UAR would take no action leading to deterioration Yemen situation if Saudi Arabia did not aggravate. 4. B. Viet Cong . Kamel understood US reaction to opening VC office Cairo. At same time, USG in past had asked UAR to speak to Hanoi. NVN reaction had often been tell UAR to speak to VC. Therefore Egyptians thought that mere “formality” of permitting VC (who were already in Cairo) open office might be helpful. UAR had no intention embarrass USG. 5. C. AALAPSO Conference . While Egypt not big country it had big government and not always possible control all its actions. Nasser, when told of US reaction to UAR’s hosting AALAPSO conference in 1968, had said, “who knows what will happen between now and 1968.” In any event USG should not condemn UAR a priori. 6. D. “ Blocs” in NE . Nasser had said he against idea of any “blocs, groups or axes” in area. Splitting of Arab world would create tension, attract cold war and Communist exploitation. It was not Cairo that had proposed Islamic Pacts, etc. UAR urged USG use its influence discourage groupings in NE. 7. E. UK . Kamel told Secretary “officially but secretly” that UAR disposed resume relations with UK. Thought it might take place after upcoming OAU meeting at Addis. Intimated that US might help by speaking to Prime Minister Wilson when he visited US. Said no real conflict between UK and UAR over South Arabia. 8. Kamel then moved to steps he hoped USG could take to respond to UAR actions. a. Kamel delivered Secretary second invitation from Sadat which he said had been authorized by Nasser. Hoped Secretary would visit Cairo perhaps around end of year. Secretary expressed thanks. b. Kamel asked for opportunity meet with President. Secretary said we would take it up. 9. Kamel then reviewed economic actions UAR had taken: settlement for library, discussion re global agreement for US claims, Panam oil agreement, decision buy Boeings, invitations to American industrialists, etc. 10. Kamel reverted to situation Cairo during his stay there. Said we had won that particular battle but situation still at crossroads. Nasser had spoken to Kamel re US reactions to his speeches on Yemen. Nasser said US should ask for reasons before condemning. There some elements in GUAR who were telling Nasser US was working with Faisal overthrow Nasser. Others did not question US intentions but said USG not using enough influence with Faisal and that risk (e.g. demise of Nasser regime) was the same. Nasser under pressure to save his regime. Nasser saw reports of Congressional and other influential Americans’ statements re “no wheat for Egypt” as invitation to Egyptian people to revolt. UAR Army in Yemen faced with choice between something that could be called victory in Yemen or debacle. Some felt that if debacle in Yemen or revolt in Egypt seemed inevitable there was something to be gained by precipitating crisis now. Nasser had asked Kamel explain pressure UAR was under. Felt USG would understand because it had similar situation in another part of the world. 11. Kamel then outlined “transitory” steps he hoped USG would take soon: 1) Reiterate US desire for honorable settlement in Yemen. 2) Secretary’s visit to UAR at turn of year. 3) Appointment with President for Kamel. Perhaps correspondence at Presidential level could be resumed; 4) Visit of US Senatorial delegation to UAR. 5) Support UAR efforts obtain 10% bank guarantee for CCC wheat. 6) Move ahead with grain silo project. 7) Encourage IBRD to resume loans to UAR. 8) Support UAR efforts obtain help from IMF. (Secretary interposed UAR’s need to maintain confidence of Bank and Fund. This essential in creating attractive atmosphere for private capital. Visits of leading American industrialists also helpful.) 9) Postpone UAR debt payments to USG agencies. 12. Kamel said that on longer term we had to face up to resumption PL 480. CCC might keep wheat channel open for few months. Important thing was that channel not be closed. If it were closed price would be high, although Kamel admitted US could probably afford it. Question would be whether UAR remained nonaligned or not. It was as simple as that. 13. Final question was question of nuclear weapons in area. UAR would accept international controls over its atomic activities. Secretary said this was very important statement. Kamel said that if Israel produced atomic weapons USSR would obtain bases in NE. Kamel suggested that approach might be in context non-nuclear areas ultimately to be tied into global agreement. 14. Secretary said he hoped see Kamel again within very few days and give him official answers to many important questions Kamel had raised. Rest of conversation taken up with informal, exploratory comments by Secretary. 2 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Donald C. Bergus, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv. 2 See Document 308 . 308. Memorandum of Conversation 308. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 13, 1966. SUBJECT US–UAR Relations III—Secretary’s Unofficial Comment PARTICIPANTS The Secretary NEA—Ambassador Hare NEA:UAR—Donald C. Bergus Ambassador of the United Arab Republic, Dr. Mostafa Kamel Kamel concluded by saying that the UAR wanted to cooperate with the United States, that it had taken measures to prove this, and that he hoped to have an opportunity to convey this directly to the President. The Secretary said that he wanted to see Ambassador Kamel again soon to make an official comment on his presentation. As for Kamel’s request to see the President, we would take this matter up. The Secretary wanted time to think about the other points. The rest of the Secretary’s remarks would be made on a personal basis and should not for the time being be reported. The Secretary had followed the Ambassador’s presentation with interest and appreciation. He was grateful for the renewed invitation to visit Cairo and would be in touch with the Ambassador about it. He hoped that the Ambassador would come in again in a very few days. On the question of divisions in the Arab world, the Secretary wanted the Ambassador’s frank assessment of the competition between the Arab Socialist countries vs. the conservative ones. While we would not expect Egypt to stop saying its methods were the best way to achieve economic development, would it be possible for Egypt to consider this a problem that each country should solve for itself? Kamel replied that Nasser was convinced that it was not his business to change other countries. He felt that if the Yemen were solved, this problem would be resolved. The issue of “groupings” among Arab states depended heavily on US–UAR relations. It was important that Egypt not feel it was being cornered. The Secretary expressed personal appreciation for Ambassador Kamel’s efforts in the field of US–UAR relations. As to food, the problem was changing dramatically. There would be a Development Assistance Committee (DAC) conference next week to talk about the world food problem over the next ten years. The world was facing a terrible crisis. Before World War II the underdeveloped countries sold food to the industrial countries. Now the industrial countries were sending 40 million tons annually to the underdeveloped countries. Surpluses had been exhausted. As a colleague of the Secretary’s had remarked, there could no longer be a “garbage-can approach” to the problem. Acreage would have to be increased to meet the additional food needs. The orders of magnitude were staggering. We would be sending India wheat in quantities amounting to about 60% of what the US consumed annually. But still this was a relatively small percentage of India’s annual need. It was a worldwide problem which everyone must go flat out to solve. The countries short of food would have to take rigorous measures. We had so insisted to the Indians. The US had taken risks in drawing down its own food reserves to meet the needs of others. Maybe, the Secretary continued, we should look at the UAR in the context of the world food problem. We could examine what the UAR was doing in such fields as use of Aswan Dam waters, desalination, etc. and come to a projection over a ten-year period. This might establish a different framework than the one under which the US has sent food in the past. A framework of total effort might be an improvement on past methods which have sometimes been unhappy. The Secretary reemphasized that he was speaking informally, personally and unofficially. The Secretary had been stimulated by the UAR statement of willingness to accept international controls on nuclear activities. This was a most important development. We would see what we could do to make it of significance. The United States was utterly opposed to the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. On Yemen, the Secretary was not sure that a direct role by the United States was the best way a solution could be found. If the US got into the negotiating process it would bring a lot of extra baggage with it in the form of relationships and understandings in other fields. Perhaps the formal Kuwaiti role could be built upon. The Secretary would comment officially later. His impression was that both sides desired a settlement. Certainly the Yemenis themselves must pray daily for a settlement. What perhaps was needed was more diplomatic precision in instruments of settlement. During Faisal’s visit to the United States, the Secretary had been struck by the fact that he had not wanted to create difficulties for the UAR. Faisal had referred to Nasser as his “Arab brother” and said the Arabs must find ways to live with each other. Faisal had told the Secretary privately that he would not object to food going to other Arabs. The Secretary thought that the view that the Bank and Fund have a constructive role to play in Egypt’s development was a good one. The Secretary said there was no element of truth in the proposition that the US had any interest or any activity in an attempt to overthrow President Nasser. This would be beyond the pale. A delicate problem in US–UAR relations arose from the fact that the United States at long last was becoming sensitive. This was not just a problem of Zionist pressures. There was growing recognition of the need for protecting the sense of dignity of the President and the Secretary of State. Kamel returned to the possibility of resuming Presidential correspondence. The Secretary said we would think about this. The US, continued the Secretary, had exhausted its capability to go on its knees bearing gifts. We did not necessarily want gratitude. We could live with silence but not with abuse. Kamel said he had done what he could in this regard. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bergus and approved in S on July 25. The memorandum is Part III of III parts; Parts I and II are ibid. For the remainder of the conversation, see Document 307 . 309. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 309. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, July 16, 1966, 1335Z. 124. Ref Amman 106. 2 1. In noon audience with King Hussein I raised subject armor on West Bank. Said had hoped raise subject informally in course future discussions other matters but had thought best bring subject his attention now in view his current plan for extended absence Jordan (Embtel 116), 3 his expressed desire I discuss such matters only with him, and our concern that no indiscreet use be made of tanks during his absence. 2. Recalled King’s discussions with Ambassador Barnes in March 1965 (Embtel 536, March 12) 4 and understanding then reached that, while he could make no commitment re internal disposition of armed forces, it was his intent under normal conditions keep armor off West Bank. Said we had been aware for some time presence small number of tanks south of Jenin; had assumed they moved there following Israeli raids night April 29–30, but had not mentioned them in expectation would be withdrawn as situation calmed down. 3. King responded that above was correct description his intentions, that in fact two tank battalions had been withdrawn into hills on East Bank and that few, if any, tanks remained on West Bank. He avoided flat statement none there, and I did not pretend to any exact knowledge as to number and whereabouts of any remaining. Rather, I expressed satisfaction tanks in fact were being withdrawn, at same time stressing U.S. concern avoid any confrontation American tanks across Jordan-Israeli frontier, alluding specifically to Congressional concern this spectacle in Pak-Indian confrontation. 4. Expressing his understanding, Hussein went on refer to recent incidents between Syria and Israel, 5 asserting this further demonstration Israeli intent keep pot boiling. I countered to extent only of saying fortified nature Syrian side made it highly unlikely incursions into Israel made without knowledge Syrian military. 5. Comment : I avoided any allusion to report JAA plan station two tank battalions on West Bank but hope that if such is plan, my reference to indiscreet use of tanks during King’s absence will bring delay or reconsideration. In any case, Hussein certainly again aware our continuing concern. Adams 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 6–8 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House and USIA. 2 Dated July 14. (Ibid.) 3 Dated July 15. (Ibid., POL 7 JORDAN) 4 Document 188 . 5 Terrorist incidents on July 13 and 14 in Israel near the Syrian border were followed by an Israeli airstrike against Syrian territory on July 14. Following complaints by both Israel and Syria to the UN Security Council, the Council discussed the incidents between July 25 and August 3. On July 29, Jordan and Mali submitted a draft resolution condemning Israel’s July 14 attack, calling on the Israeli and Syrian Governments to cooperate with the UNTSO Chief of Staff and urging reactivation of the Mixed Armistice Commission (UN document S/7437). On August 3, the Security Council voted on the draft resolution, which failed of adoption by 6 votes to 0, with 9 abstentions, including the United States. 310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, July 28, 1966, 3:49 p.m. 16922. 1. Israeli Envoy Gideon Rafael, accompanied by Amb. Harman, today presented to Secretary results of GOI task force deliberations on possible initiatives on refugee problem. He began by saying GOI has not made any decision, but would like to put forth some tentative proposals for our consideration. 2. Rafael said GOI eliminated possibility of any overall peace proposal because Arabs would not accept that. Repatriation means for Arabs driving Israel out of Mideast. This left rehabilitation-resettlement as only possible basis for progress. 3. He recalled US and UN had negotiated resettlement projects with Syria, Egypt and Jordan under UNRWA rehabilitation fund in early fifties, and then proposed we prepare ground at GA for creation of similar rehabilitation instrument financed by international subscription to which Israel could contribute with help of loans. 4. When Secretary asked if GOI excludes repatriation, Rafael said yes, at this stage, because repatriation is symbol of Arab hostility to existence of Israel. Time is ripe, he said, for rehabilitation and against repatriation which is not realistic basis for settlement. GOI is inspired by Hussein’s speech, 2 he said, and believes his ideas about “breaking down walls of UNRWA and getting refugees out of camps” should be encouraged. 5. In reply to question, Rafael said Jordan should be approached separately, because divisions in Arab world would prevent Arabs from acting as group. Lebanon would go along when feasible, Harman added. 6. When Secretary asked if GOI already in touch with any Jordanians on this, Rafael said no, GOI wanted first to discuss with USG. GOI does not want to make approach, he said. 7. He then added GOI for time being only wants to prepare groundwork at UNGA for this project, i.e. to conduct debate in such way as to show Arabs UNRWA is not permanent fixture, that UN will not respond to further Arab attempts to politicize this question. When Secretary asked if GA then would be final rather than first step, Rafael said first steps would be reform of UNRWA, reduction of relief rolls, elimination of PLA, then assuring that host states prepared to take over responsibility—these would prepare ground for this proposal. 8. Rafael asked if US would take up proposal with Jordanians. Secretary said USG could not take lead. If we broached idea, question of repatriation would immediately arise. He suggested Israelis might wish approach SYG Thant and ask him if he would take this up. Jordanians should be asked if King Hussein’s speech indicated any Arab interest in rehabilitation, he added. 9. Rafael said this idea was GOI constructive approach to problem. If this not acceptable, he indicated, many felt GOI should simply take no action but remain strong and wait for more favorable time for dealing with refugee problem. 10. Secretary noted that Arabs know rehabilitation has been available to them from outset. He said he had no indication they had changed in their negative attitude toward it. He also cautioned that UN unlikely to forget repatriation aspect of resolutions. 11. Secretary concluded by stating he not rejecting suggestion “if you and Arabs agree on it,” but indicated again Israelis should sound out Arabs through their own means. 12. Above is full record of conversation and no additional memcon being prepared. 13. Rafael’s earlier separate conversations with Assistant Secretaries Hare and Sisco followed same line as above. Memcons by pouch. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF PAL. Confidential; Noforn Except Israeli officials. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Symmes and Sisco, and approved by Buffum. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and to Geneva for Goldberg. 2 Reference is to a June 14 speech by King Hussein in which, inter alia, he declared his rejection of “the absurd logic and the weak policy which advocates keeping Palestinians in tents and camps surrounded by barbed wire.” Telegram 787 from Amman, June 20, transmitted that portion of his speech. (Ibid., POL 15–1 JORDAN) The Embassy in Amman commented on the speech in telegrams 776, June 15, and 778, June 16, highlighting what telegram 778 called the King’s “blistering attack” on the PLO, and his charge that the peril of Communism was greater and more dangerous than that of Zionism. (Both ibid.) 3 A memorandum of Rafael’s July 26 conversation with Hare is ibid., REF ARAB. A memorandum of his July 27 conversation with Hare and Sisco is ibid., REF 3 UNRWA. 311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, July 28, 1966, 6:42 p.m. 17321. Following summary uncleared FYI/Noforn and subject to revision upon review memcon. Salient points Secretary’s remarks to UAR Ambassador Kamel July 28: 1. US wants find continually strengthened basis for its relations with UAR. This does not mean we seek agreement all points. Does mean it important that we look at points difference, resolve them if we can or try to circumscribe them if we cannot. 2. Secretary wants come Cairo but unable set date at this time. Not likely be before November. Secretary would like visit Cairo and other countries in area. 3. We would let Kamel know re appointment with President. 4. Congressional visits to UAR would be useful, probably more feasible after November elections. We could exchange suggestions as to whom UAR might wish invite. 5. Re Yemen, Secretary said we had taken full note Kamel’s July 13 statement that UAR would do nothing exacerbate situation provided SAG did likewise. Everyone seemed want settlement but up to present settlement “just beyond our fingertips.” We remained interested in settlement and would continue direct contacts with interested party. We did not wish undertake formal role in mediation but would pass on thoughts or ideas as they occurred. 6. Secretary congratulated UAR for having obtained necessary 10% American bank guarantees for CCC food purchases and said we would try expedite CCC implementations. 7. On UAR’s longer term food needs, Secretary noted El Sayah July 22 statement to Hare that UAR hoped be able obtain food requirements without outside assistance by 1972. On unofficial basis Secretary suggested might be helpful if UAR could let us have what information it could on its plan. Seemed to Secretary that approaching UAR food problem in broader framework of world situation might allow all of us to be more constructive and more relaxed. 8. Secretary emphasized that maintaining confidence of IMF and IBRD was extremely important to any country. FYI. Kamel’s reaction to para 7 indicated concern lest GUAR might get impression USG was foreclosing resumption of PL 480 Title I sales. He said this matter would have to be handled in Cairo with great delicacy. Secretary assured him our continuing interest UAR food problem. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Hare. Also sent to Jidda and Taiz. 312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, July 28, 1966, 8:39 p.m. 17501. After discussion Israeli proposal on refugee problem (State 16922), 2 Secretary raised question of Israeli nuclear intentions. He noted Soviet interest in denuclearization and said that if Israel would agree to IAEA safeguards, he believed its Arab neighbors would also agree and USSR would go along. Would Israel agree to IAEA safeguards, he asked. Ambassador Rafael said Israel was not giving any thought to it at present because of GOI’s concern for broader problem of conventional weapons. Rafael said Soviets did not indicate to Israelis in Geneva they would be willing to limit conventional arms in area in exchange for nuclear ban. He added Israel made clear its position it would not be first to introduce nuclear weapons in Near East. Secretary noted our assumption GOI does not wish go nuclear, and added: If you do, you will lose US support. If on the other hand, you accepted nuclear ban, he continued, your neighbors would follow you and that would be first step toward reduction of tensions. Secretary said we cannot guarantee USSR interested in conventional arms limitation, but nuclear question can be separated out and that consideration is fundamental to US position. Secretary then told Israelis that nothing would be more disastrous to GOI than enter nuclear weapon field, and urged them to agree to international safeguards. When Rafael protested nuclear ban does not take care of GOI’s problem with conventional weapons, Secretary said: This means then you want to hang on to the threat of nuclear weapons. Rafael said no, GOI has made position clear in Knesset, but there are some people in Israel—not in govt—who say Israel should go nuclear. Secretary said either this card is in your deck, or it is not. If it’s not, then get it out of the way by accepting safeguards. He again noted that if Israel is holding open the nuclear option, it should forget US support. We would not be with you, he said. Secretary asked Israel to bring this matter to attention of Eban. They suggested it might be discussed further while Eban is in US for GA. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Symmes and Sisco, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Geneva for Goldberg. 2 Document 310 . 313. Letter From the Charge in the United Arab Republic (Nes) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) 313. Letter From the Charge in the United Arab Republic (Nes) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) 1 Cairo, July 28, 1966. Dear Rodger: Ever since arriving here a little more than a year ago, I have sought some way of breaking out of the ever tightening circle of our relations with the UAR occasioned by our own political realities on the one hand and the continuing foreign adventures of the UAR on the other. May I say that I have always been absolutely convinced of the necessity, if at all possible, of retaining the maximum Western position in the UAR. Frankly I am discouraged. The following are my own comments and I have not discussed them with the staff: 1. Haikel’s 22 July article (Cairo 381) and Nasser’s 23 July speech (Cairo 388) 2 could indicate that the UARG is no longer thinking in terms of an eventual affirmative U.S. response to their $150 million PL 480 food request and are preparing to act accordingly. 2. If this is true, and there is other evidence to substantiate such a conclusion, we may, indeed, be in for the “hot” summer Haikel referred to earlier. 3. Without the restraints imposed by food expectations and facing a deteriorating internal economic situation and an external financial crisis, we may see an increasing resort to foreign “adventures” such as terrorism in Saudi Arabia designed as a prelude to a “war of liberation” against the Faisal regime, greatly increased terrorism in Aden to force a British withdrawal and humiliation before 1968, renewal of the campaign against Wheelus Field and open support for North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong. This latter change from the official neutral attitude could be presaged in Nasser’s speech; “American hostile action against North Viet Nam is an obstacle to peaceful settlement—We must—denounce American hostile action—.” 4. Since there has been no discernible improvement in the overall climate of U.S.-UARG relations since the May IRG meeting, I believe Washington should reconsider whether it is really in our long range interests, if indeed we wish to continue to seek to achieve our more limited objectives in the Near East, to tie food for the UAR so tightly to its performance in the Arabian Peninsula. Are our interests there more important than preserving what remains of the U.S. and Western position in the UAR; is it really wise to use food as a club at all? 5. Since I have no solid regional basis for recommending any change in our tactics at this time, I wish only to reiterate the dangers which may flow from a starving, frustrated and desperate Egypt. I would imagine that the IRG will again be meeting on the UAR food problem later in the summer and you might at that time like to stress, perhaps more forcibly than has hitherto been done, the very grave dangers involved in pushing Nasser into a financial and food corner. If we should embark upon a policy of endeavoring to replace him with a more moderate leadership in the UAR, this is of course another matter and one not supported in the current draft of our National Policy Paper. Do not feel that you need reply to this letter. I write you only because I want to be sure that all factors involved in our current tactics toward Egypt should be seen in the light of their possible repercussions. Sincerely, David 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Official-Informal. 2 Both telegrams are dated July 22. (Ibid.) 314. Memorandum of Conversation 314. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 2, 1966. SUBJECT Call on President Johnson by President Shazar PARTICIPANTS President Lyndon B. Johnson His Excellency Zalman Shazar, President of Israel His Excellency Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel Mr. Ephraim Evron, Minister, Embassy of Israel NEA—Assistant Secretary Raymond A. Hare The Honorable Walworth Barbour, Ambassador to Israel Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President S/CPR—The Honorable James W. Symington (for portions) Mr. William Moyers (for portions) NEA/IAI—Harrison M. Symmes After a brief private conversation with President Shazar, President Johnson asked the other Israelis and Americans present to join him and President Shazar. President Shazar discussed some of the impressions he had gained in his visits to Uruguay, Brazil and Chile. He mentioned particularly educational problems faced by some of these countries and commented on some of the leaders he had met. President Shazar recalled he had first met President Johnson at the funeral of President Kennedy. He had been one of the first Chiefs of State received by President Johnson after the funeral. They had had a memorable conversation in which President Johnson assured him there would be no diminution in U.S. support of Israel as a result of President Kennedy’s death, but, indeed, U.S. support might be even greater. He had reiterated to President Shazar assurance previously made by President Kennedy. After his return to Israel President Shazar said he had repeated to persons all over Israel what President Johnson had said to him. He continued to tell people about the President’s assurances to Israel. President Shazar thanked President Johnson for the sale of U.S. military equipment to Israel. President Johnson responded that this had been a difficult decision because we do not wish to become an arms merchant anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, we had made the sales because we had been persuaded by Israel that the arms were necessary. President Shazar commented that Israel in turn does not like to have to buy arms. Israel would like nothing better than to live at peace with its neighbors, but Israel has been given no alternative. The Fatah raids on Israel have resulted in the murder of innocent Israelis. Israel has no alternative but to defend itself. To establish its own Fatah is no alternative. It must have military force to deter its enemies. President Shazar at one point apparently misunderstood President Johnson and thought he was referring to the current U.N. Security Council consideration of Syrian and Israel complaints. It appeared he thought President Johnson had referred to “Israeli aggression.” He said that Israel had not always been happy about U.N. consideration of problems involving Israel. U.S. representatives in the U.N. did not always take a clear-cut line with regard to problems involving Israel and the Arabs. Unless the U.S.G. takes a clear-cut line with the Arabs and shows by its votes that it is opposed to aggression the Arabs will not get the message. U.S. action is particularly important in persuading the younger generation in Israel: a “skeptical generation” among a “believing people.” The two Presidents had an extended discussion of the principles involved in the U.S. stand against aggression in Vietnam and its implications for U.S. assurances it will seek to deter and prevent aggression against other small states. President Johnson said that the U.S.G. did not want troops or money from Israel. We were asking for no material support from Israel in Vietnam. What we wanted was sympathetic understanding of the principles involved and what we are trying to do. The United States has commitments to other small states. It was important to ask this question: if, because of critics of our Vietnam policy, we did not fulfill our commitments to the 16 million people in Vietnam, how we could be expected to fulfill our commitments to 2 million Israelis? Yet some friends of Israel in the United States had publicly criticized U.S. policy in Vietnam and had called upon the President to disengage the United States from its commitment. President Johnson stressed that these critics seemed to believe that one could pick and choose how he would oppose aggression against small states. A principle was involved. Either we opposed aggression against small states and honored our commitments, or we did not. We could not fail to honor our commitments in one place and then try to hold to them in another place. Our failure to carry through in Vietnam would be bound to affect our ability to carry through in our commitment to other small states such as Israel. President Shazar and the other Israeli officials present indicated that they understood this principle and its implications. President Shazar noted that among the first things he had mentioned on reaching American soil was Israel’s appreciation for the policy of the United States toward the security of small states from aggression. This applied to the situation in Vietnam and what the United States was doing there. Other Israeli officials recently had spoken along similar lines. The President interjected that he had received from the Israel Embassy a statement recently made by Foreign Minister Eban along these lines. President Shazar commented that he was happy he could say he had made his statement before the President had raised the matter. This indicated Israel’s understanding of the principle. President Johnson emphasized that he had reiterated to President Shazar our assurances regarding Israel’s security. In doing so, he also wanted to make clear how our commitment in Vietnam and public criticism of that commitment was involved. During an extended discussion President Shazar said that he was President only of Israel, not of world Jewry, and that he had no control over what Jews elsewhere in the world might say. He and the other Israeli officials present indicated, however, that they understood President Johnson was referring to the criticism of U.S. Vietnam policy that had been made recently by Jewish groups in the United States, particularly Rabbi Weinstein, and that it would be important for the Government of Israel to make known its views on this matter. President Shazar gave every impression of comprehension of the problem. President Shazar showed President Johnson the statement he proposed to read to the press upon his departure from the White House (attached). 2 President Johnson indicated his approval of the statement. He also told Mr. Moyers that in speaking to the press about the call of President Shazar he might comment along the following lines: President Shazar had told the President about his recent visit to Latin America and his impressions of problems and leaders in the countries he visited. The two Presidents had then reviewed world problems and the desire of the United States and Israel to try to promote peace. President Shazar had stressed Israel’s desire to live at peace with her neighbors. The two Presidents had discussed the intention of the United States to help small nations to defend themselves against aggression. There had been some mention of the joint U.S.-Israel desalting project and U.S. economic assistance to Israel. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on August 5. According to the President’s Daily Dairy, the meeting took place at 12:46 p.m. in the President’s office at the White House. (Johnson Library) President Shazar’s visit was informal. Briefing material for the visit is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Israel, Shazar Visit Briefing Book. 2 Not attached. 315. Memorandum of Conversation 315. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 12, 1966. SUBJECT US–UAR Relations PARTICIPANTS Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the United Arab Republic The President The Secretary (joined the talks shortly after they began) NEA—Ambassador Hare White House—Mr. Rostow Ambassador Kamel expressed appreciation for being received. He conveyed the good wishes of President Nasser to the President and “to the newly-weds.” Kamel then said that President Nasser had very much appreciated the President’s photograph. President Nasser valued it highly not only for its own value but also as a symbol of the President’s wish to have good relations. Kamel then presented Nasser’s photograph to the President and said it was being given in the same spirit. The President expressed thanks. Ambassador Kamel then launched into a lengthy presentation which followed quite closely the presentation he gave the Secretary on July 13. 2 He said that Nasser wanted good relations with the United States, that these were important for the entire Near East and that good relations were compatible with the ideals of President Johnson. Nasser wishes to dispel confusion regarding our relations. Kamel thought it important that we differentiate the fundamentals from the nonfundamentals in our relations. The fundamentals included opposition to communism, continued flow to the West of oil, and calm in the Palestine situation. All other problems between us were secondary and they should not affect our judgment on the fundamentals. Kamel at this point and later in the conversation referred to the difficulties created by US communications media. Since returning from Cairo, Kamel could say authoritatively that the UAR would adhere to the fundamentals in our relationship and wished to work with us to resolve some of the smaller problems. Kamel likened US–UAR relations to a Catholic marriage in which there could be no divorce. The UAR had taken a number of actions to demonstrate its desire to work with the US. These had not just been words but were specifics. They had been intended as “signals” of the UAR’s good intentions. The UAR would persevere in seeking a settlement of the Yemen issue but it was not simple and it would take time. The UAR was willing to accept nuclear safeguards “as prescribed by Vienna.” Kamel warned that if any Middle East country obtained nuclear weapons it would create a very serious situation. At this point the President interposed that the US remained adamantly opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Near East. Kamel then reviewed the list of “signals” he had set forth in his July 13 discussion with the Secretary. The only new element was a statement that the UAR would do its best to make the maximum use of additional land reclaimed as the result of additional waters available from the Aswan High Dam. He stressed that after the present “transitional period” during which Egypt was obtaining its wheat needs through the CCC it would be essential to obtain some kind of food assistance in order to permit the UAR to remain non-aligned. He bespoke USG support for the UAR in the latter’s discussions with the IMF and World Bank. The President thanked Ambassador Kamel for his presentation. He noted that he was leaving Washington within a very short time. He would not attempt to discuss each individual point raised by the Ambassador. He would ask Messrs. Hare and Rostow to analyze the purport of the Ambassador’s presentation so that he could review it. The President said that if the Ambassador had any further points to make they should be communicated to Mr. Rostow. The President welcomed Ambassador Kamel’s statement on nuclear safeguards. He expressed the hope that the Yemeni talks would succeed. He said that the US desired improved relations with the UAR. He did not feel that there were any basic differences between us. He respected the efforts which had been made to improve these relations. Improvement would come more easily if our differences could be discussed quietly and not publicly. As a final point Ambassador Kamel stressed the importance of PL 480 assistance to Egypt and his hope that an agreement could be accomplished by early next year. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved at the White House on August 18. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 1:48 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. (Johnson Library) 2 See Documents 307 and 308 . 316. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hoopes) 316. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hoopes) 1 Washington, August 22, 1966. Dear Tim: We have given careful consideration to your letter of June 30 2 regarding certain weapons and components requested by the Government of Israel in connection with the A–4F package. I continue to agree with you that the United States should stand by the decision that the Sidewinder 1–C air-to-air missile, the Bullpup B air-to-ground missile, the Rockeye II cluster anti-tank weapon and the tail warning radar should be refused to Israel on general policy grounds. I also remain of the opinion that we should continue to avoid specifying to the Israelis reasons for our refusal to comply with their requests. As I mentioned in my letter of August 1, 3 we see no requirement in discussion of their requests to distinguish between “military” and “security” as opposed to “political” or other considerations and in fact see obvious disadvantages in making such distinctions. It is our opinion that, as with the four items mentioned above, the United States should also refuse to sell napalm bombs and fuzes to Israel on general policy grounds. This is a type of weapon that raises particularly sensitive reactions among the Arabs, as among others. I am not convinced by the arguments advanced thus far by the Israelis that we should provide even limited quantities of napalm equipment. To provide napalm after Israeli use of it in the July 14 retaliatory raid on Syria and the August 15 incident with Syria would indeed risk substantial political liabilities in our relations with the Arabs. Sincerely, Raymond A. Hare 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Wolle on August 18 and cleared by Symmes, Padelford of NEA/RA, and Warren of G/PM. 2 Not found. 3 Hare’s August 1 letter to Hoopes, concerning an Israeli request to produce military equipment for the A–4 aircraft, agreed that there was no objection to Israeli production of non-lethal stores and fittings but that the United States should refuse authorization for Israeli production of any lethal items. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 452.1 Israel) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 317. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 317. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, August 22, 1966, 10:53 p.m. 33056. Ref: Depcirtel 2464, June 15. 2 1. Dept authorizes Ambassador Barbour to accept anticipated formal Israeli Government invitation to attend inauguration ceremonies new Knesset building Jerusalem August 29–31. 2. We consider this inauguration one-time affair that is not to be regarded as precedent or pattern for future nor as representing any change in USG policy on status of Jerusalem. USG continues to support 1948 UN General Assembly resolution that provided for international status Jerusalem under UN administration, and does not recognize Jerusalem as de jure capital of Israel. We trust attendance of official Americans at Knesset opening will not be spotlighted. These points being made to Israeli Embassy here and should be reiterated by Embassy to GOI at appropriate time. 3. Department is informing British, Canadian, German, Belgian and Italian Embassies here since they previously queried us on US position. Embassy Paris may draw on above at its discretion in speaking to GOF. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–2 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle on August 17; cleared by Symmes and Hare and in substance by UK Country Director J. Harold Shullaw, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Spanish Sahara, and Tunisia Country Director John F. Root, Edward W. Schaefer of AFNE, and Kinsolving; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Bonn, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tripoli, and Tunis and pouched to Taiz. 2 Circular telegram 2464, June 15, summarizes a conversation that day between Lebanese Ambassador El Ahdab and Davies, in which El Ahdab expressed concern over the possible attendance by Ambassador Barbour at the ceremonial opening of the new Knesset in Jerusalem. (Ibid.) 318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, August 30, 1966, 12:06 a.m. 37395. Ref: Amman Embtel 470 to Dept. 2 You authorized to convey message contained para 10 reftel 3 to Israeli Govt at level you deem most appropriate, making clear that we simply acting as channel of communication. At same time you may express hope that in this reportedly tense situation no Israeli action will be undertaken which might be seized upon as pretext for Syrian action. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kinsolving and cleared in substance by Symmes and Davies. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Cairo, Jerusalem, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Telegram 470 from Amman, August 29, reported that Prince Hassan and Prime Minister Tell had told Burns of a Syrian report, relayed by the United Arab Command, that Israeli troops were massing on the Syrian frontier. They stated that, in the event of hostilities on the Israel-Syria border, the United Arab Command had ordered Jordan to launch an offensive into Israel. They felt that if they implemented the order, Jordan’s forces would be cut to pieces, but if they did not, Jordan would be accused of treason to the Arab cause. (Ibid.) 3 Paragraph 10 reported the request that the United States explain Jordan’s predicament to the Israelis in general terms and ask them to “keep the lid on.” 4 Telegram 769 from Tel Aviv, August 30, reported that Acting Director of the U.S. Affairs Department Argov, to whom the Embassy had passed the message, stated that the report was baseless. The telegram further stated that all information available to the Embassy indicated the report was without foundation. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR) 319. Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 319. Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, September 1, 1966. No. 1944/66 ARAB–ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY [Here follows Part I, an introduction.] II. Summary A. Arab-Israeli Comparison 1. Israel retains qualitative superiority over any of the various combinations of Arab states with which it could be expected to come into direct conflict. In addition, Israel possesses the industrial capability to improve and alter armored vehicles and to rehabilitate aircraft. As shown in Table Ib, the six Arab states—UAR (Egypt), Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia—which are most likely to come into direct major hostilities with Israel have a two-to-one numerical superiority in tanks, three-to-one in major naval units, two-to-two in fighter aircraft and ten-to-one in bombers. 2. In armor, the Arab numerical superiority is offset by Israel’s maintenance and training excellence as well as by factors of distance. For example, it is doubtful that Iraqi tanks could be sent across the Syrian desert quickly enough to play a meaningful role in conflict with Israel. This applies equally to self-propelled weapons. 3. Whatever the comparable technical qualities of the aircraft flown, the Israelis’ better training, greater aggressiveness and superior maintenance give them a good chance of coping with the Arab threat. The Israelis’ limitations include the small number of airfields and the short scramble time available to its aircraft because of the fact that all parts of Israel are within a few minutes’ flying time of its neighbors. 4. The accelerating arms race is involving both the Arabs and Israel in advanced weapons development, particularly in the missile field. The Israelis probably will be able to deploy a French-built surface-to-surface missile with a range of about 270 nautical miles by 1967–1968; the UAR may be able to deploy a few considerably less sophisticated missiles of slightly less range by 1970. Neither Egypt nor Israel is likely to have nuclear weapons by 1970. 5. The Egyptian Navy presents the only significant sea threat to Israel, which has taken the calculated risk of not building up a comparable naval force. The Israelis believe that their air power can neutralize the sea threat. 6. During the period through 1970, it is unlikely that any major change in procurement patterns will occur. Israel will continue to look to Western sources. The danger of Jordanian and Lebanese acquisition of Soviet-built weapons seems to have been averted for this period. Both Syria and Egypt will continue to rely on the USSR for their equipment. Although Iraq will acquire major items from the USSR under its May 1966 arms agreement, it will probably continue to procure some items—artillery and possibly aircraft—from Western sources. [Here follow Part II. B, country analyses, Part III, likely actions of arms suppliers, and Part IV, an explanation of the tables, 11 tables, and a map.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the paper was prepared in cooperation with INR and DIA. A table of contents is not printed. 320. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 320. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, September 7, 1966, 1352Z. 1246. Ref: State 35301. 2 1. Former Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson had lunch with me Sept 6 immediately following meetings with Kaissouni and PriMin Mohieddin. He said he had followed script suggested by Sec Rusk emphasizing following points: (A) USG unable make any food commitments to UAR at this time because our assistance is conditioned by Congressional attitudes and affected by pending legislation. Nevertheless USG has sincere desire for good relations with UAR and there are no inherent inhibiting factors. We do not ask UAR to abandon socialism or support US foreign policy. We do ask, however, that it be truly neutral between East and West and that it concentrate its energies on internal development. (B) UAR will be judged by its performance and not by expressions of intent. We do wish UAR to withdraw from Yemen and believe that this can be done with honor. The UAR must come to terms with the IMF and the IBRD and bring its expenditures into line with its avail resources. It is now extended far beyond its capabilities. (C) Public statements by senior UAR offs which tend to exacerbate differences between us are not helpful. There should be period of silence. (D) Sec Rusk sincerely wanted to visit the UAR and still does and was unable to come last spring solely because of the pressures of other work. It was not a political decision. 2. Mohieddin accepted points made by Anderson, apparently without rancor, and made following comments: (A) UAR wants to get out of Yemen but for this purpose needs clear and unambiguous agreement with the Saudis. (B) The UAR is interested in private foreign investment, particularly in fields of industrial and economic endeavor which have international implications and which are beyond the UAR’s own ability to finance, e.g., petro-chemicals. Port Said free zone has been the subject of considerable contention with leaders of the ASU, and it is not likely that it will amount to a great deal in the near future. Other less controversial projects avail for foreign investment. (C) The UAR needs USG help. 3. Anderson will provide me within few days with copy his memorandum of conversation with Mohieddin which I will forward to Dept by pouch. 4. Kaissouni expects to see Anderson prior his departure from Cairo and has indicated he desires advice as to what he should do at forthcoming IBRD-IMF meeting. Anderson convinced that UAR cannot meet hard currency obligations to U.S. and international agencies falling due next year and that it would be much better for GUAR frankly to inform Bank and Fund members this fact as soon as possible rather than await default with consequent increased bitterness and lack confidence this will entail. 5. I find Anderson’s visit has been useful and that repetition of line we have been taking here and in Wash DC by well-known Americans outside govt is all to good. He has been very cooperative. Nes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, TRV ANDERSON, ROBERT B. Confidential; Limdis. 2 Telegram 35301 to Cairo, August 25, stated that former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson’s forthcoming visit to Cairo was completely private, but that Secretary Rusk had briefed him along lines recommended by NEA. (Ibid.) 321. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 321. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, September 10, 1966, 0745Z. 1296. Former Treasury Secretary Anderson gave Blackiston 2 resume at lunch September 9 his meeting President Nasser previous day. Meeting reported in press. Following points made by Nasser: 1. Yemen—We want to get out of Yemen but want firm agreement Saudis to insure non-restoration of Hamid Ed Din. Saudis only want verbal agreement this point. UAR fearful once its troops withdrawn Saudis will restore Imamate by force. 2. IMF—The IMF has been very hard in its negotiations with Dr. Kaissouni. 3. Food—The UAR food problem is critical. We must have wheat from abroad. Why did you cut it off abruptly? We could understand a gradual reduction but abrupt termination has made it impossible for us to plan for replacement. If you are our friend why have you done this? Do you want riots in the streets? We will get wheat from somewhere. 4. South Arabia—We have no designs on South Arabia. UAR has been giving no support to South Arabian nationalists other than money. We want British to meet with nationalists but they (British) have refused. 5. East-West balance—We must keep balance between East and West. If we lean too far in the direction of the East, we get complaints from you and if we go the other way, the Russians complain. The Russians gave us the High Dam and even supplied skilled workers when we did not have them. They sent wheat shipments when you stopped. These are the things we cannot forget. 6. Land reclamation—We now have the water from the High Dam to bring new lands into cultivation but we need help to develop areas like Salhia. 7. Subversion—They accuse me of having Nasserite agents in other countries of the Arab world. I have no organization and cannot control these people. Secretary Anderson’s comments follow: 8. US–USSR relations—U.S. Government has no latent hostility to the UAR but what we can do for you is conditioned by UAR actions. 9. Armaments—We do not begrudge armaments. Every nation must have them, but the question is quantity and what you can afford. 10. IMF—The IMF is hard but it is composed of honest, dedicated, non-political people. I urge you to come to agreement with the IMF. It is the key to your problem. Without agreement all of your credit will dry up. Hard decisions are required. You have to decide for yourself where to cut. 11. Nuclear—Are you in favor of international safeguards? Yes. Can I then say this back in Washington? Yes. 12. Non aggression—Are you against aggression by any country in the Near East against any other country of the area? Yes. May I say this in Washington? Yes. 13. Salhia—If this is your great need are you prepared to devote all your available resources, plus what you may obtain from abroad, toward implementing this project? Yes. May I say this in Washington? Yes. 14. Public statements—You need to say what you have told me publicly (ref item 11, 12, 13 above). (Blackiston not entirely sure from recollection of conversation with Anderson whether latter stated Nasser committed himself to public statement or not. We hope have written memcon provided us early next week, and will forward to Washington on receipt.) Anderson saw Kaissouni again morning September 9 and provided rundown his conversation with Nasser. According Anderson, Kaissouni expressed great appreciation for points which Anderson made and frankness with which they had been stated. Nes 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, TRV ANDERSON, ROBERT B. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda. 2 Slator C. Blackiston, head of the Embassy’s economic section. 322. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 322. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, September 14, 1966, 1115Z. 946. Ref: State 17501. 2 1. Emphasizing I had no specific instructions to raise the matter, I stressed to FonMin Eban Sept 13, in meeting arranged at my request and in anticipation of his prospective meeting with the Secretary in New York, our fervent hope that Israel would find way make clear to world in unmistakable terms that it would forswear nuclear weapons. I mentioned IAEA controls as vehicle accomplish end. I recognized that our visits Dimona and PriMin Eshkol’s statement on subject gave us considerable reassurance in this respect but noted that as long as Israel seemed retain option take nuclear route, no matter how self limited it might be, this added to already acute danger world confronts in problem nuclear proliferation. I stressed the Secretary’s personal interest and concern as this problem touches Israel and the Middle East and expressed my belief that the Secretary would wish discuss in New York. I stressed that essence of issue is not only that Israel remove this card from its hand but be seen publicly to do so. I used familiar arguments as to importance Israeli peaceful image, as stabilizing force in area etc., and added that since it obvious, as result various leaks, that Israel in fact not embarking on weapons production, GOI had nothing to lose and everything to gain in making gesture suggested. 2. Eban said he impressed with importance Secretary attaches to matter and that my comments lent urgency to full briefing on subject including consultations with PriMin he intended to undertake prior his departure for New York. He noted limitations of time and pressures of other matters in New York and expressed hope there would be opportunity discuss subject in detail it deserved. Expressed also his opinion that nuclear arms race somewhat more remote contingency in area than it had been, less pressing immediate possibility for example than clash with Syria. Referring to the Secretary’s conversation with Rafael, he took exception to what had been reported to him as the suggestion the U.S. would be “through with Israel” if Israel did not do what we wanted in this respect. He felt this suggestion of sanctions against Israel was not in accord with the atmosphere of trust and good will that should prevail between good friends. (I responded that the Secretary’s frankness with Rafael should be understood both in the context of our countries’ friendship and of the strength of the Secretary’s feeling on this subject. I added it not question of sanctions, on contrary it matter of losing U.S. support.) Eban said that Israel had said it would not manufacture nuclear weapons and would certainly not be the first to introduce them into area. This was an extraordinary assurance when set against the constant threats of Israel’s neighbors to destroy it. More weight should be given to the PriMin’s assurances. (I replied that this was an important contribution, but that a further dramatic gesture was essential.) Eban concluded that he had the signal. He hoped to be well versed on subject on arrival in New York and hoped to have something substantive to say. 3. Comment: In spite of Eban’s testiness about some things and indications he considered matter had less immediacy than it had had, I believe he will try to get mandate from PriMin (it not excluded judging by some innuendos of his comments that he already has it) to make some useful contribution in direction we desire, and hope that he will go to New York prepared to discuss matter concretely and constructively. He will be interested in our views of Egyptian attitudes. We may be sure he will lay stress on Israel’s immediate security concerns vis-a-vis Syria. I reminded him that we had done much lately to permit Israelis to sleep more soundly in their beds, and this is a factor obviously in favor GOI understanding this problem. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. 2 Document 312 . 323. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 323. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, September 14, 1966, 1151Z. 949. Ref: State 42098. 2 Palestine refugees. 1. I conveyed paras 2A through 2H of reftel to Ambassador Rafael Sept 12. He subsequently passed to FonMin Eban who raised with me Sept 13. 2. Eban said we in “complex misunderstanding.” There not any Israeli “proposals.” Before Israel crystallized its thinking on this matter it wanted benefit our thoughts. This was not the end of GOI thinking on subject. GOI had not given six months to consideration of this matter, in fact it had not given six minutes. (By this he meant there had not been govt—Cabinet—consideration of ideas FonOff had had.) Eban continued this was rather “cold douche” on Israeli efforts to discuss problems like this with US in their early stages of consideration. Israel had never said it would try to rethink whole problem. What it was trying to do was find ways to give debate in UN new direction. It was inaccurate to say Israel had retreated from its earlier proposals. Israel in fact wanted to bring UN back to something like Resolution 513 of 1952 with its accent on rehabilitation and resettlement. UN position has steadily eroded in direction emphasis on para 11 and repatriation. If these tentative thoughts were non-starter then perhaps only thing left to do in UNGA was to try and hold the line. 3. I remarked that whatever exception might be taken to specifics of Dept reply mood of disappointment it conveyed was correct one. Absence of any mention of repatriation obviated at outset any broad UNGA support for these ideas. After six months and GOI despatch of high level envoy to discuss with the Secretary it reasonable for us expect something more forthcoming. (Eban interjected that 18 years had seen no progress on main issues. Israeli thought was to make progress on marginal aspects. “Palestinians coming across border with guns and knives” did not provide propitious climate for consideration these problems. Particularly difficult Israel come up with idea such as open ended $50,000,000 unilateral compensation.) I concluded that Dept remarks had been conveyed in spirit frankness that characterized our relations. There was erosion in Israeli positions in UN and while we were willing consult closely on tactics substance of what Israelis could offer was of overriding importance. 4. In subsequent brief conversation with Rafael, he confirmed Eban upset by Dept’s reaction. He added, as I had anticipated, that FonOff consideration had consisted of efforts rethink numerous possibilities previously advanced and that conclusion had been essentially that none of them starters this time. He, therefore, of opinion expressed by Eban that probably only tactic at UN is to hold current line with as little fanfare as possible. Objective of talks with US was and is to assure maximum possible tactical cooperation, since it apparently not possible to redirect emphasis of debate toward humanitarian, and away from political, aspects of problem. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF PAL. Confidential. 2 Telegram 42098 to Tel Aviv, September 7, commented that the Israeli proposals described by Rafael to Hare, Sisco, and Rusk (see Document 310 and footnote 3 thereto) were “patently unacceptable.” The Israelis were proposing resettlement without repatriation, with the main cost to be borne by countries other than Israel, and they were asking the United States to assume the political liability of launching the plan. It instructed Barbour to tell Eban that the Department was “frankly disappointed” that after 6 months of deliberations, the Israeli Government had brought forth a proposal that seemed to be, if anything, a retreat from its former positions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF PAL) 324. Memorandum of Conversation 324. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 5, 1966, 3:45–5:10 p.m. SecDel/MC/39 SUBJECT Arab-Israeli Problem PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Wm. L. Simmons (NEA) Iraq H. E. Adnan M. Pachachi, Minister for Foreign Affairs H. E. Nasir Hani, Ambassador to the United States The Minister said there was a feeling in the Arab world that the method of US approach to the Palestine question had undergone a change in the last three years. When asked for specifics by the Secretary, the Minister cited the aircraft and tank deals with Israel. While he recognized the US position that this was done to equalize Soviet aid to Arab states, he disagreed with the belief that there could ever be a balance between the Israeli nation of two million people and the Arab community of nations. He also said that the Arabs had not been fully informed of the arms deal and he found the timing extraordinary. The announcement of the most recent arms delivery to Israel shortly after Kosygin had visited Cairo made it appear that the US was pro-Israeli and the USSR pro-Arab. He said that there was an impression throughout the Arab world that the present administration is less concerned with Arab sensibilities than the previous administration. The Secretary said the arms problem in the Middle East is triangular: The USSR arms aid is substantial to Egypt; this in turn causes anxiety among the UAR’s Arab neighbors and in Israel. The US earnestly desires some regional understanding on arms levels in the Middle East but neither Cairo nor the Soviet Union has indicated any interest. We understand that the US cannot balance off all the powers in the Middle East; however, we have felt that US action was necessary from time to time for psychological reasons. The Minister said that Soviet arms provided the UAR, Iraq and Syria will never be used against another Arab country. No one objects to US arms aid to Jordan or Saudi Arabia and Jordan was recognized as having the most legitimate claim for armaments of any Arab country. The Secretary said that there are those Arabs who fear Israeli expansionism and those Israelis who fear the Arabs wish to drive the Israelis into the sea. He suggested that these two points appear capable of being eliminated. The Minister said that Arab fears of Israeli expansionism had a firm basis in historical fact. The Secretary assured the Minister that the US would not permit Israeli territorial aggrandizement and cited US intervention during the Suez crisis. The Secretary said that he was continuously hearing of these fears from both sides but did not believe that they were realistic. However, he did not underestimate the extent of such feeling. The Minister said his government was rather unhappy about further US reductions in its contribution to UNRWA, although he appreciated that the US continues to bear the financial brunt of the organization. The US was reducing its contribution at a time when Iraq and other countries were increasing theirs. The Secretary said that this was a difficult problem for us with Congress because we see no end to the refugee problem. The Minister said the central point was whether the refugees would be permitted to exercise the right of choice. The Secretary commented that there may be a distinction between individual choice by a family and organized choice for political purposes. He said that he believed that there would be no more refugees prepared to return to Israel than Israel would be prepared to accept. The Minister stated no genuine attempt had ever been made to ascertain the refugees’ own views. The attempt by Joseph Johnson was a good effort but it was weakened by linking consultation with implementation. The Secretary asked for the Minister’s reaction should UNWRA personnel begin to informally ask a number of refugees each week what their desires were. The Minister said that this was an “interesting” idea but first there should be agreement on the principle that the refugees should be able to freely express their views in accordance with paragraph 11, resolution 194. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret. The meeting was held at USUN. The memorandum is Part IV of V Sections. Records of the other portions of the conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83. 325. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 325. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 New York, October 7, 1966, 2345Z. 1353. Secto 48. 1. Following memcon uncleared, FYI, Noforn, subject to amendment upon review. 2 During UAR FonMin Riyad’s call on Secretary October 7, Secretary raised subject recent UAR press and radio campaign accusing CIA of being party of Jordan-Saudi-Israeli-British plot against Syria. 3 Secretary raised matter in context difficulties Executive branch has encountered in Congress this year on economic aid legislation. Secretary stated there is disposition on our part to have good relations with UAR and to cooperate in areas of common interest, including food. He expressed concern re press charges and categorically denied them. He expressed hope that such unfounded allegations would cease and there would be a period of calm and quiet in which to sort out our relations without undue pressures from respective public opinions. 2. FonMin replied that the Secretary knew there was trouble within area at present time which UAR had hoped avoid. He called King Faisal prime villain with King Hussein, Prime Minister Tell as participants. FonMin said that while US could dismiss this as Arab problem sometimes US name used by both sides, in this case by Jordanians. Abu Asali told Egyptians he heard from Jordanians CIA connected with plot. Secretary stated USG aware some make this claim to add weight to their cause. FonMin said because US had taken sides in Arab region in past this association always comes to mind. 3. Riyad expressed puzzlement why Hussein undertaking present “adventure” which puts him in dangerously weak position. 4. Secretary closed conversation by stating that since assuming his position he had seen 54 coups d’etat none of which involved CIA; he asked FonMin to assure President Nasser that US not involved in Asali episode. 5. Other subjects discussed (Viet-Nam, South Arabia, Yemen) will be reported septels. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, and Baghdad. 2 Memoranda of the conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83. 3 A memorandum from William McAfee of INR/DDC to Hughes records an October 4 meeting among Davies, Bergus, James R. Gardner of INR/DDC, and a CIA representative, at which Davies noted the recent charges in Cairo about a Jordanian-CIA plot to overthrow the Syrian regime and asked what was going on. The CIA representative replied that as far as CIA was concerned, nothing. The group speculated as to the reason for the UAR charges but reached no decision as to what should be done about them. (Department of State,INR Historical Files, NEA-CIA Meetings, 1965–1967) 326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria 326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria 1 Washington, October 10, 1966, 4:31 p.m. 62966. Ref Damascus 384 and 392. 2 During conversation with Syrian Charge Kayyali October 7 (Memcon by pouch), 3 Department officers (1) expressed concern and bewilderment over Syrian accusations USG involved in anti-SARG plotting, (2) stated categorically such accusations without foundation and asked Kayyali so report to his government, and (3) noted current anti-US campaign ran directly counter to desire often professed by Kayyali and FonMin Makhus, which USG shared, for better US-Syrian relations. Kayyali noted SARG charges directed against CIA, not USG as whole. Department officers emphasized such distinction meaningless since no agency USG could pursue independent foreign policy. Kayyali replied he aware of this but same not true of elements in Syria (impliedly the military) responsible for current anti-American campaign who, he suggested, are relatively unsophisticated and not very smart. Department officers did not inform Kayyali FonMin Makhus apparently shared view of these “unsophisticated” elements (Damascus 384). Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL SYR–US. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Atherton. 2 Telegram 384 from Damascus, October 3, reported a meeting between Ambassador Smythe and Foreign Minister Makhus, who gave a long lecture on the aims of the current Baath regime, the futility of attempts to subvert the revolution, with a “pointed warning against outsiders seeking change in Syria.” (Ibid., POL SYR) Telegram 392 from Damacus, October 4, reported that the Syrian Government was “heating up attempt convince itself and socialist friends US pushing hard to topple present regime.” (Ibid., POL SYR–US) 3 The memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL 23–9 SYR. 327. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 327. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, October 11, 1966, 7:19 p.m. 63961. Arab-Israel Border Situation. 1. Israeli Ambassador Harman called on Hare today to discuss current security situation. Assistant Secretary Sisco also present. 2. Harman reviewed two incidents that happened over weekend, noting Syrians had quickly published Fatah communique on Jerusalem incident October 7. This was third incident in past three weeks from Jordan territory, two previous having taken place in south. Seriousness of Jerusalem incident lay in fact much more damage and loss of life might have occurred, it had taken place well inside Israeli territory, and perpetrators could only have come from Jordan. 3. GOI appraisal is SARG deliberately seeking involve GOJ. GOI also believes GOJ does not want to become involved in Fatah incidents, and taking measures to prevent them. Nevertheless, there strong domestic pressures on GOI to act if incidents from Jordanian territory not stopped. GOI therefore hopes GOJ can act to clean out their territory. 4. Harman recalled GOI had been told USG not prepared to go to GOJ every time there was incident apparently involving Jordanian territory. Series of three incidents, however, now justified Israeli request for USG to bring Israeli views to attention GOJ, particularly serious view GOI takes of Jerusalem incident. GOI wished GOJ to understand it under considerable pressure to take action and so far had resisted this pressure. 5. Other aspect of current situation involves Syria. Incident at Shaar Hagolan last Saturday is worst since 1965 in terms of fatalities and skill and sophistication with which it mounted. Four persons had been killed.GOI impressed by both planning and performance this incident in which border patrol had been lured into mine field by timed explosions. Saturday incident was part of a chain that had occurred from Syrian territory. GOI had reported other incidents in early September to Security Council. Incidents coming from Syria are being planned at higher military level and are based on doctrine of “popular liberation war.” 6. Although SARG probably aware from SC discussions last July and August 2 of public relations disadvantages publicly supporting Fatah incidents, Syrian Chief of Staff recently said SARG cannot stop Fatah. SARG had also broadcast communique on Saturday incident. 7. Harman concluded by stating what Israel wants is to have Fatah incidents stopped. If chain continues, GOI will have no alternatives. Yesterday in New York Eban called on Secretary General and also circulated letter to President of Security Council stressing need to stop incidents. 3 Israel recognizes that asking USG to speak to Syria is fairly useless. Israeli PermRep in New York is trying to see Fedorenko to present Israeli views to Soviets. Prime Minister Eshkol was calling in Ambassadors of four big powers in Tel Aviv (including USSR) today. These diplomatic approaches have aim of impressing Syrians with importance of stopping incidents. 8. Hare responded by assuring Harman USG deplores loss of life in Saturday incident and concerned about very real problems he had described. USG not disposed in any way to varnish over these incidents. Secondly, it seemed to us that attitude adopted by GOI was reasonable and instrumentalities it now using were correct. 9. At this point Harman broke in to explain both Jerusalem and Hagolan incidents had been subject complaints in UNTSO machinery, former in HKJIMAC and latter in ISMAC. Israel differentiating between two only to extent that one involved Jordan territory and other Syrian territory. GOJ had shown it could prevent Fatah incidents from its territory. GOI now wanted GOJ to take extraordinary steps to prevent any further use of Jordanian territory.GOJ should see it is prudent to take extraordinary measures to track down and stop terrorists. 10. Hare stated USG prepared to go to GOJ to make clear very serious nature of present situation. 11. In further discussion Harman emphasized that Israel raising Fatah matter as whole in present diplomatic approaches. Even Saturday incident has implications for Jordan since it occurred near Jordanian border and might have been additional attempt involve GOJ. Tracks, however, led to Syrian territory. Point is that SARG has adopted raiding doctrine that other Arabs give up in nineteen-fifties and trying to involve other Arabs. SARG must be made to see that this doctrine will not work and that other Arabs do not accept it. While other Arabs had not abandoned belligerence toward Israel, they at least were not following border-crossing and sabotage doctrine advocated by Syrians. Harman said Embassy had just received message reporting Israelis had found mine today at Maryan Baruch, near Tell Dan. If this mine had exploded, something serious might have happened. 12. In reply Sisco query, Harman stated SYG had seen Syrian Rep Tomeh yesterday but he had no report on results. In further comment Harman said absence of further incidents would be best way to judge whether Syrians getting message. On other hand, if incidents continued serious Israeli policy decision would be involved. 13. In discussion whether more formal approach to Security Council desirable, Harman said automatic Soviet veto discouraged Israel from such step. Hare and Sisco emphasized SC nevertheless could contribute toward improvement situation. Sisco granted Soviet veto always possibility, but present incident is clear cut, serious and part of pattern.SC members have been educated as result SC discussions last summer. GOI through present diplomatic moves has made its views clear and has helped create favorable circumstances for SC hearing based on clear evidence. Even if veto occurred there would be interesting test of Soviet attitudes and policies. Soviets also have interest in not allowing present situation mushroom. Thus, recourse to Security Council might be good and constructive political move and should not be precluded. 14. Harman deplored delays in UNTSO investigations incidents and tendency UNTSO to try to balance out evidence without fixing blame and responsibility. This characteristic would carry over into any Security Council hearing. What Israel wants is fixing of responsibility and cessation of incidents. 15. Sisco recalled that even in July SC hearing, when Israel was accused, Israel had not done badly. Moreover, USG statement 4 had gone beyond UNTSO report to draw explicit conclusions re responsibility for Fatah incidents and obligations on parties to observe GAAs. In present case, Israel has not retaliated militarily, is exercising restraint, and pursuing political and diplomatic remedies; and particularly, if any thought being given presently to retaliation for recent incidents, due weight should be given to political advantages accruing to Israel in recourse to formal proceedings of SC. Harman said he would report these observations to Eban. 16. Hare added that Israeli tactics in present situation had been pragmatic and wise. Israel was well aware our views on avoidance force. Soviets undoubtedly wish avoid anything more serious. UAR and GOJ also probably wish avoid military involvement. There high degree of abnormality in Syrian domestic politics that might have unforeseen results. 17. Harman said that SARG aware of advantages they enjoyed because of nature of terrain which would force Israel mount major military action. An irresponsible and irrational element in Syria wants war with Israel and is seeking to drag in other Arabs by forcing such major incident. In further comment, Hare again pointed out present measures being taken were designed to get message across to Syrians. Sisco suggested that even if formal SC action vetoed or without conclusive result, support thereby garnered by GOI would be politically important. 18. Harman said he would convey foregoing to his government and once again requested GOJ be informed about Israeli attitudes, which Hare affirmed would be done. 19. For Amman: Request Charge inform GOJ at appropriate level that, in context our continuing assessment of Syrian situation, we want inform GOJ of serious situation we see developing as result recent Fatah incidents. Failure all Arab governments to curb Fatah operations will, in our considered opinion, almost certainly lead to major Israeli retaliation that could embroil area as whole militarily. We are urging Israelis avoid retaliation and avail selves of UN machinery, but there is limit to our influence in this regard if Fatah incidents continue. We recognize GOJ has been making serious effort control Fatah. Nevertheless, several recent incidents appear to have been launched from Jordanian territory. In discussing with us GOI has taken line SARG deliberately seeking involve GOJ by staging Fatah incidents from Jordanian territory and that, although GOI believes GOJ sincerely attempting prevent such use its territory, it is under growing domestic pressure to take action. We therefore urge GOJ redouble efforts prevent further Fatah operations from or through Jordan. 5 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Priority All Addressees. Drafted by Atherton and Symmes; cleared by Campbell, Vladimir Toumanoff of the Soviet desk, and Sisco; and approved by Hare. Sent to Tel Aviv, USUN, Amman, and Cairo and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, Damascus, and Beirut. 2 See footnote 5, Document 309 . 3 UN document S/7536. 4 The texts of statements made on July 29 and August 3 by Acting U.S. Representative Sisco during the Security Council debate are printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 29, 1966, pp. 313–317. 5 Telegram 823 from Amman, October 12, reported that Adams conveyed the substance of paragraph 19 to King Hussein that day. The King replied, indicating that his comments could be transmitted to the Israelis, that the Jordanian Government was exerting maximum efforts to wipe out Fatah cells and apprehend infiltrators. As a result it had arrested half a dozen Fatah saboteurs in the last few days and expected to arrest more soon. Noting that the Israeli side of the border south of Jerusalem was more populated than the Jordanian side, he urged that the Israelis redouble their efforts to patrol the common border, and he warned that if Israel attacked Jordan, the Jordanian Government would have no alternative but to attack. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) 328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, October 12, 1966, 7:27 p.m. 64853. Following are highlights uncleared memcon of Secretary’s talk with Israeli FonMin Eban October 8. 2 1. Vietnam. Secretary praised Eban’s speech as constructive contribution in helping focus world attention to problem of initiating process negotiation. Eban indicated Israel believes onus of beginning negotiations now clearly rests with Hanoi. Secretary expressed doubt whether SYG would play any role in establishing contact between various parties as had been suggested in Eban speech. 2. Near Eastern Tour d’Horizon. Eban said he had never seen Arab world in such disarray. Question still remained whether Nasser would settle down and confine himself to UAR’s pressing internal problems. Nasser had clearly not changed basic objectives toward Israel, but GOI believed magnitude his other problems would keep him from undertaking new provocations against Israel at this time. Eban characterized GOI relations with Lebanon and Jordan as good and felt that even with Syria there was good chance of keeping conflicts localized. Israel most concerned at growing Soviet influence in Syria and UAR. Israeli requirements were continued effective balance of strength between itself and Arab states and support of status quo by great powers. Question mark is attitude of Soviets. Gromyko had recently reiterated it possible for USSR have good relations with both Israel and Arab states. He had also reaffirmed that Soviet doctrine on non-use of force to effect territorial changes applied to Near East. Secretary observed Gromyko had shown no interest in dampening down arms race in area, excepting nuclear weapons. 3. South Arabia. Secretary said US was concerned at Soviet activities in southern end of Red Sea. Eban said Israel shared this concern because of Israeli shipping lines through Red Sea. GOI believed that after British withdrawal emergence of non-independent government in south Arabia was inevitable. 4. Palestine Refugees. Eban said while refugee problem was in political deadlock GOI still hoped shift emphasis somewhat toward resettlement and rehabilitation. Agreed, however, best that could be hoped for this session UNGA was to hold line against Arab pressures. Secretary raised question of polling refugee preferences. If two out of ten refugees wanted return to Israel, would they be accepted? Eban jocularly said he thought he could swing two in cabinet. He stressed difficulty carrying out fair polling in light of Arab political “psychosis” on this issue. Secretary said nonetheless he felt it possible gnaw away at refugee problem. Eban said any Israeli commitment on refugees would have to be based on knowledge of number refugees who might wish return. 5. Israeli Territorial Limits. In response Secretary mention of Arab concerns over Israeli expansionism, Eban stated Israel accepts present frontiers as inviolate. Arab contention Israel needs more land for economic reasons not logical since Israeli economy not agricultural but closer to that of Benelux countries or Switzerland. As for 3 million Soviet Jews, even if USSR opened doors wide, some would choose to stay in USSR, some would go to countries other than Israel, and only portion would come to Israel. 6. Soviet Jewry. Secretary said he thought Soviets might move on Soviet Jewry problem if they were pressed through non-governmental channels. Government-to-government approaches not likely be productive since USSR considers this internal matter. 7. Southwest Africa. Secretary and Eban agreed to desirability some gesture from South Africa to help head off Afro-Asian resolution and enable General Assembly come up with realistic moderate resolution. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sterner, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. 2 Memoranda of the conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83. 329. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 329. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, October 17, 1966, 6:31 p.m. 67505. Ref: State 66870. 2 1. In meeting with Israeli Amb. Harman today on another subject, Assistant Secretary Hare took occasion restate US policy against unilateral action and use military force in Arab-Israel situation. 2. After expressing gratification Israel had resorted to UN instrumentalities in present case, 3 Hare emphasized US policy against retaliatory action still holds. Any idea that failure of UNSC to take effective action would justify Israel’s resort to force is wrong, and it was important for that to be said now instead of later. 3. Harman acknowledged he understood US views in this respect. He said he would not speculate on what action Security Council might be able take or what his government would do if no effective results. He would say, however, that failure curb Fatah terrorist incursions would create “very, very serious situation.” 4. In response Hare’s query as to Israeli estimate Soviet attitude, Harman said he had not been surprised by public attitude taken by Soviets. He was nursing hope Soviets would realize seriousness of situation and restrain Syrians. It would appear be in Soviet interest to restrain present regime. 5. Asked if GOI had considered any initiatives that might be taken to improve situation along borders—such as parties electing cooperate more with UNTSO and MACs—Harman said he knew of nothing. He added that as far as he knew Syrian Perm Rep Tomeh had not responded to U Thant’s discussion with him last week. 6. Hare reminded Harman that knowledge of recent exchange with Jordanians should be closely held. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Symmes, cleared by Campbell, and approved by Hare. Sent to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Cairo, Kuwait, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 2 Telegram 66870, sent to Amman and Tel Aviv, October 15, authorized the Embassy in Amman to give the Jordanian Government comments by Israeli Foreign Office officials in response to King Hussein’s points (see footnote 5, Document 327 ) except those requiring further Jordanian reply. It stated that the U.S. Government had not changed its long-established position of avoiding the role of postman between the Arabs and Israelis except in the most serious circumstances. (Ibid.) Telegram 1279 from Tel Aviv, October 13, reported that the Embassy passed on King Hussein’s points to Israeli Foreign Office officials, who stated that Israel had also increased precautions along the frontier and urged extra Jordanian precautions to curb infiltration in the Jerusalem area and Jordanian cooperation in MAC investigations. They also requested a more specific description of the area south of Jerusalem to which the King referred. (Ibid.) 3 On October 12, Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider its complaints against Syria. (UN document S/7540) 330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, October 31, 1966, 7:27 p.m. 76248. Ref: Tel Aviv 1480, Amman 982. 2 1. Ambassador Harman called on Assistant Secretary Hare under instructions to discuss Israeli concern about continued terrorist incidents and failure of Security Council so far to act. Harman noted matter before Council for 17 days with no sign effective action. 3 Meanwhile there have been nine incidents, five of which from Jordan. This has stimulated atmosphere in area that terrorist raids can be made with impunity. Situation has deteriorated with different groups of raiders now almost operating in competition with each other. In addition to Fatah group, there now resurgence of Palestine Liberation Force group in Jordan (which left pamphlets at site of train derailment Oct. 27) and Organization of Returning Heroes in Lebanon. Finally, Jordanian delegate Farra has been following tactics in UN designed to obstruct and postpone action. Farra played central role last Friday 4 in obstructing Council action. Jordanian MAC delegate Daoud continued be uncooperative. UNTSO’s approach to investigating incidents led to failure fix responsibility for incidents even when circumstantial evidence clear. Summing up, Harman noted Foreign Minister Eban had discussed situation with Barbour yesterday with view to having USG ask GOJ to consider what is happening re terrorism and also to restrain Farra. Commenting that latest developments in Council today showed search for consensus had been fruitless, Harman urged we now go ahead with our resolution. 2. Ambassador Hare recalled our continuing dialogue with both Israel and Jordan. We had talked to both sides with sincerity and frankness which we believe has been reciprocated. Our Ambassador in Amman had discussed general situation only yesterday with Prime Minister Tell. 5 We evaluate Jordanian efforts control Fatah as being active and sincere. Ambassador Hare emphasized GOJ had recently moved troops to Syrian frontier area and had made arrests of Fatah personnel and uncovered arms caches. (Dept officer subsequently provided Minister Evron orally with GAS headquarters-coordinated, sterilized summary intelligence reports mentioned in Amman 982.) We had urged GOJ cooperation in MAC and had received positive assurances. Jordanians in good spirit had emphasized need for more active Israeli border patrolling as well to help control terrorist infiltrations. So far as Farra’s performance concerned, he under great pressure as “Arab” representative on SC and had maintained considerable restraint until Friday. After USUN had reported what actually transpired we would mention factual details to GOJ. Meanwhile, we would continue our dialogue with Jordan in effort to be helpful. 3. In further discussion of present situation in New York, Harman emphasized Israel expects Council to speak with clear voice on its complaint. Ambassador Hare rejoined that one important thing has been done, nevertheless. That is whole situation has been brought out more clearly. What has been learned has been to Israel’s advantage. Going to Council has not been wasted effort. 6 For Amman: After receiving factual report from USUN concerning Farra’s performance last Friday and subsequently, Embassy should seek occasion apprise Jordanian government at appropriate level and inquire if he acting under instructions. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Symmes, cleared by Campbell and Atherton, and approved by Hare. Repeated to USUN, Amman, Jerusalem, Paris, London, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Telegram 1480 from Tel Aviv, October 30, reported that in a conversation with Barbour that day, Eban stressed the seriousness of the latest terrorist incident but stated that Eshkol was exercising restraint. He stated that the attitude of Jordan’s Security Council representative was particularly galling to Israelis, since the most recent incidents occurred near the Jordanian border, and suggested that the United States try to get this point across to the King. Telegram 982 from Amman, October 31, advised against making the approach suggested by Eban and urged telling the Israelis that the Embassy in Amman was convinced the Jordanians were doing everything possible to control Fatah. (Both ibid.) 3 A U.S.-British draft resolution, submitted on October 27, deplored the recent incidents, reminded the Syrian Government to take measures to prevent the use of its territory as a base for acts in violation of the Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement (of July 20, 1949; UN document S/1353), called for strict adherence to the agreement, called on the Syrian and Israeli Governments to cooperate fully with UN machinery and to facilitate the work of UNTSO personnel, and requested the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the resolution. (UN document S/7568) No vote was taken on the draft resolution. 4 October 28. On that day, the Security Council agreed to a suggestion made by Mali, on behalf of Nigeria and Uganda, to adjourn the debate in order to hold broader consultations, with a view to avoiding the adoption of any resolution and seeking a consensus. 5 The conversation was reported in telegram 973 from Amman, October 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) 6 A draft resolution submitted on November 3 by Argentina, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Uganda deplored the incidents, invited the Syrian Government to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents in violation of the General Armistice Agreement, invited the Israeli Government to cooperate fully with the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, called upon both governments to facilitate the work of UNTSO personnel, urged them to refrain from any action that might increase tension in the area, and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate. (UN document S/7575 and Rev. 1) On November 4, the Council voted on the draft resolution, which failed because of a Soviet veto. The vote was 10 to 4, with 1 abstention. The United States voted in favor. 331. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 331. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, November 3, 1966, 0855Z. 1540. Ref: State 68096. 2 1. After delays caused primarily by Security Council consideration of Israel complaint against Syria re Fatah, FonMin Eban and I finally had opportunity discuss together arms control in ME at long lunch session on Nov 2. Having heard me out on Secretary’s oral message contained reftel, Eban made following points: A. He had not for moment thought that lack of reference this subject at his Oct 7 meeting with Secretary indicated any loss of interest on our part. B. GOI too has put considerable thought on this matter. As reflected in Raphael Nov 2 speech in New York GOI stands solidly behind anti-proliferation treaty and will give it active public and moral support. C. From all evidence available to GOI, Egypt now fairly relaxed as to Israeli intentions re nuclear weapons. D. In fact, PM has been convinced by President Johnson that effort keep Nasser uncertain as to Israeli intentions is no longer worth risk of Egyptian weapons escalation. E. However, due Egyptian predilection for sabotage and plotting, GOI must find middle ground between letting Egyptians be assured GOI not manufacturing bombs and giving them full info as to Israel’s scientific nuclear facilities. F. Therefore, GOI cannot accept IAEA system of controls to which Egyptians have access at all levels and, furthermore, it wishes be sure we (and presumably others) do not pass on to Egyptians specifics as to location or functions of Israeli installations. G. Possibility remains that some kind of political controls can be worked out but recent Egyptian speech in Vienna makes Israelis less convinced of Egyptian willingness. H. Israelis too have hopes of being included in general non-proliferation treaty before long which they would prefer to being singled out in some special arrangement in way contrary Israel’s sovereign status. 2. I pointed out that treaty not yet a reality and, much as we all support it, we do not know when it will be. Furthermore, this being imperfect world, Israeli gesture to assure its suspicious neighbors that it not moving toward nuclear weapons would promote peace of area. Acceptance of IAEA controls would be best way accomplish this. I suggested that although my instructions did not go this far, if Israel cannot see its way clear accept these, verification scheme including Israel and Egypt with third country is another possibility. Still another which would have advantage of being unilateral act of sovereign state would be GOI invitation to scientists of other countries to participate in research projects at Dimona. 3. Then I brought up May 24 conversation with PM in which he stated missiles were at least two years away (Embtel 1229 to Washington) 3 and suggested that since UAR running into difficulties in missile development, this type of sophisticated weaponry too should be subject control arrangement. 4. Eban said he not informed on history our missile discussions and would look into matter. He added that he would discuss points made in our conversation with PM and would get in touch with me for further discussion. Comment: Although GOI does not appear any closer now than it ever was to accepting IAEA controls, I think we are making progress. It is significant that Eban now says President was successful in convincing PM that tactic of keeping Nasser in state of uncertainty as to GOI intentions was dangerous. Also, it hopeful sign that GOI is supporting anti-proliferation treaty and that Eban for first time appears genuinely interested in keeping dialogue going on this subject. Airgram with further report conversation follows. 4 Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Secret;Exdis. 2 Telegram 68096 to Tel Aviv, October 18, transmitted the text of an oral message from Rusk to Eban. The message stated that Rusk hoped to have a second meeting with Eban while he was in the United States (for the first meeting, see Document 328 ) to discuss arms control, especially actions that might be taken to prevent the escalation of the Arab-Israel arms race into the nuclear field. Noting that this was a major U.S. concern, it expressed the hope that the U.S.-Israeli dialogue on the subject could continue. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 NEAR E) 3 Document 293 . 4 Airgram A–263, November 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 NEAR E) 332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, November 13, 1966, 3:25 p.m. 83785. Ref: Tel Aviv’s 1652. 2 1. You should inform Bitan and higher levels as appropriate that USG deplores Israeli attack on Jordan this morning. 3 As we have said frequently, we cannot agree to or condone such retaliatory action. Moreover, timing of action particularly embarrassing to King, who this morning is host to President Ayub. This retaliation coming a few days after the U.S. made a major effort over weeks of deliberation in the Security Council puts us in a particularly difficult position. Action can only make objective which we, Israelis and Jordanians alike seek of putting end to border raids more difficult to achieve. It will (a) place heavy domestic and external political strain on King Hussein’s regime; (b) raise pressures for more militant posture toward Israel; (c) make much more difficult or impossible GOJ’s carrying out anti-terrorist campaign in Palestinian areas of Jordan. 2. We deplore terror attacks inside Israel and recognize domestic pressures for action created but we do not agree that incidents in which three Israeli soldiers killed left GOI with no recourse except retaliatory military action across ADL. 3. We are not willing deliver Israel’s message to King Hussein. We have served as intermediary between Israel and Jordan in the interests of peace—not in the interests of facilitating or explaining Israel’s policy of retaliation. Given extraordinary efforts GOJ root out terrorist nets of which we have kept Israel informed, our relaying message now could connote to Jordanians some justification in our minds for Israeli action. That action has seriously undermined credibility our efforts exert restraining influence, particularly in Jordan. We suggest Israelis pass sanitized explanation for raid to Jordan through General Bull or UNSYG. 4. You should note our feeling that moral and diplomatic support Israel garnered by recent Security Council debate has now been seriously affected. Those Afro-Asians and others who viewed Israel’s restraint favorably and recognized terrorism resulted primarily from Syria’s irresponsibility will undoubtedly take less sympathetic view Israeli case. Syria, for its part, can take comfort from Israeli strike against Jordan citing it as vindication SARG claim of non-responsibility for terrorist activities. 5. Ambassador Goldberg has passed essence of above to Comay. For Amman FYI. Having in mind GOJ’s previous assertions of pressures on it to retaliate against Israel, believe you should continue efforts forestall thinking along those lines. End FYI. You may inform GOJ that we deplore Israeli action and will make this clear both publicly and to Israelis, but urge continued Jordan reliance on UNTSO and UN machinery in the area. Despite this backward step, we believe continued efforts eliminate use of Jordan territory for hostile acts against Israel essential for area stability and Jordan’s security. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, Davies, Atherton, Sterner, and Symmes; cleared by Hare and Sisco, and in substance by Goldberg; and approved by Davies. Wriggins at the White House was informed. Also sent to Amman and repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Barbour reported in telegram 1652 from Tel Aviv, November 13, that Foreign Ministry Assistant Director General Bitan gave him a message that the Israeli Government wanted to have passed to Jordanian authorities. (Ibid.) 3 An Israeli force including tanks and jet aircraft conducted a large-scale raid on villages in the Hebron area early on November 13. 333. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 333. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 15, 1966. SUBJECT Israel-Jordan Clash at Today’s Lunch I’m concerned that we haven’t reacted strongly enough against Israel’s massive raid into Jordan. 2 I suggest discussing this with Secretary Rusk at lunch. 3 I’m not suggesting our usual admonition against retaliation. We’ll maintain that posture, but I can sympathize with the Israelis’ answer that they can’t ignore increasing cross-border raids of Arab terrorists which generate strong pressures on the Israeli government to defend its border citizens. The coalition government can’t stand up indefinitely to these pressures. But retaliation is not the point in this case. This 3000-man raid with tanks and planes was out of all proportion to the provocation and was aimed at the wrong target. In hitting Jordan so hard, the Israelis have done a great deal of damage to our interests and to their own: —They’ve wrecked a good system of tacit cooperation between Hussein and the Israelis. We had his tacit agreement to keep his armor off the west bank of the Jordan, and he had made an honest effort to round up terrorists in Jordan. Continuing this kind of cooperation will be all but impossible now. —They’ve undercut Hussein. We’ve spent $500 million to shore him up as a stabilizing factor on Israel’s longest border and vis-a-vis Syria and Iraq. Israel’s attack increases the pressure on him to counter attack not only from the more radical Arab governments and from the Palestinians in Jordan but also from the Army, which is his main source of support and may now press for a chance to recoup its Sunday losses. —They’ve set back progress toward a long term accommodation with the Arabs. It makes even the moderate Arabs feel fatalistically that there is nothing they can do to get along with the Israelis no matter how hard they try. It puts a premium on extreme Arab chauvinism. —They may have persuaded the Syrians, who are the main troublemakers, that Israel didn’t dare attack Soviet-protected Syria but could attack US-backed Jordan with impunity. It’s important that we strengthen the hand of those within the Israeli Government who feel this is not the proper way to handle the problem. Even members of the Israeli military now doubt that retaliation will stop the cross-border raids, though they see no better solution. We’ve already laid the groundwork for a sharp reaction, but this by itself doesn’t go far enough. Ambassador Goldberg issued a statement in New York deploring the attack. 4 We refused to pass an Israeli message to King Hussein justifying the raid. We will probably support Jordan if it goes to the UN (though we’ll also have to deplore the Jordan-based road-mining incident that killed three Israelis and provoked this attack). Ray Hare gave Ambassador Harman a pretty hard time this afternoon. 5 (Harman was more embarrassed than defensive.) To stimulate discussion, you may want to raise the following possibilities with Secretary Rusk: —You could send a message to Eshkol restating our interests and making clear that Israel has undercut those interests as well as its own. —We could leak the main points of such a message to the press or in UN corridors to rebalance our image with the moderate Arabs. —We could slow down military deliveries to Israeli inconspicuously but just enough to make our point. Vietnam priorities could be an overt excuse. —We might begin putting out the line with our Jewish friends here that the US can’t go on supporting Israel’s interests in the Middle East unless the Israelis themselves show some intent over the long run to reach an accommodation with the Arabs. This, after all, is what we are trying to do with the Indians and Pakistanis. —The most constructive thing we could do looking to the future would be to offer help either through the UN or bilaterally to make available the latest techniques in border security. Many new simple devices have been successful in Vietnam and have been available on the open market. This is delicate business, but you’ve put a high priority on finding new ways to get at the Arab-Israeli stalemate. This kind of Israeli move makes progress impossible. We’ve felt that, with Eban’s appointment, the winds in Israel might begin to shift away from the old timers’ idea of “fortress Israel” to the younger men’s hopes for some kind of break in the impasse. We ought to come down on the side of accommodation where we can. If we don’t this time, no one will ever believe we care. W. W. Rostow 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. 2 Rostow informed the President of the raid in telegram CAP 666983, sent to the LBJ Ranch on November 13, and summarized the U.S. response in a November 14 memorandum to the President. (Both ibid.) 3 A November 15 memorandum from Read to Rusk states that Rostow called at noon to pass on suggestions from his staff of possible steps to underscore U.S. displeasure with the Israelis and to suggest that Rusk raise the matter at his lunch with the President that day. The suggestions included “talks with the Jewish Community here,” slowing U.S. military deliveries, and a possible Presidential letter. Rostow discussed the suggestions with Hare, who opposed taking additional steps at that time. (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 ARAB–ISR) 4 The text of the statement issued by USUN on November 13 is in circular telegram 83788, November 13. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) 5 This November 14 meeting is recorded in telegrams 84604 and 84620 to Tel Aviv, both November 15. (Both ibid.) 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 334. Memorandum for the Record 334. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, November 15, 1966. SUBJECT Israeli/Jordan Flare-up At the meeting of November 15 with the President, Secretary Rusk, and Mr. Rostow, 2 the subject of Israel’s massive conventional intrusion into Jordan was discussed. The President asked Bob Komer to get in touch with Mr. Feinberg and Ambassador Harman to make clear in no uncertain terms our objections to the steps the GOI has taken. Bob indicated that this in itself would do little good unless we made clear in these conversations that if the Israelis did this again, our military pipeline would begin to dry up. The President agreed. H 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, Israel, 4/1/66–12/31/66. No classification marking. Prepared by Howard Wriggins on November 16. 2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Rusk and Rostow met with the President at 1 p.m. At 1:05 p.m. they were joined by McNamara. They had lunch at 2:05 p.m., joined by Bill Moyers and Komer, until 3:40 p.m. Several subjects, not including Israel and Jordan, were on the agenda for discussion at lunch. (Ibid.) 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, November 15, 1966, 8:39 p.m. 85342. Subj: Israel-Jordan. 1. Israeli Amb Harman called on Asst Sec Sisco Nov 15 to discuss Israel-Jordan SC case. 2. Harman said Nov 11 mining incident was great shock to GOI which found no link between it and Syria but considerable evidence pointing to unruly elements in Hebron area who were cocking fists at everybody including SC, GOJ, and Israel. He said GOI had to consider the results if it did nothing and allowed these elements to operate with complete impunity. He denied retaliation was GOI objective and asked what Israel could do in situation where people were unsafe in their homes and on roads. We have no objectives against GOJ, he said, if they leave us alone, we will leave them alone. 3. Amb said Israel wanted to avoid loss of life but operation didn’t go according to plan when Jordan Legion appeared on scene. 4. He expressed hope our purposes for future could follow along common lines. Specifically a) that GOI and USG would regard Nov 13 incident as end not beginning of something; and b) a common position in SC. 5. Re latter point, he said unbalanced treatment could have very bad and far reaching results in area. If after getting only watered down and vetoed resolution in SC against Syria GOI now gets knocked down for this attack, psychological and practical results in area would be disastrous. He made special plea against invidious comparisons between official and open acts by GOI and what Arabs claim were acts by “unofficial” bodies. He said Israel also could indulge in “unofficial” strikes if it wished to. GOI hopes attempt will be made in SC and in area to make last weekend the end and not beginning of something and that SC does not take action which lends encouragement to acts which led to present situation. 7. Sisco said we are dismayed by Israeli attack. He said we thought both USG and GOI made out very well in Nov 4 SC case and noted GOI presented situation effectively to Israeli press and people. He recalled our repeated urging against retaliation strikes and noted our concern over the magnitude of IDF action. 8. Frankly, Sisco continued, we do not understand why you chose to attack Jordan since we both know Government of Jordan was trying to control terrorism and Syria was the chief culprit. 9. Sisco said USG is afraid this is not the end but the beginning. We are worried about effect of this situation on King Hussein and his government. He noted a) disarray in GOJ; b) disaffection in Jordan army on which King depends; c) consequent uncertainties of GOJ future policies; d) pressure on King to accept PLA unit which he has stoutly resisted in past; e) likely strong demand for arms by GOJ with resultant arms escalation. 10. Sisco noted US policies based on King and Israeli attack may be the beginning of the deterioration of that whole policy—a matter of deep concern and mutual interest to both USG and GOI. 11. Our primary concern he explained is what we can do to shore up King’s position and this concern is bound to have important ramifications on what we do in SC. 12. NEA officer present then read Harman sections of Amman’s 1118 2 and commented that these reports indicated most serious anti-regime sentiments in recent times, even worse than April 1963. He noted GOI said attack was against terrorists but King and GOJ considered the attack against him and his regime. He said we had report directly from King noting his disillusionment and his belief his whole policy called into question. 3 DeptOff noted it would take time for us to reestablish our relations with King and GOI’s relation with King through us. 13. Sisco then concluded: GOI should expect two things in Council a) very strong statement by us and b) strong resolution. When Amb asked if it would be completely unbalanced, Sisco said he did not wish to go beyond that at this time. 14. Harman returned to his principal theme that Israel could not be expected to stand by and to permit provocations against them and killing of its own citizens without responding. He also emphasized pattern and series of past incidents. Sisco said he fully appreciated that raid does not represent isolated incident and that serious problem has arisen as result pattern of incidents over previous weeks and months. However, fact is that recent large-scale retaliatory raid has given new dimension to problem. Situation could evolve in such way that King would be seriously weakened, which is neither in interest of US nor GOI. We would have to take this fact particularly into account as we determined course of action in SC. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by UNP Deputy Director Stephen Campbell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, and Jerusalem. 2 Telegram 1118 from Amman, November 15, reported increased popular discontent and criticism of the Jordanian Government because of the Israeli raid. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 1105 from Amman, November 14, Burns reported a meeting with the King in which he spoke along these lines. (Ibid.) 336. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 336. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 16, 1966. Warning the Israelis. I promptly called Abe Feinberg to pass the blunt word that Israel was “going too far” in striking Jordan and had better lay off. Feinberg was quite receptive, and said he’d just had a meeting with Jack Herzog of PM Eshkol’s office, who admitted that the strike had proven “unexpectedly violent;” the original plan was just “to blow 40 houses.” I replied that they should have thought of such risks before they acted, not after. Feinberg asked if he should call Harman. I told him I’d do that myself, but that you hoped he as a special friend would get the word direct to Eshkol through his own channels. He agreed to do so. I gave Ambassador Harman the same pitch this morning, stressing that I was speaking privately and unofficially. I added that, while I was no longer up on Arab-Israeli affairs, it seemed to me that Israel’s ill-considered and grossly excessive strike might have utterly disproportionate repercussions in Jordan. Moreover, how could we supply tanks to Israel if it was going to use such armor against Jordan, and after we’d asked the Jordanians at Israel’s request to keep their armor out of the frontier zone Israel had now struck. I told Harman that in the event of any more such strikes we were determined to “reexamine” our supply of arms of Israel, regardless of whether contracts had been signed or not. The Israelis had put in jeopardy our whole policy of promoting Arab-Israel stability by subsidizing an independent Jordan. I asked Harman not to give me the standard reply, as I was no longer in the business. But he did ask me to convey privately to you that Eshkol was under heavy pressure “from his own conscience,” because as PM and Defense Minister he couldn’t even assure his own people that they could travel safely in their own country or sleep safely in their own homes at night. If Israel didn’t strike back when repeatedly provoked, other Arabs besides those in Hebron might conclude that it was “a sitting duck.” I told Harman that you fully understood Israel’s problems, but that use of force was dubious at best and use of such disproportionate force—against Jordan to boot—was folly indeed. It undermined the whole US effort to maintain Jordanian stability, which was so much in Israel’s own interest that Israel’s action was almost incomprehensible. R. W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Rostow. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and an indication that the original was signed. 337. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 337. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 16, 1966. SUBJECT Next Steps on Jordan-Israel Amman’s 1109 and 1120 2 attached underscore the magnitude of the damage Israel has done in attacking Jordan. The King in a private session [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] made it clear that he considers the unwritten agreement with Israel which had neutralized the Jordan-Israel border has “now been permanently shattered.” He feels the only way he can discharge his obligation to his people is to beef up his military establishment with new equipment—hopefully from the US but from “the devil himself” if need be. He admits this buildup will cost Jordan much in both material and human resources. The Embassy fears that the monarchy itself is in jeopardy. While the King says he will not counter-attack unless Israel attacks again, the pressure among his populace and junior officers to strike back is mounting. The Syrian radio is urging his junior officers to push him aside. Embassy Amman feels we must (a) support a strong condemnation of Israel in the UN without coupling Israel’s strike with earlier sabotage incidents and (b) announce suspension of our military aid and sales to Israel. State is pressing the following actions in the next few days: —NEA and IO have recommended a resolution that condemns Israel without mentioning the sabotage incidents. Goldberg’s speech today did condemn Israel but Goldberg so far has not bought the IO-NEA recommendation on the resolution. —If we confirm Jordanian charges that US Patton tanks were used in the Israeli attack, we will almost certainly have to suspend further shipments to Israel. Most of the tanks have gone, but we still have 80–85% of the refitting kits. Also, the Israelis have urgently requested some ammunition and we can be clumsy about meeting their demands on that. —Letters from the President to both Hussein and Eshkol. The question is whether to wait till we have a clearer long-term position or to get something out quickly and follow up later. —State is developing a series of graded actions for suspending military aid: delay one ammunition order this month; slow down the whole pipeline; temporarily suspend all aid and credits; and cancel. These moves are all good tactical ones in the heat of this post-strike week. However, we ought to begin facing now the basic question of what kind of relationship between Israel and Jordan we can rebuild. We’ll either have to give in to Hussein’s expensive new arms requests or try to rebuild what the King today feels is “permanently shattered.” Our vote is to tackle the Israelis along these lines: They’ve wiped the slate clean by this attack and laid low the impressive tacit arrangement we’ve built over the years to neutralize the Israeli-Jordan border. They’ve probably wiped out the King’s commitment not to station his army on the west bank. They’ve destroyed the running dialogue we had on controlling the cross-border terrorism. The King will shortly ask us for substantial quantities of military equipment and if we don’t provide it, says he will go anywhere he can get it. So the Israelis have left us with a tremendous bill on our hands. We’d be entirely justified in suspending all aid to Israel simply to offset that bill. However, we’d like to try rebuilding what we can of the old tacit arrangement with Jordan. To do that, we need to know what we can count on from Israel. For instance, can we tell King Hussein we have a commitment from Israel not to strike again? Will Israel help build up the UN border-control system? If the Israelis are interested in this kind of arrangement, we will do what we can with the King. State is not thinking clearly in these terms yet because it’s still struggling with the details of our immediate reaction. Therefore, we should begin talking in these slightly longer range terms. One way to do this would be to ask for draft Presidential letters to both parties within a week designed to lay the groundwork for this kind of rebuilding. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos. Secret. 2 Telegrams 1109 and 1120 from Amman, November 15 and 16, are attached but not printed. Copies are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. 338. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 338. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, November 18, 1966. No. 19–66 SUBJECT Current Problems for the Jordanian Regime 2 1. The 13 November Israeli raid on the Hebron district of Jordan has shattered the modus vivendi which had lasted for several years along the Israeli-Jordan border. During this period, King Hussein had made a sustained effort to avoid provocations to Israel. This has involved such steps as preventing Arab saboteurs from crossing from Jordan into Israel and keeping his armored forces east of the Jordan River. These measures have been politically unpopular at home and have subjected him to criticism from other Arab states. 2. Hence, Hussein is particularly bitter at the size of the attack and the damage it caused. He feels he has been betrayed by an assault out of all proportion to the provocation. He has been—and would be—able to live with an occasional night-time foray by Israeli forces resulting in the destruction of, say, a police station and a few houses. However, the recent raid involved an infantry brigade supported by armor, aircraft, and artillery; it resulted in about 50 deaths—half of them Jordanian soldiers—and in the destruction of about 150 buildings. Jordan’s army was clearly humiliated in the process. 3. The Israeli attack badly damaged Hussein’s position at home. It made him vulnerable to attack by disaffected elements of his population, who argue that his policy of peaceful coexistence with Israel has been dictated by the US and has proved a failure. There is a glaring contrast between Israeli treatment of Jordan and of Syria, which had severely provoked the Israelis, had received public Soviet support, and had been left alone by Tel Aviv’s army. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 3 is now redoubling its pressure for the establishment of Palestinian military units in Jordanian border villages, a move Hussein has resisted because such units would not be under his control. The pressures in the Jordanian Armed Forces for retaliation against Israel are very high. 4. Hussein is aware that such feelings exist and will probably try to propitiate both military and civilian elements by stationing significant army units, including armor, on the West Bank of the Jordan River. He may also make a political gesture such as changing his Prime Minister. Hussein probably feels he cannot for the present use his security forces to prevent Syrian-trained saboteurs from operating through Jordan into Israel. The result will probably be an increase in sabotage incidents, which in turn may result in further major Israeli retaliations. Should such a raid occur in the next few months, Hussein would almost certainly feel compelled to retaliate, although he would probably try to keep Jordanian military action on a limited scale. He is aware that retaliation carries the risk of an expanded conflict, which could involve the bulk of his army, a process in which the latter would almost certainly be defeated. 5. The Israeli raid has caused extensive grumbling and discontented talk directed at the regime, but only one demonstration so far—at Hebron on 15 November. Emotions are running high, however—this is the worst single incident since Suez—and there could be disturbances in major towns and cities in Jordan. It would be particularly difficult for the regime to control demonstrations directed against Israel, and they could easily be diverted against the King. In this superheated atmosphere the prospects for an attempted coup or assassination cannot be ruled out. 6. The reactions of Jordan’s Arab neighbors have been mixed. The Syrians have severely criticized Hussein for failing to deal strongly with Israel, but Cairo has been very restrained. Nasser is aware that if Hussein retaliated with a military strike at Israel, Cairo could be faced with a choice of coming to Jordan’s support or of losing much prestige by staying aloof. The Syrians, on the other hand, can be expected to continue to train saboteurs and dispatch them to Israel through Jordan. They are intent upon causing trouble in both countries. 7. Even if the Jordanian regime gets through the immediate crisis, Hussein’s position appears to have been damaged to an extent we cannot yet fully assess. He [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and even at his best probably commands the allegiance of not more than a quarter to a third of the population. Hence, the regime’s continuity requires that it not suffer too many public defeats in close succession. Failure of the regime to respond militarily to incidents occurring in the near future would almost certainly stimulate more determined plotting within the Armed Forces as well as widespread public disorder. 8. For some time, Hussein will feel compelled to take a harder line toward Israel. He will be forced into a military buildup, both for greater border security and to keep the military happy. He will certainly turn to the US for more military hardware and faster delivery. He will seek and probably get Saudi money to buy arms. If he does not obtain substantial help from these sources and if internal pressures increase, he will try to repair his relations with the radical Arab states and may turn to the Soviets for economic aid and possibly for arms. Tension along the border will almost certainly remain high, incidents are likely to be frequent, and Hussein’s future will to a great degree depend on the scope and nature of Syrian and Israeli initiatives in this respect. Hussein himself is most unlikely to approach the question of Israeli-Jordanian relations as openmindedly and as positively as he has in the past. 9. The Israeli raid seems illogical and miscalculated to us, and there is evidence that it seems so to some segments of opinion in Israel as well. On the whole, and in the absence of further evidence, we think it most likely that the Israeli act was one of genuine retaliation, determined to be necessary to satisfy Israeli opinion, and (in the Israeli view) to throw fear into the Arabs and restrain them from further forays into Israel. As for why the Israelis attacked Jordan instead of Syria, one major concern was the greater military costs of an incursion into Syria. A decision was probably made some weeks ago to stage a major raid into Jordan as soon as a pretext arose. It also appears likely that Israel wished to avoid attacking Syria because of Syria’s close relations with the USSR and Israel’s desire not to worsen relations with that great power, especially in view of the large Jewish population in the USSR. For the Board of National Estimates: Sherman Kent Chairman 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. II. Secret. 2 This memorandum has been produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Clandestine Services. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 The PLO is a radical organization, established by agreement of the Arab rulers during the recently-ended period of Arab harmony. It is strongly supported by the UAR, which grants it extensive radio and other privileges. [Footnote in the source text.] 339. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 339. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, November 20, 1966, 1820Z. CAP 661007. The Israel-Jordan border situation remains explosive. Last Sunday’s raid weakened King Hussein’s ability to control terrorists operating into Israel from Jordan because he no longer has full cooperation of the army, which Israel badly mauled. 2 Another Israeli strike in retaliation for new incidents that could happen would force Hussein to counter attack. I. Our first job, therefore, is to keep Israel from attacking again. Secretary Rusk recommends a tough message to Eshkol which says we would have to reassess our last year’s decision to supply military equipment if Israel attacks again. Since we have already sent a number of tough signals, he hesitates to recommend unqualifiedly that you send this message and volunteers to deliver it himself via Harman if you prefer. (The last paragraph is our suggestion to which working levels at state are agreeable. There has been no time to get it to Secretary Rusk.) I recommend you send it yourself for Ambassador Barbour to pass orally to Eshkol for three reasons: 1. Sunday’s attack badly damaged our ability to go on stabilizing Israel’s Jordanian border. Ambassador Harman now understands this, but we’re not sure Israeli leaders in Jerusalem do. Asking Barbour to deliver it there will have greater impact. The Israelis have gravely damaged the unspoken truce we’ve helped them build with Hussein—including possibly the agreement in return for our plane and tank sale not to station Jordanian armor on the West Bank of the Jordan near Israel. They’ve upset your delicate and successful balancing act in selling jets to Jordan to keep the Soviets out. He is now reported to be receiving Soviet equipment offers and is making requests to us for substantial additional equipment. The Israelis must be made to realize that if they retaliate again, in response to anything short of a major attack, our ability to stabilize the area may be crippled. 2. Bringing home to them that they’ve undercut your policies will strengthen your hand for whatever we may have to ask Israel to do later to re-stabilize the situation. 3. We also want to use this opening to jolt Israeli leaders into realizing that they can’t go on looking to us for protection over the long haul unless they make some effort of their own to coexist with their neighbors. In view of your stance that reconciliation not aggression is the way to solve problems, we can’t miss this opportunity to challenge a policy that is leading us all up a dead-end street in the Middle East. Many of Israel’s new leaders doubt that the old retaliation policy of Ben Gurion is wise and believe Israel can only survive by working toward accommodation with the Arabs. Their bad mistake last weekend will sharpen debate over this issue. This message from you laid before Eshkol personally would bring them up short and may help the moderates turn the corner. II. Our second job is to put Hussein back on his feet. His regime has been severely shaken and he has asked us for substantial additional amounts of military equipment. He wants some of it to be airlifted for dramatic impact to undercut critics who charge that he is incompetent to defend Jordan. We do not want to feed his belief that his only response is to build a defense establishment he cannot afford, but we will have to try to meet his problem of demonstrating to his people that he’s doing all he can. One way to do this is to speed up a few items in the military aid pipeline. We don’t like this, but the alternative again is to stand by and watch the Egyptians and Soviets happily pour the stuff in. The sensible long-term approach is to send a mission or possibly missions to work out effective ways to seal off the Israel-Jordan border. That’s the real problem, and the sooner we divert his attention to that, the better. I suggested the idea to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. They are exploring possibilities along these lines. If we speed up Jordan’s pipeline, we will have to tell Israel why and ask them to restrain critics here. We would also have to offer similar border-control help to Israel because, in all fairness, they can only give up retaliation if they find some other way to deal with Arab terrorists. We will push staff work on this today and be back to you quickly with a concrete response to Hussein. But the most immediate need is to restrain Israel and lay a strong bargaining base for whatever long-range scheme we can work out. I also think it would be a good idea for me to spell out our thinking to Feinberg as soon as we have ourselves lined up. We may have to look like we’re making some anti-Israeli gestures before we’re done, and a little pre-emptive briefing might help. Approve message for direct transmission to Eshkol via Barbour Ask Secretary Rusk to deliver it 3 Keep last paragraph Delete last paragraph Talk with Feinberg 4 Not now Suggested Message to Prime Minister Eshkol “You are aware of our concern at the events of November 13 and their impact on the stability of the regime in Jordan. I am sympathetically aware of the painful dilemma posed by your need both to protect Israel’s citizens and to promote peace with your neighbors. Just two weeks ago we made our position on terror incidents mounted from across your border clear beyond question in the Security Council hearings on your complaint against Syria. But while recognizing your problem, I must recognize also that the fact of the raid on Jordan and its magnitude have raised threats to United States interests and, I believe, to those of Israel. Sunday’s raid has set in motion developments in Jordan the outcome of which at this juncture we cannot fully assess. But the position of King Hussein’s government and United States interests have been gravely affected. Another such action, no matter what the cause, could bring on irreparable damage. The implications of such action for Israel’s security and for area stability would therefore be serious indeed. Continued application of the policy of military retaliation by Israel raises concern here as to the supply of some categories of United States military equipment to Israel. You will recall that it was only after exhaustive consideration of the military situation in the Middle East that we agreed last year to an exception to our long-standing policy on arms sales. This decision was not easily arrived at. It was taken in the belief that it would contribute to stability in the area. In full candor, I must make certain you are aware that further punitive forays by Israel across armistice lines in the Near East could bring a reassessment of the premises on which our decisions regarding military supply to Israel were based. These are troubled times, Mr. Prime Minister, when peace is fragile and stability more necessary than ever. Just as there have been events that disturb the peace, there may be in the future more such events. In these circumstances it is the hardest and highest task of government to hold fast to course of moderation and reason. It is because I know you share with me these views that I know I can count on you not only to recognize the peril but also to have the determination to avoid it. Beyond this present situation, there is also the need to look toward Israel’s eventual coexistence with its neighbors. I well know from my own country’s experience along its long borders how difficult—but also how essential—this is. It has also been part of our experience that out of a crucible such as the present crisis can come small but sound steps toward a more stable and secure future.” 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel. Secret. 2 Telegram 1173 from Amman, November 19, reported that Prime Minister Tell told Burns that day that Jordan urgently needed U.S. help to prevent further deterioration of the situation in Jordan, including a strong Security Council resolution condemning Israel, delivery of certain defensive weapons to Jordan, beginning as soon as possible, and U.S. suspension of delivery of military items to Israel. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN) Telegram 1176 from Amman, November 19, reported that in a meeting with Burns that evening, King Hussein underscored the importance of the requests. (Ibid.) 3 The President added the following handwritten note: “this message as his own to Harman & you inform Feinberg of contents & ask him to notify his friends of urgency. Another message may be necessary later.” An attached note states that the President’s wishes were relayed to Rostow by telephone from the LBJ Ranch at 8 a.m. on November 21. The message reads: “Rostow: Ask Secy Rusk to deliver this message as his own to Harman and you inform Feinberg of contents and ask him to notify his friends of the urgency. Tell Rostow it may be necessary for me to send another message later, so I will let Rusk deliver the first one.” 4 The President checked this option. 340. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 340. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, November 21, 1966, 4:14 p.m. 88377. 1. Evron called on Assistant Secretary Sisco on Sunday 2 to discuss current status of discussions in New York on Security Council resolution. He stressed two points in particular: (a) that we disabuse members of the Security Council that in final analysis we would support original Nigerian text; and (b) that regardless of what the United States might think about the retaliatory Israeli action against Jordan, the important thing was peace in the Middle East and that a completely one-sided Security Council resolution would only add to sense of demoralization and frustration in Israel. 2. Sisco responded that he appreciated the points made, and that we too are anxious that the Security Council act in such a way as to promote peace in the area. We have suggested changes in Nigerian draft to give it better balance. Sisco promised to convey above views expressed by Evron to Goldberg on Monday. 3. Evron also seemed particularly concerned over fact that neither British nor French were being helpful at present time, and he seemed to realize that US efforts to introduce some balance to resolution would be difficult. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN/UN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Tel Aviv and Amman. 2 November 20. 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, November 21, 1966, 4:21 p.m. 88396. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. 1. A New York lawyer for ALCO, Mr. James Birdsall, has recently reported to Department substance of a lengthy conversation he had with Nasser in Cairo on October 12. 2 Main thrust of conversation was reaffirmation of desire maintain good relations with US, arguments aimed at demonstrating that US and UAR had many common interests in area and request that USG exert new initiative to resolve Yemen impasse. There was strong plea for resumption PL 480 wheat shipments and expectable indications of what Nasser and UAR would do to be helpful if wheat forthcoming. Disturbing element was Nasser’s statement to Birdsall that within last 18 months to two years he had become convinced that US determined overthrow his government and possibly go so far as to assassinate him. He added that “he had indisputable evidence that within the last several months agents of the CIA had entered into a conspiracy with Egyptians aimed at his assassination and violent overthrow of his government.” He said he would be prepared to disclose evidence and to discuss matter with any representative of USG. 2. In same conversation Nasser, while not accusing you of being active participant in any “plot,” said he had no evidence that you not aware of plot. Birdsall’s answers were responsible, forthright, and adroit. He refused as private citizen examine any so-called “evidence” and said only he would convey Nasser’s concern to USG. Problem of UAR suspicions of USG intentions is one with which both you and we have been wrestling for many months. We have no illusions that any single action on our part can in itself reestablish new atmosphere of mutual evidence. At same time we feel that Nasser’s open-ended offer disclose “evidence” to a USG official carries with it an opportunity that should not be cast aside. 3. I believe it would be appropriate, unless you perceive serious objection, for you to see Nasser to make following points: a. It has been brought to attention of USG that reports have reached the highest levels of the GUAR to the effect that the USG is involved in an alleged “plot” to interfere directly in the internal affairs of the UAR in opposition to President Nasser and his government. b. You have been personally authorized by me to deny categorically the authenticity of such reports and to assure Nasser that the USG has no intention or desire to interfere in the UAR’s internal affairs. c. I want President Nasser to know of my concern at this indication of an obstacle to confidence between our two Governments and my belief that it is to the interest of both countries that this matter be expeditiously dealt with. d. I believe that these reports and accompanying material should be subjected to joint scrutiny by competent intelligence technicians from the US and the UAR. I would like to send a high-ranking and responsible official of the Central Intelligence Agency to Cairo to discuss this matter with the appropriate UAR authorities and carefully to examine and comment on any material which the UAR may wish to make available to him. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] e. The USG would give serious consideration to any alternative suggestions which President Nasser might care to make as we strongly desire to set the record straight as quickly as possible. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State,INR Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Cairo. Secret; Roger Channel; Special Handling. Approved by the Secretary. A draft of the telegram was sent to Rusk with a November 10 memorandum from Hare setting forth its background. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US) 2 Hare’s November 10 memorandum states that Birdsall’s memorandum of the conversation (not found) had been shown to and discussed with James Critchfield of the Central Intelligence Agency, who state that “CIA is involved in no operations in the area which could in any way be interpreted by the Egyptians as ‘evidence’ of the kind they claim they have.” Hare noted that although it was highly unusual for a Chief of State to communicate through a private individual, Nasser had since 1952 had significant conversations with prominent but non-official Americans such as Robert Anderson. Hare thought they should take Nasser’s statements seriously and act on the assumption that he would expect a response. 3 Battle reported in telegram 3300 from Cairo, undated, received on December 11, that he raised the subject with Nasser on December 10. He followed paragraphs 3a through e of telegram 88396 closely, telling Nasser that he was following Rusk’s personal instruction. Nasser said immediately he had no feeling that Battle was personally involved. Battle thought he seemed “extremely surprised at the subject of our conversation and a little flustered.” When Battle pressed him to make available the evidence he had mentioned, he replied that except for the Mustapha Amin case, he had not had anything for perhaps 2 years. Nasser made numerous efforts to change the subject and indicated no willingness to pursue the matter with Battle or anyone else. Battle thought he either had no evidence or was uncertain about making it available. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 UAR) 342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, November 21, 1966, 8:44 p.m. 88812. Ref Amman 1177. 2 1. We fully share concern of GOJ over continuing unrest in Jordan and hope that strong action by SC will have calming influence upon situation. While Nigerian-type resolution with loose talk about sanctions under Chapter VII might have some heady effect for moment, we have been working on assumption that resolution containing ref to “cessation of violent acts from either side of line” would add some greater element of balance and would have greater long-term influence on general overall problem of peace in area. 2. Accordingly, in discussing with Zu’aiter Dept’s reaction to his demarche on SC resolution, you should note our conviction that there will be no peace in area as long as Israel is subject to recurring Fatah type raids taking place despite Jordan’s best efforts so far to prevent them and it difficult isolate Nov 13 incident from them. In seeking to create better understanding within GOJ of motives and objectives of US moves so far in Council, Embassy should draw as appropriate on para 4 of USUN 2491 and on USUN 2411. 3 Para 7 of latter will serve as general outline of background of our approach to problem in SC and may so be used. Embassy should not however refer specifically to our initial draft which is now outdated. Although we do not wish to refer to “terrorist activities” as such, 4 we believe some language clearly covering Fatah-type raids should be included, although there would be no implication Jordan was to blame for them. Consultations at UN today, reported by USUN septel, indicate approach of this nature urgent since Nigerian Permrep plans to table resolution strongly favorable to Jordan, condemning action of Israel but containing language following closely along lines of last preambular paragraph of our draft (USUN 2493). 5 3. Dept commends your initiative in approaching FonMin on El-Farra actions. We believe you should again express hope instructions have been sent to him since he again on Nov 21 saw fit to link US position in SC to domestic political considerations. 6 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN/UN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Wolle and in substance by Brown, Sisco, and Davies; and approved and initialed by Atherton. Repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, London, Moscow, Cairo, Paris, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Kuwait, Jidda, Jerusalem, and UNCINCMEAFSA. 2 Telegram 1177 from Amman, November 20, reported that Foreign Minister Zu’aiter called in Burns to urge U.S. support for an African draft resolution condemning Israel and to complain that a U.S. draft resolution contained “irrelevant” references to Israel-Syria border incidents. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 2491 from USUN is dated November 19. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN/UN) Telegram 2411 was not found. 4 Telegram 88974 to Amman, November 22, instructed the Embassy to substitute the words “Although reference to ‘terrorist activities’ as such no longer possible in light of sentiment of Council,” for the opening clause of this sentence. (Ibid.) 5 Dated November 19. (Ibid.) 6 Telegram 1217 from Amman, November 22, reported that since Tell had indicated he did not want to seem to dictate to El-Farra by instructing him on details, the Embassy thought it would be counterproductive to press him to send further instructions. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) 343. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 343. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, November 22, 1966, 10:24 a.m. 88940. For the Ambassador only. Secretary saw Ambassador Harman morning 21st 2 to convey through him President’s concern over Israeli raid into Jordan and its impact on King Hussein’s position in Jordan. Secretary said we aware dilemma faced by Israel in coping with terror incidents but that the raid was disproportionate to problem. It was launched without consultation with us although just two weeks earlier we had stood firmly with Israel in the Security Council on this very problem. Israel’s action has put Jordan Government under heavy pressure and both our interests and Israel’s have been adversely affected. Secretary made clear that a recurrence of action across armistice lines could bring re-examination of our decision to sell certain military equipment to Israel. 3 Secretary said he welcomed statement by Prime Minister Eshkol as carried Monday’s newspapers that Israel would seek to strengthen border security measures to prevent infiltration. Israel faces basically police problem, and police measures rather than disproportionate military attacks were the answer. Harman said President’s thoughts would be conveyed immediately to Jerusalem. He had however just received message from Prime Minister 4 concerning USG distress over November 13 incident which he then read. Message opened with statement relief at news President’s swift and resilient recovery and expression appreciation for meaning President’s leadership for cause world peace and advancement human welfare. Noted Prime Minister’s distress at course which events have taken since disturbances of November 12 and 13 and stated USG views being studied with utmost respect. Following lengthy recapitulation events in Israel and Security Council which led to Israel’s decision to take action in response to November 12 incident, Prime Minister stated he felt refusal to act would not only demoralize his people but also open way for new attacks by terrorist groups. What was planned as limited local action turned out differently owing to arrival of Arab Legion infantry who unexpectedly engaged Israeli unit at close range. Repeated details attack as given by General Rabin to Barbour (Tel Aviv’s 1742). 5 In regard to future Prime Minister wished President to know he has ordered study be made and action be taken in regard methods of improving Israel’s static defense. Prime Minister stated central point is that Israel’s basic policy has not changed. It stands by armistice agreement, supports status quo, and sovereignty and integrity of existing states. Prime Minister invited understanding of President for dilemma in which Israel found itself. Message closes with strong appeal for US support to prevent SC resolution which utterly ignores Israel’s losses, anxieties and difficulties. Following Harman’s presentation Secretary stated he still could not understand how Israel so misread situation as not to realize even limited action would seriously endanger Jordan Government and moderate policies it pursued. That Israel’s action got out of control and escalated brought to his mind three incidents where escalation had or could have occurred. First occurred last year when infiltrators crossed from Pakistan-held territory into Indian-held Kashmir to harass area. Action taken by GOP without consultation with us brought move into Pakistan-held territory by Indian forces, again without consultation with us. Rate of escalation such we had no means to use our influence with either party. When cease-fire agreement finally came we were “fifteen minutes” from Congressional resolution which would have barred all further aid to India and Pakistan. In matters involving U.S. we have practiced restraint in order to avoid escalation to extent possible. Despite heavy infiltration of North Viet Nam forces into south we waited five years before ordering bombing of supply points and routes in north. In effect, there was a five-year pause during which we sought other solutions. At present, almost every week, there are armed forays from Cambodia against us in Viet Nam. We know Prince Sihanouk does not condone actions and that he lacks military force to prevent them. Yet, because of position in which he would be put, we do not strike at our enemy in Cambodian territory. Secretary noted that recently when six U.S. soldiers killed south of demilitarized zone in Korea we did not launch retaliatory action against north. Restraint is essential to avoid escalation and to build up prospects of peace. And yet, restraint and moderation are the most difficult of postures for any government to assume. Ambassador Harman said Israel faces most difficult problem. Terror incidents occur on doorstep rather than miles away as in Kashmir. Its 800-mile frontier across extremely difficult terrain is guarded by only small conscript army. Government had increased length military service to make more men available for security patrols. Frontier villages employing night guards at their own expense. All this created “siege atmosphere” and made for most difficult way of life for Israeli citizens. Arab actions seem indication of policy of total aggression. Secretary did not agree this the case and again noted measures taken by Jordan to control terror groups. He said “what you have done in the name of your security seems in fact to have undermined Israel’s security.” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on November 21 and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 2 A memorandum of the conversation is filed with a memorandum of November 21 from Read to Rusk telling him that the President had sent word through Rostow that he would prefer Rusk to call in Harman and deliver the warning against further Israeli reprisals. It also states, “Apparently the President looks with favor on the idea of a border sealing and hopes we can encourage the Israelis and the Arabs to promote this action.” (Ibid., POL ISR–US) 3 In telegram 88827 to Tel Aviv and Amman, November 21, Rusk informed Barbour and Burns that Komer had made this point to Harman and warned them that no indication of this should be given to the Jordanians. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB–ISR) 4 The message, stated in the third person, dated November 21, is filed with a covering memorandum of November 22 from Rostow to the President, which notes that Evron called on Rostow that day, underlined the shock felt in Israel at the consequences of the raid, and reaffirmed that the Israeli Government was “beginning to think seriously about more effective passive defense.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel) 5 Dated November 21. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) 344. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 344. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, November 22, 1966, 6 p.m. 89339. Amman 1120, 1180 and 1200; 2 Tel Aviv 1742; 3 USDAO Amman 1703 Nov 66. 4 Joint State-Defense. Arms Deliveries to Israel 1. Idea of suspending or slowing down arms deliveries to Israel has much appeal as possible means (a) underline to GOI our strong disapproval Nov 13 raid and retaliation doctrine generally and (b) as short-term psychological measure to help bolster morale Hussein and GOJ. After careful consideration we have concluded for number reasons that such actions, whether publicly announced or privately conveyed to one or both parties, would not be wise at this juncture and might in fact be counterproductive. 2. Regardless general indignation concerning nature of Israeli raid, public announcement suspension of deliveries could be interpreted as slap at Israel that failed to take into account context of terrorism over past two years, growth of “popular liberation” sentiment in area, and alleged lack of immediately effective alternatives. We also have in mind most recent reports indicating Israeli forces used were on much smaller scale than originally reported and that no significant, if any, US equipment was employed (Tel Aviv 1742 and USDAO Amman 1703 Nov 66). In addition, publicly announced suspension of arms to Israel could lead to demand for same to be applied to Jordan, and perhaps to whole area. At very least this could reopen previous public questioning of US sales to Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, which could do considerable damage to our policy interests both in short and longer run. Finally, suspension of deliveries would face us with problem developing convincing rationale for their ultimate resumption. Even if suspension were kept private, fact of suspension would probably surface, and if terrorism and present tension continue it would be difficult justify resumption unless Israelis had renounced retaliation (which we judge as most unlikely). 3. Similar disadvantages and risks would apply to non-publicized actions affecting Israel arms deliveries. If actions were to do any good along lines para 1 (a) and (b) above, Israelis and Jordanians would have to be made explicitly aware of them, and damaging, probably distorted, publicity would almost inevitably result. 4. Whatever wisdom Nov 13 raid, Israel is in good position in larger context to justify defense requirements and thus to argue that delays in arms deliveries could jeopardize Israel’s defense. If it could be demonstrated Israel had violated agreements with us by using our equipment for aggression there would be no question our reactions to suspend shipments. In present circumstances we believe measures short of suspension such as deliberate slowdown of shipments would risk strong reactions that could undercut Israel’s tacit agreement for recent US tank and aircraft sales to Jordan. 5. In sum, in present circumstances we believe disadvantages outweigh advantages of suspension of arms deliveries to Israel and are therefore concentrating on (a) other ways to put IDF on notice that conditions of sale of US military equipment and US position on retaliation are not mere “paper points,” (b) demonstrating that effective alternatives can be developed for containing terrorism, and (c) finding other means to provide psychological encouragement to GOJ. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on November 21; cleared by Atherton, Handley, Colonel Jordan of DOD/ISA, Sisco, Kitchen, and Davies; and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to Amman, Tel Aviv, USUN, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Paris, and Moscow and pouched to POLAD CINCSTRIKE. 2 Regarding telegram 1120 from Amman, see footnote 2, Document 337 . Telegram 1180 from Amman, November 20, urged a favorable response to the Jordanian request for military equipment but stated that the Embassy was convinced the most effective action to help Hussein, deter future Israeli attacks, and benefit the U.S. image in the Middle East would be an announcement of suspension of military deliveries to Israel. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN) Telegram 1200 from Amman, November 21 reiterated the Embassy’s view that the action that would have the maximum impact in Jordan would be an announcement of suspension of military deliveries to Israel. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) 3 See footnote 5, Document 343 . 4 Not found. 345. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 345. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, November 22, 1966, 2009Z. 1780. Ref: State 88408; Tel Aviv 1741. 2 1. In mtg this afternoon, after discussing situation in SC reported septel, I told FonMin Eban that I assumed there no necessity for me to emphasize further the seriousness of the situation resulting from the Israeli Nov 13 raid, particularly insofar as its consequences in Jordan. I said that in worst event Hussein’s regime will be displaced and at best damage of inestimable magnitude has been done to Hussein’s attitude toward Israel and his estimate of Israeli intentions. This situation abundantly clear and I would spare him repetition. 2. Eban acknowledged full comprehension on part GOI now and its apprehensions. He said this understandably was reason he sought mtg. Having consulted at length with PM Eshkol, he wished to give some of GOI’s thinking as to future. He expressed confidence in and gratitude for basic foundation of US–GOI relations. He cited help of U.S. in security field and its assistance in UN refugee and Syrian debates as components in making this a “good year” for Israel and a high point in US-Israeli relations. He went on that essential now is to get over current divergence. Basic factor which had been introduced into Arab-Israeli confrontation in recent times was concept of “popular war.” This had given scope to non-governmental terrorist organizations hitherto under wraps. Attacks on Israel’s capital (Romema dynamiting) and on railway between capital and main city added new dimension to security problem. GOI had reacted against harborers of agents involved. He admitted effect on Jordanian regime not as anticipated and dangerous situation had resulted. 3. PM has now approved as basic GOI policy the reestablishment of stability in Jordan. GOI will welcome any ideas as to measures which will promote this purpose. Meanwhile, PM has ordered “maximum restraint.” This means no reaction to further popularly inspired incidents. Of course, in event of major military attack, GOI will defend itself. (Here Eban cited report earlier today of intention of commander of Jordanian brigade to take matters into own hands. I replied we had report apparently on same item but markedly different in most important element namely that commander in question was going to petition the King for authority. This seemed to reassure him.) 4. In implementation this policy GOI will endeavor first to minimize contact. Scopus convoy scheduled for tomorrow will not go. Trains on Jerusalem-Tel Aviv route will not run at night. Fences will be constructed in Jerusalem area at two points along railway. I asked about cultivation on Syrian border in DZ. He said GOI attempting through Bull to get informal three power—Israel, Syria and UN—negotiations going to settle fields on basis of status quo. 5. Of more continuing impact, PM has instructed that major effort be made to improve static defense in hope that even if it impossible to seal borders entirely at least infiltration can be made “less easy.” Guards will be increased and technical devices sought. Any U.S. ideas will be welcome. 6. Eban wondered whether U.S. had any influence with Egyptians which might be utilized to assist King. Israeli impression is that subversion being fomented in Nablus is PLO inspired and although Shuquairy not Nasser agent his organization is in Egypt. I noted our stock with Nasser not high but it possible he also might not be anxious overthrow Hussein this time and might exercise moderating influence on his own. 7. Finally, Eban said King could be assured in firmest terms that Israeli policy as to Jordan and its disinterest in acquiring West Bank has not changed. Raid was not prelude or rehearsal for invasion. It merely got out of hand. 8. Conversation confirms that PM and other members GOI deeply shaken by developments. Also shocked by revelation of degree of precariousness of Hussein regime which, although they admit we told them repeatedly, they had been unable to comprehend. They probably have further taught themselves importance to Israel of Hashemite dynasty, idea which they adopted intellectually but less than wholeheartedly. Lesson may be worthwhile. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Jerusalem and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA,USIA, and NSA. 2 Telegram 88408 to Tel Aviv, November 21, instructed the Embassy to continue to emphasize U.S. concern with the situation in Jordan and to outline developments at the United Nations so that the Israeli Government would understand the strength of the opinion against it in the Security Council. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN/UN) Telegram 1741 from Tel Aviv, November 21, reported a conversation with Foreign Office Director General Levavi, in which Barbour deplored the consequences of Israeli raid, stressing its impact on King Hussein. (Ibid.) 346. Telegram From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas 346. Telegram From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, November 23, 1966, 2006Z. CAP 661033. Memorandum for the President. Subject: Message to King Hussein. Our next step in defusing the Jordan-Israel crisis is to bolster King Hussein. He is under great pressure both from the Palestinian elements in his population and from the junior army officers who charge that he has not provided adequately for Jordan’s defense. Demonstrations have spread to all the major centers in West Jordan. He has asked us for substantial amounts of military equipment to help him demonstrate that he has moved to prevent a repeat of the mauling Israel gave Jordan’s forces on November 13. Some of his advisors tell him that only attacking Israel will win the popular support necessary to save his regime. From our point of view either of the extreme approaches Jordan officials are talking about amounts to suicide. An attack on Israel could result in nothing but a severe Jordanian defeat. Expanding the army to the extent the King is talking about would be economic suicide because the Jordanian budget—already heavily subsidized by us—could not stand the additional $20 million a year in normal support maintenance costs we estimate would be required. The King may still choose to commit suicide. He has told Ambassador Burns that a point may come when he would rather go down fighting his enemies rather than his own people. However, our job is to (a) do what we can to help him through this tense period and (b) to restore balance to his thinking. We are convinced—and we now have Eshkol’s own assurances—that Israel has not changed its policy toward Jordan as the King seems to believe. With the gradual restoration of calm, we hope to turn his thinking to modest efforts to better control his borders. The following message, approved by Under Secretary Katzenbach, from you to the King is designed to help him over the current crisis. It expresses our sympathy to Hussein, makes clear our sharp disapproval of Israel’s action and reaffirms our interest in the peace, security, and economic progress of Jordan. It seeks to allay his fears that this major raid represents a change in Israel’s policy toward the West Bank by indicating you have good reason to believe it highly unlikely that the events he fears will in fact occur. (We have the firmest assurances from Israel to this effect.) It makes clear that the Israelis are fully aware that a repeat performance will have the gravest consequences for U.S.-Israeli relations. I believe we now have the Israelis focussing on better control of the borders—the most necessary immediate step in launching a period of quiet in Israel-Jordan relations. It will be more difficult to get Hussein concentrating on this problem rather than making unrealistic calls on us to make Jordan and Israel militarily equal. We will also have to help him parry thrusts again from the USSR and UAR, who are standing in the wings waiting to jump in with offers of new equipment as they were when you approved our plane sale. However, this message is the first step in that direction. “Your Majesty: Words of sympathy are small comfort when lives have been needlessly destroyed. I do, however, want to convey to Your Majesty a sense of the sorrow and concern the military action by Israel in the Hebron area has raised in me and in this country generally. My disapproval of this action has been made known to the Government of Israel in the strongest terms. Our support of condemnation of this action by the Security Council and Ambassador Goldberg’s statement during the Security Council hearings demonstrate the depth of my feelings and those of our country. This action has placed Your Majesty in a difficult position. I am certain that with your demonstrated courage, wisdom and moderation, your difficulties will be overcome. For our part, I assure you that this government maintains its interest in the peace and security of Jordan and in the economic progress and well-being of its people. I have ordered an urgent review of measures which the United States Government could take to assist you during this difficult period. 2 We will continue to be in touch with your government on this question. Finally Ambassador Burns has informed me of Your Majesty’s concern that Israel’s policies have changed and that Israel now intends to occupy territory on the West Bank of the Jordan River. While I can understand the reasons for this concern, I have good reason to believe it highly unlikely that the events you fear will in fact occur. In this connection my government’s opposition to the use of force to alter armistice lines or borders in the Near East has been made unmistakably clear to all parties concerned. The strong private representations we have made in Israel as well as our forthright public statements make clear that should Israel adopt the policies you fear it would have the gravest consequences for United States-Israel relations. 3 There is no doubt in my mind that our position is fully understood and appreciated by the Israelis. Sincerely,” Approve Disapprove 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 15. Secret. A handwritten note reads, “Sent 4:40 p.m.” 2 On another copy of CAP 661033, this sentence is revised in an unknown handwriting to read as follows: “I have ordered an urgent review of measures which the United States Government could take to assist in settling these difficulties.” (Ibid., Special Head of State Correspondence File, Jordan) 3 On the copy of CAP 661033 cited in footnote 2 above, the sentence ends after the word “consequences” and the words “for United States-Israel relations” are crossed out. 4 Neither option is checked. A handwritten note states, “Been cleared with revisions.” The message, with the revisions indicated in footnotes 2 and 3 above, was sent in telegram 90603 to Amman, November 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) Burns reported in telegram 1237 from Amman, November 24, that he delivered the message that morning to the King, who was “clearly pleased.” (Ibid.) 347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, November 24, 1966, 3:01 p.m. 90817. For Ambassador from Handley. 1. By immediately following telegram 2 we are responding to King’s and Tell’s request for accelerated delivery of already programmed military equipment. We believe this positive and quick response will be helpful in meeting immediate need of bolstering morale of King and his status in eyes of Army and people as well as reducing chances of further disaffection in JAA. But it should not be interpreted as an indicator that USG is prepared underwrite long-term buildup JAA. 2. At this moment, primary need seems to be psychological and we believe President’s letter plus quick response GOJ’s request for speedup certain equipment, especially F–104s, may help all concerned get over present extremely tense and dangerous period. 3. We are carefully weighing longer range problem posed by GOJ request and Embassy recommendations re increased military aid. Thinking here, however, is that major contribution US can make in months ahead lies not so much in buildup Jordan’s military heft, as in finding ways to improve border security, i.e., static defense. Within few days we hope be able lay out plan and program to meet this problem. Meanwhile, consider it of highest importance you continue assess GOJ mood for indications that our short term measures and other current developments may make it possible discuss longer range problem in realistic and constructive context. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and Handley and approved by Handley. 2 Telegram 90818 to Amman, November 24, instructed Burns to inform the King of a favorable U.S. response to his request for emergency delivery of certain items of military equipment. The airlift to Jordan of 6 105mm self-propelled howitzers, 15 quarter-ton utility trucks, and 15 106mm recoilless rifles and an accelerated delivery schedule for the F–104 sales program had been authorized. (Ibid.) 3 Burns reported in telegram 1251, November 26, that he met with the King the previous day and informed him of the U.S. response to his request as authorized in telegram 90818. There followed “a long and deadly silence.” The King finally thanked Burns but indicated that what the United States was offering would have little impact. (Ibid.) 348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, November 25, 1966, 11:24 a.m. 90878. Cairo’s 2907. 2 1. Hare lunched alone with Kamel November 23. Kamel made usual lengthy presentation, by this time well known to Department and Embassy Cairo, re importance US aid to UAR. At one point Kamel stated US should not try to “starve Egyptians.” Hare rejoined sharply pointing out fact we had given over one billion dollars worth of aid to UAR as evidence of our desire to be helpful. 2. Main thrust of Hare’s remarks centered around need dampen down internal situation in Jordan. Hare dwelled at some length at inappropriateness HKJ UN rep Farra’s trying to drag US domestic politics into Jordan situation. (Hare dwelled on this point in hope that Kamel would see that it could apply equally to UAR.) Hare also referred to inflammatory behavior of Shukairy and intimated that it was not in UAR’s own best interest to allow Shukairy “lead Egyptians around by the nose.” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) UAR. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Hare. Repeated to Amman and USUN. 2 Telegram 2907 from Cairo, November 24, reported that Battle called on Fawzi, told him of U.S. concern over the situation in Middle East, and appealed for steps to alleviate tensions by all countries interested in peace in the area. He referred to a change in tone of the Egyptian press and to PLO statements as provocative and unhelpful. Fawzi assured him of UAR interest in peace but declared that recent charges by Wasfi Tell, required answers in the press and other media. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) 349. Editorial Note 349. Editorial Note On November 25, 1966, the UN Security Council adopted a draft resolution proposed by Nigeria and Mali on November 24 (UN document S/7598) as Resolution 228 (1966). The resolution’s preambular section included language observing that the incident constituted “a large-scale and carefully planned military action on the territory of Jordan by the armed forces of Israel,” reaffirming previous Security Council resolutions condemning past incidents of reprisal in breach of the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement and the UN Charter, recalling “the repeated resolutions of the Security Council asking for the cessation of violent incidents across the demarcation line, and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,” and reaffirming “the necessity for strict adherence to the General Armistice Agreement.” The resolution deplored the loss of life and property damage resulting from Israel’s action on November 13; censured Israel for its action; emphasized to Israel that if actions of military reprisal were repeated, the Security Council “will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts;” and requested the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and report to the Security Council as appropriate. The resolution was adopted by 14 votes to 0, with 1 abstention. The United States voted in favor of the resolution. 350. Memorandum for the Record 350. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, November 28, 1966. At the urgent request of UAR Ambassador Kamel, I called on him yesterday afternoon. He said he had asked me to come on a busy afternoon because of his extreme anxiety about the drift in US–UAR relations at a time of crisis in Near Eastern affairs. He had touched bases widely in the Department and in the White House without tangible results. He was aware that the Secretary would leave Washington December 4 for about two weeks and he feared the consequences if nothing occurred during that period. The heart of his anxiety is the stalemate on consideration of a possible PL–480 agreement. Maintaining that the key to peace and stability in the Near East is the continuation of effective US–UAR relations, he urged that technical discussions of the PL–480 question begin before the end of the year. He pointed out that the UAR is receiving massive military and economic assistance from the Communists while pursuing independent nationalist policies. This was possible because a food-link was maintained with the West. Kosygin had told Nasser that Russia would meet the UAR food requirements if this proved necessary. Kamel believes that, if this occurs, the UAR will slip irrevocably into the Soviet camp with dire consequences for peace and Near East stability. Despite the highly explosive situation which currently exists in the Near East, Kamel is confident that the area can be quieted down. He claims the UAR has no intent to bring Hussein down, since this would create a very dangerous situation for everyone in the area. When I raised the Ford problem, Kamel said that Ford had stupidly created the problem and that it was now incumbent upon the UAR and US Governments, as well as Ford, to resolve the issues. He said Ford assets had been blocked under UAR law over a customs dispute. He had been in direct contact with Ford and the company is prepared to make certain payments and this issue appears negotiable. Regrettably the Arab League Boycott Committee had met in the immediate aftermath of the Israeli action against Jordan. Under these circumstances, no Arab Government could oppose the boycott proposals of the radicals. 2 Nevertheless, some way could be found to get around this problem. He suggested that Eugene Black be authorized to raise it with Nasser when he sees him on December 1. Turning to the question of the recent departmental reorganization he asserted that all Arab Ambassadors concurred that the new structure and arrangements were less satisfactory. John P. Walsh Deputy Executive Secretary 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Prepared on November 29. 2 This portion of the conversation is recorded in more detail in telegram 92233 to Cairo, November 28. Kamel stated that the UAR Government had “long since” given up the notion that the Arab boycott was an effective weapon against Israel. He advised against a direct U.S. assault on the boycott apparatus and recommended that the companies involved take up matters with individual Arab governments. (Ibid., FT 11–2 ISR ARAB) Other documentation related to the boycott is ibid. 351. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 351. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, November 29, 1966, 1025Z. 1845. Ref: State 91607. 2 In meeting with Eban last evening, substance of which reported separately, I also referred to arms control accordance para 3 reftel. I noted that we encouraged by his remark to me on Nov 2nd that GOI no longer believes desirable keep Nasser in dark about Israeli nuclear intentions and hopes find “middle ground,” still protecting Israeli security considerations. Eban confirmed this GOI policy. I said that in circumstances, next week after current deluge Congressional delegations has passed, I would hope he and I can get together with PriMin to pursue discussion. He thought this good idea and will endeavor arrange appointment. I added that in meantime in line our understanding we would like to have another visit to Dimona and that AEC team is prepared to do so any time during next three weeks. I commented that it almost eight months since last visit. Eban said he will speak to PriMin and give me reply early as possible. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Secret;Exdis. Received at 6:14 a.m. 2 Telegram 91607 to Tel Aviv, November 25, instructed Barbour to request a meeting with Eban and Eshkol to follow up on his November 2 discussion of arms control with Eshkol (see Document 331 ) and to tell Eban that, in line with the U.S.-Israeli understanding on visits to Dimona, an AEC team was prepared to visit Dimona at any time within the next 3 weeks. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 NEAR E) 352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, November 29, 1966, 9:58 p.m. 93329. 1. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. Memcon 2 is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review. 2. In meeting with General Khammash afternoon Nov 29, Secretary expressed distress at situation which had brought Khammash to Washington, stated President and he have devoted much time to this problem and said he grateful for King’s message, which Khammash delivered. 3 USG well aware of details Nov 13 Israeli raid and had made known in both Israel and SC our view that Israeli action was wrong and misguided. 3. Khammash said as Chief of Staff it difficult be absent from Jordan at this time, but King Hussein felt it important convey at high level GOJ view of situation and corrective measures needed. Israeli raid, largest since 1956, had revealed Jordan defenses inadequate and adversely affected morale of Army. He had initially thought Israeli attack was beginning of invasion and had considered ordering return strike. If he had, area could have been plunged into war. 4. Khammash said while GOJ could cope with present demonstrations, they were most serious Jordan had experienced and revealed depth of popular feeling. Jordan now subject propaganda attacks from Syria, UAR and PLO. Public opinion in Jordan was convinced Israel attacked Jordan because Syria, which Israel had earlier held responsible for terrorism, was strong militarily and protected by USSR. In this situation Jordan was turning to its friend the United States. Must be understood that Nov 13 incident unlike incidents in past and situation would not return to normal if nothing was done. If USG unable to help, King faced with choice of (a) dying in Battle with Israel rather than at hands of own people, (b) becoming hero by turning to Soviets for military equipment or (c) abdicating. If Jordan received equipment requested and money to pay for enlarged Army, all would be well. This connection Khammash asserted Jordanian officers sufficiently sophisticated to tell difference between real and token help. 5. In response Secretary’s question whether opinions differed between East and West Bank in this matter, Khammash replied sense of defeat equally strong among all Jordanians. Only difference was that East Bank less vulnerable to Syrian,UAR and PLO propaganda. Jordan had been subject to such propaganda before but situation created by Nov 13 attack had made elements of population more responsive than previously. 6. Secretary enquired re King’s personal safety. Khammash said King for present could depend on loyalty of armed forces. If nothing done, however, Nov 13 might in time become Jordan’s new national day. 7. Secretary stressed he could not overstate gravity with which we viewed Israeli attack. Another such attack would have most serious consequences and there no doubt in Israel about this. At same time, he wanted emphasize two points: in our view attack (1) did not reflect Israeli scheme to seize West Bank and (2) was not aimed at King Hussein. He therefore could not comprehend how Israel failed to foresee consequences for King. 8. Secretary continued that US has strong fraternal feeling for His Majesty and interest in well being of Jordan. We would take urgent look at Jordan’s request. While he could not comment in detail pending consultations with Defense colleagues, there was no question about our policy of support for Jordan. 9. Secretary said he now frankly more concerned about Syria and UAR than Israel. Did Khammash see any connection between recent Syrian-UAR security pact 4 and current situation? Khammash said in his view it was USSR which brought those two countries together. Secretary commented that, while we had not discussed latest incident with Soviets, we had held discussions with them regarding Near East in UN context and he had discussed possibility of slow-down in arms race with Gromyko. We had, however, found no interest on Soviet side. 10. Secretary emphasized President deeply concerned re Israeli attack Nov 13 and had conveyed his views to Israel through more than one channel. Khammash responded that high GOJ officials do not doubt USG position but Jordan public disillusioned. It seemed to GOJ that only Jordan, which had longest frontier with Israel, was victim of “balance of strength” policy. Israel could get military equipment it wanted from various sources and UAR, Syria and Iraq could get theirs from Soviets. USG must show it won’t let its friends down. Having already invested over one-half billion dollars in Jordan, USG must now judge how much Jordan is worth to it. 11. Secretary expressed hope Jordan’s security problems could be met without interfering with GOJ development program. At this point he could only say we would have to see what can be done and would be as responsive as possible. Secretary noted that, just as Israel found it difficult guard against terrorism, Jordan undoubtedly realized that complete security not easy to guarantee. Khammash concurred, saying principal need was increased mobility and firepower to improve defense. Secretary said we were looking into possibility that techniques developed in Viet Nam might be applicable in detecting intrusions across Jordan-Israeli border. Khammash replied GOJ list included early warning system but equipment could not be too sophisticated in order permit rapid assimilation by Army. 12. Khammash noted GOJ had been subjected to repeated USG inquiries regarding stationing tanks on West Bank—a restriction not applicable to Israel. This had had unfortunate effect and he hoped subject would not be brought up again. Secretary said he appreciated problem and would give it further thought. In conclusion, Secretary assured Khammash we felt sense of solidarity with Jordan and would give GOJ request most serious attention. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 2 Not found. 3 A copy of the King’s letter is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JORDAN–US. 4 During talks held in Cairo November 1–7 by Nasser and Syrian Premier Yussef Zayen, Syria and the UAR agreed to resume diplomatic relations and on November 4 signed a joint defense agreement. 353. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 353. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, November 30, 1966, 3:47 p.m. 93594. 1. While we not in position accept or reject Israel version of yesterday’s air Battle, 2 neither are we certain that Israel’s behavior is as “innocent” as it claims. We have some difficulty in understanding how aircraft allegedly destroyed over Israel territory happened to fall in UAR. 3 FYI Noforn. Our suspicion compounded by statement made to Dept Off by Israel Minister Evron yesterday that Piper was checking on reports of UAR troop concentrations in UAR territory near Qusaima. Evron then said he had “gone beyond instructions” in telling Dept Off this. End FYI Noforn. 2. Statements in paras. I and K in Tel Aviv USDAO’s 1272 4 indicate Israel military well aware of political implications their actions. 3. We do not believe that Israelis should be allowed to believe that they can practice their version of realpolitik with neighboring Arab states at this critical juncture without attracting notice of USG and arousing doubts as to their professed peaceful intentions. 4. Accordingly, unless factors unknown to us make it undesirable, Embassy Tel Aviv should advise FonOff that while we still studying reports of air incident we would deplore behavior by any party which would tend to arouse anew Arab-Israel tension at this time. 5 We not at all sure that challenges to UAR and exploitation of incident by release photographs allegedly of UAR MIG being shot down by Israeli Mirage (which published front page today’s Washington Post and New York Times ) will produce result tending to strengthen position of Hussein in Jordan. Katzenbach 1 Source:National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 31–1 ISR–UAR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bergus, cleared in draft by Wolle, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo. 2 On November 29, Israeli forces shot down two United Arab Republic MIG 19 aircraft on the Israeli-UAR border. 3 Telegram 3091 from Cairo, December 1, reported that according to information from the UNEF Commander there were daily incursions by Israeli reconnaissance aircraft into UAR airspace as far as Suez, since the UAR’s MIG 17s and MIG 19s were incapable of matching the performance of Israel’s Mirage aircraft. (Ibid.) Telegrams 3124 and 3206 from Cairo, December 3 and 7 respectively, reported that according to the UAR Foreign Minister and an official in the UAR Vice President’s office, UAR aircraft frequently flew photographic missions over Israeli territory. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 31–1 ISR–UAR) 4 Telegram 1272 from the Defense Attache Office in Tel Aviv, November 29, described an Israeli briefing on the incident. (Ibid.) 5 Telegram 1972 from Tel Aviv, December 7, reported that Barbour discussed the substance of telegram 93594 with the Foreign Minister and other high-ranking Israeli officials. (Ibid.) 354. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 354. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 1, 1966. SUBJECT UAR Decisions Up in the Air Before Secretary Rusk leaves for the Far East Sunday, 2 we badly need to get him to focus on the UAR. Two decisions must be made: 1. The food recommendation has been hanging fire in State for three weeks simply because Ray Hare tried unsuccessfully to talk with the Secretary before he discussed it in the IRG. As you remember, the Egyptian economic delegation told you officially in September that the UAR would have to have our answer by the end of November in order to get grain elsewhere if necessary. This is such an important decision that we should not make it by default. 2. Budget Bureau now has the Presidential Determination necessary to continue our technical assistance program. The President agreed in June to continue this when he approved offering CCC credit sales for six months, but we can hardly ask him to sign a new Determination without having some notion of where we’re going. One way to handle this would be for the Secretary to stop in Cairo on the way to Paris. The main problem in our UAR relations is lack of confidence. Nasser believes we’re out to get him, and the fact that our high level travellers bypass him just confirms his belief. The Egyptians still consider that postponement (for pressing US reasons) of the Secretary’s scheduled visit last spring was a calculated slight, but the invitation has been repeated. A visit would have several advantages. If we can’t make a food decision now, he could explain why. He could also make plausible our line that, even though we have difficulties with further concessional food aid, we’re not trying to bring Nasser down. At the least, it would give the Secretary a chance for a heart-to-heart talk with Nasser which could be a sound basis for the President’s decision. We are coming to believe that we’ve reached a “crossroads” in US–UAR relations —though not necessarily the “crossroads” Kamel keeps talking about. The Kennedy experiment is over. We gambled that a three-year food deal, personal correspondence, and a certain amount of human respect for Nasser might moderate his revolutionary policies. We probably went too far too fast, but we have been frankly disappointed in results. He continued clandestine organization against the more moderate, oil-rich monarchies; he ventured into the Congo rebellion; more recently, his army has become increasingly Draconian in the Yemen; Radio Cairo continues to agitate Arab “nationalism”; his policy often parallels Moscow’s. Now that that experiment has run out of steam, and we have to decide among three possible courses: —We can give up, drop food aid and try to live with a potentially more troublesome UAR. —We can go on—if the President will approve—with an uncertain series of interim food agreements. —We can seek some new base for our relationship, though less ambitious than our 1962 effort. Our own inclination is to try the last, though we would settle for the second this time. We can’t see that the first buys us anything and it could cost us a lot. Nasser could behave much worse and do much greater damage to our interests. On balance, within the Arab world he has been a restraining force vis-a-vis Israel. His present involvement in Syria is a force for restraint, not aggression. He has not precipitated attacks on Western oil interests or inhibited movement of oil. The Secretary’s visit could be the first step in building something new. The main disadvantage to his going now without going to Amman would be our apparent support for Nasser at a time when Nasser’s propaganda machine has King Hussein on the ropes. It would be ideal if the Secretary could go to Amman too though that may be impossible. We think this idea is worth considering. But the main point is to find out how the Secretary plans to handle these UAR decisions. If we’re going to let them drift till he comes back, we ought to be signalling the UAR that we’re just being indecisive—not saying no. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. Filed with a brief covering memorandum of December 2 from Wriggins to Rostow, suggesting that he talk to Rusk and urge him to stop in Cairo on the way to Paris. Rusk was about to leave on a trip in which he visited several countries in Asia, concluding with a visit to Paris, where he attended a December 15–16 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. 2 December 4. 355. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 355. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 2, 1966. SUBJECT Israel-Jordan This Week We’ve moved this week into the second phase of our effort to put together the pieces after Israel’s 13 November raid. Hussein is still on top of his security situation. Although the army has stuck with him in putting down demonstrations, morale is still a serious problem. We must now show enough movement in improving Jordan’s defenses to satisfy his military over the longer term. He sent his army commander, General Khammash, here Monday 2 with a stupendous $200 million request for equipment, army expansion and budget support. Secretary Rusk and I have both received him 3 in an effort to make Hussein feel he is getting a fair hearing. We will have to whittle Khammash’s request down to keep Hussein from ruining Jordan economically, but we probably can’t get off scot free. We’ll have to put together some kind of package and will try to gear it to streamlining existing forces and improving border control. We don’t agree with Hussein that this is chiefly a military problem because we don’t believe—as he does—that the Israeli attack was the first step in grabbing West Jordan. We are holding Secretary McNamara in reserve to sell our final proposition to Khammash when we have a clearer idea what we can do. The Israelis have recovered their composure enough to take us to task mildly for supporting last week’s UN Security Council censure of Israel. They claim the UN action gives a blank check to the Arab governments backing the terrorists. We’re pressing them to beef up their own border control effort and to help improve the UN machinery there. They’re willing to talk about improving their own system, but we’ll have to press hard before they will be willing to see the UN beefed up. Nevertheless, we still feel the least that ought to come out of this mess is a system that will be a serious deterrent to continued terrorism. We will be back to you with a formal proposal later. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. 2 November 28. 3 For Rusk’s meeting with Khammash, see Document 352 . No record of Rostow’s meeting with him has been found, but a December 1 briefing memorandum from Wriggins and Saunders to Rostow is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. A December 1 memorandum from Wriggins and Saunders to Rostow concerning Macomber’s meeting with Khammash that morning is ibid., Name File, Wriggins Memos. A memorandum of a November 30 meeting between Townsend Hoopes and Khammash is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 400.3295 Jordan. 356. Intelligence Memorandum 356. Intelligence Memorandum 1 Washington, December 2, 1966. No. 2205/66 PALESTINE ARAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 1. The tradition of terrorism in Arab-Israeli relations extends back into the 1920’s and ’30’s. Before the Arab-Israeli war of 1948–49, terrorism was the principal weapon of both Arabs and Jews in harassing the British authorities in Palestine. In the early 1950’s, the Arab governments organized paramilitary commando groups—fedayeen—which undertook raiding and sabotage missions into Israel. Israel’s invasion of Sinai was in large measure a retaliation for this fedayeen activity, and the terrorist raiding ceased after the 1956 Sinai campaign. The PLO 2. As official support of terrorist operations ceased, many Palestinian Arabs became increasingly frustrated at the relative lack of aggressiveness toward Israel on the part of Arab governments. There was persistent agitation among Palestinians throughout the Arab world for some kind of representative organization, and this culminated in 1964 in the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO received the formal sanction of the League of Arab States at an Arab summit meeting that year. 3. The organization is a kind of Palestinian government in exile but it has been careful to avoid such a designation because of King Husayn’s well-founded suspicion that it posed a threat to his authority in west Jordan. The PLO’s activities are mainly political and military; it has tried, for example, to form a “Palestine Liberation Army” around a core of Palestinian units which had been formed over the years in the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi armies. Nasir exercises considerable influence over the PLO, though he does not completely control its leaders. The organization’s “Voice of Palestine” broadcasts emanate from Cairo. The PLO is led by a dynamic super-orator, Ahmad Shuqayri, a Palestinian who at various times has been a UN representative for Syria and Saudi Arabia. 4. The PLO’s long-range plans for opposing the Israelis initially omitted sponsorship of terrorist operations into Israel. PLO leaders and sponsors recognized that such operations would provoke Israeli retaliation, and very possibly lead to a war for which the Arab governments are still not ready. This policy was a source of frustration to many activist Palestinians, and it led to the emergence of the present generation of terrorist groups. The PLO has failed to persuade these groups to submit to over-all PLO direction, and, to meet their competition, has within the past few months felt compelled to undertake such activities on its own. The “Organization of Heroes of the Return” (to Palestine) is the group which appears to be the new PLO terrorist arm. Some of its members clashed with Israeli forces near the Lebanese border in mid-October. Fatah 5. The most prominent of the terrorist groups is Fatah (a reverse acronym of the Arabic for “Palestine Liberation Movement”). Fatah is sometimes also known by the name of its commando arm, Asifa (Storm). Fatah appears to be descended from a clandestine Palestinian organization—now inactive—which was formed in the mid-1950’s. Some of its members had connections with the Muslim Brotherhood, a conservative, strongly anti-Nasir politico-religious movement. Fatah also may have had links with the Arab Higher Committee of Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, with whom the Brotherhood collaborated in regard to Palestine affairs. 6. In its present incarnation, Fatah emerged publicly in January 1965, when it claimed responsibility for terrorist incidents in Israel. Its leaders had previously participated in the organization of the PLO, but had become disenchanted. They are also disgusted with the continuing inability of most Arab governments to act decisively toward Israel, and are wary of any official control which might curtail Fatah’s operations. 7. Syria, the most bellicose of the Arab states, is the one government whose policy comes closest to Fatah’s violently anti-Israeli line. Damascus supports Fatah by providing it with a base for its operations, training facilities, and a propaganda outlet. The infiltrations into Israel, however, have been undertaken from Jordanian and Lebanese territory, since those borders are more easily traversed. This has occurred without the approval of either the Jordanian or the Lebanese government. Most of Fatah’s financial support comes from wealthy Palestinians living in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 8. The number of people who participate in Fatah, as well as in other terrorist organizations, is unknown and probably fluctuates. Many of the terrorists are professional thugs or smugglers, and some were active against Israel in 1955–56. The Israelis say Fatah has been responsible for 61 sabotage incidents. Israeli Foreign Minister Eban recently stated, however, that Fatah had been inactive for about six weeks. The PLF 9. A rival Palestinian terrorist organization called the “Palestinian Liberation Front” (PLF) has been credited by the Israelis with the 12 November road mining incident which triggered the Israeli raid into Jordan the next day. Jordanian officials also suspected the PLF of having perpetrated that incident, and they had begun a search for those responsible at the time Israel attacked. Little is known about the PLF. Like Fatah, it apparently aims at provoking a general Arab-Israeli war, but it is reputed to be more skilled in its operations. PLF members are said to regard Fatah as an organization of publicity seekers. 10. Some “terrorism” in Israel is more or less spontaneous. For years, Arab smugglers and crossborder operators have occasionally clashed with Israeli security forces. Incidents of this sort have been much reduced as the Israelis’ security measures have been tightened. The organized, professional terrorism of the Fatah, the PLF, and of the PLO’s new arm, poses problems for Israeli authorities that have no easy solution. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the memorandum states that it was produced solely by CIA and was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence. 357. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 357. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, December 5, 1966. JCSM–751–66 SUBJECT Military and Supporting Assistance for Jordan (U) 1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–28025/66, dated 28 November 1966, 2 subject as above, which requests the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on further military actions which the United States should take to assist the Government of Jordan. 2. (S) The internal crisis in Jordan which has arisen in the wake of the 13 November 1966 Israeli attack requires additional prompt responses on the part of the US Government to restore stability and bolster King Hussein. The stability of the regime and the maintenance of order are dependent upon the loyalty and effectiveness of the Armed Forces. In order to insure their continued support, any assistance to Jordan must be of such impact that it will demonstrate to the Armed Forces, the civilian population and the Middle East as a whole, that King Hussein has the active support of the US Government. 3. (S) The most immediate and probably the strongest impact action that the United States could take would be to suspend arms shipments to Israel. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the statement made by Secretary of State Rusk to the Israeli Ambassador on 21 November 1966 3 that a recurrence of action across armistice lines could bring reexamination of decision to sell certain military equipment to Israel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that should another incident occur under similar circumstances, the United States should suspend the sale and deliveries of military equipment to Israel. 4. (S) King Hussein has stated that a requirement exists to improve internal security and Jordanian defensive capabilities by increasing the pay of enlisted personnel, increasing the size of the Armed Forces, and the addition of new equipment. In developing their views on these matters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the Military Assistance Program to Jordan, the recommendations of the Country Team, and the urgent Jordanian requirements as presented to the Office of the Secretary of Defense by General Khammash. 5. (S) The complete list of equipment submitted by General Khammash is beyond Jordan’s ability to operate and maintain effectively and would entail a heavy financial burden. Although it is impractical for the United States to furnish all of the equipment requested, a more modest equipment package should be provided which would assist in deterring future Israeli border raids, improve Jordan’s border defenses, and have a less adverse impact on the Jordanian economy. 6. (S) Attached at Appendix A 4 is a proposed package, which, with a pay increase, would meet, in part, the most pressing security needs of Jordan as expressed by General Khammash and provide an important psychological impact. As proposed by the referenced memorandum, this package has been developed without regard to planned financial ceilings on military and supporting assistance for Jordan. Cost of the equipment package is approximately $12.8 million. It would entail an increase of approximately 11,400 personnel, of which 4,500 would be part-time border village guards. Addition of these personnel and approval of a 25 percent pay raise would require an estimated $11.1 million increase in annual Jordanian defense expenditures. Armaments and equipment proposed in the package would produce no significant change in the arms balance in the Middle East. Additional military measures which could be taken to assist the Government of Jordan are also contained in Appendix A. A recapitulation of the arms and equipment package is contained in Appendix B. The equipment list submitted by General Khammash, annotated, where possible, with price and availability, is contained in Appendix C. 7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the provisions of the package require diversions of equipment from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Korea and other countries and consider that the United States should not unilaterally make these diversions, but rather the agreement of these countries should be sought. 8. (S) In reference to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–28187/66, dated 3 December 1966, 5 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States take action now on the package proposed herein and not defer action due to dispatch of survey teams. Further comment on this memorandum will be provided concerning their views on the option for Jordan to purchase additional F–104 aircraft and the dispatch of a high-level mission or an air defense survey team to Jordan. 6 9. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The United States support in principle the Armed Forces pay increase proposed by General Khammash. However, before assuming this recurring annual cost, every effort should be made to obtain the necessary money from other Arab states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. b. The United States provide to the Government of Jordan the arms and equipment package proposed in Appendix A and support the attendant increase in personnel. c. The United States take the additional military measures contained in Appendix A. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Jordan 091.3 MAP. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that the memorandum was seen by the Secretary. 2 Not found. 3 See Document 343 . 4 The appendices are not printed. 5 Not found. 6 JCSM–758–66, a JCS memorandum of December 7 to Secretary McNamara, provided the comments. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Jordan 091.3 MAP) JCSM–765–66, a JCS memorandum of December 9 to McNamara, provided further comments on the question of aid to Jordan. (Ibid.) 358. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 358. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 7, 1966, 3:47 p.m. 98110. Ref: Tel Aviv USDAO 1250 and 1293 Nov 66. 2 1. In conversation sixth with Israeli Minister Evron Dept officer raised difficulties recently encountered by DATT in obtaining permission visit Israeli military installations and disapproval attache reconnaissance efforts voiced by some IDF officers. Using line taken by Ambassador in second reftel with Foreign Minister, Dept officer said attaches under standing instructions travel around Israel, particularly during times of crisis, and also to become acquainted with Israeli military installations. Their mission no secret, and Ambassador had reminded Foreign Minister on Nov 28 that Prime Minister himself had said attache travel around country welcomed provided there no roadblocks. Unless we had independent access to all parts of country we would not be in position provide assurances to certain other countries about Israeli intentions. Moreover, limitations on attaches would tend to create suspicions in our own minds about Israeli intentions. We therefore hoped any misunderstandings on part of IDF could be dispelled and there would be no question of free movement by our attaches. 2. Evron in somewhat defensive response ended up saying he was certain no restrictions would be placed on attaches. He also used Foreign Minister’s line that DATT had asked to “inspect” installations in order to check out Israeli assurances regarding Jordan. Dept officer rejoined he certain request was to visit not to inspect and there must have been misunderstanding. In course conversation Dept officer also reminded Evron of easy access Israeli attaches have to US officials and agencies. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 15–7 ISR–US. Secret. Drafted and approved by Symmes. Repeated to DIA, OSD,USUN, Amman, Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, USCINCEUR/USDUCOM, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, CINCUSNAVEUR, CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, COMSIXTHFLT, and JCS. 2 Neither found. 359. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 359. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, December 9, 1966, 0013Z. CAP 661223. Information. Forewarned is forearmed and you should be aware that the Israelis are now zeroing in on our proposed small military aid package for Jordan. Ambassador Harman was in to see me this afternoon 2 and conveyed the clear message that the Israeli Government is very much concerned that anything we do for Jordan will unsettle the delicate military balance in the area. We will be sending you more formally in the next day or two a specific proposal on Jordan. Defense still has not quite wrapped up all the details, but it is fair to say that the package will be minimal and will not seriously affect the Israeli-Jordanian military balance. However, we will have to reckon with an Israeli reaction no matter what we do. We are on firm logical ground in saying that we would be doing nothing more for Jordan than already planned if the Israelis had not raided on 13 November. After all, we are only picking up the pieces in a mess they created. But regardless of how firmly we take that line, the Israelis have regained their composure and are going to be pretty tough to deal with. We will include recommendations for handling the Israeli side of the problem when we send our final proposal to you. However, I wanted you to be forewarned of this aspect of the problem in case someone should try to reach you at the Ranch. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. The telegram was received at the LBJ Ranch at 6:52 p.m. on December 8. A handwritten “L” on the telegram indicates that it was seen by the President. A notation in an unknown handwriting reads as follows: “Walt: Let Komer tell Abe Feinberg do not want this—unless they want an enemy.” 2 A memorandum of the December 8 conversation is ibid. 360. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 360. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 9, 1966. As instructed, I called Abe Feinberg pronto. I told him I wanted to clue him privately so he could head off a developing problem which, otherwise could cause nothing but trouble all around. The situation in Jordan was still very dicey. We were working day and night to overcome a crisis which Israel itself had created. As usual, we had to pick up the pieces. It was imperative—in our own interest, in Jordan’s, and above all in Israel’s—that we strengthen Hussein’s position and his support from his army. This would almost inevitably require expediting some arms already contracted for, and quite possibly some added sweeteners. But when we told Israel’s Embassy this, we had gotten a lot of backflap about why we hadn’t consulted Israel first before talking with Jordan, about bad faith if we sold new arms to Jordan, etc. I wasn’t up on these matters any more, but wanted him to know that such rejoinders had caused much high level annoyance here. So I urged that Abe tell his friends to keep their shirts on, and not start telling us how to handle Jordan again. Their credentials were hardly very good on this subject; the very time when we were being forced again to clean up their mess was no time to start hitting us from the flank and souring relations. Abe should pass this word in spades, as coming from a friend. Abe said he’d see Eban (now in New York) pronto. But he wondered whether more arms to Jordan would create a new arms imbalance; in this case he urged a formula to help Israel out too. I retorted that asking us to compensate Israel would leave a very bad taste just now. In any case I doubted that any significant military imbalance was likely; we weren’t foolish. The problem was rather one of preventing the truly major imbalance which would result if Jordan went sour. Abe wanted me to know the “domestic political angle.” The entire US Jewish community felt it was isolated after Israel’s censure by the US. To add another pinprick by announcing arms to Jordan alone wouldn’t sit well. I said I’d pass on this message, but urged he pass on the full flavor of mine. This was just the wrong time to “rock the boat”; Eban would be wise to pour oil on troubled waters. R. W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and an indication that the original was signed. 361. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 361. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 10, 1966. SUBJECT Response to King Hussein’s Military Equipment Request We can’t come close to meeting Hussein’s $200 million request. We don’t have the money, and that big a program would ruin Jordan’s promising economic development. So Secretary McNamara has designed a small package to tackle Hussein’s main problem—his army’s morale. 2 It includes only $4.7 million (reprogrammed from existing appropriations) on top of $3.5 million already in Jordan’s FY 1967 military aid program. Instead of enlarging his forces, it would help him improve pay, mobility and organization to tide him over the present crisis of confidence with the army. This offer probably won’t satisfy Hussein. We see it as the starting point for a tough series of negotiations over our whole aid program. We may have to give a little, but before we do we’d send former Ambassador Bill Macomber to try to talk Hussein back to reason. If you approve this approach, Secretary McNamara will go over the package with Hussein’s army commander at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday. Secretary Katzenbach also requests your approval of the attached message from him to Hussein explaining the rationale for the package. 3 We feel the Secretaries should handle this initial response, since you’ve already sent the King one message 4 and may have to step in again later. No matter what we do, the Israelis and their friends will object. But we’re just cleaning up the mess Israel’s raid created and we’ve taken Israel’s military concerns into account. Our JCS says this small package will not affect the military balance on Israel’s borders. If you approve, State and Defense will brief key Members of Congress on the program, and we’ll tell the Israelis what’s involved as soon as we’ve told the Jordanians. I recommend you approve. 5 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret. The memorandum, filed as an attachment to Rostow’s December 12 memorandum to the President ( Document 361 ) was apparently drafted by Wriggins, who sent it to Rostow with a December 10 covering memorandum. 2 Material concerning the proposed aid to King Hussein is attached to a December 9 memorandum from Hoopes to McNamara, on which the Secretary indicated his approval. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 381 Jordan) 3 The proposed letter from Katzenbach to King Hussein, undated, is attached to a December 10 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President, attached to this memorandum. 4 See Document 346 and footnote 4 thereto. 5 The President did not check either the approval or disapproval line but wrote: “Check this out thru UN & Goldberg.” 362. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 362. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, December 11, 1966, 1320Z. 1456. 1. I was called to see the King late yesterday evening at Homar, the King’s private residence outside Amman. EmbOff accompanied me. 2. The meeting with the King lasted one hour. I have never seen him so grim or so obviously under pressure. It was apparent that he had to use the utmost in self-restraint to keep his emotions from erupting openly. At several points in the conversation he had tears in his eyes. Then he said that although the surface manifestations of discontent in the form of demonstrations had abated, pressures under the surface were in fact building up. The discontent on the West Bank is deeper than he had imagined. “The growing split between East Bank and West Bank has ruined my dreams.” The only thing that binds the army to him, he said, is traditional loyalty, but this tie is daily growing weaker. “There is near despair in the army and the army no longer has confidence in me. A contributing factor is that the army is over-extended throughout the country for reasons of internal security, and this is causing the army and the people to become increasingly fed up, an obvious objective of those opposed to this regime.” The King observed that he is beset on all sides by enemies, outside Jordan and within Jordan, with Syria openly calling for his overthrow, publicly offering arms for the purpose, and covertly infiltrating arms and terrorists into Jordan to help achieve the purpose. 4. The King said he simply must have Washington’s decision on his request for assistance. Nor could he longer forego the presence and help of General Khammash in Amman at this critical time. General Khammash had been in Washington for nearly two weeks, and as yet he has been given no answer. Khammash’s appointment with Secretary McNamara has been twice postponed, and the appointment is now set for Wednesday. The King is aware that the Israeli FonMin is visiting Washington early next week, before Wednesday. 2 The King wishes General Khammash to leave Washington on Wednesday evening, and whatever answer General Khammash is given before he leaves will have to be considered by the King as the final answer. Time is running out on him, said the King, and he can no longer delay making decisions on the courses of action he must take. In the circumstances a temporizing answer to Khammash would have to be considered as a negative answer. 5. If General Khammash receives an answer “which is not responsive,” the King would not go to Washington, as, until recently, he had contemplated doing should Khammash fail to get a satisfactory answer. The King said he greatly admires President Johnson and it would give him great personal satisfaction to meet with the President personally. But the pressures building up on him are so great, he said, that there is no longer time for a trip to Washington. Nor, if Khammash is unsuccessful, would a trip by him, he reflected, with its attendant publicity, serve the interests of either of us. For a decade, the King said, we and he have been partners. And in this critical hour we are the only friend to whom he can turn. If we cannot help him, he said, then he must move quickly to an alternate course. “The right answer from the US would enable me to justify my past policy to my army, to my people, to the PLO, and to everyone else. If I do not get the right answer, even I must conclude my past policy has been a failure.” 6. Since he was unsuccessful in obtaining postponement of the Arab Defense Council meeting in Cairo, the King said, and since Khammash has not gotten an answer from us, the King had felt he had no choice but to make a concession to the pressures he was subjected to at the Cairo meeting. Friday he had had to instruct his delegation in Cairo to agree to the stationing of Saudi and Iraqi troops in Jordan. The King said that three brigades of these foreign Arab troops would be involved. In return for this concession the Arab Defense Council had agreed to meet Jordan’s demands, which include, inter alia, the strengthening of Egyptian forces in the Israeli border area (presumably Sinai). The stationing of Iraqi and Saudi troops in Jordan would not come about for a least two months, said Hussein, since a great deal had to be worked out first. I asked the King whether in the event the US were responsive to his request for assistance he would nonetheless have to go through with the stationing of Iraqi and Saudi troops in Jordan. The King replied that he supposed he might somehow be able to head it off during the course of the technical negotiations to come in this regard. He said he is not happy with the instructions he had to send to his delegation in Cairo. 7. The King said that if the US cannot be responsive to his request for assistance, he saw three courses open to him. 8. The first course was to turn to the East. “I will not try to mislead you, nor to blackmail you, by telling you I will turn to the East. I cannot and will not do so. My reign has been devoted towards building Jordan to be a self-sufficient, moderate, evolutionary state. I have all my life fought the East. If in the end Jordan feels she must turn to the East, it would have to be under someone else, not with me.” 9. The second alternative, said the King, was to “batten down the hatches and take on everyone who is working against me at one and the same time.” This was a course which tempted him, said the King, because he was ready for a fight and he did not care about his own fate. But, he said, “The deck is stacked against me and I do not have the right to commit those who have been loyal to me to a course which would likely mean their doom.” 10. The third alternative, said the King, is the one which commends itself to him as the best. He would declare the West Bank a “military directorate” and call on all Arab states, and the PLO, to furnish forces to be stationed on the West Bank for the protection of that area. Jordan would leave on the West Bank its pro rata contribution of forces, and withdraw the remainder of its forces, now stationed on the West Bank, to the East Bank. The King would not, he said, make this as an offer, to be accepted or rejected by the Palestinians and by the other Arab states. He would simply announce this is what he has decided to do, and if other Arab states do not furnish the necessary defense forces, that would just be too bad. At least this arrangement would permit him to make a redoubt of the East Bank, he said, and “this might offer me one last chance to serve my cause.” The King observed that Prime Minister Tell thought of the “military directorate” idea as a means of calling the bluff of Palestinians and of other Arab states. Hussein indicated he diagnoses the situation in Jordan as more critical than does Tell. He indicated further that he is serious about establishing a “military directorate,” and not as a means to call a bluff. The King said he was quite aware that if the West Bank were transformed into a “military directorate”, much as he envisages, Israel might decide to take military action. He said this was a chance he and all the Arabs would simply have to take. To try to maintain the status quo in the face of an unfavorable response from Washington to his request for assistance was clearly impossible. 11. Comment: There were many indications during the course of the conversation that the King has become suspicious of US motivations and intentions with respect to Jordan. He is perturbed that we were not able to give General Khammash an answer during the first week the General was in Washington. I gather his apprehensions are twofold: (A) that, as he sees it, we are so closely tied to Israel, and the Israelis can generate such pressure on us, that this is a powerful inhibiting factor in our ability to respond to the King’s request for assistance; (B) that the King believes the US does not have full appreciation of the seriousness of the situation concerning Jordan or of what the King considers the potent desires of others to replace our influence in Jordan, or even to liquidate Jordan. 12. I think we can take at face value the King’s statement that we must give General Khammash an answer by Wednesday and that the answer we give will be considered by the King to be the final answer. 13. I regret I cannot say with any degree of certainty what the King and General Khammash would consider to be a “satisfactory response.” Since General Khammash is in Washington, and he is the key man in this regard and the King will likely abide by Khammash’s judgment, the Department is in a better position than Embassy Amman to probe the answer. I am fairly certain, however, that the package outlined in paragraph 6 of our tel 1415 3 represents minimum, and I cannot exclude the possibility that even that package is undershooting what Khammash and the King consider to be the minimum. 14. The concept of a Palestine entity is not a new idea with the King; he was turning over something of this sort in his mind last summer in political rather than military terms as a means of coping with his West Bank problem. 15. The King said he hoped the views he had expressed at the meeting last evening could be brought to the personal attention of the President. Burns 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JORDAN–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Noforn. Repeated to London, CINCSTRIKE, OSD, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Kuwait, and Jidda and passed to the White House. Rostow sent a copy to the President with a covering memorandum stating that he would want to read “this rather ominous cable.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III) 2 December 14. 3 Telegram 1415 from Amman, December 6, reported disaffection in the Jordanian Army and urged a positive response to the Khammash mission. Paragraph 6 recommended providing the army with a $20 million package of defensive equipment, increasing annual budgetary support by $16 million to finance a defensive buildup, delivering previously negotiated ground and air packages, leaving the door open to future negotiations on items on which they could not reach agreement, and preparing for an increased deployment of equipment on the West Bank. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23 JORDAN) 363. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 363. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 12, 1966, 11:35 a.m. SUBJECT King Hussein’s Problem At this morning’s breakfast with the Vice President, Bob McNamara, Nick Katzenbach, Bill Handley, Bill Macomber, Howard Wriggins, and Rodger Davies, the King’s problem was thoroughly discussed. Sisco and Goldberg could not attend; but both have been brought in. Nick talked with Goldberg and, while not familiar with the details, Goldberg agrees this is broadly the right course. Sisco, who was committed to breakfast with Eban, is now going over the package. 2 The conclusions were as follows. 1. The proposed package was insufficient to meet the King’s essential political needs. 2. Movement on a larger package would be appropriate only as we pressed discussions with Israel on improving border surveillance technology. These will be started by Nick with Eban today and would go forward at the UN and in the Middle East with Israel, and, hopefully, with the Arab countries as well. 3. Bob McNamara, Nick, and the others agreed that the package for Hussein should be expanded in the following ways: (a) delivery of the 12 F–104’s presently in the Jordanian pipeline should be accelerated. Six should be drawn from the inventory within 30 days and delivered to Hussein even though the pilots and ground environment are not yet ready; (b) 18 self-propeller antiaircraft units should be airlifted within 30 to 60 days; (c) the $4.7 million package to improve mobility, firepower, and effectiveness—which you have already seen—should also be airlifted. 4. When he talks to General Khammash, Bob McNamara would make clear that, while this is less than the King asked for, it is a substantial and prompt response and that we have several parallel concerns: (a) the King should stress quality, rather than quantity, and we could only make this package available if he agrees to keep his manpower at present levels; (b) we assume he would continue his policy of moderation and restraint and his considerable efforts to prevent guerrillas from using Jordan as a base for operations against Israel and we will consider helping him to improve his border police (AID is reviewing this part of his problem); (c) no United Arab Command troops should be situated on the West bank area of Jordan. 5. Several present hoped that you could personally take ten minutes with Khammash before he sees Bob McNamara tomorrow at 11 o’clock to discuss: (a) our concern for Hussein’s future; (b) our substantial and prompt response; and (c) our need to discuss the longer run financial implications of this assistance. However, Nick does not want to trouble you, knowing that, if you see Khammash even for five minutes, you will feel it necessary to see Eban. I believe you should keep out at this stage. 6. We will get flack from the Israelis no matter what we do, although Eban acknowledged to Goldberg the raid was a grave error. It was the consensus of all present, including the Vice President, that this sort of package is what is required and we’ll have to use our discussions with Eban to insure Israel’s friends here sit tight. 7. Unfortunately, time is short, because Khammash should see McNamara and McNamara leaves for European discussion tomorrow afternoon. Nevertheless, I see little alternative to helping Hussein in this way. And we will press hard on Israel the importance of border stabilization through the UN if possible and directly, if that is the only way. 8. I, therefore, recommend you accept the attached package, plus accelerated delivery of 6 F–104’s within a month and 18 40mm AA guns within 60 days, under the conditions set out in paragraph 4. 9. Nick and Bob suggest Bill Macomber, an old Jordanian hand, shortly go out to talk, on your behalf, to his friend Hussein. His cover would be an examination of the AID implications of Hussein’s defense problem. 10. A short letter from you to King Hussein will come up shortly for signature. 3 It could be carried back by the King’s emissary, General Khammash, who returns on Tuesday evening, Dec. 13, or Wednesday, Dec. 14. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret. 2 Rostow’s handwritten note in the margin reads as follows: “He has gone to New York to clear with Goldberg. We’ll hear later in the afternoon. W.” 3 Rostow sent the draft letter to the President with an undated memorandum from Katzenbach recommending that he send it, a December 12 memorandum from Katzenbach ( Document 365 ), and a covering memorandum of December 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III) The letter was not sent. 364. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 364. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 12, 1966, 2:15 p.m. Mr. President: You should read this quite extraordinary revelation by Hussein. 2 Among experts there is some doubt as to its truth; but it could be that the contacts existed in a very narrow circle and were not known to the whole government or to the Israeli military. In that case, as they faced heavy pressure to retaliate, those who had the contacts would have been in a most difficult bind. This final warning about secrecy is justified. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 A copy of telegram 1457 from Amman, undated but received December 11, is attached to this memorandum. It reported that during the conversation reported in telegram 1456, from Amman ( Document 362 ), King Hussein told Burns that he had been in contact with Israeli leaders for the past 3 years through secret correspondence and meetings. He stated that he had met with Golda Meir, Eban, and others, had told them that he had done his utmost to eliminate terrorism against Israel from Jordan, and had warned them that he could not absorb or tolerate a serious retaliatory raid. Expressing great bitterness, he declared that the attack was a complete betrayal of his efforts in the interest of peace and stability. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JORDAN–US. 365. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson 365. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 12, 1966. SUBJECT Military Assistance to Jordan I have the following recommendations with respect to increased military assistance to Jordan. I have discussed these with Ambassador Goldberg and he is in agreement. 2 1. We should proceed with the recommendations in the attached memorandum which expedite current programmed MAP assistance and include an increment, primarily of defensive weapons, totalling $6 to $7 Million. 3 2. We should candidly inform the Israeli Government about this program. Based on my conversation with Foreign Minister Abba Eban, I believe that the Israeli Government will accept this program as necessary to support the regime of King Hussein. Eban quite candidly said that the Israelis had as much of a stake in preserving the King as we did. 3. Ambassador Goldberg believes that we are likely to have a sizable domestic problem with respect to the increment even if the Israeli Government quietly agrees to it. He believes, and I agree, that in presenting this to the Israelis (and to the Jewish community in this country) it would be helpful to give something to the Israeli side of the ledger: We recommend a. We tell the Israelis that we will make every effort to speed up deliveries of Skyhawks (A4’s). Bob McNamara has no objection to this commitment and believes delivery probably can be speeded up somewhat to enable some delivery in advance of the scheduled date. b. We tell the Israeli Government that we will attempt to assist them in working out static defense plans and, to the extent possible, help with hardware to make this effective. We should further state to them that while we cannot presently commit ourselves to any dollar-for-dollar offsetting through AID or otherwise of our increased commitments to Jordan, we will take this into account in giving sympathetic consideration to Israeli requests for assistance; for example, we might be able to subsidize some of their African operations which indirectly benefit us. (There is a good deal of opposition to any firm commitment in this respect and many Government officials believe that we should not really offer anything in this regard to Israel at this time. Ambassador Goldberg and I believe, however, that to meet the sensibilities of the Israelis (and their domestic supporters) that we should make this general commitment as an appropriate response. The amount is not large and such a commitment would help the Israelis and help us domestically. We believe this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all, particularly since it is not necessary to do this simultaneously with the Jordanian move and can be worked out at a later date.) Ambassador Goldberg would be happy to take this up with Ambassador Harman, who could help us greatly here with the Jewish community. 4 Respectfully, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret. Filed with a December 12 covering memorandum from Rostow to the President, which also forwarded the draft letter to King Hussein cited in footnote 3, Document 363 . 2 Telegram 101492 to USUN, December 13, from Katzenbach to Goldberg, transmitted the text of Katzenbach’s memorandum, noting that it was “the memorandum which we discussed last night.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN) 3 Not attached. 4 There is no indication of the President’s approval or disapproval. 366. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 366. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 14, 1966, 7:29 p.m. 102760. Israeli Foreign Minister Eban accompanied by Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron called on Acting Secretary December 12. Eban opened by noting substantive change in Israel’s security situation over past two or three years. Israel’s deterrent capacity had achieved a viable balance in that no neighboring state wished military confrontation. Israel’s enemies were now employing new method of expressing active hostility: guerrilla warfare, classic strategy of the weaker side. Arab press reflected tremendous interest in guerilla warfare as practiced in Algeria, Viet-Nam, etc. Arabs now viewing this as answer to direct confrontation. This technique plus the ideology of adding the “sixth entity,” the Palestine nation, to the five opposing Arab states created a major problem. This entity serves as the “liberating force.” Its activities create a serious situation and the prospect looks ominous. Perhaps no more than twenty people were involved in disrupting train service between the capital city and the coast, sabotage in the capital city, and causing safe travel on certain frontier roads to be problematic. The action on November 13 was designed to meet these problems. US and Israeli views diverge on wisdom of this decision and US conclusion is that this answer is not valid. Israel is not committed to this course as the answer but seeks to gain understanding seriousness of the problem and of fact that Israel is looking for an answer. The government had decided to look at static defense measure including reinforcing frontier guards, increasing patrolling, adopting and investigating all kinds of electronic and other electrical devices, increasing the number of vehicles available for patrols, fencing and illuminating certain frontier settlements, and asphalting certain border patrol routes to prevent mining. These measures were burdensome economically and any US experience in these fields would be useful. 2 The Acting Secretary welcomed this approach and said we would seek to be helpful. We would be in touch with the Embassy very shortly on the matter. He asked whether the UN peacekeeping effort couldn’t be strengthened by adding more personnel and providing more mobility. Mr. Eban replied that UNTSO would be more effective if the organization were less interested in investigating incidents and more in preventing them. Since the SYG has raised the question of strengthening UNTSO, he felt Israel would join the dialogue. He noted that Israel did cooperate with UNMOS, while Syrians locked them in their observation posts and do not permit them to move more than fifty yards therefrom without escort. Mr. Eban expressed concern at the exaggerated interpretation on the other side of the meaning of the events of November 13. Israel believes that maintenance of the territorial status quo and existing regime in Jordan is of great importance for Israel’s security. Hussein however fells Israel aspires to topple his regime and grab the West Bank. The King was way off the track on this. The Acting Secretary said he was prepared to accept these assurances but no matter what Israel’s motivation, its actions made things extremely difficult and precarious for Hussein. Israel can’t now say it didn’t mean to precipitate the situation. It exists, and Israel must live with the consequences. The tragic aspect is that Israel damaged the King’s position at a time when all the trends in Jordan were favorable. However what was done is past and we must look to the future and a future with King Hussein in place is desirable for both Israeli and US interests. Picking up the pieces will take patience and some actions which we will undertake Israel will not like. Mr. Eban touched on the adverse impact on Israel’s psychological atmosphere of the “insensitive and intemperate” Security Council resolution censuring Israel. He appealed for understanding and asked that in arriving at our decisions we weigh this factor. Twice in the recent past Israel had been asked to give assent or not to object to things we had found it necessary to do for Jordan. Israel had expended its efforts to be helpful. The Acting Secretary remarked that Jordan had also made efforts that might have been more effective than Israel had been willing to give credit for. This is part and parcel of King Hussein’s feeling that Israel’s motivation must have ends other than mere retaliation. Nevertheless despite the divergence in our views on this action there are many areas of agreement between Israel and the US and nothing is being undone. Our objective is to seek to stabilize the border and help Jordan prevent incidents fomented by others. To do this, we must have someone to work with; therefore, we seek to shore up King Hussein’s regime and to restore the status quo ante or even improve on this. The magnitude of King Hussein’s request for assistance is such that we are not able to meet it in entirety. What we have under consideration will not alter the military situation or threaten Israel in any way. We plan to do the minimum necessary to bolster the King’s position with his armed forces. Mr. Eban said that in shoring up the regime Israel and the US shared an interest. However, Israel hoped that what we did would not adversely affect Israel’s economic, political or military position. Of particular concern was the type of hardware that might appear on Israel’s frontier. It had been a tradition with the two governments to discuss problems such as these and to reach a consensus. This had created an atmosphere of confidence. If Israel’s reaction to what the US planned to do is a factor in the situation, Mr. Eban hoped the GOI could be taken into our confidence as we reached decisions. Mr. Eban touched on the situation in Egypt noting an apparent contradiction in its policies. On the one hand Egypt seemed to be exercising prudence in not seeking a confrontation with Israel and, he believed, Nasser was exercising restraining influence on Syria. At the same time, however, propaganda from Cairo within the past two days had taken on a new stridency in attacking King Hussein. Mr. Eban suggested that if there is a dialogue between the USG and the UARG, the US seek to moderate Cairo’s output. Radio Cairo and the Voice of the Arabs he thought were of extreme psychological importance in the present situation. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Davies on December 13, cleared by Handley, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Cairo,USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 Telegram 96200 to Tel Aviv, December 3, records a December 1 conversation between Davies and Bitan, in which Davies stated that U.S. officials were studying technical devices to assist in detecting cross-border infiltration, which might be of use to the Israelis, UNTSO, or Jordanian security forces. Bitan expressed enthusiasm and urged U.S. flexibility to provide such materials. Telegram 96200 also instructed the Embassy to confirm to the Foreign Ministry that U.S. study of this was continuing. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ARAB–ISR) 367. Memorandum of Conversation 367. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 13, 1966. SUBJECT Meeting Between the Secretary of Defense and Major General Khammash of Jordan, 11 a.m., December 13, 1966; Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes was also present Secretary McNamara opened by expressing the US Government’s admiration for the coolness and courage with which King Hussein and the Government of Jordan were meeting the present crisis. He reiterated the US view that the Israeli raid of November 13 had been a serious and unfortunate miscalculation; he acknowledged that great psychological damage had been done, and that the pressing problem now was to repair that damage. He said however that we have reason to believe that the raid presaged no basic change in Israeli policy. He said he would hand General Khammash a paper which represented his own recommendations, that he had discussed this paper with his colleagues in the USG, and that he believed they were in agreement with him. While the paper did not represent at this point a definite US decision and was therefore labeled “draft,” he expected that it would be formally approved, and he wished General Khammash to take a copy with him. He said that the President was prepared to send Ambassador Macomber to Jordan immediately to discuss the entire range of problems, including those dealt with in the paper. (It was subsequently agreed that, since General Khammash was pausing for 24 hours in London, it would be more appropriate for Ambassador Macomber to depart Washington on 14 December than 13 December.) The Secretary then read aloud, paragraph-by-paragraph, the paper entitled “Measures For Strengthening Jordan’s Defenses” which is attached as Tab A hereto. At the conclusion of the reading, General Khammash appeared grave, quiet and crestfallen. He responded in a low voice. He said that he was aware of the large financial and manpower implications in the lists he had presented on his arrival here, but that the lists did not exaggerate Jordan’s true requirements. He said terrorism is rising; Jordan is beleaguered; Israel is not the only foe; Jordan must also face the PLO, Syria, and the UAR. Iraq is another potential enemy, although quiescent for the moment. Unfortunately, whatever the Israeli intentions may be, their assurances can no longer be trusted. The Jordan Army was humiliated by the raid of November 13 and this has caused the people of Jordan to view the Army with suspicion; it has also caused the Army to question King Hussein’s leadership and his policy of moderation toward Israel. General Khammash said that Jordan was projecting no military buildup, but was merely seeking to remedy “deficiencies” in supporting arms, especially artillery and air defense. He emphasized that the Jordan Army is presently handicapped by obsolescent equipment, and that it needs a great deal more mobility than was indicated in the US response (60 APC and a number of trucks). He said he must be very frank regarding the US response. He appreciated the assistance it represented, but it would not meet the criteria of “adequate defense” as set by the Jordan Officer Corps; therefore, it would not meet the problem of loyalty and reliability. Again he expressed the view that the projected increase of 16,000 men and the infusion of new equipment would represent no military buildup. He expressed the hope that Ambassador Macomber would be endowed with the necessary authority to “expand the list.” The Secretary said that the US response had been developed in the context of three constraints: (1) availability of items, having in mind the heavy US requirements in Southeast Asia and Europe; (2) the financial cost to the US, having in mind the continuing downward congressional pressures on the MAP budget; and (3) the heavy cost to Jordan arising out of a substantial enlargement of its armed forces. With respect to point (3), he alluded to a “partnership relationship” between the US and Jordan, and said that partners must restrain each other from irresponsible acts. General Khammash said he could only repeat that he was “honest,” and that his requests represented “bare minimum needs.” The Secretary said that we agree in principle on the necessity of some pay increase for enlisted personnel, but we want to discuss with Jordan how the funds can be found, and also how Jordan proposes to finance the purchase of the ground equipment and the F–104s under existing agreements. He said that these would be among the matters which Ambassador Macomber would be prepared to discuss in Amman. General Khammash asked whether the Secretary had yet seen his own paper assessing the current situation in Jordan. The Secretary replied in the negative, and General Khammash then presented him with a paper which he had prepared after his arrival in Washington. 2 The Secretary thanked him for the paper and said that the US earnestly desires peace and stability in the Middle East. He said that he hoped sometime to visit Jordan “as a tourist.” General Khammash assured him that we would be welcome “in office or out.” The Secretary concluded the meeting by reiterating the US view that King Hussein has acted with courage, wisdom and restraint; that we believe the US package represents a substantial and prompt response; and that Ambassador Macomber will be departing Washington on 14 December to pursue the entire range of outstanding problems with the King and the Government of Jordan. The meeting was adjourned at 11:40 a.m. Townsend Hoopes Principal Deputy Tab A MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN JORDAN’S DEFENSE In a meeting of December 13, 1966, between US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Major General Amer Khammash, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Jordan, the Secretary of Defense made the following points: 1. The US understands and shares the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused the Government of Jordan. The US has notified the Government of Israel, in the strongest terms, of its concern and of the serious implications of US-Israeli relations should there be a recurrence. The US has strong reason to believe that the attack at Samua does not presage a change in Israeli policy. 2. The US appreciates the unfortunate effect which the raid has had on Jordan’s sense of security and on the morale of the Jordan Armed Forces. The US fully recognizes the important role the armed forces play today, and must play for some time to come, in the maintenance of Jordanian stability and security. The US is especially aware of the need to assure the armed forces that adequate measures are being taken respecting their basic equipment, organization and pay; and also to increase the visible defense of Jordan’s border villages. The US is prepared to provide prompt and meaningful assistance to meet these needs. 3. The US is seriously concerned however about the financial implications of Jordan’s projected force goals and indicated equipment requirements. Security is vital, but it can never be absolute; moreover, it is rarely a function of the size of armed forces, but is more often a function of their quality and spirit. It could be a tragedy for all concerned if the Government of Jordan were to embark upon a military buildup which later events proved to have been an incommensurate response, and for which resources were shown to have been inadequate. 4. The US believes it would be wiser for Jordan to concentrate on qualitative factors designed to improve the firepower, mobility and communications of its forces, rather than to embark upon a force expansion at this time. The US must ask the Government of Jordan, as a condition of further assistance, to forego any manpower increases until it can discuss more fully with the King and his advisers the financial implications of any force expansion. 5. The US notes the Government of Jordan’s view that some increase in the pay of enlisted ranks is required in the present circumstances. The US agrees in principle, but would want to discuss this matter with Jordan to determine how the necessary resources could be found. 6. The US has already accelerated the delivery of certain items in the current program as a first step in our effort to meet the problem facing the Government of Jordan. 7. The US is now prepared to deliver (by airlift to the extent feasible) an additional quantity of material within the next 30–60 days as set forth in the Annex hereto. The US regards this additional material as representing a very substantial and forthcoming response. It requires diversions from US forces and from the forces of several allied and friendly countries. It is designed to meet the indicated priorities of the Jordan armed forces and at the same time to constitute a sufficiently prompt and dramatic manifestation of US support to meet the psychological problem facing King Hussein. 8. The 6 F–104 aircraft listed in the Annex will be provided on a loan basis from the United States Air Force inventory, pending the availability of the planes originally designated for Jordan. These latter aircraft will be available for substitution beginning in July 1967, as agreed between the two governments, and will constitute a more modern and powerful version of the F–104 A/B than the loan aircraft. 9. Jordan must recognize that the United States is constrained from meeting its full requests by their adverse financial implications for both the United States and Jordan, and their adverse implications for a Middle East arms race, which the United States does not wish to stimulate. 10. The US notes the intention of the Government of Jordan to proceed with the purchase of ground equipment under the US-Jordan agreement of 1965 and to exercise the option to procure additional F–104 aircraft under the US-Jordan agreement of 1966. The US is fully prepared to honor these agreements, provided that the Government of Jordan can give satisfactory assurances that the necessary funds for their purchase and support will continue to be forthcoming from sources external to Jordan. This is in accordance with the terms of both agreements. In this connection, the US is prepared to give strong diplomatic support to Jordan’s efforts to obtain the necessary funds from sources such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but cannot contemplate a change in the terms of the contracts. 11. The US will continue to keep under close study the situation in the Middle East and the requirements of the Jordanian armed forces. The US is prepared to send a special emissary to discuss with the Government of Jordan a number of questions, including (a) the relationship of recent events to the limits on Jordan’s budget as defined in the several US-Jordan agreements; (b) the optimum size and appropriate equipment of the Jordanian armed forces; (c) the levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources; and (d) what role the US might usefully play in a Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states which have an important stake in the continued integrity and stability of Jordan. 12. The US reaffirms its admiration for the manner in which the King and the Government of Jordan are facing the hard problems created by recent events, and extends renewed assurances of US friendship and support. [Here follows an annex entitled “Equipment To Be Furnished Jordan.”] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 70 A 6648, 333 Jordan. Secret. Drafted by Hoopes and approved by Secretary McNamara on December 17. Filed with a December 16 covering memorandum from Hoopes. 2 The paper, undated, bears a notation that Khammash gave it to McNamara during their meeting. (Ibid.,OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Jordan 091.3 MAP) 368. Editorial Note 368. Editorial Note President Johnson raised the subject of Jordan and Israel during a telephone conversation with Arthur Goldberg at 5:40 p.m. on December 13, 1966. After discussion of unrelated subjects, he asked Goldberg if “they” had checked with him about Jordan and Israel, stating that he had told them not to do anything for India, Pakistan, Jordan, and Israel without checking with him. Goldberg replied that they had, that Katzenbach had given Johnson a memorandum of the conversation (presumably Document 365 ) and that he was seeing Ambassador Harman on December 16. Johnson said, “What we’ll do is, the proper time, we won’t be chintzy with them, we’ll go back to Africa or something else. We can’t make a deal, but I just think they’re damn fools to let that Hussein get thrown out.” Goldberg replied, “Well I think they know that, and I’ll be glad to talk to them.” Johnson indicated his approval, and after brief comments on unrelated subjects, the conversation concluded. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Conversation Between President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg, December 13, 1966, Tape F6612.02, Side A, PNO 3) 369. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 369. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 13, 1966, 8:55 p.m. Mr. President: Nick and I saw Feinberg, Krim, and David Ginsburg who happened to be in New York. We went through the scenario, as you directed. They all indicated at the end that they thought it would be manageable not only with the Israelis but with their friends here. They intend to get to work much as they did on the earlier Jordan package. 2 We assume Arthur saw the Israeli Ambassador today. 3 I will let you know as soon as I have a report. I will see Abe Feinberg tomorrow here in Washington. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential. 2 A December 13 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow expressed his “disquiet” at the handling of the “Jordan package.” He stated that although the package was small and defensive and represented the minimum necessary to meet King Hussein’s political requirements, the delay in reaching a decision had seriously weakened its impact, weakened Khammash’s faith in the United States as a reliable friend, and downgraded his stature in the King’s eyes. Such details, he commented “do not receive the attention they deserve when the President writes the details of the scenario.” He complained that Rostow and Katzenbach had had “to rush off to New York on a blizzardy afternoon, leaving State headless,” to talk to the Jewish community, and asked, “Is there no way to stiffen the President’s will and enliven his memory concerning all we have already done for Israel, so that he (and you and Secretary Rusk and Nick) is not victimized in this way?” (Ibid., Name File, Wriggins Memos) 3 Telegram 3188 from USUN, undated, received on December 14, stated that in accordance with Goldberg’s telephone conversation with Katzenbach, he had briefed Israel’s UN Representative Comay along the lines of the Katzenbach memorandum. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN) 370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 Washington, December 13, 1966, 9:34 p.m. 102121. Deliver to Ambassador Opening of Business December 14. 1. Khammash had appointment with Secretary McNamara morning December 13. We have sent to you by septel through Defense channels substance of response given Khammash at that meeting. 2 Response presented to Khammash as package having SecDef approval but not yet cleared throughout USG. We anticipate King will receive message from Khammash early December 14 reporting discussion. Khammash was very disappointed over amount equipment under consideration and King may have similar reaction. 2. You should seek immediate audience with King and inform him President is sending Ambassador Macomber as his special emissary to give King full benefit USG views re GOJ request. President requests that King receive Ambassador Macomber, whom he has designated both as person favorably and personally known to King and as one who has been intimately involved in Washington deliberations this subject. 3. Macomber arrival now planned for Friday, December 16, and we prefer postpone discussions on force and equipment levels of JAA and economic and budgetary matters until he arrives Amman. Talking points for Macomber will be sent septel. 3 4. It essential that King not take action inconsistent with existing relationship between US and Jordan as emotional reaction to report received from Khammash. If you have any reason believe that King will take steps toward establishment Military Directorate for West Bank or other action detrimental our objectives, you should advise him that we believe this would have very serious consequences for Jordan and might seriously complicate US-Jordan relations. 5. FYI. Package we are offering GOJ represents both painful and substantial effort on our part, including diversion from other country programs in present extremely tight MAP funding situation. We aware it falls far short of King’s request, but hope Macomber mission with your help will forestall drastic reaction damaging to our own and GOJ interests while we endeavor persuade King of necessity adopting more realistic course. To this end, our approach is to offer prompt delivery of significant equipment package and our assent to pay raise while sending Macomber to discuss USG concern re longer term implications for aid levels and Jordan’s economic future which larger program, particularly increased force levels, would involve. End FYI. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and Marshall W. Wiley; cleared by Handley, Macomber, and in substance by Wriggins and Hoopes; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to London. 2 See Document 367 . 3 Telegram 102795 to Amman, December 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/MACOMBER) 371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 15, 1966, 6:03 p.m. 103435. Acting Secretary saw Ambassador Harman and Evron 14th to inform them of USG decision to respond to King Hussein’s request for aid by offering to supply small quantity arms. Package described as between $6 and $7 million, less than 5% of what King had asked. General description of items given when pressed by Israelis. Harman said his government would be most concerned about supply of artillery and repeatedly asked for details. Noted Eban’s remark re tradition of working closely to resolve problems and expressed hope same policy would apply now. Stressed difficult psychological atmosphere existing in Israel and danger of leak on proposal without prior joint planning, particularly when Knesset in session. Acting Secretary indicated some better idea of items involved would be given but stressed that even considerably larger package would have no impact on military balance. He said that Jordan’s need for defense on border other than Israeli could not be discounted. He pointed out the massive shopping list requested is what Hussein and his military experts feel is absolutely necessary to stabilize situation and we have task of working from list. We cannot reject list in entirety and substitute only police equipment nor can we delete principal items and achieve our objectives. These latter being: (1) to permit continuance Jordanian policies of restraint and moderation, particularly in connection with prevention of terrorist acts from Jordanian territory, (2) to assist King in his efforts to keep other Arab troops out of his country and, (3) to provide equipment of type not requiring increase in force levels of Jordanian Army. Davies seeing Evron 15th to discuss further nature of package. 2 Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Handley, and approved by Katzenbach. 2 A summary of the conversation is in telegram 103654 to Tel Aviv, December 15. (Ibid.) 372. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 372. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 20, 1966. SUBJECT Arms for Hussein Hussein and Macomber are bargaining hard. 2 Hussein welcomes the McNamara package, believes that the drama of the airlift will be very helpful, as will 6 F–104’s in advance. He will do all in his power to prevent the stationing of non-Jordanian Arab troops in Jordan; he will continue his moderate policy toward Israel. Now remains at issue his force level. Macomber has pressed hard for no increase but for a substantial improvement in quality. General Khammash wants an increase of 10,000 from the present 50,000 on deck to 60,000. However, Macomber believes the King is under pressure to increase numbers as well as quality—his generals do not find it credible that they can meet the threat from both Israel and Syria without a numerical increase. ( Note: The United Arab Command’s plans for Jordan implied a total strength of 75,000 including an 8,500 national guard. The Government of Jordan has authorized a strength of 55,000, but had not gone farther than 50,000, a level we had never formally agreed to.) Macomber believes a 2,000-man increase is reasonable to absorb the new equipment we are adding. He hopes to hold the line at that. But if he can’t, he feels the pressure is strong enough to warrant taking out a small insurance policy by accepting a 5,000-man increase, but for one year only. On budget costs, we and they had reached agreement on the Jordanian defense budget of some $54 million. We have been providing a declining level of budgetary support ($37 million in 1962, $32 million in 1966). We have told Congress that we are continuing to reduce this support. And we had planned cuts of $5 million a year beginning this year. DoD estimates that apart from the costs of the McNamara package the add-on costs are as follows: 1. pay raise $6 million 2. 2,000 men to handle new equipment: $2.5 million 3. 3,000 men to 55,000 total: $3.5 million $12.0 million Where will this $12 million additional come from? 1. Khammash says he can cover these costs for one year out of UAC funds (though we are somewhat skeptical). 2. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could be tapped by Jordan, with our backing, in the event the UAC contribution does not come through (but we’re already expecting them to pick up the $70 million balance from the tank and plane sales and therefore can’t expect much more). 3. We ourselves could scratch our $5 million cut in budget support, and might put in some additional contingency fund if necessary (though this would undercut the important goal of shifting Jordan to development funding). I assume the President would prefer to satisfy them with a bit more cash in the form of budget support than have a new crisis on his hands. Have you any reaction to the above before I join in a State-Defense meeting at 10:45? 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Confidential. 2 Macomber’s reports from Amman are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/MACOMBER. 3 The memorandum bears no indication of Rostow’s reaction. 373. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 373. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1 Amman, December 22, 1966, 0001Z. 1570. From Macomber. Deptel 106069. 2 1. Concluded negotiations with King Hussein afternoon December 21. In course of this and earlier meetings we have come to following understandings: 2. King does not agree with our belief that there has been no basic change in Israeli policy toward Jordan. He understands, however, that US response is predicated on this assumption and aimed primarily at easing current situation, rather than dealing with longer term threat of revised nature. 3. His Majesty understands very difficult position facing us should it turn out that dramatic effort to strengthen Jordan army along lines of McNamara package was happening in apparent conjunction with introduction of foreign Arab troops into Jordan. While understanding the implications of this for USG, he also feels that introduction of foreign troops is incompatible with Jordan’s own interests. He cannot give an absolute guarantee that he will be able to keep foreign troops out of his country but he does guarantee to the President that he will do all he can to keep them out. 4. The King has committed himself to hold increase in current actual force levels (50,000) to an increment of 3,000. He wishes President to know that he understands and shares US concern for escalating troop strength. He asks him to understand, however, that some increase at this time is absolutely essential. He also wishes to personally assure the President that at earliest opportunity he will try to cut back his troop strength. He has specifically agreed one year from now to reexamine need for additional 3,000 troops in light of political and financial conditions existing at that time. 5. King intends to continue his moderate policies and measures to enhance area stability. In this connection, Jordan will persist in its efforts to prevent terrorist infiltration into Israel. 6. King Hussein understands that USG is fully prepared honor US-Jordanian sales agreements of 1964 and 1965 provided GOJ can continue to meet payments on schedule from funds obtained from sources external to Jordan. He understands also that US not prepared to alter terms of these agreements. He knows we are willing to give vigorous diplomatic support to GOJ effort obtain necessary funds from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. He is fully aware, too, our position that any funds obtained from such sources or from UAC would be applied first to meeting GOJ obligations under US purchase agreements and would be available for general support of GOJ forces only after US obligations met. (In early February King plans to visit Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in search of funds; and in March will go to Libya for same purpose.) 7. With respect to option to purchase 24 additional aircraft, 3 King understands that we are prepared interpret “on or about January 1” liberally and that we believe it would be preferable wait to exercise this option until he has, with our support, obtained necessary funds from Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. In any event, he understands if GOJ exercises option in January, payments totalling 5.4 million will have to be paid in January to USG and that these obligations would have prior claim on UAC funds over their use to finance any increase in force levels. 8. King understands that we acquiesce on enlisted men’s pay raise of magnitude of twenty-five percent. In our agreeing to this, he understands that we will take raise into account in later negotiations for a new ceiling in Jordanian military budgetary expenditures to replace current 19.2 million dinar limitation. 9. I have informed King that under difficult political and financial circumstances he facing USG will not proceed with all $5 million projected cut in our budget support for FY 67. I have therefore indicated that, subject to Congressional appropriations, our budget support payments for the coming year will be reduced to $27 million rather than to $25 million. Also indicated that in restoring a portion of our cut I would have to make it clear that all our budget support for forthcoming year would be subject to 57 percent special letter of credit arrangement as we had earlier informed his government. 10. On basis of foregoing I have also told Hussein that we will deliver the equipment listed in McNamara package and make every effort to airlift a substantial portion of this equipment to Jordan in next 30 to 60 days. I have indicated that it will not be possible to augment package to extent he and General Khammash requested in our first meeting, but have given him list of machine guns, radios and communication wire, as spelled out Deptel 104754, 4 noting that we were prepared to add these items to initial McNamara list. King expressed disappointment that package still did not include upgunning of M–48 tanks. He understands, however, that while this request can be considered on another, later occasion, it is not part of our current package. 11. While indicating disappointment that other items had not been added to McNamara package, King Hussein said that present package dramatically flown in to Jordan will help situation here “very, very much.” 12. King believes that advance loan of six F–104’s, and their presence here will be most helpful. I have confirmed that we will attempt to deliver them to Jordan in course of January and early February. King understands that when American pilots are piloting the planes they will be used only for training of Jordanian co-pilots. He has also guaranteed that every effort will be made to avoid these planes coming into combat with any of Jordan’s neighbors as long as they are being serviced on ground by US personnel, even when they are being piloted by Jordanians. Additionally, he is aware that if other foreign aircraft should be stationed in Jordan while the F–104’s are still here on a loan basis, we will have to reexamine question of whether they should remain. 13. We have agreed on proposed text for public announcement of package along lines suggested Deptel 106068, 5 with paragraph added for use in Jordan only. (Text being sent separately.) 6 Hussein would like to make announcement Friday morning Amman time and agrees with us that numbers and types of equipment should not be revealed publicly. 14. In course my final meeting with Hussein on December 21, we also discussed tactics of forthcoming Cairo meeting as well as King’s current thinking with respect to changes in his government. These discussions reported in Embtel 1569. 7 15. After returning to office and dictating foregoing, I received call from Prime Minister Tell who said he and General Khammash had talked to King re agreement which we had reached and must see me at once. We met at Embassy residence and meeting began with my reviewing point by point all key language of agreement spelled out paras 2–12 in this telegram. Prime Minister and Khammash, in an intense and emotional effort, made in the next two hours one last try to obtain further concessions. While much of old ground again gone over, main thrust Tell-Khammash argument was that U.S. response was not enough and that by our failure to be more forthcoming we were denying Jordan minimum necessary support needed at this critical time. They asserted that King’s sense of courtesy masking depth of his disappointment and that their own disappointment was “many times greater” than the King’s. 16. Tell argued pay raise, which King pretty much committed to after meeting with officers previous evening, would not be possible. (I went over figures to show that it would be.) Tell also suggested that it might have been better to head off pressures for troop build-up by deciding not to take U.S. package and instead going ahead with plans to accept foreign troops into Jordan. Khammash felt King, after last night’s meeting with officers, was also committed to much larger troop build-up than would now be possible. Khammash, in very emotional state suggested that he might not be able carry on. (Unless he calms down, I suspect he may resign in next day or so, as he did once before on a similar occasion. If so, I believe King will be able persuade him withdraw resignation.) 17. Throughout meeting I made it absolutely clear that while recognizing sincerity of their appeal we had come to the end of the line. I added, however, that in view of their comments, I thought I should contact His Majesty to see whether he was having second thoughts about the agreement we had reached. At that point Tell interjected to say that there was no question about going back on the deal, that it had been made and it was too late now for it to be unmade. Shortly thereafter, when Tell and Khammash finally concluded that there was in fact no more give in my position meeting ended. 18. While I have no doubt there was considerable sincerity in this eleventh hour effort on the part of Prime Minister and Chief of Staff, I believe that Hussein while disappointed is not as deeply disappointed as they are suggesting. Further I believe that under the circumstances we have made about the right deal. 19. When I returned to the office I found waiting for me to carry back to Washington a very courteous and appreciative letter to the President from King Hussein. Text of letter follows by separate telegram. 8 20. My continued presence here now will only raise false hopes that there is in fact further give in my position. I have said goodbye to King and will be leaving Amman for Washington morning 22nd. Burns 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/MACOMBER. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 2 Telegram 106069 to Amman, December 20, authorized Macomber to accept an increase of 2,000 in the force level and to accept another 1,000 if he was convinced it was absolutely necessary, stated that the United States would expect to share the burden of increased budgetary costs of an agreed force build-up, authorized him to reduce the cut in U.S. budget support for fiscal year 1967 to $2 or $3 million, and reminded him that he was authorized to yield the entire $5 million if he considered it absolutely necessary. It instructed Macomber to try to discourage the Jordanians from exercising their option to purchase 24 additional aircraft on or about January 1, 1967, and to advise the King that the United States was not prepared to recede from the terms of their agreement on payment for the aircraft. (Ibid.) 3 After extensive U.S.-Jordan discussions in early 1967 on this subject, Burns reported in telegram 2938 from Amman, April 12, that he met with Khammash, who was authorized by the King to conclude the revision of the F–104 package. The Jordanian Government was exercising its option for 6 additional F–104s and planned to exercise its option for the remaining 18 aircraft in March 1968. Delivery of the 18 aircraft currently on order was to begin in July 1967 and continue through June 1968. Delivery of the next 18 aircraft was to begin in March 1969. Payment due in 1967 on the ground package and the first 18 aircraft would be $26.5 million, with the possibility of deferring $2 million until 1968. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN) 4 Dated December 18. (Ibid.) 5 Dated December 20. (Ibid.) 6 The text was transmitted in telegram 1572 from Amman, December 21. (Ibid.) 7 Dated December 22. (Ibid.) 8 Telegram 1571 from Amman, December 22. (Ibid.) 374. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 374. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 22, 1966, 8:49 p.m. 107579. 1. Under Secretary saw Ambassador Harman morning 22nd to inform him that US agreement provide additional arms Jordan would be announced at 10:00 p.m. 2 He noted difficulty of balancing between King Hussein’s need to maximize our effort publicly and Israel’s desire to see it minimized. 2. Under Secretary said package as described earlier except for very small number additional light arms such as M–1 rifles and machine guns. 3. The King was committed to hold his increase in forces to 3,000 men and has agreed one year from now to re-examine need for these additional troops. 4. King has assured us he will continue his moderate policies and measures to enhance area stability including efforts to prevent terrorist infiltration into Israel. 5. King has guaranteed that he will do his best to keep foreign Arab troops out of Jordan, although he stressed he could not make an absolute guarantee that he would be successful. 6. Ambassador Harman thought reaction in Israel would be low-key, although this would depend somewhat on the level of publicity given the agreement here and in the area. The action would not of course be welcomed. GOI, in fact, thought we were doing more than circumstances required. 7. Nevertheless, GOI understood our position and welcomed (a) the candor with which we have dealt with them on this problem; hoped this would continue on all matters; (b) King’s determination to continue moderate policies; (c) continuance of efforts control terrorism; and (d) our assurances that we would be helpful to Israel on border control equipment and other matters. 8. Harman said he returning this weekend to Jerusalem to participate in discussion of general balance in the area. He thought that GOI comment on Jordan deal would be limited to statement along lines that matter would be studied and if military imbalance involved, Israel would move to correct it. 9. Harman suggested it would be useful if fact that no tanks or additional aircraft are involved could be leaked to press here. Also, he hoped that no reference to Israeli knowledge of or acquiescence in package would be made. 10. In later conversation with Davies, Minister Evron said Israeli Consul General New York had been fully briefed yesterday and instructed to allay concern among Jewish community leaders. Since Harman proceeding Israel via Miami Beach, we assume he will contact others of leadership there. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Handley, and approved by Katzenbach. 2 The texts of the announcement and a background briefing given by a Department of State spokesman on December 22 are in circular telegram 107544, December 22. (Ibid.) The text of the announcement is identical to that in telegram 1572 from Amman (see footnote 6, Document 373 ). 375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, December 30, 1966, 8:14 p.m. 111019. 1. Department hopes you will seize earliest opportunity follow up our request for visit to Dimona as well resumption talks on overall arms control problems. 2. Re former you should inform Eban that USG increasingly disturbed at pattern which USG-GOI exchanges on Dimona appear to be taking. Our desire make sixth visit to Dimona could not have come as surprise to GOI since principle of visits at six-monthly intervals long ago established. Yet each time visit falls due GOI delays in responding to our request to set date causing sour note be struck in US-Israeli relations. We see no reason why US-Israeli relations should be subjected to this periodic strain. We urge FonMin to give us early date for visit lest lack of GOI responsiveness be misinterpreted within USG. We would hope FonMin would agree with us as to desirability making visits, beginning with present one, automatic six-monthly procedure. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Michael Sterner of NEA/IAI; cleared by Wolle, Davies, and Saunders, and in substance by Trevithick and Rochlin; and approved by Handley. 376. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 376. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, January 9, 1967, 1437Z. 3753. For the Secretary. I understand you are seeing my colleague Ambassador Kamel tomorrow. 2 In connection this appointment I hope you will read Cairo’s 3744 and 3752 3 which I trust my old friends in Secretariat will make available to you. I am deeply disturbed at drift and deterioration US position stemming in large part from strong Egyptian belief we are long overdue in giving them answer to their request of last March for additional food. I have seen the report of the IRG meeting of December 19, 1966, 4 with which I strongly concur and urge your approval and that of the President of the recommendations contained therein. Regards. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Rusk met with Kamel on January 12; see Document 378 . 3 Telegram 3744 from Cairo, January 9, reported a meeting of Owen T. Jones, the new director of the AID mission in Cairo, with UAR officials. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15 UAR) Telegram 3752 from Cairo, January 9, reported a meeting between Battle and Finance Minister Hasan Zaki, in which Zaki contrasted the delayed U.S. response to UAR food requests with the allegedly prompt Soviet response to the UAR request in December. Battle commented that the conversation underscored the importance of an early response. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) 4 At its meeting on December 19, 1966, the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia decided that, on balance, it was desirable for U.S. long-run interests in its relations with the UAR and more broadly in the Near East to offer some food aid to the UAR. It recommended offering a package of $50 to $70 million of commodities for sale under P.L. 480. (Memorandum from Davies to Rusk, January 5; ibid.; and record of meeting, December 19, 1966; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, NSC, SIG, IRG) 377. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 377. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State 1 Tel Aviv, January 11, 1967, 1321Z. 2339. Ref: State 96223. 2 1. In conversation with FonMin Eban Jan 10 (PM Eshkol on vacation and I did not wish delay discussion further) I urged that GOI reconsider carefully its stand on IAEA safeguards. Drawing particularly from reftel, I stressed importance we give to this matter, our confidence and reasons therefore that IAEA system inspection need not endanger Israeli security or reveal commercial secrets, and our view that unilateral Israeli accession to IAEA safeguards would be positive contribution to world peace, raising esteem in which Israel held in world and working in Israel’s own self interest. 2. Eban’s response centered about three points: (A) “national dignity” (B) national security (C) domestic political considerations. 3. Re (A) national dignity. Eban objected to Israel’s being asked to give up something while the same demands were not being levied on UAR. He rejected idea that somehow Israel “owed UAR something” in this matter. Israel’s own peaceful disposition on area nuclear matters had been made abundantly clear in recent statements by himself ( Realite interview and “Meet the Press”) and by Israel Delegation in UN. His researches showed him he said that a basic premise of arms control agreements was mutual recognition of sovereignty, right to existence of partners in agreements. There seemed to be no disposition on part UAR make such elemental concession in case Israel. Instead one only heard talk of war of liberation. He wondered whether USG was not seeking do too much to increase range of assurances to UAR and not taking sufficient account Israel’s concerns. He said Israel’s hopes for progress in this problem rested largely on the achievement of general non-proliferation treaty. 4. In my rejoinder I emphasized we not pushing Israel to take action under assumption Israel owed UAR anything. Rather we felt this was something Israel could do that would serve its own self interest and broader interests world peace. Nuclear variable lent whole new dimension to Middle East arms race and was regarded by us with utmost seriousness. We were not asking Israel to do anything we would not ask UAR, though in case latter, in view paucity its nuclear facilities, this almost academic question at this time. 5. As for possibilities general non-proliferation agreement we were hopeful, but its prospects were uncertain and we could not rely on it solely as a check to M.E. race at this stage. 6. Re (B) national security. In response my question Eban said that nuclear facilities in plural he had referred to in conversations Nov 2 were various components of Dimona complex and there no others. GOI concerned that details of Dimona lay out would become known to UAR through inspections and thence through important Egyptian presence at IAEA headquarters. Inquiry had been made to Israeli reps in Vienna and consultations undertaken with experts in Israel and both agreed inspection carried substantial security risk. 7. I countered with reminder that under IAEA procedures GOI would have say in who inspectors would be and that Israel’s presence or lack thereof on IAEA Board of Governors would not affect protection it would enjoy in this respect. 8. Re (C) domestic political considerations. Eban’s point here was closely related to “national dignity” argument. He asked how GOI could explain to Israeli people if it were to unilaterally accede to IAEA inspection while the UAR does nothing. Israeli people would wonder where national equality was then. 9. I suggested that Israeli people might very well understand such an action as we would: as a logical next step in the unilateral reassurances that Israel has already given to world about its nuclear intentions. It might even be argued that such unilateral action would be more palatable to Israeli public opinion than a bilateral agreement with Nasser, though I recognized that bilateral agreements would ultimately be desirable. 10. Eban said that he would again consult the PriMin and experts on the various technical problems. He agreed to take up with PriMin the suggestion that my next meeting on this subject be with both of them. Eban suggested that we consider putting in writing future exchanges on the subject. I said I hoped we would not formalize our discussions to this extent at this stage. It seemed to me that if we felt we needed to put things in writing we could use informal bout de papier procedure. He agreed. 11. In parenthetical remarks near end of discussion of subject Eban expressed GOI satisfaction with talks with Ambassador Bunker. Said GOI feeling was that water is essential aspect of desalting project not nuclear power. Any means technically feasible to get required water would be satisfactory to Israelis. 12. I closed with expressed hope GOI would give this subject careful priority attention it merited. Eban said he would be in touch as soon as he had had further discussions. 13. Comment: Foregoing is summary lengthy conversation being reported more fully by airgram. 3 Believe I covered all points of reftel with in some cases additional what, I hope, were supporting arguments. No doubt but that the going is heavy. MFA Assistant DirGen Bitan, who was present at conversation, said later at lunch he thought progress along lines we were pressing was unlikely. No doors have been shut however and I did not detect in Eban’s remarks any desire to stop our exchanges. It would of course be quite helpful if we could convey to Israelis some sign of UAR give in practical matter of IAEA inspection. Barbour 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AE 13 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. 2 Telegram 96223 to Tel Aviv, December 3, instructed Barbour to focus on the question of IAEA safeguards in his coming meeting with Eshkol and Eban. (Ibid., DEF 12 NEAR E) 3 A memorandum of the conversation was enclosed with airgram A–414, January 16. (Ibid., AE 13 IAEA) 378. Memorandum of Conversation 378. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 12, 1967. SUBJECT US–UAR Relations—Food PARTICIPANTS H.E. Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the United Arab Republic The Secretary of State Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NEA Mr. Donald C. Bergus, Country Director NEA/UAR The Secretary opened the conversation by stating we were not yet in a position to give a reply to Egypt’s outstanding request for food assistance. He had not had a chance to discuss the matter with the President. The Secretary adverted to Ambassador Kamel’s presentation of December 29. 2 We had thought about many of the points he had raised and felt it might be useful to go a little further in the present discussion. As to the UAR’s request for food assistance, the Secretary said this problem raised large questions having to do with food supplies and specific questions in terms of applicable US legislation. He felt that in his previous conversation, Ambassador Kamel had tended to discount the large question. The Secretary referred to the Indian situation and said that we were disappointed at the limited responses of other countries to India’s needs. We must get out of the position of being held responsible on a bilateral basis for food supplies. In 18 months we had shipped over $1 billion worth of wheat to India. When it became apparent we could no longer maintain assistance at this level, there was an adverse reaction. We had sent Egypt a great deal of food. When it becomes difficult for us to continue we are accused of waging a war of starvation. We must get out of that context. The Secretary referred to the problems created by the Findlay Amendment and Egypt’s trade with Cuba and the need for Presidential determinations. 3 We had been disappointed in the UAR’s reaction to our request to exercise the option to purchase rice in accordance with the terms of the previous PL 480 agreement. The Egyptians seemed to feel that we had let them down by even asking that this be done. The Secretary said we did not know how much or on what terms the Soviets were giving food assistance to Egypt, but we welcomed this kind of help. He hoped that the UAR would give him the necessary priorities to food production in relation to its total resources. Ambassador Kamel said that this was an important meeting and that he wanted our help. He did not want to create a crisis in US–UAR relations. The Near East was now in a crisis situation and he wanted to work with us as a friend. He didn’t wish to leave the room until agreement could be reached as to what should be said to Cairo. He felt embarassed by imposing on the Secretary’s time but he felt most sincerely that the situation was very serious. He felt a deep sense of responsibility toward history. He had not come to ask for wheat in the pursuit of Egyptian or Arab interests but to participate in the protection of American and Western interests and the preservation of peace in the area. He said that prevention was better than cure. The Ambassador said that for six months he had been giving tranquilizers to Cairo. His little pharmacy was now exhausted. President Nasser was following these discussions very closely. The Ambassador then reviewed his well-known list of actions taken by the UAR over the last year which he felt should be read as signals of Egyptian desire to improve relations with the United States. He went on to say that there could be no peace in the area in the absence of a workable relationship between Washington and Cairo. There could be no peace in the area and the cold war would never finish if Egypt lost its position of non-alignment. The Near East was more important and more dangerous than Vietnam. Egypt could not be non-aligned if the US didn’t do anything. Nasser had instructed him to say that the UAR’s wheat supplies were very limited. The 250,000 tons en route from the Russians would last for a short time and the additional 400,000 tons were not yet under active discussion. What would be the effect in Cairo if after a month the Egyptian people came to believe the US was exposing them to famine—not Nasser, not the government but the Egyptian people? If wheat did not flow, the cold war will flare up. The Ambassador said he must have an answer. Egypt must have wheat. Failure to get it would cause the greatest repercussions on all our relations and interests in the Near East and even on US relations with the Soviet Union. This was a more important matter than the Soviet arms to Egypt or the Aswan Dam. It was indeed the most important decision the US had faced with respect to the Near East since World War II. The Secretary asked if he could pose a personal question. How could he interpret to his Cabinet colleagues or to Chairmen of Congressional committees the point that unless we provide food something bad would happen as anything but a threat? They would react strongly to threats. As to Egypt’s orientation or non-alignment wasn’t this something that Egypt could control? Kamel countered by asking if we were talking in theoretical or practical terms. He believed that threats and blackmail were inelegant and improper. If he were asked this question by members of the Cabinet or Congressional chairmen he would reply by stating that it was in the American interest to keep the UAR non-aligned. This needed more than speeches. Otherwise there would be greater and intolerable pressure on Egypt from the USSR. The Secretary asked why Egypt really needed so many arms from the USSR. Kamel replied because of Israel. Israel was there. Why would the US need more arms against the USSR? Only time would improve the Arab-Israel situation. Decades were needed and an essential element was good US–UAR relations. This would permit the UAR to build up its own confidence. Presently we were doing the contrary. If there were no wheat there would be more tension in the area. The Secretary asked if the UAR’s military leaders were apprehensive of an attack from Israel, why was Egypt maintaining such large forces in Yemen? Kamel replied, “Who knows who brought us to Yemen and who knows who will bring us into other situations if you leave us?” The Secretary asked how it happened that this responsibility for feeding Egypt had been concentrated on the United States. Kamel said we should look upon our ability to give food aid to Egypt as a blessing. Egypt would not require any more help after two or three years. If we listened to him the USSR would disappear from the Middle East and an Israel settlement would become possible. There was no reason why Egypt should be forced to succumb to the pressure of a great power close to its borders. There followed some discussion as to how the Ambassador should report the conversation to Cairo. It was agreed that something along the following lines could be said: Kamel saw Secretary for 70 minutes January 12. Most of discussion was taken up with wide-ranging exploratory and useful discussion current problems in NE, many of which had been raised by Kamel in his December 29 meeting with the Secretary. Re UAR wheat request, the Secretary informed Ambassador Kamel that pressure of business relating to opening of Congress, State of the Union message, and other matters had not permitted him complete necessary consultations. These consultations presently going forward. It was hoped that there could be another meeting with Ambassador within about ten days. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved in S on January 17. The memorandum is Part VI of VI. The other five memoranda of conversation are ibid. 2 A memorandum of the conversation is ibid. 3 Section 103 (d) of the Food for Peace Act of 1966 (Public Law 89–808, approved November 11, 1966; 80 Stat. 1526) forbade the sale under Title I of P.L. 480 to any nation trading with Cuba or North Vietnam except under certain circumstances if the President determined the sale was in the U.S. national interest, and forbade the sale under Title I of P.L. 480 to the United Arab Republic unless the President determined it was in the U.S. national interest. 379. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 379. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 1 Washington, January 13, 1967, 6 p.m. 118193. 1. On January 12 Foreign Minister Hakim had general discussions on current situation in Near East with Secretary (at lunch) and Acting Assistant Secretary Handley. Without specifying magnitude, he also presented Lebanon’s request for PL–480 and CCC credit assistance to Assistant Secretary Solomon. 2. Mr. Solomon expressed regret GOL had not taken up USG March 1966 offers 2 which represented considerable effort for USG, given GOL’s strong financial position. He explained USG would be in better position discuss government-to-government CCC deal when more was known about future of $21 million in CCC credits guaranteed by Intra. 3 3. Hakim said GOL’s intention was to protect Intra’s creditors to maximum extent possible but that it could not give any creditors consideration more favorable than that given others. He said preliminary auditors report on Intra would be ready in about one month and its substance could be conveyed to Ambassador Porter. He said that it would be two to three months before issuance final report on basis of which informed judgement could be made on whether Intra to be refloated or liquidated. He emphasized GOL request should be considered separately from Intra problem, that GOL had not been party to Intra transactions and in fact at time his last visit in November 1965 had recommended CCC wheat authorization should not all be for account private Lebanese traders. He said he hoped CCC arrangement could be worked out with GOL, especially because Lebanon closest of all Arab states to U.S. policies and ideals. 4. Mr. Solomon said possibilities would be reviewed within USG to see what could be done under circumstances. 5. Memoranda of conversations with Messrs. Handley and Solomon follow. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967– 69, POL 7 LEB. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gamon and John T Morgan of E/OMA and approved by Davies. 2 The offer, set forth in an aide-memoire with three attachments given to President Helou on March 8, 1966, was made up of (1) long-term credits under Title IV of P.L. 480 for the purchase of up to 40,000 metric tons of wheat valued at $2.6 million annually, (2) Commodity Credit Corporation export credits for purchases of wheat and flour, and (3) up to $20 million in possible long-term loans by the Export-Import Bank. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–11 LEB) Telegram 451 from Beirut, July 18, reported that the Lebanese Government accepted the P.L. 480 proposal but requested a larger program at a lower interest rate and accepted the CCC offer in principle but wanted a waiver of the requirement of a bank guarantee. (Ibid., AID (US) LEB) Telegram 30913 to Beirut, August 18, stated that during the preceding 4 months, the U.S. wheat supply situation had become critical and that only 20,000 metric tons of wheat could be programmed under a Title IV P.L. 480 agreement with Lebanon. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–11 LEB) 3 Documentation relating to the October 1966 Intra Bank failure is ibid., FN 6 LEB. 4 A memorandum of the conversation with Solomon and a memorandum of a January 13 conversation between Hakim and Under Secretary Rostow are ibid., AID (US) LEB. A memorandum of the conversation with Handley is ibid., POL 2 NEAR E. 380. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 380. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 16, 1967. SUBJECT Another Israeli Raid? Prime Minister Eshkol’s informal message to you this morning 2 makes it plain that the Israelis are not going to repeat the mistake they made in November. Our reaction to their raid on Jordan shook them badly. This time, they’re carefully warning us that their patience with Syria has about run out. Despite Eshkol’s restraint, Israel is either on the brink of another attack or is pushing us to curb Syria. Israeli Charge Evron warned State this morning that “continuation of Syria’s policy would force Israel to take action.” 3 Eban said about the same publicly. Since the first of the year, the Israelis have built a full record in the UN of Syrian-based attacks. To strengthen their case further, they’ve accepted U Thant’s appeal for an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. This costs little since press reports suggest that Syria will reject or sidestep the appeal. We probably can’t stop the Israelis from another attack without laying our whole relationship on the line. We’ve offered border control equipment for them to test, but any system is months off. However, we’re pulling out the stops short of a showdown to encourage continued restraint: —Katzenbach told representatives of the Jewish Council of Presidents this morning 4 that an Israeli strike would consolidate support for the deteriorating Syrian regime. —We endorsed U Thant’s appeal 5 in a New York Statement. —We’re instructing Ambassador Smythe to tell the Syrians we believe Israel is on the brink of an attack and they can’t count on us to hold Israel back. 6 We’ll say the same in Cairo. —We’ll have a response to Eshkol for you shortly. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President. 2 See Document 382 . 3 In a meeting with Acting Assistant Secretary Handley that morning, Evron delivered an oral message stating in part, “The continuation of this aggressive policy will force Israel to take action in self-defense as is her international right and national duty.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR) 4 A memorandum of the conversation is ibid. 5 A January 15 message from UN Secretary-General U Thant to the Israeli and Syrian Governments urged restraint and called for an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. The text is in telegram 3582 from USUN, January 15. (Ibid.) 6 Telegram 119382 to Damascus, January 16, instructed Smythe to tell Foreign Minister Makhus that terrorist incidents were placing the Israeli Government under pressures that might become intolerable, that the United States considered that situation was dangerously close, and that the Syrian Government should not overestimate the U.S. ability to influence the Israeli Government against military reaction to acts of terrorism. (Ibid.) In a January 17 meeting, Makhus said that Syria had already agreed to the suggestion of an emergency ISMAC meeting but wanted it to deal with the question of cultivation in the demilitarized zone. (Ibid.) 381. Memorandum of Conversation Between the UAR Ambassador (Kamel) and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff 381. Memorandum of Conversation Between the UAR Ambassador (Kamel) and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, January 17, 1967. SUBJECT Lunch with Ambassador Kamel At a two-hour lunch this afternoon Ambassador Kamel went over much of the same ground as he has with Secretary Rusk 2 and Mr. Walt Rostow. 3 Much of what he said was a repeat of his familiar analysis of how important it is that the US maintain a position in Cairo over the next 3–4 years until oil revenue put the UAR on its own feet. Essentially, he made two points: 1. The importance of a US decision on food aid within the next ten days. He had obviously absorbed Mr. Rostow’s Saturday 4 admonition that it was time he stopped describing Cairo’s acceptance of Soviet wheat as a threat to the US and started thinking of it as a threat to the UAR. He made very clear that, in painting the specter of Moscow’s filling the Egyptian wheat gap, he was not threatening the US but simply stating a fact of life—that a sick man needs moral support from more than one quarter. 2. His three-part plan for progress in the Middle East which he had outlined to Secretary Rusk but not to Mr. Rostow: —Keep the Israeli issue in the icebox. —Achieve a modus vivendi among the Arab governments: (a) Use the good offices of the US to further the Kuwaiti mediation of the Yemen dispute; (b) Do what we can to help reestablish British relations with the UAR. He explained this second point as relevant to the first in that the British have substantial influence in Saudi Arabia and can do a lot to break down the animosity between Faisal and Nasser. —Maintain a workable economic relationship with the UAR, including encouraging the IMF and IBRD to help. He described the importance of this in ways that do not sound like a threat but they come close. As he put it: Just as no government can expect to have good relations with any nation in the western hemisphere without the approval of the US, so is it true with the UAR in the Middle East. He raised again the proposal he had made to Mr. Rostow on Saturday of our sending to Cairo another mission like the Ed Mason enterprise several years ago. 5 He felt that, if we agreed to a new round of food aid, he could sell this to Nasser. When he asked what I thought of the idea, I said I felt it could be useful if it connoted a willingness on the part of the UAR government to adopt more pragmatic economic policies and to consider the analysis of western economists. In general response I told him I felt he was addressing two points not necessarily wholly related. First is the political element of our response to UAR food requests. Contrary to some impressions that might be logical in Cairo, our delay in deciding should not be read as political. Second, I felt that our delay had to be read in the context of our broader concern over the world food problem. I explained how the US and the world are going through a transition in their thinking about agricultural development and food aid. Washington in particular in the last three months had been coming to grips with this new situation in a way that almost required delaying any decisions on food aid until we had sorted out our position on the worldwide problem. I realized the difficulty of convincing Cairo that preoccupation rather than premeditated neglect could be a reason for our delay, but I felt this was much closer to the truth and hoped he could convince his government. When I turned the discussion to Syrian-Israeli relations, he had little to offer in the way of interpretation but did volunteer that he had cabled Nasser yesterday that the UAR should do what it could to restrain Syria. I told him we appreciated that because we were very much concerned that the Israelis might launch another strike if terrorist activity continued, and especially if it cost another Israeli life. He diverted the discussion to an exposition on how the UAR had been quite responsible on the Israeli issue. I agreed that it had been better than some of its neighbors and hoped that in this instance it could do all in its power to avert another blowup. In parting, I left with him the two USDA paper-back books on the world food problem and outlined to him the new facts about the world food situation as we see it. He ended by reiterating his plea for a US decision “within 10 days”. He retained his composure throughout, but was more emphatic than I had ever seen him. H.S. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. A copy was sent to the Department of State. 2 See Document 378 . 3 A brief memorandum of Kamel’s meeting with Rostow on January 14 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. 4 January 14. 5 Economist Edward Mason visited the UAR in March 1962. For the summary of his report, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVII, Document 230 . 382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, January 17, 1967, 9:17 p.m. 120440. 1. Following is text of “piece of paper” delivered January 16 by GOI Embassy to White House, described as message from Premier Eshkol to President Johnson but bearing no salutation or signature line: “Today I took a most difficult decision—not to authorize a military reaction to the brutal Syrian provocation which took place yesterday morning. Terrorists from Syria mined the village of Dishon and put anti-personnel mines on a football ground. A young man was killed and others wounded. This outrage came as a climax to a period of sustained Syrian aggression which included the following acts over the past ten days: wholesale penetration of the Israeli side of the frontier; attacks with light arms on our farmers inside and outside the Demilitarized Zone; bombardment of Israelis on sovereign Israel territory with tank shells; laying of mines in roads and fields, and totally unprovoked shooting on Israeli vessels on Lake Tiberias which is Israeli territory. Through all this period we kept our reaction to the minimum and tried to avoid escalation. The country is seething with indignation. It seems that Syria wishes to appear as the champion of anti-Israel militance, and to embroil it in the aggressive policy. If we have decided not to act today it is because we still hope that Syria will understand the danger of her present course. Since we agreed to be in close and frank contact I felt bound to share my deep concern with you.” 2. Embassy should deliver following message in response either through Foreign Ministry or Prime Minister’s office. Message should be prepared in style similar to GOI text, i.e., on plain paper without salutation or signature lines. Text follows: “Thank you for writing to me candidly about the present difficult situation on Israel’s northern border. I respect the courage you have shown in dealing with it. I was saddened to learn of the fatality caused by the mine explosion at Dishon. We share Israel’s sorrow about this senseless and brutal act. I want you to know how fully I appreciate the painful dilemma that you and your colleagues face in coping with continuing acts of terrorism along Israel’s borders. No government can be expected to adopt a passive attitude toward incidents that threaten the lives and properties of its citizens. The tragedy is that the search for security can lead to actions which, perversely, threaten to destroy chances for the permanent peace we all seek and which thus in turn pose a serious dilemma for this government. I am therefore particularly gratified by your decision not to authorize military retaliation. I say this, believe me, in full appreciation of how difficult that decision must have been for you. I am convinced, however, that there are, fortunately, alternatives to military retaliation that in the long run will provide Israel with a greater measure of security. Your government and mine are already engaged in discussions concerning possible ways in which technology we are developing might help strengthen the capability of the Israeli border forces to intercept infiltrators. I believe this to be a promising approach, and I can assure you of our continuing interest in seeing this program go forward. I earnestly hope that your government will continue to meet the present situation with the same high statesmanship which it has so frequently displayed in the past under trying circumstances. We believe that the evidence from years past demonstrates that military retaliation is not the answer to this problem. We have already seen enough of the present pattern of events in the Middle East to realize that armed reprisals not only fail to put a halt to terrorism, but on the contrary, strengthen the radical and irresponsible forces in the Arab societies that provide a favorable climate for terrorist activities. I am encouraged by the initiative of Secretary General U Thant in calling attention to the present dangerous situation along the Israel-Syria border and asking both the Israeli and Syrian Governments to agree to an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. I welcome your government’s initial favorable reaction to his proposal. I hope that your government will be flexible about the details of the emergency meeting in the interest of furthering the overall objectives of relieving tension on the border. We have instructed our Ambassador in Damascus to approach the Syrian Government urgently to call attention to the dangers of the situation, to stress our belief that acts of terrorism within Israel are a major factor threatening the peace, and to urge full cooperation with the Secretary General’s appeal. Let me once again assure you of my personal close attention and deep concern for Israel’s security.” 2 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner and Wolle; cleared by Davies, Atherton, Handley, Walt Rostow, and in draft by Buffum; and approved by Katzenbach. A note to Rostow from LN, dated January 17 at 7:35 p.m., attached to a draft of the telegram, states that Walsh had called to say that the telegram should go that evening and that Walsh had talked to Katzenbach who had not seen it but agreed that it should go; a handwritten note in the margin indicates that Rostow cleared with the President. The draft telegram and the note are attached to a January 18 memorandum from Wriggins to Rostow warning that the message might have given the Israelis an unintended signal because it was softer than the message Johnson sent to Eshkol after the Israeli raid into Jordan in November. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 10/1/66–6/30/67) 2 Telegram 2421 from Tel Aviv, January 19, reported that the message was delivered on January 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR) 383. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 383. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, January 18,1967, 8:20 p.m. 121337. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. Ambassador Harman accompanied by Mr. Evron and General Geba met with Under Secretary January 18. 2 Ambassador Harman presented request for additional military assistance and US public support of Israel in its confrontation with Syria. Military assistance requested included: 1) 200 modern APCs on grant basis, 2) $2 million tank spares on grant basis, and 3) $14 million credit on “Hawk terms” for follow-on spares for Hawk missiles and M–48 tanks. Ambassador Harman reviewed dangerous situation arising from border incidents and terror attacks and noted that Government of Israel has left time before reacting in order to have pressures brought to bear by other powers in Damascus. He expressed appreciation for US demarche to SARG about which he had been informed. He thought it of major importance now for powers to point finger at Syria as responsible for terror attacks. He hoped that Syria would not be allowed to “fuzz” situation by taking position it could not control Palestinian groups. The Under Secretary noted that there were two sides to this approach. Therefore calling attention to actions and Syrian responsibility could have opposite effect from that desired. Acts have been carried out in such a way that Syrians can reap credit domestically yet deny responsibility in UN. We have urged the UN to take action and are giving strong support to its efforts. Although Ambassador Harman stated that there considerable risk in Israeli inaction in face of terrorism, greater risk could stem from ill advised action at this juncture. Ambassador Harman said he was basically optimistic about situation in Near East since Israel’s borders have been almost quiescent from 1957 to 1965. There were indications of Arab realization that Israel was here to stay and now Arab solidarity seems well along the way to complete breakdown. The fixing of world attention now on the need to keep Israel’s borders quiet could defuse a very dangerous situation. The Under Secretary undertook to look into Israel’s military requests and to continue weighing the desirability of a stronger USG public statement on terrorism. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–8 US–ISR. Secret. Drafted by Davies and approved by Walsh for Katzenbach. 2 A memorandum of the conversation is ibid. 384. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk 384. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 26, 1967. SUBJECT PL–480 Assistance for the UAR Attached is the latest revision of recommendations for a new PL–480 program for the UAR. These consolidate the IRG/NEA decision and the dissenting views of AID, E and H in a range of four alternatives with back-up rationale. Representatives of AID, Agriculture, CIA,DOD, JCS, NSC and USIA participated in the IRG discussion under my chairmanship. Ambassador Kamel continues to press for a decision on his government’s PL–480 request. He is again attempting to put off Cairo by telling them you have been too busy testifying on the Hill to finish up the consultations necessary to get a decision this week on this important and delicate matter. While he agrees that setting a time limit is not helpful, he says his government is growing ever more insistent for an answer. Thus he has reported to Cairo that he hopes to get the decision from you this week. This position remains the same, though more and more emphatic, that a negative decision would be a catastrophe, benefitting only the Soviets and those seeking confrontations and polarization in the Near East area to the detriment of western and moderate interests. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum for the President. Attachment Washington, undated. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson SUBJECT PL–480 Assistance to the UAR Recommendation: That you authorize us to negotiate a new six-month PL–480 agreement with the UAR in accordance with one of the following alternative proposals: Alternative A : A $68 million program containing 250,000 tons of wheat, 500,000 tons of corn and/or milo and some vegetable oil, tobacco and tallow. Dollar repayment over ten years, two year grace period, US Treasury rates. This would assist us in maintaining tolerable relations with the UARG. Alternative B : A $52 million program containing no wheat but all of the other commodities in A above on the same dollar repayment terms. The prospect of future US wheat assistance would be held out to the UAR. This might still be attractive enough to the UAR and indicate our desire to minimize policy differences. Alternative C : A $25 million program containing 250,000–300,000 tons of wheat, with the remainder made up of other commodities. Dollar repayment over fifteen years, no grace period, US Treasury rates. This could be acceptable to the UAR provided the preconditions attached to A and B above are sufficiently watered down. Alternative D : A $16 to $17 million program of 250,000 tons of wheat, just matching the recent Soviet wheat aid. The UAR might accept on credit terms of A above and provided there were no preconditions. However, this further shortening of the leash might well be counterproductive in terms of hopes for improved US–UAR relations. Discussion: Opinion is divided on this difficult and complex foreign relations problem. This is reflected in the spread of alternatives. The issue is where the balance falls—i.e., on the side of consequences to our Near East interests or with the unfavorable repercussions on Congressional attitude toward both food and dollar aid. PL–480 legislation requires that you determine it in the national interest to make concessional food sales to the UAR. Alternatives A and B represent the decision of the Inter-departmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia. Considerations underlying this decision are: A negative or inadequate US response will be taken by Egypt as a challenge. The reactions of Egypt, the most powerful Arab country, can be detrimental to our interests, especially in the current increasingly tense and unstable Near East scene. There are few major situations in the area where we do not bump into Egypt and its influence. Recent American oil discoveries in Egypt have added new dimensions to that country’s economic future and our interests there. Egypt has some influence in less developed areas where we contest with the Communists for position. US–UAR relations have not changed for the better since we ended PL–480 assistance in June. But time has run out on keeping Egypt’s April 1966 request on ice as was indicated by Nasser’s reference to a “starvation war” in a recent major speech. The implications of this long delay have had some beneficial effects in terms of increased Egyptian concern with its food and population problem and of signals from Nasser, through private American and foreign government contacts, of a desire for better relations. Offer of a modest PL–480 program, in terms of UAR needs, will preserve at least the minimum effective US–UAR relationship, maintain some of our influence in Cairo, keep up the hope of those around Nasser who favor good relations, continue to offer an alternative to ever-increasing reliance on the Soviets and provide an umbrella for cooperative Egyptian pound programs in the critical areas of agricultural production and population control. There will be adverse reactions to renewed PL–480 assistance from some leaders friendly to us in the Middle East area and from certain elements in Congress, but, on balance, IRG/NEA decided such criticism would be less disadvantageous to US interests than the probable foreign policy effects of not doing so. A fuller explanation of this rationale is set forth in Enclosures 1 and 2, 2 including the conditions precedent to a new PL–480 agreement. Alternatives C and D reflect concern with domestic reaction. AID, with the endorsement of the Economic Affairs and Congressional Relations Bureaus of State, believes that the disadvantages of further loss of Congressional support for the Administration’s foreign aid programs outweigh the possible advantages to US foreign policy interests of a new PL–480 program with the UAR. AID is skeptical that Egyptians will starve if PL–480 is not available, and that such assistance affects Egypt’s long-run policies toward the US and the Near East area. (By contrast, the IRG and Intelligence and Research Bureau assessments indicate that the UAR’s long-term non-alignment policy is vulnerable to full dependence on the Soviets, that there is some scope for UAR changes of policies to avoid confrontations with the US, and that alleged starvation could be made into an issue.) If a decision is made to go ahead on foreign policy grounds, AID and the Economic Bureau believe the program should be kept sufficiently limited ($25 million) so that Congress can be shown we are still pursuing a “short leash” policy toward the UAR. The Congressional Relations Bureau believes that the opposition in Congress is so strong that no PL–480 program of any size should be initiated at this time. To the catalogue of Egyptian activities that incense some members of Congress may soon have to be added charges, yet unsubstantiated, of UAR use of poison gas in Yemen. A fuller explanation of these positions is set forth in Enclosures 3, 4 and 5. 3 Alternative D would undoubtedly be the easiest to live with from the domestic standpoint, but it would be too small to support any preconditions much less maintain a minimum effective relationship with the UAR. While it would match the 250,000 tons of Soviet wheat actually agreed to, it does not take into account the additional Soviet offer of 400,000 tons which apparently remains open but not yet agreed upon. Dean Rusk 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15–8 UAR. Secret: Exdis. Drafted by George Bennsky of NEA/UAR. A January 27 memorandum from Deputy Executive Secretary Herbert B. Thompson to Katzenbach states that he understood the memorandum had been revised according to instructions from Katzenbach’s office. A February 9 note, unsigned, attached to the action memorandum states: “Walt Rostow called to say that Eugene Black and Robert Anderson had called today to urge that we give another look at the food package for the UAR, despite Congressional problems, because of the urgency of the situation.” An attached April 25 note to CMS from Walsh states: “Both of these seem to have been OBEd.” 2 The enclosures, all unsigned and undated, are not printed. Enclosure 1 is entitled “Rationale for the Decision of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia Re PL–480 for the UAR.” Enclosure 2 is entitled “Comments of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research Re PL–480 for the UAR.” 3 Enclosures 3, 4, and 5 consist of comments by AID, the Bureau of Economic Affairs, and the Bureau of Congressional Relations, respectively. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 385. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 385. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, January 27, 1967, 10:28 a.m. 126458. 1. Dept officer informed Israeli Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron Jan 26 that USG had now completed certain plans related to our earlier decision to accelerate F–104 deliveries and training for Jordan. In next few weeks we would be sending 6 F–104s to Jordan on temporary basis. These would be US Air Force planes, would be maintained by US Air Force personnel and would be withdrawn as Jordan’s own F–104s were delivered. We were taking this step within context our effort achieve maximum psychological impact in Jordan through rapid and visible response to King Hussein’s request for assistance. While in Jordan, aircraft would be used for training Jordanian pilots and ground crews. 2. Dept officer stated that this action would be presented publicly as integral part of our December commitment to accelerate training and delivery F–104s for Jordan. We did not intend to initiate publicity and would not comment on status of aircraft or details our arrangements with GOJ. We wanted GOI to know, however, that USG had taken every precaution to assure that there would be no incidents involving these aircraft; specifically, they would not be flown in border areas. Dept officer stressed that this and other details being very closely held and requests GOI do likewise. 3. Ambassador Harman said this information would be helpful to Prime Minister Eshkol in calming fears which presence these aircraft in Jordan might arouse. At same time, noting GOI’s concern re publicity currently being accorded to airlift in Jordan, Harman urged that arrival of F–104s be kept in low key. In addition, he urged early favorable response to GOI request for delivery of eight rather than presently scheduled four A–4F’s to Israel in December (Katzenbach-Harman Memcon Jan 18); 2 such decision would help counteract potentially adverse reaction in Israel to arrival F–104s in Jordan. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–8, US–JORDAN. Secret; Exdis; College Run. Drafted by Atherton on January 26, cleared by Robert B. Houghton and Hoopes, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman. 2 See Document 383 . 386. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 386. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, February 1, 1967, 1051Z. 4279. 1. Bergus and Parker 2 had 70 minute discussion with UAR Vice President Zakaria Muhieddin evening Jan 31. It can only be described as somber. Muhieddin marshalled his considerable resources of inner strength, charm, intelligence and last, but by no means least, quiet determination. Highlight of discussion was opening statement by Muhieddin who had obviously been very well briefed on previous Bergus conversations with UARG officials (FonMin, Presidential Adviser Al-Khouli, DePriMin Fawzi, et al). Muhieddin neatly and effectively summed up these several hours of conversation in few minutes. 2. He was not optimistic over future of US–UAR relations. He believed UAR had made substantial contribution toward containment Arab-Israel dispute. He thought UAR had demonstrated its objective was to maintain truly independent nonaligned position. UAR had welcomed American economic interests in development its oil resources realizing that for “many years at least”UAR, as other Arab countries, needed American capital, know-how, and accessibility to Western markets. 3. He felt that USG has not brought itself to recognize forces of change at work in Arab world. UAR shared US desire for stability in area and did not “export revolution.” (Comment: Muhieddin and other Egyptian interlocutors have been quite sensitive on this point.) But US seemed to feel it could best protect its interests by aligning itself with Arab leaders such as Hussein and Feisal (with much heavier emphasis on latter) who determined resist change. Feisal was doing his best promote US–UAR confrontation and apparently succeeding in his effort. Both Feisal and Hussein seemed convinced that time had come work openly and otherwise to cripple if not destroy present UAR regime. US, willy-nilly, had let itself become party to these efforts. 4. Primary theater of confrontation was, of course, Yemen. Muhieddin frankly stated that objective Jan 27–28 Najran bombings had been bring physical and moral “pressure” on Feisal to desist from anti-YAR activities. Muhieddin clearly implied such attacks on Saudi Arabia would continue despite UAR’s full awareness that USG might react. 5. He acknowledged that UAR economic situation was not good, that serious mistakes had been made in the past, and that the next couple of years would not be easy. He made it clear that UAR would use its scarce hard currency resources purchase wheat and maintain relationships with “cooperative” creditors. Debt payments to others such as IMF or USG were obviously of lesser priority. He was pessimistic re new UAR-IMF stabilization agreement. 6. On wheat he spoke little and mostly in terms of resentment which US behavior in this field has created in India. He did not play on Nasser theme of US “war of starvation.” He did however seem to believe there was something sinister in USG’s lack of response to UAR requests for assistance. US, in his view, was trying string along Egyptians, perhaps as part of its strategy support activities Feisal and Hussein rather than giving clear-cut answer. 7. Muhieddin believed that US–UAR relations were at their lowest ebb since 1952. Things were even worse than during period 1956–59 crises in Near East. He felt that basic regard of Egyptian people for USG and Americans had survived foregoing without much difficulty. But he thought that it inevitable that animosity toward US would develop throughout Egyptian society and that restoration of friendship would not come quickly or easily. (Comment: This theme used by Fawzi and others.) 8. Throughout conversation Bergus and Parker did their best point out fallacies and contradictions Muhieddin’s position. They drew heavily on Secretary’s conversations with Kamel and Ambassador Battle’s continuing discussions with UARG leadership. They stressed conviction that UARG assumption that USG had changed its basic policies toward Egypt and area was both erroneous and dangerous. While ensuing discussion with Muhieddin was hardly a “dialogue of the deaf” neither do we believe that there was much impact on him. 9. Bergus and Parker left with impression UARG becoming increasingly convinced that broad US–UAR confrontation is unavoidable. There is little basis for believing that Egyptians any longer flinch at such a possibility. In Egypt, as elsewhere in this part of world, there is strong streak of fatalism. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv. 2 Donald C. Bergus visited Cairo January 25–Feburary 1. Information concerning his trip is ibid., ORG 7 NEA. Richard B. Parker was Political Counselor of the Embassy in Cairo. 387. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 387. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, February 2, 1967. JCSM–55–67 SUBJECT Military Equipment for Israel (U) 1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 20 January 1967, subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an Israeli request for military assistance on a grant aid basis. 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider that grant military aid to Israel is justified by the internal or external threat. In addition, neither the need for insuring Israel’s pro-Western orientation nor Israel’s economic condition justify such aid. Provision of grant aid to Israel would not be in consonance with established MAP policy and would be contrary to US interests in the Middle East. For additional information on the adverse effects of a grant aid program, see Appendix A. 2 3. (S) Israel’s present military forces are capable of defending successfully against any individual or collective Arab attack; currently programmed arms shipments to Jordan and expected deliveries to other Arab states do not affect this capability materially. Israel’s superior offensive and defensive capabilities would be improved by acquisition of 200 modern armored personnel carriers, but this improvement is not needed at the present or in the next three to five years to insure Israel’s security. 4. (S) Aside from the basic questions of grant aid and Israel’s security needs, providing armored personnel carriers to Israel in CY 1967 would either delay programmed deployments to Southeast Asia, further degrade our CONUS position, or require diversion from existing commitments to other countries. Moreover, a US agreement to sell additional major items of military equipment to Israel is not advisable since it would: a. Negate the effect of the US warning to Israel in the wake of its recent attack on Jordan. b. Aggravate the current unstable internal situation in Jordan. c. Serve to establish further the United States as the primary supplier of military equipment to Israel. d. Provoke adverse Arab reactions. e. Further contribute to the Arab-Israel arms race with the United States supplying both contestants. 5. (S) M–113A1 APCs are also produced in Italy under the US/Italian coproduction project; however, sale to Israel from this source is considered inadvisable for the reasons given above, since the Italian-produced model is outwardly identical to the US M–113A1. 6. (S) Suitable substitutes for the M–113A1 armored personnel carrier are available in Europe as noted in Appendix B; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States discourage Israel from procuring any additional armored personnel carriers. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Israel 091.3 MAP. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by McNamara. 2 Neither Appendix A nor B is printed. Appendix A, unsigned and undated, is entitled “Advisability of Grant Aid/Sales to Israel.” 388. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to Secretary of State Rusk 388. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 8, 1967. SUBJECT US-Israeli Discussions on Anti-Infiltration Technology The attached telegram 2 summarizes a meeting February 6 between DOD/State officials and the Israeli Military Attache to consider our draft Memorandum of Understanding 3 on US-Israeli cooperation in the field of anti-infiltration technology. From this meeting, as well as from other recent discussions with and public statements by Israeli officials, there has emerged an Israeli position which may be summarized as follows: 1. The application of electronic and other technological developments to the problem of protecting Israel’s borders against Arab clandestine penetration attempts is not a new concept; Israel has been experimenting with this approach for some years. 2. The Government of Israel is prepared to examine and test the latest American devices and techniques to determine whether Israel can improve its own effectiveness in this field. It is disappointed, however, with what we have come up with so far and is not yet prepared to sign the proposed agreement. 3. In any case this approach can never provide a complete answer to Israel’s security problem. To give it undue weight as part of a “static” defense policy would limit Israel’s sovereign right to defend itself by whatever means it deems necessary. Even while Israel continues to practice military restraint it must maintain a credible deterrent posture. This means that it cannot permit the impression to be created that it has renounced the right to choose the manner, place and time in which it will act to assure the security of its borders. Politically, undue emphasis on anti-infiltration technology would create a defensive, ghetto psychology that would encourage increased Arab harassment and foster a defeatist attitude in Israel. Both of these developments would constitute a setback to Israel’s search for a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israel problem. 4. Israel thinks the U.S.G. is overselling the anti-infiltration idea, creating the impression that it can solve Israel’s security problem. Israel was particularly disturbed by the description of anti-infiltration technology as an “alternative” to military reprisal in the President’s reply to Prime Minister Eshkol’s recent message. 4 In the Israeli view this emphasis, which they also see reflected in comments by various U.S.G. officials, suggests a fundamental U.S. failure to understand the true nature of the threat Israel faces. Those on the Arab side who advocate terrorism—the Syrian Government, Palestinian extremists and their ideological mentors—must be shown that this is a self-defeating doctrine before it becomes too deeply rooted to be destroyed. By advocating “passive defense,” the United States is encouraging the aggressor while asking the victim to limit his freedom of action. We have endeavored to make clear to our Israeli contacts that we do not view our cooperative anti-infiltration efforts as a cure-all, but rather as part (one might say the U.S. component) of a more measured and precise response to the type and level of threat Israel now faces than are massive retaliatory raids of which Samu is the most recent example. The latter, in our judgment, exacerbate rather than contain the problem. The raids encourage the terrorists in their aim of goading Israel into intermittent hostilities with its neighbors. Fundamentally, we do not believe that Israel can achieve absolute security, so long as there is no peace between it and its Arab neighbors, or that it can shoot its way to peace. We think military retaliation is both ineffective and reckless and may in time give serious substance to Palestinian terrorism which, despite some tragic successes, is still a shadowy and relatively disorganized force. At the same time we agree that efforts to improve Israel’s anti-infiltration capabilities should be carried out quietly, and we have accordingly endeavored to avoid focussing public attention on them. The fact is that the first official public acknowledgment of U.S.-Israeli cooperation under way in this field came in a press conference by Foreign Minister Eban on January 24. Israeli complaints that we are overselling the anti-infiltration concept seem prompted primarily by privileged references we have made in private forums to our joint efforts in this field, in an attempt to reassure Congressional and other friends of Israel in this country regarding our continuing interest in Israel’s security. We would therefore not rule out some degree of Israeli stalling in getting the anti-infiltration device study into operation, but believe this to be primarily for tactical reasons. The Israeli Government, as you know, has argued that the United States over-reacted to Israel’s November 13 raid against Jordan. Israel has also been clearly concerned that our reaction to that raid would adversely influence our response to Israel’s requests for assistance in the economic and military field. Perhaps to counteract this as well as to maintain world sympathy and concern for Israel, Israeli spokesmen have made a concerted effort of late to dramatize the current Arab terrorist threat to Israeli security. The present Israeli tendency to downplay the importance of anti-infiltration technology, as an answer to terrorism, would appear to be a part of that effort. Despite some lack of enthusiasm in Israeli military circles, we do not interpret this as an indication of official Israeli indifference to our anti-infiltration proposals and believe we should continue to push those proposals quietly but firmly. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 ISR. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Atherton. 2 The attached telegram is a copy of telegram 132912 to Tel Aviv, February 7. Another copy is ibid., DEF 1 ISR. 3 Not found. 4 See Document 382 . 389. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 389. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 13, 1967. SUBJECT Your Talk with Feinberg—1:00 p.m. Tuesday, 14 February 2 In preparation for your talk with Abe Feinberg, you ought to know where we stand on this year’s Israeli aid requests. State, Defense and AID are putting them all together, and Secretary Rusk will have one package of recommendations for you in the next two weeks. My preliminary feeling is that aid for them will be tough this year and that you may want to use your talk with Feinberg to lay the groundwork for a slim response. We need not feel defensive about this since our aid in FY 1966 was the highest single year ever by 25% because of the plane sale (see attached chart). 3 The Israelis argue that they need continued help over the next 2–3 years while they work their way through the austere economic measures necessary to make them more competitive in European markets and help close their trade gap. They point to their especially high debt repayments and their heavy defense burden. But given their substantial foreign exchange reserves, some of their points are exaggerated by normal aid standards. These austerity measures have thrown Israel into a recession, which we expect to be short-lived. The government allowed Israel’s growth rate to slip to 7% in 1965 (previously over 10%) but was shocked when it slumped to 1–2% in 1966. This is probably a main reason for their aid requests. They’ve made six separate requests, totaling at least $75 million: 1. Grant military aid—$9.4 million. They’ve asked for 200 armed personnel carriers and $2 million in spares for tanks we’ve already sold. They are clearly trying to match our December Jordan package. Since their raid caused that package, no one here wants to give in on this. Besides, we’ve never given grant military aid to Israel, and no one feels we should break that precedent, especially so soon after the Israeli raid. JCS sees no serious military requirement for the APCs. However, Eshkol considers the APCs important, and we’ll undoubtedly end up considering a credit sale, though State and Defense oppose. 2. Credits of $14 million to buy maintenance items for Hawk missiles and tanks. They want the same terms we gave on the 1962 Hawk sale (10% down, 10 years, 3.5%). Defense doesn’t believe we should finance maintenance and, in any case, couldn’t come close to 1962 terms today. However, if you feel it’s essential to come up with some military help, there might be a little give here with harder terms. 3. Development loans of $20 million. They got only $10 million last year (plus $10 million Ex-Im), and we’ve already given them that $6 million left over from FY 1963. With today’s even tighter aid criteria it will be tough to justify any AID lending at all, though Ex-Im loans are still possible. Even the Israelis know this request is unrealistic. 4. PL 480—$32 million (same as last year). Congress has been increasingly critical of highly concessional sales to Israel where per capita GNP is already higher than in several European countries. However, we could probably come up with $23 million on harder terms, even without wheat. 5. Deliver 8 aircraft next December instead of the 4 now scheduled. We all feel this would be desirable but, since these are new production items needed in VietNam, we’ll want to hear Secretary McNamara’s final view. 6. An exception to AID policy to let Israel bid on AID-financed fertilizer purchases for Korea and VietNam. AID will probably come around on this since we can pay half in dollars and half in excess Israeli pounds. In addition, we have just agreed to increase their cotton textile quota by 35%. In the background is desalting. Ambassador Bunker’s report will be ready shortly. His economic study 4 appears to show that for either a nuclear or an oil-fueled plant an outright grant of some $50 million would be required to produce water at realistic cost. He found Eshkol more relaxed on the timetable than he had expected. It doesn’t look as if we’ll be spending much money on this in FY 1967, but if we ever decide to go ahead, it will cost us quite a bit. Of course, you will want to hear from Bunker before you say anything to Feinberg that could be read as a commitment. What this adds up to is that—with last year’s high aid level behind and desalting possibly still ahead of us—we ought to be able to make a low year stick this year. Therefore, I’d propose leveling with Abe, explaining your problems and asking his help in making them clear to others. If you have a moment, it would be worth your time to skim the attached description of the overall US-Israeli balance sheet. 5 It was done for our panel of outside consultants on Middle Eastern affairs who met here over the weekend. It’s a neat and straightforward statement of what we’ve done for Israel and how our relationship has been pretty much a one-way street. You might want to get this balance across to Abe as a means of letting him know there are limits. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. 2 The President met with Feinberg from 1:20 to 1:47 p.m. on February 14. Feinberg had requested an appointment with the President before departing for Israel on February 18. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) A February 13 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow states that he had recommended that the President see Feinberg because circumstances might force substantial reductions in the previous year’s levels of economic and military aid and the President himself should lay the groundwork for this. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI) 3 The chart is not attached. 4 Bunker enclosed a February 15 memorandum on “Israeli Desalting Project: Economic and Engineering Aspects” with a February 17 letter to Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II) 5 The attachment, unsigned and undated, entitled “U.S.-Israel Relations,” is not printed. 390. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 390. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 14, 1967. SUBJECT Lunch Discussion of UAR Secretary Katzenbach would like to discuss at lunch 2 the UAR’s April 1966 request for a new PL 480 agreement. This is the toughest—but the most important—decision facing us in the Middle East today. Many of us—and Nasser’s vice president as well—feel we’re rapidly sliding into a showdown. Nasser more and more sees us behind all his troubles in the Middle East. To us, the UAR looks increasingly incompatible in interests, outlook and temperament. Although Egypt needs the food, the real question is whether we try to maintain a relationship with Nasser. Last summer, we extended $70 million in CCC credit, but that’s run out. The USSR tided Nasser over with 250,000 tons of grain—about five weeks’ imports—and appears to have offered to help round up another 400,000. Even that will leave the UAR at least 600,000 tons short of its FY 1967 grain needs. But entirely apart from food needs, Nasser regards our decision as the main indication of whether or not we’re out to get him. We have little else going for us, since our economic aid has shrunk to a little technical assistance and school feeding. One key question is whether abandoning the field would result in unchallenged Soviet influence or whether Nasser’s own interest in maintaining his independence would bring him back to the West. Many of our friends—some Israelis, British and Saudis—have urged us to stand aside and let the full weight of Nasser’s economic problems hem him in. His foreign exchange is at rock-bottom, and he has even had to default his latest repayment to the IMF. Yet it was interesting to hear that Israeli Teddy Kollek during his last trip here told Averell Harriman that we should “keep our relations with Nasser open and not leave the field to the Soviets.” He felt we had given Nasser too much in the past but hoped we wouldn’t go to the other extreme now. Since our effort over the past 5 years to get closer to Nasser has gained us little positive, it’s tempting to try the tougher line. But we’ve received enough quiet signals from Nasser through Bob Anderson and other private Americans to make us wonder whether he isn’t already as close to the brink of complete dependence on Moscow as he can afford. Most recently Nasser’s top military man has invited a group of top-level US business executives to visit the UAR this Easter. If he is trying to find a western anchor again, it’s hard to cut him adrift completely. Why should we care? We’re all reluctant to picture the consequences of a break with Nasser. Arguing that line rubs us all the wrong way because no one likes the idea of paying off a bully. Nevertheless, there are few major situations affecting our interests in the Near East, where we don’t bump in to Egyptian influence. Nasser could cut off important overflight rights—as he has just done on our airlift to Jordan. 3 He could turn the Arab boycott into an even more effective restraint on American trade. He can make plenty of trouble for friendly regimes—and for us—in Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Lebanon. He could cause trouble for our shipping in the Suez Canal, bring out the demonstrators against Wheelus Base, stir up more trouble for Israel via the Palestine Liberation Organization or even trigger the nationalization or harassment of our oil companies. More positively, Nasser is still the most powerful figure in the Middle East. At least out of respect for Israel’s power, he has restrained wilder Arabs who have pushed for a disastrous Arab-Israeli showdown. Despite its mounting economic problems, the UAR has the trained manpower and the will to modernize that will make it the most advanced nation in the area. Two American companies have brought in promising oil finds, and the chances of the UAR becoming a substantial oil exporter look good. It’s hard to argue that we should burn all our bridges with the capital of the Arab world. Secretary Katzenbach has been considering four alternatives: 1. A $68 million agreement through June including 250,000 tons of wheat, 500,000 tons of corn and/or milo and some vegetable oil, tobacco and tallow. Dollar repayment over 10 years, 2 year grace, US Treasury rates. 2. A $52 million deal with all the above except wheat. Same terms. 3. A $25 million program with 250–300,000 tons of wheat and the remainder in other commodities. Dollar repayment over 15 years, no grace, Treasury rates. 4. A $17 million program of 250,000 tons of wheat, just matching the recent Soviet deal. Dollar repayment over 10 years. This spread of alternatives reflects the division of opinion. The first two are the choices posed by those concerned chiefly with the consequence for our Near East interests. The last two reflect concern with domestic reaction. AID and Doug MacArthur have predicted strong reaction on the Hill. We would also expect strong reaction from our friends in the area. But while I understand all the pressures for letting this decision ride, I have watched our relations with Nasser closely since 1961 and am reluctant to see us close this door. Our experience in Indonesia is strong argument for buying a little insurance against a better day. This program is not all political. The UAR is a natural potential showplace to demonstrate what can be done in agricultural production and population control. Its problems are as acute as anywhere, and yet it has the homogeneous population, compact area and happy combination of water, soil and climate to get relatively quick results. The government is putting more into agricultural development, and so far in FY 1967, it has bought some 700,000 tons of grain here on CCC credit. Time is running out, Ambassador Kamel has seen Secretary Rusk twice, and the Secretary has promised to get him an answer. This need not influence our decision, but in all fairness we ought to answer soon and not allow the decision to drift any longer. Our purpose at lunch is to get a sense of your priorities. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. 2 The President had lunch at 2 p.m. on February 14 with McNamara, Katzenbach, Rostow, White House Press Secretary George Christian, and Special Assistant to the President Joseph Califano. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. 3 The UAR Foreign Office informed the Embassy on February 12 that the UAR Government had decided to cancel its previous permission for U.S. aircraft to overfly the UAR carrying arms for Jordan. (Telegram 4542 from Cairo, February 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 17–1 US) 391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, February 23, 1967, 6:54 p.m. 142711. From Secretary to Ambassador Barbour. Your A–478 2 describing conversations with two Israeli contacts suggests Israel could be much closer to nuclear weapons capability than we had supposed. We are requesting urgent assessment these and other recent reports by Washington intelligence community. While we will reserve judgment pending outcome that assessment, potential implication these reports makes it even more pressing to obtain response from Eshkol on our request for visit to Dimona. You will recall that on January 16 he promised invitation would be forthcoming “within a few weeks.” 3 You should inform Prime Minister that highest levels of USG are aware you requested GOI agreement to visit as long ago as November and are frankly disturbed at lack of GOI response. We hope Prime Minister will be able set date for visit in very near future. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Davies, Atherton, Handley, and Wriggins, and in substance by Trevithick and Rochlin; and approved and initialed by Rusk. 2 Airgram A–478 from Tel Aviv, February 7, is filed as an attachment to a February 22 memorandum from Handley to Rusk, which summarized reports suggesting that Israel’s nuclear program might be moving at a faster pace than previously indicated. (Ibid.) A February 17 memorandum from Davies to Bunker, outlining NEA views on the Israeli desalting project, states, “Some recent intelligence reports suggest that Israel may be constructing a chemical separation facility and proceeding so far in the production of bomb components that assembly of a nuclear weapon could be completed in 6–8 weeks.” It states, however, that pending a fuller assessment, NEA was inclined to view these reports with reservations. (Ibid., E 11–3 ISR) In a March 9 letter to Davies, Barbour commented, “I was pleased to see the NEA paper’s cautious appraisal of recent alarming reports on Israel’s nuclear activities and intentions. Such caution is well placed. Moreover, my own impressions from such information as is available to us is that Dimona is not running at full blast.” (Ibid.) 3 Barbour reported this conversation in telegram 2371 from Tel Aviv, January 16. (Ibid.) 392. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 392. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, February 24, 1967, 0932Z. 4793. 1. In farewell call Feb 23 on Anwar Sadat he remarked that US policy in Middle East and particularly toward UAR even worse than that of John Foster Dulles. Dulles had said flatly UAR broke and US had no intention of providing aid. We dangled hope of aid and never gave answer while at the same time he suspected we engaged in unfortunate behind scenes actions with enemies of UAR as well as arming them. Our delay in response brought forth speech by President last night 2 with its many uncomplimentary references to US. 2. I very earnestly urged Sadat accept fact US had no basic goal in area other than peace and security and no chosen instrument. Reviewed many factors involved in world food problem. Pointed out that at various times we were accused being more partial one Arab than another but accusations often reflected inter-Arab differences. Arms sales to Jordan concerning which he had expressed alarm had initially stemmed from UAC levying of requirements on Jordan. What had happened is that events had changed relationships between Arabs and that what appeared satisfactory to UAR in past now suggested plotting by US which totally untrue. 3. Comment : Sadat highly emotional in charges against US altho very warm and cordial to me personally. Like many others he appears convinced indecision US on wheat reflects positive opposition UAR. We are getting this line from many quarters at present. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 UAR-US. Confidential. 2 Battle reported in telegram 4780, February 23, that in a February 22 speech, Nasser made extensive attacks on the United States for creating, supporting, arming, and protecting Israel, supporting Arab “reactionaries,” applying economic and psychological pressure against the UAR, and refusing to provide arms aid to Egypt in the 1950s. (Ibid., POL 15–1 UAR) 393. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 393. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, March 4, 1967, 1533Z. 5030. 1. I made farewell call which lasted one hour and ten minutes on President Nasser March 4. After exchange pleasantries during which he expressed regret my departure, I said I wished reflect on some of my final conclusions and impressions as I left this country where I had made many friends and in which I had had a very rewarding tour of duty. 2. I said I was more convinced than when I came of the rightness of US goals in the area. Seeking peace and stability as we do, we must attempt maintain as friendly relations as possible with as many countries as possible. This not an easy course. In large measure changes in relations Arab countries to each other frequently resulted in suspicions re US motives and aims. For example, I mentioned sales arms Jordan stemming from UAC assessment defense needs that country, an arrangement which Egyptians now appeared in some strange way view with suspicion. On Yemen, Saudis suspected we more tolerant Egyptian attitudes than of their own and Egyptians considered we supported Saudis. In truth we have no material interest in Yemen and wish only see peaceful resolution that problem, which is danger to relations between our friends the Saudis and our friends the Egyptians. In accordance his instructions, Hassan Sabry el Khouly and others his government have kept me fully informed re UAR efforts at various times resolve situation. I still hoped way could be found bring about peaceful resolution this difficult area problem. At various times Egyptians had indicated to me that if US wanted solution Yemen problem, we should play more active role that direction. I wanted to ask him today whether on my return Washington to assume broader responsibilities for area relations I should urge my government offer join in one of several offers mediate or take initiative on our own in that direction. 3. President then launched into lengthy discussion Yemen, saying he had gone to Jidda to conclude agreement Feisal against advice his colleagues and had entered agreement “on my own responsibility”. As he landed for Jidda meetings, he felt nervous and uncertain, but felt he must make effort resolve conflict. Since that time many actions had entered into situation, including Islamic Pact, Aden problem and other difficulties. He could not at present be hopeful solution. Yemen operation not now costly to UAR although has been in past. UAR can remain indefinitely and will do so if necessary. He was always interested offers solution but not hopeful in view Feisal’s arrangements Jordan and in view their determination to view his earlier efforts as sign weakness, which Jidda agreement had not in fact reflected. 4. I said I took it from his remarks that he would not oppose any efforts by US if we thought we could be helpful but he did not appear hold out much hope chance success any US efforts. He replied this was his attitude although he appeared pause and be somewhat reflective in his response. 5. Nasser then launched into thirty minute tirade of most emotional character yet displayed in my meetings with him. He said UAR proud, independent country with its own dignity. He had decided in thinking over my call on him to be very frank and he hoped I would not take offense at anything he said, but he must deal lucidly and frankly with issues. UAR would not respond US pressure. It did not want American wheat. During time we had provided wheat he had gone to bed each night disturbed that UAR dependent on US for food and had resented each item in American or world press reminding UAR that five out of each eight loaves of its bread were provided by US. UAR would not accept interference by other countries. It was not influenced by Russia and would not be. Whether he remained or not, attitudes UAR re its own independence would be consistent and those lieutenants he trained would take same position as he took. UAR had no designs other countries contrary our impression and our press but wanted, for example, Aden to be ruled by revolutionary forces and not British stooges. Re Israel, his views are well known. He hoped Arabs could return. 6. He then switched to IMF, asking why he should pay IMF 104 million dollar debt when it would not give him seventy million dollars to which he felt entitled. In meeting in that room a few days ago, when some of his colleagues voiced concern re UAR relations IMF, he had stated UAR must stand on own feet and if IMF and all Western Interests refused do business with UAR, UAR would still survive and make progress. UAR would have been better off if it had not in developing its economic plans based those plans upon continued supply wheat which had distorted development efforts by permitting broader program than justified. If any country attempted hurt UAR, UAR would respond and no doubt could do damage US and other countries. 7. I replied by asking his permission be as frank with him as he had been with me, saying I would not under any circumstances wish offend him in my last meeting but I must answer as frankly as he had on statements he had made. 8. The US had entered into food arrangement, which admittedly had become issue of its own between us, in hope providing help which would accelerate development and be of help to Egyptian people. Based on his speeches, it appeared he had given up hope continuing these arrangements before I had and before Executive Branch had completed deliberations on matter. During recent days, for example, consultations had been under way with Congressional leaders, that consultation had not been helped by his own statements and those of Heikal with respect our relations and motives. (I mentioned specifically latest Heikal article.) 9. He interrupted, saying he had given up hope of wheat several months ago and reminded me that he had never before brought up wheat in conversation with me and that I had always raised matter first. He could not approve efforts his Ambassador Washington to obtain wheat in manner that appeared be begging on knees. 10. I went on to say US Government and I personally respected need for UAR be independent, dignified country and we wanted see it develop viable economy and we still hoped for success in those goals and in his achievements and aims for his people. 11. He referred to fact that he owned several newspapers in Beirut and that Saudis and Jordanians also had newspaper spokesman in area. Indicated he had been restrained in his response many of their attacks on UAR but could only accept so much and had had to respond to them. 12. I said that I wished remind him as I had in past that he was world figure and that each utterance coming from him was read and interpreted throughout world and that his remarks more important than newspaper stories one kind or another. While this great compliment to his influence in world, it was also responsibility to bear as I well recognized. I said there was no doubt ability many countries hurt each other, including ourselves, but we must find way to build lasting friendship which I was convinced both sides really wanted. I hoped he could find satisfactory relationships IMF and with West. He replied, “If we cannot, we will go on with other countries.” 13. In closing I repeated that US policy in area had not changed and that we sought continued friendship UAR and that while I had not succeeded in removing suspicions and doubts and problems from agenda, I had every intention in new assignment continue my efforts and I hoped he would view future as long time indeed in which we would try overcome various problems between US in relations often marked by such ups and downs. 14. Nasser was more emotional than I have ever seen him and at moments developed glaze over eyes typical of that we have seen when he makes speeches. He was at all times extremely cordial to me, very friendly and warm and at various moments of tirade against US said not to take it personally. In view his attitudes re US mediation Yemen, I cannot be hopeful. Suggest we wait few days, however, to see whether idea picked up by lower level officials. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Amman. 394. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 394. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, March 6, 1967, 1321Z. CAP 67111. Fresh from his stop in Cairo, Hal Saunders of my staff who is quietly touring the Middle East 2 has reported the following. 1. Nasser should be told soon one way or the other about wheat. It has come to symbolize our future intent toward him and his regime. 2. Help on the IMF negotiations is nearly as important. Officials argue they’ve cut expenditures, have made real economic achievements. Their self help performance is “relatively positive.” 3. No one in Cairo believes the Soviets and Nasser are working hand in glove. There is parallelism of policy, but Cairo wants to avoid Soviet control. 4. Because the UAR is the chief power in the Middle East, and modernizing rapidly, Saunders believes we should build some kind of new relationship. 5. He doubts this can be done unless you and Nasser meet somewhere to define your areas of common interest and disagreement. He acknowledges the risks, but hopes we will consider this carefully, since Cairo persists in seeing everything we do in the area as directed against him—those not actively with him must be against him. (WWR Comment: Perhaps a letter from you could do the job.) 6. Hal commends a cautious but revitalized policy to rebuild our position in Cairo, avoiding equally the over-enthusiasm of the early 1960’s and the distrust of today. Comment We’ve shown this to Nick Katzenbach only. He plans to pursue wheat for the UAR a bit further on the Hill before making a recommendation to you. Probably a small amount as a gift, about matching the Soviet Union’s 250,000 ton gift (which Ellender, among others, seems to prefer over a credit sale!). We have some doubts on the timing, because it may be seen both in Egypt and Arabia as a reward for raising hell. But this will be looked into before the recommendation comes to you. Hal will be back in ten days, when we can go into the complex of Middle East issues with a fresh look. Fm Harold Saunders 8693 To the White House eyes only for Walt Rostow and Howard Wriggins Following impressions my intensive talks in Cairo with Foreign Minister, Treasury and Economy Ministers and others bear on your wheat decision. First. We ought to say something to Egyptians about wheat soon one way or the other. Dragging out line that we have food request “under consideration” reaps all disadvantages of negative answer without gaining advantages of keeping door open. Months of ambiguity plus other events Mid East have convinced Egyptians we have cast our lot with other side and for that reason have decided against wheat aid. They say bitterly that even Dulles gave them an answer. Second. Wheat decision unfortunately more than ever symbol our future intent because it involves both development and human requirements. We would be a lot better off if we could get off this wicket but for moment it looks as if wheat alone can break stalemate. I think we might get away with dollar sale as long as grace period long enough to cover next three years which Egyptians see as period of real economic pinch. After that, they not euphoric but do seem have reason hope oil and other slowly increasing exports plus improved import substitution will begin pay off. Third. To economic insiders, help in new IMF negotiations almost as important as food decision. Main point made to me by Nazi Deif and Hamed El Sayeh whom you met last fall is that they have succeeded in bringing expenditures under control in six months since IMF talks began. Therefore new situation exists here and Gunter Mission must come end March with some give its position. Fourth. Despite political symbolism both these issues and contrary conception created by usual intra-USG justification our aid program in UAR. This far from purely political program designed bribe Nasser keep out of our UAR. Washington, especially the press and Congress, badly needs understand that UAR not just proverbial rathole down which we pour our aid. All Washington fully aware foreign exchange bind. Point not widely appreciated is degree to which this a place of real achievement and sound planning. I now understand why World Bank relatively optimistic despite gaps in execution. I well know weakness this argument in offsetting Nasser’s polemics, but it important President know that self-help case relatively positive. Fifth. I found no one Cairo willing assert that Nasser and Soviets working hand in glove. Soviet-like political model adopted for pragmatic reasons since Western style democracy not suitable Nasser’s style. Hard evidence any firm Moscow-Cairo understanding lacking. Soviet influence and parallelism interests substantial. But Egyptian desire avoid Soviet control is unanimous impression. Sixth. Because Egyptians are making honest development effort and do not look like Communist tools, believe it still possible build some kind US–UAR relationship if we consider it worthwhile. After seeing energy with which Egypt modernizing, I do not see how we can do otherwise, though I recognize domestic pressures may tip judgment other way. Common argument for relationship is that Nasser can cause us so much trouble elsewhere. This true but in my view misses simpler main point that Egypt clearly chief power modern Middle East. Seventh. If we do want to sustain long-term US position Cairo, only sound foundation I can see is eventual meeting between Nasser and President. Because our contradictory interests in Near East will always feed Egyptian suspicion we working against them, only way establish accurate picture limits our objectives is for two Presidents reach understanding each other’s purposes and agree on inevitable areas disagreement. I could see this working out much as President’s understanding with Ayub. I realize hard thought needed weigh risks for President against disadvantages, but I am convinced as never before that wide gulf misunderstanding unlikely be bridged any other way. Ambassador Battle essentially agrees, though he wisely cautious we should not try this unless we willing sustain followup. My main reason for arguing this case is that our biggest problem in Cairo today is that no amount of logic sufficient persuade Egyptians that everything we do in Near East not directed at them. It amazing what shreds of evidence they have woven together to prove this to themselves. These not just debating points. Every official I talked to from Foreign Minister on down obviously sincerely believes this. Main thread this fabric of illogic seems be philosophy those not helping them must be against them. Unfortunately, there just enough truth their evidence to make it difficult refute. For instance, editorial and Congressional statements that get most play made by people who have in fact chosen sides here. Even more damaging, McNamara statement that tensions in Middle East “sparked by UAR” considered coup de grace in argument that we view Cairo as the enemy. Therefore, if we wish stop drifting this part of world one major pillar revitalized policy must be some effort rebuild in Cairo. Last five years have taught us not go too far too fast or expect too much. Fortunately international tools at hand in IMF and World Bank study and not impossible try moving gradually to position we shooting for in 1961–62. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret; Eyes Only. The message is dated March 4; it was received at the LBJ Ranch at 10:21 a.m. on March 6. A handwritten “L” on the telegram indicates that it was seen by the President. 2 Saunders visited the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. He reported his conclusions in a May 16 memorandum to Rostow, which Rostow forwarded to the President on May 17. (Ibid., Name File, Saunders Memos) 395. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 395. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 15, 1967. SUBJECT Israeli Assistance and Your Talk with Abe Feinberg tomorrow, Thursday at 12:30 1. Your talk with Abe coincides with the arrival here of State-DOD recommended response to recent Israeli assistance requests. 2 2. Abe has reported that exaggerated Israeli publicity on our shipments to Jordan, pressures from Syria, and economic recession resulting from overenthusiastic anti-inflationary measures have left the Israeli Government nervous and discouraged. 3. You may wish to consider the following factors in assessing what we ought to do for them this year: (a) Their December raid on Samu precipitated our emergency military assistance to Jordan, costing us about $9 million this FY for defensive military equipment. The Joint Chiefs hold this has not changed the military balance in the area. In sum, the Israelis do not have much of a claim on us for the steps we took to help sustain Hussein after their raid nearly brought him down. However, Nick and Arthur told the Jewish community leaders we would take our increased commitment to Jordan into account “in giving sympathetic consideration to Israeli requests for assistance.” While we made no commitment to match exactly for Israel what their action at Samu forced us to in Jordan, Arthur, under continuing pressure in New York, feels strongly we should do nearly that. (b) Israel has not yet given us permission to visit the nuclear plant at Dimona. Our last visit was in April, although we had an informal understanding that visits would be allowed every six months. (c) They have not yet replied to your letter of May 21, 1965 to Eshkol urging acceptance of IAEA safeguards. (d) We have already increased our textile import quota by some 60%, a concession worth $2.5 million in Israeli foreign exchange earnings. 4. State and DOD have recommended the restricted package (items (c) to (f), below). Items (a) and (b) are fall-backs suggested by State. Nick recommends that no package be agreed until firm arrangements have been made for the next inspection of Dimona. (a) Sell 100 Armoured Personnel Carriers on commercial credit. (The Israelis asked for grant assistance for 200 APC’s.DOD recommends against supplying any APC’s now, but State believes half their request, on a sales basis, would be tolerable, and could be justified as improving their border patrol capability. Value roughly $3.7 million.) (b) Provide standard DOD credit for Hawk and Patton tank spares. (DOD opposes, since we do not usually provide credit for spares, but an exception in this case is recommended as an inconspicuous way to help on the military side. Value roughly $14 million.) (c) “Fifth echelon” maintenance facilities for the Hawk missile system. (State and DOD recommend this.) (d) Encourage an Ex-Im loan for a fertilizer plant. (The Israelis asked for a $20-million development loan, but they are too well-off to qualify for a DL.) (e) Permission to bid on potash and phosphate fertilizer sales to South Korea and Vietnam. (AID reluctantly approves.) (f) PL 480—$19 million of a commodity mix, without wheat, payment 75% in dollars, 25% local currency. (They asked for $35 million. State and Agriculture recommend.) 5. An important question is how we communicate this package, if it meets with your approval. Ideally, it would be best to tell Feinberg none of these details, but reserve them for official discussions with Ambassador Harman. If possible, it would be best simply to hear him out sympathetically, indicate that our careful studies are nearing conclusion, and remind him of some of the steps Israel has not taken to be helpful to us. But if you feel it necessary to tell him something, you could indicate that some APC’s will be available on terms to be discussed with the Israeli Government, and that the matter of spares will also be discussed. State’s documents are attached, 3 but they are so complicated that we have not referred to them in this memo. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret. Johnson’s handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Put on my desk & get chart on our Israel aid by years. L.” 2 A March 8 memorandum from Rostow to the President states that Feinberg came in that day after his return from Israel to report “a strong feeling in Israel that we are shifting our policy away from them.” Feinberg urged U.S. responsiveness on the Israeli requests, especially by granting or allowing the Israelis to purchase 200 armored personnel carriers and by providing credit for Hawk missile and Patton tank spare parts. (Ibid.) 3 Two March 15 memoranda from Katzenbach to the President are filed with Rostow’s memorandum. One set forth recommendations with Department of Defense and AID concurrence. The other suggested a fallback position if the President wished to be more responsive to Israel’s requests. It also stated that the Israeli Government had not responded to the latest request for a Dimona inspection, that Eshkol had not replied to Johnson’s letter of May 21, 1965 ( Document 218 ), urging Israeli acceptance of IAEA safeguards, and that Israeli officials had not been forthcoming about their missile development program. It recommended no response to Israel’s current aid requests at least until arrangements had been made for the next Dimona inspection. 396. Memorandum From the Country Director for the United Arab Republic (Bergus) to Lucius D. Battle 396. Memorandum From the Country Director for the United Arab Republic (Bergus) to Lucius D. Battle 1 Washington, March 16, 1967. SUBJECT The CIA in US–UAR Relations Your farewell talk with Nasser demonstrates that once again CIA operations [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] have created a major problem in US–UAR relations. 2 The response of CIA here to Nasser’s allegations 3 [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] was unsatisfactory. CIA appears to hope that these incidents can be swept under the rug. This should not be allowed to happen. At the same time I think that any approaches made by the Department to CIA on this subject should place the matters raised by Nasser with you in their proper perspective. These particular incidents simply reinforce some basic suppositions which I believe that many of us have felt for a long time. I would hope that our discussions with CIA would therefore concentrate primarily on the basics to the end that a more acceptable method [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] can be found. These observations are submitted to you in line with this hope. In the Near East CIA is happiest and most productive in those situations where it has been welcomed by the local authorities and used by them as an adjunct to its own internal security services . [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] These close relations naturally create an instinctive warm glow between the CIA and these particular countries. While this in itself is not reprehensible, I do believe that it colors the attitudes of the CIA and contributes to a readiness there to divide the Near East into “the good guys” and “the bad guys”. I think that this factor should be constantly borne in mind both by the CIA leadership and our own policymakers on the seventh floor and in the White House. At issue is the question as to whether the US can in fact accept the proposition that some at least of the Near East states are fully sovereign, are jealous of their sovereignty and are legitimately entitled to that jealousy. There should also be recognition that CIA in the 50’s had and then lost [ 1 line of source text not declassified ]. That there should be feelings of nostalgia for this among the CIA leadership is probably also natural but such feelings should not be allowed to color judgments. CIA, at least in the Near East, has yet to prove that it can operate usefully and effectively in a sophisticated and/or hostile environment . Since the loss of its [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] the CIA has been able to produce very little by way of useful intelligence [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] UAR. This little has been produced at considerable risk to our relations and presumably considerable cost to the taxpayer. At the same time intelligence targets in the UAR are probably increasing in number. We may have come to the point where the experts should make a basic re-examination of targets in the UAR and methods of achieving them. Hide-bound attitudes as to methods plus the nostalgic hostility towards the Nasser regime mentioned above can only give us more trouble in Egypt. [ 5–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] The only safe assumption is that the UAR is probably aware of most, if not all, of our intelligence operations in Egypt or with Egyptians in other countries. From this assumption flow two rather important considerations: 1) We are constantly at risk that the UAR will blow an operation at a time and in circumstances of its own choosing, 2) That Egyptian informants are being coached to tell us what the UAR wants us to hear. This must be kept in mind in evaluating the product of such informants. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bergus. Battle left Cairo on March 5 and assumed the duties of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on April 5. 2 Battle reported in telegram 5031 from Cairo, March 4, that during his March 4 conversation with Nasser (see Document 393 ), Nasser referred to their December 10 conversation (see footnote 3, Document 341 ), told Battle that the UAR Government had information about two alleged former CIA agents, and charged that a third country’s contacts with the Egyptian army were under U.S. direction. Battle stated that he was unaware of any information concerning the charges and that he wanted to review them and deal harshly with any such actions, which were clearly contrary to U.S. policy. (Department of State, INR Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Cairo) 3 At a March 16 meeting among Davies, Bergus, Gardner, and a CIA representative, the CIA representative stated that there had been no thought of using the alleged agents to work against Nasser, that the charge that a third country’s contacts with the Egyptian army were under U.S. direction was a lie, and that “it was ridiculous to think that the Agency had any thought of trying to overthrow Nasser.” (Ibid., NEA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1967–1969) 397. Memorandum for the Record 397. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, March 17, 1967. In conversation with Mr. Abe Feinberg yesterday 2 the President indicated: 1. That before we moved on the Israel package, we would like a date set for a visit to Dimona. 2. Without making it explicitly contingent, he referred to the failure of Eshkol to respond to the President’s letter of March May 21, 1965 recommending accepting IAEA safeguards. 3. He indicated some of the headings of a possible Israeli package, pointing out that unresolved disagreements existed within the government. 4. He said he would get to it after Guam. 3 5. He instructed me to assure that State, Defense, and AID came closer together on an agreed package. Mr. Feinberg said that he had strongly made the case that Israel could not expect U.S. grants in the military field; that the APC’s were extremely important to give a sense of security in the face of continuing Syrian raids and incidents; he pressed hard for feed grains rather than wheat in the PL 480 program. WR 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential. Prepared by Rostow. Copies were sent to the State Department and to Wriggins. 2 The President met with Feinberg and Rostow from 1:20 to 1:46 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) 3 President Johnson met with South Vietnamese officials on Guam March 20–21. 398. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 398. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, March 19, 1967, 4:51 p.m. 158247. Ref: Amman’s 2566 and 2567. 2 1. While we believe GOJ fear of Israeli retaliatory raid at this juncture is exaggerated, Dept in complete accord Embassy Amman’s analysis likely consequences in Jordan should raid take place. In circumstances, Ambassador should, at level he considers appropriate, inform GOI soonest of GOJ’s concern and efforts GOJ making prevent infiltration drawing on substance reftels. Ambassador should leave GOI in no doubt as to Dept’s strong disapprobation retaliatory raid against Jordan which we firmly believe could have catastrophic consequences for Jordanian regime. GOI should also be made aware of Department’s conviction that GOJ doing everything within its capabilities to stop infiltration. 3 2. Embassy Amman’s offer to pass to GOJ any appropriate info relevant to border situation should be made to GOI. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Robert B. Houghton and cleared by Davies and Sterner. Also sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo,CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Damascus, and Jerusalem. 2 Telegram 2566 from Amman, March 19, commented on a telegram from the Defense Attache Office in Tel Aviv (not found) transmitting a message from Rabin to Khammash. The telegram expressed concern about the possibility of another Israeli attack on Jordan and recommended warning the Israelis against the possible “catastrophic consequences” of such an attack. Noting that the Jordanians had rejected any direct contact with Israel in the wake of the Samu raid, it recommended that if the Israelis had information for the Jordanians, they should forward it to the Embassy in Amman, which would pass it to the appropriate authorities. (Ibid.) Telegram 2567 from Amman, March 19, reported that Khammash confirmed that it was still Jordan’s policy to take all possible action to prevent infiltration into Israel. (Ibid.) 3 Barbour reported in telegrams 2985 and 2990 from Tel Aviv, both March 20, that the Embassy had conveyed the Department’s position to the Israeli Government. (Ibid.) 4 Burns reported in telegram 2597 from Amman, March 21, that he relayed the substance of Rabin’s message to Khammash, who replied that arrangements for direct Jordanian-Israeli patrols, telephone contact, or direct exchange of information were politically impossible at that time but that Khammash would be happy to receive information conveyed through U.S. Government channels. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN) Telegram 159758 to Tel Aviv, March 21, stated that although the Department agreed to a U.S. role as a channel of information in this instance, it considered that the Mixed Armistice Commission was the proper “third party” in such cases and did not wish to be regularly involved as a channel between parties. (Ibid.) 399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 1 Washington, March 24, 1967, 5:11 p.m. 162169. Following uncleared memcon is Noforn, FYI only and subject to revision: At his request UAR Ambassador Kamel called on Secretary Rusk March 23. In beginning Ambassador referred his likely departure indicating that while he had no orders he had received indications likely assignment European post. He then reviewed history US–UAR relations over recent years emphasizing that US interests in Middle East great and preservation those interests depended in part on US relations UAR. During periods those relations good US interests better protected than in periods strain between two countries. Non-alignment basic to UAR policy and without non-alignment friction between Great Powers could develop with strong likelihood confrontation in area particularly in view increasing importance Soviets attach Middle East. Over recent years basic US presence has been PL 480 wheat. Kamel now under specific instructions not ask for wheat although purely personally he recognizes wheat has been major counter Soviet influence. While wheat arrangements between us now discontinued must make major and speedy effort find way restore relations between us. Situation now highly delicate but not impossible overcome. Kamel recommended we search for new avenues cooperation but was not specific in suggestions. Urged we take new look at Yemen and as he had suggested many times before recommended offer US good offices to bring about solution this difficult problem. UAR does not wish overthrow Faisal and has no desire harm US interest in area. Faisal on other hand appears desire prolong Yemen conflict to bring about US–UAR military confrontation which would be very difficult situation for both countries. Essential US overcome belief in UAR that US does not want conflict to end and condones Faisal’s actions. Ambassador Battle recalled suggestion he made President Nasser during their last meeting re possible US willingness help pave way solution. Neither President Nasser nor Vice Presidents Amer and Sadat to whom similar suggestion advanced appeared encourage possibility. Kamel responded by urging US make another effort this direction. Kamel then reviewed importance Western position UAR and expressed concern difficulties with US increased as result absence relations with UK. He urged US encourage UK take initial step to bring about resumption relations, since UK larger power and must not be reluctant make first move. In summary Kamel urged early action by US find modus vivendi, based on continuation icebox policy re Israel and effort restore waning confidence between US–UAR. He emphasized again situation sensitive but controllable. Secretary in responding expressed concern difficulty US had to get across fact to Nasser that US wants good relations UAR. Expressed concern that Nasser has concluded for reasons not clear to us that US wishes ill to UAR regime. This not the case with President Kennedy, President Johnson nor Secretary Rusk. Suspicions erode confidence and undoubtedly affect willingness Nasser listen to us in our statements desire maintain good relations. Secretary agreed Israeli problem probably manageable and domestic pressures not as important an influence politically as some Arab observers believe and not of nature to eliminate chance good relations. Secretary then mentioned Arab neighbors afraid of UAR. Nasser has created impressions that have led to fear of his intentions. Leadership cannot be demanded, it must be granted. If UAR wished to lead Arabs and Arabs willing to be led US would have no objection but this would be different situation from insistence and coercion. We would hope Nasser could find way to reassure Arabs including King Faisal of peaceful intentions in manner which would remove attitudes of fear. One effect of level of arms Russia has put into UAR is to upset equilibrium and raise concerns other countries. Imperative some effort be made settle arms race. Once in past Secretary had asked Gromyko whether Russia willing assist in limiting arms race. Gromyko had replied affirmatively with respect nuclear arms but negatively with respect conventional arms. Therefore must conclude USSR considers present policy advantageous to Russian interest particularly when Russians make public reference to special friendships with UAR, Algeria and Syria. Another point of difficulty is that Nasser has never fully understood problems inherent in dealing with giant democracy and all its complexities. What is said can make tremendous difference in attitudes and speech such as that on February 22 can cause great harm. This particular speech came at moment of consultation Congressional leaders re new PL 480 agreement. While US does not need flattery or cajoling silence itself might be great contribution. One channel we must look to in period strain is private field. Business ties and private investment to extent UAR wishes permit can help improve political relations. Secretary agreed consider various points made by Ambassador and expressed appreciation his efforts over past years improve relations between US–UAR. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Battle and cleared by Bergus. Also sent to Jidda. 400. Record of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia 400. Record of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia 1 Washington, March 28, 1967. IRG/NEA 67–11 In considering our policy on the supply of arms to the Near East, and certain pending requests from the Government of Israel and the Government of Lebanon for the supply of arms, the Group: Recalled our hope that a plateau in Near East arms supply had been reached about a year ago after we had concluded arms sales to certain Near East countries, and our hope that a sustained pause in the further supply of arms to the area could be maintained; noted that meanwhile the Soviet Union had continued to ship arms to certain countries in the Near East, and that soundings we had taken with the Soviet Union on the possibility of an arrangement with it on the control of arms shipments to the Near East had been negative; and agreed that the Soviet Union probably continued to see advantages in its military relationship with certain Near East countries, and that there was no evidence that the Soviet Union would be interested at this time in an understanding with Western suppliers on controlling arms shipments to the area. Noted that our arms policy toward the area is aimed at, and is affected by, not only the Arab-Israeli confrontation but also the relations between the so-called “progressive” Arab states (e.g., UAR, Syria, Iraq) and the more traditional Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Jordan), as well as the prospects for internal stability in certain of the Arab countries which are friendly to us (e.g., Jordan, Lebanon); noted that urgent considerations arising out of the Israeli attack on Samu in November 1966 had most recently caused us to agree to provide certain additional military equipment to Jordan; noted also that there is a direct relationship between our policy on arms for the Arab states and Israel and our policy on arms for Iran, given the Shah’s concern over the threat he sees from Nasser; and noted finally that, when it is consistent with our broad foreign policy objectives, we have a balance-of-payments interest in selling arms to certain buyers. Agreed that our interests would be best served by the maintenance of only such military forces and capabilities in the area as would deter the outbreak of hostilities between the Arab states and Israel, and/or among the Arab states themselves. The Group agreed that a drastic reduction—if not a complete moratorium—on imports of arms into the area would be desirable, not only to help maintain peace but also to permit countries in the region to devote maximum resources to internal economic and social development; and agreed that it remains particularly important to avoid the introduction into the area of sophisticated new types of weapons systems, including nuclear weapons. The Group agreed, furthermore, that Soviet cooperation is essential for effective arms control in the Near East and that we should continue to explore on all appropriate occasions the possibilities of an understanding with the Soviet Union on this subject; and that an effective understanding would also require the cooperation of various other European countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy, as well as Czechoslovakia). The Group agreed that, while working toward our long-run objective of effective arms control for the area, we should continue to exercise maximum restraint in supplying arms to countries in the Near East. Given our current lack of control over other external sources of arms for the area, we must retain the flexibility to supply arms selectively so as to help maintain an equilibrium that may deter an outbreak of hostilities. As regards the Arab-Israeli confrontation, despite Soviet shipments to the Arabs we should avoid becoming involved as the major supplier of arms to Israel and should encourage the Government of Israel to look generally to Western European suppliers for arms needed to maintain an effective defense against Arab forces. The Group also agreed that, within a general policy of maximum restraint, it may also continue to be desirable for us to supply limited quantities and types of arms to help friendly countries in the area to maintain internal security and political stability; but that the supply of arms in such cases should be decided upon only with full consideration of the aim to avoid an escalation of the arms race and to maintain peace in the area. Israel In considering the pending request of the Government of Israel for (1) the grant of 200 armored personnel carriers (APC’s—Model M–113 A1) valued at approximately $7.4 million, (2) the grant of tank parts valued at $2 million, and (3) the supply on soft concessional credit terms of follow-on Hawk missile spares and M–48 tank parts valued at $14 million, the Group: Agreed that Israel does not have a valid military requirement at this time for the APC’s; that, in any event, the recency of Israel’s attack on Samu (Jordan) made it undesirable for us to accede at this time to the supply of new weapons; that the supply of improved new APC’s of the M–113 A1 type would tend to escalate the Near East arms race; and that if Israel were adamant about obtaining new APC’s, our own interests dictated that the United States should not be directly involved. Reaffirmed that we should maintain our established policy against supplying grant military aid to Israel and that we should reject the Government of Israel’s request of grant aid for APC’s and tank parts. The Group agreed, furthermore, that we should refuse to sell Israel the M–113 A1’s or to agree to the sale of the similar U.S.-licensed, Italian-made Model M–113, for either credit or cash; and should the Government of Israel ask to purchase our APC’s, we should encourage it to look to other sources in Western Europe for equipment. The Group also reaffirmed its view that it would set an undesirable precedent to provide credit for Israel for the purchase of follow-on military spares and parts. The Group agreed, however, that if it should be determined that some concession on military supply should be made to Israel, a credit in the range of $7–10 million might be offered at the current going rate (5 1/2% interest, 7 years, 10% down payment) for the purchase of spares and parts. Lebanon On the Lebanese request for M–48 tanks, 2 the Group: Noted that a Lebanese request for tanks had been made more than a year ago; that we had recently made Lebanon an offer, pursuant to a long-standing request, to supply two Hawk missile batteries on concessional credit terms, and that our offer was now before the Government of Lebanon for decision; and that the prospects of funds for additional military purchases by Lebanon have been adversely affected by Lebanon’s commitment to purchase fighter aircraft from France, the probability that no further funds will be available from the United Arab Command, and conflicting budget demands in Lebanon. The Group also noted the importance attached by the Government of Lebanon to the purchase of tanks, the importance of continued support by the Lebanese armed forces to the stability of the moderate government of President Helou, the fact that we have not supplied any military equipment—apart from a few recoilless rifles—to Lebanon for several years, and the desirability of maintaining some U.S. military tie to Lebanon. The Group agreed that, because of the various factors noted above and because of the relatively small size of the proposal in question, that our agreement to supply a limited number of M–48 tanks to Lebanon would not be inconsistent with our broader policy on the supply of arms to the Near East and would not constitute a major factor in accelerating the arms race; and agreed that we could now offer to sell up to 35 M–48 tanks to Lebanon, together with necessary support spares and basic load ammunition. Lead time on delivery of the tanks is estimated at 24 months, and the estimated cost of the entire package is $4.25 million. The Group agreed that no further financial accommodation should be offered to Lebanon beyond the amount of concessional credit already contemplated for the supply of Hawks, and that the burden of any decision on procurement as between Hawks and tanks should be left to the Government of Lebanon; if part of the contemplated credit is not used for the Hawks, it could be applied to the sale of tanks. [Here follows a list of members present, including Acting Executive Chairman Battle, Hoopes, Saunders, Williams of AID, Critchfield of CIA, Brigadier General Sibley of the JCS Staff, and Nevins of USIA. Others present included Handley, Davies, Wolle, Kitchen, Colonel Jordan, and Sober.] SS 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, Israel-Arms. Secret. Prepared on March 29 by Sidney Sober, Staff Director. 2 Documentation on U.S.-Lebanese discussions concerning possible U.S. arms sales to Lebanon is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66 and 1967–69, DEF 12–5 LEB and DEF 19–8 US–LEB. 401. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 401. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 7, 1967. SUBJECT Israeli Aid Package State and Defense now agree on a package. 2 It doesn’t give the Israelis everything they asked for and runs lower than last year. However, on all but one item, I think they’d have to admit we’ve been as responsive as possible given our limitations. Katzenbach recommends about $48 million (Israel’s requests total $76 million). We’ve tried to be as generous as possible in balance of payments type aid because Eshkol faces unemployment after deliberately slowing economic growth to shake out uncompetitive industry, narrow Israel’s trade imbalance and get ready for association with the Common Market. The package includes: —$23.5 million in PL 480 (feedgrains, oil, maybe tobacco, no wheat). Agriculture is thinking of 75% dollar sale. Last year dollar sale was only 25%. I’d go only to 50% this year. —$9 million in credit for tank and Hawk missile spares. Defense opposes credit for normal maintenance items, but would make an exception to beef up the package. I recommend this inconspicuous military help. —$5 million in covert aid for Israel’s anti-Communist African programs. This is a private request from Eshkol to help with his budget and doubles last year’s program. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] 3 —About $10 million in Ex-Im loans. We can’t assign an exact price tag yet because we don’t have details on the project. But we’d invite the Israelis to submit a fertilizer project to Ex-Im instead of to AID. 4 —We’d offer to accept Israeli bids on AID off-shore procurement for 12 months. Though the price tag is relatively small, this is important in helping put unemployed Israelis to work. Defense is also increasing procurement in Israel. Eshkol’s Finance Minister has made a strong pitch for this. —We’d give the Israelis Hawk missile capability to do all their own maintenance. This costs us nothing but cuts them in on some classified data. The attached charts shows where this would put us in relation to past years. Since last year’s plane sale was unusually high, I think we can justify this FY 1967 level. We still have the desalting project to talk out, and to emphasize that I recommend we move quickly in naming Bunker’s successor. Katzenbach recommends we turn them down on two items: —They asked for $20 million in Development Loans on top of the $6 million you authorized last fall from an old loan. Israel is doing so well that it ought to be using Ex-Im rather than the softer AID loans. Congress is grumbling about adding Israel to the list when it’s trying to limit the number of countries receiving aid. Last year we split their request of $20 million and offered $10 million each from AID and Ex-Im. I think this is the year to get out of AID lending and refer them entirely to Ex-Im. They’ll gripe, but this is reasonable. —Far tougher to turn down is their request for 200 Armed Personnel Carriers ($7.4 million). Harman tells us informally that Eshkol is personally interested and that a turndown will trigger a violent reaction from Jerusalem—and by implication from Israel’s friends here. I agree with State and Defense that we can’t give these via grant. A grant would amount to starting a Military Assistance Program in Israel, since all previous deals have been credit or commercial sales. This would be a major change in our policy not to be a major arms supplier in the Middle East. The real issue is whether to offer a credit sale instead. We understand informally they’d settle for that. Katzenbach earlier recommended that we sell 100. Now he agrees with Defense to recommend against supplying APC’s on any terms. The argument: —We ought to keep the brakes on the Middle East arms race. When we completed the Israeli aircraft deal in March 1965, we told Nasser that sale completed a round of escalation. We said we didn’t foresee further sales soon unless the Soviets made more. As far as we know, they haven’t, and our December sale to Jordan was too small to affect the balance. —We don’t want to become Israel’s sole military supplier, but Israel is trying to maneuver us into that position. In our aircraft deal, we made them agree they’d continue to look to Europe for most of their equipment. Good APC’s—unlike the aircraft—are available in Europe at reasonable prices. Israel has 1,000 old ones, and selling even 100 opens the door to our modernizing the whole line. —We should be tough as long as they play coy on their nuclear position. Eshkol has invited our technicians to visit Dimona on 22 April. 5 It will be more than a year since our last visit. Only when they report will we know whether we should use all our leverage to make them agree to visits every six months. —We don’t think Israel needs APC’s urgently. The 1,000 in operation are World War II vintage and will have to be replaced in five years or so. But the Israelis do a remarkable job of keeping equipment running, and the JCS feels that immediate modernization is not essential. —We shouldn’t compensate the Israelis for our Jordan package since that resulted directly from their attack. They won’t take seriously our counsel of restraint if we reward them now. The strongest argument for a turndown in my book is trying to get a grip on the Middle East arms race. The only approach that could work is an understanding with the USSR to stop big shipments. We’ve probed before, and the Soviets have shown little interest. But in the context of persuading the Israelis to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they might show more. This is a long shot. But if you decide you can stand the heat, a pause in sales might be worth a try. We could stand up to Israel’s friends confident that we’re not just stalling. If by fall, the NPT has come to naught, then we’d reconsider. I’ve double-checked with Katzenbach, and he doesn’t feel we’d be reneging on a commitment to refuse the APC’s. Even so, if you approve a turndown, the way we couch our answer will be important. The spirit of our response should be more “not now” than a flat “no.” My suggestion is to have Katzenbach give them our answer. I can background Abe Feinberg, but the official request came through Katzenbach, and I think we ought to try building him as our sympathetic but firm spokesman to the Israelis. The key problem in US-Israeli relations is that the Israelis like to think they have a special relationship with us, while the State and Defense professionals treat them and the Arabs with the same cool even-handedness. Katzenbach should be warmer and more candid, yet still keep this in official channels. Walt Approve your formulation for refusing APC’s We ought to sell 100 See me 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Sensitive. Received at 7:30 p.m. Rostow’s handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Howard &Hal: Hold—but for your guidance. Walt.” None of the approval or disapproval lines is checked, but handwritten numbers appear in the margin. A table dated April 18, attached to Document 406 , shows the President’s initial decisions, which accord with the marginal notations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI) For his final decisions, see footnote 6, Document 416 . 2 An April 4 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President with the recommendations summarized here is attached. 3 A handwritten note, apparently in Johnson’s hand, reads: “[ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ].” 4 A handwritten note, apparently in Johnson’s hand, reads: “No development loans.” 5 Telegram 3020 from Tel Aviv, March 23, reported the invitation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AE 11–2 ISR) 6 None of these options is checked. 402. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 402. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, April 7, 1967, 9:14 p.m. 171366. 1. Following evening reading item on today’s Israel-Syria clash sent to President tonight: “A major border clash centering in and around the Southern and Central Demilitarized Zones took place today. The trouble apparently began when an Israeli tractor plowing in the DZ near Haon was fired upon by Syrians. The resulting battle lasted most of the day and involved mortar, artillery and tank fire and several aerial dogfights. Israel claims to have downed seven Syrian MIG–21 aircraft without loss to its own air arm, and claims to have damaged several Syrian ground positions that had fired on Israeli cultivators and settlements. Syria also claims a victory, alleging that five Israeli aircraft were shot down and at least 70 Israelis killed in fighting that came about when Israel ‘insisted on aggression.’ Syria admits losing four MIGs and suffering 5 deaths. “There are no reports yet from UN truce observers. We have no basis for assessing Israel’s claim that the plowing that touched off the day’s events was being done in a field that had been under regular cultivation by Israel for years. With both sides claiming victory, there is a fairly good chance that fighting will not be resumed tomorrow.” 2. Department taking following line with press on “if asked” basis: “We regret the hostilities and loss of life involved. We are continuing to study the situation and will be interested particularly in reports that come out through the United Nations.” Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle; cleared by Houghton, Wheelock, and UNP Director Elizabeth Ann Brown; and approved by Davies. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, USUN, and London and repeated to Secretary Rusk at Punta del Este as Tosec 16. 403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, April 11, 1967, 8:41 p.m. 173186. Deliver to action officers immediately on opening of business April 12. 1. Bunche informed USUN (septel) that he authorized a Bull (Johnson) 2 letter be sent to Israelis and Syrians today, April 11, urging early resumption ISMAC meetings and suspension of cultivation pending outcome of meetings. This move particularly welcome in view renewed shooting southern DZ this morning and military preparations apparently being made by both sides which might lead to repetition incident of April 7 proportions or worse as early as April 12, should Israeli cultivation probings continue. Although Syrians may have been bloodied on April 7, it seems unlikely they will desist from further responses to Israeli plowing. This threatens in turn to cause serious difficulties for King Hussein in Jordan for whom hostilities between Syria and Israel present serious internal dilemma. We think UNTSO efforts to defuse situation should be reinforced. 2. Consequently Embassy Tel Aviv authorized approach GOI at highest level necessary as early as feasible on April 12 in order to stress our concern at escalating potentialities and broader area implications of situation and urge GOI resume earlier suspension of cultivation in troubled areas of DZ and elsewhere along border. 3 Without attempting judge merits of cultivation issue or in any way condoning Syrian firing, we believe it essential provide cooling-off period and give both sides chance to respond to Johnson’s letter. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Atherton and Lambrakis; cleared by Houghton, Campbell, and in draft by Gabriel J. Paolozzi of IO/UNP; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Amman and repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, USUN, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and to Secretary Rusk at Punta del Este as Tosec 94. 2 Acting UNTSO Chief of Staff. 3 Telegram 3254 from Tel Aviv, April 12, reported that Barbour discussed this with Eban and Bitan that day. Telegram 174533 to Tel Aviv, April 13, recorded a similar conversation between Davies and Evron. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 ISR–SYR) 404. National Intelligence Estimate 404. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 13, 1967. NIE 30–67 THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE: CURRENT PHASE The Problem To estimate present attitudes and future trends in the Arab-Israeli problem over the next two or three years. Conclusions A. The Arabs and Israelis are no closer to a solution of their fundamental differences than they ever were. B. Rivalries and disputes among the Arabs reduce their chances of doing anything significant about their quarrel with Israel; these rivalries also create some danger of precipitating crises from which large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities could develop. C. The Israelis seem likely to continue existing policies, including occasional retaliatory action; they would resort to force on a large scale only if they felt their security seriously endangered. D. The Soviet leaders almost certainly view the Arab-Israeli dispute as promoting their interests. But they do not wish to see it develop into armed conflict. While continuing to supply arms to their Arab friends, they probably wish to keep the arms race from getting out of hand. E. If and when the Arabs come to believe that the Israelis are at the point of deploying strategic missiles, 2 a phase of sharply increased Arab-Israeli tensions will probably arise. This is likely to occur within the next two to three years. In this event, the Egyptians would probably press the Soviets for help. F. To such an appeal the Soviet leaders would probably feel that they had to respond in some way. They would probably pledge to help Egypt or other Arab states if attacked and would probably provide token technical aid on the Egyptian missile program. They might go so far as to provide a missile system, but we believe they would not supply nuclear warheads or assist in the development of a nuclear weapons program. G. Although periods of increased tension in the Arab-Israeli dispute will occur from time to time, both sides appear to appreciate that large-scale military action involves considerable risk and no assurance of leading to a solution. In any event, the chances are good that the threat of great power intervention will prevent an attempt by either side to resolve the problem by military force. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 13. The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in its preparation. The CIA, State, Defense, NSA, and AEC representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction. 2 In the context of an Arab-Israeli conflict, strategic missiles would be those capable of striking the major population centers or military installations of the enemy, i.e., missiles with a range roughly between 100 and 500 miles. [Footnote in the source text.] 405. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 405. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 17, 1967. SUBJECT Israeli Arms Requests I believe you are familiar with the recommendation of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East-South Asia (IRG/NESA) that we should not accede to Israel’s request for 200 armored personnel carriers (APCs), on either a grant aid or sales basis. 2 I personally support that recommendation, and believe it would be a serious mistake for us to provide APCs to Israel at this time, either 200 or any lesser number. I recognize our interest in the maintenance by Israel of an adequate deterrent against attack by any of its Arab neighbors, but the present and prospective military balance in the Middle East strongly favors Israel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently confirmed their view that Israel will be militarily unchallengeable by any combination of Arab states at least during the next five years. 3 As presently trained and equipped, the armed forces of Israel are greatly superior in effectiveness and firepower to those of their potential opponents, individually or collectively. Israeli security is also strengthened by the US policy of maintaining a controlled military supply relationship with those Arab states who show moderation toward Israel and who resist opportunities to acquire Soviet equipment; this helps to avoid a polarization of the Arab-Israeli dispute along East-West lines. Our dramatic airlift of equipment to Jordan last winter was necessary to save King Hussein’s regime, which had been badly undermined by the unfortunate Israeli raid against Samu in November. Our failure to act could have led to a rapid deterioration in Jordan, involving the introduction of Egyptian armed forces and Soviet advisers and equipment. Provision of additional APCs to Israel at this time could, in my judgment, only serve to undercut the good effect of what we did for Jordan, to “pay twice” for the Israeli miscalculation at Samu, and to agitate a situation that is now relatively quiescent. In the agreement of March 1966 for the purchase of Skyhawk aircraft, 4 Israel explicitly recognized that that sale did not constitute a precedent for future U.S. action, and further agreed “to continue to look to Europe for the bulk of its military requirements and not to regard the U.S. as a major arms supplier.” In making its current request for APCs, the Israelis would appear to be disregarding these conditions which they accepted just over a year ago. In my judgment, our recent supplementary aid to Jordan has not altered the validity of these conditions. I therefore recommend that we turn down the Israeli request for APCs, and suggest that they should look to Western European sources if they consider it necessary to purchase APCs at this time. Robert S. McNamara 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Exdis. Filed as an attachment to Document 406 . 2 See Document 400 . 3 See Document 387 . 4 See Document 283 . 406. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 406. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 18, 1967. SUBJECT Israeli Aid Package The attached table 2 reviews where we stand. Three issues remain. You may want to discuss the APC’s with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara Thursday 3 afternoon. Whatever you decide, I recommend you hold them until after 28 April when we’ll have a report on this weekend’s inspection of the Dimona nuclear plant. I. Armed Personnel Carriers. Secretaries McNamara (Tab A) 4 and Katzenbach (Tab B) 5 have reconsidered and still recommend against. Their arguments boil down to: A. Uneasiness about fueling any arms race. Congress is concerned. Our India-Pak decision tried to restrain that buildup, and we’ve kept our Middle East programs to the minimum. APC’s would not seriously affect the arms balance, but no one wants to start another round of sales. In the context of the Non-Proliferation talks, we may even try for tacit Soviet agreement to hold down arms shipments to the Middle East. This sale wouldn’t upset that effort, but our skirts would be cleaner without it. B. Concern over too close a military relationship while Israel’s nuclear intentions are in doubt. Our intelligence people suspect—on uncertain evidence—that Israel may be building a separation plant. Our inspection team will visit Dimona this weekend for the first time in over a year. With the NPT ahead of us, we may need a clear expression of Israel’s position. We can’t bargain with APC’s, but we could hold them until we’re sure our inspection team gets full cooperation. Our dilemma is that foreign policy interests argue against a sale now, but the Israelis will treat a “no” as a broken promise. Israel could do without APC’s this year, but Eshkol believes that we promised something in return for their keeping quiet on our Jordan package last December. If we go ahead, Secretary Katzenbach recommends we minimize repercussions by selling only 100. He suggests stretching delivery through 1970, but after our airlift to Jordan, I’m afraid that won’t work. In any case, we must control publicity and timing. Defense tentatively concludes that Israel could set up an assembly line using some US-supplied parts, but Secretary Katzenbach believes this would make our relationship too close. You may want to hear argument before deciding. On foreign policy grounds alone, I would recommend telling the Israelis we can’t sell APC’s now, but would reconsider next year. But if you want to go ahead, I recommend 75–100 now and promising to discuss assembly in Israel. Hold APC’s until after 28 April; go ahead with the rest of the package now I want to move on 100 APC’s and assembly; ask for a scenario 6 I’m willing to say “not now” II. Amount and terms of PL 480 . Secretary Katzenbach recommended $23.5 million because Agriculture judged that Israel will need less than it asked for. Your figure was $28 million—the full Israeli request. One way to avoid rushing more scarce grain than needed would be to negotiate $23.5 million now but say we’ll go up to $28 million if Israel needs more. In view of Congressional pressure to tighten terms, Secretary Katzenbach recommended 75% dollar sale at about 4.5% interest (last year 25% at 2.5%). Normally, we would figure on moving to 50% dollar sale at maybe 3.5% as an appropriate transitional step. You initially preferred last year’s terms, but you may want to consider slight hardening this year to put us on a better footing with Congress. $23.5 million now; will amend up to $28 million 7 Up to $28 million now 25% dollar sale 2.5% interest 50% dollar sale 3.5% interest 75% dollar sale 4.5% interest III. Moving on Bunker’s successor might improve the package. Bob Bowie is a good possibility, but we might ask Douglas Dillon again. Walt See if Dillon is available Sound out Feinberg on Bowie 8 Give me other names 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Exdis. Filed with an April 18 covering memorandum from Rostow to the President recommending that he hold the APCs—and if politically feasible, the whole package—until April 28. The covering memorandum bears Johnson’s handwritten note: “Put on my desk &have available when Feinberg appt is ready. L.” 2 Not printed; see footnote 1, Document 401 . 3 April 20. 4 Document 405 . 5 Katzenbach’s April 17 memorandum to the President is not printed. 6 The first option is revised in Johnson’s handwriting to read: “Hold APC’s and package until after 28 April.” The second option is checked. 7 This option and the “2.5% interest” option are checked. 8 This option is checked. 407. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 407. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 20, 1967. SUBJECT Your Meeting with Mr. Feinberg at 11:30 a.m. 2 I have sent you a separate memo on the Israeli aid package. 3 I recommend you not give Abe any answers until you have discussed this with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. Your options on timing are: 1. Hold the whole package until after we get the report on our Dimona inspection about 28 April. 2. Release everything in the package except your decision on APC’s until we’re sure the Israelis have cooperated fully with our inspection team. 3. Release the whole package now. The main reason for holding off is to demonstrate that you’re serious about nuclear non-proliferation. Even this year’s whole aid package wouldn’t be enough to bargain with on this life-or-death issue (as Israel sees it). However, as we approach the time when we may need to press Israel to sign the NPT, we must consider how much leverage we need to hold in reserve. So far the Israelis have succeeded in keeping this apart from the rest of our relationship. The only counter big enough to sway Eshkol, I suspect, will be the US-Israeli relationship itself. By purely foreign policy standards, we should be drawing back a little now to signal how seriously we take this issue. I realize this creates a domestic dilemma, but I should think the Jewish community itself with its liberal tendencies would be strongly attracted to the NPT. Israel has never leveled with us on its nuclear intent. Our intelligence people have scattered—but as yet unconfirmed—evidence that Israel is quietly but steadily placing itself in a position to produce nuclear weapons on short notice. We also know that Israel is investing large sums in a French built surface-to-surface missile designed to carry a nuclear warhead. I must emphasize that we do not know exactly what Israel is doing or what its position on the NPT will be. But we know enough to be seriously concerned. Therefore, it may be wise to take special care with each step this year. Walt Attachment 4 Washington, April 20, 1967, 10:10 a.m. Mr. President: Hal Saunders and I have staffed out the paper done by Dave Ginsburg. 5 I wanted you to have, as he did them during the night, Hal’s direct comments on the paper 6 —including their flavor. Hal is an extremely well-balanced analyst of the Middle East. I would divide my own comments in two parts: first, the items in David’s paper which we had planned already to support or could support; second, our security relations with Israel. 1. This is the position with respect to David’s non-military proposals: —Food purchases: already provided for. —Development loans: EX–IM is the proper source, given Israel’s level of income and foreign exchange position; but there is no reason why Linder cannot be very generous. —Stimulating Israeli fertilizer exports: provided for in our package. —Repayment in commodities: a new proposal now being staffed out. It seems possible to me, especially if Israel would make the deal proposed by David in the first part of paragraph 16 (p. 17). 7 —Exports to the U.S.: DOD is pressing this as hard as it can; perhaps Bob McNamara could press it a little harder. —Desalinization: This should go forward urgently: Jack Valenti would be fine but, as with Eric Johnston, he might need to put himself in the position to approach the Arabs with some kind of parallel project in order not to damage his moving picture interests in the Middle East. Such an approach was not ruled out in the Bunker terms of reference; but it may be more important for Jack than for Ellsworth. Katzenbach proposes Bowie; but Dillon and others are possibilities. —An American University in Israel: Without intimate knowledge, Hal’s marginal comment on page 15 seems wise; namely, that it is unlikely we could create a new institution up to high existing Israeli standards; but we might increase our already substantial support for Israeli institutions now in being. Nevertheless, an “American University” in Israel might be looked at afresh. —Visits to Israel by high-level U.S. officials and a visit to the U.S. by Eshkol seem manageable. 2. Security problems. a. In general David’s paper does not recognize something which the Israeli government does recognize even if sometimes reluctantly; namely, the U.S. has legitimate interests throughout the Middle East and the maintenance of those interests is, by and large, in the long-run interest of Israel, because, where our influence is strong, we strengthen the hand of Arab moderates. It is odd that as thoughtful a man as David should not have made this point. b. Our critical problem with Israel is that they have wanted the advantage of a U.S. guarantee but have simultaneously wanted to maintain a military establishment which could be effective if the U.S. guarantee did not operate in a crisis. The technical reason for the Israel position is their anxiety about a quick Arab strike against them—from the air or on the ground—which we might be too slow to deal with. It is this ambiguity which has, quite understandably, in some ways led them to build up their military establishment in ways which made it easier for the Russians to have their offers of military aid accepted in the Middle East. The APC question relates to this. Bob McNamara and others think that APC purchases from the U.S. might open up another round of Soviet military credit sales to the Arabs in the Middle East. I am not sure that is necessarily so if the APC’s are moved in on a clear replacement basis. There is another problem with certain members of Congress who have resisted our being an active part of the Middle East arms race. c. The nuclear question. This is critical for large U.S. interests. We have been able to live with this ambiguous Israeli defense policy in terms of conventional weapons. Should they wish to have both a national nuclear capability and U.S. guarantees, we would be in an almost impossible position. Moreover, if they insisted on it, it might well destroy the possibilities of a non-proliferation treaty throughout the world. Therefore, we must develop a much deeper understanding with them on the nuclear question if we are to proceed with a policy of being, quite openly and without apology, their friends. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret; Exdis. 2 The President met with Feinberg from noon to 12:40 p.m. on April 20 prior to the latter’s departure for Israel. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) 3 Document 406 . 4 Secret. 5 Reference is evidently to an unsigned and undated memorandum for the President on the subject “1968—American Jewry and Israel,” attached but not printed. 6 An April 20 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow with his comments is attached but not printed. 7 The proposal was for Israel to retain from $150 to $250 million of its foreign exchange reserves in the United States in order to ease the U.S. balance-of-payments difficulties. 408. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 408. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, April 20, 1967, 1625Z. 9598. 1. Met with Pres Helou evening April 18. His main themes were (A) deterioration in Lebanese political stability, (B) necessity for GOL commence economic and social development program despite lack of funds, (C) massive Soviet aid offer to Lebanon, and (D) urgent, almost desperate plea for US assistance. 2. Soviet comprehensive assistance package is major new factor in equation. Offer, which buttresses increased Soviet activity in Lebanon in other fields, includes inter alia (A) Soviet purchase large amounts Lebanese apples and citrus fruits in exchange for Lebanese agreement buy equivalent value of commodities in USSR which now being purchased in third countries. (B) Proposal to construct up to twenty (presumably consumer goods) factories in Lebanese private sector with Soviets agreeing purchase total production. (C) Financing and constructing the usual steel plant. (D) Wide-ranging proposals to finance a variety of GOL development projects, particularly in hydro and electricity generating and distribution projects. (E) Financing and technical assistance in road projects as well as a possible subway system. I feel sure offer also included armament sales proposals although Helou skipped several sections in reading to me from very detailed multi-page Soviet proposal. 3. Helou said he had been sitting on Soviet proposal since March 13 and so far had avoided leaks. He was aware, however, that he was sitting on a timebomb and that leftist groups in the country would ultimately expose existence of Soviet offer in order present maximum embarrassment to GOL. Soviets would also be putting on pressure, perhaps during upcoming visit of Soviet Parliamentary delegation. Soviets had stressed in original presentation that they now involved in large-scale aid to Iran and Turkey and had posed specific question to Lebanon as to whether she intended to act more pro-Western than the CENTO powers. This was important propaganda point in Helou’s mind. Also, he added, Damascus and Cairo would of course join at appropriate time in applying pressure on Lebanon to accept all or part of the Soviet offer, using their own experience as model. 4. Unfortunately, said Helou, he was not immune to such pressures since he had been unable to make progress in moving the GOL’s essential economic and social development schemes off dead center. Despite his determined efforts reduce graft and pare budget, the problem was very simply one of lack of ready funds and ultimately he could not resist attractive offers of external assistance from any sources if there was no other way to respond to the legitimate aspirations of his people. The leftist and radical political forces and leaders within Lebanon were more than ready to take advantage of the government’s inability to act. Since they would be espousing legitimate social causes and economic grievances this was not the kind of situation which he could control by muzzling the press or calling in the security forces to suppress leftist agitation. In any case, he also believed that social progress was essential and he could only chide himself for not having started sooner. (He did not take refuge in the genuine excuse that the Intra Bank crisis was a major set-back to his plans.) 5. Helou emphasized that he was not raising the bugaboo of Soviet assistance in Lebanon to apply leverage on the US. But the simple fact was that he had to have untied credits of the kind represented by US grain sales in order to give him a free hand in financing the most urgent projects (e.g., housing, education, public health, roads) without the further long delay which specific and detailed project planning would involve. Proposed credits from international institutions or from such countries as Kuwait and France, although available, required substantial down payments and too much time to implement. He needed action now. In response to my many remonstrations on the dangers of Soviet economic penetration and my comments on the lack of comparability of Soviet proposals for Lebanon (which gave them strong foothold in economic life of country) as contrasted to Iran (exploitation of petroleum resources which had no other ready market), Helou simply responded that he fully agreed. His main objective was to keep the Soviets out of Lebanon. The pitfalls he clearly understood. What he needed was an alternative course of action which would keep the opposition quiet. 6. Helou then made it clear, in a somber and sometimes impassioned presentation, that his only source of help was from the US. The psychological impact of US assistance was as important as the financial. Without visible US support he could not stave off the pent-up pressures for development and social progress which ultimately would present the left with its golden political opportunity, and as well bring in a Soviet presence. He painted a gloomy picture of the future, and said that his successor would indeed have infinitely worse problems than he, unless something were done quickly to stem the leftward drift of the country. The socialist Arab states were of course already at work, nibbling away at confidence in Lebanon’s free enterprise system. 7. I took the opportunity to make the point that I had been disturbed about the steady deterioration and leftward trend in Lebanon as represented by such events as Lebanese sponsorship of Afro-Asian Writers Conference; the apparent succumbing to outside pressures to make decisions that obviously were not in Lebanese interest; and the inability of the GOL to restrain propaganda attacks in the local press in such obvious matters of self-interest as Sixth Fleet visits. I noted with concern the growing permissiveness with regard to criticism and attack against the US. Helou accepted the criticism and admitted that much of it was apt. The real problem, he reiterated, was that the GOL had been unable to start its development programs. This had brought about a legitimate focus of unrest and loss of confidence in the government which was seized upon by the radical political elements. As he had reminded me many times before, he thought it was in the self-interest of the US to help him create an environment which would reverse this trend and make it possible for the GOL not only to do that which needed doing to develop the country, but also to emphasize the supporting role of the US. It was up to the US, as the stronger partner, to take the initiative to create the ambiance for closer cooperation between Lebanon and the US in all fields. 8. During the course of the conversation I took the opportunity to describe the US grain credit proposals, as set forth in State 173820. 2 Helou, while unhappy with high cost (particularly bank guarantee) of CCC credits and the small size of the possible PL–480 component, nonetheless expressed substantial interest in considering any US offer which was “acceptable” even if not clearly “advantageous.” His problem was to get funds, and any funds generated by our credits would be immediately channelled into development projects. He said he would like as large a program as possible, if we could come to agreement. I informed him that I had just discussed the matter with FonMin Hakim and had given him latest information I had. We agreed I would again see Hakim immediately in order to present to GOL in clear terms the nature and conditions of the US proposal. Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL LEB. Confidential. Received at 1:51 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, Moscow, and Tehran. 2 Telegram 173820 to Beirut, April 12, instructed the Embassy to present a proposal for CCC credits to the Lebanese Government and to explain what Washington officials anticipated discussing in May a prospective P.L. 480 proposal for fiscal year 1968. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–11 LEB) 409. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 409. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, April 20, 1967, 1631Z. 9599. Subject: US Sixth Fleet. 1. During the course my discussion with President Charles Helou April 18, I raised issue of present propaganda attacks levied upon Sixth Fleet and its presence in Mediterranean. Referred to Eshkol statement 2 and took basically same line with President as I did with Foreign Minister Hakim April 17 (see Embtel 9452). 3 Reiterated that unauthorized statement by a leader of a given state does not constitute United States policy. With due recognition to existence free press in Lebanon, expressed distress over unbridled propaganda attacks against United States and against Sixth Fleet visits Lebanon by radical Lebanese papers and few Lebanese politicians. 2. Explained to Helou that purpose Sixth Fleet in Med twofold: (1) oppose Communist aggression, (2) safeguard peace in area. Pointed out raison d’etre Sixth Fleet had to be viewed in this context. Fleet not here to protect any particular state, but to forestall aggression. 3. Helou stated Lebanon played instrumental role in Arab League in avoiding all criticism of presence nuclear weapons in Mediterranean. Helou commented if he could “press a button” to stop attacks of politicians and newspapers against US and Sixth Fleet he would do so immediately. Stated “I am not King Hussein, nor King Feisal, nor President Nasser, I am the Chief of State of Lebanon”. Referred to confessional nature Lebanon’s society and stated he obliged play much more delicate role in facing various propaganda attacks which emanate from inside and outside of Lebanon. Said he had to take into consideration views of various Lebanese confessional groups and commented “half the population of Lebanon looks to Nasser and Atassi” for leadership. Said he must work within these limitations. 4. Helou asserted US must recognize Prime Minister Karame’s position. Explained that Karame, as Sunni leader, facing domestic political opposition which ready take advantage any opportunity to bring pressure to bear against Karame government. Helou said if pressures emanating from Cairo and Damascus added to local pressures Karame faces, Karame would find himself in most difficult situation in maintaining himself in power. Nonetheless, Helou said had discussed question with Karame to try to forestall action which would aggravate problem of future Sixth Fleet visits. 5. I made it clear to Helou that if Syria’s so-called “government” able to pressure Lebanon into actions which might mean practical withdrawal Sixth Fleet from Eastern Mediterranean, this would appear have tragic consequences not only for Lebanon but for peace in the area as a whole. 6. Helou said unfortunately no delineated border exists between Lebanon and Syria and as consequence there is not only unauthorized physical passage across borders but also free passage ideas and propaganda. Helou tied issue Sixth Fleet visits to US policy of assistance to Lebanon and said Karame needs help. Explained that if GOL could point to tangible US assistance offer to Lebanon, situation of GOL would be much easier in respect to staving off mounting pressures for cancelling Sixth Fleet visits (see Embtel 9598). 4 7. I reiterated to Helou that it basically in Lebanon’s interest have Fleet visits and only Cairo, Damascus, and other states interested in eliminating US presence in garble would stand to gain if Lebanon refused visits. Comment: Helou has of course always been staunch supporter Sixth Fleet visits, and needs no reminders of significance of Fleet to Lebanon. His inability, for the first time, to give me flat reassurances that visits will continue, is indication of the hard political dilemma with which he (and Lebanon) are faced. 9. Nonetheless, GOL is trying hard keep Sixth Fleet issue from coming to head. Cancellation of general Parliamentary debate April 19 through lack of quorum undoubtedly Karame ploy to avoid taking public position in response to inevitable hostile questioning. He will have take hard line position, against his better judgment, if pressures become too intense, but will probably hold out for a while longer in hope US assistance offer will enable him show tangible evidence US support for GOL’s economic and social objectives. 10. This is going to be another typically Lebanese issue where the final decision will be based largely on external influences and only secondarily on rational self-interest of the country. 5 Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 LEB–US. Confidential. Received at 2:49 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Moscow,CINCSTRIKE, Tel Aviv, CINCUSNAVEUR, CNO, COMSIXTHFLT, COMIDEASTFOR, CTG 60.2, and the Department of Defense. 2 Reference is to a statement made by Eshkol in an interview that appeared in U.S. News and World Report. In response to a question whether he would expect help from the United States if Israel were attacked in force by its neighbors, he stated that Israel would rely primarily on its own army but that he would expect help “especially if I take into consideration all the solemn promises that have been made to Israel. We get these promises when we ask the United States for arms and are told: ‘Don’t spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here.’ My reply to this advice is that the Sixth Fleet might not be available fast enough for one reason or another, so Israel must be strong on its own.” (U.S. News and World Report (Vol. LXII, No. 16), April 17, 1967, p. 76) 3 Telegram 9452 from Beirut, April 17, reported that in a meeting that day, Hakim urged a public U.S. refutation of the Eshkol statement. Porter told him the United States could not constantly engage in public debate over statements by leaders of other states and assured him that U.S. policy toward the Middle East as stated by President Kennedy and other leaders had not changed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 LEB–US) 4 Document 408 . 5 Telegram 10510 from Beirut, May 15, reported that Helou informed Porter that day that area developments and pressures on the Karame government led him to the reluctant decision to postpone a U.S. carrier group visit scheduled for May 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 LEB–US) 410. Editorial Note 410. Editorial Note The President met with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Walt Rostow, and George Christian from 6:43 to 7:45 p.m. on April 20, 1967. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) An agenda for the meeting sent to the President by Rostow includes the following item: “ Aid to Israel—(Sect. Rusk) “a. You have a State memorandum on aid which was sent you as a basis for your discussion with Mr. Feinberg. “b. Sects. Rusk and McNamara have been asked for their views on the Israeli policy paper which I sent to them this morning. You have my views on the paper. “c. A new Israeli proposal: US engines for a French fighter. (Sect. McNamara)” (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings With the President) The “State memorandum on aid” apparently is a reference to Katzenbach’s April 17 memorandum (see footnote 5, Document 406 ). The “Israeli policy paper” is a reference to the memorandum cited in footnote 5, Document 407 . Rostow sent partial copies to Rusk and McNamara with covering memoranda of April 20 stating that the President wanted to have their personal views at the meeting that day. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Israel 092) McNaughton commented in an April 20 memorandum to McNamara. (Ibid., Israel 091.3 MAP) Battle commented in an April 21 memorandum to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–8 US–ISR) The Israeli request to purchase U.S.-made engines for French interceptor/fighter bombers was made by Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense Zvi Dinstein at an April 17 meeting with Vance. (Memorandum of conversation, filed with an April 21 memorandum from Hoopes to Vance; Washington National Records Center,RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Israel 091.112) No record of the meeting has been found. The copy of the agenda with Rostow’s marginal notes (cited above) bears the following notes next to this agenda item: “Dimona. Post-trip.” and “Italians? APC’s. R.McN.” 411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon 1 Washington, April 21, 1967, 5:34 p.m. 180013. Beirut 9598. 2 1. We are encouraged by President Helou’s interest in considering CCC and PL–480 proposals as reported reftel. Reaction not as negative as anticipated. We therefore are looking forward to results your subsequent conversation with Foreign Minister Hakim. We are anxious move ahead as fast as possible. 3 2. On other hand, we are disturbed by Helou’s analysis of Lebanese political situation. In particular, his apparent assessment that moderates might be relinquishing initiative to anti-Western elements seems unduly pessimistic. We tend to feel that Helou failed to mention those groups in Lebanon (including military) whom, we feel, would not stand by idly in face of bid for power for Left. We recognize that Lebanon is probably now in a political drift and that continued reluctance to stand up to those who seek to undermine its integrity might entail a relinquishment of that integrity. However, we feel situation need not necessarily lead to disintegration of forces which have held Lebanon together, particularly if moderates are given positive leadership. It had been our understanding that most political leaders were in agreement that extremism must be contained for sake of Lebanon’s future welfare. 3. We would therefore appreciate receiving the Embassy’s analysis of President Helou’s assessment, and its projection of Lebanon’s political future in the light of that analysis. In particular, (a) will responsible political leaders allow the present drift to get out of hand? (b) Is existing power structure seriously threatened? What are the alternatives? How would these alternatives affect U.S. interests? (c) Will those who have benefited most under Lebanon’s system of private enterprise be unwilling to accept larger degree of control over their power and wealth as insurance against extremism? (d) Will net effect of knowledge of “massive Soviet aid offer” referred to by Helou be strengthening or weakening of moderates? (e) What would be political impact in Lebanon if Soviet projects carried out? (f) Would existing power structure accept a significant Soviet bloc influence in Lebanon? 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL LEB. Confidential. Drafted by Gamon and approved by Davies. 2 Document 408 . 3 Telegram 9663 from Beirut, April 21, reported that Hakim informed Porter on April 20 that Helou wanted to accept the U.S. offer. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AGR 12–3 LEB) After further negotiations, Porter informed Hakim on May 18 of U.S. approval of a $12 million line of CCC credit for purchase of up to 150,000 metric tons of wheat between May 1967 and June 30, 1968. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 9869 from Beirut, April 27, conveyed the Embassy’s analysis. It stated that although most Lebanese political leaders preferred to follow a pro-Western neutrality, this was a difficult task when the Egyptians, Syrians, and Soviets were attacking the United States for a variety of reasons, including policy toward Israel, Vietnam, and aid to the UAR; it would be impossible if the Soviets offered sizable aid to Lebanon and the United States did nothing. The Embassy thought no Lebanese Government could survive turning down Soviet aid under those circumstances. It concluded that if the United States sought to retain the advantages it derived from Lebanon’s free economic and political systems and pro-Western stance, it would have to provide support along the lines requested by the Lebanese leadership. (Ibid., POL LEB) 412. Memorandum of Conversation 412. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 26, 1967, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT US–UAR Relations PARTICIPANTS Mr. Mahmoud Younes, Deputy Prime Minister of the U.A.R. Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the United Arab Republic Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Undersecretary of State Mr. Richard H. Nolte, American Ambassador to the U.A.R. Mr. Donald C. Bergus, Country Director for NEA/UAR The Acting Secretary asked jocularly if Mr. Younes had discovered any oil on his visit to the United States. Mr. Younes had said that he was trying to discover more American explorers for Egypt’s oil. The TENNECO Company was interested in two areas in the UAR. Some difficulties had cropped up in the TENNECO/UAR negotiations but Mr. Younes felt that these could be reconciled. The UAR had a great interest not only in oil production but in such related enterprises as petro-chemicals, insecticides, and fertilizer industries. Mr. Younes had also talked to the leadership of Phillips and Standard of Indiana. With the latter, studies were going forward as to how the best use could be made of the gas which would be a byproduct of the oil operations at el-Murgan Field. He acknowledged that Standard of Indiana had had a mixed experience with the UAR. There had been lengthy delays in previous negotiations. Mr. Younes said he was now in full charge of oil matters in the UAR. There was a brief discussion of the type of arrangement being made between the Egyptian Oil Authority and Phillips. Although the joint company would have three Egyptian and only two American members, it had been agreed that no vote would be binding unless at least one American were in the majority. Mr. Younes said that as result of his talks with the oil companies he had the feeling that they would like some kind of statement of support and encouragement from the US Government. The Acting Secretary was then briefly called out of the room. In his absence a discussion between Ambassador Nolte and Mr. Younes ensued as to the practicability of a semi-autonomous Tourism Authority, along the lines of the Suez Canal Authority, which could make binding cost-plus contracts with foreign investors and management organizations in the tourism field. Mr. Katzenbach then returned and asked Mr. Younes how he viewed the economic picture in the UAR. Mr. Younes replied that the UAR would need two or three years to balance its situation. The Americans could play a great role in this through their oil companies. The UAR hoped to double its oil production next year, achieving an additional 7–1/2 million tons from the Murgan Field. Then Phillips would follow and UAR production would shortly be tripled. Ambassador Kamel commented that what was crucial was what we did in the meantime. Perhaps it would be as long as five years before the UAR could stand on its feet economically. Ambassador Kamel gave a lengthy expose of his “plan” for the improvement of US–UAR relations. This involved a) CCC roll-over, 2 b) encouragement of US private banks to enable the UAR to implement its stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund, c) IBRD loans and d) some kind of a consortium to look into the UAR’s external debt situation. Throughout Kamel’s presentation ran the theme that the USSR could only stand to benefit from continuing poor relations between the US and the UAR. He felt that political difficulties between the US and the UAR could be “frozen” while economic cooperation was increased. Mr. Katzenbach agreed that ways of cooperation must be found. He did not feel that relations between the United States and the USSR were the principal problem in US–UAR relations. He saw the situation more in terms of problems between the UAR and the United States. He was delighted that Egypt had reached an agreement with the Fund. He could not comment on what the International Bank might do. He felt that the Egyptians would have real problems with regard to their current economic situation. These problems entered even into the question of the CCC roll-over. He felt that measures which the Egyptians might take to stimulate private investment were important and was all for them. But US ability to assist had to be considered in terms of the political difficulties between the two countries. These could not be wished away. The US wanted good relations with the UAR. Mr. Younes felt that this made it the right time for both sides to move forward. Mr. Katzenbach referred to the need for Congressional support for many of the actions which the UAR would like us to do. This could be difficult to obtain. Ambassador Kamel stated there was a need in the UAR for a new start in US–UAR relations. He had carefully explained to Cairo the complexities of US constitutional processes, but now some moves were required on the part of the United States. Presently there existed a genuine vacuum of cooperation. Mr. Katzenbach pointed out that the improvement of relations was a two-way street. Mr. Kamel stated that the US as a big power should exercise more patience. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UAR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus and approved in U on May 4. 2 An April 28 memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow enclosed a draft telegram to Cairo authorizing the Embassy to inform the UAR Government of U.S. willingness to negotiate an agreement based on its offer to pay $40 million in principle and interest due in 1967 to the Export-Import Bank, AID, and the Department of Agriculture in exchange for a new $24 million CCC credit. The memorandum states that the Department of Agriculture was concerned that the proposal would open the Department to charges of trying to finesse Congressional constraints on aid to the UAR. It asked Rostow to call Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman to try to obtain his clearance. A handwritten note on the memorandum notes that talks within the U.S. Government were aborted by the outbreak of hostilities in the Near East. (Ibid.) 413. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 413. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 29, 1967. SUBJECT Our Attendance at Israeli Independence Day Parade 2 We are in the midst of our annual hassle over whether Ambassador Barbour should go to Israel’s parade in Jerusalem. He would go if both the French and British Ambassadors were going. But London has decided at Cabinet level that its Ambassador should not go this year, and Paris has agreed. The issue is where we draw the line in lending our presence to ceremonies which further recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. UN resolutions of 1949–50 recommended that Jerusalem be placed under international administration. We have gone along with this position. Although we do business with Israeli government offices in Jerusalem, we have refused legally to recognize it as Israel’s capital and have kept our embassy in Tel Aviv. While the conditions that led to our initial position have changed, we don’t believe we should change that position unless in the context of some Arab-Israeli settlement. Doing so otherwise would kick off a tremendous Arab reaction. State really doesn’t feel our presence makes that much legal difference because we’ve been to other such functions in Jerusalem. But it does fear that the Israelis and Arabs would read great significance if we broke with the British and French on the issue. We could probably get Eshkol to promise not to exploit our presence, but we can’t stave off some Arab reaction. The Jordanian Foreign Minister has already formally asked us not to attend. He feels that Jordan is especially vulnerable to Arab criticism because of Jordan’s close relationship with us. The issue is not the parade itself but the fact that the Israeli government uses this kind of thing to nibble away at the Western position. The British have decided—at the Cabinet level after two reviews and considerable Jewish pressure—that they must draw the line somewhere and that this is the place. In 1965, they attended a tattoo in Jerusalem after the Israelis assured them they’d make nothing of it and then six weeks later Eshkol cited British and American presence as a significant step toward Western recognition of Israel’s status in Jerusalem. The British were burned up, and there’s a good bit of their annoyance in this year’s decision. The Israelis are telling us informally that our refusal to attend will provoke a crisis in our relations. That’s nonsense, and we can probably talk them out of that line. But unfortunately they can read our absence as the kind of aloofness that doesn’t help you here at home. Personally, I can’t get excited about whether we go to the parade or not, and I think the British may be drawing the line at the wrong place. But they do make one important point. There’s no question that every Israeli move like this is calculated “salami tactics.” Unhappily, there is no such thing with this tough-minded, always-negotiating government—much as I love the Israelis as people—as just making a nice gesture without having them attach significance to it. The main issue in this as in the aid package is whether we’re now ready to throw open the gates to Israel or whether we’re still willing to draw the line somewhere to preserve some balance between our Arab and Israeli policies. They think they’ve made a breakthrough with you on the tank and planes sales, and they’re trying to exploit it to the hilt. I hate to see something like this cause you trouble, and I think the British have made a wrong decision. But Secretary Katzenbach has decided we ought to go along with them and the French, and if there were no domestic concern, I wouldn’t even bother you with this. He has not asked our review, but I asked to put this before you. You can either let his decision stand, or I can ask him to take a second look if you are concerned. Walt Let the decision stand Ask Secretary Katzenbach to review 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that it was received at 3:55 p.m. 2 Israel’s annual Independence Day parade was to be held in Jerusalem on May 15. 3 This option is checked, and a handwritten note states that this was done on May 1. Katzenbach renewed his recommendation in a May 2 memorandum to the President, which Rostow forwarded with a May 4 memorandum endorsing it and recommending a low-key approach to the Israelis to urge them not to make an issue of it. Johnson’s response is conveyed in an attached May 4 note telling him to talk to David Ginsburg and “see if you can get him aboard” and to have Harry McPherson talk to Evron. An attached May 6 note from Jim Jones to Johnson conveyed Rostow’s query whether this meant approval of Katzenbach’s recommendation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI) Apparently it did; telegram 193643 to Tel Aviv, May 12, states that the Department informed Evron that day that Barbour would be unable to attend the parade. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 8 ISR) 414. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 414. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 1 New York, May 1, 1967. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL As requested I have reviewed the recommendations from the Department and it is my own recommendation that you respond to Israel’s request as follows: I. Military A. You authorize the sale rather than grant of 100 APC’s to Israel, half the number Israel has requested on a grant basis—on current non-concessional credit terms. The delivery schedule should be based simply on availability rather than stretched-out delivery. Israel should be requested to limit or avoid publicity on the transaction. Key congressmen should be briefed, using modernization needs as the basic justification for the sale. In my view there will be no difficulty with the Congress on this point. This is in essence the fallback recommendation of the Department except for the delivery schedule which the Department would stretch out and which in my view is unnecessarily harsh on Israel. B. I agree with the Department’s recommendation that if manufacturing facilities for the Skyhawk A–4H aircraft make a speed up impossible, we will not be able to grant this request. It should be recalled, however, that at the time of the Jordan proceedings in the Security Council we did commit ourselves to an expedited schedule for delivery of these airplanes. C. I agree with the Department’s recommendation that we agree to Israel’s request to establish “fifth echelon” facilities for the Hawk missile system insofar as such facilities relate to maintenance rather than production or resale of missiles. D. I recommend that we agree, as a one time exception to policy, to provide $4 million credit for Hawk spare parts and $10 million for tank spare parts, this latter figure being the figure mentioned in the original deal. The Department’s fallback position calls for a $9 million credit. I believe we can meet Israel’s request for an additional $5 million credit, since a credit rather than a grant is involved and the difference is relatively small. The terms should not be the more onerous terms proposed by the Department but rather the terms of the original deal; i.e., a 3–1/2% interest rate and a pay back period of 10 years. To overcome the objection that this would establish a precedent in a supplementary credit deal, the original contract could be re-written to make this credit part of the original commitment. II. Economic A. Israel has requested development loans of $20 million. The Department would deny this request and refer Israel to the Export-Import Bank. I recognize the difficulties involved here but perhaps we could consider settling this request, as was done last year, by a $10 million development loan and by a $10 million Export-Import Bank loan, or if this is not possible, by assuring prompt and favorable consideration of the $20 million loan by the Bank. B. I agree with the Department’s recommendation that we agree to Israel’s request for permission to bid on AID supporting assistance purchases of potash and phosphate fertilizers primarily for South Viet Nam and South Korea for a period not to exceed 12 months. This is also to our advantage since it involves Israel in aid to South Viet Nam. C. I recommend that we agree to Israel’s request for commodities under the Food-for-Freedom Program by providing commodities, excluding wheat, of $26.5 million on the basis of Israel’s requirements and our own availabilities. Israel has asked for $35–36 million including wheat. The Department recommends a range of $19 to $23.5 million. I believe the figure I suggest $26.5 million is a good compromise. The Department’s proposals, moreover, are too severe with respect to payment and Israel’s are too liberal. I suggest a compromise, i.e., 50% local currency and 50% dollar credit sales to be paid over twenty years but at the same interest rate as last year, i.e., 2–1/2%. D. I agree with the Department’s proposal that we give sympathetic consideration to further support of Israel’s assistance programs in Africa along the lines of past support for programs which indirectly benefit us (Central African Republic, Chad, and Dahomey), within the limitations imposed by the revised strategy for United States aid to Africa. General Comment: What I have suggested, in my view, is a reasonable compromise which will be acceptable to the Israelis and to American public opinion and would not prejudice our relations with Arabic states. Finally, I should like to suggest as a replacement for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker as your representative on the American-Israel Joint Nuclear Desalinization project that you consider the appointment of Jack Valenti. This would follow the tradition of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower who appointed Jack’s predecessor at the Motion Picture Association, Eric Johnston, as a special Ambassador in this area. Jack Valenti shares your concern, vision and foresight in this vital area and would bring a practical rather than a bureaucratic approach to the solution of the problems involved. This, I know, would be a highly agreeable appointment to all concerned. Respectfully submitted, Arthur J. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret. Filed as an attachment to Document 416 . 415. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 415. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 1, 1967. SUBJECT The Arab-Israel Arms Race and Status of U.S. Arms Control Efforts Conventional Forces . Israel has a safe margin of superiority over any combination of Arab forces likely to attack it and can be expected to maintain that position for at least the next five years. Arab numerical force superiority is more than matched by Israel’s superiority in training, leadership, military doctrine and maintenance of equipment. Moreover, the Arab states have made little progress in military coordination among themselves. Recent border clashes have demonstrated that short of general hostilities, or Israeli occupation of Arab territory, the Arab states will not rush to one another’s assistance. In practical terms, therefore, Israel’s security must be measured by its ability to maintain military superiority over the UAR, the strongest single Arab state that can challenge Israel. Nuclear Weapons . Concerned that over the long run the Arabs will achieve superiority in conventional forces, Israel is carefully preserving its option to acquire sophisticated weapons, including, we believe, nuclear weapons. We have no evidence that Israel is actually making a bomb, but we believe Israel intends to keep itself in a position to do so at reasonably short notice should the need arise. The Israeli reactor at Dimona is capable of producing enough plutonium to make one or two bombs a year, but thus far our periodic inspections of this facility (most recently on April 22, 1967) have uncovered no evidence of weapons activity. Our inspectors emphasize, however, that their visits cover only the Dimona site and there can be no assurance that the Israelis are not pursuing a clandestine weapons program elsewhere. 2 Our suspicions that we do not know the full story have been heightened by the Israelis’ unwillingness to tell us what happened to 80–100 tons of unsafeguarded uranium concentrate that they bought from Argentina 4 years ago. We have also had reports that Israel has acquired a nuclear chemical separation plant, which—if true—would be a significant step toward a weapons capability. These reports are being urgently investigated. On the Arab side, no state is anywhere near a nuclear weapons capability. The UAR has a small 2-megawatt research reactor which cannot produce significant amounts of plutonium. Both Eshkol and Nasser are on record as saying that their countries will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. Beyond this, however, neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis have accepted IAEA safeguards over their entire nuclear programs, in spite of our urging them to do so. The UAR’s position is that so far they have nothing that requires safeguarding whereas Israel does and should therefore be the one that takes the first step. Israel’s position is more complex. Israelis have stressed to us their concern that information obtained by IAEA inspectors, which might be available to the UAR, could aid the latter in planning a military or sabotage operation against Dimona. In terms of their long-range security the Israelis may also have decided that they will not accept limitations upon their sophisticated weapon option in the absence of Arab arms control undertakings in the conventional field. Ballistic Missiles . Israel has contracted with the French firm of Dassault to purchase an unknown quantity of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and would not be militarily cost-effective unless so used. The missile (designated the MD–620) is now being flight-tested by the French. None have apparently been delivered to Israel as yet, but initial deliveries could take place sometime in 1968. Latest evidence indicates that, despite some difficulties with the guidance system, the MD–620 program is moving forward. Israel is also pursuing an indigenous SSM R&D program. The UAR’s SSM program, though widely advertised for many years, has reached a virtual standstill. Most of the West German scientists who were assisting this effort have departed. Flight testing of the UAR missiles has been suspended, and it is estimated that the missile program, at its present level of activity, could not be successfully completed within the next decade. Soviet Policy. Although the Soviets have gained much from their large sales of conventional weapons to certain Arab countries, we believe it unlikely that they will help any Arab state toward a nuclear weapons capability. There is similarly no hard evidence of Soviet assistance on the UAR’s missile program. U.S. Initiatives. The coming months may well offer our best opportunity in years to press for our arms control objectives because of two possible forms of additional leverage—first, a non-proliferation treaty, and second, U.S. willingness to finance desalting plants in the area. We plan to pursue our objectives along the following lines. 1. Safeguards and the NPT. We hope the non-proliferation treaty will prove to be a vehicle to help us get both Israel and the UAR to accept safeguards over their nuclear programs. Much will depend on whether the treaty emerges with a strong safeguards clause. As soon as the U.S. is ready to table a draft treaty at the ENDC, we plan to discuss it with the Israelis and the UAR. We are also exploring ways of overcoming Israel’s suspicions of the IAEA, including the possibility of getting Israel a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors. 2. Ballistic Missiles . In May last year we raised with Eshkol our concern over Israel’s plans to acquire ballistic missiles. Eshkol said Israel would not acquire SSM’s “for two, maybe three years.” He indicated that if Nasser “abandoned” his missile program, Israel would do likewise. Since the UAR’s program has remained inactive in the intervening year, we plan to raise this again with Eshkol in the near future. Our objective is to try to achieve a tacit understanding with the Israelis and Egyptians for mutual forebearance in the further development of their SSM programs. If Eshkol is receptive, we are prepared to approach Nasser. 3. Talks with the Soviets. Our probes of the Soviets concerning arms control in the Arab-Israel context have elicited little show of interest thus far. We do not expect that the Soviets will be receptive to an approach on controlling the supply of conventional weapons. However, depending on the course of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the nonproliferation treaty, we may have a renewed opportunity to take up the problem of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Near East. 4. Put More Punch Into Our Arms Control Discussions with the Israelis. We are disappointed not only in the lack of progress of our arms control discussions with the Israelis but in the lack of Israeli candor that has characterized them. There is a large area of Israeli activity and planning that is a closed book to us. During the coming year we would like to see arms control results linked more directly to Israel’s requests for military and economic aid. Continuing Intelligence Surveillance. While our inspections of Dimona can reassure us concerning activities there, they leave open the possibility of Israeli weapons activity somewhere else in Israel. For this reason continuing surveillance of Israel by every means at our disposal must remain a high priority intelligence requirement. We intend also to keep a watch on Israeli efforts to acquire in other countries equipment and technology related to nuclear weapon and missile programs. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Exdis. Filed as an attachment to Document 416 . No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Sterner and cleared in draft by Rochlin, Deputy Assistant Director of ACDA for International Relations Culver Gleysteen, Raymond L. Garthoff of G/PM, Vladimir Toumanoff of SOV, Director of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Donovan Q. Zook, Edward A. Padelford of NEA/RA, Director of INR/RNA Granville S. Austin, Bergus, Battle, and Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA Stuart W. Rockwell. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR) An undated memorandum from Battle, forwarding the memorandum for Katzenbach’s signature, states that it was prepared at the request of the White House staff. (Ibid.) 2 A “Preliminary Report of the Visit to Atomic Energy Sites in Israel, April 20 to April 24, 1967: Summary and Conclusions (Only)” is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting. 416. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 416. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 8, 1967. SUBJECT Israeli Aid Package We now know enough informally about the AEC’s inspection of Dimona to wrap up the Israeli aid package. Secretaries McNamara and Katzenbach have acquiesced (Tab A) 2 in most of Arthur Goldberg’s proposals (Tab B). 3 I have outlined the resulting package on the attached chart. 4 It gives the Israelis almost everything they want, except on APC’s. The one major difference between Arthur’s recommendation and the Secretaries’ indicates the Secretaries’ continuing concern over providing APC’s. They propose only that we license sale of 100 APC’s for cash, while Arthur recommends credit sale on no-concessional terms. The main issue remains how closely we should identify ourselves with Israel in view of its unclear nuclear intentions and our interests in the Arab world. I understand—and share—your desire to do everything we can to help the Israelis. On the other hand, we know that every request they make is not only a request for help but part of an effort to maneuver us into closer and closer identification. They feel they’ve made a breakthrough in the tank and plane sales and are pushing hard to exploit it. The AEC team found no evidence that Israel is using Dimona to produce material for use in nuclear weapons. While this conclusion is encouraging, it can’t tell us one way or the other whether Israel may be pressing a clandestine weapons program elsewhere. Secretary Katzenbach concludes (Tab C) 5 that Israel is carefully preserving its option to produce nuclear weapons on short notice if it needs to. Our intelligence proves nothing, but there are enough unanswered questions to make us want to avoid getting locked in too closely with Israel. In addition, State and Defense worry about our substantial interests in the Arab world. I know you are keenly aware of our oil interests ($2.75 billion investment, $750 million in yearly profits in production alone plus downstream operations) and of our obligations to our Arab friends. Our greatest single liability there—and one of the USSR’s greatest assets—is the sincere Arab belief that the “Zionists exercise a veto on US policy.” These important concerns account for the rough passage this package has had. The alternative to selling APC’s now would be to tell the Israelis that our agreement to their full requests for credit on military spares ($14 million) is all we can do this year but that we’ll consider the APC’s along with other requests they’ve already made for the next generation of Israeli weapons. In fact, that $14 million alone is a substantial concession—larger than the whole cost of the Jordan package ($12 million) including airlift costs. If you approve APC’s, we will need to control publicity. I’ve set up the attached chart as your decision document. 6 We might gain some points by giving the Israelis our decision before their Independence Day (15 May), especially if we don’t go to their parade. Secretary Katzenbach will send a separate memo on desalting. 7 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President. 2 Tab A is a May 5 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President. 3 Document 414 . 4 The chart, entitled “Israeli Aid Package,” dated May 8, not attached, listed the various elements of the package in three columns, headed “Israeli Request,” “Katzenbach-McNamara-Goldberg Proposal,” and “Your Decision.” A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel Aid, 5/67. 5 Document 415 . 6 Handwritten notations on the chart cited in footnote 4 above indicate the President’s decisions, which he made at a May 23 luncheon meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Christian, and Helms. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) A list attached to a May 23 memorandum from Rostow to the President states that the President approved a cash sale of 100 APCs for $3.7 million, preferably the sale of 100 Italian APCs with U.S. license, with a direct U.S. sale only if that arrangement was not workable, a $2 million cash sale of tank spare parts, $14 million military credit at 5 percent interest for Hawk and tank spare parts, sale of $27.5 million in food at 2–1/2 percent interest, $20 million in Export-Import Bank loans, $5 million for special Africa assistance, agreement to establishment of facilities for Hawk missile maintenance, and agreement to offshore procurement for U.S. aid programs. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67) 7 A May 10 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President recommended Jack Valenti as a possible Coordinator on Israeli and UAR desalting plants. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 27) 417. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 417. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 10, 1967. SUBJECT Our Latest Brush with Nasser Nasser’s Foreign Minister promises that our two AID men in Yemen will be out of jail by 15 May. 2 We’ve evacuated all but a skeleton crew there. If we get these two out safely, our main loss will be some CIA material the Egyptians filched from one of the safes left behind when our people were dragged off. We don’t think Nasser staged the incident in Yemen to get us out. However, once Egyptian mishandling on the scene created an opening, Cairo gave vent to its emotions and played it out for its full propaganda and intelligence advantage. Their readiness to see us humiliated and their duplicity illustrate the bitterness they feel toward us, while their willingness to set limits against harm to our people suggests they want to stop short of an open break. Nasser summed up the reason for this bitterness in his 2 May speech: “… you do not consider us your friends.” To him, our cutting back food aid is the final evidence that we are working against him and want to see him crushed under his economic burdens. But above all, he sees CIA’s hand behind everything that goes wrong for him. In his final talk with Luke Battle, he admitted he is a “suspicious man,” but he also claims he has evidence that CIA is working to topple him. It was natural for him to see a sinister hand behind AID’s roadbuilding work in southern Yemen where Egyptians are training the “liberation army” for South Arabia. We’ve held our tempers so far, but getting our men out of jail may take the lid off strong pent-up desire to wash our hands of Nasser. The Egyptians have maddeningly violated every code of diplomatic practice—despite Secretary Rusk’s strong statement on the “rights of legation”—and they’ve used more poison gas in Yemen. Yet on the constructive side, they have reached agreement with the IMF, entertained American businessmen, are negotiating with another American oil company and are trying to avoid defaulting on debt repayments to us. While the temptation to break will be greater than ever, cooler heads will probably prevail. With the South Arabian problem reaching center stage, we’ll badly need someone on the scene in Cairo. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum states that it was received at 5:20 p.m., and a handwritten “L” indicates that it was seen by President. 2 An April 27 note from Rostow to the President states that two Americans at the AID mission in Yemen had been charged with attempting to destroy the city of Taiz. It comments that in both Cairo and Yemen, some groups wanted to get rid of connections with the United States, and that those groups appeared to have won. It states, “We shall be announcing tomorrow that the charges are without foundation—which they are.” (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 26) The two men were released on May 17. For further information concerning this episode, see the Yemen compilation in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXI . 418. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 418. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 Washington, May 12, 1967, 6:02 p.m. 193481. 1. Israeli Ambassador Harman called on Asst Secretary Battle evening eleventh with instructions from FonMin Eban to register serious GOI concern over terrorism northern Israel. In summary, Eban’s view is that Syrians creating dangerous situation, without any restraint. In reviewing recent series incidents, Harman emphasized that Syrians are making increased use Lebanese territory to hit at Israel, are penetrating region hitherto quite free from terrorism (the area immediately north of Lake Tiberias), and are suddenly putting mines on major metalled roads. Fact there have been no casualties fortunate but does not diminish Syrian guilt and obvious terrorist intention include women and children among victims. 2. Harman said though he had not seen text May 11 statement by U Thant on situation, 2 he understood it contained very helpful language. In particular, it contained one “very accurate” point that recent incidents showed greater expertise than before.GOI convinced, said Harman, that signs pointed definitely to involvement Syrian Army. 3. Harman said he did not want speculate on what GOI response might be if terrorism continues. He hoped that situation would not arise. Said GOI hoped Syria under no illusions that tactic of terrorism bestows on it some immunity from Israeli response any more than in cases like April 7 when other tactics such as interference with cultivation and shelling of villages from fixed positions are introduced. 4. Battle said he deeply regretted situation of terrorism, which we agree is alarming, and appreciated problems it poses for GOI. He could only commend calmness and restraint. 3 He agreed SYG’s statement might be helpful. Said Dept thinks Lebanese Govt. doing its best to stop terrorism, but one should remember Lebanese internal problems recently fanned by tumult surrounding proposed Sixth Fleet visit, and in any event would be most difficult attain 100 percent success. He was glad to note from Harman’s presentation GOI recognized dangers if situation got out of hand. Also to be kept in mind is that Syria having problems internally with regime’s critics in disorganized and tumultuous way trying to show disapproval. 5. Harman said that while no question Syria is main culprit, Lebanese nonetheless had permitted their soil be used for terrorism seven occasions in short period time. Said GOL is responsible under GAA for taking forthright action against terrorism. 6. Harman agreed with Battle’s statement that increased GOI success recent months in intercepting infiltrators is encouraging note. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ARAB–ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle; cleared by Paolozzi, Davies, and in substance by Robert H. Flenner in EUR/SOV; and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, Jerusalem, and Moscow. 2 The text of the statement made by Secretary-General U Thant during a May 11 press conference is in telegram 5263 from USUN, May 12. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 190856 to Tel Aviv, May 9, expressed concern at the flurry of terrorist incidents in the previous 10 days and instructed the Embassy to counsel restraint. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–LEB) Telegram 191818 to Tel Aviv, May 10, summarized a conversation that day between Davies and Evron in which Davies reiterated this and urged that alternatives to military reprisal be sought. (Ibid.) Index Index AALAPSO Conference, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] Abu Simbel, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Adas, J. Wesley, Jr., 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 576 n [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] -618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 327 ] Adasiya Tunnel, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] Aden. See South Arabia, Federation of . Adoula, Cyril, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] Adzhubei, Aleksei I., 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 52 ] Afghanistan, 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Africa, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Afro-Asian Writers Conference, 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 408 ] Agency for International Development (AID), 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] desalinization, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 299 ] economic aid to the UAR, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] Israel: development loans, 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] -787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] economic aid, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] offsetting of military sales, 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] offshore procurement through, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Jordan police training program, 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 363 ] Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] Ahdab, Ibrahim al-, 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 240 ] Air Force, U.S., 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] Al Ahram, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] Algeria, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] Amer, Ali, 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] Amin, Mostafa, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 228 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 528 n [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Amitay, Morris J., 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 278 ] Anderson, Robert B., 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 138 n [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 673 n [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 749 n [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] Andreotti, Giulio, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] Arab boycott of Israel, 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] Arab Defense Council meeting, Cairo, Dec. 1966, 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 362 ] -709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 362 ] Arab Higher Committee, 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] Arab-Israeli border conflicts. See Border conflicts ; Jordan River water dispute . Arab League, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] Arab Legion, 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] Arab Summit Conference, Cairo, Jan. 1964 , 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 11 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] -51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 212 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] Arab Summit Conference, Cairo, Sept. 1964 , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 91 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 212 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] Arab Summit Conference, Cairo, Sept. 1965 , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 232 ] Arab Summit Conference, Cairo, May 1966 , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] Arab unity, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 204 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 211 ] Arabian Peninsula, 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] Arad, Shimshon, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 58 ] Argentina, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] Argov, Shlomo, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] Arms control ( see also Disarmament ; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections; Nuclear proliferation), 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] aircraft sales, 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 267 ] missiles, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 331 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] Soviet position, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Soviet-U.S. talks, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 111 n [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 536 n [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 272 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] -783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] UAR position, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S. proposals, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] -817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] U.S.-UAR talks, 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 52 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] -146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 71 ] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] Asali, Abu, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] Asha, Rafik, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] Aswan Dam, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 378 ] Atallah, Anton, 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 39 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 41 ] Atassi, Nureddin al-, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 685 n [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 690 n [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 746 n [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 753 n [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 758 n [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 388 ] , 766 n [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 790 n [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Attwood, William H., 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 132 ] Austin, Granville S., 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Australia, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Ayub Khan, Mohammed, 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] Baathists, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 257 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 644 n [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] Bacteriological weapons, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 86 ] Badeau, John S., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] -9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 54 n [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 24 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 52 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] -178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Bahrain Boycott Conference, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] Bahti, James H., 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Balfour Declaration, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 167 ] Ball, George W., 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 310 n [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 323 n [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 349 n [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 350 n [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 408 n [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 431 n [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] Arab states-U.S. relations, 144 n [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 61 ] Dimona nuclear reactor, 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] Israeli arms purchases, 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 391 n [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Israeli-U.S. relations, 147 n [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] -162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 67 ] Jordan River water dispute, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 39 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 130 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 331 n [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 150 ] Palestinian entity, creation of, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 54 ] U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Barbour, Walworth, 36 n [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 40 n [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 231 n [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 307 n [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 358 ] arms control, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 301 ] Dimona nuclear reactor, 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 249 n [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 178 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Fatah attacks on Israel, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 251 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Harriman mission, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 167 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] IAEA nuclear inspections, 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] -737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 377 ] Israeli arms purchases, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] Israeli downing of UAR aircraft, 694 n [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] Israeli missile program, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 37 ] Israeli-U.S. relations, 82 n [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 262 n [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] Jerusalem, 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 811 n [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 413 ] Jordan River water dispute, 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 150 ] Jordanian-Israeli border incidents, 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] -683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] , 779 n [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 398 ] nuclear proliferation, 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] refugees, 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 323 ] Syrian-Israeli border incidents, 181 n [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 791 n [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] UAR missile program, 293 n [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 131 ] U.S. security commitment to Israel, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 58 ] Bar-Hain, Shaul, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Barnes, Robert G., 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 231 n [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Jordan River water dispute, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 213 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 211 n [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 134 ] -301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 405 n [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] Jordanian-Israeli border incidents, 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Jordanian-U.S. relations, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 203 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] Palestine Liberation Organization, 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] West Bank tank ban agreement, 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Battle, Lucius, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] -770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Arab boycott of Israel, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] Congolese rebels, UAR aid, 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 132 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Congressional talks with, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 237 ] Israeli arms purchases, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 197 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 576 n [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] Jordan River water dispute, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 134 ] Lebanese arms purchases, 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] P.L. 480 agreements, 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 252 ] Syrian-Israeli border incidents, 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] -822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 418 ] UAR fear of CIA plot, 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] UAR missile freeze, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 98 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] -426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] -490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] -503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] U.S.-UAR relations, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 197 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] -594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 687 n [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] Yemen conflict, 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] Beam, Jacob D., 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Bedek (Israel Aircraft Industries), 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] Belgium, 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] Bell, David, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 199 n [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 494 n [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 259 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] Ben Bella, Ahmed, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 37 ] Benelux countries, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] Ben-Gurion, David, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 339 ] Benhima, Mohammed, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 194 ] Bennsky, George M., 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 749 n [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] Bergmann, Ernst, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Bergus, Donald C., 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 612 n [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 621 n [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 643 n [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 687 n [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 396 ] -777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 780 n [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Birdsall, James, 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 341 ] Birth control, 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Bishti, Ahmad, 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] Bitan (Israel), 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 119 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 307 n [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 347 n [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 377 ] , 791 n [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] Bittermann, Kathleen, 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Black, Eugene, 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 749 n [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] Blackiston, Slator C., 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Blake, James J., 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 461 n [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] Blaustein, Jacob, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 70 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] Border conflicts ( see also Jordan River water dispute ): Israeli downing of UAR aircraft, 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] Israeli retaliatory raids on Jordan: Arab League response, 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] Israeli position, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] -678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] -683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 363 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] -718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] JCS position, 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 387 ] Jordanian position, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 669 n [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 398 ] Security Council Resolution 228 (1966), 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] -673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] -676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] -688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Syrian position, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 333 ] UAR position, 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 338 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 338 ] U.S. position, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] -664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] -672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 388 ] -760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 398 ] U.S. resolution in Security Council, 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Jordan-Israel border: Fatah raids, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 248 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] Lebanon-Israel border: Fatah raids, 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 248 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Organization of Returning Heroes raids, 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] Syria-Israel border: Afro-Asian position, 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 332 ] attack on Syrian bulldozers, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] attacks on Israeli fishing boats, 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] border disputes, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] cultivation of fields in demilitarized zone, 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] -791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] Israeli massing of troops, 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] Israeli position, 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Israeli raid threats, 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] -743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] Israeli restraint, 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 338 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] -748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] military patrolling, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] planting of land mines, 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] -747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 382 ] Soviet support for Syria, 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 338 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 352 ] Syrian position, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] UAR position, 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 381 ] UN actions, 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] U.S. position, 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] -790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] use of force, 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] Bourguiba, Habib, 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] Bourguiba, Habib, Jr., 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 194 ] Bowie, Robert, 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] Brewer, William D., 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] Brown, Elizabeth Ann, 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 789 n [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] Brown, Kenneth L, 46 n [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 249 n [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] Budget, Bureau of the, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] Buffum, William B., 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 746 n [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] Bull, Gen. Odd, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Bunche, Ralph, 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Bundy, McGeorge, 42 n [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 45 n [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 103 n [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 111 n [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 147 n [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 164 n [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 241 n [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 274 n [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 275 n [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 323 n [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 408 n [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 419 n [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 476 n [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 509 n [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] desalinization, 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 305 ] Dimona nuclear reactor, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] Israeli-U.S. relations, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 148 n [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 533 n [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Israeli arms purchases, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] agreements for, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] aircraft, 539 n [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 264 ] from Britain, 122 n [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] Feldman-Sloan mission, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] Israeli-U.S. disagreements and, 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Jordanian arms purchases, balancing of, 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] tanks, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] -33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 29 ] -72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] -76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] U.S. negotiating strategies for, 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] from Western Europe, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 130 ] -290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 331 n [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 336 n [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 156 ] nuclear proliferation, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 137 n [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 8 n [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 138 n [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 234 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 474 n [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Bundy, William P., 32 n [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Bunker, Ellsworth, 608 n [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 377 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Bunte, Col. Donald W., 182 n [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 202 n [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 208 n [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] Burchinal, Lt. Gen. David A., 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 81 ] Burns, Findley, Jr., 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 662 n [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 669 n [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] -711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 713 n [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 729 n [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 779 n [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 398 ] Burundi, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] Butler, Richard A., 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] Byrd, Lt. Col. Billy W., 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] Califano, Joseph, 763 n [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] Cambodia, 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] Cameron, Turner C., Jr., 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] Campbell, Hugh, 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] Campbell, Stephen J., 72 n [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 476 n [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 790 n [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Canada, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] Carroll, Lt. Gen. Joseph F., 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] -583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 289 ] Carter, Lt. Gen. Marshall S., 31 n [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Castro, Fidel, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 45 ] Central African Republic, 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 249 n [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] Arab-Israeli arms survey, 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 319 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Dimona nuclear reactor, 31 n [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Intelligence Memoranda: No. 0830/66 , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] No. 2205/66 , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] Israeli arms purchases, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] Palestine terrorist organizations, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] Soviet-UAR relations, 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Special Memorandum No. 19–66, 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 338 ] Special Report No. 00699/65A , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 255 ] Study No. 1944/66 , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 319 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Syria plot, charges by the UAR, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] UAR plot, charges of, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 396 ] -777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] U.S. food aid to the UAR, 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 384 ] U.S. Near East initiatives, 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 73 ] Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 408 ] Chad, 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Chapin, Frederic, 72 n [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Chase, Robert, 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] Chase Manhattan Bank, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] Chemical weapons, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] Childs, Marquis, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] China, People’s Republic of, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 223 ] Christian, George, 763 n [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Church, Frank F., 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 102 ] Churchill, Winston S., 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 126 ] Cline, Ray, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] Comay, Michael S., 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credits: for Lebanon, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 411 ] for the UAR, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] UAR rollover of, 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] -809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 412 ] Common Market, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] Congo, Republic of the, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Belgian-U.S. evacuation mission, 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Chinese military aid to rebels, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] UAR military aid to rebels, 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] -283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 132 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 200 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] U.S.-UAR compromise on, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 151 ] Congress, Acts of: Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. See P.L. 480 assistance. Farbstein Amendment, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 45 ] Findlay Amendment, 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 378 ] Food for Peace Act, 1966 , 738 n [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 378 ] Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 , 7 n [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] Gruening Amendment, 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 9 n [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 45 ] Congress, U.S. ( see also Congress, Acts of ; House of Representatives, U.S. ; Senate, U.S.), 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] Arab boycott of Israel, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] attack on U.S. Embassy in Cairo, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] Israeli arms purchases, 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 283 ] Jordan River water dispute, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 283 ] Military Assistance Program budget cuts, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 367 ] Soviet aid to the Arab states, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 41 ] Soviet arms sales to Jordan, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 121 ] UAR economic aid, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] -752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 412 ] UNRWA, support of, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] U.S. economic aid to Israel, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] U.S. military aid to Jordan, 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 372 ] Costa Rica, 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 256 ] Cottam, Howard, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 134 ] Couve de Murville, Maurice, 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] Crawford, William R., Jr., 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] Creel, Robert C., 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] Criddle, Wayne, 27 n [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] -110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 46 ] Critchfield, James, 673 n [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] Cuba, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 60 ] -141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 378 ] Cubic Corporation, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 150 ] Cyprus, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] Czechoslovakia, 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 400 ] Dahomey, 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Daoud, Col. Muhammed, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] Dassault, Marcel, 815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] Davies, Rodger, 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 42 n [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 72 n [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 105 n [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 109 n [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 138 n [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 151 n [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 231 n [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 241 n [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 242 n [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 249 n [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 252 n [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 276 n [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 283 n [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 304 n [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 305 n [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 332 n [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 349 n [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 385 n [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 410 n [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 415 n [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 430 n [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 461 n [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 690 n [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 715 n [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 725 n [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 732 n [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 734 n [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 735 n [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 741 n [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 746 n [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 748 n [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] , 753 n [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 766 n [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 776 n [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 779 n [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 789 n [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 790 n [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 791 n [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 806 n [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 821 n [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] anti-infiltration technology, 716 n [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 388 ] -760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] Israeli arms purchases, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 153 ] Israeli-Jordanian border incidents, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 260 ] Jordan-U.S. relations, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] Lebanese-U.S. relations, 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 643 n [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 378 ] U.S. military aid to Jordan, 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] Davis, Rear Adm. J. W., 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 83 ] Dayan, Moishe, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] De Gaulle, Charles, 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 168 ] Dean, Jonathan, 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] Defense, U.S. Department of, 24 n [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 359 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] -761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] Deif, Nazi, 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 394 ] Demilitarized zones, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] -233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] Denney, George C., Jr., 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 54 ] DePalma, Samuel, 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] Desalinization of sea water: appointment of U.S. representative, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] -814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] financing for, 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 389 ] Israeli position, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 288 ] -581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] Jordanian position, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 39 ] non-nuclear alternative, 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 377 ] by nuclear energy, 32 n [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 259 ] UAR actions toward, 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] UAR-U.S. cooperation in, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] U.S. internal conflict over, 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] U.S. position, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 65 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] -609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 308 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] Dickman, Francois M., 42 n [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 145 n [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 242 n [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Dillon, C. Douglas, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] Dimona nuclear reactor ( see also International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections), 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] foreign participation in research projects, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 331 ] inspection, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 12 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] invitations and scheduling for, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 406 ] Israeli position, 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 178 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 407 ] Israeli request for delay, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] -242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] -250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] results of, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] -583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] U.S. military and economic aid tied to, 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] -797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 407 ] U.S. requirements, 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 263 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Israeli misleading of U.S. regarding, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] U.S. reassurance to the UAR, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] -75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] -103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Din, Khalid Muhyi al-, 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 232 ] Dinsmore, Lee F., 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Dinstein, Zvi, 483 n [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] Disarmament ( see also Arms control ), 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 217 ] Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 272 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] Duke, Angier Biddle, 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] Dulles, John Foster, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 392 ] Duncan, Enoch S., 37 n [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 105 n [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] East Ghor Canal, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] Eban, Abba, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] -537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] anti-infiltration technology, 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 388 ] arms control, 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] border incidents, 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] -682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 363 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] -718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] , 791 n [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] Dimona nuclear reactor inspections, 413 n [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 734 n [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Fatah, 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] IAEA inspections, 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] -737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 377 ] Israeli arms purchases, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Israeli-U.S. relations, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 268 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] -650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] Jordan River water dispute, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] Jordanian-Israeli secret talks, 713 n [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] military inspections by U.S. attaches, 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 358 ] nuclear proliferation, 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] refugees, 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 266 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 323 ] UAR missile threat, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 366 ] -718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] U.S. military aid to Jordan, 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 360 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] U.S. security commitment to Israel, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] Vietnam conflict, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] Egypt. See United Arab Republic (UAR). Egyptian General Intelligence Agency, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] Egyptian Oil Authority, 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] Egypt/Israel Military Armistice Commission (EIMAC), 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] Eisenhower, Dwight D., 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Eisenhower Doctrine, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 60 ] El Al, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] El Salvador, 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 256 ] Eleish (UAR), 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] Ellender, Allen, 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 394 ] Erhard, Ludwig, 127 n [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 216 ] Eshkol, Levi: Arab threat to Israel, 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 260 ] arms control, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 301 ] border incidents: attack on Syrian bulldozers, 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Fatah attacks, 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 251 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Syrian-Israeli border, 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] -743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] Jordanian-Israeli border, 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] -678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] -682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] Lebanese-Israeli border, 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 248 ] desalinization, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 389 ] Dimona nuclear reactor inspections: delay, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] -242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] -250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] Israeli position, 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 407 ] U.S. reassurance to the UAR, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 48 n [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] -103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] U.S. requirements for, 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 263 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] exchanges with Pres. Johnson, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 241 n [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 337 ] -666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] -672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 388 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] IAEA inspections, 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 377 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] Israeli arms purchases: agreements for, 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] aircraft, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 163 ] -356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Feldman-Sloan mission, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 58 ] -137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] FRG-Italian tank transfer arrangements, 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 99 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] Israeli-U.S. disagreements over, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 179 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 179 ] missiles, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] tanks, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] U.S. negotiation strategies for, 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] U.S. position, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] Jerusalem, status of 447–448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 413 ] Jordan River water dispute, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2 n [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Jordanian arms purchases: Harriman mission, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] -345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 360 n [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 169 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 175 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] Israeli position, 298 n [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] Komer mission, 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] -335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] U.S. agreement for, 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 131 ] Jordanian-Israeli relations, 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] nuclear proliferation, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] political situation in Israel, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 216 ] refugees, 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] UAR missile threat, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 17 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 37 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 37 ] U.S. aid programs, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 99 ] U.S. economic aid to Israel, 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] U.S.-Israeli relations, 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 262 n [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 358 ] U.S. military aid to Israel, 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] -788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 406 ] U.S. security commitment to Israel, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 37 ] -86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 37 ] Vietnam conflict, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] visits: Washington, June 1964, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 29 ] -72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 119 n [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 60 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 63 ] -163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 172 n [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] Washington, proposed, 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] Ethiopia, 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] European Economic Community (EEC), 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] Evron, Ephraim, 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] -673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] -726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 791 n [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 811 n [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 821 n [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] Export-Import Bank, 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 741 n [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] -787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 808 n [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] Farbstein, Leonard, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Farr, Walter G., Jr., 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Farra (Jordan), 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] Fatah: attacks on Israel: Israeli position, 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] Israeli retaliation, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 248 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 287 ] from Jordan, 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 251 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 327 ] U.S. position, 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 342 ] CIA view of, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] Israeli listing of members, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] Kuwaiti support for, 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] Saudi support for, 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] Syrian support for, 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] Fawzi, Mahmoud, 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 687 n [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] -755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] Fedayeen, 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] Fedorenko, Nikolai T., 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] Feinberg, Abraham, 122 n [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] -587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 671 n [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 704 n [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 359 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 360 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] -724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] Feldman, Myer ( see also Feldman-Sloan mission ), 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 61 n [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 230 n [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Israeli arms purchases, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 66 n [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 588 n [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] Israeli-U.S. relations, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 261 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 156 ] U.S. military aid to Israel, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 99 ] visit to Israel, Apr. 1964, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 29 ] -72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] Feldman-Sloan mission, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] -137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Feqi, Ahman Hassan al-, 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] Fertilizer, 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Finney, John W., 413 n [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 193 ] Fisher, Adrian S., 46 n [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] Flenner, Robert H., 821 n [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] Food-for-Freedom Program, 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Ford, Emmet B., 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] Ford Motor Company, 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] Foster, William C., 114 n [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] Fountain, L. H., 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] Fowler, Henry, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] France ( see also France and French subheadings under other subjects ), 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 74 ] -178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] Freeman, Orville, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 808 n [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] Free World Air Intelligence Briefs, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 81 ] Freund, Richard B., 145 n [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] Fritsch, Arnold R., 30 n [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 12 ] Fulbright, J. William, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 102 ] Galili, Israel, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Gamon, David L., 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 741 n [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 806 n [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 411 ] Gardner, James R., 643 n [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 776 n [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 396 ] Garthoff, Raymond L., 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Gathright, Wreatham E., 145 n [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] Gaza strip, 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] Gazit, Mordechai, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 72 n [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 293 n [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 201 ] -431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 459 n [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 476 n [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] Gbenye, Christophe, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 132 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 200 ] Geba, Gen., 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] Geneva Disarmament Conference, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 169 n [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 193 ] George, Scott, 304 n [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Germany, Democratic Republic of, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 197 ] Germany, Federal Republic of ( see also Germany, Federal Republic of and FRG subheadings under other subjects ), 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 194 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] Ginsberg, David, 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 407 ] -798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 811 n [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 413 ] Gleysteen, Culver, 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Goldberg, Arthur, 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 707 n [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 363 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] -715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368 ] -724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 414 ] -814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] Goodpaster, Gen. Andrew, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] Gordon, Herbert, 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Grant, James P., 208 n [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 211 n [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 212 n [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 94 ] Great Society, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Greece, 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] Greenhill, Denis, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] Gromyko, Andrey Andreyevich, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 536 n [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 352 ] Gruening, Ernest, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Guerrilla warfare, 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] Habib (UAR), 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Hafiz, Amin al-, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] Haikal, Hassanain, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 393 ] Hakim, Georges, 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 240 ] -499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] -803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 806 n [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 411 ] Handley, William J., 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 505 n [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 685 n [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 715 n [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 725 n [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 732 n [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 734 n [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] , 746 n [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] -753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 766 n [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] Hand, Lloyd, 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] Hani, Nasir, 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] Haradh conference, 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] Hare, Raymond A., 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 562 n [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 612 n [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 673 n [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] Dimona nuclear reactor, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] Israeli arms purchases, 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 316 ] border incidents, 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 248 ] -511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] -646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 333 ] -659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] -664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 671 n [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 339 ] Israel-U.S. relations, 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 314 ] Jordan-U.S. relations, 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 284 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] political situation in Jordan, 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] refugees, 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 639 n [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 315 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] Harlech, Lord, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] Harman, Avraham, 293 n [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Arab threat to Israel, 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 260 ] Israeli arms purchases, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] -62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 122 n [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 179 ] -387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] : Border incidents: Israeli-Jordanian border, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 123 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] -646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 333 ] -664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] -679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] Israeli-Lebanon border, 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 248 ] -511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 248 ] Israeli-Syrian border, 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] -822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 418 ] Jordan, U.S. military aid to, 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] -726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] -733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] Jordan River water dispute, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 298 n [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] Palestine Liberation Organization, 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] refugees, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] U.S. economic aid to Israel, 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] U.S. military aid to Israel, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] -749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] U.S.-Israeli relations, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] -262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 288 ] -582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 314 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 61 n [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 72 n [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 105 n [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 111 n [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 160 n [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 199 n [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 241 n [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 381 n [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] arms control, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 98 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] desalinization, 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Eshkol visit to Washington, June 1964,152, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] Harriman mission ( see also Jordanian arms purchases below ), 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] -388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] instructions for, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] proposals for, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] reports from, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 195 ] Israeli arms purchases, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Jordan River water dispute, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] Jordanian aircraft purchases, 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] Jordanian arms purchases ( see also Harriman mission above ), 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] nuclear proliferation, 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] U.S. economic aid to Israel, 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] U.S. security commitment to Israel, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] Vietnam conflict, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] Hart, Parker T., 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 134 ] Hassan, Prince, 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] Hassanoua, Mohammad A.B., 225 n [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] Havana Conference, 1966, 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Hawk missiles, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 29 ] Israeli purchases: 1962 agreement for, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] as counterbalance to UAR, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 193 ] credits, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 774 n [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Lebanese purchase, 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 400 ] -785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] maintenance, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Haykal, Hassanein, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] Haynes, Col., 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] Helms, Richard M., 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 584 n [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 791 n [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Helou, Charles, 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 741 n [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] -804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 411 ] Hennessey, Helen, 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Herzog, Jack, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] Hickenlooper, Bourke, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 117 ] Hoopes, Townsend W., 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 550 n [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 697 n [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 706 n [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 753 n [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] Hornig, Donald F., 587 n [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 606 n [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 305 ] -609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Horton, Frank, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Houghton, Robert B., 753 n [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 779 n [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 789 n [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 790 n [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] House of Representatives, U.S., 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 132 ] Hughes, Thomas L., 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] Humphrey, Hubert H., 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 363 ] Husayni, Hajj Amin al-, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] Hussein I, Ibn Talal, King of Jordan, 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Arab-Israeli relations, 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Arab-Jordanian relations, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 134 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] exchanges with Pres. Johnson, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 337 ] -666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] Harriman mission, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 203 ] Israeli arms purchases, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 283 ] Israeli downing of UAR aircraft, 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] Israeli-Jordanian border incidents: Fatah raids, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] -472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 648 n [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] Israeli retaliation for, 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] -659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 335 ] -669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 366 ] Israeli-Jordanian relations, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Israeli view of, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] Jordan River water dispute, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] -110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 213 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 130 ] agreements for, 394 n [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] -401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 188 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] aircraft, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] -195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 112 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] -686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] Israeli position, 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] Jordanian proposal for, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] from the Soviet Union, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 262 ] UAR-Jordanian talks on, 338–339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 154 ] UAR position, 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 194 ] U.S. offers for, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 139 ] -312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 141 ] -316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 149 ] U.S. position, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 339 ] Lebanese view of, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] Palestine Liberation Organization, 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] political stability of, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] -683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] refugees, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] UAR-Jordanian relations, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 130 ] -290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] Unified Arab Command, 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 126 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 134 ] U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] U.S.-Jordanian relations, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] -3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 203 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] U.S. military aid to Jordan, 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 360 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 367 ] -722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 405 ] West Bank occupation as Israeli goal, 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 366 ] West Bank tank ban agreement, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] -618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] Hutchinson, Edmond, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] Idris as Sanusi, King Muhammad, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 194 ] India, 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] -679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 406 ] Indonesia, 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG), 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] -752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] -785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] Interior, U.S. Department of, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 299 ] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections (see also Arms control ; Dimona nuclear reactor ; Nuclear proliferation ), 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] alternatives to, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 331 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] arms sales to Israel tied to, 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 160 ] desalinization, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 299 ] Israeli position, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] Israeli rejection, 447 n [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] -816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] Israeli-UAR joint acceptance, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] Israeli-U.S. talks, 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] -737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 377 ] requirements, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] Soviet-U.S. talks, 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] UAR compliance, 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 377 ] -737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 377 ] UAR position, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] universal acceptance, 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] U.S. military and economic aid tied to, 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] U.S. position, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] -809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 412 ] International General Electric, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] International Monetary Fund (IMF), 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 808 n [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] Intra Bank, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 408 ] Iran, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 408 ] Iraq, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 319 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] Islamic Pact, 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] Israel ( see also Border conflicts ; Fatah ; Israeli arms purchases ; Israel and Israeli subheadings under other subjects; Jerusalem ), 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 65 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Arab boycott, 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] Arab states, relations with, 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Arab threat to, 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 260 ] Argentine sales of uranium concentrate, 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] defense budget, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] demilitarized zones, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] -233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] deterrent posture, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 63 ] -149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] economic situation, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] elections, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] elimination, as Arab goal, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] expansionism, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 52 ] France, relations with, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] Harriman mission, 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] -388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 203 ] instructions for, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] proposal for, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] reports from, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 195 ] immigration to, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 39 ] Jordan, relations with, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] border issues, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Fatah connections, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] secret talks, 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] unwritten agreements, 664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] West Bank military reinforcement, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] Komer mission, 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 149 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] Lebanon, relations with, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 248 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] military capability, 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 319 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] military strategy, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 366 ] missile development, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] nuclear weapons development, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] French aid for, 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] international inspection, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Israeli-U.S. talks, 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Jordanian position, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Syrian position, 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] technical capacity, 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] -815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] UAR position, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 331 ] UAR possible response to, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] U.S. position, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 178 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] -583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] Palestine, status of, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] PLO policy toward, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 199 ] political situation, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] -537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 377 ] shipping rights, 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 83 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] Syria, relations with: border disputes, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] increased tension in, 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 322 ] -639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Israeli massing of troops, 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] Israeli use of napalm, 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 316 ] military patrolling, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] technical aid, 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] territorial claims, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] UAR missile threat, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 17 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 37 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] UAR policy toward, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] United Arab Republic, relations with, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] United States, relations with, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 25 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 261 ] -534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] U.S. economic aid, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] commodities, 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] development loans, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] -787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Haifa loan, 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] offshore procurement, 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] under P.L. 480, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] -130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 406 ] as subsidy for military expenses, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] -130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 259 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] support for development assistance, 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] universities, funding for, 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] U.S. intelligence surveillance, 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] U.S. military aid, 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] indirect subsidies, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 259 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] IRG discussion of, 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] -784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 400 ] Israeli request for, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] -51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] JCS position, 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] -757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 387 ] under MAP, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] recommendations for, 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] -819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] sales instead of grants, 812 [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 414 ] -813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] for support in Syria confrontation, 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] -749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] U.S. policy toward, 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] U.S. security commitment, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 26 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 37 ] -86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 63 ] -149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 160 n [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 169 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] West Bank occupation as goal, 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 366 ] Israel-Egypt General Armistice Agreement, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement, 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Israel/Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission (IJMAC), 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 779 n [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 398 ] Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement, 822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 418 ] Israel/Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC), 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 248 ] Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement, July 1949, 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] Israel/Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC), 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] , 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Israeli arms purchases (see also Israel ; Arms control ), 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] aircraft, 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 316 ] accelerated delivery of, 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] agreements on, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 283 ] disclosure of, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] from France, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] requests for, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 163 ] -356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 271 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 271 ] UAR position, 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] U.S. position, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 271 ] U.S. proposals for, 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] Weizmann visit, Oct. 1965, 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 263 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] from Western Europe, 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 236 ] anti-infiltration technology, 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 388 ] -760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] anti-tank weapons, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 28 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 55 ] financing, 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 58 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 58 ] from France, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 215 ] Germany, Federal Republic, tank sales, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 58 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] German reneging, 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 143 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 193 ] Israeli request, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 58 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] Jordanian knowledge, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 149 ] publicity, 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] transfer via Italy, 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 99 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 184 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] UAR position, 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 197 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 215 ] uncertainty over, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] U.S. position, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 169 ] U.S. replacements, 394 n [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] increased need for, 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Jordanian arms purchases, balancing of, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 140 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] -338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] -341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 153 ] -338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] missiles, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 29 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] deterrence as objective of, 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] from France, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 29 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 588 n [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] -816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] nuclear fuel, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] secrecy requirements for, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 58 ] -137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] -162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 99 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 140 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 163 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 184 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 261 ] tanks ( see also Germany, Federal Republic of, tank sales above ; U.S. direct sale of tanks and U.S. tank sales below ): British sales of, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 122 n [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 58 ] conversion kits, 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] European sales, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] French sales, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] Italian sales, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] training for use, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 95 ] -216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] from the United Kingdom, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] U.S. direct sale of tanks, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] -51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] -62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 33 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 173 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] Arab response, 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] -102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] cover story for talks, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] Defense Department team visit, Tel Aviv, Feb. 1964, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] delay in commitment, 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 29 ] -72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] -76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] domestic political difficulties, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] JCS position, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 55 ] refusal, 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Soviet response, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] U.S. provision of conversion kits, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 58 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 95 ] -216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] U.S.-UAR talks, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] from Western Europe, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 47 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 405 ] U.S. tank sales, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] agreements, 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] credit terms, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] disclosure, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] French position, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 271 ] Harriman mission, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] -388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 203 ] Israeli raids on Jordan and, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 344 ] -681 [ Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Komer mission, 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 149 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] Peres gambit, 394 n [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] UAR position, 432 n [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 207 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 253 ] -520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] U.S. negotiation strategies, 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] U.S. notification of Arabs regarding, 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 193 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 194 ] U.S. position, 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 193 ] Italy ( see also Italy and Italian subheadings under other subjects ), 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 387 ] Jackson, Elmore, 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] Jaeger, George W., 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Japan, 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] Jarrah, Muhammad, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] Javits, Jacob, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Jefferson, Thomas, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 102 ] Jenkins, Walter, 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 122 n [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] Jernegan, John D., 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 61 n [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 72 n [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 109 n [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 138 n [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 143 n [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 145 n [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 151 n [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 249 n [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 293 n [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 298 n [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 304 n [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 310 n [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 332 n [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 360 n [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 370 n [ Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] -380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 201 ] -431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 461 n [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] Jerusalem, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 123 ] Independence Day parade, U.S. attendance, 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 413 ] -811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Jordanian-Israeli border incidents, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] -646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 651 n [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] Knesset opening ceremonies, 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] relocation of U.S. Embassy, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Jewish Council of Presidents, 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] Jews, American ( see also Zionism ), 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 407 ] Israeli arms purchases, 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 267 ] Jerusalem, status of, 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 413 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 182 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] tank sales to Israel, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 60 ] -141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] U.S. military aid to Israel, 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] Vietnam conflict, opposition to, 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 314 ] Jews, Moroccan, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] Jews, Soviet, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 338 ] Jidda Agreement, Aug. 1965, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 393 ] Johnson, Charles E., 30 n [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 12 ] Johnson, Joseph E., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 25 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] Johnson, Lyndon B., 9 n [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 335 n [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 336 n [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 555 n [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 272 ] Arab states-U.S. relations, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 41 ] arms control, 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] border incidents: Jordanian-Israeli border, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 333 ] -660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] -664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] -678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] Syrian-Israeli border, 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] Congolese rebels, UAR aid to, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] correspondence: with Eshkol, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 241 n [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 337 ] -666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] -672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 388 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] with Hussein, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 337 ] -666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] with Nasser, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] -46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] -199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] -459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Nasser exchange proposals, 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] desalinization, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 587 n [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 305 ] Dimona nuclear reactor inspections, 31 n [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] -103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] -242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] IAEA inspections, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] Israel: missile development, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 17 ] Eshkol visit to Washington, June 1964, 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] Shazar visit to Washington, Aug. 1966, 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 314 ] United States, relations with, 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] U.S. economic aid, 226 n [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 587 n [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368 ] -723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 414 ] U.S. military aid, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] U.S. security commitment to, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 26 ] Israeli arms purchases, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 193 ] agreements, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] aircraft, 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Feldman-Sloan mission, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] -126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 58 ] Jordanian arms purchases, balancing of, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] tanks, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 29 ] -72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 391 n [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] from Western Europe, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 216 ] Israeli-Jordanian secret talks, 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Jerusalem, 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 413 ] Jordan: United States, relations with, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] -3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] U.S. economic aid, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] U.S. interest in security, 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] U.S. military aid, 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 359 ] -708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368 ] -724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] Jordan River water dispute, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2 n [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 140 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] aircraft, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 130 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] Harriman mission, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 160 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 169 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] Israeli response, 307 n [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 156 ] Komer mission, 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] tanks, 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] U.S. proposals, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] nuclear proliferation, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 52 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 331 ] refugees, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] -178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 197 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 315 ] -629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 394 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] -426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 476 n [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] U.S. security commitments in the Near East, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] Yemen conflict, 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Johnson, U. Alexis, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 160 n [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Johnston, Eric, 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Johnston Plan ( see also Jordan River water dispute ): Arab states position, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 212 ] Israeli position, 2 n [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 174 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] Jordanian position, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] Lebanese position, 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 240 ] UAR position, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] UN role in support, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 349 n [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] U.S. differences with Israel, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 179 ] U.S.-Israeli negotiations, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 174 ] U.S. position, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 65 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 201 ] Wiener-Criddle technical formula, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] -110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] -380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 176 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] documents, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 81 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] -702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] -757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 387 ] Israeli arms purchases, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 55 ] Israeli deterrent posture, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 63 ] -149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 65 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 81 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 246 n [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] Near East arms balance, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 211 ] U.S. military aid to Israel, 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] -757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 405 ] U.S. military aid to Jordan, 700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] -702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] Jones, Curtis F., 105 n [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 212 n [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 276 n [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 332 n [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , Jones, Jim, 811 n [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 413 ] Jones, Owen T., 735 n [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] Jones, Paul W., 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] Jordan, Col., 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of ( see also Border conflicts ; Fatah ; Jordanian arms purchases; Jordan and Jordanian subheadings under other subjects ; West Bank): Arab states-U.S. relations, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] border conflicts, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] economic situation, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 41 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 41 ] Fatah connections, Israeli listing of, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] foreign radio rebroadcasts, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 203 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 203 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 203 ] Iran, relations with, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] Iraq, relations with, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] Israel, relations with, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 352 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Kuwait, relations with, 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 245 ] Kuwaiti military aid, 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 373 ] Lebanon, relations with, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] Libyan military aid to, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 373 ] military situation, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 28 ] border troop buildup, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 123 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] force level increases, 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 372 ] -729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] Iraqi/Saudi troop stationing plan, 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] -729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 373 ] pay increases, 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 357 ] -702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 373 ] military threat to Israel, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] Nasserist threat, 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] Near East arms race, 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 319 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] nuclear weapons, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Palestine Liberation Organization, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 255 ] Palestinian threat, 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 367 ] political situation, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 335 ] -669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 339 ] refugee resettlement projects, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] Saudi Arabia, relations with, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] Saudi military and economic aid, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 203 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 373 ] Soviet influence on, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 362 ] Syria, relations with, 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 362 ] Syrian threat, 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 372 ] traditional nature of, 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] UAR threat, 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] United Arab Republic, relations with, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 687 n [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] United States, relations with, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] -3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 362 ] U.S. economic aid, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 284 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] U.S. interest in security, 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] U.S. military aid, 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 405 ] Israeli position, 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 359 ] -705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 360 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] -726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] -733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] Jordanian request for, 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 352 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] -702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] -711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] -732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] U.S. proposals for, 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] -707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] -722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 367 and Doc. 368 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] West Bank military reinforcement, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] West Bank tank ban agreement, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] -618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] Jordan River water dispute ( see also Arab-Israeli border conflict; Johnston Plan ): Arab diversion of water: Arab planning, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 212 ] Israeli position, 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Israeli pre-emptive action against, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 349 n [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 165 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 178 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 187 ] -403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Jordanian position, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 209 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 213 ] Soviet aid, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] UAR position, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 200 ] U.S. position, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 194 ] -417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Arab-U.S. disagreement over, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] Harriman-Komer talks, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] Israeli diversion of water, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2 n [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] Israeli position, 2 n [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Israeli-U.S. talks, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 37 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] Jordanian diversion of water, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] Jordanian position, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 84 ] -195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 129 ] Jordanian-U.S. talks on, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 213 ] Lebanese diversion of water, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 174 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 201 ] -431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] -478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 240 ] -499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 240 ] Lebanese position, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 134 ] salinity, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 39 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 46 ] Syrian diversion of water, 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 178 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 240 ] Syrian position, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 134 ] UAR position, 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 197 ] UAR-U.S. talks on, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 193 ] U.S. position, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] U.S. tank sales to Israel and, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 58 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 58 ] Western oil interests, affected by, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] Wiener-Criddle technical formula, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] -110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 176 ] Jordanian arms purchases: aircraft, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 75 ] accelerated delivery, 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] -686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] agreements, 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 373 ] disclosure, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] from France, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 254 ] Israeli position, 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] State-Defense Department differences, 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] UAC funding, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 82 ] -191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 254 ] from the UAR, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] UAR position, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 254 ] from the United Kingdom, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 254 ] U.S. position, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 82 ] -191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] -195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] -275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] U.S. proposals for, 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] from Western Europe, 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] anti-infiltration technology, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 352 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] British position, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] British-U.S. talks on, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 93 ] from France, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 138 ] from Germany, Federal Republic of, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 138 ] ground equipment, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] -191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Harriman mission, 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] -388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 203 ] instructions for, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] proposal for, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] reports from, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 195 ] implications of, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] -208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Israeli arms purchases, balancing of, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 140 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] -338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] -341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] Jordanian proposal, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 41 ] Jordanian-UAR talks, 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 154 ] Kuwaiti funding, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] from the Soviet Union: Israeli position, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 179 ] Jordanian commitment not to buy, 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Jordanian position, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] U.S. position, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] -344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 346 ] tanks, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 260 ] conversion, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 373 ] from the UAR, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 346 ] from the United Kingdom, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 138 ] from the United States (see also Harriman mission above ): agreements for, 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] -401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 188 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 373 ] credit terms for, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] disclosure of, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Iraqi position, 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] Israeli position, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 121 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 298 n [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 163 ] -356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] -399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 260 ] Israeli-U.S. disagreements over, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 179 ] -387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Komer mission, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 149 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 195 ] security guarantee in lieu of, 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 126 ] tanks, 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 260 ] UAR position, 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 392 ] -768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] UAR-U.S. talks on, 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 94 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 193 ] U.S. discussion, 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] -275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 344 ] U.S. domestic reaction, 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 140 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] U.S. offers, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 139 ] -312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 141 ] -316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] -330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] U.S. Near East policy and, 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] from Western Europe, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 112 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] Joyce, J. Wallace, 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] Judd, Thomas M., 609 n [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Juma, Saad, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 254 ] Kaissouni, Abdel Moneim, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] -490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] -503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Kamel, Mustafa, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] Arab boycott of Israel, 240 n [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] attack on U.S. Embassy in Cairo, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] CIA involvement in the UAR, 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 234 ] Near East, UAR peace plan, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] nuclear proliferation, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] political situation in Jordan, 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 200 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] food aid, 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 378 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 381 ] new P.L. 480 agreements, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 229 ] -482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] U.S.-UAR relations, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] -558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 315 ] -629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] -782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] -809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 412 ] Yemen conflict, 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 296 ] Kanza, Thomas, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 132 ] Karame, Rashid, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] -804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 409 ] Kasavubu, Joseph, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 132 ] Kashmir, 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] -679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] Kassem, Abdul Karim el-, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 363 ] , 713 n [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] -718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] -726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] -733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 746 n [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] -749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 763 n [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 394 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] -809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 412 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] -818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 416 ] Kayyali (Syria), 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] Kean, John, 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] Keating, Kenneth B., 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] Kennedy, Jacqueline, 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] Kennedy, John F., 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] Arab states-U.S. relations, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 60 ] correspondence with Nasser, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] -45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] Israel, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 138 n [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 399 ] U.S. security commitments in the Near East, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] Kent, Sherman, 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 338 ] Khammash, Brig. Amer, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] -195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 202 n [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 572 n [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 352 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 357 ] -702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 363 ] -713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] -720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 723 n [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 729 n [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 373 ] -732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 779 n [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 398 ] Khouli, Hassan Sabri al-, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] Khrushchev, Nikita S., 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 197 ] Killgore, Andrew I., 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 202 n [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 208 n [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 211 n [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 212 n [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 283 n [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 310 n [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Kinsolving, Lucien L., 72 n [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 476 n [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 46 n [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] Knight, Ridgway B., 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] -232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 134 ] -301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 134 ] Kollek, Theodore, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] Komer, Robert W., 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 45 n [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 124 n [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 145 n [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 151 n [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 196 n [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 205 n [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 208 n [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 241 n [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 249 n [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 315 n [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 410 n [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 415 n [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 461 n [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 509 n [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 555 n [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] Arab-U.S. relations, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] Dimona nuclear reactor, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] -103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 304 n [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 305 n [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] Eshkol visit to Washington, June 1964, 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 63 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] Eshkol visit to Washington, proposed, 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Israeli arms purchases, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] -33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 179 ] agreements, 394 n [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] aircraft, 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 539 n [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] European talks, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] Feldman-Sloan mission, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] Jordanian arms purchases, balancing of, 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] missiles, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] tanks from Western Europe, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] U.S. negotiation strategies, 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Israeli-U.S. relations, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 261 ] -534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Jordan-Israel border incidents, 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] -664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Jordan River water dispute, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 174 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] -275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] -310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 140 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] aircraft, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 112 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Harriman mission, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] -344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Komer mission, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 149 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 195 ] Jordanian-U.S. relations, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] nuclear proliferation, 137 n [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] tanks, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 33 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 33 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 8 n [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 234 ] U.S. economic aid to Israel, 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] -426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 237 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] U.S. military aid to Israel, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 99 ] U.S. military aid to Jordan, 704 n [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 359 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 360 ] U.S. Near East policy, 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] U.S. security commitment to Israel, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 33 ] Korea, Democratic Republic of, 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] Korea, Republic of, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Kosygin, Aleksey N., 570 n [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Kranich, Robert H., 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] Kratzer, Myron B., 249 n [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] Kuss, Henry J., Jr., 96 n [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] Kuwait, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 245 ] Lambrakis, George B., 790 n [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Laos, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] Latin America, 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Lebanon ( see also Border conflicts ; Lebanon and Lebanese subheadings under other subjects ): Arab League arms aid, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 40 ] Arab states-U.S. relations, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] cross-border raids, 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 248 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] economic situation, 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 408 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 408 ] Israel, relations with, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] Jordan, relations with, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] Kuwaiti economic aid, 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 408 ] military capability, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 28 ] Near East arms race, 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 319 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] political situation, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 411 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] refugees, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] Soviet economic and military aid, 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 411 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] Syria, relations with, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] -804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 409 ] Syrian raid on Israel via, 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] -822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 418 ] transfer of water to Syria and Jordan, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 174 ] UAR, relations with, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] UAR threat, 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] United States, relations with, 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] U.S. economic aid to, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 408 ] -802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 411 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] U.S. military aid to, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 400 ] -785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] U.S. military intervention, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 74 ] U.S. Sixth Fleet visits, 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 408 ] -804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] Levavi (Israel), 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] -395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 467 n [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 681 n [ Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Lewis, Geoffrey W., 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] Libya, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] Lightner, E. Allen, Jr., 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Long, Richard G., 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] Looram, Matthew J., 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] Lubrani, Uri, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] Lumumba, Patrice, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 45 ] Ma’arri, Ra’if, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] MacArthur, Douglas II, 431 n [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] MacDonald, Adm., 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] Macomber, William, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 105 n [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 84 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 202 n [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 310 n [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 332 n [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 697 n [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 363 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] -720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] Maghreb, 89 n [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] Makarios, Archbishop, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] Makhous, Ibrahim, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 257 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] Malaysia, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] Mali, 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 653 n [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] Mann, Thomas, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 259 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Maqarin Dam, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] Mason, Edward, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] McAfee, William, 643 n [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] McCaskill, Charles W., 239 n [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] McCloskey, Robert J., 576 n [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] McCloy, John J., 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] McCone, John A., 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 80 n [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] -130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] McGhee, George C., 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] McKesson, John, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] McNamara, Robert S., 124 n [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 660 n [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 763 n [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] Dimona nuclear reactor inspections, 572 n [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] Israeli arms purchases, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] agreements, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] aircraft, 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] Defense Department team visit, Tel Aviv, Feb. 1964, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Feldman-Sloan mission, 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] French aircraft, 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 172 ] JCS position, 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Jordanian arms purchases, balancing of, 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Near East arms balance, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] tanks, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] U.S. negotiating strategies, 391 n [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] U.S. proposals for, 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] Israeli exports to the United States, 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] Jordanian-Israeli border incidents, 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 339 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 246 n [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] U.S. military aid to Israel, 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] -794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] U.S. military aid to Jordan, 700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 702 n [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 363 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] -720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 372 ] U.S. security commitment to Israel, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] Vietnam, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] McNaughton, John T., 61 n [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] -12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 550 n [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] McPherson, Harry, 811 n [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 413 ] Mecom, John W., 254 n [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] Meir, Golda, 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] Arab threat to Israel, 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] Fatah attacks from Jordan, 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 251 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Feldman-Sloan mission, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 58 ] Israeli arms purchases, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] Israeli attacks on Jordan, 467 n [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 220 ] Israeli-Jordanian secret talks, 713 n [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 156 ] Harriman mission, 347 n [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 173 ] Jordan River water dispute, 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Lebanese-Israeli border incidents, 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 248 ] Palestine Liberation Organization, 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 256 ] refugees, 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] Soviet economic aid to Jordan, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] U.S.-Israeli relations, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] Mexico, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Meyer, Armin H., 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 231 n [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] Meyers, Howard, 208 n [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] Michel, Robert H., 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Middle East. See Near East . Mifti, Jawdat, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] Military Air Transport Service (MATS), 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] Military Assistance Program (MAP): for Israel, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] for Jordan, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] tightness of funds for, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] Monk, George D., 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Monroney, Mike, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 102 ] Moore, George C., 239 n [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] Moqeiba Dam, 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] Moratt, Shimon, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] Morgan, John T., 741 n [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] Morocco, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] Moyers, Bill D., 8 n [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 660 n [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Muhieddin, Zacharia, 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 302 ] -604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] Mukheiba Dam, 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] Munn, Robert H., 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] Muntassir, Omar, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 194 ] Muraywid, Hassan, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Muslim Brotherhood, 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] Nahal Soreq reactor, 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] Napalm, 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 316 ] Naqib, Usamah, 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] Nasser, Gamel Abdul, 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] anti-American statements, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] -254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 392 ] as Arab leader, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Arab Summit Conference, Cairo, Jan. 1964, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 212 ] Arab unity, 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] arms control, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] missile proposals, 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] -222 [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] UN talks, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] U.S. position, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] U.S.-UAR talks, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 52 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] as Beirut newspaper owner, 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 393 ] blocking of Ford assets, 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] border conflicts, 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 381 ] CIA plots against, belief in, 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 396 ] -777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] Congolese rebels, UAR aid to, 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] -283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] correspondence: with Pres. Johnson, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] -46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] -199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] -459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Pres. Johnson exchange proposals, 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] with Pres. Kennedy, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] -45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] detention of U.S. attache, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 228 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 228 ] Dimona nuclear reactor, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] economic situation in the UAR, 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] foreign bases in the Near East, 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Germany, Federal Republic of-UAR relations, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 421 n [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 197 ] IAEA inspections, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] Iranian view of, 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 400 ] Israeli arms purchases, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] Israeli-UAR relations, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] Israeli view of, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] Jordan, influence in, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 91 ] Jordan River water dispute, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 124 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] Jordanian-UAR relations, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 130 ] Jordanian view of, 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] Latin American subversion, 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] Lebanese view of, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] missile program, 113 n [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] nuclear energy, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] nuclear proliferation, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 331 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] Palestine, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] re-election, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] Saudi-UAR relations, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] Soviet economic aid to the UAR, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] Soviet military aid to the UAR, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] Soviet-UAR relations, 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] Syria plot charges, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] threats to Israel, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 267 ] U.S. desire to overthrow, 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 592 n [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] commodity loans, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 302 ] food aid, changes in, 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 378 ] Israeli position, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] P.L. 480, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 384 ] U.S. decision on agreement for, 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 253 ] U.S.-UAR relations, 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] -81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 284 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] -770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 393 ] Vietnam conflict, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] visit to Moscow, Aug. 1965, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] -488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] war, probability of, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] Western interests, threats against, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 187 ] Yemen, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] National Charter for Palestine, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 54 ] National Intelligence Estimates, 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] NIE 4–2–64 , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] NIE 36–64 , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] NIE 30–65 , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 187 ] -403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 187 ] NIE 36.1–66 , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] NIE 30–67 , 791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] National Security Action Memoranda, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 66 n [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] NSAM 290 , 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] -76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 47 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] NSAM 319 , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] National Security Council: 544 th meeting, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] 545th, 307 n [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] U.S. food aid to the UAR, 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] Near East: arms race: IAEA controls as ceiling, 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] Iraqi-U.S. talks on, 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] missiles, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] -156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 96 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] Soviet responsibility, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] Soviet-U.S. talks, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 272 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] UAR position, 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] -459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] UAR-U.S. talks, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 71 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] U.S. initiatives, possible, 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 73 ] -175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] U.S. position, 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 319 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] -816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] U.S.-UAR talks, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] bloc formation, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 308 ] British policy, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] CIA operations, 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 396 ] -777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] Communist threat, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 284 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] French policy, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 60 ] Israeli arms purchases and, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] neutrality, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 200 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 200 ] nuclear weapons, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Soviet arms sales, 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] UAR peace plan, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] U.S. aircraft sales, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] U.S. initiatives, proposals for, 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 73 ] -175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] U.S. policy, 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 803 n [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] arms sales, 24 n [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] -185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 194 ] Jordan arms request and, 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 129 ] military equilibrium, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] U.S. security commitment, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] Western base rights, 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 45 ] Near East Chiefs of Mission Conference, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] Nes, David G., 486 n [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] -635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] Nesiahu, Col. Itzhak, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 58 ] Netherlands, 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] Newberry, Daniel O., 250 n [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 240 ] Newsom, David, 208 n [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 415 n [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 194 ] New Zealand, 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] Nigeria, 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 653 n [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] -673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] Nolte, Richard H., 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] -808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] North Africa, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] North Atlantic Council, 694 n [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 282 ] Nuclear energy ( see also Dimona nuclear reactor ; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection): desalinization of sea water and, 32 n [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 259 ] UAR development, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] Nuclear free zones, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] Nuclear proliferation (see also Arms control ; arms race under Near East ; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections): British position, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Chinese testing, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 167 ] Geneva talks on, 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 24 ] in the Near East, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Indian development of weapons, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] Israeli position, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 173 ] Israeli-U.S. talks, 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] -623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] OAU position, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] possibilities, 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] prevention, 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Soviet position, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] Soviet-U.S. talks, 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] -490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] UAR position, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] U.S. position, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] -116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] Nuclear war, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] Nuclear weapons development. See under Israel ; see also Nuclear proliferation ; United Arab Republic . Nuseibeh, Hazem, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 41 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Nyerges, Anton N., 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 500 n [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] Odell, Bruce Taylor, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 228 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] Offshore procurement, 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Oil: Arab economic pressures, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] Jordanian arms purchases and, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Jordanian position, 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] nationalization, 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] OPEC demands on Western producers, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] UAR discoveries, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] -808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] UAR-U.S. break and, 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] U.S. Israel policy and, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 63 ] U.S. policy toward the UAR regarding, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] Organization of African Unity (OAU), 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 132 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 151 ] Conference, Addis Ababa, Sept. 1966 , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] Organization of Returning Heroes, 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] Outer Space Treaty, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] Owen, Henry D., 46 n [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] Pachachi, Adnan M., 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] Padelford, Edward A., Jr., 46 n [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Pahlevi, Shah Reza, 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 400 ] Pakistan, 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 406 ] Palestine: Arab League position, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] creation of entity for, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] -716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 366 ] Jordanian position, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 255 ] liberation, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] Syrian position, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] terrorist organizations, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] UAR position, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 96 ] -221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] U.S. position, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 204 ] Viet Cong, aid to, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] as word in U.S. diplomatic seal, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] Palestine Liberation Army, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] Palestine Liberation Force, 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] Palestine Liberation Front, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): Arab states’ position, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 223 ] China, People’s Republic of, contacts with, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 223 ] CIA view of, 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] -699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 356 ] establishment of, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] Israeli position, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 137 ] Jordanian position, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 367 ] return of refugees, 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 129 ] stationing in Jordan of units, 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 338 ] UAR position, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] UN recognition, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 256 ] U.S. contacts, guidelines for, 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] -427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 199 ] U.S. position, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 223 ] Palestine National Congress, Jerusalem, May–June 1964, 158 n [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] Palestinian refugees. See Refugees . Palmer, Stephen E., Jr., 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 347 n [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] Pan American Airways, 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] Pan American Oil Company, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] Pan-Arab movement, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] Paolozzi, Gabriel J., 790 n [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 821 n [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] Parker, Richard B., 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] Parkes, Sir Roderick, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 287 ] Pelly, Thomas M., 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Peres, Shimon, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] Dimona nuclear reactor, 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 263 ] Eshkol visit to Washington, June 1964, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] Feldman-Sloan mission, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 58 ] -137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Israeli arms purchases, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] Israeli missile program, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 37 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] refugees, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 70 ] UAR missile threat, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 17 ] U.S. security commitment to Israel, 160 n [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] Peres gambit, 394 n [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] Persian Gulf, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] Petroleum. See Oil . Philippines, 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Phillips Petroleum Company, 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] P.L. 480 assistance: to Israel, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] -130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 406 ] to Lebanon, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 411 ] to the UAR, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] as aid in U.S. diplomacy, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 129 ] discontinuation, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] Michel amendment, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 151 ] opposition, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 399 ] UAR position, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] UAR request for new agreement, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 229 ] -482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] -490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 237 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] -765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] UAR violations of agreement, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] U.S. recommendations for agreements, 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] -605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 735 n [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] -753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] -765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] wheat sales, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] Plimpton, Francis T. P., 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 70 ] Plutonium, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] -583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Pollack, Herman, 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Popper, David H., 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] Porter, Dwight J., 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] -804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 806 n [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 411 ] Proctor, Carolyn J., 179 n [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 75 ] Proliferation. See arms race under Near East. Quinn, Charles, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 112 ] Rabin, Lt. Gen. Yitzhak, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 167 ] -364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 398 ] Radio Cairo, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] Radiological weapons, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 86 ] Rafael, Gideon, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] -623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 322 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 331 ] Read, Benjamin H., 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 76 n [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 111 n [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 152 n [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] -185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 240 n [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 481 n [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] Reedy, George, 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] Refugees, 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] Arab position, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] Israeli position, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] Jordanian position, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 40 ] repatriation, 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] resettlement, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] -650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] UAR position, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 25 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] UNRWA resolution, 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] U.S.-Israeli talks on, 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 266 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] -650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] U.S. position, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] Reichard, Charles H., 249 n [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] Riad, Mahmoud, 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] Ribicoff, Abraham, 122 n [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 65 ] Rice, 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 378 ] Robinson, Col. William B., 182 n [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] Rochlin, Robert S., 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 734 n [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 766 n [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Rockwell, Stuart W., 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Ron, Col. Ram, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 483 n [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 271 ] Root, John F., 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] Rossides, Zenon, 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 266 ] Rostow, Eugene V., 808 n [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] Rostow, Walt W., 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 105 n [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 663 n [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 714 n [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 365 ] , 746 n [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] Border incidents: Jordanian-Israeli border, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 333 ] -660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] -671 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 339 ] Syrian-Israeli border, 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] desalinization, 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] -609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Dimona nuclear reactor inspections, 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] -797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 407 ] Israeli aircraft purchases, 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] Israeli-Jordanian secret talks, 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Jerusalem, 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 413 ] -811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 413 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] Near East peace plan, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] refugees, 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 315 ] -629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] -820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] U.S. economic aid to Israel, 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 778 n [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 406 ] -798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] -819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] U.S. economic aid to Lebanon, 742 n [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] -604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 749 n [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] -765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] U.S.-Israeli relations, 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 288 ] -582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 314 ] U.S. military aid to Israel, 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 395 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 n [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 406 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] -819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] U.S military aid to Jordan, 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 359 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] -707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] -724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 728 n [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] U.S. policy toward the UAR, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 45 ] Rowan, Carl T., 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 130 ] Rowen, Henry S., 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 17 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] Rusk, Dean, 8 n [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 42 n [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 45 n [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 61 n [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 124 n [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 378 n [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 408 n [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] -696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 789 n [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 790 n [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Arab states-U.S. relations, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Arab threat to Israel, 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 260 ] arms control, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] border incidents, Jordanian-Israeli, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 333 ] -660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 671 n [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 343 ] -679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] desalinization, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 305 ] Dimona nuclear reactor inspections, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] Israeli arms purchases: agreements, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] aircraft, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] anti-infiltration technology, 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 388 ] Jordanian arms purchases, balancing with, 331 n [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 153 ] -338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 177 ] missiles, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] tanks, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] -19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 391 n [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Israeli-U.S. relations, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] -262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] Jordan River water dispute, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 476 n [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 240 ] -499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 240 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 352 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] Jordanian-U.S. relations, 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Near East arms race, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] Near East Chiefs of Mission Conference, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] nuclear proliferation, 137 n [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] -623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] political situation in Jordan, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 352 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] refugees, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 595 n [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 639 n [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] Syrian-U.S. relations, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] UAR peace plan, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] UAR-U.S. relations, 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 282 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 308 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] -635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] -782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] deterioration in, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] -81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 200 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 200 ] Syria plot charges by the UAR, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] Congolese rebels, UAR aid to, 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] UAR fear of CIA plot, 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] UAR position, 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] U.S. economic aid to Israel, 226 n [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 99 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] U.S. economic aid to Jordan, 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] U.S. economic aid to Lebanon, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] U.S. economic aid to the UAR, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 528 n [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] commodity loans, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] food aid, changes in, 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] -696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 378 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] P.L. 480, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 229 ] -482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] U.S. military aid to Israel, 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] U.S. military aid to Jordan, 700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 723 n [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] U.S. security commitment to Israel, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 58 ] U.S. technical assistance to the UAR, 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] Vietnam, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] Yemen conflict, 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] Russell, H. Earle, Jr., 29 n [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 46 n [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 49 n [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 143 n [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 160 n [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 249 n [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 305 n [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 347 n [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 178 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 385 n [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 481 n [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 257 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 562 n [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Saad, Jamal, 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] Saba, Gen., 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] Sabri, Ali, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Sadat, Anwar es-, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] -594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] Al Salim Al Sabah, Sheikh ‘Abd Allah, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 194 ] Sapir, Pinhas, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] Saudi Arabia ( see also Saudi Arabia and Saudi subheadings under other subjects ): Arab states-U.S. relations, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] Jordan, relations with, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] military capability, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 260 ] Near East arms race, 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 319 ] traditional nature, 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] UAR, relations with: British role as intercessor in, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] detente in, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] Syria plot charges by the UAR, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] U.S. position, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] Yemen conflict, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 296 ] -594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] UAR threat to, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] UAR-U.S. relations, effect on, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] United States, relations with, 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] U.S. aircraft sales, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 134 ] U.S. assessment of trends, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] U.S. economic aid, 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] U.S. military aid, 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 344 ] U.S. military aid to Jordan, 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] Saunders, Harold, 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 594 n [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 606 n [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] -696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 697 n [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 723 n [ Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 734 n [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 760 n [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 407 ] Sayeh, Hamed El-, 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 394 ] Schaefer, Edward W., 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] Schultze, Charles, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 299 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 606 n [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Scoville, Herbert, Jr., 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] Senate, U.S. See Congress, U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] Shadi, Abu, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] Sharaf, Sami, 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] Shazar, Zalman, 608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 314 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 314 ] Shelepin, Aleksandr N., 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] Shell Oil Company, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Shepilov, Dmitri T., 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] Shriver, Sargent, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] Shullaw, J. Harold, 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] Shuqayri, Ahmad al-, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] Sibley, Brig. Gen., 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] Sidqi (UAR), 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] Simmons, William L., 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] Sinai, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] Sisco, Joseph, 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 266 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 639 n [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 335 ] -663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Sixth Fleet, U.S., 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 408 ] -804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] Sloan, Frank K. (see also Feldman-Sloan mission ), 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 32 n [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 164 n [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 95 ] Smith, Bromley K., 8 n [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 124 n [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 349 n [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 360 n [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Smith, Hedrick, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 132 ] Smythe, Hugh H., 644 n [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 382 ] Sober, Sidney, 782 n [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] Solbert, Peter, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 483 n [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 230 ] Solomon, Anthony M., 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 379 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] , 808 n [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] Somalia, 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] South Africa, Republic of, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] South America, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] South Arabia, Federation of, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] Arab-U.S. differences over, 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 194 ] British-UAR conflict over, 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] British withdrawal, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] UAR actions against, 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] UAR position, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 296 ] -594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 393 ] UAR threat to, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 313 ] U.S policy toward, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] U.S.-UAR differences over, 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Southeast Asia, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 387 ] Southwest Africa, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] Soviet Union ( see also Soviet Union and Soviet subheadings under other subjects ): African influence of, 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Arab states, relations with, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] Arab states-U.S. relations, 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 55 ] Arab support in UN, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 29 ] Australian wheat sales to, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Canadian wheat sales to, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Israel, relations with, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] Jews in, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 338 ] Near East policy, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] nuclear support programs, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] UAR, relations with, 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] UN role, 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] United States, relations with, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] Spaak, Paul-Henri, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 132 ] Spain, James W., 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates, 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] SNIE 36.1–64 , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 51 ] SNIE 36.2–64 , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] -102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 47 ] SNIE 36.3–64 , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] -208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Stabler, Wells, 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] Stackhouse, Heywood H., 109 n [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 430 n [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 201 ] Standard Oil of Indiana, 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] Sterner, Michael, 503 n [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 734 n [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 746 n [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 766 n [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 779 n [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Stevenson, Adlai E., 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] Stino (UAR), 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 132 ] Stoddart, J. D., 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 202 n [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 208 n [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] Streator, Edward J., 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 283 n [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] Strickland, Brig. Gen. Eugene L., 40 n [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] Strong, Curtis C., 332 n [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Strong, Robert C., 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 231 n [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 134 ] Submarines, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] Sudan, 89 n [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Suez Canal, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] Suez Canal Authority, 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] Suez crisis, 1956, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] Sufi, Muhammad, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] Sweden, 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Switzerland, 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] Symington, James W., 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 314 ] Symmes, Harrison M., 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 145 n [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 151 n [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 202 n [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 208 n [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 211 n [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 212 n [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 410 n [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 415 n [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 430 n [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 476 n [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 481 n [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 500 n [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 562 n [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 703 n [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 358 ] Syria ( see also Border conflicts ; Jordan River water dispute ; Syria and Syrian subheadings under other subjects ), 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 408 ] Arab League arms aid, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 40 ] Arab states-U.S. relations, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] border disputes with Israel, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] Communist threat, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] Germany Federal Republic of, economic aid to, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 257 ] Israel, relations with ( see also border disputes with Israel above ), 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 322 ] -639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Jordan, relations with, 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 362 ] Jordan River water dispute, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] Lebanon, relations with, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 409 ] -804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 409 ] as member of progressive axis, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] military capability, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 28 ] Near East arms race, 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 319 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Palestinian units in army, 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] plot charges, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] political situation, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 278 ] refugees, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] Soviet influence, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] Soviet military aid, 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] UAR role for, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] United Arab Republic, relations with, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] United States, relations with, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 257 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] U.S. assessment of trends in, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] U.S. economic aid, 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] Syrian-UAR Joint Defense Agreement, Nov. 1966, 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 352 ] Taft, Robert, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] Talbot, Phillips, 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 17 n [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 114 n [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 164 n [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 231 n [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 241 n [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 283 n [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 305 n [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 332 n [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 349 n [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 350 n [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 360 n [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 378 n [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 410 n [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 415 n [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 476 n [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 481 n [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 229 ] Arab states-U.S. relations, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] arms control, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 98 ] IAEA nuclear inspections, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 253 ] Israeli arms purchases, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 179 ] -387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] aircraft, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] German tank sales, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Jordanian arms purchases, balancing with, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 153 ] -338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 186 ] Israeli-U.S. relations, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] Jordan River water dispute, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 39 ] -94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Jordan troop buildup, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 123 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] Jordanian arms purchases, 202 n [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] agreement, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] aircraft, 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 130 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] ambassadorial meeting, 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] U.S. offers, 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 141 ] -316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 145 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] U.S. position, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] U.S. proposals, 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Jordanian-U.S. relations, 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] Near East arms race, 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 215 ] nuclear proliferation, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] Palestine Liberation Organization, 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 106 ] Syrian-Israeli border incidents, 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] United Arab Republic (UAR): missile deployment, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] United States, relations with, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] U.S. economic aid, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 207 ] U.S. policy toward, 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 45 ] U.S. military aid to Israel, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 13 ] U.S. Near East initiatives, possible, 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 73 ] Tanks. See Israeli arms purchases ; Jordanian arms purchases . Tanzania, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] Tarapur reactor, 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] Tasca, Henry J., 143 n [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 124 n [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 57 ] Tell, Wasfi el-, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 444 n [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 284 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 669 n [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 676 n [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 687 n [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 362 ] -710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 373 ] -732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] TENNECO, 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] Thant, U, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] -743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 382 ] -748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] Thomas, Charles W., 29 n [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 249 n [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 304 n [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] Thompson, Herbert B., 749 n [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 272 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] Tobacco, 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] Tomeh (Syria), 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] Toumanoff, Vladimir, 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Trans-World Airways (TWA), 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] Trevithick, John P., 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 734 n [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 766 n [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] Tri-Continental Conference, Havana, 1966 , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Tri-Continental Conference (AALAPSO), Cairo, 1968, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] Tripartite Declaration, May 1950, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] Truman, Harry S, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Tshombe, Moise, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Tueller, Blaine, 283 n [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] Tukan, Kadri, 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] Tunisia, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] Turkey, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 408 ] Uganda, 653 n [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] Ulbricht, Walter, 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 197 ] ’Ulwan, Jasim, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] UN Emergency Force (UNEF), 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] UN General Assembly, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] -238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 266 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 328 ] Resolutions: 194 , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] 512 (1952), 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 323 ] 2002 (XIX), 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 106 ] 2052 (XX), 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] UN Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), 22 n [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] -238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 256 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] UN Security Council: Congo crisis, 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] -258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 120 ] border incidents: Israeli-Jordanian border, 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 669 n [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] -673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] -676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] -688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 366 ] Israeli-Syrian border, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 327 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] -682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] Jordan River water dispute, 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 654 n [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] -791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] Unified Arab Command (UAC), 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 318 ] air strength of, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 211 ] Arab unity and, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 212 ] funding of Jordanian arms, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] -191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 372 ] funding of Lebanese arms, 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 400 ] Israeli position, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 163 ] U.S.-Israeli differences over, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 157 ] Jordanian military commitment to, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 126 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 131 ] Jordanian talks with, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 134 ] timetable for arms deliveries, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 149 ] troops of, stationed in Jordan, 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] U.S. position, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] -194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 93 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 392 ] -768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] Unified Plan. See Johnston Plan . Union Carbide, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] United Arab Airlines, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] United Arab Republic (UAR) ( see also United Arab Republic and UAR subheadings under other subjects ): agricultural development in, 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] Argentine wheat sales to, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Belgium, relations with, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] China, People’s Republic of, relations with, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 237 ] CIA plot, suspicions re, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 396 ] -777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] Communist influence in, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] -266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] Congolese rebels, aid to, 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] -283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 132 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 200 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] Cuban trade, 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 378 ] East-West balance, desire for, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] economic situation, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] IMF stabilization program, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 25 ] land reclamation projects, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] tourism, 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 412 ] foreign policy, 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 51 ] France, relations with, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] German Democratic Republic, relations with, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 197 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 207 ] Israel, relations with, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] Israeli arms purchases, 397 n [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 184 ] Israeli threat to, 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] Jordan, relations with, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 687 n [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] Jordan River water dispute, 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] Kuwaiti loans to, 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] Latin America, subversion in, 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] leadership of the Arab world, 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 211 ] Lebanon, relations with, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] Libya, relations with, 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] Mexican wheat sales to, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] military capability, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 28 ] military threat to Israel, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] missile acquisition and development: freeze proposals, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 96 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 301 ] Soviet aid for, 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] as threat to Israel, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 17 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 37 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] U.S. position, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] U.S.-UAR talks on, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Near East arms race, 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 319 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] nuclear proliferation, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 86 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] United Arab Republic (UAR)— Continued nuclear weapons development, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] Palestine, 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 356 ] P.L. 480 aid ( see also U.S. economic aid below ), 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] as aid in U.S. diplomacy, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 129 ] appropriations, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] Michel amendment, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 151 ] opposition, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 399 ] UAR commitments under, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] UAR position, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] UAR request for new agreement, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 229 ] -482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] -490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 237 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] -765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] UAR violations of agreement, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] U.S. position, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] U.S. recommendations for agreements, 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] -605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 735 n [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] -753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] -765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] wheat sales, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] political situation, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] Port Said free trade zone, 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] refugee resettlement projects, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] Salhia irrigation project, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Saudi Arabia, relations with: British as intercessor in, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] detente in, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] Syrian plot charges by the UAR, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] U.S. position, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] Yemen conflict, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 296 ] -594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] Soviet economic aid, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 384 ] -753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] Soviet economic aid to Lebanon, 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 408 ] Soviet influence, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 120 ] -269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] Soviet military aid, 9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 324 ] Israeli position, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 260 ] missiles, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] nuclear materials, 169 n [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] nuclear weapons, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 218 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 415 ] U.S. position, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 399 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] -254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] Syria, relations with, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] United Kingdom, relations with, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 87 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] United States, relations with, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] -81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 366 ] -718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 412 ] arrest of AID workers, 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] -820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] attack on U.S. Embassy/library, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] confrontation, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] -820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] Congressional views, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 412 ] detention of U.S. attache, 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 228 ] deterioration, 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 200 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 394 ] downing of U.S. aircraft, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 120 ] improvements, 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] -809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 412 ] liberation movements, support of, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] talks on, 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 87 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] -782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] UAR position, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 315 ] -629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] unofficial channels, use of, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] U.S. position, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] -46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] -696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] U.S. public opinion, 9 n [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 205 ] U.S. economic aid ( see also P.L. 480 aid above ), 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] commodity loans, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] -426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] -605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] Congressional views of, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] -752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] direct investment, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] food aid, 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] -696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] grain storage facilities, 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] Israeli position, 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 390 ] reductions/cutoff, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 243 ] technical assistance, 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] UAR position, 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] U.S. package proposal for food, 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] U.S. position, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] -269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 207 ] Zionist reaction, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] U.S. military aid, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 135 ] U.S. policy toward, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] -9 [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 284 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Western interests, threats against, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 187 ] Yemen conflict, see under Saudi Arabia above United Kingdom ( see also United Kingdom and British subheadings under other subjects ), 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 87 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] United Nations (UN) ( see also UN headings and UN subheadings under other subjects ), 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 87 ] Arab positions in, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 212 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 212 ] arms control, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] as custodian of Arab land in Israel, 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] Israel accepted as a state by, 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 129 ] Israeli position, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 266 ] Jerusalem, status of, 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 413 ] Jordan River water dispute, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 272 n [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 219 ] Near East initiatives, 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 73 ] United Nations Charter, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] United States Information Agency (USIA), 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] Uranium concentrate, 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 298 ] U.S. Intelligence Board, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 584 n [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] Valenti, Jack, 44 n [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] -814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Vance, Cyrus R., 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 66 n [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 111 n [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 160 n [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 164 n [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 410 ] Vegetable oil, 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] Viet Cong, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 738 n [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 378 ] Vietnam, Republic of, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] -582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] Vietnam conflict, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 26 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] anti-infiltration technology, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 352 ] Israeli-U.S. talks, 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 314 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 328 ] UAR position, 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 274 ] -559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 592 n [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] U.S. rice purchases from the UAR for, 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 378 ] Voice of the Arabs, 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] Voice of Palestine radio, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] Von Hassel, Kai-Uwe, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 56 ] Vu Van Thai, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] Wadi Sreid canal, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] Walsh, John P., 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 748 n [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] , 749 n [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] Warburg, Eric, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 98 ] Warren, George L., 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 316 ] Wehmeyer, Donald A., 109 n [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 278 ] Weizmann, Gen. Ezer, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 271 ] Weizmann Institute, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] West Bank: Israeli goal of occupation, 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 366 ] Jordanian military reinforcement, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] Jordanian tank ban agreement, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] -618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] military directorate status, 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 362 ] -710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 363 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] as political entity, 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 362 ] -711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] stationing of tanks, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 157 ] Westinghouse, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 306 ] Westrick, Ludger, 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Wheat: for Israel, 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 414 ] for the UAR: from the Soviet Union, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] UAR position, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 393 ] -770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 393 ] U.S. position, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 384 ] -753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] -765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 394 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 394 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 387 ] Wheelock, John T., 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 789 n [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] Wheelus Air Force Base, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 390 ] Wiener, Aharon, 27 n [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 11 ] Wiley, Marshall W., 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] Williams, G. Mennen, 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Wilson, Evan M., 231 n [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 102 ] Wilson, James Harold, 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 307 ] Wolle, William D., 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 476 n [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 500 n [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 734 n [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 746 n [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 789 n [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 821 n [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 418 ] Wood, Gen. Robert J., 96 n [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 40 ] Woods, George, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] World Bank. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Wriggins, W. Howard, 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 660 n [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] -696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 697 n [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] -728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 746 n [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 766 n [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] Xerox Corporation, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 204 ] Yahil, Chaim, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 77 ] Yemen ( see also Yemen conflictM ; Yemen subheadings under other subjects ), 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 87 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 592 n [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 381 ] Yemen conflict: Saudi-UAR agreement on Imanate, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 321 ] Saudi-UAR confrontation, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 232 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 274 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 290 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 296 ] -594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Saudi-UAR detente, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 320 ] chemical weapons use, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] ending, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 282 ] escalation, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 354 ] Israeli position, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] -51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 238 ] Jordanian position, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 284 ] UAR position, 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 399 ] U.S. position, 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 9 n [ Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 393 ] U.S.-UAR relations and, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 87 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 306 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] -820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 417 ] Yost, Charles W., 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 114 ] Younes, Mahmoud, 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] -809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 412 ] Yugoslavia, 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 242 ] Zaki, Hasan, 735 n [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] Zionism ( see also Jews, American ), 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 39 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 416 ] Zook, Donovan Q., 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] Zu’aiter, Akram, 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 342 ]