FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XVII, EASTERN EUROPE Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Eastern Europe (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII) Contents Preface Selection and Editorial Policies Sources Abbreviations Persons Eastern Europe Eastern Europe Region (Documents 1-26) Bulgaria (Documents 27-36) Czechoslovakia (Documents 37-99) Hungary (Documents 100-115) Poland (Documents 116-138) Romania (Documents 139-174) Yugoslavia (Documents 175-197) Austria (Documents 198-204) Finland (Documents 205-211) Index Errata Selection and Editorial Policies Selection and Editorial Policies Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series In preparing each volume of the Foreign Relations series, the editors are guided by some general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also made regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in bibliographical notes. The following general selection criteria are used in preparing volumes in the Foreign Relations series. Individual compiler-editors vary these criteria in accordance with the particular issues and the available documentation. The compiler-editors also tend to apply these selection criteria in accordance with their own interpretation of the generally accepted standards of scholarship. In selecting documentation for publication, the editors give priority to unpublished classified records, rather than previously published records (which are accounted for in appropriate bibliographical notes). Selection Criteria (in general order of priority): 1. Major foreign affairs commitments made on behalf of the United States to other governments, including those that define or identify the principal foreign affairs interests of the United States; 2. Major foreign affairs issues, commitments, negotiations, and activities, whether or not major decisions were made, and including dissenting or alternative opinions to the process ultimately adopted; 3. The decisions, discussions, actions, and considerations of the President, as the official constitutionally responsible for the direction of foreign policy; 4. The discussions and actions of the National Security Council, the Cabinet, and special Presidential policy groups, including the policy options brought before these bodies or their individual members; 5. The policy options adopted by or considered by the Secretary of State and the most important actions taken to implement Presidential decisions or policies; 6. Diplomatic negotiations and conferences, official correspondence, and other exchanges between U.S. representatives and those of other governments that demonstrate the main lines of policy implementation on major issues; 7. Important information that attended Presidential decisions and policy recommendations of the Secretary of State; 8. Major foreign affairs decisions, negotiations, and commitments undertaken on behalf of the United States by government officials and representatives in other agencies in the foreign affairs community or other branches of government made without the involvement (or even knowledge) of the White House or the Department of State; 9. The role of the Congress in the preparation and execution of particular foreign policies or foreign affairs actions; 10. Economic aspects of foreign policy; 11. The main policy lines of intelligence activities if they constituted major aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward a nation or region or if they provided key information in the formulation of major U.S. policies; 12. The main policy lines of U.S. military and economic assistance as well as other types of assistance; 13. The political-military recommendations, decisions, and activities of the military establishment and major regional military commands as they bear upon the formulation or execution of major U.S. foreign policies; 14. Diplomatic appointments that reflect major policies or affect policy changes. Scope and Focus of Documents Researched and Selected for Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, Volume XVII The documentation in this volume highlights U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, particularly the U.S. response to the crisis created by the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Prior to the invasion, U.S. policy in the region had been characterized by an ongoing effort to loosen ties between the Soviet Union and its Communist satellites through the use of limited economic assistance. This policy of “Bridge Building” to Eastern Europe through selective use of U.S. economic power was only partially successful. President Johnson faced serious opposition from within Congress to this initiative. In addition, Eastern European Communist regimes, while eager to obtain U.S. aid, wanted few conditions attached to its utilization and aimed to use outside assist-ance to consolidate their political control. The rise of a Communist reform movement in Czechoslovakia, while welcomed by the United States, offered U.S. diplomacy little practical assistance in carrying out this policy. The Communist reformers were fundamentally hostile to the United States. As a result the Johnson administration was an interested observer as the Czech and Soviet states confronted each other. After the Soviet invasion of August 1968, the United States feared further Soviet military moves and actively sought to provide support to bolster the independence of Austria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Finland. Responsibility for policy formulation and advice to the President on these issues was shared between the National Security Council and the Department of State. In addition to papers from President Johnson's White House, documents were selected from among the records of these agencies, together with intelligence estimates prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and interdepartmental planning group papers, in order to provide broad coverage of basic political and economic policy formulation in Washington. Embassy reporting was also included to provide the context of the policy debate in Washington and document major interchanges with foreign leaders. Editorial Methodology The documents are presented in chapters, arranged chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted. Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for security reasons have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. The amount of material omitted from this volume because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however, has not been delineated. Brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes. The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote. Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts have been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record. Sources Sources The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors believe that in terms of access this volume was prepared in accordance with the standards and mandates of this statute, although access to some records was restricted, as noted below. The editors have complete access to all the records and papers of the Department of State they deem necessary: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; certain intelligence-related files maintained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers and the collections of principal officials of the Johnson administration maintained and preserved at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library include much of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of these agencies, the support of the National Archives and Records Administration, and the special close cooperation of the staff of the Johnson Library. Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants. Thanks to the cooperation of Johnson Library Director Harry J. Middleton and the Library staff, Department of State historians were given access to the collection of audiotapes of more than 7,000 telephone conversations of President Johnson. The collection is far too large for the Department historians to review in detail and also maintain the accelerated schedule for the preparation of Foreign Relations volumes for the Johnson Presidency. Working with the Library staff, Department historians developed a plan for the selective review of those conversations that occurred during major foreign policy crises and negotiations. The first audiotapes became available to the editors in late 1994, after this volume had been compiled. The editors decided not to delay publication of this volume since very few telephone conversations concerned Eastern Europe, but if relevant records are found among the conversations, they may be included in a later Foreign Relations volume. The Johnson Library also gave Department historians access to its collection of audiotapes of President Johnson's meetings in the Cabinet Room during 1968. Records of three important meetings concerning Czechoslovakia during 1968 have been included in this volume. Department of State historians' access to intelligence records still in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency is arranged by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. Department of State and CIA historians coordinate the procedural and scholarly aspects of the access. The variety of intelligence documentation made available and selected for publication in Foreign Relations volumes has steadily expanded since 1991. This volume, which was compiled in 1992 and 1993, includes four documents from the CIA records and one CIA document from other repositories. The following are the particular files and collections consulted and cited in this volume. Unpublished Sources Department of State Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files . In February 1963, the Department changed its decimal central file system. The new system was divided into broad categories: Administration, Consular, Culture and Information, Economic, Political and Defense, Science, and Social. Within each of these divisions were subcategories. For example, Political and Defense contained four subtopics: POL (politics), DEF (defense), CSM (Communism), and INT (intelligence). Numerical subdivisions further defined them. The following were the most important files used in this volume. Other files are indicated in the annotation to the documents. AV 12–1 CZECH, aviation issues AV 9 CZECH–US, aviation issues DEF 12–5 FIN–SWE, defense arrangements between Finland and Sweden FIN 19 CZECH, financial affairs of Czechoslovakia POL 7 USSR, visits of Soviet leaders POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH, political relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union POL AUS–US, political relations with Austria POL AUS–USSR, political relations between Austria and the Soviet Union POL BUL–US, political relations with Bulgaria POL CZECH, internal politics of Czechoslovakia POL CZECH–US, political relations with Czechoslovakia POL CZECH–USSR, political relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union POL EUR E, political relations with Eastern Europe POL EUR E–US, political relations with Eastern Europe POL FIN–US, political relations with Finland POL HUNG–US, political relations with Hungary POL POL, internal political Affairs of Poland POL POL–US, political relations with Poland POL RUM–US, political relations with Romania POL YUGO–US, political relations with Yugoslavia Lot Files . Documents from the central files have been supplemented by materials from the Lot Files of the Department of State. A list of the Lot Files used in the preparation of the volume follows. Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379 Files of Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, 1942–1970. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, May 1961–December 1964. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials for 1965. Conference Files: Lot 67 D 568 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, September 1966–April 1967. Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, May 1967–January 1968. Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials for 1968. INR Files Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Policy Planning Council Files: Lot 71 D 273 Papers prepared in the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State, 1964–1968. Polish Desk Files: Lot 71 D 158 Records maintained by the Officer in Charge of Polish Affairs of the Bureau of European Affairs, 1966. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, 1953–1964. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, 1964–1965. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, 1966. President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217 Collection of the President's memoranda of conversation with foreign visitors, 1965–1968. Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 Memoranda of conversation of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, 1961–1964. SIG Files: Lot 74 D 164 Records of the Senior Interdepartmental Group. S/S Files: Lot 70 D 216 Miscellaneous S/S Files, 1964–1966. S/S-I Files: Lot 74 D 164 Secretary of State's memoranda for the President's evening reading and for luncheon meetings, 1964–1971. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Master set of papers pertaining to the National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents, 1961–1966. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master file of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs), 1961–1968. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318 Cabinet and National Security Council records, 1966–1968. Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, National Security File Agency File Country File Files of McGeorge Bundy Files of Robert Komer Files of Walt W. Rostow Memos to the President National Security Council Histories NSC Meetings File Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Files Meeting Notes File President's Office File Papers of Francis M. Bator Rusk Appointment Book Tom Johnson's Notes on Meetings Published Sources Only those publications cited in the volume are listed here. Beam, Jacob D. Multiple Exposure . New York: Norton, 1978. Remington, Robin Alison, ed. Winter in Prague, Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis . Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1969. U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967 . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. ———. Department of State Bulletin . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968–69 . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Abbreviations Abbreviations AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AID, Agency for International Development AIRA, Air Force Attaché APAG, Atlantic Policy Advisory Group ARMA, Army Attaché B, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs BCP, Bulgarian Communist Party BOP, balance of payments B/P, balance of payments CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board CAP, Common Agricultural Policy CC, Central Committee CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation CDU, Christian Democratic Union (Germany) CEMA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CIA, Central Intelligence Agency COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group, based in Paris, consisting of the nations seeking to control the export of strategic goods to Communist countries CODEL, Congressional delegation COMECON, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CP, Communist Party CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union CSA, Czechoslovak State Airlines CSSR, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram Deptel, Department of State telegram DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DOD, Department of Defense ECE, Economic Commission for Europe EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EEC, European Economic Community EFTA, European Free Trade Association Embtel, Embassy telegram EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/RPM, Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State E/W, East-West EXIM, Export-Import Bank Eximbank, Export-Import Bank FonOff, Foreign Office ForMin, Foreign Minister FRC, Federal Records Center FRG, Federal Republic of Germany G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for GA, General Assembly GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDR, German Democratic Republic GNP, Gross National Product GOA, Government of Austria GOB, Government of Bulgaria GOC, Government of Czechoslovakia GOF, Government of Finland GOH, Government of Hungary GOP, Government of Poland GOR, Government of Romania GOT, Government of Turkey GOY, Government of Yugoslavia G/PM, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICC, International Control Commission IMF, International Monetary Fund INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State IZT, Interzonal Trade JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff KGB, Committee for State Security (Soviet Secret Police) LCY, Yugoslav Communist Party Legtel, Legation telegram M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs MC, memorandum of conversation MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFN, most favored nation MLF, Multilateral Force NAC, North Atlantic Council NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State Niact, night action, communication indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of of the day or night NIE, National Intelligence Estimate Noforn, no foreign dissemination NPT, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSA, National Security Agency NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OIC, officer in charge OSD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs PAA, Pan American Airlines PL, Public Law PM, Prime Minister PNG, persona non grata POLAD, Political Adviser Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization PriMin, Prime Minister PZPR, Polish Communist Party RCP, Romanian Communist Party RFE, Radio Free Europe RG, Record Group RL, Radio Liberty RPM, Office of Regional Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State RWP, Romanian political party S, Office of the Secretary of State SC, Security Council Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his delegation to the Department of State SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State SYG, Secretary General Topol, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State or his delegation from the Department of State U, Office of the Under Secretary of State UAR, United Arab Republic UK, United Kingdom UNGA, United Nations General Assembly USG, United States Government USIA, United States Information Agency USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations VOA, Voice of America WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State WEU, Western European Union WP, Warsaw Pact Z, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time) Persons Persons Anderson, H. Eugenie, Minister to Bulgaria to December 1964 Balaceanu, Petre, Romanian Minister to the United States to May 1967 Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State to September 1966; Ambassador to the United Nations, June–September 1968 Barber, Arthur W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control Bashev, Ivan, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bator, Francis M., Member, National Security Council Staff, 1964–1967; President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1965–1967 Beam, Jacob D., Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from August 1966 Birladeanu, Alexandru, Romanian Deputy Prime Minister Bogdan, Corneliu, Romanian Ambassador to the United States from July 1967 Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France to February 1968; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Brezhnev, Leonid I., First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from October 1964 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, 1964–1966 Bundy, McGeorge, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to February 1966 Cabot, John M., Ambassador to Poland to September 1965 Ceausescu, Nicolae, Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party from March 1965 Clifford, Clark, Secretary of Defense from March 1968 Crawford, William A., Minister to Romania to December 1964; thereafter Ambassador to Romania to October 1965 Creel, Robert C., Director, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, to July 1964 Crnobrjna, Bogdan, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States David, Vaclav, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Davis, Nathaniel, Jr., Member, National Security Council Staff Davis, Nathaniel, Sr., Minister to Bulgaria, May 1965–June 1966; thereafter detailed to the White House Davis, Richard H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, April 1964–December 1965; thereafter Ambassador to Romania De Gaulle, Charles, President of France Debre, Michel, French Foreign Minister Denny, George C., Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Djilas, Milovan, Yugoslav dissident Dobrynin, Anatoli F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States Drozniak, Edward, Polish Ambassador to the United States until November 1966 Dubcek, Alexander, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party from January 1968 Duda, Karl, Czech Ambassador to the United States Elbrick, C. Burke, Ambassador to Yugoslavia from March 1964 Fock, Jeno, Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister Fowler, Henry H., Secretary of the Treasury Gaston-Marin, Gheorghe, Romanian Deputy Prime Minister Georgiev, Ivan-Asen, Bulgarian citizen tried and executed for treason Gerasimov, Luben, Bulgarian Ambassador to the United States from December 1966 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, Romanian President and First Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party to March 1965 Gligorov, Kiro, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Goldberg, Arthur J., Ambassador to the United Nations, July 1965–June 1968 Gomulka, Wladyslaw, First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party Grechko, Andrei, Commanding General, Warsaw Pact Forces Gronouski, John A., Ambassador to Poland from December 1965 Gruber, Karl, State Secretary in the Office of the President of Austria Hajek, Jiri, Czech Ambassador to the United Nations Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to March 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large Harmel, Pierre C., Belgian Foreign Minister Hayes, John S., Ambassador to Switzerland from September 1966 Haymerle, Heinrich, Director for Political Affairs of the Austrian Foreign Ministry Helms, Richard, Director of Central Intelligence from June 1966 Hillenbrand, Martin J., Ambassador to Hungary from October 1967 Hont, Janos, Hungarian First Deputy Minister of Agriculture Horsey, Outerbridge, II, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia until August 1966 Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States Jones, Owen T., Charge d'Affaires in Hungary until July 1964 Kadar, Janos, First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party Kardelj, Edvard, President of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Under Secretary of State from October 1966 Kennedy, John F., President of the United States until his death on November 22, 1963 Klaus, Josef, Chancellor of Austria Knappstein, Heinrich, German Ambassador to the United States Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union to November 1966; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1966–December 1967 Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union to October 1964 Leddy, John M., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 1965 Lemberger, Ernst, Austrian Ambassador to the United States Lucet, Charles, French Ambassador to the United States from December 1965 MacArthur, Douglas, II, Ambassador to Austria from May 1967 Manescu, Cornelieu, Romanian Foreign Minister Mann, Thomas C., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, March 1965–May 1966 Maurer, Ion, Romanian Prime Minister McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence until April 1965 McGhee, George C., Ambassador to Germany to May 1968 McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense to February 1968 McSweeney, John M., Minister to Bulgaria, October 1966–April 1967; thereafter Ambassador to Bulgaria Michalowski, Jerzy, Polish Ambassador to the United States from September 1967 Micunovic, Veljko, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States Mindszenty, Cardinal Josef, Roman Catholic Primate of Hungary Mod, Peter, Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister Modrezewski, Franciszek, Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Munkki, Olavi, Finnish Ambassador to the United States Nagy, Janos, Hungarian Ambassador to the United States from October 1968 Nikezic, Marko, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Novotny, Anton, President of Czechoslovakia to March 1968, First Secretary of the Czech Communist Party to January 1968 O'Shaughnessey, Liam, Charge d'Affaires in Hungary, November 1964–September 1966 Owen, Henry D., Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from June 1966 Peter, Janos, Hungarian Foreign Minister Podgorny, Nikolai, President of the Soviet Union from October 1964 Popov, Lyubomir, Bulgarian Minister to the United States to October 1965 Popovic, Vlado, Secretary General to President Tito of Yugoslavia Radvanyi, Janos, Hungarian Charge d'Affaires in the United States to May 1967 Rapacki, Adam, Polish Foreign Minister Rostow, Eugene V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 1966 Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council to March 1966; thereafter President's Special Assistant Ruser, Claus, Acting Staff Director, Senior Interdepartmental Group Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Schnittker, John A., Under Secretary of Agriculture Schultze, Charles, Director of the Bureau of the Budget Seebohm, Hans, German Minister for Transportation Smith, R. J., Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Stewart, Michael, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, January 1965–August 1966, and from March 1968 Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from September 1965; Ambassador to Poland from August 1968 Strauss, Franz Josef, Chairman, Christian Social Union, and German Minister of Finance from December 1967 Szilagyi, Beli, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Tims, Richard W., Charge d'Affaires in Hungary, June 1966–October 1967 Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large until December 1966; thereafter Ambassador to the Soviet Union Toon, Malcolm S., Country Director for the Soviet Union and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 1968 Toncic-Sorinji, Lujo, Austrian Foreign Minister until January 1968 Tuch, Hans, Deputy Chief of Mission in the Embassy in Bulgaria, July 1965–July 1967 Ulbricht, Walter, Chairman of the Council of State and First Secretary of the East German Communist Party Vedeler, Harold C., Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State Vejvoda, Milos, Member, Czech Mission to the United Nations Velebit, Vladimir, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe Waldheim, Kurt, Austrian Ambassador to the United Nations to January 1968; thereafter Foreign Minister Zhivkov, Todor, Bulgarian Prime Minister Eastern Europe Region Eastern Europe Region 1. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 16, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, E EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Harriman and approved in M. 2. Special Report by the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, March 27, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, East Europe. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The chart and photographs included with the text are not printed. 3. Record of Discussion Washington, March 31, 1964. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 71 D 273, Eastern Europe. Secret. The source text, which is dated April 1, bears no drafting information. 4. National Security Action Memorandum No. 304 Washington, June 3, 1964. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 304. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, to the Director of Central Intelligence, and to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. 5. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 9, 1964, 3:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Creel and approved in S on June 17. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 6. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone Washington, June 25, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, East Europe, Vol. 7. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A handwritten note on the source text by McCone reads: “Personal for McGeorge Bundy, JAM.” In a June 26 memorandum to Bundy, attached to the source text, McCone explained that the memorandum printed here consisted of “some ideas that we have developed as to how these bridges might be constructed.” He noted that no attempt had been made “to deal with the questions of legal restrictions or the practicality of suggestions on the basis of political or public opinion considerations.” 7. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, July 22, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. This estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board with the Directors of INR, DIA, and NSA concurring and the representative of the AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstaining on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 8. Record of Discussion Washington, July 27, 1964. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 71 D 273, Eastern Europe. Secret. The source text, which is dated July 30, bears no drafting information. 9. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, December 24, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, PER 12. Secret. Drafted by Vedeler, Henry, and McAfee and cleared by Llewellyn Thompson, Denney, and Davis. 10. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, February 18, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Eastern Europe. Secret. Prepared by the Office of National Estimates. 11. Editorial Note 12. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR E–US. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but the paper was transmitted as an attachment to a June 5 memorandum from Read to Bundy. 13. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, August 26, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. This estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board. The representatives of the AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 14. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 1, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT EUR E–US. Confidential. Drafted by Jenkins. 15. National Security Action Memorandum No. 352 Washington, July 8, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. 16. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 5, 1966, 10:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALB. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text, which was approved in S on November 9. The conversation was held at the U.S. Mission. 17. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to President Johnson Washington, September 25, 1967, 4:05 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 43. Secret; Eyes Only. 18. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson Washington, November 14, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 51. Secret. 19. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, January 19, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, East Europe. Confidential. 20. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 24, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Confidential. Drafted by Davis on April 26. A copy was sent to Rostow. 21. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, April 28, 1968. Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 66. Secret. This memorandum was circulated to members of the Senior Interdepartmental Group for Europe as an attachment to SIG Memorandum No. 66, May 9. 22. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 70. Secret. Drafted by Toumanoff on May 21. The paper was an attachment to SIG Memorandum No. 70, circulated on June 3. 23. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, October 1, 1968. Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 87. Secret With Top Secret Attachments. Drafted by Beaudry. 24. Record of Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Washington, October 4, 1968. Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 74 D 344, SIG Decisions. Secret. Drafted by Ruser on October 12. 25. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 12, 1968, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR. Secret. Drafted by Tanguy and approved in S on October 21. Debre was in the United States to attend the U.N. General Assembly session. The source text is labeled “Part V of V.” 26. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, November 7, 1968. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the Members of the U.S. Intelligence Board. The representatives of the AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 1. Memorandum of Conversation 1. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 16, 1964. SUBJECT Eastern Europe PARTICIPANTS Mr. Vladimir Velebit, Executive Secretary, the Economic Commission for Europe Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Mrs. Liane W. Atlas, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs In reply to my question as to what was going on in Eastern Europe, Velebit said that of course his contacts were only on the economic side, and then proceeded to discuss the political side as well. He started with Czechoslovakia, and said they were not doing well, their economy was stagnant, and there was a disposition to change their system. I asked, “Moving more to the Yugoslav example?” He replied, “I hope they do better than that.” He said that the Czechoslovakians had shown more independence vis-á-vis the Soviets. They had openly opposed the Soviet position on the importance to be accorded East-West trade problems at the UN Conference on Trade and Development. Also, they had praised the ECE Secretariat's “Economic Survey of Europe” despite its unfavorable report on the Czech economy and the traditionally critical attitude of the Bloc toward such surveys. He said the Hungarians were much bolder than they had been, and even more so than the Poles. The Poles were being held back by Gomulka, who was “stupid and stubborn” and was putting the brakes on. When I asked him in what areas the Hungarians were bolder, he said both political and economic. The trend was towards close relations with Yugoslavia and acceptance of their ideas. He went into some detail in explaining Rumania's desire for independence of Soviet COMECON planning. The Rumanians were demanding independence in their economic development. He saw no progress in Bulgaria. He said the situation in East Germany was “hopeless”. When I commented that the East German government was the most unpopular in the world, he said he wasn't sure that he could accept that and mentioned South Viet-Nam. I said to avoid argument I will change it to the most unpopular communist government. He replied, “undoubtedly.” He said that 90-odd percent of the people were opposed to Ulbricht. He agreed that the undoubted objective of all Eastern European countries would be Tito's independent status. When I asked him what we could do to encourage this, he said we must be patient, it would be slow, but “don't put in any obstacles.” He suggested we help to expand trade, of course on a “most-favored-nation” basis. He reiterated his conviction that improved trade improves the political climate. He said he regretted the comment that was made when the CIA report on the USSR was made public, 2 drawing the conclusion that since the Soviet Union was in difficulties, we should put every obstacle in the way of her development. He said that sort of statement was counterproductive. I told him I hadn't seen the statement, but it evidently came from some news columns or commentaries. I agreed with his conclusion as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, but said that I felt that the regime of Peiping was so aggressive and in such difficulties it would be a mistake for us to change our attitude. As he was just leaving, he didn't comment on this. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, E EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Harriman and approved in M. 2 Reference is to a January 1964 CIA report that placed Soviet growth rates over the previous 2 years at less than one-half those of the United States. For a summary of the report, see The New York Times , January 8, 1964. 2. Special Report by the Central Intelligence Agency 2. Special Report by the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, March 27, 1964. NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE A new and less rigid relationship is developing between Eastern Europe and Moscow. This has resulted partly from changes in Soviet policy but, more importantly, from a recognition by the lesser Communist regimes themselves that they now are in a position to insist on greater consideration for individual national interests. Although this discovery is having an ever-increasing influence on their attitudes, the Eastern European regimes realize also that there are continuing political, economic, and military advantages in remaining a part of some sort of bloc of Communist states. Moscow nevertheless can expect to encounter increasing difficulties in leading that bloc. Erosion of Soviet Control The recent trip to Peiping of a high-level Rumanian party delegation 2 highlights the changes which have been developing in Moscow's relations with Eastern Europe. It seems clear that the Russians, lacking unanimous support even in Eastern Europe for their projected harder tactics in the Sino-Soviet dispute, had no acceptable alternative but to acquiesce in the Rumanian desire to play the role of mediator in talks with the Chinese Communists. Certainly Moscow's propaganda coverage after the Rumanian delegation returned empty-handed was warmer and more friendly than that given on its departure for Peiping. In the post-Stalin era, policies pursued by the Soviet bloc had until last July increasingly reflected a consensus of the member states. Multilateral consultations on policy matters, with the views of all being heard, had with reasonable success replaced Stalinist bilateralism. At times, of course, such consultations became acrimonious as a single participant, strongly motivated by self-interest, held out for more consideration of his position. But in the long run the will of the Soviet Union usually prevailed. This technique of controlled multilateral policy-making suffered a severe blow last summer, however, when the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) finally yielded to Rumania's opposition and abandoned, at least for the time being, certain aspects of Soviet bloc planning and integration sponsored by the USSR. The subsequent trend toward even slacker control promises increasing difficulties for Moscow in its relations with the Eastern European countries, particularly because it no longer has as extensive a network of informers and advisers throughout their government and party structures. In Poland, for example, Soviet advisers and intelligence specialists since 1958 have been restricted to formal contacts with their counterparts under a written agreement and are no longer integrated into party and government offices. Similar arrangements are believed to govern Moscow's present relations with the other Eastern European States. Also contributing to the USSR's difficulties has been the disappearance, except in the broadest sense, of clearly defined limits set by Moscow of what constitutes acceptable behavior by a Soviet bloc member. A Polish Foreign Ministry official recently commented to a Western official that, even though neither the East German regime nor the USSR liked the idea of the Rumanian delegation going to Peiping, the Rumanians had the right to take an individual initiative in ideological as well as economic affairs. Ironically, Khrushchev's problems in Eastern Europe are the result of his own concept of “different roads to socialism,” first made a point of doctrine in 1956. 3 During his trip last summer to Yugoslavia 4 he gave added weight to the concept by accepting Yugoslavia as a Communist country practicing a correct form of socialism. This probably carried an implication for some of the Eastern Europeans that the limited autonomy they had heretofore exercised only in internal affairs had been extended to matters having bloc-wide significance. The effect is visible even in such conservative regimes as that in Czechoslovakia. Influential Czechoslovak party dissidents recently published an article strongly praising the basic features of Yugoslavia's unique brand of socialism and implying that these should be adopted in their country. 5 Even the Bulgarian regime is encouraging experimentation with and debate on more liberal methods of economic management, including decentralization and improved incentives. The Eastern European leaderships, recognizing that Khrushchev needs their active support and backing in the dispute with Communist China, have been further emboldened in their efforts to establish a semi-independent relationship with Moscow. Since last fall several other Eastern European countries—in addition to Rumania—are believed to have vigorously opposed Russia's intention of bringing the Sino-Soviet dispute to a showdown. East Germany, on the other hand, is reported to be dissatisfied with Moscow's failure to take a firm line with Peiping. Effect of New Relationship with Moscow The assertion of autonomy in Eastern Europe has probably gone further than the Russians originally anticipated. In the summer of 1963, for example, following Rumania's insistence on going ahead with its plans for the construction of the Galati steel complex in the face of opposition from Moscow, CEMA, and the more industrialized northern satellites, Presidium member Podgorny visited Bucharest in an effort to persuade the Rumanian leadership to change its mind on this and other matters. 6 Then Khrushchev himself made a secret journey to Rumania to reason with Gheorghiu-Dej. 7 Moscow's opposition was based on the sound grounds that Galati was an economically questionable project. However, both Podgorny and Khrushchev failed to budge the Rumanian leader from his adamant opposition to plans which would in effect have kept Rumania predominantly an agricultural country. An even more difficult problem for the Russians, growing out of the developing autonomous relations, has been public conflict between individual Eastern European countries over policy questions. This type of behavior, which has rarely been observed before, reflects the decline of Moscow's influence and is likely to become more frequent. Recently the East German party published a politburo report on problems it faced because of Czechoslovakia's de-Stalinization program. 8 This same report also attacked, although not by name, those brotherly countries—Poland, Rumania, and Hungary—that had signed economic agreements with Bonn. The East Germans were concerned because these three countries had recognized for trade purposes that West Berlin was a part of West Germany, a position contrary to that long propagandized by the Ulbricht regime and the USSR itself. By implication the East Germans criticized the USSR for permitting these developments and suggested that Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia should not sign such agreements. Bulgaria, nevertheless, did so three weeks later, and apparently with Russian approval. The Eastern European countries will almost certainly attempt to broaden their autonomy even more in view of the unsatisfied demands of self-interest in all of them. Also they have seen the success of other Communist regimes such as Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China in taking wholly independent courses of action. There are, to be sure, some built-in brakes on this pursuit of an independent course. No Eastern European Communist leader wants to risk his personal position through any weakening of the power structure in his own party, a distinct threat in Czechoslovakia and Poland and to a lesser degree so far in East Germany and Bulgaria. He may see Soviet support as the only thing standing between him and Albania. Furthermore, there are still advantages to be drawn from a generally common ideology and from participation in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA—despite disagreements with certain aspects of CEMA's programs. In the present fluid situation, Moscow is highly reluctant to try to insure conformity through coercive measures, such as political or economic sanctions, lest existing differences sharpen or more resistance be generated. Indeed, as a Yugoslav foreign affairs official recently remarked while commenting on the possibility of an international Communist meeting to condemn the Chinese, meetings such as those held in 1957 and 1960 could never again take place. The time is past, he said, when such meetings could be called at Moscow's behest. In his opinion, Rumania would decline to attend unless it has a clearly defined agenda in advance, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would probably adopt a similar attitude. The development of a more persuasive approach on Moscow's part may therefore be adumbrated in its recently announced $300-million loan to Bulgaria for industrial development and its signing of bilateral agreements with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia for long-term scientific, technical, and economic planning assistance and for greater economic coordination. Of all previous Russian loans to Bulgaria, totaling about $400 million, approximately half was earmarked for agricultural development. The new loan may thus be designed in part to forestall demands and recriminations by Sofia and another disagreement like that with Rumania. In another indication of Soviet fence-mending, a high official in Bucharest has just recently let it be known that the USSR will supply significant amounts of equipment, as originally promised in 1960, for the Galati complex as well as increased supplies of iron ore, a decision which, according to another source, may have been taken in early January. Effects on Internal Affairs The greater diversity and freedom of action that now characterize both the Soviet bloc's intramural ties and its relations with the West are not without effect on the individual parties, where current trends are in dispute. Factionalism in Czechoslovakia and Poland has become intense, is evident in Bulgaria, and has appeared even in East Germany. Czechoslovakia's Novotny has been forced by liberal elements in his party to remove close associates with Stalinist background, to ease restrictive domestic policies, and to give more latitude to the restive liberals and intellectuals. So far this has only sharpened the desires of the liberals for even more sweeping reforms and has weakened party authority and Novotny's power. Bulgarian Party First Secretary Zhivkov is under conflicting pressure from both hard-line and revisionist elements. In Bulgarian political terms Zhivkov is relatively moderate. He owes his present position largely to Moscow's support, which he must hold if he is to retain his leadership. The consideration may account in part for the USSR's recent new credit to Bulgaria. At the recent party plenum in East Germany, 9 Walter Ulbricht alluded to developing internal strains. Among the contributing factors apparently are his regime's imitation of some of Moscow's innovations in economic policies; the rehabilitation of old party officials who were imprisoned in the wake of Czechoslovakia's purges in the early 1950's; the smoldering differences with other Eastern European countries—and perhaps Moscow—on the subject of Berlin and Germany; and the problem of trying to appear moderate to the outside world while pursuing harsh internal policies. De-Stalinization elsewhere in Eastern Europe heightens the anachronism of the Stalinist Ulbricht. Even though in Moscow's view some liberalization of conditions in East Germany would probably be desirable, his strong hand is needed to inhibit the development of rivalries among potential successors. The Soviet leaders dare not risk such a situation in East Germany in view of their inability last winter to bring about a quick solution to the problems posed by the anti-Novotny elements in the Czech party. Polish party leader Gomulka at the moment seems to face the most serious challenge to his leadership and authority since his return to power in 1956. His politburo is aging; four members are seriously ill, and a fifth post has remained vacant since the ouster of Roman Zambrowski last July. Encouraged in part by the seeming decline in Moscow's influence over the local affairs of the Eastern European countries, a number of hard-line internal security specialists in Poland are pressing against this weakened top layer of their party. They reportedly have circulated a letter in the party criticizing some of Gomulka's policies, apparently hoping to challenge him at a party congress to be held in June. Unless meaningful Soviet backing is forthcoming Gomulka may thus be forced by the physical attrition now going on in the Polish politburo to co-opt some of his hard-line opponents into policy-making positions. Such a move could bring about a significant tightening of his present moderate policy. Prospects In order to maintain the present degree of diversity in Eastern Europe and the increasingly frequent expressions of national individuality, the regime leaders recognize they must have the good will of the Soviet Union. Their own self-interests dictate continued participation in Soviet bloc activities. Nevertheless, as national interests come to the fore in one satellite, similar interests are stimulated in others; and each move toward greater independence spreads like an infection throughout the bloc which Moscow may be able to limit but probably not fully control. As one Western official notes, de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe inevitably leads to “de-satellization.” This fluid state in the Soviet bloc will continue. It may eventually lead, although not without strife, to some loose form of relationship in which each member would have reasonably broad freedom of action, a belief that it is an equal partner, and an assurance that its own interests will be respected. Such a grouping of independent Communist states held together by mutual self-interest could constitute a stronger, more viable system than an empire held in thrall by the Soviet Union. In this situation the countries of Eastern Europe will continue to evolve toward a status as genuinely autonomous political entities, subject to the pressures of national interests, rising popular expectations for a better life, and a resurgence of the historical frictions that have plagued the area for centuries. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, East Europe. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The chart and photographs included with the text are not printed. 2 March 3–10; the delegation was led by Prime Minister Maurer. 3 Reference is to the communiqué issued on June 2, 1955, at the conclusion of Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia. For text of the relevant portions, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives , 1955–1956, pp. 14266–14267. 4 August 20–September 3, 1963. 5 During the winter of 1963–1964, the Czech Government and Communist Party launched a series of attacks on cultural publications such as Kulturi Tvorba, Literarni Noviny, and Kultury Zivot , for articles they had carried that included suggestions that the Czechs examine other models of socialist development. 6 According to Pravda , June 5, 1963, Podgorny visited Romania for a 2-week period in late May and early June. 7 Presumably during his August visit to Yugoslavia. 8 The report of Horst Sindermann was published in Neues Deutschland , February 13, 1964. 9 The meeting, held February 3–7, focused on economic and party discipline problems. It was reported on in airgram A–517 from Berlin, February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 GER E) 3. Record of Discussion 3. Record of Discussion 1 Washington, March 31, 1964. HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE SECRETARY'S POLICY PLANNING MEETING HELD MARCH 31, 1964 SUBJECT S/P Paper Entitled: “Western Policy Design and the Quiet Revolution in Eastern Europe” 2 The paper under consideration was described as an attempt to break through the conventional vocabulary and stimulate thought and discussion concerning basic assumptions of Western policy toward Eastern Europe. It was submitted to the March 11–13 meeting of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group. The paper is framed by the intimate inter-relationship for Western policy of what happens in Eastern Europe, in the USSR, and in divided Germany. It identifies the forces at work in Eastern Europe which tend to promote polycentrism—but within prevailing limits of Soviet security and Communist control. It suggests that a central consideration in Western policy toward the area is to further favorable evolutionary development in the USSR. It indicates that the anticipated extension of current trends there may present perils and opportunities for Western policy—particularly in terms of German unification. It was reported that discussion of the paper at the APAG meeting revealed general gratification that “civilizing” influences are at work in Eastern Europe, and substantial agreement that these should be promoted for various reasons and by divers means including trade, cultural contacts and exchanges. There was a range of opinion on the extent to which Eastern Europe can be treated as a problem more or less separate from the USSR, on the importance for Western policy of current trends (and of Eastern Europe itself), and on the degree to which the West can influence events in Eastern Europe. APAG representatives from the UK, Norway and Canada treated the German problem gingerly and emphasized the efficacy of economic inducements to channel Eastern Europe's momentum in desired directions. At the other extreme, the representative of the Netherlands took a hard line, centering on the German problem and according no significance to East European developments as such. The middle ground was dominated by the French representative who underlined the priority of the German problem in relations with Eastern Europe, proposed exploitation of the political attraction of the Common Market, and urged planning for possible, if unlikely, large-scale violence in Eastern Europe. The German APAG representative hoped to make reunification attractive in Eastern Europe and the USSR by such means as a commitment not to change boundaries by force, a discriminatory denuclearized zone, bilateral agreements for Observation Posts and reparation payments. He indicated that relevant German policy attitudes vary from: (a) passive observation of the unfolding of history in the East, through (b) attempts to influence liberalizing forces in the area and (c) working by means of trade, contacts, etc. in the area, to (d) encouraging Eastern Europeans to negotiate while intensifying contacts with East Germany. He pointed to rising German sentiment for unification and forecast that issue would prove a critical test of the NATO Alliance. He thought in the event of another uprising in East Germany that the FRG would leave the Alliance if nothing were done to move the cause of Germany forward. It was suggested that the basic lesson of the recent APAG meeting and of the paper discussed may be that the future of Eastern Europe is inextricably bound up with questions of German unity and political freedom for East Germany. Perhaps we need to begin to think hard about Eastern Europe not only because current developments there are welcome signs of independence, but because these developments might lead to conditions under which the Soviet Union could accept a Germany united in freedom. We must recognize, however, that if the USSR gave up East Germany, it already or soon would have no ideological empire left in Eastern Europe. To do that the USSR would have to be much more Russian and less Communist. Nonetheless, the decisive question remains: will Moscow accept the ideological loss of East Germany and Eastern Europe? The ensuing discussion of the paper centered around the following major topics: 1. Relevance of the United Nations . It was suggested that the UN is relevant in the sense that Articles I and II of the UN Charter set forth standards of sovereign independence to which we adhere and can encourage others to adhere. We need not unilaterally shoulder the burden of urging the Soviet Union to divest itself of empire in Eastern Europe. 2. Role of Ideology . It was pointed out that the Soviets have made such a religion of communism that the ideology lives on in twisted form forty years after its legitimate death with Lenin. That religion is now out of date and must adapt or perish. If the USSR sticks to its unworkable tenets it will be inviting increasing trouble, making peaceful competition impossible ideologically as well as economically. In this sense the Chinese Communists are correct; i.e., genuine co-existence and orthodox Communist ideology are incompatible. It was noted that our principal concern is the external relations of countries not their internal policies. However, the latter may shape external relations in objectionable fashion. 3. Relative Importance of the USSR . There was discussion of the extent to which it is possible to view policy toward Eastern Europe in relative isolation from policy toward the USSR. The opinion was expressed that the main question must remain, what can we do in Eastern Europe to speed up evolution in the USSR? It was explained, with reference to ideology, that further evolution is essential to make it possible for the Soviet Union to accept a reunited Germany. On the other hand, it was noted that long-range policy toward Eastern Europe envisages full independence and sovereign relations for those countries with the free world and with the UN. A concern was expressed with inadequate focus on the goal of an independent Eastern Europe and at the possible implication that if the Soviets behaved the US would accommodate to Communist domination in Eastern Europe. It was pointed out that it is perhaps unnecessary to think about Eastern Europe in terms of our gain is the Soviet's loss and vice versa. We don't need the Eastern European countries on our side—we don't seek them as allies. Moreover, there is little practical likelihood of Eastern Europe being frozen into a polycentric status. There is too much political ferment for that, e.g., hard political choices for leaderships. It clearly is not enough simply to encourage developments in Eastern Europe without considering the effects on the USSR and on the German problem, in large part through the USSR. 4. The German Problem . It was noted that there appear to be two routes to German unification—confrontation and détente. The former has proven unsuccessful since 1945; the latter has yet to be tested. It would, however, present different security problems to the USSR. Soviet concern, it was argued by some, is far less with the security threat of a unified Germany than with the domino effect in Eastern Europe of the loss of East Germany. There was discussion of the impact on Soviet security of a unified Germany with meaningful security and disarmament arrangements. The opinion was expressed that if unification were evolutionary and without violence, Soviet concerns might be satisfied. Another view was that the security problem in Soviet eyes includes the threat of eventual German offensive capability, or at least of a German capability to spark a conflagration. 5. Potential Crises . It was suggested that trends in Eastern Europe to date comprise a cumulation of small increments, but historical trends may now outrun manageable rates and magnitudes. Thus, the US need prepare for crises in the area lest we freeze as we did at Budapest or act in haste contrary to our real interest. The unpopularity in Eastern Europe of the USSR and of the Communist regimes was cited as a potential source of mass violence and possible subsequent escalation. It was noted that the unpopularity of at least the USSR seems a permanent condition if for no other reason that the USSR has no economic possibility of satisfying the aspirations of the peoples of Eastern Europe. It was pointed out the Soviets could create a real crisis of a different order for the Alliance by withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe and East Germany and challenging us to reciprocate. Follow-up Action Suggested by the Discussion a. Preparation of a paper further pointing up the policy implications of developments in Eastern Europe (in connection with consideration of the Soviet succession process). 3 b. A review of the extent to which smaller Communist countries are actively engaged in conspiratorial aspects of world communism (as a possibly important aid in treating different Communist countries differently). c. Study of problems and opportunities should the USSR challenge the US with meaningful and/or dramatic disengagement and disarmament moves (e.g., troop withdrawals from Hungary and reductions in East Germany). d. Renewed attention to planning in connection with crises likely to stem from developments in Eastern Europe (e.g., East German or Czechoslovakian blow-up, Rumanian defection, double-header succession crisis in Moscow and East Berlin). 1 Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 71 D 273, Eastern Europe. Secret. The source text, which is dated April 1, bears no drafting information. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Apparent reference to “The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany,” April 3. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 71 D 273, Eastern Europe) 4. National Security Action Memorandum No. 304 4. National Security Action Memorandum No. 304 1 Washington, June 3, 1964. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State SUBJECT U.S. Relations with Eastern Europe In his speech at Lexington, Virginia, on May 23, 1964, 2 the President said: “We will continue to build bridges across the Gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors and of humanitarian aid.” The President would like Department of State to complete by August 1, 1964, recommendations which translate this statement of policy into specific action programs for each of the Eastern European countries (with particular reference to substance and timing) and, at the same time, to examine the possibilities of multilateralizing these relations in Eastern and Western Europe. McG. Bundy 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 304. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, to the Director of Central Intelligence, and to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. 2 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–1964 , Book I, pp. 708–710. 5. Memorandum of Conversation 5. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 9, 1964, 3:15 p.m. SUBJECT East-West Relations; Situation in Southeast Asia PARTICIPANTS Germans Franz Josef Strauss, Chairman of the Christian Socialist Union Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, Embassy of Federal Republic of Germany Herr Reuter, German Press Office, Bonn US The Secretary Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER Following a brief opening exchange about the situation in Southeast Asia, the Secretary asked Herr Strauss for his views as to what was going on in Eastern Europe. He cited the example of Rumania where, among other developments, the government had recently referred to Mr. Khrushchev as a “thief”. 2 Strauss said he was very interested in this situation. He had recently talked to a journalist from Die Welt who had returned from a trip to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The journalist had told of the existence of an open anti-Khrushchev movement in Soviet Georgia. Young people seemed to be particularly involved in this movement and the police were apparently helpless to do anything about it. Strauss felt that his information on this situation was insufficient and he wanted to look into it further when he returned to Germany. He said that the big question was how far the leaders of the Eastern European countries could go against Moscow without eliminating themselves, either by provoking Moscow to some action against them or as a result of internal disturbance. He felt that national Communism was not possible without the protective umbrella of Moscow. Should this umbrella be removed, it would be only a few months before the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe would be upset. The problem for these regimes, therefore, was to try to balance between gaining more independence and not losing the protection of Moscow against internal upheavals. Another factor in the picture, Strauss continued, was the resentment felt by the peoples in Eastern Europe against Soviet economic exploitation. The Secretary commented that he had had in the past extensive contacts with scientists from Eastern Europe and he had been made aware of their strong resentment against the second-class status in scientific matters which had been accorded them by Moscow. In addition to the dangers in Southeast Asia, the events in Eastern Europe were in his opinion among the most interesting developments in the world picture today. Ulbricht appeared to be getting worried over a sense of increasing isolation from the rest of Eastern Europe. Today the winds of liberalism were even blowing out of Prague of all places. The Secretary inquired of Strauss where he thought this trend would lead us. Strauss replied that “this depends on us”. There were two extremes; on the one hand, the mood of détente might lead people to ask why, if we are moving to normal relations with the Communist countries in Eastern Europe, should we not also have normal relations with Ulbricht; on the other hand, a policy could be pursued tenaciously to make Ulbricht an intolerable burden to Moscow. Strauss said he felt it should be recognized how difficult it would be for the Soviets to replace the Communist regime in East Germany. He had always said that the German problem could not be separated from its context, and he felt the objective should be to bring about a situation where Moscow would be prepared to normalize the situation on the basis of increasing self-determination in the areas under its control. Strauss continued that there were three points in the area of East-West relations that he wished to stress: 1) We must help remove the fear among the peoples of Eastern Europe of a military threat from a united Germany. 2) We should make clear that there was no long-range solution possible in Europe on a lasting and stable basis which did not take legitimate German interests into account. (He interjected here that he would dismiss out of hand the recent Seebohm speech, which he described as “crazy”.) 3 3) It was necessary to convince Moscow that the danger from abandoning their satellites in Eastern Europe was less than from withholding a peaceful settlement in Central and Eastern Europe. The Secretary said he thought it was possible that in the period immediately ahead we might find Khrushchev more adamant than ever about the German question. Khrushchev fully recognized that if Soviet troops were pulled out of East Germany he could end up by losing all of Eastern Europe. Strauss said this was why he was convinced the German problem could not be separated from its European context. In a sense the 22 Soviet divisions in East Germany were a garrison for the entire Soviet “belt” in Eastern Europe. He agreed with the Secretary that there was not much hope for a short-range solution. One factor was the importance of ideology—if one Communist regime should fall back into the ranks of capitalism, this would represent a great setback to the world Communist movement. The Secretary referred in this connection to the current controversy between Moscow and Peiping and said that from the standpoint of orthodox Communist principles Peiping was right; any really genuine peaceful co-existence which could be achieved would basically transform the character of world Communism. Strauss cited the case of Austria, and said that what had happened there was not applicable to the German situation. In Austria the Russians had never established a Communist regime. This meant that they could retreat from Austria without losing any face. This was impossible in Germany where there was a Communist regime. Should the Soviets stop upholding this regime and permit free elections, 90 percent of the people would vote against it. This would represent a great defeat for world Communism. The Secretary referred to our recent talks with the Rumanian trade delegation. 4 While there had been no anti-Soviet talk from either side, he felt that the net effect had been to encourage Rumanian national feeling. He agreed with Strauss that the problems of Germany and of Eastern Europe were part of the same complex; the 22 Soviet divisions in East Germany helped the Soviets maintain control over the situation throughout Eastern Europe. He also agreed with Strauss that there was a limit beyond which the Communist governments in Eastern Europe would find it difficult to go. All this did not make the solution of the German problem any easier. Strauss said he agreed we could not expect too much. The Poles, Czechs and others would have to be careful to “stop short of the threshold”. The Secretary referred to the recent increase in tourism from West Germany to Eastern Europe as a new and important factor in helping to mitigate fear of Germany in Eastern Europe. Strauss agreed. He said that the fear of Germany in these countries was one of Moscow's strongest instruments. It was most important to take away the “nightmare” of the German military threat from the peoples of Eastern Europe, although some of the governments in that area might need a supposed German threat to remain in power. The Secretary commented that he had repeatedly cautioned about any complacency developing over any atmosphere of détente. It was important to bear in mind that the range of US-Soviet agreements thus far was very small and that all the big questions, such as the German problem, still remained unresolved. We were concerned that any feeling of détente might cause the peoples in Western Europe to relax prematurely. Strauss agreed there were dangers in any détente atmosphere. For one thing, he felt very strongly that we must destroy the idea that a détente means a series of concessions to the Soviets. Another danger was that in looking for material comforts and advantages out of a détente we could all fall asleep at the expense of our military posture. The Secretary said that at one point we had been concerned about a double standard which seemed to exist, particularly in the matter of East-West trade. For example, when we sold wheat to Russia there was an outcry from Europe, although European trade with the Communist world was much greater than our own. Strauss said he agreed and felt that “there had been a lot of hypocrisy in Europe on the matter”. Speaking personally, he would like to have as little trade as possible with the Soviets and Eastern Europe. The Secretary said he wondered, however, whether we should not consider how important a stake the Eastern Europeans might acquire in East-West trade. Strauss agreed this was a factor and said maybe we should use trade as a political weapon without saying so. The Secretary said this would be fine if we could all move in step together, but we had not succeeded in doing so over the past 17 years. He cited current disagreements over long-term credits to the Soviet Union as an example. The Secretary commented that NATO's basic problem was to try to maintain solidarity in a time of peace and prosperity. There was of course no problem in this regard in times of real trouble. Strauss said he agreed. We seemed to be further from a real military crisis in Europe than at any time since 1945. He added that despite tendencies in other parts of Western Europe, there was no pressure in Germany to reduce the 18-month period of conscription. The Secretary said that another big problem facing NATO was whether the member countries could have common policies, if not common actions, in other parts of the world where a Communist threat existed. In the US we felt that these problems could not be separated, since they formed part and parcel of the world-wide Communist threat. If there were real trouble in Southeast Asia, this also raised a threat to Europe. Strauss said he wondered what Moscow would do if the US and China got into real trouble with each other in Southeast Asia. He himself felt that Moscow would welcome this. The Secretary said one thing which was sure: there would not be another Korea in Southeast Asia. The military situation now was much different and our own military posture much better than at that time. The Secretary continued that the big question was how to get Peiping and Hanoi to realize where they were going before they went too far. They seemed to have a rather primitive view of the situation. Strauss inquired with a smile whether the Secretary was elaborating a contingency plan for action. The Secretary replied that one plan we were not studying was how to get out of Southeast Asia. We would not get out. The consequences would be a chain reaction throughout Asia and the Middle East which would extend even into Western Europe. He felt that while Europe might be somewhat disinterested now in Southeast Asia, they would lose this disinterest rapidly if the US were to leave Southeast Asia. Strauss said it was a pity that the movement toward European unity had not made further progress. The Secretary agreed that it was a tragedy that when there was such disarray in the Communist Bloc, the West also seemed incapable of united action. Strauss said he knew that the Germans should be prepared to accept greater commitments in the world at large, but there was a difficulty arising from German memories of the disasters suffered in their past history as a world power. These memories had tended to make the German people more narrow-minded and provincial. He felt he must add that the Allied program after the last war for “re-educating” the German people had been partly responsible for this attitude in Germany. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Creel and approved in S on June 17. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 2 Apparent reference to an exchange of attacks in broadcasts made by the state radios of Romania and the Soviet Union during late May and early June 1964. 3 In a May 19 speech, East German Minister Hans Cristoph Seebohm called for the return of the Sudetenland to Germany. 4 See Documents 142 and 143 . 6. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 6. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 1 Washington, June 25, 1964. SUBJECT “Bridges to Eastern Europe” 1. This memorandum is responsive to your request that we identify some of the moves which could be taken with respect to implementing the President's policy of “building bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe.” It is not intended as an exhaustive study of the many possibilities available. 2. Obviously some steps which might advance our interests with the current regimes in Eastern Europe might have adverse effects on the general population in the area. They might also have similar effects on our interests in other areas, for example in West Germany or in the USSR. In general we have not attempted to sort out and weigh the balance of interests involved in each case. 3. The memorandum also does not attempt to evaluate the chances of obtaining positive action by the US Congress in cases where legislative action might be necessary. 4. We have coordinated this paper with DD/P. General Considerations 5. Clearly, implementation of the policy must avoid dramatic and flamboyant actions which are likely to generate suspicion or which would be difficult for an Eastern European nation to accept. A series of small steps that convey our intentions and that do not create embarrassing political overtones would best serve Western interests. Even these must be subtly initiated. 6. There are open to Washington certain domestic actions which, although they would arouse a critical response in certain circles in the US, would contribute to a general improvement in the atmosphere with Eastern Europe. 2 Among these are: A. Abandonment of the annual Captive Nations Week resolution by the US Congress. It is outdated, obviously resented, and ignores the diversity in Eastern Europe. B. Withdrawal of direct and indirect support of East European refugee groups and governments-in-exile. These organizations enjoy no political influence in their native countries and could never serve as an acceptable nucleus for a non-Communist government. US support of these groups, moreover, carries the implication that they are an alternative government to that in power with which we would be attempting to establish a bridge. C. Expansion of the modest efforts now underway to educate the US public so that it will understand the evolving situation in Eastern Europe. This could lead to a lessening of local discrimination in the US against the sale of goods imported from Eastern Europe. It could lead to a favorable attitude in Congress toward the President's policy. D. Essential to any program of “building bridges” is the easing or repeal of restrictive legislation on dealings with Communist countries, so that the executive agencies of the US Government can deal with these states with greater flexibility. Under present law the extending of aid even for humanitarian purposes, such as after the Skoplje earthquake, is time-consuming and extremely difficult to arrange. 7. There are other general official actions the US can take which would not require any change in existing policies. A. The Department of State could clarify immigration policy regarding people born in Eastern Europe who now are resident in the free world and who have subsequently made trips behind the Iron Curtain. Many such people erroneously fear they would lose the right to visit or emigrate to the US if they make a return trip to their homeland. Western European citizens also suffer under the same illusion. B. The Department of State could publicly clarify in Eastern Europe US policies on issuing visas to rank and file members of the Communist party or other extant parties in Eastern Europe. Many party members do not realize they are eligible for US visas under existing regulations. C. Provisions could be made for more expeditious handling of requests by US citizens of Eastern European origin who desire and need official help in making substantial gifts (such as the X-ray machine recently given to Wroclaw Hospital in Poland) to their homeland. The present process of arranging for delivery of such gifts is very laborious because the machinery of the Department of State and other government agencies is not prepared administratively to deal with such requests. 8. Since 1949–1950, US restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe and Communist emphasis on production for internal or intra-bloc use have kept commerce between the two areas far below its potential. 9. In recent years, however, all the Eastern European countries have shown growing interest in increasing their imports from the US, primarily of advanced technical equipment, but also of agricultural and other products. Some of these goods are denied the Eastern European countries by means of US export licensing restrictions. Moreover, the ability of these countries to pay for imports from the US is limited since they are denied access to commercial credit and are not accorded Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment. Partly for these reasons, and partly because of domestic economic priorities, the East European countries have not made a major effort to develop production of goods marketable in the US. The exceptions are Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent Poland, which have been treated much more liberally than the other countries of the area in regard to US export licensing. They receive normal commercial credits, PL-480 credits, and MFN treatment. More liberal export policies and access to commercial credits also are being given to Rumania, which, however, does not have a very large short-term potential for exporting to the US. 10. Czechoslovakia probably has the most urgent need for increased trade with the West, including the US. Hungarian interest in Western machinery and equipment has increased. Bulgaria, the least developed of the Eastern European countries except for Albania, has a vital and continuing need for foreign equipment, technical assistance, and credits. The USSR has provided this support and recently granted Bulgaria a credit of $333 million. Bulgarian interest in increased trade with the US, therefore, probably would be mainly long-term and devoid of great urgency. 11. One way to increase US trade with East European countries without new legislation would be to liberalize US licensing requirements and make available normal commercial credits. Licensing policy toward Eastern Europe, however, involves questions of what constitutes “strategic goods” and of policy toward the Soviet Union, which may have access to products and technology sold to Eastern Europe. Substantial expansion of trade with these countries in the long term would require extension of MFN treatment to East European countries. 12. Further dissemination of information, trade fairs and exhibitions, resident offices and other means of trade promotion on a reciprocal basis would also serve the general objective of expanding US contacts with Eastern Europe. 13. US support for the accession of East European countries to the various Western-oriented international economic organizations, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), might help to provide additional forums for East European contacts with Western countries, although the present nature of Soviet-type economic systems precludes any meaningful adherence to the policies of these organizations. 14. Outside the trade field, encouragement of tourism and exchanges of delegations and of university students and professors could be pressed further. 15. There is another general consideration bearing on the “bridge” policy as a whole. This is to avoid unnecessary competition with our Western European allies in certain Eastern European countries. By virtue of history and economic factors, several NATO states are better qualified to undertake some aspects of the “bridge building” and could be encouraged to expand their current role. Whatever steps the US may take to improve relations with Eastern Europe will necessarily influence the policies of our NATO allies. 16. Appended are annexes detailing possible approaches for each country in the area. 3 R. J. Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, East Europe, Vol. 7. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A handwritten note on the source text by McCone reads: “Personal for McGeorge Bundy, JAM.” In a June 26 memorandum to Bundy, attached to the source text, McCone explained that the memorandum printed here consisted of “some ideas that we have developed as to how these bridges might be constructed.” He noted that no attempt had been made “to deal with the questions of legal restrictions or the practicality of suggestions on the basis of political or public opinion considerations.” 2 Appended as Annex I is a summary of former Ambassador Kennan's views on US policy toward Yugoslavia, written in December 1962. His views are pertinent to the “bridge building” policy. [Footnote in the source text. For text of Kennan's memorandum, dated November 28, 1962, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVI, Document 140 .] 3 None printed. 7. National Intelligence Estimate 7. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, July 22, 1964. NIE 12–64 CHANGING PATTERNS IN EASTERN EUROPE The Problem To assess the situation and outlook in the Eastern European countries and their external relations over the next few years. Conclusions A. Eastern Europe has entered upon its third post-Stalin phase. The years 1953–1957 were marked by popular upheavals and the danger of disintegration, and the next several years by consolidation and relative quiet. The present is marked once more by a preoccupation with change and we look for a period of political liveliness and fluidity. (Paras. 1–11, 22) B. In the minds of most Eastern Europeans, however, the basic fact of Communist rule is not now in dispute. It is rather the question of the national future, within the framework of a Communist system, which is being subjected to examination and experiment. The internal issues are those of liberalization and economic reform. These in turn are closely related to the problems of autonomy within the Communist camp and relations with the West. Increasingly, the leaders of Eastern Europe are feeling free to approach these questions less in the light of Soviet wishes or the supposed common interests of the Bloc, more in the light of national aspirations and local political conditions. (Paras. 8, 12, 24) C. One result of this trend, which is likely to continue for the next several years, is a growing diversification in Eastern Europe. Outsiders, including the USSR, will find it increasingly hard to apply a general analysis and a general policy to the area. We expect in most of these countries some movement toward political liberalization and a search for better balance and more efficient methods in managing the economy. Economic progress, while likely to show some improvement over the generally dismal record of the last two years, will not be such as to diminish dissatisfaction and impatience in the near future. Political evolution is not likely to proceed at a speed which threatens the Communist regimes. (Paras. 22, 24–25, 29–30, 33) D. In external relations, we expect a similar uneven evolution away from the tutelage of Moscow and toward closer contacts with Western Europe and the US. We believe that the Soviets would consider direct military intervention in Eastern Europe only in emergency circumstances, when they believed vital Soviet interest to be threatened. In political terms, the irreducible Soviet demand probably is that these regimes should remain professedly Communist and continue at least formal membership in the Warsaw Pact. So long as these limits are not transgressed we believe that the USSR is prepared to tolerate considerable divergence in internal policies and even to acquiesce reluctantly in further manifestations of independence in foreign policy. Most countries will almost certainly seek to develop their economic and cultural relations with the West at a rapid rate, though the economies of Eastern Europe will remain closely tied to that of the USSR. (Paras. 24, 31–32, 34, 36) E. Though we believe that these trends will unfold gradually and without major upheavals, we are conscious of the possibility of sharp instability and even violent shifts. The chances of change of this sort depend to some extent upon each country's success in managing domestic problems and party factionalism. Developments in the Soviet Union will probably be equally important. If the USSR continues to falter in its competition with the West, to lose prestige in the contest within the Communist movement, or to give an impression of uncertainty in its policy, Eastern European nationalism may be moved to bolder ventures. These possibilities will also be heightened during the succession period in Soviet politics, which is likely to breed factionalism, nervousness, and exaggerated hopes and fears in Eastern Europe. (Paras. 26–27) [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. This estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board with the Directors of INR, DIA, and NSA concurring and the representative of the AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstaining on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 8. Record of Discussion 8. Record of Discussion 1 Washington, July 27, 1964. HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE SECRETARY'S POLICY PLANNING MEETING OF JULY 27, 1964 SUBJECT Bridgebuilding in Eastern Europe Under discussion were two papers: one an S/P paper on policy toward Eastern Europe, 2 the other a draft reply to NSAM 304 3 outlining action programs in Eastern Europe. 4 The NSAM draft reply was characterized as a wide-ranging response which should distinguish more clearly between the measures that could be taken now and those that might become feasible as developments in East Europe progressed. Two specific criticisms were made: (1) it fails to distinguish between East Germany and the other East European states; (2) the proposal to encourage West Germany to modify the Hallstein Doctrine 5 is unrealistic and impractical. The policy paper received general acclaim for its worth in boldly proposing a line of policy. It was criticized on the following counts: 1. The paper is overstated in its optimism concerning both the analysis of the evolution of the East European nations and the action programs proposed. The ideological aspect is understated: these are strong Communist regimes. The possibility of a “Marshall Plan” approach is overstated. The paper needs to emphasize that its proposals are long-run in nature and cumulative in effect. 2. There is an overemphasis of the beneficial effects upon the Soviet succession of the evolution in the East European nations. “Reconciliation” with the West may have a reverse effect, causing the Soviet succession to eventuate in a regime determined to hold Eastern Europe in its grip. We must be cautious, since our East European policy will affect the Soviet succession. 3. In any case, “reconciliation” is a dangerous word politically, implying that we are reconciled to the suppression of the East European peoples by their Communist governments. A new word or phrase should be found. Moreover, the paper's proposals seem to lend support to these governments at the expense of the people, who, in some cases, are suppressed in a most Stalinist way. 4. The paper should delve deeper into the relationship of the “reconciliation” process to German reunification and Central European security arrangements. The long-run erosion of East European ideological unity may well contribute to the progress on a German settlement. 5. The paper should not permanently preclude the possibility of “reconciliation” with the GDR as well. Instead of “isolating” East Germany, why not consider the same “reconciliation” policy toward it as toward the other East European states? This could help to promote German reunification. (This suggestion was rebutted on two grounds: (1) the internal effect in the FRG of such a policy would render it self-defeating. Alienated West Germans might turn to a strong nationalist government which would by its character retard the desired evolution and “reconciliation” in Eastern Europe. (2) A “reconciled” Titoist-minded East Germany would cause the Soviets to hold on to it that much harder.) In discussion it was emphasized that we must not allow our Eastern European policy to be vetoed by Bonn. There is a certain amount of hypocrisy in the German objections to enlarged US contacts with the East. A short paper was requested outlining the differences between our present Eastern European policy and what that policy would be were we to go as far as the Germans in our contacts with the East. It was also suggested that an article on the Eastern European situation written by John Strachey for Encounter be distributed. 6 The problem of what kind of public statement on our Eastern European policy could be issued was discussed at length. In brief, the problem is how to talk about our objectives without getting in their way. Two points of view developed: one holding that for the present we should keep as quiet as possible, the other holding (with the S/P paper) that the President should issue a public statement enlarging upon his “bridgebuilding” speech. The following reasons were advanced against a public statement: a) In an election year it would be dangerous and divisive, as East European policy might become a campaign issue. New policy should not be introduced in a political campaign because it would not benefit from rational debate. b) There would be an element of presumptuousness in our publicly proclaiming our policy. This would irritate our European allies who are far ahead of us in pushing contacts with the Eastern European nations. Due to Congressional inhibitions we are far behind Western Europe in trade development with these countries. It would be better to bring Congress along before speaking out. The counter-arguments to “keeping quiet” follow: a) The President has already spoken out in his “bridgebuilding” speech; hence, this issue is bound to make its way into the campaign in any case. b) The latter is desirable, as the issue of East European policy is a good one with which to confront the unthinking opposition. c) Khrushchev already has a jaundiced view of our intentions in Eastern Europe. Hence, enunciating them—as the Attorney General did upon his return from Poland—will not do any harm. d) The articulation of our policy toward Eastern Europe has been helpful in the last six months; we need continued articulation. e) It was suggested that we use the drafting of a Presidential message on Eastern Europe as an exercise in prior consultation with the UK, France, and West Germany. This would go far to ensure a coordinated allied policy in the future. Concerning trade relations with Eastern Europe, it was cautioned that we must look into the deeper implications of MFN treatment. The problem is what do we do when we achieve this? Tariffs are of no significance to Communist nations with state trading systems. We must realize that these nations will have state trading for the foreseeable future. This means that their presence in the GATT might disrupt that already fragile body; we must consider this when we respond to their overtures for closer relations with the GATT. In the case of the USSR, we should not extend MFN until they settle some outstanding claims, including lend-lease. Divergent opinions were expressed concerning whether the “reconciliation” of Eastern Europe should have a primarily European or an Atlantic orientation. It was held that the US has the most prestige of any Western nation in Eastern Europe and that we should maximize the presence of Americans there. It would be a mistake to overemphasize Eastern European association with Western Europe. The structure of the latter is weak already, and the association of Eastern European states would only dilute it further. Eastern Europe should develop closer links with the Atlantic Community as a whole. Cooperation on specific subjects within the framework of the OECD might be useful. But the view was expressed that apart from the possibilities of arranging European-wide cooperation in some technical fields such as highway safety standards, the Council of Europe could do little in associating Eastern Europe with the West. On the other hand, it was held that rather than trumpeting a new US policy toward Eastern Europe it would be wiser to conform our policy with that of Western Europe first. The Europeans are not at present unhappy to see the US a minority of one on COCOM. Before talking of pushing on, we should first catch up with our European allies. Both Western Europe and the US have tools with which to help loosen the Eastern European “bloc.” Western Europe has geography, history, and such things as common waterways to weigh in the balance. The US has other assets such as the six million Americans of Polish extraction. The following additional problems were mentioned: The process of “reconciliation” with Eastern Europe raises three questions concerning its future orientation: (a) the connection between Eastern and Western Europe; (b) the connection between Eastern Europe and the US, and (c) between Eastern Europe and worldwide institutions. In addition, this process raises the question of how the US can consult with its Western European allies on policy toward Eastern Europe. Systematic consultation is needed at operational levels. This could be done in the Quadripartite Group or in the NAC. It was suggested that in our public statements we should stress our desire to improve relations with all Communist states, including Soviet Russia, and not just with “special cases” in Eastern Europe. Otherwise, if the Soviets receive the impression that we are fomenting difficulties for them in Eastern Europe, this would be contrary to our long-run policy of achieving understanding with the Soviet Union. Action: A short paper outlining the differences between (a) our present East European policy and (b) what that policy would look like were it as liberal as that of the FRG. Distribution to Bureau representatives attending the Secretary's Policy Planning Meetings of the pamphlet by John Strachey on Eastern Europe. 1 Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 71 D 273, Eastern Europe. Secret. The source text, which is dated July 30, bears no drafting information. 2 Apparently “Bridge Building in Eastern Europe,” undated. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Eastern Europe) 3 Document 4 . 4 A draft of Document 12 . 5 Reference is to the December 9, 1955, statement by the Federal Republic of Germany that it would break diplomatic relations with any nation that recognized the regime in East Germany and that it would refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with any East European state except the Soviet Union. 6 Reference is to a series of lectures by John Strachey published as an Encounter pamphlet, The Challenge of Democracy (London, 1964). 9. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara 9. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, December 24, 1964. Dear Bob: I am disturbed by the effect on our relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Poland of the recent incidents involving clashes between United States Military Attachés and local officials in those two countries. I have in mind particularly the Khabarovsk affair and the shooting incident in Poland. 2 These are the latest manifestations of a problem which has caused serious difficulties in our relations with the Communist countries for some years. Although the fault lies in most instances with the authorities of the other governments concerned, our people sometimes contribute to incidents through over-zealousness, violation of local laws or failure to appreciate the responsibilities underlying the enjoyment of diplomatic privileges and immunities. I think the time has come to review our policies, regulations and instructions governing the intelligence-gathering activities of our military personnel in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in an effort to reduce the chance of future incidents which might cause further complications in the pursuit of our over-all foreign policy objectives. We are also concerned that the present trend, if not checked, may result in the curtailment or even termination of the activities of our Attachs in the Communist countries. There have occurred in the past few years several developments that have a significant bearing on this problem. In the first place opportunities for political gains among these countries have increased, while the improvement in our relative power position and a reduction in U.S.-U.S.S.R. tensions have reduced the likelihood of military engagement. Second, other methods of intelligence collection have become available, thereby raising the question whether the risks Attachés should take need be so great as formerly. A further relevant consideration is that last year for the first time we imposed restrictions in the form of closed zones on the movement of Attachés of the Eastern European countries in the United States. 3 This step, taken without regard for reciprocity, has, as expected, produced a reaction from the Eastern European Governments prejudicial to our relations with them and to the environment in which our Attachés operate. The Department and our diplomatic missions abroad, particularly those in Communist countries, appreciate the contribution of our Military Attachés to national security. Their responsibilities receive and will continue to receive the full support of the Department of State and our Ambassadors as one of several important and interrelated functions of our diplomatic posts. In the light of recent developments, however, we should make sure, in the effort to protect the diplomatic immunity of the Military Attachés themselves as well as all other members of our missions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, that the operations of our Attachés conform as far as possible to diplomatic standards. I have two suggestions. (a) Renewed attention to the points in President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961 4 regarding the Ambassador's authority to coordinate and oversee activities of all personnel of United States Government agencies assigned to his mission, and in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2 (Revised January 18, 1961) 5 concerning the coordination of collection activities and the Ambassador's responsibility in this regard. (b) The development of guidelines to govern the activities of all United States personnel engaged in the overt collection of military intelligence in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The guidelines, which would be formulated by appropriate officers of our Departments, should have as their basic theme the obligation of all of the officers on an Ambassador's staff to contribute to the creation and maintenance of a climate which will give this Government the best possible opportunity to implement United States foreign policy in the country concerned. This would, for example, call for Embassy officers to seek required intelligence to the maximum extent possible through overt collection activities, and to avoid pointless conflict with a security system which is an ever-present fact in Communist countries, though at times and after appropriate clearance exceptions could be made. May I have your approval of or comments on these suggestions as well as any other views you have on this general subject? If you agree to a more detailed exchange between our Departments on this matter, may I suggest that you have the appropriate officers of your Department make contact with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard H. Davis and Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research George C. Denney, Jr. I shall look forward to hearing from you in this matter. 6 With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean 7 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, PER 12. Secret. Drafted by Vedeler, Henry, and McAfee and cleared by Llewellyn Thompson, Denney, and Davis. 2 Documentation on the incident in Khabarovsk, September 28, is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XIV . The reference to a shooting incident has not been identified. 3 For texts of the November 12, 1963, statement outlining travel restrictions of East European diplomats, the U.S. notes to individual countries, and a list of U.S. counties closed to travel, see Department of State Bulletin , December 2, 1963, pp. 860–863. 4 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 1345–1347. 5 The revision was approved at the 474th meeting of the National Security Council, January 18. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The text of the original paper, dated September 15, 1958, is ibid., Gray Papers, NSCID series. 6 No reply was found. 7 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 10. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 10. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, February 18, 1965. No. 10-65 SUBJECT Prospects for Independence in Eastern Europe Since the publication of our last estimate on the subject (NIE 12–64, “Changing Patterns in Eastern Europe,” dated 22 July 1964), 2 the trend toward independence in Eastern Europe has survived the overthrow of Khrushchev and has continued to gather momentum. 3 In the paper that follows, we bring this story up to date and extend our judgments as to its likely outcome. SUMMARY Soviet control of Eastern Europe is gradually being whittled away. Changes within the USSR itself, a surge of Eastern European nationalism, a general disenchantment with traditional forms of Marxist economics and harsh Soviet-style politics, and the growing attraction of the West have all combined to give the states of Eastern Europe both the incentive and the opportunity for striking out on their own. Rumania, the most daring exemplar of the new trends, has made especially telling use of the force of nationalism and is fast approaching a degree of independence comparable to that enjoyed by Yugoslavia. Others—except for East Germany and perhaps Bulgaria—in their own way are likely over the long term to follow suit. The Soviets, for their part, will find it difficult to arrest the process, and though crises are an ever-present danger, we believe that these countries will be able successfully to assert their own national interests gradually and without provoking Soviet intervention. In ways unforeseen by both the Soviet Union and the West, communism is taking firmer root in Eastern Europe, but it is a truly national communism which is doing so. It is, in fact, much closer to the traditional interests of the individual countries involved and much more remote from the interests and the ambitions of the USSR. I. Introduction 1. Twenty years after the end of the war and the occupation of Eastern Europe by Soviet armies, Stalin's empire has begun to show signs of considerable disarray. Unlike the first national defection from the Bloc, Yugoslavia in 1948, and the violent eruptions in Hungary in 1956, the current process of withdrawal from Soviet dominance is gradual and unspectacular. It lacks the drama of sudden political upheavals, and thus does not challenge the USSR with provocative acts sufficient to justify armed intervention. It lacks the finality of a complete severance of the bonds between protectorate and overlord, and thus it is sometimes difficult to know precisely where relations stand and in what direction they are likely to go. But it does not lack for a potential fully as meaningful as that inherent in previous, more vivid crises in Soviet-Eastern European relations. II. General Trends A. Factors Leading to Change 2. The states of Eastern Europe remain generally within the Soviet sphere of influence, and each is affected—though not in equal degree—by the policies and interests of Moscow. But these countries now move in increasingly eccentric orbits around the center, and their responses to Soviet demands and their abilities to pursue their own national interests vary widely from state to state. 3. Khrushchev's decisions to de-Stalinize and to improve relations with Tito's Yugoslavia were probably the prime movers in this process. The rulers of these countries soon found that without Stalin, his apparatus of terror, and his awesome mystique, they could no longer reign in the grand and arbitrary manner of Stalin. Even more important, the Soviets themselves discovered that, without Stalin, they could no longer operate at will within his empire. Stalin had been able to appoint the Satellite leaders, purge them at will, and control all the vital levers of power within each state. Not so his successors. 4. Gradually, perhaps so slowly as to defy even Moscow's awareness of what was taking place, Soviet means of control were whittled away, both by happenstance and by design. The Soviets could not stop Gomulka's accession to power in Poland, and, having failed in this, they could not reassert their dominance over his party. It was much the same story for a time in Hungary, where the appointment of Gero to succeed Rakosi was intended to insure continued Soviet dominance but led in fact to the opposite. 5. There was some reconsolidation in the years which immediately followed the Hungarian Revolution, but this was a transitory phenomenon which rested as much on the dispositions of the Satellite parties themselves—especially their fears of insurrection—as on the actual instruments of Soviet power. But Moscow had apparently forgotten its lesson, for its crude attempts in 1961 to bring a Soviet faction to power in Albania met with complete, humiliating failure. 6. It fell to the Rumanians to recognize and exploit the new situation. They saw the opportunity, had the motive, and gathered the means. The opportunity was the Sino-Soviet dispute and the USSR's growing warmness toward the West; the means were both economic (oil and corn and timber) and political (a unified leadership); and the motive was nationalism and the desire of the regime to seize this fervor to bolster its own position. 7. In addition to these reasons underlying change in Eastern Europe—the surge of nationalism, evolution in the USSR—are a number of factors that grew of their own accord within the area itself. In economics, adversity in effect bred diversity. The slowdown in growth and other severe shortcomings in the economies of most of these states led to a reexamination of the Soviet way of doing things and to a new look at the tenets of the doctrine which underlay the entire economic scheme of things in each of these countries. 8. It soon occurred to everyone but the most hard bitten and doctrinaire that Soviet methods were obsolete, especially for the more industrialized countries. It was then easy to exaggerate the degree to which these economies had been exploited by the Soviets and to blame current miseries on past Soviet sins. It was also found that Marxism-Leninism was simply inadequate to show the East Europeans the way out of their troubles, and that the Soviet Union was unwilling to devote sufficient resources to bail them out. The East Europeans therefore had to turn elsewhere. They looked at the Yugoslav system, which was a strange, though functioning, amalgam of socialist ownership, state direction, and a market mechanism. They also turned to the West, sometimes only for the tools of better planning and management, but in some cases to seek radical ways of changing the economic system. 9. Here the great successes of the Germans and the French and the faraway technological spectacular of the US told them that, far from collapsing from its own crises, the capitalist world was booming as never before. The Eastern Europeans travelled to the West and sought information and help, and they encouraged visitations of Western economic officials and businessmen to their own plants. Homegrown economists began to do without the shibboleths of Marxism and abandoned the jargon as well. In its place they began to talk among themselves, and then to party functionaries, about interest charges on capital, the market, supply and demand, and even the role of profits. 10. While the official outlook was thus being transformed, the popular mood was growing more restive. Years of doing without—of poor housing, starchy diets, few consumer goods—and of hard work for low pay had begun to take their toll. The very gradual improvements in living standards merely whetted appetites for more, and soon public discontent transmitted itself to the leaderships in general and to reform-minded elements within the leaderships in particular. Clearly, if labor were to perform as asked and if the people as a whole were to cooperate at all with the regime's programs, improvements had to be made. And to allow such improvements, the economies themselves had to become stronger and grow faster. 11. These changes in attitude led, though at a varying pace, to efforts to reform the economies, to make them more responsive to popular demands, and to get them on the move again. Doctrine inevitably suffered in the process. It was as if, beginning with the economy, ideology were being chipped away piece by piece. But quite clearly, Marxism-Leninism was never meant to be applied—or even believed in—as a selective philosophy. It may change, but it is intended to be a coherent doctrine not subject to the erosion of its fundamentals. 12. Encouraged by Khrushchev's “revisionism“, by the sanctioning of the Yugoslav “road to socialism,” and by the split between the USSR and China, changes were made in Eastern Europe which only a few years before would have been quite unthinkable. Some of these innovations were solely political in concept, such as the Hungarian regime's public judgment that those not actively against it would henceforth be considered for it. Some were mainly economic, though with political implications, such as the spirited debate over economics waged in official publications, especially in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. And some were purely economic in origin, but even here—as is the case with the turn toward “market socialism” in Czechoslovakia—there will be important political repercussions. 13. Changes in economic thought and in ideology were paralleled by a relaxation of political controls and a generally more permissive attitude on the part of the regimes. The knock on the door in the early morning was done away with, conversation became considerably freer, and barriers against the intrusion of Western ideas into the closed societies were penetrated, sometimes with official encouragement, sometimes despite official discouragement. European culture—books, plays, movies—received widespread distribution in most of the area. The move toward European unity appealed to many in Eastern Europe who saw in it a way of escaping Soviet domination. Intellectual ferment once more became widespread and authors began again to write of contemporary problems with more realism than socialism. Such “radical” and antitotalitarian authors as Franz Kafka were taken off the index everywhere except in East Germany, and the population at large was exposed to Western radio broadcasts without jamming. All in all, the life of the average man became both more comfortable and freer; if the regimes were looked upon with no less contempt, they could nonetheless be suffered without the overriding anxiety and fear produced by the Stalinist insistence on absolute conformity. B. The Levers of Soviet Power 14. The Soviet ability to help chart the course of history in Eastern Europe rests ultimately on its proximity and the preponderance of its military power. The USSR's invasion of Hungary in 1956 demonstrated forcefully for all of Eastern Europe this ultimate means of Soviet control. But military power has traditionally been used by the Soviets in quite another sense, as a prop for the local regimes against trouble at home or threats from abroad. But time and international change have tended to diminish the value of the Soviet protective umbrella for the individual East European regimes. Only in the ultimate sense of survival under the threat of an actual invasion from the West or internal insurrection which cannot be handled by local forces do these regimes look to the USSR for support. Even in these instances, the situation has changed appreciably, for the West no longer professes a policy of rollback and “liberation” and the people no longer consider revolt to be a feasible or even desirable course of action. 15. After the initial period of occupation and the establishment of lines of control, Stalin did not depend heavily on the USSR's military power. Rather, he relied principally on his direct control of the indigenous parties and their leaders. These organizations and these men were almost wholly dependent on the USSR for their very existence; certainly they had few local strengths and few resources with which to confront the USSR. But this situation has since changed radically. After some twenty years in power, these regimes have been able to one degree or another to build up indigenous sources of strength. A good deal of their power now rests on the local parties themselves. 16. Thus Moscow's influence on these parties now depends not on direct control but on indirect influence. It may persuade and bribe, but it can no longer merely issue instructions with any degree of confidence that they will be followed. As the first governing Communist party in history and as the fount of Communist wisdom, it commands considerable respect and some degree of loyalty from its former client parties. Certainly it will be listened to, if not obeyed, and in at least one respect, the Sino-Soviet dispute has increased Soviet prestige and mellowed Soviet doctrine—almost all the Eastern European countries are horrified by the Chinese version of the ideology. Otherwise, however, this reservoir of respect and loyalty has been diminished by the acts of the Soviets themselves, their juggling of doctrine, their denunciation of Stalin and his works, their inability to provide firm leadership to the international movement, and, most recently their overthrow and criticism of Khrushchev. 17. Soviet foreign policies form another means of guiding Eastern European destinies. Soviet policy toward Germany, for example, conforms well with the fears, aspirations, and prejudices of many of the Eastern European governments and peoples, especially those that suffered most acutely during World War II. Further, to the extent that disputes erupt between these states, Moscow plays an influential role in its capacity as adjudicator and referee. It can use traditional hostilities between them for its own purposes and, by siding with one country or another, can use these enmities to barter and to threaten. The Rumanians, for example, are convinced that the Soviets have privately encouraged Hungary to agitate over Rumania's policies in Transylvania. 18. In more general terms, the size, prestige, and awesome political and economic power of the USSR provide it with still another lever, distinct from that provided by sheer military strength. As has always been the case in relations between large and small states, the power of the larger can be used as a form of pressure against the smaller. This is particularly useful in seeking to curb policies which are specifically hostile in intent, and thus helps to define the limits of independent action for the smaller states; it constitutes a barrier of sorts against radical forms of defiance. 19. Finally, the Soviets maintain a method of influencing Eastern Europe through a variety of economic devices. But, if they have learned their lessons, they must realize that the use of economic pressure frequently has disappointing results; Yugoslavia, Communist China, and Albania failed to succumb to it—indeed, they actually accelerated their anti-Soviet policies as a direct consequence of its use. Nonetheless, the Soviets almost certainly consider it one of the major weapons in their arsenal. The Eastern European states depend for close to half their total trade on the Soviet Union, and most of them certainly realize that their industrial exports have little demand in the West. 20. Most of these countries are seeking to reduce this dependence on the USSR. They are trying to improve the quality and the mix of their export trade, attempting vigorously to expand exchanges with the West, and seeking out Western credits with which to improve domestic performance. It is not inconceivable that, with time and luck, they could materially reduce their dependence on the USSR and at least develop a potential for trade with other states should the need suddenly arise. III. Country Survey: The Spectrum of Sovereignty 21. While for most purposes the countries of Eastern Europe should not be considered as a whole, should be examined in the light of their diversity, in one important way they may now be viewed in terms of their collective impact. From the point of view of Moscow, and in terms of their influence on Soviet policies, these states can be seen as an autonomous political force. Increasingly over the past several years, and with Rumania showing the way, the course of political action and the direction of political pressure in this area now runs from East to West. These countries are gradually chipping away at Soviet dominance, asserting individual national interests, and turning increasingly to the West as an alternative to Soviet dominance. 22. Nationalism is now a strong factor throughout the area, most of it strongly laced with anti-Russianism, and it must appear to many of these leaderships to be an attractive prelude or even alternative to genuine liberalization. It is finely calculated to maximize popular support for otherwise highly unpopular governments; by itself, liberalization appears quite unable to do a comparable job. Indeed, unless its economy is able to sustain fairly consistent and impressive rises in the standard of living—as is nowhere the case in this area—the regime which embarks on liberalization runs the risk of actually increasing popular discontent by allowing its more vocal expression. 23. It may be that some of these regimes—Bulgaria comes immediately to mind—are so compromised and conditioned by their history of abject subservience to the Soviets, or so blinded by the myths of their ideology, that they will not be able to introduce a policy designed to appeal to nationalistic sentiments. But others will surely see the benefits of such a course, especially in terms of their own interests and positions of power, and will be strongly tempted to travel the Rumanian road. [Here follow paragraphs 24–50 (pages 13–28), a country-by-country survey.] IV. The Outlook A. The Growing Trend 51. It is not possible to predict the specifics of future change in Eastern Europe. These will be the result of individual choice, the consequence of events yet to come, the product of factors and movements essentially unpredictable, and, of course, the policies and actions of the great powers. But of this we are sure—there will be change, and it may come faster than we had generally anticipated and in ways we do not expect. We have learned from experience—from, for example, Albania and Rumania—to be wary of generalizations about this area. As time goes by and as the trend toward independence in Eastern Europe gathers momentum, diversity will increase and chances for the unexpected may grow apace. 52. The initiative of political movement in Eastern Europe now rests largely with these states themselves, rather than with the USSR. Each of these states, with the exception of East Germany, is led by a group of men and a political institution which now depend for their very existence primarily on domestic sources of strength and domestic attitudes and traditions. In several states, communism is perhaps taking firm root, but in a way quite unforeseen in both Moscow and the West. It is a variety of national communism which has established itself in Rumania and bids fair to do so elsewhere. 53. We would not expect these regimes to become national Communist in character on similar schedules, in equal degree, or in identical form. Common to them, however, would be full control over domestic policies and a meaningful degree of independence in foreign affairs. Their allegiance to Marxism-Leninism would probably vary but at least in some this would be a question of public image rather than true adherence to doctrine. Some might retain a fairly unified and disciplined one-party structure; others, though operating through only one party, might see the development of important and diverse political forces within a Communist party framework and the gradual growth of extra-party and even popular influences. Nowhere, however, would we anticipate the development of a genuine multi-party system, though almost certainly pressure for this would grow. In the last analysis, each regime would determine for itself what in fact constituted “socialism” and each regime would remain “communist” so long as it declared itself to be so. 54. As its efforts to convert CEMA into a Soviet-dominated supranational force would seem to testify, the USSR is almost foredoomed to failure when it does seek to innovate and expand its controls. Moreover, the failure of Soviet initiatives tends to produce a chain reaction, for each instance of successful Eastern European opposition contains within it the seeds of even stronger resistance for the next round. The USSR thus is forced to choose between making concessions, following more permissive policies, or finding itself more and more in the position of a power seeking to restrain change rather than trying, as it once did, to impose it. In a sense then, each of these regimes can choose the time, the place, and the issue with which to apply pressure on Moscow. And nothing now seems more inevitable than a gradually increasing interest in and desire for greater independence on the part of most or all of these countries. The replacement of the present, aging leaderships with younger, more vigorous, and probably less doctrinaire officials is much more likely to hasten this process than to retard it. 55. It is thus possible, as it has been in the past, to discern the general outlines of this trend and to ascertain its direction. The movement is not of its own accord toward the West, nor does it appear necessarily to be heading toward Westernized concepts of democracy. Rather, these states are acting in what they conceive to be their own national interests, and they look to the West principally in order to strengthen precisely those interests. True, this in many instances has the effect of moving them away from the East and in this manner toward the West. It is also true that most of these states looked westward before they were forced by Moscow to about face. And a few of these countries, notably Czechoslovakia, to a lesser extent Hungary and Poland, had at least some tradition of democracy before they were compelled to surrender to communism. But, while they may move only partway toward the West and its ideas, from the perspective of Moscow the trend is highly dangerous. This was the great fear of Moscow during the Hungarian Revolution; it was genuinely concerned that Hungary would rejoin the West of its own accord, whether the West desired it or not, and, ultimately, it was this fear that led Moscow to intervene militarily. The same concern could bring about a repetition of that event. 56. For the most part we do not foresee crises in Eastern Europe. These regimes are likely to move with relative caution, to test and probe for Soviet reactions before adopting new policies of their own, and, in general, to avoid acts which might provoke the Soviets into intervention. But this does not mean that precipitous Soviet action can be ruled out of the question. The Soviets could fear the overthrow of an Eastern European regime, or its submission to non-Communist forces, and intervene to forestall it. They could, in addition, badly misjudge a given situation, see threats to their vital interests where in fact none existed, or become overly frightened about specific events and move accordingly. Or it is always possible that a change in the Soviet leadership could lead to a determination to restore Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe through whatever means proved necessary. For their part, the Eastern European regimes might provoke severe Soviet moves by capitulating to strong popular pressures and pursuing nationalistic policies overtly and virulently hostile to the USSR and Soviet interests. They could also miscalculate Soviet responses to specific moves and provoke Moscow without actually meaning to do so. 57. It may be that it is already too late to speak of the relations between Moscow and the Eastern European states in terms of the formal instruments of Soviet hegemony. The Cominform is long gone; CEMA functions, but not well. 58. Concerning the Warsaw Pact, two distinct trends are visible. The USSR has seen fit to provide these countries with at least the potential for more independent military action. The Eastern Europeans have, in fact, assumed greater control over their own forces, a trend consonant with developments in the political sphere. On the other hand, the Soviets seem to be placing greater reliance on the Eastern European forces in the formulation of their military strategy. It may be that the Soviets no longer look upon the Pact as an important means to ensure political control but primarily as a more or less conventional military alliance, dominated, of course, by the supplier of arms, Moscow. If so, it would certainly accord with the Soviet effort to improve the military capabilities of these forces. 59. In any case, the Rumanians seem to have cast a dubious eye on the value of the Pact to Rumanian purposes, have publicly deplored all military pacts as anachronistic, and have privately informed US authorities that Rumanian troops will defend only Rumania. They have also privately indicated that, left to their own devices, they would pull out of the Pact. It is probable that the Rumanians are bent on reducing their role within this organization to a purely formal level. 60. But these countries remain under firm, one-party Communist control, as Hungary did not, and, in the last analysis, they can remain at least nominal allies of the USSR so long as they remain avowedly Communist. It is for the Soviet Union to decide whether this is enough. In the event that one or more of these states severed even that one last tie, military intervention would be the only avenue open to the USSR to enforce its will on the defecting country. Whether this would then be judged a feasible course of action, whether the gains in Eastern Europe would balance the risks and losses elsewhere in the world, only Moscow could decide. And Moscow is not good at solving this sort of dilemma. B. Soviet Policy 61. Moscow has sought in fits and starts, and for the most part ineffectually, to arrest the drive for independence in Eastern Europe. For one thing, the USSR does not fully understand the emotional force of nationalism and thus can frame no clear policy to combat it. For another, the Soviets have themselves facilitated the process by a general loosening of policies toward the area, aided and abetted by their moves against China and toward the West. We believe that, unless the Soviets are willing to resort to military intervention, the momentum of this movement toward independence will gather force and become highly contagious. 62. The USSR sees Eastern Europe as vital to its strategic needs. Not only does it provide a forward area for defense and offense, it serves generally as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and West Germany and the other “hostile” status of Western Europe. The USSR also sees in Eastern Europe a vindication of Communist doctrine, a proof of the inevitable advance of socialism; conversely, it would view the defection of any of these states as a refutation of that doctrine. Finally, the USSR sees Eastern Europe as an integral part of its empire, a source of actual and potential economic, political, and military support. 63. All three of these concepts are, of course, subject to change. The strategic consideration is perhaps the least susceptible to modification, but even here the facts of the nuclear-missile age render the concept considerably less valid than it once was. Nonetheless, long after strategic factors make the area relatively useless for the defense of the homeland, Soviet thinking is likely to reflect more or less traditional military concepts of Eastern Europe's value to the USSR. 64. Greater change may take place in the area of doctrine. The evolution set off by de-Stalinization, and further shaped by the Sino-Soviet conflict, has already altered the concept of a monolithic bloc. As the Eastern Europeans increasingly depart from Soviet practice, as Yugoslavia is welcomed to the club, and as the Soviet definition of “socialism” is further diluted both by domestic changes and by the inclusion of more and more countries, such as the UAR, into the “progressive” camp, the requirements of the doctrine for the individual Eastern European states become vaguer and more permissive. What will constitute a loyal member of the bloc in terms of ideology a decade hence can be but dimly perceived. 65. Inevitably, this sort of ideological erosion will also have an effect on the Soviet concept of empire. The dreams of a tightly knit organism following a single economic plan, with national boundaries turning into unimportant anachronisms, have surely faded. If this is indeed the way in which the USSR's attitudes and policies toward Eastern Europe are likely to evolve in time, it will be difficult to define the Bloc in the usual way, i.e., as a Bloc. Organizations like CEMA and the Warsaw Pact might be retained only on the basis of a genuine partnership and only to the extent that they served some specifically worthwhile purpose, something comparable, for example, to the European steel community. Or they might become moribund, be scrapped, and then superseded either by a series of bilateral treaties or by an amorphous regional pact of only symbolic import. Some of these states might form various regional associations with each other and even with non-Communist neighbors. Under all such arrangements as these, each member state would be largely free to pursue its own interests at will, presumably so long as these did not involve policies actively hostile toward one another. 66. If the USSR were to recognize clearly the trends in Eastern Europe and to initiate forward-looking policies which sought to encourage and to influence the process, the formation of a harmonious Soviet-East Europe alliance would be greatly eased. The history of their relations to date, however, does not suggest that the Soviets are likely to do this. The Soviets will find it hard to accept a loose confederation of sovereign countries bound together in traditional ways of alliance and cooperation. This strikes at the Russian sense of great-power status, and herein lie numerous possibilities for ill timed Muscovite heavy-handedness. They are apt to fight the problem as they have in the past, hoping to halt or at least delay the process through a variety of small measures and perhaps large threats, ultimately discovering that they must give in with as much salvaged grace as possible. This, of course, usually has the opposite effect from that intended; not only does it incur the ill will of these countries, which does not surprise Moscow, but it also frequently stimulates further efforts to increase sovereignty, and to Moscow this apparently does come as something of a shock. C. Eastern European Attitudes Toward Specific Soviet Policies 67. The Eastern European states are not enthusiastic supporters of many facets of Soviet foreign policy. Except when internal exigencies require it, for example, most of these regimes are reluctant to express full-throated Communist hostility toward the West. On the contrary, because of burgeoning hopes for expanded economic relations with the advanced Western countries, the Eastern European countries would like to improve their relations with the West. Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have made this intention quite clear in recent months. So long as the USSR's own policy includes an element of détente, it will be difficult for the Soviets to restrain Eastern European movement toward the West. Should Moscow reverse itself, it could expect resistance on the part of its allies, a factor to be taken into account in the formation of Soviet policy. 68. In the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Eastern European states sympathize with the Soviet doctrinal position and some of them, such as Czechoslovakia and East Germany, have been quick to commit themselves publicly to the Soviet side. But Poland has sought to soften the dispute and has counseled the USSR to act cautiously, and Rumania has gone even farther and publicly dissociated itself from the Soviet point of view. In general, the Eastern European regimes have been given added leverage with the USSR because of the dispute and, though none would favor a Chinese victory, or even important Soviet concessions, they welcome the increased maneuverability they have been granted by default and are probably not anxious for a final settlement of the problem. 69. In yet another area of Soviet policy, the East European states are important contributors to the Soviet bloc's program of economic and military aid to underdeveloped nations, adding some $1.9 billion to the Soviet total of $7.4 billion. Czechoslovakia and Poland play by far the most important role—the Czechoslovak program is much larger per capita than the Soviet—but the other countries also participate. At its inception, these states had no choice but to carry out the Soviet will, and they often were used to promote strictly Soviet interests. There are signs, however, that the Eastern European aid programs now are being managed in a way that is more consistent with national interests. Recently, these states have participated only rarely in Soviet economic programs, relying instead on bilateral arrangements, and have almost stopped extending military aid. 70. The Eastern European states, except Yugoslavia, have few national political interests in the underdeveloped countries, and they have far less interest in expanding their economic relations with these countries than with the industrial West. Moreover, there is widespread popular resentment of the aid programs in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, these programs probably will continue, even in the absence of Soviet domination, because some prospective economic benefits are expected from them. By extending credits on liberal terms the East European states gain access for their manufactured goods to markets that might not otherwise be available and to new sources of goods and raw materials. The main exception to this general rule may be aid to Cuba, where some subsidies may be involved and where prospects for repayment of credits are dubious. 71. Soviet policy toward West Germany may also be at issue between Moscow and some Eastern European regimes. Despite their apprehension and dislike of the Germans, the East Europeans are particularly anxious to expand their economic relations with West Germany and see no good reason why the unresolved question of Berlin should be imposed on them as a hindrance to the development of closer ties. Indeed, the willingness of some of these regimes to sign so-called Berlin clauses as a pre-condition for trade agreements demonstrates their unwillingness to allow the interests of East Germany to intrude. Given a continuation of the West German policy of increasing its presence in Eastern Europe, and of such arrangements as are now under negotiation between Bonn and Warsaw for the establishment of joint industrial enterprises on Polish soil, we consider the expansion of Eastern European-West German ties to be almost certain, and we would expect hostility to diminish. D. Impact of the Soviet Political Scene 72. The removal of Khrushchev from power destroyed one of the strongest surviving political links between the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Khrushchev was careful to cultivate good relations with all the Satellite leaders, replacing the iron will and discipline (and contempt) of Stalin with personal force and camaraderie, persuasion, and occasional threats. He developed particularly close working relationships with both Kadar and Gomulka, swallowed his dislike of Ulbricht and cajoled him into cooperation, kept the strings taut on Zhivkov in Bulgaria, and in general treated the Eastern European leaders as fellow politicians in the Bloc club. He even introduced Tito into membership. 73. One result was the sour reaction of these leaders to his downfall. Gomulka, Kadar, Novotny, and even Ulbricht publicly indicated their displeasure by praising Khrushchev when it was quite clearly the Soviet intention only to criticize him. Mainly, we suppose, these leaders were concerned about reactions within their own parties, but we do not discount some genuine attachment to Khrushchev, approval of his policies, and concern and uncertainty over those of the new leaders. In any case, we know of no personal ties between the Eastern European leaders and Khrushchev's successors, and we do not expect any single Soviet leader to gain the stature Khrushchev once enjoyed for some time to come. 74. It seems likely that most or all of these leaders will now take the opportunity afforded by the new situation in the USSR to press their own national interests and to make their voices heard in Moscow. Gheorghiu-Dej has already begun to assert Rumania's interests more vigorously than ever and others will probably follow suit. In any event, should Moscow seek to restore tighter controls over these leaders, it is likely to meet with greater resistance than ever. Only Ulbricht among them was in the top spot at the time of Stalin's death; thus the others have either worked successfully for their own autonomy and are by now accustomed to running the affairs of their own parties, or have worked only in an atmosphere of relative Soviet permissiveness. They are surely aware that the new Soviet leaders have no more means at their disposal—and probably fewer—for enforcing Eastern European conformity than Khrushchev had. 75. They are also acutely sensitive to the general political scene in Moscow and are almost certainly convinced that the present collective arrangement is inherently unstable. They will probably be reluctant to support one faction or the other until the outcome of such instability becomes clear, and they will be equally averse to committing themselves to policy except in a very general way. Some in Eastern Europe—probably the weaker elements—may identify themselves with one Soviet faction or the other and seek political support therefrom, but the chances of this do not seem as great as they once were, for example, in Hungary where Nagy clearly identified himself with Malenkov, Rakosi with Khrushchev. For their part, the Soviets, so long as they remain locked in a struggle for power, are unlikely to formulate new and coherent policies for the area, and disputes on this issue are likely to arise. Decisions needed in a crisis may thus be hard to obtain. As with foreign policies in general, Soviet interests in Eastern Europe might be better served by one-man leadership. 76. Of equal import is the question just where and when the USSR can now count on these states for support. Matters have already reached the stage where Moscow cannot assume in advance that its particular policies will receive automatic approval from Eastern Europe; in order to be sure, the Soviets must sound out these governments in advance. They must wheedle and cajole in instances where support is withheld, and in cases where even this fails, they must either alter or abandon their tack or proceed alone. This is particularly true in issues related to the Sino-Soviet dispute, where Rumania has declared its full neutrality and other states, most notably Poland, have exhibited a reluctance to adopt the Soviet line. But to a lesser degree it also applies to Soviet policy toward the West; the President's state of the union message, for example, was blistered in Moscow but praised in some East European capitals. We think the trend is clear: the East European states are no longer willing to adopt as their own whatever foreign policies the USSR sees fit to advance. Before giving their full support, most of these states seem to wish to subject such policies to critical examination in the light of their own burgeoning national interests. For the Board of National Estimates: Abbot Smith Acting Chairman 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Eastern Europe. Secret. Prepared by the Office of National Estimates. 2 Document 7 . 3 Nikita S. Khrushchev was removed from his post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union on October 15. Aleksei N. Kosygin replaced him; Leonid I. Brezhnev replaced him as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. 11. Editorial Note 11. Editorial Note On March 9, 1965, President Johnson appointed a special committee on U.S. trade relations with Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, under the chairmanship of J. Irwin Miller, Chairman of the Board of Cummins Engine Co. Documentation on the activities of the Miller Committee is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume IX . The ”Miller Report,” formally entitled Special Committee on U.S. Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union, Report to the President (Washington, 1965), was released by the White House on May 6. 12. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 12. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. NSAM 304 2 ACTION PROGRAM FOR US RELATIONS WITH EAST EUROPE Policy Considerations We believe that the quiet revolution now in progress in the East European countries will continue and gather momentum in the years ahead. The current changes in East Europe are characterized by four important features varying in degree from one country to another: (1) internal liberalization; (2) establishment of a certain degree of national independence from Soviet control; (3) pragmatic innovations designed to cope with pressing economic problems; and (4) progress in reassociation with the West. Our basic purpose in building bridges to East Europe is to facilitate and sustain these changes. We seek thereby progress toward the realization of our ultimate objective in East Europe, that is: the establishment of conditions under which the people of each country may determine its own society; and where each country may enjoy national independence, security, and a normal relationship with all other countries. This will mean the final dismantling of the Iron Curtain and the free association of East Europe and the West. It will entail the establishment of a viable relationship between the East European countries and the Soviet Union consistent with the security of both. To weave the fabric of reassociation with East Europe is to lower barriers, strengthen ties and broaden relations with the countries of that area. We seek to promote and influence the evolution of Communism in the area and to obtain the agreement and positive cooperation of Communist governments in spheres of mutual interest. We must focus and rearticulate our policy in keeping with the developing East European situation. We must also closely relate our moves in East Europe to the solution of the German problem and the achievement of a durable relationship with the Soviet Union. Our policies for achieving West European unity, East European evolution and secure peace with the Soviet Union must move forward together. There are two great needs: a. One is coordination—of US policies toward the various parts of Europe; among Western countries in building relationships with East Europe; within the Executive agencies; and among the Executive Branch, the Congress and the American public. b. The other is further tools for the purpose—in legislative authority giving the Executive Branch greater means and flexibility to influence developments in the European Communist countries. Recommendations The Department recommends a comprehensive program of: (1) actions affecting East Europe as a whole; (2) actions to achieve a common Western approach; (3) steps in multilateral associations; and (4) country initiatives. The program includes actions that can be taken now as well as measures that will put us in a better position to take advantage of opportunities as they emerge in the various countries of East Europe. Timing and priority are shown in specific cases. I. Actions Affecting East Europe as a Whole Since this paper is concerned with East Europe (as well as the Soviet Union), it does not cover East Germany and none of the recommendations are intended to apply to East Germany. 1. Extension of Official Relations We should prepare the way for fresh initiatives in East Europe by clearing up certain outstanding issues. Specifically: a. Negotiations of claims settlements. (Country Programs for Czechoslovakia and Hungary) 3 b. Removal on a reciprocal basis of travel restrictions and limitations on the size of diplomatic staffs. (Tab A) c. Settlement of specific consular problems and conclusion of consular conventions. (Country Programs) d. Opening of Consulates in USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. (Country Programs) 2. Negotiating New Bilateral Agreements We can support such initiatives by entering into commercial agreements with individual European Communist countries on the basis of a mutual exchange of benefits. Such agreements need not be limited to trade. They should be used as an opportunity to resolve outstanding problems in matters concerning trade, such as: the protection of industrial property (Tab B), settlement of commercial disputes, and expansion of trade and tourism opportunities. Such agreements could also be related to the settlement of financial claims and consular problems. They can be used as a means of bringing US relations with an individual country under regular review and consultation procedures. We can move in this direction through bilateral negotiation on the pattern of the Rumanian talks in 1964. For this purpose, we must be prepared to liberalize our export licensing practices and to guarantee commercial credits as part of the process of broadening relations with an individual country. If we are to expand trade with these countries on a sound basis and maintain forward momentum in our relations with them, it will be necessary for the US to grant most-favored-nation tariff treatment where the situation warrants. 3. Shipping (Tab C) a. We should gradually admit ships of the European Communist countries to an increasing number of US ports. b. We should partially and gradually relax surveillance of Polish and other East European ships in US ports insofar as US security arrangements will permit. c. We should scrupulously treat commercial transactions with the European Communist countries outside US preferential shipping requirements. d. We should not apply the preferential shipping requirements of PR 73–17 to transactions involving Export Import Bank guarantees of commercial bank credit of 5 years maturity or less. 4. Civil Aviation (Tab D) We should adopt a new course in this field by: a. Fostering the exchange of aviation officials and technicians with selected East European countries. b. Seeking to obtain rights, unilateral if possible, but through reciprocal agreements if necessary, for US air carriers to serve selected East European points. c. Relaxing current barriers to sales of US civil aircraft and aviation equipment to East European countries and within security limitations encouraging such sales. d. Supporting applications from individual East European countries for adherence to the Chicago Convention and urging East European countries to apply the ICAO standards. 5. Facilitation of Travel We should encourage the flow of tourist travel both ways by civil aviation links, by establishment of tourist offices where appropriate and by a more expeditious procedure for issuing visas to temporary visitors from East European countries. The last proposal (Tab E) would also facilitate the conduct of official relations with the East European states since many of the visitors have official status. The Agencies involved should reduce drastically the time required to complete the prescribed security name checks on applicants. 6. Humanitarian Assistance (Tab F) We should be in a position to respond promptly and effectively to disaster situations and other requirements for humanitarian assistance in East Europe. Present authority to provide food assistance for needy persons through voluntary agencies is adequate. However, we have only limited authority to meet disaster situations in East Europe. We should also be able to cover on a selective basis longer term requirements for rehabilitation and reconstruction after the immediate emergency. 7. Bridges of Ideas (Tab G) a. We should systematically expand our programs of cultural exchanges and exchanges of persons with East Europe. We should also seek a better balance by arranging more exchanges in the arts, humanities and social sciences. We require more funds, both public and private, for these purposes. b. We specifically propose: —to increase grants and scholarships; —to promote the export of US publications, television and motion picture films; —to establish additional libraries in our diplomatic missions, US cultural centers and reading rooms; —to distribute cultural and scientific bulletins as well as an America magazine in the local language; —to assist East European countries to improve the teaching of English in their schools and universities and where possible to establish chairs of American studies. (Country Programs) c. We have concluded a Fulbright agreement with Yugoslavia. We should be prepared at the right time to conclude Fulbright agreements with Poland and Rumania if those countries are ready to undertake the standard obligations under such agreements. 8. Arms Control (Tab H) In the absence of a basic European political settlement, efforts to develop understanding with East Europe in the field of arms control and disarmament should be focused on: a. Persuading East European leaders and people of the peaceful purposes and defensive posture of the US, the Federal Republic and other Allies, especially as concerns the MLF and Allied nuclear strategy as well as Bonn's policy toward East Europe. b. Limited steps of a “bridge-building” character within the arms control and disarmament framework including: (1) greater contact with individual East European delegations at the ENDC and UNGA for exchange of views; (2) the welcoming and careful consideration of East European initiatives such as the Gomulka plan even if they are inadequate; (3) visits of US experts to East Europe for presentation of US positions or possible exchange of visits of specialists; (4) exchange of documents and provision of US research studies; (5) increased public information activities including if possible placement of articles on US disarmament policy in East European publications. 9. Articulation of Policy The President's “bridge-building” speech in 1964 and his reference to the subject in the State of the Union speech as well as the Secretary's earlier speech on “Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently” have been of great benefit in explaining to the American people the US approach to East Europe and in helping to build support at home for a positive policy. 4 Such authoritative statements on our purposes in East Europe in relation to our policies in West Europe, especially Germany, and toward the Soviet Union are essential in order to make clear to all parts of Europe the design of our policy and the interrelationship of its parts. The US should continue to enunciate, and build support for, our policy through such presentations on opportune occasions. 10. New Legislation (Tab I) In the field of trade, our greatest need is for the President to have discretionary authority to grant most-favored-nation tariff treatment where he believes it is in the national interest. With this authority, the US could negotiate commercial agreements with individual European Communist countries that would enable us to make maximum use of trade as a means of broadening our relations with these countries and influencing the evolution of their societies. As a further means of facilitating trade relations with European Communist countries, the legislation should also clarify the existing authority for the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial export credits. In separate legislation, we should propose an amendment of the Battle Act which would permit greater flexibility in the use of our PL 480 5 funds in Poland to support US programs and trends there to our advantage. The present PL 480 legislation should be amended to remove the five-year limitation on Title IV sales to Poland. (Poland Country Program) To meet disaster situations in East Europe, we should seek to amend the Foreign Assistance Act so as to give the President authority to provide emergency famine relief and other forms of humanitarian assistance. II. Actions Toward Achieving a Common Western Approach We should strengthen our effort to develop a common Western approach to East Europe: (1) to increase the possibilities of realizing our policy objectives in the area; and (2) to insure that the drawing together of East and West Europe occurs in association with, not to the exclusion of, the US. We should: 1. Cooperate closely with the Federal Republic in the evolution of Western policies toward East Europe without permitting Bonn a veto on such policies. 2. Work with Bonn and other West European governments as appropriate in promoting understanding and a better relationship between the Federal Republic and the East European countries especially (a) by discouraging public pronouncements by Bonn officials on claims to the “lost territories” or Germany's 1937 frontiers in the East; (b) by encouraging the FRG to consider undertaking discussions with the Poles looking toward a definitive understanding, in advance of a German peace treaty, on the ultimate boundary between Poland and a unified Germany; and (c) by supporting any disposition shown by the FRG to modify or by-pass the Hallstein Doctrine insofar as it serves to impede the development of Bonn's relations with East Europe. 3. Cooperate with the FRG and other Western states in ways to increase the differences between the GDR and East Europe and to make the reunification of Germany more acceptable to the latter. 4. Consult with West European states on how relations of the West with East Europe, especially with Poland, can be utilized to build bridges from there on to the Soviet Union. 5. Concert with NATO members on utilizing developing opportunities to bring selected East European states into a feasible working relationship with certain multilateral organizations. 6. Seek in NATO a closer coordination of trade and credit policies toward East Europe. 7. Begin a systematic exchange of views with the EEC Commission on East-West relations. 8. Explore the possibilities of quadripartite consultations on policies toward East Europe and of periodic meetings of Western officials responsible for dealing with East Europe. 9. Explore the suggestion made by West Berlin's Governing Mayor Willy Brandt in a New York City speech in June 1964, when he declared that the West should propose “common projects” to the peoples of East Europe, such as joint construction of continental highways, waterways, etc. III. Actions in Multilateral Organizations We should make more active use of specialized multilateral organizations to influence the evolution of East European countries and to enlarge the area of peaceful engagement between them and the West. Individual East European countries are becoming increasingly interested in full membership, partial membership, or observer status in multilateral organizations composed wholly or almost wholly of non-Communist countries. They are also likely to seek various types of links with the supranational European Communities. We should seek to utilize this interest, examining each opportunity on a case-by-case basis and responding appropriately to specific overtures from East European countries. We must balance the risk that entry of East European countries could dilute the operational effectiveness of the organization concerned against the gain in advancing our goal of reassociation of the East European countries with the West. [Here follow action recommendations on specific organizations.] IV. Country Initiatives The principal features of the attached country programs are: 1. Albania (Tab M) Albania presents the most unpromising situation of any East European state. The only immediately practical move is to relax restrictions on the travel of Americans to Albania. When and if there is any possibility, we should try to open a channel of communication to the Albanians. 2. Bulgaria (Tab N) In spite of setbacks and difficulties since the Georgiev spy case at the end of 1963, there are some signs of movement at the present time. We should continue efforts to improve the atmosphere and content of bilateral relations through efforts to negotiate a consular convention, the encouragement of trade, with credit contingent on political amelioration, and the expansion of cultural exchanges and the exchange of visits. 3. Czechoslovakia (Tab O) Czechoslovakia may provide us one of our more attractive opportunities but a broad advance in our relations depends upon signing an economic and financial agreement. We should decide, as soon as prospects for an East-West Trade Act are clarified, whether to proceed with the economic and financial agreement already initialed or to reopen the negotiations with the Czechs looking toward a larger amount of compensation for US claimants. Measures should be taken to encourage trade, cultural exchanges and exchanges of visits as opportunities appear. The negotiation of a consular convention should be undertaken at an early date. 4. Hungary (Tab P) New possibilities are opening up in Hungary. The first requisite is to move forward in the normalization of our relations by discussions to resolve outstanding economic, financial, consular and other problems. 5. Poland (Tab Q) The most immediate step is to conclude the consular convention now in process of negotiation. The reciprocal establishment of consulates should follow. We should advance further in putting our economic relations with Poland on a purely commercial basis, expand our trade, and broaden our cultural exchanges. 6. Rumania (Tab R) Our proposals are principally concerned with measures to follow up and consolidate the results of the negotiations of 1964 with the Rumanians, which significantly extended Rumanian relations with the US and helped to enlarge the basis of Rumanian independence. If we are to continue this forward movement it will be necessary soon to be able to accord Rumania most-favored-nation tariff treatment. 7. Yugoslavia (Tab S) Of most importance are: (1) US action to permit sales of military spare parts from Government stocks to Yugoslavia; (2) the continuation of PL 480 and EXIM Bank programs so long as these may be necessary; (3) exchanges of high-level visits; and (4) the implementation of the Fulbright agreement concluded in November 1964. 8. Soviet Union (Tab T) While the Soviet Union is not formally a part of East Europe we include a program for it since movement there is related to movement in East Europe. Proposed steps in this bilateral program include: ratification of the consular convention, reciprocal establishment of consulates, signing and implementation of the civil air agreement, exchanges of military visits, cooperation in desalination, implementation and expansion of the cooperative program in outer space activities, improvement of seismic data exchange, negotiations on outstanding economic issues, and expansion and improvement of exchanges as a whole. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR E–US. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but the paper was transmitted as an attachment to a June 5 memorandum from Read to Bundy. 2 Document 4 . 3 The Tabs and Country Programs are not printed. 4 Regarding the President's “bridge building” speech, see Document 4 . For text of the State of the Union address, January 4, 1965, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 1–9. For text of Secretary Rusk's September 14, 1964, speech before the Economic Club of Detroit, see Department of State Bulletin , October 5, 1964, pp. 463–468. 5 For text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, enacted July 10, 1954, see 68 Stat. 454. The Battle Act (the Mutual Defense Control Act of 1951; P.L. 213) provided for the suspension of U.S. economic aid to nations supplying strategic materials to Communist nations; 65 Stat. 644. 13. National Intelligence Estimate 13. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, August 26, 1965. NIE 12–65 EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WARSAW PACT The Problem To estimate the significance of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance, the military capabilities of the non-Soviet members 2 and probable trends over the next five years or so. Conclusions A. For years little more than a paper organization, the Warsaw Pact has become an important element in Soviet European policy and military planning. In the early 1960s, the USSR moved to establish a new military relationship with the countries of Eastern Europe, to improve their military capabilities and to tighten the Pact as a military organization. Of late, the East European countries have manifested in varying degrees an increasing independence of the USSR in their political and economic policies. The loosening of Soviet controls in Eastern Europe has increased the importance of the Pact to the USSR as an institutional tie. For their part the East European countries see the Pact as an assurance that the Soviets will continue to underwrite their regimes and to safeguard existing boundaries. (Paras. 1–8) B. Improvements over the past five years have made East European military forces a more useful adjunct to Soviet military power. We estimate that 35 of the 63 East European line divisions, varying considerably in quality, could be deployed within a few days. East European air defense systems are coordinated with each other and with the Soviet air defense organization. With 125 SAM sites and 2,400 fighter aircraft these systems afford a fair defense throughout the area. While we believe that the Soviets will not give East European forces nuclear weapons in peacetime, in the event of war these weapons would probably be made available under strict Soviet control. (Paras. 23, 29, 31–34) C. The Soviets will probably continue their efforts to strengthen the Warsaw Pact. The growing independence of Eastern Europe, however, will make it difficult to obtain agreement on specific courses of action. Changes in NATO will influence developments in the Warsaw alliance; in particular, any substantial increase in the role of West Germany would strengthen the special relationship among East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Rumania will probably seek to minimize its participation in the Pact, but we do not believe that it will attempt formally to withdraw. (Paras. 43–45) D. In a crisis situation threatening general war, we believe that the East European regimes would attempt to exert a moderating influence on Soviet policy. If the USSR ordered mobilization, their responses would probably differ, ranging from immediate compliance by the East Germans to recalcitrance on the part of the Rumanians. In the event of armed conflict, we believe that the East European armed forces could be relied upon to take part, at least initially, in military operations in conjunction with Soviet forces. (Paras. 9–11) [Here follows the 10-page Discussion section of the estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. This estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board. The representatives of the AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 2 The active East European members of the Warsaw Pact are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. The military capabilities of Albania, which has not actively participated since 1961, and Yugoslavia, never a member, are considered in an annex. Soviet strategic concepts with respect to a war in Europe and the relevant Soviet forces will be discussed in the forthcoming NIE 11–14–65, “Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces.” [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11–14–65 is ibid.] 14. Memorandum of Conversation 14. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 1, 1965. SUBJECT Defense Department Views on Trade with Eastern European Countries PARTICIPANTS The Secretary of the Department of Defense, Robert S. McNamara The Ambassador Designate to Poland, John A. Gronouski Mr. Kenneth Roberts, OSD/ISA Mr. Arthur W. Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control, OSD/ISA Mr. Walter E. Jenkins, Jr., Officer in Charge of Polish Affairs In the course of a conversation with Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara on October 1, 1965, Postmaster General John A. Gronouski, our Ambassador-Designate to Poland, inquired about the attitude of the Defense Department regarding U.S. trade with Eastern European countries. Secretary McNamara stated that the Defense Department completely favored such trade. Noting that in the past most of such trade with Poland had been in agricultural products, the Postmaster General asked whether the attitude Secretary McNamara had expressed also extended to industrial items, including those of heavy-industry items, which have been coming up for consideration recently. Secretary McNamara assured Ambassador-Designate Gronouski that it did and indicated that the only exception would be highly technical strategic products and equipment. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT EUR E–US. Confidential. Drafted by Jenkins. 15. National Security Action Memorandum No. 352 15. National Security Action Memorandum No. 352 1 Washington, July 8, 1966. TO The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology The Chairman, Export-Import Bank SUBJECT Bridge Building The President has instructed that—in consultation with our Allies—we actively develop areas of peaceful cooperation with the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He has asked the Secretary of State to examine and propose to him specific actions the Government might take. These actions will be designed to help create an environment in which peaceful settlement of the division of Germany and of Europe will become possible. In addition to the arguments for and against each action, the recommendations to the President should propose appropriate steps for implementation, Congressional consultation, and the like. 2 The President has asked that you give your strong personal support to the Secretary of State in carrying out this assignment. W.W. Rostow 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. 2 In an address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers in New York on October 7, the President called for better relations with the Communist nations of Eastern Europe; for text of his address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pp. 1125–1130. 16. Memorandum of Conversation 16. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 5, 1966, 10:30 a.m. SecDel/MC/57 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1966 SUBJECT Albania (Part III of XI Parts) PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Mr. Bertus H. Wabeke, EUR Austria H.E. Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, Foreign Minister of Austria H.E. Dr. Heinrich Haymerle, Director, Political Affairs, Austrian Foreign Office H.E. Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Austrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations 1. Minister Toncic referred to feelers that have been put out—often in an awkward manner—by the Albanians in Vienna over the past two or three years and which would appear to indicate a desire on their part to move nearer to the West. Noting that the Albanians appear not to dare take the plunge and seem to be afraid of being repulsed by the West, Toncic asked the Secretary if he expected any change, be it ever so slight, in the Albanian attitude, and wished to know if Austria should respond. 2. The Secretary stated that the U.S. has little information on the subject except for impressions gained by Albania's neighbors. The Secretary speculated, however, that the Albanians may be becoming restless under the monopoly of the Communist Chinese. The Secretary indicated that while it would be a great mistake for the U.S. to try to probe the intentions of the Albanians, it would be constructive and helpful for the Austrians to do so and, he concluded, “You might meet with a response.” 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALB. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text, which was approved in S on November 9. The conversation was held at the U.S. Mission. 17. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to President Johnson 17. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 25, 1967, 4:05 p.m. SUBJECT The Future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, A Summary The future of Radio Free Europe has been under consideration for several years. McGeorge Bundy convened a special study group in 1966 which consisted of Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Dr. William Griffith of MIT, Richard Salant of CBS, and the current Ambassador to Switzerland, John S. Hayes. This paper, among other tasks, reviewed the work of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and found that the value of these assets had not diminished and would continue to have a role in an era beyond the cold war. This opinion was unanimous. The matter became more critical after the Katzenbach Committee was forced to reach some decisions regarding covert support to various U.S. voluntary educational, philanthropic and cultural endeavours. This committee and Secretary Rusk recommended that the 303 Committee examine this problem because of its unique complexities. Since that time, Messrs. Rostow, Nitze, Kohler, and Helms, as well as Marks and Schultze, have given considerable time to looking at this problem from all angles. Some nine possible solutions were examined; these included the status quo, conversion from non-profit to profit-making corporations, reincorporation abroad, relocation abroad, support by a public private mechanism, support from a public private mechanism specifically designed to foster private international broadcasting and other communications, overt funding by USIA (or another agency of the Executive Branch), transfer to VOA/USIA, and termination. All were eliminated in 303 discussions except for the three possibilities: a. continued financing by CIA; b. financing through a public private mechanism to be established by Congress; c. transfer to USIA. It was these three approaches that were tackled on a priority basis by William Trueheart of State and an inter-agency group. The conclusion reached in this solid study was that there were really but two realistic choices: either continuation as now constituted or termination. Some basic conclusions from this report are quoted: “A special Radio Study Group (RSG), with representatives from State (Chairman), White House, Bureau of the Budget, Defense, USIA, and CIA, was directed to conduct this further study and make recommendations. “The RSG has concluded that RFE operations should be continued on substantially the present scale . RFE broadcasts make and can continue to make a significant contribution to U.S. objectives in Eastern Europe in promoting and encouraging internal pressures for reform and political liberalization (de-Stalinization) and for the attenuation of Soviet influence and control. Further, we believe that the broadcasts are not incompatible with a policy of bridge-building; indeed, meaningful improvement in East-West relations is probably dependent in the long run on the kind of internal changes which RFE seeks to foster. The unique element of RFE broadcasts—detailed reporting and comment on internal developments—could not be duplicated by VOA without substantial changes in VOA operating principles and the risk of unacceptable diplomatic consequences. Nor do we believe that VOA could realistically be expected, partly but not wholly for budgetary reasons, to maintain the massive news-gathering and research operations on which effective programming of the RFE sort depends. “The case for continuing RL is less clear because it is impossible to obtain relatively reliable data, such as we have for RFE, on the size and make-up of the RL audience. We do know that the massive Soviet jamming operation makes listening difficult at best. As against this, the RL target is incomparably more important than that of RFE, audience access to foreign information other than by radio is very much less, and developments in the Soviet Union could make retention of RL's capability of substantial importance. The Soviet jamming effort (at least 160 jamming centers) itself attests to the effectiveness, at least potentially, of the broadcasts and argues against according the windfall which termination would represent. On balance, we believe that RL operations should also be continued on substantially the present scale . ” Both RFE and RL represent important U.S. assets, in terms of rare talent, specialized organization and base facilities, which it has taken over 15 years and some $350 million to develop . Once dispersed, they could be recreated only with immense difficulty, if at all. We believe that this in itself is a powerful argument for continuing the operations for the time being. ” On the other hand, RFE and RL should not be regarded as permanent enterprises . The situation in the target countries may over time so develop as to make the broadcasts superfluous. ” If the radios are to be continued, we see no satisfactory alternative to continued CIA financing . Our judgment and that of those we have consulted—including some who have earlier advocated other solutions—is that normal Congressional appropriation procedures would almost certainly result in a fairly rapid phase-out of the operations, whether the radios were being funded through a public-private mechanism or as a line item in the USIA budget. In the process, appropriations for VOA might suffer as well. Even if this were not so, the extensive and annual public debate, in which it would be necessary inter alia to explain and defend the mission of RFE/RL as distinct from VOA, would directly jeopardize the position of the radios in certain host countries and could lead to serious diplomatic complications with the target countries. The public appropriation procedure, in short, would firmly fix the image of the radios as official instruments of the U.S. Government and, in our view, this image would not be significantly blurred by the device of the public-private mechanism, at least in foreign eyes. ” It will not be feasible to deny government support of the radios, and we propose that such support (without identifying CIA explicitly as the source) be officially acknowledged . There would be certain advantages, e.g., in handling Communist protests over the broadcasts, if open acknowledgement could be avoided. We believe, however, that to take a 'no comment' stance in response to queries about government support would very likely undermine the credibility of the Katzenbach Report as a whole. On the other hand, official acknowledgement can be accompanied by an unambiguous assurance that RFE/RL are the only activities covered by the statement of policy in the Katzenbach Report which will continue to be subsidized in substantially the same way after December 31, 1967. There is the subsidiary advantage that future government support being acknowledged, i.e., not covert, an exception to the Katzenbach policy is not involved. Mr. Helms, however, is on record as follows: 'To contend that, since government support is being openly acknowledged, no exception to the Katzenbach policy is involved, would in my opinion be construed as an evasion of the issue. It would invite questions as to source and specific amounts. The failure to answer would provoke editorial criticism and a continuing attempt to get at the whole truth … I believe our best course is to face the situation directly by making an exception under the terms of the Katzenbach report, and by admitting that it has in fact been made.' Needless to say, the solution recommended in the report (if successful) would make life happier for the State Department and Mr. Katzenbach. “We believe that there is no reason to expect that the press will seek to exploit the acknowledgement in a major way. Government support for these operations is not 'news'. Moreover, neither operation has come in for serious press criticism in the past, except for charges of deception in connection with the mass-media solicitation of individual contributions by RFE. (We concur in previous recommendations that such solicitation be discontinued but we also agree that fund-raising within the business community should be continued, in part to substantiate the private nature of the organization.) ” Protests from target countries will be somewhat more difficult to handle, once government support is acknowledged . However, it is believed that the United States can continue to take the position in diplomatic exchanges that RFE and RL are private operations, pointing out that many private organizations receive government financial support without thereby becoming instruments of the government. Host countries should be able to use the same line in response to target country protests or press criticism. Nevertheless, if government support is acknowledged, there will be added importance in insuring that any needlessly provocative themes are avoided. ” Acknowledgement of U.S. Government support is not expected to make any substantial difference in RFE and RL credibility with their audiences . Most listeners have probably assumed such support all along and if anything acceptance of the radios may have been enhanced thereby. ” Continued CIA financing is of course dependent on approval by the Senate and House 'watch-dog' committees . They have not been consulted and we have no basis for estimating their likely reaction. ” Should continued CIA financing be ruled out, then we believe the operations should be terminated . The problems associated with normal appropriation procedures, taken with our estimate of the practical life expectancy of the operations, convince us that the game would not be worth the candle. ” In the event of termination of either radio, every effort should be made to retain technical facilities, frequencies and personnel for the VOA . As the report of the technical subgroup indicates, certain of the technical installations and frequencies would be valuable to VOA in improving its service and in providing a backstop in the event of loss of facilities elsewhere. Important savings might also be made in future construction costs. These benefits would, of course, be contingent on satisfactory arrangements with the host countries for VOA use of the facilities. The price of such arrangements in Portugal would probably be unacceptably high: a change in our African policy, especially modification of our views on self-determination for Portuguese territories. In the case of Spain, prospects would be less bleak, but we could expect the Spanish to demand a substantial monetary quid pro quo. At this juncture, this might take the form of increased demands in the 1968 base negotiations. We believe also that the German Government, for the reasons mentioned earlier, would be reluctant to agree to additional USIA facilities on German soil. As regards personnel, any major use of RFE/RL personnel would probably be contingent on a VOA decision to expand its programs to the target areas as well as to change its broadcast policies so as to permit somewhat more freedom in dealing with internal developments. This raises much broader problems affecting the world-wide operations of VOA which are beyond the scope of this study. “We have considered whether it would be possible to obtain a quid pro quo for the termination of RFE and RL. While the target countries would undoubtedly regard cessation of the broadcasts as a concession, we see no way of using them as direct bargaining counters in present circumstances. On the other hand, the kind of broad negotiations directed at détente, in which the question of terminating the broadcasts might indirectly play an important role, are not in the offing. “Finally, we recommend that the question of the future of RFE and RL be reviewed periodically, perhaps annually. Such reviews should take into account, as the present study has done, (a) the continuing need for the radios, (b) the outlook for retention of base facilities, and (c) the feasibility of transferring technical facilities and staff to VOA and/or of obtaining compensating concessions from the Communist countries in the event of termination.” The Bureau of the Budget dissented from this report on the grounds that the following considerations were not adequately assessed: a. The alternative of an enriched VOA should be more adequately developed … b. The recommendations of the committee should be assessed in the light of (1) implicit disclosure of CIA funding; (2) attendant political repercussions at home and abroad; and (3) probable congressional reactions to funding acknowledged activities in the CIA budget. c. The case for continuing Radio Liberty under acknowledged U.S. Government financing is even less convincing than the RFE case and should be decided separately. The Department answered this dissent, saying that even if the concept of an enriched VOA was not “developed“, it was thoroughly considered and the program review groups for the following areas had reported as follows: “The Polish Program Review Group reported as follows: 'Within the present charter of VOA it could not duplicate the type of reporting on internal policy affairs broadcast by RFE.' “The Czechoslovak PRG reported: 'We do not see how the official U.S. Government radio station can ever take over some of the specific objectives of RFE—unless we were at war with the country being broadcast to … The U.S. objective, like RFE's, is awakening and creating political consciousness among the citizens of Czechoslovakia. As it stands now, it does not appear that VOA could effectively absorb RFE.' “The Hungarian PRG reported: 'Department of State and USIA guidances, as well as the USIA mission document and the VOA charter would have to be specifically amended and changed to permit VOA direct approach to Hungarian internal affairs … We do not believe that such an overall policy change is either advisable or desirable.' “The Rumanian PRG reported: 'The key difference—and the principal RFE function which VOA cannot and should not undertake—is RFE's open criticism of the domestic situation in Romania and suggestions for improvement.' “The Radio Liberty PRG reported: 'Theoretically, it would not be impossible for VOA to duplicate most of the objectives and themes of RL, using the same facilities and personnel … The U.S. would be giving up a current asset—and one with considerable potential value for years to come—without receiving a quid pro quo from the Soviet government.' “The second way in which the Study Group addressed the possibility of an 'enriched country-oriented VOA' was through inquiries to our missions in target countries. In a relevant comment from Embassy Moscow, Ambassador Thompson concluded that status quo should be maintained for the time being and that 'public disclosure (of U.S. Government support) would be unfortunate but believe risk must be taken.' “The third approach to the 'enriched VOA' alternative was technical … The subgroup report brings out that 'the entire shortwave system of the VOA is being used at maximum capacity for broadcasting to the European area at the present time during reasonable listening hours.' Hence additional broadcasting during such hours would require additional transmitters. “A fourth consideration is that enrichment of VOA programs would also require VOA to absorb at least some substantial part of the RFE/RL news-gathering, research, and program personnel and facilities. Embassy Bonn believes that 'if the RFE/RL executive and professional staffs became U.S. Government employees, the FRG would certainly view the status of the organizations as having basically changed.' “More basic than any of the foregoing is the question whether VOA world-wide broadcasting policies, evolved over the years, should be changed—quite apart from the practicality of doing so. The Study Group thought this question went well beyond its mandate. “Apart from the question of the 'enriched, country-oriented VOA', the BOB dissent boils down to a questioning of the majority view on the public reaction to acknowledging U.S. Government support and Congressional reaction to continued CIA funding. The former is a matter of judgment; the latter can only be assessed by consultation with the Congress—which the Study Group assumed would be the first order of business if the basic recommendation is approved.” However, Budget Director Schultze has expressed serious doubts, both orally at the 303 Committee meeting on 20 September 1967 and later on paper, about the proposal to acknowledge government support and continue CIA financing of both RFE and RL, with or without a public exception to the policy developed by the Katzenbach Committee. He believes the principal disadvantages of this course of action are: —The CIA funding will be obvious; it is the only source of covert funding for this type of activity. —Continued CIA funding of an acknowledged activity will create serious problems in Congress: —Congress has already eliminated all funding for RFE and RL after December 31, 1967, except termination costs. —Russell and Mahon are strongly opposed to CIA funding of activities that are not wholly covert. (On these grounds, Congress cut out CIA funding of the Vietnam Revolutionary Development Worker program.) —We should be very careful not to start the practice of having CIA finance activities simply because Congress won't provide funds otherwise. —Public acknowledgement of continued covert U.S. Government financing will cast doubt on the credibility of the whole Katzenbach policy. —Though there has been considerable speculation about CIA funding, the acknowledgement of support would be given a big play in the press and will provide ammunition to attack the Administration. There are two alternatives to the proposed course of action which would avoid the dangers cited above and keep open our options on Radio Free Europe. The options are: 1. Terminate Radio Liberty and, before December 31, pre-fund RFE for an 18–21 month period . Mr. Schultze believes the case for RL is weak and termination would simplify the problem. Pre-funding RFE would require the approval of Russell and Mahon, but they are more likely to agree to this one-shot action than to continued CIA funding. No exception to the Katzenbach policy would be required. We would have time to develop a plan either to provide alternative means of overt support or to fold the valuable RFE activities into USIA in connection with the 1970 budget. 2. Terminate RL and seek an open appropriation to USIA to support RFE . The main disadvantages of this lie in the risk of congressional turndown, the inevitable congressional comparisons between VOA and RFE and the effect of open support on the target countries and the countries where the transmitters are located. The 303 Committee, in discussing these opinions on 20 September 1967, recommended that Secretaries Rusk's and McNamara's views be sought and the matter brought to your attention. As I see it, this is basically a political decision with some far-ranging repercussions regardless of the way the issue is decided. We have built up a $350,000,000 asset; it has been and is a useful instrument; by terminating, we will indeed lose something. By continuing as is, with CIA funding, certain credibility risks exist. As we see it, the risks of termination are as follows: a. We would be surrendering without any quid pro quo a proven instrument for affecting the rate of change in Soviet and Eastern European societies. b. We would, in other words, be making a unilateral concession to the other side. c. There could be a Western European reaction in which they could construe the termination of RFE/RL as an acceptance of Communist domination of Eastern Europe after 17 years of opposition. d. Within the United States, certain blocs within both Democratic and Republican parties would consider the termination as outright appeasement. Certain ethnic minority groups of Eastern European origin with powerful regional strength in Pittsburgh, Chicago and Detroit, etc., and a political voice through such Congressmen as Pucinski and Zablocki could be both vociferous and intemperate. e. There is more than a possibility that Richard Nixon or another Republican candidate, in casting about for issues, could go flat-out against bridge-building. The liquidation of RFE/RL could provide some gunpowder for such an attack. f. Last but not least, a decision to liquidate might well be taken quite personally by such individuals as Michael Haider of Standard Oil, Crawford Greenewalt, Frank Stanton, Roy Larsen, and Roger Blough. These men have had long association with this effort and, we have reason to believe, feel strongly about it. Continuation as recommended with continued CIA financing entails the following hazards: a. If the State Department scenario is followed in which the United States Government admits covert funding, it is definitely open to the charge: How can you call this an open subsidy if you won't reveal how much and from where? Both the press and Congress may find this unpalatable. b. If it is claimed by the government that, yes, this is an exception to the Katzenbach ruling, the press could lean heavily on this and the only truthful answer is that no other solution has been found. c. Any large-scale press play—something very difficult to forecast—may directly affect the present satisfactory attitudes of the Portuguese, Spanish and Germans, who control as host governments the leasing and transmitting site facilities. An open disclosure by itself could adversely affect the attitudes of these governments. We have desisted from initial feelers among members of Congress because we felt this issue was sufficiently subtle so that you would prefer to design the strategy and name the strategists yourself. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have been briefed on this problem by Mr. Kohler and Mr. Nitze and are presumed ready to discuss the matter with you. A decision is needed sooner rather than later because of the size of the enterprises, the interested parties, the money involved, and the deadline of December 31, 1967. Peter Jessup 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 43. Secret; Eyes Only. 18. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson 18. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 14, 1967. 1. You will recall that at lunch on 17 October 2 we discussed the future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. At that time, you expressed a willingness for me to consult those leaders of Congress having to do with appropriations in an effort to establish whether or not they would be willing to continue appropriating money for these radios on the understanding that this would not constitute a request by you for this money or a charge against your congressional program. 2. As a result, I visited individually with five members of Congress: Representatives Mahon of Texas, Bow of Ohio, Lipscomb of California, and Senators Russell of Georgia and Milton Young of North Dakota. All five of these individuals expressed a willingness to support the radios financially in the round amount of $30,000,000 per annum for at least the next fiscal year and possibly longer. 3. At my visit with each of these five individuals, I explained in detail the problem we have had in finding alternative means of financing these radios. I made it clear that a public relations problem still exists in terms of how the Administration explains the continuance of the present financial arrangements. On the other hand, if there is no firm assurance of congressional support for the radios, there is no need to waste time on devising the right tactical approach to the press. I carefully underlined that I was there on my own since you wanted it clearly understood that you did not want to make a personal appeal for the money involved nor did you feel that you should be asked to plead for these radios as against other projects which you felt to be more essential. It was my distinct impression that each individual understood the terms of the discussion quite clearly. 4. Congressman Mahon reacted to my presentation by saying that he had felt it had been a mistake to include the radios in the Katzenbach report and that he had always preferred to have them continue to operate as they had in the past. He recognized the public relations problems but stated that it did not concern him unduly even if there were some criticism. (At this point, he made a disparaging reference to the influence of The New York Times and told me “I never read Reston.”) He then remarked that he thought the radios should be continued and that he was prepared to help provide the necessary funds. He pointed out, however, that Mr. Bow would have to agree and asked me to see both Mr. Bow and Mr. Lipscomb, the two Republican members of his CIA Appropriations Subcommittee. 5. Representative Bow told me that he thought the radios were doing a good job and that they should be continued. He promised to help provide the money. In the course of our conversation, he pointed out that he was on the Appropriations Subcommittee which deals with USIA and that in his opinion it would make no sense to try to meld Radio Free Europe and/or Radio Liberty into the Voice of America organization. He indicated that he clearly understood the difference in the program content of the Voice of America on the one hand and the two “private” radios on the other. He concluded by opining that this was no time in history to reduce our efforts to bring about change behind the Iron Curtain. 6. Representative Lipscomb said that he was in favor of the radios and did not want to see them terminated. He volunteered to do what he could to have the money appropriated and asked a few questions about the amounts involved and how they were allocated. He accepted the fact that some admission of government support might have to be made. He stated that this would present “a tricky problem” in dealing with the press but did not anticipate widespread newspaper criticism. 7. Senator Russell expressed his support of the radios and said that he thought they ought to be continued at least for a time. He repeated what he has said before that he never could understand what all the ruckus had been about. He pointed out that criticism over these subsidies had died out quickly after the initial flurry last winter. He indicated his willingness to help secure the money involved and asked me to go see Senator Young and put the matter to him. He authorized me to tell Senator Young that he favored continuing the radios. 8. When I met with Senator Young, I told him that Senator Russell had asked me to see him, but I did not attempt to influence his decision by telling him in advance what Senator Russell's position was. He did not even inquire. He simply stated that he thought the radios should continue to operate and that he would do what he could to help as far as appropriations are concerned. He expressed the opinion that the state of the world being what it was, no useful efforts to deal with Communism or Communist ideology should be reduced. He voiced concern that possibly not enough was being done in this area. 9. I have reported the above to Secretary Rusk. We will again raise with you shortly how we should proceed on this problem of handling Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Dick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 51. Secret. 2 No further record of this conversation has been found. 19. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 19. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, January 19, 1968. SUBJECT East European Economic Reform At the staff meeting on Wednesday, we talked about the relationship between political stability in Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany and the success or failure of reform efforts. You pointed out the crucial role of management incentive and I remarked that the most notable recent step was the Hungarian reform which took effect at the start of this year. Yugoslavia, of course, remains out in front. Perhaps you would like a bit more information: Rank order, from a market economy at one end to Stalinist planning at the other, might now be the following: Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, East Germany, the Soviet Union, Romania, and finally Albania. In Yugoslavia they are moving toward free convertibility and share capital. By a system of investment through contract, firms can even use their profits to buy into other firms. Some Yugoslav academicians even advocate factory managers having shares, and there is talk of a stock exchange. The present period of transition has been painful. The government's policies have been classically deflationary and economic growth has radically fallen off. There are estimates that urban unemployment is as much as 15 percent. The Hungarians have an inherent advantage, in not having set up an intermediate network of trusts, cartels or production associations between the ministries and the individual firms (as is the case in most of the other countries in Eastern Europe). In their latest move they have done away with planning for each enterprise. The manager's salary and bonus do depend on his ability to find customers and satisfy them. If he does not show a profit at all, he pays back a quarter of his base salary. The Hungarians plan a phased transition from a three-tier pricing system to the virtual abolition of price controls. They plan increased reliance for investment on retained profits (from about 25 percent in 1968 to a larger percentage in each coming year). Another quarter of investment is to be financed with bank credits at 7 to 8 percent. Increasing number of firms will have the right to engage directly in the import and export trade, with foreign currency controlled by duties and surcharges rather than governmental allocation. Apparently at least part of the Hungarians' motive is to qualify for the GATT. In Czechoslovakia , economic reform has been hindered by the almost Stalinist conservatism of Novotny and his friends. Tight foreign exchange, continuing scarcities, constant Party interference and the continued incumbency of managers from the earlier era have all served to slow reform. There is no doubt that this was an important element in the recent leadership crisis. Partly because of the genuine socialist tradition in Czechoslovakia, salaries paid managers are much lower as compared with workers' salaries than in other countries (e.g. East Germany). The manager can increase his earnings by about one-third if he maximizes profits, sales and exports. Poland is still benefiting from 1956 (including, of course, the de-collectivization of agriculture). There is quite a bit of private trade, and more of the new breed of men than in Czechoslovakia. Quite apart from Oscar Lange, the Poles have some of the best economists of Eastern Europe. East Germany 's economy benefited for years from the open border with the West. Even now private firms, averaging about 25 employees, produce about 5 percent of gross output. Mixed private/public enterprises produce another 10 percent. For a few general observations, plans for economic liberalization tend to run afoul of Party control, scarcities, foreign exchange limitations, etc. As for the Party, I am sure not a few big wigs and old aparatchiki have wondered what the Party does if it doesn't run the economy. Only in Yugoslavia is the manager not hired or fired by the Party/Government. So far, only in Yugoslavia is it the factory manager who has the dinars really free to buy another blast furnace. However, Hungary will be moving in that direction if her most recent reform is really carried out. One last word. You are probably familiar with the story told by the Czech economist, Sik, which goes as follows: Prague was having worse and worse trouble with traffic congestion and remembered that the British seem to handle things better in London. So they sent a delegation. The delegation reported that the British did seem to handle things better, and the most remarkable difference was that they drove on the left. So the Czech Government decided to shift sides; but, being cautious, they felt they should not take too radical a move—so they decreed that taxicabs drive on the left. ND 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, East Europe. Confidential. 20. Memorandum for the Record 20. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 24, 1968. SUBJECT NSC Meeting of April 24—Eastern Europe Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by observing that the Eastern European societies had, in one sense, the opposite problem from our own. Our tradition has been individual rights, and we have recently had to concern ourselves with collective problems. The Communist societies depart from the collective view and are only recently facing the problem of the individual. This produces a pull of attraction to the West. A second tie to the West is provided by the desire of Eastern European intellectuals to pursue professional contacts with their Western colleagues. A third tie is the desire of the Eastern European states to assert their independence against the Soviet Union. Secretary Rusk warned against the danger that the East Germans might react to the changes going on in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere by provoking additional tensions with the West. The Secretary said he had Berlin particularly in mind, and mentioned the recent problems of travel and Bundestag meetings. So far as U.S. policy is concerned, the Secretary thought we were right in playing the Eastern European question in low key. We should maintain our public posture of non-intervention. The Secretary said we should bear in mind the classic distinction between rape and seduction. Secretary Rusk expressed regret that so many of our policy tools had been taken or withheld by the Congress. In particular, it is a pity the East-West Trade bill was not passed earlier. A drive to pass the East-West Trade bill now might be a mistake. Secretary Rusk said that, because of circumstances and policy, the Western Europeans may have to be out in front in efforts to exploit Eastern European developments. However, we have opportunities in the fields of trade and cultural contacts. The Secretary went on to mention that he had just sent over a package on the Romanians' desire to purchase a heavy water plant, with his recommendation that the President approve it. The President asked Deputy Under Secretary Bohlen if he had anything to add. Ambassador Bohlen observed that the Communist parties in Eastern Europe have usurped an all-encompassing role and this has had a stifling effect on Eastern European societies. The original Marxist idea was that the parties should exert ideological leadership. They have become both the keeper and prisoner of ideology, and thereby increasingly ineffective in leading these societies forward. Ambassador Bohlen expressed concern that Czech developments go too far, and provoke a Soviet reaction. He seconded the Secretary's advocacy of quiet diplomacy. The President, noting that he was making a brief digression, asked Ambassador Bohlen why he thought DeGaulle made his recent gesture to Hanoi. Ambassador Bohlen said DeGaulle had tipped his hat to the President's acts of renunciation on March 31, 2 and probably felt he needed to redress the balance in Hanoi's direction. Ambassador Bohlen said DeGaulle's general attitude has not changed, and we can expect continued obstruction and hostility on gold, British entry into the Common Market and NATO. The President asked Secretary Fowler if he had any observations on the gold question and Eastern Europe. Secretary Fowler said the Yugoslavs were cooperating with us, and the Soviets were not playing the market to our disadvantage. The Red Chinese, on the other hand, were heavy takers. Secretary Fowler briefly discussed the possibility that the Eastern European countries might seek membership in the Bank and Fund. He noted Yugoslavia's creditable role and recent feelers from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. While noting these were constructive developments, he warned that we would have to be careful that membership in international institutions did not enhance the Communist countries' ability to penetrate and influence the free world. He suggested we might think about using the Eastern European countries' interest in the Bank and Fund as a way to encourage them to reduce military aid to the developing world and loosen economic coordination with Moscow. The discussion shifted to Soviet interest in regional development banks. Secretary Rusk said the Soviets had hinted they might do something in connection with the Asian Development Bank, but nothing had come of this. Secretary Fowler noted that we should be careful to observe international strictures on credit (the Berne limits). The President asked what added steps in our Eastern European policy we can take without having to go to the Congress. Secretary Rusk observed that the recent set of restrictive amendments (Findley, Belcher, etc.) hampered us considerably. Nevertheless there are things we can do. For example, a Bulgarian Trade Delegation is coming shortly, and the Secretary himself participated in the Bulgarians' efforts to promote the sale of wines. The Secretary said we should look again at the Czech gold question, as we ought to try to resolve it. He added that the Czechs were offering us something like $2 million on a $72 million claim. (Actually the U.S. Government has already distributed $9 million to claimants from a $17 million steel mill which the Czechs once purchased and did not get delivery on.) Secretary Rusk mentioned our negotiations for a consular convention with Hungary and Poland, and the possibility of revising our visa forms for tourists, to accommodate Eastern European sensitivities. Secretary Fowler raised the question of Comecon, and Soviet insistence that the Eastern European countries import raw materials from the Soviet Union at inflated prices. He said this anomaly should present us with opportunities under PL 480. (Use of PL 480 would require legislation.) Secretary Rusk said we might take a look at revising Comecon controls to allow Eastern European scientists who study here, with our high-quality equipment, to bring that equipment home for their own use. Ambassador Bohlen noted that the Secretary was probably referring more to U.S. export controls than to Comecon. The Vice President noted the usefulness of trade fairs. He said he thought we didn't do as well as we should with these opportunities. Secretary Rusk observed that our funds were limited, and suggested that Commerce's view would be useful in this regard. The President added: “So would Rooney's views.” The President asked the Secretary of Defense if he had any comment. Secretary Clifford observed that nationalism was spreading like a virus. He raised the question whether the Soviet Union would consider using force in Eastern Europe and suggested some contingency planning would be useful. Ambassador Bohlen said that the Soviets would be reluctant to resort to direct military intervention on the Hungarian pattern, and had, in fact, refrained from doing so against Romania. Mr. Helms observed that Czechoslovakia's move towards independence had started as a result of economics. Dependence on the Soviet Union had produced a degradation of the Czech economy, which led to resentment throughout that society. The President thanked the participants. ND 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Confidential. Drafted by Davis on April 26. A copy was sent to Rostow. 2 For text of the President's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69 , Book I, pp. 469–476. 21. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 21. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, April 28, 1968. SUBJECT Eastern European Contingencies At my direction, EUR, INR and G/PM have concerted in an examination of two contingencies which could arise should the Soviet Union consider it necessary to intervene to protect its interests in Eastern Europe. At Tab A is a discussion of the contingency involving Soviet military intervention. A discussion of possible Soviet economic sanctions on one or several Eastern European countries is at Tab B. Both papers concur in the necessity of approaching with discretion these contingencies, as well as the actual situation in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, there are steps we can and should take both to clear the deck in anticipation of the above contingencies, and, given the present circumstances, to seek to expand our economic ties with Eastern Europe, particularly Czechoslovakia and Romania. Accordingly, I recommend: (a) that the Departments of State and Defense undertake a formal review of existing orders to troops on the eastern borders of the FRG and arrangements for border security; (b) that we consult with FRG authorities concerning the contingency of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia; (c) that, depending on the responses of the FRG, the attitude of the British and French, and recommendations from Amembassy Bonn, we review in the Bonn Group existing contingency plans and instructions concerning Soviet military intervention in Eastern Germany; (d) that approval be given to the general policy guidelines on pages 12–22 of Tab A covering the contingencies of (1) the immediate future, (2) a clear threat of Soviet military intervention, and (3) actual Soviet intervention; (e) that we ease licensing restrictions, including granting to Czechoslovakia the privileged licensing status of Poland and Romania; (f) that we support Eastern European membership in international economic bodies such as GATT and the IMF/IBRD; (g) that we make clear our continued willingness to expand scientific and technical exchanges; (h) that we make known our continued willingness to finance agricultural exports with CCC credits to the extent that Eastern European countries are interested therein; (i) that we continue consultations with key members of Congress in behalf of an East-West trade bill (we could use the forthcoming hearings scheduled by Senator Sparkman's Subcommittee on International Finance for this purpose); (j) that we expand our efforts to identify specific points of vulnerability to Soviet sanctions in Eastern European economies; (k) in the event of a changed political climate, particularly in the event of the actual application of Soviet economic sanctions, that we actively seek to secure from Congress discretionary Presidential authority to extend MFN treatment and Export-Import Bank guarantees to key countries such as Romania and Czechoslovakia; (l) that we move rapidly to establish a position on the Czechoslovak gold/claims problem. Ambassador Beam's recommendation is at Tab C. 2 These studies were commissioned for possible SIG action. I believe the action recommendations are unexceptionable. What is now required, however, is a detailed action scenario implementing the recommendations of the type IRG/EUR could most readily develop. You may wish to consider having the SIG approve this package and endorse it to IRG/EUR for this purpose. Tab A 3 SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE I. Summary 1. Eastern Europe is presently in the highest state of flux—in terms of domestic change and the weakening of Soviet authority—since the events of 1956. In many ways, the Soviet Union faces even greater problems than it did then. 2. On the basis of current estimates, it is unlikely that the USSR will intervene militarily to reestablish its authority in one or another country in the area. There are, however, unpredictable elements. The present situation—particularly the reformist revolution in Czechoslovakia and the deterioration of Romanian-Soviet relations—is progressing, not ebbing. Moreover, the volatile developments in individual countries interact upon one another, and could have side-effects on other, presently stable, regimes in Eastern Europe. No one can say with assurance what the end result will be. It is possible, under circumstances not now expected, that the Soviet Union would feel compelled to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia or even Romania; intervention in Poland or the now quiescent GDR is a more distant possibility. 3. Given the present set of circumstances and expectations, the US and its Allies should assume as axiomatic that we wish to avoid a Soviet military intervention. At the same time, we should carry forward our existing policy, that of bridge building, by which we seek to normalize and expand our relations with Czechoslovakia, Romania, and other countries of Eastern Europe in the field of trade, cultural and scientific exchanges, ideas and tourism, to the maximum extent possible within existing limitations. By continuing this policy, we will be doing all within the means given to us to encourage further the constructive developments that have been taking place. The efforts should be made discreetly, without provocative public comments by the US Government or its information media. We should also be careful not to arouse unrealistic expectations concerning the degree of support which the US may be willing or able to provide these countries. 4. These actions should also be accompanied by quiet preparations for the contingency of Soviet military intervention, particularly in Czechoslovakia and possibly the GDR which border on the FRG. Through a formal State-Defense review, we should confirm the findings of a preliminary study that standing orders to US border troops in the FRG are in basic conformity with the guidelines set forth in existing quadripartite agreements (BQD–EG2, BQD–EG–2A) 4 covering the contingency of a Soviet intervention in East Germany, but which would generally apply to the Czechoslovak contingency as well. In essence, these guidelines provide (a) that there be no intervention across the FRG border by our troops, and (b) that asylum and protection be provided for refugees gaining Federal Republic or West Berlin territory. (See Annex A.) We should also consult with the FRG to establish that orders to West German troops along the Czechoslovak border are based on the same general principles. Finally, we may at some point wish to review in a quadripartite forum existing contingency plans and current instructions to troops in regard to Soviet military intervention in East Germany. 5. If a Soviet military intervention should actually occur, our principal aim would be to avoid any deliberate or spontaneous military involvement by the US and its Allies, save to preserve order on the FRG side of the border. Diplomatic action and public statements would be designed to mitigate, if possible, the effect of the Soviet intervention on the country concerned, and to confine if possible, the adverse impact of the action on other Eastern European countries. A central element of our public posture would be to demand the cessation of Soviet military intervention, though it would hardly be expected that Moscow would heed this call. The UN would presumably be the central forum for diplomatic action, though much would depend on the circumstances of the Soviet intervention, i.e., whether it was undertaken against an established government or at its invitation. 6. Actions Recommended: a. That approval be given to the general policy guidelines set forth in this paper (Section IV) covering the contingencies of (1) the immediate future, (2) a clear threat of Soviet military intervention, and (3) an actual Soviet intervention. b. That the Departments of State and Defense undertake a formal review of existing orders to troops on the borders of the FRG and arrangements for border security. (Paragraph IV.A.6) c. That we consult with FRG authorities concerning the contingency of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. (Paragraph IV.A.7) d. Depending on the response of the Federal Government, the attitude of the British and French, and recommendations from Embassy Bonn, that we review in a quadripartite forum (Bonn Group) existing contingency plans and instructions concerning a Soviet military intervention in East Germany. (Paragraphs IV.A.8–9) [Here follow the body of the paper and the annexes.] Tab B 5 EXECUTION OF RECOMMENDATIONS IN CONTINGENCY PAPER ON POSSIBLE SOVIET ECONOMIC SANCTIONS The paper recommended that under existing conditions, that is, unless Soviet economic pressures are substantially stepped up, we should (a) continue our present efforts to expand trade and other relations and (b) plan for other contingencies. Under (a), the following specific steps were recommended: 1. We continue to express approval of trade in peaceful goods. 2. We continue to express support and to make educational efforts for an east-west trade bill. (Congressman Findley and Senator Mondale have separately introduced legislation making the restoration of MFN status to Czechoslovakia possible. The Department is not opposing these moves, but is expressing a preference for a general east-west trade bill.) 3. We continue to oppose restrictive trade measures to the extent possible. 4. We support as actively as possible east European membership in GATT and the IMF/IBRD. Romania's application to join the former is progressing; Czechoslovakia is already a member. No concrete steps toward IMF/IBRD membership are being taken at the moment by any eastern European country; however, Messrs. Schweitzer and McNamara are reported to be planning visits to Bucharest and other eastern European capitals in June. 5. Commerce is prepared to give Czechoslovakia the licensing status of Poland and Romania, subject to receipt of Czech assurances against unauthorized exports; this action should be completed in a few days. 6. We continue to be willing to expand scientific and technical exchanges. 7. We are willing to finance agricultural exports under CCC credits. There is some possibility that the drought conditions which have hit Romania and Bulgaria may make some action on this front more likely than seemed probable a month ago. An Agriculture trade mission is to go to eastern Europe later this spring to investigate possibilities. EUR has not been assigned responsibility for the planning recommended under (b). The CIA has drafted a study of Czech dependence on the USSR. This is now being circulated for comments preparatory to publication later this month. The paper also recommends avoiding making gratuitous suggestions of support. This policy has been carefully followed. 1 Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 66. Secret. This memorandum was circulated to members of the Senior Interdepartmental Group for Europe as an attachment to SIG Memorandum No. 66, May 9. 2 Document 58 . 3 Secret. 4 BQD EG–2, “Western Attitude in Event of an Uprising in East Germany or East Berlin,” December 4, 1961, and BCQ EG–2A, “Report of the Bonn Quadripartite Group on National Orders Pursuant to the 'Rules of Conduct' of EG–2,” August 15, 1962, were attached as annexes to the source text, but are not printed. 5 Secret. 22. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 22. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. STATUS REPORT ON ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS OF SIG PAPER, “SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE” 2 The paper with policy guidelines covering various contingencies concerning Soviet intervention did not receive formal SIG approval as an action document. Nevertheless, its recommendations for action have been largely fulfilled as appropriate to the course of developments in Eastern Europe. The recommendations, taken from Section IV of the paper, and corresponding actions are reviewed below. IV.A.1 The paper recommends restraint in official public comment on developments in Eastern Europe. Official comment by the Department has been restricted essentially to little more than “we are watching the situation closely” (but note press report of Clifford's testimony May 17 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). 3 Appropriate US Missions and foreign governments have been cautioned not to speculate to the press about US reactions or intentions. Selective deep backgrounding by the Department has resulted in at least one column (Marquis Childs, Washington Post , May 17) on the adverse consequences of a Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. IV.A.2 The paper recommends that US Government-controlled media (VOA, RFE) should exercise restraint but continue to carry factual reports. Corresponding instructions have gone to US-controlled broadcast media in Europe, and Embassy Bonn has been instructed to suggest to the FRG Government that broadcast stations under its control exercise equivalent restraint. EUR/P is in daily contact with VOA personnel at the working level who are operating under similar restraint. IV.A.3 Developments in the economic field are covered by separate memorandum to you. 4 IV.A.4 The paper recommends consultation as appropriate with the FRG, UK, and France regarding the possibility of Soviet military intervention. Informal consultations have been initiated and are continuing with the FRG and UK. For the present we have not considered it appropriate to raise the subject at a high level with the French Government. In any case our periodic assessments of the situation are being made available to all three governments in capitals and are briefed by Cleveland in NAC. IV.A.5 and 7 The paper recommends confirmation with the FRG Government of the BQD EG–2 general rules of conduct, 5 orders to allied troops in West Germany, and arrangements for liaison between West German and US military contingents. Embassy Bonn, together with appropriate US military authorities, has undertaken the necessary consultations with FRG officials. IV.A.6 The paper recommends formal joint State-DOD review of orders issued to US troops along the Czechoslovak and East German borders to assure conformity with the principles of BQD EG–2 and US political-military interests. It also recommends that the review encompass orders to the troops of other nations stationed on the FRG border, along with other arrangements for border security. EUR has met with ISA and JCS for this purpose. IV.A.8 and 9 The paper recommends a quadripartite review at some point of planning and instructions to troops against the contingency of Soviet military intervention in East Germany. No such review has been initiated because it was not considered desirable at this time. IV.A.10 The paper recommends continued normal consultation in NATO. This consultation is under way. IV.B.1 and 2 Against the contingency of a clear threat of Soviet military intervention, the paper recommends that border guards and troops in the FRG should be alerted but that military steps which would suggest a US intention to intervene be avoided. Appropriate JCS instructions have been sent General Burchinal. No military actions that would suggest a US intention to intervene have been undertaken, and the FRG Government has been assured that the US has no intention of taking unilateral military action from the FRG which could exacerbate the situation. IV.B.3 and 4 The paper discusses possible US diplomatic action at the UN. EUR has given IO a memorandum 6 listing the possible forms of military intervention which may occur, and on this basis, IO is developing contingency plans for US action at the UN. IV.C The paragraphs under this section address themselves to action in the event of various forms of Soviet military intervention. In addition to the IO planning mentioned in the paragraph above, contingency press guidance has been developed. Embassy Bonn has briefed FRG authorities on USAREUR contingency planning for increased border surveillance and refugee handling. I understand Mr. Katzenbach has asked Barbara Watson and Graham Martin to prepare additional contingency refugee plans. 7 1 Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 70. Secret. Drafted by Toumanoff on May 21. The paper was an attachment to SIG Memorandum No. 70, circulated on June 3. 2 The paper is printed as Tab A to Document 21 . 3 For text of Clifford's testimony, see Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, Hearings, Part 2, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1968), pp. 428 ff. 4 Attached to the source text but not printed. 5 See footnote 4, Document 21 . 6 Not found. 7 Not further identified. 23. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 23. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, October 1, 1968. SUBJECT Material for Use in the SIG Meeting, October 4, Concerning Contingency Planning in Europe The attached papers review the issues confronting us in Europe as a result of the Czechoslovak affair with particular reference to Rumania, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Berlin. The papers have been prepared for use by the SIG members in their review of status of contingency planning in the aftermath of the Czech crisis. 2 Attachment 1 Washington, undated. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 3 AFTERMATH OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA—ISSUES AND PLANS The military intervention in Czechoslovakia indicates the lengths to which the Soviet Union is prepared to go to subjugate a neighboring ally to the national interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of international communism. 1. Doctrinal Justification The ideological foundation for this intervention was set forth in the Warsaw Letter of July and more recently in Pravda of September 26. 4 These documents stated that internal affairs in any socialist state become the affair of all when the international communist system is thereby threatened. Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statement to Secretary Rusk 5 underlines this determination in concluding that “it would be a mistake to suppose, however, that showing its care in this respect [i.e., improved US-Soviet relations] 6 the Soviet Union would neglect its primary responsibility—the defense of the position of socialism wherever and in whatever form, should a threat to the fraternal socialist countries emerge.” Implicit in these theoretical statements is the assumption that the Soviet Union, as the most powerful member of the camp, will be the final arbiter in determining who has become a deviant requiring punishment and rescue. 2. Assessment of Soviet “Rationality” The Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia should thus be understood as a rational act of an orthodox majority which decided that it was necessary to undertake limited risks and to assume certain political costs in order to prevent the further disintegration of the communist order in Eastern Europe and to ensure the preservation of the existing balance of forces in Europe as a whole. It should not be seen as the first in a succession of reckless moves by the USSR which could ultimately engage NATO forces. The Soviets, we believe, will continue to avoid moves risking serious confrontation with the West so long as NATO maintains its essential military strength and political cohesion. 3. Possible Further Threats Nevertheless, the instinct and determination to nail down the status quo has a dynamism of its own and could lead to further repressive measures and actions in Eastern Europe. Yakubovskiy's tour to East European capitals is reportedly motivated by an attempt to strengthen Warsaw Pact defenses. Parallel moves to tighten economic links within the framework of CEMA may also be underway. Such moves beg the question of how far the Soviet Union intends to go to impose its brand of orthodoxy in the Warsaw Pact camp and to protect what the Soviet Union determines to be its vital interests. Even now Romania feels threatened despite the fact that it, unlike Czechoslovakia, has a party which is in absolute control and a frontier which does not border on “revanchist” West Germany. Similarly, Yugoslavia, even though it is not and has never been a member of the Warsaw Pact, is uncertain enough of Soviet intentions to believe that a Soviet military move against it is possible. Despite these fears, there is as yet no hard evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union intends to intervene militarily in these two countries. The danger of intervention would appear to increase if the Soviets, for example, felt it necessary to impose a harsh occupation regime in Czechoslovakia. Such an act would suggest that a hard-line majority was willing to escalate its military actions to stamp out heresy and would foreshadow increased impatience with “deviationism” in Romania, especially in the foreign policy arena, and critical, polemical attacks from the side of Yugoslavia. Moves against Romania and Yugoslavia would further pose the question whether the Soviet Union would consider violating Austrian neutrality for one reason or another to protect and advance its interests in Central Europe. Should such a chain of events take place, dangerous actions against Berlin could not be excluded, although in this instance the Soviets would have to consider more than in the other cases the likelihood of a Soviet military confrontation with the US and its allies. 4. General Issues and Strategy In the foregoing cases, i.e., Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria and Berlin,NATO faces a range of challenges to the security and vital interests of its member countries. Although we would wish to deter a Soviet move against Romania, for example, the fact is that an invasion and occupation of that country would not seriously affect the vital interests of NATO or result in a significant shift in the strategic balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. It could be argued that invasion of Romania might weaken the Warsaw Pact war potential since additional Soviet forces would be required to neutralize the Romanian divisions—as in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia would be of a totally different dimension, and the challenge at the far end of the spectrum, Berlin, would be much more acute and require an entirely different series of political and military responses. In each case, however, NATO countries face two problems. The first is how best to combine political, psychological, economic and military moves to deter aggressive actions by the Soviets and their allies. Thus in the case of Yugoslavia, political assurances must be matched by higher and more visible stages of alert and action by NATO than in the case of Romania. This suggests that some NATO actions included in the Romanian contingency papers would be more credible if incorporated in contingency plans for Yugoslavia. The second question posed in each case is what action NATO should actually take in the event an invasion occurs or Berlin is physically threatened. The attached papers discuss these issues and policy questions in detail and provide a basis for revising and fleshing out the contingency arrangements now incorporated in the general Romanian package. Attachment 2 Washington, undated. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 7 ROMANIAN CONTINGENCY Summary : A Soviet invasion of Romania, while always possible, appears less likely than it did a month ago. Although NATO and the US have no security commitments vis-á-vis Romania, an invasion by the Soviet Union would be a matter of concern to the West. It would signify further Soviet willingness to resort to military force in international affairs. Such a move would also suggest an increased numerical strength in combat-ready Warsaw Pact forces and pose an increased threat to Yugoslavia where NATO strategic interests are more directly concerned. NATO military counter-intervention in Romania is unlikely since it could be the touchstone for World War III. NATO and US efforts should therefore focus primarily on political actions. Consideration would, however, have to be given to assistance of some kind should the Romanians resist. Every possible pressure would have to be brought to bear to forestall further military aggression and threats to European security. 1. Assessment of Invasion Possibility: These factors are pro-invasion: a. Having taken the step in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets are clearly capable of a second invasion. Romanian nationalistic communism, a chronic thorn in the Soviet side, would be eliminated or neutralized. b. With the Romanians brought to heel, Warsaw Pact territory would once more come under complete Soviet control. c. Soviet doctrine as articulated in the September 26 Pravda article effectively legitimizes such an action as far as the present Soviet leadership is concerned. Anti-invasion signs: a. In contrast to Czechoslovakia, the Romanian party is in complete control. b. Unlike Czechoslovakia with its long common border with West Germany, Romania offers virtually no foreign security problems. c. There is no hard, verifiable military or diplomatic intelligence indicating the likelihood of a Soviet invasion. d. The Romanians have already made conciliatory noises and will doubtless be trying to convince the Soviets that they are not dangerous. Conclusion : Given their present apprehensions, the Romanians will avoid giving the Soviets any pretext for intervention. The probable result: a low-key war of nerves for several months with the Romanians sensitive and generally accommodating to Soviet demands. 2. The NATO Stake: a. Aggression anywhere in Europe is of concern to NATO. b. Pressures on the rest of Europe would be greatly intensified. c. An increased threat to Yugoslavia and, by extension, to the NATO southern and southeastern flanks would be posed. Conclusion : These are important concerns. While eschewing military intervention, NATO should remain vigilant and weigh extremely carefully responses and reactions open to it to forestall a further deterioration in matters affecting European security and stability. 3. The US Concern: Increasingly independent foreign policy moves by Romania since 1964 have coincided with our more substantial post-war efforts to improve our relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe. The gradual improvement in our relations with the Romanians has been a solid plus in our Eastern European policy. It cannot be forgotten, however, that we have no commitment to the Romanian communist leadership which has not hesitated to use repressive measures to control the population. Against this background, our concern over a Soviet invasion falls into these categories: a. The remnants of hope for East-West détente which still existed following the Czechoslovak invasion would be further damaged by a second invasion. b. The possibility of implementing the non-proliferation treaty or of opening new business in related fields would be substantially deferred. c. A second invasion would further inhibit the bridge-building policy, at least in the foreseeable future. It would be extremely difficult to engage in “normal” economic, cultural or scientific exchanges with the Soviets or with regimes which had either collaborated in a Soviet invasion of a second Eastern European country or were themselves under increasingly inhibiting Soviet control. d. A more direct and immediate threat of an invasion of Yugoslavia than now exists would have been created. 4. US Action Objectives: Our dominant objective must be to forestall further aggression. We could at least partially achieve this if we were disposed to use military means. This course is impracticable for the following reasons: a. If NATO were to act militarily, this could trigger World War III since it would involve us in a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union in an area where we have no security commitment and in which the Soviet Union considers its interests paramount. b. Even if military intervention by NATO were considered desirable or necessary, it is doubtful that sufficient ground forces could be brought to bear soon enough to affect the complete takeover of Romania by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. c. Public opinion would perhaps have a difficult time believing that the security of the West should be endangered to save a communist regime which has not been above using Stalinist methods against its population. In the mind of the public, the Czechoslovak experiment to evolve a more democratic and humane form of socialism would have been more worthy of fighting to save than the Romanian nationalist form of communism. d. Unlike Yugoslavia, there has been no precedent for tangibly supporting Romania's independence and integrity by means of significant military aid and economic assistance. 5. Our Options: Although military intervention is inadvisable, this should not foreclose considerable US, NATO, and UN activity in other areas. The President's August 30 speech 8 and the Secretary's three meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin (August 23, 30 and 31) 9 all conveyed a message of deep US concern over the possibility of a Soviet invasion. As a general proposition, we should (a) assume an escalated national posture of moral outrage, (b) cease all but the most urgent bilateral contacts with the aggressor powers, (c) consult urgently with our NATO allies, (d) have recourse to the Security Council, and (e) consider carefully types of assistance which could conceivably be of some help should the Romanians in fact put up a stiff resistance. 6. Contingencies and Responses: The Soviet capability to invade Romania in any desired strength and by any military means or mixes of means from any or all of four directions—Ikraine-Moldavia, Hungary (plus forces based in Czechoslovakia), a, and the Black Sea—is impressive. This is the basic contingency, and the responses we are likely to make are those cited earlier. Gradations in style, timing, manner of orchestration, political preparations, or others may create contingencies demanding somewhat different immediate reactions. The subsequent list of such possibilities and recommended US actions is by no means exhaustive: a. Continuing Evidence of Soviet and Warsaw Pact Military Buildup: We and our NATO allies—as well as concerned governments anywhere—should maintain constant top-level pressure on the Soviets, preferably through their Ambassadors, along lines already exercised in the US. b. Advance Warning and Request for US Assistance: The timing of a Romanian request for military or economic assistance is unpredictable. Military aid is likely to prove impracticable. The decision as to whether and how to grant economic assistance would depend on type, terms, need, and availability (reserves and pipeline). But even extending US economic assistance of any kind to Romania could be considered provocative by the Soviets. c. Severe Economic Warfare Against Romania by the Soviets: There has been some evidence, notably in formal Romanian requests that Western European countries step up purchases of Romanian goods, that some traditional markets in the USSR and Eastern Europe are at least temporarily closed to Romanian merchandise. Interestingly, the Romanians have not approached us. If they do, we should promise to look into possibilities for an early expansion of trade. d. Soviet-Directed Coup d'Etat in Romania: There is little we could do. We can and should, however, exploit such a development in our propaganda output. We should also recall our Ambassador until an “election” is held and a new regime “legalized” and the situation is assessed. e. Czechoslovak-Style Invasion: The scenario of political actions suggested in the existing contingency papers should be followed closely. Military measures such as an increase in vigilance should be screened carefully, however, to insure against giving false signals either to the Soviets or to our Western allies as to the nature of our intended reaction. In a meeting with Dobrynin, the Secretary should warn against any further moves by the Soviets and make clear that any encroachment on Yugoslavia, Austria, Berlin or Germany would be of a totally different dimension and would risk triggering World War III. f. Unexpectedly Strong Romanian Resistance: Neither the capacity of the Romanian military nor the experience of Romanian history suggests the likelihood of protracted military resistance, guerrilla warfare, or even, in fact, harassments of the type executed by the Czechoslovaks in the early days of the Soviet invasion. In the unlikely event that any of these materialize, however, we could not ignore considering whatever options may be open that entail limited risks. g. Dismemberment of Romania: The Soviets might conceivably detach Transylvania and hand it to loyal Hungary. They should be criticized harshly for perpetrating such an action. Attachment 3 Washington, undated. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 10 YUGOSLAV CONTINGENCY Summary: The immediate possibility of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia is sharply limited. Our concern is based on the threat posed to the NATO area. We are also interested in preserving Yugoslavia's independent and relatively liberal image. If an invasion materializes, we should extend the Yugoslavs maximum political support and selective economic assistance upon request. If military conditions permit and the Yugoslavs ask for help, we should grant them conventional small arms, transport equipment, and spare parts, if we have them. 1. Assessment of Invasion Possibility: Advantages for the Soviets: a. The Soviet military and strategic position would be superb. It would also force an expansive redeployment of NATO forces. b. A long-standing irritant, the peculiar but successful Yugoslav brand of socialism, would be reshaped and brought back into line. c. Dramatic proof of Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe would have been demonstrated—and would provide a ready answer to doubters in both parts of Europe. Anti-Invasion Factors: a. An invasion of Yugoslavia would be long, costly, complex, and probably more trouble than it would be worth. b. It is possible that an invasion attempt would not be entirely successful. c. Yugoslavia has long since been written off as part of the Soviet-dominated world. It has never been in the Warsaw Pact or CEMA and has been identified as a leading neutral for close to 20 years. Although they have frequently antagonized the Soviets, however, the Yugoslavs have more often than not cooperated with them. d. The US and NATO would be considerably more concerned than they were in the Czechoslovak or Romanian cases and might react militarily. This could trigger a wider war. Conclusion : It appears highly doubtful that the Soviets will take the enormous risk of invading Yugoslavia for the questionable gains that would be achieved. 2. The NATO Stake: The strategic and security considerations raised by a Soviet invasion are serious and possibly vital to the defense of Europe for these reasons: a. The balance of military power in the Mediterranean and in the NATO southern and southeastern areas would be significantly altered. b. A direct threat to Italy and Greece would be posed. c. An important military challenge to NATO itself would have been offered. d. Austrian neutrality would be challenged, both by the possibility that Soviet troops would cross Austria en route to Yugoslavia and by the presence of Soviet forces in Yugoslavia. 3. The US Concern: Our stake in Yugoslavia since 1948 has been political, economic, and, to an uncertain degree, strategic. Cooperation with the Tito regime has been uneven, both in substance and objective. Although we have had cause to welcome Yugoslav political independence, and its development of considerable domestic liberalization, we have only rarely achieved any identity of views. There has been no effective military relationship for a decade. On most issues affecting world peace or European security the Yugoslav position has been considerably closer to the Soviet than to ours. Recent examples include Viet-Nam and the Middle East. We would nevertheless be deeply concerned over a Soviet invasion, both for the reasons cited in the preceding paragraphs, and because of the evidence it would provide of Soviet readiness to continue an aggressively adventurous course immediately adjacent to the NATO area. If this followed an invasion of Romania, it would be the third case of direct Soviet aggression in Eastern and Central Europe. The argument for considering active counter-measures stems basically, therefore, from the actual direct danger to US and Western European security interests offered by a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia. 4. US Action Objectives: We would want ideally to prevent this invasion without becoming directly involved. In fact, to prevent without involvement is all but impossible, because any truly preventive steps would entail the serious risk of triggering a wider war, but on the other hand our actual security stake in Yugoslavia is too large and immediate for us to resist some type of involvement as proposed below. Our political debt to Yugoslavia for past “favors” is non-existent. In a post-invasion situation, any political or action objectives we might have would be directed almost exclusively to protecting the regional NATO position and forestalling further aggression rather than shielding the Tito regime. Our other interests can be practically served only by contributing to the prevention of an invasion. 5. Our Options: a. The Case of Assistance: Both politically and psychologically, supporting Yugoslavia is more attractive, convenient, and necessary than assisting Czechoslovakia or Romania. The Yugoslavs have considerable appeal in the West, they are closer and more identifiable geographically and, as they have done so skillfully in the past, they would actively resist invasion. These and actual military factors are a strong argument for proferring quick, effective assistance to Yugoslavia. They are not completely offset by the character of the Tito regime which, although more “liberal” than that of any other Communist country, is still basically undemocratic, or by the fact that the Communist Yugoslav Government has supported the Soviet position on virtually every major international issue since 1955. The balance tips toward some kind of assistance beyond the political steps we should take almost automatically. b. Political-Military Action: At a minimum, we should quickly take all of the steps described in the contingency papers for Romania and several others. These should include, both in the pre- and post-invasion periods, as appropriate: (1) Strong statements by the President and other NATO chiefs of state. (2) Regular, preferably inconvenient call-ins of Ambassador Dobrynin here and similar action by the NATO Governments. (3) Early, unmistakable reference to the risk and real possibility of nuclear war. (4) Convening of emergency NAC meeting followed as quickly as possible by force deployments calculated to demonstrate NATO determination to defend its regional interests. (5) Instructions on increasing military vigilance measures, return of redeployed US NATO air and army units, and redeployment of Spanish-based air squadrons. (6) Emergency meeting of Security Council and other appropriate UN action. (7) Announcement of the suspension of travel of US military dependents to Europe and return of those already there. c. Economic Assistance: The accompanying action memorandum “Assistance to Yugoslavia in the Eventuality of Soviet Military Pressures” 11 sets forth the procedures to be followed to facilitate granting economic aid to Yugoslavia. The steps described in it should be taken upon determination that Soviet military intervention is likely. d. Military Aid: Aside from a military sales agreement, which amounts to an undertaking to sell Yugoslavia spare parts for equipment it obtained from us in the 1950's, we have no military responsibility for providing military aid to Yugoslavia. Legal obstructions which now exist can be overcome according to procedures set forth in the accompanying paper. We should be prepared to engage in military support operations for Yugoslavia in these circumstances: (1) Only if requested by the Yugoslavs. (2) No involvement of US or NATO personnel beyond participation in delivery operations. (3) Heavy equipment of a type requiring considerable lead time for delivery should not be provided. (4) If portable relatively easily deliverable equipment can be furnished at any stage of hostilities, we should take all necessary steps to grant it. (5) The Yugoslav military genius is in guerrilla-type operations. We should orient our assistance in that direction. 6. Contingencies and Responses: An invasion of Yugoslavia can occur in any one or combination of several ways: a. The movement of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces through Bulgaria and Romania. b. An invasion which would include the movement of Warsaw Pact forces through Romania either with Romanian agreement or after, or accompanying, an occupation of Romania itself. c. An invasion which would include the movement of Warsaw Pact forces through Austria. Our response to the invasion of Yugoslavia itself would not be materially different whichever routes of invasion were involved. The Soviets can in any case invade and occupy large areas of Yugoslavia quickly and probably effectively with elements from Hungary, Bulgaria, and (by air) the USSR as well as with occupation forces from Czechoslovakia and probably Romania. They would have considerable difficulty, however, in taking the country. The Yugoslav resistance potential is an enormous, proven quantity. It is highly probable that the Western response would, in the final analysis, be directed to bolstering and feeding it. Attachment 4 Washington, undated. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 12 AUSTRIAN CONTINGENCY A. Strategy and Issues Soviet action against Austria would indeed present a grave challenge to the United States and our national interests would be seriously involved. The threat to us would arise from a combination of strategic, psychological and political factors. Strategic Austria has no strategic resources or other important strategic considerations except for its geography. The gain of Austrian territory by the Soviet Union, however, would provide it with a more defensible line against the West, would provide it with a natural corridor for access to Yugoslavia, and potentially Italy and Germany, and would deprive the West of a strategically located corridor for its access to Eastern Europe. Psychological Austria has demonstrated in recent weeks its concern regarding Soviet action against Czechoslovakia. That concern would undoubtedly intensify if moves appeared imminent against Romania and Yugoslavia. The Austrian press has discussed the desirability of an American guarantee of Austrian neutrality and Chancellor Klaus has informally inquired of Ambassador MacArthur what our reaction would be to Soviet aggression against his country. 13 We are committed by the State Treaty of 1955 14 to recognize Austrian independence but we have no commitment to protect or guarantee that independence. There is no doubt, however, that the loss of Austria would be a severe psychological defeat for the West. Political The challenge to this country in a Soviet move against Austria would be greatest in its political aspects. Austrian independence and neutrality has been clearly recognized by East and West and has become an important fact of political life in Central Europe over the past 13 years. An effort by the Soviet Union to violate that independence and neutrality would clearly be a change in the status quo which would threaten U.S. national interests. B. Scenarios There are several possible ways in which the Soviet Union might effect its move against Austria. There could be a request to the Austrian Government for free passage of Warsaw Pact forces across Austrian territory to reach Yugoslavia. There could be an unannounced violation of Austrian air space and territory by Soviet forces en route to Yugoslavia. Finally, there could be a statement by the Soviet Union that Austria was not living up to the terms of the State Treaty and, to protect Austrian independence, the Soviet Union was obliged to move into Austria to carry out the terms of the treaty. We see no likelihood of a coup d'etat in Austria in connection with a Soviet move. The Communist Party is no threat and the Austrian people have clearly demonstrated their disapproval and revulsion of the Soviet moves in Czechoslovakia. Austria has said it would resist any Soviet move by force; our assessment of the capability of the Austrian armed forces, however, leads us to believe that Austrian resistance would be ineffectual militarily, although it might create a psychological impact. Request for Passage The Austrians would undoubtedly respond that, as a neutral and sovereign nation, they could not permit the use of their territory for military operations against another nation. They would probably refer to the State Treaty and call upon the U.S., the UK and France to intercede with the fourth signatory to honor the obligation in that treaty to respect Austrian independence. Our response to such a request should be positive. We should issue, in the form of a Presidential or Secretarial statement, a call to the Soviet Union to honor its Treaty obligation. We should announce consultations with the British and French. We should announce our intention to convoke a meeting of the Security Council to discuss this matter on an urgent basis. Unannounced Violation The Austrians are fully aware of their inability to oppose the Warsaw Pact forces militarily. Their announced intention to do so is therefore probably aimed at exerting psychological pressure on the West to come to their defense and to help avert their defeat. Depending upon the time available to them, they would undoubtedly make public requests for assistance. These requests would be for ammunition, supplies, arms, air support, and commitment of Western forces, in an ascending order of involvement. Our response to these requests would have to be determined in the light of other developments and requirements for U.S. forces at the same time. Alleged Violation of the Treaty The above two scenarios discuss a move by the Soviets against Austria in conjunction with a move against Yugoslavia. It is possible, although less likely, that the Soviets might move against Austria alone, without at the same time undertaking a move into Yugoslavia. Such a move would probably be couched in the terms of a necessity by the Soviet Union to take action to correct a failure by the Austrians to live up to their commitments under the State Treaty, most likely a claim they had violated Article IV which prohibits union with Germany. Our response to this would be framed in terms of the Treaty. The Treaty provides a mechanism for consultation among the four chiefs of mission at Vienna on disputes arising from interpretations of the Treaty and we should use that mechanism to blunt the Soviet charges. Our reaction should be in concert with France and Great Britain and should also include a convening of the Security Council. Finally, however, it is recommended that we consider a preemptive move regarding Austria. Our public statements to date have not referred to Austria specifically and such a reference at an early moment would appear to be appropriate. We should undertake immediately to consult with France and Britain, reminding them they, too, have responsibilities under the State Treaty. We could suggest to them that the Secretary, Stewart and Debre call in the respective Soviet Ambassadors and state that recent developments have caused us to re-examine the State Treaty and our mutual obligations thereunder. In order that there be no misunderstanding, each Ambassador would be requested to report to Moscow the firm intention of his host government to uphold and honor the State Treaty and our firm expectation that the Soviet Union would do the same. The Ambassadors would be asked to convey to Moscow the three governments' views that any Soviet move against Austria would be a grave and serious threat to the peace of Europe and would be considered a clear indication that the Soviet Union was no longer interested in maintaining that peace. 1 Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 87. Secret With Top Secret Attachments. Drafted by Beaudry. 2 Attachment 5, “Report on Berlin Task Force Planning,” October 1, is not printed. 3 Secret. Drafted by Dubs (EUR/SOV) on September 30. 4 Reference is to the Brezhnev Doctrine, originally propounded by Soviet Communist Party spokesman Sergei Kovalev in an article entitled “Sovereignty and International Responsibility of Socialist Countries” in Pravda , September 26, 1968. A translation is printed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press , October 16, 1968, and Remington, Winter in Prague , pp. 412–416. 5 See Document 91 . 6 Brackets in the source text. 7 Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. 8 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69 , Book II, pp. 917–920. 9 See Documents 87 , 90 , and 167 . 10 Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. 11 Not printed. 12 Secret. Drafted by Crump (EUR/AIS) on September 30. 13 See Document 202 . 14 For text of the treaty, signed May 15, 1955, in Vienna, see Department of State Bulletin , June 6, 1955, pp. 916–932. 24. Record of Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group 24. Record of Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group 1 Washington, October 4, 1968. CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY DISCUSSION AND DECISIONS AT THE 44TH SIG MEETING ON OCTOBER 4, 1968 PRESENT The Under Secretary of State, Chairman The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Taylor for the Director of Central Intelligence The Director, United States Information Agency The Special Assistant to the President The Under Secretary of Treasury The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs SIG Staff Director DOD—Mr. Wyle JCS—General Bayne State— Mr. Leddy Mr. Toon Mr. Shaw Mr. Lesh [Here follow Items I and II.] III. Eastern Europe: Issues and Contingency Planning. The Chairman remarked that his purpose in asking for SIG consideration of the situation in Eastern Europe was to reach agreement on the broad principles embodied in the contingency papers which had been circulated in advance of the meeting. 2 He did not wish to discuss specific details at this time. If the general policy line could be agreed by the SIG, details of contingency plans could be worked out through interagency channels under the direction of the new IRG/EUR sub-committee to be chaired by Mr. Toon. United States Military Posture in Europe . The discussion opened with a series of comments on the military situation in Europe, with special reference to the less than desirable level of battle-readiness of certain United States units assigned to NATO. The existing shortfalls in men and materiel were readily explainable, it was pointed out, by the higher priority which had been assigned to support for the war in Viet-Nam and our strategic forces, as well as by the deleterious effect of recent severe budget restrictions. A question was raised concerning the preparedness of the Department of Defense to go to Congress for a supplemental appropriation if the situation in Eastern Europe suddenly took a serious turn for the worse. The reply was that justification for a supplemental could be produced on very short notice. However, in the event of the development of a real crisis—such as Warsaw Pact movement against Berlin—the Department of Defense could raise expenditures for troop support even above the current budget level by using unobligated funds, and seek a supplemental appropriation later. Such short-term excess expenditure could be authorized by the Secretary of Defense even in the absence of a Presidential declaration of a national emergency. Czech Situation . One member expressed the opinion that a tighter Soviet squeeze on Czechoslovakia appeared to be in the offing. The Chairman remarked that, after the initial Soviet decision to invade had been taken, it had become less a question of whether there would be a further squeeze than when and how the squeeze would come. Sterner Soviet measures to enforce their will in Czechoslovakia seemed to him to be a foregone conclusion. Other members commented that it must be deeply aggravating to the Soviets that they have not been able to produce even one Czech leader who is willing to state that he requested that Soviet troops enter the country. There was some evidence, it was felt, that the Soviets were attempting to drive a wedge between the Czech and Slovak elements of the population, and simultaneously striving to build up the image of the Slovak politician Husak as a national leader. However, it was pointed out that there were serious limitations on how far the Soviets could carry such a policy. They would be unlikely to favor a federal solution in Czechoslovakia, with greater autonomy for the Slovaks, because such a development in Czechoslovakia would have great impact on a number of national groups in the USSR itself who desired a greater degree of self-determination. Mr. Katzenbach then invited Mr. Leddy to comment on the Eastern European situation and the various issues and contingency papers which had been distributed for SIG consideration. Mr. Leddy noted that the EUR papers on Czechoslovakia and the organization of a new IRG/EUR subcommittee were primarily informational, while those on Romania, Yugoslavia and Austria were action-oriented and would require further study and refinement. He did not propose to summarize all the papers but would comment on selected problems. Deterrent Actions . Mr. Leddy observed that most planning heretofore had been slanted towards defining United States responses to selected contingency situations in Eastern Europe. He now hoped to give increasing emphasis to possible deterrent actions that could be taken right now to help prevent further Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe. Our options in this area might be limited, but there were certain things we could do to signal our concern to the Soviets. He felt, for example, that a firm United States posture in 1951 had been influential in deterring Soviet action against Yugoslavia. The Secretary's recent speech to the United Nations General Assembly 3 was a useful step, and other ways could be found to focus public attention on the aggressive Soviet posture in the Balkans and to discredit the Soviet attempt in Pravda to formulate a philosophy to justify armed intervention in the affairs of her socialist neighbors. 4 In the Yugoslav case, it would be desirable to encourage further high-level visits such as that of Gligorov to the United States. (Harmel and Stewart's visits to Bucharest, Mr. Leddy said, were also useful in signalling our general concern about possible Soviet moves against Romania.) 5 Such visits had the salutary effect of underlining the continuity of Western ties with the Yugoslav regime. Similarly, we (as well as the British and French who were partners in the effort) ought to make public reference to the 17-year-long tradition of United States assistance to Yugoslavia, without in any way committing ourselves to specific actions in the event of a Soviet attack. This would have to be done carefully and in an appropriate context to avoid giving the Soviets a green light on Romania. Another suggestion offered was a quiet campaign to convince Western European Communist Parties to come out more explicitly against Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe, and to induce some reputable European newspaper or periodical—preferably socialist or even communist in sympathy—to devote more critical attention to the Pravda justification for Soviet intervention. The point should be driven home that such a philosophy is unrelated to Marxist-Leninist theory, and in fact could most accurately be characterized as Hitlerian. Some members pointed out that we must plan for a progression of deterrent actions designed to suit differing scenarios. Following a Soviet invasion of Romania, for example, we should have in mind a series of much stiffer actions to warn the Soviets of our increased concern over the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. These might include overt military moves such as rapid reinforcement of NATO air squadrons in Italy, and naval maneuvers by the United States Sixth Fleet in the Adriatic. Mr. Leddy commented that at that point we should also be fully prepared to move quickly in the United Nations. He felt that the General Assembly should be seized of the problem as soon as possible, because in the case of Yugoslavia we could probably obtain widespread support for deterrent action. The Chairman commented that he felt the best way to deter further Soviet military action in Eastern Europe was to keep raising the cost to the Soviets of their invasion of Czechoslovakia. There was a growing tendency to begin to accept the Czech episode as closed, which only played into Soviet hands. The degree to which we are able to keep the occupation of Czechoslovakia a painful and embarrassing subject for the Soviets inevitably would influence their decision whether to embark on similar adventures in Romania or Yugoslavia. The Balkan Pact . There was general agreement that the relationship of the Balkan Pact to NATO needed further study. At the time of the signing of the Bled Agreement between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey in 1954 6 there had been some direct bilateral military coordination between the Yugoslavs and the Greeks. In the event of a serious military threat, the Greeks had been granted the right to move into the southern tip of Yugoslavia to defend the approaches to Greece, and there had been exchanges of information on the military staff level. The degree to which this cooperation had persisted in more recent years was unknown. Apparently NATO had never taken official cognizance of the Balkan Pact, despite its possible effect on its obligations to Greece and Turkey under Article V of the NATO agreement. Mr. Leddy said that legal experts were currently studying the possible interrelationship of the two international treaties but more work needed to be done. Yugoslav Capacity to Resist . An associated question was raised about the present Yugoslav capacity to resist armed intervention by the Soviet Union. It was agreed that the intelligence community should develop a current estimate, possibly in the form of a SNIE. Austria . Mr. Leddy commented that the contingency of Soviet military pressure on Austria was less likely but more complicated than the cases of either Romania or Yugoslavia. If the Austrian State Treaty were violated by the Soviets—for example, by seizure of their previous zone of occupation—United States action would have to be concerted in advance with the United Kingdom, France, and Austria. A great deal more preliminary work remained to be done in this area. Furthermore, we were assuming that Austria would reject a Soviet demand for the right of transit of Soviet troops. But what would we do if the Austrians, under great pressure, agreed to such transit? Would we consider this grounds to justify our re-occupation of Austrian territory under the State Treaty? Berlin . It was observed that the paper dealing with Berlin 7 was rather bland in its estimate of the current threat, especially in regard to possible reactions to the forthcoming CDU convention to be held in West Berlin. No such convention had been held there since 1952, and the resumption of this degree of FRG political activity in Berlin might be considered highly provocative. In addition, when discussing Allied responses to curtailment or interruption of access to Berlin, it was probably wrong to assume that the FRG would agree to any restrictions on Inter-Zonal Trade (IZT). Past experience had shown that the West Germans were unwilling to take any action to abridge existing agreements on IZT. Mr. Leddy suggested that a useful move in contingency planning for Berlin would be to get authorization for a tripartite declaration on the relationship between the FRG and West Berlin. It was suggested that another possibility would be a quiet diplomatic note on the subject from the United States, United Kingdom, and France delivered simultaneously to the Soviets, but it was pointed out that if the advice was to be effective, it would have to be publicized. Whatever the course of Berlin contingency planning, General Wheeler remarked that he hoped no one would recommend stationing more United States troops in the city. In the first place, there were too few available elsewhere in Europe. Mr. Leddy agreed that the military effectiveness of a build-up in the Berlin garrison would be most doubtful, and it would not provide any real increase in deterrence against Soviet and East German military action. The only true guarantee for the existence of West Berlin remained the United States warning to the Soviets that overstepping a given line would mean war. Discussion of Berlin concluded with a series of comments regarding the growing reluctance of the World Bank to schedule its 1970 meeting in West Berlin. The French reportedly had passed the word that a meeting in Berlin would be unacceptable, and authorities at the World Bank had begun to talk of serious difficulties with the Yugoslavs, Arabs, and others if such a meeting were scheduled. Mr. McNamara had informally expressed his preference for Copenhagen to avoid these problems. Some international bankers had begun to speak deprecatingly of the economic future of Berlin as a result of its constant population drain, especially in the younger segments of society, and its failure to achieve economic viability. Mr. Leddy expressed the opinion that the United States must work to stem this tide, and continue to support the convening of the World Bank meeting in Berlin. It was true that Berlin was plagued by economic problems, mostly understandable as a result of the peculiar situation of the city, but these in no way diminished our national interest in Berlin nor should they weaken our support for the World Bank meeting there in 1970. At this point the Chairman and other members were required to leave in order to attend a White House ceremony. Since there remained ample ground for further discussion of Eastern European problems, the Chairman suggested that the SIG Staff Director would be in touch with SIG members on the advisability of scheduling another meeting on the same subject. IV. Action Summary. A. The proposal by General Wood with regard to the Special State-Defense Study Group report on overseas base requirements (see Section II) was approved. B. The formation of a sub-committee of the IRG/EUR under the chairmanship of Mr. Toon to coordinate interagency contingency planning on Eastern Europe was approved. C. It was agreed that further interagency study would be undertaken under the direction of the IRG/EUR sub-committee, emphasizing the range of preventive measures which might be taken to deter further Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe, as well as specific contingency responses to Warsaw Pact action against Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Berlin along the lines set forth in the SIG discussion (see Section III). D. It was agreed there would be further study under the same auspices of the interrelationship, if any, between the Balkan Pact and the NATO treaty. E. It was agreed that the intelligence community would develop an estimate of Yugoslav capacity to resist Soviet armed intervention, possibly in the form of a SNIE. 8 Claus W. Ruser Acting Staff Director 1 Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 74 D 344, SIG Decisions. Secret. Drafted by Ruser on October 12. 2 The papers are Attachments 1–4 of Document 23 . 3 For text of Rusk's October 2 speech, see Department of State Bulletin , October 21, 1968, pp. 405–410. 4 See footnote 4, Document 23 . 5 British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart visited Bucharest September 8–9; Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel visited Bucharest September 13. 6 For text of the Bled Treaty, signed on August 9, 1954, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents , pp. 1235–1239. The treaty established the Balkan Pact. 7 This paper was Attachment 5 to Document 23 , not printed. 8 No SNIE was produced. 25. Memorandum of Conversation 25. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 12, 1968, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Outlook for Eastern and Central Europe PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Secretary Fowler The Under Secretary Under Secretary for Political Affairs Rostow Assistant Secretary Leddy Mr. Charles R. Tanguy, Country Director, FBX Mr. Alec G. Toumayan, Interpreter France Foreign Minister Michel Debre Ambassador Charles Lucet M. Jacques de Beaumarchais, Director for Political Affairs, Quai d'Orsay M. Roger Vaurs, Director of Information Services, Quai d'Orsay Mr. Jean-Yves Haberer, Director of M. Debre's Cabinet M. Jacques Leprette, Minister, French Embassy The Secretary emphasized the importance of being clear in advance as to what our commitments are vis-á-vis situations possibly involving war. Debre reiterated the importance of the distinction he had drawn in his talks in New York between a Soviet move against Romania and any such move against West Berlin, Yugoslavia or Austria. The Secretary agreed that there would be significant differences between these two types of action. He added that the United States was watching Soviet troop movements carefully. We do not see any imminent Soviet threat today against Romania, Yugoslavia or Austria. The Secretary added that Soviet intervention in Romania might well be designed to prepare a move against Yugoslavia. Debre observed with feeling that any new Soviet moves would close the door to a resumption of Western conversations with the Soviet Union. Debre thought that the Soviets were aware of this and would give it considerable weight in planning their future actions. The Secretary hoped that Debre was right but he was personally less confident that this factor would deter them. When the Russians judge that their fundamental interests are involved, the Secretary said, it is difficult to know in advance how far they will allow themselves to go. M. Debre declared that the French Government operated on the postulate that Russia did not want to become a country which was forced to choose “guns over butter.” Such a development within Russia would mean a return to the worse days of the Stalin period. It would also mean that the Soviets accepted the possibility of a new war. When and if this day comes, Debre continued, “everything would change” including their leadership and our estimate of their policies and intentions. The Secretary observed that hopefully the Russians may now be learning that some things cannot be accomplished by means of armies of occupation. If so, this would be a helpful development. The Secretary asked Mr. Leddy to look into the feasibility of expanding our information programs to Yugoslavia and other Eastern European countries to accentuate the message regarding the immense problems which the Soviet Union has created for itself by its use of armies of occupation. Debre commented that the leaders of Communist parties in the other Eastern European countries seem to have gotten the point of direct interest to them from the Czech experience. In the event of Soviet intervention and occupation the local Communist party must change one leader out of every two. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR. Secret. Drafted by Tanguy and approved in S on October 21. Debre was in the United States to attend the U.N. General Assembly session. The source text is labeled “Part V of V.” 26. National Intelligence Estimate 26. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, November 7, 1968. NIE 12–68 EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA Conclusions A. The Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia because of their genuine fear that the existence of a reliable Communist authority in Prague was threatened by the reform movement in the Czechoslovak Party. The Soviet leaders believed that if this development was not checked their hegemony would ultimately be jeopardized in Eastern Europe as a whole. The process of forcing the Czechs back into the approved mold is proceeding slowly, and the Soviets may be obliged in the end to move directly against the Prague leadership. B. Both Romania and Yugoslavia will remain apprehensive about Soviet intentions for some time, especially in view of Soviet assertions of a right to intervene in Socialist countries. The Soviets probably do not now contemplate any direct military action against Romania, although other means of pressure can be expected. A Soviet military move against Yugoslavia seems even less likely. Although by its action against Czechoslovakia the USSR has probably for the time being discouraged assertions of national independence among its East European allies, the growth of anti-Soviet nationalism in the area seems likely to continue and to produce new manifestations of resistance to Soviet authority. C. The present Soviet leadership will probably continue to strike a course somewhere between attempting to restore complete subservience in Eastern Europe and accommodating the trend toward independence and the expression of national peculiarities. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance will remain generally ineffective, both as an instrument of Soviet hegemony and as a means of fostering East European economic development. Within the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets will probably feel obliged to place greater reliance on their own forces and less on those of the East Europeans. D. Although the Soviet leaders were probably in basic agreement that measures had to be taken to arrest the reform movement in Czechoslovakia, over time this crisis will probably sharpen a number of chronically troublesome issues within the Soviet leadership. Yet the Soviet leaders are likely to realize that this is not a propitious time for open displays of disunity. Among other things, they are probably concerned over the effects of their actions of Czechoslovakia on the Soviet population itself. E. The Soviet move in Czechoslovakia did not signify a general hardening of Moscow's policies toward the West. The Soviet leadership considers the Czechoslovak problem as one internal to its own sphere. But Moscow's attitude toward West Germany will remain quite harsh and the Soviets may authorize the East Germans to undertake new harassments aimed at the West German position in Berlin. Discussion I. Introduction 1. The dust and debris raised by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia have yet to settle, and the uncertainties left in its wake involve more than the kind of regime which will govern in Prague. Also affected are Moscow's attitudes toward West Germany and the Berlin question, its policies toward the other Communist mavericks, Yugoslavia and Romania, and its posture toward Eastern Europe as a whole. Involved in addition are the broader questions of the USSR's policies toward Western Europe and the US and its position in the international Communist movement. Finally, the Czech events could affect the relative positions of the various Soviet leaders and the stability of the leadership as a whole, which may have been shaken by differences over Soviet policies during the crisis. 2. The Soviet leadership's decision to invade and occupy Czechoslovakia was apparently arrived at with some reluctance. It came only after various other forms of pressure on the Czechoslovak regime had failed and, presumably, after the leadership had decided that the risks of nonintervention simply outweighed all the probable costs of an invasion. The Soviet leaders, or a majority of them, came to believe that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was no longer reliable and was in effect abandoning control over the country to the “counter-revolutionaries;“ that Czechoslovakia was edging toward at least a de facto withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and a policy of neutrality; and that the West, and especially West Germany, was almost certain to gain greater influence in Prague. Moscow apparently calculated that the political and strategic consequences of these developments would shake its position in the other countries of Eastern Europe. And the Soviet leaders feared that this, together with the example of a liberalized socialism in Czechoslovakia, would ultimately have deeply unsettling effects on the Soviet population itself. 3. The intervention did arrest the political developments in Czechoslovakia which the Soviets viewed as dangerous, but the process of forcing the Czechs back into the approved mold is taking some time. Moscow would like to avoid further violence and to oblige the Czech leaders themselves to take the responsibility for undoing the reforms so intensely supported by the population. Probably Moscow would also like to discredit the present leaders and to displace them with others willing to collaborate in the old way. To this end the Soviets are trying to build up a pro-Soviet faction within the Party and to place men loyal to themselves in the security organs and communications media. Their hope is that ultimately the present leaders, under the demoralizing conditions of occupation, can be divided among themselves and discredited with the population. 4. It is difficult to see how the present indirect manifestations of resistance can be sustained indefinitely or how these alone could force the Soviets to abandon the aims for which they intervened. If necessary, the Soviets will probably take direct measures to install a reliable leadership and will use force to suppress any demonstrations by the population. If they are obliged to go to these lengths, however, the political costs of the intervention will be compounded and the problems of maintaining Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe will in the longer term be still further complicated. II. The Implications in Eastern Europe Near-Term Repercussions 5. Among the other states of Eastern Europe, Romania and Yugoslavia were most immediately affected by the shock waves flowing from the Soviet action. Fear of a similar Soviet move against themselves was for a time quite high in both Belgrade and Bucharest. The reactions in each capital, however, seem to have been different. Following a brief period of public outrage, the Romanians have, on the whole, been more restrained. Clearly, as initial fears recede, the Ceausescu regime is determined not to surrender its sovereignty, but it is equally anxious to tailor its actions so as not to provoke Moscow into moves against it. Tito, on the other hand, was appalled by the invasion and—more certain of his independence—was perfectly willing to say so to the Soviets and to the world at large. The Yugoslavs saw in the invasion an assault on their own principles and policies, both domestic and foreign, and foresee a long period of strain in their relations with the USSR. 6. Soviet pressures on Romania and hostility toward Yugoslavia seem likely for some time to come. Anti-Yugoslav propaganda, some of it directed against Tito personally, will probably remain fairly intense, in part because of Moscow's anxiety to remind the other East Europeans of its attitude toward all forms of “revisionism.” Pressures on Romania, perhaps including hints of military moves and additional demands regarding Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian soil, will probably continue at least so long as Bucharest insists on behaving in an independent, and at times, unfriendly fashion. The Soviets probably do not now contemplate any direct military action against Romania, however, partly because of their calculations of the political costs and partly because they do not consider Romania to be as important strategically as Czechoslovakia. A military move against Yugoslavia seems even less likely. Nevertheless, apprehension about Soviet intentions will persist in both countries for some time, especially in view of the Soviet assertion of a right of intervention in socialist countries. 7. Ceausescu's strong domestic position—which rests substantially on his image as a nationalist—will probably not suffer as a result of his efforts to cultivate the appearance of more harmonious relations with the USSR. These will probably be widely regarded as a simple exercise in prudence. For his part, Tito will probably push all the harder for his program of liberal reform at home and will try to strengthen his ties with both the West and the Third World. In Yugoslavia, the net effect of the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia will thus be to reverse Belgrade's movement toward closer relations with the USSR and to strengthen its determination to pursue an independent and nonaligned socialist course. 8. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Czech invasion may in the short term strengthen the positions of the existing regimes and leaders, but it has also created new problems for them. Gomulka has emerged from the crisis as still the principal Soviet ally in Eastern Europe; this will not help him with his people, nor intimidate for any length of time his enemies within the Party. Kadar's popular reputation may suffer somewhat because Hungarian troops were used in the invasion, and his Party position may suffer somewhat because he supported Dubcek. Generally, however, the Hungarians are likely to appreciate more than ever that, under Kadar, they have enjoyed relative prosperity and freedom. Ulbricht, in East Germany, has seen his harsh attitude toward the Czech experiment adopted by the Soviets (and he himself thus vindicated), but he has also had to face increased expressions of public dissatisfaction. Zhivkov in Bulgaria has behaved entirely as the Soviets wished him to, and their support of him, as a result, is probably assured for some time. The apprehensive Albanians have begun to show a friendlier face toward both Romania and their traditional enemy, Yugoslavia, while stepping up their attacks on Bulgaria. 9. In general, the lesson of Czechoslovakia, like the lesson of Hungary before it, is not likely to be lost on either the ruling parties or the people at large. The USSR has now moved forcefully to set limits on the permissible. No party will be allowed to share power with other organized groups, to institute programs of reform which significantly decentralize political power or economic control or remove restraints on public media. Further, all parties will be under stronger pressure to follow foreign policies (as, for example, toward West Germany) which adhere to guidelines laid down by Moscow. For the next few years, Moscow has probably assured a larger measure of compliance from its East European allies, though most of them will continue to seek ways to pursue their own interests as best they can. In any event, resentment of Soviet authority will no doubt continue to smolder, and the political and economic forces working for greater national independence, though subdued or underground, will continue to pose a threat to tranquility and to the Soviet position in the area. 10. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia probably served, in fact, to dramatize for all the East European peoples the power and the appeal of the Czech movement and the poverty of Soviet efforts to contain it. Thus while certainly made aware of the risks of going beyond the bounds now firmly set by Moscow, East Europeans have also been reminded once again of their unhappy relationship with a doctrinaire, reactionary, and oppressive neighbor. Many East Europeans were clearly chagrined by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and by the use of East European forces in that invasion. All in all, if the Soviet move has served to erect new barriers against the advance of national independence in Eastern Europe, it has also surely failed to halt the growth of a strong anti-Soviet nationalism behind those barriers. Longer Term Outlook for Soviet Authority in Eastern Europe 11. The Soviets have sought since roughly 1953 and the death of Stalin to transform their system of control and influence in Eastern Europe into a largely voluntary association of allied states owing political and ideological allegiance to Moscow. The use of terror was for the most part discontinued, heavy state-to-state economic and political pressures were played down, and cordial relations between “fraternal” Communist Parties were emphasized. In addition, multilateral organizations, principally the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) and the Warsaw Pact, were used in an effort to coordinate economic and military affairs and to provide the Soviets with mechanisms for exercising their Bloc-wide dominance. At least some Soviet leaders apparently believed that a true “socialist commonwealth” could be established on these new foundations and that it was only natural—and in accord with Marxism-Leninism—for the various states of the commonwealth to identify their national aspirations with those of the USSR. Other Soviet leaders were perhaps more cynical but seemed to be convinced that they could establish a harmonious and viable empire on the basis of strong inter-Party ties. 12. But the predominant trend in Eastern Europe has been toward greater independence from the Soviet Union. Since 1953, the people of two countries have sought to rebel against the Soviet-imposed system: East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. Poland, swept by nationalist fires, had its moment of defiance in 1956. Albania succeeded in breaking away a few years later. Romania has gradually been acquiring a large measure of freedom from Soviet dominance since the early 1960's. And Czechoslovakia, through a process now called “peaceful counterrevolution” by the Soviets, was well on its way in 1968. Over the past 15 years, then, only one of the USSR's allies in Eastern Europe has remained largely untouched by the currents of nationalism, and even that country, Bulgaria, was the scene of an attempted military coup in 1965 which had anti-Soviet undertones. 2 13. This long history of discord and dissension, and in particular, the recent crisis in Czechoslovakia, pose some fundamental questions for the Soviet leaders. Can they continue to approach Eastern Europe in the way laid down after 1953 and, at the same time, maintain their position there, let alone encourage the formation of an enterprising and viable empire? Can CEMA ever manage to coordinate, unite, and develop under Soviet leadership the economies of the entire region? Similarly, can the Warsaw Pact perform adequately in the various capacities it has been assigned—can the various national armies be relied upon, could they fulfill a wartime role against NATO, can the Pact structure be used to help control the member states, could Pact forces be used once more against another socialist state? Are there changes which could be made in either CEMA or the Pact which would significantly enhance their capabilities? 14. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is a going concern only on paper and in a number of particular areas—e.g., in transportation and electric power—where cooperation between the member states is obviously desirable, noncontroversial, and relatively easy of accomplishment. In other areas, and in terms of coordinating and dividing specific national tasks, the organization has consistently run into apparently insurmountable economic and political obstacles. Romania, for example, has since 1963 persistently refused to surrender any of its national economic prerogatives to an international body dominated by the USSR. The Soviets are unable, or are themselves unwilling for various national reasons, to push very hard for the concept of a truly united Bloc economy. It seems highly unlikely that this picture will change very much within the foreseeable future. As an instrument of Soviet hegemony, or even as a means of fostering Eastern European economic development, the future of CEMA does not appear to be at all promising. 15. Instead the Soviets will continue to rely on bilateral relations with the individual Eastern European countries as the main channel for strengthening trade ties with the USSR and for enforcing economic orthodoxy. Eastern European hopes of relaxing political controls over economic life have clearly been set back by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Economic reforms of the restricted type practiced by East Germany and Poland will remain in effect. The bolder programs of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, such as partial decontrol of prices and foreign trade, are likely to flounder in the absence of political liberalization and closer ties with the West. And Czechoslovakia has been forced to drop the radical plan of setting up workers' councils like those in Yugoslavia. Trade with the West should continue to rise, as fast as the economic facts of life permit, but without the growing Western influence that seemed to be in prospect before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 16. The Czechoslovak crisis has put in question the USSR's reliance on various East European Armed Forces to function in important roles during wartime. 3 Moscow must consider that the Czech Army can no longer function as a reliable instrument of Soviet policy, and must also be concerned about manifestations of nationalism in the armed forces of other allied states. As a simple matter of prudence, the Soviets probably feel obliged to place greater reliance on their own forces and less on those of the East Europeans. Moscow may now seriously consider not only the strengthening of its forces in Eastern Europe, but may also seek ways to achieve a more closely integrated Warsaw Pact command structure. Steps such as these would be useful not only against NATO but also as a means to develop a stronger instrument of control within Eastern Europe. 17. The Soviets have for some time sought to enlist the voluntary compliance of the Eastern European regimes but they have also been ready to apply pressure whenever it seemed necessary. Though this approach has been found severely wanting, they probably are not at this point prepared to make many changes in their general policies in Eastern Europe. The Soviet attitude will probably be more unyielding for a time toward deviations, and on key issues Moscow will almost certainly remain harsh and demanding. But it does not now seem that the Soviets are prepared to attempt a general rollback in Eastern Europe toward complete subservience and orthodoxy. Nor, however, does it seem at all likely that the present leadership will entertain any notions of a basic accommodation to the trend toward independence and the expression of national peculiarities. 18. Over the longer term, of course, when new leaders appear in Moscow, the Soviets might come to adapt themselves to the process that is underway in Eastern Europe. They could, for example, become less and less concerned about the orthodoxy of other Communist parties and less and less enchanted with the dreary prospects (and rising costs) of trying to maintain their imperial position. Such a stance would certainly have its advantages: it would help to improve relations between Moscow and the presently disgruntled leaders of Western European Communist parties; it would permit a return to détente policies vis-á-vis Western Europe as a whole, West Germany excepted; and it would help to advance the USSR's prestige within the international Communist movement and within the Third World. 19. The ideas and character of the next generation of Soviet leaders are not, however, predictable, and we certainly do not look forward to any change in fundamental Soviet attitudes toward Eastern Europe within the foreseeable future. Probably for a long time, hegemony exercised on the present pattern will be seen as vital to Soviet national interests. Certainly the present Soviet leaders have shown no disposition to allow it to crumble. Khrushchev wished to reform the empire, not dissolve it, and his successors are wary even of reform. Given the continuing growth of Eastern European nationalism, and given the continuing determination of the Soviets to combat it, tensions between ruler and ruled are likely to be endemic and further crises appear almost inevitable. III. The Implications for the USSR Domestic 20. Throughout the recent period of crisis in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership acted in public as a unified collective. But Brezhnev, as the most powerful figure on the Politburo and as the leader who was earlier most closely identified with both Novotny and Czechoslovakia, was generally thought to be the major architect of the USSR's policies and the man most responsible for its setbacks. It seems likely that the leadership as a whole was essentially united on the principal proposition: the course followed by the new leadership of Czechoslovakia threatened the vital interests of the USSR. It seems plausible, however, that there were different currents of opinion within the leadership over the degree of danger Czechoslovakia represented at any given moment and over what should be done by the USSR to contain that danger. 21. In addition, the Czech problem will probably in time have the effect of sharpening a number of chronically troublesome issues within the leadership. As a consequence of the invasion, for example, the Soviet military may demand a greater share of the nation's economic resources, to the distress perhaps of some of the leaders especially concerned with the growth of the civilian economy. Policy choices bearing on the international Communist movement and on relations with the West may become more contentious. Discontented and ambitious leaders can be expected to try to weaken the position of rivals who might appear newly vulnerable in the wake of the crisis. 22. The collective has endured for almost four years, and its ability so far to govern with few signs of inner turmoil has surpassed most expectations. The Czech problem probably presented it with its most difficult hours and may have placed some of the top leaders in a weaker position. Although Brezhnev may, for a variety of reasons, become the obvious and most convincing scapegoat for an unsatisfactory episode in the conduct of Soviet affairs abroad, there is no evidence at this time that any other leader has the strength to displace him. It also seems unlikely that a move against Brezhnev, or any of the other top leaders, would come too close on the heels of the events themselves. This is not a good time for open displays of disunity. 23. The Soviet leaders will wish to preserve the appearance of unity within the collective in part because of their probable concern over the effects of their actions in Czechoslovakia on popular attitudes at home. Though many Soviet citizens seem at least initially to have accepted the rationale for the invasion, or to have been apathetic about the whole affair, some of the intelligentsia entertained strong doubts about the official reasons given. (Abrupt changes and contradictions in the Party line—e.g., toward the character of Alexander Dubcek—would be enough in their own right to foster skepticism, or at least bewilderment.) Some Soviet intellectuals—who looked on democratic developments in Czechoslovakia as a happy augury for their own circumstances—have apparently been greatly agitated by the invasion and, in some instances, anxious privately to disown it. Finally, within Soviet minority groups, most notably in the Ukraine, there apparently had been growing interest in what was going on in Czechoslovakia, especially concerning the implications for the USSR of Prague's newly tolerant attitude toward its own national minorities. 24. While the problem of intellectual and minority group dissent in the USSR has existed for some time, the growth of democratic and nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe seems to have stimulated similar attitudes in the USSR. In fact, despite increasingly repressive official policies, signs of disaffection within the Soviet Union have recently become more frequent. Both intellectuals and members of minority groups appear to have become more sullen and less disposed to cooperate with the regime, and radical ideas seem to have maintained currency despite heavy-handed efforts to subdue them. Clearly the Soviet leaders have acted as if they consider this kind of disaffection to be a deeply rooted and long-term problem, though they will probably be able to hold it to manageable proportions for some time. Foreign Policies 25. The Soviets apparently do not now contemplate any radical shifts in foreign policies beyond those required by the Czechoslovak occupation itself. The move in Czechoslovakia did not signify the USSR's intention to undertake a general hardening of its policies toward the West. As Gromyko made explicit in his recent speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet leadership considers the Czecho-slovak problem as one internal to its own sphere, and therefore as a matter not subject to discussion with outside powers. The Soviet effort to solve this problem was conceived and executed in this context, and the Soviets have sought—except partially in the special case of West Germany—to avoid entangling their policies elsewhere in the world with their actions against Prague. That is to say, Moscow has made no deliberate moves to change course toward the Third World, Western Europe, or the US. 26. Specifically concerning the US, a number of proposed programs already appear to be casualties of the Soviet move and prospects for a number of others have been placed in doubt. Small accommodations, such as the institution of New York-Moscow air services, do not appear jeopardized, but proposals for arms control and disarmament, already inherently difficult of accomplishment, face formidable new obstacles. The economic and military interests which seemed to be moving the Soviet leaders closer to the idea of some arms control arrangement have not in and of themselves been lessened by recent developments in Eastern Europe, though the consensus within the collective on this subject may well be affected by the atmosphere of renewed tension generated by the Czech events. Much will now depend also, of course, on the impact of recent events on the attitudes and policies of the US. 27. Concerning Germany, the current heavy propaganda and diplomatic campaign against Bonn seems primarily to represent an effort to levy blame for the Czechoslovak crisis on the most convenient and useful outside scapegoat. This effort happens to coincide quite well with the traditional Soviet attitude toward Bonn, and also serves as a rationale for the permanent stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. It seems likely that the USSR's attitude toward West Germany will remain quite harsh, in part because Moscow fears West Germany's relations with Eastern Europe as a potential alternative to Soviet influence. The Soviets clearly want no further forward movement of Bonn's Ostpolitik. 28. One way of seeking to blunt these West German policies and of bringing direct pressure to bear on Bonn would be to renew the campaign against the West German presence and activities in West Berlin. The Soviets realize, however, that in the wake of the events in Czechoslovakia, sudden moves by them in Berlin could quickly generate a major crisis. They probably will not, therefore, attack the Allied presence in Berlin directly but, instead, may authorize the East Germans to undertake new harassments aimed at the West German position. On the whole, we think the chances are good that there will be a renewal of tensions around Berlin in coming months. 29. In Western Europe, the Soviets are seeking to repair the damage done their relations with the various governments and the local Communist Parties by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. There are no signs that Moscow is prepared to depart from its preinvasion efforts to cultivate good will, especially in France. Its task is much more difficult now, however, and the heavy-handed propaganda tactics used against Bonn have greatly reduced Western Europe's receptiveness to détente overtures. But the Soviets are anxious, apparently, to convince the West Europeans that their move against Prague was essentially defensive and is not to be seen as a threat against the integrity of any Western country. Kosygin's sudden visit to Finland was probably undertaken to calm Finnish apprehensions about Soviet policy. To a certain extent, of course, the state of relations between East and West is a matter of atmospherics. If the situation in Czechoslovakia appears to return to “normal,” concern in Western Europe will gradually abate, and the Soviets will probably then revert to the themes of European security and détente which have been featured in their policy for the last several years. 30. Moscow's relationship with many Communist Parties has been heavily damaged by the action against Czechoslovakia. The international Communist conference, which has long been sought by the Soviets and has now had to be postponed, will have little chance of restoring Communist unity. Both the French and Italian Parties counseled against the intervention but were disregarded by Moscow. Official Soviet doctrine now emphasizes that the USSR has a duty when necessary to interfere in the affairs of any fraternal Communist state, and with military force if circumstances require. The French and Italian Parties have rejected this proposition, in part from the conviction that it is ideologically untenable, in part from the knowledge that it is indefensible to their local electorates. Despite grumbling by their Stalinist minorities and pressure from Moscow, the major West European Parties have maintained their initial disapproval of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. They will not be pressured into reversing this decision, although they will continue to pay lip service to “proletarian internationalism” and friendship with the USSR. The Soviets have little prospect of restoring the position of commanding influence over the international Communist movement they once held. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the Members of the U.S. Intelligence Board. The representatives of the AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 2 On April 22, 1965, the Bulgarian press reported that a plot against the Bulgarian Government had been uncovered and that its leaders included the commander of the Sofia military garrison, a member of the diplomatic service, and a senior Communist Party member. The Bulgarians officially described the plot as “pro-Chinese.” Western analysts, however, noting that the three were former partisans, and had formerly been purged as Titoists, believed they were nationalist Communists. Nine plotters were tried in secret and sentenced to jail terms. 3 For further discussion see SNIE 11–17–68, “Capabilities of the Warsaw Pact against NATO,” dated 8 October 1968, Secret, and the forthcoming NIE 11–14–68, “Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces,” Top Secret, All Source. [Footnote in the source text. SNIE 11–17–68 and NIE 11–14–68 are in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry.] Bulgaria Bulgaria 27. Telegram From the Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State Sofia, January 9, 1964, 8 p.m. Source; Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–US. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Vienna and Munich. 28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Legation in Bulgaria Washington, February 19, 1964, 5:31 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–US. Confidential. Drafted by Warker; cleared in EUR, E, and the Commerce Department; and approved by Vedeler. 29. Memorandum of Conversation Sofia, August 6, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–US. Confidential. Drafted by Anderson. Transmitted as Enclosure 1 to airgram A–78, August 13. 30. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 17, 1965, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 BUL. Confidential. Drafted by White, and approved in S on February 25. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VI Parts.” 31. Memorandum of Conversation Sofia, October 8, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL–US. Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the source text, which was transmitted as Enclosure 1 to airgram A–155 from Sofia, October 14. The meeting was held in Zhivkov's office. Anderson left post on December 6, 1964, and President Johnson nominated Nathaniel Davis, Sr., as Minister to Bulgaria on May 6, 1965. He presented his credentials on June 4. 32. Airgram From the Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State Sofia, January 26, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2–3 BUL. Secret. Drafted by Davis and Tuch. Repeated to Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Berlin, Paris for USRO, Munich, and Vienna. 33. Memorandum of Conversation Sofia, November 2, 1966, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Tuch and McSweeney. Transmitted as Enclosure 1 to airgram A–168 from Sofia, November 8. The meeting was held in Zhivkov's office. Davis left post on May 20, 1966, and President Johnson nominated John M. McSweeney as Minister to Bulgaria on September 16. He presented his credentials on October 26. The Legation in Sofia was raised to Embassy status on November 28; McSweeney was promoted to Ambassador on April 5, 1967. 34. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, October 3, 1967, 2103Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Sofia. Rusk and Bashev were attending the U.N. General Assembly Session. 35. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 1, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Houston. 36. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State Sofia, September 20, 1968, 1525Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–USSR. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Warsaw, USNATO, and Vienna. 27. Telegram From the Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State 27. Telegram From the Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State 1 Sofia, January 9, 1964, 8 p.m. 436. Department pass USIA. Legtel 433. 2 I called on Foreign Minister Bashev 5:00 p.m. January 9. Also present Legation officer Robert Houston; Chernev, Chief, American Section Foreign Office and Garvalov, Foreign Office interpreter. I first presented at some length US views and reactions to Bulgarian December 27 attack, 3 pointing out inevitable harmful consequences which attack has already produced on Bulgarian-US relations, adding this attack had impaired my personal confidence in future Bulgarian intentions. I also emphasized that attack had been harmful to Bulgaria's expressed interest in increasing trade and tourism with U.S. in view of damage done to good will of American people and that doubts had been raised in minds of U.S. Government officials. I stressed the outrage felt by U.S. press and public opinion. I then stated my Government and I emphatically reject Bulgarian demand that Legation close its windows, adding U.S. considers this an attack on Legation's inviolability and direct contradiction to Vienna convention. 4 I repeated that this demand completely unacceptable and has only contributed to worsening our already seriously damaged relations. Finally I suggested that if Bulgarian Government wished to try to regain some of its lost good will and prestige Bulgarians should put forward some alternative constructive proposals which might help to improve relations. I said I would be glad to meet Bashev in few days to discuss such constructive proposals but repeated I could not accept demand to close windows. Bashev responded by repeating his earlier claims that December 27 attack was “spontaneous” demonstration which Bulgarian Government could not control. While Bashev did not specifically refer to Georgiev, he mentioned attack as a popular reaction to trial. 5 He then brought up NBC–TV film re my activities in Bulgaria which he said Bulgarian Government considers offensive. He blames U.S. Government for permitting film he considered derogatory to Bulgaria to be shown in U.S. After quoting from this TV script he turned to subject of Legation windows. He implied that unless we yielded to demand Bulgarian people would be told about NBC–TV derogatory film which might revoke another “spontaneous” demonstration. I categorically rejected any responsibility for NBC–TV film emphasizing that U.S. Government has no control over TV industry, which is entirely private. Bashev repeated demands regarding windows mentioning they still stuck to their deadline for closing. I responded I could not accept this demand but I would be willing to meet him again in few days to discuss alternative proposals of constructive nature. Comment : Conversation lasted one hour and was conducted in serious, calm and unyielding vein on my part. At one point during conversation when Bashev said he would inform his government of my remarks, I had impression he was about to back down on his demand. However, later he again repeated his demand in much the same terms as previously. I believe extreme sensitivity shown by Bashev and Bulgarian Government regarding unfavorable publicity in U.S. may be restraining factor in further demonstrations against windows. Bashev did not cite any instances of improper use of windows. Only justification given for closure request concerned extra situations such as NBC–TV film and so-called Bulgarian popular reaction against U.S. Noteworthy that although I mentioned several times the hope that Bulgaria and U.S. could resume improvement of our relations Bashev responded to this by saying “we wish to develop normal relations with U.S.” This is distinctly retrogressive in contrast to position taken by Chernev December 31. Legation intends to maintain normal window display and await developments. I believe we have given Bashev sufficient opportunities to take up some new line and that meanwhile we should remain unyielding. Pouching details soonest. Anderson 1 Source; Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–US. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Vienna and Munich. 2 Telegram 433, January 8, reported that cancellation of Anderson's flight from Vienna had forced a cancellation of her meeting with Bashev. (Ibid., ORG 7 SOFIA) 3 On the second day of the trial of accused spy Ivan-Asen Georgiev, a “spontaneous” demonstration of approximately 3,000 people gathered before the U.S. Legation, hurling ice chunks, rocks, and other solid objects at the building's windows. The mob also damaged four automobiles belonging to Legation employees. 4 For text of the convention on consular relations, done at Vienna on April 24, 1963, see 21 UST 77. 5 During the trial of Georgiev, the prosecution introduced evidence designed to implicate a Legation Second Secretary in the espionage. 28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Legation in Bulgaria 28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Legation in Bulgaria 1 Washington, February 19, 1964, 5:31 p.m. 392. Ref: Legtel 497. 2 1. Department agrees your view that US should continue give GOB evidence that it takes overall view of dealings with Bulgaria and that US decisions on commercial transactions will be affected by general status US-Bulgarian relations. 2. It also important bear in mind that sales US surplus agricultural commodities for cash or on normal commercial credit to Sovbloc countries carry significant advantages for US including reduction CCC storage costs and improvement US balance payments. 3. Department believes best way to follow above two principles is along lines procedure followed for cotton license (Deptel 377, Legtel 490), 3 where GOB given evidence Department and Legation act on important transactions in light overall relations and not automatically. 4. In light all factors (reftel, Deptel 384, point 2 above) 4 Department believes on balance Commerce Department should be enabled inform US merchant he may proceed wheat sale. However pursuant point 1, above, Department agrees you may mention this transaction to appropriate Bulgarian official (not necessarily Foreign Minister) in manner similar to that in which you discussed cotton transaction with Foreign Minister. Request this be done earliest opportunity and that you cable response and your recommendation. Anticipate that if contract giving US space it desires Plovdiv signed as expected (Legtel 498) 5 wheat sale should be permitted proceed. 5. Most significant transaction Department currently delaying because of political situation is application submitted CCC by US exporter for sale to Bulgaria of $8 million worth tobacco on three year credit terms. Transaction would involve private bank giving irrevocable letter credit to CCC with bank assuming all risk. Possibility EXIM guarantee not raised. USDA desires approve this transaction soon to help dispose large surplus tobacco stocks and willing agree three year terms. Department prefers utilize this rather than wheat transaction to test Bulgarian sentiment over period next week or ten days. If situation unchanged or more favorable at end this period, would be desirable approve this transaction. 6. Department will continue review issuance export licenses for Bulgaria (Deptel 340). 6 Legation will be consulted on important transactions as political situation warrants. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–US. Confidential. Drafted by Warker; cleared in EUR, E, and the Commerce Department; and approved by Vedeler. 2 Telegram 497, February 14, recommended that, in light of Bulgarian unwillingness to take concrete action to improve relations, the Department of State continue to consult the Embassy before issuing export licenses and that the Commerce Department continue to hold wheat negotiations in suspension. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 377 to Sofia, February 5, the Department of State provided instructions to the Legation for discussions with the Foreign Minister on licensing issues. (Ibid., INCO–COTTON–US) Telegram 490 from Sofia, February 10, reported that Anderson had informed Bashev that the Legation had recommended favorable action on export licenses for cotton. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 384 to Sofia, February 12, reported that the Commerce Department would issue licenses to Bulgaria and the Department of State would drop its advisory role in the process unless the Legation saw reasons for its continuance. (Ibid.) 5 Telegram 498 from Sofia, February 14, outlined Bulgarian desires for specific U.S. exhibits at the Sofia trade fair. (Ibid., TP 8–1 BUL (PL)) 6 Telegram 340 to Sofia, January 19, outlined procedures for obtaining Commerce Department licensing. (Ibid., INCO–WHEAT–US 7) 29. Memorandum of Conversation 29. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Sofia, August 6, 1964. PARTICIPANTS Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev Minister Eugenie Anderson Foreign Office American Desk Chief Purvan Chernev Legation Officer Alexander Bloomfield Interpreter US Views on US-Bulgarian Relations I began the talk by mentioning certain developments and problems in US-Bulgarian relations, covering the following main points: (1) Agricultural Production Minister Vachkov's impending visit to the US, with four agriculturists, is a gratifying development. 2 (2) Bulgarian purchases of large quantities of US agricultural commodities (especially fodder) is a healthy sign in the trade field, indicating that the US is able to offer these commodities on terms most favorable to Bulgaria. The Legation is informed that some further licenses are now pending. (3) The US is preparing an extensive exhibit at the Plovdiv Fair, cooperating with the Bulgarian authorities at each appropriate step of its development, and anticipates successful participation. (4) As a step toward developing “two-way” cultural relations, the Legation has recently passed on to the Bulgarian authorities some practical suggestions for Bulgarian cultural exhibits in the US which we would be glad to help seek to arrange. (5) Some problems persist in our relations, the principal one being the continuing militia interference with visitors to the Legation. To illustrate, within the past week a US professor was questioned by the militiaman at the door as he sought to enter. Both sides have agreed that such action is contrary to all principles of international practice, yet it goes on. (6) We would appreciate it if the Foreign Ministry would expedite action on the claims the Legation submitted last month for payment for damages to our vehicles during the December 27 attack on the Legation. Payment can be made in leva, if necessary. Bulgarian View of US-Bulgarian Relations Then Bashev began with his reply, the main gist being that he saw nothing to be pleased about as far as US-Bulgarian relations are concerned. He didn't think they were very good. There had been absolutely no improvements that he could see. He did thank me for my statement, but he said that unfortunately he found no reasons to say there was any normal basis for developing our relations. The United States, he went on, does not show enough understanding to enable such development to take place. Bashev claimed that he has said more than once that the development of relations between our two countries must be on a mutual basis. At present such a basis does not exist. The US has not changed its attitude in the economic field. “We see nothing positive that has been done on the part of the United States,” he said. “You continue to discriminate against our commodities. This hampers our exports. The fact that some export licenses have been issued cannot be considered as a change in attitude on the part of the United States. Trade should be two-way trade. This does not exist now due to discriminatory measures on your part. Bulgaria sees no goodwill on the part of the United States.” Bashev continued as follows: The Bulgarian Government has not changed its desire to develop good relations with the United States. This has been stated in the past by the Bulgarian Prime Minister and by other responsible officials. And again I am repeating it. I was authorized to say that the Bulgarian Government has the desire to normalize and improve relations with the United States, but we do not see such readiness on your part. I can give two examples to substantiate my statement. Some time ago we signed the claims agreement. 3 The USA expressed at that time its readiness to develop trade, but nothing has been done. During my conversation with Secretary Rusk, 4 the latter stated that, although there were no legal possibilities to change the discriminatory measures in the trade field, the Department of State might take some other “special measures” to alleviate the situation. No steps were taken. We buy some US commodities. We may continue to do so for some time. But if the US does not buy our commodities, we will look for other markets which are opening up for us. The US found it impossible to sell electrical locomotives to us. We were able to buy them somewhere else. If the US decides “magnanimously” (here Bashev became sarcastic) to sell some goods to us, this is no help in bettering our relations. We would like conditions on equal footing. Whether this can be done by some legislative action, or otherwise, I do not know. This is your business. If the US has no interest in improving our relations, we will understand that, too; but the United States should also understand us. We cannot confine our relations to cultural relations, only. This is of small interest to us. For us, the important thing is to develop normal economic relations, not because we are compelled to buy from the United States but because this would amount to the establishment of normal relations. In absence of appropriate changes on the part of the US toward Bulgaria, we will be compelled to believe that some elements in the US unfriendly to our country are influencing our relations. You know very well what I mean. There were statements made in the US Congress addressed to so-called nationalist groups. At the present time we do not see enough good will on the part of the US ruling circles. Of course, visits by American public opinion leaders to Bulgaria and the visit of Minister Vachkov and his group to the US are positive factors but they are not sufficient to change our relations. We should not minimize the importance of such visits, nor should we overestimate it. US Considers General Improvement in Relations a Prerequisite to Concessions in Trade I said I was disappointed and surprised to hear Bashev speak like this. I reminded him, as I have done many times before, that trade is a two-way street. I said we have done everything we could to try to improve relations. I said it was very surprising to me if he thought that economic relations could exist in a vacuum. For us, trade is only a part of good relations—diplomatic, cultural and political relations are also part of the picture. Unfortunately, I said, there has been very little progress during the past year. I reminded him that the December attack on our Legation has made it virtually impossible for me to work toward bettering relations. I said that if he did not understand the effect that the December attack on the Legation and subsequent bad publicity had had on American public opinion, then he did not understand the American people and our Government. I said that he must understand we cannot possibly give Bulgaria MFN treatment at present; that Congressional action is required. Even if Congress should in the future extend MFN treatment to Rumania, I said, there is no guarantee that Bulgaria will receive it. There must be a general improvement in our relations. I went on to say that I believe that the terms on which export licenses are being issued to Bulgaria are good ones. If they were not, Bulgaria would not accept them. Concluding, I reiterated that I see the relations between our countries in a broad spectrum—diplomatic, political, cultural and trade relations. Maybe Bashev is interested only in trade, but we are interested in all aspects. I would like to see an improvement of our general relations before I could recommend special trade concessions. Bulgarian View: Trade is the Basis of our Relations, and Must Be on Equal Footing Bashev repeated his same old statement, saying we were not living up to our word. I asked him to be specific: what specifically did he want. He merely repeated the same two examples of our alleged failure to live up to promises to help develop trade, made when we signed the claims agreement and during the Rusk-Bashev talks. Then he went into the question of US purchases of Bulgarian tobacco. He complained that the US buys Oriental tobacco from some countries at 12 percent tariff but that Bulgarian tobacco continues to have the 36 percent tariff. Bashev said that other countries do not talk about public opinion as a factor governing bilateral relations. He said, “We trade with England, Japan, West Germany, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries—none of them raise such problems. Why should the United States?” He said he would like to remind me that Bulgaria, too, has public opinion, and that this is very important to the Bulgarian Government. Bashev repeated once again that there are few encouraging factors in our relations. He said Bulgaria considers that it is the fault of the United States. Bulgaria has declared that it is ready to develop relations. This is not our first conversation on this subject, Bashev recalled. He asked that I understand two points well: (1) trade is not the content of our relations but only the basis; (2) Bulgaria does not ask for any concessions. Bulgaria wants to trade as equal partners. How this can be achieved, whether through legislative action or otherwise, is up to the US Government and not to Bulgaria. The Bulgarian people feel no guilt, and ask for no concessions from the US. Bulgaria is an independent state and can trade with anyone. It is up to the US to decide whether it wants to trade with Bulgaria. Bulgaria wants to be friendly. Bashev said “I am not angry. I am just stating the facts. On the basis of equal footing and improvement in trade, Bulgaria is willing to improve relations with the US. Until then, there can be no change in US-Bulgarian relations. Bulgaria is ready to see deeds on the US part to substantiate its declarations.” Bulgarian View of US Participation in Plovdiv Fair Reacting to my statement about the Plovdiv Fair, Bashev said he would like to see US participation in the Plovdiv Fair help develop trade relations. He asked that our participation be “without any other intentions”. Bulgaria Will Expedite Payment of Claims for Legation Cars The sole positive note in Bashev's tirade on US-Bulgarian relations was his response to my request to expedite payment on the Legation's claim for damages to its vehicles in the December 27 attack. He said that as I knew, the question “will be settled“, and that the appropriate Bulgarian authorities would be asked to expedite the matter. Bulgarian View of Vietnam Developments After Bashev had reiterated his accusations about the US failure to develop trade, I said I didn't think it was productive to continue this subject and that perhaps we could discuss it another time, with better results. I changed the subject to ask Bashev for his Government's views about the crisis in Vietnam. Bashev answered that his government had not met on this matter; they had as yet taken no position. He could only tell me of the Foreign Ministry's views. He said they were deeply concerned; also that the Bulgarian people are very much concerned about American actions in Southeast Asia. He repeated sadly that they were deeply concerned. I said we were acting to put down aggression. I pointed out that American ships had been attacked on the high seas and that the US had every right to repulse the attack and defend itself. Here Bashev shook his head, sadly. He said this was dangerous to world peace and that the responsibility was entirely in the hands of the US Government. “The recent action by the US Government refutes the previous declaration made by President Johnson,” he said, adding that he hoped that common sense would prevail. Bashev said that deeds are more important than declarations. The action against the North Vietnamese villages (sic) was in contradiction to, and refuted, US declarations about democracy, humanity and justice, he claimed. I said we were only living up to our agreements by helping Vietnam to maintain its independence. Further, I said, we would always defend ourselves when attacked, but we hoped not to widen the conflict. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–US. Confidential. Drafted by Anderson. Transmitted as Enclosure 1 to airgram A–78, August 13. 2 A memorandum of Vachkov's talks in the Department of State on August 13 is ibid., AGR 7 BUL. 3 For text of this agreement, signed in Sofia on July 2, 1963, see 14 UST 969. 4 They met at New York on September 30, 1963; see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVI, Document 22 . 30. Memorandum of Conversation 30. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 17, 1965, 11 a.m. SUBJECT US Concern over Attacks on US Legation in Sofia and Continued Militia Harassment 2 PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Merrill A. White, EE Bulgarian Lyubomir Popov, Minister, Bulgarian Legation The Minister mentioned several recent developments which he believed clearly showed Bulgarian intentions to improve relations. His Government recently agreed to a limited cultural exchange in the field of English teaching and in principle to the negotiation of a consular convention. These developments were helpful, he believed. The Secretary had certain comments to make. We were, of course, also interested in improving US-Bulgarian relations. We were prepared to make efforts in that direction in connection with both small and large questions involved. However, he wanted to emphasize strongly that the starting point must be the observance of the minimum rights of legations worked out by diplomacy over several hundred years. If these rights are not fully respected, it is difficult to make an effort for the improvement of relations. We are seriously concerned that our Legation has been attacked for the third time in two years. We feel such matters very deeply. These attacks also create political problems in the U.S. Such actions tend to proscribe our freedom of action to improve relations. Even if we have different views on serious and dangerous questions, we cannot permit these differences of opinion to erode generally accepted diplomatic practices. Otherwise the whole fabric of diplomatic life falls to pieces. We hope the Bulgarian Government will do everything in its power to protect the rights of our Legation in Sofia. The Secretary said he had not used violent language or excessive adjectives in his discussion, but this does not make the problem any less serious. Having said that, he continued that we are interested in improving relations—not for any undisclosed or for any cold war reason—but we do believe that peoples with different social systems should find ways to reduce and eliminate difficulties whenever possible. We want to put relations between peoples on an accepted normal basis if the situation permits. The Minister had a few comments relative to the demonstration on February 15. In this latest incident the Foreign Minister took the initiative to call in the US Charge to express regrets. Steps were taken to protect our Legation. The Secretary should be aware of these facts. The Secretary commented there was another problem which he must mention. The activities of the militia near our Legation in Sofia are a source of concern to us. He wished to urge that the rights of the Legation be of particular concern to both sides. Problems of this kind should not be allowed to arise. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 BUL. Confidential. Drafted by White, and approved in S on February 25. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VI Parts.” 2 On February 15, a mob protesting U.S. involvement in Vietnam attacked the U.S. Legation and Residence in Sofia. 31. Memorandum of Conversation 31. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Sofia, October 8, 1965, 10 a.m. PARTICIPANTS Todor Zhivkov, Chairman, Council of Ministers Gero Grozev, First Deputy Minister, Foreign Affairs Nathaniel Davis, American Minister Hans N. Tuch, Deputy Chief of Mission FNU Izmirliev, Interpreter The Prime Minister welcomed Mr. Davis and stated that unfortunately in the relationship between the United States and Bulgaria, ninety-nine per cent depended upon the Department of State and only one per cent depended upon Bulgaria; but that that one per cent consisted of good will and good faith. The Minister said that the Prime Minister is too modest in his assessment, to which the latter replied he is a realist, that 35 years of party and Komsomol work had taught him to become a realist. He added that he was not speaking the language of diplomacy, that he talks straightforward and plain language. He stated that Mrs. Anderson started out speaking to him in diplomatic language but that he wanted to talk with her in human terms which they then did. Zhivkov added that he had been very pleased with his talks with Mrs. Anderson, that he liked her personally and that he would like to send his regards to her. Zhivkov asked how the Minister liked his experience in Bulgaria—a Communist State. The Minister said that this was already the third country in Eastern Europe in which he had served and that therefore the area was not new to him. In reply to Zhivkov's question, the Minister stated that he had served in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, to which Zhivkov retorted that these are the “classical countries of socialism” that they are “developed countries” whereas “we are poor”. The Minister answered that he felt that Bulgaria was developing industrially very quickly, that he had seen some of the new industrial plants and was impressed and that the statistics show how quickly Bulgaria is developing its industry. The Minister then stated that he was here in order to improve relations with Bulgaria; and that he did not consider for a moment that this improvement of relationship must be at the expense of Bulgarian relationships with the Soviet Union. He assured the Prime Minister that we understood this perfectly well. We know that the Soviet Union has given Bulgaria great assistance, that there are close historical and ideological ties between Bulgaria and the USSR. He stated that our relations with Bulgaria cannot possibly be as close as those of Bulgaria with the Soviet Union. It is not our objective to interfere with these close relationships. We are located far away, whereas the Soviet Union is a close neighbor of Bulgaria. We realize that Bulgarian-Soviet relationships will be primary. But on the positive side, the Minister continued, there is no historical or other fundamental reason which should prevent us from having good relations with Bulgaria. Our historic contacts have been constructive. Just as Bulgaria has improved its relationships with other countries, we have the same objectives. These are modest objectives but they are real. The Minister then stated that he particularly was anxious to improve communications—contacts between the Bulgarian Government and the Legation. We want to know what they consider to be problems and we want to discuss how we can solve them. The Minister felt that there had not been enough real effort to solve mutual problems. We should break out of isolation from each other. The Minister assured the Prime Minister that although he obviously does not control all U.S. policies it is his desire and the desire of our Government to find ways to lessen problems. Some problems have already been solved and he hopes to be able to solve more. He asked Zhivkov whether there are any problems concerning our relationships which he should try to work on. Zhivkov replied that he welcomed the Minister's words especially in regard to maintaining contacts and solving problems. What the Minister said about improvement of relations not being at the expense of the United States-Soviet relationship is of course true. The U.S. should have no illusions on this. He, Zhivkov, would not be in his present position if it were otherwise. In speaking about our mutual relationships, Zhivkov continued, he must revert to Mrs. Anderson's time and even before—to World War II. Our major problems are that the United States discriminates politically and economically against Bulgaria. The Department of State must take the first step to eliminate this discrimination, and no improvement in our relationships can take place until the U.S. has stopped discrimination, especially in trade. If the U.S. cannot stop discrimination completely it should at least take steps which lead toward the end of discrimination. There are, of course, also international problems, primarily Vietnam, which hamper our relationships. We can improve our cultural relationships and contacts but the real essence of our relationship depends on the end of U.S. discrimination. Zhivkov said that he felt that he did not need to develop this subject in theoretical terms, that he could speak practically. He stated that their relations have improved with those states which do not discriminate against them politically and economically even though they have other social systems. He cited examples—England, France, Italy and Belgium. He went on to state that even with West Germany their relationship is “normal”. He stated he is satisfied with Bulgaria's relations with West Germany and they can “live together”. But with the United States they are not satisfactory. He felt that they will not improve for a long time. He said, speaking frankly, Bulgaria cannot expect to stop the U.S. from conducting political discrimination against it but the U.S. can improve economic relationships by lifting tariff restrictions, at least in part. Once this problem is solved we can discuss other matters such as cultural relationships. He stated that he talked about cultural relations with Mrs. Anderson often; they had sent the Kutev Ensemble to the United States, but American newspapers then wrote that every third member of the Kutev Ensemble was a spy. Anyhow, he stated, Bulgaria is prepared to exchange cultural attractions. Again however, the key to elementary good relations is the question of discrimination. He said that with the British Bulgaria has perfectly normal relations even though Great Britain is a capitalist country and Bulgaria is a socialist country. But there is no discrimination. There are certain difficulties and even Bulgaria imposes certain restrictions on trade but there is no discrimination. Zhivkov then changed the subject and asked whether the Minister had ever had a Prime Minister talk to him in these frank terms, to which the Minister replied that this was his first post as Chief of Mission. Zhivkov then made a reference to the fact that their counter-espionage expenses are getting higher and higher here. The Minister interjected that he felt that perhaps their expenses for counter-espionage could be reduced and referred to one of our principal concerns, namely the question of free access to the Legation. He stated that we too feel that we are being discriminated against in this respect; that he wants to be able to carry out the regular, accepted business of the Legation, and we are not able to carry out normal business as long as access to the Legation is restricted. He added that we need good will on both sides in improving relationships; that it was his desire to bring good will from the United States; that his objective is to solve these problems. The Minister continued that he also desires better economic relationships between Bulgaria and the United States, but that he cannot agree that only one per cent is the responsibility of Bulgaria. The Minister continued that he had a fruitful discussion with Foreign Minister Bashev. 2 He was gratified that Bashev had told him that they are trying to resolve outstanding questions. On our side, the Minister stated, he will do his utmost to resolve the question regarding tariffs and other problems which have already been raised or will be raised in the future. The Minister stated that the Secretary had told both Minister Popov during the latter's farewell call 3 and Minister Gerasimov's introductory call 4 that we desire improvement in economic relationships and that the Administration intends to ask the Congress to pass legislation to increase the flow of peaceful trade, which would include dealing with the question of tariffs. The Minister underlined that the Bulgarian Government must understand we cannot change our tariff policy without changing the law. In the meantime, however, the Legation would do its utmost to facilitate trade. The Minister continued that there are minor questions which serve as irritants to U.S.-Bulgarian relationships and that some of these have already been solved as for instance the question of U.S. importation of raw silk and silk waste. (At this point Mr. Grozev explained to the Prime Minister what the silk issue was and confirmed that it had been solved. Zhivkov obviously did not know the facts in this issue.) The Minister said he did not wish to exaggerate that we can solve all problems one after the other, but that we will do our best. Zhivkov stated what Foreign Minister Bashev had told the Minister represented Bulgarian Government policy. He wanted to add that if he felt that the U.S. can change its policy towards Bulgaria even partially, he would take such a change at face value. He added that Bulgaria too wants to improve relationships but he felt that Bulgaria would be the last country in Eastern Europe with which the United States wanted to improve relations. The Minister asked why. The Prime Minister replied that he spoke from profound experience. Bulgaria was not important to U.S. policies or to U.S. economic interests. He stated that he knew that Bulgaria was considered by the United States to be “the closest satellite” of the Soviet Union. The Minister replied that our desire to improve relations with Bulgaria was quite apart from the question whether Bulgaria was what the Prime Minister referred to as the Soviet Union's closest satellite. We feel that an improvement of relationships is possible completely apart from Soviet-Bulgarian relations. Zhivkov replied that he also thought so, but as he had told Mrs. Anderson, he felt that the Department of State completely underestimates Bulgaria's position in the heart of the Balkan peninsula. He thought that relationships with Turkey and Greece had improved and that these two countries were realistic in assessing correctly Bulgaria's importance in the Balkans. He mentioned particularly that Greek and Turkish tourism to Western Europe would not be possible without Bulgaria since all major roads lead through Bulgaria. He stated again that Turkey and Greece base their relationships with Bulgaria on realism—on the fact that Bulgaria is in the center of the Balkans—but that the Department does not understand this. It wants to move “through the back door”. He stated that relationships must be improved through “the main entrance” and not through the back door. The Minister replied that he did not know what Zhivkov was talking about, that he himself was speaking only about “the front door” through which he entered when he came to visit the Prime Minister. Zhivkov replied that he was not talking about the Minister but was speaking about U.S. tactics and strategy of policy. The Minister again reiterated we wish to improve relations in an open and straightforward way. Zhivkov replied that this is his first meeting with the Minister and that what will follow from now on is important. He stated that, in regard to access to the Legation, Mrs. Anderson had complained to him about the same subject and that he had asked for a report. He claimed that access to the Legation is free. The competent authorities denied to him that they interfered with access and that militiamen stationed in front of the entrance are only there to “guide citizens” who wanted to enter and to be helpful. Zhivkov stated that perhaps they had been overdoing this, to which the Minister replied that he hoped the Prime Minister would interest himself in this question and help to ensure that they would not overdo their duty. In closing the meeting, the Minister expressed to the Prime Minister his appreciation for the assistance which the Foreign Ministry had given him, in particular, Mr. Grozev, with special reference to the Minister's radio-TV appearance on July 4. The conversation lasted approximately 55 minutes and was conducted throughout in a relaxed manner on the Prime Minister's part verging from time to time almost on the jovial. Note : In commenting on the cognac which was being offered for frequent toasts during the conversation, Zhivkov related that Tito had tried to get him to drink whiskey which the latter apparently preferred, but he didn't like whiskey because “it smelled of bedbugs”. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL–US. Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the source text, which was transmitted as Enclosure 1 to airgram A–155 from Sofia, October 14. The meeting was held in Zhivkov's office. Anderson left post on December 6, 1964, and President Johnson nominated Nathaniel Davis, Sr., as Minister to Bulgaria on May 6, 1965. He presented his credentials on June 4. 2 Reported in airgram A–33 from Sofia, July 23. (Ibid.) 3 A memorandum of their August 30 conversation is ibid., POL 17 BUL–US. 4 A memorandum of their August 12 conversation is ibid., POL 17–5 BUL–US. 32. Airgram From the Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State 32. Airgram From the Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State 1 Sofia, January 26, 1966. A–285 SUBJECT U.S. Policy Assessment REF CA–5400, Nov 17, 1965 2 Relations between Bulgaria and the United States have improved. They are reminiscent, however, of the first smiles one gets from a few-months-old baby. One is not entirely sure whether the smile is real or simply a gas pain. Draft NSAM 304 3 lays down three criteria for our “differentiated policy” toward the countries of Eastern Europe: (1) internal liberalization; (2) national independence; and (3) progress in re-association with the West. It might be useful to comment on Bulgaria's progress under each of these headings. 1. Internal Liberalization . A year ago we reported “no concrete evidence of political liberalization.” 4 It is probably fair to say that there has been some in 1965. The regime's new economic theses give greater autonomy to individual enterprises. Although the reform leaves numerous strings available to an economically jittery regime, it places Bulgaria among the moderately progressive regimes of Eastern Europe—according to an RFE analysis alongside Czechoslovakia and somewhat ahead of the USSR, Poland and East Germany. Since last spring the regime has allowed private craftsmen to engage in business more freely. If the regime holds prices steady, the wage hikes announced at the end of the year may help the population. The presence in Bulgaria during 1965 of a million foreign tourists—equivalent to one-eighth the population of the country—has had an impact. Reportedly foreign tourists were put up in 1,500 private homes in Sofia; Western newspapers were available in Black Sea resorts; a rent-a-car service was established; etc. The regime exhorts its citizens to caution, but the Bulgarians' desire for the economic benefits of tourism inexorably force some acceptance of increased contact with the West. So, too, does the contact which accompanies Western trade. There have been a few other signs: a satirical political review last summer, a few more political jokes on the radio, two or three mildly “daring” plays during the past couple of seasons, comments by foreign visitors over the past year or two about “less fear,” progressively more private cars over the past several years, a report from RFE that “mail from Bulgaria has now begun to reach RFE,” absence in the press over the past six months of reported prison sentences for telling political jokes and death penalties for black-marketeering, no recent reports of deportations, a contemporary art show put on this year while permission was refused last year, a report that Bulgaria, together with Czechoslovakia, has started to authorize the sale of state-owned houses to private buyers, etc. The atmosphere is of a slight easing. The abortive plot last April 5 does not seem to have reversed this cautious, unconfident inching liberalization. The plot seems to have been more episode than earthquake. Apparently the plotters wished to move closer to the Yugoslav example. Apparently they inspired considerable popular sympathy. Apparently they were poorly organized. The regime tried to play down the affair, giving light sentences. In its wake, the security organs were reorganized and party control within the army was tightened. The security forces in Bulgaria are probably now even more closely coordinated with the Soviets than before and enjoy the technical sophistication which this support implies. Prime Minister Zhivkov has told me openly that the Bulgarians are increasing resources devoted to “counterintelligence” against us. 2. National Independence from the USSR . A year ago we reported that the Bulgarian leadership had given “no indication that the example of independent nationalism set by nearby Rumania had any appeal whatsoever.” The generality of Bulgaria's satellite status still holds, but one has to be a trifle less categorical. The Bulgarian effort to improve relations with Yugoslavia and Rumania has produced some verbal movement. In successive joint communiqués with Tito and Ceausescu, Zhivkov subscribed to the idea of “independent parties” and “non-interference” in the internal affairs of the various Communist states. This is not the first time Zhivkov has played the chameleon. Nevertheless, these publicized statements affect the atmosphere within the Communist Party here, and more nationalistic elements have a peg on which to hang their arguments. Apart from Bulgaria's over-touted historical and cultural affinity to the Soviet Union, her economic situation ties her to the USSR in Zhivkov's phrase, “in life and death.” With two billion dollars in Soviet credits since World War II, Bulgaria is industrializing—having climbed from an industrial production representing 15% of the total in 1939 to over 50% at the present time. Bulgaria will soon be importing over 40% of her expanding energy needs—mostly from the USSR. Bulgaria's foreign trade is 50% with the Soviet Union and, even in the other direction, Bulgaria ranks as the USSR's fourth largest trading partner. Zhivkov is neither a Tito—with flare and following—nor a Sekou Toure—who, for Guinea's independence, gloriously defied economics and common sense. More like the East German regime, the Bulgarian Communists need USSR support to stay afloat. There are a few signs that Bulgaria may be playing a bit cozy with the Soviets of late, 6 but the prospect is for Bulgaria to remain Moscow's reliable satellite. 3. Progress in Re-association with the West . During the past year Bulgaria has developed its ties with both the neutralist world and Western Europe. Zhivkov's trip to the UAR and Ethiopia 7 was but one example of this trend. Bulgaria is trying to branch out, and even has a few dizzy economic dreams. Among these were a 37 million dollar loan to the UAR; a joint banking enterprise in Beirut; multifarious and dubious economic activities in Ethiopia, negotiations for mammoth Japanese-built tanker ways in Burgas, talk of a joint British-Bulgarian hotel complex on the Black Sea, feelers for U.N. technical assistance (including some American specialists), etc. Zhivkov continued the policy of improved relations with Greece and Turkey. The Bulgarian Government has made an effort, albeit with lapses, to develop more cordial political, cultural and economic relations with France, Italy, the Benelux countries and Great Britain, probably in that order. Trade and tourism from West Germany produce an impressive balance of about 40 million dollars in each direction. However, Bulgaria faces an uphill struggle in trade with the West, as it must sell more and more non-agricultural products as its economy changes and expands. If Bulgaria's trade with the West fails to grow apace, Bulgaria will automatically slip further into the Soviet and CEMA trade embrace. 4. Relations with the United States . A year ago it looked as if there was no way to go but up. Our year-end assessment spoke of “a hardened Bulgarian attitude“, inactivity, stagnation, dwindling contacts, increased police operations against the Legation, the manhandling of US personnel on three occasions, minimized US-Bulgarian contact, pressure to extend closed zones, and the second assault in a year on the Chancery. If anything, the first months of this year saw movement further down. The Bulgarians reacted to the extension of the Vietnamese War with still another assault on the Legation offices and, for the first time, on the Residence. The early months of 1965 also saw imposition of still further travel controls, violently offensive anti-American propaganda in the windows next to the Legation (including exultation over American soldiers' coffins) and the rejection of cultural exchanges. After a probable low point early this spring, relations appear to have slowly improved. It might be added that the Bulgarians have been excruciatingly cautious in any moves that might be described as constructive. Why? First, there is the Soviet tie and America's role as the Socialist Camp's great enemy. There is the ten year hiatus in American-Bulgarian relations and their legacy of suspicion. Moreover, other Western diplomats note a general Bulgarian passivity and inertia, perhaps a result of long-standing isolation and backwardness. The Bulgarians may not be advanced enough to sense and appreciate their need of contact with the West. They may be afraid of it—like the eminent Bulgarian solid-state physicist who recently came to America as an exchangee and found he was at “graduate-student level.” While the Bulgarians desire Western embassies here, they would like them to nestle like parsley—decorative and irrelevant. What signs of movement have there been? There has been no repetition of the destructive attacks on the Legation since last February—the longest period without them since 1963. There has been a resumption of more normal—for a Communist country—official and social contact between Bulgarians and Legation personnel. (Last November Legation officers hosted 14 occasions at which 58 Bulgarians attended.) Access to Bulgarian officials, including the Prime Minister, has been facilitated. The police “blockade” of the American Legation offices has been mitigated, although intimidation and post visit interrogation no doubt continue. Casual visitors—the man who saw his daughter's picture in our window, the woman who wants to buy a Christmas card, or the student who wants to borrow a book—have increased from virtually none to one or two a day. In the past year the consular business of the Legation has doubled (citizenship cases from 24 to 65, immigrant visas from 7 to 17, and non-immigrant visas from 123 to 321). The Bulgarians gave agreement in principle early in the year to negotiate a Consular Convention, although they have not yet followed through. In November and December the first of two of some 18 hardship visa and citizenship cases were moved toward solution. In the economic field, the first substantial Bulgarian deals with American firms and their European affiliates were made. These included a 15 million dollar contract with the French Schneider group of which about half will go to Litwin and Standard Oil of Ohio. This will also bring to Bulgaria the first supervising American engineers since the War. Other contracts include a Coca-Cola plant, and the renovation of some tobacco factories—bringing American Machine and Foundry about two million dollars. The year 1965 also saw the first American chartered aircraft bringing tourists to Varna, and the first Bulgarian merchant ship calling at a U.S. port. In the public affairs and exchanges field, there has been some motion. Exchanges have worked out in the field of English teaching, medicine and agriculture. The Bulgarians have expressed interest in a library science exchange. The exchange program between the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences is continuing. The Bulgarians have arranged substantive programs for such diverse visitors as composer Peter Mennin, poet William Snodgrass and Judge William Henry. A number of American journalists have come, with a Sulzberger interview with Zhivkov, a similar offer to Daniel Schorr (he declined because, on checking, he found it probably wouldn't be used on CBS) and the first direct American news broadcast from Bulgaria in recent years by Ed Morgan (for technical reasons, of unusable quality). Radio Sofia used VOA materials (without attribution) for the first time and the Bulgarian authorities, after some back and forth, permitted the American Minister to go on nation-wide radio-TV on July 4, as Mrs. Anderson had done before. Vituperative anti-American window displays next to the Legation have not been in evidence for the past three months, contrary to previous practice. The Bulgarians have not interfered with the expanding circulation of the Legation's Bulgarian language Cultural Bulletin —now up from 1,000 to 2,000 copies. The Bulgarians also did not obstruct a lecture this month in the Legation's ground floor library—the first time the library has been put to this use since November 1964. The Bulgarians have not so far interfered with the initial mailing of the Legation's new Bulgarian Science Bulletin , the first issue of which was put out this month. The Bulgarians have offered us a good site for the 1966 Plovdiv Fair. The Legation's expanded book presentation program has not been impeded; and a gift of books to the National Library resulted in an exhibit of the gift books in the library's permanent exhibit hall. There has been no instance since last spring of an announced exchange being canceled, although two American exhibit proposals were rejected on the flimsiest of excuses. The Bulgarians have been unresponsive to American offers of performing artists and ensembles. Net impression: some improvement. 5. Conclusion . To return to the three criteria of NSAM 304, the past year has seen cautious movement toward internal liberalization, a continuance of Bulgaria's satellite role, and some progress in re-association with the West and the United States in particular. Bulgaria is not totally among-the-missing in East Europe's “quiet revolution“; but it is among the most quiet, and among the least daring. The mounting gravity of the Vietnam War provides something between an excuse and a reason for Bulgaria's caution and negativism. A certain passivity and harvest of isolation were added brakes. Actually, Bulgaria's conservatism has had some positive results. It is an interesting incidental fact that Bulgaria's collective farmers still legally own their own land. Bulgaria never did a root and branch Marxist revision of its English language textbooks. Bulgaria never renamed George Washington Street in Sofia or Franklin Roosevelt Street in Plovdiv, never came under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, never imposed a ceiling on American diplomatic staffs, and never instituted a system of prior travel notification for attaches or others. It settled its outstanding financial claims with us, and does not stand afoul of the Johnson Act. It adheres to the Berne Copyright Union, and only this year ratified outstanding revisions to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Assuming that in the future the trend continues up, we envisage two phases of development in our relations. In the first phase we shall continue to seek progress towards a Consular Convention, resolution of outstanding citizenship and visa cases, progressively freer access to our offices, continued protection of the Legation, expanded official and social contact and increased exchanges. On all these counts there has been progress in 1965, but not a complete resolution. Our request for reciprocal radio rights, a moderation of anti-American propaganda next to the Legation, and multiple entry diplomatic visas fall into this “Phase I” category. When both sides are ready for larger steps, we may hope to turn to a cessation of VOA jamming, a substantially more ambitious exchange and public affairs program, the introduction of American newspapers, a general moderation of anti-American propaganda, reciprocal reduction of travel restrictions, and closer Bulgarian adherence to general norms of international dealing in trade and other fields. Among the things America can offer is Most Favored Nation treatment, greater cooperation in trade, review of our attitude toward PL 480 and credit; and possible elevation of the status of the two countries' missions. Of all these possibilities, MFN is what the Bulgarians really want most from us. Our success with the East-West Trade Bill will be crucially important for our prospective relations with this country. Whether or not we decide ultimately to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding MFN, the fate of the bill in Congress will greatly influence the psychological atmosphere here. Our opportunities may be greatest at present on the psychological front. We believe expansion of exchanges in both directions is to our advantage as a stimulant to meaningful contact and means of impact. In the exchange field, the Bulgarians have been passive, reluctant and disorganized. But we, too, need a more positive attitude, more vigor, more interest and more willingness to give deft leadership to the U.S. private sector. In another context, Freud once said that the lines of cleavage are in every crystal, but you don't see them until the crystal breaks. We must apply our wedges where we can; and chip away at Bulgarian backwardness, isolation, and fear. Nathaniel Davis American Minister 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2–3 BUL. Secret. Drafted by Davis and Tuch. Repeated to Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Berlin, Paris for USRO, Munich, and Vienna. 2 This circular airgram requested an annual political-economic assessment of the host country. (Ibid., 2–3 BUL) 3 Document 4 . 4 Airgram A–274 from Sofia, January 24, 1965. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 BUL) 5 On April 22, 1965, the Bulgarian press reported that the Bulgarian Government had uncovered and defeated a plot led by a senior Communist Party official and the commander of the Sofia military garrison. 6 The Legation was interested to see a recent INR Research Memorandum which said that “there emerged signs of possible strain in Bulgarian-Soviet relations.” We do not yet see clear evidence of this here, although the pros and cons of this possibility are discussed in the Legation's A–286 of January 26, 1966. [Footnote in the source text. The INR Research Memorandum was not identified. Airgram A–286 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–USSR.] 7 October 1965. 33. Memorandum of Conversation 33. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Sofia, November 2, 1966, 4 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Todor Zhivkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Gero Grozev, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs John M. McSweeney, Chief of Mission Hans N. Tuch, Deputy Chief of Mission Veselin Izmirliev, Interpreter Minister McSweeney was making his initial call on Chairman Zhivkov. After Minister McSweeney had expressed his pleasure at being in Bulgaria and meeting the Prime Minister, he stated that he had had conversations with Bulgarian Minister Gerasimov before he left Washington and, after his arrival here, with Foreign Minister Bashev and with Chairman Traykov upon the presentation of credentials. 2 He was pleased that Chairman Traykov had made the statement that Bulgaria was ready to do what it can to improve relations between the two countries within the framework of the present situation. Minister McSweeney noted that he and Minister Gerasimov had found they were in general agreement that there were two main areas in our bilateral relations where some concrete progress had been made and can be made in the future. The first was in the field of trade. He felt that it would not be useful on this occasion to delve into the history of our trade relations, the historical background of the question the Bulgarians referred to as “discrimination” in trade, nor into the details of our legislative processes. He merely wanted to mention those things that had been done which he felt would have a favorable impact on our trade relations. First was the President's proposal of the East-West Trade Bill to the Congress which would give him the discretionary authority to extend MFN to all the countries of Eastern Europe. This bill was not considered in the Congress at the last session, but it will be introduced for consideration in the next session. Minister McSweeney recalled that Senator Magnuson, during his conversation with the Prime Minister, 3 had voiced his strong support for this bill. Secondly, the US had extended a $10 million CCC credit for Bulgarian purchases of feed grains. Thirdly, the President had made an important speech on October 7, 1966, which concerned itself with relations with Eastern Europe in which he again voiced his desire to improve these relations. 4 Toward that end the Commerce Department had removed some 400 items from the list of strategic commodities for which licenses had previously to be obtained; and the President, with the support of the Congress, extended Ex-Im Bank guarantees to those countries in Eastern Europe which had not had these previously. Further he had expressed his determination to press for enactment of the East-West trade legislation. Minister McSweeney said these are facts which, if they do not give all that one might want to improve our trade relations, were certainly concrete indications of the direction in which the US is moving. The second broad area, Minister McSweeney stated, in which he thought we could expand our mutual relationship was in cultural exchanges—the exchange of people, information and ideas in order to spread the knowledge of our respective countries and people. He was pleased to note, Minister McSweeney continued, that there had also been some progress in exchanges in both directions to which the GOB had contributed. Minister McSweeney mentioned the Electric Power Delegation, 5 the visit of Senator Magnuson, the visit of the US Trade Delegation, 6 US participation in the Plovdiv Fair and Bulgarian assistance in obtaining exit visas for a number of hardship cases as evidence of this forward movement. He stated that he did not want to go into detail, that he hoped to have discussions on various matters with the respective officials of the Bulgarian Government, that he hoped to contribute to progress in our bilateral relations, and that he hoped for Chairman Zhivkov's support. Prime Minister Zhivkov first proposed a toast wishing the Minister a successful mission in Bulgaria. He stated that the GOB understands the steps that have been taken so far and that the GOB will respond positively to any American initiative. He felt, however, that US-Bulgarian relations were now in a cul-de-sac, that they were not developing properly but marking time. He stated that Bulgaria had developed its relations with Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Austria but not with the US. He asked who was responsible for this situation—the United States or Bulgaria? He stated that perhaps both sides were responsible, and that both sides would nave to make mutual concessions with the aim of finding solutions to their problems. He said that he is not an optimist but a “rough realist” and that perhaps for this reason he was ill-chosen to be a Prime Minister. However, he stated, the Minister can count on his and his Government's support in any effort to improve bilateral relations. Zhivkov stated that on the subject of Vietnam, Bulgaria would continue to voice its position that the United States is committing aggression against a fraternal socialist country. Bulgaria would state this position at the upcoming Party Congress and on other appropriate occasions, but, Zhivkov continued, Bulgaria takes account of the “actual situation” and will respond positively to any initiatives from the US in the bilateral field. He stated that he had spoken with many people inside and outside of Bulgaria and he follows the area of foreign relations closely. He reiterated that any positive steps by the US will be welcome and will be reciprocated by Bulgaria. He cautioned, however, that if both sides were to view the future through “rose-colored glasses,” they would fail to improve relations. They must view the relationship by considering concrete things—“what can be done.” He stated that he had a mandate both from the Central Committee of the BCP and the Government to respond to US initiatives and he would do so immediately. He then asked what can we do concretely right away? Can the US extend credits? Minister McSweeney stated that Bulgaria had an outstanding credit line of $10 million for feed grains right now and that Ex-Im Bank guarantees also were available now for all countries in Eastern Europe. Prime Minister Zhivkov asked whether Bulgaria could get immediate credit to buy either complete plants or to engage in a barter deal whereby they would purchase plants or equipment and pay in kind. He stated that in matters like this MFN is not of primary importance to Bulgaria but that he is interested in reaching concrete decisions. Minister McSweeney replied that there recently had been a number of representatives of leading New York banks in Sofia who had offered to extend credit lines. This was an indication of the American private sector's belief that things were moving forward. He continued by saying that we would probably have to start on a small scale since our problems in this field are of long standing, but that the US is prepared to consider proposals as they come up. On the subject of Vietnam, Minster McSweeney stated, our views are obviously different, and he would not try to convince Chairman Zhivkov at the present meeting that the US is right. He expected the GOB to continue to express its views on the subject. And he realized that the Chairman is well informed about international developments, but he wanted to recommend a careful reading of the communiqué of the Manila Conference. 7 It had been previously suggested that the American Government had been seeking something for itself in Vietnam. The communiqué shows clearly that the US wants to settle the problem and, as a practical step, is prepared to evacuate its military personnel within six months if the other side does the same. Minister McSweeney stated that to the extent that Chairman Zhivkov can use his influence to have the other side look at this proposal seriously, this would help efforts to achieve peace. Minister McSweeney emphasized that our readiness to withdraw is a fact. Mutual withdrawal can lead to a reduction in the war and make a political solution possible. Chairman Zhivkov stated he wanted to emphasize that Bulgaria wishes to maintain normal relations—it is a small country, but that it has an active foreign and internal policy. He stated that it was in the mutual interest of both countries to have normal relations. He believed that the main question is to end “discrimination” starting with the economic field, and that after such “discrimination” had ended, both countries could turn to other sectors. He stated again that Bulgaria would welcome any steps on the part of the US to improve relations and that his Government would respond positively. But, he continued, the fact that the Department of State carries out “discrimination” against Bulgaria in trade creates major difficulties. He said that he cannot understand how cultural relations can be developed unless a solution is found to the problem of economic relations. He cited as an example that Bulgaria has more economic relations with Spain than with the US in spite of the character of the Spanish regime. He said that the US-Bulgarian dialogue had always revolved around the same problems ever since he became Prime Minister. “Discrimination” prevents establishing normal relations and interferes with normal contacts between Bulgarian and US officials. Bulgaria, he said, had no problems with France in spite of the fact that President DeGaulle's view of the world is not its own. Bulgaria has wide trade with West Germany although the two countries constantly insulted each other. He said that Bulgaria does not worry about VOA making propaganda threats. The main problem is the economic problem. On the subject of Vietnam, Chairman Zhivkov continued, the question is very complicated. US bombardment must be stopped and then both sides can proceed to negotiations. He stated that nobody told him to say this, but he wanted to say anyway that the US should stop bombing and that would be the way to bring about negotiations. If the Vietnam conflict were to grow it would be a terrible business, he continued. He had just returned from the Soviet Union where he had been shown the latest Soviet weapons and he had been told that US weapons and Soviet weapons were very similar in their characteristics and destructive capability. He said that he knew what US weapons could do and what Soviet weapons could do, and that if they were to come into contact with each other a catastrophe would result. He said that this is absurd and reiterated that US should stop its bombing whereafter talks could start. Minister McSweeney stated that the US had stopped bombing twice, but there had been no response from the other side. He said that a bomb is a bomb whether it is placed under a railroad tie or dropped from the sky. He stated that if there were some indication from the other side that it is prepared to reciprocate, something could be accomplished immediately. He reiterated that there is no one who wants to get the Vietnam conflict ended more than the US. Chairman Zhivkov replied that US propaganda states that North Vietnam has sent troops to the South. “It is nothing like this,” he insisted. Bulgaria had recently had a delegation in North Vietnam of which Mr. Grozev had been a member. No North Vietnamese troops have been sent to South Vietnam, he said. North Vietnam does give material assistance to the South Vietnamese guerrilla forces, but this is a guerrilla war. As evidence that there are no North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam and that this is merely a guerrilla war, he cited the fact that not one town had been taken by North Vietnamese troops in the South. Minister McSweeney opined that this may either be a matter of tactics or a measure of lack of success of the North Vietnamese troops. He said that many North Vietnamese prisoners in camps in South Vietnam are good evidence of North Vietnamese direct participation. Chairman Zhivkov then acknowledged that there may be individual North Vietnamese helping in South Vietnam, but reasserted there are no military units. But, he continued, it is neither his mandate nor the Minister's mission to discuss this problem today. Minister McSweeney stated that during his tour of duty with the Strategic Air Command over two years ago he also had seen information about US and Soviet weapons similar to that which Chairman Zhivkov had evidently seen in the USSR. He stated that the US knows the dangers of nuclear war full well and that therefore it wanted to see the Vietnam problem resolved as quickly as possible. On that note the conversation ended with repeated expressions of mutual goodwill. The conversation lasted approximately 45 minutes and was conducted in a cordial and relaxed manner. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Tuch and McSweeney. Transmitted as Enclosure 1 to airgram A–168 from Sofia, November 8. The meeting was held in Zhivkov's office. Davis left post on May 20, 1966, and President Johnson nominated John M. McSweeney as Minister to Bulgaria on September 16. He presented his credentials on October 26. The Legation in Sofia was raised to Embassy status on November 28; McSweeney was promoted to Ambassador on April 5, 1967. 2 Telegram 441 from Sofia, October 10, reported on the talks with Bashev. (Ibid.) McSweeney reported on his meeting with Traykov in airgram A–498, April 22. (Ibid., POL 17–1 US–BUL) 3 Senator Magnuson visited Bulgaria September 27–30 as President Johnson's representative to the Plovdiv Fair, which was held September 15–October 2. He met with Zhivkov on September 28. A memorandum of their conversation was transmitted as an attachment to airgram A–127, October 11. (Ibid., LEG 7 Magnuson) 4 For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pp. 1125–1130. 5 This visit has not been identified. 6 October 1–15. 7 For text of the communiqué, released on October 25, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 867–871. 34. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 34. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 New York, October 3, 1967, 2103Z. 2 Secto 42. USUN 1165. Bulgarian-US Relations. Fol based on uncleared memcon, 3 subject revision upon review, Noforn and FYI: 1. Secretary met today with Bulgarian FonMin Bashev at latter's initiative. Discussion of bilateral relations was in constructive and positive vein, with Bashev emphasizing his interest in concrete steps to develop relations despite difficulties which “international situation” poses (he did not mention Vietnam until Secretary raised question). 2. Bashev dwelt most of all on Bulgaria's interest in developing exports to US. He expressed understanding that action on MFN hampered by present international situation and did not press this question. He said Bulgaria interested in exports to US even at financial sacrifice, and requested some further public expression US Govt approval expanded trade to facilitate Bulgarian approaches to US business firms. Bashev mentioned specifically Bulgarian desire sell tobacco and wine and purchase complete industrial plants. 3. Bashev also mentioned Bulgarian interest expanding scientific, technological, industrial exchange. He envisaged no need to sign cultural agreement, which he said might restrict rather than develop cultural relations. 4. In reply, Secretary explained present situation with regard to MFN, emphasized US interest in developing trade relations now within framework present legislation, and assured Bashev of US readiness to take specific steps to improve relations. 5. Pouching memcon. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Sofia. Rusk and Bashev were attending the U.N. General Assembly Session. 2 Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 Memoranda of conversation are in Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL–US. 35. Memorandum of Conversation 35. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 1, 1968. SUBJECT Visit of Bulgarian Ambassador Guerassimov PARTICIPANTS Bulgarian Ambassador Luben Guerassimov Vesselin Vassilev, Attache, Bulgarian Embassy Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy Robert B. Houston, Jr., EUR/EE Departure of Tarabanov Ambassador Guerassimov first apologized for not having been able to keep the appointment he had requested with Mr. Leddy on March 27. He explained that UN Permanent Representative Tarabanov had been preparing to depart for Bulgaria on March 27 and that he had to confer with Tarabanov before the latter's departure. President Johnson's Speech Ambassador Guerassimov next asked if the statement of President Johnson that he would not be a candidate for re-election 2 meant any change in the foreign policy of the US Government. Mr. Leddy said that no change in the basic foreign policy of the US should be expected. The President said that he wanted to devote himself to working on the problems facing the country without getting involved himself in the election campaign. In respect to Viet Nam the President was going to try what many people had urged—a halt to bombing—to see if the expectations would come true that peace talks would start promptly and that no military advantage would be taken. Mr. Leddy expressed the hope that persons on the side of Hanoi who had spoken optimistically of what would happen if bombing were halted would now exert their influence to make their predictions come true. Ambassador Guerassimov said that perhaps Hanoi would want to delay any action to see who the new President would be. Mr. Leddy said that Hanoi would make a mistake if it decided to await the inauguration of a new President before responding to the bombing halt. US Attitude Towards Greece Noting that Bulgarian relations with Turkey had significantly improved with the just concluded Zhivkov trip to Turkey, the Ambassador asked how the US viewed the present Greek government. Mr. Leddy replied that if the Ambassador wished a detailed discussion on Greece, he should talk to Assistant Secretary Battle within whose area Greece fell. Mr. Leddy said that he was informed about Greece chiefly in the NATO context. As the Ambassador might guess, the US did not want to see Greece leave NATO. The US did want to see Greece return to constitutional government with traditional freedoms. The US did not feel there was anything to be gained by cutting relations with the present Greek government. Our policy was therefore to continue contacts, to exert such influence as we could and to hope that in time, constitutional government would be restored. Ambassador Guerassimov said that the present regime in Greece was reminiscent of that which existed there prior to World War I and was hindering the development of a better atmosphere in the Balkans. Bulgarian Interest in Technology Ambassador Guerassimov said that he had asked for the appointment in order to leave with Mr. Leddy copies of several documents which had been presented previously to various persons in Washington. These documents showed ways in which Bulgaria thought US-Bulgarian relations could develop. The documents were: 3 1. The Bulgarian draft of an exchange agreement between the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences. 2. A list of factories which Bulgaria was negotiating to purchase in the US. 3. A list of licenses on which Bulgaria wanted information with a view of possible purchase. 4. A list of technical fields in which Bulgaria desired scientific-technical cooperation with the US (i.e. fields in which Bulgaria wished to have specialists receive industrial training in the US). 5. A list of certain scientific fields in which Bulgaria would like to have specialists receive academic training in the US. Mr. Leddy said that the documents would be studied and the Embassy advised of the Department's comments on them. Ambassador Guerassimov added that in addition to the persons who might come to the US under the projects mentioned in the lists, Bulgaria was in touch with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare about exchanges of medical personnel and Bulgarians were also making arrangements for technical training directly with various American universities. Topics on Which US Seeks Bulgarian Action Mr. Leddy told Ambassador Guerassimov that the US would like to hear from Bulgaria on several matters: the US-Bulgarian consular convention, the proposed agreement on reciprocal radio rights and the ending of Bulgarian jamming of Voice of America broadcasts. Ambassador Guerassimov said that the Embassy in Washington was not involved in the consular convention negotiations but that he would inform Sofia of Mr. Leddy's interest. He also said that he thought the US Embassy in Sofia had received some information on the jamming question. Mr. Leddy said that no satisfactory information had been received on jamming. Ambassador Guerassimov then brought up the recent reply of the Foreign Ministry to the Department's note of July 27, 1967 reducing the number of counties in the US closed to Bulgarian travel. 4 Mr. Houston said that the US Embassy had just reported receipt of a communication on this subject from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but had not had time to analyze it. Events in Czechoslovakia Mr. Leddy asked Ambassador Guerassimov for his views on the recent events in Czechoslovakia. The Ambassador replied that his only information on the events came from reading the Bulgarian press. He said that there was nothing new insofar as the Czechoslovak Party was concerned, as there had always been criticism within the Party and the replacement of no longer useful Party officials. He said that in his view, what was going on in Czechoslovakia was the realization of reform in public life and government. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Houston. 2 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968 , Book I, pp. 469–476. 3 The documents were not found with the source text. 4 A copy of the note is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 17–2 BUL–US. 36. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State 36. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State 1 Sofia, September 20, 1968, 1525Z. 1323. Subj: Bulgaria after Czechoslovakia. 1. Bulgarian policy appears primarily to be designed to keep Moscow well satisfied with Bulgarian support in all matters and, now, especially in Czechoslovakia. In this Bulgaria is running true to form. In other areas, the regime seems to be following a “watch and wait” line. Business as usual is the motto in contacts with most Westerners. The GOB has taken care not to close out the possibility of continuing to cultivate increased trade with almost any willing partner “regardless of differences in political system.” Condemnation of the US, the FRG, Yugoslavia and other standard targets of criticism continues to be severe but by no means as extreme as it could become. On the other hand, as demonstrated by the recent announcement of new economic arrangements with the USSR, arrangements which promise to leave Bulgaria sunk even deeper in the Soviet embrace, the regime appears to have taken advantage of the present situation to squeeze more economic aid out of Moscow. 2. While the events in Czechoslovakia have clearly been unsettling to the population and a burden to the regime, the effects are probably somewhat less severe in Bulgaria than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Postwar Bulgarian history is unmarked by shock comparable to the uprising in East Germany in 1953, the October events in Poland in 1956, and the Hungarian uprising of October 1956. Despite a degree of liberalization carried out slowly since 1956, the regime has remained essentially conservative and hence does not have to retreat very far now. Geographically, economically and socially, Bulgaria is further removed from the Czechoslovak events than any of the other four Warsaw Pact countries. The majority of Bulgarians are decent enough to regret what has happened in Czechoslovakia, but the intensity of their identification with the Czechoslovak people is not remarkable. 3. The regime is working along predictable lines to limit the damage to its moral position and that of the Soviet Union arising from the invasion. The plausibility of the arguments advanced is very low, including heavy dependence on such conceptual slogans as “machinations of Western imperialism.” Even Pavlovian conditioned reactions should have difficulty with reference to “Morgans and Duponts,” “Rockefeller and Franco” as somehow justifying use of Communist tanks to combat Communist words and ideas. That the Czechoslovak people as a whole sought to move away from the more oppressive aspects of Soviet-style socialism is probably widely accepted here. If, as we believe, large segments of Bulgarian public are seriously depressed by Czech events, it is because they are seen as harsh object lesson that any significant steps toward liberalization will be forcefully repressed by Moscow as an intolerable attempt to “restore capitalism and detach the country from the camp of socialism.” 4. The regime's propaganda effort is probably intended more to persuade Moscow of Bulgarian loyalty than to win credibility among Bulgarians. For the latter the message is to stick with the regime, enjoy such increased material benefits as are being made available and forget any vagrant thought that any measure of liberality is to be expected in the near future in Bulgaria. 5. The Czechoslovak events have thus far brought no new signs of instability within the Bulgarian leadership. The presence of Zhivko Zhivkov alongside Todor Zhivkov at Moscow September 16 is not necessarily confirmation of his continued occupancy of the number two position, since he oversees economic matters, but we believe he retains this position in any case. 6. Assuming continued Warsaw Five occupation and a continuing stalemate between Soviet repression and passive resistance from “good soldier Schweiks” in Czechoslovakia, we would expect the GOB, Moscow permitting, to diminish its defensive and justificatory propaganda, and to treat the Czechoslovak repression more and more as an accomplished fact while turning to other provocative subjects such as Yugoslav Macedonia and “revisionism.” 7. This is likely to be accompanied by an effort to return to “business as usual” in the form of trade, cultural and eventual renewed political exchanges with willing NATO and non-aligned countries, especially France, Italy (whose trade is in balance) and the smaller countries. Practical commercial and financial considerations coincide with political desirability to indicate no upsurge in economic activity with regard to the Federal Republic. 8. The revulsion felt in the U.S. for Bulgaria's collaboration, clearly manifested by cancellation of participation at the Plovdiv Trade Fair, and the resultant dimness of prospects for improved relations under current circumstances, might well tempt the GOB to indulge in some form of self-serving reprisal. This might include well-publicized trials of one or another “American spy” to demonstrate to Moscow Bulgaria's vigilance. (Recent rumors are to the effect that Dr. Sarafov, whose arrest as an “American agent” was recently reported (Sofia 1248), 2 will soon be given the full public treatment.) 9. Thus we look for a very cool political winter, during which the prescribed low visibility posture seems quite appropriate. McSweeney 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL–USSR. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Warsaw, USNATO, and Vienna. 2 Telegram 1248, August 29, reported on Bulgarian announcements regarding a “Western” spy ring. (Ibid., POL 23–4 BUL) Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia 37. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 19, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CZECH–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Davis on February 25. 38. Memorandum of Conversation New York, November 18, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. 39. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 10, 1964, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on December 17. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 2;“ a separate memorandum of conversation dealing with the MLF is ibid. 40. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 18, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 9 CZECH–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Styles on December 21. 41. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, September 27, 1965, 0730Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 12–2 CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to London. 42. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 12, 1965, 10:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CZECH–US. Confidential. Drafted by Schiffman and approved in S on November 29. The meeting was held in Rusk's office. 43. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, October 22, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CZECH. Confidential. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:10 a.m. 44. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 6, 1966, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 85. Confidential. Drafted by Dean and approved in S on October 17. The meeting was held at USUN. 45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia Washington, October 6, 1966, 12:49 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 9 CZECH–US. Confidential. Drafted by Styles; cleared in E, EUR, L, H, and the Civil Aeronautics Board; and approved by Solomon. 46. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 21, 1966, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US. Confidential. Drafted by Schiffman and approved in S on December 28. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 47. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, February 28, 1967, 1500Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Confidential. 48. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, April 5, 1967, 1200Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Confidential; Limdis. 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia Washington, April 11, 1967, 7:57 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Phelps, cleared by EE and Stoessel, and approved by Stoessel. 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia Washington, April 13, 1967, 7:56 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 12–2 CZECH. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Christiano; cleared in E, H, EUR, S/S, the Export-Import Bank, and the Department of Commerce; and approved by Katzenbach. 51. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, July 10, 1967, 1630Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US. Confidential; Limdis. 52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia Washington, November 10, 1967, 0118Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Batjer, cleared in EE, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Brussels for Petrow. 53. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, December 2, 1967, 1130Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Vienna and Munich. 54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia Washington, December 9, 1967, 0149Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 USSR. Secret. Drafted by Costalanski, cleared in EE and SOV, and approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Sofia, Warsaw, and Berlin. 55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia Washington, February 13, 1968, 1630Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CZECH–US. Confidential. Drafted by Batjer, cleared by Costalanski and USIA, and approved by Lisle. 56. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 21, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held in Ambassador Duda's residence. 57. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, March 25, 1968, 1600Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Paris, Sofia, Vienna, Warsaw, Munich, and Berlin. 58. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (Beam) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) Washington, April 26, 1968. Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 70. Confidential. Drafted by Beam. Copies were sent to Harriman, Meeker, Solomon, Campbell, and Lisle. Beam was in Washington for consultations. A handwritten note on the source text by Bohlen reads: “I agree with this approach. CEB” 59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, April 27, 1968, 0045Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Batjer; cleared by Lisle, L, and E; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Prague, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Brussels for Petrow, USNATO, and Berlin. 60. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 10, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–USSR. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Bohlen and Leddy. In a May 11 note attached to the source text, Under Secretary Katzenbach commented: “I disagree strongly with both the analysis and the recommendations. So do the other senior officials of the Government with whom I have talked generally on this subject.” Rusk wrote on Katzenbach's note: “So do I. DR” 61. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, May 10, 1968, 1936Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USNATO, Prague, Munich, USEUCOM, USAREUR, and USAFE. 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, May 11, 1968, 0126Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by EUR/RPM and Stoessel, and approved by Katzenbach. 63. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, May 28, 1968, 1735Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US. Confidential; Limdis. 64. Editorial Note 65. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, July 11, 1968, 1520Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Budapest, Warsaw, Sofia, London, Berlin, Bucharest, Bonn, USNATO, Prague, Belgrade, Paris, and Munich. 66. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, July 12, 1968. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Papers: Lot 74 D 379, Czech Contingency. Confidential. Drafted by Briggs. 67. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 20, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–USSR. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information but is initialed by Rostow. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the White House. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 14) 68. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, July 22, 1968, 1710Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CZECH. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. 69. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, July 22, 1968, 1720Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Prague. A copy of this telegram was passed to President Johnson by Rostow on July 23, with the annotation: “Herewith Tommy Thompson's current evaluation of Czech affair.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Cables, Vol. 21) 70. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 22, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and initialed by Bohlen and approved in S on July 24. 71. Memorandum From Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, July 23, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Czechoslovakia, Memos, Vol. 2. Top Secret. 72. Notes of Meeting Washington, July 24, 1968, 1:30–3:50 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held on the second floor of the mansion. 73. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 26, 1968. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 73 D 374, Memos Drafted in G. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen. 74. Transcript of Meeting Washington, July 27, 1968, 3–4:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. The source text comprises pages 28–32 of a 34-page transcript. The text printed here contains revisions that were made after the editor listened to the recording of the conversation. The recording is ibid., Recording of Meeting Between President Johnson, Senator Dirksen, and Secretary Rusk, July 27, 1968, 3–4:30 p.m. [Tape FC002, Side B]. 75. Transcript of Meeting Washington, July 29, 1968, 7–8 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. The text printed here contains revisions that were made after the editor listened to the recording of the conversation. The recording is ibid., Recording of a Meeting Between President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and Secretary Clifford, July 29, 1968, 7–8 p.m. [Tape FC001, Side A]. 76. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, August 2, 1968, 1245Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–USSR. Secret. Repeated to Prague, Warsaw, Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Bonn, London, Paris, USUN, and USNATO. 77. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, August 4, 1968, 1130Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, Sofia, Warsaw, and USUN. 78. Notes of Meeting LBJ Ranch, Texas, August 10, 1968, 12:25 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Prepared by Tom Johnson. 79. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 19, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Exdis. Drafted and initialed by Rostow on August 20. The source text is labeled “Part IV of IV.” 80. Summary of Meeting Washington, August 20, 1968, 8:15–8:42 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. The text printed here contains revisions that were made after the editor listened to the recording of the conversation. The recording is ibid., Recording of Meeting Between President Johnson, Ambassador Dobrynin, and Walt Rostow, August 20, 1968, 8:17–8:42 p.m. [Tape FC002, Side A]. 81. Notes of Emergency Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, August 20, 1968, 10:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Secret. A transcript of this meeting is ibid., Transcripts. 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia Washington, August 21, 1968, 0855Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Batjer, cleared in S/S and CTF, and approved by Leddy. 83. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, August 21, 1968, 1935Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to USUN. 84. Notes of Cabinet Meeting Washington, August 22, 1968, 12:16–1:50 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. A covering memorandum from Tom Johnson to the President lists the 35 participants and noted the time of the meeting. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. 85. Summary of Meeting Washington, August 23, 1968, 1:07–3:06 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. 86. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, August 23, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret. Drafted by Myerson and cleared by Leddy. 87. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 23, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson. A notation on the source text reads: “SecDef has seen.” 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, August 24, 1968, 1600Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, and USUN. 89. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 27, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/S on August 28. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. 90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, August 31, 1968, 1552Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Leddy and Thompson and approved by Rusk. Also sent to London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Ottawa and repeated to USUN, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, and Belgrade. 91. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas Washington, August 31, 1968, 1801Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 92. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. 92. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but in a September 3 memorandum to Bromley Smith of the NSC Staff, accompanying the source text, John P. Walsh, Acting Executive Secretary, noted that Rusk had approved the paper for submission to the September 4 meeting of the National Security Council. 93. Summary Notes of the 590th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, September 4, 1968, 5–7:25 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The source text bears no drafting information. 94. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, September 23, 1968, 1410Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret. Repeated to USUN, USNATO, Paris, London, Bonn, Belgrade, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, and Bucharest. 95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia Washington, September 25, 1968, 1440Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Batjer and cleared by Lisle, Leddy, and Moffat. Also sent to USUN. 96. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, October 26, 1968, 1130Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Budapest, Bucharest, Moscow, Munich, Sofia, and Warsaw. 97. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 15, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Toon. 98. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, November 18, 1968, 1630Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Brussels. 99. Airgram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State Prague, November 29, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US. Confidential. Drafted by Beam. 37. Memorandum of Conversation 37. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 19, 1964. SUBJECT Economic and Financial Agreement; Trade; Consular Convention and Consulates; Cultural Exchanges PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Dr. Karel Duda, Czechoslovak Ambassador Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Ambassador Duda telephoned me last week to invite me to lunch today at 1:00 o'clock at Sans Souci restaurant. This was his first invitation to me for a t#te-a-t#te lunch and from the tenor of his remarks, I judged he was not acting on instructions but only on his personal initiative. He mentioned no other substantive matters than bilateral issues between Czechoslovakia and the United States. Economic and Financial Agreement He asked my opinion when we might move ahead to complete the Economic and Financial Agreement. I said, as he knew, most questions had been settled, but there remained the technical question of the transfer of the gold. The French had given their assent but the British had not as yet, though we had asked them to do so. He professed not to know about the British position and asserted that the Czechs had always considered this a bilateral matter. I pointed out that the question of the gold required the assent of the Tripartite Commission. 2 Trade Ambassador Duda asked my personal opinion about the prospects of MFN for Czechoslovakia over the long run, saying he realized it was not possible in an election year. I gave him the standard line. He remarked that Czech trade with the United States had grown in recent years but that only 4% of Czech imports from the United States was heavy machinery. He said they were interested in increasing their purchases of machinery, particularly in the chemical field and were likewise interested in stimulating exports of machinery to the United States. He said they had been thinking of sending a delegation of specialists in machinery to the United States for the purpose of exploring possibilities. He did not pursue the subject and I gave him no encouragement. Consular Convention Ambassador Duda referred to the Czechoslovak approach to the Department in 1960–61 in regard to opening consulates in the United States and asked what I thought of the prospect. I said I remembered my conversation with former Ambassador Ruzek on this and we had proposed first to negotiate a consular convention. 3 After some inconclusive discussion, I told Ambassador Duda it was not “excluded” that we could discuss simultaneously opening of consulates and a consular convention. He emphasized he had no instructions to speak on this matter. Cultural Exchanges Ambassador Duda mentioned the desirability of increasing exchanges in the cultural field but presented no concrete ideas. It is possible he may ask to see Mr. Siscoe when he returns from Moscow. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CZECH–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Davis on February 25. 2 The Tripartite Commission of the United States, United Kingdom, and France was created at the end of World War II to oversee the restoration of property looted from occupied nations by the Germans. 3 Negotiations led to a December 1961 initialing of a note ad referendum. The United States subsequently informed Czechoslovakia that after further review of the draft text of the agreement it would not proceed to signature. (Beam, Multiple Exposure, pp. 178–180) 38. Memorandum of Conversation 38. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, November 18, 1964. SUBJECT Czech Affairs, Czech Relations with USSR, Czech Foreign Relations, UN Financing Issue PARTICIPANTS Milos Vejvoda, Deputy Chief of Czechoslovak Mission to the UN John A. Baker, US Mission to the UN Helmut Sonnenfeldt, INR/RSB In a wide-ranging talk over lunch, Vejvoda made the following points. 1. The Czechs were hopeful that the changes in Moscow would not affect them adversely, 2 though Vejvoda would not speculate beyond the next Soviet party congress which he anticipated some time next summer or fall. In answer to a question he said that Khrushchev's visit to the CSR last August 3 had come as a surprise to the Czechs. His purpose had been to give recognition to the Slovak uprising at the end of World War II (thus correcting earlier Soviet attitudes), and to encourage improvement in Czech-Slovak relations while giving strong support to Novotny's position. Novotny's position has been further strengthened by his decision to express himself favorably about Khrushchev following the latter's fall. This was seen in Czechoslovakia as a sign of independence. Vejvoda indicated that Novotny's failure to go to Moscow for the October Revolution anniversary was another gesture in this direction, noting that while it was true there was a presidential election in Prague on November 12, Novotny had no particular worry about winning it. Vejvoda was on the whole optimistic about the policies of the new Soviet leaders so far as his own country's interests were concerned, noting that Brezhnev was well known and liked in Prague. (Vejvoda confirmed, incidentally, that Mrs. Brezhnev and Mrs. Khrushchev were at Karlovy Vary at the time of Khrushchev's ouster.) He did not think the recent promotion of Shelepin, former head of the KGB, to be a full Presidium member was worrisome. He thought Shelepin had been put in to moderate the police. Vejvoda qualified his general optimism by some remarks about the possibility of Sino-Soviet accommodation, which he felt sure would occur if the US attempted to “isolate” the USSR. (This was evidently a reference to US policy on the UN financing issue.) 4 Undertones of worry about a possible change in Soviet policy also appeared in a bantering reply to a question regarding Soviet intentions to ratify Charter amendments for the enlargement of UN Councils. Vejvoda said he thought the Soviets would do so unless Chou En-lai had persuaded them otherwise. He said Yugoslavia and Albania, for opposite reasons, were most worried about the implications of Khrushchev's fall. 2. In a discussion of Czech cultural developments, Vejvoda stressed the flourishing experimental theater in Prague. Asked how the Party felt about this, he stated that Party Secretary Koucky, who implements but does not make policy in this field, tried to steer a middle course between the beatniks and the dogmatists. He said the Prague theater was a great attraction for West German tourists whom the Czechs welcome for currency reasons along with the Austrians who visit Brno and Bratislava on one day trips. (Vejvoda denied that many West Germans came to Czechoslovakia to meet East German relatives, indicating that GDR nationals were not in any case particularly welcome nor easily able to leave East Germany.) Asked whether there would be a return flow of Czech visitors to the FRG and Austria, Vejvoda expressed doubt not, he said, because the Czechs feared defections but because of their hard currency problem. This led him to remark that defection was a tough personal problem for the individuals involved but that for his part he wished that such individuals would think not only about their own desires but also about the fact that every defection caused the dogmatists at home to clamp down on those who stay behind. The evolution toward greater intellectual scope and freedom gets set back through such incidents. 3. Referring to CEMA, Vejvoda did not think it was going anywhere very fast. He said that Czechoslovakia was the only country that had really shown an interest in bloc integration efforts, along with the Soviets, and that even Poland was dubious. He indicated the Czechs were disenchanted with their forward role and would look increasingly for trade relations with the West. He saw little future in economic relations with the southeast European communist countries. In connection with economic matters, he said that the Czechs had suffered severely from the Sino-Soviet split because they had lost one of their best markets, including that for their inferior products, like second-rate shoes, which no-one but the Chinese would take. He said the Chinese had been good trading partners, delivering needed raw materials and even hard currency punctually. Vejvoda observed that the Czech man in the street was quite resentful of economic assistance to African countries, which were poor credit risks. But Cuba was popular both for romantic reasons and because it supplied tropical fruit which were a luxury in a small landlocked country like his own. Vejvoda did not deny that there had been problems over economic relations with Cuba but stressed that at the time of the 1962 missile crisis there had been a lot of sympathy for Castro because he seemed to have suffered the same fate as the Czechs did in 1938. Vejvoda said he had always suspected that the whole missile episode had been pre-arranged by the US and the USSR—a notion on which he was strongly challenged. 4. On German issues, Vejvoda said that Berlin was Khrushchev's greatest failure. He had thought he had the power to get a free city but instead got himself into a military confrontation. The Czechs were especially bitter over this (despite their general approval of Khrushchev) because it had obliged them to undertake a major mobilization, including industrial, in 1961 in order to put the totally unready Czech army into some semblance of fighting shape. Vejvoda attributed Czech economic problems in great part to the dislocations produced by this mobilization (plus the simultaneous disappearance of the Chinese market). He thought that the Wall, however regrettable for the people of Berlin, had stabilized the German situation and enabled Khrushchev to terminate his Berlin gambit. He thought too that the East German regime had managed to improve the lot of the people following the Wall, though he did not contradict a comment that of all the Communist parties in Eastern Europe the SED had attracted the most odious individuals to its ranks. Vejvoda said the Czechs had not been worried by the contemplated Khrushchev visit to the FRG, noting in this connection the Czechs' own interest in good relations with Bonn. He pointed out that even in the days when Czech propaganda heaped abuse on Adenauer, they had always indicated their interest in trade and normal relations. 5. Referring to the current visit here of a Czech writers' group (whose itinerary, he said, the Czech travel organization had badly bungled), Vejvoda mentioned that some of the Jewish members of the group had sought to make contact with Jewish writers here. He said anti-semitism was minimal in Czechoslovakia, though at one time, after the war, anti-German feeling had also been directed at German-speaking Jews. He pointed out that Defense Minister Lomsky was Jewish and expressed his belief that there was no discrimination against Jews so far as professional and official jobs were concerned. He thought US “propaganda” exaggerated anti-semitism in the USSR, though he admitted that it did exist there historically. He did not think that Czech Jews had ever attempted to urge the Soviets to curb anti-semitism. 6. In mentioning Lomsky, Vejvoda got to talking about former Defense Minister Svoboda who is now apparently the head of the military academy. Svoboda was put to work as an accountant in a cooperative after being purged in 1948. Some time later, Vejvoda thought in 1952, a Soviet delegation came to Prague and some of its members who had known Svoboda in the USSR during the war asked about him rather insistently. Eventually the Czech authorities agreed to produce him and sent an official to Svoboda's apartment to locate him. He had Mrs. Svoboda pull out one of Svoboda's general's uniforms and went off to the cooperative where he told Svoboda to put on the uniform and go to meet his Soviet friends, but instructed him not to mention his low estate. Svoboda performed as instructed and thereafter was gradually rehabilitated. 7. Vejvoda several times urged the US to conduct an active policy of contacts with the east, especially through trade and cultural exchange. He said US policy could greatly affect the further development of Sino-Soviet relations. He felt that most US officials had the correct attitude toward Eastern Europe but that some still seemed to feel that the East European countries could be split off from the USSR and their communist regimes removed. This he said was unrealistic and the expression of views along these lines hampered the development of relations. His attention was called to President Johnson's references to bridge-building and to the abiding US interest in seeing greater independence and liberty come to the peoples of Eastern Europe. The US considered the satellite status inflicted upon the East Europeans after the war repugnant but had always recognized the legitimate interest of the Soviets and East Europeans in friendly relations with each other. Vejvoda said that Czech-Soviet friendship was traditional—even Benes had been accused of being a Communist because of his desire for good relations with Moscow—and that there would always be close relations. 8. Vejvoda thought that most of the foreign ministers from the Bloc, including Gromyko, would be coming to the General Assembly. David, however, had a prior commitment in Paris which would delay his arrival here. 5 Vejvoda said that David's talks in Paris would go beyond economic matters and observed that Czechoslovakia held recent French cultural accomplishments in high regard and was desirous of deepening relations in this field. 9. On Article 19, Vejvoda deplored the current impasse and expressed the view that the Soviets would not pay up under pressure. Reminded that the US position was not motivated by the desire to bring pressure on the Soviet Union but by our view of the role of the UN, Vejvoda acknowledged that the Soviets had missed opportunities to avoid the present situation. He stressed that the Soviets wished to preserve Security Council prerogatives in the peacekeeping field and not to weaken them by accepting the system of Assembly assessments for peacekeeping. He thought that the only hope now was to act on Soviet suggestions for a working group to consider future peacekeeping moral-ities while postponing a showdown. He was again reminded that US proposals in this field had been on the table since March and that Soviet responses had been utterly uncompromising. It was suggested to him that the new Soviet leadership could quite plausibly have backed off from Khrushchev's untenable position when it came to power. He indicated that the French were urging the Soviets to stand firm while the developing countries were giving contradictory advice. Some expressed the view that the Soviets could not give in under pressure while others were concerned that the US and Soviets would get together to curb the role of the Assembly. Vejvoda implied that the Czechs here had tried to explain the firmness of the US position, including the domestic reasons for it, to the Soviets and to the Foreign Ministry in Prague. He hinted that his delegation had even raised with Prague the possibility that Czechoslovakia pay its arrears, but had been overruled. Prague had replied that “for the time being” it would support the USSR. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. 2 Reference is to the ouster on October 15 of Nikita Khrushchev as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party by a group led by Leonid Brezhnev. 3 August 27–September 5. 4 The Soviet Union insisted on its right to contribute only to U.N. activities of which it approved. The United States insisted that it pay its full assessed contribution. 5 David arrived in New York on November 27. 39. Memorandum of Conversation 39. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 10, 1964, noon. SecDel/MC/29 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSIONOF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, December 1964 SUBJECT Czechoslovakia-U.S. Relations PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Mr. Givan, EUR Czechoslovakia Foreign Minister David Dr. Jiri Hajek, Ambassador to the UN Dr. Karel Duda, Ambassador to the U.S. Mr. Frantisek Soukup, Interpreter Foreign Minister David noted a certain modest development in peaceful bilateral relations, notably in trade, cultural exchanges and tourism, since he had talked with the Secretary in September 1963. 2 The GOC has tried to move forward and has taken certain steps. Jamming of VOA broadcasts has ceased. Medals have been awarded U.S. citizens who participated in the Slovak uprising. Visa issuance has been simplified and emigration procedures have been revised. There is also an agreement on patents. They are agreeable to some exchanges in the agricultural field and to further development of cultural exchanges. David thought it would also be useful to establish an exchange of economic delegations. He noted that three groups of U.S. Congressmen toured Czechoslovakia recently; he thought they were satisfied with their visits. Tourism has increased since 1963 and the GOC is trying to send outstanding people as exchange visitors. Despite these positive phenomena, David thought it necessary to say that a number of problems remain for which solutions are not being pressed forward. He had in mind in particular the conclusion of an agreement on financial matters. He recalled that at their last meeting the Secretary had said that they should lock their experts in a room until they reached a solution, in the manner of a papal election. The GOC presented a draft agreement in March 1964 but has noted no progress since then. David thought the time had come to sit down and sign the agreement, which has an important bearing on the general development of relations. Another problem, David said, concerned bilateral trade. Trade has increased a little but significant improvement depends on American policies. The GOC is interested in developing trade with many countries and has reached a number of agreements in this field. It is important to restore the MFN relationship that was suspended in 1951. 3 Without MFN they cannot imagine any substantial trade development. The Czechs think, further, that trade relations are one of the most significant means of improving general relations between states. David noted that a Chamber of Commerce Delegation would visit the U.S. in the first quarter of 1965. David said a third problem related to the restricted areas for official travel. 4 They expressed their view by note last year: they think the restrictions are not good for bilateral relations, are discriminatory and do not reflect a realistic evaluation of the situation. They ask that the restrictions be removed. They understand that the problem has been considered within the USG and hope the Secretary will say something about its status. They would not like to take a similar measure in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary repeated an observation President Johnson had made yesterday to Gromyko, 5 namely that we wish to explore every possibility of reaching further agreements with Eastern European countries. This attitude toward Eastern Europe was one of the issues in our elections. President Johnson's view of Eastern Europe was that we should keep our guard up but our hand out. The American people decided in effect that we ought to explore possibilities of further agreements. With regard to Czechoslovakia we are prepared to move ahead to see how our relations can be improved. We have noted with satisfaction the modest improvement of the past year or two. The Secretary said he wished to compliment Ambassador Duda for his alertness in keeping in touch with ways of improving our relations. The Secretary would not concede that the initiatives all came from one direction, but this was of no great consequence. The Secretary thought the exchange program should be developed further and saw no obstacle to this. He agreed that MFN is the key to significant trade improvement. The executive branch and Congress are taking a new look at this problem and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is studying it. There are increased indications of interest among our business and economic groups and the State Department has encouraged their interest. But MFN will require legislation and there are certain obstacles in the way of an easy and quick change in the law. For example, it is important for us to reach a settlement of our lend-lease problem with the USSR. Consideration of such legislation will also be influenced somewhat by the general relations and atmosphere between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO countries. We hope this atmosphere will be favorable so far as it affects this legislation. Some steps can be taken without legislation, however, and we will do what we can. The Secretary said he was interested to note that some Americans showed increased interest in buying in Czechoslovakia. We will work with Congress on this question. The Secretary could not make a firm prediction when Congress would consider the question or what the outcome would be, but he was personally optimistic. Meanwhile there is one area in the economic field where rapid growth is possible, namely tourism. The American tourist has a great interest in visiting countries he has not seen before. In the post-war period relatively few American tourists have gone to Czechoslovakia, so there is a considerable reservoir of tourist interest. The actions of the GOC in this field have been constructive and will encourage further development. We hope the GOC will earmark part of its income from tourism for Czechoslovaks to visit the U.S., since we are in the tourist business too. On the financial agreement, the Secretary said he was frankly embarrassed to find out this morning that he was personally uninformed about its status at the moment. He would phone the Department and get a message to David on this point. If the Secretary was not personally satisfied with the answer the Department gave him he would ask again. On travel restrictions, the Secretary said he would speak quite frankly. The problem rose in a new form in the last two or three years because of certain activities of Warsaw Pact missions which we found difficult to accept. These activities had to do with our intercontinental missile sites. In arranging travel certain representatives left normal routes and criss-crossed small country roads in, through, and around sites. Reciprocity was not involved for some of the Warsaw Pact countries because they did not have sites in their territory. We are under no misapprehension where this information was going. Had we not taken steps to insure that such activity was stopped, we would have been in great difficulty and the Warsaw Pact countries would have regarded us as children. However, we would look into the matter again and see whether improvement is possible. This question should not be considered a thermometer of our general relations but as a matter to be thoroughly understood on both sides. We will hope there can be some improvements. If Ambassador Duda personally has difficulty the Secretary would be glad to discuss the matter personally and facilitate his travel if he can. The trouble is that Ambassador of Czechoslovakia is not the only one waiting to travel. David thanked the Secretary for all he had said and looked forward to trade expansion. He would repeat, however, that MFN is an obstacle. The Secretary said he agreed. David said they would now wait with interest for news from us. He believes many Americans are interested in buying Czech goods and he does not know why they should be deprived. Why should Americans not have the best beer in the world, frankfurters, Prague ham, glassware etc.? The Secretary said he agreed there is a market here for such products. At the same time, David said, there is interest in American goods; no one has to persuade Czechoslovaks that American production and technology have reached a high level. As for the solution of financial issues, he believed this agreement is ready for signature; the experts are waiting and have nothing more to do. The Secretary said that was his understanding but he would like to find out more about it. David said old matters should be liquidated. The GOC has liquidated problems with a number of countries, which has proved to be of mutual benefit. As for the third problem, travel restrictions, David begged the Secretary to give his attention to this matter so that it also would be liquidated. The restrictions really hamper their people, not only in their work but by making their life more difficult. Americans stationed in Prague have no such troubles. The Czechoslovak Ambassadors to the U.S. and UN and their colleagues have no task except to improve relations. The Secretary said he had tried to be very frank about the essence of this problem. We will see what can be done. As the Secretary accompanied David to the elevator, the latter referred to U.S. citizen Alois Vesely now under charges in Czechoslovakia. 6 David said that in a few days the GOC would take action in this case that would reflect the desire of both countries to improve their relations. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on December 17. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 2;“ a separate memorandum of conversation dealing with the MLF is ibid. 2 The Rusk-David meeting was reported in Secto 12 from USUN, September 25, 1963. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2313) 3 On October 2, 1951, President Truman suspended Czechoslovakia's MFN status under the provisions of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. For text of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin , October 15, 1951, pp. 621–624. 4 On November 12, 1963, the Department of State imposed travel restrictions on Eastern European diplomats resident in the United States. For text of the Department's statement and the note presented to the Czech Embassy, see ibid., December 2, 1963, p. 860. 5 A memorandum of President Johnson's December 9 conversation with Gromyko is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XIV . 6 Alois Vesely, a U.S. citizen, was arrested on November 24 during a visit to his native village on charges of spying for France in 1948–1949. Following a U.S. protest, he was expelled from Czechoslovakia on December 11. 40. Memorandum of Conversation 40. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 18, 1964. SUBJECT Czech Interest in Air Service to U.S. PARTICIPANTS Mr. Martin Murin, Czech Director of Civil Aviation Administration Mr. Prauel Vransky, Deputy Chief, Transport and International Air Relations, Civil Aviation Administration Dr. Jiri Majsajdr, Third Secretary, Czech Embassy Mr. Allen R. Ferguson, OA Miss H. Alberta Colclaser, OA/AP Mr. Michael H. Styles, OA/AN Mr. Herbert Kaiser, EE Mr. George Wharton, CAB The meeting was requested by Messrs. Murin and Vransky who had accepted an invitation to visit the U.S. in connection with the 20th anniversary of ICAO. Mr. Murin opened the discussion by recalling the recent talks between CSA and PAA which had led to an interline agreement between them. He said he wished to explore three subjects further, as follows: CSA charter flights to U.S. Mr. Murin said that CSA was considering operating a few irregular flights to the U.S. next summer in connection with the Czech athletic games held every five years in Prague (from July 1 to 4, 1965). Approximately ten flights might be involved, and they would all consist of plane-load charters, rather than split charters or individually-ticketed arrangements. Their purpose would be to attract persons of Czech origin living in the U.S. who had an interest in seeing the games. In response to questions, Mr. Murin and Mr. Majsajdr said that Czechoslovakia had liberalized tourist controls greatly in the past year and they described several of the measures taken. There were not as many Czechs who had an interest in visits to the U.S.; most of these were relatives of persons living in the U.S. There was some discussion of charter concepts. Mr. Wharton said that, as a member of IATA, CSA would be familiar with the rules. Mr. Murin indicated he understood these concepts. Mr. Ferguson asked whether Czechoslovakia would allow a U.S. airline to do the same thing proposed by CSA. Mr. Murin replied that Czech civil aviation policy was based on reciprocity. He noted that Czechoslovakia was party to all the international agreements in the aviation field. Mr. Murin asked whether he could characterize the discussion as indicating there were no major obstacles to the CSA proposal for charter flights. Mr. Ferguson responded in the affirmative. 2 Scheduled service to U.S. Mr. Murin said that Czechoslovakia wanted to “prepare conditions” for scheduled CSA service to the U.S. and he understood that PAA was interested in service to Prague. Although nothing had been decided, he wished to raise this matter now to determine what problems there might be. The purpose of such air services would be to foster relations between the two countries and encourage exchange visits. An air transport services agreement already existed. The two airlines had concluded an interline agreement and PAA had stationed a representative in Prague. This step-by-step approach might create conditions for profitable services. Mr. Ferguson said he could not answer this question as fully as he could the first subject of non-scheduled service. He said that, although the two countries had an agreement on paper, the U.S. would want to reexamine it to determine whether it was still adequate. After that, the two countries could discuss the subject further. Mr. Murin agreed that the agreement should be re-examined, but he noted that operations had taken place under it for a number of years and that Article 8 provided a ready means for amending the route annex. After saying that the U.S. would wish to study the whole agreement, not merely the route annex, Mr. Ferguson said that the U.S. would communicate its views on this question to Mr. Majsajdr. Mr. Murin said he hoped negotiations could begin within the next year. 3 Other questions Mr. Murin raised two other questions. He asked whether CSA could station one of its representatives in New York. After some discussion, it was concluded this was not an aviation matter as such, and that CSA could use the establishment of the CEDOK office in New York both as a precedent and as an example of how to establish a CSA office. Mr. Murin also asked if the U.S. would approve the lease of jet aircraft to CSA. Mr. Wharton said that there are no general obstacles to the leasing of aircraft if certain conditions are filled, and that the U.S. lessor would be aware of these conditions. Mr. Ferguson noted that it was the responsibility of the U.S. lessor, not the foreign lessee, to obtain CAB approval. Therefore, CSA should look to the U.S. lessor to determine whether U.S. approval could be obtained. Mr. Ferguson said that Czechoslovakia should be aware that the CAB has statutory responsibility for the regulation of the economic aspects of aviation, both domestic and foreign, but that the State Department take a prominent role with respect to foreign airlines because of the international relations aspects. The U.S. Government thus speaks with one voice on such matters. Mr. Murin felt that this informal exchange was a good start toward “normalizing” aviation relations between the two countries. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 9 CZECH–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Styles on December 21. 2 In telegram 1110 to Prague, April 1, 1965, the Department of State reported that difficulties in arranging Czech charter flights had arisen because the aircraft CSA proposed to use were the property of Cuban Airlines and thus subject to seizure under Cuban Assets Control Regulations. (Ibid.) 3 Pan American inaugurated New York-Prague service on July 17, 1965. 41. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 41. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, September 27, 1965, 0730Z. 2 466. Embassy tel 1434, London's 1240. 3 Pan Am representative Wenzel says that at technical level Czechs have concluded they don't want to go through with purchase of Soviet IL 62 craft scheduled for 1967 delivery. Uncertainty that such aircraft would obtain air worthiness certificates big factor in decision. This introduces possibility Czechs will now seriously enter market for Western aircraft. Air Attaché sees some profit to Czechs in using same type aircraft that Pan Am uses in flying here thereby reducing maintenance problem in Prague and eventually in US if CSA receives permission for flights. They have already made some overtures to Wenzel about joint training program in engine maintenance of Western craft. However, credit might loom as factor influencing Czechs to British or French planes. This is thinking CSA technical level and top level Ministry not yet sold. Horsey 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 12–2 CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to London. 2 Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 Telegram 1434 from Prague, May 13, reported that the prospects for Western sales to an expanding CSA “appear remote for financial, operational and political reasons.” (Department of State, Central Files, AV 12–2 CZECH) Telegram 1240 from London, September 21, reported on British efforts to sell VC–10 aircraft in Eastern Europe. (Ibid., AV 12–2 EUR-E) 42. Memorandum of Conversation 42. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 12, 1965, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Call on the Secretary by the Czechoslovak Ambassador, Dr. Karel Duda PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Irving I. Schiffman, EUR/EE Czechoslovakia Ambassador, Dr. Karel Duda Ambassador Duda called on the Secretary at his own request to inquire regarding the current status of 1) the financial and claims settlement and 2) the question of travel restrictions on Czechoslovak diplomats. The Secretary had promised Minister David to look into these two bilateral problems, 2 Dr. Duda said, and he wished to learn the results of the review. Ambassador Duda said that he did not think he needed to restate the Czechoslovak position on these two questions. The Secretary replied that he was familiar with the Czechoslovak views on these subjects. With regard to the travel restrictions, the Secretary said that it is a complicated matter, requiring a review with other Departments of the Government, and that at this time he could say nothing new on the subject. Insofar as the claims settlement is concerned, the Secretary said that we have had a sharp critical reaction to the proposed draft agreement from claimants and some Congressmen. He said that the reaction was based in part on the very large discrepancy between the settlements we have concluded with other East European countries and the proposed settlement with Czechoslovakia. The Secretary then cited the following percentages we have obtained in the claims settlements with other countries: Yugoslavia (1948)—91%, Yugoslavia (1964)—60% (estimated), Romania (1960)—40%, Bulgaria (1963)—75%, Poland (1960)—50%, (estimated), Czechoslovakia (1964) proposed—16% (approx.). The Secretary went on to say that major resistance to the settlement with Czechoslovakia resulted from its being way out of line with other agreements and that we could not move ahead on the present basis. To force the issue on the basis of the present draft agreement in the face of strong opposition would create an impediment to our broader policy objectives and to our intentions in the area of East-West trade. The Secretary suggested that “my colleagues in the Department could review the subject” with the Ambassador to see what were the possibilities in this matter. The Secretary added, after we have had access to the appropriate Congressional Committees and ascertained their thinking, we would be in a better position to act. Ambassador Duda said that he would report the Secretary's remarks to Minister David, but that at this time he wished to make two points: 1. Negotiations for the agreement had extended over a period of about ten years and there were few people around who were directly involved. He was one of those few. In the course of the long negotiations, when the lump sum claims settlement for nationalized property was under discussion, the amount was never presented as a problem by the American side and there was no indication of dissatisfaction with the settlement, the basic provisions of which were agreed upon in 1958. We acted in good faith, Dr. Duda said, that we were in agreement with the American Government on the terms of the settlement and that the American Ambassador in Prague had full powers to negotiate. The Secretary interjected that the agreement was a tentative draft, which Dr. Duda acknowledged. 2. The second point Dr. Duda wished to make was related to the gold question as a part of the agreement. Under the prevailing circumstances, Ambassador Duda said, we agreed to make the gold question part of the package, although it was not strictly a bilateral matter. He added that the Nazi-looted gold was to be returned to Czechoslovakia under the Paris agreement. Although Czechoslovakia has been able to live without the gold for twenty years and could do so for another twenty years, they regard the blocking of the recovery of the gold by the United States as a very sensitive political question, transcending its economic importance, because of the close connection of the gold problem with the Munich agreement and the German question. The Secretary replied that he was familiar with the Czechoslovak position in this regard, that he did not wish to enter into a legal discussion of the matter, but that there were obligations of varying kinds on both sides which have a bearing on each other. The Secretary added that the stakes in our relations are greater in the field of bilateral trade, which should be developed on a positive basis and in the broader context of East-West trade relations. The Secretary said that we would like to see the question of the financial and claims settlement out of the way and suggested that Ambassador Duda may wish to discuss the matter further with Mr. Leddy, to which the Ambassador agreed. The meeting took place in a cordial atmosphere. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CZECH–US. Confidential. Drafted by Schiffman and approved in S on November 29. The meeting was held in Rusk's office. 2 Rusk and David met on October 6 during the U.N. General Assembly session. Memoranda of their conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. 43. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 43. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, October 22, 1965. 604. Fluidity of Czech policy in relation to Western countries in general, and to US in particular, is theme of several reports reaching Embassy in last few days. At least one was almost certainly intended to reach policy-making levels in our government. Reports are premised on disappointment of Czech leadership at results of Moscow visit September, especially in relation to long-term trading needs of Czechoslovakia. (See also our A–180 2 and other reports to same effect.) Seemingly planted report (mentioned above) said that Czechs had as result been given blank check to make best arrangements they could with West. Two reports (including Ruzek of MFA speaking with me on October 19) indicated that it was important under present circumstances for US to make positive gesture demonstrating that advocates of such Western orientation will meet with constructive response. These reports are similar in content (and possibly in original motivation) to one cited in Embtel 652 of 10 November 1964. 3 If (as I suspect) they are genuine and really reflect view of significant section of leadership, they may refer only to Czech need for Western wheat. In any case I think it is in interest of long-term US policy towards Eastern Europe to take them at face value and as referring to overall policy. We shall not for long time see here dramatic shift from pro-Soviet alignment, such as occurred in Rumania, but there have been small signs and subtle changes of attitudes which suggest that Czechs, too, are asserting their national interest more than in past. There has been, moreover, striking degree of internal liberalization in past two or three years, and far-reaching reforms in economy are going forward, if somewhat haltingly. We have so far given very little sign that we recognize that there has been any change at all since Stalinist days. I therefore renew recommendation which I have made through informal channel that we take significant positive step forward such as signature (or other forward-looking action) of long-pending financial-claims agreement or approval of pending application for export license for synthetic rubber technology such as I believe was recently approved for Poland. Both actions would also have certain incidental advantages to specific American interests. Horsey 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CZECH. Confidential. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:10 a.m. 2 Airgram A–180, October 18, reported Czech dissatisfaction with talks in Moscow on economic assistance. (Ibid., POL 7 CZECH) 3 Telegram 652 from Prague reported the “furious” Czech reaction to the ouster of Khrushchev. (Ibid., POL 15 USSR) 44. Memorandum of Conversation 44. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 6, 1966, 10 a.m. SecDel/MC/50 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1966 SUBJECT Bilateral Issues (Part I of III) 2 PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Mr. Jonathan Dean—IO/UNP Czechoslovakia H.E. Vaclav David, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia H.E. Karel Duda, Ambassador of Czechoslovakia to the U.S. H.E. Milan Klusak, Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the UN Mr. Miroslav Soukup (Interpreter) 1. Minister David said he greatly welcomed this annual opportunity to discuss questions of mutual interest. He wanted to raise a number of bilateral questions, then discuss Viet-Nam and the German problem. 2. Minister David said there had been a moderate increase in Czech-American trade. This had been helped by visits on both sides; another American business group was expected in Prague soon. But Czechoslovakia was limited in its capacity to work toward further increase of trade since it had no representation in New York, the center of most commercial dealings. The Embassy's commercial section was located in Washington, out of the commercial mainstream of the country. Minister David asked whether it would not be possible to station in New York a few of the personnel of the commercial section of the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington as a subsection of the Embassy, not a separate, independent commercial representatives office. The Secretary took note of the fact that the establishment of a commercial representatives office had been included in the draft of the financial agreement between the two countries. He said in the given context he did not find the Czechoslovak request extraordinary, but that he would look into the matter further after his return to Washington. 3. Minister David said there had been a marked increase in scientific and cultural exchange between the two countries, which was definitely a positive trend in their relations. Czechoslovak films had received high critical recognition and a number of awards. The Czechoslovak government was considering a number of exhibits in the U.S.; among these were an exhibit of medieval Jewish religious art, drawings of children who had been in the Theresienstadt concentration camp and works of Czechoslovak modern artists. The Minister said this favorable development could be much greater if some old outstanding issues were resolved. One was the financial and property claims agreement, which had been initialed by the U.S. side but not concluded. The second was granting of Most Favored Nation treatment to Czechoslovakia. Solution of these problems would result in a great increase in trade and contacts. Without solution, there would be limits to progress in these fields. 4. The Secretary replied that since he and the Minister had last seen each other, the President had proposed to the Congress East-West trade legislation which would permit granting MFN treatment to individual countries. According to our constitution, this legislation must originate in our House of Representatives. The Secretary said, for the Minister's private use only and not for public circulation, he had been told by Congressional leaders that they were not prepared to take up the trade legislation before the pending Congressional elections but would be prepared to do so after the elections. This was a political factor beyond the control of the executive branch in the American system. We expected Congressional hearings on the bill to begin in January or February. Meanwhile, we were trying quietly to build up support for the legislation among various public groups including business and trade union circles; visits of American businessmen to Czechoslovakia like that mentioned by the Minister could be helpful in this sense. 5. The Secretary said the financial and property claims agreement was to some extent linked with the MFN legislation. The previous draft agreement, which had been a working-level paper subject to Departmental approval, had, in addition to earlier payments from Czech properties here, provided for settlement through payment by Czechoslovakia of $2 million against total property claims; $20 million in gold would also be returned to Czechoslovakia. The amount to be paid by Czechoslovakia in this settlement was out of line with the American property claims, and the settlement as such was out of line with other similar settlements in Eastern Europe. The draft had encountered very severe opposition in Congress. If signed, it would have become an obstacle to conclusion of East-West trade legislation because the American claimants would have made their objections effectively felt in Congress. Consequently, as a minimum step, we must delay action on the agreement with Czechoslovakia. As a new chapter in Czechoslovakia-American relations developed, we would hope to find some way to proceed with the question without causing a political incident, which would be a set-back to our relations. 6. Minister David said that the negotiations had been a long time in the process. Each step by both sides had been carefully considered, the negotiators on both sides had been sincere. He said that the Czechoslovak side had all along had its own critics, who kept claiming that the Czech Foreign Ministry was not pushing hard enough and its claims were too low. As regarded the gold, it belonged to Czechoslovakia and had been stolen by Hitler. This fact was undisputed and the other members of the Tripartite Commission controlling disposal of the gold had expressed their agreement to its return to Czechoslovakia. The moral issue here was clear: the gold belonged to the Czechs, had been stolen by the Nazis, and should be returned to Czechoslovakia. Minister David said he was hesitant to make observations on the domestic political proc-ess of the U.S., but wasn't it possible that progress toward these agreements with Czechoslovakia before the elections might not actually have a favorable effect on the American electorate. 7. The Secretary said he would not debate the gold question. Our problems were procedural and political in character; we hoped in time to find a better solution. He said that American political leaders, who had to be the best judges of such matters, told him that sympathy or a favorable attitude does not have the same impact on the electorate and on election results as does opposition. More generally, it was true that the overall atmosphere in the United States had improved with regard to East-West relations. President Johnson had taken the initiative on this question on a number of occasions. The formulation of some of his statements may not have pleased the governments of Eastern Europe, but they had definitely helped to move public opinion. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 85. Confidential. Drafted by Dean and approved in S on October 17. The meeting was held at USUN. 2 Memoranda of the other portions of the Rusk-David conversation concerning Vietnam and Germany are ibid. 45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 1 Washington, October 6, 1966, 12:49 p.m. 60675. Ref: Prague 1793 and 481. 2 1. After careful consideration economic and political issues, USG has decided it would be in long-term US aviation interest and advance bridge-building concept to negotiate new air transport agreement with Czechoslovakia for U.S. and Czech airline services. However because Prague service holds little immediate commercial attraction to PAA based on poor operating results to date, US will want obtain best possible aviation deal and will thus be prepared to adopt firm bargaining position with Czechs. 2. We prefer new agreement, not merely amendment of 1946 agreement, 3 because we would like Czech agreement be same as US agreements virtually all other countries. Such agreements include a principal and critical feature lacking in 1946 agreement with Czechs, namely, recognition right of airlines to decide in first instance amount of service (capacity) they will operate. Although 1946 agreement remains legally valid, we have tried downplay its operative usefulness by having present PAA service conducted “outside” that agreement and, in present situation, by calling for entirely new agreement. In final analysis, USG could denounce 1946 agreement, but we hope Czechs would not force issue to this extent. 3. Subject any views Embassy may wish express, it requested transmit note to MFA, text of which in following cable. 4 4. Embassy may in its discretion impart orally flavor of this message. You may explain date earlier than November 15 out of question due other commitments. 5. US delegation would include Department and CAB representatives and airline industry observer, and be headed by Department officer. 6. FYI. If Czechs do not renew PAA's permission beyond October 31, Department would wish to reexamine US offer to negotiate on November 15 since we would not want to be bound in advance to talks held under inauspicious circumstances. This does not rule out talks on November 15, but merely leaves us room for maneuver. 5 End FYI. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 9 CZECH–US. Confidential. Drafted by Styles; cleared in E, EUR, L, H, and the Civil Aeronautics Board; and approved by Solomon. 2 Telegram 1793, June 29, summarized the contacts of a Czech note on revision of the 1946 bilateral air agreement. (Ibid., AV 6 US/PAA) Telegram 481, September 19, reported Pan American's plans for service to Czechoslovakia and requested information on Department plans for extending Pan American's landing rights. (Ibid.) 3 For text of this agreement, signed in Prague on January 3, 1946, and entered into force on June 17, 1946, see 60 Stat. 1917. 4 Telegram 60676 to Prague, October 6. (Department of State, Central Files, AV 6 US/PAA) 5 In telegram 78442 to Prague, November 3, the Department of State commented: “interest in early aviation negotiations based primarily on desire to protect continuation PAA operation pending bilateral agreement. Understand that GOC has issued temporary indefinite permit to PAA. Therefore urgency from US viewpoint diluted.” (Ibid.) 46. Memorandum of Conversation 46. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 21, 1966, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Secretary's Meeting with Ambassador Duda PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Dr. Karel Duda, Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Jaromir Pribyl, Second Secretary, Czechoslovak Embassy Irving I. Schiffman, EUR/EE After the preliminary pleasantries, the Secretary said that he was disappointed to find on his return from the world tour he had just completed that the Kazan case is not yet settled. 2 Just as the Secretary was about to make his representations on the matter to Ambassador Duda, the Ambassador interjected and said that he himself had planned to see the Secretary in this regard and referred to the informal conversation he had had with the Secretary some time ago during a social occasion. The Ambassador said that he had reported the earlier conversation to the MFA, received a reply and wished to read it to the Secretary. In response to the Secretary's question whether he could leave a copy, the Ambassador said that it was “incomplete and in rough form”. He would read it slowly. As you know, Duda said, Kazan is being charged with crimes which are punishable in all countries and on the basis of a court order issued in 1963. We are not going to suspend the application of Czech laws simply because Kazan is a US citizen. He will be brought to trial. To the Secretary's question whether the Ambassador knew when the trial will be held Duda replied: “No”. Duda then said, we have proceeded in full conformity with international procedures and we have granted consular access. We are prepared to issue visas to Mrs. Kazan and to the father-in-law, Duda continued, and I presume that a request to see Kazan will receive favorable consideration. We have protested the exaggerated handling of the matter by the State Department and the US public, which is out of proportion to the importance of the issue. We cannot agree with the anti-Czechoslovak measures which have been taken, such as the withholding of visas and the unofficial but practical discouragement of travel. 3 The Kazan case is of a consular nature and will be handled as such and on its merits. Publicity, pressures, and retaliatory measures will only complicate a solution to the problem. We have no intention to permit this case to undermine our relations, but it is necessary that the court proceedings be permitted to take their course. In the past, Duda continued, we have received no cooperation from the US to our just requests involving questions affecting our bilateral relations. These have been seriously affected by the discrepancy between words and deeds. US statements that we are interested in normalizing relations are contradicted by the precipitous actions such as have been taken in this case. These are bound to affect relations adversely. US pronouncements are impaired by our unwillingness to sign the concluded financial/claims agreement and the yardstick of our sincerity is our unwillingness to return the Nazi-looted gold. In this context, the US image is not a good one and we are not going to prevent the public from learning the full facts of this matter. The Ambassador hoped that his statement clarified the Czech position in this matter. Referring to Duda's remark regarding a solution of the case, the Secretary asked what he meant by this. Duda replied that he had no authority to elaborate and added that he preferred to let the statement stand. He then said that the atmosphere engendered by a campaign in the press and by measures intended to exert pressure cannot but complicate the general atmosphere. The Secretary replied that there is a distinction between the general atmosphere and the fate of an individual. We know well the circumstances under which Kazan's detention took place, the Secretary said, and he proceeded to recount the details of the flight which was diverted from its normal northern route to make the unscheduled landing at Prague. The Secretary said this was a clear case of kidnapping by security agents. If Kazan had gone to Czechoslovakia voluntarily, the case would have been difficult enough, but under the circumstances this is a very special case. We cannot overlook this in terms of our general relations. Under our constitutional system the fate of an individual is of greatest concern. The Secretary then asked what would happen to the members of the family if we issued them passports to go to Czechoslovakia? Duda replied that he had no doubt they would be safe. The Secretary responded there was a major doubt about Kazan's safety, although he had had no intention of visiting Czechoslovakia. Duda replied that he had nothing to add to the Soviet statements on the landing of the plane “which are known to you”. As to the safety of Americans and of the Kazan family there is no doubt, especially on the background of 30,000 to 40,000 American tourists a year who have visited Czechoslovakia without any major incidents. Duda repeated that the Kazan case has been magnified out of all proportion and to the point where it has overshadowed relations, whose improvement both sides strived to achieve. Duda then asked whether the Kazan incident is being used by some people here as a pretext to obstruct progress in US-Czech relations. The Secretary replied that this surely is not true of the President, himself, and the Executive in general. He said that we relied and will rely again on the assurances the Czechs have given us regarding the safety of American travelers, but this case presents us with a very special situation. The Secretary added that on his recent trip he had encountered many Senators and Congressmen, all of whom had questioned him and commented on the Kazan case. The Secretary also mentioned his lunch-eon with seven Congressmen earlier in the day who brought up the case. The Secretary then said to Duda: “I wish you would ask Foreign Minister David how he envisages a solution in the interest of better relations on both sides.” The Secretary expressed the hope that David could reply to his question personally. He said he would withhold further comment until he received an answer from David, adding that he deliberately refrained from talking about the case at his press conference that afternoon. Duda promised to convey the Secretary's request to David, but added that he wished to stress again that any publicity and pressure will only tend to complicate developments. The meeting was concluded with the Secretary saying that he hoped to see Duda again when he had a reply from Minister David. 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US. Confidential. Drafted by Schiffman and approved in S on December 28. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 2 On October 31, a Soviet commercial aircraft in service from Moscow to Paris was diverted to Prague airport, where V. J. Kazan, a U.S. citizen of Czech origin, was forcibly removed from the aircraft and arrested on charges of espionage. In February 1967, Kazan was tried, convicted, sentenced to 8 years imprisonment by Czech courts, and then expelled from Czechoslovakia. 3 The United States had declined to issue visas to a Czech cultural exhibit group and indicated that a tightening of visa requirements for Czech citizens was a likely response to Kazan's seizure. 4 David did not reply to Rusk's inquiry. In telegram 1149 from Prague, January 17, 1967, Beam reported that he had attempted to secure an official response from Czech Foreign Office officials without success. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US) 47. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 47. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, February 28, 1967, 1500Z. 1412. Ref: Prague 1393. 2 1. Czech note and increasingly active campaign to recover Nazi-looted gold point up fundamental tactical dilemma facing us on econ financial settlement: whether to (a) take active steps to conclude this affair more advantageously for US claimants in immediate or near future, (b) let pressure continue to build up to point where our failure release gold could prove genuinely embarrassing, or (c) wait for passage East/West Trade Act 3 with subsequent MFN grant to soften hitherto adamant Czech position that initialled 1961 agreement was negotiated in good faith by both sides and is only basis for comprehensive settlement. 2. On basis our contacts with Czech officials since Kazan expulsion, atmosphere is now, even taking Viet-Nam into account, as good as it is likely to be for early attempt at renegotiating economic package, and I believe we should be considering concrete steps to open way for placing US-Czech relations on more rational, promising basis. Despite added leverage restoration MFN via passage of E/W Trade Act would give us in demanding higher claims settlement figure, pinning hopes on uncertain future of this legislation could leave us hanging in present limbo vis-á-vis Czechs. 3. In circumstances of post-1948 US-Czech relations, unilateral restitution of gold, despite legitimate Czech claim to it, and however heavy Czech pressure becomes, is clearly out of the question. Since we are forced to maintain logical and essential connection between claims and restitution, the trick is somehow to induce Czechs that a higher figure is in mutual interest and that they should join in working toward it. This unlikely to be achieved, however, by simply setting higher sum and negotiating downward to something both sides would be willing accept. The package must be given different, more attractive face, something Czechs can digest before they will even consider reopening question. 4. I am sure Dept also seized with this problem and is considering possible steps to solve it. Two alternatives—and I am sure others exist—appear to merit some study. First and probably most practicable would be that originally suggested in A–206, January 6, 4 namely, a ten to fifteen year stretch out of payments in return for predetermined increase in excess of $2 million contribution Czechs agreed to in 1961. Secondly, some kind of possible bookkeeping device whereby the Czechs could pay any additional agreed amount, or portion thereof, in crowns to underwrite USG local expenditures with the dollar equivalent being remitted to the claimants. 5. Strong argument we can use in justifying increase is that in course of period of deferred payment MFN likely to be restored through passage E/W Trade Act which administration continues to press for. Realize we ourselves might have problem in releasing 22 million in gold to Czechs at present time but something can be made of fact current trade balance in US favor and Czechs likely to continue heavy US purchases. 6. We should be under no illusions Czechs will fight hard for conclusion of the 1961 accord as it stands and will exploit their public relations advantage in the matter of their right to looted gold. Consequently rather than accepting the prospect of long drawn out negotiations at the start, I would strongly favor a form of one-shot package offer to the Czechs based on adjustments within the 1961 accord. If Dept interested, would be happy to suggest in Limdis telegram increase I think we could obtain in claims figure. In any event believe we should not give detailed written reply to Czech note but should propose initiation of discussion based on plan of our own. Even if Czechs rejected it I firmly believe our tactical and public position would be enhanced by our offer of a ration-ally defensible easement which would enable the Czechs to go measurably higher on claims in the interest of removing an intractable bloc in our bilateral relations. 5 Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Confidential. 2 Telegram 1393, February 24, forwarded the substance of a Czech note on the gold issue. (Ibid.) 3 Congress took no action on the East-West trade bill during its 1967 session. 4 Airgram A–206 reviewed U.S.-Czech relations in the light of the Vietnam war and the actions of the Czech secret police. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CZECH–US) 5 In telegram 158340 to Prague, March 25, the Department of State forwarded a draft reply that outlined U.S. insistence that the gold issue had to be resolved in the context of the settlement of other outstanding financial issues. (Ibid., FN 19 CZECH) 48. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 48. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, April 5, 1967, 1200Z. 1642. For EUR—John Leddy. 1. It is quite obvious Czechs believe with some justification that ball is in US court on return of monetary gold and settlement economic/financial issues. For number of reasons, not least of which is strong desire to spur foreign trade and constructive economic reform, Czechs intend press both diplomatically and by propaganda means for return of gold. Closely related if not especially decisive factors are Czech prestige and fact UK and France ready to release gold. 2. Conversely I personally believe that should Czechs be offered the prospect of early release of gold, say within next two months, 2 they could be persuaded to promise a higher figure on nationalization claims. The problem would be to establish this as a sine qua non commitment in the context of the FonOff suggestion that gold and claims be settled “separately or semi-separately” (Prague's 1596). 3 Tactically we could endeavor to work out a linked understanding or advance agreement through which we could obtain an indication whether increase on claims would be within negotiating range. My own view is this is worth trying. 3. One method would be to accept principle of FonOff Feb 24 note (Prague's 1393) 4 of gold return and immediate payment to US of $2 million balance on claims with added proviso Czechs would agree to negotiate immediately thereafter higher claims settlement. Incentives we could offer would include (a) ten-year or longer stretch-out on payment of increment; (b) removal of Czechoslovakia from Treasury Circular 655; (c) US export licenses for miscellaneous goods purchased by Czech firms in 1948; and (d) release of blocked Czech assets (to be offset by Czech release of US Army crown account and special crown “film account”). 4. More practicable approach would probably be to advise Czechs informally we desire to release gold at an early date and have certain suggestions for settling claims at same time. They by now must understand our domestic political problem and we are prepared to take theirs into account by proposing modalities which would make an upward claims settlement easier for them. These would include incentives (a) through (b) above plus a willingness to fund their present offer of $2 million into an enlarged total within the stretch-out period. We could then ask Czechs to consider giving us early indication how much such suggestions would be worth to them in terms of an increase which would produce a final settlement and remove major long-standing irritant in bilateral relationship. 5. I do not think potential benefits of East/West Trade Act should be introduced into claims picture at this stage. We can nevertheless argue that payment of a higher figure will be facilitated by a likely increase in trade during a ten-year stretch-out. I do believe, however, eventual resumption for debt service on bonds will depend directly and decisively on restoration of MFN and accrual of hard currency. 6. The UK experience with the Czechs in above general regard is illuminating although not entirely satisfactory and we can telegraph a brief summary furnished us by UK Embassy if information unavailable in Washington. Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Confidential; Limdis. 2 In telegram 1653 from Prague, April 6, Beam amplified: “Mention of 'two months' in Para 2 intended to apply to period during which negotiations would be undertaken rather than to actual release date for gold which probably not feasible.” (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 1596, March 25, reported on discussions with Czech officials at the time of the March 24 delivery of a U.S. note on the gold issue. (Ibid.) 4 See footnote 2, Document 47 . 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 1 Washington, April 11, 1967, 7:57 p.m. 173162. 1. Duda called on Stoessel April 11, on instructions his Government, to reiterate Czech position re gold. Indicated some disappointment with US interim reply March 25 2 and expressed hope that forthcoming proposals by US would be “positive.” Stressed that GOC regarded US position on gold as yardstick by which sincerity of various other US pronouncements re relations with Czechoslovakia would be judged. Duda emphasized Czech view that US position linking gold with claims settlement indefensible on legal and moral grounds. 2. Stoessel explained that we were reviewing our position and intend offer constructive proposals soon. He said we wish to see problem settled but pointed out negotiating history shows both sides have recognized gold and claims were linked and that it is in our mutual interest to work out solution to claims problem which would be defensible to Congress and the public. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Phelps, cleared by EE and Stoessel, and approved by Stoessel. 2 See footnote 5, Document 47 . 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 1 Washington, April 13, 1967, 7:56 p.m. 175032. Ref: Prague 1685. 2 1. Department agrees with Embassy recommendation that Ambassador call on Minister of Transport and/or Minister of Foreign Trade supporting invitation to Czech delegation by both Douglas and Boeing to visit US plants. Washington representatives of both manufacturers informed Department April 12 that invitations still stand. 2. Department concurs in Ambassador's plan to arrange such calls through MFA and recommends that approach be made soonest. Czech delegation may be encouraged to call at Department and other interested US agencies. 3. FYI. You should be aware that House Banking and Currency Committee presently holding hearings on further 5-year extension of Exim charter beyond June 30, 1968. Hearings have revealed vocal minority sentiment in favor of restricting authority of Exim to help finance exports to Communist countries. Despite such sentiment, outlook appears favorable for Exim re-chartering without restrictions. While publicity about Czech visit could complicate re-chartering approval and some publicity may be unavoidable if Czechs visit Douglas and Boeing plants, we believe invitations should be supported. Exim willing to receive Czech delegation if it comes to Washington, but you should not make specific reference to Exim in your conversations with Czechs. End FYI. 4. Wallace, Douglas representative, discussed with Department officers April 12 need to invite Czech delegation ASAP, since decision on purchase may be made within 30 days. Delegation should expect to spend 10–12 days in US. Wallace believes Czechs no longer seriously considering purchase of UK's VC–10. 5. Karlik, Director General of Czechoslovak State Airlines (CSA) informed Wallace that Czechs under strong political pressure to purchase IL–62 from USSR, but that Karlik prefers US aircraft and needs USG help to continue having Boeing and Douglas considered. Thus, Karlik believes that approach by Ambassador would give CSA another opportunity to press for US aircraft. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 12–2 CZECH. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Christiano; cleared in E, H, EUR, S/S, the Export-Import Bank, and the Department of Commerce; and approved by Katzenbach. 2 Telegram 1685, April 10, reported on talks between a representative of Douglas Aircraft and Czech officials. (Ibid.) 51. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 51. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, July 10, 1967, 1630Z. 55. 1. As Department will have noticed, current international situation seems to have furnished Czechs with new pretext for hardening official attitudes toward US in recent weeks. 2. We have the impression that the regime in its immediate outlook is motivated by purpose of isolating and ostracizing the US, and even insulting and humiliating us. Another fact is perhaps regime's frustration stemming from US failure to liberalize trade (MFN) and to take other steps in the economic/financial area. FonMin hard-liners have gone so far as to represent return of looted Czech gold as a make-or-break issue. 3. Czechs apparently feel they can pursue their present course with impunity because of recent successful effort to acquire international respectability. For them this is what Montreal is all about 2 and they actively push same goal in exchanges of state visits with our Western allies. Against this background what they appear to seek especially from the US as still readily attainable is a continuation of scientific and academic grants for selected Czech nationals in pursuit of technological know-how. We know Czech authorities attach considerable importance to such programs. They have taxed British with not coming anywhere near the some 200 grants (official and private) extended to Czechs in US. 4. I believe that without entering on any irreversible steps and certainly without altering our present visa and tourist policies, we should be thinking about how we might scale down the advantages Czechs derive to a level more consistent with state of bilateral relations they have imposed. 5. Starting with US Government grants, we should review those of predominantly Czech benefit mostly in physical and engineering science with a view to a selective non-renewal for successor candidates. Word that time and atmosphere are not opportune could also be discreetly passed to some of US academic groups sponsoring ambitious programs for Czechoslovakia. Even though some exchanges of special interest to us might suffer, the message would soon get across to authorities here that they cannot continue with their present policies without paying a price. 6. It might also be wise to discourage prominent American visitors from coming to Czechoslovakia for prestige purposes until such time as there are signs they will be properly received. Our government spokesmen, and especially those on speaking trips throughout US, could perhaps counter Czechoslovakia's more blatant distortions of fact on international and bilateral issues in a manner which would get back to policymakers here. External media, including VOA, could also play a part. 7. On other side of the coin and specifically with reference to economic relations where we may shortly confront Czechs again, I recommend we proceed in a straightforward manner, not only as a matter of equity but also wise expediency. Our suggested approach has been set forth in a series of messages, in particular Prague's 1642, April 5, 3 and we feel strongly that demands for a substantially higher figure on claims would be unattainable and counterproductive. We would not expect Czechs to accept every offer the Embassy has proposed (thus placing US domestic embarrassment of an immediate return of gold under present international conditions), but effort would at least help deflect a head-on clash while affording an opportunity of engaging Czechs in faith so discussion of a settlement that would be feasible and fair. [sic] We have promised to follow up on their March request for return of gold and I hope that our response will not be much longer delayed. 8. In short, while believing we should match Czech actions by bearing down in some of political and prestige areas first mentioned, we think our long-term interests would be safeguarded by showing for our part we are amenable to this type of businesslike approach, including such pragmatic initiatives as bilateral air agreement and continuing alleviations in trade. Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US. Confidential; Limdis. 2 Reference is to the Montreal “Expo '67” world fair. 3 Document 48 . 52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 1 Washington, November 10, 1967, 0118Z. 2 67657. Subject: Gold/Claims. 1. Leddy-Duda meeting held November 8. 2. Prior to presenting Duda with Aide-Memoire on settlement of outstanding US-Czech economic questions, Leddy stated we have completed thorough and exhaustive review problems unsettled issues of claims and gold in sincere effort find solution which might be mutually acceptable. As result this review would like to lay on the table, for purposes discussion, proposal which we hope might commend itself to Czech Government as basis for beginning serious negotiations. We do not put this forward in spirit of “take it or leave it,” but rather as contribution to discussion and in spirit of seeking accommodation in order to achieve a fair settlement all around. 3. Leddy then reviewed elements proposal: First , proposal embraces: a) Settlement of claims. b) Settlement of blocked Czech funds in US and blocked US funds in Czechoslovakia. c) Question of Czech dollar bonds. d) Release to Czechoslovakia of accumulated social security payments under Treasury Circular 655. e) Regularization of payments situation under Surplus Property Agreement. f) Immediate release of Czech gold upon conclusion of agreement. Second , with respect to claims: a) Are proposing settlement which would both give credit to Czecho for full value ($17 million) of steel mill and also be as equitable to Czechoslovakia as average of our settlements with other socialist countries. In addition, we are proposing methods of payment which take into consideration balance of payments situation of Czechoslovakia. Essential elements: (1) Original claims filed were $300 million. (2) After hearings, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission established figures of $72 million of principal plus accrued interest of $41 million, or total of $113 million. (3) US proposal is: (a) settlement for total of $44 million. (This is about 61% of principal, or average of settlements with other socialist countries.) (b) Crediting of $17 million for steel mill, so that remaining balance is $27 million. (c) Spreading of payments so that only $2 million would be immediately payable and remainder over 8 years—or about $3 million yearly. Third , with respect to Treasury Circular 655 and social security payments, we estimate there is backlog of $5 million immediately available to Czechoslovakia and $500,000 annually. Pending Congressional legislation could eliminate back-payments or limit them to 12 months. We hopeful 12-month grace period will be adopted thus allowing back-payments in Czechoslovakia if agreement reached. Fourth , with respect to surplus property, 80% of past debt would be spread out over 4 years ($4 million) and only 20% immediately ($1 million). (Annual payments over and above would be $300,000.) Fifth , freeing of blocked accounts here and in Czecho would mean about $1.7 million due Czecho and $1.1 million due US—a net gain to Czecho of $600,000. Finally , leaving aside question of bond settlement, which still to be negotiated, if US proposal accepted, we estimate: a) Czechs would receive immediately some $26 million (gold $20 million, social security $5 million, $600,000 net unblocked funds). b) Czechs would have pay immediately only $3 million. Rest would be spread out over extended period. 4. After reading Aide-Mémoire and listening to Leddy presentation, Duda commented that during his visit to Prague this summer he had found GOC considered attitude of USG toward this problem as a measure of its good will to improve bilateral relations. Duda added: (a) Agreement initialed in 1961 constitutes best basis for settlement. This agreement result long negotiations. (b) He without instructions thus in no position to reply. But speaking frankly and personally he felt this proposal no basis for solution to problems. He would, however, duly transmit Aide-Memoire and Leddy comments to his Government. (c) Said $44 million claim based on exaggerations which do not correspond with actual losses. Leddy interjected that Department willing to review all claims awards with Duda or any member his staff. Leddy added war damage not included in awards. (d) Inclusion full value of steel mill not new but had been agreed to previously by USG during 1959 negotiations, he believed. (e) Outlay connection this proposal would be very heavy and couldn't believe b/p taken into consideration, particularly since trade with US worsening and likely deteriorate further under Kennedy Round. (When pressed, Duda admitted that b/p vis-á-vis US this year better than ever.) (f) He had been given impression from various Department officials that our proposal would be flexible and constructive and now disappointed. (g) Proposal creates entirely new situation. He would have to await Prague instructions before making further comment. GOC reaction may be transmitted either through Czech Embassy here or to US Embassy Prague. 5. Leddy thanked Ambassador for his comments and said he did not wish to review history of initialed note of 1961 except to add that it was initialed ad referendum and when examined by senior Department officers found unacceptable. Stressed again sincerity with which our proposal drafted. We believe it flexible. 6. Duda seemed surprised by claims figure of $44 million. He made no comment about gold and did not attack any other features of Aide-Mémoire. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Batjer, cleared in EE, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Brussels for Petrow. 2 Beginning in 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 In telegram 1088 from Prague, December 8, the Embassy reported that while it had yet to receive an official reply to the U.S. aide-mémoire, Czech officials had been “stunned” by the offer, which they regarded as a “provocation.” (Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH) 53. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 53. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, December 2, 1967, 1130Z. 1063. Subject: Political changes rumored. Rumors of political changes are common stock in trade here and until now have proved false. Recently, however, they have become so open and persistent that I, together with some of my Western colleagues, in particular the Italian and British, believe they deserve notice. 2. Some of the rumors seem extreme and go so far as to predict Novotny's replacement in the Presidency by the aging General Svoboda and assumption of party power by Party Secretary Kolder who has been visiting the UK. Presidium member Cernik's name also continues to appear in the latter connection. Whether or not these reports derive from a background similar to that which produced the spurious Writers' Manifesto published in the London Sunday Times , 2 there may be good reasons for rumor circulation, if not for the inevitability of portending change. 3. The current year has not been a good one for the regime. While the classic Communist production indices have been favorable, the new economic reform is simply not yielding intended results and is likely to run into further political and technical difficulties which may come to a head in the party plenum scheduled for the first half of the month. The writers remain quiescent for the time being but unsatisfied, while a new source of trouble has loomed from local student quarters and their reaction to police brutality in putting down the October 31 demonstration where extremely serious consequences could have resulted from a loss of life. 3 The investigation which it is announced Prime Minister Lenart will head could affect the position of the security forces. 4. Over and above all of this is the general recognition that the government and the party suffer from internal confusion and are not operating efficiently. It has been reported publicly that the party's role is being re-examined and it is likely that more is taking place behind the scenes. The opportunities to speculate on possible combinations are infinite. As explained to me by a knowledgeable source, an obstacle to reform is that changes would be regarded as imputing blame and humiliation, especially for Novotny, which it is considered desirable to avoid. Even divesting Novotny of some of his functions and burdens could have that effect. 5. According to one of my Eastern European colleagues, questions of changes and reorganization were considered peripherally at the September plenum among some of those concerned. Action was deferred on the grounds that it would deviate from and go beyond the compromises and accommodations worked out at the May 1966 Party Congress. My informant thought that a larger consensus and more discussion would be required and that it was even questionable whether decisions would be reached at this month's plenum. 6. On balance, it looks as though leadership changes are in fact under consideration. Given the party's history of stability, however, and the difficulties of selecting a new team acceptable to contending factions, the present leadership may still have time to work out tolerable solutions to its admittedly grave problems. Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Vienna and Munich. 2 Reference is to “Manifesto to the Western World,” published in the London Times, September 3. 3 The police had assaulted students holding a non-political rally in Prague. The incident provoked mass demonstrations and a student strike against “socialist illegality.” 54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 1 Washington, December 9, 1967, 0149Z. 82369. Following summaries two INR Intelligence Notes 975 and 978 sent Secretary December 7 and 8: 2 Brezhnev's December 8 arrival in Prague on unexpected “short friendly visit,” on eve of Czechoslovak Central Committee Plenum reportedly to deal with leadership changes, adds another imponderable to confused Party-Government leadership situation in Prague. Visit comes in midst of persisting rumors in Prague of impending top leadership changes, most of them involving Party First Secretary and President Novotny. Whatever merit of rumors, it is incontestable that recent failures in Czechoslovak foreign and domestic policies have increased disaffection and dissension within Party to such extent they pose most serious challenge to stability of Novotny leadership in more than decade. While no single Party leader or faction has emerged to threaten directly Novotny's position, his authority and prestige appear to have been eroded considerably over past months. Arrival of Brezhnev “at invitation of Czechoslovak Party and Government” injects element of possible Soviet intervention in Czechoslovak leadership developments. Although Kremlin undoubtedly reluctant to interfere in Czechoslovak affairs, it may feel it has no alternative to action intended to insure stable regime in Prague. Soviets undoubtedly realize any interference would render them liable to charges from Chinese and others of crass interference in affairs another party and possibly unite Czechoslovak party against Soviets, as nothing else could. Should Novotny be deposed in wake of Brezhnev visit, Soviets could escape these charges. Probable that Novotny instrumental in having Brezhnev visit Prague, in effort to shore up his position and obtain Soviet sanction for any measures he may take, including personnel changes in leadership, to give appearance of coping with political, economic, and cultural-ideological difficulties. Soviets probably prefer to have Novotny remain in power, since he known quantity to them. Moreover, he could hardly be faulted for not supporting Soviet foreign policy positions on such matters as Sino-Soviet dispute, International Communist Conference, etc. since he long one of strongest Soviet supporters among ruling Communist leaders. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 USSR. Secret. Drafted by Costalanski, cleared in EE and SOV, and approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Sofia, Warsaw, and Berlin. 2 Neither found. 55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 1 Washington, February 13, 1968, 1630Z. 114361. Subject: Policy Recommendations and Assessment. Ref: Prague 1304 and A–344. 2 1. Embassy's policy recommendations and assessment welcomed. 2. Since political, social and economic situation in Czechoslovakia still very unclear and obviously in state of flux, believe our posture at moment should in general be one of responsiveness to positive Czech approaches without attempting to precipitate Czech action. 3. Agree position of new First Secretary Dubcek cannot be properly evaluated at this time because lack concrete information on his past performance and his future intentions. Even if his intention is one of Czechocentrism, road to this goal likely to be long and tedious if bloc political crisis to be avoided. Before he can begin to direct Party and Government on internal or external matters he must gain control Party apparatus, a feat still not accomplished and one which may take months. 4. While Dubcek solidifying position, internal affairs continue drift or be handled in interim manner, i.e., student unrest, intellectual ferment, and all important economic reform. As initial high hopes of progressives and of watching public cool, interim solutions may fall apart and deepen Czech crisis forcing Party to take firmer position re internal matters and to submit to bloc pressures. 5. If Dubcek and company intend develop more independent posture and able do so, they will certainly see need to improve relations with West, including US. There are many obvious ways available to them to indicate this desire. 6. Department will comment on Embassy's specific recommendations by septels 3 except for bilateral civil air negotiations which successfully concluded Washington, February 9, 4 and Brno Fair in which Czechs already advised we will participate. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CZECH–US. Confidential. Drafted by Batjer, cleared by Costalanski and USIA, and approved by Lisle. 2 In telegram 1304, January 30, the Embassy outlined its recommendations for future negotiations with the Czechs, cautioning against a precipitous opening to the emerging Dubcek regime. (Ibid.) Airgram A–344, January 26, outlined the changes that had taken place in Czech politics and assessed the problems facing the nation's new leaders. (Ibid.) 3 The Department of State's comments concerning cultural policy were forwarded in telegram 114460, February 13. (Ibid., EDX CZECH–US) Its views on a consular convention were the subject of telegram 115967, February 15. (Ibid., CON 4 CZECH–US) It commented on social security issues in telegram 116878, February 16. (Ibid., PS 14–4 CZECH) The Department outlined its views on the gold issue in telegram 117516, February 19. (Ibid., FN 19 CZECH) It dealt with trade mission negotiations in telegram 125298, March 6. (Ibid., TP 7) 4 The second round of discussions on an air transport agreement commenced on January 22. For text of the civil air agreement, signed at Prague on February 28, 1969, and entered into force the next day, see 20 UST 408. 56. Memorandum of Conversation 56. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 21, 1968. SUBJECT Political Developments in Czechoslovakia; Various US-Czech Bilateral Questions PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Dr. Karel Duda, Czechoslovak Ambassador Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs I lunched alone today with Ambassador Duda at his residence. The following subjects came up in the course of our conversation. 1. Czechoslovak Political Developments . The Ambassador said he expected that Novotny would bow to public pressures and would resign his post as President in the very near future. 2 The Ambassador felt that the Central Committee Plenum on March 28 would be very important. He anticipated that, at this meeting, an action program would be elaborated and that a number of personnel changes in the government would be decided. He thought that the action program would include various measures designed to further the process of democratization in his country. Among these, he anticipated that an increased role for the Central Committee would be provided for and that the police would be “brought under control”. Various proposals are being considered with regard to this question, but the Ambassador thought that the most likely solution would be for the police to be removed from the Ministry of Interior and to be put under the authority of the Minister of Justice. The Ambassador also felt that the action program would direct Czech foreign relations in general terms, indicating a desire for good relations with all countries regardless of ideological considerations. He said that, realistically speaking, it must be recognized that the Viet-Nam conflict posed a problem in US-Czech relations; nevertheless, he felt that, within the limits imposed by this situation, the new leaders in Prague would wish to improve relations with the United States. The Ambassador repeatedly expressed his pleasure at changes taking place in Prague and said he was confident that things were moving in a desirable direction and would continue to do so. He ruled out any “foreign intervention” (obviously meaning from the Soviet side), although he acknowledged that, if civil strife developed and there were bloodshed, the situation could change radically. However, he did not anticipate that matters would go this far. 2. Extradition of General Sejna . 3 The Ambassador spoke with great seriousness about this case. He observed that it was ironic, to say the least, that Sejna, who represented the worst element of the “conservative” clique in Czechoslovakia, should find a haven in the United States. He stressed that the Sejna case was of political importance and said that it would be most unfortunate if the main problem with which the new leadership had to deal in its relations with the United States was a refusal to extradite Senja. The Ambassador said he was particularly concerned about the possibility that Sejna might be exploited in this country on TV and in the press. He mentioned that he had seen several days ago in The Washington Post an indication that Sejna might appear on “Meet the Press”. He felt that this would be greatly resented in his country. The Ambassador added that he expected to be seeing me within the next few days to present additional evidence from Prague concerning Sejna's criminal activities. In responding to the Ambassador, I agreed that the Sejna case had its ironic aspects; however, it should be understood we had not sought Sejna out—he had come to us. I remarked that, as the Ambassador was well aware, we were handling the request for his extradition in strict accord with the provisions of our Extradition Treaty with Czechoslovakia. Consideration of such a request was time-consuming. In the meantime, there was no intention on our part to exploit the case through publicity, and I certainly did not anticipate that the General would be appearing on any TV program. The Ambassador appeared to take special note of my last comment. 3. Trade and Gold/Claims Negotiations . Other than the immediate question presented by the Sejna case, the Ambassador observed that the two outstanding problems between our countries were in the field of trade and gold/claims matter. On trade, the main question is obviously that of most-favored-nation treatment for Czechoslovakia. Ambassador Bohlen had told him this morning 4 that liberalizing trends in Czechoslovakia might have a favorable impact on Congressional representatives in considering most-favored-nation treatment for Czechoslovakia; the Ambassador felt this might well be true, although he was not optimistic that any favorable action on MFN would be taken during this calendar year. I said that I would not dispute the Ambassador's conclusion, although I certainly agreed with Ambassador Bohlen's remarks to him, and thought that sooner or later the trend of events in Czechoslovakia, if continued, would produce favorable results. On the matter of gold/claims, the Ambassador said that, as we knew, the authorities in Prague took a very negative view of our proposals. However, on his advice, the Czech side had held off giving us a formal, negative response to our note. The Ambassador hinted that, given the political uncertainties in the United States at this time, it might be considered advisable to leave the whole question open pending our elections in November; thereafter it might appear that the United States would be willing to take a more forthcoming stand on the problem. I emphasized to the Ambassador that the gold/claims problem was not really political in nature, and I strongly discouraged him from thinking that our election could affect our position on the problem one way or the other. Regardless of the Administration in power, or of its views concerning improving relations with Czechoslovakia, the fact would remain that we had a very large outstanding claims settlement still pending with Czechoslovakia and the interests of the U.S. claimants had to be taken into account. I reminded the Ambassador that our proposal had not been made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 5 While we felt that our proposal had been a reasonable one, and certainly any counter-proposal would have to be “in the ball park” of the general framework sketched out in our proposal, we would welcome suggestions from the Czech side as to how they would envisage a settlement. I felt that a completely negative Czech response would be regrettable and I urged the Ambassador to consider the possibility of further discussions with us of the problem. 4. Export of Czech Airplanes . The Ambassador mentioned in passing that his Embassy would be in touch with the Department in the near future in connection with sales possibilities for light Czech airplanes and gliders in the United States. He said he had already received hundreds of inquiries from California about such products and he hoped that a good market could be developed in the United States for these items. 5. The Ambassador did not raise at any point the question of security in Washington of official Czech installations. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held in Ambassador Duda's residence. 2 Novotny resigned on March 22. 3 Major General Jan Sejna, head of the Communist Party apparatus within the Czech Defense Ministry and close collaborator of Novotny, defected on February 25, following revelation of a plan to use military units in support of Novotny. 4 No memorandum of this conversation has been found. 5 See Document 52 . 57. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 57. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, March 25, 1968, 1600Z. 1667. Subject: After the fall. 1. For first time in history, a Communist regime has purged top leader by bringing popular pressure to bear on him. The occasion warrants reflection on what this means for Czechoslovakia and for US interests. 2. While Novotny's fall was necessary to progressive coalition's objectives as well as symbolically important, it by no means solves coalition's problems. As coalition attempts cope with selection new President, weeding out remaining Novotnyites, and working out and trying implement action program, it faces two principal sources of friction: a. Members of the coalition—e.g., Kolders and Cerniks—who are getting or may get cold feet about unbridled democratization and who might join forces with those conservatives who manage to save their positions; b. Possibility that democratization will run out of control, leading to dangerous demands (e.g., for neutrality or takeover by non-Communists) by significant organizations, embarrassing mass demonstrations, or violence. 3. To take latter difficulty first, one obvious factor is that Czechs are not Poles or Hungarians. Neither history nor popular attitudes thus far in crisis suggest that Czechs as a nation will lose their heads. Small minority may stridently urge extreme ideas, but majority would probably remain passive, and if coalition (it may still be too early to call it a regime) is able to continue to give vocal minority chance to blow off steam seems unlikely that trouble would arise on that score. Students have been significant plus on progressive side and may become even more politically active, but their restraint thus far (especially in Prague) has been noteworthy and it seems unlikely they would deliberately endanger regime they felt was working in right direction. Slovaks are historically less averse to taking risks but will probably be occupied with discussions of federalism at least in immediate future. 4. More immediate prospect of resistance is from proponents of caution and conservatism working within framework of victorious coalition. Cernik has suggested that adoption of action program should bring discussion to an end; if new [garble] tries to do so it will alienate its more progressive supporters and possibly open way for new political crisis. In any case coalition will be highly vulnerable to dissension in its ranks when it begins dealing with specific issues. For example there are signs that trade unions may come to life and if so they will certainly cast critical eye on some aspects of economic reform; probable desire of economic reformers to sit firmly on trade unions in such case could put them at odds with political reformers who may welcome trade unions as independent force. Czech-Slovak problems are obviously another fertile field for manipulations to break up the coalition. 5. Obvious question mark is Moscow's attitude. Embassy Moscow is in better position to judge but as of today following Dubcek's return from Dresden 2 certain Czechs are giving some colleagues, especially the British, the impression they have turned the corner with the Soviets insofar as concerns present reliability and intent. Still in question is the effect of compounded events in Czechoslovakia and Poland, enlivened by memories of 1956, and probably plied by hysterical East Germans. The Soviets of course have powerful economic (to say nothing of military) levers at their fingertips, but will they attempt to use them in a drastic way? Or, more to the point, will Czechoslovakia give cause to use them? It can be hoped that lessons were learned on all sides from 1956, and it can be expected that Prague will do its utmost to avoid any high risk foreign policy moves. What cannot be predicted is ultimate scope of domestic democratization and Soviet reaction thereto. 6. The reawakening of political life which we are witnessing will not easily be stopped. In fact, leaders of coalition apparently do not expect that genie of open public discussion which they let loose to bring Novotny down will now meekly return to its bottle; they seem prepared to live with their genie and to use it as instrument for working out solutions to overwhelming problems which face their country. We still remain skeptical that genuine democracy can successfully be restored in Czechoslovakia behind Communist facade. But without yielding to apocalyptic prophecy, it is obvious that consequences of even partial success would reach far beyond the borders of this small country. 7. Trend here is obviously in US interest and Embassy believes we should ponder what can be done to encourage it. Embassy will offer suggestions in later tel. 3 Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Paris, Sofia, Vienna, Warsaw, Munich, and Berlin. 2 He was attending a March 23 meeting of Communist Party leaders. 3 The Embassy forwarded its suggestions regarding a U.S. low profile in response to changes in Czechoslovakia in telegram 1693 from Prague, March 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CZECH) 58. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (Beam) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) 58. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (Beam) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) 1 Washington, April 26, 1968. SUBJECT Czechoslovak Claims/Gold—Information Memorandum Discussion: When I saw the Under Secretary last week he asked me to follow up with you a suggestion to have a new look at the above question. He thought that alternate possibilities should be explored in the light of recent events in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Katzenbach suggested Governor Harriman be informed and consulted in view of his concern with our nationalization claims against Czechoslovakia in 1964. Accordingly, a copy of this paper is being sent to him, as well as to other interested parties in the Department. The crux of the matter is that against the background of earlier negotiations with us, the Czech Government is mounting a major campaign for the return of some $22 million of monetary gold looted by the Nazis. This gold is now held in US, UK and French custody, but we have refused to agree to its release pending a settlement of our nationalization claims and other outstanding financial matters. The Czechs insist that we concluded an agreement in December 1961 2 (which, in principle, we did) whereby we would have accepted some $11–12 million in payment of our claims (this sum representing $9 million from our sale of the American steel mill purchased by but denied to the Czechs, plus $2 million in an additional Czech contribution, but at the cost of $8 million to the Czechs because of the loss suffered by them in our sale of the steel mill); that we have repudiated this agreement as well as the work accomplished in the earlier negotiations started in 1955; and that we have created a new and unacceptable situation in our latest proposal of November 7, 1967 3 which increased our claims fourfold to a total of $44 million. The above proposal does, however, offer the Czechs certain benefits in a seven-year stretch-out repayment period and in a possible windfall of some $5 million and a continuing half-million dollars annually due in dollar payments to US social security annuitants in Czechoslovakia. Our proposal nevertheless lacks an essential adjunct to make it negotiable, namely, our restoration of MFN which we are unable to provide because of the non-enactment of the East-West trade legislation. In my view, we possess two guarantees, or bargaining levers, to secure satisfaction of our citizens' legitimate claims, namely, non-release of the gold and the negotiating value of an eventual restoration of MFN. I seriously question whether it is necessary to hold both of these in our hands at the present time. I am firmly convinced that the second factor will be decisive and that we will not get a claims settlement of anywhere near the amount we are asking until we can exploit the prospect of restoring MFN. By continuing our present course we put ourselves in the position of receiving nothing more for our claimants for the foreseeable future, while we bring down on ourselves the odium of blocking the return of gold looted from the Czechs by their Nazi invaders. Palliatives, such as trying to reach partial settlements through offsets on blocked accounts, may help a little but not very much, as long as the main issues remain at an impasse. Real heat is likely to build up against us later this year when Czechoslovakia observes the 50th anniversary of its founding (in Pittsburgh) as a nation. There are cogent political reasons for trying to do better, especially when our aim should be to differentiate in the new regime's favor and to develop relations which could promote our influence and interests in the Communist world. Recommendation: That as and when new discussions become possible, we attempt to renegotiate the agreement of December 1961 whereby: (1) We would accept as a partial settlement and as an installment on our claims an amount in the order of the $2 million in new money offered by the Czechs in December 1961. (Actually we should try for a higher figure in view of the easements included in our November 7, 1967 proposal which should be retained.) (2) We would agree to the release of the monetary gold on condition it were recognized that a final claims settlement remained open for future negotiation. (Here we would make it bluntly clear that MFN would not be granted until such a settlement were reached.) Final Justification: A precedent for this approach exists in the UK agreement with the Czechs to consent to the release of the gold against payment of 1 million pounds on account on British nationalization claims. In our case, we would gain the benefits: (1) of receiving an immediate increment (which could satisfy most of the individual small claimants); and (2) of divesting ourselves of a political embarrassment while retaining at the same time the essential bargaining lever of MFN. 1 Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 70. Confidential. Drafted by Beam. Copies were sent to Harriman, Meeker, Solomon, Campbell, and Lisle. Beam was in Washington for consultations. A handwritten note on the source text by Bohlen reads: “I agree with this approach. CEB” 2 See footnote 3, Document 37 . 3 See Document 52 . 59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, April 27, 1968, 0045Z. 154242. Ref: Bonn 11211. 2 1. Czech situation under close consideration. Contingencies involving possible Czech appeals to US for economic support have been studied. Under present legislative restrictions (no aid, PL-480, Exim loans or guarantees, MFN tariff treatment), regrettably our ability to respond in such circumstances is limited. Also this connection Czechoslovakia is substantial supplier of arms to North Viet-Nam. 2. Major US-Czech issue of gold/claims settlement remains. Czechs have indicated they will respond negatively to our November 1967 proposal for settlement this issue. 3 We will carefully consider Czech response but are not prepared to consent, as Czechs desire, to release Nazi-looted Czech gold until there is satisfactory settlement of US financial claims. Gold is our only effective leverage for such settlement. 3. With regard possibility West European countries, including FRG, extending financial assistance to Czechs, we would encourage such action. 4. Our position on Czech developments is to make clear informally and discreetly to Czechs on appropriate occasions that we welcome steps they are taking toward liberalization. We believe it advisable to avoid any steps at this time likely to embarrass new leadership in its internal course or its delicate relationships with Soviet Union and other EE neighbors. 5. When appropriate, you may inform FRG and others of our position. Western Embassies here well briefed regarding our position and legislative limitations vis-á-vis financial assistance to Czechoslovakia. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Batjer; cleared by Lisle, L, and E; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Prague, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Brussels for Petrow, USNATO, and Berlin. 2 Telegram 11211, April 24, reported German Foreign Ministry comments on Czechoslovakia's financial position. (Ibid.) 3 See Documents 52 and 56 . 60. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 60. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 10, 1968. SUBJECT Soviet threats to Czechoslovakia I have thought further about our conversation yesterday. 2 I conclude that it would be a serious mistake not to give the Soviets a private signal of concern about troop movements near Czechoslovakia. 3 1. In retrospect, our failure to deter the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948 was one of the most serious mistakes of our foreign policy since the war. Firm diplomatic action then—a period of our nuclear monopoly—could well have prevented the Cold War. Similarly, our public statement in 1956 that we would not intervene gave the Soviets a full license. 4 Obviously, the situation has profoundly changed. 2. What is at stake now is the process of movement towards détente—the policy of the President's speech of October 7, 1966; 5 the NATO resolution of last December accepting the Harmel Exercise Report; 6 the German Eastern policy; and the possibility of real improvement in the political climate in Europe, leading to mutual and balanced force reductions. Progress in this direction would be set back if the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia. I simply do not agree that Soviet efforts in Eastern Europe would fail to stamp out liberal trends. They have long since proved their capacity to keep the animals tame by police methods, and their willingness to do so. 3. The Russians must be hesitating. The moment to give them a deterrent signal is therefore now. It will be too late once they cross the border. 4. we should use the occasion to the maximum to fortify our European and NATO relations, accelerating the processes which have been started during the last year. I therefore recommend: (1) that the President and you see Dobrynin together, preferably today (a) to ask the Soviets what these reports mean; (b) to express the hope that they do not portend any change in the policy of movement towards détente. We could say that we have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, and hope that the Soviets will continue to pursue the same policy; that the present process of improving the political climate step by step is the only possible path to true détente in Europe, including the possibility of reaching an accommodation on the German question; that the use of force in Europe would set in motion processes we cannot now foresee, but which perhaps neither of us could control; (2) that we use our new machinery of political consultation in Europe to consult intensively with our NATO allies about all aspects of these events; (3) that we consider setting up a high-level special group of NATO allies—of those who wish to do so—here in Washington, to remain in continuous touch with us on the implication of these events, and to develop together proposals of policy for dealing with them; (4) that the NATO military side examine these problems intensively, and be prepared to go on an alert or to make other appropriate demonstrations which might be warranted; (5) that the President consider the advisability of sending messages to Wilson, Kiesinger and De Gaulle asking for their views on the significance of these events and offering to review together, perhaps at the Ministerial level, the policies which should be pursued as the situation evolves. Effective consultation with our principal NATO allies over a matter so vital to the future of Europe would seem crucial if there is to be any future growth of the Alliance. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–USSR. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Bohlen and Leddy. In a May 11 note attached to the source text, Under Secretary Katzenbach commented: “I disagree strongly with both the analysis and the recommendations. So do the other senior officials of the Government with whom I have talked generally on this subject.” Rusk wrote on Katzenbach's note: “So do I. DR” 2 No record of this conversation has been found. 3 Soviet forces stationed in Poland had carried out troop maneuvers near the border with Czechoslovakia at the beginning of May. 4 Apparently a reference to President Eisenhower's October 31, 1956, national address on the Hungarian and Suez crises. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents , 1956, pp. 453–455 and 648–650. 5 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pp. 1125–1130. The President expressed his desire to improve relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. 6 For text of the communiqué and the Harmel report on the future of NATO, see Department of State Bulletin , January 8, 1968, pp. 49–52. 61. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 61. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, May 10, 1968, 1936Z. 11943. Subj: Czechoslovakia. 1. I know that urgent attention is being given in the Department to the question of what the reaction should be in the event of Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. This is also the case in the FRG and the FonOff has already asked us what the US will do if the Czech Government should request our assistance. Under the circumstances, I wish to set down relevant considerations as seen from here. 2. It is inevitable, of course, to recall the Hungarian experience. A major difference in the case of Czechoslovakia, however, is the presence of substantial US forces in Germany. This means that, contrary to the Hungarian case, we could in theory signal our support for the Czech Government by moving our troops closer to the Czech border or, indeed, cross the border to assist the Czechs in warding off a Soviet attack. I cannot, of course, on the basis of my responsibilities in Germany, make any significant contribution to whether this is desirable per se. Not only Germany but NATO would be deeply involved. 3. There is now a different attitude on the part of the German Government on dealing with the Soviets than was true a few years ago. The coalition's Eastern policy is not the same as that of previous governments. FonOff Acting Assistant Secretary Sahm raised the matter with us in a very preliminary way, and the view he conveyed can be summarized as follows: (a) the FRG must avoid any involvement internally in Czechoslovakia and (b) the United States should not undertake any action re Czechoslovakia from Germany, i.e., the utilization of any US forces stationed here. During the meeting this afternoon on border security (reported by septel) 2 Sahm, after a direct telephone call from State Secretary Duckwitz, emphasized the German wish that the United States fully respect German sovereignty in planning for a Czech emergency. Sahm also suggested that we review very carefully the output of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and RIAS during the current period. He clearly meant that any statements emanating from German soil which might seem to constitute intervention in the Czech situation should be avoided. 4. If the likelihood of Soviet military intervention increases, I believe that there should be further high level discussion with the FRG in order to insure that our thinking and planning on how to meet any crisis that might arise are running parallel. My present assessment—which still requires testing at a high German level—is that it would be unrealistic for us to think in terms of countermeasures involving action in or from Germany even if we were inclined in this direction. 3 McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USNATO, Prague, Munich, USEUCOM, USAREUR, and USAFE. 2 Telegram 11942 from Bonn, May 10. (Ibid, DEF 1–1 GER–W) 3 In telegram 11943 to Bonn, May 11, the Department of State responded that it would seek to avoid any military provocation by U.S. forces within Germany and was restraining the content of broadcasts in an effort to avoid any pretext for Soviet military action in Czechoslovakia. (Ibid.) 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, May 11, 1968, 0126Z. 162669. NATUS. For Ambassador Cleveland from the Under Secretary. Subject: Czechoslovakia. 1. In context of our overall review of Czech situation, we have been considering how best to handle NATO interest. On the one hand, situation requires great prudence. Developments of past few days obviously reinforce earlier NAC and POLADs discussions pointing to need for extreme caution on the part of Western countries and perforce NATO as an institution. On the other hand, we wish to avail ourselves in all appropriate ways of NATO facilities for information exchange and consultation. 2. Under these circumstances, you should be guided by following which you may convey to Brosio or others of your colleagues as Washington thinking: A. Using its routine NAC and POLADs procedures, NATO should maintain closest possible watch on situation and pool information and views from capitals as much as possible. (We are making every effort to keep you up to date for this purpose, including material for Situation Center.) B. We believe anything that has appearance of unusual concern, for example, special NAC session should be avoided due to visibility. C. As of now, we think public comments of any kind are risky and almost certainly would do more harm than good. Therefore any response to press queries, even on background basis, should be limited to fact that NATO is naturally following the situation through its normal consultation process. 3. We assume that under established procedures NATO military authority are also watching things closely from standpoint of their own plans and intelligence analysis. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by EUR/RPM and Stoessel, and approved by Katzenbach. 63. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 63. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, May 28, 1968, 1735Z. 2237. Subj: Call on Foreign Minister. 1. I called on Foreign Minister Hajek this morning. Sixth Section Chief Trhlik also present but did not, except as noted, take part in conversation. Talk lasting over hour dominated by gold/claims issue. In this specific connection as well as his general tone Hajek cast something of pall on hope I expressed for better relations. 2. I began talk by stating US following Czechoslovak developments with constructive interest and intensive study at all government levels, and that our reaction both public and official has been restrained, taking account of Czech problems. Noting US policy response to changes such as these tends to be calm and deliberate, I stated movement likely to be in future rather than immediate and pointed out I had brought back nothing definitive from Washington although we hoped talks on substantive matters could begin weeks or even days. 3. Hajek replied that my report afforded “certain hope” for improvement in relations, present level of which not very high, in fact “far from normal.” He asserted, however—a point he repeated later—that improvement up to us. He said he had returned to MFA after several years' absence to find same US–CSSR bilateral problems as in 1962 and professed to see not only no progress but even “certain deterioration” and hardening of US position in areas where Czechs wanted to cooperate in removing obstacles. 4. I observed it unfortunate when tone from past leaves us with many problems but said we now should work for improved atmosphere. I noted there have been some changes for better: expansion of mutually beneficial private and government-sponsored exchanges, progress in some technical and scientific areas including relaxation of US export licensing restrictions, and recent air agreement which we look forward to signing and believe will help augment commerce and traffic between our countries. 5. Hajek said he did not want to dwell on obstacles to better relations arising from world situation, of which Viet-Nam major example; he merely noted Czechs definitely opposed to US activity in Viet-Nam “which we consider aggressive” and hope for peace settlement. He wanted to discuss outstanding bilateral issues, especially gold/claims question; this topic occupied bulk of ensuing conversation. 6. Hajek began by stating he thought Czechs had sufficiently impressed on my predecessors their attitude on question. He gave his view of history of talks, including 1961 agreed principles and apparent US loss of interest in fulfilling settlement in early 1962. He noted Secretary told David in March that year 2 that US not interested because of CSSR attitude toward Cuba and similarly alluded to political obstacles in subsequent meetings with Czech FonMin. However, he said, US never raised question over content of proposed settlement until November 1967 when it apparently rejected everything previously agreed upon and proposed starting again at 1955 position without, however, giving reason. He said he did not doubt sincerity of US expression of good will but could not see how it reconcilable with American position on this problem. 7. I agreed that conclusions on principles reached in 1961, 3 but said that during next three years Czechs had engaged in haggling over formulation of agreement. In meantime Foreign Claims Commission on basis of evidence had arrived at adjudication of $72 million which was far out of line with $12 million envisaged in 1961 paper. New situation arose with strong understandable reactions from claimants and Congress. We had negotiated 1961 principles sincerely and in good faith but later came up against a political fact of life, namely they could not be implemented under changed conditions. Reviewing major provisions of alternative US proposal, 4 I said they afforded Czechs significant benefits, especially as regards deferred payments, and should be acceptable for consideration. I emphasized Department seriously interested in breaking out of impasse. 8. Hajek took up question of insufficiency of proposed claims settlement, stating he found it hard to believe this could have been overlooked in 6-year period before 1961 agreement. He alleged it sounded like pretext rather than real reason not to go forward with agreement, and would have hard time explaining it to his government, Czechoslovak National Assembly and public if new negotiations to open on basis of raised claim figure. 9. In any case, he continued, Czechs did not accept linkage of gold return and claims, because former represented giving back “what is ours.” He said for US to link its obligation to return gold under 1946 agreement with something else is perhaps without precedent, in any case not fair way to treat issue. Gold was taken from Czechoslovakia in difficult circumstances brought about by Western Powers (reverting to subject later he alleged US official documents in Foreign Relations series proved US involved in pressure resulting in Munich Agreement), and US has responsibility to liquidate effects of World War II. Instead it is trying through gold to exert pressure on small country. (He alleged US behavior in this instance suggested to him Fulbright book on Arrogance of Power; I rejected this recourse to an unofficial critic as unfair, subjective and out of place in our discussion.) 10. I said we both could agree that history of gold negotiations unfortunate, but that 1967 proposal could not have been surprise, since we had told Czech Embassy two years before we could not go through with principles. Czech right to gold never in question, but US claimants have substantial equal right to satisfactory settlement of their claims and natural linkage exists between two questions in overall settlement of outstanding economic and financial matters. Precedent exists for setoff of assets of negotiating countries in similar negotiations, e.g., US-Yugoslav and US-Bulgaria. 11. I warned Hajek we had been very restrained in voicing our grievance against Czech Government in non-fulfillment of claims. Compulsion to state our case fully would only exacerbate matters and could hopefully be avoided pending rational consideration of a new approach. 12. Hajek observed we both working for our respective governments and conceded I could not force Washington into offering something different in new proposals. However, he said, those working on those proposals should be aware of lack of understanding and bitterness is CSSR over US position up to now. He professed little hope for future talks, alleging Czechs could only look forward to protracted dealing and possible settlement which might be repudiated “as you repudiated 1961 agreement.” Thus, he said, he would be grateful if my optimism were fulfilled but he personally could not share it. In general, he said, Czechs knew big, rich US did not need their trade, and they in turn could live without their gold or MFN (he mentioned MFN issue only once in passing during whole conversation). But it would be better if US claimants got what their government considered adequate in 1961 and Czechs got their gold; then relations could develop more fully. 13. Other points: (A) I asked for a definitive report on Jordan case, 5 noting I had talked with JDC and they anxious for complete story. Hajek referred question to Trhlik who said case still under investigation but FMA would approach “proper authorities” for another interim report. (B) Hajek asked about reply to CSSR request for extradition of “former General Sejna,” stating US knew about his criminal activity and political background, neither of which should reinforce his request for political asylum. I replied case still under consideration and information supplied by Czechs taken into account. 14. In conclusion I noted that in receiving me the President wished to inform himself regarding Czech developments and that Secretary hopes to meet Hajek at UNGA, urging in the meantime we try to reach practical solutions. Hajek responded to latter point that he hoped talks with Secretary would be different from his predecessor's when atmosphere pleasant but nothing happened afterward on outstanding issues. 6 Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US. Confidential; Limdis. 2 For a memorandum of this conversation, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVI, Document 11 . 3 A statement of principles regarding the settlement of claims and other economic problems was signed in Prague by Ambassador Wailes and Foreign Minister David on December 8, 1961. See ibid., Document 12 . 4 See Document 52 . 5 Charles Jordan, European representative of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, disappeared and was murdered during an August 1967 visit to Prague. His body was recovered on August 20. In 1975, a Czech intelligence agency defector informed a U.S. Senate committee that Jordan had been killed by Palestinian terrorists while under Czech security surveillance. (Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Communist Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S. Hearings, November 18, 1975 (Washington, 1976), pp. 1–64) 6 In telegram 2238 from Prague, May 29, Beam noted: “It is particularly apparent from my talk with Hajek that Czechs believe they have found an effective anti-US issue in gold question.” He commented: “It probably suits their purpose to use such an issue to uphold their standing in Communist world and to prevent natural pro-American sympathies throughout the country from lending support to ultra-liberal wing in present reform movement.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US) 64. Editorial Note 64. Editorial Note On June 20, 1968, Assistant Secretary of State Leddy and Ambassador Duda exchanged letters that made U.S. annuitants living in Czechoslovakia eligible for Social Security and other benefit payments. Leddy also informed Duda that the United States was considering liberalization of its trade controls as applied to Czechoslovakia and would be submitting new proposals on the gold issue. The Assistant Secretary handed the Ambassador a note outlining U.S. plans. The text with commentary was transmitted in telegram 188016 to Prague, June 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US) 65. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 65. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, July 11, 1968, 1520Z. 4614. Subj: USSR-Czechoslovakia. 1. Summary. As Czech CP Congress approaches, Soviets apparently increasing pressure on Dubcek leadership to contain “democratization.” This reflects growing concern not only over danger of contamination other EEs with resultant adverse effects on their foreign as well as domestic policies, but also over possible reverberations in USSR itself. 2. Despite reported Brezhnev's tearful protestations to Smrkovsky's delegation 2 that Soviets did not even think of interfering in Czech internal affairs, they obviously attempting to do just that. Most dramatic evidence this effort are, of course, delay in departure Soviet troops after Warsaw Pact exercise and recent letters to CPCS from Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian CPs. After brief lull in press polemic with Czechs following Kosygin's “rest and cure” at Karlovy Vary, Soviets have also intensified their public campaign against proponents of liberalization in Czechoslovakia, with implied threat they would come to support true defenders of socialism. 3. Following their attack on Cisar (Moscow 4268), 3 Soviets seized upon letter Czech People's Militia to Soviet Ambassador Prague as pretext for well-publicized meetings throughout USSR expressing support for defenders of socialism and condemning “anti-socialist” elements in Czechoslovakia. This campaign included July 7 Pravda denunciation of Mlada Fronta's reaction to meetings, which ended with statement that “our Czech class brothers can always count on full understanding and support Soviet people.” Czech Embassy here also receiving from one to two hundred letters a day from Soviet citizenry endorsing Czech militia letter, and even Koucky expressed to British Ambassador his annoyance at action Soviet Government in stimulating such letters. 4. Continuing Soviet attacks on Czech liberals, yesterday's Literaturnaya Gazeta carried extremely sharp attack on Vaculik and his “2000 Words” declaration. 4 Article accuses Vaculik of attempting promote “hot summer” of chaos and disorganization in Czechoslovakia, of hating Communist Party and “truly popular democracy,” and of seeking establish “pure democracy” designed deprive CPCS of power. “2000 Words” labeled as provocative, anti-Communist, and counter-revolutionary program. Echoing Kirilenko's remark in Bologna that “no one has right close his eyes” to danger caused by imperialist attempts subvert socialist countries from within, article states “watershed” between “healthy” and “anti-socialist, in essence counter-revolutionary” forces increasingly evident in Czechoslovakia, and expresses bewilderment “2000 Words” published by four Prague papers and in effect supported by National Front President Kriegel on TV June 28. 5. While Literaturnaya Gazeta focused its attack on Vaculik personally, and in fact suggested he had had some difficulty in finding signers for declaration, today's Pravda article by Aleksandrov states “2000 Words” not isolated phenomenon but evidence growing activity rightists and outright counter-revolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia. Indeed, in asserting tactics used by these forces similar to and even more devious than those employed by Hungarian counter-revolutionaries in 1956, article implies Czechoslovakia on verge of anti-Communist revolt. Although Aleksandrov notes that “healthy” forces in CPCS regard “2000 Words” as open attack against socialist system, against leading role CPCS, and against friendship between Czechoslovakia and USSR, as well as other socialist countries, he also deplores “equivocal” stand taken by some of Czech leaders and attacks Prace, Zemedelske Noviny, Mlada Fronta, and Prague radio and TV for influencing public opinion in favor declaration. Pointing out other socialist countries closely watching Czech developments, Aleksandrov refers to Soviet meetings in support Czech Militia's letter, and cites criticism of “2000 Words” voiced by Rabotincheka Delo and Nepsabadszag. In what sounds like strong warning to Dubcek leadership, article expresses “confidence” Czech Communists will be able give resolute rebuff to reactionary, anti-socialist forces and ensure further development of country on road of socialism and friendship with all socialist states. Similar to Pravda July 7 denunciation of Mlada Fronta, it ends with ominous statement that in their struggle for strengthening socialism “working class and all working people of Czechoslovakia can always count on understanding and full support Soviet people.” 6. Another device used by Soviet press in criticizing Czech developments is to identify FRG with objectives pursued by Czech liberals. Latest piece along such lines, perhaps prompted by Ziak's suggestion Brandt visit Prague (Bonn 14142), 5 was July 5 Izvestiya article accusing Bonn of seeking spread deviously falsified interpretations of Marxism in effort split EE's among themselves and from USSR. 7. Last, but not least, Soviets' concern about Czech situation and their effort put pressure on Dubcek evident from Brezhnev's speeches on occasion Kadar visit and at reception military academies graduates July 8. Soviets probably do not hope be able turn clock back in Czechoslovakia, but they clearly making every effort stop it. Thompson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Budapest, Warsaw, Sofia, London, Berlin, Bucharest, Bonn, USNATO, Prague, Belgrade, Paris, and Munich. 2 The Chairman of the Czech National Assembly led a parliamentary delegation to Moscow June 4–15. He met with Brezhnev on June 14. 3 Apparently an incorrect reference. Telegram 4268 from Moscow, June 14, reported on the makeup of a Soviet scientific delegation. (Department of State, Central Files, SCI 40–3 IAEA) 4 A June 27 manifesto written by Ludvik Vaculik and signed by 70 prominent Czech intellectuals calling for a speed-up in democratization and denouncing party rule under the Novotny regime. For text, see Times Literary Supplement, July 18, 1968. 5 Telegram 14142 from Bonn, July 5, reported that the Czech Vice Foreign Minister had expressed a desire for a visit by Willy Brandt to Czechoslovakia. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W) 66. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 66. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, July 12, 1968. CONTINGENCY PAPER: UN AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA The current situation in Czechoslovakia may deteriorate to the point that UN involvement is inevitable, or desirable from the US point of view. This paper discusses how the UN might become involved; what the UN might hope to accomplish; and what role the US should take in the process. The sudden loss of Czechoslovakia's recently acquired freedom should the Soviets reassert control would inevitably provoke strong reactions in many parts of the world—even among those accustomed to the post-war division of Europe and more concerned with non-European colonial issues. According to Czechoslovakian announcement, Soviet forces now in Czechoslovakia are to begin their withdrawal on Saturday, July 13. 2 The question arises whether they actually will withdraw, and if they do not, what then may occur within Czechoslovakia. The desirability and probability of recourse to the UN depends on how the Soviets proceed. 1. How UN Might Become Involved The Soviet war of nerves now underway, accompanied by a Soviet refusal to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia or partial withdrawal and re-introduction might quickly lead to a confrontation between the two countries. We thus may be suddenly faced with a situation in which the Czech government appeals to the UN or other external sources for help, or violence flares. On the other hand, the issue may be somewhat less clearcut. It is possible, though unlikely, that the Soviets might replace the Dubcek regime with a pro-Moscow faction. It is possible that Dubcek is playing this on the side of the Russians. In either circumstance it might be difficult to engage the UN. Moreover, Dubcek might try to avoid UN involvement and keep the whole problem in a Warsaw Pact context. 2. Why the UN? Whatever efforts might be made by the Secretary General, the Security Council, or the General Assembly (as discussed below), the fact remains that the UN would not be able to take effective action against the Soviets. The primary purpose for involving the UN would be to expose Soviet brutality and catalyze international criticism of the Soviets, as a means of exerting some restraint on them. 3. Who Would Take the Lead? It would be preferable for Czechoslovakia itself, or a sympathetic Eastern European neighbor (Romania or Yugoslavia) to raise the issue at the UN. For the US to do so might risk the appearance of ulterior motives on our part, or of a cynical effort to manipulate a marginal matter to our own purposes. Possibly even worse would be for us to appear to be giving an implied commitment to help the Czechs. Nevertheless, in the event of outright Soviet intervention and Czech resistance, the US would probably take a leading role at the UN (if only because of domestic political pressures) either by introducing the question or by strongly supporting UN consideration if someone else moved first on Czechoslovakia's behalf. Because of Great Power involvement, the Secretary General would hesitate to undertake any role in the matter, especially on his own initiative. Because of the Soviet veto, the Security Council could not realistically take any meaningful decisions. Nevertheless, the first recourse would be to the Security Council, the appropriate UN organ. Assuming sufficient sympathy among the membership for the fate of this small Central European nation, the General Assembly might be able to come up with some useful recommendations. The degree to which the United States took an active role in the process would depend on the general UN reaction. 4. The UN Mechanism—How It Would Work. The SYG, the SC, and the GA Could All Be Engaged. a. Secretary General . Although at best it would have only marginal utility, the Secretary General might seek to exert his influence on Moscow, other Warsaw Pact capitals, and with the Third World to bring pressure to bear on the Soviets to cease interfering in Czech affairs. It is unlikely that if U Thant would agree to undertake such an effort he would succeed. b. Security Council . The Soviet veto would prevent the Council from reaching any decisions. The Council could discuss resolutions: —condemning the USSR for its intervention; —calling for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Czechoslovakia; —asking the Secretary General, a UN representative, or a committee of inquiry to investigate and report back to the Council. Support for such action would depend on the actual circumstances, but we should be able to count on Denmark, Brazil, Paraguay, and Ethiopia, in addition to the UK, France, China and Canada. It is more difficult to anticipate the positions of Senegal, Pakistan and India, but if France supported the majority probably Senegal would go along too. The USSR would be supported by Hungary and Algeria. c. General Assembly . Although there are limits on how far we might be able to push the matter (including, as mentioned, the degree of sympathy among the general membership), going to the Assembly would have the advantage of subjecting the Soviet action to sharp public criticism. Whether or not Moscow were condemned the exercise would serve as a reminder of the true nature of communism and Soviet brutality. Moreover, on the basis of the Hungarian experience, the Assembly could profitably adopt a number of resolutions of a humanitarian nature, such as assistance to refugees. 1 Source: Department of State, Bohlen Papers: Lot 74 D 379, Czech Contingency. Confidential. Drafted by Briggs. 2 Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces held military maneuvers in Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European states June 19–30. 67. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 67. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 20, 1968. SUBJECT Deterrent action with regard to Czechoslovakia I The possibility of Russian military intervention in Czechoslovakia is a matter of basic concern to the United States. Ambassador Thompson and others think the risk is increasing. Such an event could well torpedo the NPT and set back the trend towards détente in Europe. Its effect on our relations with the Soviet Union would probably reduce the chance for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and Viet-Nam, although it is conceivable that the Russians would make concessions in those two areas in return for our neutrality with regard to Czechoslovakia. On net, Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia would probably change the political atmosphere fundamentally in ways that could harm our interests. If the Czech government and people resist and call on the UN and NATO for help, we could be put in an extraordinarily dangerous dilemma. It would be difficult to explain why the UN Charter protects Korea against aggression, but not Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia is surely in the Soviet sphere of influence. But that fact hardly justifies murder in broad daylight. And if fighting broke out in Eastern Europe, the evolution of events could get completely out of hand. We should not forget that Russian soldiers fought with the Hungarian revolutionaries in 1956. On the other hand, if the Soviets hesitate and withdraw, allowing the process of liberalization to proceed in Eastern Europe, the political atmosphere should improve fundamentally, in ways most favorable to us. Poland would almost surely follow the Czech example. Ulbricht would be isolated. New possibilities for a settlement in Europe would be opened. We could hope for a toning down of Soviet imperialism in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Soviet leaders responsible for the failure of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe might well be thrown out, as Khrushchev was, to be replaced by leaders who would at least be weaker for a time than the present group. Since we have an immense national interest in a Russian decision not to intervene, and would face unforeseeable risks if they do, I believe that we should seriously consider the British suggestion of doing everything possible at this point to deter the Russians from such a step. The contrary argument is that any expression of interest on our part would convince the Russians that we are behind Czech policy, and would harden their decision to wipe out a dangerous heresy with their tanks. I think much depends on what we say and who says it. I have always felt that Dulles' public statement in 1956 2 (that we would under no circumstances move in Eastern Europe) was a profound mistake. At a minimum, uncertainty on that point would have been preferable. We must not make any threats in this situation, or take positions that would confirm Russian suspicions. But we might still be able to affect the decision by carefully planned, and entirely conciliatory secret messages. Furthermore, we have made great exertions to revitalize NATO and re-launch it as a body for serious political consultations. We should not ignore NATO with regard to a major event affecting European security. I believe the British suggestion in that regard should be followed up, not only at the level of the Permanent Representatives, but through a meeting of higher officials in Brussels, to be followed, if intervention occurs, by the establishment of an action group representing a number of interested governments in Washington. (You will recall that the NATO Resolution of December 1967 3 contemplated political working groups of less than all the NATO members to concert policy on problems outside the NATO defense area, strictly defined.) II In view of the shortness of time, I recommend that we follow up Bob McCloskey's denial of C.I.A. activity in Czechoslovakia 4 with an aide-mémoire protesting the Soviet press charges that we are fomenting counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. When the note is delivered, several additional points could be made orally. The British, and, if possible the French, the Italians, the Belgians and the Dutch could be encouraged to weigh in as well. And we should have a NATO meeting at the ministerial or near ministerial level within a week. Our aim at this point is deterrence. We should also be examining contingency plans, on an urgent basis. The aide-mémoire could make these essential points: A. We are deeply concerned by charges in the Soviet press that the United States has participated in any way in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, or had any part whatever in recent political events in that country. The fact that such charges have been made, and made publicly, can only heighten tension. B. We can assure the Soviet government most categorically that we have done nothing in Czechoslovakia, and have played no part in these events. Our position on Czechoslovakia is a matter of record. It has been and remains our policy to respect in every way the independence and integrity of all states. We ask only that others exercise parallel restraint. C. We hope and believe that rumors of Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia are equally unfounded. Such a step could set in train tendencies whose consequences it would be nearly impossible to predict. It would be irresponsible on our part if we did not bring to the attention of the Soviet government our conviction that such a course would imperil recent progress towards détente, and intensify the futile and burdensome arms race. D. It is our conviction, on the contrary, that the present trend towards détente represents the profound national interests of the United States and, we hope and believe, those of the Soviet Union as well. It is in no one's interest to reverse that trend. We believe that the path towards a secure and peaceful settlement in Europe is that represented by our proposals, and those of the other members of NATO, for a gradual and agreed reduction of tension and military risks in Europe and elsewhere. E. We understand and respect the concerns of the Soviet Union for its security. In that connection, we call attention to the proposals for balanced and mutual force reductions made at the recent Reykjavik meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council. 5 And we reaffirm our willingness to consider Soviet proposals to improve their own and Western European security, in terms both of conventional and nuclear arms, in ways that could impose lesser dangers and burdens on us both. It might be preferable to make point E orally, rather than in a note or aide-mémoire. Stressing our force reduction proposals too much could strengthen the hand of those in the Soviet Union who oppose “bridge-building” and détente as imperialist tricks to subvert Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the first sentence of E should be put on the record, if we give the Soviets any piece of paper. On balance, I recommend that E be kept in. III I recommend also that the Soviet invitation to Averell Harriman be taken up at once. He would be going, obviously, to discuss Viet-Nam. Such a visit could be interpreted as a signal that we don't care what the Soviets do in Czechoslovakia, but will pursue détente through thick or thin. We should therefore make it clear to the Russians, privately, that we are sending Averell on the assumption that there will be no basic change in the political situation, or in the relationship among states. He would, of course, be instructed to follow up at the highest level on the implications of our aide-mémoire with respect to NPT, the arms race, and other issues that would inevitably be affected by a Soviet military move in Czechoslovakia. IV I attach great importance to working with our NATO allies in this situation. If we are to succeed in building up NATO as an active collaborator on issues beyond the military defense of Europe, we must miss no opportunity to involve NATO, or the more active members, in responsible consultations with us. In retrospect, I think the NATO dimension has been the weakest element in our Middle East diplomacy. I realize that NATO consultations on the situation in Eastern Europe will be a striking sign. But why should we hesitate to give strong signals, so long as we avoid threats we do not intend to carry out? The Soviets are having all kinds of meetings on the subject. The outcome of the struggle between the Soviets and the Czechs will affect political and security conditions in Europe for years to come. It would be ridiculous to hesitate about being seen to consult with our European allies on a subject that vitally and directly concerns their political environment, as well as ours. V We are preparing a scenario of preliminary political consultations about the line we are proposing here with our allies, with other interested countries, with neutrals, and with Roumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and perhaps Poland. We should also consider having some Senators of both parties make statesmanlike speeches on the subject at this stage. 6 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–USSR. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information but is initialed by Rostow. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the White House. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 14) 2 Apparently a reference to Eisenhower's October 31, 1956, statement; see footnote 4, Document 60 . 3 For text, see Department of State Bulletin , January 8, 1968, pp. 49–52. 4 Not further identified. 5 The North Atlantic Council met in Reykjavik June 24–25. For text of the statement on mutual and balanced force reductions, see Department of State Bulletin , July 15, 1968, p. 77. For documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 312 . 6 In a July 20 informal memorandum, attached to the source text, Rostow commented: “My feeling is that the time for possible deterrence is very short—a matter of four or five days.” 68. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 68. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, July 22, 1968, 1710Z. 2682. 1. Notice question has been asked whether US is in touch with Czech leaders during current crisis (Belgrade 3725). 2 The answer is that the prospects for meaningful contact are not very good and this appears to be by Czech choice. Smrkovsky is probably the most approachable among the hierarchy but he is too shrewd to become involved with us without checking with the Foreign Ministry which would put things back in present sterile channel. 2. It is on my conscience whether we should indicate we would be prepared to help in any way regime thought fit. This could be done through informal inquiry to Snejdarek, Director of Institute for International Politics and Economics, who seems to stand close to important party circles or through Austrians whose standing is now probably highest among Western countries. My feeling of the moment is that we should not undertake this move. Once it got into formal channels we would run the risk of being charged with hypocrisy since Czechs could claim they have made it amply clear what they wish from U.S., namely the elimination of alleged economic discrimination. 3. Believe Czechs are realistic in realizing limits on US action, i.e., no military support or massive economic aid. They are aware of reciprocal inhibitions stemming from Viet-Nam war. Cool official relations also enhance their standing in Communist camp. They know in any case they can count on considerable benefit of US public understanding. Secretary's statement was helpful in making this point. 3 4. Despite Western press stories playing up alleged concern over US-Soviet tacit collusion over Czechoslovakia, regime does not seem to be too unhappy with present US stance, viz., rude Pravo article yesterday (Prague 2672) 4 citing US-Soviet cooperation as contribution to moderating of cold war. Article incidentally served purpose of refuting Soviet insinuations of US interest in instigating local unrest. 5. We are not impressed by influence other Western countries can bring to bear on present situation. For time being Czechs seem to prefer handling their troubles within the Communist orbit. But suggestion I have to offer is VOA might play up US public reaction somewhat more as legitimate news, stopping short of making this possible issue with Soviets. Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CZECH. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. 2 Dated June 20. (Ibid.) 3 Not further identified. 4 The file citation for this telegram, dated July 21, is missing from the microfilm finding aid. 69. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 69. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, July 22, 1968, 1720Z. 4751. 1. Although there are many pros and cons I am convinced that our present posture on Czech affair is the correct one particularly in absence any request from Czechs for a change. They should be in the best position to judge effects of any actions or statements on our part. Any appeal to the Soviets would necessarily reveal weakness of our position by what we would not and could not say. Moreover, I believe that on balance such appeal would strengthen the hands of the hardliners rather than those who oppose intervention. 2. Soviets have left themselves little ground to retreat and have already paid a big price in the Communist as well as the free world by their crude handling of this affair. If Czechs face them down, Soviet prestige will suffer and other members of the camp will be encouraged toward greater independence. If they use force the free world will be deeply shocked, NATO strengthened, hope of reducing military expend-iture by agreement with US jeopardized, etc. Moreover internal dissatisfaction with Soviet leadership would increase. Their only hope is that Czechs will back down and even if this happens, as it may well do, Soviet efforts to unify Communist camp under their leadership will be thwarted. In Soviet practice serious errors demand at least a scapegoat and regardless of how the Czech affair comes out this may well be the beginning of a process leading to the fall of Brezhnev, Suslov and others. Thompson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Prague. A copy of this telegram was passed to President Johnson by Rostow on July 23, with the annotation: “Herewith Tommy Thompson's current evaluation of Czech affair.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Cables, Vol. 21) 70. Memorandum of Conversation 70. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 22, 1968. SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Situation PARTICIPANTS Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR The Secretary Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen The Secretary said he had asked Ambassador Dobrynin to come to see him because he had just been in Honolulu and while there and on the way back had been informed of a series of articles in Soviet newspapers and on Soviet radio which seemed to imply U.S. involvement in the Czech situation. He said he had no paper to give the Ambassador but would merely make an oral statement. The Secretary went on to say that he wished to express the seriousness with which the U.S. regarded accusations of this kind. For example, he referred to an article in Pravda on July 19 in which it spoke of a NATO Western plot against Czechoslovakia involving the Pentagon and CIA. He wished to state emphatically that there was absolutely no truth in this allegation. A further statement in regard to arms caches had appeared in the Soviet press and he had even seen something questioning the authenticity of these arms caches by some Czechs. He referred to a Bulgarian newspaper account which indicated one of the arms caches had been barely concealed, thereby suggesting it had been placed there for easier detection. He referred also to a Moscow radio broadcast of July 22 of an alleged plot by Bonn and the U.S. in regard to Czechoslovakia. The Secretary went on to say that no one knew better than members of the Soviet Embassy the restraint the U.S. had exercised in regard to Czech developments. He said we had not wished to involve ourselves directly in this matter, that the U.S. had been attempting to develop better relationships with Eastern European countries as well as with the Soviet Union. However, in regard to these current charges he would like to make three points: 1) They were emphatically not true; 2) They were creating in this country a considerable amount of agitation in political circles in regard to the Czech situation. Congressmen and Senators were making statements and becoming very concerned about them. (Dobrynin here intervened and said—“were we causing this?”) The Secretary said these charges against the U.S. had created a part of this agitation. He mentioned that Mr. Bohlen had been asked to appear in Executive Session of the Sub-Committee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss the Czech situation. 2 3) The feelings of the American people were perfectly understandable in matters of this kind. In fact they go back to Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence (which parenthetically the Secretary said ante-dated Karl Marx by about one hundred years) that set forth the right of peoples to order their own affairs themselves. The U.S. Government had not sought to involve itself in this situation, but there should be no misapprehension as to the feelings and sympathies of the American people. The Secretary mentioned that this was the first time that anybody had spoken officially to Ambassador Dobrynin about the Czech situation. He added that the U.S. Government had not wished to point out that undoubtedly the Soviet Government had a highly professional intelligence service which would make it clear that there was absolutely no truth to these allegations. We therefore were entitled to wonder what particular purpose was being achieved in their dissemination and whether or not this might be a pretext to lay a basis for some future action against Czechoslovakia. If this happened we would deeply regret it and it could not possibly have anything but a very negative effect on our relations, all the more so if the U.S. was to be presented as a scapegoat. The Secretary said that both he and the President took these allegations very seriously and hoped that the Ambassador would be able to obtain from his government an explanation of these totally erroneous charges. He then asked the Ambassador if he had any questions. The Ambassador said he could only say there was no question of any form of pretext or excuse. Beyond that he could only say that he would report this matter to his government. The Secretary then discussed how it would be handled with the press. (The Secretary had received a telephone call to say the Ambassador's car had been seen by the press.) He said that we were planning to state that the Secretary had asked the Ambassador to come in to take up with him the charges appearing in the Soviet press, to refute them, and to ask for an explanation. Dobrynin said he thought that this was perhaps a little too detailed but had no suggestions as to how to handle it. Comment: Dobrynin appeared to be considerably worried, possibly due to the U.S. démarche but most likely by the general state of affairs in regard to Czechoslovakia. He was distinctly not his usual genial self. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and initialed by Bohlen and approved in S on July 24. 2 No copy of the testimony was found. 71. Memorandum From Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 71. Memorandum From Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, July 23, 1968. Walt: Here are Bill Lemnitzer's answers to the two questions you raised with me yesterday. The four major conclusions which emerge are: —Czech defection would weaken the Warsaw Pact threat to Western Europe—but probably not enough to justify reduction of current NATO forces. —Czech neutralization would justify some reduction in NATO force levels—dependent on our confidence that the Czechs would remain neutral in the event of war. —Forces for possible intervention in Czechoslovakia could involve 1 U.S. brigade, 2 French divisions, and 2 FRG divisions. —Employment of anything more than 1 brigade ought to be accompanied by NATO mobilization, which would require six months to reach planned force levels. G 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Czechoslovakia, Memos, Vol. 2. Top Secret. 72. Notes of Meeting 72. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, July 24, 1968, 1:30–3:50 p.m. NOTES OF THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS AT LUNCH ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE: The President Secretary Rusk Secretary Clifford General Maxwell Taylor General Earle Wheeler CIA Director Helms Walt Rostow George Christian Tom Johnson [Here follow 1–1/2 pages of discussion on the Vietnam war.] The Czechoslovakian situation Mr. Rostow: The Soviets will not move militarily against them, I do not think. I told House we are on the Czech side. 2 We should hold off on “Most Favored Nations” legislation in order not to cause a problem for the Czechs. The continuing resolution—what does it do to DoD, Foreign Aid, Foreign Policy things. See what kind of resolution they will get. [Here follows 1/2 page of discussion on German nuclear consultations.] Secretary Rusk: We saw the Czech situation as nearly over. The real crisis has subsided. We don't want to spoil the deal. [Here follows 1/2-page of discussion of the sale of tanks to Belgium and the Geneva disarmament talks.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held on the second floor of the mansion. 2 Apparently in either an informal meeting or executive session. No printed volumes of House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings include testimony by Rostow. 73. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk 73. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 26, 1968. SUBJECT Situation in Czechoslovakia While of course it is not conclusive I must say I don't like the tone of the Soviet and Satellite press in regard to Czechoslovakia. Not only is the tone shriller, but for the first time an authoritative Soviet journal, i.e., Pravda , has stated that there is going on in Prague preparations for a coup which the Czech leaders do not seem to be aware of, and that action is necessary to forestall this coup. There is also a reference in the Red Star to the fact that the combat readiness of the Soviet army increases day by day and hour by hour. There has been no announcement made of the date of the Politburo meetings, and there is even an indication in an American correspondent's story from Moscow that diplomatic circles there are beginning to wonder if the meetings would come off. There is also the increased Soviet mobilization and the report that at least two, if not three, Soviet divisions moved south from the Berlin area towards the Czech border. Of course this could all be part of the war of nerves, but I think something to watch is whether or not there is any serious indication that the proposed meeting is off. I find the military preparations somewhat excessive for a war of nerves, and it could be that in addition to making final preparation for a move into Czechoslovakia the Soviets are preparing for any eventuality which might arise. The foregoing is pure speculation, but I thought I should tell you that I think the scene has darkened a bit since yesterday. 1 Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 73 D 374, Memos Drafted in G. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen. 74. Transcript of Meeting 74. Transcript of Meeting 1 Washington, July 27, 1968, 3–4:30 p.m. Meeting in Cabinet Room, Saturday, July 26 [27], 1968, With the President and Senator Dirksen. They Were Joined Later by Secretary Rusk From 3:00 to 4:30 . 2 [Here follow 28 pages of discussion of domestic politics.] Dirksen: How the hell did the Wall Street Journal ever write that editorial on the subject of Czechoslovakia? To do anything there looks very dim. Rusk: Any time you want to call me, just pick up the phone and call me because the situation changes on a daily basis. The issues between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are really fundamental issues. The Soviets are deeply concerned about the future of the entire Communist world in Eastern Europe as a result of what is happening in Czechoslovakia. They raised the question on the monopolization of the Communist Party. The Czechs raised the question on the arrangements within the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact. They have eliminated censorship to the extent that there is more free expression now in Czechoslovakia than there has ever been present in any Communist country including Yugoslavia. I think the Soviets are concerned both on the security grounds of a country that is on their border and also borders on the west. But they're even more concerned about the possibility of contagion—how is Czechoslovakia affecting Poland, Hungary, West and East Germany and even the Soviet Union itself where they have important troubles with their young people and with their nationalities. Our people who visit the Soviet Union or live there say there's enormous apathy around Moscow. It is just like a dead lump of dough and it's stirring all through that part of the world. Matter of fact, John Foster Dulles used to talk about this possibility in '53 and '54. Now publicly we've taken the line that these charges by the Soviet Union that we are somehow concocting this thing in Czechoslovakia are false. The Soviet Union knows them to be false and that, of course, the Soviet Union knows what the American people think about an issue of this sort when it is raised anywhere in the world. We think people ought to determine their own affairs. Privately we have been much more stiff than that with them and have specifically said so. Now look, if you're trying to build up a pretext by your charges against us for action against Czechoslovakia, cut it out because that's going to have very serious effect on our relations. They denied they're doing it which is sort of interesting, but nevertheless now on the problem that he will face down there during at least three or four days will be how to handle it in such a way not to get in the way of the Czechs, not to hurt the Czechs. Now we've been told by the Czechs this is their final remark that they consider that our public handling of this question has been about right from their point of view. If we would go on much more dramatically in supporting the Czechs this would create real problems for them in their attempt to deal with the Russians. Now there is another reason why we might want to be a little careful about this problem. The chances are that the Czechs will make some compromises here to keep the Russians off their backs. It may be we pledge fidelity to the Warsaw pact, it may be some changes in personnel, it may be the reimposition of censorship. We just don't know. But you just might want—before you lock up any comments you make about Eastern Europe, you just might want to give me or give Chip Bohlen a telephone call and see if there are any later developments that could possibly have any bearing on what you are thinking about. On the general idea of détente—this thing the so called détente—there's very little basis for any generalization on it. On the one side we have such things as the civil air agreement and the Consular Agreement, the Space Treaty and the nonproliferation treaty and the possibility of talks on the strategic offensive and defensive missiles. But on the other hand you have got Berlin and Germany and Vietnam and the Middle East so you've got many dangerous questions that have not been resolved. So one can't speak of détente, one can't speak of the opposite. It's pragmatic kind of situations. [Here follow 1–1/2 pages of discussion of domestic politics and Vietnam.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. The source text comprises pages 28–32 of a 34-page transcript. The text printed here contains revisions that were made after the editor listened to the recording of the conversation. The recording is ibid., Recording of Meeting Between President Johnson, Senator Dirksen, and Secretary Rusk, July 27, 1968, 3–4:30 p.m. [Tape FC002, Side B]. 2 The correct date, July 27, is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The diary also indicates that Rusk joined the meeting at 3:45 p.m. 75. Transcript of Meeting 75. Transcript of Meeting 1 Washington, July 29, 1968, 7–8 p.m. Cabinet Room Meeting of Monday, July 29, 1968, 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. With the President, Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford and Tom Johnson Clifford: You've got to look at it, too, of the possibility of there being some serious danger inherent in it. One quick reaction I would have would be that if by chance Czechoslovakia is still a pending problem, I don't believe I'd go near Kosygin during the time that Czechoslovakia is still hot. I don't. You could get caught up in that and I'm just afraid it would be difficult for you to extricate yourself. You could have a talk with Kosygin and the day you talked with him Soviet troops could move on Czechoslovakia or the day after you left, troops could move in Czechoslovakia. It would be, they'd be tied together in some way, whether that would suit Kosygin's attitude or not, I don't know. I think that we have to be careful about the reasons why the President was seeing Kosygin at this time. Is it because the President has a new plan that he is taking to Kosygin vis-á-vis Vietnam? Is there something new he wants to take to him? Is it because the President's concerned about the Middle East—some development there? Is he concerned about NATO? You know there's so much cooking right now. As far as starting off with Kosygin on a discussion of strategic limitation and ultimate reduction, I don't know. Right at this time, Mr. President, I wonder whether that's advisable. These are going to be long, difficult, exceedingly complex negotiations. Whether the President and Kosygin can do anything much at the very beginning of it, I don't know. I think that the general approach would be, well—I just wonder what they can do about it. And I think we have to be careful. The time that the President selects to see Kosygin. I would hope that there'd be a time when we didn't have a situation quite as inflammable as it is. I'm thinking of the Czechoslovakian problem. I think that's a terribly difficult problem. I know we can't get in it. I feel some concern that we can. Czechoslovakia is supposedly a free country and they can be under the heel just like Hungary was. I don't know for instance whether somebody might decide to bring this up in the Security Council in the UN—Czechoslovakia. Maybe some member of the Security Council could decide to bring it up. That would tend to exaggerate it. So, a second point I'm making is to sound a note of basic caution about going to see Kosygin right at this time. I think it must be watched with great care. The third point I have: After Dean left Saturday afternoon, I just noted down thoughts that I had. Just in my own handwriting—I've not given them even to the girls. The third point I'd like to make has to do with the Convention. [Here follow 4 pages of discussion of the Democratic National Convention and Vietnam.] [Clifford:] This is very prominent in my mind, as I look ahead. At this time, Mr. President, with the condition existing in Czechoslovakia, with existing in Vietnam we're waiting for the other shoe to drop over there, I can see more danger in a visit with Kosygin at this time, then I can see benefit. Now I think there will come a time when the President can see Kosygin. Right now it just seems to me that it's tempting fate too severely. President: What time do you see that it could come? Clifford: Well, I think there'll be a resolution of the problem in Czechoslovakia. These things don't go on indefinitely. The President is still President. Let's see, August, September, October, November, December, you're still President for six months, until the 20th of January. That's almost six months off. I don't know, it could be in a week. President: You think it would probably be all right to have meetings in November and December? Clifford: It wouldn't bother me a bit. It wouldn't bother me a bit. You're going right on being President and you're not bothering with politics. The fact that there's some new man or something, that wouldn't bother me a particle. I think in maybe a week, it could be a week. Czechoslovakia would be resolved one way or another. It could be two weeks, or three weeks, but I think it's going to be resolved that this thing has gotten so acute now, so inflammatory, that I think they're going to lance this abscess one way or another and I think it will be out of the way. Now, I think that we will all learn during the month of August whether there's going to be another series of attacks from the enemy in Vietnam. Maybe it will come and maybe it won't, and I think we get that out of the way so that that doesn't get too involved in it. It wouldn't disturb me at all if the talks on strategic weapons control were to start at some other level. It's going to go on for some time. I don't know that it has too much significance in having it started by Kosygin and the President and I'm not even sure that it's particularly valuable to just confine it to that at the starting. I think that the President when he goes to see, or arranges to see Kosygin under the proper circumstances in which Kosygin's comfortable, I would hope the two of you would be able to sit down and cover the entire mosaic of our problems. An announcement could be made ahead of time to that effect and something after it that could come out. Right now I believe that if I were Kosygin with this real nose bleed on my hands with Czechoslovakia I think almost the last person I would want to see right now would be President Johnson. President: Yes, I think there is something to that. I'm not necessarily trying to help him though. Rusk: Well, Mr. President, I'd like to comment very briefly. President: I agree. Let me comment on what Clark is saying. I think there is no reason why we have to act until the Czechoslovakia situation is cleared. As I indicated, that's number one. I don't know how. If it's two weeks, that's another matter. I would expect maybe it wouldn't be that long. I don't know. I can't tell. But I don't think it's essential. We don't say that I don't think that the President and Kosygin sit down together. We have though for four years urged this step upon them and we finally got them to agree now that there will be a meeting within a month or a month and a half. I would like to forthrightly respond to that and accept it and give him my views of what ought to happen. And I think there may be some merit in the four days of the Convention there waiting until it's over with, I don't care. And it may be that he won't want to start at this level. I'd rather think he wouldn't. Although I would like to because I would think that that would be the way. But if not, if you want to modify that part of it if that is a—, then you might say, or at the Foreign Minister level. One or the other of us ought to start it off. And I'm willing to rewrite the letter and use his phrase—not ours. Rusk: Month, month and a half. President: Yes, and I'm willing to and also add that if this doesn't suit you, that we'd be glad for the Foreign Ministers to start it off. We do think it is of sufficient importance. The very first proposal that we made to the Soviet Union we insisted on time and date and place and subject. There is so much that is pending that needs the attention of both countries. What I'm terribly afraid of is—I'm afraid that by our sitting with our hands in our pockets, just merrily, merrily going along, just reacting to all of their initiatives and their propaganda and their party line that we just finally catch ourselves just signing on which we have been doing most of the time and I think we're likely to be doing it again. I think we'll be having a Council meeting here in a week or so and everybody will pretty well agree in general that we ought to cut out something else we're doing in deference to these folks. That is what I am fearful of. Rusk: Well, I agree with Clark. I think you do, too, about the possible connection between this Czechoslovakia business. I think, myself, that the chances are— President: We won't have waited today if it hadn't agreed on that. Rusk: That's right. That's right. I think we're likely to see here some sort of answer on the Czech business before then. President: I think so. Rusk: We did put in this draft: “If the general situation permits,” a phrase that would cover the Czech business in our minds that if things really start in Czechoslovakia we'd just ourselves pull back even if Kosygin accepted this. President: That is what that was intended to do. But I don't think that we even need to dispatch the letter until we see a little clearer than we do now. Rusk: That's right. President: I said that last weekend and I didn't ask for this meeting today. Rusk: I asked for it. Now on this other—what would such a meeting be about. I think that we can make it pretty clear that it is about offensive and defensive missiles. That is a question which everybody knows the President's worked on very hard and worked on it personally. He tried very hard at Glassboro to get these talks started. He's also worked hard on the non-proliferation treaty which has in it an obligation on the part of the nuclear powers to get going and negotiate in good faith the elimination of the arms race. So from that point of view it seems to me that it would militate in favor of the President's launching these discussions. There's another factor and that is that, Clark, you may not like this one particularly. I think if the President initiated the discussions, this would be a sign to what General Eisenhower called the military industrial complex that Goddamn it, getting an agreement to limit offensive and defensive missiles is the national policy of the United States. We want people to think about how you do it and not think about how you'll avoid doing it. Looking ahead you look at these tens of billions that are going down this rat hole if we don't find an answer to this, you see. So there's an internal commitment involving the President's study. Now the danger is—the court of last resort getting it into session and Kosygin could turn up there with demands on Berlin or something—after all Khrushchev did drop the Berlin crisis in President Kennedy's lap when they met in Vienna. This did not happen in Glassboro partly because Kosygin was over here in the United Nations on a Middle East where, frying some fishes on his own at that time. And therefore, this was not racked up. There's little danger. I think it is not as great now as it might have been earlier if nothing had happened. So this is why—subject to Czechoslovakia—I myself come down on the balanced judgment that there would be real merit in the two meetings if it could be done under the appropriate circumstances. Clifford: I find no disagreement with that, Dean, I think that President Kennedy's meeting in Vienna with Khrushchev was a calamity. Rusk: It was. Clifford: Boy, it was a real zero from President Kennedy's standpoint. Clifford: Now I think conditions have changed. I think that the Soviets have shown an inclination to find some basis of cooperation with us. That's a very interesting sentence in the last letter of Kosygin that we will both find as we get into this that a savings can be effected to a very substantial degree. Rusk: I would be for the President having a chance to talk with him very informally without pretending that the main subject is about Vietnam and about the Middle East. Clifford: I would have no difficulty with that. President: You know originally I thought we ought to say there and I took it out. Rusk: Yes. President: This is not the only subject. Rusk: This refers now to—it will also give us a chance to discuss quietly and informally some of the problems or tensions that you referred to. President: That just polished up, the very [inaudible] the three matters that we wanted to talk about and that also left us a getting out place even on Czechoslovakia or any other developments after it was set. And I don't think I would want to specify that I would not want to attend a meeting. Now, I don't see that this would do the damage to the Democratic Party that Clark does. I have a different viewpoint. I think it's the best thing that we could do for the Democratic Party, whoever is nominated at that time. I don't think we necessarily need to go at that specific moment, but I think most of them will be pretty glad that we're having a meeting. I would just leave it more in his hands on the month to month and a half basis. Rusk: All right. President: But I think we could do that after we see the situation. Rusk: I would agree, too, that it would be of great benefit to the Democratic Party if it didn't take place on those very days that they were having their Convention. President: Well their Convention is going to have all the television every hour. This meeting is not going to be taking much of it. And I would doubt that he would set the meeting. I would just leave it and say anytime within the month or month and half he mentioned, it would be agreeable with us. I'd be pretty agreeable to hear suggestions. Rusk: All right. Clifford: Does he have in mind that the President would like to start it off, personally with Kosygin because he said nothing about that in his last reply. And the President I think said nothing about that in this one. Does he? President: Yes. Rusk: Yes. Clifford: Oh, I see. I didn't notice it. President: He understood at Glassboro that we were pressing on this very hard, a little history would help us. Khrushchev wrote to me in December '63 a rather broad long letter and we responded January the 16th, '64 in which we discussed the perils of armament in the world and the two powers poised at each other and how much it would cost us and how much good could be done if we could only approach this problem of disarmament and particularly if we could have some agreement that would bring about the non-proliferation treaty. That was number one on the list and we listed a series of reductions in our armed strength and in our future investments in armaments. And we stuck it right up to him and said that we very much want to do this and then we followed that with a series of specific moves where we reduced our atomic reactors and asked him to do likewise and he held off to the last moment until ours was announced. I was actually at the microphone speaking when he notified us that he would issue an announcement at the same time. We suggested 2 o'clock on Tuesday. I started speaking at one forty-five and we hadn't heard from him and about one fifty-five they brought us a note that he was going to announce it at 2 o'clock, right at the last minute. He went out and our people, we pursued this up until we went in there with our bombing in '65 and things kind of tapered off. At Glassboro it heated up again, very strong. And we took the initiative and just almost wrestled him to have a meeting and said anytime, anywhere we'll send our men to Moscow or we'll meet in Geneva or we'll come back to Glassboro. We'll do anything, but this we must do. We thought we got a tentative, implied acceptance then and we thought it would be rather soon. He got back and subsequently came along and implied it again. What did he say in that language we got back? We announced it the day Bobby Kennedy made a speech and we didn't call him up to find out he was going to speak the same day or not so they charged us with bad motives. You remember that don't you. Rusk: Yes, I remember it. President: There was some indication that they would meet with us again but they never would set a date. So we have kept shoving 'em all during that period. Now we've come along and Kosygin has said yes a month or six weeks. Now if we don't want to talk or if we are hesitant to talk or if we want to just let it go through the regular channels of Bill Foster at Geneva. That's one thing. That's now my view. It hasn't been for four years and I think this is most important we could ever do. Rusk : Mr. President, I tried to get Kosygin to accept McNamara in Moscow the following Wednesday after Glassboro. Well, they gave us that story—can't come then. Well then name a date. Pressed them very hard on this. President: Now, it's been a year, during that time he's put off and put off during that year. During that time I've had to go up with my budget and I've had to put the ABM in the budget to stick it, to hold firm and not weaken with everybody wanting to shimmy a little bit. And then when he got up, a lot want to run away from it after it gets up there, as you've observed with Symington, and so forth, the fight that went on in the Senate. And now he's still holding back one Goddamn year and not doing anything and finally when the Senate vote gets out of the way and it looks like we are going ahead, and we hold out the hand of peace here but the hand of strength here so we're going to go on, we don't want to do this we'd like to save this 50 billion that the two of us are spending, but he's just got no sense at all. We'll go on. We are not going to let you destroy us. We're not going to let you be defended and us not defended. Then he comes up and says I'll see you in a month or month and a half. That's where we are. Then we say well we can't do it because we've got a Convention. That doesn't appeal to me. I'd go right back to him and say that you suggest a month or a month and a half and to me that is agreeable and a month or a month and a half is agreeable and we would suggest it on this level and if you're not satisfied, if you don't want to do it on that level, well then I'll arrange for the Foreign Ministers to meet. Rusk: All right. President: And then I'd let him say if he picks August 25th I wouldn't be worried. I don't think he will, but I'm sure that we can so arrange the agenda that we could get our man nominated and the American people would have all the Democratic Convention that they want. I think they will have. I think it will be the thing that is uppermost. We talked a lot with these folks. You have met with Gromyko a good many times. I have met with Gromyko and with Kosygin and it hasn't turned the world upside down. We know, just like Averell and Vance meeting with them over there, what I'm really worried about is they're more in command of our forces that I am. That's what really troubles me. These damned cables coming in like that. Because I read this record and I see these pictures and I see Javits get up and I see Morgan get up and I see all of them get up and I see the New York Times editorial and it just fits in to this whole damn facet. If I hadn't been watching it for four or five years I wouldn't be worried about it but it's not accidental. And I don't want to get hung on the rack. I just don't want to get caught on it. Rusk: All right. President: I want to make it so firm and loud I don't want my people to serve that up to me and then have Goldberg come along here and saying well as you know I felt this way. Rusk: They can well concentrate on trying to get another private meeting, get an answer from Hanoi. President: I think we'd better show them that it's just a few speeches and pressure are not going to do it. They are beginning to think we're jelly and we'll do it and I don't understand why he sent this wire after we told him how we felt about it. Rusk: The trouble is that negotiators habitually— President: It's not negotiations, hell— Rusk: Get action to take the next step. That's one of the problems about American negotiators they're always in a little bit more of a hurry than the other side. I think they also—Averell is making some judgments about politics here at home. President: A good deal and it looks like a good deal of it in Vietnam—the battle strategy too. Rusk: Mr. President, on the longer range negotiations for this thing I'd just like to put it in the back of your mind. I think Clark and I would agree that the two chief people from our respective departments might be Brown. He's very knowledgeable in this field. Clifford: Harold. Rusk: Harold Brown and Butch Fisher he's with ACDA. I think we also feel there ought to be a principal negotiator on top of them. Maybe in the State Department. A man from the Defense Department would be the principal negotiator on disarmament I think it would be a mistake and the Pentagon would feel it even more strongly than I for ACDA to be the number one fellow on this particular subject. Now one possibility would be to bring Tommy Thompson out of Moscow for these talks in Geneva and let him be there for three or four weeks for the first round. And then they're bound to close off the talks for awhile and study each other's position in more detail. Tommy is not doing a great deal in Moscow these days and he would be a in a position to follow up. So he would be one possibility. Another possibility would be that is after the Foreign Ministers review would get through with it, another possibility would be Chet Bowen [Chip Bohlen]. I think in terms of negotiations and this kind of thing. Tommy Thompson would be, in some respect, a more competent negotiator because he's very familiar with all of these matters having worked with the Pentagon for years in that Deputy job over in my shop. I just wanted to mention that to you, because other names may occur to you to head up the delegations but we would suggest a head of the delegation plus Brown and Fisher and their respective staffs. Clifford: We have to bring the Joint Chiefs along on this one, as you would know, they'd be very important and our record must be absolutely clear. They feel the responsibility, of course, as we all do, protecting the security of this country. They, I was telling Dean Saturday afternoon they paw the air when Bill Foster's name is mentioned. They think Bill is very soft and very fuzzy-headed. Now, Dean said, very frankly, well, anybody could be head of ACDA would be viewed in that light by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President: Just one second. [The President left the room.] Rusk: My guess is the Russians will bite at the Foreign Ministers level like a [inaudible]. Clifford: You mean the ACDA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff problem? Rusk: No, I said if we go back to the Russians to say, Kosygin himself, if not the Foreign Minister, I think the Russians will bite at a Foreign Ministers meeting like a shot. Clifford: [whispering]: I don't think Kosygin will see the President now with all his difficulties. Rusk: Because I don't see much of a meeting between the two after November with the President-elect in the wings. I think it ought to be before November. I think so too, I think it should be before November. The problems the Russians have seem to be Peking with Kosygin and the President meeting and all. Clifford: I think they're awfully sensitive about this too. And of course, they'll get a hell of a lot of blast right now. Apparently, the President wants to start, however. Does he? Does he want to start? Rusk: Yeah. Clifford: Then, what is this alternative? What would the Foreign Ministers meet about. Just meet together to plan an agenda for the two? Rusk: Well, to deal with that, we would try to agree on some general principles. [The President re-entered the room.] And we would make a proposal that we're working on now. We'll have it up to the President shortly after April—August 7th we hope. Clifford: Just to finish this other point, if the President were to designate Bill Foster to be the chief negotiator then I think that he would be waited upon by Wheeler and the rest of the Joint Chiefs and I think they say we can't go along with it and there's no use taking on that kind of fight at the beginning I think. I believe they'd feel better about Butch Fisher than they feel about Bill Foster. I think they feel that Butch is a little harder nosed than Bill is. At the same time if you were to suggest that Butch Fisher was to be the chief negotiator I think that they'd be over here within the hour saying let us tell you why this must not be. Wheeler felt so strongly about it he called and made an appointment with me. He came and talked to me about it. Told about all the experiences that they had had with ACDA and it's one of those situations in which men get locked into a state of mind after a certain number of years. Now whether there's justification for it or not, I think it's beside the question. If it's a state of mind, it's one that we don't have to take on. [Here follow 6 pages of discussion on Congressional relations and defense-related issues.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. The text printed here contains revisions that were made after the editor listened to the recording of the conversation. The recording is ibid., Recording of a Meeting Between President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and Secretary Clifford, July 29, 1968, 7–8 p.m. [Tape FC001, Side A]. 76. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 76. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, August 2, 1968, 1245Z. 4910. Subj: Czechoslovakia-Soviet relations: the long range view. 1. In view of the paucity of hard information, it is impossible to judge what actually happened at Cierna, 2 although it would appear that both sides have made concessions. There follows an attempt to examine some of the more fundamental factors involved in the crisis which, while it claims no new insights, will, I hope, be useful in assessing the outcome when more information becomes available. 2. Power: So far as the Soviet leaders are concerned, undoubtedly one, if not their most important, concern is the preservation of their own power. No one gets to the top in this system without an unhealthy interest in power, and they can excuse their pursuit of it by rationalizing that they and they alone can preserve the gains and advance the aims of Communism. Ever since Lenin, Communism has meant not only the exercise of power by a small group but also the exclusive right to decide who should hold it. With the very rare exceptions, such as Khrushchev's appeal to the Central Committee, this has been confined to the small group now called the Politburo. 3. The introduction of democratic processes in Czechoslovakia, even if confined to the party, would threaten to undermine the whole system. When freedom of the press and other forms of expression are added to this, it is clear that, unless reversed, what the Czechs will end up with is not what the Soviets mean by the term Marxism-Leninism. In other words, a fundamental change is in process. It is difficult to see how such a development could fail to have serious repercussions on the other bloc countries, including eventually the Soviet Union, or how the Soviet leaders can fail to consider it a serious threat to their hold on power. 4. Security: The strategic location of Czechoslovakia must certainly cause the Soviet military as well as political leaders concern over the possible loss of this salient in the center of their East European bunker zone. Although in an atomic age such considerations of geography have diminished significance, they can still be important for psychological reasons. For example, in a future Berlin crisis the unavailability of Czech territory would make Soviet threats less credible. Moreover if, as seems likely, the situation should develop where Soviets could not count upon Czech military forces, this would make Czechoslovakia a negative liability as Soviet forces would have to be earmarked to control it. 5. Another aspect of security is the loss of classified information that could leak out through a Czechoslovakia friendly to the West, and the operations there of foreign agents which the Soviet press has emphasized from the beginning of the crisis. Also of importance is the possibility of Czechoslovakia providing an escape route for East Germans, Poles and Hungarians desiring to reach the West. Regardless of Czech Government policy, I can't imagine soldiers in a relatively free Czechoslovakia shooting refugees fleeing across the Czech-German border. Even if soldiers could be brought to shoot escapees, I should think an underground railroad a likely possibility. It is possibly this aspect and the possibility of pressure on the Czech regime, other than a defense of the frontier, that the Soviets would have in mind in any demand to station Soviet troops on the Czech frontier with Western Germany. 6. Ideology: A great source of strength of Communism has always been its flat assertion that there is only one truth and that Communism provides all the answers. The appeal of this doctrine has already been badly shaken by the Yugoslav and Chinese heresies. For Czechoslovakia to add another would be to substitute a confusing maze of cloverleafs for the one clear and straight road to Communism. As their claim to be the true interpreters of the doctrine is the basis of the Soviet leadership's claim to power, any further doubt cast on the orthodox view of Communism is bound to be of great concern to the Soviet leaders. 7. The bloc: The Soviets have already shown the importance they attach to the scheduled November meeting of Communist Parties and their attempt to reassert their leadership over the Communist bloc as well as over Communist Parties in the free world. Their ability to do this was highly doubtful before their brutal pressure on the Czechs. Now it would appear to be out the window. If to Yugoslav independence and Romanian estrangement of foreign affairs is added a successful Czech revolt against Soviet dictation of the internal order, there could be little doubt that a further loosening of bloc ties would follow. On the other hand if the Soviets, by using whatever means are necessary, are able to restore an orthodox regime in Czechoslovakia, they could at least for a time hope to consolidate their hold over a smaller portion of the bloc. The eventual price they would have to pay for this would, however, doubtless be great, including their relations with non-ruling Communist Parties. 8. The past: An important factor in the Soviet attitude is their desire to avoid opening the skeletons in the closet to public view and to precipitate a showdown on the issue of Stalinism which they have with such effort and strain managed to avoid. Although the Czechs while under existing pressures may exercise sufficient voluntary restraint to defer this issue, it would seem inescapable if a free press continues to exist in Czechoslovakia. With the involvement of a number of current Soviet leaders in Stalin's crimes, Czech remarks touching on this issue are fighting words. 9. The future: While I will not in this message attempt to analyze the many cons to Soviet attempts to restore an orthodox order in Czechoslovakia, the foregoing considerations indicate, it seems to me, that for the Soviets to accept the proposed changes in that country would mean the beginning of the ultimate disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Inevitably Czechoslovakia would gradually be forced or be drawn to the other side of the Iron Curtain, especially if the Czechs are to solve their economic problems without massive economic aid from the Soviet Union. Thus the best the Soviets could hope for unless present trends are arrested would be a Czechoslovakia paying only lip service to the Warsaw Pact. Should the Poles or East Germans catch the infection, the entire Soviet position in Europe would be jeopardized. Furthermore, and there is no doubt in my mind that this is a primary consideration of the leadership, this infection would spread to the USSR and aggravate the problems of the present order. There are already numerous signs of the disaffection of intellectuals and youth, a widespread dissatisfaction with the role of the Communist Party in this country, as well as a rising feeling of nationalism in the various Soviet republics. 10. Conclusion: In view of the foregoing, it is my view that the Soviets will go to great lengths to push the Czechs back to something close to the pre-January situation. A factor difficult to judge in all this is the capability of the Soviet leadership to unite in support of a bold and risky policy. Their tendency has been to postpone, compromise or muddle through. Another is the ability of the Czech leadership to remain united and correctly judge how much they can get away with. I must confess that in the short run I am pessimistic that the two sides can find and maintain the right combination which will reconcile their conflicting needs and objectives. In the longer view, it seems to me that however the current crisis is dealt with the Soviets will be unable, even by temporizing, to maintain a system that is out of step with the times. 11. For the near future the levers in Soviet hands are not insignificant. They can continue the war of nerves with military threats and political pressure. They can play on Czechoslovak differences and exploit those elements in Czech society opposed to current trends. In view of heavy dependence of Czechoslovakia on the bloc, and particularly the Soviet Union, for raw material as well as markets, they can bring strong economic pressure. Although the effect of their recent tactics has been both to consolidate Dubcek's position and to limit his freedom of action, they could change their tactics and attempt to bring him down by exploiting the difficulties his regime will doubtless face in the next months. In the short term before the Czech Party Congress, the Soviets will likely seek to utilize these levers as fully as possible to try to avoid a situation where their options are reduced to either direct military action or tacit acceptance of the new Czechoslovakia with the consequences that will flow therefrom. Thompson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–USSR. Secret. Repeated to Prague, Warsaw, Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Bonn, London, Paris, USUN, and USNATO. 2 The Presidiums of the Soviet and Czech Communist Parties meet at Cierna, Czechoslovakia, July 25–August 1. For text of the communiqué issued on August 2, see Remington, Winter in Prague, p. 255. 77. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 77. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, August 4, 1968, 1130Z. 2825. Subj: Assessment of Czech-Soviet confrontation. 1. Dubcek regime can take considerable credit for saving its skin at Cierna and for staring down the Soviet threat of force. We understand this is what actually happened at first meetings, when Dubcek stood up against personal attack and Svoboda said he would resign if Soviets insisted on troop stationing in Czechoslovakia. Czechs also seem to have essentially preserved their ability to pursue their own domestic program. 2. Czechs however paid heavy verbal price in language of Bratislava Declaration 2 (see below), which if nothing else clearly implies that Czechs will hew closely to Soviet foreign policy line. They also agreed at Cierna to hold down anti-Soviet material in media and reportedly agreed to restrict emergence of new political groups; both concessions spell trouble for Dubcek group's relations with progressive domestic allies. Additional concessions may have been made and not yet brought to light, e.g. on Soviet military presence here or on personnel adjustments (either removal of progressives or retention of others). 3. We regard following as principal Czech concessions in Bratislava Declaration: a. Acceptance of proposition that high international tension exists and that “subversive activity of imperialism” requires strengthening Communist unity; b. International obligation of all to defend socialist achievements, which provides possible future justification for intervention in Czechoslovakia or demands for tighter CSCP control; c. Recognition that leading role of CPs is under attack and that “extraordinary vigilance” is needed in this regard; d. Agreement to “harmonize and coordinate” foreign activities in context sharp criticism US, West Germany and Israeli “ruling circles;” e. Acknowledgement that in face international tension marked by growth of revanchist forces in West Germany, political and military cooperation in Warsaw Pact must be strengthened. 4. The passing of this latest crisis will assuredly be welcomed with relief here but will also give rise to much questioning as to what kind of deals were made with Czechoslovakia's hard-line ideological opponents. Reinstitution of terminology of cold war could provide cover for special measures which may be demanded in name of European Communist solidarity and security. The setting and atmosphere would thus be beyond Czech regime's control. 5. Meeting organized by students in Prague Old Town Square last night indicated questions already being raised; one prominent placard demanded that truth be told about Bratislava. Perhaps Dubcek speech scheduled tonight and public rally we understand being planned for tomorrow evening will help clarify matters. Tito and Ceausescu visits—if latter in fact still comes after reading communiqué—could also provide enlightenment on where Czechs now stand. 3 6. Communiqué will be difficult for us to handle publicly since we can hardly extract much joy from its invidious language. Perhaps Department could express satisfaction that costly crisis, which was provoked artificially as means of pressure against small state, seems to be surmounted. We would hope the Cierna meeting will enable the Czechoslovak nation to pursue its self-development insofar as possible in accord with its people's wishes. Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, Sofia, Warsaw, and USUN. 2 Soviet, Czech, and Eastern European Communist leaders met at Bratislava on August 3. For the text of their communiqué, issued on August 4, see Remington, Winter in Prague , pp. 265–261. For extracts, see Department of State Bulletin , September 9, 1968, p. 264. 3 President Tito of Yugoslavia visited Prague August 9–11; President Ceausescu of Romania visited Prague August 15–16. 78. Notes of Meeting 78. Notes of Meeting 1 LBJ Ranch, Texas, August 10, 1968, 12:25 p.m. NOTES ON BRIEFING OF FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON AND GOVERNOR AGNEW THOSE ATTENDING THE BRIEFING WERE: The President Former Vice President Nixon Secretary Rusk CIA Director Helms Cyrus Vance Governor Agnew Tom Johnson CIA Director Helms: Czechoslovakia is eased, not over. The Czechs want to reduce commitment to Warsaw Pact. Czechoslovakia made certain assurances. Prague meeting will take place in September. Soviets seek to bring about reforms. Nixon: Is it your opinion that the Soviets can't let this happen? Secretary Rusk: The problem is if both sides can move along so Czechoslovakia can progress and the Soviets can take care of its problems with its students, visitors. Nixon: Will pressure be kept on? CIA Director Helms: Yes. The situation will continue to be a tense one. Nixon: The best line publicly is that this is a sensitive situation. We have sympathy but to say anything would not be helpful. Secretary Rusk: That is right. Governor Agnew: What is the relation of this to the Jewish question? CIA Director Helms: No anti-semitism in Czechoslovakia. Nixon: The Czech government goes to great pains to show Jewish cemetery. It is no problem. It is a problem in Poland. Secretary Rusk: Don't give the Russians a pretext for action. We've been tough on the USSR privately, not in public. [Here follow 4 pages of discussion of the Near East and Vietnam.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Prepared by Tom Johnson. 79. Memorandum of Conversation 79. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 19, 1968. SUBJECT Czechoslovakia and Arms Limitation PARTICIPANTS Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs At the Secretary's dinner on the Honey Fitz , on August 19, Ambassador Dobrynin invited Under Secretary Rostow to withdraw for a private talk. The topics covered are treated in separate memoranda. 2 Rostow commented that the Soviet decisions at Cierna seemed wise to us, and potentially very important. Dobrynin said these were matters of great difficulty for his government. Rostow said we understood that, and had tried, as the Secretary had made clear to him, not to make the problem more complex. Dobrynin said that that was appreciated. Rostow said we thought the NATO proposals at Reykjavik were constructive, and he hoped they were being carefully considered in this connection. Dobrynin asked how far those proposals went. Rostow said we had no official position on that question, but remarked on a personal basis that he thought they would find we were willing to examine any issue they wished to raise in the field of balanced and mutual force reduction, arms limitation, and European security, in the interest of reducing tensions and promoting détente. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Exdis. Drafted and initialed by Rostow on August 20. The source text is labeled “Part IV of IV.” 2 Not found. 80. Summary of Meeting 80. Summary of Meeting 1 Washington, August 20, 1968, 8:15–8:42 p.m. Summary of Meeting in Cabinet Room, Tuesday, August 20, 1968 With the President, Soviet Ambassador Anatoli F. Dobrynin and Walt Rostow, 8:15 p.m. to 8:42 p.m. The President started off the meeting by asking Ambassador Dobrynin how he had been and asked about Mr. Kosygin. He then told him that he had night before last seen a color movie at the ranch which was very good. The movie was one taken at Glassboro when the President met with Kosygin. Mr. Dobrynin said that he would have liked to have seen it and the President told him that it was good of both Kosygin and of him. The President said it was particularly good when he was talking to the crowd which had assembled outside the house. Mr. Dobrynin said it was probably the students. The President said: “And you could have thought he was a … “ Mr. Rostow spoke up and said “A campaigner.” The President said: “Well, you would have thought he could be a County Judge of New Jersey, or President of the United States or anybody.” Mr. Dobrynin laughed at this statement by the President. The President said it was colorful because the children were in red, blue, and green—different colors. Mr. Dobrynin asked the President if he had ever seen a Youth Parade (he was not sure what the name was) and he said it was a pageant and very colorful and a huge gathering. He said it was an interesting thing to see. The President told Walt Rostow that Dean Rusk was going to be on television at 9 o'clock and that he ought to watch it. The President said he had just been down to have his hair cut because he did not have a barber at the ranch, to which Mr. Dobrynin said “Why not?” They both laughed. Mr. Dobrynin then asked the President if he would be at the ranch long. The President had told him he was leaving in the morning for the ranch. He said he would be there unless President Eisenhower died. He said he would have to be there the second day and possibly the third—it's a six day affair. He said on the fifth day, however, they would take him out to Kansas and the President said he did not know whether he would go out there or not. The President said that President Eisenhower had had another attack that day. Mr. Dobrynin said: “He still has a strong heart because so many heart attacks, and he still survives. It's unbelievable.” The President told Mr. Dobrynin that he (the President) had had one heart attack and he almost did not make it. He said his blood pressure went to zero at once and they counted him out. He said they just thought he was gone. Mr. Dobrynin said: “This is very dangerous … in the old country they used to give some stimulant or something. Otherwise they couldn't do anything. There was no surgery, anything specific. They couldn't do it—especially not at his age. And today, even in my own country, now we have very nice surgeons—but … until now there wasn't a single operation.” The President said this was going to open up all new, different and complex problems. Mr. Dobrynin said: “This is the point.” The President then offered Mr. Dobrynin a Fresca and asked him if he had ever drunk this drink. Mr. Dobrynin said: “No, is it a strong one?” The President told him that it contained no alcohol and had no calories and Mr. Dobrynin wanted to know how he did it. The President said he had to lose some weight and that he had lost about seven or eight pounds. Mr. Dobrynin said: “Now, Mr. President, I have an urgent instruction from my government to tell you about serious business. I will read it.” The President asked him to read a little louder—that he was a little hard of hearing but was so vain he would not wear a hearing aid. Mr. Dobrynin went on to say: ”Kosygin asked me personally to visit you and to say the following on behalf of my government. I will read this; what I am instructed to say: 'The Government of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to inform, personally, President Johnson about the following. In connection with the further aggravation of the situation which was created by a conspiracy of the external and internal forces of aggression against the existing social order in Czechoslovakia and against the statehood established by the constitution of that government, the government of Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic approached the allied states, the Soviet Union among them, with a request of rendering direct assistance, including the assistance of military forces. 'The Soviet Government repeatedly stated that the events in Czechoslovakia and around it involve vital interests of the Soviet Union and of a number of other states tied by appropriate treaty obligations, and that the threat to the Socialist order in Czechoslovakia constitutes at the same time a threat to the foundations of European peace and world security. In view of this, the Soviet Government and the Governments of the allied countries have taken a joint decision to satisfy the request of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic rendering necessary assistance to the Czechoslovak people. Accordingly, the Soviet military units received orders to enter the territory of Czechoslovakia. Of course, they will be withdrawn without delay from the territory of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as soon as the present threat to the security is eliminated and they come to the conclusion that there is no need in further presence of the allied forces. We would like President Johnson to know that our steps, which are being taken upon the request of the Czechoslovak Government are dictated fully by the concern to strengthen peace and in no degree do they involve state interests of the United States or any other state. We proceed from the fact that the current events should not harm the Soviet-American relations to the development of which the Soviet Government as before attaches great importance.' This is what I was asked to tell you.” The President said: “I would like to take it and read it and study it and I appreciate very much your bringing it to me and I will review it in the morning with Secretary Rusk and we will be back in touch with you.” Mr. Dobrynin thanked the President. The President then asked if it were in English and Mr. Dobrynin said it was not, but that he could tell him afterwards if he would like it. The President said that frankly he had missed a word or two here and there. He asked Mr. Rostow how he would summarize it and Mr. Rostow said: “As I understand it, the Soviet Government informs you, Mr. President, that they and other states have taken a collective decision at the request of the Government of Czechoslovakia to introduce military forces into Czechoslovakia because of a threat defined by the Czech Government; that those forces will remain until the threat to the Czech Government has passed, and be withdrawn. It is the hope of the Soviet Government that this will not interfere with US-Soviet relations and that there is no threat to the United States or to the interests of peace in Europe. In fact, it is stated that these moves should stabilize the peace in Europe.” The President replied: “Our position with regard to the problem that exists in Czechoslovakia is as represented by Secretary Rusk and I trust that you understand that the position that he explained in detail to you is my view, and the views of this Government, and is the honest and absolutely correct attitude that we have taken. Although I have seen a good many other interpretations and predictions and evaluations, Secretary Rusk, at my instruction, asked you to come in to see him and told you frankly and honestly, looking directly in your eyes, what our position was and you can rely on it. 2 “I didn't hear the conversation between you and Secretary Rusk but I have such confidence in him that I know he related to you what I asked him to and I don't want there to be any doubt about our attitude.” Mr. Dobrynin said: “No. This message refers to you. I know what you told him to say and it is very clear.” The President asked Mr. Dobrynin what had been done about his announcement and he said they had had no word yet. 3 The President went on to say: “Well, I have all these problems about all these folks I have got to talk to beforehand. And I thought I would have them at breakfast at 8:00 o'clock and we'd stay from 8 to 10 at breakfast and I would do it so they wouldn't shout to high heaven that I gave them no information.” Mr. Rostow said that it had been our understanding that the joint announcement would be made at 10 o'clock tomorrow. The President continued: “There are four changes. I had to sit down with various people and assure them at 10:00—they would all be in the same room at 10:00 o'clock—but at 10:00, the Soviet Union will say this and we will say this. And I gathered from the announcement that I received that—I think your expression of it when I got off the airplane last night in Detroit—it said that it is acceptable, or there is no objection in Moscow if the American side desires it—if the American side desires it—and announce in the nearest time—I don't know what that means—in the nearest time about the coming visit. Now the language that they suggested, I understand that you and Secretary Rusk had a little adjustment, just a little leeway, about the same thing.” Mr. Dobrynin replied: “Yes, but you see, Mr. President, sometimes when you make … in my impression, the text the Secretary gave me yesterday at midnight, there is no difference really. But the question is, when does the United States, or the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson, wish to continue …” The President said “what we propose is to announce at 10:00 o'clock our time and whatever time it is there—6:00 o'clock their time. Look, while we're at it, I would like to touch a base or two, you see. And in order to touch a base, I have to get people to come in 35 miles to Washington. And I thought I'd do it at the breakfast table, and over breakfast I would say: This is what is going to be said when we finish the breakfast.” Mr. Rostow pointed out that there were two issues that the Presidium would have to set. “The President's suggestion was, raised the question—would things move quicker if we accepted your language. But my guess is you have two issues that have to go to higher authority: One, the exact time of the announcement, and two, the exact language. So that any check-back, there had to be a check-back with Moscow on the time, Mr. President.” Mr. Dobrynin said: “So I will try, Mr. President, to get back tomorrow morning.” The President told him there was no rush, for him to go on and do the best he could. The President then directed his remarks to Mr. Rostow and said they ought to get their drinks down—that he didn't mind, but he just did not want them to think they all were in there drunk. The President went on to say that Mr. Rayburn used to say that he would never take a drink before the House adjourned in the afternoon because if they had a big fight or something and they had a roll call and he had to get up in the chair, he said just as sure as he did, he would trip his toe and someone would say he is drunk again. They all laughed and the President asked Mr. Dobrynin if he knew Mr. Rayburn and he said, yes, for a long time. The President said that Mr. Rayburn and his father were deskmates in the Legislature before the President was born. Mr. Dobrynin said: “That would be in Texas? Now I see.” The President continued: “The old Capitol that was built was the original Capitol that was destroyed when we were a Republic. You see we were a Republic, an Independent State, before we came in to the Union in 1845. We won our independence in 1856 from Mexico, and from 1836 until 1845, a nine year period, we were an independent Republic.” Mr. Dobrynin asked why it called Lone Star. The President pointed out that that's the flag—that we had a lone star flag and that we were known as the Lone Star State. Mr. Dobrynin said: “Did you know the song the Yellow Rose of Texas?” The President said: “Yes, that was during the Civil War. One of the better Commanders, the Hood Brigade. My grandfather was a member of it, and they went into battle with the flag flying and the boys singing the Yellow Rose of Texas. It's a good marching hymn. It gets you excited, and so on and so forth.” Mr. Dobrynin asked if we had an official state song or flower. The President replied that we have the bluebonnet as our state flower but he did not know what our state song was. Mr. Rostow laughingly said that if the President didn't know, he certainly didn't. The President asked Mr. Dobrynin if it was his impression that this meeting be around the first of the month and he replied that was his understanding—the first of the month—the first three days—between the first and the tenth of October. The President said he had a grandson or a granddaughter that was expected during that period. Mr. Dobrynin said: “Ah, you will bring her along … But you see, in your case, in America when somebody is born here, he automatically becomes an American citizen. In our case it is not so.” [Here follow comments by the President on his family.] The President then switched to a more serious note and said there were many subjects that needed to be discussed and that he thought they were very free to do that now and that he thought their meeting in Glassboro was good. He said he enjoyed it very much. He thought it was good for our people and for their people also. He went on to say: “I thought the reception they gave Mr. Kosygin was really unusual. Ten years ago you wouldn't have thought that could happen.” “I was here ten years ago” Dobrynin said, “so I know how the situation was.” Mr. Dobrynin went on to say: “For him it was a caution he had no chance to see more than New York and New Jersey. He is very connected with the university. He would like to see for himself, because he is the head of the whole economy of the Soviet Union … All the responsibility of dealing with those buildings, dams, those huge dams, factories … He said—in New York I would like to see both bad and good sides.” The President said—“We have many misfortunes and lots have problems, but one of the fortunate things that's happened to both countries is that we have been blessed with good men like Thompson in Moscow who tells us what it is without prejudice or without any hatred or without any ambition or personal attempt to satisfy me or our Government. I want you to do the same thing with your people. It would be good for this country and for your country too, if we had men of quality like you and Thompson.” Mr. Dobrynin thanked the President very much. The President went on to say: “Yes, one Ambassador sometimes can change the fate of the world. And a lot of times Tommy Thompson says to me—well, just a minute.” The President asked Mr. Dobrynin to let us know about the other thing because he wanted to have the breakfast date. Mr. Dobrynin said: “Thank you very much, and good luck.” 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. The text printed here contains revisions that were made after the editor listened to the recording of the conversation. The recording is ibid., Recording of Meeting Between President Johnson, Ambassador Dobrynin, and Walt Rostow, August 20, 1968, 8:17–8:42 p.m. [Tape FC002, Side A]. 2 Apparently a reference to the Rusk-Dobrynin meeting of July 22; see Document 70 . 3 Reference is to a joint announcement of a visit by President Johnson to the Soviet Union. 81. Notes of Emergency Meeting of the National Security Council 81. Notes of Emergency Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, August 20, 1968, 10:15 p.m. THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE: The President Secretary Rusk General Wheeler CIA Director Helms The Vice President Ambassador Ball Walt Rostow Leonard Marks George Christian Tom Johnson Secretary Rusk: This surprises me. Secretary Clifford: It does me too. General Wheeler: Ambassador Bohlen was uneasy about this. CIA Director Helms: This was what their big meeting was about today. Walt Rostow: The evidence is: (1) Withdrew Soviets' planes to Poland. (2) Brought them back. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. (4) Maneuvers. CIA Director Helms: On 14 August exercise started. General Wheeler: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and USSR troops have moved in: 23 aircraft into Poland 50 aircraft into border area 50 aircraft entered Czechoslovakia Walt Rostow: Aircraft: 50 in Czechoslovakia 18 in S. W. Poland 44 in central Poland Prague domestic radio tells people not to resist. The President: I asked you to come here because of the alarm of the last few hours. Ambassador Dobrynin called me late today with a very “urgent” message. He read from a long-hand note. (Insert A) 2 I told him we would give it our attention. He said they were invading Czechoslovakia because the Czechs had asked them to come in. I notified the Secretary of State and called this NSC meeting to analyze these actions and try to determine what our national interest is. It is one country invading another Communist country. It is aggression. There is danger in aggression anywhere. We need to give immediate thought to timing of meeting with Soviets. The agenda is more full now than before. We must discuss all problems before us. Is October agreeable or should we meet earlier. There are serious questions: (1) Can we talk now after this. (2) Does our presence look as though we condone this movement. It demonstrates the difficulty the platform committee has in working out strategy at the Hilton Hotel. What do we do? Secretary Rusk: First, I am surprised by the timing of this action. I am disappointed, particularly in light of their favorable messages on (1) nuclear explosion (2) strategic missile talks (3) your meeting. 3 This shows they hold the USA in contempt. Walt Rostow: Read FBIS 07 Bulletin. (Insert B) 4 Secretary Rusk: We do not know yet if the Czechs will raise a voice. There is not a great deal we can do if they don't. We could support the Czechs in the United Nations and through USIA. If we do they can put pressure on the West, particularly Berlin. Khrushchev called Berlin the testicles of the West and when he wanted to create pressure he squeezed there. Secretary Rusk: Draft reply to Dobrynin read. 5 We have a public problem as well. We must decide what moral force and political force we should bring to bear. The big question is what the Czech reaction will be. I would not move ahead in next day or so. The President: We should talk to Dobrynin tonight. Secretary Rusk: For the press to know I call him in to give him our views it will be good to position ourselves publicly. Walt Rostow: There are two points in Rusk's statement. The President: I am amazed that Dobrynin told me it was at the request of the Czech government and the Czech government was never told. We must talk to him about the other announcement. The President: We reviewed information and information given by Ambassador Dobrynin. The President instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter. The Secretary could say: (a) Astonished at this news. (b) Not opportune time to make announcement tomorrow. Tell allies we are dismayed and outline what should be anticipated. Secretary Clifford: They had first meeting. It seemed to go well. They had a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries. I am not clear as to the reason the Soviets took this action. The President: We have been fearful that they lost so much face they had to return. They could not stand to move in until the other ducks were in a row. CIA Director Helms: It is not what has happened but what has not happened. They wanted to see if the Czechs would clamp down on the press. They did not. The President: Wasn't this hard to swallow? CIA Director Helms: Yes. Military exercises were designed to see how the troops could move in. The President: Should the Secretary talk to Dobrynin tonight? CIA Director Helms: Yes. Secretary Clifford: Czechoslovakia is just one piece on the chessboard. This march will have effects on Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. We must visualize what effect this will have on other countries. Secretary Clifford: I agree we have to speak to Dobrynin. We have to delay this announcement. The President: This seems strange in light of (a) peaceful uses of atomic energy and (b) the scheduled Geneva meeting. (c) The scheduled Geneva announcement. Then this bombshell. Secretary Clifford: It may be that Supreme Soviet rumblings caused this. Ambassador Ball: They have been concerned about the internal structure of the Warsaw Pact and about not destroying the relationship with the United States. This occurred just before the Democratic convention, just as Hungarian invasion occurred before election. We can't be idle in the United Nations about this. General Wheeler: There is no military action we can take. We do not have the forces to do it. This approach is cynical to the Nth degree. They have had CPX exercise and troops on the border. I think this message is an insult to the United States. They say keep your hands off. Dean (Secretary Rusk) should say the future course of US-USSR relations depends on how this is handled. The President: A. Do we send for him? B. Do we say no announcement? C. Do we say we are utterly dismayed by it. D. Cannot reconcile his statement with other statements we've received. Secretary Rusk: Czechoslovakia is 3rd arms supplier to Vietnam. General Wheeler: That is because they were told to. Secretary Clifford: Bus 6 gets to the heart of this matter. They may be sincerely conciliatory. Suppose there is no combat. Suppose there is a pullout. They had a lot of troops in there two weeks ago. The President: I sympathize with General Wheeler's views. We do not have to say what we feel. 1. Call in Dobrynin. 2. Tell him we won't make announcement. 3. Tell him we asked Council to meet. The Vice President: We need to show caution. The Czechs touched the heart of the Communist revolution. All you can do is snort and talk. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Secret. A transcript of this meeting is ibid., Transcripts. 2 A copy of the Soviet note is ibid. For text of the note, see Document 80 . 3 The messages are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to the Soviet Union. 4 Not found. 5 See Document 82 . 6 General Wheeler. 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 1 Washington, August 21, 1968, 0855Z. 224693. 1. At Assistant Secretary Leddy's invitation Czech Ambassador Duda came to Department early morning August 21. Leddy said he wished to inform Ambassador of action taken in Washington regarding Czech crisis. 2. Following delivery to the President by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin of message (Duda given copy to read, but not to keep), President held meeting of National Security Council to discuss matter. As a result of meeting he asked the Secretary to call in Ambassador Dobrynin to communicate to him the points set forth below. 3. Secretary Rusk met with Dobrynin at approximately 11:30 p.m., August 20 and stated the following: 2 The message communicated to the President by Dobrynin had been received by the US Government with deep concern. There were certain points which puzzle us and on which we feel we do not have adequate information. The US failed to understand the reference in this message to the “request of the Government of Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic” for assistance by military forces from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the light of the broadcasts from Prague saying that the Warsaw Pact forces were entering Czechoslovakia without the knowledge of the President of the National Assembly (Smrkovsky), the Prime Minister (Cernik), the Chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (Dubcek) and the President of the Republic (Svoboda). The US Government does not understand the reference in the message to “external … forces of aggression against the existing social order in Czechoslovakia.” The Secretary said that the US has no information to support the idea that any non-socialist country is involved in, or is contemplating, any aggression against Czechoslovakia. 4. Ambassador expressed gratitude for information. Said he uninformed and could not comment. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Batjer, cleared in S/S and CTF, and approved by Leddy. 2 No other record of the Rusk-Dobrynin conversation was found. 83. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 83. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, August 21, 1968, 1935Z. 5178. Subject: Invasion of Czechoslovakia. 1. I would like in this telegram to provide some preliminary thoughts on meaning of invasion as seen from here, subject to views of Ambassador Thompson. 2. It must first be said that invasion took all friendly diplomats here by surprise. Some had expected it in earlier stage of crisis. None with whom we have talked thought it particularly likely following Bratislava Declaration, which seemed offer a face-saving device for all concerned. 3. There is consequently considerable speculation that Soviet leadership itself shifted from a minority to a majority favoring invasion in interval following Bratislava meeting. Story was current this evening among diplomats that as late as August 19 Kosygin and Podgorny (sic), summoned hastily from vacation, were confronted with new majority decision in Politburo for intervention. This story is not confirmed, and all reports of Politburo views and actions must be considered suspect in absence firm intelligence. Their relevance to what has happened will no doubt be clarified only in time, if then. 4. Alternative hypothesis is that decision to intervene was taken at or immediately following Bratislava meeting. According this hypothesis, Bratislava Declaration was from outset purely tactical compromise papering over differences so fundamental that Soviets recognized they were unbridgeable under Dubcek leadership. Invasion was consequently timed to achieve maximum psychological and tactical surprise (which was in fact achieved). 5. What seems readily estimable, on basis our conversations this evening, is that many countries under emotional impact of events find Soviet action so repugnant that their bilateral relations are likely to suffer at all levels; that November international conference of Communist Parties faces virtually insuperable odds; that underdeveloped third world countries will have second thoughts as to Soviet connections; and that East-West détente has suffered significant setback. 6. What is less clear is internal impact of this event. Knowledge that regime has resorted to military force against ally accused of ideological deviation cannot but add [garble] to already strident demands on Soviet population for orthodoxy and conformity. We anticipate that in near term Soviet population will conform. Over longer term, consequences for leadership are unpredictable. Some heads could fall unless there was greater support for intervention than most diplomats believe possible. 7. Our own posture poses difficult problems given urgency and importance of bilateral and multilateral issues needing resolution. For the short term, however, it seems to us indispensable that we condemn invasion in strongest terms and avoid any action which could be construed as mitigating that condemnation. That applies not only to Soviet Union but to its four collaborators. 8. Department pass as desired. Swank 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to USUN. 84. Notes of Cabinet Meeting 84. Notes of Cabinet Meeting 1 Washington, August 22, 1968, 12:16–1:50 p.m. President: Czech situation. 1. We did not assume there would be no military intervention. 2. There was massing of troops on the borders. 3. Thompson said they would go to any length to push Czechs back to pre-January site. 4. Tuesday lunch included item on Soviet Central Committee meeting. 5. At 7:05 —Dobrynin asked for meeting —Rostow told Rusk —Read Soviet message —Rusk sent message to DNC meeting —Asked for NSC meeting —Rusk called in Dobrynin —Ball instructed to talk to other nations in UN. Yesterday morning we formalized a statement. 2 —We have no commitment to intervene militarily. —It would not be in Czech interests or ours. —The “Cold War” is not over. —Our relations with Soviets are in transition. —We would go anywhere at anytime to further interests of peace. —We have thought at times we have made progress. —We have the NPT, Outer Space agreement and the Consular Treaty. —Soviets thought a pause would enable them to do something in Vietnam. We tried a 37-day pause in the bombing. —There are some plusses and some minuses. —We have been disillusioned if not deceived. Secretary Rusk: The political costs the Soviets would have to pay was one reason we thought they would not move. A decision was made on Monday. If there were military intervention, there would be a world war. In the Security Council the matter was inscribed, 13–2. India, Pakistan and Algeria voted to put it on the agenda. Only two voted against it. They were the Soviet Union and Hungary. There would be 80–90 votes on this issue in the General Assembly. This action has created violent world reaction. The National Assembly can speak. The President and the Foreign Minister can also. As far as the relation between Czechoslovakia and Vietnam—I see no direct relationship. I hope members of the Cabinet will not get into this. Secretary Wirtz: 3 I agree Czechoslovakia and Vietnam are different situations. There is confusion in the peoples' minds. The Czechs spoke to the world as though people do not recognize the difference between this and Vietnam. Sixty five percent of the people in the world wish us well in Vietnam. Vice President: I was shocked to find Galbraith talking as though it was one and the same. President: I want the Cabinet to have all the information that is available to me. We want to achieve peace. Secretary Clifford: JCS maintain watch over the Soviet Union. They followed the meetings of the Czechs with the Warsaw Pact countries. They understand the dangers. They watched the exercises on the border. The Warsaw nations had rehearsed it. Planes moved in. Elements of 26 different divisions took part. They went into radio silence. Dobrynin's message was the first notice. There is no basis for resistance on the part of Czechs. We have no mutual assistance pacts. We do have an understanding with West Germany. This action on the part of the Soviet Union may be helpful to us in not getting the troop cutback in Europe. [Here follow 3 pages of discussion of Vietnam.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. A covering memorandum from Tom Johnson to the President lists the 35 participants and noted the time of the meeting. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. 2 For text of the August 21 U.S. statement, see Department of State Bulletin , September 9, 1968, p. 261. 3 Secretary of Labor William W. Wirtz. 85. Summary of Meeting 85. Summary of Meeting 1 Washington, August 23, 1968, 1:07–3:06 p.m. Summary of Meeting in Cabinet Room, Friday, August 23, 1968 from 1:07 to 3:06 p.m. List of Those Attending Attached . 2 Mr. Helms reported to the group that Rumanians were in a state of considerable apprehension because they were afraid that if Russia moved on Czechoslovakia, they would also have to move at the same time on Rumania. That explained the mobilization of Rumanian forces. He pointed out that Rumania had taken one of the strongest public positions on Czechoslovakia of any government in the world. He said we believe it is important to make clear that this is not just a bilateral issue between the Soviet Union and the United States, but it is a case of the Soviet Union against all the rest. General Wheeler said that Dubcek met with about sixty of his editors but apparently was unable to dissuade them to show their strength that would satisfy the Soviets. He said that while there would be no evidence, it was reasonable to speculate that there had been a shift between the Soviet politburo at that time in favor of intervention. He said you can sum it up what the Soviets' objectives were and are if you set the clock back. What it really amounts to is their concern about their own position, their own power. They already had lost Yugoslavia and Rumania has been going completely independent in foreign policy. But the thing that was particularly of concern to them in Czechoslovakia was the introduction of democracy into the Czech Communist Party and freedom of the press which General Wheeler thought was completely incompatible with the Communist system. Secretary Rusk said that they had not contemplated military action in support of Czechoslovakia in this situation—nor had Czechoslovakia asked for it or suggested it. In that situation, therefore, the most powerful weapon with the Soviet Union would seem to be unanimous—highly mobilized charged world reaction against this kind of thing. So in the very nature of their system, the Soviet Union pays special attention to propaganda aspects. Ambassador Ball took the matter up with the United Nations and he reported on his meetings with representatives of the United Nations. Secretary Clifford said that from the military standpoint the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets has been a very well planned, efficient, and sophisticated operation. They moved a great many planes and enormous number of men. They did it very efficiently. Clifford further stated that we must view it within the framework of the attention that the Defense Department and this Government has been giving to the Soviet Union in the past month for it's very clear that the Soviet Union is heading down the road to greater military strength. He said the matter reached a point of drama last October when at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, the present regime announced that they were going to increase military expenditures for 1968 by 15 percent. Coupled with that was an announcement by the Soviets that they would increase outlays for science by 11 percent. We have come to know that that area carries a very heavy leading [ loading ?] of military expenditures. When these announcements were made, they indicated there would have to be cutbacks in the investment for agriculture and in non-military commodities. It appears clear now that the Soviet leaders with this increased military strength intend to find ways to increase that additional military power into political influence. Clifford went on to say that the Soviets appear to be engaged in a process of letting the world know that the Soviet Union can deliver its forces wherever it might choose to deliver them—say through the Mediterranean and throughout the European area. They have been engaged in a rather expensive ship-building program and even more dangerous to our own security is an exceedingly extensive and very sophisticated submarine-building program. He said that for those who have a degree of responsibility in this field to visualize the Czechoslovakian incident within a framework of a basic program wherein the Soviet Union is substantially increasing its military strength. The President then called on General Wheeler for his remarks. General Wheeler said that from the military point of view, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was quick, efficient, and effective. It was based upon very thorough planning. He reported they had command post exercise during a period from August 13–20 in which they went through all the necessary planning and practicing in the time and space factors to do precisely what they did. During the period of six to ten days Soviet divisions moved to the Czechoslovakia border. Three came from East Germany, one from Poland and two from the Carpathian military district of the USSR. On the 30th of June they held a Warsaw Pact exercise in Czechoslovakia and they had elements of four divisions that had actually moved into Czechoslovakia and the Czechs at least to some degree participated in the exercise. They also had similar exercises in Poland and East Germany. Later they moved more divisions up, having between 19 and 24 Warsaw Pact divisions. This would be somewhere between 190,000 and 250,000 men. Their actual intervention followed rather precisely the pattern of those command post exercises. General Wheeler pointed out that there are military disadvantages also as far as the Soviets are concerned. They had a sizeable number of units in Czechoslovakia—far more than they really needed to deal with the Czechs. But if fighting did break out there they would have losses and so on which would decrease their capability to engage in any other military adventure and that the Warsaw Pact had been weakened in a broad sense by the actual loss of the Czech armed forces to their cause and he would judge they would have little reliance in the remaining Armed forces under the present circumstances. He made the observation that the situation in Central Europe today indicates it would be less than prudent for us to further reduce the U.S. military presence there. On the other hand, he suggested that we should take the lead in maintaining our strength, improving it to the degree we can, and in urging our allies to improve their forces in certain areas where improvement is certainly needed. [Here follow 2 pages of discussion of Vietnam.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. 2 Not found. 86. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 86. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, August 23, 1968. SUBJECT Proposals for NATO, Tripartite (US, UK, France) or Quadripartite (US, UK, France and FRG) Heads of Government Meeting on Czech Crisis After careful review, we have concluded that our present course of mobilizing world opinion through the United Nations offers the best hope at this time of influencing the Soviets toward moderation in the present crisis. We are in close touch with all the allies through the North Atlantic Council and consultations on the crisis are continuing. In the Department's view, however, an initiative for a NATO Heads of Government meeting, or any dramatic action in NATO, would be inadvisable at present for the following reasons: 1. It would divert the world's attention from the UN effort without, in all probability, producing any concrete action that would cause the Soviets to modify their present course. 2. It would tend to place the Soviet invasion in a cold war context, lessening the moral impact on the non-aligned and dissident communist nations. 3. The Soviets might even gain a propaganda advantage since they have sought to conjure up a NATO and German plot against Czechoslovakia. 4. Most of the allies favor the UN approach, and some at least would be most reluctant to participate in a NATO Heads of Government meeting. Similar reasons militate against a Tripartite (US, UK, France) or Quadripartite Heads of Government meeting at this time. The French Foreign Minister told Ambassador Shriver on August 21 of his opposition to “formal consultations” between the US, the UK and France, since these could only result in a “meaningless declaration” which would be useless. There are even more cogent reasons why a top-level meeting including the FRG would be inadvisable at this time. These include the fact that, historically, the Germans are viewed by many of the Eastern Europeans, including the Czechs, with suspicion. We consider it important, nevertheless, that while the public spotlight remains focused on New York, the US take action with the allies to demonstrate its leadership in regard to the Czech crisis. We think the best approach would be for the President to send personal messages to Heads of Government of all other NATO countries. We shall be submitting a recommended text for such messages covering a number of points in our current position on the crisis. Such messages would also emphasize the importance of NATO and allied consultations in the present situation. Secretary Rusk concurs with this memorandum. There is enclosed a paper analyzing these questions in more detail. 2 BHR 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret. Drafted by Myerson and cleared by Leddy. 2 The enclosure, a paper entitled “Courses of Action in the Czechoslovak Crisis,” is not printed. 87. Memorandum of Conversation 87. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 23, 1968. SUBJECT Situation in Czechoslovakia PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin The Secretary Ambassador Thompson The Secretary said he had asked the Ambassador to come in for a very informal chat about current problems. He began by referring to his talk with the Ambassador early in the week on developments in Czechoslovakia. 2 The Secretary said that he came from Georgia and was sometimes referred to as soft spoken in manner. He wondered whether the Ambassador had in any way been misled by the manner in which he had discussed the Czechoslovakia problem, and whether the Ambassador had fully understood the significance of what the Secretary had told him about reaction in this country and the possible effect of Czechoslovakia developments on Soviet-American relations. The Ambassador said he had fully understood the Secretary's remarks. He said that the decision which his Government had made was obviously not an easy one. The reaction in the United States and for that matter in certain Communist parties had been clearly predictable. He had personally thought that a solution to the Czech problem had been found, but something must have happened to change the situation. In speculating on what this might be the Secretary referred to Herr Ulbricht's visit to Czechoslovakia. 3 Dobrynin said that Soviet policy was not determined by Herr Ulbricht or anyone else. East Germany was of course an important member of the Warsaw Pact, but the Soviets knew how to say no to Herr Ulbricht. Later in the conversation Ambassador Thompson speculated on the role of the Czechoslovakia press in effecting the Soviet reaction, and Ambassador Dobrynin acknowledged that this was certainly a factor. Ambassador Dobrynin said that his counselor had returned from Moscow last weekend, and had told him that most of the Soviet leaders were on vacation. Dobrynin had been on the verge of asking permission to accompany his wife and daughter when they return to the Soviet Union next Tuesday. He indicated he had received word of the change in Soviet policy only a short time before he had informed the President about it. When the Secretary indicated that he had been surprised by the Soviet action, Dobrynin attempted to justify it largely on the basis of internal developments in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary said that we had seen no indications that Czechoslovakia intended to leave the Warsaw Pact or conduct itself in any way other than as a member of the socialist camp. Dobrynin said that in his view it had become clear that Dubcek was a weak leader who was allowing things to drift, and that in these circumstances the right was steadily gaining influence, and the Soviets thought that Dubcek was losing control of the situation. These developments were leading in the direction of a situation in which Czechoslovakia would no longer be a member of the Warsaw Pact. Dobrynin emphasized that the Czech economic reforms had nothing to do with the case as the Soviets considered that this was a matter for them alone to decide. When the Secretary again referred to the possible effect of recent developments on Soviet-American relations, Dobrynin said that he could tell the Secretary that he had received instructions to say, in case the subject were raised, that the Soviet Union desired to continue to make progress upon the bilateral questions with which they had been dealing before the recent Czech events. He referred specifically to the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the strategic missile problem. He understood that it would probably be impossible for the United States to proceed immediately in these matters while the international situation was still so unclear. Without wishing to press the Secretary he wondered whether as a matter of policy, unrelated to timing, the United States would also wish to proceed to deal with these problems. The Secretary said that his reply would have to consist of two statements. The first was that from the beginning of his administration the President was profoundly and passionately interested in advancing the cause of peace and in promoting better relations and better understanding between our two countries. We of course had differences, and some of these would remain but in this atomic age the President considered it essential to do everything he could to diminish dangers of conflict. The Secretary mentioned that the President had today met with the Congressional leadership. Many of these men had been scattered about the country, and their reactions reflected the serious impression which the Czech developments had had on the American people. It appeared that the President would be subject to strong criticism for his efforts in building better relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he could assure the Ambassador of the President's deep commitment to the cause of peace. The second part of his answer was that at the present stage he simply could not say what the policy of the United States would be upon the problems under discussion with the Soviet Union. The Secretary expressed the hope that President Svoboda's visit to Moscow would be successful. 4 Dobrynin said that Svoboda would stay on until the next day when he would return to Czechoslovakia. The Secretary raised the question of the safety of the Czech leaders, 5 and Dobrynin said that while of course he had no specific information, he was convinced that no harm would come to Dubcek or the other Czech personalities. In this connection the Secretary referred to the Czech radio broadcast commenting on the composition of the Czech delegation that had gone to Moscow. The Secretary mentioned that the President had gone to the Ranch. We had received in the last few hours a number of alarming rumors about a possible Soviet invasion of Romania. The Secretary emphasized that these rumors had not come to us from the Romanians. The Ambassador would surely be aware of what the effect such action would have upon the United States opinion coming on top of the recent Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary expected the President to telephone him as soon as he arrived at the Ranch and received these reports, and the Secretary did not know what he should reply. He asked whether Dobrynin had any information on this subject. Dobrynin said he had neither seen nor heard any indication whatever of any contemplated Soviet action against Romania, and did not believe that there was anything to these rumors. On the contrary, he referred to the warm greetings which the Soviet leadership had sent to the Romanian leaders on the occasion of their National holiday. 6 The Secretary concluded the conversation by stating that he did not contemplate informing the press of Ambassador Dobrynin's visit. Additional Points Covered in Secretary's Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, August 23, 1968 The Secretary referred to the statement Ambassador Dobrynin had made to President Johnson when informing him of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia to the effect that nothing was contemplated which would affect the vital interest of the United States. The Secretary said we had noted this statement very carefully and assumed that it was meant to be taken quite seriously. Ambassador Dobrynin confirmed that this was indeed the case. Ambassador Thompson asked Dobrynin how long he thought the jamming of our broadcasts would go on. Dobrynin said he thought the jamming quite probably was related to the debates in the Security Council and mentioned that Ambassador Ball had used some very strong language. In discussing the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Dobrynin said the Soviet troops had obviously had strict orders not to respond to provocations until absolutely necessary. He mentioned one incident in which some Czechs had deliberately crashed an automobile into a Soviet tank and then had taken pictures of it. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson. A notation on the source text reads: “SecDef has seen.” 2 See Document 82 . 3 Ulbricht met with Dubcek at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, on August 12. 4 Svoboda visited Moscow August 23–27. 5 Dubcek, Prime Minister Cernik, and three other Czech leaders were seized and flown to Moscow during the invasion. 6 August 23. 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, August 24, 1968, 1600Z. 3163. Subj: Czechoslovak situation. 1. As occupation goes into fourth day, following is situation as viewed from here. 2. This is bizarre kind of occupation. Although occupying forces have taken over key points they have not established martial law (except in some provincial cities), have not imposed military government, and have not yet installed puppet government. Legally constituted government claims to be still in being: 22 out of about 30 Ministers attended Cabinet meeting yesterday, apparently in Hradcany Castle. National Assembly claims to be in continuing session in its own building. Communist Party organs not only continuing to operate but managed to convene Party Congress under noses of occupying forces despite fact that Congress severely complicates Soviets' problems in installing compliant regime. 2 Several district and regional committees have announced they will respect new CC elected by Congress. 3. Much credit for remarkable cohesion of Czechoslovaks in present situation must go to brave and competent individuals manning numerous radio stations, many of which seem to have at least nine lives. Hazards and operational difficulties, including jamming, continuing to increase, but at least nine transmitters, including two in Prague and two in Slovakia, could be heard at various times last night. Press has also performed well, publishing numerous special editions (presumably under highly adverse circumstances) which are handed out on street corners. 4. Population in Prague has conducted itself very well. Nonacceptance of occupation has been demonstrated in unmistakable and in some cases ingenious ways. Downtown area was almost completely plastered with placards yesterday (many have disappeared this morning, either as result of rain or clean-up by Soviets during curfew). Last night we saw new neon sign in bright light district which read simply ”Dubcek.” On advice radio stations which anticipating [garble] street signs and house numbers have completely disappeared in some districts of city. Actions of population and slogans (including many which equate Soviets with Fascists) are highly provocative, but with few exceptions people have been able to avoid provoking extreme reaction by occupiers. Widespread calls for neutrality represents wishful thinking which could embarrass reformist leaders seeking realistic solution. Cancellation of mass demonstration late Thursday afternoon with enforcement by young Czechs is best example of self-discipline practiced by population. Silent clearing of streets during general strike at noon yesterday also impressive. 5. Public transportation in Prague is reduced and few private cars are in circulation, probably because of gasoline unavailability (gas stations no longer operating). Most shops remained closed through yesterday but are beginning to open this morning. Prague factories were open yesterday but did not seem to be working. Food still available in limited supplies, for which long queues wait, but we have seen little evidence of obvious hoarding. 6. Scene [ Serene ?] attitude of Soviets perplexing in many respects. Except for resistance and firing first day in vicinity Prague Radio building (Embtel 3054) 3 they have not used much muscle and sporadic apparently aimless firing may primarily be intended as reminder of military presence. At beginning Prague populace inclined to talk to soldiers asking them why they were here but this has stopped and silent contempt treatment may be making troops edgy. 7. Czechoslovakia presents remarkable demonstration of a country running itself without an effective central government. Main direction so far being provided by strong party elements controlling clandestine radios. Interesting Soviets have not used their own means of issuing proclamations and their decisions, which have to be heeded, such as curfew, are carried on resistance radios. In some other cities, notably Pilzen which has been observed, accommodations of mutual non-interference have been worked out between commanders and local party chiefs. Lacking a Quisling administration Soviets were obviously unprepared to take over the country and had not called forward conventional instruments of occupation such as a pervasive secret police and military government commands. 8. All of this, reinforced by calm determined attitude of population and avoidance of anti-Soviet excesses, places Czech reformist (and non resistance) Communists in stronger political position than could have been expected under occupation conditions. This is apparently their belief, at any rate, and widespread belief many Czechoslovaks. If “new government” just announced by TASS does not reflect overwhelming popular strength of reformists it will have difficulty establishing its authority without continued Soviet military presence. Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, and USUN. 2 The August 22 meeting called by the Prague Party Committee reaffirmed loyalty to Dubcek and the other captured leaders and organized a 1-hour general protest strike on August 23. 3 Telegram 3054, August 21, summarized Prague radio reports on the Czech situation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH) 89. Memorandum of Conversation 89. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 27, 1968. SUBJECT Czechoslovakia PARTICIPANTS Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson I had lunch today with Ambassador Dobrynin pursuant to an invitation which he had issued last Friday. In the course of the conversation, I said I was still baffled by what had triggered the Soviet decision to invade. He said he was also curious but doubted if he would find out until the next time he was in Moscow. I said that it was clear that there had been a Politburo meeting on the weekend but there was some doubt as to whether there had actually been a meeting of the Central Committee. He replied that it was quite clear that it had been and that a decision of this sort would require such a meeting. I said that I assumed that some of the members would not have been able to get there on time, and he replied that obviously the people on the other side of the country had been unable to be present. When I remarked that I thought that their military had carried out their side of the operation more effectively than the political side, he said, “You better not say that around Moscow.” When I inquired how he would interpret the word, “temporarily,” with respect to the length of stay of the Soviet troops, he replied that he thought this would depend entirely upon how successful the Czechs were in carrying out the agreement. The Soviets would obviously like to make this period as short as possible. He stated that he thought the basic problem was the Soviet concern that the Communist party was losing control and mentioned in passing the type of thing that was appearing in the Czech press as well as the activities of non-Communist party groups. I said that speaking frankly and personally there seemed to have been a serious misjudgment of the situation. He referred to the fact that the Soviets under Stalin had suffered much more than the Czechs ever had from the cult of personality but that the recent outcry in Czechoslovakia had been quite different from the reaction in the Soviet Union after the denunciation of Stalin. The Czechs were beginning to blame everything that had happened on the Communist party and to say that there had been nothing good accomplished. I pointed out that there was an element of nationalism involved in the case of Czechoslovakia that was absent in the case of the Soviet Union. He admitted that this was true. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/S on August 28. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. 90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, August 31, 1968, 1552Z. 231337. 1. Following is substance of Secretary's conversation with Soviet Amb. Dobrynin at which latter gave “oral statement” transmitted State 231323. 2 2. For Action Addressees you may provide senior local official with text of oral statement and substance this message orally. Begin report . Secretary noted that Ambassador had asked to see him August 31 and inquired whether or not he could take up now the matter for which he had asked for an appointment. Ambassador looked somewhat surprised but said that he had been instructed to make an oral communication. He said he had been instructed to see either the President or the Secretary. When the Ambassador had finished his oral statement, the Secretary reminded him that at their last meeting he had referred to disturbing reports in regard to Romania. 3 The Ambassador said he had reported his conversation but had received no reply. The Secretary said that we continue to get reports that were disturbing and that in the last 24 hours we had received a number of reports of troop movements, incidents on the frontier, etc. He asked whether the Ambassador had any basis on which he could give him assurances that action against Romania was not intended. Dobrynin said he had no official information but that he personally doubted that any such action was contemplated. The Secretary said that if such action were contemplated, he wished in the name of all humanity to ask that it not be done. The results of such action on world affairs would be incalculable. Dobrynin inquired if the Romanians felt the same way. The Secretary said we had no reports whatever from the Romanians. He wished, however, to underline the gravity of this problem. We were deeply concerned. Our attitude was based upon well-known principles that had motivated us throughout our history. Our attitude on Czechoslovakia was not related to our bilateral relations with that country which were not particularly good. We believed, however, that every country, large or small, had a right to national existence. We respect that among our NATO allies and we thought the Soviets should respect it among their Warsaw Pact allies. We cannot understand how the state interests of the Soviet Union were involved in any way that would justify military action. Czechoslovakia was not going to leave the Warsaw Pact or join NATO and no one was threatening them. The Secretary said he wished again to underline the seriousness with which we took the Ambassador's statement to the President on Aug. 20, and repeated today, that the Soviet Union did not intend in any way to threaten the state interests of the US. He wished to point out that among these interests was Berlin. Frankly, we did not trust Ulbricht. We wished to emphasize the gravity of any move with respect to Berlin in the current situation. He also wished to point out that the thoughts he had expressed carried the authority of the President with whom he had just talked by telephone. 4 The Secretary said he would be available any time, day or night, if the Ambassador had anything to say to him. Dobrynin asked if he could report that he had made his oral statement and that the Secretary would study it and comment later. The Secretary agreed but said he could say now with respect to the reference in the statement to revanchist and imperialist threats to socialist countries that there was no such threat, no CIA plot, there was no intrusion into any of these countries in a manner hostile to the Soviet Union. We could not accept a statement that revanchists or imperialists were carrying out any threat to any of these countries. End report . 5 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Leddy and Thompson and approved by Rusk. Also sent to London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Ottawa and repeated to USUN, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, and Belgrade. 2 Dated August 31. (Ibid.) The statement was a defense of Soviet conduct in invading Czechoslovakia. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Czech 1968. The text of the statement was transmitted to the President in Texas in telegram CAP 82309, August 30, 10:41 p.m. (Ibid., Rusk/Dobrynin) For a memorandum of this conversation, which was held at 9 p.m. on August 30, see Document 165 . 3 See Document 87 . 4 No record of this telephone conversation was found. 5 Dobrynin and Rusk met again on August 31; see Document 167 . 91. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 91. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 1 Washington, August 31, 1968, 1801Z. CAP 82323. Herewith a draft letter to Kosygin as cleared by Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford. Sec Rusk was comfortable with this draft. He wondered out loud whether it might be delayed, especially since Thompson and Bohlen are in Maryland two hours away and he would have preferred their going over it. I said the only urgency I could perceive was: —a quick follow-up to your speech 2 and his talk with Dobrynin last night, 3 and —the possibility that if anything were to happen in Rumania, it might happen in the week beginning September 2. I would suggest that, for the record, you proceed with this letter which sends a clear message without making matters worse between US and the Soviet Union. But I would also suggest you might wish to chat with Sec. Rusk when you have considered the text. Dear Mr. Chairman: In the spirit of our frank and friendly talks at Glassboro, I wish to underline what Secretary Rusk said to Ambassador Dobrynin last night and what I said at San Antonio. The concept we explored at Glassboro was one in which the United States and the Soviet Union carefully avoided pressing against each other's vital interests; avoided being drawn into conflict by others; worked towards the maximum number of bilateral agreements judged by each nation to be in its interest and the common interest; and constructed agreements—bilateral or working with others—which would reduce the possibilities of conflict and danger on the world scene. Looking back over the year after Glassboro, I believe we had reason to feel we were making some progress. But the application of Soviet military power in Czechoslovakia and the reports we are receiving of further military movements in Eastern Europe are sources of deep disquiet. No evidence has come to me which suggests that events in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere in Eastern Europe have in any way constituted a security threat to the Soviet Union. On this matter, the policy of the United States and of our NATO allies has, moreover, been clear: We ourselves have no desire or intention of taking any action in Eastern Europe which might threaten the security of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we have been working towards the possibility that NATO and the Warsaw Pact might negotiate mutual troop withdrawals or reductions and gradually ameliorate the confrontation in Central Europe and open the way towards stable peace in that critical area. Therefore, I deeply believe what I said last night: I see no issues that we confront or that the Soviet Union confronts which cannot be better settled by patient negotiation than by the application of military power. I hold that view with respect to Southeast Asia and the Middle East as well as Europe. It is against that background that I wish to tell you of the depth of the concern felt in our government and by our people about events in Eastern Europe. Twice in your lifetime and mine world war has come upon us, triggered by events in Eastern Europe. In 1914 this happened without anyone really intending it to happen. The forces that are set in motion when military power is applied are sometimes extremely hard to control and may lead humanity down paths which no man and no government intends. At this moment, therefore, I urge you and your colleagues to pause and consider whether we might not turn back towards the path we explored at Glassboro. What has already happened in Czechoslovakia has made this more difficult. But I would hope that the Soviet Union and the other nations which joined in bringing their forces into Czechoslovakia, will promptly find it possible to withdraw them, as Ambassador Dobrynin's oral message to me of August 20 indicated would happen. 4 As Secretary Rusk emphasized to Ambassador Dobrynin, I would hope that your government would hold its hand, if it is the case that a military movement is contemplated against Rumania or any other country in Eastern Europe. I would also hope that there is no misunderstanding in Moscow or elsewhere about our election processes and debates in the United States. I know that sometimes they can convey to others a wrong impression of division and distraction. But there is, I know, a deep and united sentiment in the United States against the movement of arms and men across international frontiers. I send you this message because the peace of the world depends peculiarly on the policies of the United States and the USSR. The facts of life are such that this responsibility is imposed on both of us. This responsibility requires that we be in frank and frequent contact on matters affecting the peace of the world. 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 92. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. 2 For text of President Johnson's August 30 speech to the Milk Producers annual convention at San Antonio, Texas, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69 , Book II, pp. 917–920. 3 See Document 90 . 4 See Document 80 . 5 There is no evidence the letter was sent. 92. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 92. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. NSC PAPER THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND THE CZECHOSLOVAKIA CRISIS I. Introduction The Czechoslovak crisis has raised grave issues for the United States and its Western European allies. It has cast into question such matters as the future of détente, the defensive capability of Western Europe, and the future of Communism and the independent states of Eastern Europe. The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues and the current and prospective means for meeting these problems by the United States and its allies. II. Détente The August 20–21 occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact provided a cold douche for the future of détente, or the progressive rapprochement of East and West. In the late Sixties, the achievement of détente had become an important objective in the policies of most Western European nations as well as the United States. It had become a key element in the work program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But its assumed basis was seriously undermined by the Czechoslovak crisis. Most Western nations have reacted with strong expressions of disgust at, and disapproval of, the Warsaw Pact occupation of independent Czechoslovakia. There was almost universal support for the United Nations consideration of this problem and approbation for the resolution supported by the majority in the Security Council. 2 To give further meaning to their disapproval, most Western nations undertook to limit contacts with the Soviets and the occupying powers of the Warsaw Pact, and cancelled plans or proposed visits in the political and cultural fields. As the repression of Czechoslovakia continues, with the possibility of the installation of a de facto occupation regime, the deterioration of East-West contacts may well continue. These relatively limited actions do not necessarily preclude the possibility of return in due course to the pursuit of détente. The present disposition of many European nations is to avoid actions which might impair the eventual resumption of closer relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. The positions of the United Kingdom and the Government of France on this score are particularly apparent. US actions have so far generally paralleled those of its Western European allies. For the time being we are seeking a balanced approach that will satisfy the immediate objective of expressing censure of Soviet action without destroying overnight our longer-range goals. In the cultural field we propose the following criteria: a. Cancel or postpone highly visible exchanges susceptible to being interpreted as evidence of goodwill or friendship toward the invading powers. (For example, the trip of the Minnesota Band to Russia.) b. We do not propose disrupting low-visibility exchanges already in progress. (For example, graduate students, individual scientists and researchers already on study tours.) But we should discourage new initiatives. c. We should avoid across-the-board restrictive measures, such as indiscriminate restrictions on travel that could be construed as a return to the cold war. d. We should maintain exchange activities with Czechoslovakia to the extent possible, and with the still-independent state of Romania. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, we should participate in the Trade Fair at Brno if the Czechoslovak Government decides to hold it. In the political and economic fields similar criteria should prevail. We are considering cancelling or discouraging activities such as the second inaugural flight of Aeroflot. We might continue certain scientific and technical activities which are of special interest to us, such as oceanographic research and the renegotiation of the US–USSR Atlantic Fisheries Agreement. In the area of peace and security, important decisions will need to be taken. For example, should we agree to open missile talks at any definite early date. Similar decisions involve US participation in the solar eclipse experimentation in the USSR, US–USSR discussions on peaceful nuclear devices, etc. In the economic area we should discourage the development of new commercial activities with the aggressor states, and we are considering a curtailment of export licenses. III. The Defense of Western Europe The movement of Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia and the continuing occupation of that country has obviously affected the military situation in Europe. The status quo has been changed. There are larger military forces present in Central Europe than at any time since the post-war period. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia puts Soviet forces in a country where they have not been since World War II. There is no assurance as yet that the Warsaw Pact forces will soon return to their deployment where they existed six weeks ago. The changed East-West military situation in Europe is of significance to the security of the United States and its allies. In the light of these developments we are reviewing with our allies what the implications may be for existing arrangements to provide for our common security. The principal forum for this review will be NATO. Since the onset of the Czech crisis, the NATO posture has combined three essential elements: (a) vigilance by the NATO political and military authorities; (b) a low public profile while the spotlight was on the United Nations; and (c) intensified consultations among the Allies regarding implications of the situation for Western security interests. As a result of NATO consultations a number of issues require consideration. These are outlined below. A. Proposals for high-level NATO meetings Following a period of speculation and trial balloons—including Kiesinger's public mention of a Heads of Government meeting 3 —the British on August 30 took the initiative. They have sought our views on two alternative proposals. Both take account of the fact that Defense Ministers of seven NATO countries are already scheduled to meet in Bonn, October 10–11, as the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The first alternative envisages postponing the NPG until the end of October or early November, advancing the date of the usual year-end NATO meeting to the end of October or early November, and holding both sessions in Brussels. The result would be a stock-taking meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers to consider defense and political matters arising from the crisis. Like the normal December meeting, fourteen countries would meet to examine defense issues while the French would join them later to examine political problems. In the course of the three (or four) day session, the seven-nation NPG would meet for a day. The second alternative involves simply broadening the presently scheduled (October) NPG meeting to include all Defense Ministers (except presumably the French). The British favor the first alternative on political, psychological and practical grounds. It would permit a maximum amount of business to be transacted and avoid a “nuclear affairs” meeting as NATO's first major response to the Czech crisis. A key question, in either case, is whether the necessary groundwork can be laid in time to permit Ministers to take substantive decisions. A meeting without concrete results could be disappointing for NATO as an organization and for public opinion. Another possible course would be to hold a special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers towards the end of September to issue a new program of work for NATO. The usual year-end meeting would be held in December. A September meeting would have the advantage of an early public response by NATO to the crisis. B. General Alliance policy on East-West Relations In connection with any special meeting, Ministers would have to decide whether the Czech crisis—and Soviet and Warsaw Pact policies demonstrated by recent events—call for any changes in Alliance policy objectives as stated in the Harmel Report (on future tasks of the Alliance), the Reykjavik declaration on mutual force reductions, or other public pronouncements (such as on strategic concept) issued by NATO over the past two years. Our aim, and presumably that of all Member Governments (with France a possible exception) would be to seek a strong public reaffirmation of the Alliance—its defense and deterrent role—while maintaining the long-range commitment to improved East-West relations. C. Strengthening NATO by extending the North Atlantic Treaty Italy has suggested—although not yet by formal proposal—that Member Governments consider strengthening the Treaty by formal action to ascertain extended life for NATO. Such action would make clear the Allies intent to refrain from exercising the right of withdrawal for an additional period of years (say, ten) beyond 1969. (Article 13 provides that, after the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, a signatory state can withdraw on one year's notice.) The Allied Governments could act on this problem either by amending the Treaty or issuing individual declarations of intent to refrain from exercising the withdrawal right for, say, ten more years. Greater assurance about the Alliance's future would have favorable impact on (a) overall US-European relations and (b) specific issues, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This subject may arise in preliminary fashion, at least in the corridors, at any special NATO meeting held in the near future. Our current position is that the Alliance will continue and need not be subject to formal action. The Czechoslovak crisis raises issue of need for a more formal commitment. D. NATO force levels and planning NATO is presently considering an urgent Military Committee proposal that member governments defer any further force reductions or redeployments pending NATO review of the overall situation. This proposal gives the United States difficulty because of the current examination of further economies in our defense establishment in Europe. Beyond this immediate question, NATO must now reexamine its entire force posture and dispositions in Europe in light of such factors as what the invasion of Czechoslovakia showed about Soviet and Warsaw Pact operations and capabilities, and the fact that Soviet forces will probably be stationed on Czechoslovakia's western frontier for an indefinite period. Apart from other US objectives that may emerge as a result of study, we will want to seek increased European contributions to their own defense. This could include improvement of reserves, equipment, and mobilization capabilities as well as any changes in standing forces. E. NATO strategy, crisis and alert procedures NATO's present strategic concept based on “flexible response” and “forward defense” is unlikely to be altered fundamentally as a result of the Czech crisis. But certain aspects, notably the doctrine of political warning time, will have to be reexamined. The doctrine envisages that, prior to any overt Warsaw Pact action against NATO, there would be a period of heightened tension and warning permitting the Allies to take necessary reinforcement measures. Closely related to the foregoing, some at least of the Allies will want reexamination of the reinforcement times, strategic mobility for redeploying US forces to Europe, NATO alert and crisis procedures, and the efficiency of the early warning radar system covering the Central Front. F. The Mediterranean While the Czech crisis has focussed attention on the NATO Central Front, concern about Soviet pressures against Romania and Yugoslavia raises anew the problem of Mediterranean security. At the June meeting in Reykjavik NATO Ministers gave various directives aimed at improving command arrangements, stand-by naval force dispositions, and surveillance activities. These were directed primarily at the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. Recent events may require review and/or speeding up of NATO work on security in the Mediterranean and on NATO's southeastern flank. G. The French attitude On all of the foregoing subjects, the French are in a special position for two reasons. First, they do not participate in most aspects of the integrated military system. Second, since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, De Gaulle has reaffirmed his policy of opposition to “blocs”. As a corollary, the French have been negative on the idea of special high-level Western meetings—NATO, WEU, or European Community. In all probability, the French would, however, be represented at any Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council. They would expect the Fourteen to meet without them for part of the session to deal with NATO military questions. The best hope for improving French cooperation in Eastern defense would probably be through practical steps—improved liaison with the NATO military or improvement of French forces in Germany. The Germans are probably in the best position to sound out the French on these questions. H. The key role of Germany The Federal Republic of Germany—on the Central Front with the largest land army of the continental allies—has been particularly hard hit by the Czechoslovak crisis. The actions of the Warsaw Pact aggressor states have thrown into question the German policy of seeking better relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the rapidity with which the Soviet Union, with little apparent warning, undertook this action, has shaken German confidence in the warning time principle of the NATO strategic concept. The Soviet actions have also caused a reexamination of the German attitude towards signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While no public decision has been made on this subject the issue is obviously one now being subjected to re-appraisal. The Germans feel that to sign the NPT—with its duration—might well jeopardize their future security. The German press is heavy with charges of “super power complicity” in the Czechoslovak crisis and expressions of uneasy doubts of the ability of the US and other of Germany's allies to stand up to the Warsaw Pact. In addition, there is the problem of Berlin. The actions of the Warsaw Pact aggressor states, following upon the June actions of East Germany against Berlin, raise doubts in German minds about the future of that city which they regard as an important part of Free Germany. The result is a general malaise through Germany. Kiesinger reacted to this feeling in his recent interview when he urged a NATO summit meeting as a means of putting new life in NATO. Germany is key to the security of Europe and to the effective functioning of the NATO alliance. While the current malaise may be founded on emotionalism rather than fact, it remains true that Germany is uneasy and disturbed. Such an attitude can have a multiplier effect throughout Europe unless steps are taken now to reaffirm the solidity and efficacy of Western defense within NATO. In short, high-level review and reappraisal by NATO nations could well be an important ingredient in calming the German attitude. It could also be an important factor in the continuance of constructive US/German relations. IV. Communism and the Future of Independent States of Eastern Europe A. The Communist World The USSR has become increasingly isolated within the international Communist movement and has undercut its position of leadership because of its rigidity and inability to adjust to changing times. As things stand, the “Communist family” has now been reduced to “The Five“: The USSR, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria. Clearly this is too thin a margin of support even for Soviet foreign policy purposes. Moreover, the loyalty and stability of some of even these regimes is not beyond question. We may find that the domestic positions of Gomulka, and perhaps also of Kadar, have been weakened much more than now appears by their willingness to serve as the tools of Soviet intervention. B. Czechoslovakia The Soviet leaders may hope that a kind of balance can still somehow be struck in Czechoslovakia (as it has in different ways in Hungary and Poland, for example). This is far from certain. If the Czech leaders prove unable to keep order or if, keeping order, they end up with a sullen, despondent population that would leave the country as stagnant as it was before, Czechoslovakia may end up as little more than a Soviet military protectorate. Over the short-term at least, this would retard the whole process of normalization in Eastern Europe and perhaps even lead to more Soviet strong-arm actions against others who have not played the game by the Soviet script, e.g., Romania and, less likely, Yugoslavia. Any such eruption of Soviet imperial fury could have the most profound effect in the USSR itself, leading to greater domestic repression but possibly also an upheaval shaking the regime to its foundations. It could also engage Western interests directly. One possibility of a calmer evolution lies in the eventual emergence of a new type of Soviet leader who recognizes that Soviet interests are best served by having neighboring countries pursue their own aspirations and interests, including a healthy friendship with the USSR. C. Romania We are carefully following all reports bearing upon a possible military action against Romania by the Soviet Union. Contingency papers have been prepared in the eventuality of an attack. The President's strong statement on August 30 against further aggression 4 and Secretary Rusk's warning to Dobrynin that night place the United States clearly on record and should leave no doubt in the Soviet mind as to our position. The response by Dobrynin on August 31 5 may indicate that the Soviets have taken full account of the U.S. position. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but in a September 3 memorandum to Bromley Smith of the NSC Staff, accompanying the source text, John P. Walsh, Acting Executive Secretary, noted that Rusk had approved the paper for submission to the September 4 meeting of the National Security Council. 2 For text of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and seven other nations to the Security Council, August 22, U.N. doc. S/8767, see Department of State Bulletin , September 9, 1968, p. 274. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution on August 23. 3 Apparently a reference to Kiesinger's August 25 call for a NATO summit on Czechoslovakia. 4 See footnote 2, Document 91 . 5 See Document 167 . 93. Summary Notes of the 590th Meeting of the National Security Council 93. Summary Notes of the 590th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, September 4, 1968, 5–7:25 p.m. U.S., Europe and the Czechoslovakian Crisis The President: The purpose of the meeting is to assess the impact of the Czechoslovakian crisis, to discuss how we can use the crisis to strengthen Western European defense and NATO, and to talk about our relations with the Russians and Eastern Europeans. Secretary Rusk will summarize the issues and possible ways of dealing with them. Secretary Clifford will talk about the defense of Western Europe and the new disposition of Soviet troops in Central Europe. Director Helms and Secretary Rusk will give us their views on the German reaction to the crisis. The press has already printed that the State Department was recommending additional reassurances to the Germans even before Secretary Rusk had made any recommendation to the President. Secretary Fowler will speak on the financial problems. If we speak out about a threatening situation and the situation does develop, we are accused of over-reacting. If we don't speak out and a serious situation does develop, then we are accused of not having done what we should have done. This is what happened following an indirect mention of the Romanian situation in the speech of last Friday. 2 More meetings of the NSC should be held in the next few weeks so that all of the members may be fully informed on current foreign problems. All requests of political candidates for briefings are to be granted. Mr. Temple 3 and Mr. Rostow are to clear Administration responses to requests for positions on foreign problems coming from candidates, advisors, task forces, etc. Secretary Rusk: The gravity of the current situation cannot be overstated in view of the very high costs the Soviet government was willing to pay for intervening in Czechoslovakia. The situation in Czechoslovakia has been developing since 1967. Dubcek gained power over conservative Communist Party members in January, 1968. Press censorship was lifted and other reforms were initiated. Dissension between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union rose rapidly. The summer maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact were used to build up military pressure against the Dubcek government in the hope that the liberals would slow down the reform campaign. The day of the Soviet invasion, the President met with Ambassador Dobrynin at 8:15 p.m. and then with the NSC later that evening. Decisions were reached at the NSC meeting to take the Czech case to the United Nations immediately and on a response to the oral message Dobrynin delivered earlier. The response to Dobrynin's message emphasized two points: a. Jefferson's quotation about governments based on the consent of the governed, and b. Denial that there was any U.S. or NATO attempt to intervene in Czechoslovakia as alleged by Moscow. Dobrynin had said that U.S. state interests were not affected by the Soviet action. In response he was told that U.S. interests are involved in Berlin where we are committed to prevent the city being overrun by the Russians. Although the Soviet military effort went smoothly, the Russians badly miscalculated the political reaction in Czechoslovakia. All Czechs opposed the movement of Soviet troops into their country. Their performance and discipline were superb. The Russians were unable to organize a puppet government to take over and legitimatize their invasion. Opposition outside Czechoslovakia to the Soviet move was world-wide and very strong. The President: Asked to interrupt the meeting to deal with a proposed press release on the admission of Czech refugees to the United States. The statement was read. (Copy attached at Tab A) 4 Secretary Rusk: The United States must grant refuge to those Czechs who want to leave their country or who are now outside and do not wish to return. The number is not large. We have to open our doors because if we do not, the refugees might return to Czechoslovakia and oppose the existing government. This would not be in our interest. Ambassador Thompson: We should not encourage Czechoslovakian refugees to come to the United States but only welcome them. If we appear to be urging them to come to the United States, the Soviet Union could use this policy to argue that we are, in fact, intervening in Czechoslovakian affairs. Secretary Fowler: Are the borders of Czechoslovakia now open? Are we by this statement inviting another Berlin Wall? The President: We can accept those who desire to come to the United States but not encourage them to come. Director Marks: The draft statement would be read by the refugees as encouragement to come to the United States. Ambassador Thompson: We should say no more than that the long-standing U.S. policy of offering asylum to political refugees remains unchanged. We should not appear to be accepting the entire burden because we want the Europeans to accept some of the refugees. Secretary Fowler: The statement should say no more than that our asylum policy is unchanged. Ambassador Cleveland: We should try for a uniform allied policy toward refugees. Mr. Leddy: The humanitarian aspect is overriding. Let all refugees come who so wish. The refugees cannot resist in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets would like to have liberals, intellectuals, etc. leave Czechoslovakia. The Vice President: Agreed with Secretary Rusk. We have to say something. We should reiterate our long-standing policy. Inevitably, many people will compare what we do for Czech refugees with what we did for Hungarian refugees. Secretary Clifford: What did we do following the Hungarian crisis? (Several recalled that thousands of Hungarian refugees came to the United States. Private organizations raised substantial sums to make possible the resettlement of Hungarians in the U.S.) Director Helms: The statement as read was acceptable. The President: Read a revised statement, commenting that he thought the State Department coordinated such statements. He suggested that the draft be further worked on taking into account all views expressed, and sent back for approval. Secretary Rusk: Last week there were disturbing indicators and press reports that the Russians might invade Romania, states other than Czechoslovakia, possibly even Yugoslavia. Read the evidence we had Friday, August 30. (Copy attached at Tab B) 5 Ambassador Dobrynin Friday evening asked for an appointment for Saturday morning without mentioning the nature of his business. It was possible that his Saturday call would be to inform us of a Soviet move into Romania. The President in his Friday speech referred to the rumors and issued a warning against another invasion. Dobrynin was asked to call Friday night to deliver his message rather than wait until the next day. The message dealt with the Czechoslovak situation. During this call, Dobrynin was asked about reports that the Russians were going to invade Romania. He was told that such a move would have incalculable consequences. Dobrynin said he was without instructions but, as he had said previously, he personally doubted the Russians would move into Romania. 6 Saturday evening Dobrynin dropped by to say that Moscow had informed him that reports of an invasion of Romania were without foundation. This was interpreted to be reassurance that there would be no intervention in Romania. When asked, Dobrynin said his comments applied to Berlin as well, although he went on to mention many Berlin developments which the Soviets consider unsatisfactory. 7 Intelligence available Saturday evening indicated that the Russians were not going to move into Romania. The answer from the Soviet Union to our question about Romania came promptly after the President's Friday speech in San Antonio. 8 Moscow had decided to hold down further troop movements for the present. However, no one can be sure that the Soviets won't hit Berlin and Romania in the days ahead. General Wheeler: 19 Soviet divisions could move into Romania with two or three days notice. This force could quickly overwhelm any Romanian opposition. There would be little intelligence warning. The movement of Soviet planes, however, we would be able to detect. Secretary Rusk: The Romanians have not been whipping up false scares. We have been careful, in talking to the Russians, to make clear that our sources of intelligence are not Romanian. We informed the Romanians of what we had done. The Romanian Foreign Minister has been in New York. Ambassador Ball will report on his conversation with him. 9 It is important that everyone know we have never had any understanding with the Soviet Union about respective spheres of influence as De Gaulle alleges. The current difficulty arises out of Soviet violation of the Yalta agreement, not out of that agreement itself which called for free elections in Eastern Europe. There is a great difference between the Warsaw Pact and NATO with respect to internal affairs of members. NATO is operative only in the event of international aggression and grants no rights to a member to intervene in the affairs of another. The Soviet Union is actively trying to put across the idea that its invasion of Czechoslovakia should not affect its bilateral relations with us. We have a difficult problem of handling the American people as well as others throughout the world who would not approve if we act as if nothing had happened. We have cancelled numerous activities of a good-will nature such as a visit of the Minnesota band to the USSR and a second inaugural flight to the U.S. of a Soviet civilian airliner. On the other hand, Soviet action against Czechoslovakia has not eliminated many major world problems involving the USSR and the U.S. such as the Middle East, strategic missile control, and Vietnam. We must not mislead the Soviet Union, the American people, or our allies. The Soviet Union is trying to carry on business as usual with us. For example, they have told us they have ratified the Astronaut Treaty. Western Europe reacted with shock following the Soviet invasion but it has not broken off trade relations with the USSR. Many European states have cancelled good-will projects. NATO must consider the new Soviet deployments in Eastern Europe. There is a real need to reassure the Alliance. The President: The members of the Council should know that when the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia, they took measures to insure that they would not be blocked. No further mention of this activity should be made but it is brought up for the benefit of those who are optimistic about the Russian willingness to improve relations and reach agreements. (This apparently was a reference to the Soviet missile alert on the day of the invasion.) Secretary Rusk: The effect of the Soviet action on the policy of détente has been serious. NATO members must consult with each other and be seen consulting. High level NATO meetings will be necessary. As to the future of NATO, it may be necessary to extend now the life of the treaty beyond 1969. The problem is what can we do to reassure NATO members that the treaty will not disappear in 1969 which does not require Senate approval and does not commit the new President. The President: We must not forget that a large number of Senators not long ago favored a substantial immediate reduction in the level of U.S. forces deployed in Europe. Some wanted to reduce this number to 50,000. Secretary Rusk: The country will now have to debate again the amount of its resources which it is willing to commit to keeping peace in the world. There is some isolationism in the United States. As NATO was warned at its last meeting held in Iceland, fears of the Soviet leaders as they face a changing world create a dangerous attitude in Moscow. Ambassador Thompson: The Soviet leaders decided to intervene in Czechoslovakia because they felt their power position in the USSR was threatened. 1. The Czech system was going democratic. For example, press censorship was abolished. 2. The other Warsaw Pact powers, especially East Germany and Poland, were worried as to the effect in their countries of the Czech liberal reforms. 3. The Czechs were printing, for the first time, suppressed accounts of the horrors of the Stalin regime. The Kremlin leaders were acutely embarrassed. 4. The Czechs were requesting financial backing from the USSR which came to a very large sum. 5. The Soviets concluded Dubcek couldn't retain control of the Czech reform elements and that the result would cause serious difficulties for other European Communist states and even within the Soviet Union itself. We do not know what triggered the Soviet action. 1. East German Chairman Ulbricht reported to the Soviets following his August visit to Prague. He may have expressed his deep concern over developments in Czechoslovakia and their harmful effect in East Germany. 2. Brezhnev may have realized that the majority of the Kremlin leaders was shifting and therefore changed his position to that of supporting an invasion. 3. Soviet military leaders may have pressured the Politburo on grounds of the security of the USSR. 4. The Kremlin may have decided that Dubcek either could not or would not carry out agreements reached earlier. We do not know of any secret agreement reached in Moscow with Dubcek. Nor do we know whether Dubcek can carry out the terms of the agreement reached with the Russians. It is very clear that the Russians totally misjudged the reaction of the Czech people to the invasion of their country by Warsaw Pact troops. The Soviets are unlikely to invade Romania. There is no current threat to the Communist system in Romania. The situation is quite different from the threat to Soviet and Communist power which was rising in Czechoslovakia. [Here follow 8 pages of discussion of the impact of the Czech invasion on NATO and the war in Vietnam. The portion of the memorandum dealing with NATO is printed in volume XIII, Document 324 .] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The source text bears no drafting information. 2 August 30; see footnote 2, Document 91 . 3 Larry E. Temple, Special Counsel to the President. 4 Not printed. The statement was not released. 5 Not found with the source text. 6 See Document 90 . 7 See Document 167 . 8 See footnote 2, Document 91 . 9 Telegram 6368 from USUN, September 3, reported that Ball had met briefly with Manescu the previous day and had found him “basically relaxed though not unconcerned” regarding Soviet intentions toward Romania. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH) Ball and Manescu also met on August 27. In telegram 6344 from USUN, August 30, Ball reported that while Manescu was neither “agitated or concerned” about a Soviet invasion, he hoped that the United States would underline the cost of such a move to the Soviets. (Ibid.) 94. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 94. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, September 23, 1968, 1410Z. 5633. Ref: US NATO 4825. 2 1. Soviet invasion Czechoslovakia was brutal act of aggression. NATO must of course take account of redeployment Soviet troops as well as indication of dominant hard line trend in Soviet Politburo. 2. However, I believe that Soviets regard their move against Czechoslovakia as defensive in sense that they were meeting what they considered a threat to the existing Communist order as well as a possible eventual defection of a bloc member. Their concentration on West Germany in their propaganda is natural as this is the only defense of their action which carries conviction with their own people and they doubtless consider that FRG's Eastern policy at least contributed to Czech developments. 3. I continue to believe that use of force against Romania or Yugoslavia most unlikely, although they will certainly keep up the pressure on both. 4. An important indicator of Soviet policy will be their decision on whether or not they decide to go ahead with world Communist meeting in November. Indefinite postponement is most likely, but if they proceed they will surely have to withdraw substantial number of their forces from Czechoslovakia before such meeting. 3 5. So far it does not appear that Czech leaders are willing or able to meet fully what Soviets appear to consider their minimum requirements. If this situation persists, uncertain whether Soviets will accept partial compliance or attempt to bring about change in Czech leadership and possibly cow opposition by wholesale arrests. Their commitment not to interfere in Czech internal affairs will not deter them if they decide a purge is their best course. Thompson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret. Repeated to USUN, USNATO, Paris, London, Bonn, Belgrade, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, and Bucharest. 2 Telegram 4825 from USNATO, September 21, reported on the discussions at a special meeting of the NATO political advisers on events in Czechoslovakia. (Ibid.) 3 International Communist “consultations” were held in Moscow December 2–6, 1969. 95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia 1 Washington, September 25, 1968, 1440Z. 244534. 1. Czech Ambassador Duda urgently requested and was given appointment with Secretary September 24. 2. Duda said, under instructions from his Government, he wished raise two matters in connection with international aspects of recent events in Czechoslovakia. A. UN Action—His Government has concluded from press reports and information transmitted by Czech UN Mission that US is giving thought to supporting discussions in UNGA on recent Czech events. There are indications that Czechoslovakia might even be put on agenda as separate item. His Government believes such action, whether discussion in general debate or item on agenda, would not help Czechoslovakia but would cause harm. Discussions have been held with other socialist countries involved and in opinion his Government there has been solution to difficulties. Therefore, raising this subject in UNGA would not only harm Czechoslovakia but all other countries. Czech Government is also of opinion that anything which would plunge world into cold war, such as debate of Czechoslovak issue in UN, should be avoided. Czech Government therefore requests that attempts to put Czech item on agenda or to discuss Czechoslovak events in UNGA be stopped. B. NPT—Duda prefaced his remarks on NPT by stating that US Congressional action on ratification of NPT is clearly an internal matter and Czechoslovak Government does not wish in any way to interfere in internal affairs of US. Because Czech Government has noticed that certain Members of Congress have asked for postponement of ratification because of developments in Czechoslovakia, it wishes to restate its position on NPT. Czechoslovak Government strongly supports NPT. This has been made clear in statements by leading Czechoslovak officials and by fact that, on instructions from President Svoboda which were approved by Government, he, Ambassador Duda, had signed NPT here in Washington. Czech Government's position on and support for NPT has been emphasized both in Geneva and New York. Duda concluded that, in his Government's view, there is no logical link between Czechoslovak events and NPT. 3. UN Action—Secretary responded that he would note Ambassador's statement on behalf of Czechoslovak Government with regard to raising Czechoslovak events in UN. His statement would be taken into account in developing our judgment on how best to handle problem in UNGA. There was, however, no possibility that General Assembly would remain silent on this issue whether it appears as item on agenda or is given major attention in general debate. It will be discussed for following reasons: A. Sympathy in most parts of world is with Czechoslovak people and there is no way of preventing discussion of Czech developments despite previous differences which may have existed between Czech Government and other governments. B. Our judgment will be based on our national interests. We have a national interest in rights guaranteed under UN Charter as they pertain to member countries. We are deeply concerned about world order. If Charter rights of member countries are not observed, structure of world order will be disrupted. This could lead to a nuclear war. Our national interests are based on peace and right of all countries to develop in their own way and have this right respected. There are about 120 smaller countries and four to five great powers. With this combination it is easy to see what could happen if rights of all guaranteed under UN Charter are not observed. The guarantees of UN Charter are vital to US national interest. C. As member of NATO our national interests are also involved for security reasons. There are now several hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, including Soviet forces along the frontier with West Germany. The Soviet intentions are not clear, and what is prudence in this situation? What are the capabilities? All these questions must be considered in addition to Czech Government's position. D. Peaceful coexistence among socialist countries also concerns our national interests, particularly when this involves judgments which are being made in Moscow. These judgments concern the whole world. Similar action such as that taken in Czechoslovakia could happen elsewhere. World opinion must try to have an influence on these decisions. Nations must make their positions clear so there are no miscalculations on part of any nation. US takes these matters seriously but has no interest in returning to cold war period. We have deep interest in peace, in standards of conduct among nations, and how military forces are deployed. E. Secretary concluded his comments on UN situation by repeating that views of Czechoslovak Government would be taken into account when formulating our position with regard to discussions in UNGA. 5. 2 NPT—Secretary stated NPT is of major importance to USG. He observed that one nation with nuclear power is too many; five, many times too many; and 20, beyond the comprehension of modern man. NPT is not a bilateral matter between US and Soviet Union. These two nations are not customers for nuclear arms. If there were no Soviet Union, USG would still be for NPT. These are views of President and Secretary. Both have made their views clear to Congress. If someone had been seeking way to sabotage NPT, no better way could have been found than to move Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. This is connection between NPT and events in Czechoslovakia. Prior to these events, six or perhaps eight Members of Congress would have been against NPT. Now there are strong feelings with regard to events in Eastern Europe. American public is indignant and shocked and one way of expressing this indignation is by using NPT as a target. Secretary then asked Duda to inform his Government that President and Secretary are in favor of NPT and are working for its ratification but recent events in Eastern Europe have created obstacles to its ratification. 6. Duda thanked Secretary for his remarks and said that if Czechoslovakia is to preserve any of gains made after January an atmosphere of peace is absolutely necessary. 7. When Secretary privately asked Duda if the reason he had stressed that his Government did not wish to interfere in internal affairs of US during this election period was because Czechoslovak leadership in fact would prefer to see ratification of NPT put off, Ambassador Duda replied Czechoslovak Government meant exactly what it said. He added Secretary should not try to read between the lines. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Batjer and cleared by Lisle, Leddy, and Moffat. Also sent to USUN. 2 There is no numbered paragraph 4. 96. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 96. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, October 26, 1968, 1130Z. 4037. 1. Prevailing atmosphere here and apparently throughout country is one of unrelieved gloom which 50th anniversary celebrations unlikely to dissipate. 2. Cause is not so much current effect of Soviet intervention which until now has not greatly disturbed everyday life but what Soviets have done to break nation's spirit. Hitherto irrepressible film producers who fared well even under Novotny view future with foreboding. Communist member South Bohemian National Council privately predicted that even though situation unlikely to return to pre-January conditions, necessary will is lacking to tackle problems calling for immediate action. 3. On larger scale, problems include federalization which has brought out latent animosities, economic reform which under best of circumstances requires strong direction and sacrifice, and party reorganization where certain tendencies toward self-destruction fostered by Soviet interference seem especially manifest. While Soviets obviously bent on producing pliant party and government leadership, it gives one reason to wonder how they envisage country is to be run without provoking kind of deterioration which will eventually redound to their disadvantage. 4. Positive factor from our standpoint is that while leaders' statements have been cheerless and in varying degrees submissive, they still enjoy large degree of popular confidence with significant external Communist support and may continue to do so as long as they stick together. Furthermore resistance spirit is strong in many quarters and is capable of asserting itself in ingenious ways, short of being stopped by mass arrests. 5. Question is what we can do to offer encouragement. An anti-Russian campaign would revive drooping morale even though we realize the validity of other considerations. Point to keep in mind is that under new circumstances anything we say or do by way of encouragement in this context is not likely to complicate situation for regime or do it harm. 6. It seems to us that ending UNGA general debate 2 we should try to find new ways to focus attention on Czechoslovakia, shifting emphasis to current blatant forms of Soviet intervention in internal affairs. Apart from non-justification of presence in Czechoslovakia of Soviet troops on basis of unequal treaty, Western spokesmen and media can play up continued presence troops above any agreed figure and outside of reserved areas. Type of gradual withdrawal of surplus troops presaged in Kosygin's statement at October 16 treaty signing is obvious intervention in domestic affairs, re-enacting on greater scale the delayed withdrawal of maneuver forces in June–July, and is completely unjustified in terms of Soviet and bloc security. Such surplus forces demonstrate that real mission of Soviet troops is political intervention. 7. Publicity can be given to recent activities of Soviet officers in participating in political meeting at which current leadership is criticized, attempting to interfere with schools, and detaining local and foreign citizens without authority. Firm US public statements on order of those during past six weeks on Eastern Europe, Berlin, US and NATO contingency defense planning would continue to stress broad issues, as would further indications that US ready to resume dialogue on world security issues when Soviets abandon acts and dogmas alien to world community of independent and diverse nations. Until such indications received, US stance toward Soviets politically and socially would still be rather distant although it could conceivably soften slightly toward certain Pact allies when they have removed all troops from Czechoslovakia. 8. On a government-to-government basis we owe the Czechs very little since they have only caused us trouble and do not wish to be liked by us. On the other hand we feel it is in our interest to keep alive the objectives which the reformists, although Communists, were seeking to achieve and which are bound historically to have lasting repercussions. Meanwhile, we should go on treating Czechoslovakia as independent country until proven otherwise, maintaining normal relations wherever possible and, in any event, continuing and hopefully strengthening contacts and exchanges of all kinds. Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Budapest, Bucharest, Moscow, Munich, Sofia, and Warsaw. 2 At the request of the Czech Government, the question of the Soviet invasion was withdrawn from the Security Council agenda on August 27. Thereafter U.S. representatives used discussions on issues inscribed on the calendars of the General Assembly and its subcommittees to highlight Soviet aggression. Secretary Rusk condemned Soviet behavior in his October 2 address to the General Assembly. For text, see Department of State Bulletin , October 21, 1968, pp. 405–410. 97. Memorandum of Conversation 97. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 15, 1968. SUBJECT Czechoslovakia; Missile Talks; McNamara's Visit to Moscow PARTICIPANTS H.E. Dr. Karel Duda, Czechoslovak Ambassador Mr. Malcolm Toon, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs I spoke briefly with Ambassador Duda at today's luncheon for Nat Davis, hosted by the Yugoslav Ambassador. I asked the Ambassador what his views were on the current situation in Czechoslovakia. He said he was not yet pessimistic. He felt that the recent student demonstrations 2 were unfortunate because they had given rise to additional pressures on the Dubcek government to bring the populace into line. He hoped that such incidents would not recur since they could only cause serious problems for Dubcek and the survival of what he stands for. The Ambassador said that he hoped “the events of last summer” would not prove to be an obstacle in the process of diminishing tension between Washington and Moscow, which had been in train before the invasion. I told the Ambassador that certainly the Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia had had an adverse effect on our relations with Moscow and, among other things, had delayed progress in working out agreements in areas of mutual interest. The Ambassador wondered if we contemplated an early start to the missile talks since he felt it was not in either our interest or the interest of the Czechoslovak people to delay them further because of our reaction to the events of last summer. I told the Ambassador that we did indeed consider the missile talks to be in our interest as well as in the interest of world peace and security and we would move on the talks at an appropriate time. We did not feel that the time was yet propitious. The Ambassador asked me about Mr. McNamara's visit to Moscow, and particularly about his conversation with Mr. Kosygin. 3 I briefed the Ambassador on the background of the visit, stressing that Mr. McNamara had stopped in Moscow for purely sightseeing purposes en route to Kabul on World Bank business. After his arrival, the Soviet Foreign Office had informed our Embassy that Mr. Kosygin would be prepared to see Mr. McNamara and, of course, Mr. McNamara readily agreed. There had been no pre-arrangement between ourselves and the Soviets for this appointment; it was completely at Soviet initiative. In response to the Ambassador's query, I confirmed that the subject of missile talks had been raised in the discussion. Ambassador Duda asked if Czechoslovakia had been mentioned, and I said that my recollection was that the subject of Czechoslovakia had not come up at all. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Toon. 2 Apparent reference to anti-Soviet demonstrations by students on October 28 and November 7 and a 3-day strike of students in early November. 3 A memorandum of McNamara's conversation with Kosygin is scheduled for publication in volume XIV . 98. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 98. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, November 18, 1968, 1630Z. 4235. Ref: State 272356. 2 Subject: Gold/Claims. 1. At a reception November 14 CODEL Gore/Pell Ambassador Trhlik of FonMin proposed time had come “to exchange papers” on gold/claims, particularly since Czech May 2 note 3 had not been answered by US. He said “Russians who are looking over our shoulder” had taxed Czechs with being remiss in not pressing for return of gold while at same time US was developing relations through increasing number of visits both ways. I replied Czechs need have no fear of inability to show they had more than defended their interests, and possibly to their detriment by refusing to consider a reasonable increase in payment of nationalization claims. 2. Trhlik did not refer as did Pribyl to supposition that US was ready to offer proposal on August 21 but said he assumed gold/claims question had lost priority among matters receiving US attention. I said this was probably so because of transition taking place between US administrations. I pointed out this was occurring in orderly fashion whereas Czech Government itself seemed to be victim not only of transition but disruption brought about by outside forces. Trhlik then said he assumed that no action on US Government's part likely before at least early next year and I agreed this was a probability. 3. Jaromir Balcar, Stalinist Vice President of Czech Chamber of Commerce, told me Cyrus Eaton, Jr. had informed him that chances of MFN restoration now more favorable in view of US popular sympathy for Czechoslovakia and he asked me whether this was correct. I replied I strongly doubted validity of this assumption, saying that while our admiration and sympathy were undiminished, MFN was more likely to be tied politically to resolution of the Viet-Nam war in which Czechoslovakia had aided our enemies, but all of us should of course work for early peaceful conclusion. 4. Comment : Believe that on purely practical grounds Czechs should be strongly discouraged from pressing major econ-financial problems at this time although I would favor offering in due course new proposal along lines of that contemplated for presentation August 21, should local situation sort itself out in tolerable fashion. If only as debating point reference could in meantime be made on some occasion to ominous nature of Soviet interest described above. 4 Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Brussels. 2 Telegram 272356, November 15, reported a Czech request to renew discussions on economic issues that remained outstanding between the two nations. (Ibid., E 4 CZECH–US) 3 The note was transmitted as an attachment to airgram A–500 from Prague, May 3. (Ibid., FN 19) 4 In telegram 291897 to Prague, December 24, the Department of State responded that the Soviet invasion had caused the United States to suspend a new proposal for settling the gold and claims issues and that the U.S. position would be considered again after the new year. (Ibid., FN 19 CZECH) 99. Airgram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 99. Airgram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State 1 Prague, November 29, 1968. A–902 SUBJECT US-Czech Relations in Time of Transition Despite its depressing progress the turnabout in Czechoslovakia has not yet come to a definitive conclusion and may still be susceptible to positive influence. Below are offered some tentative opinions and suggestions dealing in outline with some of the problems which may arise during the transition period through which both the US and Czechoslovak administrations are passing, each in its different way. The Present Scene The setting is provided in the story of what can and did go wrong in a unique attempt to reform a Communist system. The abuses of the 1950s and of the Novotny regime cried out for inevitable correction. Even the Soviets apparently recognized the more obvious inefficiencies and were prepared to admit change. When Novotny's control disintegrated about a year ago, pent up pressures and reactions broke loose which became more than the means of getting rid of a repugnant personality but grew rather into a movement with sweeping objectives. For this credit (or in any event, responsibility) goes to the media people, intelligentsia and some worker elements (almost all Communists) who first supported and then impelled the successor leadership on uncharted paths. The new leaders were composed of well-intentioned Party officials whose hands were relatively clean and many of whom had suffered from Stalinist excesses but who in part were inexperienced in national politics and not especially well versed in an understanding of power. A flowering of demands for reform of all kinds—economic, the rehabilitation of persons injured by the past, proposals for drastic federal reorganization—all added up to a burden which a strong stable leadership would have found it hard to carry out even if unmolested from the outside. In shorthand, the main components which challenged the Communist system—and no experiment has yet been permitted to show whether Communism can survive changes of this kind—were: (1) abolition of censorship; (2) almost unlimited freedom of travel abroad; (3) voting by secret ballot with some choice among candidates; (4) a measure of freedom of assembly and association; (5) a ceding of Party dominance to allow a form of parliamentary rule in which other groups could effectively join; and (6) a more tolerant view of East/West confrontations over Germany and the Middle East. An emphasis on human rights was a by-product of all these aims, giving larger meaning to the principle of rule by law. The short-lived Action Program, which was propagated by Communists who had no idea of abolishing total public ownership, was beginning to create a sense of participation, bringing the Party popular credit for the first time in decades. For whatever reasons the Soviets intervened—whether for fear of contagion in other countries or because they saw Czechoslovakia eventually slipping away from their strategic control—their brutal invasion compounded the shock of being deprived of a promised new way of life. The shape of politics remains unsettled, even after the last November 14–17 plenum. The Soviet-supported elements on the one hand seek to push reform back into the mold envisaged a year ago, namely that it should lead to a correction of abuses—largely economic—within an orthodox framework. (It is interesting that prominence is now being given to moderate administrators such as Strougal and Cernik who were mentioned as potential leaders at that time and who probably would have succeeded to Novotny's positions if the Slovak political revolt had not brought Dubcek to the top.) On the other hand the movement to fulfill the larger aspirations of giving Communism “a human and democratic face” still strongly survives. Even with Dubcek becoming more of a fading symbol, it remains a factor in the continuing political struggle. For the nearest future we are largely limited to efforts outside Czechoslovakia. Although unsolicited, our sympathy and continued concern can encourage the hard core of popular resistance without being provocative. This may be important in stiffening the backs of the leaders who probably have more to fear from direct Soviet bullying than from pressures by their conservative opposition, which is publicly discredited and acts chiefly in response to Soviet instigation. As the Soviets seek to bend the Czechs to their will, we should publicize instances of interference and repression of human rights. Even having been stifled, the Czechoslovak reform experiment will have an enduring effect on inter-Communist relationships and the Soviet world position. The manner of its repression has impaired Soviet standing to our advantage. With due consideration to specific matters of US-Czechoslovak interest, that advantage can best be pursued by keeping alive world concern over Soviet methods and by encouraging positive Czechoslovak internal forces. Bilateral Issues The timing for a reactivation of bilateral relations depends somewhat on the course of the internal political struggle but more importantly upon the establishment of the government which will emerge from this process and the effects of federalization. Both are unlikely to assume clearer form until early next year. In the area of foreign policy the Czechs may now be expected to follow an unswerving Soviet/Warsaw Five line, but given Czechoslovak minimal influence in foreign affairs, this is not of major consequence to us, except with respect to their aid to North Viet-Nam, which again may be a matter entirely of their own choice. Historically, US-Czech relations have been difficult since the war (nationalization of foreign property and Benes's Pan-Slavism were obstacles even before the Communist takeover). Czech officials describe current relations as poor and show little wish for improvement except in fields of unilateral advantage to them. Although contacts were easier during the period of high reform, the benefits to us were largely indirect since the attention of the leaders and their supporters remained focussed on internal affairs. A need for friends where they can be found these days has produced a moderation in anti-American polemics and a politer tone of discourse, but the regime retains its essentially Communist outlook towards the US. A complex of intractable economic/financial problems form the hard core of present difficulties, consisting mainly of the following elements: (1) Our refusal to return some $20 million of Nazi-looted monetary gold until a satisfactory settlement of US nationalization claims is reached. The gold, which is held tripartitely by the US, UK and France, cannot be set off directly against the claims but it is still our main bargaining counter. (2) The claims themselves amount to a US-adjudicated value of $72 million on which we are prepared to accept a $44 million payment. The matter is complicated by an $8 million loss sustained through the enforced sale by us to another country of a steel mill which the Czechs had purchased in the US and paid for in 1947. Another embarrassing circumstance for us is the fact we signed a paper in December 1961 recommending acceptance in principle of a settlement releasing the gold in return for a Czech payment of $11–12 million on claims. (3) Restoration of most-favored-nation treatment which was justifiably withdrawn from Czechoslovakia under 1951 conditions is now a sore point with the Czechs who denounce their exclusion as a discriminatory act.MFN is of course tied up with future East/West trade policy but its restoration to Czechoslovakia either separately or in conjunction with its extension to certain other Eastern European countries would seem necessary to enable the Czechs ultimately to pay for a claims settlement of the order we now insist upon. It will be recalled that just prior to the August invasion, US government approval had been obtained for a proposal whereby the Czechs would receive the gold upon payment of an installment on claims and would remit the balance up to an agreed total figure of $44 million in further annual installments following the restoration of MFN. Realistically the Czechs are probably as aware as we of the difficulty we would face in offering MFN before a resolution of Viet-Nam, but a formula of the kind previously approved (possibly leaving the final claims total to be determined when MFN is negotiated) would permit a reopening of discussions on an equitable basis which in turn would remove a major obstacle to even tolerable official relations. As regards other issues and projects affecting Czechoslovakia, their character can be identified by mention in the list of recommendations below. Their general purpose is to establish and maximize US influence within the limits posed by the fact Czechoslovakia is a Communist state now subject to a greater degree of Soviet control. In keeping with the approach suggested in this message, priority is given to political acts or gestures which might help preserve reformist gains, with other steps to be taken conjointly or to follow appropriately as conditions evolve. Recommendations (1) That the US maintain an active watching brief, indicating through opportune public statements and use of all media resources that we are closely following events in and affecting Czechoslovakia, especially signs of further Soviet interference and a curtailment of the benefits originally promised in the spring Action Program. News of the type now fully covered by the Western press is doubly effective when played back to Czechoslovakia, both in putting the Soviets on the defensive and also in stimulating popular pressure upon the leaders here to resist. Meanwhile we should continue to treat Czechoslovakia as a sovereign state until proven otherwise by nullifying Soviet actions. (2) That we proceed with exchange programs, showing our willingness to maintain and expand programs in which there is mutual interest. While two-way exchanges do not resolve basic problems they have helped create a better atmosphere, even though such is not acknowledged by Czech officials. (3) That we let it be known we will continue existing channels and modalities of trade under recently suggested more liberal export licensing procedures. Items with a critical interest can be scrutinized more closely, and in borderline cases assurances can be demanded that products are intended solely for non-military use and not for re-export. (4) That barring incidents and local disturbances before next spring, we then cease discouraging private travel, in order not to penalize the local tourist industry in which some US firms also have an interest. (5) That we proceed with the plan for the payment of US social security benefits, this being a decision which it would be difficult to withdraw. At the same time we should not be reluctant to urge that this step, whereby the Czechs will profit from some $5 million in back payments and about $400,000 in continuing annual payments, entitles us to favorable consideration for the settlement of some of our outstanding accounts. (6) That when the Czechoslovak federalized government takes shape in the spring, we consider presenting a gold/claims proposal along the lines of that approved in August. It should be amply clear to the US parties that they have small prospect of receiving final satisfaction of their claims until MFN is restored to Czechoslovakia, and in turn the Czechs should know that this event is unlikely to take place until Viet-Nam is no longer an issue. As for the return of the monetary gold, it would not be out of place to assure ourselves it would return to Czech and not Soviet custody. (7) That with the elevation of Slovakia to a federal state, we plan to reopen our consulate in Bratislava in the course of next year on a reciprocal basis permitting Czechoslovakia a consulate in the US. (8) Finally, we should, in New York as well as in Prague and Washington, encourage this regime, so long as it includes individuals who in any significant degree represent the aspirations of the Czechoslovak people, to develop a discreet dialogue with us. In retrospect one of the Dubcek regime's more significant oversights may have been the apparent lack of an “American policy” (except of course to seek return of the gold). Naively believing that failure to cultivate the US would reassure the Russians, Prague did not attempt a “Romanian gambit” (i.e., giving an impression of friendly ties with the US), and thus perhaps contributed to Moscow's assumption that mutual disinterest existed between Prague and Washington. To the extent the Czechoslovaks now or later attempt to remedy their lack of private dialogue with us, we should lend sympathetic and, when appropriate, high level ears. Department please pass as desired. Beam 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH–US. Confidential. Drafted by Beam. Hungary Hungary 100. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 13, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Squire on January 16. 101. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State Budapest, January 21, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. 102. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State Budapest, February 26, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Secret. 103. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State Budapest, March 11, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 12–1 HUNG. Secret; Limdis. 104. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, April 14, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Hungary, Memos, Vol. 1. Secret. 105. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 10, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 HUNG. Confidential. Drafted by Squire. 106. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 4, 1964, 9:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on December 15. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.” Separate memoranda of the conversation dealing with the General Assembly session, U.S.-Soviet consultations, and Europe are ibid. The meeting was held at USUN. 107. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 13, 1965, 11:45 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 HUNG. Confidential. Drafted by Squire on February 15. The meeting was held in Tyler's office. 108. Airgram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State Budapest, August 31, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Tims. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Moscow, Munich, and Vienna. 109. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 6, 1966. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 85. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Niles and approved in S on October 27. The source text is labeled “Part I of II;“ a separate memorandum of the portion of the conversation dealing with trade is ibid. 110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Hungary Washington, June 6, 1967, 7:24 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Kecskemethy and McKisson, cleared by Stoessel, and approved by Lisle. The Legation was raised to Embassy status on November 28, 1966. 111. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State Budapest, October 3, 1967, 1420Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn for Hillenbrand and to Belgrade for Leddy. Martin J. Hillenbrand was appointed Ambassador to Hungary on September 12 and presented his credentials on October 30. 112. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State Budapest, November 20, 1967, 1600Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Munich, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 113. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State Budapest, November 30, 1967, 1626Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 114. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State Budapest, August 27, 1968, 1210Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 HUNG. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Vienna, USNATO, Berlin, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 115. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 17, 1968, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 HUNG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Tihany. The conversation was held in Leddy's office. 100. Memorandum of Conversation 100. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 13, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting of Janos Radvanyi with Director of Eastern European Affairs PARTICIPANTS U.S. Mr. Harold C. Vedeler, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs Mr. Christopher A. Squire, OIC Hungarian Affairs Hungarian Janos Radvanyi, Chargéd'Affaires ad interim Chargé Radvanyi called at his request at 11:00 a.m. January 13, 1964. After preliminary amenities, he handed Mr. Vedeler two “Reminders” each concerning the desire of a person considered Hungarian by the Hungarian authorities to return to Hungary from the US. 2 Radvanyi alluded briefly to the possibility that a consular convention between Hungary and the US might obviate similar problems, which were presently faced both by Hungary and by the US. Radvanyi then referred to the recent talks between Governor Harriman and Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister Peter Mod (December 14, 1963) 3 and the general state of US-Hungarian relations. He added that negotiations appeared desirable at this time between the US and Hungary. He asked if the Department had noted the significance of Mod's remarks to Governor Harriman that Hungary was willing to consider a general settlement of claims with the US. Mr. Vedeler assured Radvanyi that we had indeed noticed this point and were taking it into account. Radvanyi said that a “Polish type” of settlement was desirable, since Hungary would probably be facing fairly substantial claims which it would be hard pressed to pay under the Rumanian or Bulgarian formula. In other words, negotiations, which he felt might require some time, would need to take into account a prospect of increasing trade between Hungary and the US since only through such trade could Hungary expect to raise the necessary dollar sums to make payments on a general claims settlement (Radvanyi indicated that Hungary would seek compensation for the stock of the Babolna horsebreeding farm, which he alleged had been dispersed in the US). Mr. Vedeler asked what progress had Hungary made in settling the problem of meat inspection requirements for export of its meat products to the US. Radvanyi said that this question was now in the hands of the technicians, and that by late February the Hungarian agricultural authorities would transmit evidence of Hungarian inspection standards to the US Department of Agriculture. In this respect he wondered if the US would agree to the establishment in New York of a one-man office representing Agrimpex to handle commercial sales of meat to the US, much as the Yugoslav and Polish trade offices in New York handled their respective exports. The office could be “temporary“, would be strictly commercial, and would not be a part of the Hungarian Legation's Commercial Counselor's office. Mr. Vedeler said that the Department would look into the matter. It was emphasized to Radvanyi that no MFN treatment of Hungary was possible under existing legislation. In turning to another subject, Mr. Vedeler referred to various press reports about possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and asked the Hungarian Charge whether he believed there was any basis for such reports. Radvanyi replied that he had no official knowledge of any proposed withdrawal, but that it was not impossible. Radvanyi thought personally that such a withdrawal was unlikely since the troops were mostly technical forces concerned with such matters as air defense under the Warsaw Pact and included very little infantry. Soviet forces were unnecessary for internal security in Hungary and there could be no question on this score. Besides, the average Hungarian, Radvanyi claimed, did not mind seeing Soviet forces remain in Hungary in order to minimize the need for Hungarian conscripts. In his opinion, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary would be contingent on some international security arrangement such as a NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-aggression agreement. Mr. Vedeler suggested that it was difficult to see any operational or strategic purpose in the retention of Soviet troops in Hungary given the nature of modern military weapons. The absence of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and their withdrawal from Bulgaria and Rumania would support this view. At this point, Chargé Radvanyi casually mentioned that he was pleased to report that as of January 1, 1964, the Hungarian Government had ceased jamming of the VOA, RFE and BBC radio broadcasts to Hungary. (The Department later learned that Hungarian Second Secretary Istvan Varga told Mr. Carl Sharek of USIA the same thing at approximately the same time.) As to VOA, Hungary found this official organ to be a “serious” station: he intimated, however, that the Department might seek to have VOA be “more objective”. Mr. Vedeler expressed gratification at the official information conveyed by Mr. Radvanyi that the Hungarian authorities were stopping the jamming of broadcasts. Both Mr. Vedeler and Mr. Squire noted that VOA endeavored to be entirely factual in its reporting and dealt to a great extent with American life and developments. As to RFE, Radvanyi said that Premier Kadar had decided to cease jamming of this station to bring some humor into the life of Hungarians, since RFE broadcasts were so ridiculous they could not be taken seriously. In his personal estimation, the Charge continued, RFE would probably not continue for more than a year. The Department's representatives indicated that while RFE was not an official organization they could not agree with this estimate. Radvanyi next adverted to Cardinal Mindszenty. The US, he said, should put pressure on the Vatican to find a solution of the case. It was unfortunate that there was no provision in the Catholic Church for the pensioning of Cardinals, he continued, since this might permit a solution of the issue. The US should play a leading part in the settlement of the Mindszenty problem. Mr. Vedeler pointed out that the primary responsibility in any solution of the problem lay with the Hungarian government and the Vatican. He referred in this connection to the statement of Mr. Mod in his conversation with Governor Harriman that negotiations were in progress between Budapest and the Vatican on this and other Church-State matters. Radvanyi indicated that these talks were not progressing very speedily. In a discussion of cultural exchanges, there was agreement that gradual progress had been made during the past year. Mr. Vedeler asked what impressions the Charge had of the success of the recent visits to Budapest of Messrs. Steinbeck and Albee. Radvanyi said that he was uninformed about these visits except in a general way. He mentioned the successful visit to the US of First Deputy Minister of Agriculture Janos Hont, and the favorable articles which Hont had written recently in ”Nepszabadsag”. Both Mr. Vedeler and Charge Radvanyi believed that satisfactory steps, often of a non-official character, were being taken in the cultural and exchanges field without any written agreements or protocols between the US and Hungary, and that this pragmatic approach was the best in dealing with these activities. Radvanyi then asked how the US viewed the travel to the US of MTI Director General Sandor Barcs, who would come as the private guest of the AP. Mr. Vedeler said that the trip seemed to be an excellent idea, particularly since we knew something of the importance of Barcs at Budapest. Radvanyi confirmed the fact of Barcs' influence within the Hungarian Government. In conclusion, Radvanyi noted that he was contemplating arranging for the visit of Istvan Tompe, Head of the Hungarian Radio and Television, to the US. Tompe was also a close personal friend of Premier Kadar and had modernized news coverage on the Hungarian Radio and Television. Now the Hungarian radio carried much better news than did the Hungarian newspapers, and in much more objective fashion. He intimated that it might be possible during a visit by Tompe here to arrange a meeting between him and the authorities responsible for Hungarian broadcasts of VOA, and perhaps even arrange network exchanges. Mr. Vedeler said that we would be interested to see whether such a visit would be worked out. The meeting lasted slightly over one hour. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Squire on January 16. 2 Not further identified. 3 The Department of State reported on this meeting in telegram 304 to Budapest, December 14, 1963. (Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US) 101. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State 101. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State 1 Budapest, January 21, 1964, 4 p.m. 439. Apparent phasing out of jamming will further favorable image GOH attempting create of progressive country taking broad set of initiatives improve relations with West. Initiatives involving USG may be in areas of maximum favorable international impact where GOH can move independently or in collaboration with USSR while leaving untouched residue hard core problems affecting operating position Legation (property, personnel etc) and hampering USG effectiveness generally within Hungary. Other moves involving USG that should not surprise us would be thinning out or removal Soviet troops, withdrawal conspicuous surveillance of Legation, and piecemeal approaches toward settling old debts and claims. Latter might include approach to US bankers to settle old $6 million default with view making it easier for Hungarians do business with US private sector and banks. All of this would be to the good. We should, however, take measures to assure that accurate image of USG posture is widely known during all this and keep pressure on GOH to move in all areas in which USG interested. To counteract, for example, foreign and local press play that Mod recently told Under Secretary Harriman that GOH ready to discuss all outstanding issues, we suggest media (including SPO Vienna) be used to disseminate following ideas: In Washington and Budapest USG has identified outstanding US-Hungarian problems of bilateral character involved in improvement relations; has taken initiatives to point [to?] essential elements of some of these and invited GOH response; and has expressed willingness to discuss others. These same points might also usefully be gotten across to diplomatic corps when suitable opportunities arise. Jones 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. 102. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State 102. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State 1 Budapest, February 26, 1964, 3 p.m. 514. Reference: Legation telegram 504; Legation A–3; Legation telegram 513. 2 1. Szilagyi's note comes against background of continued accent on economic problems, cautious GOH optimism on Vatican-Church negotiations, and semi-official indications Khrushchev expected here Liberation Day, April 4 (accompanied by still unsubstantiated rumors he will announce troop withdrawal). 3 Szilagyi's proposal fits into this background of possible developments that could set stage for improved relations with US. It may not be entirely coincidental that Szilagyi's estimate six weeks to two months to agree on agenda brings us to Liberation Day. 2. We believe it desirable to respond to Hungarian note in context Davis talking paper October 1962. 4 Thus continuity US posture toward Hungary will be underlined and suggestion disabused that something new on our part has suddenly appeared in US-Hungarian relations. By appropriate reference to Davis paper, we can continue to take note of Mindszenty problem and possible exchange of Ministers 5 (in which Hungary presumably particularly interested) while addressing ourselves to those problems capable of earlier bilateral resolution. Within that context we believe agenda might best be proposed with general caption headings with illustrative examples that will include items still open that were originally listed in Davis paper together with new items that have subsequently developed. Broad headings might be Legation operations, economic, cultural and consular. 3. Legation operational problems should be approached on general proposition that normal relations call for normally functioning and adequately safeguarded diplomatic establishment. To that end present arbitrary limitation size American staff should be eliminated, status of US-owned property in Budapest should be regularized, authorization obtained for leased line to Vienna, and right established to bring in Marine guards. Experience recent months has underlined urgent need for Marine guards for adequate security as long as we occupy present buildings. 4. Economic problems should include settlement financial claims and receptive USG posture toward practical problems now facing Hungary in increasing trade such as meat inspection, more expeditious and liberal (non-strategic) licensing, permission to open sales office in US, certificates of origin, et cetera. Hungarians have clearly indicated here they will attempt to link financial settlement with expanded trade. Key to latter in their eyes is MFN and to lesser degree, annual trade negotiations patterned after those with Western European countries. These negotiations have led to trade agreements setting forth broad set of trade targets and may eventually serve as useful models in developing and controlling trade with Hungary. While Hungarians have not specifically said so, we believe they have in mind Polish model where grant MFN linked with financial settlement. 5. Cultural problems should include lifting present restrictions distribution of informational material and providing basis for more activity in this field here. We have in mind broader daily distribution of US wireless bulletin, monthly distribution of some sort cultural bulletin, and more use of films. In this same context we believe possibility of IMG agreement might be tabled. No GOH permission required for Legation library. On performing arts and exchanges we should be prepared to discuss generally while preserving our own maneuverability. All of this we would seek to accomplish without getting involved in overall formal cultural agreement. There have been some low level indications, however, that Hungary would like some sort cultural agreement for its prestige. 6. Consular problems should include reunion of families of both dual nationals and non-US citizens. We now have lists mentioned in Legation A–301 6 and they contain 29 and 60 names respectively for each category. They would be submitted when negotiations get under way. Does Department feel time has come for tabling either draft new consular convention or some sort understanding designed to provide Legation notification and access rights to visiting Americans under arrest? In view of background of events against which Szilagyi's note was submitted, we believe we should keep ball in Hungary court and make a reasonably prompt reply. We assume Washington will draft note in reply and provide appropriate instructions in connection with Szilagyi's procedural suggestions. Advise if anything further desired of this Legation. Jones 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Secret. 2 Telegram 504, February 23, reported on a Hungarian note proposing a settlement of outstanding differences between the two states. (Ibid.) Airgram A–3, July 3, 1963, reported on U.S. cultural programming in Hungary. (Ibid., CUL 11 HUNG) Telegram 513, February 26, analyzed the enlarged meeting of the Hungarian Communist Party's Central Committee. (Ibid., E 8 HUNG) 3 Khrushchev visited Hungary March 31–April 9. 4 See Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVI, Document 15 . 5 The United States withdrew its Minister following the suppression of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. 6 Dated February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, PT 9–11 HUNG) 103. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State 103. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State 1 Budapest, March 11, 1964, 1 p.m. 547. Department's telegrams 427, 428. 2 Our written response on President's behalf to Cardinal's letter of February 4 3 was delivered March 11 as authorized 427. In course subsequent conversation, “statement” as modified 428 was gone over with Cardinal. He put statement in context past messages conveyed to him orally. Cardinal professed to be satisfied with written response upon seeing clause “this refuge remains available to you so long as consideration for your personal safety and freedom requires such an arrangement”. Once having assured himself on availability of refuge, he did not appear to focus on contents of statement even though he did appear to read it. In hour and half talk Cardinal made three principal points: 1. Preoccupied with position of five bishops in Hungary who not allowed in their diocese and with position of bishops in Slovakia, for which he says he is responsible, who may be in similar position. Fears reported church state negotiations will not protect interests of these old faithful members of clergy for whom he feels responsible. Vatican appears to him to be too disposed to arrive at accommodations with EE regimes. 2. As long as there is smallest percentage of chance of change in Hungary, feels he should hold himself available to play his constitutional role when appropriate time comes. Saying he did not know what lay in the future, he recalled that one of his predecessors, Yorgys Zechenyi, lived to be 107 years old. 3. Described attitude of Vatican and USG as two key factors in his position. Vatican's plan to have him come to Rome would represent a “careless” attitude on his part toward his responsibilities here and to loyal priests for whose appointments he had been responsible. While he did not think GOH would arrest him now if he left Legation, to either return to his native village or be subject to living conditions of priests who had been faithful to him would be intolerable. He professed to find satisfication in nature of written response given him that asylum in American Legation continued to be available. We took suitable opportunity to point out to Cardinal that, while we were sympathetic to humane considerations prompting his feelings, USG not competent to deal with problems involving church and primacy. We called his attention to relevant portions of statement bearing on these and expressed gratification that he would shortly be able to discuss these problems in depth with a representative of Vatican. With respect to availability of asylum, we called his attention to terms and conditions in statement and to our government's hope that reasonable solution could be found to problem of refuge. He did not appear to really focus on statement as whole or on portions to which we called his special attention. At end he thanked us for letter and its “supplement.” Statement not left with him. Jones 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 12–1 HUNG. Secret; Limdis. 2 Telegram 427, March 9, transmitted the text of a reply to Mindszenty's letter to the President to be delivered by Jones. Telegram 428, March 9, provided instructions for delivery of the message. (Both ibid.) 3 In this letter, Mindszenty outlined his personal history, gave his view of his legal position, and explained the conditions he would set with Hungarian authorities as the basis for an agreement under which he would leave the Legation. (Ibid., Hungarian Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, January–June 1964) 104. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy) to President Johnson 104. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 14, 1964. Secretary Rusk is asking for your approval to accept a Hungarian offer to initiate confidential bilateral discussions looking toward the establishment of more normal relations between the U.S. and Hungary. 2 If successful, these talks could produce several immediate and specific benefits, including: (1) the settlement of claims by American citizens for losses suffered from Hungarian nationalization and/or acquisition of American-owned property; (2) improved protection for American citizens in Hungary through the establishment of mutually acceptable consular arrangements; (3) rejoining of families separated since the Communist takeover, and more particularly in the wake of the 1956 revolution; (4) some increased trade; and (5) greater contacts between Americans and Hungarians resulting from improved diplomatic relations. In a larger sense there is a long range and substantial advantage that could accrue from an improved American presence in Budapest. Hungary has perhaps gone farther than any other satellite in de-Stalinizing the Communist system and the movement in that direction continues. With strong representation there, the United States would be in a better position than it now is to take advantage of this situation and make its views and influence felt and understood. On balance, it seems clearly in our interest to accept the Hungarian offer for these discussions and if you approve, they could get under way in Budapest on or about May 15. McG. B. Approved Speak to me about this 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Hungary, Memos, Vol. 1. Secret. 2 An April 8 memorandum from the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State requesting approval to proceed with negotiations is ibid. 3 President Johnson checked this option. A checkmark after “Approved,” initialed by Bundy, is dated April 21. In telegram 500 to Budapest, April 21, the Department of State forwarded the text of a note offering to begin discussions on or about May 15 in Budapest. (Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US) In telegram 695 from Budapest, April 30, Jones reported that he had delivered the note. (Ibid.) 105. Memorandum of Conversation 105. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 10, 1964. SUBJECT The Hungarian Situation and US-Hungarian Relations PARTICIPANTS Ferenc Nagy, former Prime Minister of Hungary Monsignor Bela Varga, former President of the Hungarian Parliament Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Harold C. Vedeler, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs Robert B. Wright, Director, Mutual Defense Control Staff, E Robert M. McKisson, Deputy Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs Christopher A. Squire, OIC, Hungarian Affairs On September 10, 1964, at 3:00 p.m., Hungarian émigré leaders Ferenc Nagy and Monsignor Bela Varga called on Mr. Davis at their request. Msgr. Varga opened his remarks by noting that, although he could not speak for the entire Hungarian Committee, he and Mr. Nagy were in agreement with US policy towards Hungary. The US policy of building bridges to Eastern Europe had impelled Mr. Nagy and himself to go to Europe to observe its effect, particularly, the reaction of Hungarians. He was glad to say that the news from Hungary in this regard was very good. Hungarians had hope in America and were waiting for America not to start a war or a revolution but to make even further progress in inducing peaceful liberalization in Hungary. After spending considerable time in Vienna talking to the stream of travelers coming out of Hungary, Msgr. Varga said that he had gone alone to Rome, where conversations with Vatican officials showed that the Vatican's policy was parallel to that of the US, namely aimed toward inducing the liberalization of Hungary's internal regime. Mr. Nagy noted that since this US policy towards the EE countries had first been presented by Assistant Secretary Tyler in late 1962 and later reiterated even more strongly by Deputy Under Secretary Harriman before the European Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2 he and Msgr. Varga had supported that policy in a positive fashion. Indeed Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga favored closer US-Hungarian contacts because they realized that no matter how long Communist regimes lasted the Hungarian people needed to survive under the best obtainable economic and moral conditions. Among the émigrés, opinions were divided. It was needless to say that some exiles felt it was better not to sell grain to Hungary, for they feared this helped the Government and thus tended to lengthen the rule of the Communists. He and Msgr. Varga were not of that opinion, however. While he did not know what future events would bring real changes in the form of Hungary's Government, in the meantime the Hungarian people must live and survive. The Hungarian population situation was particularly bad since, according to the latest UN figures, Hungary had the lowest birthrate in the entire world. This was a reflection of the people's fear and uncertainty over tomorrow. In order to be able to take a firm stand on policy toward Hungary, Mr. Nagy continued, it was necessary to know the opinion of Hungarians in Hungary. He was not concerned to represent the émigrés, he added, but rather the views of the Hungarian people at home. So he and Msgr. Varga went to Europe to meet Hungarians traveling abroad. They had collected a lot of information, little of it new, but all of it strengthening their conviction that they must give positive support to the US policy towards Hungary and Eastern Europe. In the process they had met a great many Hungarians, in Paris and in Vienna. None of the Hungarian visitors were afraid to talk to them. Mr. Nagy said that he and Msgr. Varga had asked each Hungarian with whom they had talked what their opinion was of US policy toward Hungary and of the idea of broadening economic and cultural relations between the two countries. The Hungarians were asked specifically if they believed that increased US-Hungarian contacts would strengthen the regime without being of real benefit to the Hungarian people. Not a single person opposed the US policy towards Hungary. Without exception workers, engineers, clerks and farmers asked them to help in bringing about negotiations between the US and Hungary. Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga of course told them that the US has a definite policy concerning relations and contacts. While it was true that in Hungary the process of liberalization and relaxation had progressed much further than in most other EE bloc countries, in Rumania the Government had taken certain steps towards asserting Rumanian independence of the USSR and these steps had made it possible for the US to reach certain understandings with Rumania. The US had not seen similar steps towards independence on the part of Kadar. Those Hungarian travelers interviewed by Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga were not happy at this explanation, and stated that it would be very difficult for Kadar to take similar steps in the near future because of his personal relationship with Khrushchev, the presence of Red Army units in Hungary, and the fact that “fellow travelers” in the regime such as Janos Peter (the Foreign Minister) were so subservient to Moscow. There were, moreover, no “great” men in the Hungarian Government who could be expected to visualize Hungary's future place in the international scene. The Hungarian travelers offered some detailed advice on economic projects that the US should foster for Hungary. It was suggested, for instance, that the US help Hungary process her bauxite into aluminum, which would give Hungary added use of her most abundant natural resource, lessen her economic dependence on Moscow where the bauxite (and alumina) is now processed on terms unfavorable to Hungary. To set up a smelting plant, the US would have to supply a power source to Hungary. If this were to be an atomic power plant, of the type talked about for Rumania, it would have the added advantage of giving Hungary a reason for keeping the Hungarian-mined uranium, now exported to the USSR, for Hungary's own consumption. In the cultural field, the Hungarian travelers urged an expansion of the US scholarship program for Hungarian students, but with close control of the selection of students in US hands. They suggested that the US should seek to influence the Hungarian Government to abolish the State Office for Church Affairs, which served not to help the churches in Hungary but only to corrupt them. In summary, Mr. Nagy noted that it was the opinion of Msgr. Varga and himself that it was indeed desirable to improve US-Hungarian relations, regardless of their basic belief that nothing short of complete independence would be acceptable for Hungary in the long run. Mr. Nagy added that it would be desirable that the US Government, in improving relations with Hungary, should get the idea across to the Hungarian people by radio or other means that the increased contacts were being undertaken for the sake of the people and that these contacts must of necessity be through the Government in order to reach the people. In answer to a question from Mr. Vedeler, Mr. Nagy indicated that in his opinion the most effective types of exchanges with Hungary would be student exchanges and an agreement to allow publications to enter both countries on a reciprocal basis. Mr. Davis thanked Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga for making their views known to the Department and said he was pleased to see that they agreed with the general outlines of US policy. The policy, Mr. Davis added, must be developed as occasion presented itself and this is what the US was doing. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 HUNG. Confidential. Drafted by Squire. 2 The text of the Tyler statement was not found. The reference to Harriman's testimony is apparently to a statement made to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 1964. For text, see House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc, Part 2 (Washington, 1964), pp. 348–355. 106. Memorandum of Conversation 106. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 4, 1964, 9:30 a.m. SecDel/MC/20 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, November 1964 SUBJECT Hungarian-U.S. Relations PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Mr. Givan, EUR Hungary Foreign Minister Peter Minister Radvanyi, Hungarian Embassy Peter thanked the Secretary for the opportunity to see him, and the officials of the State Department who had initiated and organized the appointment. He felt he should excuse himself for taking the Secretary's time, but their talk might have some importance for both sides. The very fact of their meeting has implications. The Secretary said he hoped bilateral relations could move along. Our representatives are talking over matters of much interest to us; this may take a little time to develop momentum, but let us try. When we can move, let us do so; if there are pockets of stubborn resistance, we can by-pass them. We will be glad to review our bilateral relations as a whole. We will look at trade questions broadly in the new session of Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is working hard on this and there is growing interest in the business community. The Committee will probably hold hearings in the first quarter of next year. Whether there will be legislative amendments, for instance to extend Most Favored Nation status, will depend on the Committee's study and also on whether the general atmosphere continues to improve. We recognize that opportunities for trade are limited as long as the MFN door is closed. Meanwhile both sides can give thought to trade possibilities from the point of view of demand and markets. This is not necessarily easy for us, since our trade is organized on a private basis and our government cannot tell businessmen what to buy and sell. From the Hungarian point of view, tourism would seem to be an area where some expansion would be possible quickly. There is a backlog of interest among American tourists in Hungary and neighboring areas where travel has been difficult for the past 20 years. If tourism increases, we hope the Hungarian Government will earmark some of its proceeds for tourists coming our way. We are in the tourist business too. Peter agreed that this was a good possibility. He said it is helpful to have this meeting to obtain personal impressions about the Secretary. If trade possibilities increase, this would facilitate an improvement in relations. MFN status would be helpful generally, not merely for trade. The Secretary said we are looking in that direction. Whether there is now legislation will probably be affected by Soviet decisions on various outstanding issues such as lend-lease. The Secretary asked whether the agricultural situation in Hungary is good. Peter said it was better and that Hungary appreciates the attitude taken by the U.S. last year on wheat sales. The Secretary said we were glad to be helpful. Peter said no doubt refugee groups had objected. The Secretary said we have several different generations of refugees. Those from 1956–57 seem to be more moderate in their views than some who came earlier. The Secretary said he had had some contact with Hungarian students when he was with the Rockefeller Foundation, and when he was in Budapest in 1957 he had found a lively interest among doctors, scientists, and others in technical and cultural exchanges, not only with the U.S. but with other European countries. Perhaps there is some possibility of increased contacts. Mr. Siscoe is looking into this now in Budapest. An increase in exchanges would benefit everybody. 1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on December 15. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.” Separate memoranda of the conversation dealing with the General Assembly session, U.S.-Soviet consultations, and Europe are ibid. The meeting was held at USUN. 107. Memorandum of Conversation 107. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 13, 1965, 11:45 a.m. SUBJECT Mob Attack on our Budapest Legation PARTICIPANTS U.S. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Christopher A. Squire, EE Hungary Mr. Janos Radvanyi, Chargé d'Affaires, Hungarian Legation Mr. Endre Szluka, Second Secretary, Hungarian Legation Hungarian Chargé Radvanyi, summoned to the Department by Assistant Secretary Tyler, appeared at 11:45 a.m. February 13 with Second Secretary Szluka. Mr. Tyler informed Radvanyi that he was sorry to have to broach a subject not particularly pleasant, and one which he had hoped would not arise at this stage in our efforts to improve relations. He had been informed, 2 Mr. Tyler continued, of a demonstration which had been staged against the US Legation in Budapest. The demonstration lasted about 45 minutes, from 10:00 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. There had been a crowd of about 1000 persons, which included a number of Asiatic and African students as well as Cubans carrying anti-American placards. According to a message from our Legation we had received a warning 10 minutes prior to the event by telephone, from the Protocol Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Protocol had warned that a demonstration was pending and that the Ministry would endeavor to provide the Legation with adequate police protection. The police arrived, however, only after all the lower windows of the Legation had been smashed, after ink had been thrown at the premises, and after two cars belonging to staff members of the Legation had been completely wrecked. The first floor theater and snack bar were penetrated briefly and the furniture thrown about; the US seal was pulled down from the front door. It was particularly significant, Mr. Tyler continued, that an organizer of the demonstration, a Hungarian, was overheard at the end of the mob action instructing Asiatic and African students to “return to the house” where they would be formally thanked for their participation. Mr. Tyler informed Chargé Radvanyi that Mr. O'Shaughnessy had already lodged a strong protest in Budapest, and had asked the Hungarian Government to pay for the damages which had resulted from this demonstration. The US Government noted that the notice given to our Legation about the demonstration was inadequate, and that police protection was inadequate. The US noted further the participation of Hungarians in the demonstration, the fact that windows were broken, cars wrecked, the Legation penetrated and the US seal had been torn down. Mr. Tyler added that very frankly he was surprised that this demonstration had been organized and permitted at a time when we were making useful progress together to resolve our outstanding problems. We were all the more surprised since, to our knowledge, this was the first time such a demonstration had occurred in Budapest since the war. The US was also mindful of the fact that there had recently been demonstrations in countries which were immediate neighbors of Hungary to the north and south, but that these demonstrations did not result in damages against our diplomatic establishments as in Hungary. Mr. Tyler then said that he took this opportunity to remind Mr. Radvanyi of the statement made three days ago by President Johnson, on February 10, regarding the demonstration against the American Embassy in Moscow. He then read the President's statement. 3 Mr. Tyler informed Mr. Radvanyi he would appreciate his informing the Hungarian Government that the US feels that this demonstration and what happened as a result is an unfortunate matter. The US considers that Hungary should have afforded the US Legation effective protection. The participation of Hungarians in the demonstration and in an organizing role gave a particularly unfortunate aspect to the whole thing. The report that African and Asian students were to go “back to the house” to be formally thanked for their participation made a most unfavorable impression on the US. Mr. Radvanyi said that according to his information the Hungarian authorities had done everything possible to protect the US Legation. He said that he would hesitate to mention all the demonstrations which had taken place against Hungarian official premises in the US. Mr. Tyler interjected to say that he hoped Mr. Radvanyi was not implying that Hungarian windows had been broken, cars wrecked or seals torn down. Mr. Radvanyi said that of course he would inform his Government very promptly of what Mr. Tyler had said. Mr. Tyler concluded that he felt bound to tell Mr. Radvanyi that this demonstration was not helpful to the improvement of US-Hungarian relations, and that we supported the protest made by the US Legation in Budapest. 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 HUNG. Confidential. Drafted by Squire on February 15. The meeting was held in Tyler's office. 2 In telegram 508 from Budapest, February 13. (Ibid.) 3 For text of the February 10 statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, p. 170. 4 In telegram 469 to Budapest, February 16, the Department reported: “U.S. Government at highest levels greatly disturbed by current demonstrations which have assumed form of impermissible mob violence,” and commented: “Culpability Hungarian Government in this incident apparent.” The Charge was instructed to stress U.S. concern and was informed that further discussions of outstanding bilateral issues would be suspended. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 HUNG) 108. Airgram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State 108. Airgram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State 1 Budapest, August 31, 1965. A–137 SUBJECT United States-Hungarian Governmental Relations The Hungarian Government makes Vietnam the most conspicuous issue in its relations with the United States at the moment. Like other East European Communist governments, the Kádár regime has conducted a strong campaign of denunciation against US policy in Southeast Asia ever since the Vietnamese crisis entered its present phase last February. The regime permitted a destructive attack on the American Legation by Asian students at that time and has subsequently called on the Hungarian people almost daily, through the press, radio, and mass meetings, to show their solidarity with the Vietnamese against the American “aggressors.” It has repeatedly pledged Hungarian “volunteers” to fight against the US in Vietnam in case of need. The campaign casts a large cloud over the US-Hungarian official talks for normalization of relations that got under way last year. The tone and scope of the Hungarian official anti-US propaganda is hardly compatible with any initiatives from the Hungarian side on behalf of normalization. Foreign Ministry officials have, indeed, told us that Vietnam makes progress in our bilateral talks difficult. Hungarian cultural-exchange authorities have cited today's East-West political situation to us as their reason for refusing to discuss plans for cultural reciprocity at this time. Thus the regime is keeping in line with Moscow in the “freeze” that the Soviets have applied to cultural and other relations with the United States, apropos of Vietnam. The only positive event here during this entire period has been the US participation for the first time in the Budapest International Fair, last May—and this was an event to which the Hungarians had invited us long before the Vietnamese crisis arose. Moreover, the enthusiastic response of the Hungarian people to the American display there, at a moment when their government was trying to whip up popular condemnation of the US, must only have strengthened the regime's prejudice against opening the doors to any substantial increase of American cultural influence. But while Vietnam has been a factor in the current Hungarian “go slow” policy toward our bilateral relations, it appears to be more of an additional reason than an original one for this policy. The Kádár regime has, in fact, taken a cautious, slow approach to normalization from the start and has indicated a hard bargaining posture. Foreign Ministry officials from the outset of our talks have stressed the view that it is mainly up to the United States to make the political and trade concessions on which normal relations will depend. The Hungarians took a non-committal or negative position on official cultural exchanges initially as well as later, and the Foreign Ministry indicated its touchiness toward even the suggestion of a possible future USIA operation in Hungary. In other fields, the Ministry has never responded to US proposals regarding useful steps that might be taken toward improved relations, such as permitting a relatively small number of dual nationals to emigrate from Hungary to the US, and the abolition of arbitrary ceilings on our diplomatic missions. With regard to negotiation of US financial claims against Hungary, the Hungarian side by raising large counterclaims indicated that it was prepared to take a tough stand and to protract the bargaining process for years, if need be, in order to obtain favorable terms. The official Hungarian attitude to date suggests that while the Kádár regime would like to obtain the prestige and other benefits of fully normal relations with the United States, it hopes to do so at the smallest possible cost. The regime is quite conscious of the avowed US interest in building “bridges” to Eastern Europe for the purpose of exerting political leverage in this part of the world, and of the Administration's plans for seeking East-West trade legislation for this purpose; and it will be watching carefully to see what the American side is prepared to offer. With regard to cultural and other relations, the Hungarian leadership is quite willing, in its desire for Western technical information, to take advantage of such opportunities as the Ford Foundation grants—currently enabling several dozen Hungarians to train in the United States—but is clearly not anxious to move into a program of official exchanges of a kind that would sharply increase the American presence in Hungary. In view of these various considerations it seems likely that the Hungarian Government will continue to proceed very cautiously and cagily in its negotiations of “normalization” with the United States. It will doubtless continue to stall on any conspicuous normalization proposals as long as East-West tensions (and Moscow's example) call for this, and will use Vietnam as an excuse for dragging its feet. The Hungarians are careful not to shut any doors, however, and to maintain correct, even friendly official relations at the personal level regardless of the current propaganda campaign against our “imperialism.” They will undoubtedly be ready to bargain with us more actively, though always shrewdly, for the advantages they seek, the moment any relaxation appears in East-West affairs. For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. Richard W. Tims Counselor of Legation 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Tims. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Moscow, Munich, and Vienna. 109. Memorandum of Conversation 109. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 6, 1966. US/MC/60 SUBJECT Status of Missions PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Thomas Niles (note taker) Hungary Foreign Minister János Peter Chargé d'Affaires János Radványi Peter asked the Secretary to accept his most sincere condolences on Mr. O'Shaughnessy's death. 2 He said he knew that Mr. O'Shaughnessy had suffered from a heart ailment, but he had no idea that it was so serious. The Secretary said he appreciated Peter's expressions of sympathy. Peter than asked the Secretary whether the United States planned to send another Chargé d'Affaires to Budapest, or whether it might be possible for Hungary and the United States to exchange ambassadors. The Secretary replied that he wished to consider this question but reminded Peter of the special problem which might well stand in the way of such a development. Peter remarked that it would be “useful” to get rid of that obstacle. When the Secretary observed that the United States thought that the Vatican was working for a solution to the problem, Peter replied that the Vatican was really not interested in a solution. He claimed that the Vatican regards the present situation as the best possible, particularly since the presence of Cardinal Mindszenty in Rome could be a major embarrassment. Peter said that the Hungarian Government was in contact with the Vatican, and he suggested that US intervention with the Vatican would be useful. He repeated his earlier statement that the Vatican did not appear to be interested in a solution, and the Secretary said that he would review the problem. Peter asked whether Cardinal Mindszenty's presence posed an insurmountable obstacle for the exchange of ambassadors. The Secretary replied that the required Senatorial approval for ambassadorial appointments did pose a problem in the case of Hungary. Peter replied that he had the impression that the Secretary was able to control the Senate. The Secretary laughed and said that Mr. Radványi had been misleading his authorities in Budapest if Peter thought the Administration was able to control the Senate. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 85. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Niles and approved in S on October 27. The source text is labeled “Part I of II;“ a separate memorandum of the portion of the conversation dealing with trade is ibid. 2 O'Shaughnessy died of a heart attack on September 24 in Budapest. 110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Hungary 110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Hungary 1 Washington, June 6, 1967, 7:24 p.m. 208645. 1. Sandor Jozan, Acting Hungarian Chargé, called at his request on McKisson at 2:30 P.M. June 6 to convey following oral representations on instructions GOH. Jozan said two incidents had occurred recently which do not contribute to improved US-Hungarian relations and which GOH considered unfriendly. First was publicizing Bernat defection, 2 despite assurances previously given that Department did not plan initiate publicity in case. Second matter involved separate telephone calls to two members Hungarian UN Mission on June 1 and 2 by anonymous male callers who attempted induce them to defect. Jozan said, in response queries by Department officer, that he not aware identities of UN Mission personnel involved and added that callers did not identify selves in any way. 2. Department officer stated that Department had refrained in entire good faith from initiating publicity on Bernat case. However, in wake of Radvanyi case, 3 fact of Bernat defection became known to some members of press through sources not known to Department, and new situation arose when press addressed direct inquiries to Department on subject. Department, in such circumstances, could not properly deny or misrepresent essential facts in case. Information made available in response such press queries was accurate, limited to essential facts, and not aimed at exploiting case for propaganda purposes. 3. Re telephone calls to Hungarian Mission personnel, McKisson expressed concern and regret that Hungarian personnel had been subjected such improper approaches but added that it was his firm conviction that such calls were the work of individual “cranks” and that there was no reason whatsoever to attribute such harassments to US officials. Department officer expressed his hope Hungarian Embassy and Hungarian UN Mission would report all such harassments promptly to US authorities and affirmed US concern and readiness take all possible steps to investigate and, wherever possible, prevent recurrence such acts. 4. Department officer also took opportunity to reiterate with regard Szabo, 4 Bernat, and Radvanyi cases that all three individuals had acted entirely on own initiative and voluntarily without prior knowledge or inducement by US authorities. Expressed hope that GOH, despite concern it might feel in these matters, would seek, as US has sought, prevent them from having adverse effect on US-Hungarian relations generally. US, for its part, looked toward improvement relations and progress toward settlement outstanding bilateral problems and issues. 5. Jozan expressed understanding and appreciation for statement Department's views and made no effort at rebuttal or further comment. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Kecskemethy and McKisson, cleared by Stoessel, and approved by Lisle. The Legation was raised to Embassy status on November 28, 1966. 2 Erno Bernat, Third Secretary of the Hungarian Legation, defected in June. Documentation relating to his defection is ibid., POL 30 HUNG. 3 Janos Radvanyi, Chargé d'Affaires, defected in May. Documentation relating to his defection is ibid. 4 Laszlo Szabo, Second Secretary of the Hungarian Embassy in the United Kingdom, defected in October 1965. 111. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State 111. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State 1 Budapest, October 3, 1967, 1420Z. 2 438. 1. US-Hungarian relations were reviewed in two hour meeting between Assistant Secretary Leddy and Deputy Foreign Minister Bela Szilagyi Sep 27. 3 At Szilagyi's request Leddy outlined US views, including administration's aim of continuing to seek East-West trade legislation and belief that meanwhile improvement in bilateral relations possible in several fields such as cultural and scientific exchanges and consular affairs. He reminded the Deputy Foreign Minister that President's ability to offer Hungary most-favored-nation treatment is blocked at present by absence Congressional authorization, which in turn is influenced by political opposition against trading with countries that assist North Vietnam. 2. Szilagyi thanked Leddy for views and in turn outlined GOH standpoint. He said Hungarian-US relations are disturbed at two levels: (1) On world level, by US aggression against Hungary's North Vietnamese friends, US policies in Middle East, Cuba, etc., and US role in European security question; (2) at bilateral level, by US trade discrimination against Hungary, inability to finish claims negotiations (which he attributed to US barriers to normal trade), US travel restrictions, and such incidents as recent defections Hungarian diplomats, which, he said, remains “serious hindrance to performance normal work of Hungarian Mission in Washington.” Szilagyi elaborated standard GOH line re Vietnam at great length, including necessity of unconditional cessation bombing, though he was unable offer opinion what would happen if US stopped latter. Similarly, re European situation, in response to Leddy statement that US hopes Eastern Europe governments will give receptive consideration to constructive E–W initiatives of Kiesinger-Brandt coalition, Szilagyi rehearsed familiar East bloc skepticism toward Bonn policies and stressed Hungarian support of GDR. 3. On bilateral relations, Szilagyi referred in passing to attacks by Hungarian émigré organizations and ”US supported Radio Free Europe” as additional obstacles to normalization, but reverted to US trade discrimination as principal impediment from GOH viewpoint. In this connection he brought up and emphasized the point that even if MFN were extended, GOH would regard trade with US as problematic, even risky basis on which to found long range plans. He cited current Congressional proposals to withdraw MFN status from Poland as proof of unreliability of US East-West trade policy Tims 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn for Hillenbrand and to Belgrade for Leddy. Martin J. Hillenbrand was appointed Ambassador to Hungary on September 12 and presented his credentials on October 30. 2 Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 A memorandum of their conversation was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to airgram A–127 from Budapest, October 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 HUNG–US) 112. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State 112. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State 1 Budapest, November 20, 1967, 1600Z. 626. 1. During 45 minute discussion this morning with FonMin Peter, I went over the areas in which progress might be made in moving towards solution of at least some of our outstanding problems with the Hungarian Government. Starting from the general philosophy outlined in the President's speech of Oct 7 1966, 2 I expressed the conviction that, despite admitted differences, we could most usefully come to grips with the issues between us on a pragmatic case by case basis, and noted that in our conversation on Nov 17 Prime Minister Fock 3 had concurred in this general approach. 2. Under consular matters, stated that we would be prepared to negotiate a consular convention with the Hungarian Government. This would serve a mutually useful purpose, regularize the handling of cases involving our respective nationals, and make a contribution to tourism. In this context, cited Csala case, 4 noting that it was a current irritant in our relations and expressing the hope that the Hungarian Government would move toward its early resolution. 3. Under cultural contacts, observed that, as Lisle had already told Nagy, we were prepared rescind our Sept 1 1955 restrictions if the Hungarian Govt took reciprocal action. We hoped that greater scope could be given us in field of media exchanges, e.g. circulation of cultural bulletin and publications such as “Amerika“, now distributed in USSR and Poland, and mutual exchange of radio and television programs. Added that regularization of arrangements for treatment of performing artists would also be useful, as would increased scope for US participation in English-language instruction programs. Expressed concern that, precisely at this juncture the Hungarian authorities had seen fit to cancel IUCTG exchange program, and urged that Hungarian Govt consider whether it would not wish restore this program. 4. In economic area, noted that while Congress had not granted the President requested authority to grant most-favored-nation treatment to countries as Hungary, we had taken earlier action to liberalize export license controls, would as usual participate in next year's International Trade Fair in Budapest, were discussing with appropriate Hungarian authorities American sanitary requirements affecting Hungarian meat exports to US, and were prepared exchange patent gazettes. Also noted that, while the situation was difficult, we hoped take up again at a suitable time question of financial claims. 5. Finally, in area of diplomatic problems, raised question of Embassy personnel ceilings and travel restrictions along lines indicated in Deptels 56033 and 71229. 5 6. In concluding presentation, observed that, in many of these areas, Hungarian practice was more stringent than that of other socialist countries. We hope begin discussion of details with Hungarian authorities soon, and assumed that FonMin would appropriately instruct Deputy FonMin Szilagyi and Ambassador Hazi (head of Dept V) who would presumably have to bear main burden, in this sense. 7. In response, Foreign Minister said that he too could accept the general approach which had been outlined, that is, to negotiate on a pragmatic case by case basis in an effort to achieve specific improvements. Hungarian Govt would be prepared to discuss anything US wished to raise. He had to point out, however, that Hungarian authorities could not overlook the general international situation. They could not come to any agreements with the US of a political nature which would be misinterpreted by Hungarian people and their allies as representing tacit acceptance of US actions which government did not approve. Hungary must maintain posture of sincerity and consistency in this respect. When I asked him how he defined political agreements, since the four areas which I had described were essentially non-political, Peter indicated that particularly cultural field tended have political overtones. Moreover, too lenient treatment in Csala case would be misunderstood by Hungarian people under present circumstances. Should specific actions occur which would contribute towards an improvement of relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be able exercise more influence in the case. 8. In his view, Peter continued, the economic field seemed particularly suitable for progress at this point. Anything which would contribute to increased trade between Hungary and the US would be all to the good, and would lead to a real betterment of relations. He personally saw no reason why we should not make another effort to move towards a claims settlement, although the Hungarian negotiators, after the abortive round last spring, had reported to him that negotiations had reached a dead end. In any event, Hungarian Govt would be pleased to resume negotiations on claims at any time the US wishes. 9. Before I left, Peter requested that my presentation be summarized in aide-mémoire to be furnished to him as soon as feasible. I agreed and hope to have delivered to him start of business tomorrow morning. Text will be forwarded by airgram. 6 10. Comment: In possible effort to appear more forthcoming than realities may actually permit, Peter may have been dispensing a certain amount of soft soap. Both he and Fock have emphasized their complete acceptance of pragmatic case by case approach towards resolution of outstanding problems between Hungary and US, despite the international situation to which they make reference in stock phrases. Neither Fock nor Peter brought up subject of Viet-Nam by name, a degree of forebearance which I had not expected but significance of which should not be overemphasized in evaluating actual prospects. 11. As soon as Szilagyi and Hazi return from their trip to Western Europe, Embassy will approach them with view to opening detailed discussions. We must expect, however, that any progress in achieving even minimal US objectives will follow a very measured pace. Hungarian authorities are unlikely overlook fact that, upon analysis, balance of practical advantage in nearly all of areas indicated other than those economic ones in which progress is least likely, falls on side of US. We may, however, expect a small initial gesture or two. Hillenbrand 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Munich, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 2 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, pp. 1125–1130. 3 Hillenbrand reported on this meeting in telegram 622 from Budapest, November 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US) 4 Csala, an American citizen of Hungarian birth, was arrested, convicted of espionage in March 1966, and sentenced to 6 years in prison. He was released in October 1968. 5 Telegram 56033, October 16, and telegram 71229, November 17. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US) 6 A copy of the aide-mémoire was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to airgram A–189 from Budapest, November 26. (Ibid.) 113. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State 113. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State 1 Budapest, November 30, 1967, 1626Z. 663. Subject: Conversation with Party First Secretary Janos Kadar. 1. My introductory call today on Party First Secretary Janos Kadar lasted one hour and ten minutes. He obviously wanted to go beyond the usual exchange of pleasantries for such an occasion, and after a few minutes launched into a long, somewhat discursive but obviously prepared statement of how he saw the state of relations between US and Hungary. There was no false modesty, and he spoke with the assurance of someone who is not only party boss but the real power in this country. 2. Kadar began by welcoming fact that US had sent its first Ambassador to Hungary. This was useful step, although fact that it had taken nearly a year to accomplish after initial announcement was in itself indicative of our current difficulties. When last December US had proposed a date for announcement of mutual raising of diplomatic establishments to Embassy rank, this date by accident happened to coincide with an important party congress in Budapest. When it was suggested that it might be inopportune to make such an announcement at that time, he had brushed this objection aside, since he sincerely believed the value of establishing full relations with the US and saw no reason to qualify such a step, or to postpone its public announcement, merely because of a party meeting. The great majority of the Hungarian people undoubtedly support better relations with the US, and this was a fact that any Hungarian leader had to take into account. 3. He had been fully informed of my previous discussions with Hungarian officials including that yesterday with Parliament President Kallai (reported A–199 Nov 30, 1967), 2 Kadar continued, and had taken note of the statements made. The task of a new Ambassador in Budapest would in some respects be pleasant but in other respects difficult. It would be pleasant because the Hungarian authorities were prepared to deal sympathetically with outstanding problems between the two countries in an effort to dispose of those which would be solved. They would be polite and helpful in every legitimate way. The Ambassador's role would, however, be difficult because of the admitted differences between Hungary and the US on major issues. He recalled that a school friend of his who had planned to become a diplomat had once lent him a manual for students of diplomacy. From this he had learned that a primary function of diplomacy was to strive to achieve peaceful solutions of outstanding problems. In this sense, the US would find that the Hungarian Government practiced diplomacy in its best form. He wanted us to know that the Hungarian authorities were really sincere in their espousal of peaceful coexistence as the only rational approach today between countries whose systems were based on differing theories of society. It might not have been possible to say this 20 years ago, when the force of ideologies was much more intense, but the basic problem today was to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war between the two superpowers. 4. He did not want to belabor the past, Kadar observed, but he did want to bring to my attention two problems between Hungary and the US which he felt it useful to examine for their illustrative value. The first of these was the Mindszenty case (his remarks on this subject are being reported in a separate Limdis telegram to Dept). 3 The second was the handling of the Hungarian question in the UN. He referred to a chance meeting which he had had in 1963 with Governor Harriman (then Under Secretary of State) at the Moscow Sports Stadium. He had compared the situation at that time as similar to two boxers who had been slugging at each other for seven rounds (from 1956 to 1963). Neither could hope to knock the other out, neither was prepared to capitulate, and neither could ultimately hope to gain very much from the contest. Hungary was not prepared to come on its knees to the US, and he knew the US was not prepared to assume this posture before Hungary. As I knew, he went on, the UN problem had now been solved in an acceptable way. If we approached current problems in the same spirit which had finally led to a solution of the Hungarian question in the UN, based upon realistic acceptance of the facts of life, then there was good possibility of advancing towards agreement in other areas. 5. The system which existed in Hungary today is a reality, Kadar stressed with some emphasis, and it is a fact that it will remain. Compared to the feudal conditions which had existed in the country until the end of World War II, the present system was certainly far superior for the masses of the Hungarian people, who had previously lived in abject poverty. He was willing to concede that many in the US would undoubtedly still like to change the system in Hungary, and he would be the first to admit that he would like to make some changes in the American system. However, as a realist, he recognized that this was out of the question. Mutual recognition of each other's systems as facts of life was basic premise of peaceful coexistence. Both sides would, of course, indulge in propaganda against each other, but firm and realistic acceptance of this truth would not let the possibilities of improving our relations be submerged by such propaganda. 6. Kadar said that he did not want to spoil the cordiality of this initial talk by any pointed references to Viet-Nam, but he did want to observe that, while the US might win further victories there, it could not in the final result be victorious. 7. He concluded his remarks (which by surreptitiously glancing at my watch I timed as lasting 55 minutes) by reiterating his pleasure at the establishment of relations at the Ambassadorial level between Hungary and the US, his hope that I would have a pleasant stay in Budapest, and that both sides would mutually make a genuine contribution towards better relations between our countries. 8. I responded by noting that he had indicated he had received a full report of my previous discussions with Hungarian officials, and I would therefore not repeat what he already knew. As I had pointed out in my previous talks, the basic framework of current American policy towards countries such as Hungary was set forth in the President's speech of Oct. 7, 1966, and I hoped that, in the spirit of the speech and of his own remarks about the desirability of coming to grips with the problems between us we could move towards a solution of at least some of them. I hoped soon to begin talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Szilagyi, after his return to Budapest early in December, on the various matters which I had raised with Foreign Minister Peter and which had been incorporated in an aide-mémoire sent to the Foreign Minister. 4 I finally observed that our objective in Viet-Nam was not to be victorious in the sense of desiring conquest of the country, but to achieve the limited objectives which had been set forth in numerous statements by American leaders. 9. Comment: Although Kadar's remarks fell pretty much in the same pattern as those of my previous conversations with Hungarian leaders, I report them here at some length because they represent, I believe, the first contact in recent years between an American official and the undisputed leader of this country. Kadar was in an obviously relaxed, good humored, sometimes semi-ironic mood. He was well-briefed and had apparently carefully thought out the line of argument he wished to use. He seemed to enjoy playing the role of a confident leader big enough to forget the past, and hopeful for betterment of Hungarian-American relations though very mindful of present difficulties. Hillenbrand 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., POL 15–1 HUNG) 3 Telegram 665 from Budapest, December 1. (Ibid., SOC 12–1 HUNG) 4 See footnote 6, Document 112 . 114. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State 114. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State 1 Budapest, August 27, 1968, 1210Z. 1814. Subject: Hungary after the Czech events. 1. In seeking to assess the implications for Hungary of its participation in military occupation of Czechoslovakia, one is struck by the general popular mood of dismay at the turn of events, by the seeming discomfort of most officials, and by the cliche-laden sterility of arguments by which the press and other media are attempting to justify action taken. Whatever may have been the actual role in influencing events of the meeting between Kadar and Dubcek on Aug. 18 (Budapest 1796), 2 no one is claiming that Hungarian leaders tried to the end to prevent military intervention. The essentially satellite character of Hungarian policy in the crunch is all too painfully clear. 2. There are rumors circulating in Budapest that Kadar's personal position is in danger given his early endorsement of reformist developments in Czechoslovakia, his widely-publicized mediatory role, and his apparently only last-minute conversion to need for forceful measures. He has certainly been left in an exposed position and his prestige is bound to suffer seriously. We doubt, however, that his actual position as Party First Secretary is in any significant danger at this time from putatively ascendant hard-liners, and there is no indication that he is losing control of Hungarian Party apparatus. 3. We have had reports from good sources that some of the Hungarian troops which were first sent in to Czechoslovakia have had to be replaced by new units. Apparently the troops, who were stationed in Hungarian-speaking area of Slovakia, became infected with views of local population. It can be assumed that the returning troops will bring back their own version of the occupation and that this will filter out to the population at large, which is in any case highly skeptical of regime's explanation of events. This incident is symptomatic of domestic problem facing the regime as a result of Czech events which is likely to persist and continue to give trouble. 4. Clearly, so far as Kadar's position is concerned, as well as internal developments in Hungary generally and the whole complex of Hungarian relations with both Communist and Western countries, much will depend on the actual outcome of Czech situation and any repercussions this may have on Soviet leadership situation and Soviet policy. Until smoke has dissipated it will be difficult to see clear directions in these key areas. 5. There is little doubt, however, that Czech developments will seriously impede efforts which Hungarians have made to improve relations with West generally, at least in the short run. This may come about not so much as result of Hungarian unwillingness to pursue such a course as lack of Western receptivity. The Hungarians may indeed try to press their efforts to improve bilateral relations Western countries, and even be prepared to make concessions to this end, as if to compensate for their role in the occupation of Czechoslovakia. 6. Among all the current rumors and reports, we are struck by one hard fact, namely the intensity and sharpness of Hungarian press criticism of Romania and specifically of Ceausescu's role. Weekend Hungarian press carried several extremely harsh criticisms of Romanians, in effect equating their role to that of NATO countries. We note that press shifted its ground August 27, muting attacks on Romania and turning to criticism of Yugoslavia. It would seem that there will be a palpable deterioration in Hungarian relations with Romania and Yugoslavia. In case of Romania especially, such a climate is likely to revive latent nationalist differences centered on always sensitive Transylvania problem. If only in this sense, Czech events mark a new stage in complex relationships in Balkan politics. 7. Postscript. Current Budapest joke: Question: What are the five armies doing in Czechoslovakia? Answer: They're trying to find the guy who invited them. Hillenbrand 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 HUNG. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Vienna, USNATO, Berlin, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 2 Not found. 115. Memorandum of Conversation 115. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 17, 1968, 11 a.m. SUBJECT Introductory Call of Hungarian Ambassador Nagy on Assistant Secretary Leddy PARTICIPANTS Janos Nagy, Hungarian Ambassador John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Leslie C. Tihany, EUR/EE, Hungarian Affairs Ambassador Nagy's introductory call on Mr. Leddy lasted 12 minutes. In order to avoid a repetition of the tactic used by the Ambassador during his call on Mr. Lisle (see Lisle-Nagy memcon dated October 15, 1968), 2 which was to blur the issue by introducing Viet-Nam in response to our opening expression of disapproval regarding Warsaw Pact action in Czechoslovakia, Mr. Leddy took the initiative by first mentioning Viet-Nam and then proceeding to Czechoslovakia. He told the Ambassador that, because of his wearisome conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Szilagyi in Budapest a year ago, 3 he was familiar and also in disagreement with the Hungarian Government's views on Viet-Nam. Next focussing on the events of last August, Mr. Leddy tersely explained that our efforts toward détente with Bloc countries, including Hungary, which have borne some fruit in the case of the Soviet Union, would now have to proceed more slowly and with more difficulty owing to Czechoslovakia. The Ambassador said he realized that his arrival in Washington occurred in a situation marked by difficulties but that his efforts would be directed toward contributing to an improvement rather than to a deterioration of the situation. Mr. Leddy expressed approval of this intent and mentioned that among the various bilateral problems awaiting solution that of the mission personnel ceilings, in Washington and Budapest, could probably be handled most rapidly. We were interested for security reasons, he added, in assigning five Marines to our Embassy at Budapest. Ambassador Nagy agreed that the matter of personnel ceilings posed a problem easy to handle. He continued to say that his Government did not tie in this problem with any other outstanding issue. “My need for increased staffing,” he added, “is not in Washington but beyond the capital city.” This oblique reference to the Hungarian desire to open consulates in New York and Cleveland (see Lisle-Nagy memcon dated October 15, 1968) 4 drew the comment from Mr. Leddy that “this was not our case.” On the other hand, Mr. Leddy continued, we were concerned about two protection cases in Hungary, those of Andrew Csala and Henrietta Blueye. Release of these imprisoned Americans would mark progress toward improved relations, he said. The Ambassador promptly replied that Mr. Csala would be released the following day (October 18) and that our Embassy at Budapest was so informed today. He was not familiar with the Blueye case but felt hopeful as to its outcome as well. Mr. Leddy said that Csala's imminent release was good news, indeed, and expressed his appreciation. When the Ambassador next took up the subject of US-Hungarian trade, Mr. Leddy agreed that our inability to grant MFN should not prevent some expansion of trade through promotional activities. He mentioned, as an example, the Bulgarian Embassy's current drive to popularize Bulgarian wines in this country. The Ambassador appeared interested. Mr. Leddy terminated the conversation by wishing the Ambassador well in his new assignment. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 HUNG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Tihany. The conversation was held in Leddy's office. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., POL 17 HUNG–US) 3 See Document 111 . 4 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 HUNG–US) Poland Poland 116. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 16, 1964. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Kaiser on January 17 and approved in U on January 22. 117. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 9, 1964, 11:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Tims and approved in S on June 16. 118. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, November 19, 1964, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow and Prague. 119. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, November 24, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL–US. Confidential; Priority. 120. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 10, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK. Confidential. Drafted by Glenn and approved in S on January 8, 1965. The source text is labeled “Part 1 of 2;“ a second memoranda of conversation dealing with Southeast Asia is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2448. The meeting was held at USUN. 121. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, January 12, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL–US. Confidential; Limdis. 122. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, June 20, 1966, 1335Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, and USUN. 123. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 23, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Niles and approved in S on October 4. The meeting was held at USUN. 124. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, Polish Desk Files: Lot 71 D 158, Pol 1966. Secret. 125. Telegram From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, in Texas Washington, December 26, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret. The telegram, sent through Rostow, was received at the LBJ Ranch at 12:45 p.m. 126. Memorandum of Conversation Warsaw, February 9, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL–US. Confidential. Drafted by Gronouski. Transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A–528 from Warsaw, March 2. The meeting was held at the Polish Foreign Office. 127. Airgram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, April 6, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL–US. Confidential. Drafted by Kaiser and approved by Jenkins on April 4. 128. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 5, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL–US. Confidential. Drafted by Buell and approved in G on October 16. 129. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, October 31, 1967, 0935Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL–US. Confidential. Repeated to Prague. 130. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 13 and 14, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stoessel on December 16. 131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland Washington, January 15, 1968, 2342Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Jaffe, cleared in EUR, and approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, and USNATO. 132. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 17, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Rec'd 5/18/68, 11:20 a.m.” 133. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 28, 1968, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Martin. 134. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas Washington, July 9, 1968, 1536Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 3. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 11:50 a.m. CDT. 135. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, September 4, 1968. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Confidential. Drafted by Lisle. A notation on the source text reads: “U suggests you advise Ives at lunch we are working on this proposal. It needs refinement.” 136. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, September 17, 1968, 1505Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Munich, USNATO, and Poznan. 137. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 17, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 3. Confidential. Drafted by Nathaniel Davis. 138. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, December 11, 1968, 1579Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL–US. Secret. 116. Memorandum of Conversation 116. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 16, 1964. SUBJECT US-Polish Economic Relations PARTICIPANTS U.S. U—Mr. Ball U—Mr. Springsteen EE—Mr. Kaiser Polish Franciszek Modrzewski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Edward Drozniak, Ambassador Zbigniew Bidzinski, Economic Counselor Modrzewski declared that this was an important opportunity to speak about bilateral and multilateral problems. He was pleased that the PL-480 2 negotiations were beginning to move as the conclusion of a PL-480 agreement was important for Poland in its effort to plan its imports of grain and other commodities from the US. Last year the grain market had become somewhat crowded because of Soviet wheat purchases on world markets. Poland, he said, wants to increase its imports from the US as well as its exports. He was anxious to know the views of the US with respect to the future development of its trade with Poland. Mr. Ball commented that the US is interested in maintaining a close relationship with Poland. The US is also interested in having Poland progress from PL-480 transactions to commercial purchases of agricultural commodities in the US. Modrzewski then expressed the deep appreciation of his Government for the favorable action on MFN. 3 Poland desires short term and other credits from the US for the purchase of agricultural and other products. Although competition for the sale of industrial products in Western Europe was severe, Poland could compete because of the good progress it had made in this area. Poland wishes to expand its exports to the US. Last year Polish exports to the US were probably slightly higher than the year before despite the uncertainty about MFN and the boycott campaign in the US which he now understands has died down. Mr. Ball said the US seeks to discourage such actions as the boycott but it cannot always control them. Modrzewski explained that Poland wants to expand its exports to the US in order to be able to meet its debt which will represent an increasingly heavy burden. Poland enjoys and wants to keep its good reputation for meeting its debts. Mr. Ball then mentioned as a limiting factor Poland's unsettled bond debt to Americans. Modrzewski said Poland is aware of this matter, but Poland is still poor. Poland has to be careful about assuming a new schedule of debt. In response to Mr. Ball's inquiry, Modrzewski said Poland's agricultural production last year was better than the year before. Until the end of October the situation seemed very bad but more recently there were indications that the situation was not so bad as previously supposed. The real difficulty stemmed from 1962 when about 2 million pigs and a large number of cattle had been lost. It was now necessary to regain these losses. This year Poland was buying more than 2–1/2 million tons of grain abroad. Although Poland is supposed to receive 400,000 tons of grain annually from the USSR and had in fact received 800,000 in the last few years, Poland had received nothing this year. This month Poland had purchased for cash 150,000 tons of wheat in the US. For the still developing Polish economy these cash purchases abroad are difficult. Grain imports are structural for Poland. The Polish harvest determines the amount of required imports which might vary anywhere from 2–3 million tons. Poland wants to be a regular buyer in the US. Modrzewski said he understands the interest of the US in having Poland increase its commercial purchases in the US. He wondered, however, whether it would be possible to continue PL-480 transactions. Mr. Ball said he would not want to rule out that possibility. The Poles now have our present PL-480 offer. We realize that the shift to commercial purchases is not achieved overnight and that the shift has to be progressive. We are willing to consider the matter sympathetically. Modrzewski commented that for planning purposes, the delay in proceeding with a new PL-480 agreement was unfortunate. Mr. Ball regretted the delay and said the US is interested in Poland's problem and looked toward the evolution of our relationship. The US is in the meantime interested in developing its trade with Poland. Modrzewski then inquired about the Kennedy Round and declared that Poland is interested in participating. Mr. Ball said he was pleased to hear this. Since the US maintains an MFN relationship with Poland, we are interested in the possibilities of Poland's developing a closer relationship with the GATT. In answer to Modrzewski's question, Mr. Ball said the US approves of Poland's desire to participate in the Kennedy Round. 1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Kaiser on January 17 and approved in U on January 22. 2 For text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see 68 Stat. 454. 3 Section 402 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 (P.L. 88–205), approved on December 16, 1963, authorized the President to restore most-favored-nation status to Poland and Yugoslavia. 117. Memorandum of Conversation 117. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 9, 1964, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT Polish-United States Economic Relations PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary EE—Richard W. Tims Poland Edward Drozniak, Ambassador of Poland Dr. Marian Dobrosielski, Counselor of the Polish Embassy Following a discussion of Poland's role in the Laotian crisis, 2 the Secretary turned to US-Polish bilateral relations and specifically raised the question of the Polish Government's inaction, to date, on its prewar indebtedness to American bondholders. This matter was previously mentioned by Under Secretary Ball in a talk here with Polish Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Modrzewski last January, 3 and the Secretary expressed the hope to Ambassador Drozniak that, now that the Most-Favored-Nation issue had been favorably settled, 4 the Polish Government could make progress on the troublesome question of bondholders' claims and get it out of the way. The Ambassador replied that he indeed would take the matter up upon returning to Warsaw this week. He added that Polish export sales in the US had suffered last year, affecting Poland's ability to pay, and that they wanted to be more sure of this ability before undertaking an obligation to the bondholders. The Secretary asked whether Polish trade here had not recently begun to take an upward trend again and whether tourism had not increased, remarking that the latter seemed one of the best ways for Poland to increase its dollar earnings. The Ambassador replied that they had some hope of increased trade here this year and that the tourist outlook was indeed better than last year, partly because of an improved political situation in the world. He pointed out, however, that Poland was handicapped in offering adequate tourist facilities, being a war-damaged country with many other pressing economic priorities. The Secretary said he would make a purely personal comment on this. American tourists like comfortable lodging while abroad, and in ministering to this taste our hotel chains have constituted a stimulus to tourism around the world. As an example, the Hilton chain has contributed managerial services under arrangements with local hotels in various countries. Would such arrangements be incompatible with the socialist system? Would they not rather be a very practical kind of marriage between capitalism and socialism, noninjurious to either side? The Ambassador smilingly replied that the proposed Hilton hotel in Budapest seemed to offer the answer, and that he would seek further comments on this subject while in Warsaw. He added that his Government had even considered building a Coca Cola plant. Ambassador Drozniak went on to comment that US-Polish bilateral economic relations were confronted by no major difficulties at present but that there were certain remaining obstacles, including the Battle Act and the Johnson Act. 5 He inquired whether there was any prospect of the latter being amended. The Secretary replied that this was in the realm of speculation and would depend on the coming elections as well as other factors; there was no possibility of such legislation being amended in the present session of Congress, and he could not answer for the next session. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was studying these and related questions of our foreign trade, and there was interest also on the part of private groups. He felt he could express mild optimism. In conclusion Ambassador Drozniak mentioned his government's hope of negotiating another PL-480 agreement with the US next fall, and said he had been gratified in discussing this with Assistant Secretary Tyler to find that the latter saw no obstacle to US consideration of a Polish proposal along this line early in the fall, since that would be the most propitious time from the viewpoint of Poland's planning requirements. The Secretary replied that he knew of no reason why Poland could not raise the matter with us at that time. 1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Tims and approved in S on June 16. 2 The memorandum of this portion of the conversation, transmitted in Unsec 30 to Warsaw, June 9, is ibid., Central Files, POL POL–US. 3 See Document 116 . 4 On March 26, President Johnson directed Secretary Rusk to report to Congress that Poland's MFN status would be continued under the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. For text of the President's memorandum and statement, see Department of State Bulletin , April 20, 1964, pp. 626–628. 5 For text of the Battle Act, the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, P.L. 218, see 65 Stat. 644. The Johnson Debt Default Act, signed April 13, 1934, prohibited financial transactions with any foreign government in default of its obligations to the United States. (48 Stat. 574) It was amended on July 31, 1945, to exempt foreign governments that were members of both the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development from some of its provisions. (59 Stat. 516) 118. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 118. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, November 19, 1964, noon. 1136. Following information results from hour long conversation evening November 18 between Embassy officer and candidate member PZPR CC Mieczyslaw Rakowski: 1. Gomulka for more than year had objected Khrushchev handling Moscow-Peking differences. Gomulka spoke to Khrushchev several times and attempted advise him but Khrushchev failed to listen. Gomulka also held views different from Khrushchev regarding relations with West Germany but this relatively minor matter. Within PZPR there were those who predicted Khrushchev's removal as early as February of this year. Removal, according to Rakowski, stimulated almost completely by domestic problems and differences of opinion within CSPU regarding how handle them. 2 2. If one compares Gomulka and Novotny, then Rakowski believes Gomulka can be said have supported Khrushchev's removal and Novotny did not. 3. Gomulka's attitude regarding Moscow-Peking differences have placed him in strong position with ChiComs. This not because Gomulka pro-ChiCom in dispute but because he long on record trying change Khrushchev's tactics in dealing with ChiComs. 4. Rakowski claimed he firm supporter of Gomulka but said recognized Gomulka has narrow outlook some topics. Conceded even within PZPR these increased critical opinions regarding Gomulka. Said his (Rakowski's) newspaper, Polityka, has more conservative editorial policy now than two years ago. Claimed this caused by political realities brought on by changes within PZPR since 1959. 5. Regarding current trial of “distributors of pro-Chinese pamphlet” (Embtel 1123), 3 Rakowski said Kazimiesz Mijal influential figure behind pamphlet. Said Mijal would probably never be brought trial because political ramifications trial would have within PZPR. 6. Rakowski refused comment on what Presidium changes in CPSU might indicate. Said however that strength of “conservatives” and “liberals” within CPSU very near equal. Said if election possible among CPSU members results would not reveal margin anything like President Johnson succeeded gaining over Senator Goldwater. Cabot 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow and Prague. 2 Nikita S. Khrushchev was removed from his post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union on October 15. 3 Telegram 1123 from Warsaw, November 18, reported on closed political trials in Poland. (Ibid., POL 29 POL) 119. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 119. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, November 24, 1964, 5 p.m. 1171. I had long talk with Winiewicz today on general subject of bridge building. Talk was cordial but rather vague. I pointed out that in my previous conversation with him on November 2, I had expressed interest in bridge building (Embtel 997). 2 Now that President Johnson had won overwhelming popular mandate and had a Congress which would presumably be more amenable to his wishes than last one, time seemed to be particularly propitious for a little effort on both sides to improve relations. We briefly discussed Rusk meeting with Rapacki and he indicated they would suggest about December 9 in New York for it. 3 Winiewicz referred to decisions of Polish authorities to permit Atoms for Peace and Kennedy exhibits. He thought this was clear evidence of Polish agreement with our positive position. He said Jaroszewicz had telephoned him immediately after his conversation with me (Embtel 1139) 4 to ask a lot of questions. Jaroszewicz was now having study prepared of possibilities for increased trade with US and nothing further could be said until study completed. We discussed at some length Jaroszewicz's desire for more diversified Polish exports, particularly of machinery. Winiewicz then went into considerable detail about Polish misgivings regarding MLF. He said that Poles had noted with concern ever increasing influence of West Germany in NATO. He said that Rapacki had spoken of this to Rusk on previous occasions and suggested that he would doubtless wish to mention it again. I pointed out that it was precisely because of tensions and unresolved questions that we felt this was appropriate time to build bridges. We could not now say what could be accomplished but we could start. This seemed to strike responsive chord. We discussed PL 480 at some length. He showed positive interest in possibility of another agreement under Title IV but he was worried about terms we would impose. I said I could tell him nothing about them but would suggest an inquiry on their part. Winiewicz spoke with appreciation of McCloskey's statement regarding Polish-American relations. 5 He was rather critical of recent Frankel articles. He said that when he had reported in highest quarters after our previous conversation his assurances to me that Poland also desired better relations, he had been told that he had been quite right in giving me these assurances without even consulting higher authority. I carefully left door open for further discussion. Cabot 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL–US. Confidential; Priority. 2 Telegram 997 from Warsaw, November 3, also reported on Polish reaction to Khrushchev's ouster as Soviet leader. (Ibid., POL 15 USSR) 3 See Document 120 . 4 Telegram 1139 from Warsaw, November 19, reported on Cabot's discussion on the topic of “bridge building” with Vice President Jarosewicz. (Department of State, Central Files, POL POL–US) Regarding President Johnson's policy of “bridge building,” see Document 4 . 5 At a November 18 press conference, Department of State spokesman Robert McCloskey stated that U.S.-Polish relations “continue to be good.” The Embassy reported on Polish reaction to this statement in airgram A–536 from Warsaw, November 25. (Ibid., POL 2–1 POL) 120. Memorandum of Conversation 120. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 10, 1964, 5 p.m. SecDel/MC/42 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, December 1964 SUBJECT Political Situation in Europe PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Mr. Glenn (Interpreter) Poland Foreign Minister Rapacki Minister Goldblat (Interpreter) After an exchange of pleasantries the Secretary asked Mr. Rapacki what the latter considered to be the main political problem of interest to Poland. Mr. Rapacki said that this was, as usual, Germany. However, this time there was a new wrinkle, the MLF. Mr. Rapacki is not familiar with the precise status of the MLF, nor with the new UK proposals. 2 However, he feels that the very idea of the MLF would amount to a disruption of the balance of power in Europe, from both the military and political points of view. Under such circumstances it would become necessary for the countries of the Eastern Bloc to do something to re-establish the balance. This might include steps which otherwise they would not wish to take. Mr. Rapacki is familiar with the various parts of the scheme which are designed to prevent a West German takeover of nuclear weapons. However, he feels that there are no guarantees that such schemes will succeed and he fears that the scheme rapidly will bring about a German finger on the trigger. This is a fear which even the Western nations should share, and in fact, do share. The Germans are past masters at taking advantage of dissensions between their allies, whether such dissensions arise for financial or other reasons. Therefore, the MLF is bound at the very least to exacerbate the relations between the two blocs and deepen the distrust between them—the very opposite of what Poland would wish to see happen. Moreover, Poland opposes all proliferation of nuclear weapons and considers the MLF as a step toward such proliferation. The Secretary stated that he understood the interest of Poland in these questions. He feels, however, that the MLF should give the fullest guarantees against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. U.S. policy has always sought a permanent settlement of the problems of Central Europe and ultimately, disarmament in Europe and elsewhere. We do not see how a permanent solution could be found in Europe unless the nations of that continent, and in particular the two groups of the German population, are allowed to determine fully and freely their own future. Such an expression may or may not lead to an agreement to the unification of Germany, but it must constitute an expression of the free will of the people of Germany which will provide a basis for permanent solutions, possibly including disarmament. With regard to nuclear weapons within NATO and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States has never agreed to do anything which would favor such proliferation; it even opposed the French wishes in that area. On the other hand, we do not know what has happened in the Warsaw Pact. Nations of the Warsaw Pact have openly exhibited in parades weapons capable of carrying nuclear warheads, one which would be exceedingly inefficient for the delivery of conventional warheads. Another point is that there are two ways for a nation to become involved in a nuclear situation. One of these is to possess nuclear weapons. The other one is to be a potential target of nuclear weapons, and there are many of the Western nations which are well within reach of nuclear weapons poised in Europe. It is because of such a situation that the MLF idea has been put forward. Mr. Rapacki asked the Secretary why the latter mentioned only Western nations. The Secretary said that a way must be found to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. believes the MLF provides one such way. The question is not only one of direct proliferation but also of testing. Moreover, the question of proliferation is not one which concerns only Germany, it is one which concerns many nations outside of NATO, such as Sweden, Switzerland and countries of Europe. It is because of the danger of this type of proliferation that the U.S. has been thinking of new types of measures. It should be remembered that the U.S. has proven its opposition to proliferation, even at the expense of irking some of its Allies. We do not know, however, what the Soviet Union has done in this respect. Some of the Soviet leaders had announced that they had given nuclear fuel to China; this may have contributed to the recent Chinese explosion. 3 Mr. Rapacki said that in regard to the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons, Poland could certainly not be accused of any misdeeds since it neither had nor wanted such weapons. He knew little about rockets except that there are nuclear-tipped rockets stationed in West Germany. Poland has made a proposal for eliminating such weapons from Europe and has attempted to make it more acceptable by broadening the zone from which such weapons would be eliminated. 4 Mr. Rapacki was of the opinion that the MLF will lead to proliferation even if this is not the purpose of those who came up with the idea. He reiterated his view that there are guarantees against German control and his opinion of West German ability in playing their partners one against the other. Even if no independent nuclear strength for Germany is now planned the result will be to bring Germany closer to it and under such circumstances it is possible that, irrespective of their wishes, the Warsaw Pact nations would also become involved in such a proliferation. The Polish suggestion would be that steps toward relaxation of tensions might better be obtained through an immediate freeze of nuclear (and possibly other) weapons at the present levels, than by their gradual elimination from a certain zone. A plan of this sort, if accepted, could then be joined by other nations. The extent of the zone of armaments freeze could also be something open to negotiation, though it seems quite difficult to see how the Soviet Union could be included in it. In any case Mr. Rapacki does not feel entitled to speak in the name of the Great Powers. In regard to German unification, Mr. Rapacki feels that such steps as the MLF postponed rather than improved the prospects of it. The only realistic way to envisage such a unification is through an historical process which would be based on step-by-step agreement on such measures as disarmament and which little-by-little would create realistic conditions under which unity could be obtained. Unfortunately, drawing West Germany deeper into military responsibilities encourages the West German Government to take attitudes which cause concern among its neighbors and thus bring the situation into a vicious circle. The Secretary wondered if there might perhaps be possibilities of bringing in all of these measures together; bringing about the possibilities for reunification at the same time as discussion of armaments freeze and similar measures. Mr. Rapacki admitted that these problems are connected. However, the beginning should be made with various disarmament steps and not with the question of reunification. First there must be a détente in which the two German nations would participate. The other questions would then find their solutions. The Secretary said that it is rather the failure to solve the fundamental problem of Central Europe which is the cause of the armaments tension and the disruption of equilibrium. This is something we are not responsible for. It would be difficult to wait for historical processes to take care of the armaments race and the pressing dangers of the moment. Mr. Rapacki agreed with the necessity of doing something rapidly in order to decrease both the danger to peace and the armaments race. Clearly the military and the political problems are connected. The present situation does not help toward the solution, but on the contrary deepens the opposition between the two blocs. The main irritants are certain attitudes on the part of the West German Government and in general on the part of the Western allies. Only France recognizes the present Polish-German border as being final. Also West Germany acquires more and more power within NATO. Mr. Rapacki does not consider West Germany as being a monolith of revenge-seekers. He realizes that there are various shadings of opinion in Germany and that many German groups seek peace. Unfortunately the present policies do not encourage such groups but on the contrary those intent on revenge. Steps toward a solution of problems should begin with a freeze, followed perhaps by disarmament measures. If this path is followed, then a situation might follow which will bring together the two Germanies. Otherwise the separation between them is bound to deepen. To speak quite frankly, Poland does not desire a common border with West Germany. Even if the majority of the East German people were to express themselves for unification it would find such a solution not acceptable. Free elections would not be acceptable because of such a possibility. East Germany for the moment must be maintained because it is working very hard to win its people away from the militaristic and nationalistic traditions of Germany. Unfortunately West Germany pursues policies which keep alive those traditions. The Secretary thanked Mr. Rapacki for his expression of his views. He felt on the contrary that if the German problem is resolved, and thus if security for Poland is established under the fullest guarantee by the United States and by others, the result would be an improvement in economic and social relations which is desired by all. Such a solution would give Poland more security than she has known for two or three centuries. Mr. Rapacki said that German unity might perhaps be brought about by an historical process but no guarantee could be strong enough for such unity to take place now. Poland after all had the strongest of guaranties in 1939 and then lost six million people. The Secretary mentioned that the United States had participated in two world wars in which it did not find itself on the same side as Germany. Nevertheless he recognized that Poland had a very special experience in this field. He asked Mr. Rapacki how the relations between Poland and West Germany were developing and whether they were improving. Mr. Rapacki said the economic relations were increasing and some cultural relations existed. Further development depends on the German Government. In all frankness, however, in the present situation great political improvements are unlikely. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK. Confidential. Drafted by Glenn and approved in S on January 8, 1965. The source text is labeled “Part 1 of 2;“ a second memoranda of conversation dealing with Southeast Asia is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2448. The meeting was held at USUN. 2 Reference is to a December 16 statement to Parliament by Prime Minister Wilson offering an Atlantic Nuclear Force as an alternative to the MLF. 3 In October, China carried out nuclear tests in Sinkiang Province. For text of President Johnson's statement announcing the Chinese tests, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 , Book II, pp. 1377–1380. 4 Reference is to the Rapacki Plan, first proposed by Rapacki in an October 2, 1957, address before the U.N. General Assembly. For text, see U.N. doc. A/PV 697. On March 28, 1962, he submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva another revised plan for a nuclear-free zone in Europe; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 201–205. 121. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 121. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, January 12, 1965, 10 a.m. 1410. I have been somewhat disappointed by lack of any specific implementation of President's wishes to build bridges in Poland. Consular negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily if somewhat slowly but hardest points remain to be decided. We must bear in mind that there is strong evidence that during past year Poles and Russians have not seen eye to eye in number of situations: 1. Russia wanted to withdraw from co-chairmanship in Southeast Asia. Poles claim they have so far successfully dissuaded them. 2. Poles were very disturbed at Khrushchev's idea of visiting West Germany. 3. Evidence suggests that Russians were unenthusiastic about Gomulka plan. 2 4. Poles were undoubtedly disturbed at way Khrushchev was ousted. 5. Poles have openly shown their differences with Russians over way to treat Communist China. I do not think these differences are of fundamental significance. Poles in own protection must remain loyal allies of Russia. Nevertheless, they do suggest that Poles might desire second string to their bow and might be willing to find it in West. It would seem to me the part of wisdom to encourage them to do this. This view is reinforced by fact that until unfortunate Carey incident (Embtel 1405), 3 Poles recently have been rather forthcoming with us. I refer to their acceptance of the Atoms and Kennedy exhibits, the quick agreements on IMG, and the generally friendly tenor of the consular negotiations. I recognize that it is not easy to come up with ways of conciliating Poles without running into more important adverse effects. Nevertheless, I do believe that we might urgently examine possibility of taking one or more of following steps: 1. To restore legal possibility for Poland to make Title I PL 480 purchases or alternatively to hint more strongly that we would be prepared to enter into a favorable Title IV contract with them. 2. To offer to open one or more US ports to Polish shipping in connection with negotiation of satisfactory consular convention (Embtel 1245). 4 3. To abolish in US travel restrictions on Polish civilian officials. Any one of these three steps would, I believe, have favorable effect locally. I must point out that having talked at some length about bridge building some time ago, we shall lose our momentum if we do not now take steps quickly to implement it. I also note that in the Secretary's second talk with Rapacki no mention was made of bridge building. We have no record of the first. 5 It seems to me important to get this project moving again. Cabot 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL–US. Confidential; Limdis. 2 Reference is to Gomulka's call for a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Rapacki formally presented the details of the proposal at a March 5, 1964, press conference. 3 Telegram 1405 from Warsaw, November 1, reported that Poland had declared a U.S. military attaché persona non grata. (Department of State, Central Files, PER WARSAW) 4 Telegram 1245 from Warsaw, December 11, reported that talks on a consular convention were moving at a good pace. (Ibid., CON 4 POL–US) 5 The second talk is recorded in Document 120 ; regarding the first talk, dealing with Vietnam, see footnote 1 thereto. 122. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 122. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, June 20, 1966, 1335Z. 2 2230. Please pass White House, Defense. Deptel 1930; Embtel 2226. 3 1. I am convinced that our reaction to expulsion of Engbretson and Ochs, 4 and Polish proposal to limit number of military attachés and enlisted men, must not be permitted to spill over into and jeopardize our economic and cultural programs and objectives. 2. Our negotiating position difficult because (A) We apparently have greater interest in maintaining military attaché and enlisted staff in Poland than Poles have in keeping them in U.S. (B) Those officials who are currently prevailing in Polish handling of attaché incident appear to be hard-liners bent on deteriorating U.S.-Polish relations. In contrast to our position and that of many responsible Polish officials, they would be pleased to see attaché matter adversely affect U.S.-Polish economic and cultural relations. (C) Our principal weapons of retaliation are in economic field. We could hurt Poles by ending MFN treatment, limiting size of their commercial staff in U.S., refusing them CCC credits, etc. However, use of such weapons would be self-defeating; these would be negative acts with adverse effects on our own foreign policy objectives. 3. Use of such economic weapons would be detrimental to our interests because: (A) Not only here, but elsewhere in Eastern Europe, long-range trend is running in our favor, primarily because of economic pressures: for trade, for internal economic reorganization and liberalization, and for improved standard of living. Another factor is growing influence of economic pragmatists, many of whom are in high-level policymaking posts, who understand glaring deficiencies in prevailing economic system. Our long-range interests are served by expanding rather than reducing our economic cooperation and involvement, by supporting these trends toward economic liberalization and people in leadership who are sympathetic to and give direction to these trends. (B) Development of our economic relations with Poland has been prime example to other EE countries. Our retaliating in economic area would be used to depict U.S. as unreliable partner and would adversely affect our efforts for improved economic and cultural relations in other EE countries. They are well aware of sudden unexpected U.S. actions in past which unsettled U.S.-Polish economic relations, i.e. in 1964, withdrawal Poland's eligibility for Title I PL-480 purchases and, in 1962, Congressional action to remove Poland's MFN status. Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia would eye with increased suspicion a USG that talks “bridge building” but acts in the opposite fashion. They would be much more inclined to view such action as a capricious shift in U.S. policy rather than outgrowth of military attaché incident. (C) It would seriously undercut our position of leadership and influence with our NATO Allies, most of whom are now committed to a resolution of the Central European impasse, including expansion of economic relations with the EE countries. The French could quite persuasively point to this as evidence that the U.S. fails to understand needs and aspirations of nations of Europe, East and West. They could logically argue that at very time when U.S. and many of its NATO Allies are talking of NATO as an instrument of East-West détente, the U.S. in its bilateral relations with its major EE trading partner is moving in opposite direction. (D) Such action would inevitably result in Polish retaliation. Our USIS staff and projects would be most likely targets. Cultural, student, and other exchanges, which have been so effective in increasing presence and influence of U.S. in Poland, would be curtailed. We might also look for cancellation of our foreign claims settlement agreement, particularly if MFN were terminated. 4. As a corollary to rejecting use of negative economic weapons, we should develop instruments for positive negotiation. We should continually seek ways to mesh more closely U.S. and Polish economies with objective of strengthening hand of moderates in government by making it increasingly difficult and costly for the hardliners to prevail. Making available Ex-Im Bank credit guarantees, and thus permitting Poland to buy much needed U.S. machinery and equipment on normal credit terms, would increase Poland's dependence on U.S. economy. So would possibility of long-term agricultural credits which we were able to offer before Congress cut Poland out of PL-480 program in 1964. To same end we should offer some positive solution to problem arising out of Poland's 1967–68 dollar repayment hump which is at least partly result of our abruptly ending long-term PL-480 loans to Poland shortly after Poland committed itself in 1964 to $30 million 3-year agricultural commodity loan. In another area, a return to policy of bilateral reciprocity with respect to diplomatic travel restrictions would have positive appeal to Poles and strengthen hand of moderates in government by creating atmosphere of reduced tension and improved relations between our two governments. Also on our agenda, perhaps out of necessity more long-range than foregoing, should be repeal of relevant sections of Battle and Johnson Acts. These laws impede exercise of kind of positive diplomacy President Johnson has enunciated in his “building bridges” pronouncements. Their continued existence seriously damages case of moderate elements in governments of Eastern Europe. 5. Not because of attaché incident, but because they stand in their own right as elements of constructive U.S. policy, I believe we should act now on measures listed below. Their adoption will make it progressively easier for moderates to support better U.S.-Polish relations and resist actions designed to worsen them. Therefore I strongly urge we act now to: (a) Make available Ex-Im Bank credits to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. (b) Authorize EE country Chiefs of Mission to enter bilateral negotiations to eliminate travel restrictions on diplomatic personnel. (c) Do everything possible to insure insertion of Presidential discretion clause into Findlay Amendment to Food for Freedom bill. (d) Offer Poles positive solution to 1967–68 dollar repayment hump, including: use of dollars due on 1964 three-year loan for current U.S.G. expenses; five-year re-scheduling of 1964 loan repayment (which would include replenishment of our travel fund); and English language teaching zloty project. Details will be spelled out in subsequent Embtel. 5 6. Our specific reaction to present attaché incident impasse should reflect thinking expressed in first five paras part one of this telegram. 6 In addition, reaction of DepFonMin Winiewicz and FonMin Rapacki to my earlier attempt to settle our problem, convinces me that we cannot rely upon either direct confrontation or appeals for moderation. Polish military and security officials seem determined, while FonMin, as reflected para 4 Embtel 1747, 7 would be most happy to have continuing irritant vanish by eliminating both military staffs. Therefore, I now recommend that our strategy be to deemphasize issue and to extent possible let time and effect of positive action in other areas induce a more reasonable attitude. 7. Our first reaction should be to wait until the two attaché clerical replacements arrive in Warsaw. Timing of Polish visa authorization and other pertinent arrangements will provide guide to current atmosphere. In interim, we should implement para 5 this telegram to extent possible. 8. I would have Frankel in few days begin “ground rules” talks with Polish military liaison officer and suggest to Polish Embassy that they begin ground rule talks in Washington. 9. If we reach a point in coming weeks where we must formally respond to their Embtel 2181 proposal, 8 I would say, in a firm but conciliatory manner, that we believe traditional U.S.-Polish practice permitting sending state determine diplomatic staff requirements should be preserved. Equality of strength in our various diplomatic and consular staffs has not been past practice. ConGen in Chicago is three times size of our Consulate Poznan. Polish 24-man trade mission is without U.S. equivalent in Poland. We would wish to preserve this tradition, and we make this point simply to point out reasonableness of traditional practice. 10. I would also say that, while we are in no way compromising our prerogative to determine our own diplomatic staffs, it might be helpful for them to know that our own plans for the next year call for replacement of only two of the three attaches PNGd, drawing on Dept. suggestion para 2 Deptel 1794. 9 Also, while we cannot say what results will be, our evaluation of enlisted men needs during time our attaché officer strength is down to three, may result in not replacing one or perhaps two of enlisted men scheduled to leave early in 1967. (FYI—If this becomes necessary we would compensate by assignment additional administrative employee to Embassy Admin section and utilizing qualified working wife. End FYI) 11. I strongly recommend acceptance above approach designed to preserve 10-year prerogative each country ascertain size own staff. If para 10 becomes operative, we would in effect tacitly accept temporary reduction attaché staff while preserving our right to make final determination our own requirements after atmosphere clears and procedures agreed upon. Prospects for resolving matter would improve by working on problem in calmer atmosphere and shifting attention to fruitful discussions of our recommendations in para 5. Hopefully, also, the ground rule discussion, if aggressively pursued, could contribute to reducing many of the frictions that have developed in the attaché field over the past few years. 10 Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, and USUN. 2 Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 Telegram 1930 to Warsaw, June 16, transmitted the Department of State's request for comments on the expulsion of U.S. attachés. Telegram 2226 from Warsaw, June 18, reported that Embassy comments would be sent on June 20. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL–US) 4 On April 6–7, Polish police used physical force to detain and seize property belonging to U.S. military attachés. Following a U.S. protest and Polish reply that was deemed unsatisfactory, the United States on May 4 expelled a Polish air attaché. On May 13, the Polish Government declared three U.S. attaches persona non grata. The United States responded on May 20 by declaring two Polish attaches persona non grata. 5 Not further identified. 6 Reference is to numbered paragraphs 1–5 above. 7 Not found. 8 Telegram 2181 from Warsaw, June 11, reported on Polish readiness to close the attaché incidents and to negotiate a new agreement on the status of military personnel attached to the respective Embassies. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL–US) 9 Telegram 1794 to Warsaw, May 26, outlined U.S. proposals for resolving the status of Polish and U.S. military representatives. (Ibid.) 10 In telegram 1971 to Warsaw, June 24, the Department of State forwarded a draft response to Polish proposals prepared in the light of Gronouski's suggestions, and requested comment. (Ibid.) 123. Memorandum of Conversation 123. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 23, 1966. US/MC/33 SUBJECT European Security (Part II of II) PARTICIPANTS Adam Rapacki, Foreign Minister of the Polish People's Republic Jozef Winiewicz, Deputy Foreign Minister Tadeusz Strulak, Polish Foreign Ministry The Secretary Thomas Niles (notetaker) Cyril Muromcew (interpreter) After a lengthy discussion of Viet Nam (separate Memcon), 2 Rapacki said that he would like to discuss the question of European security. He referred to recent press articles which argued that the reduction of the U.S. presence in Europe “to unknown limits” as a result of events in Southeast Asia would be welcomed by the Socialist countries. According to Rapacki, the writers of these articles must feel that the Socialist countries are “politically naive” and he stated that Poland is interested in “constructive” United States influence in promoting the peaceful development of Europe. He asked, rhetorically, how long the European situation could remain isolated from the world-wide trend toward increasing tensions. He observed that the relatively calm conditions in Europe were deceptive and could not last. According to Rapacki, the Southeast Asian situation could well have an adverse effect on conditions in Europe and, furthermore, none of the real dangers for European stability had been removed. In this regard, Rapacki repeated the traditional Polish charge that revanchist elements in the FRG are gaining strength and are showing an increasing desire for nuclear weapons to use in pressuring the “German Democratic Republic” and forcing a revision of European frontiers. In his only comment during the meeting, Winiewicz observed that the FRG wishes to “swallow” the ”GDR.” Rapacki stated that collective security measures are necessary to avert the danger posed by the FRG and the United States has a role to play in these efforts. Rapacki referred to Poland's 1964 proposal for a European Security Conference and said that intensive contacts with countries in both Eastern and Western Europe had led to some progress toward holding such a Conference. According to Rapacki, the Europeans generally agree that a Conference would be useful, but he acknowledged that much preparatory work was necessary. In his view, the Conference would consider the basic question of guaranteeing the security of individual states. With this obstacle out of the way, increased economic cooperation among European states would develop naturally. Political questions would be taken up only at the end of the process of normalization. Rapacki stressed the importance of European and world-wide non-proliferation agreements in ensuring peace. He mentioned the problem of NATO consultation on nuclear weapons and said that Poland was particularly concerned that these consultations should not lead to giving non-nuclear powers a voice in the use of nuclear weapons. He also emphasized Poland's interest in the reduction of conventional forces and suggested that a collective renunciation of the use of force in changing the status quo would be useful. In reply, the Secretary stressed that the United States was “utterly and completely” opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He cited our refusal to assist the French nuclear weapons program, with its consequences for US-French relations, as proof of our determination not to transfer nuclear weapons or technology. The Secretary pointed out, however, that the Warsaw Pact could not have a seat at the NATO table with a veto over NATO matters. When Rapacki expressed surprise at this statement, the Secretary said that some of Gromyko's objections to NATO procedures appeared to require a veto over NATO decisions. The Secretary said that the United States welcomed increased East-West contacts and informed Rapacki that the Administration planned to reintroduce the East-West trade bill early in 1967. He observed that the question of holding a European Security Conference was well worth discussing and stressed that the United States must be present when the great political problems of Central Europe are discussed. Rapacki asked whether the United States was really interested in these problems and said that our lack of interest in the Polish proposal for a Conference indicated that we were not. The Secretary pointed to our involvement in two world wars which originated in Central Europe as proof of our interest. He said that extensive preparations were required before a European Security Conference could be held since a conference which fails is worse than no conference. The Secretary expressed an interest in discussing this and other questions with Rapacki if time permitted before his return to Poland. Rapacki said that he planned to remain in New York through October 4 or 5 but that Winiewicz planned to stay somewhat longer. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Niles and approved in S on October 4. The meeting was held at USUN. 2 A copy of this memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. 124. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk 124. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 1, 1966. SUBJECT Poland—Impressions and Reflections These impressions are based on a very small sample of Polish opinion; I talked seriously to about a dozen people, divided about equally between government and non-government. 1. Polish Concerns . Virtually every conversation began and ended with one subject: the security of the Polish state. Shadowed by a history of four partitions, Poles of every type and persuasion—in and out of government—express or reflect their fear that this time, too, Poland will not endure. One remark is worth quoting: When a Polish official and I were discussing whether Polish inheritance taxes might permit accumulation of an estate over several generations, he smiled and added: “Yes, but our country never seems to last long enough to make this worthwhile.” You have the feeling that you are talking to people living in a house that has collapsed about them several times; they are constantly looking at the roof and the walls—in this case, at their geography. Sandwiched in between Germany and Russia, they can hardly be blamed if they worry about a fifth partition. Polish concerns seem more of a product of this history and geography than of the obsessive hatred of Germany I expected to find. When I said to a Polish newspaperman, before the monument to the dead of the Ghetto, that this was a monument not only to the crimes of one nation but to the moral weakness of man, I was surprised at his agreement. Herb Kaiser (Embassy) mentioned that the Ambassador, visiting Auschwitz at Yom Kippur, had written in the visitor's book: “No one of us innocent.” The newspaperman said that most thoughtful Poles were of the same view, though it was hard to persuade the average man. Poles evidently don't like or trust Germans, but there's much more than this to their security concerns. Even when memories of wartime horrors have faded, the hard facts of geography will remain—and the history of a millenium in which no Polish generation was spared war, or foreign rule, or both. 2. Polish Remedies . When you ask Poles how their security concerns could be met by long-term change, they say something like this: “Dissolve both blocs; limit armaments in Central Europe; exchange security guarantees; and create a new security organization in Europe to police the result.” The object of all this, they make clear, is to create a system which will permit East and West to concentrate on the really serious business of jointly sitting on Germany, instead of wasting their time opposing each other. But this will be a long time coming, they acknowledge; in fact, you get the impression they are sceptical it will happen at all. In the meantime, they say, limited security measures should be initiated in Central Europe. Hence the Rapacki and Gomulka Plans. If we don't like these proposals, they ask, why don't we make counter-proposals? There is real Polish bitterness on this point—the more so since they don't seem to expect us, in fact, to take their concerns in this field more seriously in the future than they believe we have in the past. 3. Result . The net result is a people who do not believe that the existing situation assures their security, yet who do not see any likely alternative in sight. This is a prescription for worry—and worry is what Poles do. This worry makes it easier, I would suppose, for the hardnosed types who run the country to stay in power and to block moves toward reconciliation with Germany (let alone, more basic changes in the European status quo). 4. Prospect. Polish security concerns are rooted in their perception of the kind of world they live in: a world of national states, each rapaciously seeking narrow national advantage, at the expense of others. This is the way Poland's neighbors have always acted (and it is the way that Poland has acted toward its neighbors, when it could). It is difficult for Poles to conceive a different kind of Europe. Until they do, I would guess that they will remain obsessed by concerns over their security—given the facts of their geography. Our task should be to convey to thoughtful Poles a different vision of the future: one in which the concept of wider communities has so clearly replaced nationalism as to make it evident, even to this stubborn and heroic people, that wars for national territorial gain have become as unlikely as wars between feudal lords were after the decline of feudalism. The best way to make this vision convincing is to help bring it into being—by trying to create viable alternatives to nationalism in the West, in the East, and in East-West relations. 2 The ambiguity in Polish reactions to Western European integration is striking. They fear its effect on Polish trade or that it may become a cloak for German hegemony; they agree that if it proceeds far enough to subsume German nationalism it will have been a good thing for Poland. They are puzzled by the process of community-building; it is unlike anything in their experience; they watch it with an odd mixture of fascination and scepticism. That such a Western Europe should be clearly linked to the US, in the present situation, is questioned by few in Poland. Community building in the East is not a wholly new thought to them. They toy with the idea of seeking a greater measure of economic integration among the “northern tier”—Poland, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps Hungary. They quickly add, however, that the Soviet Union would never permit it. They are also interested in building a structure of multilateral East-West cooperation. They argue strongly for strengthening the Economic Commission for Europe. The President's speech 3 held out the vision of a Europe which was more stable and secure because it was built on a foundation of such communities, rather than merely national states rolling around loosely. It was well received, but I wonder how much of this message got through to the Poles. My guess is that it will have to be repeated many times and in many different ways. If the vision can be made convincing; if thoughtful Poles can see the structure of a new Europe taking shape, in which what one Pole called “our old-fashioned nationalism” is no longer a sure clue to national interest; if Germany can dramatize this change by renouncing the Oder-Neisse—then deep changes in the Polish view of the kind of world they are living in might over the long run gradually make still further changes possible. 5. Conclusion. The most impressive man I met in Poland was a professor of moral philosophy (Professor Kolakowski, who has since reportedly been expelled from the Communist Party for his courage and creative thought). He spoke of his main concern for the future: “What will our young people believe in? “Socialism—no one takes that seriously as an ideology. “Religion—its hold will decline as the present generation is succeeded by a younger generation born to city life. (He may be right, but I was struck by the large proportion of young people, presumably born to city life—men as well as women—in church in Warsaw.) “That leaves nationalism. A generation of nationalist technocrats frightens me. Such a generation will be defenseless against temptations; it will not build anything great. Polish youth needs to be given something larger than this to believe in.” He was speaking in terms of a need for moral goals, but the point has wider relevance. Perhaps the goal of building a Europe in which the new concept of communities could replace the outmoded concept of destructive nationalism could be made exciting enough to help fill some of the moral vacuum he feared. Henry Owen 4 1 Source: Department of State, Polish Desk Files: Lot 71 D 158, Pol 1966. Secret. 2 The conventional wisdom is that nationalism is a good thing in Eastern Europe, because it reduces Soviet influence. My guess is that this process has gone about as far as it is likely to go for some time. The more important effect of nationalism, from here on out, may well be to strengthen objections, among Germany's Eastern neighbors, to German reunification. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 Reference is to President Johnson's October 7 address to editorial writers. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , pp. 1125–1130. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 125. Telegram From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, in Texas 125. Telegram From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, in Texas 1 Washington, December 26, 1966. CAP 661333. FYI: I am sending by wire because it may be useful for John 2 to have a decision by tomorrow, Tuesday, December 27, when he returns to Warsaw. Subject: Polish currency package. You will recall that in your October speech to the editorial writers 3 you announced that “the Secretary of State is reviewing the possibility of easing the burden of Polish debts to the U.S. through expenditures of our Polish currency holdings which will be mutually beneficial to both countries.” At Tab A is a Katzenbach memo 4 asking you to approve a package for negotiation with the Poles. Specifically: —We would postpone $21.75 million of the $39.2 million the Poles owe us during January 2, 1967–January 2, 1968. (The $39.2 million they would have to pay if we did not postpone represents a big hump in the repayment schedule—it is four times what they had to pay us in 1966, and twice what they will have to pay annually after 1968.) —They and we would agree to use the postponed $21.75 million, over the next several years: (1) for a $9.5 million/10 year English language teaching program in Poland, perhaps manned by young Americans and administered by our universities; and (2) to help pay for U.S. cultural exchange programs in Poland and elsewhere; for the operating expenses of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw; international travel by U.S. officials from and through Poland, etc. The Poles would also agree to a firm date for negotiations on defaulted prewar bonds; to concessions on the use of other U.S.-owned zloties by U.S. tourists and businessmen, and on some other minor issues between us. A short precise account of the proposed deal is at Tab B.4 The only part that would show up explicitly as a line-item appropriation in the budget is the English language training program, at an annual $950,000 in Polish zloties. Balance of Payments We would by and large neutralize the balance of payments effects by a side agreement with the Poles that they would increase imports from the U.S. during 1967 by an amount equal to the postponed payment. We would use their recent level of U.S. imports as a base. This is not fool proof protection, but we can police it well enough to reduce the likely leakage to negligible amounts. Executive Branch Positions The package has been formally approved by all the NAC agencies, with Treasury in the chair, as well as Agriculture. Gronouski—who has been pushing very hard for something like this—thinks we are offering too little and asking too much. (An English language program, perhaps with young Americans running around Poland, would be a hard pill for Gomulka to swallow.) John may turn out to be right, and if so, we will come back to you. But the rest of us think that the proposal is balanced enough to be worth a try. The Congress We know that Senator Mansfield thinks “this a modest program … in the right direction.” On the other hand, Senator Gruening has written State opposing any such deal. 5 His letter was full of misconceptions, and State will try to straighten him out—at least on the facts. (He will not be back in town until January, but his office knows we have been trying to reach him about this.) In addition, and not surprisingly, Paul Findley is opposed. 6 Otherwise we know of no Congressional reactions—despite the reference in your speech. To avoid the risk of stimulating opposition—especially since you have already given a public signal that you are planning to do something like this—Nick Katzenbach decided against taking further soundings before asking for your approval. Timing I am afraid we need your decision on whether we can begin negotiating with the Poles before January 2. The first '67 installment of the Polish debt ($9 million) is due on the 2nd. If you authorize us to start talking with the Poles, we will offer them a three month postponement on $4.7 million—the portion which would become a part of the final rollover package if the negotiation is successful. Recommendation As a bridge builder I would vote for this. The English language program is a first-rate idea and the cost of the entire package is not great. Politically, we face the usual risk of helping a Communist country which is making a fuss about Viet Nam, and giving Hanoi some help—the usual dilemma of maintaining a balanced Presidential posture. (If, during the course of the negotiations, the Poles go in for unusual pyrotechnics on Viet Nam, we can always back off. They will be told that no U.S. proposals are final until a deal is struck.) Francis M. Bator OK to open negotiations with the Poles on the package as outlined No Speak to me 7 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret. The telegram, sent through Rostow, was received at the LBJ Ranch at 12:45 p.m. 2 Ambassador Gronouski. 3 See footnote 3, Document 124 . 4 Not printed. 5 The letter was not found. 6 On October 18, Representative Paul Findley (R–IL), leading a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats, inserted language in legislation for the charter of the Export-Import Bank that prohibited the Bank from guaranteeing loans to any Communist nation. In a subsequent legislative conference with the Senate, the language of the Findley amendment was modified to permit a Presidential waiver in cases where the President judged a loan to be in the national interest. 7 There is no indication on the source text of President Johnson's decision. 126. Memorandum of Conversation 126. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Warsaw, February 9, 1967. PARTICIPANTS H.E. Jozef Winiewicz, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ambassador John A. Gronouski Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' Meeting . I opened the conversation by asking Mr. Winiewicz about all the rumors we had heard about a conference going on here in Warsaw. He said yes, there was; it would end today and the people would leave tonight. I said “Only a one-day conference?” He said no, it started yesterday morning. He then went on to say that this is a normal ministerial level conference that takes place a couple times a year and that it did not arise, as some people suspected, as a result of the diplomatic agreement between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany. 2 The meeting is not a result of this; it would have happened anyway. I said I presumed there would be some discussion of the Romanian-FRG agreement; he said they will discuss it but he wanted to make clear this was not the occasion for the conference. He went on to say that he wouldn't be a bit surprised, however, if the Romanians had hastened their diplomatic accord with West Germany in order to have it de facto prior to the conference. He said there would be no communiqué issued on the meeting other than the fact it occurred. Relations with West Germany . I then asked him how this whole developing picture with West Germany is ultimately going to affect Poland. I said I could at least visualize the possibility that the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia could very well at some time in the future have diplomatic relations, leaving Poland and the GDR out in the cold. He responded that it did not surprise the Poles to find Romania according diplomatic relations to West Germany. He said the Poles have always felt that those countries which did not have the bad experience with Germany that Poland had, specifically Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, would have a different attitude toward relations with West Germany than they do. He emphasized that many Poles have expected this for a long time. On two or three occasions he emphasized Bulgaria, bringing in Hungary as a third possibility, suggesting that Bulgaria is the next likely candidate for relations with the FRG. He said on the broader question of West German-Polish relations, they have to look at this in the light of the history of their attitudes. He said from the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany in 1955 until the period 1957–58, the Poles repeatedly expressed willingness to have diplomatic relations with West Germany with no conditions, but their advances in this direction were rebuffed by the Germans. He referred to an interview with a British publication which Gomulka had in the late '50s in which he expressed an understanding that it is very hard for any nation to digest defeat. He said even though we remember this as having been the defeat of Hitler, the Poles appreciate that for the masses of German people it was a defeat for the German nation. Poles were very sympathetic toward establishing diplomatic relations in that period; after 1958, as world conditions changed, especially after '59 when Germany started showing an interest in atomic weapons which they had not previously shown, the Polish position was altered to the extent that they insisted on recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a precondition. At that time, Gomulka realized that of course the border could be formally recognized only in the peace treaty, but he insisted on de facto recognition. They also hoped at that time that all Western powers, including the U.S., would give de facto recognition as DeGaulle did to the Oder-Neisse line because they felt that this would make it easier for the German authorities to sell it to the German people; they still think it is a mistake for the Western powers not to take a lead on this matter. I pointed out that sometimes it is very costly for a country's friends to attempt to take the lead in matters of this sort; that in terms of internal politics it could create a situation where the opposition to the German leadership could argue that Germans were not running their own foreign policy but were being forced into an action by their allies. I said he ought to consider the possibility that it is better in the long run to have Germany take its own initiatives in these matters. He then went on to say that conditions have quite significantly changed in the early '60s because things have settled down in the East German regime. East Germany has developed into something quite different in the '60s compared to what it was between '55–'60. It has become stable responsible government and has to be reckoned with. I raised the question of what were the real conditions that Poland had for diplomatic relations with West Germany. I said I knew he had mentioned three things but I had a feeling that the Oder-Neisse line was the most significant and this feeling had been supported by conversations with people in Poland in the last six months who have distinguished between normalization of relations and diplomatic recognition. I had a feeling that of the three conditions which he keeps raising that the Oder-Neisse line is the fundamental one and is the one on which most importance is placed. He said it is true there is distinction between normalization of relations and diplomatic recognition, and then he put a different twist on it. He said they will do all they can to normalize relations; just this morning he had signed off on an approval for an invitation from a group of Polish youth to a group of Christian-Democratic youth to spend their vacation in Poland; he talked about trade and cultural relations which they are interested in developing. What they could not accept, he said, is the German notion that they represent all of the people who were in the German borders in '37. He said, “Look what this means!” There is a law on the books which says that any German that engages in communist activities is violating German law and that means a man like Kmiecik, one of their reporters who was born in Berlin, cannot technically set foot on German soil because he could be arrested for engaging in communist activities on the theory that he is still a German citizen engaged in subversive activity. He said he wasn't saying the Germans would do it; but the law is on the books and that, combined with the fact that many Poles fall under the sole representation thesis, means that technically they are in jeopardy. Relations with East Germany . He went on to describe their relations with East Germany, saying that they are most concerned about isolating East Germany and creating the impression that all its friends have abandoned it. When a nation becomes isolated it does irrational things and we can't afford to take that chance. A cornerstone of Polish policy must be not to give the East Germans the feeling that their friends have abandoned them. He talked again about the question of irrational activities and in this discussion he made mention of two things: first, that East Germany's statements will become more and more irrational if they are isolated and, second, that any hope for the development of exchanges and relations between East and West Germany which Poles encourage will diminish as the GDR becomes more and more irrational: conversations, trade, things of that sort. So, he said, “We must not abandon East Germany and we cannot therefore accept the sole representation claim as far as it applies to East Germans.” He thought the question of atomic weapons would be solved by the nonproliferation treaty. He thus returned to the proposition that there is a distinction between normalization of relations and diplomatic recognition. He indicated that the Poles were unwilling at this time to move ahead and establish diplomatic relations before the conditions for normalizing relations were met. Zloty Package . I discussed with Winiewicz the zloty package, pointing out that in the present climate this is of course very difficult for us to digest, but that I was very happy that I got solid backing from the Administration on it. I went over the package and said I thought the conditions that it imposed on the Poles were reasonable ones they could accept without too much concern. I said I did not want to suggest that passing of that part of the program which must go before Congress would be easy, but I expressed confidence that there is a lot of strength behind the President's East-West program, some of it not as publicity conscious as some of its opponents, and my best estimate was that the bill would pass. Even if it didn't, I thought it was highly important that it be brought before Congress because I regarded the Administration program on East-West relations as being in the long run as fundamental as that which is currently occupying our attention—the Viet-Nam question. For three reasons I thought the zloty proposal should be brought before Congress quickly: 1) because anything that isn't in the legislative hopper by the first of May had no chance for a thorough hearing; 2) I think it can pass; and 3) even if it doesn't pass it is highly important in terms of development of attitudes in the U.S. toward East-West relations that this issue be brought before the public in a practical, tangible way. I said I was hopeful that Poles would do what they could to get the thing moving. I knew Trampczynski had been busy and probably he hadn't had time to give it full consideration, but the sooner we can get this out the sooner we can get it before the Congress. He said he was glad to have this brought up and went on to say how much he appreciated knowing my attitude. At 9:00 o'clock last night he said he attended a meeting where the question was raised whether it was worthwhile in the present climate to pursue zloty package negotiations at all: Paul Findley was brought up at this meeting as typical of resistance to this kind of thing. 3 “They asked my judgment of it, and my judgment was that we should go ahead with it,” Winiewicz added. He said it will be very valuable to have my judgment and he would take this up immediately with Trampczynski when the latter returns from Moscow this afternoon. He emphasized that the powers-that-be will be interested in my judgment. I said there would be brickbats and I would get a few myself, but I thought it was worth it. The President and the Administration is genuinely interested in putting substance into the building-bridges philosophy and if we can't come forward with this program now I think it will be an irretrievable loss in the development of the Administration's East-West trade philosophy. Consular Negotiations . The consular negotiations were dismissed almost out of hand as being held up because the Poles are waiting to see what the Senate does with the Soviet Consular Convention. Ford Foundation Program . I discussed the history of the Ford Foundation program, relating my part in getting Stone and Birecki together last fall and my conversation with Birecki a week or so ago, my understanding that Birecki was to invite Stone here and the way the invitation turned out. I expressed my judgment that Stone and Birecki were very close and there was no reason in the world why this wasn't back on the track now; it just needs some catalyst to get it moving. I was reasonably convinced Stone was interested, I knew it was of value to Poland. I noted that Czechoslovakia had just signed an agreement with Ford. At any rate, I was very hopeful that this could get back on the track and felt there was every possibility it would if reasonable heads prevailed. I said that despite Viet-Nam and many problems on both sides of the Atlantic, many of us were interested in maintaining as high a level of bilateral relations as possible; I referred to the Ford Foundation program as being non-governmental but symbolic of these relations. He said he would take this over personally; he had already talked to Jack Fisher about it and he knew Stone was as interested as Poland was. Zloty Travel Proposal . I then raised the zloty travel proposal we had made on September 16, pointing out its importance to the many zloty-financed research programs (agricultural, medical, fishing, etc.) currently underway in Poland. I described the research in summary fashion. I suggested that maintaining this research was important in its own right as in terms of maintaining level of bilateral relations. I said it would be most unfortunate if programs deteriorated for lack of travel funds. I said I could understand why they had waited to see the whole zloty proposal before acting on this element, but hoped that now the whole package was before them they would approve this part immediately. He expressed surprise that it had not already been resolved and said he would take this up himself. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL–US. Confidential. Drafted by Gronouski. Transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A–528 from Warsaw, March 2. The meeting was held at the Polish Foreign Office. 2 An apparent reference to the technical cooperation agreement between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany. For text, see 642 UNTS 47. 3 See footnote 7, Document 125 . 127. Airgram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 127. Airgram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, April 6, 1967. A–610 SUBJECT A New Direction in Poland's Policy Toward the U.S. REF Warsaw 2366 and 2369 2 In political terms the decision of the Polish Government to agree to the zloty package and to a resumption of the Ford Program after a lapse of four years is an important augury for the future course of U.S.-Polish relations. 3 The agreements are a milestone in that they signify a willingness by the Polish Government to permit some movement in our bilateral relations. In fact, the English language program, the key ingredient in the zloty agreement, and the Ford Exchange program open up the possibility for increasing the tempo of our relations. This prospect stands in contrast to the situation that has existed here in the past few years when U.S. efforts took on the character of a holding operation. We were mainly concerned with trying to prevent U.S.-Polish relations from freezing completely, as certain regime elements used Viet-Nam as a convenient excuse to immobilize bilateral relations. For about a year the Polish leadership, with Gomulka the ultimate decision maker, had been weighing the pros and cons of the elements contained in the zloty package. The decision to go ahead was not an easy one; economic advantages had to be measured against the implications of giving the U.S. an opportunity to expand its influence in Poland. Economic considerations apparently won out. Even though the zloty package provides relatively small financial relief for Poland, the amount was nevertheless significant to a country hard pressed for dollars. Probably more important to the Poles was the precedent they saw created by this agreement. For the first time both countries agreed upon a mutually desirable project to be financed by the U.S. Government-owned zloties which were about to fall due for conversion into dollars. The Poles probably consider this a prelude to finding other mutually attractive projects which would also ease Poland's indebtedness to the U.S. By agreeing to the zloty package and the Ford Program the Poles gave evidence that Viet-Nam does not completely bar improved bilateral relations. This implies a significant change inasmuch as the Poles have long insisted that Viet-Nam obstructs any significant development of bilateral contacts. It is remotely possible that familiarity with U.S. efforts to end the Viet-Nam war had a favorable impact on Polish decision makers. Undoubtedly, the view that Poland's national interests would be better served by these agreements was the most powerful consideration. Inherent in the Polish decision is an apparent willingness of the leadership to modify, or at least restrain, its suspicions and cynicism about U.S. purposes in Poland and to accept the zloty package as an example of a mutually beneficial agreement envisaged and achieved under the President's bridge-building policy. It now behooves us to implement as fully and as quickly as possible the agreements concluded. A possible result of Poland's decision to conclude these recent agreements with the U.S. is the likelihood of an early appointment of a new Polish Ambassador to Poland to succeed the late Ambassador Drozniak who died last October. By acting as it did last week the Polish Government provides a favorable backdrop for the appointment of a new Polish Ambassador. 4 Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL–US. Confidential. Drafted by Kaiser and approved by Jenkins on April 4. 2 Telegram 2366 from Warsaw, March 31, reported on the resumption of Ford Foundation programs in Poland. (Ibid., EDX POL–US) Telegram 2369 from Warsaw, March 31, reported on discussions with the Poles regarding the terms of U.S. economic assistance. (Ibid., AID 15–8 POL) 3 For text of the agreements, signed in Washington on April 10 and 11, 1967, see 19 UST 7788. 4 Jerzy Michalowski replaced Drozniak, who died of a heart attack November 1, 1966, in Washington. Michalowski presented his credentials to President Johnson on September 12. Memoranda of their conversation are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL–US. 128. Memorandum of Conversation 128. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 5, 1967. SUBJECT Polish Views on European Security PARTICIPANTS Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Jerzy Michalowski, Ambassador of Poland William A. Buell, Jr., Polish Affairs Ambassador Jerzy Michalowski requested this courtesy call on Ambassador Kohler. Ambassador Kohler countered Michalowski's modest observation about the minor role which Poland played in US foreign policy by pointing out that US-Polish relations had been a most significant factor in the formulation of US policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole. He noted specifically the granting of MFN and the Claims Settlement Agreement of 1960. 2 The initiation of the new relationship with Poland at that time was a “test case” between the Executive and the Congress. He said he hoped that the Ambassador would learn here how very real was the separation of powers and how complicated the Executive's relationship with the Congress could be. At the moment these relations were as difficult as he had seen in 36 years of service under both Republican and Democratic administrations. Michalowski said that he hoped that the time would come when he could help in a change in US policy towards Europe. Ambassador Kohler asked for specifics, noting that our policy had been adaptable to European needs and that it appeared that we had reached a stage of stability in Europe. Michalowski demurred, calling it “an unstabilized balance” which could be upset if further steps were not taken. He noted particularly that the division of Germany was here to stay and that this fact should be recognized. Ambassador Kohler asked if the Poles believed the Germans were reconciled to it. Michalowski said they were advancing in this direction. Ambassador Kohler noted that we had persuaded the West Germans to a commitment in 1954 to renounce the use of force in any change of frontiers. 3 To this the Germans have adhered. He believed the aspirations of the German people on both sides would continue to be for unity, that it was folly to recognize the division and give the Germans the feeling of something imposed upon them, as was the case after Versailles. Michalowski said that by not bringing about a German reconciliation to the division of their country we were leaving them to expect the assistance of the US to change it. Ambassador Kohler said we had proved in 1961 and 1962 that we were prepared to fight to prevent any change being made by the other side but that we had also proved that we did not seek to change anyone else's position by force. He said that the major contributions to stability had not come from the Eastern but the Western side. Mr. Michalowski said that particularly in recent years there had been much more proof that the Eastern side was not going to change the situation by force. Ambassador Kohler agreed that this appeared to be so—since 1962. Michalowski said that if proof by both sides were furnished that no change was contemplated, the Germans would realize that their interests lay in taking advantage of the existing situation. Ambassador Kohler said he did not believe that the Poles appreciated the efforts of the new German Government under Kiesinger and Brandt in the direction of detente. On the contrary, the Eastern European leaders had called a meeting in Warsaw to condemn the Germans for their efforts to establish closer relationships with the East. Michalowski said this was to prevent a break in the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact countries and to prevent the weakening of the position of East Germany. Ambassador Kohler asked what would happen in East Germany when Ulbricht passes on. Michalowski said we should not pay too much attention to personalities. Ulbricht is not a Mao and even in Mao's case his removal would not change the basic situation. The trend since the death of Stalin has been away from personalities. Michalowski mentioned Polish continuing interest in a European Security Conference. Ambassador Kohler asked what kind of a conference he might have in mind. Would this not be directed against the American presence? Michalowski insisted that the Poles had never suggested that such a conference should exclude the United States. Any conference of this kind without the participation of the US would be absurd. If such a conference could establish the necessary basis for security, this of course, would make further USA military presence unnecessary. He said he did not hope for spectacular solutions, but that we could move ahead step by step. Ambassador Kohler asked after Gomulka, who Michalowski said had been “quiet” of late. Other Polish personalities of Ambassador Kohler's acquaintance were discussed briefly, such as Ochab and Jaroszewicz. Michalowski said he hoped that Jedrychowski (Chairman of the State Planning Commission), whose visit to the US had been called off several years ago because of the “world atmosphere“, would be able to come provided this atmosphere improved. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL–US. Confidential. Drafted by Buell and approved in G on October 16. 2 For text of the Claims Settlement Agreement, signed in Washington on April 16, 1960, see 11 UST 1953. Most-favored-nation status was restored on March 26, 1964; see footnote 4, Document 117 . 3 Article 7 of the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, as amended, signed in Paris on October 23, 1954. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1945–1970, pp. 425–430. 129. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 129. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, October 31, 1967, 0935Z. 1285. Ref: Warsaw 1235; 1240. 2 Pass USIA for IAS and ICS/E. 1. Ambassador called on Vice Foreign Minister Naszkowski Oct 30 to protest comparison of President Johnson with Hitler published in Trybuna Ludu Oct 27. In reply, Naszkowski defended such comparisons saying that U.S. escalation of Viet-Nam war produced corresponding escalation of Poles' feelings of revulsion and concern for world peace. “Cruelties” of U.S. methods of waging war in Viet-Nam remind us, he said, “of cruelties perpetrated by Nazis against Poles.” When Ambassador rejected validity of such analogies, discussion ensued on Viet-Nam problem which proceeded along usual lines and ended inconclusively. 2. Ambassador also raised problem of Architecture USA exhibit (Warsaw 1240). Naszkowski emphasized that exhibit has been postponed, not canceled. We cannot have “great spectacular events” such as U.S. exhibit, he said, during period when Viet-Nam war is causing so much concern. Exhibit has therefore been postponed, he said, in hope that future developments will be more conducive to holding it. 3. Memcon follows by pouch. 3 Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL–US. Confidential. Repeated to Prague. 2 Neither found. 3 Transmitted in airgram A–303 from Warsaw, November 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL POL–US) 130. Memorandum of Conversation 130. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 13 and 14, 1967. SUBJECT Comments of Polish Officials regarding Harmel Report and other matters PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Jerzy Michalowski, Polish Ambassador Mr. Zdzislaw Szewczyk, Polish Counselor Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs I saw the Ambassador and Szewczyk the evening of December 13 at a dinner at Szewczyk's home and had the opportunity to talk with both of them at some length. I also saw Ambassador Michalowski at the White House luncheon on December 14. Harmel Report 2 The Ambassador and Szewczyk were interested in the outcome of the NATO meeting at Brussels, particularly that part of the meeting which concerned the Harmel Report. They pressed me for details regarding it and for my views as to the significance of the Report. I provided an appropriate summary of the Report's conclusions, noting that one of the areas highlighted by the Report, concerning the future work of the Alliance, had to do with European security and a study of steps which could be taken in the direction of East-West reconciliation. The Ambassador remarked that the Belgian Foreign Minister had discussed his ideas on these subjects with Rapacki recently and that the Poles were very much interested in them. In response to the Ambassador's questions, I said that any committee set up by NATO to consider European security matters would be “open ended” and designed to study the problem and come up with recommendations for possible action; I did not anticipate that there would be any sweeping proposals for over-all negotiations on European security and that it seemed more likely that if anything was possible it would be in the form of small steps which would contribute toward reducing tensions. I thought, for example, that one of the most promising areas for action seemed to be the idea of renunciation of force declarations. The FRG seemed to be quite interested in this idea, but the reaction of some of her neighbors to the East did not seem very forthcoming. The Ambassador agreed that renunciation of force declarations could be useful, although it was important that they also include the GDR in some way which would not be discriminatory. He was not specific with regard to how the GDR should be brought into the renunciation of force package and did not indicate any conditions from the Polish side. I also discussed with the Ambassador and Szewczyk the general question of mutual force reductions in Europe. We covered generally familiar ground and they did not raise any new points. FRG-Polish Relations I talked at some length with Szewczyk on this subject, saying that I regretted the apparent Polish rigidity in this regard. Szewczyk commented that Poland was certainly not opposed to improving relations with the FRG but that it would be impossible to contemplate diplomatic relations so long as the FRG proclaimed the theory that it was the only entity qualified to speak for the German people. This was simply unacceptable to Poland, which had relations with the GDR. Szewczyk passed over rather lightly the Oder-Neisse problem and seemed primarily concerned about the FRG's claim to be the sole voice of Germany. I noted that Romania did not seem to have similar preoccupations and he acknowledged, somewhat ruefully, that Romania's views on the subject differed from those of Poland. Szewczyk added that, in fact, he did not see much urgency, from the Polish standpoint, in establishing diplomatic relations with the FRG, since he did not feel this would bring many advantages which Poland did not already enjoy. For example, Polish-FRG trade is increasing every year and cultural exchange and tourism is also on the upgrade. Viet-Nam The Ambassador was interested in possible moves by the United States on Viet-Nam in the UN. I said that this question was still under study and I did not know what the outcome would be. He observed that, in his view, any consideration of Viet-Nam in the UN would not produce an outcome favorable to the United States. It was certain, he felt, that the only resolution which could come from UN consideration would be one recommending immediate and indefinite cessation of the bombing. When I mentioned that there might possibly be some attractiveness to considering negotiations in the framework of a renewed Geneva Conference, the Ambassador said that this could only be feasible if agreement had been reached in advance by the US and the principal interested parties. If this were not the case, a reconvened Geneva Conference would simply be a shambles in which the intransigent views of the Chinese would predominate. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stoessel on December 16. 2 For text of the Harmel Report, “Future Tasks of the Alliance,” see Department of State Bulletin , January 6, 1968, pp. 50–52. 131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 1 Washington, January 15, 1968, 2342Z. 2 98888. Following is the gist of an Intelligence Note sent to the Secretary today: All three top Soviet leaders—Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny—went on an “unofficial,” and clearly unusual, visit to Poland from January 12 to 14. While unannounced Polish-Soviet consultations on international affairs are not unusual, just-completed visit has all the earmarks of urgent Soviet intervention in Polish internal affairs. Rumors from Poland have indicated Poles were planning major Party and Government changes for near future. The most important of the rumored changes would have shifted Gomulka to specially created post of Party Chairman and made Silesian Party boss Gierek new Party First Secre-tary. Although under reported scheme, Gomulka would have remained in charge of all but internal economic policy—where pressure for younger, more efficient leadership is greatest—such a shift, coming within weeks after ouster of Czech Party boss Novotny, may have frightened Soviets. They generally dislike change and may particularly not want any more East European party shifts on eve of upcoming Budapest conference of communist parties. In addition, two such shifts within a short space of time in two neighboring communist parties could, in Moscow's and Ulbricht's view, seriously endanger position of the latter in East Germany. Whether Ulbricht asked the Soviets to intervene with the Poles, or whether Soviet leaders decided to do so on their own, is less important than likelihood that they did intervene and in collective strength. If we are right that a request for postponement of any change in Gomulka's Party position was principal reason for Soviet leaders' visit to Poland, they probably met with a sympathetic response. Gierek, only clear gainer from the supposedly planned shifts, did not take part in the talks, and all Poles who did probably themselves prefer to delay the changes as long as possible. The inclusion of all three top Soviet leaders strikes one as unusually heavy-handed. The example of 1956, when a much more critical situation existed and Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Khrushchev all descended on the Polish capital only to find Gomulka already virtually installed as Polish Party First Secretary, would seem to have inhibited such an approach. Soviet practice in similar situations in Eastern Europe in recent years, such as the Czechoslovak crisis of December/January when only Brezhnev hurried to Prague, usually has appeared more circumspect. The Soviet leaders, however, have shown a somewhat special regard for Polish-Soviet relations as compared with their relations with other East European states. In addition the impulse to present a united front presumably motivated Soviet regime to send all three leaders. Action also suggests uncertainly in Soviet leadership on how to handle such situations and possibly reflects frustration over how little they were able to influence Czechoslovak shakeup. There is no reason to doubt communiqué that wide range of international questions was discussed and complete identity of views was displayed. Two issues of greatest interest to Poles—German policy and communist unity—are always on agenda when they get together with Soviets, but neither policy toward Germany nor Budapest communist conference scheduled for February seemed to call for additional top-level consultation at this time. In view of Poland's membership in the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese ICCs, current Southeast Asian issues were probably also discussed, but we do not know of differences of views between Poles and Soviets which would have necessitated top level consultations. Therefore, while we do not want to suggest that the visit was concerned solely with Polish internal affairs and the impact of Czechoslovak developments on the rest of Eastern Europe, we do believe these provided most pressing reasons for it. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Jaffe, cleared in EUR, and approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, and USNATO. 2 Beginning in 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 132. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 132. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 17, 1968. SUBJECT Jews in Poland In the memorandum at Tab A, 2 Nick Katzenbach recommends: 1. You authorize Attorney General Clark to be prepared to extend parole to Jewish Poles, and 2. You authorize Katzenbach to tell American-Jewish leaders in confidence that we are prepared to receive Jewish refugees from Poland without regard to quota limitations. Parole action may not be necessary—as current refugee provisions will probably enable us to give visas to any Polish Jews who can get out of that country. We have had some Congressional criticism of parole, and would prefer not to use this authority unless necessary. (Parole reduces delay and the need for supporting personal documentation. Technically, it could by-pass legal requirements on health, criminal records, Communist affiliation, etc.—but the State Department's intention is to require security checks and admit only Polish Jews who would otherwise be eligible as refugees.) As drafted, Nick Katzenbach's memorandum would have you authorize parole for “refugees from religious persecution in Poland.” If there were a renewed attack on the Catholic Church, this could apply to Catholics as well as Jews. There is also a theoretical question whether such a parole should apply to Russian Jews or persecuted religious groups elsewhere. In any event this all represents contingency planning. If a parole action were taken, it would, of course, be violently denounced by the Polish Government and perhaps also be criticized by some Polish-Americans. Nevertheless, Ambassador Gronouski agrees with the arguments which override these considerations. Essentially, the argument for action now is: —to show the Jewish leadership in America that we are prepared to move; and —to head off a repetition of the Jews' deeply felt conviction that the U.S. Government failed to give visas in time to the desperately persecuted European Jews in the Nazi era. I recommend you approve Nick Katzenbach's recommendations on the following understanding: a. The Attorney General will extend parole only when refugee and other provisions of legislation prove inadequate to the need; b. Persons coming into the U.S. on parole will have had security checks and would be eligible under normal refugee provisions; and c. The parole action will technically apply to both Jewish and non-Jewish refugees from racial and religious persecution in Poland. Walt Katzenbach recommendations approved No Speak to me 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Rec'd 5/18/68, 11:20 a.m.” 2 Not printed. 3 The last option is checked. 133. Memorandum of Conversation 133. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 28, 1968, 4 p.m. SUBJECT U.S.-Polish Bilateral Relations PARTICIPANTS Polish Ambassador Jerzy Michalowski Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary Ambassador John Gronouski Mr. Doyle V. Martin, Polish Affairs Officer Ambassador Michalowski said that he was returning to Warsaw for consultation and, before going, he wanted to have a general discussion of bilateral relations. He realized that current relations were less than fully satisfactory but thought it important that there be no further deterioration. Mr. Stoessel agreed that we seem to be at a low point and said we quite frankly have a problem resulting from the “anti-Zionist” campaign in Poland. 2 We are under considerable pressure to make statements or take other actions which might have an unfavorable impact but have so far been able to resist those pressures. Ambassador Michalowski denied that anti-Semitism was involved in events in Poland and said a “great deal of fuss has been created because 60 or 70 people lost their jobs.” He said that while “unpleasant things happen from time to time,” many of the people fired were not Jewish. He believed an “anti-Polish campaign” had been mounted by Jewish interests which resented Poland's policy in the Mid-East War last June. He feared, however, that the reaction of Congress to these pressures might have an effect on MFN treatment for Polish trade with the United States. He said he was aware that the U.S. Administration had taken a firm stand on this matter in the past and asked if there was likely to be any yielding now. Mr. Stoessel replied we believe MFN should not be given or taken away on such a basis and we would certainly oppose any Congressional action affecting Poland. At the same time, it would be most helpful if this “anti-Zionist” agitation were to die away. Ambassador Michalowski said there were other fields in which he would like to see more done. He regretted the ending of the IMG program in Poland and thought it was most unfortunate that American books, films and plays were unavailable to Polish audiences because of a lack of foreign exchange. He also noted that an inspection team from the U.S. Department of Agriculture had recently found three Polish slaughter-houses below standard for meat exports to the United States and he wanted to make clear that the Polish Government would move rapidly to improve conditions to have them restored to our list. The Polish Government accepts our reports on them and will comply with our recommendations immediately. Ambassador Gronouski said we have other small problems at the moment including Polish requests for us to pay certain shipping costs in hard currency. He hoped that problem would be resolved “before it becomes a cancer.” There is also the question of use of Polish zlotys for research facilities at the Krakow hospital. He thought it should be possible to arrive at some “middle ground” between the Polish position that near-end zlotys must be used and our position that they should come from the far end of the debt repayment schedule. He thought this type of relationship should not be allowed to lapse and noted that construction of these facilities would involve a hard currency input of about $600,000. He was sorry that the outlook for the English-teaching program was not optimistic but realized the problems were on our side and not with Poland. Ambassador Gronouski (who joined the conversation at this point) said he thought Ambassador Michalowski was going back into a most interesting political situation in Warsaw and he wondered what changes were to be expected. He thought Interior Minister Moczar's star was rising now and he would probably occupy a more important Party position in the near future. For the long term, however, he thought Katowice Party First Secretary Gierek will rise in importance and he may eventually replace Gomulka. Ambassador Michalowski said that although the country is changing, he expects a realignment of the leadership and not a new leadership. He did not believe Gomulka would be replaced in the near future. Ambassador Gronouski agreed that Gomulka would probably remain in office but thought he did not have “the kind of control” he had formerly exercised. He said there was a great deal of ferment in Warsaw and had even heard that Ambassador Michalowski might not return from his consultation. Ambassador Michalowski shrugged and said that would be all right with him since his time here had not been particularly happy. On the way down in the elevator after the meeting, Ambassador Michalowski said he thought it would be most unfortunate if Ambassador Gronouski were not replaced soon. 3 He thought that if the post were left vacant, it would be misunderstood as a political decision “particularly if my post were vacant at the same time.” 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Martin. 2 Following student demonstrations in March 1968, the ultra-nationalist “Partisan” faction of the Polish Communist Party attacked the “Zionism” of certain members of the Polish Government and Party and called for their removal. A purge of Jewish and more liberal Party members followed. An estimated one-half of the small Polish Jewish community applied for visas to Israel. At a July meeting of the Communist Party, First Secretary Gomulka condemned anti-Semitism. However, the Partisan faction remained strong and Gomulka was forced to give ground to its demands at a November Party congress. Gomulka finally put an end to the anti-Zionist campaign in February 1969. 3 Ambassador Gronouski left post on May 26. Ambassador Stoessel presented his credentials on September 12. 134. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 134. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 1 Washington, July 9, 1968, 1536Z. CAP 81592. Following is a memo from Nick Katzenbach recommending a Presidential statement condemning anti-Semitism in Poland as a substitute for Congressional action withdrawing most favored nation from Poland. Congressman Farbstein will probably offer his amendment to the Foreign Aid Act withdrawing most favored nation from Poland on Thursday. He has not made known his specific language. In the Senate, Dodd last week introduced a sense of the Senate resolution calling of the President to withdraw most favored nation from Poland until such time as the Polish Government changes its anti-Semitic, anti-student, and anti-intellectual policies. Mandatory withdrawal of most favored nation from Poland now would not be effective foreign policy and would not help the Jews in Poland. I believe Nick's recommendation is well worth a try. Tell Katzenbach to go ahead 2 Call me For the President from Katzenbach Subject: Polish Jews and most favored nation I have learned that Congressman Farbstein intends, within the next few days, to offer an amendment to the foreign aid bill withdrawing most favored nation from Poland. He will argue that Poland no longer deserves preferential tariff treatment because of government-inspired anti-Semitism. Unless we take immediate action, I expect the amendment to pass. This would be unfortunate because: —It could lead the Polish Government to more restrictive measures against Jews. —It would harm our relations with Poland, and make it extremely difficult to return most favored nation treatment to Poland in the future. —It would limit the powers of the President. I have talked to Herman Edelsberg, of B'nai B'rith, who is one of the Jewish leaders encouraging Farbstein to introduce the amendment. He, in turn, has talked to Myer Feldman and other Jewish leaders. Edelsberg tells me that Farbstein is too far down the road now to pull back. But he also says that he and his colleagues can probably prevent passage of the amendment (by avoiding a roll call vote) if he can assure proponents of the measure (including Farbstein) that there will be a strong Presidential statement—within the next several weeks, but after the foreign aid bill has passed—condemning anti-Semitism in Poland. Although I am not sure the amendment can be blocked, I think this tactic is well worth the effort. A Presidential statement would be politically useful at home, and far less harmful to our relations with Poland and to the well-being of Polish Jews than would Congressional action withdrawing most favored nation. If the Jewish leaders cannot prevent passage of the amendment, there will be no need for a Presidential statement. If you agree, I will tell Edelsberg that you are prepared to make a public statement of concern about the plight of Jews in Poland. (You could do this: 1) at a press conference; 2) before a group of Jewish leaders; or 3) in response to a letter—which we would generate—from a group of Jewish leaders.) I also would call in the Polish Ambassador and explain to him that: —We will try to head off withdrawal of most favored nation, but the responsibility for the public outcry which this amendment represents rests wholly on the shoulders of the Polish Government. —The President has decided that, if we are able to prevent most favored nation withdrawal, he must issue a strong statement condemning anti-Semitism in Poland. —If the Polish Government fails to heed our warning, the most favored nation issue will certainly come up again in the next session of Congress. At that time there will be no way to prevent the passage of an amendment which would be in the interests of neither of us. Draft Presidential statement follows: “For many generations the American and Polish peoples have shared common aspirations for human rights and dignity. High among these rights stand freedom of religious faith and freedom from discrimination based on origin. We know the human suffering that follows the suppression and violation of these rights. Like millions of other Americans, I have read with deep concern of recent developments in Poland. These reports make it clear that many of the relatively few Jews left in Poland now live in uncertainty and fear. Actions by the Polish Government, whatever may have been their purpose and motivation, have resulted in the dismissal from positions not only in government but in professional life of people of Jewish faith or origin. The world needs no reminder of how anti-Semitism can spread like a pestilence, leaving horror and tragedy in its wake. The lessons of history remain too vivid and too stark to ever again permit civilized nations to make innocent men the victims of political stratagems or maneuvering. Together with my countrymen, I condemn anti-Semitism wherever it may exist, whatever form it may take, whatever it may be called. I call on the Polish Government, and on men of good will everywhere, to join with me in this condemnation.” 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 3. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 11:50 a.m. CDT. 2 This option is checked. 3 President Johnson mentioned the resurgence of anti-Semitism in his September 10 remarks at the 125th annual meeting of the B'nai B'rith. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69 , Book II, pp. 944–950. 135. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 135. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, September 4, 1968. SUBJECT Preemptive Action by Administration to Suspend MFN for Poland: Information Memorandum 1. Many, perhaps most, of the members of the Congress resuming its session today will wish to express in various ways their indignation against the Powers that invaded and continue to occupy Czechoslovakia. The result may be Congressional action for withdrawing MFN from Poland, the only one of the invading countries enjoying this advantage. It has been suggested that we recommend to the President that he take the initiative in suspending MFN to Poland without waiting for possible Congressional action. 2. This proposal has certain advantages: A. It might blunt the force of the Congressional attack and thus prevent more extreme action such as an embargo. B. Presidential action could keep alive the option on the part of the President independently to restore MFN to Poland when the time was appropriate. (An opinion from L that this is legally possible is attached.) 2 C. It would demonstrate that the Executive has used its arguments in the past on the desirability of flexibility in our relations to the Communist countries in good faith. It would show that the Administration while willing to give under appropriate conditions is also ready to withdraw. D. It would show that the Executive is willing to forego substantial economic advantage both in trade and in possible loss of payments by the Poles on their long-term debt (see paragraph 3B below) by a gesture expressing the moral revulsion of the United States. 3. On the other hand, there are a number of disadvantages. I believe the first two of these most important. The others although less so are enumerated as of substantial cumulative weight. A. Withdrawal of MFN from Poland would be a clear violation of our international obligations under GATT of which Poland is a member. Withdrawal of MFN by act of Congress would equally be a violation of GATT. The international impact of such a violation of an international obligation, however (only a year after we had supported the accession of Poland to GATT) on the initiative of the Executive charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, would be far greater than if it were an act forced on the Administration by the actions of the Congress. B. Withdrawing MFN from Poland would be a serious act having substantial impact on our bilateral relations, including possible withholding by Poland of payments on its claims settlement with which MFN had been linked and conceivably on its other long-term obligations as well. This strong action would be taken against a Soviet puppet. Would not members of the Congress contrast this action with the economic “pinpricks” likely to be taken by the Executive against the Soviet Union? Would not the demand then arise in the Congress that the punishment fit the crime by more extreme action against the Soviet Union, the prime actor, such as an embargo on trade? C. To the extent that preemptive action would seem to many Congressmen a transparent device to ward off Congressional action of a less limited character, it would fail to have that effect. D. The Administration would presumably support its action on one or both of two grounds, its punitive character and its possible effect on Polish conduct in the future, perhaps by inducing the Poles to withdraw their occupying forces from Czechoslovakia. Even ignoring the fact that the Poles presumably had and will have little opportunity for control of their own behavior in this case, use of the argument would run into the Congressional question of why we had not taken this action earlier to combat Polish support of North Viet-Nam. We have consistently taken the position that withdrawal of MFN could have no effect on Polish Vietnamese policy and might even intensify Polish “anti-Zionist” actions with all their anti-Semitic implications. E. Preemptive action by the Executive on MFN would be inconsistent with the position heretofore consistently taken by Administration spokesmen in public speeches and otherwise emphasizing the broad political advantages of trade and the importance, even under adverse conditions, of pushing ahead with the long-term advantages to be derived from it (impact on society, greater realism, strengthening of pragmatic forces). We have also emphasized the long-term effect of measures such as this in creating uncertainties among businessmen. F. While it would be of course legally possible for the Administration to lift the suspension at an appropriate later time, this would in fact be politically difficult if not impossible unless current conditions had substantially changed. G. Our objectives could be better achieved by attempting to have any Congressional act suspending MFN, if such action should seem inevitable, subjected to a provision that the suspension could be lifted at such time that the President would find this to the national interest. If absolutely necessary this could be coupled with the requirement that he find that the conditions which led to suspension (invasion and continued occupation of Czechoslovakia, “anti-Zionism” with its anti-Semitic implications if this should be involved in the Congressional action) no longer existed. 4. In my view, the strong balance of arguments weighs against preemptive action by the Executive to suspend MFN. I believe we should instead direct our efforts to ensuring that any Congressional action taken to suspend MFN be coupled with a grant of authority to the President giving him the right to lift the suspension at such time that he found such action would be to the national interest. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Confidential. Drafted by Lisle. A notation on the source text reads: “U suggests you advise Ives at lunch we are working on this proposal. It needs refinement.” 2 Not printed. 136. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 136. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, September 17, 1968, 1505Z. 4540. Subject: Effect of Czechoslovak crisis on Polish scene. Ref: Warsaw 4300. 2 1. Effects of intervention in Czechoslovakia will certainly be felt in Poland for some time to come. Most important short-term consequences of recent events will probably be general clamping down of lid in Poland. Long-term consequences are not so clear, however. Following are some implications for various elements in political scene here. 2. Party—Immediate effect of Warsaw Pact joint actions against Czechoslovakia is to strengthen Gomulka's position within party. His leadership has sustained serious challenge over past fifteen months from “nationalist” and ambitious younger elements of party. He had appeared to lose ground following “March events” 3 of this year. Though he succeeded in reasserting himself in May and June, published discussions at July Plenum showed there was no consensus on major issues and, in fact, there existed considerable turmoil in party. Speculation was rife that Gomulka might again lose ground to his challengers at November Party Congress. Now, however, those who may have argued within party councils for change in the guard and/or greater autonomy from Moscow might well lie low for time being. Soviets can hardly tolerate at this moment any rocking of Polish boat. Gomulka would not in any case give up without fierce struggle, in which he would presumably be able to count on Soviet support. However, long-term prospects are not so clear; Polish regime has been increasingly exposed as Soviet satellite by willy-nilly identifying itself with Soviet international adventures and miscalculations. 3. Armed Forces—Military has not in recent times played well-defined role of its own in Polish politics, except to extent that some individual military officers have been identified with “Partisans” and that military has also purged itself of “Zionists” of alleged doubtful loyalty. It is conceivable that differences exist within military leadership on political aspects of Czech venture, as was true during aftermath of Arab-Israeli war. Fact that First Deputy Chief of Army's main political administration (Gen. Czapla) found it necessary to go to Czechoslovakia two weeks ago to talk to Polish troops on spot (Warsaw 4316) 4 may tie in with rumors of low morale among Polish occupying forces. Reading between lines in press leads to strong suspicion political “Commissars” will have some difficulty in future with military elements who experienced truth in Czechoslovakia. It is not impossible that coming weeks or months will bring further shake-up in military hierarchy, like those which followed Arab-Israeli war last year and Polish student demonstrations this spring. 4. Intellectuals—From representative sampling, Embassy concludes that Polish intelligentsia (cultural and technical) has all along strongly sympathized with liberalizing trends in Czechoslovakia and feels considerable shame and disgust at Polish complicity in invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, apart from leaflet reported in Warsaw 4320, 5 which is probably work of Warsaw intellectuals or students, we know of no active manifestations of solidarity with Czechoslovakia. 5. Students—Regime has been fortunate in that Czechoslovak crisis came to head during vacation season when students are scattered. What will happen when academic year begins and students are concentrated again in Warsaw, Krakow and elsewhere is difficult to foresee. We cannot discount possibility that there will be attempts to organize protests. However, odds will be strongly against potentially dissident students. Steam may well have gone out of Czechoslovak crisis by time students get together. Regime organs will certainly be more than usually vigilant with memory of “March events” in Poland still fresh and with example of Czech students' behavior before them. Polish students themselves may be skeptical about utility of protest actions in view of way their protests last March were turned against them and exploited for internal party purposes. Their most militant leaders of last spring are, in any case, in jail. 6. Church—So far, church has not spoken out on events in Czechoslovakia. Although we take it for granted that church hierarchy is strongly opposed to Polish participation in Warsaw Pact action against Czechoslovakia on moral and patriotic grounds, we believe that church will be cautious about expressing its views in public. Church leaders may well conclude that it would not be in church's best interests here to enter fruitless debate with regime on issue of relations with another socialist state or on merits of internal Czech liberalization process (led, after all, by Communists). Church may well prefer to save its ammunition for issues of more immediate concern to it. 7. Workers—In aftermath of Czech crisis Poland has not witnessed anything comparable to series of factory rallies organized in support of government at time of March events. Those manifestations of solidarity which have occurred with some regularity have mainly taken the form of letters, greetings and gifts directed towards “heroic” Polish soldiers in the field. Absence of any serious attempt by regime to evoke working class endorsement for its stand may indicate that government considers the workers at best apathetic or at worst uncooperative on this issue. Regime has clearly chosen to rely more on emotive power of its arguments (threat of FRG) to justify its actions and probably has decided not to use Czech affair to dissipate momentum needed among the workers for the pre-Congress campaign. 8. Poland's Foreign Relations—Poland's participation in Warsaw Pact actions will have at least temporary chilling effect on its foreign relations, above all with Western Europe and US. WE countries have already taken measures to cancel visits or other joint activities planned for near future to indicate their displeasure. Most dramatic of such actions is indefinite postponement by French of Gomulka September visit to Paris. Poland's careful efforts over recent years to cultivate smaller European countries (Scandinavia and Benelux in particular) and gain sympathetic hearing for its view on Germany, European security and European boundary problems appear for moment, at least to have suffered severe setback. Whenever Poles begin picking up threads again they will no longer enjoy psychological advantage as leading victims of Nazi wartime brutality and as first East European country to liberalize its internal structure in 1956. Wellspring of special sympathy which Poles enjoy in West Europe, in other words, has probably run dry, at least temporarily. It had already been significantly reduced by increasing illiberalism of Gomulka regime in recent years, stubborn rigidity on Central European issues, increasingly vocal subservience to Moscow line on all international matters, and above all outbreak of internal anti-Semitism earlier this year. Absence of Foreign Minister and current demoralization of Polish Foreign Service will not help in coping with problem. 9. Conclusions—Unhappy as large sections of Polish public may be over Czechoslovak affair, we are not aware of any significant protest actions and hardly anticipate any. In short run at least, we expect tightening of regime controls. Gomulka will in all likelihood be able to take advantage of current atmosphere to maintain his position in party and possibly win back some lost ground through PZPR Congress in November. However, this immediate prospect does not necessarily correspond to longer range trends. 10. To be sure, Gomulka may use his Czech windfall to pick off his potential rivals and opponents in party leadership and so maintain his predominant position indefinitely. However, younger, less dogmatic, more nationalistic elements of party—those who have been challenging Gomulka's establishment since last March student unrest—do not appear despondent re prospects following Czech invasion. While some are skilled and pragmatic, they do not necessarily sympathize with Czech democracy, liberalism and economic reform. At this stage “the game” is more nihilistic: That of making room nearer top of power structure and occupying it. Today it is Zionists and revisionists who must make room; tomorrow, their protectors (Gomulka establishment) must yield. Moreover, top contenders, Moczar and Gierek, appreciate that under Polish international and domestic conditions only way to climb to top is on Gomulka's back. If Gomulka's long-term authority and respect are debilitated along way by involvement in unpopular affairs—like anti-Zionist campaign, clamp-down on students and intellectuals, and Czech invasion—so much the better. 11. Power struggle in Poland continues with Czech occupation constituting temporary windfall for Gomulka. Final chapter Czech occupation and its influence on future Soviet leadership and behavior not yet written. Outcome in Prague and Moscow will be major factors influencing eventual political course and leadership pattern in Poland. Stoessel 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Munich, USNATO, and Poznan. 2 Telegram 4300, August 21, analyzed the implications for Poland of the Czech crisis. (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 2, Document 133 . 4 Telegram 4316, August 26, reported Polish press comments on Czechoslovakia. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH) 5 Dated August 27. (Ibid.) 137. Memorandum for the Record 137. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, September 17, 1968. SUBJECT Conversation with Ambassador Jerzy Michalowski of the Polish Embassy Ambassador Michalowski called me on the phone and suggested lunch. When I countered by suggesting a day some time in the future, Ambassador Michalowski asked if he could call on me in my office. I checked with the State Department, and he came by at 3:00 p.m. today. Ambassador Michalowski opened the conversation by asking what the prospects were of getting back on the track in our bilateral relations. I asked if he had read the President's B'nai B'rith speech, in which the President made clear that a great deal would depend on the actions of the occupying powers in Czechoslovakia from now on. 2 I asked Ambassador Michalowski when the Polish Government expected to withdraw its troops. Ambassador Michalowski said that, having paid the price, the Warsaw Pact allies could not withdraw until they were “sure” that their essential objectives would not again be endangered. In talking about the relationship between the Czechs and Moscow, he indicated the Czechs were far from docile or under control. Michalowski said his expectation was that the Czechs and Soviets would end up making some sort of agreement which would result in the stationing of two or three Soviet divisions on the western border. He spent some minutes describing how the intervention had become necessary—essentially because the Dubcek regime was allowing counter-revolutionary forces to run rampant and vital Warsaw Pact security interests were at stake. He described Dubcek as honest and a “beautiful” personality, but without the strength to defend Communism that Gomulka had in 1956. I said I could not agree with Ambassador Michalowski's explanations. If anything seemed clear from the period between January and August, it was that the Czechoslovak Government and people were determined to remain in the Warsaw Pact and to discharge their commitments to it. They had even admitted large numbers of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia for maneuvers—only to have those troops misused against them. The American Government had been scrupulous in giving no occasion for anyone to believe we were trying to take advantage of Czech developments. Our relationship to the Czechoslovak Government—a Communist regime committed to the Warsaw Pact—had been extremely reserved—even on bilateral issues such as gold and claims. Michalowski smiled wryly, and said perhaps we didn't want the gold to fall into the hands of the occupying powers. Michalowski readily acknowledged that the American Government's position prior to August 20 had been “correct.” I remarked that the stories of American “green berets” and arms caches were the purest nonsense. Ambassador Michalowski said that this was the sort of thing governments sometimes said in such circumstances, and did not dispute the matter. I remarked that the anti-Semitism in the Polish press and TV did not help matters. Michalowski said there had been one speech by Moczar and an article or two, but the policy of Gomulka and the responsible leaders of the government was firmly against such manifestations. When a remark slipped by, Mr. Randal of the New York Times could be counted on to pick it up. I asked whether the removal of Jewish Poles from government and party offices had altogether ceased. Michalowski said he knew of no removals since last spring. Michalowski said the Eastern European countries had been willing to work constructively on bilateral matters in spite of the bombing of a socialist ally in Vietnam. We should now show the same constructive attitude with the shoe on the other foot. I said the cases were not analogous. Our bombing of North Vietnam had followed a massive intervention by North Vietnam in the South. Michalowski said every action is a reaction to something. Michalowski said he had called on Congressman Zablocki yesterday, as well as a number of other Polish-Americans. So far as he could tell, the Polish-American community hoped that cultural and economic relations with Poland would continue. I said this was not my understanding of the reaction of Polish-Americans, and other Americans of Eastern European origin. The White House was getting a lot of mail advocating strong measures, and many Congressmen and other public figures felt the same way. Michalowski asked why we didn't respond to a political act politically and not vent our feelings on cultural exchanges which benefited our peoples, or economic measures which would make it difficult to rebuild our relationship later. He particularly mentioned MFN, and said much depended on the vigor of U.S. Government action to save this vital link to Poland's and America's future relationship. If MFN were lost, the Poles would retaliate; and we would be in a downward spiral. I said I was not at all confident what would happen with MFN. I said I thought it did not so much depend on the U.S. Government as on the future course of action of the Polish Government and its Warsaw Pact allies in Czechoslovakia. Michalowski said he hoped we would not take a position that a resumption of detente would depend on the abolition of censorship in Czechoslovakia. I said that there seemed to be a range of possibilities—on one hand respect for Czech sovereignty, or at least the non-interference in internal affairs which seemed to be called for in the Moscow Agreements, and on the other a blood bath, police terror, and an occupation regime. I could not make prescriptions, but was merely pointing out that the world—including America—could not fail to respond one way or the other to the future course of events in Czechoslovakia. Michalowski said he felt reassured by Kuznetsov's arrival in Prague. He said he believes things are on the road to normalization, and we will see an improvement in the situation—not a degeneration. Michalowski mentioned that a move to boycott Polish products had so far been narrowly averted. I said I was not at all sure there wouldn't be further efforts by an aroused American public. Michalowski said he hoped the American Government would not end up whipping the little countries, while business went on as usual with Moscow. He said the Polish Government had simply been participating in something it had to do. The decisions for the future would be made in Moscow. I said I couldn't help but believe Mr. Gomulka had some influence in Moscow—particularly if reports of divided councils in the Kremlin had any truth to them. Michalowski said there had been deep divisions and hard arguments in the Kremlin, and the Polish Government did have a voice, but the basic decision was Moscow's. I asked Michalowski what he had meant by his statement that we should respond politically, and not in the economic and cultural field. He answered: “Oh, perhaps by sending me home and withdrawing Mr. Stoessel—something like that.” He indicated his mission had been one tragedy and disappointment after another. If he had known what was in store, he would never have come. I said I realized that Ambassador Michalowski personally must find the present situation an unhappy one. We parted by exchanging hopes that our next meeting would be in better circumstances. Michalowski said he was even then on his way to protest the shootings directed against a Polish ship in Miami. 3 ND 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 3. Confidential. Drafted by Nathaniel Davis. 2 For text of President Johnson's September 10 speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69 , Book II, pp. 944–950. 3 On September 16, a Polish ship bound for Mexico was hit by a shell fired by a recoilless rifle. 138. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 138. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, December 11, 1968, 1579Z. 5366. Subject: US policy toward Poland. 1. Following comments and recommendations concerning US policy toward Poland are submitted with thought that they may be useful in context of policy reviews taking place during transition period. 2. Begin summary. While recognizing Poland's current position as staunch Warsaw Pact ally of USSR ruled by doctrinaire, conservative Communist regime, I believe that evolutionary trends inevitably will continue develop here as in other areas of Eastern Europe. To encourage such trends, to enhance US influence and to promote in long term better relations between Poland and West, we recommend continued, low-visibility, student, professor and technical exchanges; expanded use of PL–480 funds for English language teaching and research projects; revamping VOA broadcasts; and reinstitution some form of Media Guarantee Program. We also favor maintenance of MFN for Poland, competitive commercial credits, renewed efforts conclude consular convention, and encouragement of Polish participation in international organizations. Lastly, we believe it would be helpful if US, in consultation with FRG, could take public position recognizing de facto permanency of present Polish western boundaries. End summary. 3. Poland's political situation and prospects. Recent Fifth Congress of Polish Communist Party reaffirmed Gomulka's leadership and gave strong support to program emphasizing loyalty to USSR “for better or worse,” and conservative policies relating to internal political and economic life. Re international affairs, regime stresses hostility to FRG, necessity of recognizing status quo in Europe, and Soviet preeminence in Eastern Europe. Conservative line and continued leadership of Gomulka are supported by USSR, which wishes stability in Poland, and reflect desire of Polish regime to damp down and absorb internal stresses in wake of “March events” and Czechoslovakia. 4. However, despite lid imposed by Fifth Congress, there is tension and maneuver in dynamics of internal politics. Younger elements, both party and non-party, are pushing for recognition, and nationalist themes continue to be voiced although in muted fashion. Regardless of personal fortunes such individual pretenders as Gierek and Moczar, pressures for less doctrinaire approach to political and economic problems facing Poland exist and are certain to increase. Although Soviets as well as Gomulka and his cohorts will attempt to restrain such pressures, and may be successful in short run, I am persuaded that over long term evolutionary trends in Poland as well as elsewhere in Eastern Europe cannot be contained. It should be our policy to contribute discreetly but effectively to develop such trends. 5. US image in Poland. There is broadly based sentiment of good will toward US in Poland resulting from many factors, including numerous family ties with relatives in US, admiration for US as technologically advanced country of democracy and opportunity, and respect for US as leader of non-Communist world. Young people in particular tend regard US with sympathy as most modern state endowed with highest standard of living. At same time, regime propaganda pictures US as imperialist power trying to act as world's policeman (Viet-Nam) and internal conflicts in US are played up. While this propaganda is not in itself very convincing, it is all-pervasive, persistent, and its effectiveness is increasing as cultural, media and other contacts with US are reduced. To counter regime propaganda and to maintain and if possible enhance good US image in Poland, we should aim at improving our cultural, informational, and scientific programs in Poland. 6. With these elements in mind, we recommend following (to be elaborated in year-end policy assessment): A. Exchange and cooperative programs: (1) Expand government-sponsored, long-term student and professor exchanges; (2) encourage further institution-sponsored programs, such as Academy of Sciences, Stanford University, and projected Kansas University English language exchange; (3) develop new PL-480 cooperative and research projects in scientific fields; (4) continue efforts obtain Congressional approval for ten-year English program, and meanwhile expand current English-teaching program; (5) augment present facilities and exchanges with Krakow Children's Hospital; (6) encourage Ford Foundation's joint-project concept and further foundation exchanges, like Kosciuszko; and (7) support international cooperative programs, like current FAO/UNDP projects. B. Media: (1) Develop new program to replace former IMG (International Media Guarantee); (2) enter 1969 Warsaw Book Fair and Poznan Trade Fair; (3) utilize in Poland results of Yugoslav book reprint program; (4) foster US-Polish university book exchange; and (5) target Polish language VOA programs to an increasing extent on youth. C. Consular convention: We have had indications recently that Poles would like to conclude negotiations on consular convention (separate report will be submitted) and we recommend reopening discussions on this subject. D. Trade: Believing that our economic as well as political interests are furthered through East-West engagement, multi-lateralism and improvement BOP situation, we recommend: (1) maintenance MFN; (2) flexible US trade policy including industrial credits at least up to Berne Convention limits to East European countries and competitive CCC credits; (3) realistic strategic licensing; (4) resumption normal commercial promotion activities; and (5) discreet encouragement meaningful Polish participation in international bodies such as GATT and ECE, and increased contact wherever feasible between Poland and other East European countries and OECD. 7. Oder-Neisse line. I am aware of difficult and complicated nature of this problem, particularly from standpoint of our relations with FRG. Also, I am under no illusions that US—and even FRG—recognition of boundary would result in immediate improvement basic FRG-Polish relations or related East-West security and political problems. However, I am impressed with insistence and effectiveness of Polish propaganda re impermanent nature of western frontiers, and I am also impressed with fact that no responsible Western official seems to believe that significant alteration in Oder-Neisse boundary will be feasible or that FRG recognition at some later date can be traded for anything worthwhile. 8. In this situation, I feel that we should prepare ground for time when US spokesman could issue statement expressing our confidence that delimitation of boundaries of reunified Germany in a peace treaty would reflect factual situation east of the Oder-Neisse. 9. Timing and exact wording obviously would have to be worked out with FRG and other Allies with greatest care, possibly associating it with some significant measure or statement relating to European security and Western Alliance. Ideally it should follow or be in conjunction with statement by FRG itself concerning various aspects its Eastern policy. Probably no time is an ideal time for such a step in so far as US-FRG relations are concerned; but I believe it would pay dividends in terms of lessening impact of Communist propaganda and in injecting realism into important aspect of East-West relations, thereby furthering our long-range interests in Europe. 10. Conclusion. We recognize of course, that in post-Czechoslovakia period, and with general tightening of ideological screws in Eastern Europe, it is not politically desirable nor would it be effective for us to undertake broad-gauged program of “bridge-building” initiatives toward Poland or others of Warsaw Pact Five. Nevertheless, we should continue to play for long term in pursuing program of type outlined above, which, in discreet and non-ostentatious manner, is aimed at furthering evolutionary trends in Poland and building on already broad base of sympathetic regard for us. 11. Enunciation of new US stand on frontiers, while admittedly a more far-reaching and complicated political move, in my view could be influential in this part of Eastern Europe in lessening impact of one major element of Communist propaganda line and conceivably in preparing way for more rational Polish-FRG relations. Stoessel 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL–US. Secret. Romania Romania 139. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State Bucharest, February 26, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM–US. Confidential. 140. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State Bucharest, March 5, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM–US. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow, Hong Kong, Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Sofia, Warsaw, London, Paris, Bonn, Belgrade, Munich, and Berlin. 141. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State Bucharest, May 12, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 RUM. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bonn, Budapest, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, Vienna, Warsaw, Berlin, and Munich. 142. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 18, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 1. Confidential. Drafted by Trezise and approved in M. 143. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, May 29, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memoranda to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5. Secret. 144. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 16, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Warker and approved in S on August 11. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The source text is labeled “Part I of IV Parts;“ other memoranda of this conversation, dealing with East-West political relations and the visit of Foreign Minister Manescu to the United States, are ibid. 145. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State Bucharest, November 24, 1964, 11 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 2. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow. The United States and Romania raised their respective diplomatic missions to the level of Embassy in August 1964. 146. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 3, 1964, noon. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on December 15. The meeting was held at USUN. The source text is labeled “Part I of II;“ a second memorandum of this conversation, dealing with Communist China, is ibid. 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania Washington, January 5, 1965, 3:49 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 RUM. Confidential; Noforn. Drafted by Vedeler, cleared by Tyler, and approved by Davis. 148. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 15, 1965, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rumania, Memos, Vol. 2. Confidential. Drafted by Warker and approved in U on February 25. The meeting was held in Ball's office. 149. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State Bucharest, March 18, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 RUM. Confidential. Repeated to Paris. 150. Minutes of Meeting of the Export Control Review Board Washington, April 1, 1965, 4:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10. Secret. 151. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 20, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rumania, Memos, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. 152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania Washington, May 16, 1966, 4:16 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 USSR. Confidential. Drafted in INR, cleared in EUR, and approved in INR. Also sent to Moscow and Paris for the Embassy and USNATO. 153. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 5, 1966, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 85. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information; the memorandum was approved in S on October 18. The meeting was held in Rusk's quarters. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VI;“ memoranda of this conversation dealing with Romanian-German relations, East-West relations, Vietnam, Manescu's travel, peacekeeping, and Cyprus are ibid. 154. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State Bucharest, January 23, 1967, 1500Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM–US. Secret; Exdis. 155. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State Bucharest, February 3, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM–US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Davis. 156. Memorandum of Conversation New York, June 23, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lisle and approved in S on June 26. The meeting was held during the Secretary's dinner at the Waldorf Astoria. Rusk and Maurer were in New York for the U.N. General Assembly meeting. Memoranda of their discussion of the Middle East and Vietnam are ibid., POL 7 ROM and POL 27 VIET S, respectively. 157. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 26, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel. 158. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State Bucharest, January 19, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ROM. Confidential. Drafted by deMartino. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, and Warsaw. 159. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 11, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held at Ambassador Bogdan's residence. A typed note on the source text indicates that this was a “draft.” No cleared copy of the memorandum was found. 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania Washington, May 10, 1968, 1845Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Lisle and approved by Katzenbach. 161. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 15, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17–8 ROM. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Davis. 162. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 9, 1968, 11–11:40 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on July 11. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The source text is labeled “Part II of III;“ a memorandum of the portion of their conversation dealing with Vietnam is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. A July 10 memorandum from Read to Shlaudeman, attached to the source text, noted that at the request of Secretary Rusk no notes were taken for the portion of the conversation dealing with a heavy water plant. 163. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 23, 1968. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Memoranda of Conversation—General. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in G on August 27. 164. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 24, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. Secret. Drafted by Beaudry. 165. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 30, 1968, 9 p.m. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379. Secret; Limdis. No drafting information is on source text; the memorandum was approved in S on September 3. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. For a telegraphic report of this meeting, see Document 90. 166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania Washington, August 31, 1968, 2147Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Kaplan and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Moscow, Belgrade, and Prague. 167. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 1, 1968, 0344Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Czech Crisis. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch on August 31 at 11:01 p.m., CDT. 168. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State Bucharest, September 1, 1968, 1125Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Belgrade, Moscow, and Prague. 169. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State Washington, September 6, 1968, 1620Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, USUN, USNATO, Paris, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 170. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 1, 1968, 1:15–3:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 70 D 418, CF 320. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on October 14. The meeting was held during the Secretary's luncheon at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled “Part I of II;“ part II of the discussion dealing with Vietnam is ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. 171. Intelligence Information Cable Bucharest, November 21, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Possible Warsaw Pact Invasion. Secret; No Foreign Dissemination; Controlled Dissemination; No Dissemination Abroad; Background Use Only. 172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, November 23, 1968, 1926Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Toon and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to USNATO and repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, and London. 173. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State Bucharest, December 9, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ROM. Confidential. Drafted by deMartino. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, Paris, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania Washington, December 12, 1968, 1828Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 ROM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tihany, cleared in EUR/RPM, and approved by Toon. Also sent to Moscow and USNATO. 139. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State 139. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State 1 Bucharest, February 26, 1964, 3 p.m. 573. Had cordial hour and half talk with Foreign Minister Manescu evening February 24. Discussion dealt mainly with Rumanian-American relations. Highlights follow: 1. Manescu's relations with Secretary Rusk. Manescu spoke at length and with warm appreciation of their frank and useful discussions last fall 2 and hoped they would be resumed upon next annual visit to UNGA. However he did not want to let dialogue lapse until he next saw Secretary. For this reason he had asked see me and would like do so again from time to time. He would always be available for general discussions and could assure me as Bodnaras had recently done that “other top leaders will be equally accessible” should I wish to see them. I thanked Manescu and told him Secretary has spoken to me in same warm terms of his pleasure at their candid talks and his desire renew them whenever possible. I conveyed Secretary's personal greetings and Manescu reciprocated. We agreed meet periodically for talks ourselves. 2. Visit of agricultural experts. Manescu said Secretary had told him to approach him directly if he had something special on his mind, and for this reason having received Moghioros' urgent expression of interest in sending to U.S. four agricultural experts for observation of practical farm work, he had sent Minister Balaceanu to see Secretary personally about it. He said Rumanian Legation had meanwhile reported somewhat favorable reactions from Agriculture Department but nothing more concrete. I told him I had nothing to add but knew request (Department telegram 382) 3 being given every possible consideration. 3. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Manescu spoke with great feeling about President Kennedy's qualities as man and statesman and said Rumanians generally pleased and reassured by what they have observed of President Johnson's approach to international problems. President Kennedy had introduced new tone and more objective approach to relations with Eastern Europe which continue very much in evidence. During his tenure Rumanian-American relations had much improved. Atmosphere still steadily improving and as example new tone he cited approvingly Secretary's reply when recently asked whether certain countries could be regarded as “satellites” that his colleagues had advised that “socialist countries” better usage. Manescu thought perhaps he could take some credit for influencing Secretary's views this regard. I observed that Rumania's recent record of independent thought and action had unquestionably affected his thinking and Manescu laughingly assented. 4. Trade. I told Manescu that President Kennedy had been most interested in economic developments in Eastern Europe and its foreign trade, which were matters of pressing interest to Rumania, and that President had not only initiated review of our trade policy toward Eastern Europe generally but given impetus to special review policy toward Rumania. I elaborated somewhat upon his role this regard following Gheorghiu-Dej's talk with Secretary Freeman and my talk with President last August. 4 I told Manescu that as consequence these discussions, and as direct result Rumania's stress over past year on “national independence and sovereignty” in pursuit its economic policy and other objectives, we had been drawing up revised trade policy for Eastern Europe and within its framework separate trade program for Rumania. I said two matters currently receiving jointly top-level consideration and Rumania only socialist country for which separate program now being envisaged. I said we plan invite Gaston-Marin; visit would give everyone fine opportunity for wide ranging talks. He said there are many urgent matters because of planning requirements and several “which President Gheorghiu-Dej singled out to Secretary Freeman are of particular urgency and importance” (i.e. synthetic rubber plants). He was glad note American del from International General Electric Company is now here and understands talks going well (group is negotiating possible $10 million deal for methane gas turbines). 5. Consular Cases. Manescu said he heard I had very interesting talk with Bodnaras and we had even discussed our consular cases. I said I was most gratified have Bodnaras assure me that all consular cases I raised with Manescu last May will eventually be resolved. Manescu said what Bodnaras told me was of course “authoritative” and he could now confirm they are “moving to resolve all cases I had raised in their totality.” He cited number of 372. I said that seemed go beyond 267 cases listed in my démarche. Manescu said 372 was figure he was given (presumably covers our 267 plus other family members) and action being taken “as matter of principle for humanitarian reasons.” I said this information highly gratifying and I knew how much it would be welcomed in Washington. I then raised question two Galdau boys who had not been allowed accompany their mother to join father. Manescu checked list, verified that case disapproved, but promised it will be reexamined. I thanked him and expressed hope same attitude will be adopted in cases of others not necessarily on our lists who also may desire join close relatives in U.S. Manescu said they will continue take same approach in such cases. (Indeed since November 1963, 11 relatives of American citizens plus 11 more members of their families have received exit documents even though not on Legation's lists.) 5 6. Level of missions. Manescu then raised question of level of missions which he reminded me had discussed with Secretary and asked for my views. I repeated what I told Malita as reported paragraph 1, Legtel 567, 6 as well as what I proposed tell Manescu in numbered paragraph 4 of Legtel 556. 7 I stressed as my personal view that once all consular cases were settled they would probably not have to wait long for our decision and therefore what he had just told me this regard was particularly relevant and would be carefully studied in Washington. I also emphasized we approached question in each of three Balkan countries in light of status of our individual relations with each country and would make separate decisions accordingly. Manescu agreed with this approach and expressed satisfaction with what I had say generally on subject. I reminded Manescu there were other issues on which we also hoped see progress soon: (1) Consular convention; we welcomed Rumania's agreement conclude convention but were still waiting for their draft. Manescu said we will have it shortly and they will be prepared pursue talks in Washington. (2) Travel restrictions. I said we were still awaiting Rumanian reply our note proposing mutual waiver travel notification requirement, with certain zones to be closed for travel in both countries. 8 We considered proposal strictly reciprocal and its adoption would constitute further step toward improved relations. Manescu objected that our closed areas were proportionately much larger than theirs (spoke of third of American territory as compared with 2 percent Rumanian territory). I said I thought about third our territory was proscribed to Soviet travel on reciprocal basis but only 12 percent or so to Rumanian travel. I also believed Rumanian closed area including frontier zones was somewhat larger than he indicated. In fact I had been under impression American and Rumanian closed areas were roughly proportionate and suggested their experts might take another look at relative proportions. Manescu agreed do so. (Would appreciate Department doing same and advising me.) 9 Manescu also objected our regulations made it hard for Rumanian Legation personnel to get to seashore. Perhaps most important was that we had charged them with acting on behalf of Russians, and they resented this because they acting on own behalf. I reminded him of Secretary's words that sophisticated appraisal of situation was required. Manescu said matter might be worked out and they would give it further thought. (3) New Chancery. I alerted Manescu we might be coming soon with formal request for assistance buy or build new Chancery. He said they had same problem in Washington with lovely Chancery but too small and impractical. They had thought of buying Cuban Embassy but problems arose and they now thinking of building new Chancery. We could discuss their desires and ours, and they would be prepared give us all possible aid here. In conclusion Manescu philosophized about recent steady progress in our relations and observed Rumanian Government anticipates considerably expanded relations with U.S. in next several years. He repeated how much he values his personal relationship with Secretary Rusk and said some complimentary things about Legation's role. He said that more you get to know us, more you will realize that though we are cautious—“because we have had series of foreign bosses throughout our history we have learned to be”—we are also self-respecting and speak out for ourselves and if we are treated well we respond in kind. I told him that Americans have long been nurtured in very qualities of self-respect and independent-mindedness of which he spoke and it is precisely these qualities we most respect in others and to which we have traditionally found it easiest to respond. We agreed that talk was most useful and we will have other talks from time to time. Noteworthy that this talk held at Manescu's own initiative. He could not have been more affable and fact he refrained from any reference to subject Department telegram 391 10 underlines evident desire introduce no jarring note at this stage when more important developments pending in our relations. Manescu looked rested after two months absence but still under treatment for duodenal ulcer. Full report by airgram. 11 Crawford 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM–US. Confidential. 2 A memorandum of their conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVI, Document 23 . 3 Telegram 382, February 5, reported that the Government of Romania had requested permission to send four agricultural specialists to the United States for study purposes. (Department of State, Central Files, AGR 7 RUM) 4 Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman visited Romania August 3–5, 1963. The Legation reported on his visit in airgram A–41 from Bucharest, August 8, 1963. (Ibid., POL 2–1 RUM) Crawford arrived in Washington on August 7, 1963; his meeting with the President was not further identified. 5 In telegram 581 from Bucharest, February 29, Crawford reported that Manescu had assured him that Gheorghiu-Dej had authorized a quick resolution of all consular cases raised by the United States. (Ibid., POL RUM–US) 6 In telegram 567, February 21, Crawford reported that he told Malita that a settlement of the consular cases would bring quick U.S. action on raising the level of diplomatic missions. (Ibid.) 7 In telegram 556, February 15, Crawford reported that he would tell Manescu that raising the level of diplomatic representation between the two states should reflect a normalization of relations and that the only major issue between the two states was the question of exit visas for divided families. (Ibid.) 8 For text of the note, November 12, 1963, to the diplomatic missions in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, see Department of State Bulletin , December 2, 1963, p. 860. 9 In telegram 413 to Bucharest, February 27, the Department of State instructed the Legation to ask for a map outlining areas in which travel restrictions were imposed on U.S. diplomats, noting that such information had been provided to the Romanian Legation in the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM–US) 10 Telegram 391 to Bucharest, February 13, reported on a U.S. grant of asylum to a Romanian diplomat and subsequent discussions with the Romanians regarding the defection. (Ibid., POL 30 RUM) 11 Airgram A–212 from Bucharest, February 28. (Ibid., POL 15–1 RUM) 140. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State 140. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State 1 Bucharest, March 5, 1964, 4 p.m. 592. Legtel 591. 2 In discussion with FonMin Manescu on other matters March 3, I asked if he cared comment on recent departure to Peiping of Rumanian party delegation headed by Premier Maurer. Manescu said he could say nothing on substance of talks because they had only begun. However, he could amplify somewhat on background. He said in fields of ideology and foreign relations Rumania agrees with Soviet Union on many questions but disagrees on others, and she also agrees with Communist China on some but disagrees on others. As I was aware, there had been serious developments affecting unity of socialist camp and Rumania had her own ideas on this important matter. She wished do what she could improve situation and so had decided accept Chinese Communist invitation for discussions. I asked whether invitation was of long standing or comparatively recent (point raised Moscow's 2727 repeated Bucharest 33). 3 Manescu said comparatively recent and Rumanian acceptance quite recent in light developing situation. Manescu went on say he must underline that regardless her views on unity of socialist camp, Rumania firmly supports policy peaceful coexistence and wants good relations with all states. In particular Rumania now seeks develop good relations with US and is pleased with how they are going. He said we must realize that Rumania makes her decisions slowly and deliberately, after much careful thought, but once she has done so adheres to them, and that she keeps her promises and one can count on her word. I said I did not question this and was not much surprised by his description of Rumania's position or by decision send delegation to Communist China. Rumanian approach seemed to me to have been expressed clearly enough in Premier Maurer's article of last November in “Problems of Peace and Socialism,” and Bodnaras had warned me Rumanians not exactly orthodox and we can expect see further examples of unorthodoxy. Manescu grinned and said Maurer article sums up their approach in nutshell. (Maurer's article, of course, expounded Rumania's distinctive position on Sino-Soviet dispute and related matters. Maurer restated Rumanian support for peaceful coexistence line in relations with West, and this connection indirectly criticized Chinese for polemics. However, Maurer also stressed equality socialist states and parties and failed acknowledge Soviet vanguard role; condemned interference by one party in affairs another, in manner which could imply interference by USSR; and called on “all” parties in Sino-Soviet dispute to end public controversy and prepare for world Communist conference. General thrust was that Rumania favors closer relations with West and looser relations with erstwhile center of Communist world.) Elaborating upon Manescu's comments on Chinese invitation, MFA Director Soviet and East European Affairs Petrescu has since told me invitation extended early January. Petrescu confirmed Rumanian decision accept reached but some days ago, adding “Rumania made her own decision.” That decision evidently reached without Soviet approval further borne out by Indian Ambassador who asked Soviet Ambassador Zhegalin point blank whether USSR consulted on trip and Zhegalin replied “no”. Press so far merely reports initial talks held in “friendly atmosphere” and notes subsequent sightseeing. Crawford 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM–US. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow, Hong Kong, Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Sofia, Warsaw, London, Paris, Bonn, Belgrade, Munich, and Berlin. 2 Telegram 591, March 5, reported on Manescu's reaction to a personal message from Secretary Rusk, and on discussions about the consular cases, educational exchange, and economic assistance for Romania. (Ibid., POL US–RUM) The text of Rusk's message was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A–221 from Bucharest, March 6. (Ibid., POL 17 RUM–US) 3 Telegram 2727 from Moscow, March 2, reported that Pravda had carried a story regarding the visit of Romanian leaders to the People's Republic of China. (Ibid., POL 7 RUM) 141. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State 141. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State 1 Bucharest, May 12, 1964, 6 p.m. 850. Legation telegram 782. 2 Summary follows of Legation's A–268 3 pouched today which analyzes significance April 22 declaration RWP Central Committee in context related recent Rumanian actions on international scene. As Legation commented reference telegram, declaration represents pronouncement Rumania's right and intent to exercise national independence and equality in Communist world. In essence, it constitutes resounding proclamation of emancipation from satellite status and marks emergence of what may be justly termed new and original form national Communism. Leading up to declaration, Rumanian nationalism has been expressed in several remarkable developments over past year: (1) Rumania has firmly resisted Soviet moves establish supra-national agencies and more binding economic specialization within CEMA. As result, bulk of Moscow's program—aimed at strengthening Soviet political controls as well as economic efficiency in Eastern Europe—has been stymied. USSR and like-minded CEMA members have been forced to turn increasingly to bilateral and trilateral forms cooperation, and Rumania has increasingly alienated itself from CEMA policies and organizational arrangements. (2) Rumania's food-for-machines trade with West continues unabated and should increase, despite contrary pressure from some CEMA partners. Rumania seeks obtain advanced technology in West which CEMA partners either unwilling or unable to supply, but this trade also provides Rumania with strong material base for pursuance independent political relations with USSR. Rumania has also acted to improve political relations with Western powers, including US. (3) Rumania has taken number of steps to reduce Soviet cultural and political influence on home front and currently is quietly proceeding with extensive amnesty. These moves probably designed win popular support and lay political foundation internally for broader assertion Rumanian independence. (4) Rumania has pursued line on Sino-Soviet split increasingly in defiance Moscow's wishes and skillfully used split to advance own interest. Rumanian leaders have seized on Moscow's critical involvement with Peiping to push independent economic policies. Moreover, in progressive moves, they have directly exploited dispute to show through non-involvement that they need not fiddle to Soviet tune, through independent statements and mediation that they have right and will to take independent action, and through declaration that they intend to follow own path and reject Moscow as center world Communism. Latter point is declaration's central thesis and purpose. In various formulations, it stresses that “diversity” (i.e. polycentrism) among Communist states is natural and essential, that “each party has exclusive right independently to work out its own political line,” and that no party “has privileged position or can impose its line or opinions on other parties.” This bold denial Soviet hegemony is reinforced by declaration's total silence on CPSU vanguard role. Also, declaration considerably sharpens Rumanian stance on earlier key issues, by explicitly stating opposition to CEMA supranationalism, by condemning Moscow and Peiping equally for polemics, and by squarely opposing Soviet call for international conference to “rebuff” Chinese. In light declaration, Rumania's independent economic line should be regarded as part of general effort to place its political as well as economic relations with erstwhile master on new basis. Rumania seems intent on having full direction over its internal affairs as well as right set own foreign policies when its national interests deviate from Moscow's, and on gaining acceptance principle Moscow no longer “Rome” of Communist movement. Economic self-interest and opportunistic exploitation Sino-Soviet dispute are probably main motivating forces this development, but cohesiveness of long-established home-grown Communist leadership doubtless another important factor. There may also be further clarifying elements which not yet fully apparent stemming from past Soviet interference in Rumanian Party affairs. Despite many uncertainties, Legation believes Rumania's nascent national Communism likely to grow. Soviet pressures in response declaration would probably widen gap between Moscow and Bucharest. Other Rumanian trends point toward widening differences. I have already submitted (Legation telegram 795) 4 several recommendations re negotiating position for Gaston-Marin talks in light issuance declaration. One of these—establishment special Rumanian general license list close if not equal to Polish list—seems to me to be particularly pertinent in view of fact declaration apparently goes further than former Polish public statements in rejecting Moscow's claim to leadership Communist world. After Gaston-Marin talks held, I believe Department should carefully assess foregoing developments as well as results of talks to determine whether any steps beyond those now taken in coming months. [ sic ] Crawford 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 RUM. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bonn, Budapest, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, Vienna, Warsaw, Berlin, and Munich. 2 Telegram 782, April 27, reported and analyzed the Romanian Communist Party's declaration on the Sino-Soviet conflict. (Ibid.) 3 Airgram A–268, May 12, reported on the new approach that Romania was taking in foreign affairs as part of its changing “national” Communist policy. (Ibid., POL 2 RUM) 4 Telegram 795, April 29, forwarded Crawford's evaluation of the impact of the Romanian declaration on the Sino-Soviet conflict on upcoming U.S.-Romanian talks. (Ibid., FT 1 RUM–US) 142. Memorandum of Conversation 142. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 18, 1964. SUBJECT Private Meeting with Rumanians PARTICIPANTS United States Governor Harriman Minister Crawford Philip H. Trezise Rumania Mr. Gaston-Marin Mr. Macovescu Minister Balaceanu Gaston-Marin began an extended statement by expressing his appreciation for the invitation to the representatives of the Rumanian People's Republic “in order to analyze,” as he put it, “with representatives of the United States new ways of broadening Rumanian-American relations.” He offered special thanks to Governor Harriman for his helpfulness in making the visit possible. He went on that the Rumanian leaders had noted with great interest his report of his conversations with Governor Harriman in November, 2 particularly the thought that it would be possible gradually to develop US-Rumanian relations along constructive lines. Gaston-Marin considered the invitation to make the present visit the first specific response of the new Administration in Washington. He had found that there had been much interest here in developments within the RPR and in Rumanian economic development. He was confident that the American authorities understood what the RPR stood for within the Socialist camp and on the world plane: a policy of national independence and a policy of maintaining a Rumanian position on all problems in accordance with Rumanian national interests. If this was the American understanding of Rumanian policy, as Gaston-Marin was sure it was, then it corresponded with reality. Independence is indeed the foundation of Rumanian national policy. The regime has always been devoted to Rumanian independence and to the development of Rumania in the interests of its own people. This has never been an easy policy to conduct, and there was a time under Stalin when they were badly inhibited. However, they have been taking steady steps in this direction. True independence, nevertheless, cannot be achieved without acquiring an independent economic base. This they are now pursuing, and we can help. Today, the principles of Rumanian policy in relation to both Socialist and Western countries, have been made quite clear. The recent declaration on the part of the authorities of the RPR laid out certain fundamentals: 1. On the major international problem—that of the relationship between the communist and capitalist world—the RPR stands squarely with the USSR in favoring peaceful coexistence and the solution of all international problems through negotiations. But Rumania does not consider itself a passive participant, merely ratifying or rejecting positions taken by larger powers. It considers itself an active member of the world community, able to present its own points of view, and to argue them to the extent of its own capabilities. At the UNGA and at Geneva, for example, the RPR has recently offered its quiet independent notions on a nuclear free zone and on the question of broadening international trade. 3 2. The RPR does not favor a break between Communist China and the Soviet Union. It considers that such a break would worsen the international situation. Rumania has no illusions about the possibility of eliminating differences within the Socialist camp, but it hopes to contribute to the possibilities of a settlement by a negotiation of the major problems within the Socialist group. 3. In the field of economic relations, the RPR has declared itself in favor of the principles of non-interference, equality, mutual respect, and the defense of national sovereignty and independence. These principles are considered general in their application. If they are not observed, there can be no political independence for Rumania. The RPR has established a substantial modern industrial sector, which Minister Crawford had observed. It now intends to modernize and improve its agricultural sector; for this task it has already learned much from the US. But agriculture, Gaston-Marin observed, “does not give us a big headache” (presumably, unlike the USSR and other Eastern European states). 4. The RPR line for the future is to continue to develop its economy rapidly and on a broad scale. It intends to exploit Rumanian raw materials intensively so as to raise the Rumanian standard of living, which still lags behind, not only the U.S. but also Rumania's European neighbors. 5. Foreign trade is expected to have an important part in Rumania's economic development. The RPR intends to orient its economic relations in a diversified way so as to avoid possible pressure or difficulties. The development of economic relations with the US is seen in this context. Earlier talks with American officials have given the Rumanians hope that we can make progress in this respect. 6. Gaston-Marin recalled that Governor Harriman had said that the US had no desire to harm the relations between Rumania and the Soviet Union. This opinion had been noted approvingly by the Rumanian leadership. He wishes to say that two sets of realities must be considered in dealing with Rumania. First, that Rumania is a Socialist state, has reached a certain level of Socialist development and cannot turn back, and will continue to pursue friendly relations with the USSR. Second, that “the great power to the East” is a very strong power, and “not only a friend of Rumania but a neighbor.” The US, Gaston-Marin thought, understood realistically what this meant. Gaston-Marin went on to say that his group was in Washington to promote expanded trade with the United States. Rumania wishes to import certain industrial items and to further consolidate Rumania's independence. It wished to be granted only the conditions granted to other countries. If trade was to be expanded, export licenses would be needed, of course. Also necessary, would be the possibility of greater Rumanian exports to the US, so as to earn the means of payment of import from the US, and financial credits, such as were available from other Western countries. At this point, Gaston-Marin turned to the question of publicity about Rumania in the United States. It is important, he said, not to make “too much noise” for that “could affect certain people.” It is desirable not to exaggerate events in Rumania. In particular, the less publicity about Rumanian independence at this juncture, the better. Overattention to this in foreign press could harm rather than help our future relations. For the moment, Rumania would like to be placed after Yugoslavia and Poland among the Eastern European countries, in the public eye. “Our aspirations for independence can best be achieved not by noisy and insistent publicity but by a quiet and constructive development in Rumania's relations with the US and the West.” The important thing, Gaston-Marin concluded, is cooperation with Rumania in the field of economic affairs. This does not mean, he said, that importance is not granted to other bilateral problems. Rumania is ready to find for these problems solutions acceptable to both parties. Gaston-Marin ended his comments which had been based on extensive written notes, by referring to the nuclear power plant included on the list of installations that Rumania had provided us. He said that the RPR had asked the Soviet Union for a nuclear power plant but had been told that delivery would not be possible until after 1970. The Rumanians had had preliminary but inconclusive conversations with the UK as well. The RPR five-year plan calls for a 500 megawatt nuclear station. Their present power grid is too much dependent on oil and gas, raw materials needed for the chemical industry. Rumania has uranium which it prefers to put into electric power rather than into fissionable material. It would be an important contribution to the power sector of the Rumanian economy if the US could see fit to sell Rumania a nuclear power plant. Governor Harriman responded that US policy favors a friendly relationship between Rumania and the Soviet Union, as between all states. We have disliked the evidence of dependency within the Eastern European Bloc, and therefore we welcome what we have seen of Rumanian statements and Rumanian actions leading in the direction of national independence. President Kennedy had said last June in an important speech that the cause of world peace would be advanced if all countries would stop interfering in other countries. 4 Mr. Khrushchev had spoken very favorably of President Kennedy's remarks about non-interference but Governor Harriman observed that he had heard Soviet protestations about non-interference for many years and had found very little substance in them. Perhaps now Soviet relations with small states of Eastern Europe were changing, or the Soviets were allowing greater independ-ence to them. If so, we welcomed the change. Turning to the US-Rumanian relations, Governor Harriman made the following points: 1. The US understands that Rumania has a Socialist system. That is a matter for the Rumanians. It is no secret, however, that we believe in an open society, in which people are free to move as they please and to speak as they please. We understand that some of the other Eastern European states, including Hungary, have moved ahead of Rumania in terms of permitting personal freedom. We think that extension of freedom to the individual cannot fail but be helpful to international relations. 2. The US is ready to consider ways and means of increasing trade with Rumania. We will be able to take a broader view than in the past on export licenses, although no decisions can be taken in advance of discussion. Credits also can be discussed. We will need assurances from the Rumanian side about re-exports and about the end use of certain kinds of American equipment. 3. As far as imports from Rumania are concerned, the USG, of course, does not engage in purchases itself. It can only create the climate and environment in which trade is possible. The American authorities recognize that the absence of MFN treatment for Rumania can handicap Rumanian trade with the US. Governor Harriman said that it was necessary to be very frank, that there could be no early grant of MFN to Rumania. He did not wish to prophesy what might happen next year or in the future. He did observe that Poland and Yugoslavia now enjoyed MFN and that the US action toward these two countries might indicate something of the direction in which we could go. 4. As for press treatment of Rumania, the US Government, of course, has no control over newspapers and other media. He suggested that the Rumanians should understand that in a continental country like the US, public opinion often lags behind the reality of events. It had taken the American people a long time, for example, to fully grasp the deep difference between the US and the Soviet Union. Once public opinion had come to understand this difference, it was difficult to adjust to new situations. In these circumstances, we must expect that statements will be made in the US which are not always happy ones for our external relations. The Rumanians could be sure in any event that the USG had no wish to complicate relations between the USSR and Rumania and that authoritative comments to the press would reflect this basic position. 5. As for Soviet-Communist Chinese relations, Governor Harriman said, they are not our affair. We considered realistic Mr. Khrushchev's frank statement that Soviet policy is to avoid nuclear war, if at all possible. The Chinese Communists seem to be less realistic and we can only view this as unfortunate. We are unhappy over Communist Chinese attitude over the test ban treaty. The meeting ended with a brief exchange on trade matters. Gaston-Marin mentioned that because export licenses could not be obtained in the US, Rumania had bought rubber, synthetic fabric, and petroleum installations in Western Europe. In some cases, however, the European producers were less competent in mass production than were Americans and Rumania would like to talk seriously with a range of American firms about possibilities for buying plants and equipment here. Governor Harriman repeated what he had said earlier to the effect that we were willing to examine Rumania's requests and to make a positive beginning on improved trade relations. It was agreed by both sides that further private conversations might be desirable. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 1. Confidential. Drafted by Trezise and approved in M. 2 See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVI, Document 26 . 3 Regarding Romanian participation in disarmament discussions, see U.N. doc. A/5371, “Report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for the period January 21 to September 17, 1964.” Regarding Romanian participation in trade discussions, see Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 1964 (8 volumes). 4 For text of President Kennedy's address in Frankfurt on June 25, 1963, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , pp. 516–521. 143. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy) to President Johnson 143. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 29, 1964. SUBJECT Rumanian Negotiations Our talks with the Rumanians are about over, and a communiqué (which the Rumanians are now checking with the Government in Bucharest, Tab A), 2 announcing the results will be released Monday, June 1. We have considered whether there is advantage in a specific White House statement when this communiqué is issued, but on balance we do not see much money in it. Will you let me know if you have a different view? Essentially we achieved what we set out to get. Agreement has been reached on the following: 1. To expand Rumanian trade with the United States. Rumania will be authorized to buy 11 major industrial installations (Tab B) (out of an original shopping list of 15). They will be licensed individually and negotiations with private suppliers will be conducted on a case-by-case basis. For their part, the Rumanians have given us assurances that U.S. equipment will not be trans-shipped or re-exported, and technical data of U.S. origin will not be disclosed or otherwise transmitted without explicit U.S. approval (Tab C). Estimated value of these sales, if consummated, is $30 million a year. 2. To begin discussions on a consular agreement. 3. To expand cultural and information exchanges. 4. To work out plans for the establishment of tourist and commercial offices in Rumania and the U.S. 5. To raise diplomatic missions from legations to embassies. The Rumanians accepted virtually every condition we levied, and this despite the fact that we rejected their request for long-term credits and made clear that the most-favored-nation treatment would not be possible for some time, since this required a major legislative effort. As a collateral matter, the Rumanians promised to talk with representatives of U.S. holders of Rumanian dollar bonds (some issued prior to World War I), to assure them that their interest would be protected. (The Rumanians, however, insist they cannot make specific commitments on claim settlements at this time.) Perhaps the single most significant aspect of these talks was Rumania's determination to succeed in establishing a new and substantial relationship with the U.S.—an important factor in Rumania's drive for independence from Moscow. However, for Rumania's own reasons and political considerations here, there is an awareness on both sides that the pace of these developments cannot be forced. To succeed, there must be a gradualness and a logic about them, as well as evidence of continued Rumanian independence in international affairs and greater freedom for the Rumanian people—a point Averell Harriman intends to underscore before the talks are over. McG. B. 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memoranda to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5. Secret. 2 Tabs A, B, and C are not printed. For text of the U.S.-Romanian joint declaration, issued June 1, see Department of State Bulletin , June 15, 1964, pp. 924–926. 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 144. Memorandum of Conversation 144. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 16, 1964, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Actions to Carry Forward Agreements Reached During Recent US-Rumanian Talks PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary EUR/EE—Peter F. Warker Rumania Petre Balaceanu, Minister to the United States of The Rumanian People's Republic Minister Balaceanu said he had left Bucharest to return to the US on July 9 after three weeks of consultation with his Government. He said this consultation had involved intensive work on the means to carry forward promptly the agreements which had been reached between the US and Rumania during the talks held in Washington May 18–June 1 between delegations of the two Governments. The discussion of this subject was the main purpose of his call. After conveying warm greetings to the Secretary from Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu, Mr. Balaceanu stressed that top Rumanian officials very much appreciated the good results achieved during the recent Washington talks and considered that a sound start had been made for improving relations between the two countries in the commercial field. He expressed appreciation for the steps the US had taken since the talks, citing the June 15 Presidential determination making Export-Import Bank credit guarantees available to Rumania 2 for other than agricultural products and the publication by the Department of Commerce on July 14 of a special general licensing procedure for Rumania. He said that these steps reflected a desire on the part of the US to move forward on the agreements reached during the Washington talks. As for the Rumanian side, the Minister said that Rumania would be sending about 10 technical experts to the US to discuss contract details with producers of equipment which Rumania was interested in purchasing from US firms and to arrange for the visit of US businessmen to Rumania to conclude the contracts. It was hoped that the first orders for US equipment could be placed by the beginning of August. The Minister said Rumania was also planning to send a number of expert personnel to the US to seek to expand the market for Rumanian goods in the US. Minister Balaceanu expressed the hope that he could count on the Secretary's assistance regarding Rumanian interest in purchasing a nuclear power reactor in the US, in arranging credits with the Export-Import Bank where he envisaged the need would be in the neighborhood of $40 million (excluding the nuclear reactor), and on the problem of most-favored-nation treatment for Rumania. He also expressed hope that the Secretary could assist in arranging Commodity Credit Corporation credits for Rumania for the purchase of agricultural commodities. On this point, the Minister noted that Rumanian officials had already talked in general terms with Secretary Freeman and Under Secretary Murphy to explain why Rumania needed such credits. Since Rumanian earnings from exports to the US were limited, a purchase on three-year CCC credit of commodities which Rumania produced in sufficient quantities to meet its own needs (e.g., edible vegetable oils) would enable Rumania to expand its exports of such commodities and use the proceeds to purchase other goods from the US. He said that Rumania was very strict in meeting its foreign payments obligations, and such transactions would help it to do so. The Secretary responded to the Minister's remarks by saying that the US intended to try to move on a constructive basis to carry forward the relations between the two countries. He noted that the President's action regarding Export-Import Bank guarantees and the Commerce Department's action on licensing were examples. As regards the most-favored-nation problem, the Secretary said that this would have to be considered later. The Secretary observed that the Rumanians might encounter certain US firms which would be reluctant to sell products to Rumania even though the Department of Commerce had approved export licenses for a particular transaction. He also noted that the announcement of a major transaction might occasion considerable comment and that any problems arising in this area would have to be faced. Concerning the Minister's idea of purchasing US agricultural commodities under CCC credit to replace exported Rumanian commodities of the same kind, the Secretary said that this type of transaction may present a problem but this could be explored. 1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Warker and approved in S on August 11. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The source text is labeled “Part I of IV Parts;“ other memoranda of this conversation, dealing with East-West political relations and the visit of Foreign Minister Manescu to the United States, are ibid. 2 For text, see Department of State Bulletin , July 6, 1964, pp. 26–27. 145. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 145. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 1 Bucharest, November 24, 1964, 11 a.m. 583. Department pass Defense. Several events and remarks by Rumanian officials here suggest that development might be afoot concerning Rumania's relations with Warsaw Pact. (1) Unexplained nature of quarrel with Rumanian hosts which occurred during October–November visit here of Warsaw Pact Commander Marshal Grechko (Embtel 524, information Moscow 75 and Joint Weeka No. 23). 2 (2) In November 19th interview with New York Times correspondent David Binder, MFA Press Director Francis Pacararu said Rumania member “socialist community” but stressed it against all pacts and blocs. As illustration Rumania's attitude, Pacararu cited maintenance good relations simultaneously with USSR and China, Yugoslavia and Albania, and Western powers. Though his remarks formally stayed within confines of Soviet line re desirability abolishing both NATO and Warsaw Pact, Pacararu seemed to imply unilateral Rumanian view its membership in Warsaw Pact unessential if not undesirable. (3) In November 21 conversation with US ARMA, two officers Foreign Liaison Office (former Military Attachés) of Armed Forces Ministry said if Rumania had its way it would not belong to any pact including Warsaw Pact and would be concerned only with defense its own frontiers. They concluded by stating Rumania maintains its military alliances with reluctance and their only concern is defense their own country. This first time US ARMA has heard FLO officers discuss Warsaw Pact or Rumania's participation in such. These two officers rarely say anything departing from Party line. (See also US ARMA CX–110–64) 3 Comment: Embassy continues to believe that Rumanian attempt to withdraw from Warsaw Pact at present juncture unlikely, as risks and liabilities would much outweigh potential gains. However if above developments, occurring within short time period, represent more than mere coincidence, they might reflect either (1) Rumanian decision to adopt political line regarding opposition to all military pacts as propaganda conditioner for long term goal of possible disassociation from Warsaw Pact, or (2) response to some as yet unrevealed Soviet pressure on Warsaw Pact matters. Though probably unrelated to foregoing, noteworthy that large conference has been in session at Central Committee Headquarters Building since November 18, judging by number and type of cars parked in special lot outside building. Latter in past has been reliable sign Central Committee Plenum in session. (However, Pacararu denied Plenum being held in conversation with Binder.) Crawford 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 2. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow. The United States and Romania raised their respective diplomatic missions to the level of Embassy in August 1964. 2 Telegram 524 from Bucharest, November 11, confirmed that the Romanian military had deliberately snubbed the November 7 Soviet reception celebrating the October Revolution. (Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM–USSR) Joint Weeka 23, November 7, reported on incidents between Soviet and Romanian officers during the visit of a Soviet military delegation. (Ibid., POL 2–1 RUM) 3 Not found. 146. Memorandum of Conversation 146. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 3, 1964, noon. SecDel/MC/21 SUBJECT Rumanian/US Relations PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Mr. Givan, EUR Rumania Foreign Minister Manescu Vasile Pungan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sergiu Celac, Interpreter Minister Manescu proposed that he begin by reviewing bilateral relations. He said he was satisfied that relations have improved and that the spirit in approaching mutual problems is good and equitable. Prospects are good, steps forward are being taken and he is most conscious of the support given by the Department of State and the Secretary personally. Moving to specific subjects, Manescu said his government has granted agreement to Mr. Crawford. Meanwhile Crawford has acted in his own capacity most tactfully and without preconceived ideas. He has assured himself of good conditions of work. The Secretary said he could verify that Crawford is most seriously interested in improving our relations. Manescu said another outstanding problem is the consular convention. This would be Rumania's first such agreement with a Western country. The draft has been approved by the Government and it has been handed to Crawford. Presumably talks will start this month in Washington. There will no doubt be some discussions, but there are no problems that are insurmountable. There is the possibility of an understanding. The Secretary said we would do our best too. Manescu said cultural exchange arrangements for 1965–66 are now being achieved which will increase present relations. There has been an important exchange of visits, including a group of American power experts. There is, finally, the problem of economic and trade relations. After the Gaston-Marin mission, Rumanian authorities took steps to see that all agreements arrived at would be effectively implemented. A team is to be sent to the U.S. soon to negotiate a large purchase of cotton. There are also 13 Rumanian specialists surveying the American market. Their preliminary results show some possibilities. American demand exists for Rumanian products. Some of this demand can be met now, some in the future by adapting production to special American requirements. Certain observations should be made, however, according to Manescu. For instance, the Export-Import Bank is showing some concern that orders for technical installations should not be given as a package, which raises problems of financing. In their view this concern is unfounded. A number of contracts are quite probable, including a catalytic cracking plant and a synthetic rubber plant. These will amount to about $100 million. This is not a great amount in relation to U.S. global figures, but American producers seem interested in selling these installations, and Rumania is interested in buying them. The contracts have not been concluded, however, because such a large amount is a problem for Rumania. Much or all of this could be covered by U.S. sales, but unfortunately the very high tariffs make sales almost impracticable. Where most favored nations pay 17 percent tariffs, Rumania must pay 40 percent. Concluding this subject, Manescu said the Rumanians are counting on increased understanding of this problem and on the fact that the present Administration operates under conditions that give it a freer hand to settle the issue and improve bilateral relations. In any event the existence of so many important problems shows that our relations cover a broad field. The Secretary replied that he fully recognized that trade opportunities are limited in the absence of an MFN relationship. Minister Manescu may know, however, that both the Executive and the Legislative Branches are actively taking up the problem of the bases of trade with Eastern Europe. Senator Fulbright is making an urgent and detailed study of the subject. The Secretary said he opened the hearings before the Senator's Committee a few months ago. 2 The Minister also knows that American businessmen are expressing more interest in changing the situation. Chambers of Commerce have taken up the issue and business groups have gone to Eastern Europe. The State Department is in close touch with these business leaders. The Secretary said he personally hoped Congress would amend the legislation to permit us to extend MFN, but we cannot say exactly when this will happen. Congress will almost certainly take up the question early in the next session. In view of the need for legislation, there is a timing problem. There is also another factor involving timing. From the standpoint of the politics of trade, it would help if we could see some progress in GATT negotiations in connection with the Kennedy Round. Talking about tariff reductions across the board is easier politically than individual cases. Meanwhile we will do what we can where opportunities pre-sent themselves. This is what we did last July when we introduced general licensing procedures. We will do our best to handle the problem of the Export-Import Bank within the present legislation. We are prepared to extend some general licenses now that we were not prepared to extend three years ago. There is one field, the Secretary said, where quick improvement is possible—tourism. Americans have not been able to travel easily in Rumania and neighboring countries for 20 years and have accumulated a great backlog of interest in the area. From Rumania's point of view, the promotion of tourism could be very important. From our point of view, as tourism grows we would hope the Rumanians would earmark a part of their tourist proceeds to permit Rumanian tourists to come to the U.S. The Secretary said he would look into the Export-Import Bank problem when he returned to Washington. He said he was somewhat optimistic about the development of economic relations, although he recognized the importance of the MFN problem. We are both victims of history in this respect, but we will try to reverse it if we can. It would be useful if we could get certain Senators and Congressmen to visit Rumania next year. On this question Manescu said the Secretary would have his entire support. 1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on December 15. The meeting was held at USUN. The source text is labeled “Part I of II;“ a second memorandum of this conversation, dealing with Communist China, is ibid. 2 For text of Rusk's March 13 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see Department of State Bulletin , March 30, 1964, pp. 474–484. 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania 1 Washington, January 5, 1965, 3:49 p.m. 541. Following summary of Secretary's conversation with FonMin Manescu is FYI and Noforn. It is subject to revision upon review. While Foreign Minister Manescu in Washington at completion his tour US he accepted luncheon with Secretary January 4. Other Rumanians present were Deputy Foreign Minister Malita, Ambassador Balaceanu, Pungan and Embassy DCM Baschiru. Manescu expressed his pleasure and warm appreciation in connection with tour he had just made. Expressions of satisfaction were exchanged concerning development of bilateral relations during past year. Secretary mentioned we appreciated speed with which Mr. Dej had received Ambassador Crawford for presentation of credentials after our request made; indicated our gratification at agreement on new series of exchange arrangements and at beginning of consular negotiations January 12; suggested prospect of some action in the trade field in coming months benefiting our bilateral economic relations; stressed possibilities of enlarging Rumania's dollar income through development tourism. Remainder of conversation devoted to world affairs, especially present crisis in UN over payment arrears and Article 19, and question of MLF and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Secretary presented US position on these issues emphasizing as to former strong US interest in and support of UN; our desire to save UN by avoiding both Soviet withdrawal and collapse of US public support UN because of inability to solve present payments problem; and our deliberate avoidance of prestige considerations in order to encourage solution of UN problem by a Soviet contribution however made. Manescu expressed some doubt solution would be reached by GA resumption January 18. He confirmed view Malita had already expressed to Tyler before the lunch, the Rumanians believed great power members less interested early solution than in utilizing present UN situation to avoid consideration of some of the more important problems. Re MLF Manescu followed line its realization would lead to proliferation nuclear weapons and way to attack nuclear arms problem was for five present nuclear powers to meet and reach agreements prohibiting use of nuclear weapons and for Warsaw Pact countries and NATO conclude non-aggression pact. Secretary strongly affirmed our record and our continued intention of opposing any form of nuclear dissemination. He made point MLF would serve interest of EE by insuring against other European states acquiring national nuclear weapons capabilities in future. Since any nuclear arrangements in NATO or Atlantic alliance would be public, EE had assurance against such national nuclear weapons capabilities whereas West knew nothing about what arrangements for nuclear weapons in EE Soviets might have made with EE countries. US ready to discuss with Soviets any such NATO arrangements in relation to any such Warsaw Pact arrangements but Soviets had shown no willingness to do so. These points evoked no real substantive response from Manescu, who seemed unprepared for, or reluctant to engage in, debate. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 RUM. Confidential; Noforn. Drafted by Vedeler, cleared by Tyler, and approved by Davis. 148. Memorandum of Conversation 148. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 15, 1965, noon. SUBJECT Export-Import Bank Credit Guarantees for Rumania PARTICIPANTS The Under Secretary, Mr. Ball Mr. Linder, President, Export-Import Bank Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Mann Mr. Griffith Johnson, E Mr. George Springsteen, U Mr. Robert Wright, E/MDC Mr. Peter F. Warker, EE Mr. Linder said that EXIM was at the point of decision regarding the extension of credit guarantees to Rumania for the purchase of synthetic rubber plants and a catalytic cracker valued at $80–90 million. There are three problems remaining: 1. The Rumanians have given EXIM trade data and have agreed to give debt servicing data, provided EXIM agrees beforehand to approve the guarantees upon receipt of the debt data. EXIM cannot agree to this. The Rumanians have refused to provide data on invisibles or gold reserves. 2. EXIM has proposed that the contracts be financed with 15% cash payment and 85% on credit. Of the credit,EXIM would guarantee 85% and the balance was to have been assumed by the suppliers. EXIM would thus guarantee 72–1/4% of the contracts. The suppliers (Firestone and Universal Oil Products) are unwilling to share any of the credit risk. Their position is strengthened by the fact that they presently have no competition for the contracts. The 72–1/4% which EXIM is prepared to guarantee compares favorably with what Rumania is currently receiving from Western Europe. 3. EXIM has indications that the Rumanians are discussing various additional, large-scale equipment purchases with US suppliers, the value of which might be in the neighborhood of $70 to $90 million. This includes a $20 million fertilizer plant. The question is how far EXIM will be expected to go in giving consideration to applications for guarantees on these additional projects. The fertilizer plant might be feasible, but anything more would be very questionable. The Under Secretary commented that we were seeking in the rubber and cracking plant transaction to establish a commercial relationship with the Rumanians which we hope would develop further. Our purpose is principally political—to help peel Rumania off from the Soviet Bloc. The Rumanians have shown a willingness to give us financial information which they have not given to others, and we should be prepared to ease the Rumanians gradually toward a normal economic relationship with us. Mr. Johnson said he thought we should not at this time go much over $100 million without Rumania having more exports to the US. It was agreed that EXIM would seek the maximum balance-of-payments information from the Rumanians but would not insist on invisible data as a condition for concluding a deal on the rubber and cracking plants. It would also consider an application for credit guarantees on the fertilizer plant, but would press the Rumanians harder for information on invisibles before approving this transaction.EXIM would hold to its position of guaranteeing a maximum of 72–1/4% of the credit. Mr. Linder was confident this would present no difficulty, since the Rumanians were getting financed or guaranteed somewhat smaller percentages of the total cost in other Western countries. If the rubber, cracking and fertilizer plant transactions are concluded, EXIM would not consider further applications for guarantees for, say, a period of 18 months. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rumania, Memos, Vol. 2. Confidential. Drafted by Warker and approved in U on February 25. The meeting was held in Ball's office. 2 In a memorandum to Bromley Smith of the NSC Staff, February 23, David Klein of the NSC commented: “Our negotiations with the Rumanians are not going very well. EXIM is being quite sticky and unnecessarily so. There is a continual problem here of making Mr. Linder understand what we are about.” (Ibid., Rumania, Memos, Vol. 1) 149. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 149. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 1 Bucharest, March 18, 1965, 4 p.m. 590. Paris A–1859 to Department and Department CA–9208. 2 Embassy finds Iacobescu's comments most pertinent and believes he is on the level. Though possibly somewhat over-dramatized for effect, his statements closely reflect sentiments shared in official circles here. No question that there is very real concern within Rumanian Government how long it can continue get away with independent policies in face of possibly tightening Soviet pressures and that government is actively seeking extensive reassurance in West particularly through strengthening economic and other ties with US. Also clear this one of major reasons why Rumanians attach such importance to successful outcome current financial and industrial talks in US. As Rumanian officials have recently indicated to us, eyes not only of Rumanian Government but of entire Communist bloc are now directed toward our response in these matters to test whether we really mean business in applying policy of bridge-building and differentiated approaches in Eastern Europe. Moreover effectiveness of RPRs continuing independent policies will be judged in no small measure in terms of our reaction. Iacobescu's comments conform to recently established Rumanian pattern more candid discussions with Western delegations in major international organizations as well as growing effort strengthen relations with such organizations including some in which RPR not necessarily member state (i.e. IMF, IBRD, GATT, and EEC). In Embassy's view attempts by Rumanians to continue develop own course demand thoughtful and positive response to such approaches by all US agencies along lines indicated Department's CA–9208. Iacobescu would seem be contact well worth pursuing and same would apply to Valentin Lipatti, new Rumanian Permanent Representative to UNESCO. Crawford 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 RUM. Confidential. Repeated to Paris. 2 Airgram A–1859 from Paris was not found. Circular airgram CA–9208, March 12, is ibid., UNESCO 22–20 RUM. 150. Minutes of Meeting of the Export Control Review Board 150. Minutes of Meeting of the Export Control Review Board 1 Washington, April 1, 1965, 4:15 p.m. SUBJECT Determination of Policy Regarding Proposed Exports of Petroleum Exploration and Refining Equipment and Technology to Rumania PARTICIPANTS Members Secretary Connor, Chairman Secretary Rusk Deputy Secretary Vance, for Secretary McNamara Invitees Secretary Udall Deputy CIA Director Cline In Attendance Assistant Secretary Wyman Deputy Assistant Secretary Trezise OEC Director Hockersmith Executive Secretary, ECRB, T.L. Thau Secretary Connor opened the meeting by summarizing the cases before the Board. 2 They concern: (a) Advanced catalyst material for use in making high octane gasoline. Formerly this catalyst was approved for export to bloc countries, but in 1964 technicians found that the U.S. catalyst is superior to foreign material, and since then it has been denied. In October 1964, State concurred in denying a quantity to the USSR. (b) Advanced catalyst technology in written and oral form, to teach Rumania how to make most efficient use of the catalyst material. Commerce technicians find this technology goes well beyond normal operating and maintenance instructions; would contribute significantly to fund of technical knowledge of catalysts generally. (c) Advanced petroleum exploration equipment —Nine cases involving various kinds, all containing extractable technology, and important to help Rumania conduct deep drilling operations. Vastly superior to anything available abroad, and would enable Rumania to deep drill for needed additional supplies of oil. (d) Anti-knock compound. Available abroad in comparable quality and ample quantity. However, important to increase octane rating of gasoline. Rumania supplies North Viet Nam with 20% of its gasoline, and other petroleum products. Secretary Connor noted that at the ACEP (Assistant-Secretary-Level committee), Defense, Interior, and Commerce had recommended denial. State had recommended approval and appealed to the ECRB. He, accordingly, asked Secretary Rusk to state his position. Deputy Secretary Vance interjected at this point that he and Secretary McNamara do not necessarily agree with the position taken by the Defense representatives at the earlier meeting. Secretary Rusk began by observing that none of these cases concern COCOM embargo items. Accordingly, the question is whether the U.S. should be more restrictive toward Rumania than the other COCOM countries. He does not believe it is in our national interest to be so restrictive in trade matters. There have in the last year been many changes in Rumania's relations with the USSR and the West. They have gone to the edge of the cliff in showing their independence of Moscow. Evidences of this nature are as follows: 1. Rumania has undertaken an educational program to bring home to its people their 15 years of exploitation by the USSR. 2. The Russian language is no longer being taught in the schools. 3. Rumania has raised the issue of recovering Bessarabia from the USSR, a sensitive point to the latter. 4. Rumania has granted a major amnesty to political prisoners. 5. Rumania has promised to respect a U.S. passport as assurance of safe exit for U.S. visitors, regardless of claims of dual nationality, old political crimes, etc. 6. Rumanian officials have made official visits to most major West European countries in pursuit of friendly trade and other relations. 7. Rumanian officials did not attend the recent Moscow conference. 8. On U.S. actions in Viet Nam, Rumania has been as quiet as any Communist State. No demonstrations have occurred; protests have been restrained. 9. The new Rumanian prime minister is anti-USSR and pro-Rumanian nationalism, apparently following the course of his recently deceased predecessor, Gheorghe Maurer. 10. In Secretary Rusk's own dealings with the Rumanian foreign minister, the latter has shown in outstanding ways his country's desire to be independent of the USSR—even to the point of wanting to have the same number of talks with Secretary Rusk as the USSR's representative. 11. Rumania is allowing an American hotel to be built. This is the kind of trend that was very noticeable at one period in Yugoslavia, and in another period in Poland. We should be ready to respond favorably to that trend here as we did in the cases of Yugoslavia and Poland. On this basis, it is in our interest to take a forthcoming attitude on trade relations with Rumania. If we seem to close the door to them in areas like this where we have discretion—even before any Congressional problems have to be faced on such necessarily legislative matters as MFN treatment—then we will be injecting an unrequired negative element. That would not be in our interest, especially as the same kinds of items, even though with less sophistication, are available. Thus it is our interest to license these cases as a means of keeping the doors open, of stimulating their favorable responses toward our policies, and of encouraging normal relations between our two countries. Secretary Connor observed that foreign deep drilling equipment is not of the same kind as ours; that our technicians have found ours to be vastly superior. Secretary Udall said that the U.S. drilling equipment is substantially better in quality than that made in other countries. We would be giving Rumania here something not available to them elsewhere. Secretary Connor asked Mr. Cline to inform the members regarding Rumania's shipping of petroleum products to North Viet Nam, Communist China, and Cuba. Mr. Cline replied, as follows: In 1963, Rumania supplied somewhat less than 20% of North Viet Nam's petroleum products, with the USSR providing the balance. In 1964, the Rumanian share was 17%. For 1965, we have only one report to date, 500 tons of lubricants in one February shipment. The Rumanian shipments were primarily of motor and diesel fuels, but there is no evidence of kerosene or jet fuels. It was shipped by sea to North Viet Nam. There is no evidence the Rumanian shipments have ceased. Some free world countries do supply North Viet Nam substantial amounts of other kinds of goods, but no free world country is known to be supplying petroleum products to North Viet Nam. Rumania also shipped substantial amounts of petroleum products to Communist China, including 160,000 tons in 1964. This was primarily motor gas, kerosene, lubricants, and jet fuel. 3 The only free world shipments of petroleum to Communist China were by Iran in 1964. Rumania ships very little petroleum products to Cuba, but did send Cuba substantial amounts of oil drilling equipment, about $2 million by the end of 1964. Oil exploration work is proceeding there, but not with much success. the Rumanian equipment is for drilling to about 3,500 meters. Deputy Secretary Vance said the key issue to him is whether Rumania has promised not to copy or reexport our equipment. Secretary Rusk replied that Rumania did so promise us in the negotiations last summer. Secretary Connor observed that the Rumanian promises do not appear to go all the way. Rumania has promised the U.S. products, designs and technology will not be transshipped or reexported, and that U.S. products will not be copied. However, Rumania's promise does not bar it from using our designs and technology to make products and sell them abroad. Also Rumania can incorporate into its own oil drilling equipment advanced features of U.S. equipment without actually copying same, and then sell their equipment anywhere. Secretary Udall added that U.S. oil industry representatives believe that the USSR is very much in need of advanced deep drilling equipment and that Rumania could not hold our equipment and technology away from the USSR, even if Rumania desired to live up to its promise to us. The U.S. oil industry is very much concerned about the effects of increased free world sales of Rumanian and Soviet petroleum products and takes a hard line against our supplying them with our best technology and equipment. Accordingly, he could not support an approval decision in these cases against the objections of the U.S. oil industry unless he could tell them that the Rumanian assurances can safely be relied on. The members at this point generally discussed the question of how long it would take Rumania to produce and export equipment based on copying or adopting ideas from our equipment. Deputy Secretary Vance thought it would take them 2 or 3 years, by which time we would have even better equipment in production. Mr. Hockersmith said that the length of time would vary, depending on the particular kind of equipment. Secretary Udall agreed. Mr. Cline, in response to a question, said that the equipment the Rumanians are seeking from us is more advanced than anything the USSR and other bloc countries presently have. He also noted that in 1964 Rumania signed a new agreement with the USSR to exchange technical know-how in oil, chemical and other industrial fields. Rumania's 1965 Trade Agreement with Communist China includes exports of petroleum equipment. Secretary Connor asked whether Rumania could or would attempt to hold U.S. technology and products against demands by the USSR, to the extent of resisting force. Secretary Rusk replied that the Rumanians have been behaving toward the USSR generally as though they are sure the time is past in which a country like Hungary would be held by Russian force. We have good reason to believe the Rumanians consider it is in their national interest to adhere to their assurances to us. After all, they want from us much more than the items involved in these cases. However, it is, of course, possible that the USSR could go in openly or otherwise and try to get our technology and equipment, and it could not be guaranteed that Rumania would resist or be successful in such effort. Secretary Rusk went on to say that Rumania is not taking an active role in carrying out CEMA agreements. In response to a question from Secretary Connor, Secretary Rusk agreed that none of the items in question was on the Shopping List of last summer. 4 However, he said, we expected they would be adding other things from time to time. Secretary Udall asked how, if these cases were approved, we could describe to Rumania the meaning of our approval from a diplomatic standpoint. Could we say that you are on trial; that more will be approved, if you show you are trustworthy. Secretary Rusk replied that we have reason to trust Rumania already. They are the most independent of all Communist countries relative to CEMA requirements, and they are most interested in increasing their trade with the West. However, he agreed that we could explain to Rumania that we consider these items important and are counting on their assurances being kept. He reiterated that Rumania has an interest in having much larger trade with us than in just these items. Secretary Connor observed that it is hard to call Rumania's desire to buy these items “trade”. The variety of items is so small, and the quantities are limited to a few. This suggests they are only interested in samples to acquire our technology. If we approve these cases, we will be helping them to update their oil industry with the best U.S. technology, and at a cheap price. In response to a question from Secretary Rusk, Secretary Connor agreed that we license this same equipment for use in oil fields throughout the free world. However, he noted that in most of those areas the companies engaged in the exploration and drilling are affiliated with U.S. interests. In response to Secretary Connor's request for his views, Secretary Udall said that the U.S. petroleum industry and officials of his department take a hard line on selling Rumania and other bloc countries our advanced technology and advanced equipment containing extractable technology. “Maybe I'm softer“, he said, “but I tend, on the basis of the discussion so far, to defer to State, if State feels so strongly about these cases for foreign policy reasons.” Secretary Connor replied that this is not his attitude. He would, before favoring approval, wish to know what effects our approval would have on Rumania's oil industry, as well as its relations with both the Soviet bloc and the West. What course would our equipment enable Rumania to pursue? What avenues of independence would it open for Rumania that it presently does not have? “I see arguments on both sides“, he said. “I would not vote yea with enthusiasm as I presently have reservations about Rumania's intentions.” Deputy Secretary Vance then expressed the views of his department. He said that Secretary McNamara and he generally favor sales unless there are strong reasons against. On the drilling equipment he saw no strong reason for denial and would vote yea. The same for the catalyst material and anti-knock compound. As to the catalyst technology he said he was still uncertain, believing that a few more questions needed to be answered. Secretary Rusk then expressed his Department's views. He said that he would not have recommended approval of these cases two years ago, but so much has happened in Rumania in the last year regarding its relations with the USSR and the West. Therefore he would now “nudge the Rumanian development along” by approving these cases since they are among the several kinds of items Rumania is looking for from us. Responding to a question about whether MFN is one of the items that Rumania wants from us, and whether we would ask Congress to allow MFN to be given to Rumania if she pays her debts to us, Secretary Rusk said he hoped the U.S. would be able to give MFN treatment to imports from particular countries after we settle with them whatever has to be settled. Secretary Connor then said that he was opposed to approving the oil field equipment and the catalyst technology. He also did not like the implications regarding possible use by North Viet Nam of Rumanian gasoline that might be upgraded with the U.S. anti-knock compound, but he would approve it in a spirit of compromise, to give Rumania some of the items they have ordered. He would also approve the catalyst material. Deputy Secretary Vance asked about the importance of the U.S. catalyst technology. Mr. Wyman explained that Mr. Englehart had admitted to him that the U.S. catalyst material is superior to that available from France and other countries, and that the U.S. technology regarding its use is the best. Mr. Englehart was really not interested in selling Rumania the technology, but only the material. He had filed the application for the technology only because his competitor had applied to sell the technology too. At this point there was a general discussion of the catalyst use technology and the reason for its importance, and regarding the technology extractable from the petroleum drilling equipment. Secretary Rusk asked Secretary Connor whether his indicated opposition to approval of the drilling equipment and the catalyst technology applied only to Rumania, or extended to any country that might be a competitor of the U.S. Secretary Connor replied that he drew a distinction between free world and Soviet bloc competitors of the U.S., noting that this distinction is called for by Section 3(a) of the Export Control Act. Regarding Rumania, he asked Mr. Cline for pertinent figures and then emphasized that Rumania exports half the petroleum products it produces, and over half of that goes to other Soviet bloc countries. Next to the USSR, Rumania is the largest supplier of oil products to the bloc, with the USSR receiving most of Rumania's exports to the bloc. Secretary Connor asked Secretary Rusk whether we would supply oil directly to North Viet Nam. Secretary Rusk replied that we have no trade with North Viet Nam, but that if we were to take sanctions against Rumania because she sells oil to North Viet Nam we would have to do the same regarding a number of free world countries that also ship to North Viet Nam. Secretary Connor asked Mr. Cline whether the free world countries are known to be shipping oil or other militarily important materials to North Viet Nam. Mr. Cline replied that there is no evidence of free world shipments of petroleum products or commodities which would make a direct contribution to the military. Secretary Udall read from a report showing that Rumania's sales of oil to the free world are important to enable Rumania to earn the funds with which to buy machines and other items from the West. He suggested that from this standpoint helping Rumania increase its sales of oil to the West is beneficial to our interests. Secretary Rusk said that the U.S. has since 1945 been trying to get the Soviet bloc to learn to live peacefully with the West. The late Secretary Dulles in 1953–54 had dreamed of the day when we would have the kind of opportunity we have today to encourage a bloc country like Rumania to loosen its ties to the USSR and make friendly ties with us. If we give up the opportunity that approval of these cases gives us, we may lose the chance to help break the tight control of the USSR over the bloc countries, and may thus impair the prospects for long-term peaceful coexistence. He noted that other free world countries like West Germany are moving now to improve their relations with the various East European Communist countries. Secretary Connor said he still did not believe that as the official charged with responsibility for administering the Export Control Act he could properly approve the catalyst technology and drilling equipment cases. However, he said, “I can, of course, be overruled by the President.” Secretary Rusk replied that he would ask the President to consider this matter. Deputy Secretary Vance asked whether the French would be likely to sell their catalyst technology and catalyst to Rumania if we refuse to sell our technology along with the catalyst material. Secretary Connor replied that this would not necessarily occur. The discussion then turned to the question of what limits, if any, Secretary Rusk would put on exports to Rumania. Secretary Rusk indicated that, with possibly some exceptions, he would approve everything not on the COCOM embargo list. Secretary Connor observed that he could not think of anything not on the COCOM list, but which we control, which could be more important than advanced equipment and technology for oil exploration and production. Secretary Connor then concluded the discussion by saying he would approve the catalyst material case (Englehart) and the Ethyl anti-knock case, and would deny the catalyst technology and petroleum exploration equipment cases. Mr. Thau asked if the cases to be approved could be acted on by BIC without waiting the Presidential review of the other cases. Secretary Connor approved and the other members concurred. Mr. Hockersmith called attention to a recent application by Universal Oil Products Co. (Case No. 65378) to sell a quantity of catalyst material to Rumania. He asked if this could also be approved. Secretary Connor agreed and the others concurred. (The meeting adjourned at 5:10 p.m.) The following day Secretary Connor determined to hold up approval of the anti-knock case for Presidential consideration along with the others because of the Viet Nam possibilities. This change was communicated informally to the interested departments. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10. Secret. 2 The cases are more specifically listed in the Executive Secretary's Summary of Facts and Arguments, dated February 4, 1965. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 At the meeting Mr. Cline inadvertently said there was a “relatively small amount of jet fuel.” This is now corrected as the amount was fairly substantial. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 See Documents 142 - 144 . 151. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 151. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, April 20, 1965. McGB— SUBJECT Rumania, Firestone, etc. With the end of the Firestone-Rumanian deal, 2 it is more urgent now than before that we take a square look at the outstanding licenses for the Rumanian oil industry which have been blocked by the Department of Commerce. It is increasingly clear that neither the Secretary of Commerce nor Secretary Mann have looked carefully at the problems of Rumania to examine the characteristics which distinguish it from other Communist countries. (I have been assured that Mr. Mann's approved script for his interview with Firestone made the point of national interest far more strongly than Mr. Mann actually did and erected hurdles for Firestone which Mann did not use.) It seems to me that this problem is worth a full-scale debate so that all parties concerned understand what this government's policy is and the operating guidelines can be set accordingly. The Firestone deal is over. (I understand Firestone has issued a statement this afternoon in Akron, Ohio, to that effect.) But we may be able to save some of the political pieces. It is not clear at this juncture just how the Rumanians read the cancellation action. Bucharest sent in a cable this morning indicating that Vietnam has left the pages of the Rumanian papers—which could indicate that the Rumanians consider the cancellation a reaction to their position on Vietnam. If that is so, one of the ways we might save some of the political gains of the last months is to move ahead with the pending licenses, demonstrating that there is still a special policy toward Rumania, but it requires a Rumanian quid for our quo. This would also give us some turn-around time during which we might look around for alternative sources to fill the gap left by Firestone. But as I indicated above, in the long term it is important to bring key members of the government (i.e., the Secretary of Commerce and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) into agreement with what has generally been understood to be this government's policy. And to be useful this has to be done immediately—if possible before this week is out. DK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rumania, Memos, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 On April 16, representatives of Firestone informed U.S. officials that they would withdraw from negotiations with the Romanian Government as a result of a well-organized U.S. campaign against sales to Romania. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid. 152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania 152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania 1 Washington, May 16, 1966, 4:16 p.m. 719. Subject: Brezhnev in Romania. Following is summary preliminary INR assessment recent Romanian policy developments sent to the Secretary on May 13: 1. Precise purpose Brezhnev's trip May 10–13 to Bucharest remains uncertain. Clear, however, that recrudescence of acute Soviet-Romanian differences involved. Most broadly, plain that Romanian party boss Ceausescu's long May 7 speech was a firm reiteration Romanian national independence with strong overtones of criticism of Soviet policies toward Romania all the way back to early 1920s. Outburst may well have been occasioned by Soviet pressures convoke Warsaw Pact meeting for purpose of trying once again coordinate Soviet and East European policies. Although any estimate of latest Soviet-Romanian summit must remain speculative, reports that Warsaw Pact meeting site moved from Bucharest suggests Soviet-Romanian deadlock persists. 2. Thrust of Ceausescu's May 7 speech made with fore-knowledge imminence Brezhnev's visit, indicated Romanian determination resist Soviet pressures probably renewed at 23rd Party Congress for Romania to rein in its ultra-nationalist lines in world communist affairs. Brezhnev and Kosygin had gone out of their way receive Romanian delegation before other East Europeans during Congress. Romanians nevertheless responded following the Congress with party plenum totally ignoring Soviet conclave. Then, in most anti-Soviet pronouncement since April 1964, Ceausescu on May 7 broke new ground by attacking Comintern and implicitly Soviet efforts to dictate Romanian Communist policy as far back as Lenin. In no less than nine places he indirectly refers to Bessarabian issue. While Romania obviously has no hopes for return Bessarabia, raising issue presumably designed illustrate depth Romanian nationalism for benefit both of Moscow and Romanian people. Finally, Ceausescu denounced military blocs as “incompatible with national sovereignty.” While consistent with Communist attacks on Western alliances, coming from Rumanians this charge must appear to Moscow as directed against Warsaw Pact as well. 3. Romania's free-wheeling policies among the communist countries also must profoundly disturb Moscow. By adhering strictly to neutral stand in Sino-Soviet dispute, Romania has contributed significantly to torpedoing Soviet effort promote communist meeting to discuss Sino-Soviet conflict or coordinate aid to Vietnam. Romanian First Deputy Premier Bodnaras's May 5–11 official visit to Hanoi enabled Romania improve bilateral ties, while simultaneously maintaining separate bilateral ties with China and USSR. Chou En-lai's prospective visit to Romania comes against backdrop sharp increase in Peking's attacks on Soviet Union. 4. Insofar as Romania's nationalist policies create problems of communist coordination for USSR, there is net advantage to US. On other hand, Romania's maneuverability depends on outward appearance of solidarity with communist aims so that Bucharest has had to maintain good relations with China and increasingly better relations with DRV. Chou En-lai's reported visit May 18–23 to Romania and Bodnaras visit to DRV exemplify this aspect Romanian policy. Romania, in fact, has moved further in latter visit to anti-US position than at any time in past. Even so, Ceausescu held out hope for improved relations with US. Romania, it seems, still trying walk tightrope in overall policy of promoting good relations with all countries “irrespective of their political configuration.” 5. Foregoing drafted before receipt of May 16 Moscow-dateline report that Romanians had recently sent circular note to Warsaw Pact members with detailed proposals for watering down organization. Although AFP story cannot be confirmed at this time, it appears to be clue that Romanians have taken one more step in their effort to disengage from tight Soviet control of Warsaw Pact, perhaps setting its latest demand as the price of attending a Political Consultative Committee meeting. Such move which may have triggered Brezhnev's trip would strengthen basic analysis set forth above. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 USSR. Confidential. Drafted in INR, cleared in EUR, and approved in INR. Also sent to Moscow and Paris for the Embassy and USNATO. 153. Memorandum of Conversation 153. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 5, 1966, 8 p.m. SecDel/MC/51 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1966 SUBJECT Visit of Assistant Secretary Solomon to Bucharest; East-West Trade; Romanian Exports PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Goldberg Asst. Sec. Solomon (E) Dep. Asst. Sec. Stoessel (EUR) Romanian Side Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu Dep. Foreign Minister Mircea Malita Amb. to the UN Georghe Diaconescu Sergiu Celac, Interpreter The Secretary said that Assistant Secretary Solomon would be in Europe next week and that he might be able to pay a brief, informal visit to Romania to talk with trade representatives if the Foreign Minister thought this would be helpful. The Secretary said that he raised this matter since it was his hope that early in 1967 Congress will take up the East-West Trade Bill. Mr. Solomon will be one of the principal witnesses for the Administration, and it would be useful for him in talking with Congress if he had a chance to get the feel of the situation in Romania. The Foreign Minister responded that of course this could be arranged, and he wished all success to Mr. Solomon in connection with the Trade Bill. The Minister said this question of Mr. Solomon's visit led into a very important part of our bilateral relations, namely, that of trade. He understood that an important delegation of American industrialists would be coming to Romania soon. Also, talks have been held with Phillips Petroleum about obtaining a license for some of their processes. This showed that there was a possibility of purchasing licenses and equipment in the field of oil processing. The trouble started, however, with Romanian exports. In general, the Foreign Minister said, we are in a sad situation concerning trade. He asked that what he had to say be conveyed to the highest level of the American Government. Before he left Bucharest, he had talked with Secretary-General Ceausescu, who had said with regard to bilateral relations with the US, that Romania wished for normal relations with the US. Now, however, things were not going as smoothly as they should; the fact that Romania is unable to buy certain things it would like or to sell some products it wished to export shows that there are difficulties. All of this takes on a certain aspect of political pressure. The Minister recalled the Firestone deal which had almost been completed when rightist circles intervened and caused their arrangements to be canceled. This was hard to understand. The Minister knew that the Administration in the US was not free to do as it would like and that Congress is a problem. Nevertheless, the Minister is dealing with the Secretary and not with Congress. He had the impression that we might want the Romanians to change their regime, and if that happened, things would be easier. This is not the way to go about matters, however, the Minister said. Transactions should be considered strictly from the commercial point of view. In general, he thought the situation was rather strange. We seemed to be able to discuss various things in a constructive way and to understand each other's point of view, but still we were unable to move forward on trade. The Minister referred to Ceausescu's speech in which he had said that it is not any fault of Romania that relations with the US do not proceed as they should. The Secretary responded that the US Constitution was very complicated. It was drawn up by men who did not wish to give any element in the Government supreme power. The President does not control Congress, even when his party has a majority. Also, the Congress has a special responsibility in the field of foreign trade which is provided for in the Constitution. These are problems for the US to resolve, not the Romanians. The President hopes to resolve them and to make a good start this coming year. The Secretary said we have been told by key Congressional leaders that they will not take action on the Trade Bill until after the November elections. We don't agree with this position, but we must face facts. A second problem in the development of our trade relations, the Secretary said, was that we cannot give directions to private industry or labor unions. We deeply regretted what happened in the Firestone case. We had done our best to prevent this, but Firestone, of course, was free to do what it wanted. It turned out they were overly timid. All of these things created complications in our trade relations. However, problems which arise between systems of private enterprise and systems of socialism can be resolved, although this may take time. The Secretary noted that Romania's best customer was the FRG, which is a private enterprise system. The Secretary wondered what he, the President, or Assistant Secretary Solomon could do in the present circumstances before approval of the East-West Trade Bill. We can try to remove obstructions subject to administrative action, and we can encourage US businessmen to trade with Eastern Europe. We have done this. We can also advise Romania concerning opportunities in our markets for sale of its products. Frankly speaking, however, in the absence of most-favored-nation treatment, our tariff regulations are very severe. Manescu said he understood these problems, which he has known about for a long time. He wished to note, however, that a solution should not be sought by trying to persuade the Romanians to do things like the US or by the Romanians attempting to change the outlook of the United States to meet their views. While these may be desires on the part of both sides, they are Utopian; only life will show the way. The Secretary commented that we should put these ideological matters “in the corner.” The Foreign Minister continued that, when Mr. Solomon comes to Bucharest, he will find people who are favorable toward trading with the US. Of course, trade cannot be at a very high level. The general outlook for trade between our two countries was that it will not be extraordinary in size; however, it will play a role in our relations. It is a question of living together and of establishing a basis on which to build. He predicted that Mr. Solomon would see that Romania wants better relations. The Secretary confirmed that we on our side are interested in better relations with Romania and do not wish to quarrel about ideological matters. Of course there are things about which we disagree, but there is no government in the world with which we agree on everything. He also wished to say that we are not indifferent to small amounts of trade. The Secretary noted that he had gone to Germany to speak to the Chancellor personally about buying American chickens. We are interested in these things, whatever the size of the deal—$100,000, $100 million, or $100 billion. We do not treat these matters lightly. The Secretary had noted that our exports to Romania had increased rapidly in recent times, whereas the imports from Romania had not gone up so fast. He was concerned about this and felt we should find a way to improve the situation. Mr. Solomon noted that our exports to Romania in the last six months amounted to $11 million—a result of our liberalized licensing policy. When the Foreign Minister asked how Romania could pay for imports from the US, the Secretary said that this could be done by tourism in part. Manescu replied that US tourists in Romania are very stingy. Most of them, he said, are of Romanian origin and stay with their relatives in Romania rather than in hotels. Ambassador Goldberg said that the Minister should put out of his head any idea that the Administration of the US or officials responsible for foreign policy have any concept that trade should be used as pressure in deciding differences of opinion between countries. He would not be honest if he said that there were no Congressmen who felt this way, but for the Administration, there was definitely no idea of political pressure or of imposing ideological conditions on trade. Referring to the world food crisis, the Secretary asked if Romania had a good harvest this year. Manescu answered affirmatively, saying there had been a good wheat crop and that corn and meat was also good. In response to questions, the Minister said that Romania's principal exports are oil, wood, furniture, plywood, chemical products and agricultural products, especially corn. Exports to Germany consisted largely of agricultural products, furniture and oil. As far as Romania's balance of payments is concerned, Manescu said that it is more or less in equilibrium. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 85. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information; the memorandum was approved in S on October 18. The meeting was held in Rusk's quarters. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VI;“ memoranda of this conversation dealing with Romanian-German relations, East-West relations, Vietnam, Manescu's travel, peacekeeping, and Cyprus are ibid. 154. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 154. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 1 Bucharest, January 23, 1967, 1500Z. 2 892. 1. Annual hunt for chiefs diplomatic missions in Bucharest held over this past weekend for first time hosted by President Council of State Chivu Stoica instead of Prime Minister Maurer. FonMin Manescu was second ranking Romanian official present and by way of background both he and Stoica went out of their way during two-day hunt and at final banquet at Chisineu Cris before departure special train back to Bucharest Sunday evening to pay special attention and to make friendly gestures to me. 2. About two hours after departure of train and as I was preparing to retire Chief of Protocol MFA knocked on my compartment door around 10 p.m. and announced President Stoica would like to see me in his private car. There I found him with Manescu, the Secretary of the State Council, Geamanu, and interpreter Celac who usually accompanies Manescu on his annual visit to UN. As far as I am aware I was the only chief of mission during entire trip to be accorded this type of private meeting. After some social conversation talk inevitably turned to subjects our bilateral relations and Vietnam. 3. Manescu took initiative by asking whether Americans properly understood Romanian policy. I assured him that U.S. Government well informed on Romanian policies and actions taken by Romanian Government in support its independence during past years though there were individual members of Congress and segments of American people who were probably not so well informed. I referred in this connection to pessimistic reports that Congress might refuse to pass the administration's East-West Trade Bill this session thus continuing to deny Romanian trade MFN treatment. Stoica brushed this aside as something which would be solved in future; important thing was for U.S. to understand that Romania determined to follow independent course in its own national interest. 4. Manescu then began mildly complaining that I had not come to see him frequently, that while he profited by his discussion with “his friend” Secretary Rusk on occasions his visits to U.S., he never had had any follow up from me and he cited in particular the problem of Vietnam. He asked how many times I had taken initiative to call on high officials of Romanian Government and in this connection made reference to former British Ambassador in such a way that I can only assume he was implying that Romanians disappointed that I had never asked to call on Ceausescu. Glass was first Western Ambassador to call on Ceausescu which he did last January (see Embtel 734) 3 on eve of departure for England of important Romanian economic delegation headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Birladeanu. Glass also called on Ceausescu prior to his definitive departure earlier this month. (Bucharest 828) 4 I pointed out I had as customary for newly-arrived Ambassadors asked for and received appointments with whole series of top Romanian officials and last May I had called on him for general tour d'horizon subsequent to return of Bodnaras mission from Vietnam. True, Bodnaras had some two days later received me for first time (though he had been on my list of requested appointments submitted the previous December) a meeting which I assumed Manescu had arranged for which I thanked him. I had reported fully what Bodnaras had told me of his Vietnam visit. (Bucharest's 1095 May 27) 5 But I had not come to see Manescu frequently because I had no business of a nature which warranted my demand on his rather heavy schedule. 5. Discussion then turned to Vietnam and we went over familiar ground with difference this time, which may be important, that Manescu (Stoica let Manescu conduct almost all conversation on Vietnam) in context of referring to necessity of cessation bombing North Vietnam in order that peace talks could begin said “You always say you must have signal as to what would happen. What I tell you is the signal.” I probed as deeply as I could asking specifically whether this was based on recent contact with North Vietnamese. Manescu refused to be drawn out insisting that Romanians had continuous contact with them and that Romanians convinced information or “signal” he had given me was accurate. He specifically requested I convey this information to Washington. At one point during this dialogue Stoica intervened to emphasize that I should note Romania did not seek to blame either party for Vietnam situation; they were interested only in peaceful settlement of problem. Romanians realized U.S. prestige involved but Vietnamese had problem with “face” too. At another point both Stoica and Manescu responded in negative to my question whether import of what they telling me meant Romania offering to mediate. Conversation ended with Stoica and Manescu reiterating Romanian desire to have good relations with U.S. 6. Comment. I cannot know whether timing of meeting was calculated beforehand and based on new information from North Vietnamese or merely was conceived in the circumstance and they decided to have another “go” at the Americans on Vietnam. Nothing really new was said by any of us with exception of Manescu's emphasis on the “signal” which we were awaiting. 7. In light of this and taking into account implication in Manescu's remarks about my talking with high Romanian officials, Dept may wish consider instructing me to seek appointment with Ceausescu or Maurer or perhaps both together to go over Vietnam ground again and seek further clarification of why Romanians seem confident that cessation of bombing would bring about negotiations. Up to now I have deliberately refrained from seeking interview with Ceausescu, one, because he holds no government position only that of Secretary General of Communist Party and two, because I have always thought I should reserve such occasion for an urgent important subject or, as in the case of the British and since then of other Western Ambassadors, when a high level visit took place in Romania or a top Romanian delegation went to U.S. 8. If Dept thinks well of this idea I would go to Manescu and, referring to our conversation on train, ask on instructions to see Ceausescu or Maurer or perhaps both together in view importance which U.S. attaches to any development which could lead to Vietnam settlement. I suspect meeting would be quickly arranged and conceivably could throw more light on Manescu's statement. 6 Davis 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM–US. Secret; Exdis. 2 Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 Not found. 4 Dated January 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 5 Dated May 27, 1966. (Ibid.) 6 No response was found, but Davis met with Ceausescu on February 3; see Document 155 . 155. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 155. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 1 Bucharest, February 3, 1967. A–208 SUBJECT Meeting with Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, Nicolae Ceausescu: Romanian Policy and Bilateral Relations With U.S. At my meeting with Secretary General Ceausescu on January 31 I had referred to a question addressed me by Foreign Minister Manescu during a previous meeting whether the United States correctly understood Romanian policy. 2 I had assured Minister Manescu as I wished to do now that I was confident President Johnson and U.S. Government were well informed of and understood Romanian policies. I said the United States had followed with close interest the development of these policies in the last few years, particularly those in support of its national independence and in seeking actively to develop good relations with all countries. We thought Romanian policy generally sought to remove misunderstandings and to promote an atmosphere of détente which could make a contribution toward the establishment of lasting peace. Ceausescu said I was correct in appraising Romanian policies. Romania was preoccupied with pursuing a policy of developing its economy and to assure the independence and sovereignty of the country and nation. These are the principles which guide Romania in relation to all countries. In current conditions these policies correspond to the general interest of peace. Ceausescu expressed belief that nations and national states will continue to have an important role to play in the life of international relations. “Life itself shows this,” he said. A healthy international atmosphere must be based on trust and confidence between States, and this means respect for the independence and sovereignty of each individual nation and non-interference in internal affairs. Romania believes in development of good relations with all States irrespective of their social system. In Europe Romania has relations with all States with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, but this too will be solved. ( Comment: As all the world knew and indeed was announced in the Romanian press on February 1, agreement had already been reached between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany to establish diplomatic relations.) Ceausescu said this would contribute to the creation of a better atmosphere in Europe. At the same time, Romania sought to establish and maintain diplomatic relations with all States in every continent, and the results had been encouraging. Ceausescu then said he would like to say a few words about Romania's bilateral relations with the United States. One could say these were normal. We do have economic relations and diplomatic relations, and recently there have been various delegations which have visited Romania. One could still say relations were not so normal, especially economic. Trade exchanges between Romania and the United States amounted to only a few million dollars annually, while with the Federal Republic of Germany, with which Romania had no diplomatic relations, the annual trade turnover ran to hundreds of millions. This was also true of France, Italy and Japan where with the latter economic relations were developing rapidly. “Why is it harder to develop economic relations with the United States?” he asked. We have no bilateral problems either in the past or now. Perhaps on the U.S. side there are some problems, but Romania has no knowledge of them yet. Perhaps the presence of war (i.e., Vietnam) represents a “sort of hindrance“, but still we could develop our economic relations. Relations between States receive shape through many aspects of contact: trade, cultural, scientific, etc. Perhaps the United States and Romania were in the platonic stage, but, Ceausescu added with a smile, the platonic stage of love is short-lived. In developing relations and friendship, economic and scientific exchanges are important. Ceausescu said he wanted to be understood. Romania wanted to develop such relations to the extent the United States desired. What Romania cannot buy in the United States, it could buy elsewhere in Western Europe or from Japan. Romania does not lag behind in its economic development because of the lack of U.S. trade. Romania was not waiting. As they say, when conditions are ripe perhaps we can develop good relations. Romania understands when a government or businessmen do not desire to develop trade or to keep it at a certain level. We have no hard feelings. ( Comment: Here, I think Ceausescu had in mind the failure of the negotiations with the Firestone Rubber Company for building synthetic rubber plants, though he did not specifically so state.) This does not have a negative effect on our relations with the United States. Ceausescu then turned to Europe and expressed the opinion that we knew Romanian views. Romania had “revolutionary opinion”. Romania believes the Eastern European countries can develop relations with all countries without interference from abroad. Hence, Romania's position on military blocs and the presence of military troops. Romania was not against the policy of European countries developing their relations with the United States or other countries. But these can only be good when they are no longer based on military alliances or military bases. Ceausescu said the Romanians had an old saying that friends are good to have visit, but if they forget to leave then relations grow cooler. The withdrawal of U.S. and other troops from Europe would not cool relations but, on the contrary, strengthen them. But this is a future problem which must find a solution. The longer blocs remain, there will be continued danger to the peace, and that is why Romania believes that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be dissolved. This position was not directed against anyone, but was a requirement of the international situation. When this was accomplished it would help to improve relations and contribute to the establishment of a lasting peace. In reply, I expressed appreciation for his frankness in commenting on Romanian policies and our bilateral relations. First with regard to his comments on Europe, I said we could understand the Romanian position, but the question of the dissolution of the two existing military alliances depended upon the solution of the larger questions of European security and German reunification. This, in turn, depended to a large degree on the creation of mutual understanding and trust, about which Ceausescu had previously spoken, as well as solid agreements. I said I had already commented on the interest with which the United States followed Romanian policies of developing relations with all countries in support of its national independence and sovereignty. Turning to our bilateral relations, I said I wished to recall particularly the words of President Johnson in his State of the Union message in relation to U.S. policy toward the countries of Eastern Europe. 3 I said that in carrying out U.S. policy of developing better relations with these countries, we recognized there were points of disagreement, but where we disagreed we tried to do so quietly and seek out those areas where we could agree. We did not wish to continue a cold war but to end it. The United States sought to increase its contacts with Eastern Europe including Romania in all fields: economic, cultural, tourism, and scientific and educational exchanges. The Administration had proposed to Congress an East-West trade bill which would give the President authority to negotiate trade agreements including the granting of equal tariff treatment. Speaking frankly, based on my own talks with visiting Members of Congress and on reports the Embassy had from Washington, I was not optimistic that Congress would take favorable action in this session on an East-West trade bill. Here, the Vietnam war was, as Ceausescu had said, “a sort of hindrance”. Nevertheless, I was encouraged for the development of our trade relations by the increasing number of American businessmen who had come to Romania during the last six months to talk with Romanian organizations and officials about trade. The Embassy did everything to encourage them. I then referred to the upcoming negotiations between Romania and the United States for the renewal of a two-year exchange arrangement. Our exchange programs, though modest, had been growing, and we hoped to improve them further during the next two years. I also noted the recent Romanian proposal for three groups of high-level Romanian officials as well as directors of enterprises to visit the United States for an extended period. I said we interpreted this as a good sign and that the Embassy was recommending to Washington that these groups be well received and a program arranged for them where they would be able to see everything and to talk with those they wished. Ceausescu concluded our meeting by saying basically he was an optimist both for peace in the world and for the development of good Romanian-United States relations. I remarked that Washington did not intend to give publicity to my meeting with the Secretary General, but should it become known, I intended to respond to inquiries from my diplomatic colleagues in Bucharest along the following lines: I would say I had requested this meeting after one year in Bucharest to review our bilateral relations and certain international problems of mutual interest. Ceausescu readily assented to this and volunteered that the Romanian Government would not publish the fact of our meeting. ( Comment: It is customary for the Romanian press, at least with respect to meetings between Ceausescu and Western ambassadors, to note the fact of the meeting the morning after.) As Ceausescu indicated, the Romanian press of February 1 did not note our meeting the day before. Note: The Department may wish to send copies of this airgram to other interested posts. Davis 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM–US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Davis. 2 See Document 154 . 3 For text of the President's 1967 State of the Union message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book I, pp. 2–14. 156. Memorandum of Conversation 156. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, June 23, 1967. SUBJECT Bilateral Relations PARTICIPANTS Premier Maurer Foreign Minister Manescu Deputy Foreign Minister Malita UN Ambassador Diaconescu First Secretary Stefan Nastasescu, Interpreter The Secretary Assistant Secretary Sisco Ambassador Pedersen Mr. Lisle, Director, EUR/EE Mr. Toumayan, Interpreter Over the dinner table, after discussion of China and Viet-Nam, the Premier introduced the subject of US-Romanian relations. He wished to speak very frankly. The Romanians would like to see these relations closer, particularly from the economic point of view. Romania did not seek aid of any kind. It wishes only normal trade. This is extremely important to Romania. Diversification of Romanian economic relations is a guarantee of Romanian independence and sovereignty. Romania's independent economic development enables it to be master in its own house. In previous talks with the United States, the Romanians have met with full understanding. In practice, they have met with many difficulties. Clearly the Romanians cannot pay the United States for what it needs from it in dollars. It can pay only in the products of its labor. This is the great problem in US-Romanian relations. The Secretary expressed agreement as to the importance of mutual relations and the directions in which we should move. There are two problems which arise, not out of anything Romania has done but out of a broader context. We have asked the Congress for authority to give Most Favored Nation treatment. There will probably be hearings this year, but in the atmosphere of Viet-Nam we have very great problems not related to Romania. As to credits, the Secretary expressed hope that any Romanian difficulties were only temporary. He understood there was the problem of a glass factory (the Romanians all nodded vigorously). We are now asking the Congress for an extension of the lending authority of the Exim Bank. The Secretary explained the problem of the Fiat guarantees in the Congress. 2 He asked the Romanians to be patient on credits for a glass factory until the Congress has acted. The Premier remarked that when Romanian peasants don't like something they scratch behind their ears. (He scratched behind his ear.) The Secretary commented that he knew the Romanians would not like his reply, but, after all, trade was expanding. Maurer replied, “Not enough.” To the Secretary's comment that after all democracy was a difficult form of government, Maurer rejoined that there were different forms of democracy and that we had built a very complex system for ourselves. The Secretary emphasized again that the Romanians should not draw any negative conclusions as to our policy toward Romania from our current legislative difficulties. Maurer expressed understanding. He believed the United States appreciated as a positive political element the desire of Romania to be independent. The Secretary, referring to his talks with Foreign Minister Manescu in previous years, reflected that perhaps he had at times given unduly encouraging views and had then encountered difficulties in carrying them out. He was sure, however, that once we had the appropriate authority the problem of MFN could be worked out quite readily. Foreign Minister Manescu said he always fully reported on his discussions and that his government was fully aware of the difficulties in the United States. However, there would be measures that could be taken if the United States gave due attention to the Prime Minister's observations on Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister expressed complete satisfaction with the discussion and said he was not pessimistic as to the evolution of our relations. The Secretary said he was not at all pessimistic. He did not want to emphasize ideology. However, the Premier should understand the attitude of the American people. Since World War II we have had 250,000 dead and wounded, in the Berlin Airlift, in Korea, in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. Only in recent years have the American people come to realize that just as there are differences in the capitalist world, so are there differences in the socialist world. It is not an answer to denounce “all those capitalists” or “all those communists.” The Secretary recounted how Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and their Secretary of State had pursued every channel of possible agreement within the last six years. He mentioned particularly the Civil Aviation Agreement, the consular treaty, the Space Treaty, hopefully a nonproliferation treaty and, again, hopefully, legislation for expansion of East-West trade. We are trying to find a way to limit the development of both offensive and defensive weapons. There is no one more serious about organizing the peace than the United States. We know the extent of destructive power in the hands of frail human beings. We will in any case do our duty, what we have to do, but we know that to cage the beast of nuclear power is the greatest task of man. We seek to organize a genuine peace. The Premier replied that the Romanians base their policy on the assumption that the United States is genuinely interested in peace. If they didn't believe that, there would be no use in a frank discussion. However the Romanians don't always approve the means the United States relies on to achieve its purposes. However, one of us or another, or both, may be mistaken as to the means. The Premier expressed complete agreement with the Secretary's suggestion that we should continue to exchange ideas, that both sides can learn something in such an exchange and perhaps new ideas would emerge. The Secretary noted that we were only halfway in our discussion with Premier Kosygin. 3 The discussion of June 23 proved to be more than a mere courtesy visit. There will be a further discussion and perhaps clarification of some of the issues. The Premier hoped that this would be so. He holds Kosygin in great esteem. Kosygin is tenacious but a man with whom one can talk. Maurer has no reason always to be happy with him. Maurer has given Kosygin annoyance and Kosygin has given Maurer annoyance. Maurer hopes that solutions will be found which can have only good effects on international life. The Secretary discussed the manner in which a hostile nature could make allies of us all. Science and technology open the way of cooperation. There are many matters of interest to all men independent of ideology and individual interest. There is no communist cholera or communist plague. All people need water. Wheat rust is a common problem. The Premier said the importance of the explosive nature of scientific development and its penetration into production could not be exaggerated. We might be on the eve of a time when goods will be so abundant that their exchange value will become null. The leader in this process is the United States. Maurer does not know who will be the leader in the next stage but he thought that from the Marxist point of view the United States was the leader of the movement of capitalist society to its dialectical antithesis. The discussion ended with the Secretary noting the manner in which starting from a highly individualistic point of view we had developed the concept of social responsibility for the welfare of the individual. Perhaps Romania could find a way by which the value of the individual could be fully recognized in a socialist system. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lisle and approved in S on June 26. The meeting was held during the Secretary's dinner at the Waldorf Astoria. Rusk and Maurer were in New York for the U.N. General Assembly meeting. Memoranda of their discussion of the Middle East and Vietnam are ibid., POL 7 ROM and POL 27 VIET S, respectively. 2 On October 6, 1966, President Johnson announced that the Export-Import Bank would provide guarantees for Italian credit for the purchase of machine tools to be installed in a Fiat automobile factory in Togliattigrad, USSR. The credits were to support the largest East-West trade arrangement executed since the Russian Revolution. The following year the Senate blocked any U.S. participation. Fiat found credit elsewhere. 3 For documentation on the Johnson-Kosygin meetings at Glassboro, New Jersey, June 23 and 25, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIV . 157. Memorandum of Conversation 157. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 26, 1967. SUBJECT Call of Romanian Prime Minister Maurer on President Johnson PARTICIPANTS Romanian Side: Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu Mr. Stefan Nastasescu, interpreter U.S. Side: The President Under Sec. Katzenbach Ambassador Jas. Symington Mr. Francis Bator, Dep. Spec.Asst. to President Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr Dep. Asst. Sec., EUR The Prime Minister began by expressing his great appreciation to the President for taking time from a busy schedule to receive him. He noted that he had recently had a long discussion with Secretary Rusk in New York on matters of common interest and that these talks had been very successful. 2 The Prime Minister said that he had talked in the first instance with Secretary Rusk about the Middle East, where they seemed to have found a similarity of views due to the fact that both felt that everything possible should be done to obtain peace in the Middle East and that this was a question which must be approached in a realistic spirit, avoiding excessive claims. They had also exchanged views about Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister had told the Secretary very frankly of the Romanian desire to have the Viet-Namese question settled. It is troublesome to Romania and to everyone; it is, in fact, particularly troublesome for the smaller countries. Viet-Nam is a hot-bed of danger, which the Prime Minister felt could do damage to Romanian desires for freedom and independence. The Prime Minister said he would be pleased if the President could understand the special interest of Romania in settling the Viet-Namese problem. The Prime Minister wished to make his views quite plain. He believed that a way had to be found for American troops to be withdrawn from Viet-Nam. He understood that, in this, Romanian attitudes were different from those of the United States; however, he had the impression that the Secretary had understood the Romanian viewpoint, which sprang from the desire of Romania for freedom and independence. Tension anywhere in the world creates difficulties for smaller countries and the possibilities for achieving independence become more restricted. The Prime Minister commented that he thought there was less similarity between the U.S. and Romania on Viet-Nam than there was about the Middle East. The Prime Minister had taken up a third subject with Secretary Rusk, that of relations between our two countries. He had pointed to the Romanian desire that these relations expand, particularly in the sphere of economic relations and scientific and technical cooperation. He was well aware that the U.S., as a large country, had nothing to gain from exchanges with such a small country as Romania. On the contrary, Romania would stand to gain and that, indeed, was the Romanian purpose, since the economic development of Romania was a most important element in her striving for independence. However, even if economic relations with Romania were not especially important for the U.S., perhaps Romania's political independence would be something of interest to the U.S. The Prime Minister said that some of the Secretary's views on bilateral relations had been encouraging, while some had not been so encouraging. He had told the Prime Minister of the desire of the U.S. to develop relations with Romania, but he had pointed out difficulties in this regard which derived from the present international situation. These concern certain agreements which had been concluded between our two countries several years ago on the basis of mutual advantage. These had contemplated the use of credits, either short or long term. With regard to one of the projects which was dear to the Prime Minister's heart, the purchase of a glass plant from the U.S., the Secretary had said that there might be problems because of the danger that the Congress might not make it possible for the Export-Import Bank to extend credit to socialist countries. The Prime Minister could understand that there might be some problems about which nothing could be done. However, he very much hoped that the glass plant project could go through, since this was an important element in Romanian planning. The Prime Minister said that, to the extent that the President could contribute to developing U.S-Romanian relations, he thought this would be a useful step in the context of improved international relations generally and fulfilling obligations toward the human community. The President said that the Secretary had reported to him on his talk with the Prime Minister and he could not add very much to what the Secretary had already said. The President regretted that Romania and the U.S. had different approaches to the problem of Viet-Nam, although he appreciated the reasonable position of Romania. The President said that those closest to the problem feel differently about it than those farther away. This might make us understand the problem better but, on the other hand, it might also make us less objective. In any event, the President appreciated the candid and frank remarks of the Prime Minister. The President said that we are very anxious for U.S. troops to leave Viet-Nam, which they will do as soon as the North Viet-Namese troops leave the country. We do not feel that we can run away and leave the South Viet-Namese to face the aggressors. We have an alliance with South Viet-Nam and we will help to defend the country when it is attacked. So far as the political structure in South Viet-Nam is concerned, we favor elections which could be supervised by any objective group. We do not believe that we have the right, even though an ally, to tell the people of South Viet-Nam what kind of government they should have. They should have the right to vote freely and to choose their own leaders. Whether we like the leaders or not is unimportant; the main thing is that there should be honest, free elections. We do not wish to fight North Viet-Nam. It takes two to make a fight. If North Viet-Nam would stay behind the line, if they would stop sending troops and supplies into South Viet-Nam and stop the violence there, then we would turn the buildings, hangars and construction that have been built in South Viet-Nam into schools and hospitals, and we would bring our troops home within six months, as we have said we would do. We know that no country wants troops of a foreign power on its soil. If the North Viet-Namese troops would stay on their own soil, then our troops would stay in the United States. However, if North Viet-Nam insists on using power and on saying that “might makes right“, then we will resist. The President said that we are not trying to reform the North Viet-Namese Government, but they are invading South Viet-Nam. Four or five divisions are ready to enter South Viet-Nam as soon as we stop bombing. We are not trying to destroy North Viet-Nam nor to invade their land. All we ask is that they stay in their country and we in ours. If anyone can get Ho Chi Minh to send his troops home and cease the infiltration and violence, then the Americans will go home, but we are not prepared to raise the white flag of surrender and to let the aggressors win. Just as we do not wish to destroy North Viet-Nam, we do not want war with China or to change the system of government in China. We hope that China will join the society of nations. We have no designs on her territory or her philosophy. All we want to do is to trade with China and get along with her to the extent that she will permit. The President appreciated the Prime Minister's approach to these matters and his desire to talk about them. We wish to be friendly with the Rumanian people. We would like to see the East-West Trade Bill passed as well as the Export-Import Bank legislation so that our relations could be improved. 3 The President understood the desires of Romania to seek better living conditions for its people. Although countries may have different views on various matters, there are many things which we have in common. All of us have problems with ignorance, poverty and disease and we should all work together as brothers to fight these enemies rather than each other. The President commented that Congress sometimes did not have as liberal a view as he did about some of these things, but he thought that if Members of Congress could hear the Prime Minister, or could hear Chairman Kosygin, then they might change their views. The President was determined to work to improve relations with Romania. He told the story of Charles Lamb who, when asked if he knew the author of a book he had not enjoyed, said that he did not know the author but if he knew him he would like him. The President thought that it had been helpful for the Prime Minister to visit the United Nations, to talk with Secretary Rusk, and to come to the White House. The President said that Mr. Katzenbach would be glad to consider in a detailed way such questions as the glass factory which the Prime Minister had mentioned. The President wished to approach such problems with a desire to reach an understanding. Even though Romania is a small country, the President said the United States was very interested in its relationship with us. We feel an obligation upon the United States to do what is right in the world. Although we may sometimes make mistakes, we do our best. We would like to improve trade with Romania and to see an improvement in the welfare of Romania. He looked to the day when there were no great differences between us. The President said what we want most from Romania is not trade or approval but that Romania would try to understand the United States. The President said that the Prime Minister was going to visit other countries and that he was at liberty to describe the conversation he had had with the President and to quote whatever he had said, if this would be useful. The President said he would like to talk with the Chinese about a non-proliferation treaty and to work out ground rules so that we can avoid nuclear war. He repeated that we would like to bring our troops home from Viet-Nam and he said that if the Prime Minister could persuade Ho Chi Minh to withdraw his troops, the Prime Minister could promise to produce the President the next morning to begin negotiations. However, it takes two to negotiate and we cannot do it all ourselves. Whenever Ho Chi Minh is ready, the President would be ready and he will talk about anything that Ho Chi Minh wants to talk about. The President wants to stop the war but he cannot stop just his half of the war. The Prime Minister said that he was very pleased with what he had heard from the President. While he might not agree with everything the President had said, he did not wish to argue any points in detail. As the President probably knew, Romania did not limit herself to expressing her views to the United States. She has spoken of her views previously to other countries and will do so in the future. The Prime Minister noted that he would be in Peking on July 3. The Prime Minister hoped that the President did not think that Romania aspired to playing an important role in international debate. All that Romania wished was to be master in its own house. As it happens, this ideal for Romania cannot be achieved when there is a crisis of tension in the world. Then countries are told to get together, to renounce some of their sovereignty and some of their independence and to obey the command of another state. The Prime Minister said that these actions endanger what Romania has won, and which they wish to preserve at all costs. It is this consideration which causes Romania to interfere in problems which really are beyond her and to try to settle them. The Prime Minister noted that this was his first visit in the U.S., but he said that since hostilities began in Viet-Nam he had visited there four times. This shows that whatever Romania does springs from a belief that difficult problems should be resolved. He thought this was the President's belief as well. The Prime Minister said that it was helpful to him to have heard the President's views. He did not know what use he would make of them—that remained to be seen. The President said he understood and that he had been happy to hear the Prime Minister's comments and to give him ours. He hoped to achieve an understanding based on all the information available, since a man is only as good as his information. The President said that it would be the height of folly, it would be prehistoric and like a cave man's approach, for the United States to want to go to war with China. Nothing was farther from his mind. The President said that about 30 million people in the U.S. live in poverty. He felt we should spend money to help them rather than spending money on bombs. He also hoped that part of our budget now spent on military expenditures could be used for the economic development of the Mekong Delta. We want Indonesia to be free. We wish the same for Japan, Korea, the Philippines and other countries. We do not wish to impose our views on them and we honestly want them to decide their future. The President hoped the Prime Minister would understand the United States better as a result of his visit. Now he knew more about what we were thinking and could tell others. The visit ended with repeated thanks by the Prime Minister for the President's courtesy in receiving him. Following the visit, the President and Romanian party went to the Rose Garden for photographs. During a brief exchange on this occasion, the Prime Minister mentioned that Foreign Minister Manescu probably would be the President of the next General Assembly of the United Nations. The President said that he would be a good man and that we had heard good things about him. In a brief statement to journalists in the White House press room following the interview with the President, the Prime Minister said that he had presented his respects to the President and that they had had a useful and frank exchange on topical questions. He said that he was leaving with a particularly strong memory of a great leader and a great state. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel. 2 See Document 156 . 3 S–1155, a bill authorizing a 5-year extension of the Export-Import Bank became involved in a 1967 Congressional debate on trade policy. In 1968, Congress approved S–1155 as P.L. 90–267, extending the Export-Import Bank for 5 years. The Congress failed to act on HR–17551, the Trade Expansion Act of 1968. 158. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 158. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 1 Bucharest, January 19, 1968. A–181 SUBJECT Romanian Foreign Policy in 1968 Summary A review of Romanian foreign policy suggests that the Romanians will continue along well established lines, although they may make some concessions—more of a formal than a substantive nature—to Moscow. Will Romanian foreign policy in 1968 be more cautious than in 1967? The question is valid in view of the developments of the past year. Very recently, reliable information came to light that Moscow and other bloc countries have been exerting economic pressure on Romania (Bucharest 901). 2 To the extent that these pressures include a Soviet refusal to buy Romanian oil drilling rigs, the materials published here on the 1968 Romanian-Soviet trade protocol (signed December 30, 1967) do not indicate that the pressure is off. We had long assumed that Romania was under strong pressure, but the only evidence was indirect and circumstantial: the logic of the situation (Romania's defiance of Moscow in establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany, staying away from the conference of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary, and refusing to join in the bloc position on the Middle East), Romanian accusations or intimations of interference in internal affairs by unidentified parties (in particular, Ceausescu's article in RCP Central Committee daily Scinteia of May 7), and the evident irritation of Moscow and other bloc countries toward Romania (as reflected, inter alia, in the propaganda against nationalism). In addition, Romanian internal policy is perhaps a complicating factor for its foreign policy. The changes approved by the RCP National Conference imply a broad personnel reshuffle in the central and local Party and State apparatus. They also imply a reduction in the size of this apparatus. While some will be promoted, many will lose out in the process. The prospect of such changes presumably is a dismal one for many if not most of the Party apparatchiks. And the need to grapple with this problem is perhaps responsible for the evident caution of the leadership in moving ahead on the economic reform, witness the introduction of a slow schedule of implementation at the RCP National Conference, the blurring of responsibilities for economic activities at the local level, and the carte blanche enabling law passed by the Grand National Assembly. In passing, it is perhaps worth noting that none of the measures approved by the Conference are likely to stir up any compensating popular enthusiasm. Whether Moscow and its allies can or will try to capitalize on the dissatisfaction which presumably will develop in the ranks of the Romanian Communist Party remains to be seen. (In theory they could take advantage of the vast number of contacts with Romanians which constantly take place—exchanges of Party, State, and mass organization delegations—to strengthen such dissatisfaction.) All that is said here is that, notwithstanding the show of unity toward Moscow implicit in the continued presence of the “old guard” leaders in the top Party organs, Romania will be more vulnerable to outside pressure than before. To a degree, Romania's foreign policy in 1968 will depend upon the foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union. But only to a degree. Regardless of what the Soviets do or do not do, the Romanians are busy steadily decreasing their economic and political dependence on Moscow and its allies. In the communist world, they have done their best to maintain a facade of cordial relations with Communist China and Albania and they have assiduously cultivated other countries and parties which tend to assert their independence from Moscow. Cuba is a recent case in point. A more long-standing example is Yugoslavia. The Romanians have been very active in trying to restore the excellent rapport which existed between them and the Yugoslavs before Ceausescu and Tito fell out on the Middle East question. At the same time, the Romanians have expanded their ties with the West and with the less-developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They have also made the most of international forums (notably the UN) and regional groupings (e.g., the Group of Nine and the Balkans). Since these activities are vital to the consolidation of their independence, the Romanians will surely continue along these lines in 1968. The Soviet Union, for its part, seems determined to press ahead with a variety of policies the Romanians abhor: attacking “Mao and his clique“, isolating West Germany from Eastern Europe, siding with the Arab countries against Israel, promoting conferences of communist parties, and, perhaps, “strengthening” the Warsaw Pact. The presumed Soviet interest in renewing the Soviet-Romanian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance 3 and concluding a non-proliferation treaty also present difficulties for the Romanians. Barring a substantial deterioration in East-West relations, the Romanians will not allow Moscow to impair their relations with third parties. They will not attack Communist China nor will they join in any condemnation of West Germany or Israel. (Romanian participation in the December 19–21 meeting of Eastern European foreign ministers on the Middle East does not reflect a change in the Romanian position. Evidently, the price of Romanian participation was a communiqué consistent with the line taken in Romania's formal statements on the subject.) The Romanians could not afford to follow Moscow in these matters. On the other questions, however, there is more room for maneuver. Unquestionably, the Romanians would prefer to stay away from the Budapest consultative conference of communist parties. 4 By implication at least, the proceedings will have a pro-Moscow, anti-Peking flavor. Since it is only a preparatory conference, however—and hence presumably will not produce “binding documents”—the Romanians may find it hard to stay away. If they attend (and the Yugoslav Embassy in Bucharest seems to think that they will), the Romanians presumably will use the occasion to reassert their well known views about the conditions under which communist conferences are desirable (along the lines of the Scinteia article of February 28, 1967). In connection with the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, it is not clear whether the Romanians would prefer no treaty at all, an automatic five-year renewal of the treaty, or a new treaty. Whatever their motives, they seem to have decided to negotiate a new 20-year treaty. In so doing, one can assume that they will insist on acceptable wording and that the new treaty will neither heap abuse on the West Germans nor speak of the desirability of arriving at joint positions on international problems. This could be read as a further example of the determination of the Romanians to “stick to their guns“, especially if the new treaty is not signed before the end of the first 20-year period, on February 4, 1968. The failure of the Romanians and Bulgarians to renew a similar treaty before the expiration of the first 20-year period on January 16, 1968 indicates that the Romanians are probably taking a firm position in their negotiations with Moscow. As regards NPT, it is difficult to tell just how seriously the Romanians view their own objections to it. Although NPT presents the same type of problems for Romania as for other non-nuclear countries, it is very likely that the purpose of surfacing their objections was to show Moscow that Bucharest must be consulted on such matters. If so, their signature of a non-proliferation treaty would not be as much of a concession as it might appear at first glance. As a matter of fact, we would not be surprised to see them end up by signing a non-proliferation treaty, particularly if many of the other non-nuclear powers are willing to sign it. As for the Warsaw Pact, it is not at all certain that we are in for another Soviet offensive directed toward “strengthening” the Warsaw Pact, although the latest Soviet communiqués with the East Germans and Romanians suggest that this may be the case. If so, the participation of Romania in the August 21–27 Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Bulgaria and the statement about strengthening the Warsaw Pact Organization in the joint communiqué with the Soviets would seem to imply a co-operative attitude on the part of the Romanians. On the other hand, some of their other activities seem to have the opposite implication. In 1967, the Romanian leadership emphasized the need for less reliance on traditional sources of arms supplies. The Romanians also organized a military exercise of their own on October 12–13 to which no Warsaw Pact observers were invited and sent lower-ranking delegates than those of other countries to the October 13–17 Warsaw Pact meeting in East Germany. On balance, we would judge that the Romanians would not be willing to go along with any Soviet proposal which, in substance, would increase Romanian involvement in Warsaw Pact affairs. We doubt very much that the Romanian willingness to compromise with the Soviets would go beyond the framework discussed above. At the most, in our judgment, the Romanians might make certain concessions which are more of a formal than a substantive nature—e.g., attendance at the Budapest conference, and, if this can be considered a concession, renewal of the bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union—while continuing to defend their national interests in dealing with Moscow and steadily building up the material and political basis of their independence. The determination to continue along well established lines was reflected in the joint communiqué signed with the Soviets on December 15 and, external pressures and internal uncertainties aside, would be the logical consequence of the fact that Ceausescu and his team have emerged stronger than ever from the RCP National Conference. Nonetheless, the extent of the Romanian willingness to compose [ compromise ?] with the Soviets will bear close watching. In formulating policy in the future, the Romanians will no doubt take account of the reactions of Moscow and its allies to Romania's rather dramatic assertion of independence in 1967. Presumably, they will also consider whether far-reaching internal changes should incite them to greater prudence in international affairs. Under these circumstances, more than ever the Romanians will be looking for signs that the West, and particularly the United States, is willing to expand its economic and political relationship with them. Neubert 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ROM. Confidential. Drafted by deMartino. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, and Warsaw. 2 Telegram 901, December 22, 1967, reported on Soviet economic pressures on Romania. (Ibid., E 1 RUM–USSR) 3 For text, see 48 UNTS 189. 4 The conference was held February 26–March 5. 159. Memorandum of Conversation 159. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 11, 1968. SUBJECT Conversation with Romanian Ambassador: US-Romanian Relations;NPT; European Security PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs We lunched April 11, at his invitation, with the Romanian Ambassador, who was not accompanied by any member of his staff. The following subjects of interest came up during our conversation. 1. Trade The Ambassador referred to the recent trade agreement signed in Ottawa between Romania and Canada. 2 This provided for Canada granting Romania MFN treatment in exchange for a general commitment on Romania's part to make purchases in Canada of no less than $9,000,000 annually. The Ambassador said this latter commitment had been very difficult for Romania to make since it was not the usual practice to provide such an undertaking; however, the Canadians had insisted on it. With regard to US-Romanian economic relations, the Ambassador said he understood the problems caused by the current political situation in relation to Viet-Nam, although he hoped that progress could be made. In particular, he hoped that something could be done with regard to obtaining a synthetic rubber plant from Goodyear, a subject he had mentioned to the Under Secretary. 2. Nuclear Plant With reference to his recent urgent consultation in Bucharest, the Ambassador said this had been primarily to engage in discussions in his capital with regard to decisions which must be made in the near future concerning Romania's five-year plan. Of special concern in this regard is the planning for nuclear installations to produce electric power. Romania has decided to go in the direction of obtaining plants which can utilize Romanian uranium and this will involve obtaining heavy water plants. The Ambassador indicated that this subject had been taken up with the Canadians and that there was some interest in obtaining a heavy water plant from Canada, although the Canadians themselves had not had extensive practical experience in this field. The Ambassador recalled that Romania had approached a US concern sometime ago in connection with obtaining heavy water technology, but that this apparently had encountered some problems on the part of the American Government. Given the urgency of their own planning process, the Ambassador hoped that this question might be resolved favorably in the near future. Mr. Leddy noted that, with the progress which has been made concerning the NPT, it might be considered that we were in a new situation and it was conceivable that something could be done. In any case, he assured the Ambassador that we would take another look at the problem. 3. NPT There was some discussion of the visit to Washington of Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu to present Romania's views on the NPT. 3 The Ambassador reiterated many of the points made by Mr. Macovescu, noting that, while Romania has a positive attitude toward the NPT, they are concerned about certain aspects of the proposed treaty. In some respects, the treaty seems to freeze many inequalities which presently exist between nuclears and non-nuclears. Also, Romania is concerned about possible adverse economic effects of the NPT and, in addition, believes that the formula which has been advanced to cover the question of assurances to non-nuclear states is inadequate. Mr. Leddy reviewed in some detail the many consultations we have had with interested countries about the NPT over a long period of time. These consultations became particularly intensive beginning in December 1966, when it appeared for the first time that the Soviets were serious about an NPT. As a result of these consultations, many improvements have been made in the draft treaty and our feeling is that many of the earlier concerns which countries have expressed have been met. For example, the FRG seems much less worried about the adverse economic effects of an NPT. We recognize that the draft is not a perfect instrument, but we feel that its approval by a large number of states would be a significant step forward. On the other hand, to open up the draft to a large number of amendments would risk having the project fail entirely. We are concerned that the momentum which has been built up for the NPT should not be lost and we therefore hope that following discussions at the resumed General Assembly there will be agreement to approve the treaty. 4. European Economic and Political Integration In response to the Ambassador's questions, Mr. Leddy said that he anticipated that economic integration in Western Europe would continue to be strengthened through the Common Market and that Great Britain eventually would join this organization. He foresaw an increase in contacts between Western Europe and the countries of Eastern Europe, but he did not think it was practical to expect that there would be an over-all integration between the two areas. Mr. Leddy stressed that he felt the Common Market is here to stay and that the Eastern European countries will have to deal with it to an increasing extent. Ambassador Bogdan acknowledged that this probably was the case, although he said Romania would prefer to deal bilaterally with other countries. There was a brief discussion of COMECON and the Ambassador seemed to deprecate the possibility that COMECON would play an important role vis-à-vis the Common Market. In this context, he stressed Romania's desire to be as independent as possible in all respects. 5. European Security Responding to the Ambassador's queries on this subject, we outlined our view that the process of achieving European security would be a slow one, proceeding by small steps with no practical possibility that one over-all conference would solve basic security problems. We also noted US interest in the question of European security which, after all, is part of a global problem. The Ambassador said he recognized the US interest in this subject and he noted that the Bucharest Declaration of July 1966 4 had not commented specifically on the question of US participation in a European security conference but left this question vague. He felt that the US-Soviet presence in Europe was a fact which must be recognized. He thought it was desirable to change this situation and that such change was inevitable, but the question was how this change could get started in a political sense. He felt this was a complicated and difficult problem but that it should be given serious attention. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held at Ambassador Bogdan's residence. A typed note on the source text indicates that this was a “draft.” No cleared copy of the memorandum was found. 2 For text of the agreement, signed on March 22, see 870 UNTS 9. 3 Macovescu visited March 1. A memorandum of his conversation with Secretary Rusk is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. 4 For text of the Bucharest Declaration on European Security, July 5, 1966, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 351–359. 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania 1 Washington, May 10, 1968, 1845Z. 2 161818. Subject: Czechoslovakia. 1. Following report sent by Ambassador Goldberg evening May 9: “At Secretary's request I sought out FonMin Manescu at 5:30 PM to see if he had any info or reaction to current rumors re Czechoslovakia. Manescu said he had no info other than press reports and had not yet seen Czechs here but would later in evening. Nor had he consulted with his govt. In response his query I said I had no info other than press. Manescu then made following personal comments which he later said he would not object to being passed on to Secretary: Manescu was very concerned over lack of denial from either Soviet or Czech official sources of current stories about Soviet troop movements. He felt that if there were no official denial from both capitals within next two hours, along lines of 'imperialist fabrications,' situation would be very serious. He believes if confirmed situation would raise basic question whether any EE state can pursue a policy in any way independent of USSR. He hoped that if current stories are true that US would recognize not only the degree to which interests of all EE's are involved, but also that US interests would also be substantially prejudiced. So far as Romania is concerned Manescu believes there is no division in country or Government and they would stand against any intervention to last man.” 2. Please try to elicit in any possible way comments on subject without reference to report and without giving any indication knowledge your part of Manescu's views. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Lisle and approved by Katzenbach. 2 Beginning in 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 161. Memorandum for the Record 161. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 15, 1968. SUBJECT Luncheon Conversation with Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan of the Romanian Embassy I had lunch today with Ambassador Bogdan and Romanian DCM Iosif Gheorghiu, at Bogdan's invitation. I said we were sorry to hear of Birladeanu's illness and mentioned that I thought Dr. Hornig was proposing June 19 as a substitute date for the start of the visit. Bogdan was interested, and pleased about the visit. Bogdan described his recent trip to the West Coast. He had visited Seattle (the University of Washington), Portland, the San Francisco area (including the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Berkeley, San Francisco State and Claremont as the guest of Fred Warner Neal), and Los Angeles (the Universal Studios, Disneyland, the Mayor's office, etc.). Apparently Bogdan had made a number of speeches, had rather little sleep, and enjoyed the experience. Bogdan said he had come back to Washington, only to turn around to visit the Goodyear people in Akron. He believes Goodyear has the best synthetic rubber process in the world, and is most interested in getting them to pick up the old Firestone project. Apparently the Goodyear people told Bogdan that synthetic rubber remains more expensive than natural rubber. They wonder why Romania really wants to put up such a plant. Bogdan indicated that foreign exchange was a consideration—as well as a certain desire for self-sufficiency (assuming one has the raw materials, which Romania does). Bogdan went on to acknowledge that Romania could hardly strive for autarky, but nevertheless had an interest in standing on its own two feet. Bogdan said the Goodyear people expressed some interest in a plant in Romania on the grounds that Romania's cheap natural resources might enable the plant to become competitive with natural rubber in Western Europe. Apparently there is some problem with the fact that Goodyear normally retains a controlling ownership interest in its plants constructed abroad. Concluding his discussion of the Goodyear visit, Bogdan expressed the strong hope that the U.S. would help convince the Goodyear management that it was worthwhile to send a representative to Romania to examine the prospects seriously. I asked Bogdan whether Romania was experiencing any licensing problems. He said none that he knew of except the question of the heavy water plant. I told Bogdan I knew that question was under active consideration. Answering a question of mine, Bogdan said the Romanians hope to buy the reactor itself from General Electric in Canada—adding that he presumed that firm had “some connection” with General Electric in the U.S. He said that—apart from the question whether the U.S. would be willing to sell a reactor—there was a foreign exchange advantage in making the reactor purchase in Canada rather than in the U.S. I asked Bogdan if the rubber and heavy water plants represented their high priority interests. He said there was a third—their desire to purchase a plant to make integrated circuits. Apparently they would like to buy it from IBM. The conversation turned to politics, and I asked Bogdan how he viewed the situation in New York. He said he had just been in New York talking with Foreign Minister Manescu. Bogdan's pitch was that the U.S. and USSR should accept at least a few amendments to the NPT in order to make the General Assembly debate a serious and responsible one, and not simply a rubber stamp. Bogdan was aware of the recent Mexican proposals and seemed quite interested in them. He also raised the question of Security Assurances, commenting that he realized the U.S and the USSR would have to stand together on any issue in the Security Council if the assurances were to have any meaning. I remarked that the question of security commitments was a very touchy one in the Congress. Bogdan acknowledged the danger of the NPT coming unraveled, but said we ought to be able to find a way to make some concessions to the desire of many nations to improve the treaty—without opening Pandora's Box. He expressed the view that everybody was now resigned to India not signing—although she might adhere at a later time. When he asked me if I agreed, I said I thought we still hoped that India would find it possible to sign. Bogdan repeated several times that Romania had no desire to obstruct proceedings—but hoped that at least a few changes could be made. When I asked him how long he thought the session in New York would last, he said “two to three more weeks.” When I asked Bogdan what he thought about events in Czechoslovakia he answered: “That's the $64.00 question.” He deprecated the importance of Soviet military moves, and said he was an optimist about the situation remaining under control. He said he had no information on the Moscow five-nation Summit. We briefly discussed the differences between the present situation in Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1956—including the fact that Hungary had left the Warsaw Pact and had formed a government with a non-Communist majority. Bogdan's reaction was to recall that the Hungarians in 1956 had also set up placards on the Romanian border demanding the return of Transylvania. Nathaniel Davis 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17–8 ROM. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Davis. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 162. Memorandum of Conversation 162. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 9, 1968, 11–11:40 a.m. SUBJECT US-Romanian Relations PARTICIPANTS Romania: Alexandru Birladeanu, Deputy Prime Minister of Romania Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the United States Mihai Croitoru, Third Secretary, Romanian Embassy (Interpreter) US: Secretary Rusk George R. Kaplan, EUR/EE 1. Birladeanu's Visit Deputy Premier Birladeanu thanked the Secretary and US Government for a well-organized US visit which had been both useful and educational. His hosts throughout the country had been most hospitable and forthcoming. Birladeanu expressed his satisfaction with the joint statement he and Dr. Hornig had just issued, adding, however, that he considered it to be a declaration of intent rather than a solid program. 2 The statement now needs concrete expression. The Secretary noted that the cooperation and hospitality Birladeanu received had been spontaneous and genuine. He considered that the joint statement was a foundation on which a structure of cooperation and practical expression can be built. The Secretary reemphasized the US policy of promoting such cooperation. Commenting further, the Secretary said that this US desire for cooperation with Romania would almost certainly be reaffirmed as national policy by our next President, whoever he is. 2. Heavy Water Plant Birladeanu repeated the Romanian position that a US decision on whether to authorize the sale of a heavy water plant to Romania was of overriding immediate importance to his government, which intended to base its nuclear power complex on a natural uranium-heavy water model. Emphasizing that he was speaking confidentially and off-the-rec-ord, the Secretary said that the outlook for US authorization had improved. He said that he had been personally involved in this matter, as had President Johnson, and that the US Government favored the sale on national policy grounds. Birladeanu would understand that there had been sensitive political problems over this issue. Repeating that he was passing this information on a personal basis, the Secretary said that approval now seemed possible before September. 3. Computers Birladeanu asked if the Department of State would support and assist Romania in obtaining medium-sized computers. He stressed that any computers or technology obtained in the United States would be used only in the national economy and that there would be no question of strategic application. The Secretary noted that the Department of Commerce actually approved such applications. He cited a refusal, in which he had concurred, of authorization of a sale to France on grounds that the equipment in question had almost exclusive application to the French military program. Three agencies—State, Defense, and Commerce—are actually involved. At the Secretary's request for further comments, Mr. Kaplan added that Executive Branch judgments could be made only on the basis of specific applications for export licenses, which we did not yet have. The Secretary said that any US firm that would be involved would understand how to proceed, and he recommended that firm information be provided. Noting that he could not speak for the firms, the Secretary said that he was nevertheless inclined to encourage Birladeanu on this issue unless specific unpredictable problems were to arise. 3. Fellowships for Romanian Scientists Birladeanu asked the Secretary about expanding opportunities for Romanian students and scientists to study and work in the United States. The Secretary replied that Birladeanu's question really had two parts. The first is whether the Romanians would be welcome here. The answer would be affirmative, the Secretary said, but Birladeanu should realize that the US Government could not guarantee acceptances by specific institutions. The Secretary recalled that when he was at the Rockefeller Institute, 80 percent of 300-odd foreign applicants wanted to go to Harvard. This was clearly impossible and impractical. The second part of the question is financial. Who pays? The Secretary noted that already-limited US Government funds for exchanges had been cut 25 percent by Congress. He suggested that the Romanians examine possibilities of raising funds on their own. One possibility, for example, would be for the Romanian Government to set aside 10 percent of the income derived from US tourists. It would be a great deal easier for us, the Secretary said, if the Romanians would do something like this and also increase the number of fellowships available for Americans in Romania. Birladeanu said that the Romanian government was prepared to pay some expenses in Romanian currency. He mentioned an earlier conversation in which Chairman Seaborg of the Atomic Energy Commission had suggested that the “Atoms in Action” exhibit could generate hard currency for exchanges of specialists in the nuclear field. The Secretary reiterated our desire to expand exchanges. He noted, however, that the practical problems still needed to be worked out. He cited the possibility that exchanges might be generated in the atomic energy field if the heavy water plant deal is consummated. Romanian specialists would presumably have to come here for training. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on July 11. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The source text is labeled “Part II of III;“ a memorandum of the portion of their conversation dealing with Vietnam is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. A July 10 memorandum from Read to Shlaudeman, attached to the source text, noted that at the request of Secretary Rusk no notes were taken for the portion of the conversation dealing with a heavy water plant. 2 Birladeanu was in the United States with a team of six Romanian scientists at the invitation of Donald F. Hornig, President Johnson's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. For text of their joint statement, see Department of State Bulletin , August 12, 1968, pp. 178–179. 163. Memorandum of Conversation 163. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 23, 1968. SUBJECT Eastern European Situation PARTICIPANTS Romania: Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan United States: Deputy Under Secretary Bohlen George R. Kaplan, EUR/EE Ambassador Bogdan said he was calling without specific instructions to exchange views on the Czechoslovak situation. Mr. Bohlen said that he wanted Ambassador Bogdan to know that the Secretary desired to maintain communication with him whenever conditions warranted. Ambassador Bogdan should feel free to call the Secretary directly in case anything warranted such contact. Mr. Bohlen asked if the Romanians could confirm rumors of troop movements affecting their country. Ambassador Bogdan said he knew nothing of this and had received no information on it. Ambassador Bohlen asked whether “full mobilization” had taken place in Romania. Ambassador Bogdan again replied that he had no word of this. Ambassador Bohlen said that the world was indignant over the Soviet invasion, and he wondered who, other than the participants and two Asian Communist regimes, actually supported it. In a brief exchange of views about the actual decision-making process in Moscow, Ambassador Bohlen conjectured that the decision to intervene militarily may have been made at the last moment and on the basis of a plea from Ulbricht and some developments in Czechoslovakia. To a question by Ambassador Bohlen concerning the Romanian role in the Warsaw Pact, Ambassador Bogdan replied that there was no Romanian intention of leaving it. On the contrary, he thought it would be most useful for Romania to remain in the organization. Ambassador Bogdan reiterated the Romanian position on the Czechoslovak affair as a “clear-cut stand in which Romania states its firm opposition.” He said that the Romanian leaders had not approached the other Warsaw Pact members about the invasion. Summing up the U.S. view, Ambassador Bohlen reiterated the substance of the President's statement. 2 He added that there had never been any question of spheres of influence, either at Yalta or now. Ambassador Bohlen handed Ambassador Bogdan a Department press release to this effect. 3 Ambassador Bohlen reiterated the Department's and the Secretary's desire to stay in close touch on these developments. 1 Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Memoranda of Conversation—General. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in G on August 27. 2 For text of the President's August 21 statement, see Department of State Bulletin , September 9, 1968, p. 261. 3 Department of State press release No. 196, August 23; not found. 164. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 164. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 24, 1968. SUBJECT Contingency Planning on Romania EUR is giving consideration to the following possible lines of action, on a contingency basis, in the event of Soviet invasion of Romania: 1. Increase in NATO vigilance measures bringing them to the visible level. 2. Return to Europe of United States air and ground forces currently being returned under “reforger” and “crested cap”. 3. Reinforcement of the Berlin garrison. 4. Preparations permitting us to extend military assistance to Yugoslavia if Tito requests it. 5. Beefing up of the naval forces in the Mediterranean with additional Marine elements. 6. Take public action to inhibit further cultural, scientific and other contacts with the USSR and the other occupying powers. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. Secret. Drafted by Beaudry. 165. Memorandum of Conversation 165. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 30, 1968, 9 p.m. SUBJECT Romania PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador The Secretary noted that the Ambassador had asked to see him August 31 and inquired whether or not he could take up now the matter for which he had asked for an appointment. The Ambassador looked somewhat surprised but said he had been instructed to make an oral communication, a copy of which is attached. 2 He said he had been instructed to see either the President or the Secretary. When the Ambassador had finished his oral statement, the Secretary reminded him that at their last meeting he had referred to disturbing reports in regard to Romania. 3 The Ambassador said he had reported his conversation but had received no reply. The Secretary said that we continue to get reports that were disturbing and that in the last 24 hours we had received a number of reports of troop movements, incidents on the frontier, etc. He asked whether the Ambassador had any basis on which he could give him assurances that action against Romania was not intended. Dobrynin said he had no official information but that he personally doubted that any such action was contemplated. The Secretary said that if such action were contemplated, he wished in the name of all humanity to ask that it not be done. The results of such action on world affairs would be incalculable. Dobrynin inquired if the Romanians felt the same way. He referred to reports that the Romanian Ambassador had called in the Department. The Secretary said we had no reports whatever from the Romanians. He wished, however, to underline the gravity of this problem. We were deeply concerned. He hoped the Ambassador would not misinterpret his moderate manner. Our attitude was based upon well-known principles that had motivated us throughout our history. Our attitude on Czechoslovakia was not related to our bilateral relations with that country which were not particularly good. We believed, however, that every country, large or small, had a right to national existence. We respect that among our NATO allies and we thought the Soviets should respect it among their Warsaw Pact allies. We cannot understand how the state interests of the Soviet Union were involved in any way that would justify military action. Czechoslovakia was not going to leave the Warsaw Pact or join NATO and no one was threatening them. We wished to express in strongest terms the expectation that the Soviet Union does not contemplate the further use of military force against any countries of Eastern Europe. The Secretary said he wished again to underline the seriousness with which we took the Ambassador's statement to the President on August 20 4 and repeated today, that the Soviet Union did not intend in any way to threaten the state interests of the US. He wished to point out that among these interests was Berlin. Frankly, we did not trust Ulbricht. We wished to emphasize the gravity of any move with respect to Berlin in the current situation. He also wished to point out that the thoughts he had expressed carried the authority of the President with whom he had just talked by telephone. The Secretary said he would be available any time, day or night, if the Ambassador had anything to say to him. Dobrynin asked if he could report that he had made his oral statement and that the Secretary would study it and comment later. The Secretary agreed but said he could say now with respect to the reference in the statement to revanchist and imperialist threats to socialist countries that there was no such threat, no CIA plot, there was no intrusion into any of these countries in a manner hostile to the Soviet Union. We could not accept a statement that revanchists or imperialists were carrying out any threat to any of these countries. Dobrynin referred to a UPI statement on the ticker and wondered whether this was officially inspired. It had referred to a possible meeting between Kosygin and the President as well as to the effect of Czech developments upon our cultural relations. The Secretary said he would have to look at the stories before he could comment but he urged the Ambassador not to confuse any such reports with what he had said to him this evening. He said the President had been trying to make clear our attitudes on Czechoslovakia but he had also wished to keep our options open. The President thought that the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia was a great mistake on the part of the Soviet Union and that the US respects the right of a small country even though it was one with which our relations were not good, but the President still thinks that there are major problems that need attention. The President had had many phone calls and direct statements made to him that we were not strong enough on Czechoslovakia. If there were additional actions of this kind, it would be a great tragedy. The Secretary said that the American people are pretty mad about the Czechoslovakian affair. Anything that happened between our two great countries could be tragic for the whole world. 1 Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379. Secret; Limdis. No drafting information is on source text; the memorandum was approved in S on September 3. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. For a telegraphic report of this meeting, see Document 90 . 2 Not attached. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Czech 1968. 3 See Document 87 . 4 See Document 80 . 166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania 166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania 1 Washington, August 31, 1968, 2147Z. 231372. Subject: Bogdan-Leddy Conversation. 1. In uninstructed call which, however, approved by Foreign Minister Manescu, Romanian Ambassador Bogdan inquired August 31 as to nature any new evidence on Soviet intentions which may have triggered Presidential statement August 30. 2 Leddy replied that military-type evidence remained inconclusive but that, on basis potentially ominous request by Dobrynin for appointment with Secretary for August 31 morning and similar requests by Soviets in certain other capitals, Secretary had decided call in Dobrynin evening August 30. 3 Our concern over possibility Soviets might intervene in Romania had led to last-minute inclusion of Eastern European portion of President's speech. 2. Leddy briefly characterized Dobrynin oral statement defending Soviet action in Czechoslovakia and read aloud pertinent last paragraph giving first priority to defending socialism. (Deptel 231323) 4 3. Leddy informed Bogdan of general theme of Dobrynin's communication and partial substance Secretary's remarks on Romania reported Deptel 231337. 5 Main points mentioned by Leddy were: (a) Secretary said various reports received during past 24 hours had been disturbing. (b) Dobrynin replied he had no information. (c) Secretary said if Soviets contemplated invasion of Romania, we ask in name of humanity, that it not be done and that such action would have incalculable effects on world situation. (d) Secretary emphasized to Dobrynin none of reports re possible invasion to which we had referred had come from Romanians. 4. Bogdan appreciated info and said Manescu had planned depart Bucharest in order receive UK Foreign Secretary Stewart in Bucharest next week but had decided remain New York until situation clearer. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Kaplan and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Moscow, Belgrade, and Prague. 2 For text of President Johnson's August 30 speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69 , Book II, pp. 917–920. 3 See Document 165 . 4 Dated August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH) 5 Document 90 . 167. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 167. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 1, 1968, 0344Z. CAP 82331. Subject: Rusk-Dobrynin meeting. State 231374. 2 1. Soviet Amb Dobrynin at his request called on Secretary at home evening Aug 31 shortly before 8 pm EDT. Dobrynin's oral communication was in effect official message in response to Secretary's request for assurance from the Soviets regarding Rumania and the Secretary's warning on Berlin. 2. Dobrynin said that fears and rumors regarding Soviet military moves against Rumania were completely without foundation and also that there would be no such moves against Berlin. 3. Regarding Berlin, however, Dobrynin said that Tag der Heimat was kind of demonstration in Berlin that created problems for the Soviets which US should take seriously into account. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Czech Crisis. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch on August 31 at 11:01 p.m., CDT. 2 Telegram 231374, September 1, provided a summary of the August 30 Rusk-Dobrynin conversation and the August 31 Leddy-Bogdan conversation to NATO capitals. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH) 168. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 168. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 1 Bucharest, September 1, 1968, 1125Z. 2410. Subj: Call on Acting FonMin Sandru. Ref State 231374. 2 1. At my request I saw Sandru at 1030 Sept 1 and followed almost identical scenario as in Bogdan-Leddy conversation described reftel in informing Romanian Govt background of President's remarks on Eastern Europe Aug 30 and Secretary's conversation Aug 30 and 31 pertaining to Romania. 3 2. In briefly describing Dobrynin oral statement defending Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, I read aloud to Sandru first paragraph of statement as well as pertinent last paragraph giving first priority to defending socialism. 3. I said in communicating these facts, we were not attempting to evaluate Dobrynin message. 4. Sandru thanked me for this information and said he was sure Romanian Govt would appreciate it. 4 Davis 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Belgrade, Moscow, and Prague. 2 See footnote 2, Document 167 . 3 Regarding the Rusk-Dobrynin talks of August 30 and 31, see Documents 165 and 167 . Regarding President Johnson's remarks, see footnote 3, Document 166 . 4 In telegram 2409 from Bucharest, September 1, the Embassy reported that in the course of his conversation with the Ambassador, Sandru stated that his government had no information on troop concentrations on Romania's borders and denied that any border incidents had occurred. (Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM–US) 169. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 169. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 1 Washington, September 6, 1968, 1620Z. 2478. Subject: Meeting with FonMin Manescu. 1. Manescu received me for fifty minutes at 1530 Sept 6 and in response my initial query for his views current situation now that he had been back in Romania for few days made following points: A. Manescu had just seen President Ceausescu and Premier Maurer and they again asked Manescu transmit through me, as Manescu had done through Ball in Sept 2 appreciation of Romanian government and of themselves personally for President's Aug 30 statement which they considered wise and efficacious. Manescu said statement had had “cooling” effect on a dangerous curve which might have led to the worst. B. Danger was not completely over and it was important that this statement, which President said was not on behalf of any particular administration but the position of the United States, should not be allowed to die, to be discarded or pigeonholed. Manescu did not presume to advise on how this could be done but Romanian leaders thought statement still served useful purpose. C. Though Manescu's first meeting with Ball had been noted in Romanian press, last one had not nor had President's statement — all for “obvious reasons.” Nevertheless he could assure me that Romanians not just government were aware of this statement and the Soviet reaction thereto in Washington and elsewhere and they appreciated what President had done. D. Manescu paid tribute to Secretary for making point to Dobrynin that US information and actions not based on anything Romanians had said. E. Romania remained faithful to its commitments but otherwise was determined to make its own decisions in its own interests as it saw them without any dictation from outside. It desired to have good relations with all states. Whether Romania had relations with this or that state was a question only for Romania. G. Expressed his own deep appreciation for understanding and treatment he had experienced in New York especially for part played by Secretary, Ambassador Ball and Buffum. 2. I gave Manescu gist of Yugoslav and Romanian reports of Soviet troop deployments in Hungary and Bulgaria as well as our evaluation of these reports contained State 232256. 3 Nevertheless I would like to have his views. Manescu replied that as he had said before “danger was not over.” Romania remained watchful. However, Manescu neither confirmed nor denied these reports. But he asserted firmly that Romania was determined to defend itself against invasion. 3. Referring to report (Bucharest 2477) 4 coming to Embassy's attention only this morning that Soviets had delivered “ultimatum” two days ago demanding cessation of provocative statements by Romanians and permission for Soviet troops to transit Romania to Bulgaria, Manescu replied saying first alleged Soviet request for joint maneuvers on Romanian soil had been subject discussion with Ball on Sept 2. He said it true that one or two years ago small limited joint maneuver had been held in Romania. He could now say on authority of Ceausescu that no such request had been received from USSR recently. As for this morning's report reaching Embassy Romania would not and could not change its attitude toward invasion of Czechoslovakia for to do so would be to invite similar action against itself, he denied knowledge of reported request for transit of Soviet troops to Bulgaria but said he would nevertheless convey this report to Ceausescu and Maurer. Manescu commented that natural in dangerous situation people should become somewhat alarmed and he specifically referred to especially large purchases of sugar and flour by population. 4. Comment: I have little doubt that Manescu came from seeing Ceausescu and Maurer as he was five minutes late for our appointment and had sent his secretary-interpreter Celac to waiting room who explained Manescu had been delayed at Council of Ministers. Manescu, while outwardly calm and measured in expressing his views, appeared clearly worried that, as he put it, “danger was not entirely over.” Davis 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, USUN, USNATO, Paris, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 2 In telegram 6368 from USUN, September 3, Ball reported that he had “met briefly” with Manescu the previous day. Manescu “was basically relaxed though not unconcerned” about the possibility of Soviet intervention. (Ibid., POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH) 3 Telegram 232256, September 4, forwarded Yugoslav and Romanian reports on Warsaw Pact troop movements. (Ibid., POL 27–1 RUM) 4 Telegram 2477, September 6, reported signs of Romanian apprehension regarding Soviet intentions. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3) 170. Memorandum of Conversation 170. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 1, 1968, 1:15–3:15 p.m. SecDel/MC/13 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-THIRD SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1968 SUBJECT Eastern European Situation PARTICIPANTS Romania: Foreign Minister Manescu Deputy Foreign Minister Malita Ambassador Bogdan UN Ambassador Diaconescu Mr. Celac (Interpreter) United States: The Secretary Ambassador Buffum Assistant Secretary Sisco Mr. Kaplan, EUR/EE Mr. DeSeabra (Interpreter) Reviewing the situation and sequence of events in late August, Secretary Rusk said that there had been insufficient time for consultation with the Romanian Government prior to his meetings with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and the President's speech of August 30. We had had sophisticated information that day which we did not at all like, and our failure to contact the Romanians was surely not intended to be discourteous. The Secretary recalled that the Soviets had come back to us within 24 hours of his August 30 meeting with Dobrynin with assurances, for whatever they were worth, that they would not invade Romania. Minister Manescu reiterated his understanding of this situation and repeated the Romanian Government's appreciation for our efforts. The Secretary told Minister Manescu that, in these contacts with the Soviets, we had made completely clear that none of the information on which our concern was based had come from Romanian sources. Manescu expressed his gratitude, adding that it would have been a matter of considerable concern had such assurances not been given to the Soviets. He reviewed his contacts with Ambassadors Ball and Buffum during the late August–early September period. He said that although the Romanian Government, for understandable reasons of its own, had not published the President's Texas statement of August 30, the Romanian people were well aware of it via foreign radio. The Secretary said that we are not entirely sure of what is on the minds of the Soviet leaders at present. He thought that they may be frightened of their own idea of peaceful coexistence and that they certainly were displaying little understanding of the US motivation in building bridges to the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe. Against this background, the Secretary said he would refrain from mentioning Romania and Yugoslavia specifically in his October 2 speech before the UNGA, although he intended to mention Czechoslovakia and the important September 26 article in Pravda on the alleged Soviet right to intervene in the affairs of other nations. 2 The Secretary said that we consider that we have categorical assurances from the USSR and prefer, therefore, not to cast public doubt on this in our UNGA statement. Manescu said that the Czechoslovaks had gotten themselves into an impossible position, both domestically and internationally, and had not known what to do. One of the real tragedies of the Czechoslovak situation was that, throughout the Dubcek period since January 1968, the Czechoslovaks had still considered the Soviets to be their best friends. Their euphoric attitude had been very clear during the visit he had made with President Ceausescu to Prague a short time before the invasion. The Secretary said that a repeat performance by the Soviets in Romania would elicit a much stronger Western reaction than had been evident in the case of Czechoslovakia. The Secretary said the Romanians had these cards in their hands: 1) the attitude of the Romanian people, 2) the conscience of the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact followers, 3) the fact that an invasion of Romania would risk a fundamental breach of relations between the USSR and the West, and 4) the predictably furious response of world public opinion. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Ambassador Dobrynin had told him only two weeks before the invasion that the fundamental question for the USSR was the Communist Party leadership in the countries of Eastern Europe. The Secretary added—and Minister Manescu agreed—that the Romanians posed no problem in this regard. The Secretary expressed US concern over the fact that, for the first time in several years, we did not know what was on the Soviet mind. He found it significant that the Soviet leaders had not spoken out on the Eastern European situation but that the only Soviet reaction had come in what amounted to anonymous articles. It seems clear that the Soviets continue to want some kind of bilateral relationship with the US, the Secretary said, but they must realize that actions such as those taken toward Czechoslovakia make this extremely difficult. The Soviets, in fact, had specifically asked that nuclear missile talks continue. The Secretary asked whether it would be better from the Romanian standpoint to have tensions reduced or to maintain them for an indefinite period. Manescu replied that the major issues raised by the Soviet threat should be kept alive while the local situation in Eastern Europe is permitted to calm down. The US, Manescu said, must make clear, though not in a cold war spirit, that the Soviets cannot do as they please. The Secretary replied that we have conveyed this message privately and that a judgment as to whether to make a public challenge of it depends on an assessment of whether it would be helpful or not. Minister Manescu recalled that two prominent Westerners, Foreign Ministers Stewart and Harmel, had come to Romania since the invasion for long-scheduled visits. He appreciated this and said that normal East-West relations of this type should be maintained. Ambassador Buffum asked whether the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia should be a separate agenda item at the UN or whether the subject should be discussed generally. Minister Manescu replied that it would be neither wise nor useful to try for an agenda item. The Secretary said that, although there would be considerable attention to this subject in the general debate, that there would be problems with a separate item. The Czechoslovaks themselves would oppose it, and many of the other 125 members would take that as a comfortable answer. It would be unwise to have a special item with a bad vote. Minister Manescu was not entirely certain that the vote would be bad but thought that the Czecho-slovak representatives would be placed in an unfavorable position in that they would no longer appear to have the right to resort to UN bodies when an actual need arose. Secretary Rusk, speaking personally and privately, informed Minister Manescu that Ambassador Duda had called on him to request that the Soviet invasion not be a special item. Duda had said that the Czechoslovaks would have more maneuverability if the subject were discussed in more general terms. 3 Manescu said that the new Czechoslovak Ambassador to the UN, Cernik, had made the same point. Manescu said he hoped that the Secretary's scheduled speech of October 2 would not “unleash the dogs of cold war.” The Secretary replied that he would speak with his usual unfailing courtesy. Minister Manescu said that was what he was afraid of. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 70 D 418, CF 320. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on October 14. The meeting was held during the Secretary's luncheon at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled “Part I of II;“ part II of the discussion dealing with Vietnam is ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. 2 Reference is to the Brezhnev Doctrine; see footnote 4, Document 23 . For text of Secretary Rusk's speech, see Department of State Bulletin , October 21, 1968, pp. 405–410. 3 See Document 95 . 171. Intelligence Information Cable 171. Intelligence Information Cable 1 Bucharest, November 21, 1968. [ document number not declassified ] COUNTRY Rumania/USSR DOI November 1968 SUBJECT Comments of a [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] diplomat concerning current negotiations between Rumania and the Soviet Union with respect to military matters ACQ 20 November 1968 SOURCE [ 8 lines of source text not declassified ] 1. On 20 November 1968 a senior member of the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] to the United Nations who is known to be affiliated [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] intelligence discussed current Rumanian-Soviet relations. The [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] official stated that at the present time the discussions between Rumania and the USSR concerning military matters, notably the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in Rumania, have reached a critical stage. In these discussions which have involved a recent trip to Moscow (29–30 October 1968) by the Rumanian Minister of the Armed Forces, Colonel General Ion Ionita, and simultaneous negotiations in Moscow and Bucharest, the Soviet Union has requested: a. The right to station troops permanently in Rumania; b. Rumanian approval of the passage of Soviet troops through Rumania at any time at the request of the USSR; and c. Rumanian approval for the conduct of Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Rumania in the near future. 2. The [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] stated that in their negotiations with the Rumanian Government the Soviet officials had emphasized the following considerations: a. That as a Warsaw Pact member Rumania is obligated to cooperate with the other Warsaw Pact members in undertaking actions aimed at furthering the objectives of the Warsaw Pact; all three items raised with Rumania fall in this category. b. The actions in question must be undertaken in the near future and not postponed because they constitute essential portions of the military dispositions necessary to protect the Warsaw Pact area from “possible military movement from the direction of Yugoslavia.” 3. The [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] stated that the Rumanian Government currently finds itself in a very difficult situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] the government does not intend to accede to the three requests by the USSR. 4. Field dissem: None (also sent USUN). 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Possible Warsaw Pact Invasion. Secret; No Foreign Dissemination; Controlled Dissemination; No Dissemination Abroad; Background Use Only. 172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, November 23, 1968, 1926Z. 276992. When Under Secretary saw Soviet Ambassador November 22 on another matter, he touched briefly on the current situation in Eastern Europe. Under Secretary said that rumors of increased military activity in Eastern Europe had come to our attention, that as was his practice he had no wish to make official démarche on basis of rumors and that he would prefer to rely on assurances given Secretary by Dobrynin in late August with regard to other possible Soviet moves in Eastern Europe following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 2 Dobrynin asked if Under Secretary were questioning assurances of late August in which case he would formally ask Moscow if they were still valid. Under Secretary said he was not questioning assurances and asked if there were any question in Dobrynin's mind with regard to their continuing validity. Dobrynin said that he had no doubt that the statements he made to the Secretary in late August remained valid. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Toon and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to USNATO and repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, and London. 2 See Document 167 . 173. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 173. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State 1 Bucharest, December 9, 1968. A–517 SUBJECT Where Does Romania Stand Three Months After Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia? REF Bucharest A–473 2 Summary The following review of the Romanian situation is an updated and slightly expanded version of a briefing paper prepared for Mr. James Lowenstein, Consultant to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who visited here on November 28–30. It expresses the view, already set forth in the airgram under reference, that the Romanians are determined to hold to the essentials of national communism. Introduction It is clear that the Soviets are trying to take maximum advantage of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in order to consolidate their hold on Eastern Europe including Romania. The Romanians are under indirect pressure resulting from the logic of the situation, namely that the Soviets are willing to use force in Eastern Europe in order to achieve their objectives. They are also under direct pressure in terms of Soviet demands on a number of important substantive issues (in this connection, we would not be at all surprised if the most recent spate of rumors of an imminent invasion of Romania had not been deliberately encouraged by the Soviets in order to frighten the Romanians into making substantive concessions). The new situation in Eastern Europe has had significant effects on the internal scene where the Romanians are looking for increased support from the population. And, of course, it has also affected foreign policy where, to a limited degree, the Romanians are lying low, although otherwise acting in accordance with the precepts of national communism. Internal Situation One of the main characteristics of the internal situation is the continuation of the regime's highly controlled and gradual liberalization despite (one might even say because of) the new situation in Eastern Europe. This can be noted in a number of areas. In internal security affairs, the Secret Police continue to be on a short leash, there have been several rehabilitations of people sentenced in the 1950's, the emphasis in speeches is on socialist legality, and the latest Grand National Assembly session (November 11–13) passed a new Code of Criminal Procedure which on the face of it is a better guarantee of individual rights than the previous one. In addition, the regime shows every sign of relaxing somewhat its stringent restrictions on travel abroad. In the cultural sphere, although the official line sounds very conservative, in practice the regime seems to be increasingly tolerant of unorthodox art and varying trends in literature. As for the economic sphere, the search for efficiency is no doubt an important factor in the continued quiet work behind the scenes on a limited degree of economic decentralization. Decentralization is also one of the key aspects of the reform of higher education, implemented at the beginning of October, as a result of which the universities and other institutes of higher education will exercise some of the powers previously exercised by the Ministry of Education. No doubt the regime believes that steady (albeit very limited) progress in the direction of internal relaxation will win it a greater measure of popular support. The search for increased support is also behind the recent measures affecting the minorities. Following an RCP Plenum in October, county and central nationality councils of the Hungarians and the Germans were established. (There are also county, Ukrainian and Serbian councils.) Although their functions have been only vaguely defined in official speeches, this is a gesture of considerable significance. As for the intellectuals, Ceausescu's recent speeches (at the Universities of Cluj and Iasi) showed his concern for their preoccupations and a significant number of intellectuals have been elected to leading positions in the new Front of Socialist Unity which serves to symbolize and (so the regime hopes) to encourage national unity. Foreign Affairs The attempt of the Soviets to consolidate their hold over the socialist camp is taking place in a number of different contexts. They are trying to “strengthen” or “tighten up” the Warsaw Pact. Although we know very little about the detailed proposals, we have reports of varying reliability that at one time or another the Soviets have demanded integrated military units, more power for the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, increasing the size of the Romanian Armed Forces, and increasing the standardization of equipment throughout the Warsaw Pact countries. They have also been pressing for Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Romania. The Romanians will probably cooperate to some extent on some of these demands, and Romanian agreement to beefing up or tightening up the Warsaw Pact is in fact a concession since the Romanians would prefer that there not be any pacts at all in Europe and, short of that, that the Warsaw Pact organization be as quiescent as possible. However, we do not anticipate that the Romanians will be willing to give up national control of their Armed Forces to any significant degree. Certainly, this would be inconsistent with Ceausescu's categorical rejection in his November 29 speech of any renunciation of sovereignty in the Warsaw Pact context (Bucharest 3174). 3 Moreover, we gather that in compensation for their willingness to play along on some matters, the Romanians are pressing for a greater Eastern European voice in Warsaw Pact affairs. As far as maneuvers in Romania go, we have it on very good authority that they have agreed in principle to such maneuvers in 1969, but this agreement is subject to a government-to-government agreement specifying the exact duration and location of the exercise and the size of the forces participating therein. The Soviets and their allies also seem eager once again to try to enhance the authority of CEMA, although here we know even less about their specific proposals. In any event, Romanian opposition to giving CEMA supranational powers was flatly reasserted by Ceausescu in the speech referred to above. The Soviets have succeeded in obtaining the agreement of many communist parties, including the Romanians, to holding a World Communist Conference in Moscow in May of next year. Romanian agreement to a conference at any specific time is indeed a concession since all along the Romanian argument has been that while a conference is desirable in principle, in practice the conditions are not propitious (this is a reference to the refusal of the Chinese and some other communist parties to have anything to do with it). Perhaps the Romanians felt they could make this concession more readily now that the Italian, Austrian and French CP's had agreed to hold the meeting. In any event, the real measure of Romanian willingness to be conciliatory on this issue is not so much whether they attend a conference as whether they agree to a binding line which would have an adverse effect on their relations with Peking and other communist parties opposed to Moscow or independent of Moscow and on their relations with the FRG and the West in general. The thrust and tone of Ceausescu's comments on the world communist movement in his November 29 speech make it very unlikely, in our opinion, that the Romanians would adhere to such a line. Meanwhile, the pattern of Romanian foreign relations continues much as usual. Although in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia the Romanians were perhaps sensitive to the visibility of their ties with West Germany, Israel and the United States, at the present time relations with these three countries are normal and insofar as the United States is concerned they are, if anything, improved. Thus, there is a breakthrough on the issuance of visas for Romanians emigrating to the United States, and the just-signed Cultural and Atomic Energy Agreements and the Agreement with IREX reflect the Romanian desire to expand cultural and scientific relations with us. In addition, negotiations are about to start on a civil air agreement between Romania and the United States. Romanian relations with other countries of the non-communist world are following the usual pattern, and Manescu's recent trip to Latin America shows that the Romanians are indeed anxious to further expand them. At the same time, Romanians remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict and maintain their cordial relations with Peking. Conclusion Romanian national communism has already suffered some setback. This is certainly true to the extent that the Romanians are no longer saying loudly and openly what they really think about Czechoslovakia. It is also true to the extent that the Romanians, as noted above, presumably feel obliged to make some limited concessions of a substantive nature on important bloc issues (e.g. the Warsaw Pact and the World Communist Conference). The Romanian leadership itself, for all Ceausescu's assertiveness, must be uncertain to what extent it can salvage national communism such as it has developed since the early 1960's. Presumably, they hope that by trimming their sails for a while they will be able to ride out the storm. At this time, and assuming the Soviets do not bring military pressure to bear, we believe that the Romanians will hold on to the fundamentals of independence not only because freedom from control by Moscow is essential doctrine but because Ceausescu himself cannot afford, if he wishes to maintain his personal ascendancy, to go very far down the road of concessions. In addition, a number of factors are helping the Romanians to keep their noses above water. One of these is the disunity in the communist movement, and the continued opposition of important communist parties to Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia. Another factor is the absence, so far, of a real revival of the East-West Cold War, the compulsions of which would greatly reduce Romanian freedom of maneuver. And, finally, there is the fact that the Czechs themselves are cooperating to a degree. If there were a bloodbath in Czechoslovakia and the Soviets imposed direct control there, the Romanians would feel under even greater pressure than now. Davis 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ROM. Confidential. Drafted by deMartino. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, Paris, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 2 Airgram A–473, October 24, reported on the continuity of Romania's national Communist policies in the wake of the Czech invasion. (Ibid., POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH) 3 Dated December 2. (Ibid., POL 15–1 ROM) 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania 1 Washington, December 12, 1968, 1828Z. 286014. Subject: Secretary Rusk Receives Romanian Ambassador: European Questions. Following, based on uncleared memcon, 2 is FYI, Noforn and subject to review. Secretary received Ambassador Bogdan at his request for 45 minutes morning December 10. Bogdan leaving for consultations and home leave December 11. Tour d'horizon covered following European topics: 1. Brezhnev Doctrine (BD) . Secretary brought up and expressed concern about so-called BD. 3 We cannot accept, he explained, principle that relations among sovereign states of same system purely internal matter for Moscow. This could lead to titanic struggle among limited number of great powers. Some day BD could create problem for Romania. Ambassador should tell Foreign Minister Manescu, Secretary regrets press leak at recent NATO meeting due to indiscretion on part two delegations in revealing private discussion among Ministers, but does not apologize for discussing effect on NATO security of what happens outside NATO boundaries. Bogdan responded Romanian position on BD made clear several times, most recently in Ceausescu speech December 1, which asserted possibility participation in Warsaw Pact and membership in socialist community without diminished sovereignty. Personally, Bogdan remarked, he is interested in the recent discussion of NATO Ministers on subject whether Romania does or does not belong to “gray zone.” Secretary replied press comment went too far. We do not intend expand area of NATO responsibilities, he explained, but cannot remain unconcerned when, as in the case of Czechoslovakia last summer, Soviet forces move forward west and south. Secretary and Ambassador agreed best present procedure is to continue work toward détente, in spite of difficulties, quietly and without fanfare, outside as well as inside UN. 2. European Situation . Bogdan asked how Secretary views European situation after NATO November meeting. Secretary replied new element in situation is Soviet leaders' demonstrated ability make decisions for which heavy price must be paid: worsening of relations with Czechoslovakia, disruption of East-West relations, antagonizing world opinion. What does this mean? Ideological step backward? Fright over development of East-West coexistence? People capable making Czech-type decision also capable of facing world with other unpredictable decisions. This is why NATO must now improve quality of its forces. Europe is not third force between US and Soviet Union. Contention between these two powers not over polar bears in Arctic, but over security of Europe, which is primary issue. We have a national interest in reasonably correct relations between Eastern and Western Europe, even if we do not have as many illusions as some of our West European friends. We have a national interest as well in the future of Germany. 3. Germany . Bogdan asked how Secretary envisaged solution German question. Secretary replied solution will take time and will be work of German people themselves, East and West. Solution will be acceptable to US in case German people decide there should be two separate Germanys; also, if they agree two countries should come together. Bogdan commented unification of Germany of concern to Bucharest, indeed a difficult and painful subject, because there are Germans, both East and West, who are not interested in unification alone. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 ROM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tihany, cleared in EUR/RPM, and approved by Toon. Also sent to Moscow and USNATO. 2 Copies of the memoranda of conversation dealing with European affairs, the Middle East, and Vietnam are ibid., POL EUR, POL 27–ARAB ISR, and POL 27 VIET S, noterespectively. 3 See footnote 4, Document 23 . Yugoslavia Yugoslavia 175. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State Belgrade, June 24, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. Confidential. Repeated to Bucharest, Hong Kong, Moscow, and Zagreb. 176. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 16, 1964. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Andrews and approved in S on August 24. The source text is labeled “Part I of III;“ separate memoranda of conversation dealing with East-West relations and visitors to Yugoslavia are ibid. 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State Belgrade, October 26, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Moscow and Zagreb. 178. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 1. Confidential. An attached table, entitled “Yugoslav Requirements and Proposed Financing,” is not printed. 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State Belgrade, October 25,1966, 1445Z. Source: Department of State, Yugoslav Desk Files: Lot 79 D 230, Pol 1966 US. Confidential; Priority. 180. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) and the Under Secretary of Agriculture (Schnittker) to President Johnson Washington, November 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 2. Confidential. 181. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State Belgrade, December 7, 1966, 1800Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 YUGO. Confidential. 182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia Washington, February 24, 1967, 9:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–YUGO. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Miller, cleared by Yost, and approved by Lisle. Repeated to USUN. 183. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 13, 1967. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board with the Directors of INR, DIA, and NSA concurring. The representatives of the AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained on the grounds the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 184. Editorial Note 185. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State Belgrade, July 15, 1967, 1144Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–YUGO. Confidential. Repeated to Zagreb. 186. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 27, 1967, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 YUGO–US. Confidential. Drafted by Wilson and approved in S/AH on October 5. The meeting was held in Harriman's office. 187. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State Belgrade, December 29, 1967, 1605Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 YUGO–US. Confidential. 188. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 6, 1968. Source; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. No classification marking. 189. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Springsteen) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 11, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. Confidential. Drafted by Beaudry and Wilson and cleared by Grossman. 190. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State Belgrade, August 14, 1968, 1050Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 YUGO. Confidential. Repeated to Prague, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Sofia, Warsaw, Berlin, USNATO, and Zagreb. 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State Belgrade, August 23, 1968, 1225Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Confidential; Priority. 192. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 29, 1968, 3:45 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–YUGO. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Wilson and approved in S on September 3. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. 193. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State Belgrade, September 14, 1968, 0730Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 YUGO. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Zagreb, and USNATO. 194. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 23, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. Confidential. Drafted by Nathaniel Davis on September 26. Copies were sent to Rostow, Ash, and Lisle. 195. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 4, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 2. No classification marking. Drafted by Davis and approved by Rostow. The meeting was held in the President's office at the White House. 196. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State Belgrade, October 18, 1968, 1920Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Katzenbach was in Europe to attend a meeting of the Western European Union. 197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, October 24, 1968, 2340Z. Source; Department of State, Central Files, ORG 1 U. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Wilson and approved by Lisle and in S/S, EUR, and U. 175. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 175. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 1 Belgrade, June 24, 1964, 5 p.m. 2055. Re Embtel 2015. 2 Comment and observations on certain matters discussed with Tito June 18 follow. 1. Bilateral Relations: Tito left little doubt in my mind that he continues to regard good relations with US as significant element Yugoslav policy and hopes concrete ways can be found to give expression to mutual desire for continued improvement. 2. International Communist Meeting: Seems clear that Tito still feels would be better not to hold meeting under present circumstances, and that he told Khrushchev so. He has apparently helped to induce Khrushchev to delay, at least for time being, taking irreversible step of convening meeting but I was left with impression Tito may be unable judge for how much longer Khrushchev will be willing to wait. At this point I am inclined to believe that while Yugoslavs sincere in opposing meeting, if meeting convened they will attend on grounds that they could not exert useful influence otherwise. 3. Rumania: His remarks to me on this subject, and his subsequent frontier meeting with Gheorghiu Dej, 3 appear to strengthen view that Tito is seeking to restrain Rumanian anti-Soviet and anti-Khrushchev polemics. As Embassy has previously tried to point out, we do not believe Tito has discreditable motive, nor do we believe Tito has in slightest degree abandoned his independence or become Khrushchev's errand boy. I gathered from our conversation that he believes that Dej is taking undue risks by baiting the Soviet Union publicly; that Rumania should proceed to expand her international ties quietly and without unnecessarily exciting Soviet apprehension and animosity; and that if Rumanians continue to develop public anti-Soviet campaign dangerous consequences might ensue. These might include: Direct Soviet pressure on Rumania with setback this would represent to favorable trends in Eastern Europe; a hardened East-West confrontation, replacing trend toward accommodation on both sides which Tito believes exists and which he favors, upsetting relatively stable European situation; and discrediting, in eyes of Moscow and “the socialist world,” relatively peaceful policy of Khrushchev which Yugoslavs feel is infinitely better for themselves (as well as for West) than any foreseeable alternative policy that Moscow might adopt. All evidence here seems to indicate Khrushchev did ask Tito to intercede with Dej. If so, we believe Tito did so for motives entirely compatible with Yugoslav independence. To summarize, Tito does not object to Rumanian efforts to develop international ties beyond circle of socialist countries, but he obviously feels it is dangerous for Rumanians to do this in demonstrative anti-Soviet style. Tito clearly thinks it would be mistake if we were to encourage Rumanians to continue baiting Khrushchev, or if we seek to exploit publicly Rumanian situation as Western triumph against Soviet Union. This, he feels would tend to incite Soviets to take counter measures that could have seriously unfavorable consequences. 4. Tito's Condition: Tito impressed me with what seemed to be his excellent physical condition and intellectual alertness. He seems to be on top of major internal and international problems in which Yugoslavia involved, and is obviously actively and effectively engaged in effort to prevent developments in Eastern Europe from taking a turn that would in his opinion have unsettling and unpredictable consequence. Elbrick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. Confidential. Repeated to Bucharest, Hong Kong, Moscow, and Zagreb. 2 Telegram 2015, June 19, summarized Elbrick's June 18 meeting with Tito. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 BELGRADE) 3 June 22. 176. Memorandum of Conversation 176. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 16, 1964. SUBJECT US-Yugoslav Relations PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary EUR:EE—Nicholas G. Andrews Yugoslav Veljko Micunovic, Yugoslav Ambassador Dr. Presburger, Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy Upon his return from consultation in Belgrade (see memcon of May 22), 2 the Yugoslav Ambassador on his initiative called on the Secretary. He pointed out he had spent more than a month in Yugoslavia and had seen President Tito and many Government officials. The Yugoslav Government considered that relations with the US were normal, correct and good but that they could be even better. No serious political obstacles, as in 1962 or 1963, stood in the way of better relations. Yugoslav officials, however, saw a need for more active relations with the US, for more signs of understanding, for more results and for more contacts between the two Governments. Yugoslavia was interested in placing its relations on the same plane with both East and West. The Ambassador then raised specific questions in our relations. With reference to prewar Yugoslav debts (bonds), he said that a Yugoslav delegation was now in Washington; negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily and this question would soon be settled definitely. With reference to US claims against Yugoslavia for the nationalized property of US citizens, the Ambassador noted that Yugoslavia had increased its offer from $2 million to $3 million. At informal conversations in Washington recently, the figure of $3.5 million was mentioned. The Ambassador protested that if all the property in question were sold it could not fetch that sum of money. But he said that if the US would accept $3.5 million, our representative could go to Belgrade to negotiate a final settlement at this figure. The Secretary said he was not up-to-date on the details, and the Ambassador replied he was merely informing the Secretary. With reference to a Fulbright agreement, the Ambassador said that at last both sides were close to an agreement. It might be ready for signature in September. The Yugoslav Government wished to invite Senator Fulbright to visit Yugoslavia for the occasion, and the Yugoslav Embassy was in touch with his office. The Ambassador observed lightly that in this way a new agreement would be ready for signature every month until the end of the year. He hoped that not only the existing atmosphere but also the prospect for future relations would thereby be improved. For example, Yugoslav enterprises wanted to establish more contacts with US private capital. With reference to limitations on Yugoslav cotton textile imports into the US, the Ambassador said negotiations were not going too well. People in Yugoslavia believed that Yugoslavia was being treated worse than other states. The US was offering a quota which was less than the volume of Yugoslav exports to the US in 1962 and 1963. US agreements with other states, such as the UAR, set quotas which were higher than their exports during those years. The Ambassador, in answer to a question, confirmed that Yugoslav exports had risen in the 1961–1963 period. The Secretary then said that the US had had a gentleman's agreement with Japan on limiting Japanese cotton textile exports to the US during the same period Yugoslav exports were rising. He also reminded the Ambassador that the question of MFN for Yugoslavia had posed a special problem. The US had treated Yugoslavia as a special case, not wanting to limit cotton textile imports from Yugoslavia on account of the MFN problem. It was his understanding that Yugoslavia was being treated as well as other countries. The Ambassador demurred. The Secretary pointed out that if Yugoslavia had had a great increase in exports in 1962, then this would account for a quota lower than the volume of exports in 1962. The Ambassador remarked that the increase in Yugoslav exports was only in the value of a few million dollars and that it was part of the general trend to increase trade between our two countries. It was difficult to explain to Yugoslav enterprises why the US quota had to be lower than the volume of Yugoslav exports in 1962 and 1963, especially since Yugoslavia was not being treated as well as other states. He was hopeful, however, that a satisfactory agreement could be reached. The Secretary asked what the prospects were for agriculture this year. The Ambassador said that until June 15 or 20, wheat looked good but a period of exceptional heat for ten days and nights had seriously affected the crop. He believed his Government would be interested in negotiating for the purchase of more wheat. The Secretary referred to the Rockefeller Foundation's long relationship with Yugoslavia, mostly in the public health field since the war. The Foundation was also interested in the best ways of cultivating basic crops, such as wheat, corn and rice. Some remarkable results had been achieved in Mexico and Colombia, for example. The Foundation offered cooperation in developing research, training programs and extension services. The Secretary said he did not want to suggest that Yugoslavia was not up-to-date but he thought that, within the framework of scientific and technical contacts, Yugoslavia might be interested in inviting a Rockefeller Foundation member specializing in agriculture to visit Yugoslavia. Such ideas as he might develop might be useful for the Government to look into. The Ambassador thanked the Secretary for this suggestion. 1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Andrews and approved in S on August 24. The source text is labeled “Part I of III;“ separate memoranda of conversation dealing with East-West relations and visitors to Yugoslavia are ibid. 2 At this meeting, Rusk and Micunovic discussed the state of U.S.-Yugoslav relations and Yugoslav foreign policy objectives in other areas. Memoranda of this conversation are ibid. 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 1 Belgrade, October 26, 1964, 7 p.m. 834. During call on Federal Assembly President Kardelj October 26, we discussed bilateral relations and Soviet leadership change. 2 Kardelj, who gave impression of being unusually interested in course of US–GOY relations, was friendly and responsive throughout. Bilateral relations: Opening with this subject, I remarked upon interest expressed in recent months by GOY officials at all levels in expanding relations with US—an attitude which USG fully reciprocated. Activities in various areas such as negotiations for compensation for nationalized property, Fulbright Agreement, and PL 480 Agreement 3 showed movement in right direction which I hoped would continue. Kardelj replied at length. He said that while differences might occur between us arising from differences in political systems he believed we should make every effort to develop those areas where cooperation possible. He referred to aid given by US to Yugoslavia in past, which he termed very useful and important to GOY, but felt such aid, while necessary, tended to create difficult relationship. It is wise, therefore, to put such relations on more normal basis. Kardelj said some difficulties or “crises” in our relations had their source in tendency on part of USG to measure frequently “how many millimeters” GOY policy had departed from that of Moscow. This, he made clear, always manages to raise hackles of GOY. He felt GOY can play important role in East-West relations which points up importance of his country's relations with US without actually saying so—but following specific reference to situation created by change in Moscow—he intimated that friendly relations with US are of even greater importance now. While agreeing that GOY can play important role in helping solve East-West problems, I pointed out that this would be so as long as GOY follows “truly nonaligned policy.” I said USG glad to note matters have progressed in Yugoslavia to point where we can now put our economic relations on more normal basis, fact which should be beneficial to both countries. Soviet leadership: Noting that recent changes in Soviet leadership are of great interest to all countries, I spoke along lines of Department circular telegram 722. 4 I said we were glad to have assurances from new Soviet leaders that previous policies would not be changed, but like most countries, USG is awaiting initial actions of new Soviet regime in order to judge true significance of shift. Kardelj said world press had indulged in much speculation over change in Moscow but he, too, felt that any attempt at serious analysis is somewhat premature. He proceeded, nevertheless, to give me his opinion of certain aspects of Soviet developments. He said he felt Khrushchev's failings were generally those of style; that Khrushchev was inclined to be heavy-handed and brusque; that his removal was nevertheless a surprise. Kardelj felt that Khrushchev's important policies re coexistence and relaxation of tensions far outweighed any shortcomings that might be attributed to him. He felt immediate future would be a delicate period in history and was very pleased to note calm and statesmanlike way in which President Johnson had reacted to Khrushchev's dismissal. 5 On subject of Sino-Soviet relations, Kardelj said he saw no real solution to this problem. He said Sino-Soviet differences had no ideological basis but were, rather, national or political. He felt Soviet Government would make effort to calm matters, but he did not think USSR could possibly make concessions demanded by China. ChiComs would like, of course, to “use” great power of Soviet Union in advancing their own interests, but Soviet Government could never agree to this. He said conceivably ChiComs might use Khrushchev's dismissal as pretext for trying to improve relations with USSR but would do so only to achieve their own objectives and any détente created thereby would be temporary. With respect to Yugoslav-Soviet relations, Kardelj said he did not expect significant change although I had impression that he feared any effective efforts to heal Sino-Soviet rift might work to Yugoslavian disadvantage. Significant feature of conversation was Kardelj's apparent emphasis on Yugoslavia's need of good relations with US. Uncertainty regarding future course of Soviet Government (Yugoslavians have been made particularly uneasy by Soviet reference to principles enunciated by 21st Party Congress) 6 might well account for this although it would be premature and probably unrealistic to expect any overt moves in this direction. Elbrick 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Moscow and Zagreb. 2 Nikita S. Khrushchev was removed from his post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union on October 15. Aleksei N. Kosygin replaced him; Leonid I. Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. 3 For text of the claims agreement, signed at Belgrade on November 5, 1964, see 16 UST 11. For text of the educational exchange agreement, signed at Belgrade on November 9, 1964, see 15 UST 2081. For text of the agricultural commodities agreement, signed at Belgrade on October 28, 1964, see 15 UST 2058. 4 Circular telegram 722, dated October 23, provided guidance for discussions on Khrushchev's ouster with other diplomatic representatives. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 USSR) 5 For text of the President's October 18 statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 , Book II, pp. 1377–1380. 6 Apparent reference to Khrushchev's address to the January 27, 1959, opening session of the Congress, which included a denunciation of the Yugoslav Communist Party's conduct in the context of an outline of rules for interparty conduct. For text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press , February 18, 1959, pp. 12–19; February 25, 1959, pp. 3–10; March 4, 1959, pp. 17–25; and March 11, 1959, pp. 13–20. 178. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 178. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 22, 1965. SUBJECT Yugoslav Request for Assistance to Carry out Liberalization of Economy The Yugoslavs are seeking financial assistance to support a far-reaching program of economic reform which has been worked out in close cooperation with the IMF. Internally the program involves further decentralization of economic decision making to business firms and banks operating in the context of a market economy. Externally it involves devaluation of the currency (dinar) and use of a customs tariff to reduce reliance on quantitative and other administrative measures. The Yugoslavs are concerned that they will not have adequate foreign exchange reserves to carry the program through at the pace and to the degree they desire. Currently their reserves amount to $70 million, or less than one month's imports. The Yugoslavs see as their difficult period the next three and a half years. To support their new program they want to build up their reserves this year to $200 million and by 1968 to $300 million. The attached table shows the details of their requirements and their present plans to finance at least part of them. Briefly, what they have in mind is a package of $150–$160 million basically in new medium and longer-term credits. They are looking to us, Italy, France and the U.K. to provide these new credits. In addition, they are about to get a $50 million net credit from the IMF. From the United States, they ask the following: (1) Assurance that Export-Import Bank will issue guarantees on privately financed medium term credits for purchase of U.S. raw materials and semi-finished goods in an amount of $20–$25 million through CY 1968. (2) Putting a two-year grace period in the March 1965 PL 480 Title IV 2 agreement as well as in two 1964 PL 480 Title IV agreements, and extending the repayment period on the 1964 agreements from 3 to 12 years (which may represent a deferral over the short run of about $26 million). (3) Easier terms (two-year grace period and repayment over 12–17 years) on a 1966 PL 480 Title IV program of about the same size as the current one. There appear to be no legal obstacles to working out a package meeting these requests, and the President has made the required determination for EX–IM Bank guarantees to Yugoslavia. The 1964 and 1965 PL 480 terms can be made more favorable in the context of a new PL 480 negotiation covering 1966, and the requested 1966 PL 480 terms, while more favorable than recent agreements with Yugoslavia, are within statutory limits. The requested EX–IM Bank guarantees, however, would be in addition to those which the Bank is already prepared to extend during the period, and the five to seven-year credit period requested for sales of raw materials and semi-finished goods is beyond EX–IM Bank terms for such sales. EX–IM policy now is to issue guarantees only for 18 month credits on such sales. Political Issues The advantages to the U.S. of supporting the program are that it will move the Yugoslav economic system even further towards a typical free-world system and away from the typical Communist system. It will mean closer integration with Free World economic institutions (Yugoslavia hopes the program will enable it to move from provisional GATT membership to full membership) and continue the pressures for liberalization in other aspects of Yugoslav life against more doctrinaire Communists. Success in carrying out the program will have a definite showcase effect in Eastern Europe, where dissatisfaction with the current economic systems and tentative experimentation with reform is widespread. It must be noted, however, that high Yugoslav officials, notably Tito, and the Yugoslav press have sharply criticized in one-sided terms U.S. policies in Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic and the Congo. The U.S. has vigorously protested this criticism, and the Yugoslavs have been given to understand that it influences what we can do in the economic area. Since these representations were made, public statements by Yugoslav Government officials have been more restrained, and the joint communiqué issued on the occasion of Tito's recent visit to Moscow 3 called for cessation of bombing of North Viet-Nam, not for withdrawal of U.S. troops. At the same time Yugoslavia has no diplomatic relations with North Viet-Nam, and it has not given that country any kind of material assistance. There have been no demonstrations against the U.S. in Yugoslavia and bilateral relations in the cultural and other fields have increased. In the context of criticism of U.S. foreign policy, Yugoslavia as a dissident Communist country presents a different problem than Pakistan, presumably an ally. Furthermore, Yugoslavia has been absolutely opposed to Chinese policies, especially as they relate to wars of national liberation, and has battled Chinese influence in the Afro-Asian world. Criticism of the U.S. on these matters must be weighed against the advantages to the U.S. of supporting, in pursuit of its long-range objectives, the fundamental movement towards economic liberalization and closer affinity to Western practices inherent in the Yugoslav program and the significance of this movement in enabling Yugoslavia to continue its role as the envied revisionist and historical disruptor of Communist unity. The financial support which the U.S. is being asked to provide for the reform program is relatively small—namely, less than $17 million a year. More importantly, this support is not in the form of grant “aid” but only of extending better terms on credit facilities, all of which are repayable in dollars. In my judgment, this contribution would not give us sufficient leverage to compel the Yugoslavs to change further their public statements on our military policies in Viet-Nam, since I believe that under existing circumstances it is in the U.S. interest to continue our normal dollar repayable PL 480 program. Therefore I recommend that the U.S. support to the moderate extent indicated the Yugoslav program for greater economic integration with the Free World. TCM 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 1. Confidential. An attached table, entitled “Yugoslav Requirements and Proposed Financing,” is not printed. 2 For text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see 68 Stat. 454. 3 Tito visited Moscow June 18–July 1. 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 1 Belgrade, October 25,1966, 1445Z. 2 1294. Informal GOY reaction to Food for Peace Law as enacted by Congress is one of utter dismay. 3 Latest telegraphic report from Ambassador Micunovic to FonOff apparently indicates that immediately upon signature by President law would close door on further PL-480 Title IV commitment to Yugoslavia. Presburger, Deputy Director Western Hemisphere Division predicted yesterday it will be impossible for FonOff to counter impression in upper levels GOY that U.S. has taken discriminatory step specifically and solely directed against Yugoslavia. He said Yugoslavs could draw no other conclusion in view USG promotion of expanded trade possibilities with other Communist countries in Eastern Europe, and fact that upshot of Congressional action is to give freedom to administration to pursue its policy in every respect except with regard to issue of PL-480 vital for Yugoslavia. Similar reaction although not as pointed heard yesterday from other Embassy contacts in FonOff and other government departments. Elbrick 1 Source: Department of State, Yugoslav Desk Files: Lot 79 D 230, Pol 1966 US. Confidential; Priority. 2 Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 P.L. 89–808, November 11, 1966, extended the Food for Peace program. It eliminated surplus disposal programs and replaced them with grain sales in dollars supported by long-term credits. It also banned food sales to nations selling or transporting goods to North Vietnam or Cuba. For text, see 80 Stat. 1526. 180. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) and the Under Secretary of Agriculture (Schnittker) to President Johnson 180. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) and the Under Secretary of Agriculture (Schnittker) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 30, 1966. SUBJECT PL-480 Sales to Yugoslavia Recommendation: That you approve the sale to Yugoslavia prior to the end of 1966 of 35,000 metric tons of vegetable oils and 450,000 tons of wheat 2 under Public Law 480, subject to clearance with key Members of Congress. 3 Discussion: We have invested 3–1/2 billion since 1950 in Tito's Yugoslavia. This investment made it possible for Tito to make good his break with Stalin. It paid off. Tito's defection started the dissolution of the Communist Bloc. It led to riots in Poland, revolution in Hungary, and a new sense of national independence throughout Eastern Europe. Your program of building bridges to the East takes advantage of the forces that Yugoslavia's independence set in motion. Yugoslavia is now taking far-reaching and equally risky steps in the economic field. It is moving toward a market economy tied to the free world. It has reduced its tariffs, abolished import quotas and is now a full member of the GATT. Economic liberalization in Yugoslavia is already setting the pattern for other countries in Eastern Europe. It is in our interest to make it succeed. For this reason, the agricultural sales program we recommend would be a good investment. The proposed sale of vegetable oils and wheat amounts to $40 million. These credit sales would give the Yugoslav Government badly needed room to maneuver and help it deal with the balance of payment pressures that result from import liberalization. These dollar repayable credits would greatly encourage the Yugoslavs to continue in the direction we want them to go. They give good prospects for benefits throughout Eastern Europe. You will recall that PL 480 was amended at the last Session in such a manner as to forbid assistance to governments trading with North Viet-Nam and, after January 1, 1967, governments trading with Cuba, except for agricultural products as to which a Presidential waiver would be possible. Yugoslavia does not trade with North Viet-Nam and is the only Communist nation which does not do so. It does, however, permit small shipments of medical supplies and blood, collected through voluntary contribution to its Red Cross (a non-governmental organization). It is the view of the Department of Justice that these shipments would not, as a matter of law, preclude PL 480 aid. Yugoslavia also does a small amount of business with Cuba in non-agriculture commodities and, therefore, PL 480 assistance after January 1 will be prohibited. The wheat sales here recommended were under discussion between the United States and the Government of Yugoslavia prior to the amendment of PL 480 although no formal commitments were entered into. We have a signed agreement to sell the vegetable oil. If we are to go ahead with these sales, however, it would be important as a matter of law that they be approved prior to January 1. In addition, we agree that the sale of wheat should not be approved by you formally without discussion with key members of the Agriculture Committee so that there could be no misunderstanding with respect to the applicability of the amendments to PL 480. We would ask for your approval, therefore, subject to our straightening out any possible misunderstandings in Congress. Attached is a memorandum to you from Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick setting forth his views on this matter. 4 Nicholas deB. Katzenbach John A. Schnittker 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 2. Confidential. 2 The Yugoslavs requested a sales program of 1,150,000 tons of wheat for this fiscal year. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 There is no indication of Presidential action on the source text. At a December 21 press conference, Secretary Rusk, in reply to a question, stated that no decision had been taken on P.L. 480 shipments to Yugoslavia. For text, see Department of State Bulletin , January 9, 1967, pp. 46–47. 4 Not found with the source text. 181. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 181. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 1 Belgrade, December 7, 1966, 1800Z. 1712. Ref: State 96794, Belgrade 1666. 2 1. In December 6 call on Boris Krajger, Vice President of Federal Executive Council, I reviewed with him current status of GOY requests for financial support of economic reform, with particular reference to effects of Findley Amendment. Purpose my call was mainly to respond, even though inconclusively, to Yugoslav views which he had communicated to me prior my return to Washington (Belgrade 1427). 3 I sought give Krajger a balanced appraisal of possibilities for repeal of the amendment, noting President's public statement regretting its inclusion in Food for Peace Act. 4 Concerning possibilities of interpretations that would be helpful to economic reform, I had little to add to views conveyed to Nikezic (Belgrade 1589) 5 with which Krajger already familiar, but sought reassure him on administration's continuing interest in economic reform and generally in good relations with Yugoslavia. In course of conversation I took occasion to suggest desirability GOY viewing present problem against background of very heavy US assistance extended over long period, with many projects just now coming to completion—e.g., recently dedicated hydroelectric projects and Sarajevo-Ploce Railway. Referring favorably to Tito's private statements that GOY does not intend to dramatize situation arising from Findley Amendment, 6 I suggested, as my personal view, that it would be important avoid new issues or sources of irritation to Congressmen whose support needed for repeal of Findley Amendment. 2. In course of discussion, Krajger made following points: (A) Acknowledged magnitude and usefulness of past US assistance to Yugoslavia. This helped overcome many problems and provided foundation for current economic reform. Past assistance, always without any political conditions, had promoted good relations. (B) Stressed importance of assistance in 1966 and 1967, which to be used to carry out reform, not for expanded development. All signs indicate 1967 most important year, with many fundamental problems to be met in first half year. These include new foreign exchange regime (import liberalization) subjecting many firms to pressures of foreign competition, and restrictive credit policy, to counter inflation and force firms to export. (C) Measures to be taken in 1967 should perhaps have been carried through earlier, but it was necessary to make political preparations. Recently there have been “minor disturbances” due to this delay (pre-sumably referring to recent strong upward pressure on prices, wages and investments) but he believes possible overcome these in January and February. (D) If U.S. Food for Peace credits not forthcoming, or some alternative form of US financing, GOY would need to compensate internally for loss of 100 million (old) dinars (i.e., in revenues from sale of agricultural imports) and for balance of payments loss of some $60 million, taking account of higher payments required if purchases made on CCC credit terms. Problem is one of financing, rather than physical availability of commodities. (E) GOY greatly interested in interim assistance from rescheduling or new credits during period in which Findley Amendment remains on books, i.e., at least through first half of 1967. (F) GOY will have to consider all possible measures for compensation for restrictions of Food for Peace credits, but such measures will inevitably aggravate problems encountered in carrying out of reform. (G) He confirmed that GOY does not wish dramatize issue of Findley Amendment as a deterioration in economic relations with US. Internally, however, will need to dramatize “intense” problems encountered by economic reform in order mobilize all forces to limit economic demands and exercise greater self-discipline. Period 1966–1967 therefore being characterized as the ”battle“ for the economic reform. The greater the help from the US, the less dramatic this internal ”battle“ will be. Elbrick 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 YUGO. Confidential. 2 Telegram 96794, December 5, provided instructions for discussions with Krajger. (Ibid.) Telegram 1666, December 5, requested the most current information on the Findley Amendment. (Ibid.) Regarding this amendment, see footnote 7, Document 125 . 3 Telegram 1427, November 4, reported on a meeting between Elbrick and Krajger concerning economic assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1–4 YUGO) 4 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pp. 1373–1374. 5 This telegram, subsequently renumbered 1559, reported on Elbrick's conversation with Nikezic. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US–YUGO) 6 In telegram 1623 from Belgrade, November 29, Elbrick reported that Tito had stated he was hesitant to “dramatize publicly” the problems arising from passage of the Findley Amendment. (Ibid., POL 17–4 YUGO) 182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia 182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia 1 Washington, February 24, 1967, 9:40 p.m. 144121. 1. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject amendment upon review of memcon. 2 2. Ambassador Micunovic called at his request on Secretary Feb. 24. Recalled regular, helpful practice of consultation with Secretary before returning Belgrade and said we need discussions now more than ever before. Tito and Foreign Office awaiting with great interest details his conversation with Secretary. Stressed his feeling that, without intention either Government, in last five or six months there have been unfortunate developments in US-Yugoslav relations, i.e. legislation of US Congress on Food for Peace, 3 question US assistance for economic reform, December demonstration in Zagreb 4 and January 29 bombings. 5 Question arises therefore of policy and intentions both governments. Need clarification future prospects. 3. Secretary replied bombings outrageous and unfortunate. He had asked Under Secretary to keep in close touch with Department Justice regarding progress investigation. There have been no arrests yet but results not completely blank and these must be checked out carefully. He stressed FBI has committed full facilities to investigation. USG must make clear its attitude toward such incidents very severe, even aside from US-Yugoslav relations, since it affects 118 countries with which we have relations. We will try keep Yugoslavs informed further developments. 4. On Zagreb demonstrations Secretary said these also unfortunate and he did not wish contradict what US authorities had said earlier. Although we have feeling that demonstrations could have been prevented and their effect should not be underestimated, they have not produced permanent injury to our relations as far as President and Secretary concerned and have not affected USG thinking. 5. Secretary recalled Executive Branch had vigorously opposed legislation eliminating Yugoslav eligibility Food for Peace sales and law not aimed solely at Yugoslavia. Outcome result of psychology over Vietnam in Congress. Secretary said he not aware any negative changes in USG attitude toward Yugoslavia and emphasized our hope to further develop relations. As example, cited hope both countries would have success in Kennedy Round. 6. Secretary said debt roll-over not easy but we continue active consideration. One problem is fact US called upon play major, often almost single, role in assistance many countries, e.g. food for India. With huge budget before Congress this year, USG concerned about what other countries doing in assistance field. 7. Secretary emphasized USG would very much like to see Yugoslav economic reform succeed and wishes to help. Problem for us is not one of policy but rather limited possibilities for action by other agencies as to amount of burdens other countries they can assume. 8. Answering Secretary's question what Micunovic considers major bilateral problems, latter expressed satisfaction Department's actions on damages resulting from bombing. In eyes Yugoslav Government, public and press there can be no question USG good will but violence against Yugoslav missions must be eliminated and FBI investigation must be successful. Secretary replied FBI actively working on available information but there is difference in possibility of action toward those involved in such acts as bombing and those politically opposed to Yugoslav regime. Micunovic said he referred only to acts of violence. Yugoslav missions in US can no longer operate under “reign of terror.” 9. Micunovic said GOY had received no formal answer to request for economic assistance posed last July. GOY appreciated USG help and favorable attitude. However, whereas Yugoslavs told in October they could pay for CCC purchases at end of three years, now told must pay one third each year. GOY does not even know exact status edible oil in view question of PA requirement for purchase “usual marketing requirement” 15,000 tons oil in 1967, although GOY completed such purchases last year under April 1966 agreement. Micunovic recited emigre actions against Yugoslav premises and personnel in US in recent years. USG must provide minimum conditions for operation Yugoslav missions. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–YUGO. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Miller, cleared by Yost, and approved by Lisle. Repeated to USUN. 2 Not found. 3 See footnote 3, Document 179 . 4 The demonstration on December 20, 1966, protested U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam. It was one of a series of demonstrations and attacks on U.S. Government facilities in Yugoslavia during December 1966. 5 A coordinated series of bomb attacks against Yugoslav diplomatic missions in Canada and the United States took place on January 29. The Yugoslav Government denounced the attacks as the work of anti-Tito emigres. 183. National Intelligence Estimate 183. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, April 13, 1967. NIE 15–67 THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT Conclusions A. Yugoslavia is a Communist state in name and in theory, but in practice it is a fully independent state which has rejected most of the “socialist” experience of other Communist states, including the USSR. It has deliberately removed a large portion of its economy from direct centralized controls, and despite its retention of a one-party political system, it has largely freed its people from arbitrary authority. B. The Yugoslav experiment appears to be progressing satisfactorily. Since the break with Stalin nearly 20 years ago, the Yugoslavs have managed to build a viable and independent economy, to go a good distance down the road to decentralization and the democratization of public institutions, and to establish a position in world affairs considerably more significant than their power and resources would seem to warrant. Although the trend toward further decentralization is probably irreversible, progress will not be smooth, and change in Yugoslavia will continue to be accompanied by dissension over the structure and role of party and government, over the nationalities problem, and over the speed with which market forces will be introduced into the economy. C. The greatest problem the Yugoslav Communist Party is likely to face is arranging an orderly succession to the 74-year-old Tito. Should the succession problem arise during a period of severe internal stress and before current reforms have become institutionalized, a serious struggle might ensue. There is a remote chance that such a struggle could threaten the cohesiveness of the Federation, but we believe it far more likely that the state would survive intact. Otherwise, once Tito's changes in party and state structure have become widely accepted, we believe a relatively united leadership could avoid serious crisis and choose a replacement or, more likely, agree on some form of collective leadership. Discussion I. Introduction 1. Yugoslavia under Tito is an unusual laboratory of state craft. It is a Federation of six constituent Republics 2 whose people, after centuries of foreign domination and repeated upheaval, are divided by differences in religion, nationality, language, political experience, and economic development. It is a Communist state in name and in theory, but in practice it is a fully independent country which has rejected most of the “socialist” experience of other states, including the USSR, and which is deliberately removing its economy from centralized controls and freeing its people from arbitrary authority. Moreover, despite pretensions to a grand design, it is a state whose political, economic, and foreign policies have for nearly 20 years reflected mainly improvisation and compromise. 2. So far, despite anomaly and weakness, the Yugoslav experiment has been relatively successful. There have been occasional disruptions, such as the dismissal last summer of Tito's heir apparent, Aleksandar Rankovic, 3 but over the years internal divisive forces have been balanced against each other. The economy, with massive aid from the West, has shed some of the more cumbersome bits of Marxist theory, weathered recurrent crises, and expanded at an impressive rate. And the state, despite the threats and blandishments of opposing power blocs, has retained its sovereignty and achieved an influence in world affairs out of proportion to its power and prosperity. 3. The Yugoslav Federation was established as World War II drew to a close, and the new state was ruled absolutely by Tito as the head of a disciplined Communist Party. In 1948, however, Tito's defiance led to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet Bloc. Bereft of the stability provided by Soviet backing and hostile to most forms of Stalinist-Soviet experience, Yugoslavia's Communists began to seek new ways to win popular acceptance and to stimulate economic growth. They announced that Yugoslavia would embark on a “separate road to socialism,” one which would relax the harsher aspects of Communist rule and eventually assure the withering away of the state through the gradual diffusion of central power to local and regional governments and the construction of a vaguely-defined “socialist market economy.” 4. This separate road to socialism has been a rocky one. Despite Tito's many and clever improvisations, serious internal discords persist, and Yugoslavia's position in the international arena remains equivocal. He gave rein to a broad range of political and economic forces, hoping thus to engage the support of the population and confident that the ultimate power of a pervasive Communist Party could unite disparate interests or, in time of need, reimpose totalitarian direction. But he did not reckon with the erosive effect of decentralization or the party itself. Now, nearly 20 years after the Yugoslav experiment began, the party is in disarray, its members display loyalties divided between federal and local interests, and its effectiveness as an instrument of central power and unity is in question. 5. Yugoslav internal dissensions can be grouped into several categories. There is conflict between those who favor greater political liberalism and those who believe that the decentralization of political institutions has already gone too far; there is dispute between exponents of a centrally-controlled economy and those who would foster local industrial initiative and the profit motive; there is controversy over the role the Yugoslav Communist Party (LCY) should play in political and economic decision-making; there is tension between older leaders, nearly all veterans of Yugoslavia's partisan campaign against the Axis, and younger men unburdened by the emotional ties of comradeship and conservative Marxist ideology; and underlying all, there is the clash of national and ethnic identifications and the division of opinion on whether Yugoslavia is better constituted as a centralized federation of interdependent republics or a looser confederation which gives preeminence to the demands of the Republics for autonomy. II. The Nationalities Problem 6. It is an immutable fact of Yugoslav political life that most Serbs and Croats and Slovenes and Macedonians think of themselves first as Serbs or Croats or Slovenes or Macedonians and second, if at all, as Yugoslavs. National and ethnic rivalries are endemic; they have long constituted a centrifugal force which no liaisons for the solution of economic or political tasks can long overcome. Fears of a return to “greater Serb” hegemony haunt all Yugoslavs except Serbs; some Croats and Slovenes speak earnestly of a complete secession which no central government could tolerate; and less drastic attacks on the federal concept come from all regions. 7. The Communist regime was relatively successful in submerging particularist agitation in the years following World War II. It not only held tight rein on all forms of activity, and could exercise its considerable police powers without restraint, but it could also count on fresh memories of war and the German occupation to help generate a feeling of national unity. After 1948 and the break with the USSR, the regime could rely on common concern over the Soviet threat to perpetuate this unity. In recent years, however, arbitrary police authority has been curbed, the memory of war and wartime atrocity has faded, and the spectre of Soviet intervention has all but disappeared. At the same time, the progressive devolution of economic and political responsibility from federal to local and Republic bodies has encouraged those who would replace the federal system with a loose confederation of more or less autonomous Republics. Even Yugoslavia's growing foreign trade and the great disparities of wealth between various regions have lent weight to the arguments of Croatian and Slovenian particularists; both Republics, for example, have asked authority from Belgrade to establish quasi-official missions in Western Europe, and both have long decried the notion that they must subsidize the economic uplift of the more backward Republics. 8. Tito has met the problems of reemerging particularization in typical fashion, by limited concession and compromise. Much recent sound and fury on the nationalities problem stemmed from non-Serb fears that Rankovic, given as he was to packing party organs and the police with his fellow Serbs, might someday bring about a return of Serb hegemony. His purge probably did much to allay such fears, and Tito, in his post-Rankovic reorganization of the party, was careful to afford the Republics a more balanced representation in top party organs. In January 1967, the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Nationalities met for the first time in many years—an indication, perhaps, of the growing seriousness of the nationalities problem—and heard proposals for a constitutional amendment which would grant it equal rights with the Federal Council, now the most powerful parliamentary body. Tito may consider that by upgrading the Chamber of Nationalities he can establish a safe and controllable forum for the expression of particularist sentiment. 9. Tito has also introduced large numbers of younger men into the party and governmental organs of the individual Republics; he may thus hope to contribute to a weakening of the particularist idea. Though the sentiments on which they feed are widespread and of longstanding, the extremist segments of the particularist movement remain relatively small and—by their very nature—disunited. Younger men of the establishment, bred in an independent Yugoslavia, are likely to believe that the economic and political values of a unified federation outweigh the emotional appeal of secession. So far, this stratagem appears to be working. Many of the newer men, even some of those who were once outspoken in their advocacy of greater regional autonomy, have developed vested interests in the status quo and have become defenders of the federal concept now that they bear heavier administrative responsibility in the upper councils of party and governmental organizations. Many will continue to exploit the emotional appeal of particularism in dealing with their public supporters, but most are likely to submerge the issue in their approach to the solution of national problems. 10. We do not believe that Tito anticipates any real solution to the problem posed by particularism. On the basis of his past performance, he can be expected to seek measures which will permit these pressures to vent in a controllable manner. He may well allow individual Republics increased autonomy in the conduct of their economic affairs, but he will probably employ his full strength in putting down acts which tend to heighten regional political, cultural, and linguistic disputes. The issue of ethnic animosity, however, will continue to plague Tito, and it could represent a significant hazard to a less certain, less prestigious successor. The emotional content of this question almost certainly means that it will remain a potentially explosive issue for some years to come, one susceptible to exploitation by ambitious politicians. Or the people themselves, if dissatisfied and frustrated, could come to see in the federal structure the cause of their own discontents. On balance, however, we foresee a slow attenuation of particularist strength and the gradual invigoration of the Yugoslav idea, particularly among those whose livelihoods and sensibilities would suffer from the collapse of the unified state. III. The Structure of State and Party 11. Local governments in Yugoslavia have been granted relatively heavy responsibility for supervising economic and cultural activities within their own territories, and popular participation in local decisions on the implementation of policy has been actively encouraged. Only the broadest policy direction normally comes from the central government, and Tito has clearly relied on widespread application of the principle of interlocking directorates to provide the central government, or at least the party, with pervasive control. 12. The devolution of power to local authorities has led to widespread and vociferous debate on such significant public issues as the proper structure of the Federal Government, Federal-Republic relations, and the role and structure of the party. Over the years, Tito has responded to this debate with revisions and reforms designed to satisfy at least some of the people some of the time. Since its adoption in 1946, for example the Yugoslav constitution has twice been revised. 4 The most recent version (1963) 5 instituted changes designed to check executive power: it established a court to review the constitutionality of Federal and Republic legislation; it granted Republic and local governments enhanced powers and broadened responsibilities; and it established the primacy of Federal and Republic assemblies over their respective executives. Legislators have been slow to exercise their new powers, but in Slovenia, the Assembly's unwillingness to go along with a government-sponsored bill brought about the temporary resignation of the Cabinet in 1966, and the Federal Assembly demonstrated its independence the same year by sending the federal economic plan back to the executive for revision 11 times. 13. Another consequence of the diffusion of governmental power from Belgrade to the Republics and to local governmental units has been a parallel diffusion of power within the Communist Party, from central organs to regional ones. Local party leaders have not always followed central party directives; they have frequently found themselves torn between the demands of party discipline and the imperatives of local policy decisions. The result has more often than not been detrimental to the party: factionalism has grown and has often reflected particularist divisions; unions, workers' councils, local party groups, enterprise managers' associations, and the like have become new loci of power, and contention and debate have become chronic. All this has been particularly troublesome in a system which was designed to depend so heavily on a unified and disciplined party—with personnel and organizational lines into all other groups and institutions—to provide the centralized authority afforded by no other means. 14. Tito recognizes that the glue has been melting out of Yugoslav society, and it is clearly his hope that the party can be revitalized and remade into the pervasive tool of national policy it was intended to be. But Tito has long felt that the party should not function simply as a coercive instrument which blindly obeys orders from Belgrade and crudely enforces the central will. He wishes the party somehow to become a model social force, inspiring and guiding a national consensus, and the confusions and uncertainties attending the party's statements and actions can probably in large measure be attributed to Tito's dream. 15. The reform of the party in 1966 is a case in point. Long overdue, according to Tito himself, the new measures represent compromise, go only part way toward a real restructuring and restaffing of the party, and do not seem to have any certain and tangible objective. Nevertheless, they do represent a real effort to cope with major problems and reflect a determined response to the situation precipitated by the fall of Rankovic. As the most influential conservative spokesman, Rankovic had marshalled forces to obstruct Yugoslavia's movement toward decentralization and political liberalism, and in doing so had played upon Serbian nationalism and had accumulated state power (including control of the secret police) to a dangerous degree. 16. Tito's subsequent reaction was not so much against conservatism per se as against particularism, factionalism, and extremism of any variety. In order to restore political balance and restrain the conservatives without giving undue power to their liberal opponents, Tito instituted a series of measures designed to dilute conservative power with newer, younger men; to lessen the powers of individuals in leading party organs by expanding membership; to minimize factionalism by separating executive and policy functions in the party leadership; and to broaden the number of party members participating in the government by requiring that elected officials be limited to a single term. As yet, these changes have been only partially implemented; the completion of the party and government reforms awaits new elections in April 1967 and the convocation of a Party Congress sometime in 1968. 17. In the meantime, however, Tito has successfully altered a number of party organs to achieve his aims. He has reduced the influence of a number of the most powerful conservatives by assigning them to a 35-man Presidium which is limited to policy guidance. He has specified that the revived Central Committee must deliberate in public view, eliminating the secrecy which had aided Rankovic in his accumulation of power. He has reconstituted the formerly all-powerful Executive Committee with younger, less prominent men charged with implementing the Presidium's decisions. Finally, he has packed party leadership organs on both Federal and Republic levels with new faces: new men in the party leadership now outnumber the old by 2 to 1, and the average age has dropped by some six years. 18. While a number of these changes appear to be aimed primarily at curbing conservative power, Tito has been careful not to destroy it. Almost all the old partisans have been retained in important party positions. Very few of Rankovic's followers were purged, and Rankovic himself was not subjected to criminal prosecution, although the evidence against him—his misuse of the secret police to eavesdrop in the offices of prominent leaders, allegedly including Tito himself—was certainly sufficiently damning. At about the same time, liberal leader Milovan Djilas was released from prison, 6 perhaps as a counter to Rankovic's escape from prosecution. 19. Tito's admittedly provisional overhaul of the party has encouraged continuing debate on the proper role of the party within Yugoslav government and society. Is the party to exercise command and control or merely ideological guidance? Tito's position is ambivalent. He exhorts the party to lead by persuasion rather than command, but makes it unmistakably clear that the party's role “is growing and will increase for a long time.” He has reduced the power of the secret police by greatly restricting its activities and cutting back its manpower, and he has expanded the rosters of leadership organs so that it will be a “little more difficult for an individual to stand out much.” At the same time, he has insisted that the “party will not wither away,” that it is “still a revolutionary party” and that it has “the right to apply all means necessary to protect the society, to protect the correct line of … socialist development.” 20. If Tito has achieved no settlement of the several controversies his party reform addresses, he nonetheless seems to be on the way to constructing an uneasy consensus on the side of continuing the movement toward “democratization” and decentralization. The regime will seek to nominate and elect only supporters of the present course and leadership during the forthcoming elections to Republic and Federal Assemblies, and from these it will try to select reliable and moderate men for Republic and Federal Cabinet positions. Executive decisions will probably more and more fall to men capable of focusing on issues rather than personalities. Over the next year or so, barring a major upheaval and given a modicum of policy success, these newer men will probably take hold, and neither an ultraliberal Djilas nor an archconservative Rankovic will then be likely to become a rallying point for dissident forces. IV. The Economic Experiment 21. Yugoslavia began its lonely journey down the path of economic revisionism some 15 years ago. Since then, government economic policy has been to allow some considerable play of market forces, though government controls have never been fully relinquished and have been tightened in time of stress. The net result has been a respectable growth rate of about seven percent annually in gross national product, excessive and frequently unwise investment in industrial expansion, some growth in consumption, and a chronic deficit in the nation's balance of payments. 7 Over the years, Western lenders have been forthcoming, and Yugoslav indebtedness to the West now amounts to about $1.2 billion. The recent devaluation of the dinar and moves to facilitate the influx of foreign capital are likely to impress potential foreign investors favorably. At the same time, Yugoslavia has managed to keep her economy free from reliance on the Bloc, and although the USSR is Yugoslavia's single largest trade partner, two-thirds of her foreign trade is with Western or nonaligned nations. 22. The most recent swing of Yugoslav economic policy began in 1965, and like its predecessors, it has not been implemented without opposition. Political conservatives are undoubtedly concerned at any further decentralization, any lessening of the party's role in the decision-making process. Managers of less efficient enterprises are unhappy at the prospect of forgoing state protectionism and facing the harsh winds of foreign competition. Trade unions and workers in such enterprises have similar fears, and cannot relish the prospect of unemployment should their inefficient organizations fail and go out of business, as a number already have. Consumers, who may some day benefit the most from movement toward a market economy, in the meantime suffer from shortages of goods and rising prices. In point of fact, the Yugoslav economy is unstable and probably will remain so unless the market forces now being brought into play come to constitute a regulatory mechanism reliable enough to replace the centralized direction which in the past characterized Yugoslav economic control. 23. In the face of such problems, Tito has made a typical series of policy compromises. He has strengthened the financial resources of a number of enterprises by cutting their taxes, by permitting them to retain a major portion of their profits for investment, and by largely localizing the control of credit. At the same time, he has threatened the lash of foreign competition by eliminating import controls on fully half the goods Yugoslavia imports and by bringing Yugoslavia into full membership in GATT. He has not obstructed freer movements of capital investment and labor to needy sectors of the economy, but he is maintaining Federal control of a major portion of the price structure and 30 to 40 percent of investment capital. He has permitted labor to organize outside the direct control of the party, to play a significant role in enterprise management, and to gain inflationary wage increases. (There were a surprising 230 strikes, mostly on wage issues, in 1965 alone.) He has tried to meet the challenge of growing unemployment by encouraging the exportation of Yugoslav labor, and he has maintained extensive although indirect control on consumer consumption. 24. Despite the ambiguities of Yugoslav economic policy, the trend is currently toward increased decentralization and industrial “self-management.” The process is now probably irreversible. Major control of investment capital, until 1964–1965 in the hands of Federal Government, is now vested in local and regional banks; individual enterprise managers now have a degree of discretion in the disposal of profits (up to 70 percent); and local governments, down to the level of the Opstina (township), have demonstrated great skill in ignoring economic directives from on high in order to pursue local goals. 25. Nevertheless, continuing danger of inflation and fear of instability will probably persuade Tito to retain remaining central economic levers for some time after their purely economic justification disappears. 8 In addition, injudicious and inconsistent employment of these levers, the inertia and resistance of bureaucrats charged with implementing the reform, and continuing obstructionism on the local level will probably delay achievement of the “socialist market economy” which appears to be the long-range goal of the Yugoslav economic experiment. V. Foreign Affairs 26. Simply stated, Tito's main foreign policy goals have been to retain Yugoslav independence at any cost, to stand as a model of nonaligned socialist enterprise in the eyes of the world, and to achieve access to economic opportunity in both East and West. His methods for achieving these goals, marked by clever improvisation and shrewd compromise, have been largely successful. He has rejected alliance with either East or West and gotten substantial aid from both. He has denied Soviet hegemony in the socialist movement and lived to see that denial become something of a touchstone of socialist policy. He has accepted financial aid from the West in wholesale quantities, but has politely bid the West goodnight on the doorstep. He has failed in his efforts to establish the “third world” grouping he once sought, but he has redirected Yugoslav diplomatic energies to Europe, and this has brought him new opportunities without destroying his close relationships with the UAR and India. 27. Tito made his peace with the Soviet Union soon after Stalin's death. Trade is large, the Soviets have extended a fair amount of aid (including sales of military equipment), and attitudes toward many international problems are similar, though usually not identical. Nevertheless, party relations are often strained and marked by ideological bickering. Tito has never ceased to see himself as a Communist, a protestant perhaps, but still defender of the faith. In his view, it was Soviet recusancy, not Yugoslav, which split the socialist movement, and Tito must feel some considerable sense of vindication in the fact that other Eastern European nations are now applying lessons learned from the Yugoslav economic experiment and are choosing national roads to socialism. So long as the Yugoslav experiment continues to stimulate emulation within the socialist camp, the Soviet Union will carp and nag; so long as Soviet attacks continue to arouse Yugoslav fears for their independence from foreign meddling, Soviet-Yugoslav relations will be much more a matter of mutual convenience than affection. 28. Yugoslav relations with the US, while generally friendly, have been marked with a measure of restraint and wariness on both sides. The pragmatism which led Tito to seek US aid after the break with the USSR in 1948 remains the touchstone of the Yugoslav attitude. The hostility which Yugoslav exiles in the US bear toward the Belgrade government is always a potential source of friction, especially when it is periodically reflected in US legislation. But the Yugoslavs recognize the usefulness of a continuing measure of US political and economic support, and they do not allow themselves to be easily provoked. Nevertheless, on most of those issues which clearly polarize the world, the Yugoslavs will not forget their Communist antecedents and will pay at least lip-service to Communist positions. 29. Yugoslavia has been more actively seeking improvements in relations with its immediate neighbors in both East and West Europe. Partly this is because of the opportunity presented by relaxed tensions in Europe; partly it is designed as a defensive hedge against any future Soviet attempts at domination. Relations with Hungary and Bulgaria (despite friction with the latter over Macedonia) have significantly improved as Budapest and Sofia have begun to display signs of independence within the Bloc. Even more improvement has occurred in relations with Rumania; Belgrade and Bucharest have found common ground in their resistance to Soviet pressures and are now in a de facto alliance intended to strengthen and preserve their independence. Not surprisingly, Albania—allied with China, partly out of fear of Belgrade—continues its hostility toward Tito, but is taking steps toward some economic cooperation. Yugoslav relations with Greece, though complicated by longstanding minorities problems, are not likely to be troublesome. 30. Yugoslavia enjoys good relations with all major Western Powers except West Germany, and even here, action by the Kiesinger government to restrain Yugoslav expatriates could bring about a rapid improvement. Belgrade has already expressed interest in resuming normal diplomatic relations. Yugoslavia acceded last year to full membership in GATT, a move which will permit Tito to commit an even greater share of Yugoslav foreign trade to the lucrative Western market. Yugoslavia will continue to depend heavily on Western machinery and equipment in her drive toward fuller industrialization, and as Western economies move toward greater interdependence, the Yugoslav economy will probably become enmeshed in the same process. 31. Over the long run, the nonaligned and less developed nations will probably afford the Yugoslavs a lucrative and growing market. 9 Though itself underdeveloped by Western European standards, Yugoslavia is an advanced nation in “third world” terms, and its competitive position has been enhanced by its success in navigating between blocs and in establishing a socialist semi-market economy. It is probable that Tito will expend the diplomatic energy and extend the financial credits necessary to solidify his relations as broadly as possible with the nonaligned. VI. The Succession Problem 32. As national patriarch, savior, and political entrepreneur, Tito is truly irreplaceable. For nearly a quarter of a century, he has stood as a symbol of national unity and as Yugoslavia's supreme arbiter. Arranging an orderly succession to his office is the greatest problem the Yugoslav Party—and Tito himself—face. Though Tito is not blind to the problem his departure will create, this is one area of potential dissension in which his genius for compromise and improvisation cannot be brought fully to bear. It is possible for a man to arrange for his own funeral, but it is difficult for him to play a very active role in it. 33. A number of factors favor an orderly succession: though still evolving, the Yugoslav system as a whole has withstood the attacks of party factions, the stresses of economic crisis, and the importunities of separatists. The army continues to provide support for national unity, and fear of Soviet piracy will work to inhibit the adventuresome who might be tempted to steer a new course following the dropping of the pilot. While Tito cannot lay out a fixed path for a successor regime to follow, he may have established a pattern and style, a reliance on the empiric and the experimental, which a successor would probably want to imitate and which, in any case, he would find difficult to abandon. Much will depend, however, on when the succession takes place. Should it occur before Tito has accomplished the pending reorganization of the state and party structures, at a time of severe economic regression, or at a time when dissension among the Republics is high, serious struggle might ensue. The outcome of such a struggle is difficult to foresee. It is remotely possible that a concatenation of such unfavorable events could endanger the cohesion of the Federation. But we believe it far more likely that the state would survive intact. On the other hand, should the succession issue arise after recent reforms have become institutionalized, a relatively united leadership could, without serious crisis, choose a replacement or, more likely, agree on some form of collective leadership. 34. We believe that, over the long term, the principal accomplishments of the Yugoslav system are fairly secure, that Yugoslavia, even without Tito, will survive essentially intact and will persist as a hybrid system. We also think, however, that change and disarray will continue to confront the leadership—especially the post-Tito leadership—with a variety of serious problems. The destination of the Yugoslav regime, said to be a new and superior kind of “socialism,” is vague and uncertain, and the route toward it uncharted. None of the forces released by the Titoist reformation is likely to prevail without a struggle; changes of this nature generate formidable opposition. Separatist sentiments are likely to weaken the Federation; both pragmatic and ideological considerations will probably operate to diminish the power of the party; and economic forces, increasingly decentralized, will almost certainly encourage nonparty institutions to play a larger role in shaping national policy. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board with the Directors of INR, DIA, and NSA concurring. The representatives of the AEC and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained on the grounds the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 2 Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 Rankovic was expelled from the Executive Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party on July 1 and from the Party on October 4. 4 For text, see Amos Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations (The Hague, 1950), vol. 3, pp. 522–551. 5 For text, see ibid., pp. 1236–1307. 6 Djilas was released on December 31 as part of a general amnesty. 7 In 1964, for example, Yugoslavia's balance of payments deficit was $206 million. In 1965 and 1966, new controls cut the annual deficit to about $21 million. [Footnote in the source text.] 8 In addition to price controls and control over a declining share of Yugoslavia's investment capital, the Federal Government can maneuver the economy through limitations on enterprise wage bills and command of foreign trade, as well as through more indirect fiscal and monetary policies. [Footnote in the source text.] 9 During the first 10 months of 1966, 33 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade was with Communist countries, 38 percent was with Western Europe, 10 percent was with the US, and 19 percent was with nonaligned nations. [Footnote in the source text.] 184. Editorial Note 184. Editorial Note From July through September 1967, President Johnson and President Tito exchanged a series of letters concerning the crisis in the Middle East. The exchange was initiated by President Tito at a July 27 meeting with Chief Justice Earl Warren at which he gave Warren a message for the President. Tito's approach was prompted by the June “Six-Day War” between Israel and a coalition of Arab states. The Tito-Johnson correspondence concerned the possible terms of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Copies of the correspondence are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Heads of State Correspondence, Yugoslavia. Other documentation relating to the Yugoslav initiative is ibid., Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 2.; ibid., NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis; Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 YUGO–US; and ibid., Yugoslav Desk Files; Lot 78 D 198, Per 4. 185. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 185. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 1 Belgrade, July 15, 1967, 1144Z. 146. 1. During meeting with FonMin Nikezic yesterday, I raised question of our bilateral relations. In much the same vein as conversation with Amb Crnobrnja day before (Belgrade's 140) 2 I referred to atmosphere of mistrust and apprehension which seemed to permeate Yugoslav officialdom and press and increasing tendency to regard USG as deus ex machina responsible for world events which seem to have raised so much alarm here. USG had shown in many ways its desire to maintain good relations with Yugoslavia and I was constantly being assured here that GOY was similarly interested in good relations. Repetition of charges re ”US aggression” and ”US imperialism” in official utterances and press, however, could hardly advance this objective. I pointed to history of US-Yugoslav relations since 1948 which should have convinced Yugoslavs of sincerity of our intentions. US public cannot fail to be aware of present Yugoslav attitude toward US and this in turn could affect whole scale of our relations. 2. Nicezic said that many factors were involved in formulation of public and official opinion which in turn affect conduct of foreign policy. He was fully aware of points I had made and said FonOff frequently found itself in position of trying to moderate government's views in much the same way as State Dept is required to do from time to time. Recent events in world, culminating in Greek coup d'etat and ME crisis had alarmed many people in Yugoslavia, however, and caused conclusions to be drawn which may or may not be fully justified. He spoke about Greece particularly, noting that new Greek Govt is noisily anti-Communist and has indulged in various actions which would not indicate any desire to maintain good relations with Yugoslavia. GOY on other hand wished to maintain good relations with all neighboring states. It is assumed here therefore that for reasons intimately connected with its effort to remain in power Greek Govt deliberately fosters illusion of threat from Communist neighbors. Over and above this there is some reason to suspect that Greece might have designs on Albania which, of course, would be of vital interest to Yugoslavia. I tried to dissuade him from this line of thinking, observing that preoccupation with internal affairs should make it obvious that Greece is in no position or mood to carry out foolhardy military adventures. 3. Nikezic was very affable and frank throughout our conversation. He said present atmosphere which I had commented on and which he also deplored as affecting adversely relations with the US would doubtless begin to be dispelled with settlement of Middle Eastern problem. He expressed an interest in seeing me again before I leave for Washington and before he departs on a month's holiday. Elbrick 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–YUGO. Confidential. Repeated to Zagreb. 2 Dated July 14. (Ibid.) 186. Memorandum of Conversation 186. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 27, 1967, 3 p.m. SUBJECT US-Yugoslav Relations PARTICIPANTS Foreign Ambassador Bogdan Crnobrnja of Yugoslavia United States Governor Harriman Orme Wilson, Jr., EUR/EE, Yugoslav Affairs Ambassador Crnobrnja's call on Governor Harriman was an initial courtesy call made at Ambassador Crnobrnja's request. Governor Harriman welcomed Ambassador Crnobrnja and recalled his friendly and fruitful association with President Tito which had begun during the Second World War. The Governor next discussed his previous meeting with Ambassador Crnobrnja which had taken place in 1965 when Governor Harriman visited Tito at Brioni and Ambassador Crnobrnja was Secretary General to Tito. 2 Governor Harriman then expressed appreciation of Yugoslavia's initiative and effort directed at encouraging movement toward a Near East settlement. 3 The Governor then commented on the very significant role Yugoslavia had played in shaping the course of relations between countries in the Socialist Camp. In this connection, Governor Harriman regarded the terms under which Yugoslavia reentered into normal relations with the USSR in 1956 as equally significant politically as Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. Governor Harriman expanded on this by saying that the terms of Yugoslavia's reentry into normal relations with the USSR were Yugoslavia's terms of independence—political, military, economic and ideologic, and that the pattern of these has increasingly set the pattern for relations desired by other Eastern European countries with the USSR. Ambassador Crnobrnja was obviously pleased to hear this. He then asked the Governor's opinion regarding the thesis being put forward in some quarters that, as US–USSR relations develop favorably, US interest in Yugoslavia declines. The Governor answered that this thesis was wrong. He said that favorable development of US-Soviet relations increased opportunities for better relations between the US and Yugoslavia as well as between the US and other Eastern European countries. Governor Harriman explained that Yugoslavia, as a member of the Socialist Camp, was more or less obliged to side with the USSR when major issues arose between the US and the USSR. The Governor continued that, in such instances, US-Yugoslav relations could suffer setbacks. Ambassador Crnobrnja immediately protested that, on issues between the US and the USSR, Yugoslavia had been entirely free and would remain entirely independent in making up its mind. Ambassador Crnobrnja went on to say that President Tito had stressed the hope to him just before his departure for Washington that the US and the USSR would always appreciate the extraordinary responsibilities they shared regarding the vastly destructive weapons in their hands. The Governor answered that this was very much the case and that Glassboro and the NPT were evidences of mutual US–USSR concern in this regard. 4 The Governor added that he doubted the Russians would again want to face a showdown of the sort they brought upon themselves by their Cuban gamble. When the conversation turned to Viet-Nam, Governor Harriman emphasized the very large turnout for the recent elections in South Viet-Nam. 5 He also expressed the hope that Yugoslavia would use its best offices to encourage meaningful negotiations directed at ending the conflict. When the subject of Yugoslav-FRG relations arose, Ambassador Crnobrnja said that the door was open unconditionally on the Yugoslav side for resumption of diplomatic relations. Ambassador Crnobrnja indicated that there had been some talks on this subject and that the ball was in Bonn's court. At the close, Governor Harriman said that, although he did not have any day to day operating responsibility connected with US-Yugoslav relations, he would always be ready to receive Ambassador Crnobrnja should matters arise on which he might be interested. Before saying good-bye, the Governor showed Ambassador Crnobrnja some photographs in his office which had been taken with President Tito and Madame Broz on Vanga. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 YUGO–US. Confidential. Drafted by Wilson and approved in S/AH on October 5. The meeting was held in Harriman's office. 2 A memorandum of conversation of their July 28, 1965, meeting was sent to the Department of State as an attachment to airgram A–05 from Belgrade, July 30, 1965. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) The discussion centered on the Vietnam war. 3 See Document 184 . 4 For documentation on the Johnson-Kosygin summit meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey, June 22 and 24, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XIV . 5 September 4. 187. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 187. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 1 Belgrade, December 29, 1967, 1605Z. 1843. Ref State 89175. 2 For the Secretary. Subject: Call of Yugoslav Ambassador Crnobrnja. 1. It would appear from uncleared memcon covering your talk with Ambassador Crnobrnja on December 22 that latter attempted to place onus on US for stagnation of our bilateral relations in 1967. It is true that certain developments have caused Yugoslavs to sense in recent US policy a growing disinterest in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Crnobrnja must recognize that maintenance of good relations is not unilateral proposition and that course of our relations in year just ending cannot be disassociated from exceedingly hostile attitude toward USG and distorted picture of its actions and objectives which GOY, Party and press have presented on virtually every international issue involving vital US interests most particularly Viet-Nam, on which they have maintained well-orchestrated anti-US campaign. Tito himself used word “genocide” in describing US activities there. Good faith and integrity of US and President Johnson personally seeking peaceful and honorable solution in Viet-Nam are frequently questioned. Hostile, anti-US posture referred to above cannot help but be officially inspired or at least sanctioned and I have on various occasions stressed to Yugoslav officials the harmful effect of this to friendly public attitude on our bilateral relations and its incompatibility with their frequently expressed desire for better relations with US. 2. Given our long-range objectives, US administration has (rightly in my view) maintained steadfast course toward Yugoslavia despite differing views on international issues. Fact of matter, however, is that Yugoslavia's antagonistic posture toward US policies and activities abroad has not gone unnoticed in Congress. Congressional concern with Viet-Nam, as well as Cuba, has inevitably affected Yugoslavia which does conduct a small degree of trade with Cuba and which is (to the best of our knowledge) sending only plasma and medical supplies and equipment to the North Vietnamese and, through latter, to Viet Cong. 3. Despite critical attitude and suspicions of GOY toward our policies and actions abroad, our bilateral relations have remained remarkably stable and demonstrated a good deal of forbearance on our part. During this year, for example, we have renegotiated a three-year cotton-textile agreement, 3 extended a 40 million dollar CCC line of credit for importation of wheat and cotton, concluded an agreement on agricultural research projects, 4 maintained exchanges on both governmental and private levels, initiated an exchange of correspondence between two Chiefs of State, 5 and arranged visits by Chief Justice Warren, Governor Harriman and Asst. Secy Leddy. 4. For the immediate future, I believe that the most promising areas for an expansion and enrichment of our relations lie in fields of commercial activities, including private investment in Yugoslavia, and increased scientific, technical and cultural exchanges. We have already made effort to advance our commercial relations by exchange of trade delegations and it would be useful not [now?] to investigate possibilities of US private investment here as well as industrial cooperation between US and Yugoslavia business enterprises. At same time, I have advised appropriate Yugoslav officials that the attraction of American buyers and investors to Yugoslavia is responsibility of Yugoslavs themselves and they cannot depend on others to do their selling job for them. 5. I note that you may be seeing Crnobrnja again early in the new year. 6 These observations are submitted in the thought that you might find them useful at such time as you may resume discussion of our bilateral relations. Elbrick 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 YUGO–US. Confidential. 2 Telegram 89175, December 23, reported on talks between Secretary Rusk and Yugoslav Ambassador Crnobrnja aimed at improving U.S.-Yugoslav relations. (Ibid.) 3 For text of this agreement, concluded with an exchange of notes at Belgrade on September 26, 1967, and entered into force on January 1, 1968, see 18 UST 2827. 4 Not further identified. 5 See Document 184 . 6 Rusk met Crnobrnja on January 5, 1968, for a discussion of Southeast Asia. The meeting was reported in telegram 94524 to Belgrade, January 6 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 YUGO–US) 188. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 188. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 6, 1968. SUBJECT National Interest Determination for Export-Import Bank Financing for Yugoslavia At Tab A 2 is Nick Katzenbach's memo recommending that you determine it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank to extend credits, guarantees, and insurance for U.S. exports to Yugoslavia. If you make this finding, you should also sign the attached draft letters notifying the Congress./2/ Harold Linder concurs in this recommendation. You have already made this determination for Yugoslavia for Export-Import Bank guarantees. This determination has been required since 1964 under the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act. Since that time, the Export-Import Bank has extended guarantees on $66 million of U.S. exports to Yugoslavia. A new determination is now needed because of the Tower-Hickenlooper amendment to the Export-Import Act of 1968. This amendment prohibits Export-Import Bank participation in transactions involving communist countries unless the President determines it is in the national interest. Under the Tower-Hickenlooper amendment, your finding in favor of Yugoslavia would permit the Export-Import Bank to extend credits as well as guarantees. Under the Appropriations Act only guarantees are permitted. The legal question of which act takes precedence is open. If you make the national determination in favor of Yugoslavia, the Export-Import Bank would consult with the House Appropriations Committee before making a loan (rather than guaranteeing a loan) under the broader provisions of the Tower-Hickenlooper amendment. Katzenbach has concluded that the Fino amendment—which prohibits Export-Import Bank financing on transactions with any country whose government supplies goods or services to North Vietnam—is not applicable to Yugoslavia. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history. Fino said on the House floor that his amendment would not affect Yugoslavia. Katzenbach's memo reviews the arguments for continuing Export-Import Bank financing for Yugoslavia. In brief, it is good foreign policy and good business. Bill Macomber said that he does not expect any significant fuss on the Hill. Neither does Linder. I concur in the recommendation. Walt If you approve, you should sign the attached letter of notification to the Congress 3 Disapprove Call me 1 Source; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. No classification marking. 2 Not printed. 3 This option is checked. A copy of the letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Yugoslavia, Cables. 189. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Springsteen) to Secretary of State Rusk 189. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Springsteen) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 11, 1968. SUBJECT Yugoslav Ambassador's complaints regarding a) “Croatian Independence Day” in California b) Admission to the U.S. of King Peter Ambassador Crnobrnja called on John Leddy June 6 and raised two subjects related to US-Yugoslav relations: The Ambassador is still unhappy about the fact that Governor Reagan proclaimed April 10 as “Croatian Independence Day.” After the Ambassador first raised this with you, Win Brown wrote to Reagan pointing out the unfortunate connotation of April 10 which was the anniversary of the establishment of the Nazi puppet state in Croatia. We have not heard from Governor Reagan but we told Crnobrnja that we had information to the effect that Americans of Yugoslav origin in California have been making their displeasure at this action known to the Governor. The Ambassador also raised the question of issuing a U.S. visa to former King Peter of Yugoslavia. He complained that Peter makes unfortunate political statements about Yugoslavia whenever he visits this country. Crnobrnja asked that we not issue Peter another visa. We have looked into this visa question. While there is no reason for us to deny a visa to former King Peter, he has on occasion disregarded our admonition to avoid political statements while in the United States as a temporary visitor for pleasure. Although some of his statements have caused us embarrassment in our relations with Yugoslavia, they have on the whole been relatively moderate. Further we have no evidence that Peter is planning a trip at this time. The Yugoslav Ambassador explained his approach on both of these subjects as stemming from a desire to improve U.S./Yugoslav relations and requested that we bring these points to your attention and also to the President's attention. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. Confidential. Drafted by Beaudry and Wilson and cleared by Grossman. 2 A copy of this memorandum was sent to the White House. An annotation on the covering memorandum from Benjamin Read of the Executive Secretariat to Rostow, attached to the source text, reads: “No action required. File. N Davis, 2/14/68 [sic]”. 190. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 190. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 1 Belgrade, August 14, 1968, 1050Z. 3998. Subject: Acting FonSec comments on Tito visit to Prague. 1. In my call yesterday on Acting State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Pavicevic I asked for his assessment of Tito's visit to Prague. Pavicevic said it was too early to provide any details because delegation was still on Brioni (he had talked to them only by telephone) and FonOff members were so preoccupied with writing reports that he had not had any opportunity to talk with them. 2. Following is substance of Pavicevic's ensuing remarks: A. Prague meeting: In general, Yugoslav delegation satisfied with visit considering it a success despite fact it was a “working” visit of Party delegation. Popular demonstrations of goodwill toward Yugoslav delegation were enormous. Visit represented culmination Yugoslav efforts to assist Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav position at Prague was extremely delicate, primarily because one of purposes of visit was to assist Czechs whose position vis-é-vis Moscow also was most delicate. Yugoslavs were at great pains to do nothing or say nothing at Prague that could provide even slightest pretext for direct intervention on part of Soviets or complicate Dubcek's life any more than it now is. Visit originally had been planned to take place under different circumstances; thus, visit had different scope and purpose; even so it was useful. Yugoslavs and Czechs both pleased. B. Bilateral relations: Yugoslav-Czechoslovak bilateral relations will be strengthened, mostly in economic field, but there will be nothing spectacular. Many indiscreet questions put to Tito at his Saturday night press conference, among them being one inquiring about possibility of military pact between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is not interested in any such arrangements, its past experience in this field having been “very bad.” C. Czech problems: Main Czech task now is to move along with implementation of reforms and party program in preparation for Party Congress next month. They must have time to do this; this is dependent upon internal strength of Party leadership and its willingness to face up to serious problems. We should not expect too much from Czechs at first, especially, we should have no illusions about their capacity for achievement in foreign policy field. Change will come but it will have to be slow. Even now as Ulbricht is in Czechoslovakia, Soviet troops are maneuvering along frontier. These maneuvers do not stem from any threat to peace in Western Europe or from heating up of US–USSR relations but rather are directly related to developments in Czechoslovakia. D. Cierna and Bratislava: Czechs were firm at Cierna and no concessions were made to “Five.” No secret agreements were made and no secret documents involved. Soviets after Warsaw meeting needed way out of dead-end street and Czechs needed respite to continue along path of reform. Soviets are to be congratulated for way they worked things out; Czechs are to be congratulated because they have won right to continue along path of internal reform. They have also won recognition again of validity of principle regarding independence, sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs as cornerstone of relations between socialist states. Bratislava Declaration 2 is “all-sided” which can be cited to prove almost any point of view. Thus, Czechs must be extremely careful in way they proceed along path of reform. Yugoslavs are happy worst is over and military clash averted. Realistically, we must expect differences to crop up from time to time between Prague and “Five” but this is becoming only normal in relations within socialist world. Main point is how these differences are solved. E. Soviet change of tactics at Cierna: I asked Pavicevic why Yugoslavs thought Soviets had suddenly appeared to change their tactics when at one point they seemed bent on military intervention. Pavicevic smilingly observed that perhaps I ought to ask Soviet Ambassador who was scheduled to call on him immediately after me, “but then I am afraid you would not get an answer.” He said he thought Soviets were [garble—finally?]convinced that to intervene directly would: (1) cause disruption of relative detente in Europe; (2) deprive them of support of major parties in international Communist movement all of whom vehemently opposed Soviet intervention; (3) have a disastrous effect on upcoming Moscow Conference of ComParties when already several parties, including Yugoslavia, had indicated they would not participate; (4) be a serious setback to Soviet prestige among the non-aligned countries; and (5) set back currently improving US-Soviet relations. Pavicevic observed that all key foreign CP's (i.e., all those except Warsaw “Five”) were opposed to intervention and that for first time in international Communist world USSR was “isolated“; its only support came from parties (e.g. West German, one of Greek splinters, etc.) with no power or influence. Nevertheless, Soviets made great contribution in finding way out of direct clash. F. US policy in Czech crisis: Pavicevic said it was Yugoslav assessment that US policy had been correct one. He said it was very wise to avoid any action which could be used by USSR as pretext for intervention.FRG was wise also to cancel its maneuvers. Even when there were no provocative acts there were difficulties. Look at discovery of arms cache. “Now who do you suppose put those arms there?“, Pavicevic asked rhetorically. 3. Towards close of conversation I noted that at his press conference Tito was asked how he would describe his reaction to Prague talks, “satisfied” or “very satisfied.” 3 Was there any nuance in that reply? Pavicevic said that he was “very satisfied.” He implied that part of Yugoslav problem in making public statements on Tito visit to Prague was to avoid provocation to Soviet side. 4. There is no doubt that Yugoslav delegation during visit to Prague was aware of supreme delicacy of its mission. It was extremely careful apparently not to cause trouble for Dubcek internally or to further complicate his relations with “Five.” While full-scale press and TV coverage of tumultuous welcome accorded Yugoslav delegation had salubrious effect at home, Tito both at airport in Prague and on arrival in Zagreb was careful not appear to be returning home in triumph. This accounts for rather low key comment at both places that “we think we have done useful job.” Elbrick 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 YUGO. Confidential. Repeated to Prague, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Sofia, Warsaw, Berlin, USNATO, and Zagreb. 2 For text of the Bratislava Declaration issued on August 4 after a meeting of Soviet, Czech, and Eastern European Communist leaders, see Remington, Winter in Prague, pp. 256–261. For extracts, see Department of State Bulletin , September 9, 1968, p. 264. 3 Tito held his press conference on August 11. 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 1 Belgrade, August 23, 1968, 1225Z. 4089. 1. My meeting with Tito this morning lasted one hour. During course of conversation he reviewed Yugoslav position with respect to Czechoslovakia and repeated firm support for objectives Dubcek government. He was frank in denouncing Soviet armed intervention, describing it as complete surprise to GOY, and deplored Soviet disregard of basic principles which should govern relations between states, saying Soviet prestige throughout world had suffered a grievous setback. Yugoslavia, he said, would continue to try to maintain normal relations with Warsaw Pact group but he was emphatic in stating Yugoslavia would firmly adhere to principles already publicly expressed. He asked my opinion of present state of Yugoslav-American relations and seemed satisfied with my answer. He did not pursue this point of suggesting material or moral support though I have impression this may come later. He volunteered to receive me at any time if my government should require any information or clarification of Yugoslav position and implied hope that I would be available if Yugoslav Govt had any suggestions to make. Full report of conversation being cabled. 2 2. In view of tense situation in this area I feel it would be unwise to return to US on home leave and consultation as originally planned and have cancelled any such plans for time being. Elbrick 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. Confidential; Priority. 2 Telegram 4093 from Belgrade, August 23. (Ibid.) 192. Memorandum of Conversation 192. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 29, 1968, 3:45 p.m. SUBJECT US-Yugoslav Relations and Czech Developments PARTICIPANTS Foreign Ambassador Bogdan Crnobrnja of Yugoslavia United States Secretary of State Orme Wilson, Jr., EUR/EE, Yugoslav Affairs Secretary Rusk received Yugoslav Ambassador Crnobrnja for one hour on afternoon August 29. On August 27, Ambassador Crnobrnja had requested an appointment following his return from local leave. The conversation concerned Czechoslovakia and related matters. Ambassador Crnobrnja began by saying that Yugoslavia discredited the theory of “revanchist plot” against Czechoslovakia. It seemed clear that the Soviets wanted to stop the process of democratic and human development in Czechoslovakia out of concern that a “chain reaction” might affect other areas of the socialist world. Yugoslavia was confident that Czechoslovakia had a socialist leadership. Yugoslavia believes it inherent for the body of socialist society to proceed to “more human goals” just as other human societies are doing. Yugoslavia sensed no threat to socialism in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia would not, however, exclude the existence of anti-socialist activity in Czechoslovakia and believed that this activity may have had better chance for expression in the more liberal Czechoslovakia of recent months. However, liberalization had strengthened forces of socialism in Czechoslovakia to a much greater degree. Regarding the Moscow communiqué, 2 Ambassador Crnobrnja did not know whether it should be called an “agreement“, but Yugoslavia considers it as having been accepted by legally constituted representatives of the Czech people. In a way, this orients Yugoslavia's present position. Yugoslavia believes that the Czech leaders should be allowed to assess what the Moscow agreement means in all its consequences and aspects with a view to deciding on its future treatment. The very fact that the Moscow talks took place means a lot politically. Perhaps the holding of talks was contrary to what the Soviets had anticipated. Yugoslavia considers the exemplary conduct of the Czech people to have been the greatest help in saving what was saved. All credit should go to the Czech people and world public opinion. Ambassador Crnobrnja continued that Czechoslovak events were of great significance not only for today but for tomorrow. They were tragic but were lessons for many states including Yugoslavia. Ambassador Crnobrnja saw one danger. If the Moscow agreement should lead to a split in the Czech people, disaster would follow. Solidarity of the Czech people remains the strongest ally for achieving Czech goals. Neither the Czechs nor the Yugoslavs have a more powerful political weapon than national solidarity. Unity in Yugoslavia is as good as in the 1948–51 period. Unity is also good in Romania. These are great and promising factors. Yugoslavia is neither frightened nor worried. If the need should come, the Yugoslav people know what they will do. They will defend their independence. Under no condition will they stay quiet. On the contrary, where relations with socialist states are concerned, the justification for defense would be even greater. Crnobrnja asked the Secretary's assessment regarding Czechoslovak events and their effect on East-West relations, bridge building, and US–USSR discussions on vital problems. The Secretary said we had felt well informed at all stages regarding the deployment of Soviet and other forces in the area of Czechoslovakia as well as the nature of the maneuvers under way. It was clear that the maneuvers were intended to put pressure on Czechoslovakia. We did not have advance information of the Soviet decision to move into Czechoslovakia, but we did know that a move could be started at a moment's notice. The decision to move must have been a very difficult one for the Soviets. Internal Czech developments must have seemed a very real threat to the Soviets for, as Ambassador Crnobrnja had said, they might have “infected” the USSR itself. The Secretary made it clear that there was no US–USSR understanding, tacit or otherwise, regarding Czechoslovakia. He said he had told Ambassador Dobrynin several weeks ago about our feelings concerning the independence of states and had emphasized the reaction would be severe if the independence of Czechoslovakia were threatened. 3 The Secretary had particularly protested what appeared to be a Soviet effort to create pretext for intervention out of a myth of a Western plot against Czechoslovakia. The Secretary continued that NATO and the Warsaw Pact both knew that an attack by one against a country of the other would lead to war. NATO, however, does not recognize the right of Warsaw Pact countries to occupy the territory of a Warsaw Pact member. This could not happen within NATO. We gather that Moscow's black propaganda organs have been trying to manufacture the myth of a US–USSR understanding on Czechoslovakia. The Secretary stressed the outstanding conduct of the Czech people and the extraordinary strength of world reaction in the face of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The US had not whipped up this reaction; it had been immediate and spontaneous. The Soviets were probably surprised by the strength of this reaction, all the more so because they tend to attach more weight to propaganda than most countries do. What happens in Czechoslovakia is of serious concern for the United States. Not because we have had particularly good relations with the Czechs, though. On the contrary, Prague over the years has been one of the capitals most active in promoting “world revolution”. Czech arms today are killing our men in Viet-Nam. Our concern relates to the elementary point that, unless a small nation can live unmolested there can be no peace in the world. Spheres of influence can never prove satisfactory in achieving this condition, since the concept of spheres of influence understands a “master race” within a sphere of influence. We therefore subscribe to the principles set forth in the UN Charter whereby every nation, large or small, has a right to its own national existence. The Secretary continued that we were watching the situation as it related to Romania and Yugoslavia. We have not seen the kind of build up of forces which we clearly saw with regard to Czechoslovakia. However, if Yugoslavia obtains information suggesting a build up and Yugoslavia discreetly advises us of it, we will check the information as we have the means to do so. The Secretary commented that we had noted considerable lack of enthusiasm for the actions against Czechoslovakia within the countries which had provided token units for invasion and occupation. Secretary Rusk said that the situation in Czechoslovakia had been achieved through a significant deployment of Soviet troops to the south and west. Soviet troops were now on the Bavarian border. We have an immediate interest in the length of stay of these troops, because NATO must consider what this means with regard to the strength and deployment of NATO forces. Earlier this year at Reykjavik the NATO ministers had supported the possibility of a reduction of forces in central Europe. 4 Now this possibility was reversed by the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia. The Secretary stressed that we respected the way in which Yugoslavia had expressed itself on the Czech events. We felt that the fact that some socialist states had spoken out strongly had been a matter of great importance in helping the Czechs to preserve something. If the USSR now were to proceed against socialist states making this critical response, a very grave situation could develop. Romania's geographic position and Yugoslavia's, to an even greater degree, made this subject a matter of great interest to NATO. A further extension of Soviet forces would be a matter of very grave concern to NATO. Pointing to a map of Europe, the Secretary noted that, for instance, there were now no Soviet forces in the Adriatic area. The Secretary said that the Czech events had had a serious effect on US–USSR bilateral relations. Previously we had been in contact with Moscow on very important matters. The Soviets must have known that their action in Czechoslovakia would damage bilateral relations. Public opinion and Congressional reaction were important factors and now were negative toward the USSR. The great pity is that efforts at détente have been blocked while at the same time problems have not evaporated. The questions of missiles, Viet-Nam, and the Near East remain. We must think more about what all this means. The Russians are presumably doing the same. The Secretary wondered what the move into Czechoslovakia signifies regarding the USSR. Does it represent a step backward on other matters as well? What were the dynamics of the situation leading to the decision to move into Czechoslovakia? We don't know. The Soviets know how to maintain silence better than we do. If one were to interpret this move as irresponsible or impulsive or taken out of fear, it is distressing to think of the decisions which might be taken by a capital having as much destructive power at its disposal as Moscow. Does it mean that irrational action is possible? The Secretary added that the US has not been engaged in any way in any shape or form of mischief in Czechoslovakia. There has been no CIA activity and no arms infiltration. The Secretary said that, whereas his predecessor John Foster Dulles talked about a rollback in central Europe, the present Administration has wanted to improve relations with Eastern Europe and the USSR by bridge building. The purpose has been to bring about broader serenity in the world. We have not wanted bridge building to set one state against another. It has been notable, however, that in recent months, the USSR had been speaking negatively about bridge building. Within the USSR, comment had been quite bitter on the subject. We have been especially resentful about the theory of an “imperialist threat” which has been pushed by the Soviets. In concluding this portion of his remarks, the Secretary again invited Ambassador Crnobrnja to have his government submit any information suggesting the development of a threatening situation for Yugoslavia. The Secretary pointed out in this connection that, with regard to Czechoslovakia, the Soviets obviously felt their interests so fundamental that they were willing to make major sacrifices regarding détente, US–USSR bilateral relations, world popular opinion, and harmony within the family of communist parties. Ambassador Crnobrnja thanked the Secretary for these views and turned to the subject of US-Yugoslav bilateral relations. Ambassador Crnobrnja said that Yugoslavia had no particular requests to make and did not want to take advantage of the situation in this connection. Yugoslavia did not want to irritate the USSR even though Yugoslav-Soviet relations had already deteriorated and would probably deteriorate further. He said, however, that it would be most unfortunate if developments were to lead to paralysis in US-Yugoslav relations. He stressed that Yugoslavia wanted to continue to proceed with the gradual development of relations in areas of “real business”. In this connection, he said that Yugoslavia soon would probably join Intelsat. Yugoslavia would do so because it saw real business advantage in doing so. The US might attach other importance to the matter. He said that Yugoslavia, as a small power, wanted to avoid any action suggesting that it was within a sphere of influence. It wanted to live freely and make its own decisions. The Secretary concluded by answering that we did not believe that the Czech situation would have a negative influence on US-Yugoslav relations. We certainly did not want to create difficulties or embarrassment for Yugoslavia. He agreed that the US and Yugoslavia should proceed with matters in which they have a common interest. Public opinion was favorable. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–YUGO. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Wilson and approved in S on September 3. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. 2 For text of the communiqué and protocol issued in Moscow on August 27, see Remington, Winter in Prague, pp. 376–382. 3 See Document 70 . 4 The NAC Ministerial Meeting was held at Reykjavik June 24–25. For text of the NATO declaration, see Department of State Bulletin , July 15, 1968, pp. 75–77. 193. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 193. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State 1 Belgrade, September 14, 1968, 0730Z. 4348. 1. Yugoslav-American, who over years has had good access to Tito and his Secretary-General Vlado Popovic, called on Political Counselor September 13 to report on “interesting aspects” of Tito's remarks to him during two-day stay on Brioni (September 8–9). Among more important views attributed to Tito are following: A. GOY will not ask for military assistance from US for time being. GOY has enough arms for present. Military threat is not immediate but of longer range. Soviet presence on Adriatic adjacent to Italy and Greece would be intolerable for West which will once again have to assist small socialist country against attacks from other socialist countries. Since GOY cannot read Moscow's intentions but is convinced of its malevolence towards Yugoslavia, latter will have to remain in almost permanent state of military readiness for long time to come. B. Military preparedness steps already taken and some yet to come are most expensive as also was assistance to Czech tourists granted by GOY. These expenditures have come out of funds set aside by GOY to implement economic and social reform. Tito very much fears Moscow's method of retaliation against Yugoslavia will be via economic sanctions. Large proportion of Yugoslav textile and shoe industries heavily reliant on Soviet market. Almost all of rolling stock manufactured in Yugoslavia goes to USSR. Shipbuilding industry heavily reliant on Soviet orders. USSR owes Yugoslavia great deal of money, Tito said, lamenting fact it was not other way around. Some adjustments must be made. Objectives of economic and social reforms will not be abandoned, but pace of progress towards these objectives will be slowed down. C. Yugoslavs will have to completely re-examine and reassess their positions (e.g., ideological, foreign policy, internal political and economic) in light of new situation created by Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. New era in international relations and relations among ComParties ushered in by WP invasion of friendly socialist country. New principles have been applied in relations between socialist and other states which are alien to principles and objectives of socialism. Some hope exists for future in light of almost universal condemnation by important ComParties throughout world of WP intervention. Role of Italian and French parties in this connection most important. D. Tito is furious with UAR in general and with Nasser in particular because of lack of support from that sector. Doubts relations with UAR will ever be same because of “unprincipled behavior” in bowing to necessity to acquire arms from Moscow. E. Yugoslavs are disillusioned and shocked by Soviet behavior and relations between GOY and USSR will never be same. There is no more trust. Yugoslavs would like to maintain relations with WP countries on “correct” basis for economic reasons but don't know whether this can be done in dealings with irresponsible and unpredictable Russians. 2. At one juncture while having lunch with Popovic source noted presence of many Generals in next room, among them C/S Sumonja and Babic, Tito's military advisor. Source laughingly observed that a NATO meeting must be in offing. Popovic laughed and in reply said, “no, not NATO, Balkan Pact.” 2 Source said he trusted Yugoslav Generals would not get dust from treaty all over clean uniforms provoking laugh from Popovic. Source observed (probably reflecting own view) that Balkan Pact is “back door to NATO.” 3. Comment . We tend to regard this report as authentic and credible since much of it is substantiated by information at our disposal from other sources. However, this is first time we have had any intimation of Tito's views on arms supply, strategic probabilities, and need for overall reappraisal. Elbrick 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 YUGO. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Zagreb, and USNATO. 2 The Treaty of Bled, signed by Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on August 9, 1954, established the Balkan Pact. For text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I , pp. 1235–1239. 194. Memorandum for the Record 194. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, September 23, 1968. SUBJECT Conversation with Yugoslav Ambassador Bogdan Crnobrnja on Monday, September 23, 1968 When I went to the International Club to hear Ambassador Bohlen on Czechoslovakia, I happened to sit next to Ambassador Crnobrnja. The Ambassador invited me to join him for supper after the speech. Ambassador Crnobrnja liked Mr. Bohlen's remarks—saying he was not surprised by them. When he pressed me for amplification of our policy toward the Czech crisis, I asked what he thought our policy should be. Ambassador Crnobrnja said we should work for a broad settlement of outstanding world issues, and move vigorously to prevent a return to the Cold War. We should seek a Vietnam settlement—for which we need a bombing halt, move toward a resolution of the Mid-East impasse, and advance on the disarmament front. Crnobrnja said he realized some of these prescriptions would be hard to take. On Vietnam, I said I was pretty sure American policy would be decided on its own merits and not linked to Czechoslovakia. Ambassador Crnobrnja said he had heard rumors very recently of some sort of understanding with the Soviets. I said that, so far as I knew, these were entirely untrue. Earlier reports along these lines were categorically denied by Secretary Rusk. Crnobrnja asked me what kind of role I thought the Soviets might play in a Vietnam settlement. I said I didn't know; but I was personally skeptical that the Soviets would force Hanoi's hand. I remarked that Hanoi must even now be considering whether to negotiate this fall with this Administration, or wait until next spring. How they would decide, I didn't know. Ambassador Crnobrnja remarked that he thought the North Vietnamese were seriously interested in a solution, but had a problem of confidence. I said I did not know the details of the Paris negotiation, but I was sure the other side knew how to make the seriousness of its interest clear if it really wanted to move forward. Regarding the Middle East, I said it sometimes looked as if we were expected simply to force the Israelis back to the June 4 lines. 2 Crnobrnja said that might be the Arab point of view, but he would not recommend it. He thought Nasser would also have to make real policy changes. (Crnobrnja seemed cool to Nasser. This may have been a reflection of Yugoslav annoyance at Nasser's reaction to the Czechoslovak invasion.) Crnobrnja said we should pursue a policy of détente. When I pressed him, he seemed to be talking more about détente with Yugoslavia and the Third World than an immediate return to easy relations with the invading powers. He asked how worried I thought Yugoslavia should be, I said I thought Yugoslavia's position was different from Czechoslovakia's. After all, even Stalin had stopped short of military intervention. Yugoslavia had been non-aligned for 20 years. During that time the U.S. had given extensive economic and even military assistance. The Balkan Pact was probably a complicating factor in Russian thinking. (Crnobrnja promptly affirmed that it was still in effect.) Nevertheless, I realize a lot of things have come unstuck in Eastern Europe. Crnobrnja remarked on the signs of dissension and instability in the Soviet Politburo, but did not offer any specifics. He said that an indication of US support, interest and concern for Yugoslavia would be very helpful. In this connection he mentioned the arrival in Washington this weekend of Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Kiro Gligorov. While the formal purpose of Gligorov's trip is to attend meetings of the Bank and Fund, Crnobrnja made clear that the Yugoslav government was taking advantage of the occasion to send over a high-level official. He left the impression the Yugoslav government would appreciate a high-level reception. In response to my question, Crnobrnja said he did not have “any instructions” as to whether it was hoped Gligorov could see Secretary Rusk or the President. I said I could not speak for the attitude of senior US personalities, but I know that whatever appointments Mr. Gligorov requested would be most seriously considered. (The following day Crnobrnja called me, saying he had just received a telegram that morning indicating that Gligorov would like to meet Americans at the Cabinet level and also Walt Rostow if that were possible. I asked the Ambassador if he were conveying his request to the State Department, and he said yes, of course.) Crnobrnja gave no indication Gligorov was likely to request military assistance. What he talked about was general support and economic relations. Crnobrnja said there were a few matters which he was reluctant to mention—but US action would be very helpful. He said a Soviet request for four sonars was pending, and the Yugoslav government would be most appreciative if a way could be found to furnish them. The Mother and Child hospital has also been long pending. Crnobrnja said it would be very helpful if the US government could be more liberal in the use of dinars. (Crnobrnja did not elaborate on what he had in mind.) Lastly, the Ambassador said the Yugoslav government was pleased and gratified at the attitude shown by the IBRD and the Export-Import Bank. He hoped the US government would continue to keep a benign eye on this area of economic collaboration. Crnobrnja was agitated at the activities of Serb and Croat emigres. He said we had succeeded in damping down emigre denunciations of the Yugoslav government for a period of time after the bombing of the Embassy and Consulates. This showed we could do something if we really tried. I questioned whether we could do very much, and suggested that it may have been the emigres themselves who had pulled in their horns. Crnobrnja said many Yugoslavs—including his predecessor—had been disturbed over what they regarded as an American tendency to doubt that Yugoslavia was really independent and non-aligned. The Czech crisis had proved Yugoslav independence of action once again. I said the American government had never doubted this. The only time I could remember when there was concern about the balance and stability of Yugoslav policy was during a period of a month or two after the Mid-East war. We had the impression the Yugoslavs may have over-reacted to developments in Greece and elsewhere at the time. Crnobrnja promptly filled in the missing details, including fear of the Italian military dispositions, etc. He said he realized that there had been an over-reaction. Crnobrnja mentioned the slow decline of US economic assistance. I said this was not a reflection of a change in US attitude. Partly it was a reflection of increasing Yugoslav economic success and self-reliance. Crnobrnja observed that—even with its non-aligned posture—Yugoslavia was of some help to the West. For example, Italy must feel more secure with no Soviet naval base in the Bay of Kotor. Crnobrnja remarked somewhat gloomily that the Soviets were a great deal less understanding than the Americans. It was hard to be a small country. ND 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. Confidential. Drafted by Nathaniel Davis on September 26. Copies were sent to Rostow, Ash, and Lisle. 2 Reference is to the borders existing between Israel and neighboring Arab states of United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan before the “Six-Day War” (June 5–11, 1967). 195. Memorandum of Conversation 195. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 4, 1968. PARTICIPANTS The President Deputy Prime Minister Kiro Gligorov of Yugoslavia Ambassador Bogdan Crnobrnja Mr. Mirko Mermolja, Interpreter Mr. N. Davis Deputy Prime Minister Gligorov conveyed Marshal Tito's greetings, and said he wanted to assure the President of Yugoslavia's resoluteness in this time and her desire for friendly relations with the United States. The President said we also want to build better relations. We are distressed at recent events in Eastern Europe. We did all we could before the invasion of Czechoslovakia—which was a tragic act, against a country which only wanted to exercise its independence. The President said he had spoken out firmly about the situation in Eastern Europe. We had not sought any sort of alliance or pact with any Eastern European country, and the Soviets did not have reason to believe their security threatened. Students of history have noted that when aggressors taste blood, the appetite grows. The recent situation had not been totally unlike a quarter century ago. We are concerned, and determined that aggression not spread. The President continued that we are more concerned, perhaps, than some of our colleagues and friends. We know the consequences if aggression should win out. We were ready to talk on vital subjects with the Soviet Union just before the Czechoslovak invasion. We had vigorously pursued missile talks, agreed on the time and place, and were ready. The Soviet government fully realized the effect of its invasion. The President observed that the NPT was also important to the Russians—as well as the missile talks. So was a solution in the Middle East and Vietnam. Rather than move on these questions, however, the Soviets preferred to take the course they did, and to pursue the interest they regarded as more important. We shall have to wait and see, the President said. The Deputy Prime Minister should take Tito his regards. One of his regrets on leaving office was the fact that he had not had the opportunity to visit with Marshal Tito. The President knows the resolution of the Yugoslav people. They have gone through periods of the greatest difficulty, and they know the price they will have to pay to defend those things most important. The easy way has tragic consequences. The President said he certainly does not want to see more killing in the world. He had two boys in combat in Vietnam. But he appreciates how the appetite grows with success. The President asked Gligorov if he had any views. Gligorov said he believed the President's assessment was correct. Every nation and society must be determined to defend its independence. The Yugoslavs liberated themselves in World War II and know what the price is. Yugoslavia's President, its government and its nation are resolute, and we need have no doubts on that score. Yugoslavia spoke out immediately to condemn the aggression against Czechoslovakia. This is why Yugoslavia is the object of a campaign of vilification from the Soviet side. Gligorov said Yugoslavia is ready for any eventuality. Nevertheless, the last thing they wish for is a rupture of Soviet-American contacts—which are good. It is only through dialogue that the greatest powers can seek agreement and find solutions to the hardest questions. The two greatest powers have very great responsibilities. This is one thing. Another, however, is the importance of not suffocating the freedom of small nations. The Yugoslavs remember America's role in 1948. They greatly appreciate all we have done. We helped them defend their independence and helped them continue their economic development. Gligorov said he realized Yugoslavia and America do not agree on all subjects. Nevertheless, our cooperation and friendship have increased, even if the forms have changed. The President will find Yugoslavia has a policy of peace and cooperation. For that purpose Yugoslavia will pay any price. Often, Gligorov said, the Yugoslavs haven't been well understood. But there is no other way. The Yugoslavs believe they have a friend in the U.S. That was why Yugoslavia's government and President considered it useful to take advantage of Gligorov's presence in the U.S. to express these feelings. Gligorov said he realized he was not saying anything new. Gligorov said the Yugoslavs had chosen their own way in development and toward democracy. They are stimulating the initiative of their people. They are developing an economy open to the world. They are members of the Bank and Fund. They want private capital. This year Yugoslavia had ten million foreign tourists, 95% from the West. It is doubtful that there is any more open frontier in Europe than Yugoslavia's with Italy and Austria. Yugoslavia wants its own society and way of life. It is building and defending an open society. Gligorov said Yugoslavia is trying to build bridges to the “other world” in the West. This is along the lines of America's policy toward the East. Marshal Tito greatly appreciates the personal policy of the President. Gligorov said Marshal Tito appreciates the President's efforts to find an acceptable solution in Vietnam, and reach a reasonable settlement in the Middle East. Marshal Tito, according to Gligorov, considers Yugoslavia happy that she is not in the same position as in 1948, when she had to ask for grants of American aid. In the meantime, Yugoslavia has developed—and American aid helped greatly in this process. Now, said Gligorov, Yugoslavia can talk on the basis of partnership. Yugoslavia wants to develop its commerce. It wants U.S. capital, and welcomes joint ventures. Gligorov said he had put forward certain specific proposals during this visit, but would not bother the President with them. However, these proposals reflect Yugoslavia's desire to make her own contribution, and for future arrangements to correspond to the interests of both countries. American support would represent support for the independence of Yugoslavia and for Yugoslavia's independent position. The President said he could not anticipate events in Eastern Europe, and would not try to answer all Gligorov's points. We are watching the situation with the greatest care. The President said he was grateful for what Gligorov had to say, and for his visit. The President, in closing the conversation, said he would be happy to have any ideas Marshal Tito would like to give him on the Eastern European situation. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 2. No classification marking. Drafted by Davis and approved by Rostow. The meeting was held in the President's office at the White House. 196. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State 196. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State 1 Belgrade, October 18, 1968, 1920Z. 4720. Secun 5. For Secretary from Under Secretary. Subject: My meeting with Tito. 1. Burke Elbrick and I met with Tito today for one hour and a half. 2. I began by giving him President's warm regards, coupled with a word for word repeat of statement issued by President after Elbrick had seen him (“President has made very clear his continuing interest in Yugoslavia's independence, sovereignty and economic development”). 2 I emphasized to Tito that this was what President had released following Elbrick call. 3. Tito then ran through his impressions of Soviet intentions, from time of his April visit to Moscow through Cierna meeting (this scenario has already been reported by Embassy). 3 Tito said that he had told Soviets in Moscow that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would be a “catastrophe“; that he had been worried Soviets would move against Czechs until Cierna meeting, but that after that he decided Soviets had given up any ideas of use of force; ensuing invasion which occurred within fortnight of Bratislava meeting had shocked him. He spoke indignantly of “absurdity” of Soviet attempts to justify invasion, saying that charges that counter-revolution was taking place were completely unfounded. 4. I tried to draw Tito out on who players had been in Soviet Politburo, but he was not responsive. (Later in conversation he did say that there had been some “disagreement” within Soviet Government over Czech invasion.) 5. Tito said that while he was still worried about Soviet intentions toward Yugoslavia, he did believe situation had “eased somewhat.” (He seemed more relaxed about situation than had Acting Foreign Secretary Pavicevic in earlier conversation today.) 4 He said only help Yugoslavia needs right now is economic, emphasizing necessity of carrying through Yugoslav economic reform with its important political and social implications. He also said that Yugoslavs had sufficient arms to equip 1.2 million men. 6. I tried to draw Tito out on Jarring Mission 5 and possibilities for an ME settlement but, although we talked about ME for some time, I got little new. At one point Tito said that Soviets have more influence on Nasser than he (Tito) does. He took usual GOY line on the ME, saying Israelis have not accepted UN resolution and that a solution should be imposed. I told him I thought Israelis had accepted resolution, and that an imposed solution simply would not work. At conclusion of this portion of conversation, Tito admitted that Jarring Mission may be vital to solution of ME problem. He expressed concern about what he interpreted to be signs of renewal hostilities, and said it is most important for Mediterranean area, the Balkans in particular, that problem be solved speedily. At this point he digressed somewhat, and said that no one wanted Balkans to again become a “powder-keg“, referring with some heat to Bulgaria's pretensions to Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which, in his view, were obviously inspired by Soviet Union to discomfit GOY. 7. He inquired about Viet-Nam negotiations, saying he thought Viet-Nam solution is vital to resolution of other world problems. I told him I had seen Averell Harriman who was not able to report any progress to date. 8. Comment : In addition to conversation with Tito visit provided opportunity for me to exchange views with leading Yugoslav officials, including prominent members of legislative and executive branches of government. All have stressed long-term rather than immediate aspect of threat. They seem to recognize that situation does not call for classical variety of aid program and have asked for no commitments. They have shown special concern over Soviet plans for Balkan and Mediterranean areas, particularly with regard to foothold Soviets are gaining in Eastern Mediterranean. As emphasized by Acting Secretary Pavicevic in talks this morning Yugoslavs welcome any action on our part which would have a deterrent effect on Soviet aggression in this area of world. In this connection it seems pretty clear that Yugoslavs evaluate positively signals we have given Moscow this week beginning with statement made by Ambassador Elbrick after seeing President Monday and culminating in my visit today. 9. Yugoslavs naturally seeking to dramatize importance of visit to their own people but without saying anything specific re its significance. In this connection today, shortly after my talk with Tito, Office of President telephoned to ask if statement could be released that I had called and delivered personal message from President Johnson. I said I would prefer release to say I had conveyed President's warm greetings to President Tito but if they felt strongly about their formulation we would not object. In press backgrounder later this afternoon I emphasized that my visit was followup to earlier Gligorov visit to US and that my Paris speech 6 gave me a good opportunity for a short visit to a country I had always wanted to see. I told them that I had presented President Johnson's regards to President Tito and that no commitments had been asked or offered. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Katzenbach was in Europe to attend a meeting of the Western European Union. 2 The October 14 statement is summarized in The New York Times , October 18, 1968. 3 Not further identified. 4 See Document 197 . 5 Between January and May 1968, Gunnar Jarring, U.N. Special Representative in the Middle East, met with Arab and Israeli officials in Nicosia. After his return to New York, he continued secret discussions relating to a Middle East peace settlement at the United Nations. 6 For text of Katzenbach's October 15 address to the Western European Union, see Department of State Bulletin , November 11, 1968, pp. 489–493. 197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, October 24, 1968, 2340Z. 2 261357. Fol sent action SecState Oct 22 from Belgrade. “Belgrade 4736. 3 Exdis. For Under Secretary. Subj: Under Secretary's talk with Pavicevic. 1. UnderSec's hour and half conversation Oct 18 with Pavicevic largely covered subjects on which Embassy has reported previously. This summary report transmits more significant, and in some instances fresh points made by Pavicevic on current situation in Eastern Europe. Of these the most pertinent for US is explicit suggestion (para 1E) that West make very clear to Moscow its interest in preservation of Yugoslavia as an independent and nonaligned country. A. Relations with USSR: Last April when Tito visited Moscow 4 there were discussions about internal democratic development. Soviets said they saw no reason to change system which had been effective for 50 years. Discussion centered particularly on importance (from Soviet standpoint) of leading role of Party in internal life of country and centralized planning. Yugoslavs viewed Soviet statement on changes contemplated as step backward, especially since spring before there had been serious talk about necessity for reform. In past GOY had developed good relations with USSR confident that USSR was sincere in its professions [garble—friendship for] Yugoslavia and that it was unthinkable that USSR would attack another friendly socialist state. As result of this confidence GOY policy of nonalignment sometimes gave impression of “over-balance”. However GOY was wrong, its confidence misplaced. Even during period of good relations there were signs Soviets sought change in GOY policy of nonalignment and independence. Main issues between Moscow and Belgrade have always been role of party in internal life and economic reform and these have been permanent sources of disagreement. Soviets have always disliked economic reform and role GOY has etched out for itself. Yugoslavia last month let Soviets know that if they had any aggressive intentions towards Yugoslavia they should know that people were prepared to fight them house-to-house if need be. B. “Socialist commonwealth“: Doctrine expressed by Gromyko at UNGA 5 is most dangerous and clearly in violation of both international law and UN Charter. What, for instance, are geographic limits of “socialist commonwealth”? Yugoslavia believes Gromyko's unveiling of this doctrine at UNGA gives it an “explicit importance” and that regardless of Soviet intentions now this doctrine can be used in the future as a pretext for intervention anywhere Moscow finds a situation it does not like. C. Soviet intentions: As result of developments since WP invasion of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia is in dark re Soviet long-range intentions. They believe Soviets may well have aggressive intentions towards Balkans for both strategic and political reasons. Strategic reasons are same as they were at time of Tsars: Moscow seeks warm-water port and wishes to control land approaches to ME. Yugoslavs believe Soviets are only ones who gained powerwise in Arab-Israeli war of last year. Soviets have told Yugoslavs they in Mediterranean now and there has been no reaction from West. Political reasons stem from Soviet concern over implications of internal political, economic, and social system in Yugoslavia. D. Albania: GOY does not exclude possibility Soviets may move against Albania in effort to achieve strategic break-through and to settle old scores. If they should decide to do so Yugoslav sovereignty and independence would be threatened. One leader of WP country asked Yugoslavs what they would do in event Albania attacked Bulgaria. Yugos say they understood this question to mean exactly opposite of what was asked, i.e., what would they do if WP attacked Albania. E. Western interests in Balkans: GOY believes that in event of Soviet aggression against Yugoslavia West cannot afford to remain indifferent. GOY does not wish to say that support for Yugoslavia is 'vital' for that is a 'relative' term; it does believe, however, that it is most important for Western strategic interests. It is important that Moscow knows that West is not indifferent to what happens in Balkans. First deterrent is Moscow's recognition that Yugoslavs will fight, which poses dilemma.GOY anxious for Moscow to have as many dilemmas to think about as possible. Second deterrent would be evidence of Western interest in preserving GOY's independence and integrity. Two most important qualities of Yugoslavia's independence are its nonaligned policy and its internal system of government. Would be helpful if West could make very clear its interest in preservation of Yugoslavia as independent and nonaligned country. Besides public statements there are various ways, various channels that can be used. GOY appreciates friendly statements of high U.S. officials, including President, and friendly U.S. diplomatic gestures and counts on these as not being mere words. F. Economic relations with West: Development of good economic relations with West are important because: (1) they are pivotal to success of internal reform; (2) of political implications of success of reform both here and elsewhere; and (3) such relations are necessary for consolidation of Yugoslavia's international position. Military measures taken have been expensive. Military expenses in past have been expensive and are heavier now; they are going to be even heavier in future. 2. Full memcon follows by pouch. 6 Elbrick.” Rusk 1 Source; Department of State, Central Files, ORG 1 U. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Wilson and approved by Lisle and in S/S, EUR, and U. 2 Beginning in 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 A copy of telegram 4736 from Belgrade, October 22, is in Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 U. 4 April 28–30. 5 For text of Gromyko's October 3 speech, see U.N. doc. A/PV.1679. 6 Not found. Austria Austria 198. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 29, 1965, 11:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Foley, on December 12. The meeting was held at the Department of State. Klaus visited Washington November 28–29. Memoranda of his conversation with Rusk on November 29, dealing with peace efforts, the Asian Development Bank, and Austria's foreign policy, are ibid., POL AUS–US. A memorandum of his conversation with Vice President Humphrey on November 29, dealing with the EEC and East Europe, is ibid., Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217, VP/Memcon. 199. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, October 6, 1966, 2322Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Vienna and Rome. 200. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 21, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 AUS. Confidential. Drafted by Foley on April 25. 201. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 10, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E–US. Confidential. Drafted by Obst and approved in the White House by Rostow on April 19. A separate memorandum of conversation, dealing with Vietnam, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Austria, Memos. The meeting was held at the White House 202. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State Vienna, September 4, 1968, 1628Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–USSR. Secret; Limdis. 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State Vienna, September 10, 1968, 1640Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–USSR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 204. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 21, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E–USSR. Secret. Drafted by Crump and approved in S on October 24. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. Waldheim was in the United States attending the U.N. General Assembly. 198. Memorandum of Conversation 198. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 29, 1965, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT Developments in Eastern Europe PARTICIPANTS Austria Dr. Josef Klaus—Federal Chancellor of Austria Dr. Ernst Lemberger—Austrian Ambassador to the United States Dr. Franz Karasek—Chief of the Federal Chancellery Dr. Gerald Hinteregger—Counselor of the Austrian Embassy, Washington Dr. Thomas Klestil—Economic and Scientific Secretary of the Austrian Embassy, Washington United States Mr. John M. Leddy—Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Mr. LeRoy F. Percival—Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs Mr. David Popper—Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Mr. Raymond E. Lisle—Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs Mr. Julius Katz—Director, Office of International Trade Mr. Edgar J. Beigel—Acting Director, Office of Western European Affairs Mr. Arthur D. Foley—Officer in Charge of Austrian-Swiss Affairs Mr. Herbert Spielman—Economic Officer for Italian-Austrian Affairs Mr. Harry Obst—Office of Language Services Mr. William Krimer—Office of Language Services Mr. Leddy asked how the Chancellor sees recent developments in Eastern Europe. Development of U.S. relations with the Soviets, he said, are somewhat impeded by the Vietnam war. The U.S. would like to continue normal exchanges with the Soviets but we are meeting with a difficult attitude. This attitude is reflected only in part in Eastern Europe and differs from country to country. The U.S. would like to relax tensions and improve trade relations with Eastern Europe. Chancellor Klaus stated that this is a most important subject for Austria. Austria conducts an active Eastern European policy, particularly since the normalization of its relations with Eastern Europe. Seen from Austria, the Chancellor continued, those countries of Eastern Europe, which in 1945 turned completely toward the East, are now turning back toward Western Europe as toward an old family. The governments are permitting more liberalization but, he noted, the government leaders are in no way turning from Communism. However, a healthy climate is being created and Austria wishes to take advantage of it. Austrians find that old traditional relations with the former members of the Hapsburg Empire permit them a special entree. Austrian administration in these lands is well remembered, and this makes discussions for the Austrians easier. Human contacts between Austrians and other Eastern Europeans are increasing, the Chancellor said. 100,000 Austrians have friends or families in Eastern Europe. Crossing the borders is made easier and real human contacts can be made. Austrians now go to Yugoslavia on vacation and many thousands of Austrians go to Hungary and many Hungarians now visit Austria. The Chancellor said that on summer evenings in some parts of Vienna one can hear more Eastern European languages being spoken than German. The Chancellor noted that cultural exchanges in things German are easier through Austria for the Eastern Europeans than directly with Germany. The Chancellor said that economic relations with Eastern Europe are making progress. Austrian-Rumanian trade has quadrupled in recent years. The Austrian Government realizes that this does not necessarily improve relations; politics for the communist countries comes before trade and Austria cannot become dependent on Eastern European trade. Austria actively cultivates official exchanges with Eastern Europe, the Chancellor said. He said he had invited this year to Austria the prime ministers of Poland and Rumania and he himself had had an interesting visit to Yugoslavia. For the time being, he is not accepting invitations to the other Eastern European countries since he wants the officials of those lands to come to Austria first. In response to a question from Mr. Leddy about Czechoslovakia, the Chancellor said that relations here are difficult. Austria first normalized its relations with Yugoslavia, reached an agreement on Carinthia, then the Government reached property agreements with Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary. However, no property agreement has been reached with Czechoslovakia. He explained that since the days of the Hapsburg monarchy, Austria-Czechoslovakian property has been closely intertwined and that large sums of money are involved. This, he said, makes reaching an agreement difficult. As regards Poland, the Chancellor said Austria has no difficulties. A large Austrian cultural institute has been established in Poland and cultural exchanges are going on, as well as increased trade. Mr. Lisle asked for the Chancellor's assessment of the status of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe and relations with the Vatican. The Chancellor said that status of the Catholic Church differs from country to country. In Poland improvement of relations with the Vatican has come the farthest. Relations with Yugoslavia are somewhat tense but an agreement is being negotiated. The Chancellor said he had visited the Archbishop in Belgrade but had not seen the Cardinal in Zagreb. Vatican relations with Czechoslovakia are normalizing and in Hungary Cardinal Mindszenty is the only remaining problem. Rumania, the government which has in many respects gone further in normalizing other things, has been the most difficult for the Catholic Church. Four bishops have died in prison and one is now under house arrest. The Chancellor said that Austrian Cardinal Koenig has attempted to establish relations with the Catholic hierarchy in each of the Eastern European countries. He has had good relations with them at the Ecumenical Council. Mr. Lisle asked about the newspaper reports that Rumania wants to act as a mediator in Vietnam. Chancellor Klaus said that in the four hours of his discussions with Maurer the question of mediation was not mentioned. He said apparently Maurer mentioned this only while traveling in Western Austria. There is no question, Klaus said, of either Austria or Rumania acting as mediator. Maurer did criticize U.S.-Vietnam policy. The Chancellor said that Austria has stated that it is interested in securing peace but he noted that Foreign Minister Kreisky had said that no solution to Vietnam is possible without U.S. prestige being protected. Mr. Karasek said that so as not to create a false impression he wished to emphasize that the Austrian Government had not discussed mediation in Vietnam with the Rumanians. He has tried to check the source of these reports of Maurer's alleged statements. The reports seemed to have been the conclusions of a reporter who had heard several of Maurer's statements on Vietnam. Other reporters who had heard Maurer on the same occasions had not confirmed this conclusion. Chancellor Klaus said that there can be no mediation unless both sides request it. He added that visitors to the West from the East have repeatedly tried to get the Austrian Government to denounce U.S.-Vietnam policies and the Austrians have at all times rejected this. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Foley, on December 12. The meeting was held at the Department of State. Klaus visited Washington November 28–29. Memoranda of his conversation with Rusk on November 29, dealing with peace efforts, the Asian Development Bank, and Austria's foreign policy, are ibid., POL AUS–US. A memorandum of his conversation with Vice President Humphrey on November 29, dealing with the EEC and East Europe, is ibid., Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217, VP/Memcon. 199. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 199. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 New York, October 6, 1966, 2322Z. 2 1309. Secto 35. Secretary's conversation with Austrian FonMin Toncic Oct 5, 1966. Fol is uncleared FYI, Noforn, subject to revision upon review. 1. In hour-long tour d'horizon with Secretary, Austrian FonMin Toncic in company of Director Political Affairs of Austrian Foreign Ministry Haymerle and Austrian Perm Rep Waldheim discussed Vietnam, ChiRep, Albania, Mongolia, East-West relations, Common Market and Kennedy Round, Austrian draftees, UNOID, Tyrol, SWA and NATO. Fol are highlights of conversation. 2. Vietnam. Secretary made it crystal clear that US will not permit North Vietnam take South Vietnam by force. To do otherwise would destroy credibility of US which of fundamental importance to peace and war in world, as Berlin and Cuban missile crises have proved in past. Toncic replied it was good to hear US would not sell out South Vietnam. In his view no political solution possible without first denying other side military victory. In this sense he considered “American victory” now secure. When Toncic asked why US did not destroy Haiphong, Secretary replied that all important military targets except those in heavily populated areas have been covered. (Comment: Toncic's privately expressed views contrasted rather sharply with those expressed in public in subsequent address before UNGA, in which Toncic hewed closely to neutral line.) 3 3. ChiRep. Toncic volunteered that Austria will again abstain on ChiRep issues in GA. Secretary stated it would be big mistake for world endorse ChiCom militancy just at time when failures of ChiCom foreign policy should be persuading ChiComs that militancy leading into blind alley. 4. Albania. Toncic reported Albanians in Vienna have for some time been making vague proposals for coming nearer to West. He asked how Austria should respond. Secretary speculated it possible Albanians are becoming restive under ChiCom monopoly and stated it would be constructive and helpful if Austrians could probe their intentions, though it would clearly be mistake for US do so. Waldheim made point Albanians will not change ChiRep position and continue insist Taiwan must be expelled. 5. Mongolia. Toncic recommended recognition of Mongolia, stating Mongolia would like become Switzerland of Asia. Secretary explained US has special problem because of GRC. 6. East-West relations. Secretary stated while bridge-building is OK, Austrians should keep one thing in mind: No vital issues such as Germany are to be settled without US. Secretary added that US did not fight World War II for nothing. 7. Common Market-Kennedy Round. Toncic spoke at some length about Austrian desire there [share?] in economic advantages of Common Market without paying political price. “Everything would be easy for us if Common Market were to conclude trade agreement with Austria.” Secretary expressed understanding for problem, but when Toncic suggested maybe GATT would help relieve problem and give Austria a waiver in five years, Secretary explained at length importance of achieving progress in Kennedy Round by early March if protectionist course by US is to be avoided. 8. Austrian draftees in US. Toncic asked for some kind of assurance that Austrians in US on immigrant visas not be drafted. Secretary stated that as general principle permanent residents who participate in all benefits of US system must accept corresponding obligations. Secretary admitted there was special problem with Austria because legislation conflicted with earlier treaties. Secretary pointed out selective service had worked out problem by administrative means. Secretary suggested Austria and US not engage this question as a matter of principle. Secretary pointed out to Toncic that if question gets stirred up in Austria through public pronouncements, it will also get stirred up in US Congress. Secretary suggested Toncic answer inquiries from Austrian press along fol lines: Authorities in US have complicated problem because of conflict between treaties and subsequent Congressional legislation. As a pragmatic matter we have been able work out cases that seem of special interest. We hope that can continue. 9. UNOID. Toncic announced that in speech to UNGA (which followed hard on bilateral) he would offer Vienna as hqts for UNOID. Secretary stated he was not familiar with this particular problem but in general encouraged Austria build up Vienna as site for international mtgs. 10. Tyrol. Toncic estimated it would take Austria and Italy about one year to settle Tyrol dispute. (In subsequent GA address Toncic spoke in moderate tones about this problem, stating that goal of current negotiations had been to establish effective and internationally guaranteed autonomy for minority. Toncic resolutely condemned use of violence to resolve this problem.) Secretary recalled that in past Austria had tried draw us into Tyrol dispute, and expressed hope we would be spared recurrence of such attempts. 11. SWA. Toncic expressed his unhappiness over way SWA problem was being handled in UN. Secretary stated we too have serious reservations about African res on SWA, but expressed hope that further discussions would lead to some changes. When Waldheim raised the possibility of establishing an ad hoc commission to study problem, Secretary stated he thought this was attractive idea. 12. NATO. Secretary explained it had become imperative that NATO jointly reassess common threat, establish new force goals to meet threat and allocate individual responsibilities. Toncic's only reaction was that it would be dangerous if US strength in Europe were to be replaced by German strength. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Vienna and Rome. 2 Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 For text of Toncic's address, see U.N. doc. A/PV.1430. 200. Memorandum of Conversation 200. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 21, 1967. SUBJECT Austria and the EEC PARTICIPANTS Austria Dr. Ernst Lemberger, Austrian Ambassador Dr. Karl Gruber, State Secretary in the Office of Austrian Federal Chancellor Dr. Otto Zundritsch, Press Counselor, Austrian Embassy United States Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mr. Walter M. Kotschnig, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Mr. Robert M. McKisson, Eastern European Affairs Mr. Robert H. Kranich, ACDA Mr. Wells Stabler, Country Director, Austria-Italy-Switzerland Mr. Arthur D. Foley, Austrian-Swiss Affairs Gruber said that it is not a love affair but economic necessity which leads Austria to seek arrangements with the EEC. Austrian industry must specialize in, for example, machine tools and needs export markets. Austria is beginning to feel the effects of EEC trade barriers in its industry and agriculture. If economic troubles come, Gruber observed, political troubles will follow. Gruber continued that Austrian neutrality forbids membership in the EEC but Austria is seeking an affiliation. The Soviets do not like an Austrian connection with the Common Market in any form. However, following the Klaus visit to Moscow, 2 the Austrians feel that the Soviets now understand Austria's economic needs better. The Austrians have supplied the Soviets with a long paper on the justification for Austrian association, including a factory-by-factory analysis. But the Soviets suggest separate trade agreements with the countries of the Common Market. Gruber expressed his personal opinion that the Soviets themselves realize that they one day must recognize the Common Market. Gruber said he feels that the Soviets will do nothing dramatic as regards Austria's association with the Common Market. As regards EFTA, the Austrians have felt from the beginning that EFTA was an instrument of negotiation with the Common Market. The Austrians see no problem in this connection. The French position is important to Austria, he continued. As a member of the Common Market and a signer of the State Treaty, 3 their attitude is significant, and France has been helpful in Austria's dealings with the Soviets. Mr. Leddy asked if it is not a fact that Austria's trade with the Common Market has increased. Gruber replied that this was so as long as the general European economic boom was on. But with the present economic setbacks, Austria feels the effects of Common Market tariffs. Mr. Leddy asked if the success of the Kennedy Round negotiations followed by trade agreements with the Common Market would take care of Austria's trade difficulties. Gruber said he hoped so, but that trade agreements were not enough. Mr. Leddy asked about the Soviet position. Are the Soviets completely opposed to any arrangement with the Common Market, including a trade agreement? Gruber replied that the answer really will be found in giving Austria's affiliation the proper title, which will not be objectionable to the Soviets. The Soviets will never give their official blessing. In response to Ambassador MacArthur's question, Gruber said that approximately 50 percent of Austria's trade is with the Common Market, 15 percent with the East and 17 percent with EFTA. Mr. Leddy asked Gruber's estimate of the possibilities of UK entry into the Common Market. Will De Gaulle continue to oppose this? Gruber replied that when the UK decides to enter they will get sufficient support. But, he said, he foresees long negotiations with the UK on this. Gruber asked Mr. Leddy for the US attitude toward countries making arrangements with the Common Market. Mr. Leddy replied that the US does not like preferential arrangements now being negotiated with a number of countries. If such negotiations would lead to full membership, the US, he said, would not object. Mr. Leddy added that the US recognizes that Austria is a special case, being inhibited by the State Treaty from full membership. But, he added, the US does not like the piecemeal moves being made by other countries for special and preferential deals with the EEC, if these lead to discrimination against US trade. Ambassador MacArthur said that we hope that it will be clear that an Austrian arrangement is a special case and will not be a precedent. Gruber replied that he is sure this will be clear. Mr. Stabler asked about the requirements for approval in the Austrian Parliament of the EEC arrangement. Is a two-thirds vote required, he asked? Gruber replied that the wording of the text of the agreement will determine if a two-thirds vote is necessary. He added that the Austrian Government will want Socialist Party support anyway. Gruber said he has the feeling that the trade unions now support an arrangement. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 AUS. Confidential. Drafted by Foley on April 25. 2 Chancellor Klaus visited Moscow March 20–21. 3 For text of the Austrian State Treaty, signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955, see 6 UST 2369. 201. Memorandum of Conversation 201. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 10, 1968. SUBJECT East-West Relations PARTICIPANTS The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States His Excellency Dr. Josef Klaus, Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria The Honorable Angier B. Duke, Chief of Protocol Mr. Harry Obst, Department of State, Language Services Staff The President thanked the Chancellor for expressing the gratitude of the Austrian people for the aid given by the United States to Austria. All Americans hold names like Vienna and Salzburg in high esteem and they have a high regard for the Austrian people. This would be demonstrated at the White House dinner as people from all corners of the United States come to honor the Chancellor and the Austrian people. It is very much regretted that we have the turbulence in our city at this time and the inconvenience of the curfew, which might make it impossible for some people to attend. 2 However, the greater majority of them will be there and they are looking forward to it. The President said that the United States is also trying to build some bridges to the Eastern European countries, following the splendid example set by Austria. We are exploring the possibility of expanding trade between the United States and the Eastern European countries. Chancellor Klaus replied that as a country bordering directly on the Eastern bloc, and as a free and democratic country, Austria has been observing a steady process of loosening in the monolithic bloc led by the Soviet Union and a considerable interest by the Eastern countries in the rest of Europe. Since 1955–56 a certain turning around and looking more towards the Western world again can be closely observed among those nations. Austria is trying to gear its policy to this development. President Johnson assured the Chancellor that the United States is very appreciative of Austria's efforts in this direction. We are trying very much to do the same, as we know that this is a turbulent area which seeks to find a new level of balance while looking for more freedom. Chancellor Klaus said he wished to make very clear that in those areas, 70 to 90 percent of the people are not thinking along Communist lines, but their thoughts are very much the same as in the West. Four years ago he talked to a Hungarian engineer who had been imprisoned by Kadar and asked him if he would consider it strange or natural if the Chancellor were to shake the hand of the man who imprisoned him. The engineer's response was typical. He said please do come and visit him by all means. We must not forget that 80 percent of the Hungarians think and feel with the people of the West and want a democratic way of life. The Chancellor recalled that he had made visits to Moscow, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade and Sofia in 1967 and also traveled East as a private citizen. Everywhere he found great sympathy for Austria, for Europe, for the free world and for democracy. Austria, being historically and geographically the closest country to the Eastern bloc, can demonstrate to these countries a different way of life and government. President Johnson replied that we have observed Austria's policy with great interest and we very much appreciate her excellent efforts. We want to contribute wherever we can to such a policy. He hoped that the Chancellor would be able to discuss details of this policy more closely with Secretary Rusk. 3 Chancellor Klaus said that this conversation had been a great experience for him. He was grateful to have had the opportunity to meet with the President personally and to discuss the three most important issues of concern to the United States. He thanked the President for having spoken with him so frankly and in such a cordial manner and took this as a token of the trust that exists between the two countries. He hoped that his future meetings with the President and with his very able Secretary of State would contribute to a continued exchange of views between our two governments and that those talks would be fruitful. He thanked the President for having given him this opportunity on a very, very busy day. President Johnson closed by saying that he was very happy that the Chancellor could come and see him and he was looking forward to being with him again at the White House dinner. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E–US. Confidential. Drafted by Obst and approved in the White House by Rostow on April 19. A separate memorandum of conversation, dealing with Vietnam, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Austria, Memos. The meeting was held at the White House 2 Rioting broke out in Washington following the April 4 assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Federal troops were brought in to quell the violence and a curfew was established on April 5. 3 According to Secretary Rusk's Appointment Book, he hosted a luncheon for Klaus on the afternoon of April 10. (Johnson Library) No memorandum of conversation was found. 202. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 202. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 1 Vienna, September 4, 1968, 1628Z. 6390. Subject: Chancellor Klaus informal request for indication of US reaction if Austria were attacked. Ref: Vienna 6174, Vienna 6253. 2 1. Chancellor Klaus asked me to call today to exchange views on “very informal basis” re developments in Central and Eastern Europe. After reviewing again reasons (Vienna 6174) why GOA statements re Czech invasion had been without polemics (he is still obviously sensitive to some domestic criticism for not speaking out more strongly), he inquired how we presently viewed threat to Romania and Yugoslavia. Drawing on Dept's helpful guidance, 3 I told him that while Soviets obviously had formidable capability to move on Romania, information available does not lead us to believe intervention is in prospect for time being. Re Yugoslavia, I indicated I knew of no intelligence indicating there is any extraordinary Warsaw Pact build-up on Yugoslav frontiers. Furthermore, some qualified observers in Europe and elsewhere doubted that present Soviet leadership would undertake what Stalin had decided was not a profitable venture some twenty years ago. 2. Klaus said while he also doubted Soviets planned any imminent military move against Romania, Yugoslavia or elsewhere at this time, one could never be certain. Therefore, on most confidential and informal basis, he would like to know how we would react if in fact Soviets moved in Europe against such targets as Romania, Yugoslavia, West Berlin and particularly Austria. (Comment: Klaus obviously asked me to call to put this to me.) 3. I replied to Klaus that I would try answer his question on a personal basis. Each of the four targets he mentioned represented a different situation. Romania, like Czechoslovakia, was a member of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON and therefore full-fledged member of Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia, by contrast, while Communist state, had been independent of Moscow since 1948. Furthermore, it seemed certain that if Soviets moved on Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs would resist bitterly as they had the German invasion in the last war. West Berlin represented still another situation in that we were present there and had rights and responsibilities stemming from 4-Power Agreement to which Soviets were a signatory. President Kennedy had made crystal clear to Khrushchev in their Vienna meeting that West Berlin was not negotiable and if the Soviets did indeed move on West Berlin militarily, they would have to attack US forces stationed there. 4 Austria, on the other hand, was a militarily neutral country and not a member of any Western security pact. However, we, as well as Britain, France and Soviet Union, were signatories of the Austrian State Treaty which recognized Austria's independence and territorial integrity. If Soviets invaded free and independent Austria, a very grave situation would obviously arise which would affect the military balance of power and equilibrium in Europe. Exactly how the United States or other NATO countries would react to such an aggression I could not say. However, in this connection I assumed that as chief of government of a neutral state he was not seeking any specific guarantee or assurance as to how we or other NATO countries would react militarily but rather sought a general indication of our reaction to an attack on Austria. 4. Klaus hastened to say that his query was informal, that he would make no record of our conversation, that I was right in assuming he wanted to know our “political reaction rather than military reaction,” and that he hoped our conversation would be held in strictest confidence. He said, however, that he would be grateful if we could give him some private indication that there would be a “serious political reaction in the United States if Austria were attacked.” I replied I would hold the substance of our discussion in strictest confidence and would report it most confidentially to Dept. I personally felt that we would take a very grave view of any Soviet attack against Austria since, as contrasted with the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it would be an attack against a free and independent nation that was really a basic part of Western Europe even though it was militarily neutral. 5. Comment : I believe I have steered Klaus away from the idea that it would be either wise or prudent for him to try to obtain from us some specific assurance of how we would react to a Soviet attack on Austria since obviously we are not in a position to give any such assurances. However, I do recommend that I be authorized to inform Klaus that I reported his conversation to Washington which informed me in reply that USG would indeed take most serious and grave view of an attack on Austria, etc. Would appreciate Dept's comments Sept. 9 as Klaus indicated he would like another “informal” discussion about events in Central and Eastern Europe next week. 5 MacArthur 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–USSR. Secret; Limdis. 2 Telegram 6174 from Vienna, August 24, and telegram 6253 from Vienna, August 28, are ibid., POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH. 3 Probably a reference to telegram 231312 to Vienna, August 31, which provided the Department's updated analysis of the Czech situation. (Ibid.) 4 For documentation on the Vienna summit June 3–4, 1961, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, volumes V and XIV . 5 In telegram 234682 to Vienna, September 7, the Department of State authorized MacArthur to tell Klaus that the United States had undertaken to respect Austrian independence in the State Treaty, which “remains fully valid today,” and that the United States “would regard a Soviet attack against Austria as an extremely serious and grave threat to peace.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–USSR) MacArthur relayed this message to Klaus on September 9. He reported on his meeting with the Chancellor in telegram 6459 from Vienna, September 9. (Ibid.) 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 1 Vienna, September 10, 1968, 1640Z. 6500. Subject: FonMin Waldheim's views on Czechoslovakia. Ref: State 234682 and Vienna 6459. 2 1. Saw FonMin Waldheim today and conveyed to him same comments as I gave Chancellor Klaus based on State 234682. 2. Waldheim expressed appreciation and said although some members of GOA had been extremely nervous recently about possibility of Soviet move against Romania, Yugoslavia and even Austria, he did not share view that Austria was threatened. While Soviets would unquestionably move against any member of Warsaw Pact that Soviets thought might try to detach itself from Moscow's orbit, Soviets recognize that Austria is free and independent state which, while militarily neutral, is integral part of democratic West. If Soviets moved against Austria, it would, in his judgment, only be if they were prepared for major war with Western powers, which he strongly doubted. He said in strict confidence that Austrian military had bad case of jitters and has been the source of reports that major move against other Eastern and Central European countries might take place during Sept. 7–9 or Sept. 15–16 (Vienna 6459). He said basis of these reports were rumors of sketchiest kind picked up by Austrian military, and in Cabinet meeting this morning he made clear he disagreed with them. In this connection he had also issued a press denial today qualifying as “absurd” a press report emanating from Austrian press agency that GOA was seriously worried that in event of Soviet attack against Yugoslavia, Soviets would request right of passage for Soviet troops through Austria. 3. Re Kuznetsov mission to Prague, 3 Waldheim said Soviets obviously hope that this skilled negotiator can get Svoboda, Dubcek, Cernik, et al to do Soviet dirty work so that Soviets will not have to resort to further use of force. As GOA tentatively sees it, if Kuznetsov succeeds present Czech Government risks seriously alienating support of Czech people since Soviets obviously are very dissatisfied with GOC implementation of Moscow agreements and want Svoboda and Dubcek to impose full Soviet system on Czechoslovakia. Waldheim believes that present Czech leaders will remain and try to do Soviet bidding as long as they can save something for Czech people, but if they are pushed to the wall they may either resign or be removed and replaced by more pliant Soviet sympathizing Czechs, or Soviets may have to impose puppet regime maintained in place by Soviet bayonets. Waldheim thought imposition of puppet regime would be last resort for Soviets. 4. Dept repeat as appropriate. MacArthur 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–USSR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 2 See footnote 5, Document 202 . 3 First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasiliy Kuznetsov visited Prague September 6–9. 204. Memorandum of Conversation 204. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 21, 1968. SUBJECT Eastern European Situation PARTICIPANTS Austrian His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs His Excellency Dr. Ernst Lemberger, Austrian Ambassador His Excellency Dr. Arno Halusa, Director General of Political Affairs United States The Secretary Mr. John E. Crump, Desk Officer, Austria-Switzerland Czechoslovakia Minister Waldheim emphasized that, contrary to the impression created by Austrian newspapers, there had not been a sense of panic among the Austrians and there had never been a fear of Soviet invasion, although there had been and still remains serious concern. He admitted that the Austrian military establishment had contributed to the sense of nervousness by its prediction of Soviet action against Austria. This fear had been based upon the large numbers of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, 2 illegal over-flights over Austrian territory and a three-day period when Soviet leaders were not available to the Austrian Ambassador in Moscow. The current feeling is that the Soviets will not undertake direct action against Austria because to do so would bring on a direct confrontation with the West. It is difficult to see into the future but Austria expects no action by Warsaw Pact powers against Yugoslavia or Austria. The Secretary replied that in August we had considered the chances of an intervention in Czechoslovakia to be 51/49. We had the impression from the Soviet Ambassador and others that developments in Prague represented a fundamental threat to the Soviet Union and that possible Czech defection from the Communist Bloc had been raised. In addition, the Czechs themselves had raised questions regarding the fundamental governing position of the Communist Party. The question which now remains is the presence of Soviet forces near the Bavarian border. This is a problem for NATO and certain steps will be taken—these steps are a matter of prudence rather than steps arising from a fear of immediate attack. Possible Future Soviet Actions The Secretary outlined possible actions which might be taken by Warsaw Pact powers in a descending order of gravity. 1. Action against Berlin; this would clearly mean war. 2. At almost the same level, any Soviet move against Austria would surely involve a confrontation with the West. The U.S., France and Great Britain have an interest in Austrian independence arising from the State Treaty and if Austria were to call on the signatories of the Treaty to help her preserve her independence, this would surely precipitate a crisis. 3. Soviet action against Yugoslavia would produce a far more formidable crisis than Czechoslovakia. We cannot look calmly at Soviet actions aimed at the Adriatic area. The question arises whether Yugoslavia is still considered a member of the Socialist commonwealth. In this regard, the Secretary mentioned a press briefing recently at the Soviet Embassy which indicated that the Soviets do not consider Yugoslavia to be a member of the Socialist Bloc. 4. An attack on Romania would have different motivations because there is no question there of the monopoly of the Communist Party. The question regarding possible intervention in Romania was put directly to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin who replied categorically that the Soviet Union is not planning action against that country. 3 While it is questionable what value should be given to that response, we do not see the threat of military action against Romania nor any of the other three areas at the present time. This can obviously change very quickly. We are concerned about the recent Pravda article which apparently set forth a new doctrine of the “Socialist commonwealth.” 4 It may be that this is an explanation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia to those persons in the Soviet Union and elsewhere who require such an explanation. On the other hand, the Soviets may have indeed evolved this new theory which may be used to explain further military moves. In summary, we doubt the likelihood of further military moves at the present, although the situation remains one of utmost gravity. An attack against West Berlin, a NATO country or Austria would present an extremely grave situation; Soviet moves in other areas would be less serious but still grave. Western Responses Minister Waldheim said that it was of great importance to make clear to the Soviet Union that an act against a neutral European country would lead to counter-action. The Secretary replied that the NATO Ministerial meeting in mid-November will show a clear response on the part of NATO. 5 It is important that all Western countries move together and the days of a response by the U.S. alone are over. For example, during the 1961 Berlin crisis the U.S. added $6 billion to its defense budget, called up reserves and took actions which were not taken by any other NATO country. Similarly, we were alone in some actions following the Czechoslovak invasion. Europe cannot say that it is up to the U.S. alone to respond to Czechoslovakia. The Secretary said he would hope that if the Austrians receive any information or indications of Soviet pressure, they would immediately inform the U.S., Great Britain and France so that we can make clear to the Soviet Union our reaction. In the case of Romania we had felt it necessary to make a public statement 6 and to call in the Soviet Ambassador; 7 we would need as much advance warning as possible if similar actions were to be undertaken regarding Austria. Soviet Internal Reaction The Secretary noted that the Soviets certainly could have predicted the disadvantages which would accrue from their intervention in Czechoslovakia—unfavorable publicity in Czechoslovakia, division among the Eastern Europeans, splits in Western Communist parties. They were willing to pay this price and this may indicate a willingness to move back to the cold war days in the Kremlin. Another explanation may lie in the fact that committee actions, such as are required within the present Soviet Government, make it difficult for an individual to oppose the majority view and this may have a bearing on future moves. It is clear that the Soviets have become afraid of peaceful co-existence. The Secretary added that the Soviet Government may now realize that its intervention in Czechoslovakia has developed badly and cannot survive without far reaching changes. The Soviets face problems with their youth and with minority national groups. They must continually deal with nostalgia in Eastern European countries for ties to the West. These factors have created a difficult situation and their awareness of the situation causes them to be nervous and afraid and they are therefore dangerous. Austrian Views Minister Waldheim responded that the Austrian judgment of the present situation is similar. However, while the Austrians see no danger in the immediate future, they are concerned about long-run developments, particularly in connection with hostilities in the Middle East. If war breaks out again in the Middle East the Soviets can be expected to make further moves in Eastern Europe. He agreed that it was necessary for the U.S. and Austria to keep in close touch regarding any increases in Soviet pressures against Austria. He said that he had been asked about guarantees of Austrian neutrality and had responded that the obligations in the State Treaty are sufficient for that purpose. It is clear to the Soviet Union that an action against Austria would bring on a new war and there is therefore no necessity for any further guarantee. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E–USSR. Secret. Drafted by Crump and approved in S on October 24. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. Waldheim was in the United States attending the U.N. General Assembly. 2 Soviet troops held maneuvers in Czechoslovakia June 19–30. 3 See Document 167 . 4 Reference is to the ”Brezhnev Doctrine.” See footnote 4, Document 23 . 5 The NAC Ministerial Meeting was held in Brussels November 15–16. For text of the NATO declaration, see Department of State Bulletin , December 9, 1968, pp. 595–597. 6 Apparently a reference to President Johnson's August 30 address at San Antonio, Texas. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69 , Book II, pp. 917–920. 7 See Document 165 . Finland Finland 205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland Washington, May 15, 1964, 7:06 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 FIN–SWE. Secret. Drafted by Barr; cleared in the Department of Defense, RPM, and G/PM; and approved by Knox. Also sent to Stockholm. 206. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State Helsinki, May 21, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 FIN–SWE. Secret. Repeated to Stockholm. 207. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Munitions Control (Margrave) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Kitchen) Washington, January 11, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 FIN–SWE. Secret. 208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland Washington, March 12, 1965, 12:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 FIN. Confidential. Drafted by Barr, approved in BNA, and cleared by Creel. Repeated to Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Moscow, and Paris for USRO. 209. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Helsinki, June 1, 1966, 2248Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret. Repeated to Copenhagen, Moscow, Olso, Reykjavik, and Stockholm. 210. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 12, 1966, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FIN–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Titus. The meeting was held in Stoessel's office. 211. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 29, 1968, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FIN–US. Confidential. Drafted by Klebenov. The meeting was held in Leddy's office. 205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland 205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland 1 Washington, May 15, 1964, 7:06 p.m. 388. Joint State-Defense Message. Stockholm's 1398, info Helsinki 78. 2 Ref revives possibility that Finns might be interested in purchase Northrop F–5 or other US aircraft. Although F–5 not at level sophistication of Draken, it would for this reason reduce provocation problem and is less expensive. Existence F–5's in Norway also promises simplification of support function. Unless Embassy or USAIRA perceive objection, and bearing in mind caveat final 3 sentences, part 1, AIRA's C–31, 3 request USAIRA's initial exploration with country representatives and assessment of merit DOD team visit to Helsinki or suggested alternate means approaching Finns for purpose making sales proposal on F–5 or other suitable US aircraft. Credit arrangements are possible. In light Embassy Helsinki's 520, 4 Dept believes possibility purchase Drakens or F–5's may be wishful thinking on part Finn military, but want to do everything possible keep US aircraft alternatives under Finnish consideration. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 FIN–SWE. Secret. Drafted by Barr; cleared in the Department of Defense, RPM, and G/PM; and approved by Knox. Also sent to Stockholm. 2 Telegram 1398 from Stockholm, May 6, reported on upcoming Swedish-Finnish talks regarding aircraft. (Ibid.) 3 C–31, April 6, reported that Finland had decided to purchase the Draken aircraft with the U.S. Falcon missile system and that Finland intended to “take up problem of purchase on political level with U.S. authorities in near future.” The sentences under reference read: “Source asked if possible to keep problem on confidential basis and to keep both Hughes Acft Co and Northrup Acft Co from obtaining info on purchases. He stated Finns concerned that Hughes representatives in Geneva or Stockholm will contact Swedes prior to time Finns make political approach to obtain U.S. clearance for purchase. Specifically source asked if possible to have Hughes contacts channeled through AIRA until this matter settled.” (Ibid., DEF 12–5 FIN) 4 Telegram 520 from Helsinki, May 2, reported that the Finns were making “exploratory” inquiries regarding the purchase of U.S. aircraft. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 FIN–SWE) 206. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State 206. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State 1 Helsinki, May 21, 1964, 8 p.m. 555. Joint State-Defense Message. Your 388 received only May 20 due to servicing as missing. 2 AIRA sources have provided further information on Finnish interest in Drakens as follows: (1) Ministry of Defense had included 10 Drakens in preliminary 1965 budget estimates; (2) on this basis and on own initiative, Maj. Gen. Artola discussed purchase possibilities with Swedes, which precipitated contact with Hughes Aircraft concerning availability Falcon Missile System; (3) Artola's superiors considered this action premature, and Artola was told to take no further action; (4) subsequently, National Defense Council approved inclusion 10 Drakens in budget which will be before Parliament in September, this decision of course being contingent upon availability and acceptable terms, including credit element; (5) Lt. Gen. Maunula, when in Sweden beginning May 25 on return of Swedish Chief of Gen. Staff earlier visit to Finland, will visit Saab Plant and discuss Draken possibilities (confirms Stockholm's 1398); 3 (6) if discussions with Swedes go well, Max Jakobson, Dir. Foreign Office Pol Dept., while in US later this year, possibly in August, will explore availability of Falcon system with US authorities; (7) while 1965 budgetary provision for Drakens not directly involved in 5-year (1966–70) military procurement proposal, rejection of this proposal might require replanning of which Drakens might conceivably be victim; (8) 5-year program now being vetted from standpoint of financial feasibility (this confirmed to me by Jakobson). AIRA primary source states that 1965 budgetary provision for 10 Drakens to replace Gnats now has concurrence of highest Finnish political authority. Embassy satisfied with this information, but continues to doubt that this authority's concurrence in Finnish military's long-range objective of total replacement of Migs has been given or even sought. Our impression is that Finnish military considers acquisition of initial ten as opening wedge, with fulfillment of long-range objective being contingent upon performance Drakens and salutary political environment. An AIRA source also reports his colleagues concerned that, if Drakens with Falcon system denied them, they may be forced turn to improved Mig-21D. Embassy considers this an understandable fear in light ease of obtaining Soviet credit. In this connection, present Finnish procurement team now in Moscow (see Embassy telegram 531) 4 has shopping list which includes ammunition, artillery, and other hardware but from which aircraft have been studiously excluded. Relatively small size of credit arising from sale to USSR of agricultural surpluses has made this exclusion not too difficult to accomplish. With regard Deptel 388 suggestion that DOD team visit Finland, Embassy firmly of the view that such a move would be unfortunate. Any determination to press for acceptance F–5s as alternative to Drakens should be pursued through more shaded avenues. Furthermore, given decided preference for Drakens on part Finns, believe it best to let Finns explore whether they can both have and afford them on own time schedule. We are convinced that pressure from us now would not be welcome. If Finns decide they can afford Drakens and US must make judgment as to whether Finns may have Falcon system, hope following considerations will be weighed: 1. While fact F–5 less sophisticated than Draken might make it less provocative sui generis, any US aircraft is a priori more provocative than one from Finland's neutral neighbor. 2. While the possibility of a full drive-out of Migs with the Drakens is a long-shot, it is at least that. It is much less conceivable that American aircraft would ever replace the Migs. 3. Drakens with the Falcon system would give both Sweden and the US a valuable hold on the Finnish military posture. Commitments which we both might extract as to security and utilization would give the Finns a useful bulwark against any Soviet pressure for Finnish-Soviet Air Force collaboration. 4. We have not had reason to date to question Finnish military security or faithfulness to commitments US. 5. A denial of the Falcon system would run the risk of interpretation as crude pressure to force acceptance of the F–5, and inflate the chances of the Mig-21D. If, as is quite possible, Finns find Drakens to be beyond their means, would hope US would then have attractive F–5 offer to make which would meet the Mig-21D competition. AIRA and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] concur in these recommendations. Ingram 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 FIN–SWE. Secret. Repeated to Stockholm. 2 Document 205 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 205 . 4 Telegram 531, May 6, reported on the makeup of the Finnish negotiating team. (Department of State, Central Files, AGR 12–5 FIN) 207. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Munitions Control (Margrave) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Kitchen) 207. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Munitions Control (Margrave) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Kitchen) 1 Washington, January 11, 1965. SUBJECT Finnish Interest in the Falcon Missile System On December 29, I received a copy of a memorandum from Bill Tyler to you on the above subject. 2 After expressing his strong support for meeting Finnish interest in Falcon-equipped Drakens, he asks several questions concerning the Falcon missile system which, as you know, is of U.S. origin. I have now been able to obtain the following information which addresses points raised by Mr. Tyler on the equipment itself: (a) The Falcon missile system provided to the Swedish Government is a modified version of the U.S. Air Force air-to-air missile, the GAR–11. The modification as furnished, however, continues to provide a capability in excess of that of any known foreign system, including that provided to NATO. The classification of components is Secret and “Very Sensitive” Confidential. The Air Force advises, in addition, that further modification of the system is not technically feasible without negating the basic capability of the equipment. (b) Air Force intelligence advises, moreover, that the Soviet Union utilizes an air-to-air missile system which is inferior to that provided to the Swedes. Accordingly, compromise of this equipment would contribute to Soviet air defense state-of-the-art. Access to its componentry and technical data would, as well, provide the Soviets with the means for devising a system to counter current U.S. Air Force air-to-air missile capabilities. The Air Force conclusion that release of the Falcon missile to Finland would be harmful to U.S. interests is inter alia predicated on the fact that both the Swedish HM–55 and the U.S. GAR–11 contain advanced technology currently unique to Western equipment. Although the above solely seeks to address equipment sensitivity, necessarily, concern with respect to the Finnish security system has the most direct relevance in the premises. Should the Department consider it to be sufficiently worthwhile, I can arrange for the US–MICC to assess the capability of the Finnish security program to protect U.S.-origin classified equipment and information. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 FIN–SWE. Secret. 2 A copy of the memorandum is ibid. 208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland 208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland 1 Washington, March 12, 1965, 12:13 p.m. 284. Following based on uncleared memcon. 2 FYI. Noforn. During call on Secretary today Finnish Ambassador Munkki conveyed on “instructions highest authority” assurance Kekkonen Feb 24 speech 3 did not indicate any change Finnish foreign policy. Munkki added following points: 1. Shortness of time precluded Kekkonen elaborating on remarks. Concentrated form thus allows some people read things into speech which not there. 2. Kekkonen did not intend go beyond Swedish and Norwegian position on MLF. All Scandinavians anxious about any innovation that increases tension. 3. Kekkonen had to note that, without regard intrinsic aspects MLF, Soviets attacked plan on two occasions (presumably Mikoyan speeches in Helsinki and Moscow) strongly indicating establishment MLF would increase tensions. 4. Absolutely no connection between Kekkonen speech and FCP–CPSU meeting Moscow. FCP has no influence over GOF policy. Secretary replied we know beyond doubt that MLF cannot lead to nuclear proliferation or placement nuclear weapons under German national control. If this is genuine Soviet fear it will prove groundless and we will help explain this to USSR when details MLF worked out. If real Soviet objection is to MLF as move binding NATO powers more closely together, we unable to be of help. Secretary continued that MLF, like other NATO measures and unlike Warsaw Pact military measures, has been subject free and open discussion. Referred to stationing Soviet missiles in Warsaw Pact countries as possible Soviet version MLF which accomplished in secrecy and without open discussion. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 FIN. Confidential. Drafted by Barr, approved in BNA, and cleared by Creel. Repeated to Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Moscow, and Paris for USRO. 2 A copy of the memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL 7 US/RUSK. 3 In his speech, Kekkonen stated that the proposed NATO Multilateral Force (MLF) would endanger peace, and expressed Finnish concern about the plan. 209. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 209. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Helsinki, June 1, 1966, 2248Z. 2 Secto 11. 1. At Secretary's meeting with President Kekkonen June 1 President stated emphatically that there would be no change in Finnish foreign policy as result elections and formation new government. He added that election results had surprised victors and defeated alike and suggested that regardless of exaggerated promises made by Social Democrats in course of election campaign no substantial change in prospect with respect economic and social policies since resources simply not available for expansion of social expenditures. He mentioned in this connection continuing Finnish balance of payments problem. 2. Secretary told President that in conversations with Prime Minister Paasio and FonMin Karjalainen he had stressed President Johnson's concern with need for expanded world food production by all countries in effort meet growing world needs. He had also discussed our concern with success of Kennedy Round. In this connection Secretary pointed out that unless there is some progress by February it will be very difficult to obtain Congressional approval for extension of Trade Expansion Act. Secretary said we had been working hard with EEC countries who were key to problem. Unless we are able to take step forward we are in danger of going backward. President Kennedy had made far reaching decision in seeking and obtaining legislative authority represented by Trade Expansion Act. Congressional disillusionment and rising protectionist sentiment could produce reaction none of us wants. Kekkonen, while expressing general agreement with importance of progress of Kennedy Round negotiations remarked that six months is a short period in which to achieve results. Secretary replied that the EEC countries have been marking time for the past four years. 3. The Secretary asked for Kekkonen's comments on the new leadership in the Sov Union. Kekkonen replied that he had had a warm personal relationship with Khrushchev but noted, approvingly, that the new Sov leaders appeared disposed to follow a calm, practical and unsentimental foreign policy. He said that Viet Nam and Germany are two preoccupations of the Sov leaders. So far as Viet Nam is concerned the Sov Union may be not unpleased with current United States involvement but concerned that it might expand and involve them. He thought that Sov concern about Germany is somewhat less acute now that the prospect of MLF seems to have receded. 4. The Secretary in discussing Viet Nam reviewed our efforts to persuade the other side to come to the conference table and the efforts which we have made to this end with Moscow, Hanoi and Peking and in virtually all world capitals. He also referred to the lack of positive response to our two bombing pauses. We are still ready to negotiate but at the same time we remain faithful to our commitments and will not be pushed out of Southeast Asia. If the aggressor rejects peace we are prepared to do what is required. 5. The Secretary suggested that in his opinion a sound position for a non-aligned or neutral country to adopt is support for a settlement on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements 3 and for differences regarding these agreements to be resolved peacefully rather than by force. 6. Kekkonen said Finland has been in close touch with the other Scandinavian countries and is mindful that there may come a time when some initiative will be helpful in promoting a settlement of the Viet Nam problem. He indicated that in his view that time has not yet come. 7. Amb Llewellyn Thompson referred to the recent purges in Communist China and asked whether the Finnish Ambassador in Peking had submitted an analysis of the significance of these developments. Kekkonen replied that there had been no detailed report from the Finnish Ambassador as yet. He added that the Ambassador, who is a particularly able observer, believes the Sino-Sov dispute has now passed the point of no return. In this connection he noted that in his previous discussions with the Soviet leaders they had avoided commenting on the Sov differences with Communist China. On his last visit to Moscow, however, Brezhnev, in response to his question, said that Sino-Soviet government relations were bad and party relations broken. Kekkonen told the Secretary that Kosygin will be visiting Finland from June 13 until June 18. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret. Repeated to Copenhagen, Moscow, Olso, Reykjavik, and Stockholm. 2 Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 Reference is to the July 1954 Geneva Accords and the Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos, signed at Geneva on July 23, 1962. 210. Memorandum of Conversation 210. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 12, 1966, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT General Discussion PARTICIPANTS Olavi Munkki, Ambassador of Finland Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary, EUR Ross Titus, Finnish Affairs Ambassador Munkki reported that, from the Finnish point of view, the Secretary's recent trip to Finland (May 31–June 2) was a complete success. The discussions between the Secretary and President Kekkonen, as well as members of the newly formed coalition government, were useful and friendly even if the principals did not agree in detail on everything. The Ambassador did not dwell on the Kosygin visit to Finland (June 13–18) since Foreign Minister Karjalainen reported fully on the visit to Ambassador Tyler Thompson on June 27. 2 When Mr. Stoessel noted that the cancellation of Kosygin's visit to Sweden and Polyansky's early return to Moscow from Ottawa apparently was caused by the need to deal with the continuing Warsaw Pact problems and the early August session of the Supreme Soviet, the Ambassador observed that Polyansky was, in his opinion, a “coming man.” He expressed surprise that Kosygin dealt with unusual frankness with the Peking-Moscow rift during his press conference in Helsinki, when he admitted that relations were very bad and that party relations were non-existent. In reply to Mr. Stoessel's question about the real significance of the Kosygin visit to Finland, Mr. Munkki described it simply as a confirmation of the amicable relations which have characterized the recent relations of the two countries. Ambassador Munkki put the best possible light on the participation of Communists in the Finnish Government for the first time since 1948. As he had predicted just before leaving Washington on May 25 (government formed May 27) the three Communist-front SKDL members received non-critical positions in the Finance, Social Affairs, and Transport and Public Works Ministries. They thus will have to deal with such unpleasant problems as civil service wage policy and with price administration. The representation of the SKDL in the Cabinet also gives added security of tenure to a government which will have to undertake some unpopular measures. Mr. Stoessel noted that President Kekkonen had visited Norway shortly after the Kosygin visit, but the Ambassador offered no further information than that it was a successful fishing trip. Replying to the Ambassador's inquiry about the Brussels Ministerial Meeting, Mr. Stoessel reviewed briefly the decisions taken at this meeting. He noted the continuing interest here, as well as among our NATO partners, in increased contacts with Eastern Europe. He confirmed that the idea of a European Security Conference, such as the Danes had suggested, had been rejected by the other NATO members as premature and that apparently De Gaulle had reacted coolly to a similar proposal made during his visit to Moscow. Ambassador Munkki agreed that such a conference would not be fruitful in the absence of more concrete advance plans to solve the present division of Europe. In his opinion, matters would improve if the West German Social Democrats got a larger voice in Bonn. He added that President Kekkonen and Foreign Minister Karjalainen were very unhappy over West German Defense Minister Von Hassel's recent comment that the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance (1948) 3 was only an amicable agreement without obligations. The Ambassador said that there is much pessimism in Finland over the prospects for the Kennedy Round, particularly over the intransigence of the Six. For Finland, he said, the big question is paper and pulp. Finland, of course, accepts the principles of the Kennedy Round but feels that it must have some of its own interests recognized, at least in matters affecting pulp and paper. Mr. Munkki noted, perhaps prematurely, he said, that Finnair President Korhonen will be negotiating with Douglas Aircraft Co. for the purchase of two of the “stretched” DC–8's, with an option for a third, costing about $20 million altogether. If the sale can be arranged the first plane would be delivered in 1968 and the second in 1969. Unfortunately, the news of Finnair's interest in the DC–8 leaked to the press and the British already have started their sales offensive for the Super VC–10. This will make for a touchy situation for, although Finnair prefers the enlarged DC–8, the British are willing to use Finland's export surplus with Britain as a lever to develop sales of the VC–10. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FIN–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Titus. The meeting was held in Stoessel's office. 2 Reported in telegram 489 from Helsinki, June 27. (Ibid., POL 7 USSR) 3 For text, see 48 UNTS 149. 211. Memorandum of Conversation 211. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 29, 1968, noon. SUBJECT Review of Current European Situation and US-Finnish Relations PARTICIPANTS Ambassador of Finland, Olavi Munkki Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy Finnish Country Officer, Eugene Klebenov Ambassador Munkki said that he had requested the meeting because he planned to leave Washington for a vacation in the Caribbean and Finland, and would be away until the first of the year. The Ambassador said that he had conveyed his Government's views on European economic integration to Deputy Assistant Secretary Greenwald during his November 12 meeting. 2 Turning to the recent EFTA Ministerial Meeting, 3 the Ambassador said that Finland was ready to discuss a relationship between EFTA and the EC, but that the Finnish Government wanted to make clear its view that any agreement reached must be in accord with the GATT. The Ambassador said that his Government did not find the French proposal interesting, particularly as it did not include paper. The Ambassador summarized the Finnish attitude as cooperative but reserved. He noted that the Swiss appeared to be the most eager on this matter. The Ambassador said that, after the Brussels NATO Ministerial Meeting, 4 there had been a considerable amount of concern in Finland because of press speculation that had placed Finland in the “grey area.” The Ambassador noted that the Moscow press was now writing on this topic. Mr. Leddy told the Ambassador that all of the NATO governments are aware of Finland's sensitivities in this regard. He agreed that the press speculation, both here and in Europe, had been less than helpful. He noted that the Bonn release had also proven detrimental. The USSR, he observed, was particularly sensitive to this sort of statement. Mr. Leddy stressed that great care had been taken in the drafting of the NATO communiqué to avoid the sort of misinterpretation in which some sectors of the press were now indulging. Ambassador Munkki said that he wished to express his appreciation for the assurances given his Embassy by EUR/SCAN to the effect that, newspaper speculation to the contrary, there was little cause for Finland's fear that it had been placed in the “grey area” at the Brussels NATO meeting. Notwithstanding such formal assurances, the Ambassador said that Foreign Minister Karjalainen had asked if he could have a transcript or summary of the Secretary's address in Brussels. Mr. Leddy told the Ambassador that he did not think it would be possible to provide the Foreign Minister with a text of the Secretary's NATO address. He said that he would, however, discuss the matter with the Secretary and, if the latter agreed, give Ambassador Munkki an oral statement that might be helpful to him. The Ambassador then raised the matter of the interview given by Herman Kahn on French television, in which Mr. Kahn, President of the Hudson Institute, stated that the United States had withdrawn its protection from Finland and had, in effect, dropped Finland off the map. The Ambassador asked what, if any, were Mr. Kahn's connections with the State Department. Mr. Leddy said that he would attempt to get the text of Mr. Kahn's remarks and that, subsequently, he might be able to comment on this matter. Ambassador Munkki next informed Mr. Leddy that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is now before the Finnish Parliament. Approval, he said, is expected before Christmas. Mr. Leddy, in reply to the Ambassador's question about U.S. ratification, said that he did not know if there would be a special session of the Senate. The treaty would, he said, be the Senate's first order of business when it did convene. 5 Both the President-elect and the Senate leadership place high importance on the treaty. There was no doubt but that the treaty would be approved by a large majority. The Soviet Union will not, he said, move on this matter until the United States acts. Mr. Leddy explained that, while there was very little debate involved in Soviet approval, the USSR appears to like to maintain a sort of parity in such matters, as they did when they matched our delay in ratifying the consular convention. In reply to the Ambassador's question about the Balkan situation, Mr. Leddy said that we had no information at present that would lead us to anticipate any new developments in this area. Mr. Leddy said that the Yugoslavians are still quite concerned. Mr. Leddy noted that the recent Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact and the reported Romanian agreement to allow maneuvers in their country next year may have served to satisfy the USSR. Mr. Leddy, in reply to a question from the Ambassador, said that the recent Dobrynin protest to Mr. Katzenbach, concerning NATO and the Mediterranean, was not surprising. 6 The protest consisted of the usual Russian arguments; i.e., why does the U.S. maintain a fleet far from home in the Mediterranean, etc. We do not, Mr. Leddy noted, attach too much importance to such protests. The Ambassador noted that Dobrynin appears ready to return home. He had, the Ambassador said, asked the Finns about shipping facilities for household goods. As the meeting ended, Mr. Leddy said that we would be communicating with the Ambassador during the coming week concerning the Foreign Minister's request for a copy of the Secretary's NATO address and the Herman Kahn interview. 7 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FIN–US. Confidential. Drafted by Klebenov. The meeting was held in Leddy's office. 2 No memorandum of conversation was found. 3 The meeting was held in Vienna November 21–22. 4 The NAC Ministerial Meeting was held November 15–16. For text of the NATO declaration, see Department of State Bulletin , December 9, 1968, pp. 595–597. 5 The Senate approved the treaty on March 13, 1969. For text, see 21 UST 483. 6 Documentation regarding the Soviet protest is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XIV . 7 The pertinent passage of the Kahn interview (taped in New York by BBC and the French Television Service, ORTF) was obtained December 3 and passed to the Ambassador. In addition, Amembassy Helsinki was instructed to tell the Foreign Office that Mr. Kahn is not an official of this Government and that his occasional service as a DOD consult-ant does not mean that his views reflect American military policy thinking. A partial text of the Kahn interview is attached. [Footnote in the source text. The text is not printed. In his interview Kahn stated: “For example, if the Russians attacked Finland, I would be surprised if the Americans intervened. We have crossed the country off the map.”] Index Index Adenauer, Konrad, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] Aeroflot, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 92 ] Africa, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] Agnew, Spiro, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 133 ] Agrimpex, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] Albania ( see also Albania and Albanian subheadings under other subjects ), 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] Austria, relations with, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] Bulgaria, relations with, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 197 ] China, People's Republic of, relations with, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] economic situation, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] independent course of, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 26 ] Romania, relations with, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 197 ] United States, relations with, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] Yugoslavia, relations with, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 185 ] Albee, Edward, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] Aleksandrov (USSR journalist), 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 65 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 65 ] Algeria, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] Aluminum, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 105 ] Anderson, Eugenie, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 27 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 31 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] Andrews, Nicholas G., 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 176 ] Anti-Semitism, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] Arab-Israeli War, June 1967 (Six-Day War) (seealso Middle East conflict ), 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] Arms control ( see also Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ), 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 120 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 142 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. (ACDA), 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 75 ] Artola, Maj. Gen., 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 206 ] Asian Development Bank, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 526 n [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Atlantic Nuclear Force ( see also Multilateral Force ; North Atlantic Treaty Organizatio n ), 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 120 ] Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] Atlas, Liane W., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] Atoms for Peace. See Nuclear energy. Auschwitz, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 124 ] Austria ( see also Austria and Austrian subheadings under other subjects ), 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] Albania, relations with, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] Bulgaria, relations with, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] Czechoslovakia, relations with, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] Eastern Europe, relations with, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 201 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 201 ] European Economic Community, relations with, 526 n [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 200 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 201 ] foreign policy of, 526 n [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] France, relations with, 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 202 ] Hungary, relations with, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] Italy, relations with, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Poland, relations with, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] political parties: Communist Party, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 173 ] Socialist Party, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 200 ] Romania, relations with, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Soviet invasion, threat of, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 204 ] British position, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 23 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 204 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 204 ] French position, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 23 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 204 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 204 ] U.S. position, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 23 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 202 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 204 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 204 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 200 ] United Kingdom, relations with, 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 202 ] U.S. draft and nationals of, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] Yugoslavia, relations with, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Austrian State Treaty, May 1955, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 23 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 204 ] Babic, Gen., 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] Baker, John A., 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] Balaceanu, Petre, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Balcar, Jaromir, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] Balkan Pact, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 24 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] Balkan region ( see also individual countries ), 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 197 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] Ball, George W.: Czechoslovakia, 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] Poland, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 116 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 117 ] Romania, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] Barber, Arthur W., 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Barcs, Sandor, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] Barr, Brady G., 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 548 n [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] Baschiru (Romania), 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Bashev, Ivan K., 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 27 ] -122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 31 ] -126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Batjer, Helene A., 178 n [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 245 n [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] Bator, Francis M., 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 125 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 157 ] Battle, Lucius D., 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 35 ] Bavaria, 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 204 ] Bayne, Gen., 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] Beam, Jacob D., 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] -173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] Beaudry, Robert M., 80 n [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 450 n [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Beigel, Edgar J., 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Belcher, Page, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] Belgium, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] Benes, Eduard, 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 99 ] Berlin, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] Czech policy toward, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] German Democratic Republic position, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 26 ] Soviet invasion, threat of, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 93 ] British position, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] French position, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 25 ] U.S. position, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 202 ] -537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 204 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 204 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Soviet policy toward, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 26 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 76 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] U.S.-Soviet relations over, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 90 ] Bernat, Erno, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 110 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] Berne Copyright Union, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] Bessarabia, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] Bidzinski, Zbigniew, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 116 ] Binder, David, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] Birecki (Poland), 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] Birladeanu, Alexandru, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] Black Sea, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 23 ] Bled Treaty, Aug. 1954, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 24 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Bloomfield, Alexander, 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] Blough, Roger, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] Blueye, Henrietta, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 115 ] Bodnaras, Emil, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 139 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 154 ] Boeing Aircraft Corp., 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 50 ] Bogdan, Corneliu, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 163 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 174 ] -468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 174 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] -70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 75 ] Czechoslovakia, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 163 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe, threat of, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] -75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] Bosnia-Herzegovina, 486 n [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 183 ] Bow, Frank T., 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 18 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] Brandt, Willy, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] Bratislava Declaration, Aug. 1968, 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 196 ] Brazil, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 66 ] Brezhnev, Leonid I., 29 n [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 26 ] -110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] appointment as First Secretary, 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Soviet pressure on Dubcek government, 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 65 ] visits: Czechoslovakia, Dec. 1967, 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Poland, Jan. 1968, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] Romania, May 1966, 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] Brezhnev, Mrs., 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] Brezhnev Doctrine, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 204 ] Bridge Building. See United States, relations with under Eastern Europe and individual countries . Briggs, Ellis O., 204 n [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 66 ] British Broadcasting Company (BBC), 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 555 n [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 211 ] Brosio, Manlio, 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] Brown, Harold, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 75 ] Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Bucharest Declaration on European Security, July 1966, 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Buell, William A., Jr., 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Buffum, William B., 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] Bulgaria ( see also Bulgaria and Bulgarian subheadings under other subjects ), 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] agreements with the U.S. ( see also trade with the U.S.; United States, relations with below): Claims Agreement, Sofia, July 1963, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 29 ] Consular Relations Convention, Apr. 1963, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 27 ] Consular Relations Convention, proposed, 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 35 ] Albania, relations with, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 197 ] Austria, relations with, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] Belgium, relations with, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] economic situation, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] France, relations with, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 36 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] gold, Nazi-looted, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 63 ] Greece, relations with, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 35 ] independence of, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 10 ] Italy, relations with, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 36 ] Japan, relations with, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] liberalization, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 32 ] -129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] military coup plot, 1965, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] Romania, relations with, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] Soviet invasion of Romania from, threat of, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 169 ] Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia from, threat of, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 23 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 23 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 31 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 158 ] Spain, relations with, 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 33 ] spy trials, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 27 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 27 ] trade with the U.S. ( see also United States, relations with below ), 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] agricultural commodities, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 28 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 29 ] most-favored-nation status, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Plovdiv fair, participation in, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 135 n [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 36 ] wines, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 115 ] Turkey, relations with, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 35 ] U.N. technical aid to, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] United Kingdom, relations with, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 31 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 33 ] United States, relations with ( see also agreements with the U.S.; trade with the U.S. above ), 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 29 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 31 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] attacks on U.S. Legation, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 27 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] -120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 30 ] claims settlements, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] cultural exchanges, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 29 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] -136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 33 ] Yugoslavia, relations with, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] Bundy, McGeorge, 17 n [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] Eastern Europe, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Hungary, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 104 ] Romania, 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Yugoslavia, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Burchinal, Lt. Gen. David A., 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 22 ] Bureau of the Budget, U.S., 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 17 ] Cabot, John, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Cambodia, 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Campbell, John C., 190 n [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] Canada, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] Captive Nations Week, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] Carinthia (U.S. military attache),527 Castro, Fidel, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] Catholic Church ( see also Vatican), 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Ceausescu, Nicolae, 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 26 ] -105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 170 ] independence of Romania, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 173 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] U.S.-Romanian relations, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] -426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 169 ] visit to Prague, Aug. 1968, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] Celac, Sergiu, 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 169 ] -458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Czechoslovakia, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] documents: “Nationalism in Eastern Europe,” 2–8 Special Memorandum No. 10–65, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] Soviet economic situation, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] U.S. radio broadcasting to Eastern Europe, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 17 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 17 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] Cernik, Oldrich, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 256 n [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 203 ] Chernev (Bulgaria), 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 27 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 27 ] Chervonenko, Stepan Vasilevich, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 65 ] Childs, Marquis, 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] China, People's Republic of ( see also Sino-Soviet dispute; China, People's Republic of subheadings under other subjects ), 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] independent course of, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] international communist meetingson, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] nuclear weapons, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 120 ] representation in the U.N., 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] Soviet Union, economic relations with, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] United States, relations with, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157 ] U.S. policy toward, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] China, Republic of, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] Chou En-lai, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] Christian, George, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] Christiano, Joseph F., 174 n [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] Cierna meeting, 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 79 ] Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 45 ] Civil aviation, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] Clark, Ramsey, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 132 ] Cleveland, Harlan, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 93 ] Clifford, Clark, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] -251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 93 ] Cline, Ray, 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 150 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 150 ] Colclaser, H. Alberta, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] COMECON, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] Commerce, U.S. Department of, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 174 n [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 144 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 162 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 28 ] -116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] -380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 144 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 187 ] Common Market. See European Economic Community (EEC). Communism ( see also Communist Parties under individual countries ): China, People's Republic of, view of, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] Eastern European view of, 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 124 ] international conferences, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 190 ] role of small countries, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] -12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Romanian view of, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] Soviet view of, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] Western European parties, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 24 ] Yugoslav style, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 183 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 183 ] -491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 183 ] Computers, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] Congo, Republic of, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 178 ] Congress, U.S. ( see also House of Representatives, U.S.; Senate, U.S.): acts of: Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480), 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 178 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 180 ] Battle Act, 1951, 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 150 ] -412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 150 ] East-West Trade bill, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 153 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] Export-Import Bank Authorization, 1968, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 188 ] Food for Peace Extension, 1966, 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 182 ] Foreign Assistance Act, 1963, 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 116 ] Foreign Assistance Act, 1968, 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 134 ] Johnson Debt Default Act, 1934, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 122 ] Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, 153 n [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 209 ] Austria, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] Bulgaria, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 29 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Cuba, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 187 ] Czechoslovakia, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] most-favored-nation status for, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] Eastern Europe, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] -19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 6 ] U.S. radio broadcasts to, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] U.S. trade with, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] Fiat guarantees, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 156 ] Hungary, 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] Poland, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] most-favored-nation status for, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 135 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Romania, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] Vietnam conflict, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 187 ] Yugoslavia, 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] agricultural commodities, 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 182 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 182 ] Connor, John T., 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Convention of Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, Paris, Oct. 1954, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 128 ] Coordinating Committee (COCOM), 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 150 ] Costalanski, Paul J., 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] Cotton, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 28 ] Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] Bulgarian role in, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] Czech position, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] Eastern European position, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Romanian role in, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 141 ] -388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 173 ] Soviet control of, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 10 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 26 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 26 ] U.S. position, 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 26 ] Yugoslav role in, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 23 ] Council of Europe, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] Crawford, William A., 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 139 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] Creel, Robert C., 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 548 n [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] Crnobrnja, Bogdan, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 186 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 192 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] -513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Croatia, 486 n [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Croitoru, Mihai, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Crump, John E., 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 204 ] Csala, Andrew, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 112 ] -316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 115 ] Cuba, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 186 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 187 ] Cuban Airlines, 157 n [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 40 ] Czapla, Gen., 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 136 ] Czechoslovakia ( see also Slovakia; Czechoslovakia and Czech subheadings under other subjects ), 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] agreements with the U.S. ( see also trade with the U.S.; United States, relations with below): Air Transport Services Agreement, Jan. 1946, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 45 ] Air Transport Services Agreement, Feb. 1969, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 40 ] -158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 55 ] Consular Convention, 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 55 ] Economic and Financial Agreement, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 37 ] Extradition Treaty, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] Financial Claims Agreement, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 43 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] -174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] Surplus Property Agreement, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] anti-Semitism in, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] Austria, relations with, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] China, People's Republic, of, relations with, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] Cuba, relations with, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] Czech dollar bonds, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] democratic tradition in, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 10 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 10 ] Dubcek government, 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 55 ] U.S. relations with, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 99 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] Soviet pressure on, 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 76 ] -232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 203 ] economic situation, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] ethnic groups: Czechs, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] Hungarians, 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 114 ] Jews, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] Slovaks, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 24 ] -96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 57 ] -189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 99 ] foreign aid program of, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] France, relations with, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 41 ] French invasion, threat of, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 71 ] German Democratic Republic, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, possible military intervention in, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 71 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] -149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] liberalization, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] Action Program, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 99 ] Bulgarian position, 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] economic reforms, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 32 ] -129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] German Democratic Republic position, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] Hungarian position, 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Polish position, 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Soviet position, 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 73 ] 2000 Words declaration, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 65 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 65 ] U.S. position, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 99 ] political situation, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] British position, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 53 ] Italian position, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 53 ] Novotny resignation, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 186 n [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] student demonstration, Oct. 31, 1967, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 53 ] Radio Free Europe role in, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 17 ] Soviet invasion: Austrian position, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 203 ] Belgian position, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 67 ] British position, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] -208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 92 ] Bulgarian position, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 35 ] -145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] Czech position, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 56 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 97 ] Dobrynin's message on, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 80 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] Eastern Europe, effect on, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] -82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 26 ] -109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 90 ] French position, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92 ] German-U.S. consultations on, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 61 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 86 ] Hungarian position, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 114 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 115 ] Italian position, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 67 ] NATO discussions of, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 60 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] -209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 92 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] Netherlands position, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 67 ] Polish role in, 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 135 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 137 ] Romanian position, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 163 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] Soviet position, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 26 ] -104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 26 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 80 ] -238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 87 ] -256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, effect on, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] troop maneuvers, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 73 ] U.N. actions regarding, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 66 ] -207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 170 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] U.S. position, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 24 ] -96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] -194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 71 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] -249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 87 ] -256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] -278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 165 ] -453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 195 ] Yugoslav position, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] -514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 196 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 76 ] -232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] bilateral aid agreement, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] trade, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 50 ] trade with the U.S., 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 21 ] aircraft, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 56 ] Brno Fair, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92 ] export licensing, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] machinery, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 37 ] -147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] most-favored-nation status, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 39 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 58 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 99 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 99 ] trade with the West, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 43 ] United Kingdom, relations with, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 50 ] -176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 58 ] United States, relations with ( see also agreements with the U.S.; trade with the U.S. above), 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] arrest of U.S. citizens, 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] British position, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 37 ] charter air service, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 45 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] CIA role in, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] claims settlement, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] -161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] cultural and scientific exchanges, 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 51 ] Czech position, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] extradition of Gen. Sejna, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 63 ] French position, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 37 ] gold, Nazi-looted, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 99 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] Social Security payments to Czech residents, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] travel restrictions, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 39 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] -161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] U.S. military intervention in, possible, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 71 ] Vatican, relations with, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Yugoslavia, relations with, 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Czechoslovak State Airlines (CSA), 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 50 ] David, Vaclav, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 63 ] Davis, Nathaniel, Jr., 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] Davis, Nathaniel, Sr., 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 31 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 128 n [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 137 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Davis, Richard H., 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 37 ] -147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] -426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] De Beaumarchais, Jacques, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] De Seabra, A. Jose, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] De Gaulle, Charles, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] De Martino, John J., 436 n [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 173 ] Dean, Jonathan, 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] Debre, Michel, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 25 ] Defense, U.S. Department of, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 555 n [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 211 ] Eastern Europe, Soviet invasion of, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] Finnish aircraft purchases, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 206 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 85 ] Democratic Party Convention, Chicago, 1968, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 75 ] -222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] Denmark, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Denney, George C., Jr., 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 9 ] Detente ( see also agreements with the U.S.; United States, relations with under Soviet Union), 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] -194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 67 ] -209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] Diaconescu, Georghe, 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] Dirksen, Everett M., 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 74 ] Disarmament. See Arms control. Djilas, Milovan, 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 183 ] -492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 183 ] Dobrosielski, Marian, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 117 ] Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 23 ] -86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 204 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 211 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 79 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] -249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 87 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 165 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 192 ] Dodd, Thomas J., 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Dominican Republic, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 178 ] Domino theory, 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Douglas Aircraft Corp., 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] -175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Drozniak, Edward, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 117 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Dubcek, Alexander, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 99 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 114 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 87 ] -256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 170 ] Soviet pressure on, 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 76 ] -232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 203 ] U.S. view of, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 66 ] Yugoslav-Czech relations, 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 190 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Duckwitz, Georg F., 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 61 ] Duda, Karel, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] gold, Nazi-looted, 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] political situation in Czechoslovakia, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 56 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] U.S.-Czech relations, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 37 ] -147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 39 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] -161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Duke, Angier Biddle, 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 201 ] Dulles, John Foster, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] Eastern Europe ( see also individual countries ), 526 n [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Austria, relations with, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 201 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 201 ] cultural exchanges with the West, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 12 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] economic reform, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] economic situation, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 139 ] foreign aid programs of, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] German Democratic Republic isolation from, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] German unification, effect of, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] instability in: French position, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] U.S. planning for, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] liberalization in: British position, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] Canadian position, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] historical background of, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 10 ] Netherlands position, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] Norwegian position, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] Soviet policy, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 10 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] U.S. position, 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 38 ] Soviet economic sanctions on, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] Soviet invasion of, possible: British position, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 22 ] French position, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 22 ] Soviet position, 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] U.N. diplomatic role in, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] U.S. position, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] -75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 192 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] -82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 26 ] -109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] United States, relations with, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 12 ] -51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 39 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 155 ] civil aviation, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 12 ] disaster relief, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 12 ] French position, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 122 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 8 ] intelligence gathering, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 9 ] radio broadcasting, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] shipping, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 12 ] -46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 12 ] trade, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] -19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 153 ] travel, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 12 ] U.S. policy, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 8 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 195 ] Vatican, relations with, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 103 ] Western Europe, relations with, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 12 ] Western policy toward, 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 12 ] Eaton, Cyrus, Jr., 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 138 ] Ecumenical Council, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Edelsberg, Herman, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 134 ] Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC), 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 142 ] Eisenhower, Dwight D., 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 80 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 80 ] Elbrick, C. Burke, 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 175 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 180 ] -482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 187 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 196 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 197 ] Espionage trials, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Ethiopia, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 66 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] European Economic Community (EEC), 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 211 ] Austria, relations with, 526 n [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 200 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 200 ] British membership in, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 200 ] Commission on East-West Relations, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 12 ] French position, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 200 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 200 ] Ministerial meeting, Vienna, Nov. 1968, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 211 ] European security, 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 174 ] European Security Conference, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 123 ] -343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] European Steel Community, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 10 ] European unity, 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 196 ] Export Control Review Board, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Export controls, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] Export-Import Bank, 174 n [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] Bulgaria, 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] Czechoslovakia, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 59 ] Hungary, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] Romania, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] -401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] U.S. position, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 125 ] Yugoslavia, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 188 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 194 ] Falcon missiles, 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 206 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 207 ] Farbstein, Leonard, 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 134 ] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 182 ] Feldman, Myer, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 134 ] Ferguson, Allen R., 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 40 ] Findley, Paul, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 181 ] -482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 181 ] Finland ( see also Finland and Finnish subheadings under other subjects ): foreign policy of, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 209 ] political parties: Communist Party, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 210 ] Social Democrats (SKDL), 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 210 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Sweden, relations with, 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 206 ] -546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 206 ] United Kingdom, relations with, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] U.S. aircraft sales, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, 1948, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Fino, Paul A., 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 188 ] Firestone Rubber Co., 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 153 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] Fisher, Adrian, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 75 ] Fisher, Jack, 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] Fock, Jeno, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 112 ] Foley, Arthur D., 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Ford Foundation, 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] Foster, William C., 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 75 ] Fowler, Henry H., 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 93 ] France ( see also France and French subheadings under other subjects), 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 211 ] Communist Party, 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] United Kingdom, relations with, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 200 ] United States, relations with, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] Frankel, Max, 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 122 ] Freeman, Orville L., 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 139 ] French Television Service (ORTF), 555 n [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 211 ] Fulbright, J. William, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 63 ] Fulbright agreements, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 12 ] Galbraith, John Kenneth, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] Galdau children, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] Gaston-Marin, Gheorghe, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 141 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] Geamanu, Grigore, 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Austria, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 200 ] Czechoslovakia, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] Eastern Europe, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] Finland, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 211 ] Hungary, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] Poland, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 135 ] -370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 138 ] Romania, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] U.S. position, 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 209 ] Yugoslavia, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] General Electric Co., 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] Geneva Accords, July 1954, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] Geneva Accords on Laos, July 1962, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] Geneva Conferences: Disarmament, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 142 ] Southeast Asia, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] Georgia, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] Georgiev, Ivan-Asen, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 113 n [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 27 ] Gerasimov, Luben, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] German Democratic Republic, 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] Communist Party plenum, Feb. 1964, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] Czechoslovakia, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Eastern Europe, isolation from, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] economic situation, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 126 ] -352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] Hungary, relations with, 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] liberalization: economic reforms, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 32 ] Soviet position, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 76 ] U.S. position, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] Poland, relations with, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 126 ] -352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] political situation, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] -7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] refugees, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] renunciation of force agreements, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 130 ] revolution, 1953, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] Soviet invasion, threat of: British position, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] French position, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] German Federal Republic position, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] U.S. position, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 21 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] -278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 190 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] United States, relations with, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 8 ] German unification, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] Eastern European fear of, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 99 ] Polish position, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 120 ] -335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 128 ] Romanian position, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 174 ] U.S. position, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] Germany, Federal Republic of ( see also Berlin): border security, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 22 ] German Democratic Republic, relations with, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 126 ] -352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] Inter-Zonal Trade (IZT), 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] nuclear weapons, possession of, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 120 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] political parties: Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] Social Democrats, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] renunciation of force agreements, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 130 ] Soviet invasion of Austria, effect of, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 23 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94 ] Soviet policy, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 26 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] United States, relations with, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 153 ] U.S. radio broadcasting from, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] Gero, Erno, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] Gheorghiu, Iosef, 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 175 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 175 ] Gierek, Edward, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 138 ] Ginsburgh, Robert, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 71 ] Givan, Walter F., 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] Glass, L.C., 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 154 ] Glassboro (N.J.) summit, U.S.-Soviet, June 1967, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 79 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 186 ] Glenn, Edmund S., 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Gligorov, Kiro, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 194 ] -520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] Gold, Nazi-looted: British position, 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 99 ] Bulgarian claims for, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 63 ] Czech claims for, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 99 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] French position, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 99 ] Yugoslav claims for, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 63 ] Goldberg, Arthur, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Goldblat (Poland), 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 137 ] economic situation in Poland, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] political situation in Poland, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 133 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 138 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Soviet-Polish relations, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 137 ] U.S.-Polish relations, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] visit to France, postponement of, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 136 ] Gomulka Plan, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 124 ] Goodyear Rubber Co., 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] Gore, Albert, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] Governments-in-exile, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] Grechko, Marshal Andrei A., 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] Greece, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Greenewalt, Crawford, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] Greenwald, Joseph A., 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 211 ] Griffith, William, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Gromyko, Andrei, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 197 ] Gronouski, John A., 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 125 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 132 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Group of Nine, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] Grozev, Gero, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 31 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 33 ] Gruber, Karl, 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 200 ] Gruening, Ernest, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 125 ] Haberer, Jean-Yves, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Haider, Michael, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] Hajek, Jiri, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 63 ] Hallstein Doctrine, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 8 ] Halusa, Arno, 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 204 ] Harmel, Pierre C., 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] Harmel Report, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 130 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 75 ] Czechoslovakia, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] Hungary, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 113 ] Romania, 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 142 ] -395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] Yugoslavia, 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 186 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] Hayes, John S., 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Haymerle, Heinrich, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] Hazi (Hungary), 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 112 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 112 ] Health, Education and Welfare, U.S. Department of, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 35 ] Helms, Richard, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 18 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 93 ] Henry, David H., 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] Henry, William, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 188 ] Hillenbrand, Martin J., 313 n [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 112 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 113 ] Hinteregger, Gerald, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Ho Chi Minh, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157 ] Hockersmith, F.D., 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Hont, Janos, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] Hornig, Donald F., 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 162 ] Horsey, Outerbridge, II, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 43 ] -163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] House of Representatives, U.S., 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 17 ] Appropriations Committee, 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 188 ] Banking and Currency Committee, 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 50 ] CIA Appropriations Subcommittee, 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] Czechoslovakia, 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] Subcommittee on Europe of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] Houston, Robert B., 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Hughes Aircraft Co., 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] Humphrey, Hubert H., 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 526 n [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Hungary ( see also Hungary and Hungarian subheadings under other subjects ), 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] Austria, relations with, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] China, Peoples Republic of, relations with, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] consular convention with the U.S., 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 112 ] democratic tradition in, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 10 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 10 ] economic situation, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] German Democratic Republic, relations with, 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] jamming of foreign broadcasts, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] liberalization, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 74 ] Mindszenty case, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 113 ] refugees, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] -304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] revolution, 1956, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 114 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 115 ] Soviet invasion of Romania from, threat of, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 169 ] Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia from, threat of, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 23 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 105 ] trade with the U.S., 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 105 ] Budapest International Fair, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 112 ] meat inspection, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 112 ] most-favored-nation status, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 106 ] -306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 115 ] Transylvanian dispute with Romania, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] United States, relations with ( see also trade with the U.S. above), 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 113 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 113 ] attacks on U.S. Legation, 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] claims settlements, 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 112 ] consular problems, 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 102 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 108 ] -310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 112 ] cultural exchanges, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 108 ] -310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 112 ] defection of Hungarian diplomats, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 110 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] Hungarian emigre position, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] -304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] Legation, operation of, 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 112 ] travel restrictions, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 139 ] Vatican, relations with, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Yugoslavia, relations with, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 114 ] Husak, Gustav, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 24 ] Iacobescu (Romania), 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Immigration policies, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 6 ] India, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 183 ] Indonesia, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 157 ] Interior, U.S. Department of, 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] International Air Transport Association (IATA), 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 40 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Eastern European membership in, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] meeting, 1970, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] Yugoslav position, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 195 ] International Business Machines (IBM), 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] International Control Commission (ICC), 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] International General Electric Company, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 139 ] International Media Guarantee (IMG) program, 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 138 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] International Monetary Fund (IMF), 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 117 ] Czechoslovakia, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] Eastern Europe, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] Hungary, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] Romania, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Yugoslavia, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 195 ] Ionita, Col. Ion, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 171 ] Iran, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 150 ] Israel, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] Italy ( see also Italy and Italian subheadings under other subjects ), 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Austria, relations with, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Communist Party, 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] Soviet invasion of Austria, threat of, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 23 ] Izmirliev, Veselin, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Jaffe, Irene B., 361 n [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] Jakobson, Max, 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 206 ] Japan, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 176 ] Jaroszewicz, Piotr, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] Jarring, Gunnar, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] Javits, Jacob, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] Jedrychowski, Stefan, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] Jenkins, Alton L., 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 127 ] Jenkins, Walter E., Jr., 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Jessup, Peter, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] Johnson, Griffith, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Johnson, Lyndon B., 211 n [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] Austria, 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 201 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 201 ] Bulgaria, 123 n [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] Czechoslovakia: Soviet invasion of, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 80 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 90 ] -265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 165 ] -453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] United States, relations with, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 46 ] Eastern Europe, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] liberalization, 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 38 ] United States, relations with, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 39 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] U.S. policy, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 12 ] U.S. radio broadcasting, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 18 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] U.S. trade with, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 153 ] Hungary: Mindszenty case, 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] United States, relations with, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 113 ] Middle East conflict, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Poland, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 125 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 355 n [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 137 ] Romania, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 157 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] -459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 170 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 107 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 177 ] speeches: Oct. 7, 1966, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] Aug. 30, 1968, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 23 ] Vietnam conflict, 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 187 ] visit to the Soviet Union, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 80 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Yugoslavia, 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] -523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] Johnson, Tom, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 248 n [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 22 ] -79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] Jones, Owen T., 299 n [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 104 ] Jordan, 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] Jordan, Charles, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 63 ] Jozan, Sandor, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 110 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] Kadar, Janos, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 201 ] jamming of foreign broadcasts, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] Soviet-Hungarian relations, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 105 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 114 ] U.S.-Hungarian relations, 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 113 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 113 ] Kafka, Franz, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 10 ] Kaganovich, Lazar M., 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Kahn, Herman, 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] -555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 211 ] Kaiser, Herbert, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 127 ] Kallai, Gyula, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 113 ] Kaplan, George R., 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] Karasek, Franz, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Kardelj, Edvard, 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Karjalainen, Ahti, 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 210 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] Karlik (Czechoslovakia), 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 50 ] Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 174 n [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 196 n [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 443 n [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 211 ] Czechoslovakia, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] Poland, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 125 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 132 ] -364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 135 ] Romania, 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe, threat of, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 22 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Yugoslavia, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 180 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 188 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 196 ] -523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] Katzenbach Report, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 17 ] -59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 17 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 18 ] Katz, Julius C., 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Kazan, V.J., 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Kecskemethy, Joseph G., 312 n [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 110 ] Kekkonen, Urho, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Kennan, George F., 18 n [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] Kennedy, John F., 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 139 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 209 ] Kennedy, Robert F., 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 75 ] Kennedy Round. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Khrushchev, Nikita S., 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] Berlin, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 38 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 202 ] Eastern Europe, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 26 ] fall from power of, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 209 ] Albanian position, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] Czech position, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] Polish position, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] Yugoslav position, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Germany, Democratic Republic of, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] Hungary, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 105 ] Romanian view of, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] socialism, concept of, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 76 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 75 ] United Nations, 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 38 ] visits: Czechoslovakia, Aug.–Sept. 1964, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, proposed, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] Hungary, Mar.–Apr. 1964, 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] Romania, Aug. 1963, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Warsaw, 1956, 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Yugoslavia, June 1955, 4 n [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Yugoslavia, Aug.–Sept. 1963 , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Yugoslav-Soviet relations, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 175 ] Khrushchev, Nina, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] Kiesinger, Kurt G., 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 268 n [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] King, Martin Luther, Jr., 534 n [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 201 ] Kirilenko, Andrei P., 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 65 ] Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 207 ] Klaus, Josef, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 201 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Klebenov, Eugene, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 211 ] Klein, David, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Klestil, Thomas, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Klusak, Milan, 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] Kmiecik (Polish jornalist), 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 126 ] Knappstein, Heinrich, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] Knox, M. Gordon, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] Koenig, Cardinal, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Kohler, Foy D., 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] Kolakowski, Prof., 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 124 ] Kolder, Drahomir, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 57 ] Korea, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 157 ] Korean war, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] Korhonen (Finnish businessman), 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Kosygin, Aleksei N., 29 n [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] -226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] appointment as Chairman, 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Poland, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] Romania, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] U.S.-Soviet relations, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 165 ] visit to Finland, June 1966, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Kotschnig, Walter M., 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Koucky (Czechoslovakia), 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 65 ] Kovalev, Sergei, 80 n [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] Krajger, Boris, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 181 ] -482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 181 ] Kranich, Robert H., 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Kreisky, Bruno, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Kriegel (Czechoslovakia), 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 65 ] Krimer, William, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Kutev Ensemble, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 31 ] Kuznetsov, Vasiliy, 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 203 ] Lange, Oscar, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] Laos, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Larsen, Roy, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] Latin America, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] Leddy, John M., 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 252 n [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] Austria, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 200 ] Czechoslovakia, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 93 ] Finland, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 211 ] -555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 211 ] Hungary, 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 115 ] -324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 115 ] Poland, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 135 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Romania, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] Yugoslavia, 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Lemberger, Ernst, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 204 ] Lemnitzer, Bill, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 71 ] Lenart, Jozef, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 53 ] Leprette, Jacques, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Lesh, Donald R., 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] Linder, Harold, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 188 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Lipatti, Valentin, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Lipscomb, Glenard P., 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 18 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] Lisle, Raymond E., 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 190 n [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 312 n [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 443 n [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Austria, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Hungary, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 115 ] -324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 115 ] Lomsky, Bohumir, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] Lowenstein, James, 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 173 ] Lucet, Charles, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] MacArthur, Douglas, II, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 202 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 203 ] Macedonia, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 486 n [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] Macomber, William, 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Macovescu, George, 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] Magnuson, Warren, 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] -136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 33 ] Mahon, George H., 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 17 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 18 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] Majsajdr, Jiri, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] Malenkov, Georgi M., 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Malita, Mircea, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] Manescu, Corneliu, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 157 ] foreign policy of Romania, 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 170 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] Soviet invasion of Romania, 453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 169 ] -458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] U.S.-Romanian relations, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 139 ] -385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] -402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 153 ] Manila Conference, Oct. 1966, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 33 ] Mann, Thomas C., 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] Mansfield, Michael, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 125 ] Mao Tse-tung, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] Margrave, Robert N., 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 207 ] Marks, Leonard, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 93 ] Martin, Doyle V., 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Martin, Graham, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 22 ] Maunula, Lt. Gen., 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 206 ] Maurer, Gheorghe, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 150 ] Maurer, Ion Gheorghe, 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 169 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] McAfee, William, 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] McCloskey, Robert, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] McCone, John A., 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] McGhee, George C., 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 61 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] McKisson, Robert M., 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 110 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] McNamara, Robert S., 12 n [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 9 ] Eastern Europe: U.S. radio broadcasting to, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] U.S. trade with, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] Romania, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 150 ] visits: Moscow, 1968, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 97 ] Romania, June 1968, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] McSweeney, John M., 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] Meeker, Leonard, 190 n [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] Mennin, Peter, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] Mermolja, Mirko, 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Mexico, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] Michalowski, Jerzy, 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 137 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 137 ] Micunovic, Veljko, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 176 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 182 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 182 ] Middle East conflict, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] -207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] Austrian position, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 204 ] Romanian position, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 158 ] Six-Day War, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] Soviet position, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] U.S. position, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 195 ] Yugoslav position, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] -518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 196 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 197 ] Mijal, Kazimiesz, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] Mikoyan, Anastas I., 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] Miller, Dudley W., 483 n [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 182 ] Miller, J. Irwin, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] Mindszenty, Joseph Cardinal, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Moczar, Mieczyslaw, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 133 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 138 ] Mod, Peter, 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Modrzewski, Franciszek, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 116 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 117 ] Moffat, Jay P., 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] Moghioros, Alexandru, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 139 ] Moldavia, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 23 ] Molotov, Vyachaslav M., 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Mondale, Walter F., 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] Mongolia, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] Montenegro, 486 n [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 183 ] Morgan, Edward P., 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] Morgan, Thomas E., 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] Multilateral Force (MLF) ( see also North Atlantic Treaty Organization ), 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] Munich Agreement, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 63 ] Munkki, Olavi, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 210 ] -555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 211 ] Murin, Martin, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 40 ] Muromcew, Cyril, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Myerson, Jacob N., 196 n [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 252 n [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Nagy, Ferenc, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 112 ] Nagy, Janos, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 115 ] -324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 115 ] Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] Nastasescu, Stefan, 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 157 ] Naszkowski (Poland), 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] National Broadcasting Company (NBC), 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 27 ] National Intelligence Estimates: NIE 12–64, 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] NIE 11–14–65, 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] NIE 12–65, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] NIE 15–67, 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 183 ] -496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 183 ] NIE 12–68, 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 26 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM): No. 304, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] No. 352, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] National Security Council (NSC): Intelligence Directive No. 2, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 9 ] meetings: 474th, 28 n [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 9 ] 590th, 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] -278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 93 ] Apr. 24, 1968, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] Emergency, Aug. 20, 1968, 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] Netherlands, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] Neubert, Joseph W., 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] Nikezic, Marko, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 185 ] Niles, Thomas, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Nitze, Paul H., 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] Nixon, Richard M., 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] North Atlantic Council (NAC), 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] meetings: Brussels, 1966, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Brussels, 1967, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 130 ] Reykjavik, June 1968, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 192 ] Brussels, Nov. 1968, 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 211 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] North Atlantic Treaty, Article V, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 91 ] Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANC), 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 120 ] Austrian position, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] French position, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, role in, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] Greek membership in, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 35 ] Harmel Report, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 130 ] Italian position, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 92 ] -269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 92 ] Multilateral Force (MLF), 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] Nuclear Planning Group, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 92 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 92 ] Polish position, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] resolution of Dec. 1967, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] -208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 67 ] role outside Europe of, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] Romanian position, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 60 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] -209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 165 ] Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe, threat of, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 23 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 192 ] Soviet position, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 211 ] U.S.-Eastern European relations, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 6 ] U.S. force readiness, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 92 ] Warsaw Pact: Nonagression Pact with, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] nuclear weapons talks with, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] readiness of, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 92 ] Northrup Aircraft Co., 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] Norway, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Novotny, Anton, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 202 n [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 96 ] economic situation in Czechoslovakia, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] political situation in Czechoslovakia, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] removal from Presidency, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 186 n [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] Soviet-Czech relations, 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] Nuclear energy, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 162 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ( see also Arms control ; Nuclear weapons ), 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 92 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] Finnish position, 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] Romanian position, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Soviet position, 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] U.S. position, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 92 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 92 ] Nuclear war, 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] Nuclear weapons ( see also Arms control ; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 120 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] Obst, Harry, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 201 ] Ochab, Edward, Oder-Neisse Line ( see also Poland ), 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 138 ] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 138 ] O'Shaughnessy, Elim, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 109 ] Owen, Henry, 343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 124 ] Paasio, Rafael, 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 209 ] Pacararu, Francis, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] Pakistan, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 178 ] Palestinians, 200 n [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 63 ] Pan-American Airlines, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 158 n [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 45 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Pan-Slavism, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 99 ] Paraguay, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 66 ] Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] Pavicevic, Miso, 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 196 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 197 ] Pedersen, Richard F., 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] Pell, Claiborne H., 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] Percival, LeRoy F., 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Peter, Janos, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 106 ] -306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 112 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 113 ] Peter, King of Yugoslavia, 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Petrescu, Lucian, 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 140 ] Petrow, Chris G., 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] Phelps, Homer R., Jr., 174 n [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] Philippines, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 157 ] Phillips Petroleum Co., 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 153 ] Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] Poland ( see also Poland and Polish subheadings under other subjects), 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] agreements with the U.S. ( see also United States, relations with below ): Claims Settlement Agreement, Apr. 1960, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 128 ] Consular agreement, 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] P.L. 480 agreements, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 116 ] -326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] agriculture in, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 116 ] anti-Semitism in, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] Austria, relations with, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] China, People's Republic of, relations with, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] democratic tradition in, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 10 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 10 ] economic situation, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] foreign aid program of, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] France, relations with, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 136 ] German Democratic Republic, relations with, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 126 ] -352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] Germany Federal Republic of, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 124 ] -345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 130 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 136 ] French position, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 120 ] Oder-Neisse line, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 138 ] liberalization, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] economic reforms, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 32 ] Soviet position, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 76 ] U.S. position, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 136 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 136 ] military situation, 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 136 ] political situation, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 133 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 138 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] events of Oct. 1956, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 57 ] refugees, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] security concerns of, 343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 124 ] Soviet invasion, threat of, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 21 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 135 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 137 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] -362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] tourism, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 117 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 117 ] trade with the U.S. ( see also United States, relations with below ), 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] export licensing, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] meat inspection, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 133 ] most-favored-nation status, 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 116 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 122 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 133 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 138 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] United States, relations with ( see also agreements with the U.S.; trade with the U.S. above), 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 12 ] -51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 150 ] attack on Polish ship in Miami, 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 137 ] claims settlements, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 122 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 128 ] cultural and scientific exchanges, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] expulsion of diplomatic staff, 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] fairs and exhibitions, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] intelligence gathering, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] -27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 9 ] International Media Guarantee (IMG) program, 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 138 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] Polish debt repayment, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 125 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] Vatican, relations with, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Western Europe, relations with, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 136 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 136 ] Polyansky, Dmitriy Stepanovich, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 210 ] Popov, Lyubomir, 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 31 ] Popovic, Vlado, 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Popper, David H., 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Portugal, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] Presburger, Josip, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] Pribyl, Jaromir, 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] Pucinski, Roman, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17 ] Pungan, Vasile, 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Quadripartite Group, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 21 ] Radio Free Europe (RFE), 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] -295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 61 ] Radio Liberty, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 61 ] Radio Study Group (RSG), 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 17 ] Radvanyi, Janos, 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 106 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 109 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] Rakosi, Matyas, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 10 ] Rakowski, Mieczyslaw, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] Rankovic, Aleksandar, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 183 ] -492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 183 ] Rapacki, Adam, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] -335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 122 ] -344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 124 ] Rayburn, Sam, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 80 ] Read, Benjamin H., 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 505 n [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Reagan, Ronald W., 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Refugees, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 93 ] -275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] -304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Renunciation of force declarations, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 130 ] Reston, James, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 18 ] Roberts, Kenneth, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Rockefeller Foundation, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 176 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Romania ( see also Romania and Romanian subheadings under other subjects ), 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 192 ] agreements with the U.S. ( see also United States, relations with below ): Atomic Energy Agreement, 1968, 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] Civil Aviation Agreement, proposed, 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] Consular Convention, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] Cultural Agreement, 1968, 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] IREX Agreement, 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] Albania, relations with, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] Austria, relations with, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Bulgaria, relations with, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] Canada, relations with, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] China, People's Republic, relations with, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 150 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] Cuba, relations with, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] ethnic groups, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 173 ] foreign policy of, 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 158 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 173 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] France, relations with, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 153 ] -419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 173 ] Hungary, relations with, Transylvanian dispute, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] independent course of, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 142 ] -392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 174 ] Khrushchev ouster, effect of, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 10 ] U.S. position, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 10 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 141 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 173 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] Italy, relations with, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] Japan, relations with, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] political situation, 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 158 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 173 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 173 ] pro-Western direction of, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] Radio Free Europe role in, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 17 ] Soviet invasion, threat of of, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] Austrian position, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] French position, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 25 ] Romanian position, 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 169 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 169 ] Soviet position, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 93 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 165 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 171 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] U.S. position, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 23 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 90 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 93 ] -279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 192 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 204 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, threat of, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] -82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia from, threat of, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 23 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 26 ] -105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] attacks on Khrushchev, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] Bessarabia dispute, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] economic relations, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 158 ] Romanian-Soviet trade protocol, 1968, 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 158 ] Soviet-Romanian Friendship Treaty, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 158 ] technical exchanges, 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] U.S. position, 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 142 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 174 ] trade with the U.S. ( see also United States, relations with below ), 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 21 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] agricultural products, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 144 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] computers, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] export licensing, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 141 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] glass plant, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] industrial equipment, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] -6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] -394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 144 ] most-favored-nation status, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] -401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] nuclear power equipment, purchase of, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 162 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] petroleum products and equipment, 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 153 ] synthetic rubber plants, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] United States, relations with ( see also agreements with the U.S.; trade with the U.S. above), 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 173 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] claims settlements, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] consular and diplomatic issues, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 139 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] cultural and scientific exchanges, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] Vatican, relations with, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Vietnam Democratic Republic, relations with, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] Yugoslavia, relations with, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 175 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] Rostow, Eugene V., 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 79 ] Rostow, Walt W., 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 211 n [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 505 n [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 518 n [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 201 ] Czechoslovakia, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] -194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 71 ] -216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 80 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] economic reform, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] Poland, 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 134 ] Yugoslavia, 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 188 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 194 ] Rumania. See Romania . Ruser, Claus W., 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Rusk, Dean, 265 n [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Albania, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Austria, 526 n [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 201 ] Bulgarian-U.S. relations, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 29 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Czechoslavakia: arrest of U.S. citizens, 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Soviet invasion of, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 80 ] -239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] -250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 86 ] -256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 90 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 165 ] -453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] U.N. action regarding, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 283 n [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 170 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] United States, relations with, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] -161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Eastern Europe, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 20 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 25 ] intelligence-gathering in, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 9 ] radio broadcasting to, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] United States, relations with, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] U.S. policy, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] Finland, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] -555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 211 ] Hungary, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 106 ] -306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 109 ] Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Poland, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 117 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 125 ] Romania: Soviet invasion, threat of, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 174 ] United States, relations with, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 139 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 385 n [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] -402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 157 ] -431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 441 n [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 23 ] Yugoslavia, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 176 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 182 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 192 ] -513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] Russell, Richard, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 17 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 18 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] Ruzek, Miroslaz, 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 43 ] Sahm (FRG), 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 61 ] Salant, Richard, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Sandru (Romania), 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] Sarafov, Dr., 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 36 ] Scandinavia, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] Schiffman, Irving I., 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Schnittker, John A., 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 180 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 180 ] Schorr, Daniel, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] Schultze, Charles L., 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 17 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17 ] Seaborg, Glenn T., 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162 ] Seebohm, Hans Cristoph, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] Sejna, Maj. Gen. Jan, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 63 ] Senate, U.S., 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 427 n [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 156 ] Foreign Relations Committee, 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 173 ] Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] Subcommittee on International Finance, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] Senegal, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group meeting, Oct. 4, 1968, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Serbia, 486 n [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 183 ] Sharek, Carl, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] Shelepin, Aleksandr N., 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] Shlaudeman, Harry W., 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Shriver, Sargent, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 86 ] Sik, Ota, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 19 ] Silk, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 31 ] Sindermann, Horst, 5 n [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Sino-Soviet dispute: Czech position, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] Eastern European position, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 10 ] Finnish position, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] German Democratic Republic position, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] Polish position, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] Romanian position, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 173 ] Soviet position, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 210 ] U.S. position, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] Yugoslav position, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 177 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Sisco, Joseph, 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] Six-Day War ( see also Middle East conflict ), 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] Slovakia, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 114 ] Slovenia, 486 n [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 183 ] -490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 183 ] Smith, Abbot, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] Smith, Bromley, 265 n [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Smith, R.J., 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] Smrkovsky, Josef, 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Snejdarek (Czechoslovakia), 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Snodgrass, William, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] Solomon, Anthony M., 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 190 n [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 153 ] Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 361 n [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] Soukop, Frantisek, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Soukop, Miroslav, 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] Southeast Asia, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 331 n [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] U.S. involvement in, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] Southwest Africa, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Soviet Union ( see also Detente; Sino-Soviet dispute; Soviet Union and Soviet subheadings under other subjects ): agreements with the U.S. ( see also United States, relations with below ): astronaut treaty, 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] Atlantic Fisheries Agreement, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 92 ] Civil Air Agreement, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] Consular Agreement, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] Space Treaty, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] China, People's Republic, economic relations with, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] dissent within, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 26 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 204 ] Eastern Europe, relations with, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 7 ] economic situation, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] ethnic groups, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 204 ] Jews, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 132 ] Ukrainians, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 26 ] France, relations with, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] German Democratic Republic, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 26 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] gold, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] liberalization, economic, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 32 ] naval forces in the Mediterranean, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] political situation, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 26 ] -103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 118 ] regional development banks, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] trade with the U.S., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] United States, relations with ( see also agreements with the U.S. above), 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 80 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] anti-U.S. demonstrations, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 107 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] cultural and scientific exchanges, 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 165 ] intelligence gathering, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 9 ] jamming of radio broadcasts, 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] solar eclipse experiments, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 92 ] Soviet invasions of Eastern Europe, threat of, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 195 ] summit at Glassboro, N.J., June 1967, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 79 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 186 ] Yugoslav position, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 177 ] U.S. policy toward, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] Spain, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 33 ] Sparkman, John, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 21 ] Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with Eastern European Countries and the Soviet Union, 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates: SNIE 11–14–68, 108 n [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 26 ] SNIE 11–17–68, 108 n [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 26 ] Spielman, Herbert, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 198 ] Springsteen, George S., 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Squire, Christopher A., 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] Stabler, Wells, 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Stalin, Joseph, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 183 ] Stalinism, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 104 ] Stanton, Frank, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17 ] Steinbeck, John, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] Stewart, Michael, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 56 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 196 n [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 312 n [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] -365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 137 ] -380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 210 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Stoica, Chivu, 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] -421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 154 ] Strachey, John, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] Strauss, Franz Josef, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Strougal, Lubomir, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 99 ] Strulak, Tadeusz, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Styles, Michael H., 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 166 n [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 45 ] Suez crisis, 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] Sulzberger, Arthur, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] Summit, U.S.-Soviet, Glassboro, N.J., June 1967, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 79 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 186 ] Sumonja, Gen., 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] Suslov, Mikhail A., 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Svoboda, Gen. Ludvik, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 203 ] Swank, Emery C., 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 83 ] Sweden, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 206 ] -548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] Switzerland, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 211 ] Symington, James, 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 157 ] Symington, Stuart, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] Syria, 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] Szabo, Laszlo, 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] Szewczyk, Zdzislaw, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] Szilagyi, Bela, 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 112 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 115 ] Szluka, Endre, 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] Tanguy, Charles R., 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Tarabanov, Milko, 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Taylor, Adm., 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] Temple, Larry E., 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 93 ] Thant, U, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 66 ] Thau, T.L., 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] Romania, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 165 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 76 ] -232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] -279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94 ] Thompson, Tyler, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 210 ] 303 Committee, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 17 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17 ] Tihany, Leslie C., 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 467 n [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 174 ] Tims, Richard W., 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 117 ] Tito, Josip Broz, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 23 ] -89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 176 ] Bulgaria-Yugoslav relations, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] -130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] Eastern European view of, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] Middle East conflict, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] nationalities problem, 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 183 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 183 ] political situation in Yugoslavia, 489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 183 ] -492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 183 ] succession problem, 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] -496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 183 ] Romanian-Yugoslav relations, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 175 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 175 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 26 ] -105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] -514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 196 ] Soviet-Yugoslav relations, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 186 ] United States, relations with, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 195 ] U.S. military aid to Yugoslavia, 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] visits: Moscow, June–July 1965, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 178 ] Moscow, Apr. 1968, 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] Prague, Aug. 1968, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Yugoslav Communism, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 183 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 183 ] Titus, Ross, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 210 ] Tobacco, 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Tompe, Istvan, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Toncic-Sorinj, Lujo, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Toon, Malcolm, 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 467 n [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 174 ] Toumanoff, Vladimir I., 77 n [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Toumayan, Alec G., 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] Toure, Sekou, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] Tower, John, 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 188 ] Trade unions, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 57 ] Trampczynski, Witold, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] Transylvania, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Travel restrictions, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 39 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] -161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 139 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 139 ] Traykov, Georgi, 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] Treasury, U.S. Department of the, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 125 ] Treasury Circular 655, 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 52 ] Treaty of Bled, 1954, 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Trezise, Philip H., 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] Trhlik (Czechoslovakia), 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] Tripartite Commission, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44 ] Truehart, William C., 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 17 ] Truman, Harry S., 153 n [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 39 ] Tuch, Hans N., 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 128 n [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Turkey, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Tyler, William R., 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 401 n [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 207 ] Tyrol dispute, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Udall, Stewart, 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 150 ] Ukraine, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 26 ] Ulbricht, Walter, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] Berlin, 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 90 ] German Democratic Republic isolation, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] political situation in German Democratic Republic, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] Soviet-German Democratic Republic relations, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 131 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 190 ] unpopularity of, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] U.N. Charter, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 197 ] Article I, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] Article II, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] Article XIX, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] United Arab Republic (UAR), 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] United Kingdom ( see also United Kingdom and British subheadings under other subjects ), 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 200 ] United Nations ( see also United Nation and U.N. headings and subheadings under other subjects ): Austria as UNOID site, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 199 ] financing of: Czech position, 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 38 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] French position, 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 38 ] Soviet position, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] U.S position, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] General Assembly, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 197 ] 19th Session, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 160 n [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] 21st Session, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] 22d Session, 139 n [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] 23d Session, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 170 ] Chinese representation issue, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 66 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 95 ] -281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 170 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 170 ] Hungarian representation in, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 113 ] Security Council: peacekeeping powers, 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 38 ] Security Assurances, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 161 ] Soviet invasion of Austria, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 23 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 66 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 283 n [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 96 ] Soviet invasion of Romania, threat of, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 23 ] Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, threat of, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 23 ] Universal Oil Products Co., 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Uranium, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 17 ] -58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 17 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 108 ] U.S. Information Service (USIS), 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 122 ] Vachkov (Bulgaria), 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 29 ] Vaculik, Ludvik, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 65 ] Vance, Cyrus, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 150 ] -412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 150 ] Varga, Bela, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] -304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 105 ] Varga, Istvan, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] Vassilev, Vesselin, 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Vatican, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Vaurs, Roger, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Vedeler, Harold C., 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 401 n [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Vejvoda, Milos, 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Velebit, Vladimir, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] Vesely, Alois, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 33 ] -139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] Czech military aid to, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 192 ] Romanian petroleum sales to, 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Vietnam, Republic of, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 33 ] -139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 186 ] Vietnam conflict, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 155 ] Austrian position, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] Bulgarian position, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 29 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 33 ] -139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 35 ] China, People's Republic of, position, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] Czech position, 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] Hungarian position, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 108 ] -310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 115 ] Polish position, 337 n [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 127 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] Romanian position, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 154 ] -422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 157 ] -431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Soviet position, 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 209 ] -550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] Soviet-U.S. relations over, 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] U.N. role in, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 130 ] U.S. bombing campaign, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 178 ] U.S. position, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 157 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 209 ] Yugoslav position, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 178 ] -478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] Voice of America (VOA), 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 17 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 138 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 138 ] Bulgarian broadcasts, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 35 ] Czech broadcasts, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 51 ] Hungarian broadcasts, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Von Hassel, Kai-Uwe, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] Vransky, Prauel, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] Wailes, Edward T., 198 n [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 63 ] Waldheim, Kurt, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 199 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] -543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 204 ] Walsh, John P., 265 n [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Warker, Peter F., 115 n [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] Warren, Earl, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 187 ] Warsaw Pact: Albania, invasion of, threat of, 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 197 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 197 ] Berlin, attack on, threat of, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 24 ] Czech position, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 74 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 90 ] Eastern European role in, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 26 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 26 ] exercises near Czech border, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 85 ] German Democratic Republic position, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 87 ] liberalization, effect of, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 10 ] meetings: Foreign Ministers, Warsaw, Feb. 1967, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] German Democratic Republic, Oct. 1967, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 158 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization and: Nonagression Pact with, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 100 ] nuclear weapons talks with, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 147 ] Pact readiness compared with, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 92 ] Polish position, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Romanian position, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 10 ] -38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 152 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 171 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 173 ] -465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 173 ] Soviet position, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 173 ] U.N. involvement in conflicts in, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 66 ] U.S. position, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 10 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 208 ] Yugoslav position, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Yugoslavia, invasion of, threat of, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 23 ] Watson, Barbara, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 22 ] West Berlin. See Berli n . Western Europe ( see also European Economic Community (EEC)): defense of, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 92 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 92 ] Eastern Europe, relations with, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 12 ] integration of, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 124 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 124 ] security of, 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 210 ] trade with the Soviet bloc, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] unity, 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 196 ] Western European Union (WEU), 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 196 ] Wharton, George, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 40 ] Wheat, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 43 ] Wheeler, Gen. Earle, 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 85 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 93 ] White, Merrill A., 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] Wilson, James Harold, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 120 ] Wilson, Orme, Jr., 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 192 ] Winiewicz, Jozef, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 119 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 122 ] -343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 126 ] Wirtz, Willard, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 84 ] Wood, Gen. Robert J., 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] World Bank. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). World War III, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 23 ] -86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 84 ] Wright, Robert B., 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 148 ] Wyman, Thomas G., 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 150 ] Yakubovskiy, Gen. Ivan Ignatevich, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 23 ] Yost, Charles W., 483 n [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 182 ] Young, Milton, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 18 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 18 ] Yugoslavia ( see also Yugoslavia and Yugoslav subheadings under other subjects ), 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] agreements with the U.S. ( see also trade with the U.S. ; United States, relations with below ): Agricultural Commodities Agreements, 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 178 ] Claims Agreement, Nov. 1964, 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Cotton Textile Agreement, Sept. 1967, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 187 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 187 ] Educational Exchange Agreement, Nov. 1964, 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] agriculture, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 176 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Albania, relations with, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 185 ] Austria, relations with, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 198 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Balkan Pact, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 24 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] British economic aid to, 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 178 ] Bulgaria, relations with, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] -130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] China, People's Republic of, relations with, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 178 ] Communist Party (LCY), 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 183 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 183 ] -491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 183 ] Czechoslovakia, relations with, 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] economic situation, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 183 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 197 ] ethnic groups: Croats, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 183 ] -488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 194 ] Macedonians, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 183 ] Serbs, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 183 ] -488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 194 ] Slovenes, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 183 ] -490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 183 ] foreign policy of, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 183 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] French economic aid to, 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 178 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 186 ] Greece, relations with, 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 185 ] Hungary, relations with, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 114 ] independent course of, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 183 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] India, relations with, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 183 ] Italy, relations with, 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] political situation, 489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 183 ] -492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 183 ] Romania, relations with, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 175 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] socialism in, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Soviet invasion, threat of, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 23 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 211 ] Austrian position, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 204 ] French position, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 25 ] U.S. position, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 192 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 204 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, effect of, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23 ] -82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 170 ] Soviet invasion of Romania, threat of, effect of, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 23 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 26 ] -105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] -524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 197 ] international communist meetings, 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 175 ] Soviet economic sanctions, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] succession problem, 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 183 ] -496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 183 ] trade, 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 183 ] trade with the U.S. ( see also agreements with the U.S. above: United States, relations with below ), 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 195 ] most-favored-nation status, 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 176 ] textiles, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 187 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 187 ] United Arab Republic, relations with, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 194 ] United States, relations with ( see also agreements with the U.S.; trade with the U.S. above), 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 196 ] -523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] anti-U.S. demonstrations, 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 182 ] bombings of Yugoslav diplomatic missions, 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 182 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 182 ] claims settlements, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 176 ] cultural and scientific exchanges, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 176 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 187 ] gold, Nazi-looted, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 63 ] U.S. economic aid to, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 182 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 194 ] U.S. military aid to, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 194 ] Vatican, relations with, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 198 ] Zablocki, Clement J., 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 137 ] Zambrowski, Roman, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] Zechenyi, Yorgys, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 103 ] Zhegalin, Ivan Kuzmich, 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 140 ] Zhivkov, Todor: political situation in Bulgaria, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] Soviet-Bulgarian relations, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 32 ] U.S.-Bulgarian relations, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 31 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 135 n [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 33 ] -139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] visit to Turkey, 1968, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 35 ] Zhivkov, Zhivko, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 36 ] Ziak (Czechoslovakia), 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 65 ] Zundritsch, Otto, 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Errata The following changes have been made to the online version of Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, Volume XVII , Eastern Europe. Please be aware that printed volumes have not been revised. Revised information is in italic. 1. Persons. Page XXV. The new entry reads: Birladeanu, Alexandru, Romanian Deputy Prime Minister The entry originally read: Birladeanu, Alexandru, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Errata Errata The following changes have been made to the online version of Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, Volume XVII , Eastern Europe. Please be aware that printed volumes have not been revised. Revised information is in italic. 1. Persons. Page XXV. The new entry reads: Birladeanu, Alexandru, Romanian Deputy Prime Minister The entry originally read: Birladeanu, Alexandru, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister